CLOSED,TYPE−D
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:92−cv−00910−RCL

LAMPKIN, et al v. DC, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff BRENDA LAMPKIN as legal guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, minors TERMINATED: 11/21/1994
Plaintiff BARBETTE FRIBBLEY as legal guardian of Ashley Fribbley, a minor TERMINATED: 11/21/1994 Plaintiff DAWN HARVELL as legal guardian of Krystal Harvell and Charles Harvell, minors TERMINATED: 11/21/1994 Plaintiff MARIA SUMMERS legal guardian of Donald Taylor, a minor TERMINATED: 11/21/1994
Plaintiff PATRICIA SUMPTER as legal guardian of Eric Sumpter, a minor
Plaintiff CHERISE THORNES as legal guardian of Kendra Thornes, a minor

Date Filed: 04/15/1992 Date Terminated: 03/07/1995 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Maria Foscarinis NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY 2000 M Street N.W. Suite 210 Washington, DC 20037 (202) 638−2535 Fax: (202) 628−2737 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Criminal Section, Tax Division Ben Franklin Station P.O. Box 972 Washington, DC 20044 (202) 514−8206 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff SADIE CHATMON as legal guardian of Aqua Chatmon, a minor
Plaintiff GAIL MASON as legal guardian of Clifton Morse, Jr. and Ashley Mason, minors
Plaintiff DENISE DABNEY as legal guardian of Dejuan Dabney, a minor TERMINATED: 11/21/1994 Plaintiff TWANA ROBB as legal guardian of Michael Robb and Calvin Robb, minors
Plaintiff NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY TERMINATED: 11/21/1994
Plaintiff IDA THOMAS as legal guardian of Montrell, Vulaina, Daneal, Shareia and Maeteshia Thomas, minors

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria Foscarinis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Miller KING & SPAULDING LLP 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 737−0500 Fax: (202) 626−3737 Email: jmiller@kslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address)

Plaintiff SHARON ALDERMAN as legal guardian of Latanya and Phillip Alderman, minors
Plaintiff DAMITA WILSON as legal guardian of Da−Nai, a minor
Plaintiff NATTONNIA ROSS as legal guardian of Tanieshia Ross, a minor
Plaintiff EVELLA WASHINGTON as legal guardian of Jerome Washington, a minor
Plaintiff JULIET STEVENSON as legal guardian of Stephan Stevenson, a minor
V. Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA a municipal corporation

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Miller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Miller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Miller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Miller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James D. Miller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Jay Blustein MINER, BARNHILL & GALLAND 14 West Erie Street Chicago, IL 60610 (312) 751−1170 Email: bblustein@lawmbg.com

Defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY in her official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia
Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA School of Law 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Room 39/301Q Washington, DC 20008 (202) 274−5400 Fax: 202−274−5320 Email: ralexander@udc.edu TERMINATED: 09/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine Chandler Wilburn OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C. 441 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001−4600 (202) 442−9840 Fax: 202−727−6013 Email: nadine.wilburn@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Jay Blustein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine Chandler Wilburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Jay Blustein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine Chandler Wilburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Benjamin Jay Blustein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff TERRY PARKER as legal guardian of Michael Parker, a minor TERMINATED: 11/21/1994
Plaintiff AUDREY POSTELL as legal guardian of Alonzo and Jovaun Parker, minors

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/20/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nadine Chandler Wilburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Evelyn S Tang KING & SPALDING 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 737−0500 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Evelyn S Tang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Stuart Quarngesser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/15/1992 04/15/1992 04/15/1992 04/16/1992 04/27/1992 04/28/1992
05/01/1992
05/01/1992

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed summons (4) issued (adc) (Entered: 04/16/1992)
2 MOTION filed by plaintiff(s) for preliminary injunction ; exhibits (19) (adc) (Entered: 04/16/1992)
3 REQUEST by plaintiff(s) for hearing on application for preliminary injunction (adc) (Entered: 04/16/1992)
4 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, upon defendants DC; SHARON PRATT KELLY; DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS; FRANKLIN L. SMITH 4/15/92 (lpp) (Entered: 04/17/1992)
5 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to extend time to 4/29/92, to response to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (lpp) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
7 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to 4/29/92, to response to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction [5−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SHARON PRATT KELLY, DC response to motion due 4/29/92 ; reply to motion due 5/4/92 ; motion hearing set for 2:00, 5/6/92 ; (N) (lpp) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
6 RESPONSE by defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH in opposition to motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] by plaintiff(s) Exhibits: 1,2, and 4−6 (4) (lpp) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
8 MOTION (emergency) filed by defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to expedite discovery (cjp) (Entered: 05/06/1992)

05/01/1992 05/01/1992 05/01/1992
05/05/1992 05/06/1992 05/06/1992 05/15/1992 05/15/1992 05/22/1992
06/03/1992 06/09/1992
06/09/1992 07/02/1992 07/07/1992 07/22/1992 08/22/1994 08/26/1994 08/26/1994 08/26/1994

9 INTERROGATORIES and request to produce documents filed by defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to plaintiff(s) (cjp) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
10 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH by Robin C. Alexander−Smith (cjp) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
11 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH of their exhibit 3 omitted from their opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction; exhibit (1) (cjp) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
13 MOTION filed by defendant DC, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to dismiss the complaint (lpp) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Royce C. Lamberth by plaintiff(s) motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] argued and taken under advisement Reporter: Theresa Sorensen (fle) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
12 REPLY by plaintiff(s)to response to motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] by plaintiff(s), Exhibits: (5), Fiat by Judge Lamberth (lpp) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
14 MEMORANDUM (supplemental) by plaintiff(s) in support of motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] by plaintiff(s) (dot) (Entered: 05/20/1992)
15 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to dismiss the complaint [13−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SHARON PRATT KELLY, DC (dot) (Entered: 05/20/1992)
16 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to motion to dismiss the complaint [13−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SHARON PRATT KELLY, DC, in opposition to response [6−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SHARON PRATT KELLY, DC (clv) (Entered: 05/27/1992)
17 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs this Notice of Supplemental Authority; attachment (dot) (Entered: 06/04/1992)
18 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to dismiss the complaint [13−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SHARON PRATT KELLY, DC, denying motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] by plaintiff(s) as moot. This case stands dismissed with prejudice. SO ORDERED. (N) (fle) Modified on 06/09/1992 (Entered: 06/09/1992)
19 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Royce C. Lamberth (N) (adc) (Entered: 06/09/1992)
20 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiffs from order [18−1] entered on: 6/9/92. $5.00 filing fee and $100.00 docketing fee paid and credited USDC. Copy mailed to Robin C. Alexander−Smith. (dot) (Entered: 07/07/1992)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [20−1] by plaintiff(s) to U.S. Court of Appeals (dot) (Entered: 07/07/1992)
USCA # 92−7143 assigned for appeal [20−1] by plaintiff(s) (dot) (Entered: 07/23/1992)
22 CERTIFIED COPY of Judgment filed in USCA dated 7/1/94, on appeal [20−1] , reversing the judgment of USDC , remanding for further proceedings. ; Opinion. USCA # 92−7143 (mbd) (Entered: 08/30/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Royce C. Lamberth : Reporter: Theresa Sorensen (fle) (Entered: 08/26/1994)
21 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : referring settlement discussions to Magistrate Judge (N) (fle) (Entered: 08/29/1994)
CASE REFERRED to Mag. Judge Deborah A. Robinson for settlement discussions (mbd) (Entered: 08/29/1994)

09/12/1994 09/12/1994 09/20/1994
09/21/1994 09/21/1994 09/23/1994 09/23/1994
09/23/1994 09/26/1994
09/26/1994 09/27/1994 09/27/1994
09/29/1994 10/05/1994 10/19/1994
10/26/1994 11/04/1994

23 MEMORANDUM (supplemental) by plaintiffs in support of motion for preliminary injunction; declarations (5) (mlp) (Entered: 09/13/1994)
24 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file a supplemental complaint ; EXHIBIT (Supplemental Complaint) (mlp) (Entered: 09/14/1994)
25 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL for defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH , substituting Benjamin Jay Blustein, Nadine Chandler Wilburn for attorney Robin C. Alexander for FRANKLIN L. SMITH, attorney Robin C. Alexander for DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, attorney Robin C. Alexander for DC, attorney Robin C. Alexander for SHARON PRATT KELLY (dot) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
26 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint [24−1] by plaintiff(s)sssssssss (N) (fle) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
27 AMENDED COMPLAINT (supplemental) by plaintiff(s) adding plaintiff(s) TERRY PARKER, AUDREY POSTELL, and amending complaint [1−1] . (dot) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE before Mag. Judge Deborah A. Robinson in chambers; reporter: not reported (bh) (Entered: 09/26/1994)
28 MOTION filed by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to extend time to 9/26/94 within which to respond to plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement the complaint (dot) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
29 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendants in support to motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] by plaintiff(s) (dot) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
30 MOTION filed by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to dismiss amended complaint (supplemental) [27−1], complaint [1−1] , or in the alternative, for summary judgment ; exhibits (20) with attachments (5) (dot) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
31 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendants to its opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction [2−1] by plaintiff(s) (dot) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
32 MOTION filed by plaintiff(s) to withdraw reference [2−1] motion for preliminary injunction without prejudice (dot) (Entered: 09/28/1994)
33 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to 9/26/94 within which to respond to plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement the complaint [28−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY; nunc pro tunc. (N) (fle) (Entered: 09/28/1994)
34 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to withdraw reference [2−1] motion for preliminary injunction without prejudice [32−1] by plaintiff(s)ssssssssssss (N) (fle) (Entered: 09/30/1994)
CASE referral ended Mag. Judge Deborah A. Robinson (bh) (Entered: 01/23/1995)
35 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT/REPORT (joint) PURSUANT TO L.R. 206(d) filed by defendant DC, plaintiff(s) NATL. LAW CTR/HOME, plaintiff(s) TWANA ROBB, plaintiff(s) DENISE DABNEY, plaintiff(s) GAIL MASON, plaintiff(s) SADIE CHATMON, plaintiff(s) CHERISE THORNES, plaintiff(s) PATRICIA SUMPTER, plaintiff(s) MARIA SUMMERS, plaintiff(s) DAWN HARVELL, plaintiff(s) BARBETTE FRIBBLEY, plaintiff(s) BRENDA LAMPKIN, plaintiff(s) TERRY PARKER, plaintiff(s) AUDREY POSTELL . (dot) (Entered: 10/20/1994)
36 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth discovery due 1/31/95 ; response to dispositive motions due 11/18/94 ; tje deadline for the joinder of parties or amendement of pleadings shall be 11/4/94. (fle) (Entered: 10/26/1994)
37 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file a second supplemental complaint ; EXHIBIT (SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT) (dot) (Entered: 11/07/1994)

11/18/1994
11/18/1994 11/18/1994 11/18/1994
11/21/1994 11/21/1994 11/30/1994
12/02/1994
12/05/1994 12/05/1994
12/12/1994 12/19/1994 12/19/1994 01/03/1995 02/22/1995 02/22/1995

38 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to motion to dismiss amended complaint (supplemental) [27−1], complaint [1−1] [30−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY, motion for summary judgment [30−2] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY; exhibit (1) (dot) (Entered: 11/21/1994)
39 SUPPLEMENT by defendants to in opposition to response [6−1] by DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FRANKLIN L. SMITH (dot) (Entered: 11/21/1994)
40 CROSS MOTIONS by plaintiffs for summary judgment ; exhibits (14) (dot) (Entered: 11/21/1994)
41 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to dismiss amended complaint (supplemental) [27−1], complaint [1−1] [30−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY, motion for summary judgment [30−2] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY . (dot) (Entered: 11/21/1994)
42 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion for leave to file a second supplemental complaint [37−1] by plaintiffssssssssssss (N) (fle) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
43 AMENDED COMPLAINT (second supplemental) by plaintiffs, amending complaint [1−1]; exhibits (6). (dot) (Entered: 11/25/1994)
44 MOTION filed by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to extend time to 12/5/94 to respond to plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment (mlp) (Entered: 11/30/1994)
45 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to 12/5/94 to respond to plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment [44−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY response to cross motions due by 12/5/94 ; (N) (fle) (Entered: 12/02/1994)
46 MEMORANDUM by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH in opposition to cross motion for summary judgment [40−1] by plaintiffs; declarations (2); exhibits (5) (mlp) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
47 REPLY and SUPPLEMENT by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to response to motion for summary judgment [30−2] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY; declarations (2); exhibits (5) (mlp) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
48 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to cross motion for summary judgment [40−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (2) (dot) (Entered: 12/13/1994)
49 MOTION filed by defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH, defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant DC for leave to file a surreply to plaintiffs' reply brief in support of plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment ; EXHIBIT (SURREPLY) (dot) (Entered: 12/21/1994)
50 RESPONSE (supplement) by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH in opposition to cross motion for summary judgment [40−1] by plaintiffs; declaration (1). (dot) (Entered: 12/21/1994)
51 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for hearing on motion for summary judgment (mlp) (Entered: 01/05/1995)
52 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : denying motion for hearing on motion for summary judgment [51−1] by plaintiffsssssssssss (N) (fle) (Entered: 02/23/1995)
53 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to reschedule hearing (ja) (Entered: 02/23/1995)

02/24/1995
02/24/1995
02/24/1995 02/28/1995 03/01/1995 03/07/1995 03/07/1995
03/16/1995 03/16/1995 03/16/1995 03/16/1995 03/17/1995 03/21/1995 03/21/1995 03/21/1995 03/21/1995
03/21/1995

54 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion for leave to file a surreply to plaintiffs' reply brief in support of plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment [49−1] by DC, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SHARON PRATT KELLY, FRANKLIN L. SMITH; directing that defendants' surreply is deemed filed as of 2/24/95. (N) (emh) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
55 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to reschedule hearing [53−1] by plaintiffs; that the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment shall take place on 2/28/95 at 3:30pm.; vacating the Court's order filed 2/22/95. (N) (emh) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
56 SURREPLY by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to reply brief in support of cross motion by summary judgment 48 by plaintiffs. (mlp) (Entered: 02/28/1995)
Case Reopened (jaw) (Entered: 02/28/1995)
57 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH of clarification regarding oral arguments held on 2/28/95; exhibit (1) (mlp) (Entered: 03/02/1995)
58 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Royce C. Lamberth (N) (fle) (Entered: 03/07/1995)
59 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting cross motion for summary judgment [40−1] by plaintiffssssssssssss, denying motion to dismiss amended complaint (supplemental) [27−1], complaint [1−1] [30−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY, denying motion for summary judgment [30−2] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY (N) (fle) (Entered: 03/07/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Royce C. Lamberth : status hearing set for 4:30 3/21/95 ; oral motion of Susan Quarngesser for admission pro hoc vice granted. Reporter: Theresa Sorensen (fle) (Entered: 03/16/1995)
60 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 3/31/95 to file petition for attorney's fees (ja) Modified on 03/20/1995 (Entered: 03/17/1995)
61 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to 3/31/95 to file petition for attorney;s fees [60−1] by plaintiffs status hearing set for 4:30 3/21/95 ; (N) (fle) (Entered: 03/17/1995)
67 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Susan S. Quarngesser, pro hac vice, in open court, with leave of Court. (mlp) (Entered: 03/23/1995)
62 MOTION filed to extend time to 4/21/95 to comply with the portion of the order dated March 7, l995 regarding homeless families on the waiting list (ja) Modified on 03/22/1995 (Entered: 03/20/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Royce C. Lamberth : motion hearing set for 4:30 3/24/95 ; Reporter: Theresa Sorensen (fle) (Entered: 03/21/1995)
63 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to extend time to 4/21/95 to comply with the portion of the order dated March 7, l995 regarding homeless families on the waiting list [62−1] . (ja) (Entered: 03/22/1995)
64 MOTION filed by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to vacate the Court Order dated March 7, l995 ; exhibit (1) (ja) (Entered: 03/22/1995)
65 MOTION filed by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to stay case as to defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH compliance with this Court's Order dated March 7, l995 ; exhibit (1) (ja) (Entered: 03/22/1995)
66 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to 3/28/95 to comply with the portion of the order dated March 7, l995 regarding homeless families on the waiting list [62−1]; directing defendants to provide plaintiffs with

03/24/1995
03/24/1995 03/24/1995 03/24/1995 03/28/1995
03/28/1995 03/31/1995 04/05/1995 04/10/1995 04/12/1995
04/14/1995 04/17/1995 04/18/1995 04/27/1995 04/28/1995 05/03/1995

documentation by 3/22/95 as to compliance steps taken to date; setting hearing on 3/24/95, 4:30 pm on defendants' motions to vacate and to stay court's order (N) (mon) (Entered: 03/22/1995)
68 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : denying motion to stay case as to defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH compliance with this Court's Order dated March 7, l995 [65−1] by defendantsss motion hearing set for 4:30 3/31/95 ; granting plaintiffs' oral motion for enlargement of time until 05/30/95 to petition for attorneys' fees. (N) (fle) (Entered: 03/27/1995)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Royce C. Lamberth: motion of defendant to stay case heard and denied; motion to vacate heard in part and continued to 3/31/95, 4:30 pm for further argument. Reporter: Theresa Sorensen (mon) (Entered: 03/27/1995)
69 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to vacate the Court Order dated March 7, l995 [64−1] by FRANKLIN L. DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY . (ja) Modified on 03/27/1995 (Entered: 03/27/1995)
70 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by plaintiffs to motion to stay Court's Order dated March 7, l995 [65−1] by defendants (cjp) (Entered: 03/27/1995)
71 REPLY (SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF) by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to response to motion to vacate the Court Order dated March 7, l995 [64−1]; exhibits (5) (ja) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
72 REPLY by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH to motion to stay the Court Order dated March 7, l995 (ja) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
73 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM in support of opposition to defendants' motion to vacate the Order dated 3/7/95 [70−1] [69−1] by plaintiffs; exhibits (4) (mlp) (Entered: 04/03/1995)
74 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to motion to vacate the Court Order dated March 7, l995 [64−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY; exhibits (5) (ja) (Entered: 04/06/1995)
75 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for leave to file a supplemental response to defendants' supplemental brief filed April 5 (ja) (Entered: 04/11/1995)
76 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH of the signed and enacted emergency legislation amending D.C. Code SS 3−201 and 3−206.3; attachments (2) (ja) (Entered: 04/13/1995)
77 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion for leave to file a supplemental response to defendants' supplemental brief filed April 5 [75−1] by plaintiffs. (N) (fle) (Entered: 04/18/1995)
78 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (SECOND) in opposiition to defendants' motion to vacate the order dated March 7, l995; exhibits (4) (ja) (Entered: 04/18/1995)
79 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting defendants request to extend time until 4/27/95 to reply to plaintiffs' second supplemental memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to vacate order of 3/7/95. (N) (fle) (Entered: 04/21/1995)
80 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (SECOND) in support of their motion to vacate the Court's 3/7/95 order [79−1]; exhibits (5) (ja) Modified on 04/28/1995 (Entered: 04/28/1995)
81 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : directing defendants to provide the court, within five days, evidence that the emergency legislation was properly noticed. (N) (fle) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
82 SUPPLEMENTAL (THIRD) MEMORANDUM to order [81−1] directing defendants to submit evidence that the emergency legislation amending D.C. Code SS 3−206.3 and 3−602−1 was properly noticed by the appropriate body within the District of

05/04/1995 05/31/1995 05/31/1995 06/01/1995 06/14/1995 06/16/1995 06/26/1995 07/06/1995 07/07/1995 07/12/1995 07/19/1995 07/24/1995
07/26/1995 08/24/1995
08/28/1995

Columbia Council's Office; Exhibits (2) (ja) Modified on 05/04/1995 (Entered: 05/04/1995)
83 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : denying motion to vacate the Court Order dated March 7, l995 [64−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY; directing that the injunction contained in the order of 3/7/95 isdissolved. (fle) (Entered: 05/08/1995)
84 PETITION filed by plaintiffs for attorney fees against DC, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FRANKLIN L. SMITH ; declarations (3); exhibits (9) (mlp) (Entered: 06/01/1995)
85 BILL OF COSTS by plaintiffs; attachment (1) (mlp) (Entered: 06/01/1995)
86 ERRATA by plaintiffs in re: amended bill of costs; attachments (2) (mlp) (Entered: 06/02/1995)
87 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendants to extend time to 6/26/95 to respond to plaintiffs' fee petition (ja) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
88 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to 6/26/95 to respond to plaintiffs' fee petition [87−1] by FRANKLIN L. SMITH, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DC, SHARON PRATT KELLY (N) (fle) (Entered: 06/18/1995)
89 MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to motion for attorney fees against DC, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FRANKLIN L. SMITH [84−1] by plaintiffs; exhibit (1) (ja) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
90 MOTION (UNOPPOSED) filed by plaintiffs to extend time to file a reply in support of their petition for attorneys' fees (ja) (Entered: 07/07/1995)
91 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting motion to extend time to file a reply in support of their petition for attorneys' fees [90−1] by plaintiffsssssssssss (N) (fle) (Entered: 07/10/1995)
92 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by defendant in opposition to motion for attorney fees against DC, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FRANKLIN L. SMITH [84−1] by plaintiffs (ja) (Entered: 07/13/1995)
93 REPLY by plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees against DC, DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FRANKLIN L. SMITH [84−1]; exhibits (2) (ja) (Entered: 07/20/1995)
94 JOINT MOTION by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, plaintiff TWANA ROBB, plaintiff DENISE DABNEY, plaintiff GAIL MASON, plaintiff SADIE CHATMON, plaintiff CHERISE THORNES, plaintiff PATRICIA SUMPTER, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH, plaintiff AUDREY POSTELL, plaintiff IDA THOMAS, plaintiff SHARON ALDERMAN, plaintiff DAMITA WILSON, plaintiff NATTONNIA ROSS, plaintiff EVELLA WASHINGTON, plaintiff JULIET STEVENSON to stay plaintiffs' petition for attorneys' fees pending settlement discussions. (ja) (Entered: 07/25/1995)
95 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting joint motion to stay plaintiffs' petition for attorneys' fees pending settlement discussions. [94−1] by plaintiffssssss, defendant, plaintiff, defendant; staying the Petition for Attorneys' Fees for 30 days. (N) (fle) (Entered: 07/27/1995)
96 JOINT MOTION by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, plaintiff TWANA ROBB, plaintiff GAIL MASON, plaintiff SADIE CHATMON, plaintiff CHERISE THORNES, plaintiff PATRICIA SUMPTER, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, defendant FRANKLIN L. SMITH, plaintiff AUDREY POSTELL, plaintiff IDA THOMAS, plaintiff SHARON ALDERMAN, plaintiff DAMITA WILSON, plaintiff NATTONNIA ROSS, plaintiff EVELLA WASHINGTON, plaintiff JULIET STEVENSON to continue the stay on plaintiffs' petition for attorenys' fees pending settlement discussions. (ja) (Entered: 08/25/1995)
97 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting joint motion to continue the stay on plaintiffs' petition for attorenys' fees pending settlement discussions. [96−1] by plaintiffssssss, defendant, plaintiff, defendant; staying petion for Attorneys' Fees for 30 days. (N) (fle) (Entered: 08/29/1995)

10/04/1995
10/06/1995 10/06/1995

98 JOINT MOTION by defendant SHARON PRATT KELLY, defendant DC, defendant DC PUBLIC SCHOOLS, plaintiff TWANA ROBB, plaintiff GAIL MASON, plaintiff SADIE CHATMON, plaintiff AUDREY POSTELL, plaintiff IDA THOMAS, plaintiff SHARON ALDERMAN, plaintiff DAMITA WILSON, plaintiff NATTONNIA ROSS, plaintiff EVELLA WASHINGTON, plaintiff JULIET STEVENSON to enter consent order regarding plaitiff's petition for attorneys' fees. (ja) (Entered: 10/05/1995)
Text not available. (Entered: 10/06/1995)
99 ORDER (Consent) by Judge Royce C. Lamberth : granting joint motion to enter consent order regarding plaitiff's petition for attorneys' fees. [98−1] by plaintiffsssssssss, defendant (N) (fle) (Entered: 10/09/1995)

 
 879 F.Supp. 116 (1995)
Brenda LAMPKIN, as Legal Guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 92-910 (RCL).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
March 7, 1995.
117*117 118*118 James D. Miller, King & Spalding, Maria Foscarinis, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Nadine C. Wilburn, Office of Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LAMBERTH, District Judge.
Plaintiffs are homeless mothers in their capacity as legal guardians for their school-age children. They seek timely provision of educational services, including transportation to and from school, for homeless children in the District of Columbia. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. After giving consideration to the filings and oral arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and for the reasons more fully set forth below, the court DENIES defendants' motion and GRANTS plaintiffs' cross-motion.
Today's opinion marks one modest step in recognition of sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court more than forty years ago. Education is the "very foundation of good citizenship.... [I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values ... and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.... [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied [this] opportunity." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 690, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
I. RELIEF
Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. The court hereby finds that defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(e)(3), (8) & (9) by failing to address educational needs of homeless children in a timely fashion. The court further finds that defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(e)(1)(G) & (9) by failing to provide homeless children with access to adequate transportation to and from school.

The original complaint requested somewhat different injunctive relief than did plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.[1] 119*119 The relief sought in the summary judgment motion is more precisely delineated, although expressed in both a broad and narrow form. First, the broader version: Plaintiffs ask that the court require the District of Columbia: (1) to place each homeless child or youth in the school that is in his or her best interest to attend; and (2) to address transportation problems with respect to the education of homeless children and homeless youths, and review and revise transportation policies that act as barriers to the enrollment of homeless children in the schools that are in their best interest to attend. Plaintiffs then narrow their general requests, and ask that the following specific injunctive remedies be imposed: (1) Defendants must identify homeless children at the time they first report to the intake center, and arrange for appropriate educational services at that time; and (2) Defendants must implement a bus service dedicated to the transportation of homeless children to and from school.[2]
The court today has granted plaintiffs' motion, and responded to selected elements of the relief sought therein. Plaintiffs shall be deemed to have adopted their current prayer for relief, in an amalgam of its broad and narrow form, as a proxy for that which appeared in their original pleading. The relief granted today is dispositive with respect to the issues raised in the complaint.
Injunctive relief shall be structured as follows: First, the District must identify homeless children at the time they first arrive at an intake center, and refer these children within 72 hours for requisite educational services, including transportation. Second, the District must offer bus tokens to all homeless children who travel more than 1.5 miles to attend primary or secondary school; offer tokens to a homeless parent or other designated adult escort who accompanies a homeless child to or from school; and eliminate any delays occasioned by once-a-week distribution of tokens at homeless shelters. Alternatively, the District may, if it prefers, provide equivalent transportation services through the medium of a dedicated bus system in lieu of public transit. Details of these directives are elaborated in Parts VI and VII below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because the parties have submitted evidence outside of the complaint, the court will treat defendants' motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, rather than for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). If summary judgment is to be denied, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the nonmovant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," summary judgment may be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

III. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs in this case are a group of homeless mothers, as legal guardians for their minor school-aged children, and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty. Due to the changing population of the homeless in the District of Columbia, the list of plaintiffs has varied; families who are no longer homeless have withdrawn from this action, and several recently homeless families have joined as plaintiffs. Defendants are the District of Columbia, the Mayor, the District 120*120 of Columbia Public Schools, and the Superintendent of Schools (collectively, the "District").
On April 22, 1992, plaintiffs brought this action against the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs maintained that the District was in violation of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("McKinney Act" or the "Act"). The District moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that there was no right of action to enforce the McKinney Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[3] On June 9, 1992, this court granted defendants' motion. Lampkin v. District of Columbia, No. 92-0910, 1992 WL 151813 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992). The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the McKinney Act confers rights that are enforceable under section 1983.[4] Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 612 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 578, 130 L.Ed.2d 493 (1994).
Plaintiffs claim two specific transgressions of the McKinney Act in support of their motion for summary judgment. First, the District purportedly fails to address the educational needs of homeless children until some significant time after they become homeless, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(e)(3), (8) & (9). Second, the District does not provide adequate transportation to and from school for homeless children, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(e)(1)(G) & (9).
Defendants counter that they are in compliance with the Act; they have policies and procedures that assure homeless students in the District access to free public education at schools determined to be in their "best interest"[5]; and the District provides greater transportation assistance to homeless students than to non-homeless students.
IV. THE DISTRICT'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
The District's relevant policies and procedures that address the educational needs of homeless children are enumerated below. Where defendants expand upon or contradict plaintiffs' version of a particular procedure, the differences are noted; but none of these assorted factual disputes are material to the court's resolution of the legal issues.
1. A homeless family first applies for shelter at the District's Office of Emergency Shelter and Support Services ("OESSS"). At that time, an intake worker interviews the applicant and determines the number and ages of any children in the family. The applicant completes a screening questionnaire and is informed of any additional documents that must be obtained before shelter availability is finally determined.

2. The family is not immediately placed in a shelter, but is given a number on a waiting list. Once the number comes to the top of the list, the family returns to OESSS. Then, if the family is determined to be eligible for emergency shelter, it enters the first phase 121*121 of the District's shelter system, the Center City Hotel. Defendants observe that the information on a family's application must be verified before the family can qualify for shelter services. Once the verification process is complete, the family enters Center City Hotel the very same day.
3. The Transitory Students Technical Assistance Branch ("TSTAB") is the designated homelessness liaison for the District of Columbia Public Schools. TSTAB does not assume responsibility for addressing the educational needs of homeless children until they have entered the Center City Hotel, or until TSTAB becomes aware that the children are living in "doubled-up" situations (i.e., a family living with another family because of financial problems such as loss of housing). Illustrative of the lead time before TSTAB assumes control: Six of the plaintiffs waited an average of six weeks prior to entry into the shelter system. At the time of oral argument on February 28, 1995, plaintiff Stevenson had been on the waiting list since October 31, 1994 — a period of four months.
4. TSTAB does not have staff at OESSS and does not provide services there. Defendants note, however, that OESSS works with TSTAB and provides educational services for families within 24 hours of the time their eligibility is confirmed. For example, if a child is having a problem getting to school, TSTAB may be asked to provide bus tokens (see numbered paragraph 6 below). And if a child is having a problem with school admission, TSTAB will help the child obtain the necessary documents.
5. OESSS assists families in locating a temporary place to stay — e.g., with relatives — while waiting for their number to come up. But the District does not determine that a family is actually homeless and thus eligible for shelter and other services until the family's number reaches the top of the list and the family returns to OESSS for placement. Once in Center City Hotel, the family is interviewed to resolve educational issues in the "best interest" of their children.
6. The District does not provide school bus service, except for special education children. However, the District does offer transportation tokens for homeless children who have to travel more than 1.5 miles to school. Tokens are distributed at Central City Hotel on Tuesday. If a family enters the shelter after Tuesday, it normally will not receive tokens until the following Tuesday, although TSTAB will help obtain tokens on an interim basis if the family expresses a need. The District's usual policy is to distribute tokens only after the "best interest" determination is made at Center City. Accordingly, unless OESSS notifies TSTAB of a family's need, tokens will not be available at the intake center. In 1994, there were no such notifications by OESSS to TSTAB. Defendants assert that the reason for no notifications is that families did not express an interim need for tokens.[6]
7. On a discretionary basis, OESSS occasionally provides tokens direct to families who bring their children to the intake center and report difficulty in obtaining transportation to school. Under a limited pilot program funded by the Cafritz Foundation through June 1995, tokens are provided on a discretionary basis to some parents of homeless children, aged

five to nine, so they need not travel to and from school alone, providing the parents demonstrate a financial need.
V. THE McKINNEY ACT
The McKinney Act was passed in 1987 in response to "the critically urgent needs of the homeless," 42 U.S.C. § 11301(b)(2) (1988), including the proper education of their children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-35 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act reflected broad congressional policy that "each State educational agency ... assure that each child of a homeless individual and each homeless youth have access to a free, appropriate public education ... [and that] homelessness alone ... not be sufficient reason to separate students from the mainstream school environment." Id. § 11431. For purposes of the Act, the District of Columbia is considered to be a state, 122*122 42 U.S.C. § 11421(d) (1988), and by accepting federal funds, the District assumed the obligation to comply with the Act's requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
Section 11432(e), captioned "State plan," contains the pertinent provisions for purposes of plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. Paragraph (1) describes in general terms the concerns that are to be addressed by the plan. In particular, subparagraph (G) requires the District to adopt procedures designed to "address problems with respect to the education of homeless children and homeless youths, including problems caused by ... transportation issues." Id. § 11432(e)(1)(G).
Paragraphs (3) through (9) are devoted to specific means by which educational, health and other needs of the homeless will be confronted. To cite the three provisions that are germane here, paragraphs (3), (8) and (9) read in relevant part as follows:
(3)(A) The local educational agency of each homeless child and each homeless youth shall either — (i) continue the child's or youth's education in the school of origin — (I) for the remainder of the academic year; or (II) in any case in which a family becomes homeless between academic years, for the following academic year; or (ii) enroll the child or youth in any school that nonhomeless students who live in the attendance area in which the child or youth is actually living are eligible to attend; whichever is in the child's best interest or the youth's best interest. . . . . . (8) Each local educational agency that receives assistance under this subchapter shall designate a homeless liaison to ensure that — (A) homeless children and youth enroll and succeed in the schools of that agency, and (B) homeless families, children and youth receive educational services for which they are eligible. . . . . . (9) Each State and local educational agency shall review and revise any policies that may act as barriers to the enrollment of homeless children and youth in schools selected in accordance with paragraph (3). In reviewing and revising such policies, consideration shall

be given to issues concerning transportation.... Special attention shall be given to ensuring the enrollment and attendance of homeless children and youths who are not currently attending school.
All parties to this litigation agree that as a matter of policy, "best interest" determinations are not made and the remaining panoply of educational services are not provided until some time after a homeless family first reports to the intake center. All parties agree that as a matter of policy, neither dedicated transportation services nor assured access to public transportation is furnished to homeless children for travel to and from school. The question that the court must resolve is whether these acknowledged policies offend the McKinney Act, and if so, what can be done to fashion a remedy.
VI. COMMENCEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL SERVICES TO HOMELESS CHILDREN
Plaintiffs declare that delay by the District in commencing educational services to homeless children violates the McKinney Act. The policy neglects a portion of the homeless population — those who have applied for emergency shelter and are on the waiting list for placement in a shelter. During the waiting period, the family remains homeless; yet the District has no mechanism for securing the children's attendance at school.
The pivotal inquiry is: at what point is a child considered to be homeless under the terms of the Act? Section 11302(a) defines "homeless." The pertinent provisions follow.
For purposes of this chapter, the term "homeless" or "homeless individual" or homeless person includes — 123*123 (1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and (2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is — (A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter....
Quite clearly, families who have entered the shelter system are homeless in accordance with § 11302(a)(2)(A). Equally clear is that families who have applied to OESSS and are on the waiting list are also homeless under § 11302(a)(1). They lack a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence. It is this latter group that the District, by its policy, ignores when providing educational services. Such a policy manifestly violates the McKinney Act.
Under the Act, the District is required to assess which school is in each child's best interest to attend, giving due consideration to the parent's request. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3). This requirement is not limited to homeless children in shelters. The District's policy thus violates § 11432(e)(9). By not making a best interest determination or providing tokens to homeless families before they enter Center City Hotel, the District has erected "barriers to the enrollment of homeless children."
The District proffers three arguments in support of the proposition that its policy of commencing educational services at the time a family enters the shelter system complies

with the McKinney Act. First, the District claims that the Act does not mandate that services be initiated when a family applies for shelter. Indeed, the Act is silent as to the exact date that services are to commence. Defendants, therefore, look to the legislative history. They cite various passages reflecting the importance of shelter placement and shelter services; and they conclude that educational services can only be evaluated in context of the overall objective of the entire statute. Furnishing educational services to homeless children is merely a portion of the services that Congress intended to offer.
By satisfying the overall goals — providing shelter and stability to homeless families — the District claims to have satisfied the various statutory components. This rather strained reading of the legislative history is both textually unsupported and illogical. The court has read the legislative history cited by the parties. Even if inclined to assign much weight to such congressional indulgences, the court detects nothing whatever to intimate that lawmakers relegated educational services to a subsidiary role in the statutory scheme. Failure to discharge the mandate to make adequate educational services accessible to homeless children must be analyzed on its own merits, not subordinated to a determination that shelter was paramount. Moreover, it is not self-evident that the District has fulfilled even the primary objective of the McKinney Act; nor may it be possible to do so without meeting each major sub-goal — especially one so integral as education. It is, in this court's view, a mockery to invoke legislative history in defense of a six-week or longer delay in offering homeless children an opportunity for proper schooling.
Second, the District asserts that its local agency has reasonably interpreted the McKinney Act's silence as to when it should begin providing educational services. If the agency charged with administering an act has interpreted it in a reasonable manner, the court must defer to the agency's construction.
[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.... [A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the ... agency.
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). But Chevron applies only to an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with administering. Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. Neither the District nor its Public Schools nor OESSS nor TSTAB has been charged by Congress with administering the McKinney Act — a federal statute which makes grants to states and imposes quid pro quo obligations upon state and local agencies. Both the grants 124*124 and the relevant authorized activities are under the auspices of the Secretary of Education. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(a). The state is charged with effectuating a plan to accomplish the objectives of the Act, but not with administering the Act itself.
Defendants' third argument is that an individual, before he or she is characterized as homeless, must meet certain income eligibility requirements. "A homeless individual shall be eligible for assistance under any program provided by this chapter, only if the individual complies with the income eligibility requirements otherwise applicable to such program." 42 U.S.C. § 11302(b)(1). Consequently, argues the District, there must first be a process of

verifying the information in the family's application for shelter services. This is a misreading of the plain language of the statute. Only if there are income eligibility requirements otherwise applicable to a program, will participation be restricted. Defendants have offered no authority, and the court has found none, that establishes an income threshold for access by homeless children to a free public education.[7]
There are references to eligibility criteria for food programs and pre- and post-school care programs under 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(1)(D) & (E). There is ambiguous reference to "educational services for which [homeless families] are eligible" under § 11432(e)(8)(B). And there is more specific reference in § 11432(e)(5) to "educational services for which the child meets the eligibility criteria, such as compensatory educational programs for the disadvantaged, and educational programs for the handicapped and for students with limited English proficiency." But the express obligation that the District "ensure that homeless children and youth enroll ... in the schools" is unequivocal and unqualified. Id. § 11432(e)(8)(A).
The court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief. Specifically, the District must identify homeless children at the time they first arrive at the OESSS intake center, and refer these children to TSTAB within 72 hours for requisite educational services while they are on the waiting list and remain homeless. To the extent that the District unearths income criteria properly applied to educational services under the McKinney Act, and if implementing these criteria would prolong a 72-hour deadline, the District may move for reconsideration of the court's order as to the specific services involved. For those families currently on the waiting list for shelter, defendants shall identify their homeless children and refer them for educational services within two weeks of this date.
As plaintiffs have observed, accelerating the timetable for identification of homeless children should not be an overly burdensome task, nor is it outside the scope of procedures that the District presently has in place. Staff workers at OESSS already decide whether families on the waiting list are homeless in order to facilitate a double-up living arrangement until the families enter Center City Hotel. The District concedes that its eligibility investigations can be performed within 24 hours; families whose waiting list number comes up are interviewed and, if eligible, placed in a shelter the very same day. Delays might occasionally be prompted by the requirement for additional documentation, beyond what is supplied by the family at the initial intake interview. An extra 48 hours should be ample time to resolve such matters.
VII. THE DISTRICT'S TRANSPORTATION POLICIES
The District's current policy is to distribute public transportation tokens to homeless children aged 5 to 18 who must travel more than 1.5 miles to school. Tokens are distributed at the shelter once each week. Plaintiffs maintain that the policy is inadequate on its face because it does not ensure that children 125*125 can attend schools in their best interest to attend. Furthermore, plaintiffs contend that tokens alone will not satisfy the statutory mandate. Younger children cannot travel alone to school[8]; parents seeking or holding employment

cannot accompany their children to school; and long commutes on public transportation have forced some children to transfer to less desirable schools closer to their shelter.
Defendants respond that the McKinney Act requires only that "[e]ach homeless child shall be provided services comparable to services offered to other students in the school ... including transportation services." 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(5) (emphasis added). Since the District does not offer transportation to non-homeless students, it need not, say defendants, offer transportation to the homeless. Plaintiffs reply that non-homeless children, assigned to schools within walking distance of their homes, do not require transportation; while the homeless, relocated to a shelter outside their school's area, cannot walk to school. In order to be "comparable," homeless and non-homeless must be put in nearly the same situation.
Other sections of the statute dispense with the comparability criterion. For example, the District must "address problems with respect to the education of homeless children and homeless youths, including problems caused by ... transportation issues." Id. § 11432(e)(1)(G). Also, the District must "review and revise any policies that may act as barriers to ... enrollment.... In reviewing and revising such policies, consideration shall be given to issues concerning transportation." Id. § 11432(e)(9).
The United States Department of Education has provided further evidence that "comparability" is an incomplete standard. In its May 1991 Memorandum to State Coordinators for Education of Homeless Children and Youth, the Department stated:
[E]ven if "comparable" services are provided, lack of adequate transportation may still act as a barrier to school attendance by homeless children. Many neighborhood schools, for instance, may offer no transportation services at all. Homeless children who attend that school and are temporarily housed some distance from it would find lack of transportation a barrier to attendance.
The Department's memorandum does not constitute a binding regulation nor a formal policy statement, but it is entitled to some weight in light of the Department's oversight authority under section 11432(a) of the Act.
Still, defendants present two possible reasons why they should be deemed to have complied with the relevant statutory provisions. First, the Department of Education memorandum notes explicitly that barriers to transportation are most troublesome for children housed some distance from their school. In fact, the District has addressed this specific problem and has instituted a program whereby tokens are made available to children who must travel at least 1.5 miles to school. To be sure, tokens may be less convenient than transportation on a dedicated bus, or walking to school; but it is certainly not incumbent upon the District to eradicate every annoyance faced by a homeless child.
Second, defendants point to 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431(3) & 11432(e)(1)(I) where, respectively, they are commanded not to "separate students from the mainstream school environment" and to "ensure that homeless children and homeless youths are not isolated or stigmatized." Offering dedicated bus service to homeless children, but not to most other

students, could conceivably isolate and stigmatize. This argument cannot be casually dismissed, although similar services for special education students would mitigate any isolation or stigma.
The court is sympathetic to plaintiffs' appeal for better access to school transportation for the homeless. Still, a dedicated bus system may be ill-advised on several grounds. It would be a complex remedy, well beyond the expertise of this court (without significant outside assistance) to execute 126*126 and monitor. Most importantly, the statutory infractions can be redressed without imposing a remedy quite so draconian.
Accordingly, the court orders the District to make transportation tokens available to all homeless children who have to travel more than 1.5 miles to attend primary or secondary school; to make tokens available to a homeless parent or other designated adult escort who accompanies a homeless child to or from school[9]; and to eliminate any delays occasioned by once-a-week distribution of tokens at the shelter.
These entitlements apply from the time a homeless child first arrives at the OESSS intake center. If the District wishes to establish a reasonable income eligibility standard to control availability of tokens, it may do so, subject to this limitation: The test may be used to revoke privileges, but it may not be used to delay initial distribution. In adopting an eligibility standard, the District should take into account that costs of a public transportation system are overwhelmingly fixed in nature; usage of the system by more patrons will likely have minimal impact on the overall cost structure.[10] The principal objectives of an income qualification should be to deter fraud and to imbue a sense of equity and fairness.
Notwithstanding significant obstacles to a dedicated bus service, the court will not foreclose that possible solution. If the District prefers dedicated service rather than assured access to public transportation, the District may inaugurate a busing system specifically for homeless children, or piggyback on the program currently open to special education students. Whichever alternative is selected, the goals enumerated above must be achieved. There must be free and adequate transportation for all homeless children who travel more than 1.5 miles to school.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Homelessness has a profound influence on a child's ability to succeed at school. In a large number of cases, failure in school leads ineluctably to adult homelessness and poverty. To help break this cycle, Congress enacted the McKinney Act, directing that homeless children be provided a "free appropriate public education." Lamentably, Congressional goodwill was dissipated by murky statutory draftsmanship. As a result, the Act may not have the encompassing effect than its proponents had hoped. Courts respectful of separation of powers will only apply those provisions of the Act where legislative intent is reliably discernible.
The court's opinion today necessarily proceeds incrementally. By requiring the District to identify homeless children at the time they first arrive at an intake center, and by expanding

the coverage of the District's program for providing transportation to and from school, the court takes an exiguous step toward a "free and appropriate public education."
The court is, of course, aware of the District's current budget difficulties. The court's role, however, is to enforce existing law, not to recast the statute to ameliorate the District's financial crisis.
A separate order shall issue this date.
127*127 ORDER
This case comes before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, or alternatively for summary judgment, and plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. After giving consideration to the filings and oral arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and for the reasons more fully set forth below in a memorandum opinion issued this date, the court DENIES defendants' motion and GRANTS plaintiffs' cross-motion.
Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. The court hereby declares that defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(e)(3), (8) & (9) by failing to address educational needs of homeless children in a timely fashion. The court further declares that defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(e)(1)(G) & (9) by failing to provide homeless children with access to adequate transportation to and from school.
Injunctive relief shall be structured as follows: First, the District must identify homeless children at the time they first arrive at an intake center, and refer these children within 72 hours for requisite educational services, including transportation, while the children are on a waiting list for shelter. For those families currently on the waiting list for shelter, defendants shall identify their homeless children and refer them for educational services within two weeks of this date.
Second, the District must offer bus tokens to all homeless children who travel more than 1.5 miles to attend primary or secondary school; offer tokens to a homeless parent or other designated adult escort who accompanies a homeless child to or from school; and eliminate any delays occasioned by once-a-week distribution of tokens at homeless shelters. If the District wishes to establish a reasonable income eligibility standard to control availability of tokens, it may do so. However, the test may only be used to revoke privileges; it may not be used to delay initial distribution.
If the District prefers dedicated bus service rather than assured access to public transportation, the District may inaugurate a busing system specifically for homeless children, or piggyback on the program currently open to special education students. Whichever alternative is selected, there must be free and adequate transportation for homeless children who travel more than 1.5 miles to school.
SO ORDERED.

[1] Plaintiffs' original complaint sought the following declaratory relief, along with corresponding injunctive relief: (a) That the District of Columbia unlawfully failed to implement a "best interest" standard in making school placement decisions for homeless children, and unlawfully failed to give consideration to parents' requests in that determination. (b) That the District unlawfully failed to ensure transportation for homeless children so that they may attend schools selected in accordance with their best interest. (c) That the District unlawfully failed to ensure access by homeless children to comparable educational services and school meal programs. These charges fall under 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3), (5), (7), (8), (9), as well as § 11431(1), (2) and § 11432(c)(2), (4). Plaintiffs' more refined version of the relief they seek, as set forth in their summary judgment motion, is limited to § 11432(e)(3), (8), (9), but adds § 11432(e)(1)(G).
[2] At oral argument, plaintiffs acknowledged significant obstacles to a dedicated bus system, and indicated that effective and timely access to public transportation would be an acceptable alternative.
[3] Section 1983 provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of ... the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
[4] Plaintiffs' original complaint also alleged that the District had violated the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That portion of the complaint was dismissed and was not challenged on appeal.
[5] Plaintiffs dispute that a "best interest" determination is made at the District's intake shelters and, if it is made, that it is adequate. More generally, plaintiffs disclaim that the District's practices conform to its professed policies and procedures. These disputes would ordinarily preclude summary judgment for either party. However, because plaintiffs' motion is limited in the relief it seeks — i.e., providing educational services to homeless children on a more timely basis; and providing access to transportation for homeless children to and from school — it is not necessary to reach peripheral factual squabbles concerning conformity of actual practices with professed policies. As more fully set forth in Section IV of this opinion, the policies themselves are what is at issue. These policies can be addressed on summary judgment as a matter of law.
[6] Defendants' counsel admitted at oral argument that families are not told they may request interim tokens.
[7] To qualify as homeless for purposes of the McKinney Act, defendants require that a family have financial resources of $100 or less, or net income below the amounts set forth in D.C.Code § 3-1008 (e.g., monthly income of $966.25 for a 2-person family). Neither plaintiffs nor defendants offer statistics on the proportion of families rejected; but it seems unlikely that a single-adult family applicant for shelter services would earn nearly $12,000 annually. Moreover, no authorization is cited for applying these cutoffs in the context of educational services under the Act.
[8] Cafritz Foundation grants have supplied tokens to selected parents of children aged five to nine. However, there must be a showing of financial need, the grant expires in June 1995, and children above nine years old do not qualify even if too young to travel alone.
[9] Tokens for a parent or other escort are to be made available regardless of the child's age. The court is unwilling to make a legislative-type determination as to which children are too young to travel alone. This decision is best left to the parent. It will be up to the District to assure that the tokens are used for their intended purpose; i.e., to chaperon the children. Parents whose children are old enough to travel alone will not likely make purposeless bus trips merely to avail themselves of free tokens. Under the court's order, parents (not the court or a District of Columbia bureaucrat) will decide whether their children are capable of traveling to school by Metrobus on their own. Under the District's current policy, when the Cafritz grant expires, homeless children ages five to nine will just be given a token and told to take a Metrobus to school. And today, any homeless child age ten or above is expected to do the same. Clearly such a policy provides a barrier to education.
[10] The court understands that the District may incur added costs to acquire tokens from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), a multistate compact which owns and operates the public

transportation system for the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Of course, some portion of this expenditure will ultimately return to the city's coffers as it shares in WMATA's revenues.

 
 886 F.Supp. 56 (1995)
Brenda LAMPKIN, as legal guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 92-910 (RCL).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
May 4, 1995.
57*57 58*58 James D. Miller, King & Spalding, Maria Foscarinis, National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Nadine C. Wilburn, Office of Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LAMBERTH, District Judge.
This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion of March 21, 1995 to vacate the court's order dated March 7, 1995. 879 F.Supp. 116. After considering the filings and oral argument of counsel, and for the reasons more fully set forth below, the court hereby dissolves the injunction issued in its March 7 order, while denying the motion to vacate the order itself.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are homeless mothers in their capacity as legal guardians for their schoolage children. They sought prompt provision of educational services, including transportation to and from school, for homeless children in the District of Columbia. On March 7, 1995, the court determined that defendants had violated the McKinney Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3), (8) & (9), by failing to address educational needs of homeless children in a timely fashion; and that defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(1)(G) & (9) by failing to provide homeless children with access to adequate transportation to and from school.
Injunctive relief was structured to require the District of Columbia (a) to identify homeless children at the time they first arrive at an intake center, and refer these children within 72 hours for requisite educational services, including transportation; (b) to offer bus tokens to all homeless children who travel more than 1.5 miles to attend primary or secondary school; (c) to offer tokens to a homeless parent or other designated adult escort who accompanies

a homeless child to or from school; and (d) to eliminate any delays occasioned by once-aweek distribution of tokens at homeless shelters. On March 25, 1995, the court denied defendants' motion to stay the March 7 order. Meanwhile, the District has taken steps to comply with the injunction.
II. ISSUES
Defendants contend in support of their motion to vacate, that the District, by letter from the Superintendent of Schools to the U.S. Department of Education, has withdrawn from the McKinney Act Education Program effective March 20, 1995. Accordingly, say defendants, there is no longer a continuing obligation by the District to provide education services to homeless families under the provisions of the McKinney Act relied upon by plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs raise two objections. First, they argue that the D.C.Code prohibits the District from withdrawing from the McKinney Act Education Program. D.C.Code § 3-206.3(a), until its recent amendment, provided in relevant part that:
The Mayor is authorized to operate an Emergency Shelter Family Program [ESFP], which shall claim federal financial participation to the extent allowable by law for housing assistance and services to homeless families with minor children. (emphasis added).
Similarly, D.C.Code § 3-602.1(e) provided:
In providing emergency overnight shelter services in accordance with this chapter, 59*59 the Mayor shall claim federal financial participation to the maximum extent allowable by law for assistance and services to homeless persons and families with minor children. (emphasis added).
Because defendants do in fact operate an ESFP, plaintiffs allege that the District must continue its McKinney Act participation for the remainder of this year, and must apply for federal assistance in future years.
Plaintiffs' second argument against vacating the March 7 order is that the court should use its equitable powers to enforce the March 7 injunction as a remedy for the past wrongs of the District. These past violations of the McKinney Act, assert plaintiffs, warrant the continued enforcement of the court's order for the remainder of the school year — even if the District is no longer obligated to conform to McKinney Act directives.
In response, defendants maintain that all of the plaintiffs are now receiving the educational services that they sought in their complaint. If so, there is no further relief to be awarded. Because this lawsuit is not a class action, defendants contend that plaintiffs do not have standing to seek relief on behalf of unnamed parties. However, one of the plaintiffs, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, is an organization whose functions include helping homeless people obtain federal and local public assistance. Plaintiffs insist

that such an organization has standing to bring actions for persons who benefit from its services when defendants' misconduct causes injury to the organization.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants' Withdrawal from the McKinney Act Education Program
In resolving whether the District is obligated pursuant to D.C.Code §§ 3-602.1 and 3-206.3 to apply for federal assistance under the McKinney Act, the court must examine the totality of the statutory scheme governing aid to the homeless. Defendants note, and the court concurs, that the emergency shelter services referred to in § 3-206.3 and § 3-602.1 are under the auspices of the District's Department of Human Services, not the District of Columbia Public Schools. No part of either code section mandates educational assistance for homeless children. In fact, the requirements of both sections relate solely to housing, to services associated with housing, and to counseling connected with employment, mental health and substance abuse. Indeed, D.C.Code § 3-206.9 states that the
provision of emergency shelter and support services in accordance with this subchapter shall not be construed to require the provision of transportation to or from an emergency overnight shelter or any other services not specifically provided for in this act.
Plaintiffs point to Judge Green's recent decision for this court in Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Kelly, Civil Action No. 93-0691 (D.D.C. April 15, 1994) slip op. There as here, the District attempted to moot plaintiffs' request for an injunction by withdrawing from a federal program. The court held that because the District was operating an ESFP, it was required to claim the "maximum federal assistance possible." Id. at 6. However, the specific federal assistance at issue in Washington Legal Clinic was the Emergency Assistance (EA) program, in which the District receives partial reimbursement from the federal government for the District's ESFP. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 201.6(a), 233.120(a) and 206.10(a). The ESFP is operated by the District's Department of Human Services; the EA program is operated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Both programs relate to housing. EA is a logical referent where D.C.Code sections 3-206.3 and 3-602.1 mention federal financial participation. The McKinney Act, by comparison, is incongruent with the purpose and design of Chapters 2 and 6 of Title 3.
Legislative history of D.C.Code § 3-206, cited by plaintiffs, purportedly demonstrates that educational assistance was intended to be included within the ambit of the statute. Several witnesses testified that children residing in temporary shelters would be negatively impacted if "shuffled from school to school during the academic year without the 60*60 stability necessary to foster their emotional growth and well-being." Council of the District of Columbia Report on Bill 7-224, at 3, July 7, 1987. The Committee on Human Services reported that an intent of the bill was to protect the "health, safety and general public welfare" of homeless children. Id. Plaintiffs construe "general public welfare" to encompass

education and transportation services. These statements are a shaky foundation on which to build an argument for legislative intent. Statements of witnesses are certainly not authoritative. And catch-all concerns over public welfare are too amorphous to commit the city to participate in every federal program that might tangentially or peripherally bear upon the condition of the homeless.
The District of Columbia Public Schools do not operate a Title 3 program. Accordingly, the court finds that sections 3-206.3 and 3-602.1 do not compel the Mayor to apply for McKinney Act assistance, nor do they embrace education or transportation services for the homeless.
There is a second basis upon which to uphold the District's withdrawal from the McKinney Act Education Program. On April 5, 1995, defendants represented to the court that the D.C. City Council had amended Code sections 3-206.3 and 3-602.1. Emergency legislation, enacted by the City Council on April 4, 1995 and signed into law by the Mayor on April 11, 1995, leaves no doubt that the Mayor has discretion to apply or not to apply for federal financial participation when the District operates an ESFP. Section 3-602.1(e), as amended, now reads: "In providing emergency overnight shelter services in accordance with this chapter, the Mayor may claim federal financial participation...." (emphasis added). Section 3-206.3(a) now reads: "The Mayor is authorized to operate an Emergency Shelter Family Program, which may claim federal financial participation." (emphasis added).
The City Council has proposed identical language for incorporation in temporary and permanent legislation, both of which require Congressional review. However, the emergency amendment went into effect immediately upon its signing by the Mayor, without the need for Congressional review, and will remain in effect for a maximum of 90 days as provided in D.C.Code § 1-229(a).
In response, plaintiffs make the following three arguments: First, no emergency existed that would justify bypassing the normal legislative process. Second, the District failed to give appropriate public notice of the proposed amendment. Third, the District must comply with the requirements of the McKinney Act even if it no longer receives federal funds under the Act's Education Program. None of these arguments is persuasive.
Standards for emergency legislation are addressed by the Rules of Organization and Procedure for the Council of the District of Columbia. Rule 412(b) defines an "emergency" as
a situation that adversely affects the health, safety, welfare, or economic wellbeing of a person for which legislative relief is deemed appropriate and necessary by the Council, and for which adherence to the ordinary legislative process would result in delay that would adversely affect the persons whom the legislation is intended to protect.
Plaintiffs assert that the amendment to the D.C.Code would not protect any person whose welfare was adversely affected. Accordingly, maintain plaintiffs, there was no emergency

and the legislation was therefore invalid. The court disagrees. The District is currently struggling to overcome financial difficulties that have imposed extraordinary burdens on its citizens and its taxpayers. While the parties may dispute whether the District of Columbia qualifies as a "person" under Rule 412(b), there can be no question that District taxpayers, who must finance the costs of compliance with the McKinney Act, are indeed persons.
Defendants have stated repeatedly that the District's financial complications underlie its vigorous efforts to extricate itself from the March 7 injunction. The emergency legislation passed by the City Council on April 4 was intended to shield D.C. taxpayers from the cost of complying with certain federal programs. In his March 30, 1995 letter 61*61 transmitting the legislation to the Council, Mayor Barry described its purpose as proscribing payment "for costs of services after funds appropriated for the services are exhausted."
The D.C. Court of Appeals has given "substantial deference to the Council's definition and determination of `emergency circumstances'.... [I]n looking at a legislatively declared emergency, we seek only to assure ourselves that the act is facially valid." American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Barry, 459 A.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C.App.1983). Exigent economic circumstances that threaten the District's limited resources are sufficient justification for emergency legislation. Id. So also is a "serious budget crisis brought on by declining revenues and increases in uncontrollable spending." Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 152 (D.C.App. 1991). Whatever harms may be inflicted upon homeless children by the District's action, the court cannot as a legal matter find that the process of enacting the emergency legislation violated Rule 412(b).
Council Rule 426 requires that public notice of intended emergency action must be given prior to adoption of an emergency bill or resolution. Permissible methods of notification include publication, mail, "[p]osting notice in a prominent place in the District Building and other public buildings or posting places," or "any other manner directed by the Council." D.C. Council Rule 425. Plaintiffs claim that the District failed to give appropriate public notice in this instance. But the District, by means of a declaration from Ms. Phyllis Jones, Chief Administrative Officer, Secretary to the District of Columbia Council, has demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the District fulfilled its obligation to give notice.
The requisite Notice of Intent to Move Emergency Legislation was provided to Jones by Councilmember Linda W. Cropp, who introduced the measure. A copy has been submitted to the court and it appears regular on its face. Jones declares that she timely received the Notice of Intent; that her office by custom and policy immediately posts all such notices in the District Building, and only in the District Building; that this custom and policy for emergency legislation has been in effect for the past four years; that it was effectuated pursuant to a directive from the Council; and that no unique circumstances occurred during the relevant time frame that would have precluded the normal practice from being followed. Due to the high volume of proposed legislation and other notices handled by her office, Jones cannot attest specifically to the posting of Cropp's Notice. Still, the Jones declaration establishes a presumption of regularity that the court finds sufficient under the circumstances.

Lastly, plaintiffs suggest that withdrawal from the McKinney Act Education Program would not relieve the District of responsibility to comply with the Act. This argument defies logic and common sense. The Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 11432(c), authorizes the Secretary of Education "to make grants to States to carry out the activities" enumerated. The District of Columbia is included as a "State" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 11421(d). Quite clearly, the Act is meant to apply only to those states that receive grants. Section 11432(e)(1) declares that "[e]ach State shall adopt a plan to provide for the education of each homeless child...." It is simply inconceivable that Congress intended to coerce every state to adopt a plan that would serve as a blueprint for the expenditure of grant funds that the state would not receive.
Plaintiffs point to subsections 11432(e)(7) and (8), where coverage is specifically limited to each local educational agency "that receives assistance under this subchapter." Thus, Congress knew how to restrict coverage when it wanted to. But for purposes of the McKinney Act, the District is a "State" not a "local educational agency." Under the Act, states that receive grants may or may not allocate portions of their grant to local agencies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11432(c)(6). Congress may therefore have found it necessary or desirable to distinguish the obligations of local educational agencies that receive assistance from those agencies that do not. Both could coexist within the McKinney Act framework. By contrast, states that do not receive McKinney Act assistance are states to which the Act has no application.
62*62 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concurs. Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 611 (D.C.Cir.1994). In reviewing various sub-sections of section 11432(e), the court agreed that the language did not specifically exclude any state. Nonetheless, the court concluded: "The language of these provisions is sufficiently clear to put the States on notice of the obligations they assume when they choose to accept grants made under the Act." Id. (emphasis added).
B. Injunctive Relief to Remedy Past Wrongs
Plaintiffs and defendants disagree about the extent of compliance with the court's March 7 order. They disagree whether plaintiffs have obtained all of the relief originally sought. And they disagree whether any of the plaintiffs have standing to request injunctive relief as a remedy for past wrongs by the District. Because the court is unwilling to invoke its equitable powers to provide further injunctive relief, it is unnecessary to reach these disputed issues.
Injunctions are generally characterized as preventive, structural or reparative. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 164 (Hornbook Series, 2d ed. 1993). A preventive injunction attempts to foreclose a future harmful act; it would be improper unless the defendant is threatening to commit a wrong. The purpose of a structural injunction is to remodel an existing social or political institution to bring it into conformity with constitutional demands; e.g., restructuring a school system to facilitate equal educational opportunities. Structural injunctions are typically used as public law remedies for serious and pervasive rights violations. A reparative injunction prevents the future harmful effects of past acts; it

requires the defendant to restore the plaintiff to a preexisting condition to which plaintiff was entitled.
Here, having withdrawn from the McKinney Act Education Program, the District will no longer be committing a wrong. Nor is there a cognizable danger of recurrence, absent reapplication for McKinney Act assistance. Nor are constitutional rights at stake. A preventive or structural injunction would be manifestly inappropriate. Arguably, a reparative injunction might cleanse the effects of the District's past transgressions, as documented in the court's March 7 opinion. The basis for issuing such an injunction is a balancing of benefits versus costs. Id. at 166. In this case, the balance weighs heavily against injunctive relief.
On the benefit side, a reparative injunction would provide the plaintiffs the very thing to which they were formerly entitled under the McKinney Act. But two facts militate against this potential benefit. First, plaintiffs' ephemeral entitlement disappeared on March 20 when the District withdrew from the Education Program, affirmed on April 11 when the Mayor signed the emergency legislation. Second, section 3-206.9 of the D.C.Code is unambiguous: "[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to create an entitlement in any homeless person or family to emergency shelter or support services."
On the cost side, a reparative injunction would be a draconian cure for several reasons. First, without a continuing wrongful act to correct, an injunction would unduly intrude upon the operation of the District of Columbia government. Second, relief would be coerced by the court in respect of parties that were not before the court. Third, there is nothing in the record that particularizes the harm suffered by each plaintiff. Consequently, it would be most difficult for the court to structure injunctive relief that even roughly corresponds to the past wrongs suffered. In short, the costs of a reparative injunctive far exceed its benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding protestations of concern for the plight of the less fortunate, the District of Columbia government has mounted a vigorous and successful legal challenge to continued application of this court's injunction of March 7, 1995. Whatever commitment the District has to ameliorate the educational obstacles faced by homeless children, that commitment has not survived its head-on collision with budget realities. Defendants have assigned some dollar figure to the cost of compliance with the McKinney Act— 63*63 apparently more than the Mayor and City Council are willing to spend on the educational services mandated by the March 7 order.
The court's task is clear. It cannot create out of whole cloth a statutory scheme to do good by the City's homeless children. The court must interpret and apply existing law. Given the District's withdrawal from the Program, there is now no law to apply. Defendants have succeeded in circumventing the requirements of the McKinney Act, thereby denying District citizens the federal assistance that would otherwise have been available. If there is to be a remedy, it lies with the District's voters, not with this court.

The injunction contained in the court's order of March 7, 1995 is hereby dissolved. SO ORDERED.

 
 Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

1992 WL 151813 United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Brenda LAMPKIN, as legal guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, minors, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 92–0910 (RCL). |
June 9, 1992.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LAMBERTH, District Judge.
*1 This matter comes before the court upon plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs in this matter are ten homeless parents1 (who are bringing this action on behalf of their children) and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty. Defendants are the District of Columbia, Sharon Pratt Kelly in her official capacity as Mayor of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Public Schools, and Dr. Franklin L. Smith in his official capacity as the Superintendent of the District of Columbia public school system.
Plaintiffs bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981 and Supp.1991) (“section 1983”). Plaintiffs contend that defendants have denied plaintiffs’ rights under Title VI of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11421–11432 (Supp.1991). For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction shall be denied and defendants’ motion to dismiss shall be granted.
I. FACTS

In 1987, Congress passed the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11421–11432 (Supp.1991) (“McKinney Act” or “the Act”). The Act is based upon Congress’ policy that state educational systems shall assure that homeless children have equal access to free education.2 Title VI, Part B of the Act, entitled Education for Homeless Children and Youth, is basically a grant statute. It authorizes the Secretary of Education to grant federal funds to states so that these states can carry out the activities that are described in subsections (c), (d) and (e) of section 11432. Id. at § 11432(a). In the present case, the District of Columbia3 received $50,000.00 pursuant to the Act. See id. at § 11432(b).
Pursuant to subsection (c) of section 11432, these funds are to be used to, among other things: carry out the policies of the Act; provide such services and activities to homeless children and youths to enable them to enroll in, attend and achieve in school; carry out the state plan (discussed infra); and to develop and implement programs for school personnel to heighten awareness of the specific problems that surround the education of homeless children and youth. Id. at § 11432(c). The relevant portions of subsection (d) state that the Coordinator of Education of Homeless Children and Youth shall facilitate coordination between various state agencies and shall develop relationships between various educational programs and providers to “improve the provision of comprehensive services to homeless children and homeless youths and the families of such children and youths.” Id. at § 11432(d)(4), (5).
Most of plaintiffs’ claims are based upon defendants’ alleged failure to comply with subsection (e). This subsection, entitled “State Plan,” states that “[e]ach State shall adopt a plan to provide for the education of each homeless child or homeless youth within the State....” Id. at § 11432(e)(1). Among other things, each state plan must authorize the state educational agency to make the necessary determinations under this section and address the various problems that stand in the way of educating homeless children. See Id. at § 11432(e)(1)(A)–(I).
*2 Subsection (e) also provides in relevant part that:
(2) Each plan adopted under this subsection shall assure, to the extent practicable under requirements relating to education established by State law, that local educational agencies within the State shall comply with the requirements of paragraphs (3) through (9).
(3)(A) The local educational agency of each homeless child and each homeless youth shall either—
1

Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

(i) continue the child’s or youth’s education in the school of origin—
(I) for the remainder of the academic year; or
(II) in any case in which a family member becomes homeless between academic years, for the following academic year; or
(ii) enroll the child or youth in any school that nonhomeless students who live in the attendance area in which the child or youth is actually living are eligible to attend;
whichever is in the child’s best interest or the youth’s best interest.
(B) In determining the best interests of the child or youth for purposes of making a school assignment under subparagraph (A), consideration shall be given to a request made by a parent regarding school selection.
(5) Each homeless child shall be provided services comparable to services offered to other students in the school selected according to the provisions of paragraph (3), including transportation services, educational services for which the child meets the eligibility criteria, such as compensatory educational programs for the disadvantaged, and the educational programs for the handicapped and for students with limited English proficiency; programs for vocational education; programs for the gifted and talented; and school meal programs.
(7) Each local educational agency serving homeless children or youth that receives assistance under this subchapter shall coordinate with local social services agencies, and other agencies or programs providing services to such children or youth an their families.
(9) Each State and local educational agency shall review and revise any policies that may act as barriers to the enrollment of homeless children and youth in schools selected in accordance with paragraph (3). In reviewing and revising such policies, consideration shall be given to issues concerning transportation, requirements of immunization, residency, birth certificates, school records, or other documentation, and guardianship. Special attention shall be given to ensuring the enrollment and attendance of homeless children and youths who are not currently attending

school.
Id. at § 11432(e).
Also relevant to this case is section 11432(f) of the Act. This section provides that “[n]o State may receive a grant under this section unless the State educational agency submits an application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, and containing or accompanied by such information as the Secretary may reasonably require.” Id. at § 11432(f). See also id. at § 11433(d)(1) (which provides that “[a] local educational agency that desires to receive a grant under this section shall submit an application to the State educational agency at such time, in such manner, and containing or accompanied by such information as the State agency may reasonably require according to the guidelines issued by the Secretary”). The application must include:
*3 (A) a description of the services and programs for which assistance is sought and the problems sought to be addressed through the provisions of such services and programs;
(B) assurances that the applicant complies with or will use requested funds to come into compliance with paragraphs (3) through (9) of section 11432(e) of this title;
(C) an assurance that assistance under the grant will supplement and not supplant funds used before the award of the grant for purposes of providing services to homeless children and homeless youth.
(D) a description of policies and procedures that the agency will implement to ensure that activities carried out by the agency will not isolate or stigmatize homeless children or homeless youth.
Id. at § 11933(d)(1).
The final provision of the Act which is relevant to this case is section 11434. This section imposes various duties upon the Secretary of Education. This provision states, in relevant part, that:
[i]n reviewing the State plans submitted by the State educational agencies under section 11432(e) of this title, the Secretary shall evaluate whether State laws, policies, and practices described in such plans adequately address the problems of homeless children and
2

Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

homeless youth relating to access to education and placement as described in such plans.
Id. at § 11434(b)(1).
Plaintiffs assert that defendants have failed to comply with Title VI of the McKinney Act in that defendants have: (1) failed to implement a best interest standard in placing homeless children in schools; (2) failed to ensure transportation to and from the school that is in the best interest of homeless children to attend; (3) failed to coordinate social services and public education for homeless children, and to ensure access to comparable educational services and school meal programs; and (4) failed to provide access to free, appropriate public education for homeless children.
In addition to their section 1983 claims under the McKinney Act, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their rights to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs state that although they are similarly situated to handicapped children in their need for transportation assistance, defendants provide transportation assistance to handicapped children and not to homeless children.
Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief. Further, in their motion to dismiss, defendants assert that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because plaintiffs do not have a private right of action under the McKinney Act for the relief sought and because have failed to adequately plead an equal protection claim.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the purposes of this motion, the court shall accept all of plaintiffs’ allegations as true.

B. Section 1983 *4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal remedy for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal laws.” Section 1983 is available as a remedy for violations of federal statutes as well as for constitutional violations. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360 (1992), the Court had developed a two-part line of inquiry for determining whether section 1983 provides a remedy for a statutory violation. First, since section 1983 speaks in terms of “rights, privileges or immunities,” not violations of federal law, the court must determine whether plaintiff asserted a violation of a federal right. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). The Supreme Court has recognized three basic considerations that courts should consider when finding whether plaintiffs assert a violation of a right. First, courts should consider whether the provision at issue creates a binding obligation upon the government, in which case a federal right would be created, or whether the provision does “no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment,” in which case no federal right would be created. Id. (quoting Penhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)). Second, courts should consider whether the interest is “too vague and amorphous” so that it is considered “beyond the competency of the judiciary to enforce.” Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1987)). If so, then no federal right is created. Third, courts should consider whether the provision in question was “inten[ded] to benefit” the plaintiff. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 430)). If so, then a federal right may be created.
Second, should the court find that plaintiffs have asserted a federal right, section 1983 provides a remedial cause of action “unless the state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement.” Wright, 479 U.S. at 418. Defendants must demonstrate that Congress has “specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983” by providing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism to protect a federal right. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n. 9 (1984)). See also Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981). The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]e do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy” for the deprivation of a federal right. Wright, 479 U.S. at 418–419 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012)). The
3

Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

Court rarely finds that a remedial scheme established by Congress is sufficient to displace the remedy that is provided by § 1983.4 See Wilder, 110 S.Ct. at 2523.
*5 The availability of an administrative mechanism is not necessarily seen by the Court as sufficient to show that Congress intended to foreclose a section 1983 remedy. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (cites omitted). Rather, a private right of action under section 1983 is foreclosed “only when the statute itself creates a remedial scheme that is ‘sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.’ ” Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n., 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2523 (1990) (quoting Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)).
Moreover, the Court has also held that the generalized authority to cut off federal funds is “insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies.” Wright, 479 U.S. at 428 (cites omitted). See also Wilder, 110 S.Ct. at 2524; Suter, 112 S.Ct. at 1376 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (in which Justice Blackmun noted that “ever since Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the power of the secretary to enforce congressional spending conditions by cutting off funds has not prevented the federal courts from enforcing the same conditions”).
In Suter, which is factually similar to the present case, the Court broke from this line of inquiry. See Suter, 112 S.Ct. at 1376 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).5 The issue presented in Suter was whether section 1983 permits private individuals the right to enforce the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628, 670–679a (“Adoption Act”). The Adoption Act established a federal reimbursement program for various expenses incurred by states in administering foster care and adoption services. Suter, 112 S.Ct. at 1363. The Act provided that states which satisfy the Act’s requirements will be reimbursed for a percentage of foster care and adoption assistance programs. Id.
In order to participate in the reimbursement program, the Adoption Act required that states submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval by the Secretary. Id. at 1363–64. The Adoption Act listed 16 qualifications that state plans must contain in order to gain the Secretary’s approval. Id. at 1364. One of the requisite features was that “reasonable efforts will be made [by the state agency] (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)).

Respondents in Suter filed a class-action suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Adoption act. Id. at 1364. Respondents claimed that the state agency, in violation of the Adoption Act, “failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal had occurred.” Id. (footnote omitted). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that the Adoption Act created a right of action under section 1983. Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F.Supp. 690 (N.D.Ill.1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, relying primarily upon Wilder, affirmed, holding that the “reasonable efforts” clause of the Adoption Act could be enforced under section 1983. Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir.1990).
*6 The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Adoption Act does not confer an enforceable right of action based on section 1983. Suter, 112 S.Ct at 1365. The Court held that the fact that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) is mandatory in its terms does not alone create a right that is enforceable under section 1983. Rather, the Court considered exactly what the Act required the states to do. Id. at 1367. The Court then held that the Adoption Act only required that states have their plans approved by the Secretary, meaning that their plans must contain the 16 features that are required by the statute. Id. The Court then recognized that Illinois’ state plan was approved by the Secretary. Id. The Court distinguished the Adoption Act from the statute in Wilder, a case in which the Court found created an enforceable right, because the statute in Wilder actually required that states adopt reasonable and adequate rates.6 Id. at 1368.
Title VI of the McKinney Act, Part B, closely resembles the Adoption Act in Suter in two ways. First, like the Adoption Act, portions of the McKinney Act are mandatory in their terms. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3)(A) provides that the local educational agency “shall either—continue the child’s or youth’s education in the school of origin ... or ... enroll the child or youth in any school that nonhomeless students who live in the attendance area in which the child or youth is actually living are eligible to attend; whichever is in the child’s best interest or in the youth’s best interest.” According to Suter, however, such mandatory language alone does not create a right of action under § 1983. Rather, the court must determine exactly what the McKinney Act requires defendants to do.
The second similarity between the McKinney Act and the Adoption Act is the fact that both statutes only require states to submit plans or applications to be approved by
4

Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

the federal government. Title VI of the McKinney Act authorizes the Secretary of Education to grant federal funds to state educational agencies so that these agencies may carry out the activities that are authorized in subsections (c), (d) and (e) of section 11432. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(a), (b). One of these activities is preparing and carrying out a state plan which must comply with the requirements that are set forth in subsection (e). Id. at § 11432(d), (e). The state plan is designed to assure that local agencies comply with the provisions that are set forth in § 11432(e)(3) through (9), the sections which contain the mandatory language that plaintiffs point to in claiming that the Act creates a private right of action. Id. at § 11432(e)(2).
Section 11432(f) of the McKinney Act provides that no state may receive grants under the Act unless it submits a proper application to the Secretary of Education. Such an application must, among other things, assure that the applicant will use its federal funds to come into compliance with the requirements of section 11432(e)(3)–(9). The final piece of this statutory framework is provided by section 11434. This section requires the Secretary of Education to assure that the State educational agencies’ applications are proper in order for it to grant federal funds under this statute.
*7 Thus, much like the Adoption Act in Suter, the McKinney Act does not confer an enforceable right upon plaintiffs.7 Rather, the only requirement that the Act imposes upon states is the duty to submit a proper application if the state wishes to receive federal funding to educate homeless children. See id. at § 11432(f); § 11433(d). The only enforceable duty that the Act may impose is upon the Secretary of Education. The Secretary must comply with section 11434 and review state plans as well as state laws, policies and practices to assure that the states adequately address the problems of educating homeless children before the Secretary may grant federal funds to each state. See id. at §§ 11434(b)(1).
Accordingly, like in Suter, the mandatory language that is cited by plaintiffs in section 11432(e)(3)–(9) does not create an enforceable right under section 1983. Rather, this language merely sets forth the criteria that the Secretary must consider when deciding whether a state’s application is proper. See id. at § 11434(b)(1). It is then up to the Secretary to determine whether the states’ applications are adequate and whether the states deserve a federal grant. See id. Consequently, the court shall grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.8

C. Implied Right of Action In Suter, after finding that the Adoption Act did not create an enforceable right of action under section 1983, the Court briefly addressed whether the Adoption Act contained an implied right of action. The Court applied the familiar test from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and held that the Adoption Act did not. In the present case, plaintiffs’ statutory claims are based solely upon section 1983 and not directly under the McKinney Act. Thus the court need not address whether the McKinney Act creates an implied right of action. Even if the court were to address this issue, however, the court would conclude that the McKinney Act does not contain an implied right of action.
In Cort, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-part test for determining whether a statute creates an implied right of action. The four factors are:
[f]irst, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
*8 In the present case, although plaintiffs are in the class for whose benefit the statute was created, it is the judgment of the court that the second and third factors of this test have not been met. As is discussed above, given the overall scheme of Title VI of the McKinney Act and the lack of legislative history on this issue,9 the court cannot find that Congress intended to imply a private
5

Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

right of action as a remedy for this statute. The only duty that Congress intended to impose was upon the Secretary of Education to grant funds only to those states which submitted a proper application.
In addition, granting an implied right of action in this case would be inconsistent with the McKinney Act’s overall statutory scheme. When read in its entirety, it is evident that the Act is designed to provide federal assistance to those states that choose to provide these programs to help educate homeless children. These grants are made only if the states submit a proper application and the decision to grant federal funds is left to the Secretary upon his review of the states’ applications, laws and policies. Thus, according to the letter of the Act, the remedy for a state’s failure to comply with its state plan lies with the Secretary of Education, not with parties like plaintiffs. To find an implied right of action in this case would be the equivalent of the judiciary rewriting the statute.
D. Equal Protection The court shall also dismiss plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954), the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection guaranties that are provided in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution are applicable to the District of Columbia through the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment essentially commands that all persons that are similarly situated should be treated alike. Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1984) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). When a law is challenged on equal protection grounds, the general rule is that the law is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification that is drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Cleburn, 473 U.S. at 440 (cites omitted). In the present case, both parties agree that education is not a fundamental right and that no suspect classes are involved. See Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 451, 457–58 (1988). Thus, both parties recognize that rational basis scrutiny is appropriate for evaluating this claim.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants have violated their equal protection rights because defendants refuse to provide homeless children with necessary transportation assistance to and from school but defendants do provide transportation assistance to mentally and physically handicapped children. Defendants do treat homeless children differently than handicapped children for the

purposes of providing transportation assistance to and from school. The court cannot find, however, that this disparate treatment violates plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
*9 Defendants are required to provide transportation assistance to handicapped children under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. This Act defines handicapped children as children:
(A) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbances, orthopedic impairment, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or special learning disabilities; and
(B) who, by reason thereof need special education and related services.
Id. at § 1401(a)(1). The Act provides that transportation is a “related service” under 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17).
Defendants have a rational basis for treating handicapped children differently than homeless children for the purposes of providing transportation assistance to and from school. Handicapped children, because of their disability, are by definition less able to travel to school than non-disabled children. Plaintiffs have failed to show that homeless children, by virtue of their homelessness alone, are physically or mentally less capable of travelling to school than nonhomeless children.
A separate order shall issue this date.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court upon plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated in the court’s memorandum opinion of this date, it is hereby ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot.
3. This case stands DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

SO ORDERED. All Citations

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1992 WL 151813, 60 USLW 2807
Footnotes

1

The ten parents are: Brenda Lampkin, Sadie Chatmon, Denise Dabney, Barbette Fribbley, Dawn Harvell, Gail Mason,

Twana Robb, Maria Summers, Patricia Sumpter and Cherise Thornes.

2

42 U.S.C. § 11431 provides that:

(1) each State educational agency shall assure that each child of a homeless individual and each homeless

youth have access to a free, appropriate public education which would be provided to the children of a resident

of a State and is consistent with the state school attendance laws;

(3) homelessness alone should not be sufficient reason to separate students from the mainstream school environment.

3

The District of Columbia is considered a “state” for the purposes of Title VI of the McKinney Act. See 42 U.S.C. §

11421(d).

4

In Wilder, the Court noted that it has found that Congress’s remedial scheme was sufficient to displace section 1983

only on two occasions. In Sea Clammers, the Court held that the enforcement scheme that was created in the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., demonstrated congressional intent to foreclose the

section 1983 remedy because it granted the Environmental Protection Agency considerable enforcement power

through the use of noncompliance orders, civil suits, criminal penalties and two citizen-suit provisions. Sea

Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13. In the other case, Smith v. Robinson, the Court held that the administrative scheme set

forth in the Education of the Handicapped Act, which contained a “carefully tailored administrative and judicial

mechanism” foreclosed section 1983 as a remedy. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).

5

In his dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that “the Court reache [d] its conclusion without even stating, much less

applying, the principles our precedents have used to determine whether a statute has created a right enforceable

under § 1983.” Suter, 112 S.Ct. at 1371.

6

The Court also held that the “reasonable efforts” clause in § 671(a)(15) of the Adoption Act does not confer an

enforceable right upon the Adoption Act’s beneficiaries, but rather “it impose[s] only a generalized duty on the

State, to be enforced not by private individuals, but by the Secretary....” Suter, 112 S.Ct. at 1368–69.

7

Due to the similarity between the McKinney Act in the present case and the Adoption Act in Suter, the court shall

follow the analysis that the Supreme Court applied in Suter. Accordingly, the court does not reach on the issue of

whether Title VI of the McKinney Act would create an enforceable right of action pursuant to section 1983 under the

Supreme Court’s pre-Suter jurisprudence.

8

Since the court shall grant defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs do not have a right of action

under section 1983, the court need not pass on whether defendants have actually complied with the McKinney Act.

9

The parties have not cited, and the court has not uncovered, any legislative history that is relevant to this inquiry.

7

Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)
End of Document
8

 
 27 F.3d 605 (1994)
Brenda LAMPKIN, As Legal Guardian of Jessica Lampkin and Christine Lampkin, Minors, et al., Appellants, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A Municipal Corporation, et al., Appellees.
No. 92-7143.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued October 21, 1993. Decided July 1, 1994.
As Amended July 28, 1994.
Kerrie C. Dent, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were James D. Miller, Maria Foscarinis, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Washington, DC.
Donna M. Murasky, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were John Payton, Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC.
Deborah E. Greenspan and Gary Thompson, Washington, DC, were on the brief for amici curiae U.S. Representatives Thomas Foglietta, George Miller, Tom Lantos, Louise Slaughter, and Jolene Unsoeld.
606*606 Before EDWARDS, BUCKLEY, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge:
Parents of homeless children residing in the District of Columbia seek to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act. Concluding that the McKinney Act does not confer enforceable educational rights on homeless children, the district court granted the District of Columbia's motion to dismiss. Because we disagree with the district court's interpretation of the governing Supreme Court case law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. INTRODUCTION

The McKinney Act, Pub.L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11301 et seq. (West Supp.1993)), was passed in 1987 in response to "the critically urgent needs of the homeless," 42 U.S.C. § 11301(b)(2) (1988), including the proper education of their children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-35 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act is a mix of large visions and gritty detail, combining specific sections dealing with the provision of education to homeless children and youths with a broad congressional policy that "each State educational agency ... assure that each child of a homeless individual and each homeless youth have access to a free, appropriate public education ... [and that] homelessness alone ... not be sufficient reason to separate students from the mainstream school environment." Id. § 11431.
To achieve this goal, the Secretary of Education is empowered to grant funds to States participating in the programs authorized by the McKinney Act. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(a) (1988). Grants may be used, among other purposes, to "establish or designate an Office of Coordinator of Education of Homeless Children and Youth" and to "prepare and carry out the State plan described in subsection (e) of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 11432(c)(3) & (4) (Supp. IV 1992). Subsection (d) defines the functions of the Coordinator, which include the duty to "develop and carry out the State plan" and to "facilitate coordination" between state agencies and others providing assistance to homeless children and their families. Id. § 11432(d)(2) & (4).
Subsection (e), which is captioned "State plan," consists of nine paragraphs that may be divided into three parts. The first consists of paragraph (1) and its nine subparagraphs. These describe in general terms the concerns that are to be addressed by the plan: e.g., establishment of procedures for the resolution of disputes regarding the educational placement of homeless children and youths, assurance of their ability to participate in food programs, and undertaking to protect them from being isolated or stigmatized. Id. § 11432(e)(1)(A)-(I). The second part, paragraph (2), requires that the state plan assure, to the extent feasible under state law, "that local educational agencies within the State will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (3) through (9)." Id. § 11432(e)(2).
Paragraphs (3) through (9), which comprise the third part of subsection (e), are devoted to the "gritty details"—the specific means by which the educational, health, and other needs of the Act's beneficiaries will be addressed. To cite three examples that are germane here, paragraphs (3), (5), and (7) read in relevant part as follows:
(3)(A) The local educational agency of each homeless child and each homeless youth shall either — (i) continue the child's or youth's education in the school of origin — (I) for the remainder of the academic year; or (II) in any case in which a family becomes homeless between academic years, for the following academic year; or (ii) enroll the child or youth in any school that nonhomeless students who live in the attendance area in which the child or youth is actually living are eligible to attend; 607*607 whichever is in the child's best interest or the youth's best interest.

(B) In determining the best interests of the child or youth for purposes of making a school assignment under subparagraph (A), consideration shall be given to a request made by a parent regarding school selection. . . . . . (5) Each homeless child shall be provided services comparable to services offered to other students in the school selected according to the provisions of paragraph (3), including transportation services ...; and school meals programs. . . . . . (7) Each local educational agency serving homeless children or youth that receives assistance under this subchapter shall coordinate with local social services agencies, and other agencies or programs providing services to such children or youth and their families.
Id. § 11432(e)(3), (5) & (7).
Appellants here are homeless children living in the District of Columbia, which is deemed a State for purposes of the McKinney Act. 42 U.S.C. § 11421(d) (1988). They filed this action in the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), which provides a cause of action against persons who infringe upon federal constitutional or statutory rights while acting "under color" of state law. Appellants allege that the District has violated section 11432(e)(3), (5), (7), (8) and (9), as well as sections 11431(1), (2) and 11432(c)(2), (4). They seek an order requiring, among other things, that the District consider parents' requests and make "best interests" determinations when placing homeless children in schools; that it assure homeless children the transportation necessary to attend those schools; and that it ensure them access to various educational and school meal programs, and other services.
The district court found that the McKinney Act did not create an enforceable right of action under section 1983 and dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Lampkin v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 92-0910, slip op. at 14-15, 1992 WL 151813 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992). Thus the sole question before us on appeal is whether the homeless children can enforce the relevant provisions of the McKinney Act pursuant to section 1983, a question we answer in the affirmative.
II. DISCUSSION
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has recognized that section 1983 may be invoked to challenge violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2505-07, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). This rule has its exceptions: A statute will not be deemed enforceable under section 1983 if Congress did not intend to create any enforceable rights in it (which may be evidenced by the provision of a comprehensive remedial scheme in the statute itself) and where the statute "did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983." Wright v. Roanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). These exceptions are more easily stated than applied, as will be apparent from the Supreme Court's recent decisions

in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990), and Suter v. Artist M., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).
A. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association
In Wilder, the plaintiffs challenged the method by which the State of Virginia reimbursed health care providers under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1988). In particular, the Court faced the question
whether the Boren Amendment to the Act, which requires reimbursement according to rates that a "State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities," is enforceable in an action pursuant to § 1983.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 501-02, 110 S.Ct. at 2513-14 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)).
608*608 Drawing on its decision in Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989), the Court established a test to determine whether a statutory provision creates a federal right enforceable under section 1983. First, the provision must have been intended to benefit the putative plaintiff. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. If it was so intended,
the provision creates an enforceable right unless it [1] reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit ... or [2] unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once it has been determined that an enforceable right exists, the statute must be examined to determine whether "Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770. In applying this test to the Boren Amendment, the Court stated that there was little doubt that health care providers were its intended beneficiaries. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. The Court then reasoned that as the amendment was "cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms," it "imposes a binding obligation on States participating in the Medicaid program to adopt reasonable and adequate rates and ... is enforceable under § 1983 by health care providers." Id. at 512, 110 S.Ct. at 2518.
This interpretation, which gives substantive teeth to the reimbursement provision contained in the Medicaid Act, was criticized by the dissenting justices. See id., 496 U.S. at 524, 110 S.Ct. at 2525 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.). The dissenters agreed that a signatory State was obligated to follow a particular process in providing some level of reimbursement to health care providers but concluded that the exact level of reimbursement was left to the discretion of the States. Id. at 527-28, 110 S.Ct. at 2526-27. The majority disagreed, holding that "the only plausible interpretation of the amendment is that by requiring a State to find that its rates are reasonable and adequate, the statute imposes the concomitant obligation to adopt reasonable and adequate

rates." Id. at 514-15, 110 S.Ct. at 2519-21 (emphasis in original). The majority also rejected the argument that the obligation imposed by the amendment was too "vague and amorphous" to be judicially enforceable. Id. at 519, 110 S.Ct. at 2522. Citing the guidance set forth in the statute and accompanying regulations, including "the objective benchmark of an `efficiently and economically operated facility' providing care in compliance with federal and state standards while at the same time ensuring `reasonable access' to eligible participants," the majority concluded that while the statute grants the States "substantial discretion," it does not foreclose judicial review. Id.
Turning to the second prong of the inquiry, the majority concluded that Congress had not foreclosed enforcement of the Medicaid Act under section 1983. It found that "the Act [did] not expressly preclude resort to § 1983"; nor did it "create[] a remedial scheme that is `sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.'" Id. at 521, 110 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981)). In the eyes of the Court, the Act's grant of authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services "to withhold approval of plans" or "to curtail federal funds to States whose plans are not in compliance with the Act" was not "sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent to withdraw the private remedy of § 1983." Id., 496 U.S. at 521-22, 110 S.Ct. at 2523-24.
B. Suter v. Artist M.
Two years later, the Court again addressed the availability of the section 1983 remedy. In Suter v. Artist M., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), the Court was called upon to determine whether a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79a (1988), could be 609*609 enforced under section 1983. Under the Child Welfare Act, States seeking federal reimbursement of "a percentage of foster care and adoption assistance payments" "must submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval." Suter, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1363. To be approved, a plan must meet sixteen requirements, the following among them:
[I]n each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home....
Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1364 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (emphasis added)). In Suter, the plaintiffs sought to use section 1983 as the procedural vehicle to obtain substantive enforcement of this "reasonable efforts" provision.
In examining the nature of the obligations created by the Child Welfare Act, the Court observed that
[t]he legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power ... rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." ... [I]f

Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.
Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1366 (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1539, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981)). Thus the critical inquiry in Suter was whether, "in light of the entire legislative enactment," the Child Welfare Act "unambiguously confer[red] upon [its] beneficiaries ... a right to enforce the requirement that the State make `reasonable efforts' to prevent a child from being removed from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his family." Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1367.
The Court began its inquiry with the statutory language — "reasonable efforts will be made" — and noted that it was "mandatory in its terms." Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1367. Nonetheless, the Court's central focus was on what action was required of a State in exchange for the grant of federal funds:
Here, the terms of § 671(a) are clear: "In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary." Therefore the [Child Welfare] Act does place a requirement on the States, but that requirement only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary which contains the 16 listed features.
Id. (footnote omitted). Because the State's sole obligation was to submit a plan for the Secretary's approval, the Court concluded that section 1983 could not be invoked.
In so holding, the Court emphasized that each statute is to be interpreted on its own terms. Id., at ___ n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 1367 n. 8 ("our holding today ... merely counsels that each statute must be interpreted by its own terms."). The Court distinguished Wilder on the grounds that
in that case we held that the Boren Amendment actually required the States to adopt reasonable and adequate rates, and that this obligation was enforceable by the [health care] providers. We relied in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates.
Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. The Court then contrasted the Child Welfare Act, where "[n]o further statutory guidance is found as to how `reasonable efforts' are to be measured." Id. Similarly, no regulatory provision evidenced "any requirement for state receipt of federal funds other than the requirement that the State submit a plan to be approved by the Secretary." Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1369 (footnote omitted). The Court thus concluded that the directive to use reasonable efforts was so open-ended, and the resulting state discretion so broad, that judicial enforcement was an impossibility.
In foreclosing private enforcement of the Child Welfare Act's "reasonable efforts" clause, the Court noted that the Act contained alternative mechanisms for its enforcement. These included the provisions, in subsection 671(b), that allowed the Secretary

to reduce or eliminate payments to a State on finding that the State's plan no longer complies with § 671(a) or that "there is a 610*610 substantial failure" in the administration of a plan such that the State is not complying with its own plan.
Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. The Court also referred to a provision conditioning federal reimbursement of foster care payments made with respect to a child involuntarily removed from his home on "`a judicial determination to the effect that continuation [in the child's home] would be contrary to the welfare of such child.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1)). The Court concluded from these provisions that "the absence of a remedy to private plaintiffs under § 1983 does not make the reasonable efforts clause a dead letter." Id., at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1369 (footnote omitted).
C. Private Enforcement of the McKinney Act
In applying this jurisprudence to the McKinney Act, the first question to ask is whether the statute was intended to benefit persons such as appellants' children. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517; Suter, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1367. This point is not in dispute here: The parties all agree that the McKinney Act was enacted to benefit homeless children. See 42 U.S.C. § 11431. That said, we must hold that the Act "creates an enforceable right unless it reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). Mindful of the need "to analyze the statutory provisions in detail, in light of the entire legislative enactment, to determine whether the language in question create[s] enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983," Suter, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1367 (internal quotation marks omitted), we must determine whether the Act creates rights that are substantively enforceable under section 1983.
Section 11432(f) of the McKinney Act provides:
No State may receive a grant under this section unless the state educational agency submits an application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, and containing or accompanied by such information as the Secretary may reasonably require.
42 U.S.C. § 11432(f) (1988). The regulations issued by the Secretary stipulate that a State may not begin to obligate funds received pursuant to a federal grant until the later of the two following dates: "[t]he date that the State plan is mailed or hand delivered to the Secretary in substantially approvable form" and "[t]he date that the funds are first available for obligation by the Secretary." 34 C.F.R. § 76.703(a)(1) & (2). The regulations further stipulate that a State
shall comply with the State plan and applicable statutes, regulations, and approved applications, and shall use Federal funds in accordance with those statutes, regulations, plan, and applications.

Id. at § 76.700. Here, of course, the "applicable statute[]" is the McKinney Act, and the obligations it imposes on participating States are clear. The Act requires that grants provided by the Secretary be used, inter alia, "to prepare and carry out the State plan," 42 U.S.C. § 11432(c)(4), and that "[e]ach plan ... assure ... that local educational agencies within the State will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (3) through (9)," id. at § 11432(e)(2). Paragraphs (3) through (9) in turn provide highly specific instructions for meeting a variety of needs of homeless children and youths. This structure markedly contrasts with that of the Child Welfare Act, with which the Suter Court was concerned. Although both Acts describe in detail the contents of the plan a participating State must adopt, only the McKinney Act provides specific directions for the plan's execution. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e). It is this distinction that is ignored by our dissenting colleague, who concludes that "the genuine statutory duty of a recipient state under the McKinney Act is to prepare and carry out a plan, designed to achieve nine designated goals." Dissent at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). While we agree that the McKinney Act requires the State to submit such a plan, it also differs significantly from the Adoption Act in that paragraphs (3) through (9) of subsection 611*611 11432(e) of the McKinney Act not only inform the State in great detail on how its plan is to be implemented, they impose obligations that are independent of the plan. These are set forth in specific, mandatory terms; and it is these that appellants seek to enforce. Thus, paragraph (3) requires that
[t]he local educational agency of each homeless child and each homeless youth shall [assign the child or youth to a school which] is in the child's best interest or the youth's best interest.... In determining the best interests of the child or youth ... consideration shall be given to a request made by a parent regarding school selection.
Id. § 11432(e)(3) (emphasis added). Succeeding paragraphs stipulate that "[e]ach homeless child shall be provided services comparable to services offered to other students in the school ...," id. § 11432(e)(5) (emphasis added), and that records ordinarily kept by the school "shall be maintained" so as to be available when the child enters a new school district. Id. § 11432(e)(6) (emphasis added). Furthermore, they provide that
[e]ach local educational agency serving homeless children or youth that receives assistance under this subchapter shall coordinate with local social services agencies, and other agencies or programs providing services to such children or youth and their families[,]
id. § 11432(e)(7) (emphasis added), and "shall designate a homelessness liaison." Id. § 11432(e)(8) (emphasis added). We read this language as "mandatory rather than hortatory." This interpretation is supported by paragraph (2), which describes paragraphs (3) through (9) as "requirements" rather than options. Id. § 11432(e)(2).
In addition to the mandatory obligations listed in those seven paragraphs, the McKinney Act also provides that
[t]he Coordinator of Education of Homeless Children and Youth established in each State shall ... once every 2 years, gather data on the number and location of homeless children and youth in the State ... develop and carry out the State plan ... [and] facilitate

coordination between the State education agency, the State social services agency, and other agencies providing services to homeless children and youth and their families.
Id. § 11432(d). The language of these provisions is sufficiently clear to put the States on notice of the obligations they assume when they choose to accept grants made under the Act. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1539, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) ("if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously" (footnote omitted)).
Moreover, as we noted earlier, the Secretary has promulgated regulations stipulating that for state-administered programs like the McKinney Act, "[a] State ... shall comply with the State plan and applicable statutes, regulations, and approved applications, and shall use Federal funds in accordance with those statutes, regulations, plan, and applications." 34 C.F.R. § 76.700. Contrast Suter, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1369 (noting that the regulations accompanying the Child Welfare Act "do not evidence a view that [the statute] places any requirement for state receipt of federal funds other than the requirement that the State submit a plan to be approved by the Secretary" (footnote omitted)). Here, the regulations merely reinforce our conclusion that States undertake well-defined obligations when they elect to accept funds under the McKinney Act.
Finally, the McKinney Act contains no statutory mechanisms for the administrative enforcement of the beneficiaries' rights, suggesting that Congress did not intend to foreclose a private cause of action that is enforceable under section 1983. See, Suter, 112 S.Ct. at 1368-69 (citing alternative enforcement mechanisms provided by sections 671(b) and 672(a)(1) of the Child Welfare Act as showing that "the absence of a remedy to private plaintiffs under § 1983 does not make the reasonable efforts clause a dead letter" (footnote omitted)). Thus there is nothing in the structure of the McKinney Act to suggest that its beneficiaries may not invoke section 1983 to enforce their rights under the Act.
612*612 One hurdle remains before we can declare that the rights conferred on homeless children by the Act are enforceable in federal court. Even if a statute confers rights on a beneficiary, their judicial enforcement requires that they not be overly "vague and amorphous." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519, 110 S.Ct. at 2522 (internal quotation marks omitted). The District argues that the statutory requirement that a school be selected in accordance with the "best interests" of a homeless child is at least as vague as the "reasonable efforts" clause that the Court found too amorphous in Suter. See New York v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2445, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (Justice White, concurring in part, dissenting in part, describing Suter as "not permitting a § 1983 suit under a Spending Clause statute when the ostensible federal right created was too vague and amorphous").
This argument asserts, in essence, that the judiciary is incapable of determining the "best interests" of children, just as the plaintiffs in Wilder argued that the judiciary was incapable of determining what constitutes "reasonable and adequate" hospital rates. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519, 110 S.Ct. at 2522. In response, the Court observed:
That the [Boren] [A]mendment gives the States substantial discretion in choosing among reasonable methods of calculating rates may affect the standard under which a court

reviews whether the rates comply with the amendment, but it does not render the amendment unenforceable by a court. While there may be a range of reasonable rates, there certainly are some rates outside that range that no State could ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act. Although some knowledge of the hospital industry might be required to evaluate a State's findings with respect to the reasonableness of its rates, such an inquiry is well within the competence of the Judiciary.
Id. at 519-20, 110 S.Ct. at 2522-23 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
The obligations imposed by the McKinney Act involve, for the most part, the exercise of judgment by a local educational agency. A court, however, may discern whether the criteria or procedures adopted by the agency are reasonably designed to aid it in making the school placement decision. Moreover, we have little doubt that the court would also have the competence to determine whether the District had complied with its obligation to assign a particular homeless child to a school that was in his best interests.
In recent years, the courts of this circuit have frequently been called upon to determine whether the District of Columbia public school system had met a comparable obligation under the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1988), which requires participating States to assure handicapped children of an "appropriate education." See, e.g., Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Public Schools, 931 F.2d 84 (D.C.Cir.1991); Knight by Knight v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1025 (D.C.Cir.1989). Although the criteria and procedures set forth in the Education for the Handicapped Act are more detailed than those in the McKinney Act, the ultimate determination made under that Act — that the handicapped child's education is "appropriate" to his needs — is no less vague or amorphous than the one at issue here. As in Kerkam and Knight, should a dispute arise between the educational agency and the parents of the homeless child as to whether the school to which the child has been assigned is in his best interest, a court is clearly competent to consider the testimony of opposing witnesses and to decide whether the agency's determination of the child's best interest was reasonable.
We conclude, from the foregoing, that section 11432(e)(3) of the McKinney Act confers enforceable rights on its beneficiaries and that appellants may invoke section 1983 to enforce those rights.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's order granting the District's motion to dismiss and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
So ordered.
613*613 SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court's conclusion that the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq. (1988), creates a federal right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. I do so recognizing that the question is a close one, though in my mind it should not be. That is, I agree with Justice Powell that the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), by holding "almost casually, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations ... of any federal statutory right" distorted the Civil Rights Act far beyond any support in its then already lengthy history. 448 U.S. at 11, 100 S.Ct. at 2508 (Powell, J., dissenting, for himself, Chief Justice Burger and thenJustice Rehnquist). That said, I of course recognize that it is not within our compass to pick and choose which Supreme Court opinions we follow. Nonetheless, in my view, the district court reached the proper result and I would affirm.
Although the Supreme Court has counseled us that in the post-Thiboutot framework of § 1983 interpretation "each statute must be interpreted by its own terms," Suter v. Artist M., ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1367 n. 8, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), obviously, the high court's prior interpretations of other statutes instructs our interpretation of the present one. In Suter, as the majority points out today, the Supreme Court found no right enforceable under § 1983 in the Child Welfare Act. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990), the Supreme Court did find such a right in the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act. The majority opinion today does a commendable job of cataloging the similarities and differences between the two cases and I will not rehash them. I do not disagree with the majority's summary of either case, only with its conclusion as to the side upon which the McKinney Act falls.
As the majority notes, the Suter decision was based at least in part upon the conclusion "that the [statutory] directive to use reasonable efforts was so open-ended, and the resulting state discretion so broad, that judicial enforcement was an impossibility." Maj. op. at 609. That is to say, whatever other grounds may exist for denying judicial enforcement to statutorily-created federal "rights" under § 1983, the "judicial enforcement" of such rights "requires that they not be overly `vague and amorphous.'" Maj. op. at 612 (quoting Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519, 110 S.Ct. at 2522). Therefore, for us to undertake judicial enforcement of rights under the McKinney Act presupposes an ability by the federal courts to carry out for the recalcitrant state the duty of determining school assignments in the "best interests" of children and youths. To me this is no less vague and amorphous than the "reasonable efforts" language which the Supreme Court in Suter held insufficient to create such an enforceable right.
Certainly the majority is correct that in other circumstances courts must determine the "best interests" of particular children. However, the usual exercise of judicial wisdom in pursuit of the "best interests" of a particular child is just that — a particularized one. Here, the courts would be called upon to make programmatic decisions not as to the best interest of a particular child, but as to how a grant-augmented state program should be designed to meet the needs of groups of particularized children. The programmatic operation of a state agency is not within the judicial competence.
Finally, it appears to me that the genuine statutory duty of a recipient state under the McKinney Act is to "prepare and carry out" a plan, "designed to" achieve nine designated goals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(c)(4) & 11432(e)(1). Given the amorphousness of the "designed to" mandate, I do not see how this differs in a controlling way from the Adoption Act

construed in Suter. There the Court held that statute did not create a right enforceable under § 1983 because it did not "place[] any requirement for state receipt of federal funds other than the requirement that the State submit a plan to be approved by the Secretary." Suter, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1369. The mandating paragraphs of the McKinney Act listed by the majority do not change this. The Adoption Act also contained descriptions of the relevant 614*614 plan. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 671 provided a description of the required plan approximately as detailed, and with as many uses of mandatory words such as "shall" and "will," as does the McKinney Act outlined in the majority opinion. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the statute did not create a civil right enforceable under § 1983.
In my view, the district court in the present case properly deemed Suter rather than Wilder controlling. I would therefore affirm.