Alexande S. v. McLawhorn

JI-SC-00 -00

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

ALEXANDER S., ALFRED S. ,

)

BENNY B., CHRISTOPHER M., )

LAFAYETTE M., and RICKY S., by)

and through their Guardian ajd )

Litemf INEZ MOORE TENENBAUM, )

individually and as

)

representatives of a class of )

juveniles,

)

)

PLAINTIFFS,

)

)

V.

.

)

)

RICHARD E. MCLAWHORN,

)

individually and officially in)

his capacity as Commissioner )

of the Department of Youth )

Services for the State of

)

South Carolina; JOHN F. HENRY,) FRANK MAULDIN, KATHLEEN P. )

JENNINGS, JOSEPH W. HUDGENS, )

KAROLE JENSEN AND J. P. NEAL, ) individually and officially )

in their capacities as BOARD )

MEMBERS FOR THE SOUTH

)

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH )

SERVICES,

)

)

DEFENDANTS.

)

)

C/A No.:
COMPLAINT (NONJURY)

PREAMBLE

Now come the above-named minor Plaintiffs (hereinafter

referred to as the Plaintiff Class), by and through their

Guardian aji Litem and attorneys, and seek injunctive and

declaratory relief and damages from the above-named Defendants.

1

.The Plaintiff Class seeks this relief on their own behalf and as representatives of a class of similarly situated juveniles who are presently, and/or in the future will be, housed within the various facilities operated by the South Carolina Department of Youth Services. The Plaintiff Class also seeks class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The Plaintiff Class in this action is all juveniles housed within the South Carolina Department of Youth Services. The Defendants of this action are the Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services and the Board of that agency. These Defendants are sued individually as to any actions for damages and are sued individually and officially for the injunctive declaratory relief sought herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3. This is a civil rights class action challenging the totality of conditions of confinement of Plaintiff Class juveniles housed in the various facilities operated by the South Carolina Department of Youth Services. 4. Specifically, the Plaintiff Class, by and through their Guardian £d Litemf Inez Moore Tenenbaum, allege that the Defendants, all acting under color of state law as the Commissioner and Board of the Department of Youth Services (hereinafter DYS), have caused the Plaintiff Class and all children which may be placed in the custody of DYS in the
2

L
future, to suffer and be subjected to: a) cruel and unusual punishment; b) inhumane treatment; c) denial of due process of law in the manner in which they have been detained; and d) numerous ¯ other deprivations of constitutional and statutory rights as set forth in this Complaint.
5. It is the position of the Plaintiff Class that the following unconstitutional conditions presently exist within DYS: a) 6evere overcrowding; b) lack of adequate staffing; c) inadequate physical facilities; d) unhealthy and unsanitary environmental conditions; e) inadequate fire safety; f) deliberately harsh and arbitrary disciplinary procedures; g) an inadequate internal classification system for separating violent from non-violent juveniles; and h) a physical and mental health system which is deliberately indifferent and inadequate to provide for the physical and emotional health and well-being of the juvenile class.
6. The Plaintiff Class also reserves the opportunity to challenge other conditions, which exist within DYS, until after discovery in this case, as discovery may disclose additional constitutional violations and conditions not now known or alleged in this Complaint.
7. The Plaintiff Class seeks a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctions, damages and other equitable relief against the Defendants under the due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment amendments to the United States
3

Constitution and any related Federal and State statutes.

JURISDICTION

8. Jurisdiction to determine the claims of the

Plaintiff Class is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS1331, 1343, 2201, and

2202; 42 U.S.C. S1983 and the First, Fourth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The

Plaintiff Class further invokes 28 U.S.C. S2201 as it relates to

any additional Federal statutory rights which the Defendants, by

their acts and omissions, nay have violated.

9.

The Plaintiff Class invokes the pendent

jurisdiction of this Court to determine any rights or actions

pursuant to state law should it be determined that the actions

of the Defendants in this natter also violate state statutory or

common law.

PARTIES

10. The Plaintiff Class in this action, and

specifically Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B · , Christopher H · ,

Lafayette M. and Ricky S., are all minors and citizens of the

United States of America. Each has been committed to the

custody of DYS by the Family Courts of the State of South

Carolina and are housed within the various living units

maintained by DYS. The Plaintiff Class requests that Inez Moore

Tenenbaum .be appointed as Guardian fid Litem for the Class,

pursuant to Rule 17 (c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil

Procedure.

4

11. All members of the Plaintiff Class bring this action in their own behalf and on behalf of all other juveniles presently housed within the confines of those institutions operated by DYS and on behalf of all juveniles who may become confined within such institutions in the future.
12. The Defendants in this action are the Commissioner of the Department of Youth Services and its Board. Each is a citizen of the United States and is a proper Defendant in this action.
13. Defendant HcLawhorn and the members of the Board of DYS are directly responsible for the health, therapeutic treatment, protection, rehabilitation, safe-keeping and constitutional treatment of all juveniles housed within DYS. Each Defendant is 6ued individually as to any damages which may have been sustained, by the Plaintiff Class because of the Defendants' deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conditions and each Defendant is sued individually and officially for declaratory and injunctive relief. As the individual Defendants represent an agency of the State of South Carolina, their actions represent the actions of the State and the Plaintiff class would request that any remedy adopted by the Court in this matter as to injunctive and declaratory relief bind the State of South Carolina to act in good faith in complying with the Order.

CIASS ACTION 14. The named Plaintiff Class juveniles, by and through their Guardianfid.Litem and attorneys, bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated juveniles housed within DYS. Additionally, this action is brought on behalf of all juveniles who nay in the future be placed within the custody of DYS. Class certification of this action is sought pursuant to Rule 23 (a) (b) (2) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff Class also seeks the certification of a subclass of all juveniles within the jurisdiction of DYS who nave mental or physical handicaps, including, but not limited to, mental retardation, mental illness, learning disabilities, or emotional disorders. These juveniles are entitled to a higher level of care, treatment and rehabilitation by virtue of their conditions. In addition, Defendants1 grossly inadequate conditions and services have a disproportionately negative effect on these handicapped juveniles. The interests of these juveniles are consistent with the interests of the other members of the Class and they can be adequately represented by the Guardianfid.Litem. 15. The Plaintiff Class is informed and believes that the Court should certify this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23., F.R.C.P., for the following reasons: a) there are more than eight hundred juveniles presently detained and housed within the facilities operated by the Defendants; b) the
6

L
unconstitutional and harsh conditions alleged within this Complaint are imposed upon all Class members involuntarily housed within the confines of DYS institutions and the claims of any individual Plaintiff Class member would be substantially similar and typical of the claims of the Plaintiff Class; c) the Guardian a¿ Litem. as representative of the Plaintiff Class, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all individuals within the Class and the relief sought in this Complaint would be of a benefit to all Plaintiff Class members presently housed and/or in the future to be housed within the confines of these institutions; d) the Plaintiff Class* counsel possess the experience, knowledge and resources to provide effective and prolonged representation of the Class. Counsel for the Plaintiff Class consists of attorneys experienced in trial litigation, civil rights and federal statutory law relating to the physically and emotionally handicapped and complex research. The number of attorneys, in light of their access to adequate financial resources, assures consistent and continued representation; e) the questions of law and fact are common to all members of the Plaintiff Class and their importance would outweigh any individual issues raised by individual Class members; f) a class action is a superior method of. adjudicating the issues in this lawsuit and would further fair and efficient administration of justice; and g) a class action would be a benefit to the Defendants in this
7

matter in that it would relieve them of the obligation of multiple individual actions requesting partial relief from those juveniles housed in the various institutions within DY8 and will provide finality to the Defendants as to the issues herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 16. DYS is an agency of the State of South Carolina charged with the statutory responsibility of housing, educating, treating and rehabilitation of juveniles committed to its custody by the Family Courts of South Carolina. Additionally, DYS provides for probation and after-care of juveniles which have been committed to its institutions and for those juveniles placed on probation by the Family Court. The Defendants to this action, McL·awhorn, Henry, Mauldin, Jennings, Hudgens, Jensen and Neal, are charged with the responsibility of assuring that the conditions and programs present in the institutions operated by DYS are constitutional and comply with state and federal law. DYS and its Board were created pursuant to S. C. Code §20-7-3100 (1981). Appointment to the Board is governed by S. C. Code §207-3120 (1981). The Commissioner, McLawhorn, holds his appointment by the Board pursuant to S. C. Code S20-7-3160. The powers and duties of the Board and Commissioner are exclusive as they relate to the housing and care of the juveniles in institutions maintained by DYS pursuant to S. c. Code SS20-73170 and 20-7-3230. 17. The South Carolina Legislature, in establishing
8

the children's code, has set forth the purpose and guidelines
for the involuntary commitment of juveniles to institutions
maintained by DYS. Statutes establishing 6uch policies and
guidelines are set forth in relevant part below:
S 20-7-20. Children's policy established. . . .
(B) This policy shall be interpreted in conjunction with all relevant laws regulations and shall apply to all children who have need of services including, but not limited to, those mentally, socially, emotionally, physically, developmentally, culturally, educationally or economically di8advantaged or handicapped, those dependent, neglected, abused or exploited and those who by their circumstance or action violate the laws of this state and are found to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation. . . .
D) When children or their families request help . . . . · For children in need of services, care and guidance the 6tate shall secure those services as are needed to serve the emotional, mental and physical welfare of children and. the best interests of the community, preferably in their homes or the least restrictive environment possible. When children must be placed in care away from their homes, the 6tate shall insure that they are protected against any harmful effects resulting from the temporary or permanent inability of parents to provide care and protection for their children.
S 20-7-470. Construction of Articles.
This article shall be liberally construed to the end that families whose unity or wellbeing is threatened shall be assisted and protected, and restored if possible a secure units of law abiding members; and that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the Court shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance and control that

vill conduce to his welfare and the best interest of the State, and that when he is removed from the control of his parents the Courts shall secure for him care as near as possible equivalent to that which they should have given him.
S 20-7-3210. community services to be provided by Department.
The Department shall provide such community services as the Board shall assign to it. · ·
(c) Serving, advising and counseling of children in the various institutions as may be necessary to the placement of the children in proper environment after release and the placement of children in suitable jobs where necessary and proper.
(g) Providing or arranging for necessary services leading to the rehabilitation of delinquents either within the Department or through cooperative arrangements with other appropriate agencies.
(k) Providing for the development of secure and nonrestrictive alternatives to jail.
S 20-7-3310. Prohibition on confinement of mentally ill or retarded person; transfer to appropriate institution; commitment standards.
Ho person shall be committed to an institution under the control of the Board who is seriously handicapped by mental illness or retardation.
18. Pursuant to South Carolina Code §20-7-2170, any
juvenile between the ages of twelve (12) and seventeen (17) may
be committed to an institution maintained by DYS. When such
juvenile is "adjudicated delinquent, convicted of a crime, or
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contenderè" the juvenile is
"committed for an indeterminate period until he has reached his
10

twenty-first (21) birthday or until sooner released by the Board of Juvenile Parole.11

19. Pursuant to S. C. Code S20-7-755 the juvenile is

not accorded a jury trial when accused of a criminal act and is

not entitled to a public trial. While accorded the right to be

free from self-incrimination and the right to cross-examination,

the juvenile's rights during adjudicatory hearings are limited

to those "as shall be consistent with the best interest of the

child."

20. Due process requires that conditions and programs

at institutions for young people be reasonably related to the

<

purpose for which the individual Is committed. When the state,

acting in the role of parens patriae. imposes detention ~

especially detention of indeterminate duration as is the case

for most of the youth at DYS — it can meet constitutional

requirements only if its practice conforms to its policy.

Pursuant to South Carolina policy, the juveniles should be

housed in sanitary facilities which have enough space, have

trained staff in adequate numbers, have proper security to

ensure the resident's safety, provide therapeutic programming

for their emotional illnesses and physical well-being, and in

other ways comply with Constitutional mandates. These mandates

are met by.providing individualized treatment plans, sufficient

educational, vocational, and recreational opportunities, a

rational method of communicating and enforcing standards of

11

.behavior, and a rational system of evaluation that helps, rather than hinders, a juvenile's progress toward the goal of
rehabilitation. 21. Specifically, the Plaintiff Class alleges and
would show that the conditions of confinement at the DYS institutions are unconstitutional in the following regards:
a) Overcrowding - As of December 7, 1990, long term institutions (Birchwood, John 6. Richards, Willow Lane) housed a total of 635 juveniles. These three institutions have a rated capacity based upon 50 square feet per child of 299. The population of 635 was 212% of its rated capacity. By housing this many juveniles within these facilities the Defendants have caused juveniles to be housed in hallways in violation of state and federal fire codes. These conditions create a complete lack of privacy for all juveniles housed in these facilities. Host
of the Plaintiff Class members housed in these institutions are denied any type of storage facility in which to store their personal belongings and are severely restricted in what they are allowed to possess as personal property. The Plaintiff Class is informed and believes that the population as of December 7, 1990, will substantially increase over the next several months and that the overcrowding conditions will worsen.
.b) Lacfc of adequate staffing - The Plaintiff Class is informed and believes at present the staffing provided for juveniles housed within DYS is based upon rated capacity rather

than upon actual population figures. Each institution is provided with one psychologist regardless of the number of juveniles housed within facility. Each facility is provided with a set number of security staff. The severe overcrowding conditions as set forth in "a" above does not allow for adequate staffing to ensure the safety of the Plaintiff Class or of the staff members working in the individual housing units. This condition has caused overly restrictive regulations and rigid behavior guidelines to be adopted which deprive individual Plaintiff Class members of reasonable freedom of movement, privacy and activities which are necessary for their emotional and physical well-being. Members of the Plaintiff Subclass are often unable to comply with these overly restrictive conditions because of their handicapping conditions and, therefore, on information and belief, members of the Subclass are disproportionately punished. Additionally, the lack of education and vocational staffing, commensurate with the level of population within the institutions, deprives the Plaintiff Class of appropriate educational and vocational training and rehabilitation to which they are lawfully entitled and for which they have been committed to DYS.
c) Physical Condition of Facilities. Reasonable conditions of repair are not maintained in the facilities. These deficiencies include: the lack of appropriate doors; lack of appropriate shelving and closet space; the lack of any
13

.appropriate lockers to maintain personal items; insufficient number of toilets/sinks and showers for the number of juvenile class members housed within these facilities; insufficient furniture and other seating and writing surface areas in both the rooms and day room areas of the dormitories; inadequate mattresses, pillows, sheets and blankets; and the general conditions that do not provide the type of living conditions appropriate for the housing of juveniles.
d) Inadequate fire safety - While the Defendants have provided sprinkler systems in the living units within DYS, the manner in which the Plaintiff Class is housed creates dangerous and unnecessary fire hazards. The fire exits in the different dormitories are maintained in a locked condition and cannot be opened except by the juvenile correctional officers with .a key. There is no electronic gang lock mechanism by which to release these doors in the case of an emergency. Should a fire occur, the juvenile correctional officers may be unable to unlock the fire doors. The existing housing units do not provide a means of escape except by the fire door exits. As the facilities do not have the gang lock 6afety mechanism nor smoke evacuation system, should a fire occur there exists an unreasonable risk of loss of human life. These conditions are exacerbated by the overcrowded conditions of the dormitories and by the improper housing of juveniles in the hallways which cause additional fire hazards.
14

e) Disciplinary Procedures - At present, DYS employs a disciplinary procedure which provides for solitary confinement in non-communicative cells for violations of the disciplinary rules of the various institutions. These procedures are used without regard to the psychological effect this isolation may have upon the juvenile involved and the isolation may be for extended periods, i.e. 24 to 72 hours. The procedure is used regardless of any emotional problems the juvenile may have and the Plaintiff Class is informed and believes solitary confinement only exacerbates the emotional problems of the subclass. Upon information and belief the Plaintiff Class alleges that often the punishment imposed is of an arbitrary nature and bears little relationship to the conduct of the individual Plaintiff Class member. The haphazard nature and arbitrariness of the punishment combined with the draconian isolation constitutes cruel and unusual conditions of care for the juvenile Plaintiff Class members. The procedures used to impose punishment violate due process in that they do not allow for adequate notice to the juvenile as to the charges involved, do not allow for the juvenile to confront his accusers nor does it provide for a rational and fair system of imposing punishments.
.g) Classification - The Class is informed and believes that DYS, at present, classifies juveniles by size and sex only. To a certain extent, there is a separation of violent and
15

nonviolent offenders by institutions, but within institutions

there is no attempt to separate status and nonviolent offenders

from those offenders that have been convicted of more serious

offenses^

Additionally, there has been no internal

classification system for each institution to ensure that

violent and aggressive juvenile offenders are separated from

less aggressive'•'Plaintiff Class members. Failure to have a

rational classification system for separation of aggressive and

nonaggressive juveniles leads to unnecessary violence and the

victimization of a large portion of the Plaintiff Class.

h) Health Services - Due to the excessive number of

Class members housed vithin each of the long term facilities and

in the reception and evaluation unit, there exists inadequate

resources and staffing in the medical and mental health staffing

at DYS. Although DYS has experienced substantial and continual

growth in population at its long term facilities for a number of

years (i.e. average population FY •87 *88 - 408; FY '88 '89 -

485; FY •89 «9O - 567; FY «9O •9l to date 635) there has not

been a corresponding increase in medical and mental health

staffing at the institutions. Additionally, there does not

exist in DYS a sufficient individualized therapy plan for each

juvenile confined within these institutions. As the Plaintiff

Class members are confined within DYS in order to develop

sufficient social and emotional skills to better deal with our

society, the development of individualized emotional treatment

16

I.
f ·.

OÏS to

«*

-a*

of

onlte4

conBU«*lon. r e 6 U l t of

^
- «-
set
0—

t.
t.
o£
putpose
for. t.

Defen

ordering

17

I L

di6ciplinary procedures,

health system -

-

to compliance vith

acceptable no«s and the con

^ o l l i t l e 8 . 4) attorneys'

- - — - r : ; z -¯ toe housing o£ iuveniles in =tate ~ -——•• -

fees and costs; and 6) for

court deems just and proper.

December

Kespectfully submitted, this the ¿ _

1990.

FAIREY & PARISE, -P· *·

Federal ID No.: 758

5SySÎ
(803) 252-7606

a»C,

NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY &

18

ANGUS MACAULAY, JR. Federal ID No.: Pending
Post Office Box 11070 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 (803) 799-2000
SOOTH CAROLINA PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM FOR THE HANDICAPPED, INC.

NANCY (ÍØCORMICK Federal ID No.: 2776 HOLLY WALKER Federal ID No.: Pending

3710 Landmark Drive Suite 208 Columbia, South Carolina (803) 782-0639

29204

ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF CLASS AND THE SUBCLASS

INE¿)MOORE TENENBAUM
Post Office Box 11889 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 (803) 779-3080
GUARDIAN ad LITEM FOR THE PLAINTIFF CLASS AND SUBCLASS

19

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

RICKY S., CHRISTOPHER M.,

)

ALFRED S., BENNY B.,

)

ALEXANDER S. and LAFAYETTE M. )

by and through their Guardian )

Ad Litern, INEZ MOORE

)

TF,ÑÊÑBÀÚM, individually and as)

representatives of a class of )

juveniles,

)

)

) Plaintiffs, )

Civil Action No. 90-3062

)

vs.

) AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

) PURSUANT TO RULE l5(a), F.R.C.P.

RICHARD E. MCLAWHORN,

)

individually and officially )

in his capacity as

)

COMMISSIONER OF THE

)

DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES )

FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH

)

CAROLINA; JOHN F. HENRY,

)

5 c- ,

FRANK MAULDIN, KATHLEEN P. )

¯¯

«S* Ì ' ¿ .^

JENNINGS, JOSEPH W. HUDGENS, ) KAROLE JENSEN AND J. P, NEAL, )

¯

5^.f.¯¯ ` t¯ •`¯"

è?¯¿ ~¯; C`¯¯: ¦^;,` ^

individually and officially in)

„ ^ ; - c.. f rfi

their capacities as BOARD

)

coi*,., ... '•°/j?

MEMBERS FOR THE SOUTH

)

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH )

SERVICES,

)

•° ¿r . ^ Ç;¯» C^ ^;; - >/rrj` ' c,· r¯X;· ¾

) )
Defendants. ) )

" '¾

NOW COME the above-named minor Plaintiffs by and

through their Guardian Ad Litem and attorneys, pursuant to Rule

15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and amend their

Complaint. No Answer has been filed in this matter; therefore an

amendment as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule l5(a), is

appropriate.

Plaintiffs hereby reassert and reallege all matters set forth in their original Complaint as though that Complaint were now reprinted verbatim. Additionally, Plaintiffs would add the following language after paragraph 2l(h):
21 (i) Programs — The class is informed and believes that DYS fails to provide programs, provides substandard programs, or fails to insure access to existing programs, in Education, Vocational Education, Special Education, Social Programs, Recreational Programs, Library and Cultural Programs, Visitation Programs, and Religious Programs. The absence, poor quality, or lack of access to these programs have proxlmately caused and will continue to cause violations of the plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U. S. Constitution.
As to the deficiencies in, or absence of, the programs provided to plaintiffs, the constitutional violations encompass, but are not limited to, the following:
A. Counseling and Assessment (a) Defendants fail to adequately assess children's psychological condition at or before the time of their admission. As a result, defendants inappropriately confine children witli serious psychological illnesses, children who are mentally retarded, and children who are otherwise handicapped or developmentally disabled. (b) Defendants fail to design and implement an adequate treatment plan for each child. As a result, defendants
-2-

fail to provide children with appropriate rehabilitation or

treatment.

(c) Defendants do not make available or employ a

sufficient number of qualified psychiatrists, psychologists and

social workers to counsel and treat children.

(d) Defendants

inappropriately

delegate

the

responsibility for providing children with direct psychological

treatment to persons who are inadequately trained and supervised.

As a result, children do not receiv« psychological treatment.

(e) Defendants do not assess children for substance

abuse or dependency and fail to provide substance abuse

counseling for those children who need it.

(f) Defendants do not develop adequate after-care programs to follow-up once the child is •released.
(g) By failing to provide adequate psychological assessment, care and treatment to handicapped children, defendants discriminate against them and punish them solely by reason of their handicap.
(h) The allegations stated in the sub-paragraphs 2l(i)(A)(a-g) deprive plaintiffs and the class of their rights under the Oth and 14 th Amendments to the United States Constitution and of their rights guaranteed them by §504 oE the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder.
B. Educational and Rehabilitative Programs (a) Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs and the class with adequate and appropriate educational rehabilitative treatment.

-3-

L

(b) Defendants fail to provide adequate pre-vocational

and vocational education as part of a child's treatment plan.

(c) Defendants fail to provide children with adequate

forms of progranuning and activities. They require children to

spend prolonged periods of time without any educational,

recreational, therapeutic or other progranuning.

(d) Defendants fail to provide special education or

related services to handicapped children who were receiving such

services prior to their incarceration or who are entitled to such

services because of their handicapping condition.

(e) Defendants fail to adequately assess children to

determine whether they have special needs and how such special

needs can be met,

•(

(f) Defendants fail to develop appropriate

individualized education programs for children who need special

education and fail to assure parental involvement or to have

surrogate parents appointed. (g) Defendants fail to provide appropriate related

services including speech therapy, physical therapy and

psychological services to handicapped children who need such

services to benefit from their education. (h) By failing to provide otherwise qualified
handicapped children adequate educational services as special education and related services, defendants discriminate against plaintiffs and the class they represent and punish them solely by reason of their handicap.
(i) Exhaustion of administrative remedies by

plaintiffs and the class would be futile as defendants deprive _4_

children of special education and related services on a class-

wide basis.

(j) The allegations stated in sub-paragraphs

2l(i)(B)(a-i) deprive plaintiffs and the class of their rights

under the 8 th and 14 th Amendments of the United States

Constitution and their rights guaranteed to them by §504 by the

Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated

thereunder, and of their rights guaranteed them by the Education

for All Handicapped Children Act Public Law 94-142, 20 U.S.C.

§§1401 et seq, and regulations promulgated thereunder.

C. Programs Affecting Free Speech and Association

(a) Defendants deprive children of their right to

communicate and associate with their families and friends outside

of the institutions by interfering with and restricting mail,

telephone and visitation communication. This communication is

necessary to children's treatment and rehabilitation and to

assist their reintegration into the community.

(b) Defendants improperly restrict children from

communicating by telephone with their parents, relatives or

friends. These restrictions work a particularly severe hardship

on children whose parents live great distances from the

institutions or are otherwise unable to visit them.

(c) Defendants

severely

restrict

children's

opportunities for visitation with family and friends. Defendants

unreasonably limit the number of visitors a child may have and

the hours during which visits may occur.

(d) Defendants deprive plaintiffs and the class of

adequate access to the courts by failing to inform children that

-5-

they may make telephone calls or receive telephone calls from counsel.
(e) Defendants fail to provide children with either legal materials or access to counsel who can assist them with their legal problems. Defendants also fail to provide children with any instruction or assistance in protecting their rights through the legal system. Defendants fail to make provision for individual religious beliefs or needs of the children, or which is expressed by the families of the children.
(f) Defendants improperly restrict the free exercise of religion by failing to provide for a variety of religious beliefs or denominational differences.
(g) The allegations stated in sub-paragraphs 2l(i)(C)(a-f) deprive plaintiffs and the class they represent of their rights under the 1st, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Respectfully submitted, this the A ^ * ^ ^ d a y of L·frUX-/^-A
1991. FAIREY & PARISE, P.A.
By: [ÅÃ/^ H - ^
W. Gas ton Fairey Federal I.D. No. Î 750 J. Christopher Mills Federal I.D. No.! 4802 Post Office Box 8443 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 (803) 252-7606
_r; _

NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH

By: ïy. Bruce Sliaw ' Federal I.D. No.: 3002 Robert 0. Meriwether Federal I.D. No.: 1040 Post Office Box 11070 Columbia, SC 29211 (803) 799-2000
Attorneys for the Plaintiff Class

SOUTH CAROLINA PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM FOR THE HANDICAPPED, INC.

Nancy H2Cormìck

Federal ID No.: 2776

Holly Walker

Federal ID No.: Pending

3710 Landmark Drive, Suite 200

Columbia, South Carolina

4

(803) 782-0639

Attorneys for the Subclass

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

ALEXANDER S., ALFRED S.,

)

BENNY B., CHRISTOPHER M., )

LAFAYETTE M., and RICKY S · , by)

and through their Guardian ad )

Litem. INEZ MOORE TENENBAUM, )

individually and as

)

representatives of a class of )

juveniles,

)

C/ANo·: 3:90-3062-17

)

PLAINTIFFS,

)

)

V.

)

)

RICHARD E. MCLAWHORN,

)

individually and officially in)

his capacity as Commissioner )

of the Department of .Youth )

Services for the State of

)

South Carolina; JOHN F. HENRY,)

FRANK MAULDIN, KATHLEEN P. )

JENNINGS, JOSEPH W. HUDGENS, )

KAROLE JENSEN AND J. P. NEAL, )

individually and officially )

in their capacities as BOARD )

MEMBERS FOR THE SOUTH

)

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH )

SERVICES,

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

)

DEFENDANTS.

)

)

I do hereby certify that I have served upon the attorneys for the Defendants the Amendment to Complaint Pursuant to Rule l5(a), F.C.R.P. in this action by depositing a copy of same in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
1

l·w

This Columbia, South Carolina.

FAIREY

, 1991, m
P. A. ecretary Attorney

 
 929 F.Supp. 925 (1995)
ALEXANDER S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., and Ricky S., By and Through their Guardian ad Litem, Lesly A. BOWERS, individually and as representatives
of a class of juveniles, Plaintiffs, v.
Flora Brooks BOYD, individually and in her capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice; Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; John
F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen and J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for the
South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:90-3062-17.
United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.
November 22, 1995.
92678 *926 *927 *928 W. Gaston Fairey, Rochelle Lyn Romosca, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, Robert O. Meriwether, Alice V. Harris, William S. Brown, M. Clifton Scott, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina, Nancy C. McCormick, Holly C. Walker, South Carolina Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped, Inc., Columbia, South Carolina, for plaintiffs.
Edward M. Woodward, Frances G. Smith, Woodward, Levintis, Unger, Daves, Herndon & Cothran, Columbia, South Carolina, Vinton D. Lide, Lide, Montgomery & Potts, Columbia, South Carolina, Larry L. Vanderbilt, South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Columbia, South Carolina, for defendants.
Richard A. Harpootlian, A. Randolph Hough, Solicitor's Office, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Columbia, South Carolina, for amicus curiae.
ORDER
JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class of incarcerated juveniles they represent (collectively the "plaintiffs"), move for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Defendants oppose plaintiffs' fee requests. Although the parties, facts and prior proceedings in this classaction suit are fully set forth in the prior opinions of this court, see Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F.Supp. 773 (D.S.C.1995); Alexander S. v. Boyd C/A No.: 3:XX-XXXX-XX (order dated June 27, 1995), a brief review of the procedural history of the case is appropriate.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 28, 1990 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, from the defendants, the Director of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) and the DJJ Board Members. The suit challenges the constitutionality of certain policies, practices and conditions at the four juvenile correctional institutions operated by DJJ. Plaintiffs also mounted several statutory challenges to conditions at DJJ, particularly in regard to the educational system provided for incarcerated juveniles.
On January 16, 1991, the court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the purported class. On March 7, 1991, the court certified the class as consisting of all persons presently and in the future housed within the DJJ correctional facilities. On the same date, the court approved the litigation team assembled to represent the plaintiffs in this action. The court approved participation as plaintiffs' counsel by W. Gaston Fairey, of the Columbia, South Carolina law firm of Fairey, Parise & Mills ("Fairey Parise"). The court also approved

representation by the South Carolina Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped, Inc. ("Protection & Advocacy"), a state agency whose primary purpose is to protect the legal rights of disabled and special needs children. Protection & Advocacy was represented at the hearing by Attorneys Nancy McCormick and Holly Walker. Fairey, McCormick, and Walker represented to the court that they had extensive experience with the 929 issues *929 raised in this litigation: Mr. Fairey primarily in the area of prison litigation generally; and Ms. McCormick and Ms. Walker in the area of special needs children. These attorneys requested that the court also allow the participation of the Columbia, South Carolina law firm of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough ("Nelson Mullins"). They suggested that, because of the complex nature of the myriad issues raised in this litigation, it would be necessary to secure the services of a large law firm, such as Nelson Mullins to provide back-up support for the principal trial attorneys. It was represented to the court that Nelson Mullins had agreed to participate in this case as part of its publicly announced commitment to pro bono[1] activities. Acting upon these representations, the court then authorized the participation of Fairey Parise, Protection & Advocacy, and Nelson Mullins. The court admonished the attorneys at the time of their appointment that every effort should be made to minimize duplication and to exercise "billing judgment" with regard to attorneys' fees and expenses.
In March 1992, after a hearing on a preliminary matter relating to treatment of mentally ill and mentally retarded juveniles, plaintiffs sought interim attorneys' fees and costs as a result of prevailing on that issue. This request totaled $245,270.81. Upon reviewing the time sheets submitted in connection with the request, the court observed that some of the entries related to nonlegal work, such as preparation and dissemination of press releases. The court thereupon instructed counsel to review their time sheets, delete all extraneous items, and resubmit the request. Before the court could be presented with the revised request, the parties settled the issue of interim attorneys' fees. Although the amount of the settlement was not disclosed to the court at the time, the court has now been informed that the $245,270.81 request was pared down to $192,500.00, a sum which was ultimately paid by defendants.[2] At the time of this settlement, defendants extracted a promise from plaintiffs to make every effort possible to exercise billing judgment in an effort to minimize any fee that might ultimately be awarded at the conclusion of the litigation. An additional interim payment of fees to Fairey Parise ($61,750.00) and Protection & Advocacy ($28,250.00) was made in August 1993. No interim fees were paid to Nelson Mullins at that time. Thus the current fee request is for the period 1991-95 for Nelson Mullins and 1993-95 for the other attorneys.
Shortly after the March 1992 order, the parties requested that the court stay its scheduling order to allow the parties an opportunity to discuss an amicable settlement of the case. These efforts proved to be unsuccessful, however, and the case was restored to the active docket and scheduled for trial beginning June 13, 1994.
In April 1994, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit defendants from transferring nineteen-yearold juveniles from DJJ facilities to adult prisons operated by the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs were successful in persuading the court to issue the preliminary injunction, relying primarily upon their contention that juveniles transferred from DJJ to the adult facilities were not segregated from the adult population and were not provided with adequate educational and rehabilitative services. The court later dissolved the injunction upon learning that South Carolina law does, in fact, require special treatment for youthful offenders housed in adult facilities.
The non-jury trial of this case was conducted in June, July, and August 1994. During the course of the trial, the court heard from sixty-six witnesses (including seventeen expert witnesses) and reviewed one hundred and 930 twenty-six exhibits consisting of several *930 thousand pages. The trial was bifurcated. Phase I addressed all constitutional challenges to all of the conditions of confinement except education. Phase II dealt with the constitutional challenge to the educational system at DJJ, and claims asserted under three interrelated federal education statutes: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). Phase I of the trial began on June 13, 1994 and concluded on July 19, 1994. Phase II began on July 21, 1994 and concluded on August 29, 1994.
Before Phase II began, two events occurred which substantially altered the need to receive extensive testimony as to the issues presented in Phase II. First, the court entered an order decertifying the class as to the claim for damages. See Order dated July 5, 1994. By that time, it had become clear that any damage awards might vary

significantly among various members of the class. The court concluded that "disparate factual circumstances surrounding each class member would make the awarding of damages on a class basis totally unmanageable." Id. The court also concluded that allowing the damages claim to remain in the case would introduce significant individual liability or defense issues which would require separate hearings for each class member in order to establish defendants' liability. The second major event was the concession by the defendants, shortly before Phase II was to begin, that IDEA, Section 504 and ADA all applied to the DJJ facilities in dispute. Until that time, defendants had taken the position that the three statutes did not apply to correctional institutions.
After the conclusion of Phase II, the court took the matter under advisement and on January 25, 1995, rendered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In its January 25 decision, the court agreed with the plaintiffs on some, but not all, of the claims asserted. Rather than imposing its own remedial scheme based upon the violations that had been identified, the court afforded defendants one hundred and twenty days within which to prepare and submit to the court a plan designed to remedy the constitutional and statutory violations. On May 25, 1995 (the last day of the one hundred and twenty-day period), defendants submitted a plan to which plaintiffs timely objected. After requesting and receiving additional information from defendants, the court, on June 25, 1995, approved the remedial plan and appointed retired Family Court Judge Robert H. Burnside as the court's special master to oversee the implementation of the remedial plan.
I
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), provides, in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title ..., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
As noted, in addition to seeking relief under the remedial provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations, plaintiffs also asserted claims under three federal statutes, each of which provides for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) [IDEA]; 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) [Section 504]; and 42 U.S.C. § 12205 [ADA]. The analytical considerations for awarding attorneys' fees under IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA are essentially the same as the analysis under Section 1988. Disabled In Action v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881, 885 n. 4 (4th Cir.1982); Rossi v. Gosling, 696 F.Supp. 1079, 1084 (E.D.Va.1988).
II
"PREVAILING PARTY"
The threshold issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is whether plaintiffs are "prevailing parties." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). "To qualify as a `prevailing party,' a plaintiff need not prevail on 931 every claim or issue raised, but *931 only `on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 706 F.Supp. 1234, 1236 (E.D.Va.1989) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)) (other citations omitted) aff'd, 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.1990). Moreover, "[a] party may prevail by virtue of a voluntary action by the opposing party through settlement or a consent decree." Child v. Spillane, 866 F.2d 691, 692 (4th Cir.1989).
The "prevailing party" inquiry essentially asks whether a causal connection exists between plaintiff's litigation and the relief plaintiff has obtained. Spencer, 706 F.Supp. at 1236-37 (citing Spillane, 866 F.2d at 693). The party seeking the fees must show that the lawsuit "contributed in a significant way to the winning of benefits or relief from the factual/legal condition that the fee claimant has sought to change." Spillane, 866 F.2d at 693 (citations omitted). The court may award fees where a party's efforts have merely served as a catalyst to the beneficial result which has occurred. Id.[3]

At the very least, a plaintiff must show that "actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alter[ed] the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefit[ed] the plaintiff." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573.
Plaintiffs in this case clearly are "prevailing parties." As the court noted in its January 25 order, defendants have, from the outset of this litigation, conceded that their facilities are impermissibly overcrowded. As to the overcrowding issue, defendants indicated that they were amenable to a court order ordering the release of juveniles to a manageable level. As to all other material allegations of the complaint, defendants either denied them or admitted them with the qualification that good-faith efforts have been made to secure the necessary funding to improve these conditions. The defendants further deny that any of the additional violations constituted deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or various statutory provisions.
In its January 25 order, the court concluded that plaintiffs had shown violations of their constitutional and statutory rights in certain respects. Thus, the court granted to the plaintiffs some, but not nearly all, of the relief they sought in this litigation. In some areas, the court refused to award the specific relief sought by the plaintiffs. For example, the court found no constitutional deficiencies in the education system, and the court declined to engage in what it determined to be micromanagement of the juvenile facilities by imposing an elaborate grievance/ombudsman system as suggested by plaintiffs. In other areas, the court granted partial relief. For example, in the area of discipline, plaintiffs sought to have the court superimpose its own views on prison administration by establishing, among other things, maximum limits on the amount of time juveniles spend in lock-up units for disruptive behavior. The court declined to grant such sweeping relief, choosing instead to limit its ruling in the discipline area to a reasonable prohibition on the use of CS gas for enforcing orders.
In other areas, the court granted full relief requested by plaintiffs. For example, the court agreed with plaintiffs that defendants should formulate and implement a comprehensive program for classifying and segregating violent juveniles from non-violent juveniles.
As to the issue of overcrowding itself, the court declined the requests of both parties to this litigation and refused to order a release of juveniles. Instead, after observing that it has been more than a quarter of a century since any new facilities were constructed at the DJJ campus, the court required that defendants implement a program to establish additional housing units, either at a central facility in Columbia or in decentralized, community-based facilities around South Carolina.
932 *932 Thus, although the court disagreed with both parties as to the overriding issue of overcrowding and agreed with plaintiffs on some, but not all, of their related challenges, plaintiffs nevertheless are prevailing parties in this litigation. They have, by this litigation, "materially alter[ed] the legal relationship between the parties by modifying defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefit[s] the plaintiffs." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573. Indeed, defendants do not challenge plaintiffs' status as prevailing parties, choosing instead to take issue with the rates, hours, and documentation submitted by plaintiffs.
III.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Attorneys' Fees Generally
The attorneys' fees awarded by the court should comport with the underlying purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, which is to provide civil rights litigants effective access to the federal courts. Buffington v. Baltimore County, Md., 913 F.2d 113, 129 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 1106, 113 L.Ed.2d 216 (1991).
Under the well-settled law in the Fourth Circuit, the court should consider the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), to determine the reasonable fee award, although

there is no strict manner in which the factors are to be considered and applied. E.E.O.C. v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir.1990). The Johnson factors are:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.
Service News Co., 898 F.2d at 965 (quoting Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 329, 58 L.Ed.2d 330 (1978)); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548 n. 13, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). In Johnson, the sixth factor is expressed as whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Applying certain Johnson factors, the court determines a reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel, then multiplies the rate by the hours in order to determine the "lodestar figure," which is normally considered the reasonable fee in the case. Service News Co., 898 F.2d at 965 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 888, 104 S.Ct. at 1543); Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.1990). In "exceptional circumstances," this presumptively fair lodestar figure may be adjusted to account for results obtained and the quality of representation. An attorney's fee award should accomplish "fair and reasonable compensation," Blum, 465 U.S. at 901, 104 S.Ct. at 1550, in keeping with Congress' dual purpose of fully compensating prevailing parties for their attorneys' fees and encouraging attorneys to handle civil rights cases. A proper computation of the lodestar fee will, in the great majority of cases, constitute the "reasonable fee" contemplated by Section 1988.
Finally, in addressing the reasonableness of the fee award in the case at bar, the court must be mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), that "[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation."
B. Nelson Mullins' Pro Bono Status
As noted previously, when the court first approved the litigation team assembled to represent the plaintiffs in this action, the court was informed that Nelson Mullins would participate in the case pro bono. This participation was 933 part of the firm's commendable *933 decision to participate in the American Bar Association's pro bono publico program by encouraging each of its attorneys to devote a certain number of hours a year to pro bono activities. It was the court's understanding that Gaston Fairey and Nancy McCormick would be the principal trial attorneys in the case, and that Nelson Mullins would provide litigation support to these two relatively small law firms. Nelson Mullins is a large, highly successful, and well-managed law firm with the resources to underwrite and support a complex lawsuit such as this one. Without Nelson Mullins' support in this litigation, it is doubtful that the smaller firms would have been able to fully develop the very important issues in this case.
After plaintiffs prevailed on the first issue to be decided by this court (that of the subclass involving mentally retarded and mentally ill juveniles), all of plaintiffs' counsel, including Nelson Mullins, sought to be compensated under Section 1988. Nelson Mullins informed the court that it intended to seek whatever the fees the court might award under the fee-shifting statutes and to deposit those fees into its pro bono account so as to be able to fund future pro bono activities. As noted previously in this order, the parties settled the issue of interim fees before the court could fully address this matter, and, as indicated, Nelson Mullins substantially compromised its fee and absorbed many costs that would normally be awarded under Section 1988. See supra note 2.
Shortly before the case went to trial, Nelson Mullins' senior partner wrote to the court to inform the court that because the case had consumed more time than any lawyer had originally envisioned, Nelson Mullins wished to be released from its pro bono commitment in this case to allow it to be compensated as any privately retained attorney.[4] The court agreed to such action.

After the present petition for attorneys' fees was submitted in this case, Nelson Mullins informed the court, by way of a reply memorandum to defendants' opposition memorandum, that it intends to contribute whatever fees the court awards to it to an appropriate charity for children, thus essentially reversing course again and reverting to pro bono status.

Defendants suggest in their memorandum that because Nelson Mullins entered the case on a pro bono basis, it would not be appropriate to award attorneys' fees to this firm. Defendants cite no authority for this proposition, and the court's own independent research has disclosed none. Indeed, every court that has considered the question has concluded to the contrary. These cases generally hold that "[a]n award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff is not contingent upon an obligation to pay an attorney and is not affected by the fact that no fee was charged." Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1152 (11th Cir.1985). The court in Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S.Ct. 2254, 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978) noted:

As a general matter, awards of attorney's fees where otherwise authorized are not obviated by the fact that individual plaintiffs are not obligated to compensate their counsel. The presence of an attorney-client relationship suffices to entitle prevailing litigants to receive fee awards. . . . Of course, since the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards must accrue to counsel. . . .

The statutory policies underlying the award of fees justify such shifting without regard to whether

the individual plaintiff initially assumed the financial burdens of representation. The traditional, and

generally applicable, "American Rule" denies successful litigants the possibility of recovering fees

from their opponents. Beyond the applicability of several narrow judicially recognized exceptions

to the American Rule, the Supreme Court insists that Congress must affirmatively authorize fee

awards. . . . Congress, in fact, has often taken up the cudgel and authorized or mandated fee

934

awards in suits brought under diverse statutes. . . . Typically, congressionally *934 approved

awards are designed to encourage private enforcement of individual rights and to deter socially

harmful conduct. For example, Congress, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, authorized fee

awards for "private attorneys general" who might otherwise be deterred from bringing suit because

of the burdensome costs of litigation.... More recently, Congress responded to the Supreme

Court's decision in [Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct.

1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)] by closing `gaps' left in other civil rights laws and authorized the

award of attorneys' fees in actions brought under several provisions, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1982, 1983, and 1985.... The award of fees to legal aid offices and other groups furnishing pro

bono publico representation promotes the enforcement of the underlying statutes as much as an

award to privately retained counsel.

Id. at 1245 (citations omitted).

Cases in which attorneys' fees were awarded pursuant to statutory fee-shifting provisions to pro bono counsel include: Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1152 (11th Cir.1985) (plaintiff co-counsel, a legal services corporation attorney, did not waive his right to an attorneys' fee award under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) when he agreed to represent plaintiffs without fees); Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir.1984) ("[A]llowing fee awards to pro bono counsel under the [Equal Access to Justice Act] `serves to insure that legal services groups, and other pro bono counsel, have a strong incentive to represent indigent social security claimants.'") quoting Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F.Supp. 118, 123 (E.D.N.Y.1983); see also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 2034 n. 9, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980) (rejecting argument that representation by public interest group justified reducing fees in a case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Mitten ex.rel. Mitten v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 932, 937 (11th Cir.1989) (in awarding fees in IDEA case in which fees had not been paid by parents of student with disability even though parents could afford fees, the court noted: "[t]he statutorily guaranteed right to attorneys' fees does not depend on a party's economic resources or the availability of free legal assistance"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072, 110 S.Ct. 1117, 107 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1990); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir.1980) ("it is inappropriate to consider that the prevailing plaintiff's attorney was working for a legal aid organization" when arriving at a reasonable attorneys' fee award under § 1988); Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis, 155

Misc.2d 894, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979, 986 (Sup.Ct.1992), aff'd, 198 A.D.2d 63, 603 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993) (discussing New York and federal treatment of pro bono and pro se counsel).

An attorney's obligation to render pro bono service is outlined under the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct:

A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.

S.C.App.Ct. R. 407, Rule 6.1. The American Bar Association's most recent version of Model Rule 6.1 encourages lawyers to render at least fifty hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 (1993). A substantial majority of these hours should be provided without fee or expectation of fee to persons of limited means. Id. However, service is still considered to be pro bono when the lawyer receives statutory fees. Commentary to Model Rule 6.1 explains:

[S]ervices rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the

award of statutory attorney's fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify

such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are

935

encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or *935 projects that

benefit persons of limited means.

Id. at comment (emphasis added).

Nelson Mullins has advised this court that they intend to follow these recommendations and donate a significant portion of the fees received to charitable purposes. Though not strictly required, such donation is in keeping with the highest standards of the legal profession and will, hopefully, serve to further the interests advanced by Nelson Mullins in this action: improving the conditions of confinement and opportunities for rehabilitation of the young men and women at DJJ.

Defendants also suggest that any fee award to Nelson Mullins must be tempered by the realization that Nelson Mullins gained benefits from its pro bono activity. Defendants refer specifically to an award presented to the firm by the American Bar Association because of its public commitment to pro bono work. Defendants also suggest that Nelson Mullins is able to recruit some of the best and brightest law school graduates because of its pro bono program.

Again, defendants cite no authority for this argument, and the court has been unable to locate a case holding that intangible benefits such as goodwill and recruiting benefits may be relied upon by a court to reduce an attorneys' fee award. Indeed, the only Fourth Circuit case addressing this issue is to the contrary. In Anderson v. Morris, 500 F.Supp. 1095 (D.Md.1980), judgment vacated, 658 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.1981), plaintiffs' attorneys were successful in representing an independent candidate for President of the United States in an action against Maryland officials challenging the constitutionality of a state law preventing the candidate from being on the general election ballot. In fashioning an appropriate fee award, the district court diminished the award for what the court determined were the "intangible benefits" to the attorneys involved in such highprofile litigation. The court found that participation in such a "cause celebre" would enhance the professional goodwill and reputation of the attorneys. For this reason, the court reduced the fee by an appropriate amount to offset the intangible benefits to the attorneys. Id. at 1107 reversed in part 658 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.1981).

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was inappropriate for the district court to discount the fee because of the intangible benefits conferred upon plaintiffs' attorneys. Observing that the legislative history of Section 1988 requires that counsel are to be paid "as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, for all time reasonably expended on a matter," the Court of Appeals held that the district court's reduction of fees for intangible benefits was not appropriate. Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir.1981) (internal quotation omitted).

It is thus clear, under well-established law, that Nelson Mullins is entitled to be compensated for its reasonable attorneys' fees under Section 1988, even though it participated in this case on a pro bono basis. In determining the amount of the fee, the court will not discount the fee because of the goodwill derived by Nelson Mullins from its pro bono work.
As noted later in this opinion, however, Nelson Mullins' involvement on a pro bono basis did lead to a situation where a large number of attorneys were assigned to work on the case, resulting in a degree of overlap that must be taken into account in determining the reasonable number of hours to be compensated. See page 943, infra. The court emphasizes here that it in no way faults Nelson Mullins for the number of attorneys involved. Given the nature of pro bono work and the realities of meeting firm goals, it was, no doubt, necessary to spread the work around more than would be necessary for a fee paying client. Nonetheless, the court cannot penalize defendants by requiring them to pay for any resulting duplication.
It is with these principles in mind that the court now turns to the particular facts of this case.
C. Calculation of the Lodestar
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The first step in setting a reasonable fee is determining the appropriate hourly rate. Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 936 277 (4th Cir.1990). The reasonable hourly rate *936 must be consistent with the "market rate" in the relevant
community. The court must assess the experience and skill of the prevailing parties' attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for "similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n. 11, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The relevant community for fee determination is the judicial district in which the trial court sits. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.1987). In this case, the relevant community is the District of South Carolina. Relevant to determining the "market" or reasonable rate are Johnson factors three, four, five, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve.[5]
The third Johnson factor requires the court to consider the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered. In determining this, the court must determine whether the case presented plaintiffs' counsel with novel or complicated issues. In this case, the court finds that it did. As the court has noted on several previous occasions, there have been few, if any, cases in this area that have been litigated to judgment. The vast majority of juvenile justice lawsuits have been settled. The United States Supreme Court has thus far declined to enunciate the principles of constitutional law that apply to juveniles, even in a school setting. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n. 37, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1411 n. 37, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (expressly reserving the question of whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to schools). In addition, plaintiffs' counsel were opposed by equally skillful and well-prepared attorneys representing defendants. Thus, the case presented challenging issues of both fact and law requiring considerable skill on the part of the attorneys.
The fourth Johnson factor requires the court to determine the opportunity costs for plaintiffs' counsel in pursuing this litigation. The action was initiated in December 1990 and adjudicated on its merits in January 1995. For approximately one-half of the four-year period during which the case was pending, the court placed the case on its inactive docket in an effort to allow the parties to attempt to reach an amicable settlement. In addition, the court has attempted, whenever possible, to accommodate the schedules of counsel. To this extent, therefore, plaintiffs have not shown significant opportunity costs in litigating this case. On the other hand, because of the novelty and complexity of the issues presented, it was necessary for the court to conduct numerous status conferences, motions hearings, and other proceedings over the four-year life span of this case that required the attendance of counsel. Necessarily, participation in these court proceedings has denied plaintiffs' counsel the opportunity to work on other fee-producing cases.
The fifth Johnson factor requires the court to consider "the customary fee for like work." In making such a determination, the court should consider "various information, including `(affidavits reciting the precise fees that

counsel with similar qualifications have received in comparable cases; information concerning recent fee awards by courts in comparable cases; and specific evidence of counsel's actual billing practice or other evidence of the actual rates which counsel can command in the market.'" Trimper v. City of Norfolk, Va., 846 F.Supp. 1295, 1305 (E.D.Va.1994) quoting Buffington v. Baltimore County Md., 913 F.2d 113, 130 (4th Cir.1990) cert. denied 499 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 1106, 113 L.Ed.2d 216 (1991)).
The rates sought by the various attorneys who have participated in this case are all set forth on the table appearing on pages 943-946, infra. For the most part, these rates range between $70.00 per hour and $150.00 per hour. Only one attorney, Gaston Fairey, seeks to be compensated at a rate higher than $150.00 per hour. Mr. 937 Fairey seeks to be compensated at the rate of $225.00 per *937 hour for out-of-court work and $250.00 per hour for in-court work. The rates for all of the other attorneys are constant for in-court and out-of-court work.
Defendants challenge the hourly rates submitted by plaintiffs. Rather than focus upon the two attorneys with the highest rates (Fairey and McCormick), defendants devote most of their attention to the rates charged by most of the Nelson Mullins' associates, contending that the rates are excessive and above the market rates for attorneys with similar training and experience. Defendants also suggest that in automobile accident cases, some of these young associates bill at lower rates than those submitted here.
The court has carefully considered the hourly rates submitted and the documentation and affidavits furnished by plaintiffs to support these rates. Plaintiffs support these rates with affidavits indicating that these are their normal, ordinary and customary rates for similar complex litigation. In other words, these rates reflect counsels' actual billing practice for this type of lawsuit. Plaintiffs have also furnished the court with affidavits from senior partners in other large Columbia firms which indicate that young associates with prestigious firms in South Carolina can command rates at or above $100 per hour as the Nelson Mullins associates seek in this case. The court finds that the rates sought by the Nelson Mullins associates are fair and reasonable.
Although not specifically challenged by defendants, the court has carefully scrutinized Mr. Fairey's hourly rates and has determined that they are appropriate in this case as well. Mr. Fairey was the lead attorney in this case and the one with the most experience in civil rights and prison litigation.
Hourly rates of $250.00 or more have been approved and awarded in this district in the following cases (all of which the court finds to be of similar complexity):
1) $250.00 per hour: C & S National Bank v. Specialty Equip. Co., C/A No.: 6:XX-XXXX-XX (D.S.C.1988) [contract dispute, Judge Joseph Anderson].
2) $250.00 per hour: Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter, C/A No.: 6:XX-XXXX-X, 1988 WL 108598 (D.S.C.1988) [securities class action, Judge Falcon Hawkins].
3) $250.00 per hour: Cox v. Champion International, C/A No.: 3:XX-XXXX-X (D.S.C. 1986) [antitrust action, Judge Weston Houck].
4) $300.00 per hour: Phillips v. Bebber, C/A No.: 9:XX-XXXX-X (D.S.C.1991) [ERISA, Judge Ross Anderson].
5) $250.00 per hour: Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., C/A No.: 6:XX-XXXX-XX (D.S.C.1991) [ERISA, Judge Joseph Anderson], (rev'd in part on other grounds), 23 F.3d 855 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc).
6) $265.00 to $285.00 per hour: South Carolina Soft Drink Litigation, C/A No.: 3:XX-XXXX-XX (D.S.C.1993) [Antitrust, Judge William Traxler].
Finally, as to all of the hourly rates generally, the Fourth Circuit, in Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir.1986), authorized the court to consider the effect of delayed compensation upon the attorneys' fees awarded. The court stated:
Delay necessarily erodes the value of a fee that would have been reasonable if paid at the time the services were rendered. . . . The court may increase the hourly rates to reflect current market rates, or it may increase the lodestar to counterbalance the effect of inflation and foregone interest

on the value of the fee. The particular method of accounting for delay in payment is within the discretion of the district court.
790 F.2d at 1081. Similarly, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989), the United States Supreme Court approved enhancement of fee awards for delay in payment. The Court found that an appropriate upward adjustment can be reached by "the application of current rather than historical hourly rates or otherwise." Id. at 283-84, 109 S.Ct. at 2469. Thus, the delay in payment (four years for Nelson Mullins and almost three years for the other lawyers) is a fact that the court may consider in setting the hourly rates.
Thus, after carefully considering the affidavits submitted, the fees that counsel with similar qualifications have 938 received in similar *938 cases, the evidence of counsel's actual billing practice, and the several year delay in
receiving compensation, the court approves the rates set out in the table on page 943-946, infra.
The eighth Johnson factor requires the court to look at the amount in controversy and the results obtained. As noted previously, the court decertified the class as to the damages claims, leaving only plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief. Also, plaintiffs did not prevail on all of their claims. Plaintiffs' counsel did, however, obtain significant results for their clients.
This litigation identified several constitutional and statutory deficiencies in a major state agency. Plaintiffs succeeded in bringing about changes in the conditions of confinement and in the programs, practices and procedures of the agency charged by state law with rehabilitating and educating our state's wayward youth. As a result of counsel's efforts, juveniles are no longer sprayed with tear gas for relatively minor infractions, cockroaches are being eliminated from the cafeterias, aggressive juveniles are now being separated from more passive ones, ground has been broken for new facilities in Columbia and elsewhere, much-needed improvements to medical care are being implemented, and new programs are planned to enable all class members to attempt to correct their behavior while at DJJ. It is doubtful that many of these improvements would have occurred had this litigation not been brought.
Johnson factor nine requires the court to consider the reputation, experience and ability of the attorneys involved. This court has had an ample opportunity to observe these attributes of the attorneys during the twenty-two hearings that were conducted prior to the trial and during the six grueling weeks of the trial on the merits. In addition, plaintiffs have supported their fee petition with affidavits from other attorneys and biographical information regarding all of the attorneys who participated in this litigation. The court finds that the principal trial attorneys, Mr. Fairey, Ms. Romosca, Ms. McCormick, and Mr. Meriwether, all to be attorneys of excellent reputation, experience, and ability. Similarly, the other attorneys in the various firms who played a subsidiary role (Ms. Walker with Protection & Advocacy, Ms. Harris with Nelson Mullins, and various junior associates with Nelson Mullins) are all highly motivated, skilled attorneys who acquitted themselves well in this litigation.
Johnson factor ten requires the court to consider whether the case was undesirable in the legal community in which it arose. The plaintiffs in this case are a class of juveniles who have broken the criminal laws of South Carolina. Thus, to some extent, the case was undesirable. However, it is obvious that many civil rights cases for which fees are sought under Section 1988 involve claims by unappealing plaintiffs. Thus, this factor militates in favor of the plaintiffs' fees, but only slightly more so than in the typical civil rights action.[6]
As to Johnson factor twelve, the total fee sought in this case is not excessive when compared to other fees awarded in complex litigation in this district. See Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., C/A No.: 6:XX-XXXX-XX [Total fee of $3.5 million awarded in ERISA case after a one-week trial]; Craps v. Jim Walter, Inc., C/A No.: 3:XX-XXXX-XX [defendants settled truth-in-lending class action shortly after 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was denied and agreed to pay attorneys' fees of $3 million under state fee-shifting statute]; Faulkner v. Jones, C/A No.: 2:93-488-2, 1994 WL 456621 [plaintiff's counsel reported to court that attorneys' fees already exceed $4 million in challenge to single-gender admissions policy of state-funded university].

2. Hours Reasonably Expended
The court may not simply accept as reasonable the number of hours reported by counsel. Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 532 F.Supp. 440, 446 (E.D.Va.1982). The court should not compensate plaintiff's counsel for 939 hours which it finds "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary." *939 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir.1981); Espinoza, 532 F.Supp. at 446-47 (hours sought should be reduced by hours which are duplicative, unproductive, or are spent on issues on which plaintiff did not prevail). Additionally, the first and second Johnson factors direct the court to consider the time actually expended by counsel and the novelty or complexity of the issues involved in the matter.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs' counsel's hours are inadequately documented, duplicative, and excessive. As to documentation generally, defendants contend that plaintiffs have submitted billing records that are "far from meticulous." They contend that generalizations such as "trial preparation" and "various telephone calls and conferences" are not specific enough to allow for judicial review.
The court has reviewed the time sheets in dispute and concludes that the entries are specific enough to allow for appropriate judicial review. Although some attorneys were more careful than others in keeping their records (Nelson Mullins attorney William Brown being a particular example of a good record-keeper), the records are specific enough for the court to make an informed judgment as to the appropriateness of the work.
Defendants also challenge the hourly submissions by pointing to internal inconsistencies in the various time sheets. Plaintiffs have satisfactorily explained these inconsistencies, however. For example, Rochelle Romosca's records include entries for time spent in certain telephone conversations with Gaston Fairey, while Fairey's records do not show similar phone conversations on that date. In plaintiffs' reply brief, counsel explains that the phone calls were made by Romosca to Fairey while Fairey was on his summer vacation, a period during which he did not keep time records.
Another apparent inconsistency occurred when two attorneys indicated that they met with a third attorney in preparation for trial, but the third attorney's time sheets do not reflect the same meeting. The third attorney's time sheets do, however, include a significant block of time for trial preparation, which is not inconsistent with the time sheets of the other attorneys.
Although the court disagrees with defendants on the adequacy of the records generally and with the alleged internal inconsistencies identified by defendants, the court agrees with defendants that some hours need to be deleted in calculating the lodestar fee in this case.[7]
First, the court will disallow a portion of the charges asserted for "project assistants." Although the court will compensate plaintiffs for time spent by attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals, it appears to the court from a review of the Nelson Mullins job description for project assistants and from time sheets from Nelson Mullins and Fairey Parise that much of the work done by these assistants was of a clerical or secretarial nature. Fees for work done by secretaries is not compensable under Section 1988. Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1023 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 527, 78 L.Ed.2d 710 (1983). The court's review of the time sheets by the project assistants reveals that approximately three-fourths of their work was similar to that of a courier or 940 secretary and that the remainder of their work was more akin to that of a *940 paralegal or law clerk. For this reason, the court will disallow three-fourths of the fees for the project assistants. This results in a reduction of $33,271.38 for time spent by Nelson Mullins project assistants and $485.65 for time spent by Fairey Parise project assistants.[8]
Defendants also contend that the number of hours submitted is excessive. Defendants concede that plaintiffs prevailed on some of the issues they raised in this litigation, but suggest that the court should disallow compensation for work done on the issues on which they did not succeed.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), provides guidance on the issue of determining a reasonable number of hours to be awarded in a case in which all claims are not successful. In addressing the issue of a reasonable number of hours to be awarded in such situations, the Supreme Court set forth general principles to be followed:
We hold that the extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.
Id. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 1943.
Plaintiffs argue that they fall in the middle category identified in Hensley. In order to qualify for that category, plaintiffs must establish that the lawsuit consisted of related claims and that the plaintiffs won substantial relief.
In this case, the court has little difficulty in concluding that the claims were related. As Hensley illustrates, in institutional reform litigation, where the claims all relate to conditions within particular institutions and plaintiffs seek application of a consistent legal theory, the different claims are related both in fact and in law. As noted by one commentator:
Institutional reform litigation, like that involved in Hensley, often concerns conditions in a single institutional setting and the objective of a plaintiff class to gain overall improvements in their treatment that subsumes a number of related legal claims. Thus, the Supreme Court's view that the various winning and losing claims in Hensley, although factually diverse and only loosely subsumed under the constitutional challenges, were interrelated may be understood from the prospective that "the plaintiffs pursued them to remedy the same general injurious conduct, i.e. the denial of minimally adequate treatment."
2 Schwartz & Kirlin, Section 1983 Litigation, § 22.3 at 282-83 (2d Ed.1991) (citations omitted).
In examining the second prong, that is the overall success of the plaintiff's case, it is "[not] necessarily significant that a prevailing plaintiff did not receive all the relief requested." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, n. 11, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, n. 11. Moreover, "the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee." Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940.
Thus, although this court disagreed with plaintiffs as to many of the claims asserted in this case, plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of a number of significant claims and obtained significant relief. For this reason, the court will not reduce the hours submitted to account for unsuccessful claims, such as the effort to establish a 941 population ceiling. The court will also not reduce the total hours for *941 unsuccessful claims, such as those relating to education, discipline, access to a law library, and other issues on which plaintiffs basically failed. These claims were all interrelated with the claims on which the plaintiffs prevailed, and it would be inappropriate to delete these hours.
The court has, however, identified four discrete areas in which certain hours submitted by plaintiffs' counsel should be deleted or reduced substantially. These four areas are discussed below.
The first area relates to the April 1994 hearing on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the transfer of nineteen-year-old juveniles to adult correctional facilities. As noted in the introductory portion of this order, plaintiffs' counsel represented to the court that an injunction was appropriate because state law did not require, and state officials did not provide, appropriate educational treatment and rehabilitative services to juveniles who were transferred. Acting upon a meager record and without the benefit of full legal research, the court granted the preliminary injunction, which remained in place until the court's decision on the merits issued on

January 25, 1995. At that time, the court dissolved the injunction and observed that South Carolina state law clearly provides for the segregation of youthful offenders from the adult population and specifically provides a full panoply of educational and rehabilitative services for those juveniles. Thus, the court's January 25 Order dissolving the preliminary injunction observed that plaintiffs had pursued the wrong remedy. Specifically, plaintiffs had sought to have this court enjoin one state agency (DJJ) from fulfilling its obligations because another state agency (the Department of Corrections) was allegedly not complying with the mandates of South Carolina state law.[9]
Because this issue was separate from the other issues and because plaintiffs utterly failed to prevail on this claim, the court will disallow the brief period of time spent on this issue. According to the court's review of the time sheets submitted, the total in-court time to be disallowed for Gaston Fairey (1.75 hours), Rochelle Romosca (1.75 hours), and Robert Meriwether (1.75 hours) is 5.25 hours. To this the court will add a total of 21 hours in preparation for the injunction hearing. The preparation time for this hearing is not specifically itemized in the submissions to the court, and the court has arrived at what it reasonably believes to be a fair amount for preparation time by adopting a four-to-one ratio which assumes that for every hour spent in court, but the attorney spends four hours in trial preparation.[10]
The second area of reduction involves the time spent on the first day of trial receiving testimony and proffered photographs taken by Coates Crewe, a local photographer. During the first day of testimony at trial, plaintiffs sought to introduce a series of approximately three hundred photographs taken by Crewe. These photographs allegedly depicted typical living conditions at various DJJ dormitories. Defendants challenged the admissibility of these photographs and requested an evidentiary hearing so that the court could determine whether a proper foundation could be laid. Crewe was then called to the stand and indicated that his photographs were taken at random and represented typical scenes in DJJ dormitories. On cross examination, he denied "staging" any of the photographs. He specifically denied requesting juveniles to place their mattresses on the floor and denied requesting juveniles to "mess up" their dormitory rooms so that living conditions would appear worse than they actually were.
Defendants then called one juvenile who contradicted Crewe by testifying that Crewe did, in fact, request that the juveniles help him stage photographs so as to overstate the undesirable conditions at DJJ. Allegedly, Crewe told 942 the juvenile that he [Crewe] was there to help "shut down" some of the dorms *942 so the juveniles could be sent home early. Defendants indicated that they had several other juveniles, as well as the DJJ chaplain, who were prepared to corroborate the testimony of the first juvenile. Plaintiffs then requested a short hearing and thereafter announced that they were withdrawing the Coates Crewe photographs and would not attempt to introduce them into evidence. Because the photographs and the time spent discussing them were superfluous, the court will disallow one hour in court and a reasonable approximation of four hours for out-of-court trial preparation time regarding these photographs for each of the attorneys and support personnel present on the first day of trial.[11]
The third area of reduction relates to the extensive testimony the court heard in the latter part of Phase II of the trial. As noted in the introductory portion of this order, plaintiffs engaged in discovery and prepared for trial under the assumption that it would be their burden to prove that all three special education statutes (IDEA, Section 504, and ADA) applied to the facilities in dispute in this litigation. Plaintiffs also prepared for trial assuming that they would be required to prove specific violations so as to support an award of damages. Before Phase II could be litigated, however, two developments occurred which significantly altered the need to receive this testimony. As has been noted, the court decertified the class as to the damages claim, and defendants made a last-minute concession that the three statutes apply to the institutions being challenged in the litigation. This prompted the court to inquire of plaintiffs' counsel why it would be necessary to receive testimony about wholly-past violations. The court expressed its view, on several occasions, that any injunctive relief the court could award would be limited to a requirement that the defendants comply with the three statutes in the future. In other words, with the damages issue removed from the case, and with the defendants conceding that the statutes apply to the facilities, there was really little left to litigate in Phase II of the litigation. The court also observed that the three statutes had received scant attention in the decisions of other judges who have ruled upon challenges to juvenile correctional facilities around the country. Virtually all of these other cases were resolved by way of a consent

order, and these consent orders dealt with the three statutes in cursory fashion, by simply requiring the defendants to bring themselves into compliance.
In spite of the court's repeated entreaties to streamline Phase II of the trial, plaintiffs insisted on putting up testimony that stretched over six days. The court cannot fault plaintiffs' counsel for thoroughly developing the facts and legal issues to be presented in Phase II. This thorough and extensive pretrial factual development and legal research undoubtedly led to the concession by defendants which made much of the trial testimony unnecessary in Phase II. It was not, however, necessary to receive six days of testimony in Phase II. For these reasons, the court will disallow some of the hours spent presenting the testimony in Phase II. According to the court's records, Phase II was litigated on the following dates: July 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, and 28. The first two days (July 21 and 22) were devoted primarily to constitutional challenges to the educational system. Although plaintiffs did not prevail on these constitutional claims, the court has determined that the constitutional challenges to the educational system were inextricably intertwined with the constitutional challenges to other aspects of incarceration. The court will thus allow compensation for July 21 and July 22. According to the court's notes, the remainder of Phase II was devoted exclusively to testimony regarding the three federal education and disability statutes. The court will disallow this trial time as being redundant and unnecessary. The court will also disallow the time spent preparing proposed findings and conclusions for Phase II, because they repeated much of the unnecessary testimony and were not adopted by the court. The court announced its tentative conclusion in this 943 regard and asked counsel to compute *943 the time each attorney spent during the disallowed portion of Phase II. This information has been received by the court and provided to defense counsel. See Letter by Gaston Fairey dated October 26, 1995. Defendants have not challenged the calculations contained in the October 26 letter. The court adopts these calculations and will therefore reduce plaintiffs' award by $52,596.75, which represents the amount of fees allocated to the time the court has disallowed as to Phase II.
The final area of reduction involves the duplication necessarily arising out of the pro bono assignments within the Nelson Mullins firm. See page 935 supra. The fee submission by Nelson Mullins in this case includes the work of twelve attorneys, both partners and junior associates. Many of the associates devoted relatively brief periods of time to the case. It is obvious to the court that Nelson Mullins has fulfilled its commitment to pro bono activity by attempting to conscientiously allow many of its junior associates, some of them recent law school graduates, to work on this case as part of the firm's pro bono commitment, which includes an obligation to engage in such work by each member of the firm. It also appears to the court that Nelson Mullins used this litigation, in part, to provide these bright young attorneys with an opportunity to participate in the trial and to gain valuable courtroom experience. The court finds no fault with such practices in this case; indeed, these young associates performed admirably and contributed immeasurably to the successful results obtained in the litigation. Spreading the work among so many lawyers, commendable as it may be, has its drawbacks, however. The involvement of so many attorneys necessarily involves a degree of overlap and duplication that must be taken into account by this court in determining the reasonable number of hours to be compensated.
Courts will substantially reduce bills when unnecessary duplication is brought about by having an excessive number of attorneys involved in a case. Sun Pub. Co. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 823 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.1987); Goodwin v. Metts, 973 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir.1992); Singer v. Shannon & Luchs Co., 779 F.2d 69, 70-71 (D.C.Cir.1985); Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 953 (1st Cir.1984). Duplicative work, such as several attorneys attending the same hearing, should generally not be part of a fee award.
The court finds this overlap and duplication[12] to warrant a ten-percent reduction in the overall Nelson Mullins fee submission, said percentage to be deducted after the deductions described in the preceding paragraphs.[13]
After making the foregoing findings, the reasonable attorneys' fee to be awarded in this case is calculated as follows:

FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A.

Attorney

Rates Out/In Hours Out/In

Fees

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

W. Gaston Fairey Less:
April 21, 1994 injunction hearing Coates Crewe testimony Phase II reduction

$225/$250

Net:

1258.25/115

$311,856.25

7/1.75 4/1
2.25/.5

- $ 2,012.50 - $ 1,150.00 - $ 631.25
___________ $308,062.50 ===========

944 *944

Attorney

Rates Out/In Hours Out/In

Fees

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Christopher Mills

$140/$140

2.8

$ 392.00

Rochelle L. Romosca

$100/$100

150.55

$ 15,055.00

___________

TOTAL

$323,509.50

===========

Non-Attorney

Rates

Hours

Fees

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tammie Pope[**] Serena Malin[**]

$ 65 $ 35

105.50 12.55

$ 6,857.50 $ 439.25

Nicole Howland[**] Leigh Thompson[***] Leigh Anne Wills[***]

$ 35 $ 35 $ 35

6.45 10.50
8.0

$ 225.75 $ 367.50 $ 280.00

Less:

75% of project assistants' submissions

- $ 485.63

___________

$ 7,684.37

TOTAL

$331,193.87

===========

NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH

Attorney

Rates Out/In Hours Out/In

Fees

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Robert Meriwether

4/92-12/03/93

$120.00

490.3

$ 58,836.00

12/04/93-11/03/94

$140.00

916.1

$128,254.00

11/04/94-01/25/95

$145.00

7.4

$ 1,073.00

Less:

April 21, 1994 injunction hearing $140.00

8.75

- $ 1,225.00

Coates Crewe testimony

$140.00

5.0

- $ 700.00

Phase II reduction

$140.00

122.8

- $ 17,192.00

___________

Net:

$169,046.00

===========

Rochelle L. Romosca Less:
April 21, 1994 injunction hearing Coates Crewe testimony

$ 95.00

1313.6
8.75 5.0

$124,792.00
- $ 831.25 - $ 475.00

Net:
Alice Harris Less:
Coates Crewe testimony Phase II reduction
Net:
Darryl Smalls Brent Boyd H. Metcalf-Dodson R. Len Rowe Dominic Starr Carey Kilton Catherine Cauthen

$ 95.00
$120.00 $ 95.00 $100.00 $100.00 $ 95.00 $120.00 $ 95.00

1671.5
5.0 169.9
44.3 136.6
27.9 55.2 98.8 35.2 85.0

___________ $123,485.75 ===========
$158,792.50
- $ 475.00 - $ 16,140.50
___________ $142,177.00 ===========
$ 5,316.00 $ 12,977.00 $ 2,790.00 $ 5,520.00 $ 9,386.00 $ 4,224.00 $ 8,075.00

945 *945

Attorney

Rates Out/In Hours Out/In

Fees

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Less:

Phase II reduction

$ 95.00

2.3

- $ 218.50

___________

Net:

$ 7,856.50

===========

Clif Scott William Brown Less:
Coates Crewe testimony Phase II reduction
Net:

$120.00 $115.00

253.5 396.4
5.0 38.9

$ 30,420.00 $ 45,586.00
- $ 575.00 - $ 4,473.50
___________ $ 40,537.50 =========== $553,735.75 ===========

Non-Attorney

Rates

Hours

Fees

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Catherine Boette[*]

4/92-6/93

$ 70.00

375.5

$ 26,285.00

11/93-1/95

$ 75.00

904.3

$ 67,822.50

Less:

Coates Crewe testimony

$ 75.00

5.0

- $ 375.00

Phase II reduction

48.2

- $ 3,615.00

___________

Net:

$ 90,117.50

Kim Lanier[*]

$ 55.00

57.5

$ 3,162.50

Suzanna Timor[*] Jennifer Minick[*] Ginger Boyt[*] Kelli Stephens[*] Less:
Phase II reduction
Net:
Teri Wall[*] Less:
Coates Crewe testimony
Net:
Chip Ford[**] Donna Barnes[***] Jennifer Minick[***] Less:
Coates Crewe testimony
Net:
Cassandra Sturkie[***] Don Hampton[***] Margaret Boette[***] Shannon Willis[***]

$ 60.00 $ 60.00 $ 70.00 $ 70.00
$ 70.00
$ 60.00 $ 35.00 $ 35.00
$ 35.00 $ 35.00 $ 35.00 $ 35.00

TOTAL
Less: 75% of project assistants' submission
Net:
Less: 10% discount for duplication

70.6 85.0 79.6 663.3
38.0

$ 4,236.00 $ 5,100.00 $ 5,572.00 $ 46,431.00
- $ 2,660.00 ___________ $ 43,771.00

221.9 5.0

$ 15,533.00
- $ 350.00 ___________ $ 15,183.00

47.9 97.7 401.4
5.0

$ 2,874.00 $ 3,419.50 $ 14,049.00
- $ 175.00 ___________ $ 13,874.00

162.3 142.3 252.6 197.7

$ 5,680.50 $ 4,980.50 $ 8,841.00 $ 6,919.50
___________ $213,731.00 =========== $767,466.75 ===========
$ 32,786.25 $734,680.50 ===========

$ 73,468.05

946 *946

Non-Attorney

Rates

Hours

Fees

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Net to Nelson Mullins

$661,212.45

===========

S.C. PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM FOR THE HANDICAPPED, INC.

Attorney

Rates Out/In

Hours Out/In

Fees

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Nancy McCormick Less:
Coates Crewe testimony Phase II reduction
Net:

$150.00

445.05
5.0 47.0

$ 66,757.50
- $ 750.00 - $ 7,050.00
___________ $ 58,957.50 ===========

Holly Walker

$105.00

145.10

$ 15,235.50 ___________ $ 74,193.00 ===========

TOTAL FEES AWARDED

Total to Fairey Parise Total to Nelson Mullins Total to Protection & Advocacy

$331,193.87 $661,212.45 $ 74,193.00

The court has considered, but declines to make either an upward or downward adjustment to the lodestar figures above. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Any possible basis for such an adjustment has been reflected in the lodestar; thus, no adjustment to the lodestar should be made. See Cooper v. Utah, 894 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.1990); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir.1978).

IV

COSTS AND EXPENSES

The prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action is entitled under Section 1988 to recover "`those reasonable out-ofpocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to the fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services.'" Spell v. McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762, 771 (4th Cir.1988) (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980)).
Plaintiffs initially sought costs totaling $141,499.82. In their opposition memorandum, defendants interposed objections to certain costs, such as one first-class plane fare and expenses for meals consumed in the Columbia, South Carolina area prior to and during trial. Plaintiffs have responded by withdrawing all of the items to which defendants objected. After withdrawing these items, the revised costs totals are as follows:

Fairey Parise Nelson Mullins Protection & Advocacy

$ 8,021.25 $107,827.69 $ 2,660.65

Upon receiving the revised request for costs and expenses, defendants have indicated that they have no remaining challenges to these items. See Letter of Frank S. Potts dated November 3, 1995.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs is granted as modified herein. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs their fees and costs reasonably incurred as follows:

947 *947

Attorneys' Fees[14]

Fairey Parise & Mills, P.A. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough S.C. Protection & Advocacy Systems

$331,193.87 $661,212.45 $ 74,193.00

Costs and Expenses[15]

Fairey Parise & Mills, P.A. Nelson Mullins, Riley & Scarborough S.C. Protection & Advocacy Systems
IT IS SO ORDERED.

$ 8,021.25 $107,827.69 $ 2,660.65

[1] The term pro bono is derived from the Latin phrase pro bono publico which means "for the public good" or "for the welfare of the whole." Black's Law Dictionary 1082-83 (5th Ed.1979).
[2] Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that Nelson Mullins agreed to a substantial reduction in its portion of the interim fee, accepting twenty-eight cents on the dollar on its initial fee submission. Nelson Mullins also absorbed $118,588 in fees and costs. This represents a significant contribution to this case for which Nelson Mullins has not been compensated and for which it is not presently seeking compensation.
[3] The January 25 order observed that defendants had, by the time of trial, already formulated plans and, in some instances, begun to implement plans to remedy various problems at DJJ. It cannot be denied that this litigation was a catalyst for these voluntary corrective actions by defendants.
[4] Nelson Mullins had earlier offered to waive its claim for attorney fees if the case could be settled relatively early in the litigation. Settlement efforts were unsuccessful and the parties then engaged in extensive litigation and a lengthy trial.
[5] This court finds that the sixth Johnson factor is not relevant to the award in this case because "contingency multipliers may not be allowed in statutory fee cases." Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., 870 F.Supp. 1369, 1380 (D.Md.1994) (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992)). The court also finds that Johnson factor seven and eleven are not appropriate for consideration in this case.
[6] Absent the availability of legal fees, most civil rights actions (particularly those seeking injunctive relief) would be highly undesirable. Here, plaintiffs were aware from the outset that they would be successful to at least a large degree, and the fees would ultimately be recovered.
[7] Defendants raise a variety of additional challenges to the fee request. For example, defendants contend that some of the time sheets group tasks in one large block of time that is inadequate to allow the court to ascertain what was actually performed. Defendants also suggest that some of the time sheets indicate that too much time was spent on various tasks such as "trial preparation" after hours while the trial was in progress. Defendants further contend that some of the work performed by someone with a high skill level could have been performed by a person with a lower skill level. The court has carefully considered defendants' arguments regarding these issues as well as the plaintiffs' responses to these arguments. The court has modified the fee request in a manner that the court believes is consistent with the law regarding attorneys' fees. The failure of the court to address all of defendants' objections in the text of this order should not be taken as an indication that the court did not carefully consider defendants' position as to each of these matters.

[8] Several project assistants, paralegals and at least one law clerk included in their submissions time spent in training on June 3, 1994. The court would normally disallow this time which amounts to under $500 in fees. The court's reduction of the overall project assistant request by 75%, however, is considered by the court to offset any training time by project assistants or others. There is, therefore, no need to reduce fees further to account for these training hours.
[9] The court expresses no opinion as to whether the Department of Corrections is complying with state law.
[10] A four-to-one ratio in determining trial preparation time is probably conservative. Mr. Fairey's total time sheets in this case show approximately a ten-to-one ratio for trial preparation to trial time.
[11] The court's notes indicate approximately one hour was spent in court dealing with the photos. As with the injunction hearing, the court uses a four-to-one ratio for determining trial preparation time.
[12] For example, the time sheets of many of the Nelson Mullins associates include time for touring the DJJ facilities. It is not reasonable to expect defendants to pay a large number of attorneys to tour its facilities in a case where many of the plaintiffs' basic contentions (such as overcrowding) were not in dispute.
[13] In calculating a ten-percent reduction, the court is not unmindful of the fact that Nelson Mullins did not submit time sheets for some of its attorneys who worked briefly on the case and absorbed some costs and expenses that might have been billed to the client in a regular fee-producing case. The court appreciates Nelson Mullins' exercise of "billing judgment" in this regard.
[14] law clerks
[15] paralegals
[14] law clerks
[15] paralegals
[***] project assistants
[*] law clerks
[**] paralegals
[***] project
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
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U.S. District Court District of South Carolina (Columbia) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:90-cv-03062-JFA

CLOSED

S., et al v. Boyd, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Joseph F Anderson, Jr Demand: $0 Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

Date Filed: 12/28/1990 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Special Master
Honorable Robert H Burnside TERMINATED: 01/10/1996

represented by Robert H Burnside 10850 Garners Ferry Rd Eastover, SC 29044 PRO SE

Special Master
Thomas J Davis TERMINATED: 01/09/2002

represented by Thomas J Davis PO Box 375 Irmo, SC 29063 803-781-1665 Fax: 803-781-1665 PRO SE

Special Master
Wade H Logan, III TERMINATED: 08/11/1998

represented by Wade H Logan, III Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough PO Box 1806 Charleston, SC 29402 843-720-4314 Fax: 843-720-4347 Email: wade.logan@nelsonmullins.com

Special Master Joseph Younginer
Plaintiff Alexander S

TERMINATED: 08/11/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum 911 Lady Street Suite D Columbia, SC 29201 803-929-0464 TERMINATED: 01/16/1996

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LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Christopher Mills J Christopher Mills Law Office PO Box 5717 Columbia, SC 29250 803-787-6226 Fax: 803-787-9488 Email: chrismillsllc@aol.com TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lesly Ann Bowers SC Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped 3710 Landmark Drive Suite 208 Columbia, SC 29204 803-782-0639 Fax: 803-790-1946 TERMINATED: 04/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert O Meriwether Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough PO Box 11070 Columbia, SC 29211 803-799-2000 Fax: 803-255-9060 Email: robert.meriwether@nelsonmullins.com TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Bruce Shaw Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough PO Box 11070 Columbia, SC 29211 803-799-2000 Fax: 803-799-2000 Email: bruce.shaw@nelsonmullins.com
TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Alfred S

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Rochelle Romosca McKim Fairey Parise and Mills PO Box 8443 Columbia, SC 29202 803-252-7606 Fax: 803-790-1946 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W Gaston Fairey 1722 Main Street Suite 300 Columbia, SC 29201 803-252-7606 Fax: 803-254-5759 Email: gfairey@sc.rr.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Christopher Mills (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lesly Ann Bowers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert O Meriwether (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Bruce Shaw (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Benny B

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Rochelle Romosca McKim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W Gaston Fairey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Christopher Mills (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lesly Ann Bowers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert O Meriwether (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Bruce Shaw (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rochelle Romosca McKim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W Gaston Fairey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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CM/ECF - scd - Docket Report Plaintiff Christopher M
Plaintiff Lafayette M

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represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Christopher Mills (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lesly Ann Bowers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert O Meriwether (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Bruce Shaw (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rochelle Romosca McKim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W Gaston Fairey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Christopher Mills

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Plaintiff
Ricky S by and through their Guardian ad Litem

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lesly Ann Bowers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert O Meriwether (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Bruce Shaw (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rochelle Romosca McKim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W Gaston Fairey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Christopher Mills (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lesly Ann Bowers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum individually and as representatives of a class of juveniles TERMINATED: 01/07/1994
V. Guardian ad Litem Plaintiff Nancy C McCormick

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert O Meriwether (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Bruce Shaw (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rochelle Romosca McKim (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
W Gaston Fairey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Inez Moore Tenenbaum (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nancy Campbell McCormick Nancy Campbell McCormick Law Office 3000 Forest Drive Columbia, SC 29204 803-782-4873 Fax: 803-790-1946 Email: nancycm@sc.rr.com TERMINATED: 01/07/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Nancy C McCormick SC Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped General Counsel

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V. Defendant Richard E Mclawhorn individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina
Defendant John F Henry individually and in his official capacities as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice

3710 Landmark Drive Suite 209 Columbia, SC 29204 782-0639 Fax: 782-0639 PRO SE
represented by Edward M Woodward Woodward Cothran and Herndon PO Box 12399 Columbia, SC 29211 803-799-9772 TERMINATED: 02/09/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery Montgomery Patterson Potts and Willard PO Box 11886 Columbia, SC 29211 803-779-3500 Fax: 803-799-2755 Email: mhm@mppw.net TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY
Vinton Devane Lide Vinton D Lide and Associates PO Box 2189 Lexington, SC 29071 803-808-1799 Fax: 803-808-1887 Email: dee@lidelaw.com TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address)

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Defendant Frank Mauldin individually and in his official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice
Defendant Kathleen P Jennings individually and in her official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice

TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY
Paul L Reeves PO Box 11126 Columbia, SC 29211 803-929-0001 Fax: 803-929-0927 Email: paul@preeveslaw.com TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY
Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward, Jr Woodward Cothran and Herndon PO Box 12399 Columbia, SC 29211 803-799-9772 Email: emwoodward@wchlaw.com TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address)

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Defendant Joseph W Hudgens individually and in his official capacity as a former Board Member of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice TERMINATED: 04/09/1991
Defendant Karole Jensen individually and in her official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice

TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY
Paul L Reeves (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward, Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY
Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/09/1991 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward, Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY
Paul L Reeves (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant J P Neal individually and in his official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice
Defendant Youth Services Department of SC also known as SC Dept of Youth Svc

Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward M Woodward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward M Woodward, Jr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D Cooper, Jr Cooper Coffas Moore and Gray PO Box 11869 Columbia, SC 29211 803-779-3939 Fax: 803-779-4037 Email: jdc@ccmgpa.com TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant
Flora Brooks Boyd Individually and in her official capacity, as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice TERMINATED: 02/03/2000

John A Pincelli Suspended 00000 803-254-4700 Fax: 803-254-4748 Email: john@pincellilaw.com TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry Leroy Vanderbilt Department of Juvenile Justice PO Box 21069 Columbia, SC 29221-1069 803-896-9764 Fax: 803-896-9767 TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Hart Montgomery (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vinton Devane Lide (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John A Pincelli (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson, II Davidson Morrison and Lindemann PO Box 8568 Columbia, SC 29202-8568 803-806-8222 Fax: 803-806-8855 Email: wdavidson@dml-law.com TERMINATED: 02/03/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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V. Movant Michael W Moore Director of the S.C. Department of Corrections
Movant Vincent F Rivera
Amicus Richard A Harpootlian in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit TERMINATED: 12/06/1995
Guardian ad Litem Plaintiff Lesly A Bowers TERMINATED: 09/25/1998
V. Defendant Gina E Wood in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice TERMINATED: 05/15/2003

represented by Larry C Batson, Sr SC Department of Corrections 4444 Broad River Road Columbia, SC 29221-1787 803-896-1943 TERMINATED: 05/09/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Vincent F Rivera 518548 Florida State Prison 7819 NW 228th Street Raiford, FL 32026 PRO SE
represented by Richard A Harpootlian PO Box 1090 Columbia, SC 29202 803-252-4848 Fax: 803-252-4810 Email: rah@harpootlianlaw.com TERMINATED: 12/06/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lesly Ann Bowers (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/25/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew F Lindemann Davidson Morrison and Lindemann PO Box 8568 Columbia, SC 29202-8568 803-806-8222 Fax: 803-806-8855 Email: alindemann@dml-law.com TERMINATED: 05/15/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY

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Defendant
William R Byars in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson, II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/15/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry Leroy Vanderbilt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Henry Davidson, II (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/28/1990
12/28/1990 12/28/1990 12/28/1990 12/28/1990
12/28/1990

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT; FILING FEE $ 120.00 RECEIPT # 55633 Scheduling order due by 3/28/91 Service due by 1/28/91 for SC Dept of Youth Svc, for J. P. Neal, for Karole Jensen, for Joseph W. Hudgens, for Kathleen P. Jennings, for Frank Mauldin, for John F. Henry, for Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)

2 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)

3 Answers to 16B Interrogatories by Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S., Inez Moore Tenenbaum (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)

4 MOTION by Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S., Inez Moore Tenenbaum to certify class action , and for appointment of counsel (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)

5 MEMORANDUM by Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S., Inez Moore Tenenbaum in support of [4-1] motion to certify class action, [4-2] motion for appointment of counsel (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)

6 MOTION by Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S., Inez Moore Tenenbaum for appointment of Inez Moore Tenenbaum as guardian ad litem for Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S. , a minor (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)

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12/28/1990 01/07/1991
01/15/1991
01/15/1991 01/16/1991 01/16/1991 01/23/1991 02/11/1991

7 MEMORANDUM by Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S., Inez Moore Tenenbaum in support of [6-1] motion for appointment of Inez Moore Tenenbaum as guardian ad litem for Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S. , a minor (swil) (Entered: 01/03/1991)
8 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE executed as to Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc 12/28/90 Answers to 16B Interrogatories due by 2/18/91 for SC Dept of Youth Svc, for J. P. Neal, for Karole Jensen, for Joseph W. Hudgens, for Kathleen P. Jennings, for Frank Mauldin, for John F. Henry, for Richard E. Mclawhorn, for Inez Moore Tenenbaum, for Ricky S., for Lafayette M., for Christopher M., for Benny B., for Alfred S., for Alexander S. Answer due on 1/17/91 for SC Dept of Youth Svc, for J. P. Neal, for Karole Jensen, for Joseph W. Hudgens, for Kathleen P. Jennings, for Frank Mauldin, for John F. Henry, for Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 01/08/1991)
Status conference held(JFA,jr/kb,contract) Oral motion by Ed Woodward, Esq. for extension of time to answer Complaint GRANTED. Court appoints Inez Moore Tenenbaum as GAL (Order will be issued). Court defers ruling on pltf's motions for Class Action Certification and for Appointment of Counsel until issues have been joined. Scheduling Order will be issued w/90 days discovery time. Attorneys to discuss possible bifurcation of issues for trial. (swil) (Entered: 01/15/1991)
Oral order:, reset answer due for 1/31/91 for SC Dept of Youth Svc, for J. P. Neal, for Karole Jensen, for Joseph W. Hudgens, for Kathleen P. Jennings, for Frank Mauldin, for John F. Henry, for Richard E. Mclawhorn , an resetanswers to interrogatories due for 3/4/91 ( by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 01/15/1991)
9 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Joining of parties,amending of pleadings on 3/1/91 ; Deadline for filing of all motions 8/15/91 ; Discovery cutoff 7/15/91 ; Trial date set for 10/7/91 ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 01/16/1991)
10 ORDER granting [6-1] motion for appointment of Inez Moore Tenenbaum as guardian ad litem for Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S. , a minor ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 01/17/1991)
11 AMENDED COMPLAINT by Alexander S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., Ricky S., Inez Moore Tenenbaum , (Answer due 2/4/91 for SC Dept of Youth Svc, for J. P. Neal, for Karole Jensen, for Joseph W. Hudgens, for Kathleen P. Jennings, for Frank Mauldin, for John F. Henry, for Richard E. Mclawhorn ) amending [1-1] complaint (swil) (Entered: 01/24/1991)
12 ANSWER by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Joseph

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02/15/1991 03/07/1991 03/07/1991 03/11/1991 03/11/1991 04/01/1991
04/09/1991 04/17/1991 04/17/1991 04/30/1991 05/01/1991 05/06/1991

W. Hudgens, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn (Attorney Edward M. Woodward Jr, Michael Hart Montgomery, Vinton Devane Lide) to amended complaint (swil) (Entered: 02/13/1991)
13 Answers to 16B Interrogatories by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Joseph W. Hudgens, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 02/19/1991)
14 ORDER granting [4-2] motion for appointment of counsel ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 03/08/1991)
15 ORDER granting [4-1] motion to certify class action ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 03/08/1991)
16 MOTION by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. for discovery Order to allow inspection and filming of premises (swil) (Entered: 03/18/1991)
17 MEMORANDUM by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. in support of [16-1] motion for discovery Order to allow inspection and filming of premises (swil) (Entered: 03/18/1991)
18 MEMORANDUM by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Joseph W. Hudgens, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn in opposition to [16-1] motion for discovery Order to allow inspection and filming of premises (swil) (Entered: 04/02/1991)
19 CONSENT ORDER dismissing Joseph W. Hudgens from the action with prejudice. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 04/09/1991)
20 MOTION by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. for appt. of experts (swil) (Entered: 04/22/1991)
21 MEMORANDUM by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. in support of [20-1] motion for appt. of experts (swil) (Entered: 04/22/1991)
Status conference held(JFA,Jr./ ) Court orders videotape to be made (over obj. of deft). Ct. to make personal visit to facility. Colloquy with regard to experts. Disc. to be extended. (deputy bw) (swil) (Entered: 05/01/1991)
22 MEMORANDUM/PROPOSED LIST OF EXPERT WITNESSES by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. in support of [20-1] motion for appt. of experts (swil) (Entered: 05/03/1991)
23 RESPONSE by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen,

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05/30/1991 06/11/1991
06/14/1991 06/28/1991 07/19/1991 07/26/1991
07/26/1991 07/26/1991 07/26/1991 08/05/1991 08/05/1991

Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn to [20-1] motion for appt. of experts (swil) (Entered: 05/07/1991)
24 DISCOVERY ORDER granting [16-1] motion for discovery Order to allow inspection and filming of premises ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 06/03/1991)
Motion hearing re: [20-1] motion for appt. of experts. Court takes motion under adv. and gives deft. 1 week to submit names of general experts and 1 week to file objs. to Dr. Frank Provenzo (name subm. by pltf.) Pltf. to file written motion for production of certain employee records w/i 10 days from today. (former empl) (Entered: 06/11/1991)
25 MOTION by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. for access to defts' institutional records (swil) (Entered: 06/17/1991)
26 RESPONSE by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn to [25-1] motion for access to defts' institutional records (swil) (Entered: 07/01/1991)
Motion hearing re: [25-1] motion for access to defts' institutional records at 10:45 7/26/91, [20-1] motion for appt. of experts at 10:45 7/26/91 (swil) (Entered: 07/19/1991)
Motion hearing re: [25-1] motion for access to defts' institutional records Motion hearing held, [20-1] motion for appt. of experts Motion hearing held. Court grants pltf's motion for access to institutiional records. Pltf's motion for appointment of experts, granted, in part. Dr, Deniro apptd. as expert for pltf. on "limited" basis. Deft. to defray costs up to $5,000.00. Court refuses to appt. add. requested experts for pltf. Court to issue written order. (former empl) (Entered: 07/26/1991)
Text not available. (Entered: 07/26/1991)
Minute entry: granting [20-1] motion for appt. of experts (former empl) (Entered: 07/26/1991)
27 CONSENT ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF DISCOVERY TIME, reset scheduling order deadlines: Deadline for filing of all motions by 10/15/91 Discovery deadline on 9/16/91 Bench Trial set for 12/2/91 ; ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 07/29/1991)
28 MOTION by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn to abstain (swil) (Entered: 08/07/1991)
29 MEMORANDUM by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn in support of [28-1] motion to abstain (swil) (Entered: 08/07/1991)

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08/13/1991
08/19/1991 08/22/1991 08/22/1991 08/22/1991 08/28/1991 08/30/1991 09/11/1991 09/11/1991 09/11/1991 09/23/1991

30 ORDER appointing Paul W. DeMuro as an expert in this case; defts. shall compensate Mr. DeMuro at his normal hourly rate, not to exceed $5,000.00; the motion for appt. of add'l experts shall be held in abeyance pending receipt of Mr. DeMuro's recommendations ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 08/13/1991)
31 RESPONSE by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. to [28-1] motion to abstain (swil) (Entered: 08/23/1991)
32 NOTICE OF APPEAL by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Joseph W. Hudgens, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn . Fee Status: Unpaid, Transcript purchase order due on 9/2/91 (former empl) (Entered: 08/26/1991)
33 Docketing Statement for [32-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc (former empl) (Entered: 08/26/1991)
34 Transcript purchase order [32-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc Transcript due 10/21/91 (former empl) (Entered: 08/26/1991)
36 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETENESS BY STACEY WILSON . (former empl) (Entered: 08/30/1991)
APPEAL fees received $ $105.00 Paid (former empl) (Entered: 08/30/1991)
USCA Case Number Re: [32-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc USCA NUMBER: 912195 (former empl) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
APPEAL fees received $ $105.00 paid 8-26-91, (former empl) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
USCA Case Number Re: [32-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc USCA NUMBER: 912195 (former empl) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
38 ORDER ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) dir. that court approves counsel's request that parties have agreed to embark upon a negotiation period on all but one point raised by lawsuit; sessions to occur on weekly basis with periodic status conferences before court no less frequently than monthly (first session to occur on 9/20/91) - process to cont. for 6 months. Ct. finds no fault with this procedure and will place case on inactive status for this time period, with all pending motions to be held in abeyance. Mini-trial on issue of "population" to be schd. some time in Nov. or Dec, 1991 (disc. on this issue to be cont'd). mld eod

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09/24/1991
09/25/1991 10/03/1991 10/22/1991 10/29/1991
12/04/1991
12/04/1991 12/05/1991 12/05/1991 01/06/1992 01/14/1992 01/21/1992

9/24/91. (former empl) (Entered: 09/25/1991)
37 ORDER ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) dir. that order of 8/13/91 is modified to provide that question of which party shall be required to pay Dr. DeMuro's fee shall be reserved until conclusion of this action. If the pltfs. are the prevailing parties, the court may require the defts. to pay the DeMuro fee. MLD EOD 9/24/91. (former empl) (Entered: 09/24/1991)
39 ORDER mooting [28-1] motion to abstain ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) mld eod 9/26/91 (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1991)
40 ORDER appointing Paul W. DeMuro as pltf's expert witness; that court reserves judgment on the issue of Dr. DeMuro's compensation. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 10/03/1991)
Deadline updated; reset bench trial for 1/6/92 (swil) (Entered: 10/22/1991)
41 APPELLATE ORDER dismissing appeal w/out prejudice pursuant to Rule 42(b) FRAP; appellant shall bear all costs & fees; this order be issued as & for the mandate, Re: [32-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, SC Dept of Youth Svc (former empl) (Entered: 10/31/1991)
42 Stipulation of Fact by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Joseph W. Hudgens, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn, Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny Alfred S., Alexander S. (former empl) (Entered: 12/05/1991)
Bench trial held (JFA,jr/gs). Opening statements. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 12/05/1991)
Bench trial completed (JFA,jr/gs). WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Closing arguments. Ct. takes under advisement and directs counsel to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by 12/31/91. (former empl) (Entered: 12/05/1991)
43 REPORT OF THE GAL on the Effects of Overcrowding at S. C. Dept. of Youth Services. (former empl) (Entered: 12/05/1991)
44 PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by pltfs. (swil) (Entered: 01/07/1992)
Status conference held (JFA,jrjl). Colloquy with regard to factors (population issue and totality of circumstances) court should consider in his ruling. Written order to be issued. (former empl) (Entered: 01/14/1992)
45 ORDER pparties to take following actions: 1) to agree on definition of "seriously handicapped by mental illness or retardation. If no agreement, both sides should submit briefs; 2) defts to submit to Ct. explanation of

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02/10/1992 03/31/1992
03/31/1992 04/15/1992 04/21/1992 04/24/1992 04/24/1992 04/24/1992 04/30/1992

community treatment plan for status offenders, both before and after 7/92; 3) when defts submit info. on juveniles as per 1/14/92 hearing, it should also contain how many times juvenile appeared before family court judge and other procedural information. All information should be submitted no later than 2/14/92.( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 01/22/1992)
46 BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE (swil) (Entered: 02/11/1992)
47 ORDER 1) that the Ct. declines to make findings re: pop. ceilings; case to be restored to the active docket; parties to submit nominations for Ct appointed expert witnesses w/i 15 days of this order; all disc. to be completed by 7/15/92. 2) the Ct. certifies subclass of pltfs. consisting of juveniles presently and in the future housed at DYS who are seriously mentally retarded or mentally ill as defined in finding of fact #7. 3) Defts. to immediately determine exact # of members of above subclass and report to the Ct. their finding w/plans for transfer w/i 30 days of this order. A tentative deadline of 5 months from the date of this Order is set for all transfers to be completed. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 03/31/1992)
48 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER setting Joining of parties,amending of pleadings on 4/17/92 ; Deadline for filing of all motions 7/29/92 ; Discovery cutoff 7/15/92 ; Bench Trial set for 9/7/92 ; ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 03/31/1992)
49 BRIEF OF PROPOSED EXPERT WITNESSES by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. (swil) (Entered: 04/16/1992)
50 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM/NOMINATION OF EXPERTS by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 04/21/1992)
51 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER supplementing the definition of mental illness and mentally handicapped set forth in this court's order of 3/31/92. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
52 MOTION by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. for attorney fees, costs and expenses (swil) (Entered: 04/27/1992)
53 MEMORANDUM by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. in support of [52-1] motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses, w/affidavits in support w/i the bound document. (swil) (Entered: 04/27/1992)
54 MEMORANDUM in COMPLIANCE WITH COURT'S ORDER by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 05/01/1992)

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05/05/1992 05/06/1992 05/06/1992 05/15/1992 05/21/1992
05/22/1992
05/27/1992
05/27/1992 06/02/1992 06/02/1992 06/02/1992

55 ORDER modifying the 3/31/92 order so as to explicitly provide that the relief granted shall only apply to juveniles incarcerated at R&E and the three long-term institutions. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 05/06/1992)
56 ORDER denying [52-1] motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses W/O PREJUDICE. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 05/07/1992)
57 AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN COMPLIANCE WITH COURT'S ORDER by SC Dept of Youth Svc, J. P. Neal, Karole Jensen, Kathleen P. Jennings, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 05/07/1992)
58 AMENDED PETITION/MOTION AND MEMORANDUM by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Ricky S., Lafayette M., Christopher M., Benny B., Alfred S., Alexander S. for attorney fees, costs, and expenses (swil) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
59 ORDER clarifying erroneous statements of fact contained in a letter by the SCDMR to family court judges; this Court has not and will not issue orders to family court judges purporting to direct which juveniles may or may not be assigned to DYS; this order to be mailed to all family court judges. EOD 5-21-92. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 05/26/1992)
60 ORDER vacating the portion of the March 31, 1992 order granting immediate relief to the defined sub-class; DYS to take steps to secure return of juveniles who have been transferred out of its physical custody; mooting [58-1] motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses EOD 5-2292. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 05/26/1992)
61 ORDER APPOINTING EXPERT WITNESSES appointing the following experts pursuant to Fed. Rules of Evidence 706: James O. Finckenauer, Danie A. Johnson, Bethann Jenks, Kay W. Allen, and Margaret Beyer. Each expert to file report w/Clerk in his area of expertise regarding the issues in dispute. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 05/28/1992)
62 MOTION AND MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff S. to amend [60-1] order purs. to Rule 52b (swil) (Entered: 05/28/1992)
Motion hearing re: [62-1] motion to amend [60-1] order purs. to Rule 52b at 9:00 6/12/92 (swil) (Entered: 06/02/1992)
63 MOTION to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian (swil) (Entered: 06/04/1992)
64 NOTICE of MOTION TO INTERVENE by intervenor-defendant Richard A. Harpootlian (swil) (Entered: 06/04/1992)

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06/02/1992 06/12/1992
06/12/1992 06/12/1992 06/12/1992 06/30/1992
07/02/1992 07/02/1992 07/06/1992 07/07/1992
07/17/1992
07/22/1992
07/24/1992

65 MEMORANDUM by intervenor-defendant Richard A. Harpootlian in support of [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian, w/proposed answer attached. (swil) (Entered: 06/04/1992)
Motion hearing re: [62-1] motion to amend [60-1] order purs. to Rule 52b Motion hearing held. (JFA,jr/gs). Motion taken under advisement. Court to issue written order. All future orders and notices for hearings to be provided to all interested state agencies. (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
Minute entry: [62-1] motion to amend [60-1] order purs. to Rule 52b taken under advisement (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
66 AFFIDAVIT by Paula Finley for notice only Sandra Ray of the SC Continuum of Care for Emotionally Disturbed Children. (swil) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
67 AFFIDAVIT by John A. Morris, Jr. on behalf of notice only Kennerly M. McLendon of the SC Dept. of Mental Health. (swil) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
68 ORDER that defts. to pay Professor Finckenauer $4,400.00 for his time and reimburse him $1,136.00 for out-of-pocket expenses. Amount to be remitted to him w/i 10 days of the date of this order. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 07/01/1992)
Motion hearing re: [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian at 11:00 7/16/92 (swil) (Entered: 07/02/1992)
69 Transcript(khb/contract) of proceedings held 1/15/91 before Judge Joe Anderson, Jr. in Cola, SC. (swil) (Entered: 07/06/1992)
70 ORDER denying [62-1] motion to amend [60-1] order purs. to Rule 52b ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 07/07/1992)
71 Offer of judgment by defendant SC Dept of Youth Svc, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 07/07/1992)
72 WITHDRAWAL OF Offer of judgment by defendant SC Dept of Youth Svc, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn (swil) (Entered: 07/21/1992)
73 Amended Answers to 16B Interrogatories by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. (swil) (Entered: 07/22/1992)
74 MOTION by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for hearing to set scheduling Order (swil) (Entered: 07/24/1992)

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08/03/1992 08/03/1992 08/04/1992 08/07/1992
08/11/1992 08/12/1992
08/21/1992 08/21/1992 08/21/1992
09/18/1992 09/21/1992 10/13/1992

75 Transcript(jlp) of proceedings held on 1/14/92. (swil) (Entered: 08/04/1992)
76 Transcript(jlp) of proceedings held on 7/26/91. (swil) (Entered: 08/04/1992)
Motion hearing set [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian at 9:00 8/12/92 (swil) (Entered: 08/04/1992)
77 MEMORANDUM by defendant SC Dept of Youth Svc, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn in opposition to [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian (swil) (Entered: 08/10/1992)
78 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. in opposition to [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian (swil) (Entered: 08/13/1992)
Motion hearing(JFA,Jr/w. cecil,contract) re: [74-1] motion for hearing to set scheduling Order, [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian held. Ct. grants motion to extend scheduling Order; disc. will not end until last report of expert filed (apprx. 2/93). Ct. denies motion to intervene, grants Solicitor amicus status with rights to object. Further briefing allowed on atty's fees issue, further briefs due w/i 30 days. Ct. to issue written order. (swil) (Entered: 08/12/1992)
79 ORDER denying [63-1] motion to intervene by Richard A. Harpootlian; solicitor to proceed as amicus curiae instead, w/permission to object to any final order or settlement which may be reached in this matter. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 08/21/1992)
80 REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER setting Discovery cutoff 2/15/93 ; parties need add'l time after receipt of experts reports (90 days) for depositions and trial preparations.( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 08/21/1992)
81 ORDER making semantical corrections to the Order of 5/22/92. (Copy of protocol, transmittal memo, and memo to Juvenile Parole Board in question attached). Modifying July 6, 1992 order re: letter written by juvenile. Juvenile was from long list, not short list as quoted in order. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (swil) (Entered: 08/21/1992)
82 Transcript(W. Cecil/Contract) of proceedings held on 8/12/92 before the Hon. Jos. F. Anderson, Jr. (swil) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
83 MOTION by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. to withdraw [58-1] motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses (swil) (Entered: 09/21/1992)
84 Transcript(jmc) of hrg. held 6/11/92 before the Hon. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (swil) (Entered: 10/13/1992)

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11/24/1992 12/02/1992 12/28/1992 01/04/1993
01/19/1993
01/19/1993 02/12/1993 02/22/1993 02/23/1993 03/17/1993

85 ORDER, that defendants are to procure copies of documents listed in the Order and mail them directly to Mr. Danie A. Johnson, the architect expert appointed by the Court for this case ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 11/24/1992)
86 ORDER, that defendants are hereby requested to pay the amount of services of Dr. Bethanne Jenks, one of the court appointed expert witnesses, within 20 days ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 12/03/1992)
87 Response by Solicitor Richard A. Harpootlian to defendant's interrogatories (former empl) (Entered: 01/03/1993)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr (JFA,jr/jc). Counsel inform court that settlement agreement is probable. Deft's motion to compel, denied. Various Reports (verbal) presented by representatives of agencies. Counsel to present court with written agreement. Mr. Harpootlian to be provided with final draft of written agreement. (former empl) (Entered: 01/04/1993)
88 ORDER that the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Mental Retardation shall disclose to the Plaintiff's counsel or guardian, or agents of either, the requested records of juveniles in this class action upon request by the plaintiff's attorneys, the Guardian Ad Litem , or agents of either( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 01/24/1993)
89 ORDER that the defendant pay the attached fee to Dr. Marty Beyer, one of the court appointed expert witnesses, for services rendered from August through December of 1992 as soon as conveniently possible ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 01/24/1993)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr /gs. Progress of settlement discussed. Court indicates it may schedule for definite trial date in the fall. (former empl) (Entered: 02/12/1993)
90 MOTION by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for Hearing and Supplemental Relief (former empl) (Entered: 02/23/1993)
91 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of motion for hearing on defendants' counsel by counsel for plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. (former empl) (Entered: 02/23/1993)
92 MEMORANDUM by defendant SC Dept of Youth Svc, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn in opposition to [90-1] motion for Hearing and Supplemental Relief (former empl) (Entered: 03/25/1993)

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03/17/1993 03/24/1993 04/27/1993 04/27/1993 05/13/1993 05/14/1993 05/21/1993 06/01/1993
07/01/1993
07/19/1993
10/19/1993

93 Second Interrogatories to plaintiffs signed by defendants' counsel (former empl) (Entered: 03/25/1993)
94 Transcript of hearing before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. on 2/12/93 by court reporter Gary N. Smith (former empl) (Entered: 04/10/1993)
95 MOTION by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for protective order governing production of educational records by SC DYS (former empl) Modified on 04/30/1993 (Entered: 04/30/1993)
96 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [95-1] motion for protective order governing production of educational records by SC DYS (former empl) (Entered: 04/30/1993)
98 Agreement to develop a plan of settlement (former empl) (Entered: 05/19/1993)
97 PROTECTIVE ORDER granting [95-1] motion for protective order governing production of educational records by SC DYS ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 05/17/1993)
99 MOTION by plaintiff Class to delay prosecution pending timely receipt of a settlement proposal called for in the attached Agreement to Develop a Plan of Settlement ; attachment not received until 5/24/93 and is now attached to motion. (former empl) (Entered: 06/01/1993)
100 ORDER granting [99-1] motion to delay prosecution pending timely receipt of a settlement proposal called for in the attached Agreement to Develop a Plan of Settlement; motion to stay prosecution of the action, for a reasonable period of time, is granted so the parties may explore settlement. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.); eod mld 6/1/93. (former empl) (Entered: 06/01/1993)
101 ORDER mooting [90-1] motion for Hearing and Supplemental Relief. On March 23, 1993, the parties filed a motion requesting a hearing for the purpose of allowing the court to review a document formally setting out a procedure whereby settlement might be explored. That hearing has now been conducted and the clerk is authorized to remove this motion from the court's pending motion list. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/1/93. (former empl) (Entered: 07/01/1993)
102 ORDER directing the defendants to pay Mr. James O. Finckenauer (one of the court appointed expert witnesses), the sum of $1,214.76 representing expenses advanced, and $5,520.00 for time expended on this case, yielding a grand total due Mr. Finckenauer of $6,734.76, as soon as reasonably possible. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/20/93. (former empl) (Entered: 07/20/1993)
103 ORDER that the defendants reimburse Mr. Margaret Beyer, Ph.D, one of

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11/01/1993 11/03/1993 11/05/1993 11/05/1993 11/08/1993 11/16/1993 11/16/1993
11/23/1993 12/10/1993
12/10/1993
12/28/1993 12/29/1993

the court-appointed expert witnesses in this case, $5,000.00 for consultation and $869.20 in expenses, for a total of $5,869.20. A copy of Ms. Beyer's invoice is attached to this order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/19/93. (former empl) (Entered: 10/19/1993)
Set Status conference at 10:30 11/16/93 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 11/01/1993)
Deadline updated; reset status conference for 9:00 11/16/93 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. due to attorney schedule conflict. (former empl) (Entered: 11/03/1993)
104 MOTION by plaintiff class to amend complaint to add proper parties defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 11/10/1993)
105 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of [104-1] motion to amend complaint to add proper parties defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 11/10/1993)
106 MOTION by plaintiffs to restore case to active docket and for a trial date to be set. (former empl) Modified on 11/10/1993 (Entered: 11/10/1993)
107 MEMORANDUM by defendants SC Dept of Youth Svc, et al. in opposition to [104-1] motion to amend complaint to add proper parties defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 11/16/1993)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jane LaPorte. Plaintiff's motion to amend not ruled on at this time. Defendant's Offer of Judgment rejected by plaintiff. For trial in May or June, 1994. Court to enter revised Scheduling Order. Experts to be deposed (court sets time limitation). Inez Tenenbau, GAL, to file motion to be relieved and new GAL appointed. Trial to take 2 or more weeks. (former empl) (Entered: 11/16/1993)
108 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendant's [107-1] opposition memorandum to plaintiffs' motion to amend complaint. (former empl) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
109 MOTION by plaintiff/guardian ad litem Inez Moore Tenenbaum for an order relieving her of her duties as guardian ad litem for the plaintiff class and appointing Lesly A. Bowers as a replacement guardian. (former empl) (Entered: 12/13/1993)
110 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum in support of [109-1] motion for an order relieving her of her duties as guardian ad litem for the plaintiff class and appointing Lesly A. Bowers as a replacement guardian. (former empl) (Entered: 12/13/1993)
111 MEMORANDUM by defendants regarding the Guardian ad Litem. (former empl) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
112 SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY by plaintiffs to defendant's [107-1] memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to amend complaint. (former empl) (Entered: 12/30/1993)

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01/04/1994 01/06/1994 01/07/1994
01/07/1994
02/17/1994 02/17/1994 03/07/1994 03/07/1994
03/17/1994 03/17/1994

113 FINAL SCHEDULING ORDER setting Deadline for filing of all motions 5/13/94; Discovery cutoff 4/29/94; Bench Trial set for 6/13/94; (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 1/4/94. (former empl) (Entered: 01/04/1994)
114 AMENDED MEMORANDUM in support of [111-1] memorandum regarding the guardian ad litem. (former empl) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
115 ORDER granting Inez Moore Tenenbaum's [109-1] motion for an order relieving her of her duties as guardian ad litem for the plaintiff class and appointing Lesly A. Bowers as a replacement guardian. Substituting party; terminated party Inez Moore Tenenbaum, added Guardian ad Litem plaintiff Lesly A. Bowers. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) mld 1/7/94. (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/1994)
116 ORDER granting in part, denying in part plaintiffs' [104-1] motion to amend complaint to add proper parties defendant. The motion is granted insofar as it seeks to change the designation of the Department of Youth Services to the Department of Juvenile Justice. The motion is also granted insofar as it seeks to add Flora Brooks Boyd, individually and in her official capacity, as a party defendant. The motion is denied in all other respects. The suggestion by the defendants that the former commissioner and individual board members should be dismissed from the action is denied. All future pleadings shall bear the caption which appears on the first page of this order. (signed Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) mld 1/7/94. (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/1994)
117 MOTION by plaintiffs for temporary restraining order , for preliminary injunction , for Declaratory Judgment. (former empl) (Entered: 02/17/1994)
118 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Ricky S. in support of [117-1] motion for temporary restraining order, [117-2] motion for preliminary injunction, [117-3] motion for Declaratory Judgment. (former empl) (Entered: 02/17/1994)
119 MEMORANDUM by defendants Juvenile Justice Dep, J. P. Neal, Frank Mauldin, John F. Henry, Richard E. Mclawhorn in opposition to Motion to Restrain. (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
120 ORDER that defendant Flora Brooks Boyd and the SCDJJ shall allow one attorney for the plaintiff class, W. Gaston Fairey and 4 assistants to immediate access to the disciplinary units at John G. Richards Institution and the Santee unit and the Birchwood Institution on 3/8/94. The visit shall not be before 9:00 a.m. and must commece before 11:00 a.m. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/7/94. This matter came before the court on an oral ex parte motion by the plaintiff class counsel. (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
121 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendant's [119-1] memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion to restrain. (former empl) (Entered: 03/17/1994)
122 AFFIDAVIT of John B. Shupper. Re: [121-1] reply. (former empl)

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03/18/1994 03/29/1994 04/01/1994 04/13/1994 04/21/1994
04/21/1994 04/26/1994 04/28/1994
05/03/1994
05/03/1994 05/11/1994 05/13/1994

(Entered: 03/17/1994)
123 Transcript of hearing held 11/16/93 before the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
Set Motion hearing 10:45 4/14/94 re: [117-1] motion for temporary restraining order, [117-2] motion for preliminary injunction, [117-3] motion for Declaratory Judgment. (former empl) (Entered: 03/29/1994)
124 Amended Answers to 16B Interrogatories by plaintiff Alexander S. (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1994)
125 Letter to Judge Anderson from Claude Scarborough, Esquire regarding their position on fees in this case. (former empl) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
Motion hearing re: [117-1] motion for temporary restraining order, [1172] motion for preliminary injunction, [117-3] motion for Declaratory Judgment. (JFA,jr/Gary Smith). Court grants motion for preliminary injunction to continue until trial on the merits. Colloquy with regard to "equal access" issue. Discovery extended to May 15, 1994. (former empl) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
Minute entry: mooting [117-1] motion for temporary restraining order, granting [117-2] motion for preliminary injunction, mooting [117-3] motion for Declaratory Judgment. (former empl) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
126 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs Alexander S., et al. addressing the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Department of Juvenile Justice. (former empl) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
127 ORDER denying plaintiffs' [117-1] motion for temporary restraining order, denying [117-2] motion for preliminary injunction, denying [1173] motion for Declaratory Judgment. The court will however, grant temporary relief enjoining the transfer of any 19 year olds to adult prison facilities between the date of 4/21 and 6/13/94, the scheduled trial of this case. (signed Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 4/28/94. (former empl) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
128 ORDER that the defendants shall compile and submit to the court for its in camera review, a census of all juveniles houses at the facilities maintained by the SCDC as of 5/4/94. The census should be sent directly to Judge Anderson, not filed with the clerk's office. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/3/94. (former empl) (Entered: 05/03/1994)
129 ORDER that the defendants ahll pay the attached statement for the deposition of one of the court's experts Dr. Bethanne Jenks. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/3/94. (former empl) (Entered: 05/03/1994)
Pre-trial conference set at 9:30 5/13/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 05/11/1994)
Pre-trial conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./jane

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05/13/1994 05/13/1994 05/19/1994 05/19/1994 05/23/1994
05/24/1994
05/24/1994 05/27/1994 06/07/1994

laporte. Logistics of trial discussed. Oral motion by Mr. Woodward and Mr. Lide to be relieved as counsel for three of Board members, granted. Written order to be submitted by Mr. Woodward. (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1994)
130 ORDER directing the defendants to pay the invoice of Dr. Kay W. Allen, court appointed expert witness, as soon as reasonably possible. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/13/94. (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1994)
131 Amended Answers to 16B Interrogatories by plaintiff Alexander S., et al. (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1994)
132 MEMORANDUM by defendants Flora Brooks Boyd, et al. in support of Motion to Abstain re: exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA. (former empl) (Entered: 05/23/1994)
133 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs Alexander S., et al. in opposition to the Motion to Abstain re: exhaustion remedies of IDEA. (former empl) (Entered: 05/23/1994)
134 WRITTEN ORDER granting motion for attorneys Woodward and Lide to withdraw as attorney for defendants Jensen, Henry and Jennings. (Terminated attorney Vinton Devane Lide, Michael Hart Montgomery, and Edward M. Woodward for defendants John F. Henry, Kathleen P. Jennings, and Karole Jensen. Note: attorney Michael H. Montgomery was not listed in the order, however he made an appearance at some point for the above named defendants. As he is with the same firm Mr. Lide and Mr. Woodward, he was terminated as attorney for these defendants also. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/23/94. (former empl) (Entered: 05/23/1994)
135 PRETRIAL ORDER #1: The non-jury trial will commence on 6/13/94 at 9:30 in Courtroom #4. Court will strictly enforce Local Rule 13.04 regarding premarking of exhibits, and Rule 13.05 regarding exchanging of notices of deposition excerpts to be published at trial. Five expert witnesses shall be allowed to review their reports and update and revise any portions of the report. Parties reminded of court's authority under Rule 403 of Federal Rules of Evidence. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/24/94. (former empl) Modified on 05/24/1994 (Entered: 05/24/1994)
Deadline updated; Reset bench trial for 9:30 6/13/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 05/24/1994)
136 ORDER authorizing the Dept. of Juvenile Justice to release any records including those which contain the names of the juveniles confined at the institution to the plaintiffs' attorneys. These records may be examined by the plaintiff's counsel in this case without redacting the names the juveniles. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/31/94. (former empl) (Entered: 05/31/1994)
137 MOTION by amicus Richard A. Harpootlian to continue this case

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06/07/1994 06/08/1994 06/13/1994
06/13/1994 06/13/1994
06/13/1994 06/13/1994 06/14/1994
06/14/1994 06/14/1994 06/15/1994

beyond the October 1994 term. (former empl) (Entered: 06/08/1994)
138 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant Juvenile Justice Department in support of Motion to Abstain. Re: IDEA. (former empl) (Entered: 06/08/1994)
139 Second Amended Answers to 16B Interrogatories by defendant Juvenile Justice Department. (former empl) (Entered: 06/09/1994)
140 MOTION in limine by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Joseph W. Hudgens, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn, defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to exclude from evidence the results of surveys of the juvenile population of DJJ (former empl) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
Minute entry: denying [137-1] motion to continue this case beyond the October 1994 term. (former empl) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith/Jack Clarke. Court addresses motion in limine as to survey evidence and "exhaustion" issue. Court allows case to go forward on "exhaustion" issue. Court takes under advisement admissability of survey evidence. Court rules that experts may rely on surveys. Colloquy as to IDEA compliance. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) Modified on 06/14/1994 (Entered: 06/14/1994)
141 DEPOSITION of Bernhard N. Bates (former empl) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
143 CONSENT ORDER re: in event of damages award against defendants Jennings, Jensen and Henry, that no judgment shall be filed against these defendants in excess of the available insurance, regardless of the amount of their insurance. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) mld 6/14/94. (former empl) (Entered: 06/15/1994)
142 MEMORANDUM by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Joseph W. Hudgens, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn on the retroactive effect of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act. (former empl) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./ Gary Smith and Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Oral stipulation of counsel published - any damage award is limited to available insurance proceeds and that expert witness fees are at the discretion of the court. (former empl) (Entered: 06/15/1994)
144 REQUEST FOR QUESTIONS to be asked of witnesses - filed by Richard A. Harpootlian, amicus curiae. (former empl) (Entered: 06/15/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith/Jack

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06/15/1994 06/15/1994 06/16/1994 06/16/1994 06/17/1994 06/17/1994 06/20/1994 06/21/1994
06/22/1994 06/23/1994 06/24/1994
06/25/1994
06/25/1994 06/27/1994

Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Oral motion by plaintiff to amend complaint to add new sub-class, under advisement. (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/1994)
145 DEPOSITION of Dan Lawther, PhD. (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/1994)
146 DEPOSITION of John Kinchen (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/1994)
147 Transcript by John M. Clarke of excerpt of testimony on 6/15/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith/Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 06/17/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith/Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 06/21/1994)
148 DEPOSITION of Ronald Jenkins (former empl) (Entered: 06/21/1994)
Bench trial held at Law School before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 06/21/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke and Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Counsel directs counsel to submit findings as to damages issue by 6/23/94. (former empl) (Entered: 06/21/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 06/22/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith and Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 06/23/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith and Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Oral motion by plaintiff for federal investigation into alleged intimidation of juvenile witness by employee of defendant - under advisement. (former empl) (Entered: 06/27/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Plaintiff rests as to constitutional issue. Defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law as to following issues: Visitation - withdrawn by plaintiff; denial of access to legal system denied; free speech and association - withdrawn by plaintiff; fire safety denied; court denies defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to constitutional issues. Court de-certifies class as to damages. Written order to be entered. (former empl) (Entered: 06/27/1994)
149 DEPOSITION of Kenneth Moses (former empl) (Entered: 06/27/1994)
150 Transcript (Excerpt) of testimony of Jody G. and Ccurtis F. on 6/24/94 in Columbia before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 06/27/1994)

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06/27/1994 06/28/1994 06/28/1994 07/05/1994
07/05/1994 07/06/1994 07/06/1994 07/06/1994
07/07/1994 07/07/1994
07/08/1994
07/15/1994

Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 06/27/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke/Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Court informs counsel that he will inform United States Attorney as to alleged intimidation of juvenile witness. (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/1994)
151 DEPOSITION of Swan Benston (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/1994)
152 ORDER directing that plaintiff class is decertified solely in regard to damages claim; therefore, order of March 7, 1991 is modified so as to decertify class as to damages only. Plaintiffs' counsel shall forthwith notify all class members of the decertification decision. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) mld eod 7/5/94. (former empl) (Entered: 07/05/1994)
153 Transcript (Volume VI) filed by Gary Smith of proceedings 6/20/94 in Columbia before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.. (former empl) (Entered: 07/05/1994)
154 Transcript (Excerpt of Dr. Michael David Cohen) filed by Gary Smith and Jack Clarke of proceedinga 6/14/94 in Columbia before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 07/06/1994)
155 Transcript (excerpt of Dr. Frank J. Provenzano) filed by Jack Clarke of proceedings held 6/22/94 in Columbia before Judge Joseph F. Aanderson. (former empl) (Entered: 07/06/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Mr. Fairey requests court to reconsider ruling as to decertification as to damages - denied. Mr. Woodward renews motion for judgment as a matter of law as to overcrowding - denied. (former empl) (Entered: 07/06/1994)
156 Transcript (Excerpt) - testimony of Marlene T. McClain filed by Gary Smith and Jack Clarke of proccedings in Columbia before Judge Joseph F. Anderosn, Jr. on 6/17/94. (former empl) (Entered: 07/07/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Defendant rests as to constitutional claim. Oral request by defendant to delay any motions for judgment as a matter of law, granted. All parties agree that court will make two visits to institution - one with employee of DJJ and one with plaintiffs' guardian ad litem. (former empl) (Entered: 07/07/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. Court directs counsel to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to constitutional issues within one month from today. Counsel for plaintiffs and defendant present overview of constitutional issues. (former empl) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
157 MOTION and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by plaintiff Inez Moore Tenenbaum to decertify the plaintiff's statutory claims or in the

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07/18/1994 07/19/1994 07/21/1994
07/21/1994 07/22/1994
07/22/1994 07/22/1994 07/22/1994 07/22/1994 07/25/1994 07/25/1994 07/25/1994 07/26/1994 07/27/1994 07/27/1994 07/27/1994

alternative to abstain. (former empl) (Entered: 07/15/1994)
158 Transcript Excerpts from June 22, 1994 re: hearing before the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Gary Smith, Ct Rptr.) (former empl) (Entered: 07/19/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke. Arguments as to method of notice to class members as to decertification issue. (former empl) (Entered: 07/21/1994)
159 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. in opposition to [157-1] motion to decertify the plaintiff's statutory claims or in the alternative to abstain. (former empl) (Entered: 07/21/1994)
Bench trial (as to educational issue) held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 07/22/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Court denies defendant's motion as to decertification issue or to abstain. Clerk to enter Minute Order. (former empl) (Entered: 07/22/1994)
160 Minute order: denying [157-1] motion to decertify the plaintiff's statutory claims or in the alternative to abstain. mld eod 7/22/94. (former empl) (Entered: 07/22/1994)
161 DEPOSITION of Ellen A. Cauthen (former empl) (Entered: 07/22/1994)
162 DEPOSITION of Mavis McLeod (Volume I). (former empl) (Entered: 07/25/1994)
163 DEPOSITION of Mavis McLeod (Volume 2). (former empl) (Entered: 07/25/1994)
164 DEPOSITION of Meda C. Cobb (former empl) (Entered: 07/25/1994)
165 ORDER approving form and content of notice to be mailed to individual members of the plaintiff class. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) mld eod 7/25/94. (former empl) (Entered: 07/25/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 07/25/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
166 Stipulation of Facts by plaintiffs and defendants. (former empl) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
167 DEPOSITION of Robert J. Keivit (former empl) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
168 Plaintiff's designations of deposition testimony from Robert J. Keivit

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07/27/1994 07/28/1994 07/28/1994 08/08/1994 08/08/1994
08/10/1994 08/18/1994 08/18/1994
08/22/1994 08/29/1994
09/07/1994 09/13/1994

under Rule 32(A)(2). (former empl) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
169 Copy of form of "NOTICE" which will be mailed to class members (filed at direction of the court). (former empl) (Entered: 07/28/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Plaintiff rests as to "education" issue. Motion by defendant for judgment as a matter of law reserved by defendant. Trial to continue August 8, 1994. (former empl) (Entered: 07/28/1994)
170 DEPOSITION of Ray Cavanagh (former empl) (Entered: 08/08/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Defendant rests, except for "wrap-up" on August 29, 1994. Court directs that proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to "education" be submitted by September 29, 1994. Court and counsel discuss possible "monitor." Court to reconvene on August 29, 1994 at 9:30 for "wrap-up" witnesses and issues. (former empl) (Entered: 08/08/1994)
171 AFFIDAVIT of Publication by Greenville News for plaintiff Alexander S. Re: [152-1] order decertification of class. (former empl) (Entered: 08/12/1994)
172 AFFIDAVIT of Publication by Post and Courier newspaper Re: advertisement of decertification notice. (former empl) (Entered: 08/18/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. Court and counsel discuss method by which counsel for plaintiffs will speak with juveniles as to decertification issue. Court directs that two meetings be conducted at each campus. Logistics for remainder of trial discussed. (former empl) (Entered: 08/18/1994)
173 Transcript/Excerpt of proceedings held on 6/13/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Gary Smith Ct.Rptr.) (former empl) (Entered: 08/22/1994)
Bench trial held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Jack Clarke. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. Closing arguments. Court directs counsel to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law by 9/29/94. Court takes all issues under advisement and will issue written order. (former empl) (Entered: 08/29/1994)
174 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S., et al. addressing burden shifting under section 504 and accomodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. (former empl) (Entered: 09/08/1994)
175 AFFIDAVIT of the State Newspaper Re: advertisement/notice that ran 8/5/94, 8/6/94, and 8/7/94 re:damages. (former empl) (Entered: 09/13/1994)

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09/20/1994 09/27/1994 11/22/1994
12/02/1994 12/14/1994
01/06/1995 01/25/1995
01/25/1995 01/25/1995 01/31/1995 02/06/1995

176 ORDER that the defendants shall pay Marty Beyer, one of the court's expert witnesses as soon as conveniently possible. Copy of statement of Mr. Beyer attached to order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod ml 9/20/94. (former empl) (Entered: 09/20/1994)
177 ORDER extending time for defendants to submit proposed findings of fact. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. eod mld 9/28/94. (former empl) (Entered: 09/28/1994)
178 ORDER setting a hearing for the purpose of receiving testimony of Dolly Kent and for discussing the possibility of a federal grant set for 9:00 12/14/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) cc: Dolly Kent c/o Alston Wilkes Society, 2215 Devine Street, Columbia, SC 29205. Separate hearing notice also sent to all counsel of record along with this order. (former empl) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
Minute entry: mooting [140-1] motion to exclude from evidence the results of surveys of the juvenile population of DJJ (former empl) (Entered: 12/02/1994)
Evidentiary hearing held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. : discussion of USDJ brief, compilation submitted to court from defendants re: grants; testimony of Dolly Cant, Director of Alston Wilkes society. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (JFA,jr/Jane LaPorte). (former empl) Modified on 12/15/1994 (Entered: 12/14/1994)
179 REPLY/RESPONSE by plaintiff Alexander S., et al. to the U.S. Department of Education's Statement of Interest. (former empl) Modified on 01/09/1995 (Entered: 01/09/1995)
180 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW re: constitutional and statutorial deficiencies. Defendants are required to submit to the court within 120 days, a detailed plan to remedy the deficienies identified in this order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) (former empl) (Entered: 01/25/1995)
Deadline updated; Set defendant's brief due for 5/25/95 pursuant to [1801] order. (former empl) (Entered: 01/25/1995)
181 ORDER dissolving the preliminary injunction granted in this court's order of 4/26/94 and denying the plaintiff's motion for permanent injunctive relief. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) (former empl) (Entered: 01/25/1995)
182 ORDER directing that all exhibits be returned to parties introducing them and that they remain intact until time for appeal has expired. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) mld eod 1/31/95. (former empl) (Entered: 01/31/1995)
183 MOTION AND MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. to amend certain portions of the court's 1/25/95 [180-1] findings of fact order. (former empl) (Entered: 02/06/1995)

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02/09/1995 02/14/1995 02/17/1995
02/17/1995
03/08/1995 05/17/1995 05/25/1995 05/26/1995
05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995

184 ORDER that the court's order of 1/25/95 is not a final order for appeal purposes and the clerk is directed not to enter judgment. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/9/95. (former empl) (Entered: 02/09/1995)
185 MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' [183-1] motion to amend certain portions of the court's 1/25/95 [180-1] findings of fact order. (former empl) (Entered: 02/14/1995)
186 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [183-1] motion to amend certain portions of the court's 1/25/95 [180-1] findings of fact order. The order is amended so as to substitute the last paragraph appearing on page 54 of the order (dealing with Title II of the ADA); the plaintiff's motion to make additional findings regarding non-compliance with ADA is denied. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/21/95. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1995)
187 ORDER upon request by plaintiffs that defendants place at least 4 copies of the 1/25/95 order at each of the 3 long term campuses so that they may be reviewed by the members of the plaintiff class, as well as administrators and staff personnel at DJJ. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/21/95. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1995)
188 Transcripts (Vol. 1-4) of hearing held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. on 6/13/94. (former empl) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
Status conference set at 11:15 5/26/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr re: Hearing to review Defendants' submissions. (former empl) (Entered: 05/17/1995)
189 BRIEF by defendants Flora Brooks Boyd, et al. re: Defendants' Remedial Plans. (former empl) (Entered: 05/25/1995)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr./Gary Smith. Court and counsel discuss proposed remedial "Plan" submitted by defendants. Court will schedule final hearing for Monday, June 26, 1995 at 10 am. Mr. Lide requests permission to take depositions relating to plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees-under advisement. (former empl) (Entered: 05/26/1995)
190 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendants' [189-1] brief re: remedial plan as to statutory and educational deficiencies. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
191 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's [189-1] brief re: remedial plan for compliance in the constitutional areas. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
192 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
193 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for constitutional and

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05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995 05/26/1995 06/02/1995 06/06/1995 06/06/1995 06/06/1995 06/06/1995 06/06/1995 06/15/1995

statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
194 AFFIDAVIT of W. Gaston Fairey, Esq. Re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
195 AFFIDAVIT of Rochelle Romosca Re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
196 AFFIDAVIT of Tammie M. Pope Re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
197 AFFIDAVIT of Nancy C. McCormick Re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
198 AFFIDAVIT of Holly C. Walker Re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
199 MEMORANDUM in support of [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims by Nelson Mullins. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
200 AFFIDAVIT of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough Re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 05/30/1995)
201 MOTION by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to obtain information regarding fees charged and expenses sought by plaintiffs. (former empl) (Entered: 06/06/1995)
202 Transcript of Proceedings (Vol. V) 6/17/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Gary Smith/Jack Clarke). (former empl) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
203 Transcript of Proceedings (Vol. VII) 6/21/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Gary Smith/Jack Clarke). (former empl) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
204 Transcript of proceedings (Vol. VIII) 6/22/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson (Jack Clark/Gary Smith). (former empl) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
205 Transcript of proceedings (vol. IX) 6/23/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson (Jack Clarke/Gary Smith). (former empl) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
206 Transcript of proceedings (Vol. X) 6/24/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Jack Clarke/Gary Smith). (former empl) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
207 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alexander S. to [201-1] motion to obtain information regarding fees charged and expenses sought by plaintiffs.

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06/26/1995 06/28/1995
06/28/1995 07/14/1995 07/25/1995 08/08/1995 08/21/1995 08/30/1995 08/30/1995
08/30/1995 08/30/1995

(former empl) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
Minute entry: Final Hearing to Address Remedial Plan: Court to appoint Robert Burnside as Monitor. Court accepts Remedial Plan as submitted by defendant. Final written order to be entered. (JFA,jr/Jack Clarke). (former empl) (Entered: 06/26/1995)
208 ORDER APPROVING DEFENDANT'S REMEDIAL PLAN dated May 25, 1995 as supplemented on 6/23/95 (and attached hereto) AND ORDER REFERRING CASE to special master Judge Robert H. Burnside as special master. The defendants will pay Judge Burnside $150.00 per hour for any time reasonably spend on this case, plus reasonable expenses as compensation for his services. The clerk is authorized to enter final judgment in this case. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/28/95. (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/1995)
209 JUDGMENT approving the defendants' remedial plan; defendant Joseph W. Hudgens is dismissed with prejudice. (by Clerk) eod mld 6/28/95. (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/1995)
Case closed. (former empl) (Entered: 07/14/1995)
210 Copy of letter from Judge Joe Anderson to Family Court Judge Robert Burnside re: recent 4CCA decision Torcasio v. Murray 94-7206. cc: all counsel of record. (former empl) (Entered: 07/26/1995)
211 ORDER directing defendants to pay the attached statement for $5,325.00 compensation for special master. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod 8/8/95. (former empl) (Entered: 08/08/1995)
212 ORDER, setting status conference for 2:00 8/30/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. re: status from Judge Burnside, progress report, etc. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.) eod mld 8/21/95. (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/1995)
Deadline updated; Defendants' Response to motion reset to 9/19/95 for [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC for the constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 08/30/1995)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr: defendants allowed 20 days to respond to plaintiffs' motion for atty. fees.; court to amend 1/25/95 order. Update on remedial plan by special master Judge Robert Burnside. Colloqy re: discovery on atty fees.; 4CCA decision; school records. Plaintiff requests emergency hearing on staffing issues for safety issues. Court to schedule hearing ASAP. (former empl) (Entered: 08/30/1995)
MOTION in open court by plaintiff Alexander S. for special hearing re: safety concerns and issue of staffing levels. (former empl) (Entered: 08/30/1995)
Minute entry: mooting [201-1] motion to obtain information regarding fees charged and expenses sought by plaintiffs. (former empl) (Entered: 08/31/1995)

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08/31/1995 09/12/1995
09/12/1995
09/15/1995 09/22/1995 09/22/1995 09/29/1995 10/04/1995 10/06/1995 10/06/1995

213 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for temporary relief re: staffing situation , for special hearing on this motion. (former empl) (Entered: 09/01/1995)
214 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiffs'[0-0] oral motion for special hearing re: safety concerns and issue of staffing levels., [213-2] motion for special hearing on this motion., [213-1] motion for temporary re: staffing situation. (former empl) (Entered: 09/13/1995)
215 ORDER modifying the court's January 25, 1995 [180-1] findings of fact order in light of the Torcasio decision: the applicability of IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA was conceded by the defendants in this case. To the extent any language in the 1/25/95 order might be construed as holding that the statutes apply to institutional settings. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 9/13/95. (former empl) (Entered: 09/13/1995)
216 Transcript of hearing before Judge Joseph F.Anderson on 8/30/95 re: status conference with Judge Burnside. (former empl) (Entered: 09/15/1995)
217 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S., et al. to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ. (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1995)
218 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ. (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1995)
219 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to set a date certain for defendants to file their response to plaintiff's motion for fees filed 5/26/95. (former empl) (Entered: 10/03/1995)
220 MEMORANDUM by defendants Flora Brooks Boyd, et al. in opposition to [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for the constitutional and statutory claims. Bound document. (former empl) (Entered: 10/04/1995)
221 ORDER mooting [219-1] motion to set a date certain for defendants to file their response to plaintiff's motion for fees filed 5/26/95. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson eod mld 10/8/95. (former empl) (Entered: 10/09/1995)
222 ORDER granting [0-0] oral motion for special hearing re: safety concerns and issue of staffing levels, granting [213-2] motion for special hearing on this motion. Plaintiffs' motion shall be heard beginnign 11/20/95 at 9:30 a.m. The court anticipates ruling on the attorney fee motion without oral argument. Any party wishing to challenge the fees to be paid to special master Judge Burnside, should do so within 20 days from the date of this order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/8/95. (former empl) (Entered: 10/09/1995)

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10/10/1995 10/11/1995 10/11/1995 10/11/1995 10/16/1995 10/16/1995 10/27/1995 11/06/1995 11/07/1995 11/08/1995 11/08/1995 11/13/1995 11/15/1995

SET Motion hearing re: [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ. at 9:30 11/20/95, [213-1] motion for temporary relief re: staffing situation at 9:30 11/20/95 (former empl) (Entered: 10/10/1995)
223 Transcript of Proceedings before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. held 6/25/95 [Volume XI] (Gary Smith CR). (former empl) (Entered: 10/12/1995)
224 Transcript of proceedings held 7/6/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. [Volume XIV] (Gary Smith CR). (former empl) (Entered: 10/12/1995)
225 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendants' [220-1] opposition memorandum to plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs. Exhibits A-K attached. (former empl) (Entered: 10/12/1995)
226 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 10/16/1995)
227 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 10/16/1995)
228 MEMORANDUM LETTER by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [1921] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
229 RESPONSE by defendants Juvenile Justice Dep, et al. to revised costs re: [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 for constitutional and statutory claims. (former empl) (Entered: 11/06/1995)
230 Letter from Holly Walker indicating that she has resigned from the S.C. Protection and Advocacy System and to please remove her name from the list of plaintiff's attorneys. (former empl) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
231 MOTION by Michael W. Moore to extend time to respond to motion to add Michael E. Moore as a party defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
232 ORDER granting [231-1] motion to extend time by 5 days to respond to motion to add Michael E. Moore as a party defendant. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/9/95. (former empl) (Entered: 11/09/1995)
233 ORDER directing defendants to pay the attached invoices of Dr. Kay Allen and Judge Robert Burnside as soon as reasonably possible. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/14/95. (former empl) (Entered: 11/14/1995)
234 MEMORANDUM by Michael W. Moore in opposition to [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. (former empl) (Entered:

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11/22/1995
11/24/1995
12/08/1995
12/08/1995 12/14/1995 12/18/1995 12/18/1995
12/18/1995 12/18/1995 12/19/1995
12/19/1995 12/20/1995 12/20/1995

11/15/1995)
235 ORDER granting as modified plaintiffs' [192-1] motion for attorney fees and costs. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs their fees and costs reasonably incurred as follows (see order for breakdown of costs and fees). (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/22/95. (former empl) (Entered: 11/22/1995)
SET Motion hearing re: [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. at 9:30 12/18/95, [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ. at 9:30 12/18/95, [213-1] motion for temporary relief re: staffing situation at 9:30 12/18/95; notices mailed 11/24/95. (former empl) (Entered: 11/24/1995)
236 ORDER directing the defendants to remit to the special master, Judge Burnside, the sum of $1,550.00 as soon as reasonably possible. A copy of Judge Burnside's statement is attached. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/8/95. (former empl) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
237 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs Alexander S., et al. RE: increased security staffing. (former empl) (Entered: 12/08/1995)
238 BRIEF by plaintiff Alexander S. for 12/18/95 hearing. (former empl) (Entered: 12/15/1995)
239 DEPOSITION DESIGNATION by plaintiffs re: deposition of George Hampton. (former empl) (Entered: 12/19/1995)
Motion hearing re: [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ. Motion hearing held, [213-1] motion for temporary relief re: staffing situation Motion hearing held. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (JFA,jr/Gary Smith). (former empl) (Entered: 12/19/1995)
240 DEPOSITION of Jackson A. (Juvenile) (former empl) (Entered: 12/19/1995)
241 DEPOSITION of Donald H. (Juvenile) (former empl) (Entered: 12/19/1995)
Motion hearing (Continued) re: [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ., [213-1] motion for temporary relief re: staffing situation. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) Modified on 12/20/1995 (Entered: 12/20/1995)
242 DEPOSITION of George Hampton, Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 12/20/1995)
243 DEPOSITION of Curtis A. Ranum filed for the record. (former empl) (Entered: 12/20/1995)
Motion hearing concluded re: [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ., [213-1] motion for

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12/20/1995 12/21/1995
01/03/1996 01/04/1996 01/04/1996 01/09/1996
01/10/1996 01/11/1996 01/11/1996 01/16/1996

temporary relief re: staffing situation. (JFA,jr/Gary Smith). Court takes under advisement and directs written reports be submitted by 1/15/96. Written Order to be entered. (former empl) (Entered: 12/20/1995)
Minute entry: [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ. taken under advisement, [213-1] motion for temporary relief re: staffing situation taken under advisement (former empl) (Entered: 12/20/1995)
244 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd, defendant Juvenile Justice Dep, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn . Fee Status: PAID 300 8396 Transcript purchase order due on 12/31/95 Appeal record due on 1/20/96 (former empl) (Entered: 12/21/1995)
245 Transcript of hearings 7/7/94 before the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. Volumes XV, XX, XIII, XXI. (former empl) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [244-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, Juvenile Justice Dep, Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
246 Transcripts of hearings held 7/19/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Volumes V XVII, XVIII, excerpts). (former empl) (Entered: 01/05/1996)
247 ORDER for production of information. A single report shall be provided to the court summarizing the DJJ plan as testified to by DJJ witnesses on various subject matters (see order); The court will also require monthly reports regarding any failures to satisfy the plans listed. Set first request for production of documents due for 1/16/96 ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) faxed to counsel 1/9/96; eod mld 1/11/96. (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/1996)
248 ORDER REFERRING CASE to special master Thomas J Davis as special master; replacing Judge Robert Burnside. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 1/11/96. (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/1996)
249 Transcript of hearing of 8/29/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Volume XXVI). Transcript of hearing 8/18/94 before Judge Anderson (Volume XXV). By Gary Smith/Jack Clarke. (former empl) Modified on 05/16/1996 (Entered: 01/13/1996)
250 Transcript of hearing 7/22/94 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Volume IXX) By Gary Smith/Jack Clarke. (former empl) (Entered: 01/13/1996)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [244-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, P. Jennings, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, Juvenile Justice Dep, Flora Brooks Boyd USCA

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01/16/1996 01/19/1996 01/29/1996 02/12/1996 02/14/1996 02/14/1996 02/14/1996 02/16/1996 02/16/1996
02/16/1996

NUMBER: 96-1036, Margaret Thomas (former empl) (Entered: 01/16/1996)
251 MEMORANDUM by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep in response to the court's 12/20/95 order regarding the production of information summarizing the DJJ plan on various subject matters. (former empl) (Entered: 01/17/1996)
252 ORDER directing defendants to pay the attached statement of Judge Burnside. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 1/19/96. (former empl) (Entered: 01/19/1996)
253 MOTION by plaintiff class Alexander S. to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95 or alternatively to issue a writ of execution. (former empl) (Entered: 01/30/1996)
254 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for leave to file additional Evidence on Staffing Issue pending before this court. (former empl) (Entered: 02/12/1996)
255 ORDER granting [254-1] motion for leave to file additional Evidence on Staffing Issue pending before this court. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/14/96. (former empl) (Entered: 02/14/1996)
256 SEALED MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in response to the court's order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 02/14/1996)
257 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alexander S. to [253-1] motion to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95 or alternatively to issue a writ of execution. (former empl) (Entered: 02/14/1996)
258 Transcript excerpt of hearing held 12/18/95 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Gary Smith, CR). (former empl) (Entered: 02/16/1996)
259 INTERIM ORDER granting in part, denying in part [217-1] motion to modify the plan for correcting unconstitutional conditions at DJJ., granting in part, denying in part [213-1] motion for temporary relief re: staffing situation. The defendants are required to comply with the staffing plan set forth in attachment A to this order. Defendants shall supplement this plan as notices and shall provide the reports required as noted herein and in the court's order filed 1/9/96, on a monthly basis. The court will review the adequacy of the staffing based on these reports, and those of the court monitor...The court's review shall be conducted no earlier than 4/15/96. The court further finds that plaintiffs are entitled to fees for pursuit of this motion and they shall submit their fee application as set forth in this order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) mld 2/16/96 (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
260 MOTION by defendants Juvenile Justice Dep, et al. to stay enforcement of the judgment of this court dated 11/22/95 until the Fourth Circuit rules on the appeal of same. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)

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02/16/1996
02/21/1996 02/21/1996 02/21/1996 02/21/1996
02/23/1996 02/26/1996 02/26/1996 02/26/1996

261 MEMORANDUM by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep in support of its [260-1] motion to stay enforcement of the judgment of this court dated 11/22/95 until the Fourth Circuit rules on the appeal of same; and IN OPPOSITION TO plaintiffs'[253-1] motion to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95 or alternatively to issue a writ of execution. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
262 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiffs for fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
263 AFFIDAVIT of Cynthia J. Edwards for plaintiff Alexander S. Re: [2621] motion for fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
264 AFFIDAVIT by plaintiffs and Gaston Fairey, Esq. Re: [262-1] motion for fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. Attachments (fee totals) are part of this document. (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
SET Motion hearing re: [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. at 4:00 2/26/96, [253-1] motion to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95 or alternatively to issue a writ of execution. at <date not set>, [260-1] motion to stay enforcement of the judgment of this court dated 11/22/95 until the Fourth Circuit rules on the appeal of same. at <date not set> (former empl) (Entered: 02/21/1996)
266 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. on the issue of th 6/14/95 stipulation re: attorney fees. (former empl) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
265 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for leave to file Supplement to Appeal Record pursuant to FRAP 10(e). (former empl) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
267 RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd, defendant Juvenile Justice Dep, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry to plaintiffs' memorandum. (former empl) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
Motion hearing re: [265-1] motion for leave to file Supplement to Appeal Record pursuant to FRAP 10(e)., [260-1] motion to stay enforcement of the judgment of this court dated 11/22/95 until the Fourth Circuit rules on the appeal of same. Motion hearing held, [253-1] motion to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95 or alternatively to issue a writ of execution. Motion hearing held, [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. Motion hearing held. Court grants motion to supplement record on appeal. Court denies motion for joinder of Moore; court takes under advvisement motions as to attorney's fees. (JFA,jr/Gary Smith). (former empl) (Entered: 02/26/1996)

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02/26/1996
02/27/1996 02/28/1996
02/28/1996 02/29/1996 03/04/1996 03/06/1996 03/06/1996

Minute entry: granting [265-1] motion for leave to file Supplement to Appeal Record pursuant to FRAP 10(e)., [260-1] motion to stay enforcement of the judgment of this court dated 11/22/95 until the Fourth Circuit rules on the appeal of same. taken under advisement, [253-1] motion to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95 or alternatively to issue a writ of execution. taken under advisement, denying [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 02/26/1996)
269 Transcript Excerpt (All Colloquy prior to first witness) from 12/18/95 hearing before Judge Anderson (Gary Smith,CR). (former empl) (Entered: 02/28/1996)
268 ORDER memorializing the court's ruling at a hearing 2/26/96 before Judge Anderson: granting [265-1] motion for leave to file Supplement to Appeal Record pursuant to FRAP 10(e). denying [226-1] motion for joinder of Michael W. Moore individually and in his official capacity as Director of the SCDC as a party defendant. Plaintiff's request for discovery regarding medical care (re: court's 1/25/96 order). (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/28/96. (former empl) (Entered: 02/28/1996)
270 AFFIDAVIT of W. Gaston Fairey (counsel for plaintiff class) Re: stipulation appearing in the transcript at pages 2-155 through 2-161 (6/14/94). (former empl) (Entered: 02/28/1996)
271 MOTION/MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to amend [180-1] findings of fact order dated 1/25/96 re: hiring of physician, health care administrator. (former empl) (Entered: 02/29/1996)
273 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE/SPECIFICATION OF INADEQUACIES to plaintiffs' [262-1] motion for fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. (former empl) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
272 AMENDED MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for leave to file Supplement Appeal Record referring to [265-1] motion for leave to file Supplement to Appeal Record pursuant to FRAP 10(e). (former empl) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
274 ORDER denying defendants' [260-1] motion to stay enforcement of the judgment of this court dated 11/22/95 until the Fourth Circuit rules on the appeal of same., GRANTING plaintiffs' [253-1] motion to enforce judgment for attorney fees entered by the court on 11/22/95. The defendants must either (1) pay the judgment, (2) post a supersedeas bond, (3) file a stipulation with the clerk providing that the judgment will be paid, if affirmed or appealed, no later than 30 days after the decision becomes final. Defendants shall take one of these actions no later than 3/20/96. AMENDING the court's [235-1] order of 11/22/95 so as to conform to the stipulation. It is amended nunc pro tunc so as to provide that the fee award is against all defendants in their official capacity as well as their individual capacity with the proviso that the judgment

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03/06/1996 03/06/1996 03/06/1996 03/11/1996 03/12/1996 03/14/1996 03/15/1996 03/19/1996
03/19/1996 03/20/1996

against defendants in their individual capacity shall not exceeed the remaining amount of insurance coverage available to them. Because entry of judgment must be for a specific amount, the court will stay the effectiveness of this order until 3/20/96. Defendants shall, prior to that date, provide the court with an affidavit indicating the amount of insurance coverage remaining unexpended as of 11/22/95. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/6/96. (former empl) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
275 ORDER directing that defendants shall file a response by 3/15/96 to plaintiffs' [272-1] amended motion for leave to file Supplement Appeal Record signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/6/96. (former empl) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
276 ORDER directing defendants to pay the attached statement of Thomas J. Davis, Special Master, as soon as reasonably possible. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/6/96. (former empl) (Entered: 03/06/1996)
277 Transcript excerpt of 6/26/95 re: attorney's fees (hearing before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.). (Jack Clarke, CR). (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/1996)
280 SEALED BRIEF/THIRD RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTTATION by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 03/15/1996)
278 RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to [272-1] amended motion for leave to file Supplement Appeal Record defendants do not object to themotion. (former empl) (Entered: 03/13/1996)
279 ORDER granting plaintiffs' [272-1] supplemental/amended motion for leave to file Supplement Appeal Record ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/14/96. (former empl) (Entered: 03/14/1996)
281 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's [273-1] motion/response entitled "Defendants' Specification of Inadequacies in Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Fees and Costs" to plaintiff's motion for award of fees. (former empl) (Entered: 03/18/1996)
282 SUA SPONTE ORDER to supplement the record regarding certain document requests from the clerk's office. Directing the clerk of court to supplement the record with detailed affidavits of its deputy clerks relating to the affidavits of Gary A. Pickern and Glenn R. Vose ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod 3/19/96. (former empl) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
283 AFFIDAVIT of Edward E. Turbeville, Jr., Asst. Claims Manager with the SC Insurance Reserve Fund Re: fund policy balance. (former empl) (Entered: 03/19/1996)
284 Stipulation by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: that the court's award for attorney's fees shall be paid, if affirmed on appeal, no later than 30 days

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03/26/1996 03/28/1996 04/01/1996 04/01/1996 04/02/1996 04/02/1996 04/02/1996 04/04/1996 04/04/1996 04/04/1996
04/04/1996 04/08/1996 04/09/1996

after the decision becomes final. (former empl) (Entered: 03/21/1996)
285 AFFIDAVIT of Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District Court, District of South Carolina in response to the court's [282-1] order of 3/19/96. cc: JFA, 4CCA, all counsel of record. (former empl) (Entered: 03/26/1996)
286 AFFIDAVIT of GREG M. CORNELL, Director of Health Services at DJJ. (former empl) (Entered: 03/29/1996)
287 MOTION by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep for reconsideration of [2821] order pursuant to Rule 59. (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
288 MEMORANDUM by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep in support of [2871] motion for reconsideration of [282-1] order to Rule 59. (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1996)
289 MOTION and MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. for Appointment of Expert to evaluate defendant's medical system. (former empl) (Entered: 04/02/1996)
SET Motion hearing re: [287-1] motion for reconsideration of [282-1] order pursuant to Rule 59. at 3:00 4/4/96 (former empl) (Entered: 04/02/1996)
290 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to Fee Request. (filed by Ed Woodward). (former empl) (Entered: 04/03/1996)
291 MEMORANDM IN RESPONSE by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. to [287-1] motion for reconsideration of [282-1] order pursuant to Rule 59. (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
MOTIONS HEARING (JFA,jr/Jack Clarke): denying [287-1] motion for reconsideration of [282-1] order pursuant to Rule 59. Oral motion by plaintiff and defendant for evidentiary hearing - denied. (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
MOTION in open court by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd, defendant Juvenile Justice Dep, defendant J. P. Neal, defendant Karole Jensen, defendant Kathleen P. Jennings, defendant Frank Mauldin, defendant John F. Henry, defendant Richard E. Mclawhorn, plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for evidentiary Hearing (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
292 Minute order: denying [0-0] oral motion for evidentiary Hearing, denying [287-1] motion for reconsideration of [282-1] order pursuant to Rule 59. (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/1996)
294 Transcript (Jack Clarke, Court Reporter) of proceedings on 4/4/96 before Judge Joe Anderson in Columbia, SC (mflo) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
293 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette

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04/10/1996 04/11/1996 04/12/1996 04/18/1996 04/18/1996
04/19/1996 04/19/1996 04/19/1996 05/01/1996
05/01/1996 05/01/1996 05/01/1996

M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 (mflo) (Entered: 04/09/1996)
295 FOURTH RESPONSE TO ORDER for production of information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (mflo) (Entered: 04/10/1996)
296 MOTION with memorandum in support by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. to change the caption of the case (mflo) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
297 Certificate that the Record on Appeal is Complete for [244-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, Juvenile Justice Dep, Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 04/12/1996)
298 ORDER directing defendants to pay attached statement for services rendered by Thomas J. Davis; payable as soon as reasonably possible. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 4/18/96. (former empl) (Entered: 04/18/1996)
299 MOTION & MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs to expand the scope of the anticipated hearing on the medical system at DJJ to include the issues of defendants' compliance with the court's 3/31/92 order if the present medical system is adequately providing for the mental health of the juveniles outside of the subclass. (former empl) Modified on 04/19/1996 (Entered: 04/19/1996)
300 RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to plaintiffs' [289-1] motion for Appointment of Expert to evaluate defendant's medical system. (former empl) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
Status conference set at 11:00 5/1/96 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.; notices mailed 4/19/96. (former empl) (Entered: 04/19/1996)
301 RESPONSE/SPEFICATIONS OF INADEQUACIES by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiffs' [293-1] motion for fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 (former empl) (Entered: 04/22/1996)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.Jack Clarke. Court grants plaintiff's motion to amend caption. Minute Order to be entered. Verbal report by Tommy Davis, court monitor. Colloquy as to medical and staffing issues at DJJ. Colloquy as to proposed budget. (former empl) (Entered: 05/01/1996)
302 Minute order: granting [296-1] motion to change the caption of the case. mld eod 5/1/96. (former empl) (Entered: 05/01/1996)
303 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendants' [293-1] February/March 1996 motion for fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/1996)
304 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees

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05/08/1996 05/09/1996 05/09/1996 05/10/1996 05/15/1996 05/20/1996 05/29/1996 06/07/1996 06/10/1996
06/10/1996 06/13/1996
06/25/1996
06/25/1996

and costs under 42 USC 1988 (for April 1996). (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/1996)
305 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for limited discovery as to psychiatric services at DJJ. (former empl) (Entered: 05/08/1996)
306 ORDER granting plaintiffs' [305-1] motion for limited discovery as to psychiatric services at DJJ. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/9/96. (former empl) (Entered: 05/09/1996)
307 MEMORANDUM on the Applicability of the 1996 amendements to 42 USC 1977 to attorney fees by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [304-1] motion for attorney fees (former empl) (Entered: 05/10/1996)
308 SEALED BRIEF/FIFTH RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION by defendant Juvenile Justice Dep. (former empl) (Entered: 05/10/1996)
309 Transcripts of hearing held 12/19/95, 12/19/95, and 12/20/95 (Vol. I-III) before Judge Anderson (Gary Smith, Court Reporter). (former empl) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
310 MEMORANDUM on the Applicability of the 1996 Amendments to CRIPA by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 05/20/1996)
311 ORDER granting in part, denying in part plaintiffs' supplemental [262-1] motion for fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/29/96. (former empl) (Entered: 05/29/1996)
312 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. May 1996 Supplemental for attorney fees and costs. (former empl) (Entered: 06/07/1996)
313 Opinion of the 4th Circuit affirm on the basis of the district court's through opinion; re: [244-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, Juvenile Justice Dep, Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
314 SEALED BRIEF "Sixth Response to Order for Production of Information" by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
315 ORDER directing defendant to supplement the last two reports (per the court's order for production of information). Check brief filing compliance by 7/15/96 (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/12/96. (former empl) (Entered: 06/13/1996)
316 ORDER approving the statement of the court's special master Thomas J. Davis for payment by the US Government from funds authorized for the judiciary. cc: Finance and all counsel. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/25/96. (former empl) (Entered: 06/25/1996)
317 MOTION AND MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. for this

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06/27/1996 06/27/1996 07/01/1996
07/02/1996 07/02/1996 07/02/1996
07/03/1996 07/10/1996 07/11/1996 07/15/1996 07/15/1996 07/16/1996 07/16/1996

court to make further findings in relation to security staffing. Tabbed exhibits A-I attached. (former empl) (Entered: 06/26/1996)
318 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. on the Applicabilit of 42 USC 1977(e) to Attorney Fees in this case. (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
319 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd Fee Status: pd $105.00. Transcript purchase order due on 7/7/96 Appeal record due on 7/27/96 (former empl) Modified on 07/17/1996 (Entered: 06/28/1996)
323 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) Re: [319-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd, [244-1] appeal by Richard E. Mclawhorn, John F. Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Karole Jensen, J. P. Neal, Juvenile Justice Dep, Flora Brooks Boyd affirming decision of the District court. (former empl) (Entered: 07/05/1996)
320 JUNE 1996 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. (former empl) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
321 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees and costs accrued during the appeal of this court's order awarding fees and costs. (former empl) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
322 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [321-1] motion for attorney fees and costs accrued during the appeal of this court's order awarding fees and costs. Affidavit of Nelson Mullins attached. (former empl) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
Notice of additional appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [3191] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 07/03/1996)
324 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd entitled "Seventh Response to Order for Production of Information." (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1996)
325 Docketing Statement for [319-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 07/15/1996)
326 MOTION by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to extend time to reply to plaintiff's motion for the court to make further findings. (former empl) (Entered: 07/15/1996)
327 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in support of its [326-1] motion to extend time to reply to plaintiff's for the court to make further findings. (former empl) (Entered: 07/15/1996)
328 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd on the Applicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to Attorney Fees in this case. (former empl) (Entered: 07/16/1996)
329 ORDER that as of July 15, 1996, the population count at these three facilities was below that set by the defendant's remedial plan. For this

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07/17/1996 07/23/1996 07/23/1996
07/25/1996
07/30/1996 07/31/1996
08/02/1996 08/05/1996 08/08/1996 08/08/1996 08/12/1996

reason, the court determines that as of July 15, 1996, the defendants came into compliance with this component of the court's order of June 25, 1995. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/16/96. (former empl) (Entered: 07/16/1996)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [319-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd; USCA NUMBER: 96-1950, Margaret Thomas (former empl) (Entered: 07/17/1996)
330 OBJECTIONS/RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiff's June [320-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988. (former empl) (Entered: 07/23/1996)
331 ORDER granting defendants' [326-1] motion to extend time to reply to plaintiff's motion for the court to make further findings. Reply to Response to Motion reset to 7/26/96 for [317-1] motion for this court to make further findings in relation to security staffing. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/24/96. Called deft. 7/24/96 (former empl) (Entered: 07/24/1996)
332 ORDER directing defendants to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $2,150.00. In addition to the above amount to be paid by defendant, Mr. Davis shall be paid $292.50; the clerk of court is directed to arrange this payment... (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/25/96. (former empl) (Entered: 07/25/1996)
333 AFFIDAVIT of John J. Kispert for defendant Juvenile Justice Dep Re: memorandum and form for uniform reports to the court. (former empl) (Entered: 07/30/1996)
334 ORDER approving payment to special master Thomas J. Davis by US Government funds with the correction that th rate be paid at $45.00 per hour, which increases the total due to $1,980.00 See order filed 7/25/96. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/30/96. (former empl) (Entered: 07/31/1996)
335 ORDER extending time. Defendant's response to motion reset to 9/13/96 for [321-1] motion for attorney fees and costs accrued during the of this court's order awarding fees and costs. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/2/96. (former empl) (Entered: 08/02/1996)
336 MOTION & MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. to deny defendants' request for extension to respond to plaintiffs' motion for appellate fees. (former empl) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
337 JULY 1996 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees - July 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
338 MOTION AND MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. on the issue of class membership. (former empl) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
339 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd - Eighth Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 08/13/1996)

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08/12/1996 08/12/1996 08/12/1996 08/14/1996 08/21/1996 08/26/1996 08/28/1996 08/29/1996 08/29/1996 08/30/1996

340 MOTION and MEMORANDUMby plaintiff Alexander S. to immediately assign ot take other appropriate action to insure there are sufficient numbers of security staff for juveniles housed at Columbia Training Center. (former empl) (Entered: 08/13/1996)
341 AFFIDAVIT of Phyllis Ross for plaintiff Alexander S. Re: [340-1] motion to immediately assign ot take other appropriate action to insure there are sufficient numbers of security staff for juveniles housed at Columbia Training Center. (former empl) (Entered: 08/13/1996)
342 ORDER denying plaintiff's [336-1] motion to deny defendants' request for extension to respond to plaintiffs' motion for fees. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/13/96. (former empl) (Entered: 08/13/1996)
343 ORDER directing payment by the US Government from funds authorized by the judiciary for $1,417.50 for payment to Thomas J. Davis, the court's special master. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/15/96 cc: finance. (former empl) (Entered: 08/15/1996)
344 ORDER that arrangements be made immediately for plaintiffs' counsel and guardian ad litem to visit the Crafts Farrow facility and speak with incarcerated. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/21/96. (former empl) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
345 ORDER extending time. Defendants' response to motion reset to 8/27/96 for plaintiffs' [338-1] motion on the issue of class membership. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/27/96. (former empl) (Entered: 08/27/1996)
346 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiff's [338-1] motion on the issue of class membership. (former empl) (Entered: 08/28/1996)
347 MEMORANDUM on Applicability of the 1996 Amendments to CRIPA by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiffs' [337-1] motion for attorney fees - July 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 08/29/1996)
348 MEMORANDUM/Specification of Inadequacies by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to [337-1] motion for attorney fees - July 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 08/29/1996)
349 ORDER granting [337-1] motion for attorney fees - July 1996, granting [320-1] motion for attorney fees and costs - June 1996; granting [312-1] motion May 1996 Supplemental for attorney fees and costs - May 1996, granting [304-1] motion for attorney fees and costs under 42 USC 1988 April 1996. Total defendants directed to pay in attorney fees and costs: Fairey Parise & Mills $59,381.50 fees and $23,161.37 costs; SC Protection and Advocacy System $7,290.50 fees and $317.98 costs. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/30/96. (former empl) (Entered: 08/30/1996)

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08/30/1996 09/06/1996 09/09/1996
09/09/1996
09/12/1996 09/12/1996 09/13/1996
09/25/1996
09/25/1996
09/26/1996 09/27/1996

350 RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to [337-1] motion for attorney fees - July 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 09/03/1996)
351 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees - August 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 09/06/1996)
352 RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to plaintiff's 8/12/96 [3401] motion to immediately assign ot take other appropriate action to insure there are sufficient numbers of security staff for juveniles housed at Columbia Training Center. (former empl) (Entered: 09/09/1996)
353 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendants' response to plaintiff's [321-1] motion for attorney fees and costs accrued during the of this court's order awarding fees and costs. Attachments A-H to this document. (former empl) Modified on 09/10/1996 (Entered: 09/10/1996)
354 SEALED NINTH RESPONSE/BRIEF to order for production of information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 09/12/1996)
355 Certificate that the Record on Appeal is Complete for [319-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 09/12/1996)
356 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in opposition to defendants' [348-1] specification of inadequacies in plaintiff's 7/96 supplemental motion for attorney fees. (former empl) (Entered: 09/13/1996)
357 ORDER approving payment by US Government from funds authorized for the judiciary for 47.5 hours at $45.00 totaling $2,137.40 for payment of special master Thomas J. Davis; EOD 9-25-96, mld ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
358 MEMORANDUM/Specification of Inadequacies in plaintiff's July 1996 motion for fees and costs in opposition to plaintiff's [337-1] motion for attorney fees - July 1996. Memo filed by by defendant. (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1996)
360 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd Re: [349-1] order; Fee Status: UNPAID (former empl) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
359 ORDER granting plaintiffs' [338-1] motion for clarification on the issue of class membership. A) Juveniles placed in the Crafts Farrowand Greenwood Facilities are members of the plaintiff class and are entitled to protections of this court's prior orders and any subsequent enforcement orders. B) plaintiffs' counsel, the court monitor, and the guardian ad litem for the class shall have reasonable access to the plaintiffs in these facilities; and C) Plaintiffs' counsel, the court monitor, and the guardian ad litem shall have reasonable access to the records of juveniles housed in these facilities concerning conditions of confinement and treatment of the class members in relation to the prior or subsequent orders of this court. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 9/30/96, (former empl) (Entered: 09/30/1996)

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10/01/1996 10/01/1996 10/01/1996 10/02/1996 10/02/1996
10/03/1996 10/11/1996 10/15/1996 10/16/1996
10/28/1996 10/31/1996 11/07/1996 11/07/1996 11/12/1996 11/12/1996

361 Amended NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd ; re: [360-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
362 RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to plaintiffs' [351-1] motion for attorney fees - August 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
Notice of appeal, corrected notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [360-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
363 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees - September 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 10/03/1996)
364 ORDER granting plaintiff's [351-1] August 1996 motion for attorney fees and costs. Defendants shall pay attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel as set forth in this order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/3/96. (former empl) (Entered: 10/03/1996)
365 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alexander S. in opposition to defendants' [3621] motion response re: plaintiffs' August 1996 supplemental motion for attorney fees. (former empl) (Entered: 10/03/1996)
366 SEALED BRIEF - 10th RESPONSE to ORDER for Production of Information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
367 SPECIFICATIONS OF INADEQUACIES/RESPONSE by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiffs' [363-1] motion for attorney fees - September 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 10/15/1996)
368 ORDER directing US Government to pay attached statement of the court's special master from funds authorized for the judiciary. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/16/96 cc: counsel and finance. (former empl) (Entered: 10/16/1996)
369 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd Re: [359-1] order Fee Status: PAID, 300/10672 (former empl) (Entered: 10/29/1996)
370 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd Re: [364-1] order Fee Status: 300/10900 (former empl) (Entered: 11/05/1996)
371 NOTICE of pending motions in this matter from Judge Anderson. Court directs counsel to notify the court by 11-15-96 as to the status of these motions. mld 11/7/96. (former empl) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
372 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees - October 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
373 OBJECTION by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to plaintiffs' [363-1] motion for attorney fees - September 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
374 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in support of its

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11/12/1996 11/18/1996 11/19/1996 11/20/1996
11/20/1996
11/20/1996
11/25/1996 11/25/1996
11/25/1996 11/26/1996

[373-1] objection to plaintiffs' September 1996 motion for attorney fees. (former empl) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
375 SEALED BRIEF - ELEVENTH Response by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [370-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd USCA NUMBER: 96-2589, Margaret Thomas (former empl) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
376 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff Alexander S. in response to court's request of status of motions. (former empl) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
377 STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF MOTIONS without prejudice of defendant's motion to modify the medical plan (filed 2/29/96), plaintiff's motions regarding medical services (filed 4/2/96); plaintiff's motion to expand scope of hearing held on motion to modify medical findings... (filed 4/18/96). (former empl) Modified on 11/20/1996 (Entered: 11/20/1996)
Minute entry: dismissing [289-1] motion for Appointment of Expert to evaluate defendant's medical system., dismissing [271-1] motion to amend [180-1] findings of fact order dated 1/25/96 re: hiring of physician, health care administrator. pursuant to parties 377-1 agreement (filed 11-20-96) to dismiss these 2 motions without prejudice. (former empl) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
Minute entry: dismissing [299-1] motion to expand the scope of the anticipated hearing on the medical system at DJJ to include the issues of defendants' compliance with the court's 3/31/92 order if the present medical system is adequately providing for the mental health of the juveniles outside of the subclass; dismissed pursuant to 11-20-96 stipulation [377-1] by parties. (former empl) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
378 OBJECTION/MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to plaintiffs' [372-1] motion for attorney fees - October 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
379 ORDER granting in part plaintiffs' [321-1] motion for attorney fees and costs accrued during the appeal of this court's order awarding fees and costs. To the firm of Fairey, Parise & Mills - fees of $61,465.00 and costs of $2,529.21; to the firm of Nelson Mullins - fees of $30,991.00 and costs of $3,321.08. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod 11/27/96 - remailed 11/17/96. (former empl) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
380 ORDER granting plaintiffs' [363-1] motion for attorney fees - September 1996. Defendants shall pay attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel as set forth in this order. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/27/96. (former empl) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
381 ORDER granting [372-1] motion for attorney fees - October 1996. Defendant shall pay attorney fees and costs to plaintiff's counsel as set

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11/26/1996 11/27/1996
12/05/1996
12/10/1996 12/13/1996
12/13/1996 12/18/1996 12/20/1996 12/24/1996

forth in this order. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/27/96. (former empl) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
382 ORDER requesting input as to court monitor's compensation. The defendant has until 12/6/96 to provide the court with input. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/27/96. (former empl) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
SET Motion hearing re: [340-1] motion to immediately assign ot take other appropriate action to insure there are numbers of security staff for juveniles housed at Columbia Training Center. at 9:00 12/13/96, [317-1] motion for this court to make further findings in relation to security staffing. at 9:00 12/13/96. Defendant Boyd or her designee of Columbia Training Center is requested to attend. eod mld 11/27/96. (former empl) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
383 ORDER RE: COMPENSATION OF SPECIAL MASTER. The Court finds that Mr. Davis should again be compensated at the rate of $100/ per hour. Mr. Davis' bill should be submitted to the court for approval; fees approved shall be paid by defendant. This order applies to all fees incurred since this court's last order approving fees. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/5/96. (former empl) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
384 SEALED BRIEF/Twelfth Response to Order for Production of Information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Jack Clarke. Status of pending motions discussed re: Wilderness Camp and conditions at Columbia Training Center. Oral report of Tommy Davis, Court Monitor. Court orders mediation and will enter written order accordingly - Mediator-Wade Logan. (former empl) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
385 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees (November 1996). (former empl) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
Certified and transmitted 24 HOUR record on appeal beginning with document number 311 to U.S. Court of Appeals: [370-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd, [369-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd, [360-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd, [319-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 12/18/1996)
386 ORDER FOR MEDIATION of various issues. Wade Logan, Esq. has been selected to serve as the mediator. Mediation should be completed by 1/31/97. Status check on 1/31/97 ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/20/96. (former empl) (Entered: 12/20/1996)
387 RESPONSE/SPECIFICATION OF INADEQUACIES by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to plaintiff's [385-1] motion for attorney fees (November 1996). (former empl) (Entered: 12/26/1996)

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01/03/1997 01/03/1997 01/06/1997 01/07/1997 01/08/1997 01/13/1997 01/14/1997 01/16/1997 01/16/1997 01/21/1997 01/22/1997 01/27/1997
02/05/1997

388 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alexander S. in opposition to defendants' [3871] opposition response to plaintiffs' November Motion for fees. (former empl) (Entered: 01/03/1997)
Transmitted supplemental record No 2., Volume 5 on appeal: [370-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd at the request of Margaret Thomas, case manager. (former empl) (Entered: 01/03/1997)
389 ORDER for payment of court's monitor fees of $3,752.00. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 1/6/97. (former empl) (Entered: 01/06/1997)
390 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees (December 1996) (former empl) Modified on 01/21/1997 (Entered: 01/10/1997)
391 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $2,040.00 ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld 1/10/97 (former empl) (Entered: 01/10/1997)
392 SEALED JANUARY 1997 RESPONSE/BRIEF to order for production of information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
393 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for order of payment of fees and costs due under prior orders of the court (former empl) (Entered: 01/14/1997)
Motion hearing re: [393-1] motion for order of payment of fees and costs due under prior orders of the court Court reporter: Jack Clarke. (JFA,jr). Counsel present respective positions. Motion is moot by agreement. (former empl) (Entered: 01/17/1997)
Minute entry: mooting [393-1] motion for order of payment of fees and costs due under prior orders of the court (former empl) (Entered: 01/17/1997)
394 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in opposition to [390-1] motion for attorney fees (December 1996), [385-1] motion for attorney fees (November 1996). (former empl) (Entered: 01/21/1997)
395 ORDER mooting [317-1] motion for this court to make further findings in relation to security staffing. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld 1/22/97 (former empl) (Entered: 01/22/1997)
396 REPLY by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's [394-1] opposition memorandum to plaintiffs' November and December 1996 motions for costs and fees. (former empl) (Entered: 01/28/1997)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [369-1] appeal by Flora

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02/05/1997 02/11/1997 02/12/1997 02/18/1997 03/05/1997 03/10/1997 03/11/1997 03/11/1997 03/24/1997 04/01/1997
04/01/1997

Brooks Boyd USCA NUMBER: 96-2540, Margaret Thomas (former empl) (Entered: 02/05/1997)
397 Certificate that the Record on Appeal is Complete for [369-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 02/05/1997)
398 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees (January 1997) (former empl) (Entered: 02/11/1997)
399 SEALED FEBRUARY 1997 RESPONSE/BRIEF to order for production of information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
400 ORDER mooting plaintiffs' [393-1] emergency motion for order of payment of fees and costs due under prior orders of the court ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld 2/18/97 (former empl) (Entered: 02/18/1997)
401 ORDER for payment of court's monitor fees in the amount of $2,350.00. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld 3/5/97 (former empl) (Entered: 03/05/1997)
402 ORDER for payment of court's monitor fees in the amount of $2,300.00 ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld 3/10/97 (former empl) Modified on 03/10/1997 (Entered: 03/10/1997)
403 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees (February 1997) (former empl) (Entered: 03/11/1997)
404 SEALED MARCH 1997 RESPONSE/BRIEF to order for production of information by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 03/11/1997)
405 4CCA ORDER; Granting the parties motion to supplement the record and accepts the stipulation as a supplement to the record on appeal pursuant to Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellant Procedure. (former empl) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Jane LaPorte. Colloquy as to proposed individual cases, compliance with the "Plan," R&E facilities, pending appeal as to attorney's fees, and the sub-class. Verbal report from Tommy Davis, court monitor. Pending motion filed 8/12/96 as to CCT, moot. (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1997)
Minute entry: mooting [340-1] motion to immediately assign ot take other appropriate action to insure there are sufficient numbers of security staff for juveniles housed at Columbia Training Center. (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1997)

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04/01/1997
04/04/1997 04/09/1997 04/23/1997 05/07/1997 05/13/1997 05/21/1997 06/02/1997
06/10/1997 06/18/1997 06/18/1997 06/18/1997 06/27/1997

406 ORDER mooting [340-1] motion to immediately assign to take other appropriate action to insure there are sufficient numbers of security staff for juveniles housed at Columbia Training Center. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld 4/1/97 (former empl) (Entered: 04/01/1997)
407 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B., plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees (March 1997) (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/1997)
408 SEALED RESPONSE TO ORDER FORPRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS/BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 04/09/1997)
409 ORDER directing defendants to pay Court's Monitor's fees for March 1997. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 4/23/97. (former empl) (Entered: 04/23/1997)
410 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees - April 1997. (former empl) (Entered: 05/07/1997)
411 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: Response to Order for Production of Documents. (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/1997)
412 ORDER for Payment of Court's Monitor's fees. Defendant is directed to make payment to the Monitor, Thomas J. Davis, in the amount of $1,313.02. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/21/97. (former empl) (Entered: 05/21/1997)
413 Opinion of the 4th Circuit affimrs the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs a re eligible for attorney's fees under 42 USCA 1988. Remands the appealed orders and direct the district court to apply the attorney's fees limitations of the PLRA when determining the amount of, and Plaintiff's entitlement to, attorney's fees; re: [370-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd, [319-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 06/03/1997)
414 SEALED RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/1997)
415 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees - May 1997. (former empl) (Entered: 06/19/1997)
416 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for attorney fees and costs accrued dring the appeal of this court's orders dated 2/16, 5/29, 8/30 and 10/2 1996. (former empl) (Entered: 06/19/1997)
417 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [416-1] motion for attorney fees and costs accrued dring the appeal of this court's orders (former empl) (Entered: 06/19/1997)
418 Consent stipulation by plaintiff Alexander S., defendant Flora Brooks

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07/01/1997 07/07/1997
07/09/1997 07/10/1997 07/10/1997 07/10/1997 07/10/1997 07/10/1997 07/10/1997 07/11/1997 07/21/1997 08/04/1997 08/04/1997 08/04/1997

Boyd re: fees and costs. (former empl) (Entered: 06/27/1997)
419 Opinion of the 4th Circuit affirmed for the reasons convincingly stated by the district court; re: [369-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
420 4CCA ORDER (96-1950 (L) amends it opinion filed May 28, 1997as follows: On page 36, first full paragraph, line 3; and page 40, second full paraggraph, line 4 -- the reference to part II.B.2. is corrected to read III.B.2. (former empl) (Entered: 07/10/1997)
421 ORDER for payment of court's monitor fees for the period of 5/1/97 through 5/31/97. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/10/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/10/1997)
422 ORDER mooting [385-1] motion for attorney fees (November 1996). ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 7/11/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
423 ORDER mooting [390-1] motion for attorney fees (December 1996) ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 7/11/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
424 ORDER mooting [398-1] motion for attorney fees (January 1997) ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 7/11/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
425 ORDER mooting [403-1] motion for attorney fees (February 1997) ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 7/11/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
426 ORDER mooting [407-1] motion for attorney fees (March 1997) ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 7/11/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
427 ORDER mooting [410-1] motion for attorney fees - April 1997. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/11/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
428 BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: Defendant's response to Order for Production. (former empl) (Entered: 07/11/1997)
429 CONSENT ORDER amending [259-1] order of 2/16/97 re: fee application procedures. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/21/97. (former empl) (Entered: 07/21/1997)
430 ORDER mooting [416-1] motion for attorney fees and costs accrued dring the appeal of this court's orders ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/4/97. (former empl) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
431 ORDER mooting [415-1] motion for attorney fees - May 1997. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/4/97. (former empl) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
432 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) affirms on the judgment of the

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08/06/1997 08/11/1997
08/12/1997 09/22/1997 09/26/1997 09/26/1997
10/27/1997 10/28/1997 11/17/1997 12/05/1997 12/19/1997 01/02/1998
01/14/1998

district court; Re: [369-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
433 ORDER for payment of Court's Monitor's Fees (June/July 1997). (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/7/97. (former empl) (Entered: 08/07/1997)
435 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) Re: [370-1] appeal by Flora Brooks Boyd, [319-1] appeal affirms in part, and reverses in part the judgment of the District Court, and remands for further proceedings by Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 08/12/1997)
434 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 08/12/1997)
436 SEALED BRIEF (September 1997 Response to Request for Production) by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 09/22/1997)
437 ORDER for defendant to pay Court Monitor's fees. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 9/26/97. (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1997)
438 ORDER authorizing Thomas J. Davis to continue his duties as the Special Master, pursuant to the PLRA 18 USC 3626(f). ( (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 9/26/97. (former empl) (Entered: 09/26/1997)
439 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: October 1997 response to order for production of documents. (former empl) (Entered: 10/27/1997)
440 ORDER for payment of court's monitor fees for September 1997. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/28/97. (former empl) (Entered: 10/28/1997)
441 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: November 1997 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
442 ORDER for Payment of Court's Monitor's Fees for October 1997. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/5/97. (former empl) (Entered: 12/05/1997)
443 SEALED BRIEF/DEFENDANT'S DECEMBER 1997 RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 12/19/1997)
Partial Record on Appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals: [370-1] appeal, [369-1] appeal, [360-1] appeal, [319-1] appeal, [244-1] appeal, [32-1] appeal, 3 volumes of pleadings. Volumes 2 & 3 will be returned at a later date. (former empl) (Entered: 01/30/1998)
444 ORDER directing defendant to pay Payment of Court's Monitor's Fees for November and December 1997. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson

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01/20/1998 02/09/1998
02/19/1998 03/17/1998
04/14/1998 04/16/1998 04/17/1998 05/22/1998 06/18/1998 06/22/1998 07/21/1998 07/29/1998 08/12/1998 08/18/1998

Jr.) eod mld 1/15/98. (former empl) (Entered: 01/15/1998)
445 SEALED BRIEF/DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION (December 1997) by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 01/21/1998)
446 ORDER for Payment of Court's Monitor's Fees (January 1998). Defendants are directed to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1,306.82 ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/9/98. (former empl) (Entered: 02/09/1998)
447 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: Response to order for production of documents - February 1998. (former empl) (Entered: 02/19/1998)
448 ORDER for payment of Court's Monitor's fees (February 1998). The defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1020.00 (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/17/98. (former empl) (Entered: 03/17/1998)
449 Transcript of Status conference held 12/13/96 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 04/14/1998)
450 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: April 1998 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 04/16/1998)
451 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor (March 1998). (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 4/17/98. (former empl) (Entered: 04/17/1998)
452 BRIEF/RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION May 1998 by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 05/22/1998)
453 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for the period of 5/1/98 through 5/31/98. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/19/98. (former empl) (Entered: 06/19/1998)
454 BRIEF/RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION June 1998 by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 06/22/1998)
455 BRIEF/RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION for July, 1998 by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd (former empl) (Entered: 07/21/1998)
456 ORDER directing payment of court's monitor's fees for June 1998. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 7/29/98. (former empl) (Entered: 07/29/1998)
457 ORDER directing defendants to pay court monitor fees for July 1998. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 8/12/98. (former empl) (Entered: 08/12/1998)
458 SEALED BRIEF/RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTIONi for August 1998 by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 08/18/1998)

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09/23/1998 09/25/1998
10/15/1998 10/29/1998 11/03/1998 11/18/1998 11/24/1998 12/01/1998 12/07/1998
12/07/1998
12/17/1998
12/21/1998 01/19/1999

459 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. for subsitution of appointment of Guardian ad Litem to appoint Nancy McCormick in place of Lesly A. Bowers. (former empl) (Entered: 09/23/1998)
460 ORDER granting [459-1] motion for subsitution of appointment of Guardian ad Litem to appoint Nancy McCormick in place of Lesly A. Bowers. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 9/25/98. (former empl) (Entered: 09/25/1998)
461 SEALED BRIEF/SEPTEMBER 1998 RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 10/16/1998)
462 ORDER directing defendant to make payments to the monitor in the amount of $1,170.00 for September 1998. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/29/98. (former empl) (Entered: 10/29/1998)
463 SEALED BRIEF/RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - OCTOBER 1998 by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd. (former empl) (Entered: 11/04/1998)
464 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: November 1998 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
NOTICE of Hearing, s status conference for 2:00 12/9/98 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
NOTICE of Hearing, r status conference for 2:00 12/17/98 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 12/01/1998)
465 ORDER for payment of of court's monitor's fees for November 1998. Defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/8/98. (former empl) (Entered: 12/08/1998)
466 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for October 1998. Defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor.(signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/8/98. (former empl) (Entered: 12/08/1998)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Jack Clarke. Verbal report by Mr. Thomas Davis, court monitor and Flora Boyd, Director of DJJ. Colloquy between court and counsel as to status. (former empl) (Entered: 12/17/1998)
467 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: December 1998 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
468 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: January 1999 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 01/19/1999)

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02/10/1999 02/10/1999 02/24/1999 04/06/1999 04/12/1999 04/15/1999 05/05/1999 06/04/1999 06/30/1999 07/20/1999 07/21/1999
07/22/1999 07/23/1999 08/06/1999 08/12/1999

469 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for the period of December 1 - 31 1998. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/10/99. (former empl) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
470 ORDER for payment of the court's monitor's fees for the period of January 1, 1999 - January 31, 1999. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/10/99. (former empl) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
471 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 02/24/1999)
472 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: response to order for production - March 1999. (former empl) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
473 ORDER directing payment to court's monitor by defendants. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (former empl) (Entered: 04/12/1999)
474 ORDER directing defendants to pay Monitor's fee for March 1999. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 4/15/99. (former empl) (Entered: 04/15/1999)
475 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in response to order for production of documents (April 1999). (former empl) (Entered: 05/06/1999)
476 ORDER for payment of Court's Monitor's Fees for April 1999. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/4/99. (former empl) (Entered: 06/04/1999)
477 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fee for May 1999 by defendant. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/30/99. (former empl) (Entered: 06/30/1999)
478 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: May 1999 Response to Order for Production of Documents. (former empl) (Entered: 07/20/1999)
479 ORDER directing parties to bring monthly reports current. Set briefs due for 8/5/99. Set status conference for 3:00 8/19/99 to discuss planned changes potentially affecting the plan implementation before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 7/21/99. (former empl) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
480 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: June 1999 response to order for production of documents. (former empl) (Entered: 07/22/1999)
NOTICE of Hearing, r status conference for 9:00 8/27/99 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 07/23/1999)
481 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd - July 99 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
482 ORDER directing defendant to pay court's monitor ( signed by Judge

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08/27/1999
09/01/1999 09/13/1999 10/01/1999 10/29/1999 11/08/1999 11/29/1999 12/15/1999 12/29/1999 01/06/2000 01/06/2000 01/11/2000

Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 8-12-99, mld (former empl) (Entered: 08/12/1999)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. Colloquy as to agreements which have been reached and concerns which still exists and overcrowding generally and level of staffing. Ms. Wood, new DJJ Director, orally presents report to the court. Oral report to the court by court Monitor, Tommy Davis. Court directs that court monitor, Tommy Davis, shall continue his service to the court. (former empl) (Entered: 08/27/1999)
483 ORDER for payment of Court's Monitor's Fees for July 1999. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 9/1/99 (former empl) (Entered: 09/01/1999)
484 Transcript of 8/27/99 hearing before Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan. (former empl) (Entered: 09/13/1999)
485 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: August 1999 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 10/04/1999)
486 ORDER directing defendant to make payment for Court's Monitor fees for August 1999. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 10/29/99 (former empl) (Entered: 10/29/1999)
487 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd Re: September 1999 response to order for production. (former empl) (Entered: 11/08/1999)
488 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees - directing defendant to make payment for October 1999. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 11/30/99. (former empl) (Entered: 11/30/1999)
489 ORDER for payment of court's monitor fees for September 1999; directing defendant to make payment to monitor. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 12/16/99 (former empl) (Entered: 12/16/1999)
490 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: October 1999 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
491 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd re: December 1999 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 01/06/2000)
492 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd in response to November 1999 - Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 01/06/2000)
493 ORDER directing defendants to make payment to monitor for November 1999. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 1/11/00 (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/2000)

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01/14/2000 01/19/2000 01/26/2000 01/26/2000 02/02/2000 02/02/2000 02/03/2000
02/04/2000 02/07/2000 02/08/2000 02/09/2000
02/10/2000 02/16/2000

494 Stipulation by plaintiff Alexander S., defendant Flora Brooks Boyd to conduct discvoery. (former empl) (Entered: 01/14/2000)
495 MOTION by plaintiff Alfred S. for emergency relief. (former empl) (Entered: 01/20/2000)
496 SUPPELEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [495-1] motion for emergency relief. (former empl) (Entered: 01/26/2000)
497 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd Re: January 2000 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 01/27/2000)
498 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. re: Enforcement of the parties' agreement to conduct discovery. (former empl) (Entered: 02/03/2000)
499 MEMORANDUM by defendant Flora Brooks Boyd/Gina E. Wood re: continued viability of agreement between parties to conduct discovery. (former empl) (Entered: 02/03/2000)
500 ORDER addressing scheduling and discovery issues relating to plaintiff's emergency motion. Set discovery due for 3/8/00 , set response to plaintiff's brief due for 3/13/00 , substituting party ; terminated party Flora Brooks Boyd, added defendant Gina E Wood and Director of DJJ. Hearing on plaintiff's emergency motion set for 4/4/00 at 10:00. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod 2/4/00 mld 2/3/00 (former empl) Modified on 02/04/2000 (Entered: 02/04/2000)
501 NOTICE of Hearing, Motion Hearing before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. set for 10:00 4/4/00 for [495-1] motion for emergency relief. (former empl) (Entered: 02/04/2000)
502 ORDER for payment of court monitor's fees - defendant directed to make payment to monitor for December 1999. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/8/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/08/2000)
503 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to compel defendant's compliance with court's 1/96 order and to assign monitor to investigate data reported to court. (former empl) (Entered: 02/08/2000)
504 CONSENT ORDER, substituting attorney terminated attorney Edward M. Woodward for Richard E. Mclawhorn, attorney Edward M. Woodward for Frank Mauldin, attorney Edward M. Woodward for J. P. Neal, attorney Edward M. Woodward for Juvenile Dep. Added Andrew F Lindemann and William Davidson. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/9/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/09/2000)
505 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: February 2000 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 02/11/2000)
506 ORDER re: time frames for copying documents by plaintiff's pursuant to

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02/18/2000
02/18/2000 02/18/2000 02/18/2000 02/23/2000
02/23/2000 02/23/2000 03/01/2000
03/06/2000
03/06/2000 03/07/2000 03/07/2000

this court's prior rulings on discovery relating to plaintiffs' motion for emergency relief. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) mld 2/16/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/17/2000)
507 ORDER directing defendant to produce a computer disk containing the computer printout of filed allegations, to be produced within 24 hours of receipt of this order. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod faxed 2/18/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/18/2000)
508 ORDER re: discovery issues. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 2/18/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/18/2000)
509 MOTION by defendant Gina E Wood to set aside agreement to conduct discovery. (former empl) (Entered: 02/18/2000)
510 MEMORANDUM by defendant Gina E Wood in support of [509-1] motion to set aside agreement to conduct discovery. (former empl) (Entered: 02/18/2000)
511 ORDER granting letter request to extend time. Reset discovery due for 3/13/00 , Response to motion reset to 3/29/00 for [495-1] motion for emergency relief. , s status conference for 4:00 3/21/00 before Judge F. Anderson Jr. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 2/23/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
512 NOTICE of Hearing, r status conference for 4:00 3/21/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
513 ORDER directing payments to the court's monitor in the amount of $2,060.00 for the period of January 2000. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 2/23/00 (former empl) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
514 ORDER granting plaintiff's letter motion to retain John Kinchen as an expert witness. Defendant reserves right to challenge reasonableness and necessity of fees. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/2/00 (former empl) (Entered: 03/02/2000)
515 MOTION by Guardian ad Litem plaintiff Lesly A Bowers for protective order re: DJJ employees who are subpoenaed to testify in deposition or trial in the Emergency Motion pending before the court. (former empl) (Entered: 03/06/2000)
517 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alexander S. to [509-1] motion to set aside agreement to conduct discovery. (former empl) (Entered: 03/08/2000)
516 Stipulation by plaintiff Alexander S., defendant Gina E Wood re: sorting of records. (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. Re: discussion of plaintiff's motion for protective order re: issue of retaliation. Parties have agreed to letter from Ms. Wood re: discovery; bound by local rules re: deposition objections; cost of depositions to be paid 1/2 by defendant; stipulation filed by parties re: record keeping. (former empl) (Entered: 03/07/2000)

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03/09/2000 03/09/2000 03/10/2000
03/10/2000 03/23/2000 03/24/2000 03/30/2000
04/03/2000 04/03/2000 04/03/2000 04/03/2000 04/03/2000 04/03/2000 04/04/2000 04/05/2000 04/05/2000

Tele-conference held (off the record) before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Colloquy re: depositions. Written order to be entered. (former empl) (Entered: 03/09/2000)
518 ORDER memorializing ruling during 3/9/00 teleconference re: deposition disputes. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 3/9/00 via fax (former empl) (Entered: 03/09/2000)
Status conference held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. Argument as to discovery issues as relates to plaintiff's request to produce documents for use at depositions. (former empl) (Entered: 03/10/2000)
519 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: March 2000 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 03/13/2000)
520 MOTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to amend [495-1] motion for emergency relief. . (former empl) (Entered: 03/24/2000)
521 RESPONSE by defendant Gina E Wood to [495-1] motion for emergency relief. (former empl) (Entered: 03/27/2000)
522 ORDER directing that payment of monitor fees in the amount of $1,850.00 is hereby authorized and defendant is directed to pay said amount to monitor. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 3/30/00. (former empl) (Entered: 03/30/2000)
523 CLAIRE BURNETT'S DEPOSITION DESIGNATION AND OBJECTIONS by defendant Gina E Wood (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
524 DEPOSITION DESIGNATION AND OBJECTIONS by defendant Gina E Wood (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
525 DEPOSITION DESIGNATION of Jenny Mangum (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
526 DEPOSITION DESIGNATION AND OBJECTIONS of Karen Swain by defendant Gina E Wood (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
527 DEPOSITION DESIGNATION of Jerry Adger (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
528 DEPOSITION DESIGNATION AND OBJECTIONS of Bill Haxton by defendant Gina E Wood (former empl) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
Evidentiary hearing held before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. Opening statements. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
Evidentiary hearing continued before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 04/06/2000)
529 DEPOSITION of John Richard Kinchen (former empl) (Entered:

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04/06/2000 04/06/2000 04/07/2000 04/07/2000
04/07/2000 04/10/2000
04/10/2000 04/21/2000 04/24/2000 04/24/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000

04/06/2000)
530 DEPOSITION of Jerry Bernard Adger (former empl) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
Evidentiary hearing continued before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. WITNESSES/EXHIBITS. (former empl) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
531 DEPOSITION of Jay Kispert (former empl) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
Evidentiary hearing continued before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Debra Jernigan. WITNESSES/ EXHIBITS. Court will keep record open for two weeks to allow for further submissions at which time a final hearing on these issues will be scheduled. (former empl) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
532 REPORT OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM. (former empl) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
533 ORDER establishing deadlines for post hearing submissions and argument. Oral Argument/Evidentiary hearing for 9:30 5/5/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 4/10/00. (former empl) (Entered: 04/10/2000)
534 NOTICE of Hearing, s evidentiary hearing for 9:30 5/5/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 04/10/2000)
535 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood Re: April 2000 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 04/24/2000)
536 SEALED REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to Defendant's Exhibits. (former empl) Modified on 05/11/2000 (Entered: 04/25/2000)
537 SEALED Summary Exhibits/DEPOSITION Designations by Defendant. (former empl) Modified on 05/11/2000 (Entered: 04/26/2000)
538 OBJECTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to [537-1] deposition of Bill Haxton; response to designations. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
539 OBJECTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to [537-1] deposition designations; and to Gina Wood's deposition. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
540 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's objections to plaintiff's exhibits. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
541 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's objections to testimony of Dr. Beyers. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
542 OBJECTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to [537-1] deposition designations and Claire Burnett's deposition. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)

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04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 05/02/2000 05/04/2000 05/04/2000 05/05/2000
05/08/2000 05/12/2000 05/26/2000

543 OBJECTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to [537-1] deposition designations and objection to Ray Cavanagh's deposition. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
544 OBJECTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to [537-1] deposition designations and deposition of Marjorie Loewer. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
545 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's objections to [532-1] guardian ad litem report. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
546 OBJECTION by plaintiff Alexander S. to [537-1] deposition designations and objections to Karen Swaim's deposition. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
547 SEALED REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defendant's objections to plaintiff's summary exhibits. (former empl) Modified on 05/11/2000 (Entered: 05/02/2000)
548 SEALED REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to [535-1] defendant's response to order filed 4/10/00. (former empl) Modified on 05/11/2000 (Entered: 05/02/2000)
549 SEALED REPLY by defendant Gina E Wood to [536-1] reply by plaintiff's. (former empl) Modified on 05/11/2000 (Entered: 05/02/2000)
550 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alexander S. in support of [495-1] motion for emergency relief. (former empl) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
551 BRIEF - FEDERAL COURT MONITOR'S REPORT by Thomas J Davis. (former empl) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
552 ORDER appointing the court's special master, Thomas Davis, for an additional six months.(signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 5/4/00 (former empl) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
Motion hearing re: [495-1] motion for emergency relief. before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Gary Smith. Court hears oral arguments. Court directs that DJJ shall be afforded 6 months in which to implement new reporting system and directs that DJJ is to immediately conduct an educational campaign process for JCO's as to policy of dealing with juvenile altercations. Court will keep record open during this time. Court keeps motion for emergency relief under advisement. Written order to be entered. (former empl) (Entered: 05/05/2000)
553 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for March 2000. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 5/8/00 (former empl) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
554 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: May 2000 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 05/15/2000)
555 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS filed for dates of 4/4/00 before Judge

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05/26/2000 05/26/2000 05/26/2000 05/31/2000 06/01/2000 06/08/2000 06/12/2000 06/13/2000 06/15/2000 06/28/2000 07/10/2000 08/10/2000 08/16/2000 08/28/2000

Joseph F. Anderson Jr. held in Columbia Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan (former empl) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
556 TRANSCRIPT (Vol II) OF MOTIONS filed for dates of 4/5/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. held in Columbia Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan (former empl) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
557 TRANSCRIPT (Vol. III) OF MOTIONS filed for dates of 4/6/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. held in Columbia Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan (former empl) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
558 TRANSCRIPT (Vol. IV) OF MOTIONS filed for dates of 4/7/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. held in Columbia Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan (former empl) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
559 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for April 2000. Defendant directed to make payment to the monitor. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld 6/1/00 (former empl) (Entered: 06/01/2000)
560 SEALED AMENDED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: May 2000 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 06/01/2000)
561 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING filed for dates of May 5, 2000 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. held in Columbia, SC Court Reporter: Gary Smith. (former empl) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
562 NOTICE of Hearing, status conference for 2:30 7/5/00 before Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/2000)
563 ORDER granting letter request: extending time for defendant to file June 2000 Report. Reset brief due for 6/16/00. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 6/13/00 (former empl) (Entered: 06/13/2000)
564 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: Defendants' June 2000 Response to Order for Production of Information. (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/2000)
565 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for May 2000. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod mld6/28/00 (former empl) (Entered: 06/28/2000)
566 SEALED BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: July 2000 response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 07/12/2000)
567 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: August 2000 Response to order for production of information. (former empl) (Entered: 08/11/2000)
568 ORDER for defendant to pay court's monitor's fees for June 2000. (signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr.) eod mld 8/16/00 (former empl) (Entered: 08/16/2000)
569 ORDERed that defendant make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1770.00 for the period July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2000. ( signed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 8/28/00 mld (kbos) (Entered:

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09/11/2000 10/10/2000 10/18/2000 10/19/2000 10/24/2000 10/27/2000
11/13/2000 11/13/2000 12/11/2000 01/10/2001 02/02/2001 02/06/2001 02/12/2001 02/14/2001 02/14/2001

08/28/2000)
570 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: September 2000 Response to Order for Production of Information (former empl) (Entered: 09/12/2000)
571 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: September 2000 response to order for production of information (kbos) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
572 NOTICE of Hearing set status conference for 10:00 10/27/00 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (kbos) (Entered: 10/18/2000)
573 LETTER of Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. to Counsel Re: Agreement Reached at Mediation (kbos) (Entered: 10/24/2000)
574 ORDER for defendant to pay monitor fees for the period of September 1, 2000 through September 30, 2000 in the amount of $2490.00. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 10/25/2000)
Status conference held before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. Court reporter: Jack Clarke. Colloquy as to "agreement" which has been reached as to panel which is to be selected to make recommendations to the court. Court to submit 4 names to counsel who will have an opportunity to object thereto. Agreement to be re-worded and submitted to court. Court determines that both sides have waived hearsay objections as to panel findings. (former empl) (Entered: 10/27/2000)
575 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: November 2000 response to order for production of information (mdea) (Entered: 11/13/2000)
576 ORDER for the defendant to pay monitor fees for the period of October 1,2000 through October 31, 2000 in the amount of $2363.21. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
577 BRIEF/DECEMBER RESPONSE, with attachments, to Order for Production by defendant Gina E. Wood. Note: attachments 1 and 2 are filed under seal. (former empl) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
578 REPORT for January 2001 by defendant Gina E Wood; exhibits 1 & 2 under seal. (former empl) (Entered: 01/11/2001)
579 NOTICE of Hearing set status conference for 10:30 2/14/01 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. (kbos) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
580 ORDER directing Defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1,200.00 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod 2/6/01 (bwil) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
581 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: February 2001 Response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1 & 2 (kbos) (Entered: 02/13/2001)
582 AGREEMENT reached at mediation concerning "panel" and report of said panel. (former empl) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
Minute entry: mooting [520-1] motion to amend [495-1] motion for

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02/20/2001 03/12/2001 04/10/2001 04/25/2001 05/11/2001 06/11/2001 06/22/2001
06/28/2001
07/03/2001
07/09/2001

emergency relief., mooting [515-1] motion for protective order, mooting [509-1] motion to set aside agreement to conduct discovery., mooting [503-1] motion to compel defendant's compliance with court's 1/96 order, mooting [495-1] motion for emergency relief. (at direction of the court). (former empl) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
583 ORDER TO DESIGNATE PANEL with attached agreement attached. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 02/21/2001)
584 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: March 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1 & 2 (kbos) (Entered: 03/13/2001)
585 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: April 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, & 2A (kbos) (Entered: 04/12/2001)
586 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1,120.00 for the period of March 1, 2001 through March 31, 2001. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 04/26/2001)
587 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood re: May 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, and 2A (kbos) (Entered: 05/14/2001)
588 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: June 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, 2A, and 3 (kbos) (Entered: 06/13/2001)
589 ORDER directing the defendant to submit any challenges to the application for payment of fees for Russ Van Fleet within 14 days. If no challenge is submitted, the fee will be deemed approved and defendant shall be obligated to make payment within 5 business days thereafter. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 6/22/01 (kbos) (Entered: 06/22/2001)
590 ORDER defendant has 14 days to challenge the fee application submitted by Panel Member Robert J. Sheheen, if no challege is submitted the fee is approved and defendant shall make payment to the Panel Member within 5 business days Defendant to file any challege to fee application by 7/13/01 signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (mflo) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
591 ORDER directing the defendant to submit any challenges to the application for payment of fees for Patricia L. Wise within 14 days. If no challenge is submitted, the fee will be deemed approved and defendant shall be obligated to make payment within 5 business days thereafter. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
592 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor in the

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07/09/2001
07/10/2001 08/10/2001 09/10/2001 10/12/2001 11/09/2001 11/20/2001 11/26/2001 11/26/2001 12/04/2001
12/05/2001

amount of $1,740.00 for the period of May 1, 2001 thorough May 31, 2001. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld (mdea) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
593 ORDER that defendant has 14 days to submit challenges to fee application submitted by Panel Member Russ Van Vleet; if no challenge submitted the fee is approved and defendant shall make payment to the Panel Member within 5 business days Defendant to file any challenge to fee application by 7/23/01 for Gina E Wood ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) eod/mld (mdea) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
594 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: July 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, & 2A (kbos) (Entered: 07/11/2001)
595 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: August 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, & 2A (kbos) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
596 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: September 2001 Response to Order for Production of Information with sealed attachments 1,2, & 2A (kbos) (Entered: 09/12/2001)
597 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: October 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2 & 2A (kbos) (Entered: 10/15/2001)
598 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: November 2001 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, & 2A (kbos) (Entered: 11/13/2001)
599 ORDER granting permission to have Protection and Advocacy investigate an allegation of gassing at the DJJ institutions. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 11/20/01 (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2001)
600 MOTION HEARING on request by Protection and Advocacy to speak their clients on the recent incidents at the DJJ ORAL ORDER granting request (before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan. (mflo) (Entered: 11/26/2001)
601 Minute order: Court grants request of the Protection and Advocacy to speak with the juveniles about the most recent gassing incidents and to review any reports from these incidents. (mflo) (Entered: 11/26/2001)
602 ORDERed that defendant shall have 14 days to submit any challenges to the fee application for panel member Robert J. Sheheen. If no challenge is submitted, the fee will be deemed approved and defendant shall be obligated to make payment within five business days. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 12/4/01 (kbos) (Entered: 12/04/2001)
603 ORDER set status conference for 11:00 12/14/01 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. )

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12/10/2001
12/10/2001 12/14/2001 12/14/2001
12/17/2001 12/20/2001 12/20/2001 12/20/2001 01/08/2002
01/08/2002 01/09/2002

EOD 12/5/01 (kbos) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
604 ORDER giving defendant 14 days to submit any challenges to the fee application. If no challenge is submitted, the fee will be deemed approved and defendant shall be obligated to make payment within 5 business days thereafter. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
605 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: December 2001 Response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, & 2A and attachment 3 (kbos) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
606 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B, plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 (mflo) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
607 STATUS CONFERENCE held before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ORAL ORDER for plaintiff to file motion for monitoring to begin; Court appoints Joe Younger as monitor of DJJ (replacing Tommy Davis); Defendants to file response within 21 days; Tentative date for next hearing is week of 1/22/02; Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan. (mflo) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
608 ORDER ALTERING TIME TO RESPOND any response to plaintiff's motion to monitor compliance must be filed by the defendant with this court by December 20, 2001. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (kbos) (Entered: 12/18/2001)
609 MEMORANDUM by defendant Gina E Wood in opposition to [606-1] motion to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 (mflo) (Entered: 12/21/2001)
610 AFFIDAVIT of Gina E. Wood by defendant Gina E Wood Re: [609-1] opposition memorandum to [606-1] motion to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 (mflo) (Entered: 12/21/2001)
611 AFFIDAVIT of Larry L. Vanderbilt by defendant Gina E Wood Re: [609-1] opposition memorandum to [606-1] motion to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 (mflo) (Entered: 12/21/2001)
612 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B, plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. to extend time to file response to defendant's memorandum in opposition to motion to monitor compliance until 1/10/02 (mflo) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
612 ORDER granting [612-1] motion to extend time to file response to defendant's memorandum in opposition to motion to monitor compliance until 1/10/02 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) (mflo) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
613 NOTICE of Hearing before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. set Motion Hearing to 9:00 1/23/02 for [606-1] motion to monitor

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01/09/2002 01/09/2002
01/09/2002 01/10/2002 01/11/2002 01/18/2002 01/23/2002
02/11/2002 02/12/2002
02/25/2002 03/11/2002 03/13/2002

compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 (kbos) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
614 ORDER terminating Thomas Davis as the court-appointed monitor in this case and appointing Joseph Younginer as the court's monitor. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 1/9/02 (kbos) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
615 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES. Defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1240.60 for the period of December 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 1/9/02 (kbos) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
616 ORDER extending time for counsel to respond to the panel report by January 18, 2002 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 1/9/02 (kbos) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
617 REPLY by plaintiff Alexander S. to defedant's response on monitoring (kbos) (Entered: 01/10/2002)
618 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: January 2002 response to order for production of information with attachment 3 (and sealed attachments 1, 2, and 2A) (kbos) (Entered: 01/14/2002)
619 REPLY by defendant Gina E Wood to Panel Report (kbos) (Entered: 01/22/2002)
620 MOTION HEARING [606-1] motion to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 held ORAL ORDER [606-1] motion to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 taken under advisement (before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) Court Reporter: Gary Smith. (mflo) (Entered: 01/23/2002)
621 FEBRUARY 2002 RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION by defendant Gina E Wood with sealed attachments 1,2,2A and unsealed attachment 3 (kbos) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
622 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES. Defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $3420.80 for the period of January 1, 2002 through January 31, 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. ) EOD 2/12/02 (kbos) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
623 ORDER RESUMING MONITORING BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL all fee requests for monitoring by plaintiff's counsel shall be submitted to the Court for approval on a monthly basis ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
624 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: March 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with attachment 3 (attachments 1, 2, & 2A sealed) (kbos) (Entered: 03/12/2002)
625 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES The defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor in the amount of

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03/27/2002 03/27/2002 04/08/2002
04/09/2002 04/11/2002 04/25/2002 05/07/2002 05/09/2002
05/09/2002 05/14/2002 05/15/2002 05/31/2002 06/03/2002

$1485.40 for the period of February 2000 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 03/14/2002)
626 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Gina E Wood Re: [623-2] order Fee Status: paid Receipt # 300-43311 (cbru) (Entered: 03/27/2002)
Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [626-1] appeal by Gina E Wood (cbru) (Entered: 03/27/2002)
627 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES directing the defendant to maky payment to the monitor in the amount of $2890.80. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [626-1] appeal by Gina E Wood USCA NUMBER: 02-1347 Lisa Jernigan (cbru) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
628 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: April 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with attachment 3 and sealed attachments 1, 2, 2A (kbos) (Entered: 04/12/2002)
Minute entry: terminating [606-1] motion to monitor compliance of Court's Order of 1/8/95 (per chambers order of 2/25/02 terms motion) (kbos) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
629 NOTICE of Hearing set status conference for 10:30 5/15/02 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr (mflo) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
630 LETTER of W. Gaston Fairey by plaintiff Ricky S., plaintiff Lafayette M., plaintiff Christopher M., plaintiff Benny B, plaintiff Alfred S., plaintiff Alexander S. Re: adding attorneys Lesly A. Bowers and Rochelle R. McKim with the Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc. and removing attorneys Vinton D. Lide, James D. Cooper and Larry C. Batson (mflo) (Entered: 05/09/2002)
631 SEALED DOCUMENT -- Response to Order for production of information, monthly report (mflo) (Entered: 05/10/2002)
632 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEE for the period of April 2002 to Joe R. Younginer ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (mflo) (Entered: 05/15/2002)
633 STATUS CONFERENCE held before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr; Court discusses various topics of concerns with counsel and Direct Gina Wood; Court Reporter: Gary Smith. (mflo) (Entered: 05/16/2002)
634 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING filed for dates of January 23, 2002 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr held in Columbia, SC Court Reporter: Gary Smith (kbos) (Entered: 05/31/2002)
700 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION/STATUS HEARING filed for dates of 5/15/02 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr held in Columbia Court Reporter: Gary Smith (mflo) (Entered: 10/02/2003)

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06/10/2002 06/12/2002
06/13/2002 06/17/2002 06/17/2002 07/01/2002 07/01/2002 07/10/2002
07/10/2002 07/11/2002 07/12/2002 07/18/2002 08/12/2002
08/12/2002 09/10/2002

635 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: June 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with attachment 3 (attachments 1, 2, & 2A sealed) (kbos) (Entered: 06/12/2002)
636 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT MONITOR'S FEES directing the defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $2490.60 for the period of May 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 06/13/2002)
637 MOTION by plaintiff Ricky S. to produce defendant's budget documents (kbos) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
638 Certificate that the Record on Appeal is Complete for [626-1] appeal by Gina E Wood (cbru) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
Certified and transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals: [626-1] appeal by Gina E Wood (cbru) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
639 MEMORANDUM by defendant Gina E Wood in opposition to [637-1] motion to produce defendant's budget documents (jada) (Entered: 07/02/2002)
640 AFFIDAVIT of Otha R. Dillihay by defendant Gina E Wood Re: [639-1] opposition memorandum (jada) (Entered: 07/02/2002)
641 ORDER extending time for plaintiff to reply to defendant's memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for production of budget documents ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
643 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: July 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with sealed attachments 1, 2, and 2A. Attachment 3 also attached (kbos) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
642 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES to be paid by the defendant to the monitor in the amount of $1710.40. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
644 REPLY by plaintiff Ricky S. to [639-1] opposition memorandum (kbos) (Entered: 07/15/2002)
645 ORDER denying without prejudice [637-1] motion to produce defendant's budget documents ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
646 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES defendant is directed to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $2090.60 for the period of July 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) EOD 8/12/02 (kbos) (Entered: 08/12/2002)
647 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: August 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with sealed attachments 1, 2, 2A and unsealed attachment 3 (kbos) (Entered: 08/13/2002)
648 NOTICE of Hearing before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr set

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09/10/2002 09/11/2002 09/13/2002 10/10/2002 10/15/2002 11/08/2002 11/13/2002 11/15/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002

Motion Hearing to 10:00 10/1/02 for [637-1] motion to produce defendant's budget documents (kbos) (Entered: 09/10/2002)
649 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: September 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with sealed attachments 1,2 and 2A and unsealed attachment 3 (kbos) (Entered: 09/11/2002)
650 ORDER directing the defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1410.40 for the period of August 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 09/12/2002)
651 NOTICE of Hearing before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr reset Motion Hearing to 2:00 11/18/02 for [637-1] motion to produce defendant's budget documents (kbos) (Entered: 09/13/2002)
652 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood Re: October 2002 Response to Order for Production of Information with sealed attachments 1,2 and 2A and unsealed attachment 3 (asni) (Entered: 10/11/2002)
653 ORDERed that defendant shall make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1360.40 for the period of September 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 10/16/2002)
654 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: November 2002 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, and 2A and unsealed attachment 3 (kbos) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
655 ORDER mooting [637-1] motion to produce defendant's budget documents ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) EOD 11/13/02 (kbos) (Entered: 11/13/2002)
656 ORDER directing the defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1480.25 for the period of October 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 11/18/2002)
657 MOTION by defendant Gina E Wood to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
658 MEMORANDUM by defendant Gina E Wood in support of [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
659 AFFIDAVIT with attached exhibits of Jerry Adger Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
660 AFFIDAVIT of Ray Cavanaugh Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
661 AFFIDAVIT of Lawrence E. Gainey, Jr. Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
662 AFFIDAVIT of G. Randall Grant Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
663 AFFIDAVIT with attached exhibits of Susan Alford Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)

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11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/19/2002 11/25/2002 11/27/2002 12/10/2002 12/10/2002 01/06/2003 01/07/2003
01/08/2003 01/17/2003 01/28/2003
01/29/2003

664 AFFIDAVIT of Bill Evans Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
665 AFFIDAVIT of Charles J. O'Shields Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
666 AFFIDAVIT of Trudie Trotti Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
667 AFFIDAVIT of Deborah D. Fite Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
668 AFFIDAVIT of Samuel L. Soltis Re: [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/20/2002)
669 RESPONSE by plaintiff Ricky S. to [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 11/26/2002)
670 ORDER postponing the automatic stay provision of 3626(e)(2) ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) EOD 11/27/02 (kbos) (Entered: 11/27/2002)
671 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $1310.40 for the period of November 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
672 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: December 2002 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1, 2, 2A and unsealed attachment 3 (kbos) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
673 ORDER extending time for monthly report to be filed by January 17, 2003 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 01/07/2003)
674 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES directing the defendant to make payment to the monitor in the amount of $780.20 for the period of December 2002. ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (kbos) (Entered: 01/08/2003)
675 NOTICE of Hearing before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr set Motion Hearing to 2:00 1/28/03 for [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (kbos) (Entered: 01/08/2003)
676 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: January 2003 response to order for production of information with sealed attachments 1,2,2A and unsealed attachment 3 (asni) (Entered: 01/21/2003)
677 MOTION HEARING [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision held defendant withdrawing without prejudice with right to refile until June 2003 [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) Court Reporter: Jack Clarke. (mflo) (Entered: 01/28/2003)
678 Minute order: withdrawing [657-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision without prejudice (mflo) (Entered: 01/29/2003)

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02/10/2003
02/10/2003 02/13/2003
03/10/2003 03/17/2003 04/08/2003 04/10/2003 05/12/2003 05/14/2003 05/15/2003 06/10/2003 06/12/2003
06/16/2003 06/18/2003 07/08/2003

679 ORDER for defendant to make payment to the monitor, Joe Younginer, in the amount of $1,590.60 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) eod 2/10/03 (former empl) Modified on 02/11/2003 (Entered: 02/10/2003)
680 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
681 JUDGMENT OF USCA (certified copy) Re: [626-1] appeal by Gina E Wood; parties have filed a stipulation to dismiss, the court dismisses this appeal upon terms as have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule 42(b) (asni) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
682 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 03/11/2003)
683 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor, Joe R. Younginer, in the amount of $1,060.40 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
684 ORDER for defendant to make payment to the monitor, Joe Younginer, in the amount of $730.20 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 04/09/2003)
685 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 04/11/2003)
686 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
687 ORDER directing defendant to make payment of $1,160.40 to the court's monitor, Joe R. Younginer for April's charges ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 05/14/2003)
688 ORDER substituting party ; terminated party Gina E Wood , added defendant William R Byars ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 05/15/2003)
689 BRIEF by defendant William R Byars with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 06/11/2003)
690 ORDER substituting attorney terminated attorney William Henry Davidson II for William R Byars Added Larry Leroy Vanderbilt ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 06/12/2003)
691 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to the monitor, Joe Younginer, in the amount of $680.20 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 06/16/2003)
692 NOTICE of Hearing set status conference for 10:00 7/8/03 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr (former empl) (Entered: 06/18/2003)
693 STATUS CONFERENCE held discussion of partnership between DJJ and Clemson University before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr Court

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07/14/2003 07/14/2003 08/11/2003 08/11/2003 09/10/2003 09/11/2003 10/10/2003 10/14/2003 11/07/2003 11/14/2003 11/14/2003 11/26/2003 12/01/2003 12/10/2003

Reporter: Jack Clarke. (mflo) (Entered: 07/08/2003)
694 ORDER directing defendant to make payment to Joe Younginer in the amount of $1010.40 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 07/14/2003)
695 BRIEF by defendant William R Byars with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 07/15/2003)
696 BRIEF by defendant William R Byars with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
697 ORDER directing the defendant to pay $830.20 to Joe Younginer for July 2003 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
698 BRIEF by defendant William R Byars with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 09/11/2003)
699 ORDER directing the defendant to pay the monitor Joe Younginer $1,160.40 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 09/11/2003)
701 BRIEF by defendant William R Byars with attachments 1,2,2a under seal (former empl) (Entered: 10/14/2003)
702 ORDER directing the defendant to pay the court monitor Joe Younginer in the amount of $680.20 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (former empl) (Entered: 10/15/2003)
703 ORDER extending time for monthly report to be submitted on 11/14/03 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (mflo) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
704 BRIEF by defendant Gina E Wood RE: November 2003 Response to order for production of information with 3 sealed attachments (mflo) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
705 MOTION by defendant William R Byars to terminate judicial supervision (mflo) (Entered: 11/17/2003)
706 ORDER for payment of court's monitor's fees for the period of October 2003 in the amount of $1,060.40 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (mflo) Modified on 12/01/2003 (Entered: 12/01/2003)
707 NOTICE of Hearing before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr set Motion Hearing to 10:30 12/10/03 for [705-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision (mflo) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
708 MOTION HEARING [705-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision held ORAL ORDER granting [705-1] motion to terminate judicial supervision; final agreement to be filed (before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) Court Reporter: Debra Jernigan. (mflo) (Entered: 12/10/2003)

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12/11/2003 12/15/2003 12/29/2003 08/12/2004 08/13/2004
08/30/2004 08/30/2004 08/31/2004 09/13/2004 09/16/2004 09/24/2004 10/04/2004 10/06/2004 10/08/2004 10/08/2004 10/19/2004

709 ORDER dismissing action with prejudice ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (mflo) (Entered: 12/11/2003)
710 ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF COURT'S MONITOR'S FEES during the period of November/December 2003 in the amount of $1,010.40 ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (mflo) (Entered: 12/15/2003)
711 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING filed for dates of 12/10/03 before Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr held in COLUMBIA Court Reporter: DEBRA JERNIGAN (former empl) (Entered: 12/30/2003)
712 MOTION by movant Vincent F Rivera to reopen the case , and/or, for relief from judgment (kpri) (Entered: 08/13/2004)
713 ORDER denying [712-1] motion to reopen the case, denying [712-2] motion for relief from judgment; movant was not a party to this action and the time to reopen the judgment has long since past ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (mflo) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
714 NOTICE OF APPEAL by movant Vincent F Rivera Re: [713-1] order Fee Status: unpaid (asni) (Entered: 08/31/2004)
715 MOTION by movant Vincent F Rivera for certificate of appealability (asni) (Entered: 08/31/2004)
Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [714-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera (asni) (Entered: 08/31/2004)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [714-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera USCA NUMBER: 04-7421 Debbie Daniel (asni) (Entered: 09/14/2004)
716 ORDER denying [715-1] motion for certificate of appealability ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) (asni) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
717 FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ORDER granting appellant leave to proceed without full prepayment of fees (bbro) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
718 MOTION by movant Vincent F Rivera for reconsideration of [716-1] order (asni) (Entered: 10/05/2004)
719 ORDER denying [718-1] motion for reconsideration of [716-1] order ( signed by Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr ) eod 10/6/04 (asni) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
Certified and transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals: [714-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera (asni) (Entered: 10/08/2004)
720 Certificate that the Record on Appeal is Complete for [714-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera (asni) (Entered: 10/08/2004)
721 ADDITIONAL NOTICE OF APPEAL with request for certificate of appealibility by movant Vincent F Rivera Re: [719-1] order (asni) Modified on 10/25/2004 (Entered: 10/20/2004)

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Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [721-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera (asni) (Entered: 10/26/2004)
Transmitted supplemental record on appeal: [721-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera (asni) (Entered: 10/26/2004)
NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: [721-1] appeal by Vincent F Rivera USCA NUMBER: 04-7421 Debbie Davenport (asni) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
722 USCA JUDGMENT as to [370] Notice of Appeal filed by Flora Brooks Boyd,, [244] Notice of Appeal, filed by Flora Brooks Boyd,, Richard E Mclawhorn,, John F Henry,, Frank Mauldin,, Kathleen P Jennings,, Karole Jensen,, J P Neal,, Youth Services Department of SC,, 721 Notice of Appeal filed by Vincent F Rivera,, [32] Notice of Appeal filed by Richard E Mclawhorn,, John F Henry,, Frank Mauldin,, Kathleen P Jennings,, Joseph W Hudgens,, Karole Jensen,, J P Neal,, Youth Services Department of SC,, 714 Notice of Appeal filed by Vincent F Rivera,, [360] Notice of Appeal filed by Flora Brooks Boyd,, [319] Notice of Appeal filed by Flora Brooks Boyd,, 626 Notice of Appeal filed by Gina E Wood,, [369] Notice of Appeal filed by Flora Brooks Boyd,, [361] Subsequent Notice of Appeal filed by Flora Brooks Boyd, affirming the decision of the District Court (bbro, ) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
Appeal Record Returned: [370] Notice of Appeal, [244] Notice of Appeal,, 721 Notice of Appeal, [32] Notice of Appeal, 714 Notice of Appeal, [360] Notice of Appeal, [319] Notice of Appeal, 626 Notice of Appeal, [369] Notice of Appeal, [361] Subsequent Notice of Appeal 87 volumes (bbro, ) (Entered: 05/09/2005)

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 876 F.Supp. 773 (1995)
ALEXANDER S., Alfred S., Benny B., Christopher M., Lafayette M., and Ricky S., By and Through their Guardian ad Litem, Lesly A. BOWERS, individually and as representatives
of a class of juveniles, Plaintiffs, v.
Flora Brooks BOYD, individually and in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice; Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South
774 Carolina; John F. *774 Henry, Frank Mauldin, Kathleen P. Jennings, Joseph W. Hudgens, Karole Jensen and J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 3:90-3062-17.
United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.
January 25, 1995. As Modified on Denial of Reconsideration February 17, 1995.
7756 *775 *776 W. Gaston Fairey, Rochelle Lyn Romosca, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Robert O. Meriwether, Alice V. Harris, William S. Brown, M. Clifton Scott, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Nancy C. McCormick, Holly C. Walker, South Carolina Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped, Inc., Columbia, SC, for plaintiffs.
Edward M. Woodward, Frances G. Smith, Woodward, Levintis, Unger, Daves, Herndon & Cothran, Vinton D. 777 Lide, Lide, Montgomery & Potts, Larry L. Vanderbilt, S.C. Dept. *777 of Juvenile Justice, Columbia, SC, for
defendants.
Richard A. Harpootlian, A. Randolph Hough, Sol. Office, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Columbia, SC, amicus curiae.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, Jr., District Judge.
This is an action initiated by juveniles incarcerated at the four correctional institutions maintained and operated by the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 28, 1990 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, from the Defendants, the DJJ commissioner and board members. The Plaintiffs challenge numerous conditions of confinement of juveniles housed in the facilities operated by DJJ. They allege that the Defendants, all acting under color of state law, have deprived them of rights secured by the United States Constitution and various federal statutes.
In their answer, the Defendants admit that DJJ is forced to house more juveniles than the facilities were designed to hold, but deny that the overcrowding rises to the level of a constitutional violation. During the trial of this case, however, counsel for the Defendants admitted that current levels of population exceed minimum constitutional standards and consented to an order requiring a release of juveniles to alleviate overcrowding. In regard to the other allegations of the complaint, the Defendants either deny them or admit them with the qualification that good-faith efforts have been made to secure the necessary funding to improve these conditions. The Defendants further deny that any of the additional violations constitute deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or various statutory provisions.

Procedural History of the Case
On January 16, 1991, the court appointed a guardian ad litem[1] to represent the purported class. On March 7, 1991, the court certified the class as consisting of all persons presently and in the future housed within the DJJ correctional facilities. On that same date, the court approved the litigation team assembled to represent the Plaintiffs in this action. The court also allowed Richard A. Harpootlian, Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina, to participate in this action as amicus curiae.[2]
Acting upon the request of both parties, the court entered an order on September 23, 1991 severing the question of overcrowding for a separate trial and indicating that the court would make a "preliminary determination" as to a suitable population ceiling for all DJJ facilities in dispute. That order provided that the parties would thereafter be directed to negotiate the remaining issues in the case "in light of the court's opinion [on population] which, if unchanged, would likely be embodied in any final relief this court might fashion in this case." The court heard testimony on the population question on December 4 and 5, 1991. The court then determined, in an order dated 778 March 31, 1992, that its decision to sever and try separately the population question was in error.[3] The *778 court reached this conclusion for two reasons: (1) the court decided that the question of overcrowding could not be considered independently of the other issues relating to conditions of confinement that are presented in this case; and (2) both parties and their expert witnesses based their population ceiling analysis on standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association (ACA). The ACA standards have been rejected as inappropriate models upon which to make constitutional population determinations.[4] For those two reasons, the court declined to establish firm, or even tentative, population ceilings.
After the March 31, 1992 order was entered, the parties requested that the court stay its scheduling order to allow the parties an opportunity to discuss an amicable settlement of the case.[5] These efforts proved to be unsuccessful, and the case was therefore restored to the active docket and scheduled for trial in June 1994.
In the course of preparing for the trial of this case, the court has conducted twenty-two hearings and status conferences and issued fifty-four pretrial orders. In addition, the court has visited all of the DJJ facilities on three separate occasions, totaling more than twenty hours of visits. On two of the visits, the court partook of a meal in the DJJ dining facilities. In an effort to acquaint itself with comparable facilities in other jurisdictions, the court visited the Lorenzo Bean Youth Correctional Center near Atlanta, Georgia operated by the Georgia Department of Children and Youth Services. Also, the court visited the Columbia, South Carolina facility of the Alston Wilkes Society.
In 1992, the court appointed five expert witnesses pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 706: a juvenile correctional expert, an educator, a medical doctor, a clinical psychologist, and an architect. In addition, the court received a copy of the final report of the South Carolina Juvenile Justice Task Force, a blue-ribbon commission composed primarily of prosecutors, police officers, and family court judges, and headed by South Carolina Associate Supreme Court Justice Jean Toal. The Task Force Report identifies many of the problems the State of South Carolina faces with juvenile crime and contains recommendations for improving the state's juvenile justice system.[6]
The non-jury trial of this case began on June 13, 1994 and ended on August 29, 1994. During the course of the trial, the court heard from sixty-six witnesses (including seventeen expert witnesses) and reviewed one hundred and twenty-six exhibits consisting of several thousand pages.
As will be seen from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which follow, the court has determined that the Plaintiffs have proved that certain conditions of confinement at DJJ facilities violate their constitutional and 779 statutory rights.[7] Rather than imposing *779 a court-ordered remedial scheme, however, the court has determined that the appropriate course of action is to identify the nature and extent of the violations and then to allow the Defendants a reasonable period of time within which to submit a remedial plan to the court for its review.[8]

Introduction
Before delving into the myriad factual and legal issues presented in this case, the court is compelled to make a few general observations. This case lies at the intersection of two of society's most pressing concerns: children and the increasing crime rate. The court must be mindful, as an initial proposition, that its role in this litigation is not to attempt to construct a paragon or "model" training school program for DJJ. The court's role as to the constitutional claims is limited to establishing minimally acceptable constitutional standards. Although the court announced its views in this regard at the outset of the trial, most of the seventeen expert witnesses who testified at trial nevertheless urged upon the court a version of a remedial plan far beyond what the court has determined to be constitutionally required.[9] The court is constrained to conclude that many of these proposals are model programs which the state of South Carolina, through its duly elected representatives, might voluntarily choose to establish, but not programs that are required as a matter of constitutional law.[10] Thus, the court will grant to the Plaintiffs some, but not nearly all, of the relief they seek in this case.
Secondly, despite the court's admonition in its March 31, 1992 order and at several later stages of this litigation, both parties continue to argue that the court should adopt the ACA standards as the constitutional minima. The court must reject the parties' invitation to adopt these standards. Although ACA standards might represent desirable goals, it is well established that they do not represent the standards minimally acceptable under the Constitution.
As noted above, the Defendants have, from the outset of this litigation, admitted that their facilities are overcrowded. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants, both focusing upon the ACA standards the court has rejected, have determined between themselves that the rated capacity for the three long-term institutions operated by DJJ 780 is 299 juveniles. Testimony at trial indicated to the court that *780 these institutions routinely hold more than twice that number of juveniles. Thus, most of the testimony at the December 1991 trial and the June 1994 trial centered upon the goal of reducing the juvenile correctional population to a figure approaching the ACA-rated capacity of 299 juveniles.[11] The only real areas of dispute in regard to a population ceiling involved the period of time that the court would allow the Defendants to reduce population to this figure, and the appropriate percentage for a "surge factor" by which the Defendants would be allowed to exceed the applicable population ceiling in emergency situations.
As will be seen below, the court has determined that it will not order a release of any juveniles from DJJ facilities, but will instead require the Defendants to develop and implement a program for appropriately training and housing juveniles who are committed to DJJ facilities by the family court judges of South Carolina. The court's decision not to order a release of juveniles stems from two basic observations: (1) the last dormitories at DJJ facilities were constructed in the 1970s; and (2) since the last dormitories were constructed, the population of South Carolina has increased by nearly forty percent, and violent juvenile crime has skyrocketed, increasing one hundred and forty-nine percent in South Carolina between 1988 and 1992 alone.[12] The court is reluctant to impose on DJJ facilities a population ceiling that is based on an antiquated capacity level which takes no account of the significant increases in population and juvenile delinquency over the past twenty-five years. Instead of ordering the Defendants to release juveniles who have been committed to DJJ facilities by family court judges and kept there by the Juvenile Parole Board, the court will afford the Defendants the opportunity to develop a plan to adequately house and treat these juveniles. This remedial plan may include, at the Defendants' option, additional dormitories at DJJ facilities in Columbia or, alternatively, several regional community-based correctional facilities.
The court's final observation involves programs to rehabilitate juveniles who are committed to DJJ facilities. As articulated in the South Carolina Children's Code, the policy of the state with respect to juvenile delinquents is to attempt to rehabilitate juveniles who have been deprived of their liberty through the commitment process of the family courts of South Carolina. The court has determined that in many cases the rehabilitative efforts of DJJ are not working and that juveniles are often returned to society more prone to commit crimes than they were before their incarceration.[13] Compared to the other states in the nation, South Carolina is seventh from the bottom in

the amount of money it spends on juvenile corrections and fifth from the top in the rate of adult violent crime. The court has determined that there likely is a correlation between these two figures and that, in some cases, South Carolina juvenile correctional facilities produce graduates who later swell the populations of adult correctional facilities and figure prominently in the ranks of those who later commit violent offenses as adults. Although exact figures are difficult to obtain, the evidence indicates that between fifty-six and eighty-two percent of DJJ juveniles 781 later commit crimes as adults and are sentenced to adult prisons.[14] The court hastens to add that *781 unsuccessful efforts at rehabilitation stem primarily, if not exclusively, from the lack of adequate funding to devise and implement programs that will allow juveniles to correct their behavior while they are at DJJ facilities.[15]
Historical Development of Juvenile Justice
Young offenders have historically presented special problems for the criminal justice system. The idea that juveniles who violate the law should be treated differently from adult offenders originated at the end of the nineteenth century, when Chicago established a separate juvenile court and began to employ the common-law doctrine of parens patriae to protect children from themselves and their parents.[16] Within twenty-five years of the passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, all but two states had established specialized courts for children.[17]
A second revolution in juvenile justice began in 1967, when the United States Supreme Court held that, in juvenile commitment proceedings, juvenile courts must afford to juveniles basic constitutional protections, such as advance notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to remain silent. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Juveniles are not, however, accorded the full panoply of rights that adult criminal defendants are accorded, such as the right to trial by jury. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). As a result, juvenile courts still process juvenile delinquents in a manner more paternal and diagnostic than that afforded their adult criminal counterparts.
In South Carolina, incarceration of juveniles is said to be for beneficent rather than punitive purposes. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-20 (Law. Co-op.1985 & Supp.1993). Exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles who are alleged to be delinquent is vested in the South Carolina Family Court. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-400(A)(1)(d), (3) and (4) (Law. Co-op.1985 & Supp.1993). When a family court judge makes a determination of delinquency, the judge has a variety of options: place the child on probation (which may include restitution or community service as a condition of probation); impose a fine of up to $200; order that the child be examined or treated by a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist; order other care and treatment as the court "considers best"; or commit the child to the custody of a public or private institution. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1330 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993).
When a family court judge determines that incarceration may be appropriate, the judge must commit the juvenile to the DJJ Reception and Evaluation Center for a period not to exceed forty-five days. At the Reception and Evaluation Center, DJJ social workers perform an evaluation and make a recommendation to the committing court. The juvenile is then once again taken before the committing judge, who has the option of releasing the juvenile to his or her family or committing the juvenile to one of the three long-term institutions operated by DJJ. By law, the commitment must be for an indeterminate sentence not to extend beyond the juvenile's twenty-first birthday. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-2170 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993). The actual length of stay for the juvenile is determined by the Board of Juvenile Parole, which authorizes release of juveniles based upon internal guidelines 782 developed by the *782 Board. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 20-7-2095 and 20-7-2125 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993). DJJ thus controls neither its front door nor its back door: Admission to the institutions is controlled by the family courts; release is controlled by the Juvenile Parole Board. The average length of stay for juveniles committed to the longterm institutions is seven months.
The DJJ facilities at issue in this litigation are all located behind an escape-resistant fence on a two hundred-acre campus on Broad River Road in Columbia, South Carolina. The oldest facilities date from the late nineteenth century.[18] Historically, the conditions of the juvenile facilities in South Carolina were deficient. In the late 1960s, Howard James, a Pulitzer-prize winning reporter for the Christian Science Monitor, investigated juvenile

correctional systems across the country and described South Carolina's as among the worst in the nation.[19] In response to James's findings, a special committee of the South Carolina General Assembly conducted a hearing to consider improvements. The testimony of James and others spurred the state legislature to enact reforms and to construct additional youth facilities. Conditions improved so dramatically that, in 1977, in a federal lawsuit over Mississippi's juvenile correctional facilities, the Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services[20] was called as an expert witness to testify about South Carolina's then state-of-the-art Birchwood facility. See Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F.Supp. 1130 (S.D.Miss. 1977) (citing expert testimony of Grady A. DeCell, then Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services). Since the mid to late 1970s, however, facilities and programs have once again deteriorated, prompting the filing of this litigation in December 1990.
By any measure, juvenile crime has increased dramatically in recent decades. One study by the United States Department of Justice indicates that, nationwide, juvenile arrests for violent crime increased forty-one percent between 1982 and 1991.[21] In 1990, the total estimated delinquency caseload for the United States was 1.26 million cases.[22] The figures in South Carolina are even more staggering. Recent statistics in South Carolina show that the growth rate of juvenile crime has significantly outpaced population growth.
All of the experts who testified at trial suggested that the recent increase in juvenile crime is likely to continue, if for no other reason than demographics. By the year 2005, there will be twenty-three percent more teenagers nationwide than there are today.[23]
In an effort to identify the causes of the spiralling juvenile crime rate, the court carefully inquired of each of the expert witnesses as to their opinion of the reasons that underlie the increase. The reasons most commonly given may be summarized as follows: a significant increase in the number of single-parent families,[24] involvement 783 with alcohol *783 and other drugs, involvement in gangs and other anti-social groups, exposure to violence in entertainment and in the mass media, and access to firearms. Most juveniles who are at greatest risk of becoming extremely aggressive and violent tend to share some of these common experiences or characteristics that appear to place them on what one organization has termed a "trajectory toward violence."[25]
After receiving the testimony, carefully considering all the evidence, weighing the credibility of the witnesses, reviewing the exhibits and briefs, and studying the applicable law, this court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. The court notes that to the extent any of the following findings of fact constitute conclusions of law, they are adopted as such, and to the extent any conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are so adopted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice is the state agency charged with housing and rehabilitating wayward youth in South Carolina between the ages of twelve and seventeen. DJJ case workers around South Carolina processed 24,767 juveniles in fiscal year 1993-94. Most of these juveniles were either diverted from the juvenile justice system or placed on probation by a family court judge. In 1993-94, just eight percent (2,093) of the juveniles who were screened were actually sent to the Reception and Evaluation Center to be considered for confinement at the long-term institutions. Of these, approximately one-half (994) were actually placed at one of the institutions during the last fiscal year. The vast majority of the juveniles who are recommended for long-term placement are those who have committed offenses that society would generally describe as violent or serious. [26]
A recent study commissioned by DJJ contains ominous predictions for the future. If present trends in violent juvenile crime continue, by the year 1997 DJJ will need 1,310 beds, and by the year 2002, the department will need a total of 1,899 beds.[27] At the time of trial, population at the long-term institutions ranged from 670 to 730 juveniles.
This case involves the juveniles who are temporarily housed at the Reception and Evaluation Center, as well as those who are confined at the three long-term institutions. These juveniles claim that the basic ambient conditions

of confinement 0907 food, shelter, sanitation, living space, health care, recreation, programs, classification, discipline, and personal safety 0907 are so inadequate that exposure to them constitutes a deprivation of their rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As to the internal operation of the institutions, after studying the extensive record in this case, the court has determined that some basic reforms are necessary. The Defendants have already taken steps to implement almost all of these reforms, primarily in response to this lawsuit. These improvements, however, fall far short of the sweeping and intrusive relief the Plaintiffs seek in this case. For the court to grant the full relief sought by the 784 Plaintiffs in this case would be to involve the court in micro-management of *784 the juvenile institutions in a manner neither required nor sanctioned by the Constitution.
As to overcrowding generally, the court has determined that an outright release of juveniles from the institutions 0907 when there are no pre-release centers, halfway houses, or similar facilities available to reintegrate the juveniles into society 0907 is not in the best interest of the juveniles themselves or the public. Alleviation of overcrowded conditions may not be solved by a simplistic meat-ax approach; rather, the Defendants must be ordered to develop new facilities and programs in order to fulfill DJJ's statutory mission.
I
The Reception and Evaluation Center
The Reception and Evaluation Center is the institution designated to receive and evaluate juveniles considered for long-term confinement by the family court. Approximately 2,000 juveniles pass through the institution each year. By law, a juvenile's stay at the Reception and Evaluation Center may not exceed forty-five days. At the time of trial, the average stay was twenty-one days.
The Reception and Evaluation Center, the oldest of the DJJ institutions, is located separately from the other institutions on Broad River Road. The living units, cafeteria, and school building all appear to have been constructed before the 1950s. The activity building clearly pre-dates World War I. The infirmary and intake operations are housed in what appears to be an old mobile home or portable classroom. Juveniles at this institution are evaluated during their stay, after which they are returned to their home county for disposition by the family court. Disposition is the functional equivalent of sentencing in an adult case. The Reception and Evaluation Center frequently experiences severe overcrowding.
The Defendants have announced their intention to close the Reception and Evaluation Center by January 1996. Its functions will be allocated to three regional Reception and Evaluation Centers for which state bond money has already been committed. The state has already acquired the proposed sites, and construction is anticipated to begin shortly.
Although the testimony indicated that some of the facilities at the current Reception and Evaluation Center are substandard, the court declines to grant affirmative relief as to this aging institution that will be soon replaced. It would represent an unwise use of scarce resources for the Defendants to attempt to improve the structures at the Reception and Evaluation Center when the Defendants have pressing needs at their other institutions. Moreover, the court finds that the constitutional rights of juveniles who are confined to the Reception and Evaluation Center between the date of this order and the date of the closing of the institution will not be violated in light of the fact that the average stay at Reception and Evaluation is twenty-one days, and the maximum stay, by law, may not exceed forty-five days. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1876, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ("We simply do not believe that requiring a detainee to share toilet facilities and [an] admittedly rather small sleeping space with another person for generally a maximum period of sixty days violates the Constitution.").
II

The Long-Term Institutions
The three long-term institutions, or training schools,[28] are Willow Lane, John G. Richards, and Birchwood. The long-term institutions generally house between 670 and 720 juveniles. The average length of stay is seven months. Following is a brief description of the physical plant and functions of the three campuses.
Willow Lane houses all of the female juveniles, as well as the less aggressive and younger males. The Willow Lane campus consists of some twenty structures generally constructed in 1966 and 1972. The campus contains 785 five dormitories, a cafeteria, and *785 educational, medical, and administrative facilities. The infirmary (constructed in 1972) and the dental facility (constructed in 1977) serve all three long-term campuses.
John G. Richards houses older male juveniles and contains many of the special program dorms. The John G. Richards campus, which was generally constructed in the early 1970s, consists of five dormitories, a cafeteria, and administrative and recreational facilities. The campus also contains the "Intake/SPU" unit, which serves as a maximum security facility for the John G. Richards and Willow Lane campuses. The cafeteria facility, constructed in 1970, provides food preparation and dining services for the John G. Richards and Birchwood campuses, as well as for the Reception and Evaluation Center.
Birchwood houses the oldest, most aggressive male residents. The Birchwood campus is the newest of the four campuses. Generally constructed in the mid-1970s, the campus contains four dormitories, administrative offices, and vocational and academic educational facilities. It also has an artificially surfaced playing field, a gymnasium, an auditorium, covered picnic shelters, and a baseball diamond. Also located on the Birchwood campus is the Santee unit, a maximum security facility.
All of the dormitories on the three campuses of DJJ have air conditioning, heating, hot and cold water, fire detection and sprinkler systems, and water fountains. Most residence halls are arranged with several wings of rooms in a dormitory-style configuration, with a central lavatory/shower facility and one or more common areas for daily activities. In many cases, the common areas are utilized for additional bed space. In general, the architecture of the school facilities at the three campuses appears to be comparable to other educational facilities constructed during the same time frame.
Although the Plaintiffs' claims originally included all four institutions at DJJ, as noted earlier, the court has determined that no affirmative relief is necessary with regard to the Reception and Evaluation Center. The remainder of this order, therefore, will address the totality of the conditions of confinement at the three long-term institutions. Except for the deficiencies noted below, the court finds no other constitutional or statutory violations of the Plaintiffs' rights.
A. Discipline
An effective discipline system is necessary in a juvenile correctional institution to aid staff in controlling violence and other inappropriate behavior, to maintain safety and security, and to serve as a training tool for the overall purpose of correcting the juveniles' behavior. The Plaintiffs mount a variety of attacks against the system of discipline in place at DJJ facilities, which depends primarily upon the use of lock-up units and CS gas to punish juveniles for disciplinary infractions. The Plaintiffs challenge the procedures by which juveniles are placed in lockup units and the Spartan conditions of the lock-up cells themselves. They also seek to have the court impose a one-hour limitation on the duration of their stay in lock-up facilities. They seek an order of this court imposing "less intrusive and more effective methods of maintaining security and control." The Plaintiffs also seek to have the court prohibit the use of CS gas altogether.
With the exception of the use of CS gas, discussed more fully below, the court has determined that the United States Constitution does not require this court's intervention in the disciplinary procedures at DJJ.

Use of CS Gas
CS gas is a potent form of tear gas used primarily for riot control. It draws its name from Ben Courson and Roger Staughton, the American chemists who developed it. The evidence at trial disclosed that, until recently, DJJ agency policy permitted the use of CS gas to "maintain control," as well as to prevent harm or the threat of harm to individuals. CS gas irritates the mucous membranes of those who are exposed to it. Exposure to the gas causes instant pain and spasms in the eyelids, coughing fits, and breathing problems. Documented studies indicate that CS gas can cause damage to the cornea and potential blindness; damage to the skin, such as chemical burns, blistering, and scarring; and severe complications for asthmatics, including respiratory damage and chronic lung disease.
786 *786 CS gas has been used on a fairly regular basis in the DJJ institutions. The Defendants' own records indicate that gas was used on juveniles more than 180 times in the 1993 calendar year. To its credit, DJJ requires that strict records be maintained any time gas is used on a juvenile. After reviewing the Defendants' use of force/gas reports, however, the court finds that gas has been used for purposes other than the protection of staff or others. Indeed, the Defendants' own records indicate that gas was used "to enforce an order" in more than fifty incidents in 1993.
The court finds that the use of CS gas upon juveniles is counterproductive. It causes more anger in the juveniles toward the adults who are supposed to be caring for them. The use of gas as a form of punishment teaches the victims to inflict pain as a method of controlling others and makes the juveniles more volatile, more aggressive, and less likely to respond properly to authority figures. Moreover, the inappropriate use of CS gas may cause long-term medical complications for the juveniles. For these reasons, the court concludes that the indiscriminate use of CS gas violates the juveniles' constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. Based upon the testimony presented on this issue, the court finds that gas should be used only when a genuine risk of serious bodily harm to another exists and other less intrusive methods of restraint are not reasonably available.
At trial, DJJ Director Flora Brooks Boyd testified that she intended to implement a new policy regarding the use of CS gas consistent with the requirements stated above. She also testified that she plans to maintain a reliable system to monitor gas use and will personally review every incident in which gas is used. The Defendants should therefore include a detailed plan for the use of CS gas, consistent with the requirements of this section, as part of the overall plan submitted in response to this court's order.
Except for the use of CS gas, the court finds no other constitutional deficiencies in the discipline system at DJJ facilities. For this court to intervene in the routine administration of disciplinary programs at DJJ would be to substitute the court's judgment for that of trained penological authorities charged with the administration of DJJ facilities.
B. Fire Safety
The Plaintiffs presented testimony on one issue related to fire safety: whether securing the individual cells of the two lock-up units, known as Santee and the SPU unit, with padlocks creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the juveniles who are confined in these units.
At DJJ, the greatest risk of harm from fires is from mattress fires. Mattress fires emit insufficient heat to set off the sprinkler system, but cause substantial amounts of smoke which can be fatal to the occupants of the units if those juveniles are not removed quickly. In each of the two disciplinary units at DJJ, the thirty individual cells are all secured with individual padlocks. In the event of a fire, each cell must be opened by hand, a time-consuming process which constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm to the Plaintiffs housed in these two units. The court thus concludes that the use of individual padlocks on the cells in the Santee and SPU lock-up units unreasonably infringes upon the Plaintiffs' safety interest. While locking devices are undoubtedly necessary for security and control, there are alternative locking methods available which do not have the same degree of inherent risk to safety. During the trial, the Defendants agreed to install a "gang" locking system for these units, which would

allow supervisory personnel to simultaneously unlock all doors in the event of a fire. The court finds that such a system would be adequate to protect the safety interests of the Plaintiffs. The Defendants should include a reasonable timetable for the incorporation of a gang locking system into the two lock-up units as a part of the remedial plan submitted in response to this order.
C. Food Service
Juveniles at the John G. Richards and Willow Lane institutions dine in the dining facilities on those campuses. 787 Neither Birchwood *787 nor the Reception and Evaluation Center has its own cafeteria facility. Food is prepared
at John G. Richards and shipped to Birchwood for two meals, and the juveniles at Birchwood are transported to John G. Richards for the third meal each day. Similarly, food is transported from John G. Richards to the Reception and Evaluation Center for service to the juveniles at that institution.
At trial, several juveniles, and even the food services director, testified that frequently cockroaches and other foreign matter are present in the food served to the juveniles. The court finds that the Defendants have an obligation to provide minimally adequate nourishment to juveniles housed at their institutions, and that food containing cockroaches and other foreign matter falls below what may be deemed minimally adequate.
The Defendants have conceded that they must eliminate these problems and have begun measures to correct them. At trial, the food services director testified that the department has entered into a new contract with an exterminator, has installed new doors and weatherstripping in response to a consultant's suggestion, and has implemented improved procedures for washing utensils and trays. As a part of the remedial plan submitted in this case, the Defendants should furnish a progress report on these and any other improvements that will assure the removal of cockroaches and other foreign matter from food served to juveniles at DJJ.
D. Classification
Classification, for the purposes of this case, is the process of separating aggressive juveniles from passive ones and determining appropriate levels of restraint for each juvenile based upon the threat the juvenile presents to other juveniles and to the public. The juveniles possess a clearly recognized liberty interest in being free from unreasonable threats to their physical safety. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). On the other hand, the general public is entitled to reasonable protection from juveniles incarcerated at DJJ.
For these reasons, juveniles in DJJ facilities should be screened and classified, so that the aggressive juveniles are identified and separated from more passive juveniles. The level of restraint to be used for each juvenile should be based upon some rational professional judgment as to legitimate safety and security needs. Inherent in this right is a system of periodic review of the initial placement to evaluate whether subsequent events demonstrate the need for a reclassification of the juvenile's security requirements.
Until recently, a rational and minimally adequate system of classification did not exist at DJJ. Safety to juveniles and to the public was occasionally threatened by this deficiency.
In response to this litigation, the Defendants have recognized their obligation to establish a minimally adequate classification system and, by the time of the court's last visit on October 11, 1994, had begun to fulfill that obligation by placing into operation a special department, known as the Admissions Unit, to appropriately classify and place juveniles in the long-term institutions. The court finds that the Admissions Unit should satisfy the requirements of the Constitution in terms of classification. The full details of the classification system that has been established should be included in the overall remedial plan submitted to the court for its review.
E. Education
The campus of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice is an independent school district subject to all state and federal laws regarding public education. All juveniles in the four institutions attend school from 8:30

a.m. until 3:30 p.m., five days a week. Unlike their counterparts in the traditional school system, however, juveniles at DJJ are required to attend school year round. Students generally attend the school associated with the campus where they reside, although students who are ahead of or behind most of their peers may be transported to another school on the DJJ campus.
At Birchwood High School, vocational education is available in a number of fields, such as graphic art and 788 communication, automobile mechanics and body work, vocational *788 rehabilitation work program, carpentry,
building construction, and introduction to personal computers.
Generally speaking, classes at the DJJ schools are small, with a sixteen-to-one student/teacher ratio in regular education and an eight-to-one student/teacher ratio in special education.[29] The average DJJ student is three years below his or her expected grade level. The educational program is highly remedial, allowing extensive mainstreaming of juveniles receiving special education.
The court finds that there are a disproportionately high number of juveniles at DJJ school facilities who are suffering from a "disability" as that term is defined in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. As a recipient of federal funds, DJJ is under a legal obligation to identify and evaluate juveniles who are in need of special education and related services. For juveniles who are thus identified, the educational institution must formulate and implement an "Individualized Education Program" (IEP) for the juvenile.
As of the time of trial, the percentage of juveniles in special education programs at DJJ schools ranged between 17.9% (at Birchwood) and 32.5% (at Willow Lane). The Defendants' own educators admitted that perhaps as many as fifty percent of the juveniles at DJJ are in need of special education. The court finds that the Defendants have not adequately identified juveniles in need of special education and, in some instances, have not fully formulated and implemented IEPs for those juveniles who have been identified.
Much of the difficulty that DJJ has experienced in this regard stems from two problems not of its own making. First, local school districts around South Carolina have traditionally been reluctant to forward a juvenile's school records when he or she is sent to DJJ. And second, the South Carolina Department of Education has interpreted IDEA and Section 504 rigidly, requiring DJJ to formulate not one but two IEPs for the juvenile: one during the juvenile's brief stay at the Reception and Evaluation Center and another if and when the juvenile is confined to a long-term institution. The court finds that the inability to obtain proper school records and the burdensome requirement of formulating an interim IEP for juveniles at the Reception and Evaluation Center have impaired the Defendants' ability to properly identify and serve juveniles confined to the long-term institutions who are in need of special education services. As will be seen in the Conclusions of Law section of this order, these two impediments to full implementation of IDEA and Section 504 have now been removed. With these obstacles out of the way, the court must expect full compliance with all federal statutes regarding educational needs of students with disabilities.
Aside from the deficiencies noted above, the court finds that no other aspect of the education program at DJJ violates the juveniles' constitutional or statutory rights on a class-wide basis.
F. Medical Services
Among the traditionally recognized liberty interests of the Plaintiff class that survive confinement is the right to minimally adequate health care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Testimony at trial disclosed that medical resources for the various DJJ institutions are stretched to the limit. The institutions are forced to rely upon only three full-time nurses and a handful of part-time nurses to serve a population totaling almost 900 juveniles. One medical doctor is under contract to visit the facilities once a week for a total of three hours. For this reason, DJJ is forced to rely upon emergency rooms at local hospitals for matters, such as cuts requiring sutures, that could be handled in house much more efficiently and less expensively.

Both the medical experts and the DJJ medical staff testified that the inadequate number of nurses, nurse 789 practitioners, and *789 physicians prevents DJJ from providing appropriate medical care and places the health of
all juveniles in the population at risk. At minimum, DJJ should employ a sufficient number of trained medical staff to provide the basic components of a medical system for the institutions. Central to the issue of medical staffing is the necessity of a supervising physician to assure that the overall system is functioning properly to meet the health needs of the population. Nursing staff should be available to adequately provide daily review of sick call requests, to administer reasonably prompt medical care, and to train other staff members in identifying and monitoring the juveniles' illnesses.
Acting to correct an admittedly deficient system, DJJ has contracted with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) to run the health care program at the DJJ facilities. At trial, the Defendants were optimistic that the unconstitutional conditions regarding health care would be cured if and when DHEC begins providing services. During the trial of this case, the Defendants were still working out the details of the arrangement with DHEC; therefore, the Defendants must submit the final proposal with DHEC to the court for its review as part of the overall plan submitted in this case.
G. Grievance/Ombudsman System
The court finds no violation of the juveniles' constitutional rights in regard to the operation of the grievance and ombudsman system at DJJ facilities. Were this court to order the reforms to the grievance and ombudsman system suggested by the Plaintiffs' counsel, the court would impermissibly be encroaching upon a policy decision better left to the agency.
H. Access to Legal Assistance
The Plaintiffs contend that they are constitutionally entitled to reasonable access to the courts during their stay at DJJ and that the court should order the Defendants to provide "an adequate law library or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Although the Supreme Court has extended such protections to adult prisoners incarcerated for violations of the law, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), the Court has never extended its holding to juvenile delinquents being housed at training schools for a beneficent purpose. Admittedly, one district court has extended the right of access to courts to juvenile facilities; but it did so primarily because the stipulated record in that case disclosed that most of the juveniles had been committed to the institutions without having been represented by legal counsel. See Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F.Supp. 1130, 1158 (S.D.Miss.1977). Moreover, the court in Morgan merely accepted a proposal by the defendants that juveniles be notified that they might contact a community legal services association if they needed legal service.
The situation in South Carolina is quite different. State law provides that any juvenile involved in a delinquency proceeding that may result in commitment to an institution has the right to retain counsel or the right to courtappointed counsel at state expense if he or she cannot afford an attorney. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-740 (Law.Coop.1985). In like manner, state law provides that juveniles appearing before the Juvenile Parole Board have the right to counsel of their choice or court-appointed counsel if they cannot afford such assistance. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-2105 (Law.Co-op.1985). Furthermore, state law provides that after an initial waiting period, each juvenile has the right to appear before the Juvenile Parole Board every three months for the purpose of parole consideration. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-2095 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1993). In addition, the evidence at trial disclosed that juveniles are permitted periodic contacts with the outside world and thus would have the ability to secure the services of a legal aid society or other appropriate legal representative. Because the state of South Carolina provides ample opportunity for court-appointed legal representation 0907 both at the time of commitment and as frequently as once every three months for parole consideration 0907 and because DJJ does not prohibit the juveniles from periodic contacts with the outside world, the court finds that the Plaintiffs have not been deprived of a right to reasonable access to the courts.
790

*790 In regard to the request for a law library, the court finds that the Plaintiffs have no constitutional right to a law library. As a practical matter, juveniles between the ages of twelve and nineteen, who, on average, are three years behind their expected grade level, would not benefit in any significant respect from a law library, and the provision of such would be a foolish expenditure of funds.
I. Programs
It was apparent from the testimony in this case that programming geared toward correcting the behavior of juveniles is central to the very nature of a juvenile training facility. Virtually every witness who testified in the case asserted that appropriate programming can make a difference and substantially enhance the juveniles' opportunity to succeed upon release from confinement. Ms. Marlene McClain, the Chairman of the Juvenile Parole Board, testified that the Board would release juveniles sooner (and thereby reduce overcrowding) if DJJ maintained a minimally adequate level of programming. Additionally, because such programming improves the juveniles' behavior while confined, it reduces the need for disciplinary lock-up and enhances the safety of the institution for the juveniles and the staff. Without minimally adequate programming, the agency is simply warehousing the juveniles and ignoring the statutory purpose of their confinement. As journalist Howard James observed, "Too often all that society provides [for juveniles] is storage 0907 like ripe peaches in a warm cellar."[30]
The court finds that, under the Constitution, a minimally adequate level of programming is required in order to provide juveniles with a reasonable opportunity to accomplish the purpose of their confinement, to protect the safety of the juveniles and the staff, and to ensure the safety of the community once the juveniles are ultimately released. Minimally adequate program services should be designed to teach juveniles the basic principles that are essential to correcting their conduct. These generally recognized principles include: (1) taking responsibility for the consequences of their actions; (2) learning appropriate ways of responding to others (coping skills); (3) learning to manage their anger; and (4) developing a positive sense of accomplishment.
It is in the area of programming that conditions at DJJ have improved most during the pendency of this litigation. When this action was initiated, the Defendants offered the juveniles a very limited number of programs: anger management, drug and alcohol therapy, and, if appropriate, sex offender treatment. Since this lawsuit was filed, however, the Defendants have initiated several innovative programs, including the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) Program, the START Program, the Cities in Schools Program, and the Omega Boys Choir.[31] Juveniles who opt to participate in these programs and who meet the entrance requirements are housed in special dormitories. Preliminary data from all of these programs indicate that the juveniles are much better behaved while in the system, are paroled at their minimum guidelines, and do well after they are released from confinement. The administrators of these programs reported that there is little or no violence in these dorms and that CS gas is not used. None of the twenty-two graduates of the JROTC program has been rearrested, and only about fifteen percent of the START graduates have returned to confinement. Significantly, all of the juveniles in these special programs are housed in dormitories that exceed, to some extent, the ACA-rated capacity for population. Rehabilitative efforts are successful with these groups of juveniles, however, because the programs take the juveniles out of the overcrowded dormitories for substantial periods of time and provide juveniles with reasonable opportunities to correct their behavior.
At trial, the Defendants conceded that they have an obligation to develop effective programming for all of the 791 juveniles housed at DJJ facilities. The programs described *791 above have been implemented incrementally
and presently serve no more than half of the juveniles housed at DJJ facilities. For the juveniles who are not enrolled in these special programs, the Defendants must develop a reasonable timetable for developing minimally acceptable programs, as defined herein, for juveniles during their stay at DJJ.
J. Overcrowding and Staff Levels
At present, the number of juveniles housed in the DJJ long-term institutions remains at a fairly constant level between 670 to 720 juveniles. The Defendants have conceded in their pleadings that the facilities at issue in this litigation are overcrowded in a constitutional sense. Thus, the only questions to be resolved by this court are the

extent of the overcrowding and the appropriate remedy. The Plaintiffs seek to have the court adopt standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association, which, if applied to the institutions in dispute here, would yield a total rated capacity of only 299 juveniles. The Plaintiffs would have the court order the periodic release of juveniles until the population at DJJ approaches the ACA figure. The Defendants initially conceded that the ACA standards were applicable in this case, but by the time of the June 1994 trial, they had modified their position so as to assert that a population reduction to between 450 to 520 juveniles is appropriate.
As will be seen in the Conclusions of Law section of this opinion, the court must respectfully decline the invitation to adopt the ACA standards as the constitutional minimum. The Supreme Court itself has declared that such standards represent "goals" of the sponsoring organization, but do not establish the benchmark from which constitutional determinations may be made.
For this reason, the court's findings regarding overcrowding are based not upon ACA standards, but upon the court's review of the extensive record in this case and its three visits to the institutions under challenge. Additionally, as the court noted in its March 31, 1992 order, the overcrowding issue may not be considered in a vacuum. The issues of population, program effectiveness, physical plant, staffing, security, and other conditions of confinement have a direct bearing upon one another.
The court finds that a reasonable level of population at DJJ is that level which provides the minimum amount of physical space juveniles need for adequate living conditions and does not unreasonably threaten safety or unreasonably frustrate the purpose of confinement. Applying this standard to the facilities at issue here, the court concludes that the long-term institutions at DJJ currently house more juveniles than the Constitution will allow. All of the witnesses, including administration and staff of DJJ, agreed that at current population levels, DJJ's systems relating to security and safety are overburdened to such an extent that DJJ cannot adequately perform its mission. The witnesses agreed that overpopulation interferes with the underlying purpose of correcting the juveniles' behavior and providing safety for the general public. This testimony is corroborated by the current recidivism rate for DJJ adolescents (as high as eighty-two percent) and the periodic escapes of juveniles from the institutions.
As noted previously, the court visited the facilities in dispute on three occasions. These visits confirmed that many of the dormitories are severely overcrowded. For example, the Moultrie dormitory on the Birchwood campus has twenty individual rooms, but sometimes houses as many as ninety juveniles. At Moultrie, beds are routinely placed in the hallways and in the dayrooms. The beds in the dayrooms are scarcely two feet apart, leaving the juveniles with hardly enough room to maneuver to their beds from the doorway. Occasionally, mattresses must be placed on the floor.
Having determined that the long-term institutions are overcrowded, the court is nevertheless constrained to conclude that an order reducing overpopulation by the simple expedient of releasing juveniles is not in the best interest of the juveniles or the public, nor is it required by the Constitution.
As has been noted, the last dormitories at the long-term institutions began operating in the mid-1970s. In South 792 Carolina, population *792 generally,[32] and juvenile crime in particular,[33] have both increased dramatically
since that time. It would be an understatement to say that DJJ's building program has not proceeded apace with the significant growth in population and juvenile delinquency in South Carolina; there has, in fact, been no building program for the past twenty-five years. Thus, any effort to reduce overcrowding by working down to the design capacity of the present buildings is necessarily flawed because it is premised on the indefensible notion that the number of juveniles who need to be incarcerated in South Carolina in 1995 equals the number of bed spaces that were constructed on the DJJ campus a quarter century ago.
The Plaintiffs argue that the court could order an immediate release of 200 juveniles with no threat to public safety. The Plaintiffs base this argument upon the notion that a significant number of juveniles incarcerated at the long-term facilities are "lightweight" offenders who have been sent to DJJ for relatively minor infractions. While the argument that relatively non-violent offenders should immediately be released to alleviate overcrowding has obvious superficial appeal, the court has determined that very few juveniles incarcerated at the long-term facilities fall into this category.[34] As previously noted, only about four percent of the approximately 24,000 juveniles who

are processed through the family courts of South Carolina each year end up in the long-term institutions. In other words, DJJ intake workers and family court judges exercise their discretion in favor of diversion and probation in an extremely high number of cases, reserving long-term institution beds for more-violent juveniles truly in need of secure confinement.
In an effort to obtain a fair assessment of the types of juveniles committed to the long-term institutions, the court requested the Defendants to provide confinement records of all juveniles who were housed at the long-term institutions one month prior to trial. The Defendants furnished these records, and the court has reviewed them in exhaustive detail. These records reveal that, for the most part, the juveniles confined at the long-term institutions have committed serious offenses and require secure confinement. For example, Table 1 attached to this order summarizes the offenses for which juveniles were committed to DJJ as of May 4, 1994. Although over half of these juveniles were committed for a "serious/violent" offense as defined by DJJ, the department's definition is underinclusive 0907 it does not accurately reflect the gravity of the offenses for which the other juveniles are committed. As Table 1 indicates, crimes such as carrying a weapon on school grounds, discharging a firearm into a dwelling, and possession of LSD or cocaine with intent to distribute are not classified by DJJ as serious or violent crimes. Contrary to the assertions of some of the witnesses in this case, a relatively insignificant number 793 of juveniles at DJJ have been committed for minor property offenses or status offenses.[35]*793 Most of the juveniles who are not classified by DJJ as violent or serious offenders have nevertheless demonstrated severe antisocial conduct dangerous to the general public.
As an additional reason for declining to order a release of juveniles, an outright release of juveniles to their homes would not serve the rehabilitative goal enunciated by the Children's Code. The parties have argued, and the experts have suggested, that juveniles released pursuant to an order of this court could be sent to "community based" facilities to assist them with their reintegration into society. In fact, DJJ has precious few such community-based programs in place,[36] and those that are in operation are, like the long-term facilities, stretched to the limit. The evidence disclosed that, outside of the Columbia campuses, DJJ has available a total of ninety-six group home beds, sixty long-term foster care beds, and one hundred and ten marine institute beds. These facilities are all operating at maximum capacity levels. Moreover, a large percentage of these slots are in facilities that are owned and operated by private groups who have contracted with DJJ to provide services to a small number of juveniles who meet stringent eligibility criteria. In short, the limited number of community-based programs presently available 0907 all of which are operating at capacity levels 0907 are not capable of absorbing additional juveniles released from the long-term institutions.
Because these community-based alternative programs are operating at full capacity, if the court were to order a release of juveniles from the long-term facilities, the court would, for all practical purposes, be ordering an outright release of juveniles to their homes without even minimal efforts at supervision or rehabilitation. Such a practice would disserve juveniles who would then receive even less rehabilitation than they are currently receiving at DJJ long-term facilities. If this court accepts, as it must, the proposition that the overriding purpose of juvenile commitment in South Carolina is rehabilitation, then the court may not order an outright release of juveniles as a constitutional remedy when such a release would serve no rehabilitative purpose.
Moreover, this court cannot ignore what the Supreme Court has described as the "legitimate and compelling state interest in protecting the community from crime." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2410, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984). As the Supreme Court noted in Schall, the harm suffered by a violent crime victim "is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator." Id.[37]
794 *794 For all of the foregoing reasons, the court must to reject any effort to relieve overcrowding that relies upon the simplistic and unwise approach of releasing juveniles back to their communities in an effort to reduce population to the design capacity of the DJJ physical plant constructed in the 1970s. Rather, the court must order the Defendants to construct additional facilities to house juveniles who are committed to DJJ. Because it is well established that the state should be given considerable latitude in developing an appropriate remedial plan, the court will allow the Defendants to decide whether these additional facilities should be comprised of additional dormitories at the central location in Columbia or decentralized, community-based correctional programs throughout South Carolina.

Most of the witnesses who testified at trial advocated a decentralized approach. In fact, most experts in the field of juvenile corrections agree that decentralized alternative facilities are more effective at reducing recidivism. Although regional facilities may be more expensive to maintain, juveniles who are housed at decentralized alternative facilities, such as group homes, may be eligible for federal medicaid funds and other programs that could reduce the impact on the DJJ budget.[38] Additionally, decentralized facilities can serve as multi-purpose operations, such as "stepdown programs" or halfway houses for juveniles returning to their communities after confinement at the long-term institutions, or perhaps as alternative sites for lightweight offenders who need to be confined in a less restrictive environment for a relatively short period of time.[39]
Two recent studies in South Carolina have advocated decentralizing juvenile correctional facilities in an effort to move to community-based programs. Specifically, the Juvenile Justice Task Force Report strongly advocates the decentralization of correctional facilities and the use of innovative community-based corrections approaches in an effort to stem the rising tide of juvenile crime in South Carolina. The Task Force concluded that "large, centralized facilities ... are inherently less effective than smaller, regional facilities in altering juvenile behavior." Juvenile Justice Task Force, Report, supra, at 17.[40]
Similarly, in a 1992 report prepared at the request of DJJ, Rosser Fabrap, a private consulting group, recommended building three regional youth centers 0907 each in two phases 0907 to deal with the problem of juvenile delinquency and overcrowding in South Carolina. The Rosser Fabrap report was the product of an intensive study of juvenile crime trends in South Carolina and of the facilities currently available at DJJ.
Several countervailing considerations militate in favor of additional facilities at the DJJ Columbia campus. First, the department already owns 200 acres of land, most of it behind an escape-resistant fence, and the addition of dormitories and related facilities to this campus would benefit from economies of scale. Furthermore, because South Carolina is a relatively small state, families of juveniles can travel a fairly short distance to visit their children at the Columbia campus. Many states, such as New York, Texas, and California, that have moved to 795 decentralize their juvenile correctional facilities have done so in an effort to place the facilities nearer to *795 the homes of juveniles. Obviously, this is not as significant a factor in South Carolina.
In any event, this court will not attempt to suggest to the Defendants which approach is preferable. Decisions about the type, location, and structure of additional facilities are quintessentially decisions that should be made by the state's elected policymakers, not by this court.[41] For now, this court will simply declare that the juvenile population at the three long-term DJJ facilities is unconstitutionally overcrowded and will allow the Defendants a reasonable opportunity to develop a plan to alleviate the overcrowding. This plan should not include an outright release of juveniles to their homes. The court declines to establish a minimum square-footage requirement per juvenile, because the Supreme Court has indicated that a rigid mechanical test is inappropriate. As this court has noted, overcrowding may be determined only in light of many conditions of confinement, such as time spent outside of the room, the types of programs in place, and the amount of common area available. When the remedial plan required by this order is submitted to the court, the court will review the overcrowding question, as it should be reviewed, within the broader context of the overall remedial plan submitted.
In addition, the court finds that staffing levels at DJJ facilities, like the physical plant, are geared towards the needs of the 1970s era. As new facilities are constructed, DJJ must employ sufficient numbers of appropriately trained staff (including juvenile correctional officers, social workers, and psychologists) to adequately supervise and rehabilitate juveniles committed to the custody of DJJ. Like the issue of overcrowding, staff ratios may not be examined in a vacuum, but must be considered in the context of the overall conditions and programs at DJJ facilities. For this reason, the court will decline to impose rigid mathematical formulae on the Defendants, but will instead allow the Defendants to submit a staffing proposal, which will be considered in the context of the overall remedial plan to be implemented in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 65.
A. The Constitutional Standard
Courts around the country are not in agreement as to the appropriate federal standard by which to judge state juvenile detention facility conditions. The Seventh Circuit has applied the cruel and unusual punishment test of the Eighth Amendment. Nelson ex rel. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); cf. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998-99 (5th Cir.1977) (in dictum, expressing doubt about juveniles' right to treatment under the Due Process Clause, but recognizing that the Eighth Amendment may afford relief to the plaintiffs). The First, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431-32 (9th Cir.1987); H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir.1986); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974, 104 S.Ct. 2352, 80 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 & n. 10 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069, 103 S.Ct. 1524, 75 L.Ed.2d 947 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has not decided the issue. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 796 651, 669 n. 37, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1411 n. 37, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (expressly reserving *796 the question whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to juvenile institutions).
After reviewing these authorities, the court has determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which implicitly encompasses the protections of the Eighth Amendment, is the appropriate standard for reviewing the conditions at the DJJ facilities. Adoption of the more stringent Due Process Clause is appropriate in this case because the juveniles incarcerated at DJJ facilities have, with few exceptions, not been convicted of a crime; rather, they have merely been adjudicated to be juvenile delinquents. See Santana, 714 F.2d at 1179 ("[J]uveniles ... who have not been convicted of crimes[] have a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint which entitles them to closer scrutiny of their conditions of confinement than that accorded convicted criminals."); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 671-72 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. at 1412-13 n. 40 ("Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the state has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.").
South Carolina law clearly establishes that the purpose of confining juveniles who violate the law is not to punish them, but to provide training and services to correct their delinquent behavior 0907 that is to say, to rehabilitate them. For example, the Children's Code, the statutory authority for confining juveniles at DJJ facilities, declares as a part of its "Children's Policy" that "[f]or children in need of services, care and guidance, the State shall secure those services as are needed to serve the emotional, mental and physical welfare of the children and the best interests of the community." S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-20(D) (Law.Co-op.1985). Furthermore, this policy applies to "children ... who by their circumstance or action violate the laws of this State and are found to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation." S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-20(B) (Law.Co-op.1985).[42]
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), the Supreme Court held that, in the noncriminal setting, there must be a relationship between the purpose for which an individual's liberty is taken and the treatment provided to that person. In Jackson, a case involving a mentally retarded individual, the Court stated: "At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Id. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858.
Numerous district courts have relied upon the rationale employed by the Supreme Court in Jackson to hold that where, as in South Carolina, the purpose of incarcerating juveniles in a state training school is treatment and rehabilitation, the Due Process Clause "requires that the conditions and programs at the school must be reasonably related to that purpose." Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F.Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D.Miss.1977); see also Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y.1972) ("Where the State, as parens patriae, imposes such detention, it can meet the Constitution's requirement of due process ... if, and only if, it furnishes adequate

treatment to the detainee."); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F.Supp. 203, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y.1976). But see Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d at 1176-77 (refusing to recognize constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment for juveniles); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir.1977) (same).[43]
7978 *797 In addition, the Due Process Clause guarantees to juveniles who are incarcerated *798 the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and minimally adequate training to protect those interests. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982).[44]
Safety, in the context of this case, encompasses the Plaintiffs' right to reasonable protection from the aggression of others, whether "others" be juveniles or staff. Thomas S. ex rel. Brooks v. Flaherty, 699 F.Supp. 1178, 1200 (W.D.N.C.1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990).
The interest in freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint includes freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint through mechanical devices as well as unreasonably restrictive conditions of confinement. Unreasonably restrictive conditions of confinement are those which unduly restrict the juveniles' freedom of action and are not reasonably related to legitimate security or safety needs of the institution.
The right to minimally adequate training is more difficult to define. As noted by the Supreme Court in Youngberg:
It is not feasible ... to define or identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
457 U.S. at 319 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. at 2460 n. 25. Additionally, as noted by the Youngberg court, when a court is called upon to decide what is reasonable under the circumstances presented, the court
must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.... [T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.
Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462.
The court must emphasize that its role in this litigation is to identify minimally acceptable standards for treatment and rehabilitation. In other words, it is not necessary that the state provide the best possible services and training available to the Plaintiffs. The test in this case is whether the state is providing minimally adequate or reasonable services and training necessary to ensure the protected interests of the Plaintiffs. It is not appropriate that the state be held to a standard which imposes an affirmative duty to succeed in the purpose of correcting the juveniles' behavior. Although such a standard may be desirable, it is not constitutionally mandated. All that is required is that the juveniles be housed under conditions that provide them with a reasonable opportunity to correct their behavior. Obviously, this standard incorporates the security, program, and service functions that are basic to juvenile corrections. These basic services include sufficient numbers of adequately trained staff so that the purpose of the confinement may be advanced, minimal levels of programming reasonably geared toward aiding juveniles to correct their behavior, and other services that are minimally necessary to give the Plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to accomplish the purpose of the confinement while protecting the other recognized interests in safety and reasonable restraint.
In deciding minimum constitutional requirements for the institutions under challenge here, this court is not bound 799 by standards promulgated by organizations such as *799 the American Correctional Association. As noted by the
United States Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1876 n. 27, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), "[W]hile the recommendations of these various groups [including the American Correctional Association] may be instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in question."[45] Lower courts have also rejected efforts

to impose ACA standards as constitutional minima. For example, in Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir.1987), the district court entered a decree establishing, on federal constitutional grounds, guidelines for managing a facility for adolescent wards for the juvenile court. In so doing, the court relied upon expert testimony and the standards for incarceration adopted by professional associations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's "wholesale adoption of various professional associations' concepts for model institutions." Id. at 1433. The court determined that these standards were not constitutionally mandated and concluded that the trial court's order "far exceed[ed] anything remotely required by the fourteenth amendment." Id.; see also Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51, 60 (D.Conn. 1985) ("Although the ACA and APHA standards constitute appropriate goals formulated by experts in the field, and may provide guidance for prison administrators or other branches of the government, they do not establish constitutional minima.") (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400 n. 13, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 543-44 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. at 1876-87 n. 27). The court must, therefore, reject the invitation by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants in this action to adopt ACA standards for purposes of fashioning relief in this case.

Similarly, this court is not bound to accept the recommendations of all the expert witnesses who have testified in this case. In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Supreme Court cautioned against "assuming that opinions of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish [Constitutional standards]." Id. at 348 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 2400 n. 13. Although Rhodes involved a constitutional challenge to conditions encountered by adult prison inmates subject only to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the rationale underlying the quoted portion of the Rhodes decision is applicable here: This court must be the final arbiter of minimum constitutional standards, and although opinions of experts in the field are helpful, they are not binding on the court.

As to the discrete issue of over-crowding, the number of square feet allotted to each juvenile is not determinative of the constitutionality of the available space. Other factors, such as the amount of common area available and the amount of time spent outside the cells, must also be considered. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir.1977); Stewart v. Gates, 450 F.Supp. 583 (C.D.Cal. 1978); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F.Supp. 104 (C.D.Cal.1978); Jordan v. Wolke, 460 F.Supp. 1080 (E.D.Wis.1978), rev'd, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.1980).

Finally, in fashioning relief in this case, the court must be mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that

The "legitimate and compelling state interest" in protecting the community from crime cannot be

doubted. [The Supreme Court has] stressed before that crime prevention is "a weighty social

objective," and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile context. The harm suffered by the

800

victim of a crime is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. And the harm to *800 society

generally may be even greater in this context given the high rate of recidivism among juveniles.

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2410, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (citations omitted). In Schall, the Court upheld, against a constitutional challenge, a New York law requiring the pretrial detention of all juveniles arrested for committing an offense. In doing so, the Court stressed that the importance of crime prevention outweighed the statute's punitive effects, especially in light of the high recidivism rate among juveniles.[46]

B. The Statutory Standards

Juveniles attending the training schools operated by DJJ are potentially covered by three federal education statutes: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA").

IDEA
The purpose of the IDEA is "to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). For purposes of the IDEA, the term "children with disabilities" is defined to include children
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A). "Special education" has been defined to include "[i]nstruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings." 34 C.F.R. § 300.17(a)(1)(i).
To be eligible for federal assistance under the IDEA, states must ensure that a "free appropriate public education" is available to meet the child's identified needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.121. The state must have a policy in effect to identify, locate, and evaluate children who have a disability or who are suspected of having a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) & (2)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.128.
The IDEA provides that
[t]he State educational agency shall be responsible for assuring that the requirements of [IDEA] are carried out and that all educational programs for children with disabilities within the State, including all such programs administered by any other State or local agency, will be under the general supervision of the persons responsible for educational programs for children with disabilities in the State educational agency and shall meet educational standards of the State educational agency.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(6); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.600. The regulations make it clear that the reference to "all programs" includes state correctional facilities and that the requirements of the IDEA apply to such facilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(4).
801 *801 Section 504
Section 504 provides that no otherwise qualified individual with a disability shall, solely because of that disability, be excluded from participation in or subject to discrimination "under any program or activity" receiving federal financial assistance. The phrase "programs or activity" includes all of the operations of a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or local government. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). Therefore, the requirements of Section 504 are similarly applicable to the children with disabilities located in the correctional facilities of DJJ.
The centerpiece of the IDEA and Section 504 is the "Individualized Education Program" or IEP. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(20), 1414(a)(5). Each public agency is responsible for initiating and conducting meetings for the purpose of developing, reviewing, and revising the IEP of a child with a disability. The meeting to develop an IEP for a child must be held within 30 calendar days of a determination that the child needs special education and related services. The IEP must be implemented as soon as possible following the meetings to develop or revise the IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.342. A meeting must be held to review and, if appropriate, revise each child's IEP periodically, but not less than annually. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.343. The IEP must be in effect at the beginning of each school year and before special education and related services are provided to a child. When a child moves to a new school district, a new IEP must be formulated and implemented.

Because DJJ is an independent school district, the reassignment of a juvenile from his or her home school district to DJJ facilities triggers the obligation by DJJ to screen the juvenile for special education needs and, if necessary, develop a new IEP for the juvenile. Development of appropriate IEP's for these juveniles has proved to be extremely difficult for DJJ, often for reasons beyond its control. First, the school districts from which the juveniles are transferred have often refused to send the juveniles' school records to DJJ, citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 ("FERPA"). Without the school records, DJJ educators are unable to properly develop an IEP. Secondly, South Carolina Department of Education officials who audit DJJ schools have mandated that DJJ formulate not one, but two IEPs for the juveniles: one when the juvenile is received at the Reception and Evaluation Center and a second IEP if and when the juvenile is later confined to one of the three long-term institutions.
As noted previously, by state law, a juvenile's stay at the Reception and Evaluation Center may not exceed fortyfive days, and, at the time of trial, the average stay was twenty-one days. The requirement imposed by the South Carolina Department of Education that a new IEP be developed for the juvenile's relatively brief stay at the Reception and Evaluation Center is a burdensome one. The IEP planning meeting cannot occur until the juvenile has been at the facility at least seven days, because the parents of the juvenile must be given seven days advance notice of the meeting.[47] Thus, for juveniles at the Reception and Evaluation Center, even under the best of circumstances, the new IEP would be of short duration. Moreover, the majority of juveniles who are evaluated at the Reception and Evaluation Center do not matriculate to the long-term institutions. Just over two thousand juveniles pass through Reception and Evaluation each year, but only approximately half of them end up in the long-term institutions. The South Carolina Department of Education's requirement that new IEP's be formulated for the two thousand Reception and Evaluation juveniles 0907 most of them to be implemented for a mere fourteen days on average 0907 struck the court as one elevating form over substance.
At trial, it became apparent to the court that these two problems have caused a tremendous drain on the 802 resources and staff of DJJ officials and have prevented them from *802 doing an adequate job of developing
IEPs for juveniles who are committed to the long-term institutions and who undoubtedly need these programs. [48] The court suggested that some method be devised by which DJJ would not be required to develop IEPs for the juveniles during their short stay at the Reception and Evaluation Center; however, the Plaintiffs maintain, as they have throughout this litigation, that the IEPs are required by federal law for these juveniles as well as for those who are ultimately confined to the long-term institutions.
After the trial was concluded, this court contacted the United States Department of Education to determine whether any type of administrative solution to these two problems was available. The Department has responded by way of an interpretative memorandum sent to this court from the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. The memorandum has been made a part of the record in this case. In its memorandum, the Department of Education observes that "[n]either Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 nor IDEA specifically addresses the question of what services a child with a disability is to be provided in the interim period [while confined at the Reception and Evaluation Center], before a new IEP is developed and implemented [at the long-term facilities.]" Statement of Interest of the U.S. Dep't of Education 4 (Nov. 30, 1994). After examining the relevant law, the Department of Education concluded:
In the case of short-term, temporary confinement, the State may meet its obligation under IDEA and Section 504 ... by implementing the IEP from the previous school district or placement instead of developing a new one. The IEP must be implemented to the extent possible in the temporary setting. To the extent the implementation of the old IEP is impossible, services that approximate, as close as possible, the old IEP must be provided.
Id. at 5-6.
This court adopts the conclusion reached by the Department of Justice and will, for this reason, not require that a new IEP be developed for juveniles who are incarcerated at the Reception and Evaluation Center. Rather, the IEP formulated by the transferor school district must be utilized and implemented, to the extent possible. A new

IEP must, however, be formulated in accordance with the statutory law if and when the juvenile is later sent to one of the three long-term institutions.
The Department of Justice memorandum also indicates that school districts around South Carolina have erroneously concluded that FERPA prevents them from sending school records to DJJ without the consent of the parents of the juveniles affected. The memorandum states:
[A]n educational agency or institution may disclose education records, or personally identifiable information from education records, without prior consent if the disclosure is, subject to the requirements of § 99.34, to officials of another school ... where the student seeks or intends to enroll.
Id. at 6.
The memorandum further indicates that the school district sending the records must make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or eligible student of the fact that the records have been forwarded and, upon request, must send to the parent or student a copy of the records that were disclosed.
In an effort to eliminate this problem, the court will require the Defendants to disseminate the relevant portions of this order, together with the Department of Justice memorandum, to all school districts in South Carolina so that it will be clear in the future that neither parental nor juvenile consent is required for the school districts to forward school records to DJJ when a juvenile is confined there. The only obligations upon transferor school districts are the obligations to provide reasonable notice to the parent that the student's records have been transferred and, if requested, to provide copies of the records that have been sent.
803 *803 The evidence at trial disclosed that in some cases, the Defendants have not adequately identified, located, and evaluated children with disabilities who are in need of special education and related services. The evidence also indicated that, in some cases, appropriate IEPs were not developed for those juveniles that were identified. Finally, the evidence disclosed that, at least in some cases, the IEPs that were developed were not fully implemented. As noted above, much of the difficulty the Defendants have experienced in fully complying with the mandates of the IDEA and Section 504 stems directly from the lack of cooperation from local school districts and from the onerous requirement that IEPs be formulated for juveniles during their short stay at the Reception and Evaluation Center. Now that these two obstacles have been removed, the court must expect the Defendants to bring themselves into strict compliance with the IDEA and Section 504.
ADA
Congress enacted the ADA on July 26, 1990 to eliminate all forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Through this legislation, the federal government extended the nondiscrimination principles of the Rehabilitation Act, applicable to institutions receiving federal funds, to a much wider array of institutions, including programs and services provided by all units of state and local government. The ADA was intended to, and does, build upon the protections afforded disabled persons under federal, state, or local laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201.
Under subchapter II of the ADA, which applies to public entities, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participating in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under the ADA, "disability," with respect to an individual, means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individuals. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1993). As the Defendants have conceded, the facilities at DJJ are subject to the requirements of the ADA and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
With respect to the educational component of DJJ, the parties have not demonstrated, nor could this court discern, any additional requirements imposed by the ADA beyond those imposed by Section 504 and the IDEA.
The more familiar provisions of the ADA relate to barrier-free architectural design requirements. DJJ is subject to the physical and programmatic accessibility requirements applicable to governmental entities under subchapter II

of the Act, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, subpt. D. Indeed, the Defendants have conceded that the ADA barrier-free requirements apply to DJJ facilities.
The evidence at trial disclosed several isolated, often technical, violations of the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA that apparently produced no significant injury on a class-wide basis. Some of these violations resulted from confusion, on the part of the Defendants, as to whether they were subject to the provisions of these statutes. Now that the court has made it clear that all three laws apply to the facilities operated by DJJ, the court must expect full compliance in the future, and the court-appointed monitor designated to oversee the implementation of this order shall ensure that the statutory mandates are fulfilled.
Remedial Plan
Having determined that certain constitutional and statutory deficiencies exist at facilities operated by DJJ, the court must determine an appropriate method for devising and implementing a remedial plan. The Plaintiffs have invited the court to devise and impose a judicially created plan based on the record before it. The court has concluded, however, that it must first afford the state of South Carolina the opportunity to correct the deficiencies that have been brought to light by this litigation and identified in this order.
It is well settled that under principles of comity and federalism, this court must decline the Plaintiffs' invitation to 804 impose a broad and sweeping remedy upon the Defendants, but must instead allow the Defendants *804 an
opportunity to devise a plan of their own for remedying the constitutional violations. See Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir.1988) ("It is now established beyond challenge that upon finding a particular standard, practice, or procedure to be contrary to either a federal constitutional or statutory requirement, the federal court must grant the appropriate state or local authorities an opportunity to correct the deficiencies."); see also Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 240 (4th Cir.1993) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) ("Federal jurisprudence not only dictates, but demands that, upon finding a constitutional violation, federal courts must first afford the responsible state authorities an opportunity to devise and implement their own corrective action before imposing a judiciallycreated remedy.").
The doctrine of allowing a state the opportunity to correct constitutional deficiencies is particularly applicable when reviewing the adequacy of state correctional facilities. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the United States Supreme Court stated:
It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.... The strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors thus also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons.
Id. at 491-92, 93 S.Ct. at 1837-38.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recently cautioned against federal courts "immers [ing] themselves in the management of state prisons or substitut[ing] their judgment for that of trained penological authorities charged with the administration of such facilities." Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.1994). In Taylor, the Fourth Circuit stated that "federal courts should proceed cautiously and incrementally in ordering remediation so as not to assume the role of prison administrators." Id. at 269. The Taylor court reversed a district court decision imposing, as the Plaintiffs would have the court do here, specific population ceilings and target dates for achieving them. The court of appeals observed that "sweeping intervention in the management of state prisons is rarely appropriate when exercising the equitable powers of the federal courts." Id. The Fourth Circuit indicated that the district court should have afforded the state of North Carolina the opportunity to correct the constitutional deficiencies before imposing a court-ordered remedial scheme.
Although both Preiser and Taylor involved adult prison settings, the principles of comity and federalism that underlie those decisions are no less applicable when a court reviews conditions of confinement of juveniles incarcerated at juvenile training schools.

Accordingly, the Defendants shall, within one hundred and twenty days from the date of this order, prepare and submit to the court a written plan designed to remedy the constitutional and statutory deficiencies identified herein. The court is mindful of the fact that the Defendants have already begun to develop 0907 and in some cases, to implement 0907 new programs designed to address some of the deficiencies. At trial, however, most of these programs were still in their formative stages. Some programs, such as the new admissions unit, were just being implemented as the testimony in the trial concluded; others, such as the new policy regarding the use of CS gas, were actually developed in the court-room during the course of the trial; and others, such as the proposed contract with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control to operate the health care component at DJJ facilities, were still in the embryonic stages when the case was tried. The testimony about the scope and extent of these remedial programs was somewhat incomplete. Thus, although some of these programs that have been developed in response to this litigation may well pass constitutional muster, the court will be in a better position to review the adequacy of these programs, and others developed in accordance with this order, if they are presented in a formal, detailed, written plan.
805 *805 Appointment of Monitor
After an acceptable plan is developed, the court intends to appoint the Honorable Robert Burnside, a South Carolina family court judge, as its special master pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 53, to oversee the implementation of the program. Judge Burnside has announced his intention to retire from the bench effective May 31, 1995. Judge Burnside is a former state legislator and an eighteen-year veteran of the family court bench. The court is confident that Judge Burnside's wealth of experience in dealing with juvenile justice issues will enable him to oversee the implementation of the remedial plan.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Defendants are hereby ordered to submit to the court, within one hundred and twenty days, a detailed plan to remedy the constitutional and statutory deficiencies identified in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Table 1

The following table summarizes the most serious offense for which each juvenile at the DJJ longterm institutions was being confined as of May 4, 1994. The table, which was compiled by the court from the May 4, 1994 Daily Roster of DJJ, reflects only current commitments and includes only one offense per juvenile. Many of the juveniles have an extensive record of prior criminal offenses or were being confined for multiple charges; however, these two facts are not reflected in the table.

Serious/Violent Offenses*

Birchwood

John G. Richards

Willow Lane Total

Armed robbery

32

Assault (and battery) of a high and

aggravated nature

30

Assault (and battery) with intent to

kill

20

Assault with intent to commit criminal

sexual conduct

6

Burglary, first or second degree

29

Criminal sexual conduct

15

8

6

46

6

25

61

5

11

36

2

4

12

53

33

115

1

6

22

Criminal sexual conduct with a minor

12

Drug trafficking

0

Involuntary manslaughter

1

Kidnapping

2

Lynching

3

Murder

6

Voluntary manslaughter

0

Other acts against persons

0

Total Serious/Violent Offenses

156

Other Offenses**

Birchwood

Accessory after the fact

2

Accessory before the fact

7

Arson, second degree

0

Assault on police officer while resisting

arrest

1

Breaking into automobile or fuel tank

0

Burglary, third degree

0

Carrying pistol unlawfully

3

Carrying weapon on school grounds

2

8

25

45

1

1

2

0

4

5

0

3

5

2

3

8

0

3

9

3

3

6

0

1

1

89

128

373

John G. Richards

Willow Lane Total

1

1

4

1

2

10

0

2

2

1

3

5

4

1

5

2

4

6

2

4

9

3

6

11

806 *806

Other Offenses** Contempt of court** Criminal conspiracy Criminal domestic violence Damaging property by explosive or
incendiary device Discharging firearm into dwelling Displaying firearm in public building
or adjacent areas Failure to stop for blue light Felony driving under the influence Grand larceny Grand larceny, automobile Indecent exposure Lewd act Malicious injury to personal property Malicious injury to real property Parole violation** Pointing firearm Possession of alcohol by minor Possession of LSD or cocaine Possession of LSD or cocaine with
intent to distribute Possession of sawed-off shotgun, rifle
or machine gun Possession of schedule I controlled
substance (e.g., marijuana)

Birchwood 0 0 2
1 4
1 0 0 1 1 1 5 0 0 5 4 0 0
6
2
0

John G. Richards
24 1 0

Willow Lane 16 1 3

Total 40 2 5

1

0

2

1

1

6

0

1

2

3

0

3

0

1

1

5

1

7

5

4

10

0

0

1

0

6

11

0

2

2

0

2

2

8

3

16

0

2

6

1

1

2

6

3

9

35

5

46

0

1

3

2

1

3

Possession of unlawful weapons

4

Possession with intent to distribute

controlled substance in proximity

of school

0

Probation violation**

13

Public disorderly conduct

0

Public drunkenness

0

Purse snatching

1

Receiving stolen goods

0

Reckless homicide

1

Resisting an officer

1

Runaway

0

Shoplifting

0

Simple assault (and battery)

9

Strong-arm robbery

10

Trespass

0

Truancy

0

Use of car without owner's consent

0

0

1

5

1

0

1

13

16

42

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

5

1

6

0

0

1

3

1

5

0

1

1

2

4

6

1

5

15

2

1

13

3

1

4

0

1

1

4

5

9

Total Other Offenses

87

140

116

343

Total Juvenile Population

243

229

244

716

* For purposes of statistical data, the Department of Juvenile Justice defines violent/ serious offenses to include: murder; sexual conduct, first and second degree; assault and battery with intent to k kidnapping; voluntary manslaughter; armed robbery; arson first degree; burglary, first and sec degree; drug trafficking; and all additional offenses categorized in the South Carolina Code o Acts Against Persons. Offenses included in the latter category are found in Chapter 3 of Title South Carolina Code of Laws, S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10 et seq. (Law.Coop.1985 & Supp.1993).

** For the offenses of contempt of court, parole violation, and probation violation, Table 2 i following this table summarizes the most serious offense for which the juvenile was originally by the court, from which the juvenile was paroled, or for which the juvenile was place on prob

807 *807

Table 2

For those juveniles whose committing offense as of May 4, 1994 was contempt of court, parole violation, or probation violation (as identified in Table 1), the following table summarizes the most serious offense for which the juvenile was originally sanctioned by the court, from which the juvenile was paroled, or for which the juvenile was placed on probation. This table was also compiled by the court from the May 4, 1994 Daily Roster of DJJ.

Offense

Birchwood

John G. Richards

Willow Lane

Total

Accessory before the fact

0

Armed robbery

1

Assault (and battery) of a high and

aggravated nature

1

0

1

1

0

1

2

1

3

5

Assault (and battery) with intent to

kill

0

Assault on police officer while resisting

arrest

0

Breaking into automobile or fuel tank

0

Burglary, first or second degree

0

Carrying pistol unlawfully

2

Carrying weapon on school grounds

0

Criminal conspiracy

0

Criminal domestic violence

0

Criminal sexual conduct

3

Criminal sexual conduct with a minor

2

Discharging firearm into dwelling

0

Disturbing schools

0

Grand larceny

1

Grand larceny, automobile

0

Lewd act

1

Lynching

1

Making bomb threat

0

Malicious injury to personal property

0

Malicious injury to real property

0

Petty larceny

0

Pointing firearm

0

Possession of LSD or cocaine

0

Possession of LSD or cocaine with

intent to distribute

0

Possession of unlawful weapons

0

Possession with intent to distribute

controlled substance in proximity

of school

0

Resisting an officer

0

Runaway

0

Shoplifting

0

Simple assault (and battery)

3

Strong-arm robbery

3

Threatening school teacher

0

Truancy

0

Use of car without owner's consent

0

Total Contempt, Parole, or

Probation Violations

18

808 *808

809 *809

0

2

2

0

1

1

1

0

1

12

8

20

2

2

6

2

1

3

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

3

0

0

2

1

0

1

0

1

1

3

3

7

3

1

4

0

0

1

3

0

4

0

1

1

0

2

2

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

2

1

0

1

2

0

2

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

2

0

2

3

2

8

0

0

3

1

0

1

1

2

3

0

1

1

45

35

98

[1] The court initially appointed Inez Moore Tenenbaum as guardian ad litem for the class. After working on the case for several years, Ms. Tenenbaum felt obligated to resign so as to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest when she entered the race for Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina. The court then appointed Lesly A. Bowers as guardian ad litem to replace Ms. Tenenbaum. Both guardians faithfully represented the interests of their wards in this case.

[2] Solicitor Harpootlian provided helpful information to the court during the course of this litigation. The court expresses its appreciation to Mr. Harpootlian for his interest in the complex issues presented here and his involvement in the case.
[3] Although the court's March 31, 1992 order determined that it was inappropriate to decide the issues presented in this case in a piecemeal fashion, the court did determine that immediate relief was appropriate for a subclass of incarcerated juveniles: those who are seriously mentally ill or seriously mentally retarded. As to the members of this subclass, the court ordered the Defendants to immediately survey the juvenile population at DJJ facilities to identify seriously mentally ill and seriously mentally retarded juveniles and to begin appropriate treatment for those juveniles. The Defendants have complied with this portion of the March 31, 1992 order, and the Plaintiffs do not seek any additional relief for the members of the subclass at this time.
[4] See pages 798-799 infra.
[5] Few cases involving challenges to the conditions of juvenile correctional facilities have been litigated and, of those that have, most have been settled short of trial. See, e.g., Bobby M. v. Martinez, No. TCA 83-7003 (N.D.Fla. July 2, 1987) (final order approving consent decree); Santiago v. Philadelphia, No. 74-2589 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 21, 1988) (third amended stipulation in partial settlement); Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, No. 1519-85(IFP) (D.C.Super.Ct. July 24, 1986) (consent decree); In re Interest of G.C. v. Coler, No. 87-6220-Civ-Gonzalez (S.D.Fla. undated) (settlement agreement); Anthony C. v. Pima County, No. Civ-82-0811W (D.Utah Mar. 27, 1984) (consent decree); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F.Supp. 1231 (D.N.M.1990) (memorandum opinion and order).
[6] See S.C. Juvenile Justice Task Force, Juvenile Justice In South Carolina 0907 A Decade for Progress (April 1994) [hereinafter S.C. Juvenile Justice Task Force Report].
[7] The Plaintiffs initially sought to recover damages on behalf of all members of the class. At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' case in chief, the court raised, sua sponte, the question of whether the Plaintiff class should be decertified as to the damages claim. After discussing the matter thoroughly with counsel, the court entered an order on July 5, 1994 concluding that to allow the damages claim to go forward in the class action would "introduce significant individual liability or defense issues which would require separate hearings for each class member." After observing that Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1) provides that an order certifying a class "may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits," the court decided to decertify the class in regard to the damages claim. Appropriate notice of the court's decertification order was furnished to all class members. The court expresses no opinion on the merits of any damages claims that might be brought on an individual basis. But see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2462, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) ("In an action for damages against a professional [operating a state facility for mentally retarded individuals], the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity would bar liability.").
[8] After the testimony in this case concluded, the United States Congress passed, and the President signed, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (effective Sept. 13, 1994). Among other things, this legislation limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain Eighth Amendment claims brought by prison inmates challenging the conditions of their confinement. Id. § 20409, 108 Stat. at 1827-28 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626). This court, acting sua sponte, raised with the parties the question of whether this legislation has any application to this case. Both parties conceded that the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 does not bar the court from hearing this case, because the statute limits the court's jurisdiction only with regard to claims arising under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, the facilities at issue are training schools for juveniles who have not been convicted of a crime, but rather have been adjudicated to be juvenile delinquents. Although the complaint asserts claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the court has determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments applies to the claims asserted here. Because the Fourteenth Amendment provides more protection to the Plaintiffs than does the Eighth Amendment, it is not necessary for the court to reach the Eighth Amendment claims asserted in this case.

[9] For example, the court heard testimony suggesting that DJJ implement extracurricular activities such as a high school newspaper or athletic teams to compete in inter-scholastic competition. Such programs are not required by the Constitution.
[10] See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2499, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("In [deciding issues relating to involuntary commitment], judges are not free to read their private notions of public policy or public health into the Constitution.").
[11] At the December 1991 hearing, both parties stipulated that the rated capacity was 299 juveniles. By the time of the June 1994 trial, the Defendants had modified their position somewhat, suggesting that the court should order a reduction to no more than 450 to 520 juveniles at the three long-term institutions.
[12] South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Uniform Crime Reports Division, Crime in South Carolina 1993.
[13] For example, at trial one of the expert witnesses testified about a study in which juveniles at DJJ were administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), a widely used clinical method of testing hostility. The study, which compared the results from MMPI tests given to juveniles shortly after being admitted to DJJ with results from tests given to juveniles shortly before their release from DJJ, demonstrated that juveniles have more hostility and more aggressive tendencies after their confinement at DJJ.
[14] The budget for the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), the state agency charged with operating the adult prison facilities in South Carolina, is easily the fastest growing component of the entire state budget. In the sixteen-year period between 1977-78 and 1993-94, SCDC's operating budget increased by 800% 0907 from $29.9 million to $224.7 million. During the same period of time, the adult inmate population increased from 6,667 to 17,182. In addition, during the past decade, South Carolina spent $202 million to build seven new adult prisons.
[15] The court noted in 1992, after its first visit to the DJJ facilities, that the institutions were "staffed and led by well-meaning, caring individuals, whose good faith efforts [are] severely strained by the sheer numbers of juveniles present." After receiving the evidence in this case and visiting the DJJ facilities on two additional occasions, the court reaffirms its earlier finding that the personnel employed by DJJ are doing the best they can under difficult circumstances.
[16] James O. Finckenauer, Juvenile Delinquency and Corrections 0907 The Gap Between Theory and Practice 116 (1984).
[17] Id.
[18] According to DJJ's annual report, the first facility in South Carolina was a reformatory for boys, which was constructed in 1875.
[19] In a series of articles entitled "Children in Trouble: A National Scandal," which appeared weekly in the Christian Science Monitor from March 31, 1969 to July 7, 1969, James described the poor conditions he found in the South Carolina juvenile justice system, as well as in other juvenile programs across the nation, during this time period.
[20] As part of a state government restructuring program in 1993, the name of the agency was changed from the South Carolina Department of Youth Services to the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice.
[21] Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders 2 (1994).
[22] National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Criminal Justice Newsletter, Feb. 15, 1994, at 6.
[23] One writer has noted that "although juveniles represent less than fourteen percent of the population in this country, they account for nearly twenty-five percent of individuals arrested for violent crimes such as homicide, rape, robbery and felonious assault." Brian R. Suffredini, Note, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philosophy in Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C.L.Rev. 885, 899 (1994).

[24] As one writer has observed:
There is a mountain of scientific evidence showing that when families disintegrate, children often end up with intellectual, physical and emotional scars that persist for life.... We talk about the drug crisis, the education crisis, and the problem of teen pregnancy and juvenile crime. But all these ills trace back predominantly to one source: broken families.
Karl Zinsmeister, "Raising Hiroko," The American Enterprise, March/April 1990. Table 3 appended to this order is a graph depicting the increase in the percentage of births to single mothers in South Carolina since 1950. Table 4 is a similar graph showing the percentages, nationwide, during a similar period. The increases on these charts roughly parallel the increase in juvenile crime during the same time period. According to DJJ records, only twelve percent of juveniles in South Carolina who are incarcerated come from a household in which both natural parents live at home.
[25] American Psychological Association, Violence and Youth: Psychology's Response 21 (1993).
[26] Table 1 attached to this order contains a listing of the offenses for which each juvenile was committed to DJJ as of May 4, 1994.
[27] Rosser Fabrap, South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice Needs Assessment and Master Plan 1-5 (Feb. 1993).
[28] Throughout this opinion, the terms "juvenile correctional facility" and "training school" are used interchangeably.
[29] Outside of DJJ institutions, the statewide student/teacher ratio is thirty-to-one for high school and twenty-fiveto-one for elementary schools.
[30] Howard James, Children in Trouble 32 (1970).
[31] The JROTC and Cities in Schools Programs at DJJ are the only such programs at a juvenile correctional facility in the United States.
[32] The population in South Carolina has increased by forty percent since the last dormitory rooms were constructed at DJJ. See U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population (1971) and U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994 (1994).
[33] The unprecedented increase in juvenile crime 0907 particularly violent juvenile crime 0907 in the United States and in South Carolina is well documented. In the ten-year period between 1982 and 1991, the number of juvenile arrests for murder in the United States increased by ninety-three percent and aggravated assault arrests increased by seventy-two percent. Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders 2 (1994). In South Carolina, violent juvenile crime increased one hundred and forty-nine percent between 1988 and 1992 alone. Uniform Crime Reports Division, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Crime In South Carolina 1993.
[34] As depicted on Tables 1 and 2, only 13 of the 716 juveniles at DJJ as of May 4, 1994 were committed for what were described at trial as the "lightweight" offenses of truancy, shoplifting, and running away from home. None of the juveniles was incarcerated for being incorrigible.
[35] A recently passed law will prohibit family court judges from sentencing juveniles to DJJ for contempt of court. See Act of June 2, 1994, Act No. 7, § 75, 1995 S.C. Acts ___, ___ (effective Jan. 12, 1995, without signature of the Governor) (to be codified at S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-2205). In the past, family court judges have occasionally used their contempt power to commit juveniles for repeated episodes of what are generally termed "status" offenses 0907 running away from home, truancy, and incorrigibility. The new legislation simply imposes an absolute prohibition against such contemners being placed at DJJ facilities. It provides no alternative placement options

for family court judges. Because there are so few contemners currently occupying beds at DJJ, the new law's effect on overcrowding will be negligible.
[36] The community-based programs, such as DJJ's group homes and the Marine Institute (run by a private company under a contract with DJJ), are not within the scope of this litigation.
[37] Included among the Plaintiffs in this case is a juvenile who wrote the following letter to Donald "Pee Wee" Gaskins. At the time, Gaskins was a death-row inmate at one of South Carolina's adult prisons: Mr. Gaskins: June 9, 1991
Howdy! Let me start off by saying my name. My name is *******. I want you to know that you are my hereo [sic] and I admire you very much. I don't care what everybody says about you, but your [sic] the coolest mass murderer I know of. I like your style, background and everything else. I just hope your [sic] not a fag or a Yankee. Let me tell you some things about me before I go on. I'm 14 years old ... and I live in ***.... I'm at DYS at Willow Lane for a sexual crime with a female. She called rape on me, I'm goind [sic] to kill her and her family when I get out. I've killed before but someone else got the rap for it. I work under Brains. I don't put up with bulls*** either. But back to you. I heard that your [sic] out of appeals and there [sic] thinking of throwing the switch on you. I'd hount [sic] the f****** if they did that to me. Then when they died, beat them all the way to hell.
Maybe you should kill someone else so it would take longer for them to turn you into a chicken. Fry a police man. They'll take time to trial [sic] you on that one. Maybe tie him up and put some TNT around his neck and fix it up so you can go back a couple of steps and watch him get his head bounced around the walls. I wish I could see that. I'd laugh like a motherf***....
See Ya Your not so secret admire [sic] ***
[38] The recently passed Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (effective Sept. 13, 1994), contains provisions for federal grants to states to implement community-based correctional facilities for juveniles. E.g., id. § 30701(a), 108 Stat. at 1855.
[39] Regional facilities could also be used for status offenders and contemners who are now prohibited by law from being confined at DJJ's Columbia facilities. See supra note 38; see also H.R.J.Res. 434, 110th Leg., 2d Sess., 1994 S.C. Acts 4811, 4812 (effective May 27, 1994) (recommending that DJJ evaluate facilities vacated by base closings in the state for possible use as residential facilities for shock incarceration and job training programs for nonviolent juveniles between the ages of fifteen and eighteen).
[40] The neighboring state of Georgia has opted to decentralize its juvenile facilities. In Georgia, there are twentyone short-term regional youth detention centers operating in eight regions (twenty are state operated; one is operated by Fulton County and is partially state subsidized). In addition, Georgia maintains four long-term centers, known as Youth Development Centers.
[41] In the crime bill that became effective on January 12, 1995, the South Carolina General Assembly apparently expressed its preference for decentralized juvenile correctional facilities. See Act of June 2, 1994, Act No. 7, § 63 (1), 1995 S.C. Acts ___, ___ (effective Jan. 12, 1995, without the signature of the Governor). Although neither party in this case brought this provision to the court's attention, the Act directs the Department of Juvenile Justice to develop a long-term plan to decentralize the DJJ "facilities in Columbia and reduce the number of secure beds utilized for nonviolent, nonrepeat offenders through the use of programs involving more intense supervision and treatment services at the community level." Id.
[42] The overriding goal of juvenile rehabilitation was recognized by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966):
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.

[43] Traditionally, courts that have recognized a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment for incarcerated juveniles have generally employed two basic theories to divine such a right. These theories were initially developed in the context of mentally ill or retarded persons committed to state mental institutions or hospitals. Courts extended these theories to the context of juvenile delinquents incarcerated in training schools, because juveniles, like mentally incompetent or retarded individuals, generally fall within the same parens patriae authority of the state. See generally Santana v. Collazo, 533 F.Supp. 966, 972 (D.P.R.1982) (discussing the development of the "right to treatment" theories, although eventually rejecting them), aff'd, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974, 104 S.Ct. 2352, 80 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984).
The first theory, which is adopted by this court, finds support in the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 1858, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), that "due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." As stated previously, when a state incarcerates juveniles for the purpose of treatment or rehabilitation, as does South Carolina, due process requires that the conditions of confinement be reasonably related to that purpose. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F.Supp. at 1135-36.
The second theory is known as the quid pro quo, or mutual compact, theory. Under this approach, courts have held that states are required to rehabilitate incarcerated juveniles as consideration for affording juveniles fewer procedural safeguards than those afforded to adult criminal defendants. In other words, the quid pro quo theory provides that because juvenile delinquency proceedings generally do not involve the full range of procedural due process protections of a criminal trial, the state must provide rehabilitation to incarcerated juveniles to make up for the difference. See generally Santana, 533 F.Supp. at 969-70 (discussing the quid pro quo theory, although eventually rejecting it).
The validity of the quid pro quo theory is now quite suspect. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion specifically rejects the theory. 422 U.S. at 585-89, 95 S.Ct. at 2498-2500 (Burger, C.J., concurring). O'Connor involved an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a former patient of a state mental hospital who was confined to the hospital for almost fifteen years. The Court held that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members and friends." Id. at 576, 95 S.Ct. at 2494. Although the Court declined to reach the more difficult constitutional issues relating to a confined individual's right to treatment, id. at 573, 95 S.Ct. at 2492, Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion specifically disposed of the respondent's arguments for a constitutional right to treatment.
In O'Connor, Chief Justice Burger analyzed the court of appeals' statement that "`where ... the rationale for confinement is the "parens patriae" rationale that the patient is in need of treatment, the due process clause requires that minimally adequate treatment be in fact provided.'" 422 U.S. at 581, 95 S.Ct. at 2496 (quoting circuit court opinion). Significantly, though, the Chief Justice did not question the principle that one who is committed specifically for purposes of treatment is entitled under the Due Process Clause to minimally adequate treatment. Rather, he merely challenged the lower court's assumption that the respondent's need for treatment was the sole rationale for his commitment. As Chief Justice Burger noted, the state statute authorizing commitments did not require that a patient be treated. However, because the court of appeals did not explain its conclusion that the respondent was committed solely because he needed treatment, Chief Justice Burger determined that "the premise of the Court of Appeals' first theory must have been that, at least with respect to persons who are not physically dangerous, a State has no power to confine the mentally ill except for the purpose of providing them with treatment." Id. Burger concluded that this premise is flawed because the state's traditional authority as parens patriae allows it to confine individuals for reasons other than treatment, such as providing them with a more humane place of confinement. Id. at 581-82, 95 S.Ct. at 24.
In Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974, 104 S.Ct. 2352, 80 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984), the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson and concluded (as did the district court below) that no constitutional right to rehabilitation exists for incarcerated juvenile delinquents. 714 F.2d at 1176-77; see also Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir.1977) (in dictum, rejecting constitutional right to treatment for juvenile offenders). The court of appeals in Santana rejected both theories described above and held that juveniles incarcerated under the state's parens

patriae authority have no due process right to treatment, because the state "may legitimately confine individuals solely to protect society from them." 714 F.2d at 1176.
This court agrees that the quid pro quo doctrine is no longer valid in light of the Chief Justice's concurring opinion in O'Connor. However, the Santana court seems to have read the Burger concurrence too broadly with regard to the first theory. Although Chief Justice Burger recognized in O'Connor that states may confine individuals for reasons other than to provide treatment, he did not state that individuals who are confined for purposes of treatment have no constitutional right to receive that treatment. Indeed, such a pronouncement would apparently run afoul of the Supreme Court's mandate in Jackson v. Indiana, supra, that nature of confinement be reasonably related to the purpose of the confinement.
Accordingly, because South Carolina's policy behind incarcerating juvenile delinquents is to provide them with rehabilitation, the court has determined that the juveniles at DJJ are entitled under the Constitution to rehabilitative treatment.
[44] Youngberg, like Jackson, involved a challenge by a mental retardate to the conditions of his confinement. Although Youngberg is not squarely applicable to juveniles, this court has determined that the Youngberg analysis is appropriate in a juvenile correctional setting because juvenile delinquents, like mental retardates, have been deprived of their liberty because of their status. Additionally, the three parts of the Youngberg test are all based upon a determination of what is reasonable under the circumstances 0907 an elastic concept that allows for appropriate adjustments in view of the fact that some juvenile delinquents have demonstrated a propensity toward violence.
[45] Bell involved a constitutional challenge to conditions of confinement brought by pretrial detainees. Although the case did not involve juvenile correctional facilities, the Court in Bell was called upon to establish constitutional minimum standards for pretrial detainees who are protected, as are the Plaintiffs in this litigation, by the Due Process Clause. 441 U.S. at 536, 99 S.Ct. at 1872.
[46] In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage from a 1967 report of a presidential task force:
The spirit that animated the juvenile court movement was fed in part by humanitarian compassion for offenders who were children. ... [This compassion] should [not] be allowed to outrun reality. The juvenile court is a court of law, charged like other agencies of criminal justice with protecting the community. ... The juvenile court, like other courts, is therefore obliged to employ all the means at hand, not excluding incapacitation, for achieving that protection. What should distinguish the juvenile from the criminal courts is greater emphasis upon rehabilitation, not preoccupation with it.
403 U.S. at 546 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. at 1986 n. 6 quoting President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 9 (1967)).
[47] Testimony at trial indicated that DJJ must exert considerable effort to arrange for the parental meeting: letters are often returned undelivered, and parents often refuse to attend the meetings.
[48] As noted previously in the court's Findings of Fact, a disproportionate number of juveniles confined to the long-term institutions are in need of special education services.
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 113 F.3d 1373 (1997)
ALEXANDER S.; Alfred S.; Benny B.; Christopher M.; Lafayette M.; Ricky S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; Lesly A. Bowers, Guardian ad Litem, PlaintiffsAppellees, and
Inez Moore Tenenbaum, individually and as a representative of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v.
Flora Brooks BOYD, individually and in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendant-Appellant, and
Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; John F. Henry;
1374 Frank Maudlin; Kathleen P. Jennings; Joseph W. Hudgens; *1374 Karole Jensen; J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for the South
Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; South Carolina Department of Youth Services, Defendants,
Michael W. Moore, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Party in Interest, v.
Richard A. HARPOOTLIAN, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Amicus Curiae-Movant. Thomas DAVIS, Special Master,
Alexander S.; Alfred S.; Benny B.; Christopher M.; Lafayette M.; Ricky S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; Lesly A. Bowers, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Inez Moore Tenenbaum, individually and as a representative of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v. Flora Brooks BOYD, Defendant-Appellant,
Richard A. Harpootlian, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Movant, and
Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; John F. Henry; Frank Maudlin; Kathleen P. Jennings; Joseph W. Hudgens; Karole Jensen; J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for the South
Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; South Carolina Department of Youth Services, Defendants,
Michael W. Moore, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Party in Interest.
Nos. 96-1950, 96-2589.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued December 5, 1996. Decided May 28, 1997.

13756 *1375 *1376 ARGUED: Edward Mobley Woodward, Jr., Woodward, Cothran & Herndon, Columbia, SC, for Appellant. W. Gaston Fairey, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, SC, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Carolyn C. Matthews, Woodward, Cothran & Herndon, Columbia, SC, for Appellant. Rochelle Romosca McKim, Fairey, Parise & Mills, P.A., Columbia, SC; Nancy C. McCormick, Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc., Columbia, SC; Lesly A. Bowers, Columbia, SC, for Appellees.

Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote a separate opinion in which she concurred in Parts I., II., III.A. and C., IV., and in the judgment. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we must decide whether the recently enacted limitations on attorney's fee awards set forth in § 803 (d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West Supp. 1997)), apply to attorney's fees awarded to Plaintiffs, a group of incarcerated juveniles who have successfully challenged the constitutionality of juvenile prison conditions in the state of South Carolina. Section 803(d) provides that no attorney's fees shall be awarded to a "prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility" in an action seeking redress for unconstitutional prison conditions unless:

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's right protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or

1377

*1377 (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

§ 803(d)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(1)). In addition, any award made pursuant to § 803(d) is limited to
an hourly rate no greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established for payment of court-appointed counsel. [1]See § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(3)).

In successive orders, which were consolidated for this appeal,[2] the district court held that the PLRA, enacted on April 26, 1996, did not apply to fee awards for work performed, but not compensated, prior to its enactment. As to fees for work performed subsequent to the PLRA's enactment, the district court held that the PLRA did not limit the fees generated in proving unconstitutional conditions at juvenile detention facilities, as opposed to adult facilities, because juvenile facilities were not covered by § 803(d) of the PLRA. For the reasons set forth herein, we disagree and hold that the attorney's fees limitations set forth in § 803(d) of the PLRA apply to juveniles confined to juvenile detention facilities. Moreover, the provisions apply to all awards of attorney's fee made after April 26, 1996, regardless of when the work was performed, if the plaintiff meets the new standards imposed by the PLRA for determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees in a prison conditions lawsuit. Accordingly, the PLRA limits the fees available to Plaintiffs for proving unconstitutional conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities and for monitoring services ordered by the district court. Because the awards entered by the district court were determined under the pre-PLRA standards, we reverse and remand to the district court for a redetermination under the new standards.

I.
This appeal arises out of ongoing litigation between a group of incarcerated juveniles confined to four South Carolina juvenile detention facilities and the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (the State). First, we review the procedural background of this case.
A.
In 1990, Plaintiffs filed the underlying class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.1997) and three interrelated statutes0907the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, see 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West 1990 & Supp.1997); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-96 (West 1985 & Supp.1997); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp.1997) 0907 challenging the conditions of confinement of juveniles housed in the Department of Juvenile Justice facilities operated by the State. Plaintiffs alleged that the State violated a number of their constitutional and federal statutory rights. After exhaustive discovery and a three-month bench trial, the district court concluded that certain aspects of 1378 confinement violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[3]*1378 Plaintiffs, therefore, prevailed in proving that actual constitutional violations occurred in the juvenile facilities. In its order of January 25, 1995, the district court cited constitutional and statutory deficiencies in the areas of fire safety, food services, medical services, programming, overcrowding, and staffing levels. See Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 876 F.Supp. 773, 786-95 (D.S.C.1995). The court also found that the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been infringed upon by the improper use of CS gas, a potent form of tear gas used for riot control, and by the State's failure to adequately identify those Plaintiffs who suffer from a "disability" for purposes of the facilities' educational programs. See id. at 785-88. Accordingly, the district court ordered the State to devise and implement a remedial plan to cure each violation. It also stated its intent to appoint a special master to monitor the implementation of the program. See id. at 803-05. The State did not appeal.
On November 22, 1995, after submissions and arguments, the district court issued an order awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees for work relating to the January 1995 order. The State appealed the fee award, but argued only that the rates, hours, and documents submitted by Plaintiffs were inaccurate. In fact, during oral arguments before this court held two weeks after the effective date of the PLRA, the State specifically disavowed any claim that the PLRA limited the fee award.[4] Finding no error, we affirmed the award. See Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished).
B.
On May 25, 1995, the State submitted its proposed remedial plan in accordance with the January 1995 district court order. The district court approved the plan, which provided, in pertinent part, for an increase in the facilities' security staff. The amount of the staffing increase was expressly dependent upon an anticipated reduction in the juvenile facilities' population.
On August 30, 1995, the district court held a status conference to assess the remedial plan's implementation progress. The court-appointed special master testified that the existing conditions "caused him to fear for the safety of the juveniles." (J.A. at 20.) At this conference, Plaintiffs made an oral motion to increase security staffing at the various juvenile facilities. Plaintiffs subsequently submitted in writing an Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief. Plaintiffs then filed a superseding Motion to Modify the Plan with regards to security staffing needs due to an increase, rather than the anticipated decrease, in the number of juveniles detained in the facilities.
In December 1995, the district court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion to modify the remedial plan to increase staffing. During this hearing, the State agreed to revise its proposed plan. Following the December modification hearing, the district court issued an interim order on February 16, 1996, in which it found that the level of security staffing remained constitutionally inadequate and ordered the State to institute the revised plan presented during the modification hearing. The district court also found that Plaintiffs were the "prevailing party"

on this issue and were entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1994 & Supp.1997). In addition, the district court acknowledged Plaintiffs' future entitlement to attorney's fees for ongoing 1379 monitoring *1379 activities and set up a procedure for the submission of fees.[5]
C.
Plaintiffs subsequently submitted separate motions for attorney's fees related to, among other things, the December modification hearing and subsequent monitoring activities. The State timely filed objections arguing that the "results obtained" in the December modification hearing did not justify the fee sought and that charges for secretarial services and work performed preparing a separate attorney's fee appeal and a December 1993 memorandum were improper. The State also submitted a supplemental memorandum, after the enactment of the PLRA, arguing that the limitations contained in § 803(d) of the PLRA applied to Plaintiffs' pending fee requests. After considering the State's various objections, the district court issued an order on May 29, 1996, awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees for services performed by counsel from May 1995 until February 1996, including the December 1995 modification hearing. The district court specifically concluded that it did not need to determine the applicability of the PLRA because the fees at issue were all incurred prior to the PLRA's enactment date.
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs continued to submit fee applications to the district court for monitoring work performed from February through July 1996. The State again timely filed objections to the fees, in which the State reiterated its position that the restrictions on attorney's fees set forth in § 803(d) of the PLRA applied to the Plaintiffs' fee applications. However, by order dated August 30, 1996, the district court awarded Plaintiffs additional fees for monitoring activities from February through July 1996 based on pre-PLRA standards. After conducting an indepth analysis, the district court concluded that § 803(d) did not apply to Plaintiffs because the juveniles, while admittedly "prisoners" under the PLRA, were not "confined to a prison, jail, or other correctional facility" as that phrase is defined by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 (West 1994), a section left unaltered by the PLRA. And again, on October 2, 1996, the district court, over the State's objection that the PLRA limited the available fee award, awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees based on pre-PLRA standards for monitoring performed in August 1996. We have consolidated the State's timely appeals of the orders of February 16, May 29, August 30, and October 2, 1996.
II.
On April 26, 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA, landmark legislation that, by imposing new restrictions on class action and individual prisoner lawsuits, sharply circumscribes a prisoner's ability to seek remedies for alleged unconstitutional prison conditions. To limit federal courts' involvement in the daily operation of federal and state correctional facilities, the PLRA made significant changes to Titles 18, 28, and 42 of the United States Code. For the purposes of this appeal, we are concerned primarily with §§ 802 and 803 of the PLRA (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (West Supp.1997) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West Supp.1997)).[6]
1380 *1380 Prior to the PLRA, § 3626 of Title 18 was titled "Appropriate remedies with respect to prison crowding." Section 802 of the PLRA, however, amended the statute to provide the specific avenue through which prisoners may institute class actions to obtain prospective relief for prison conditions in general, not only for prison crowding. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a), and (g)(2) (setting forth the requirements for obtaining prospective relief in "any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison"). In fact, Plaintiffs agreed at oral argument that the Plaintiffs' underlying § 1983 action, if initiated after April 26, 1996, properly would have been brought under § 802 of the PLRA, in addition to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.1997).
Section 802 limits the remedies available in actions challenging conditions of confinement brought under any Federal law, as in this action, which was brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Commonly known as the "Stop Turning Out Prisoners" (STOP) provisions, § 802 limits a federal court's ability to grant prospective relief. Specifically, § 802's provisions restrict preliminary injunctive relief, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(2); prohibit the imposition of population caps except as a last resort, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3); allow for the immediate

termination of prospective relief after a limited time, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b); restrict approval of consent decrees, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(c); require prompt judicial decisions on motions to modify or terminate relief, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(e); and limit the authority and payment of special masters, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(f). Congress specifically made the STOP provisions of § 802 applicable to juvenile prisoners detained in juvenile detention facilities who challenge the conditions of their confinement in "any civil action with respect to prison conditions." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(5) (defining prison to include "any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults").
In an attempt to stem the tide of frivolous lawsuits initiated by federal and state prisoners, Congress passed § 803 of the PLRA (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e), which places new procedural restrictions on lawsuits "with respect to prison conditions" whether brought under § 1983 or any other Federal law by "a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility." In addition to mandating administrative exhaustion, § 803 of the PLRA, entitled "Suits by prisoners," provides for the immediate dismissal of frivolous lawsuits, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c); limits recovery for mental and emotional injuries, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e); limits the removal of a prisoner from confinement during pretrial proceedings, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(f); allows the waiver of the right to reply to prisoner lawsuits, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(g); and, as is pertinent to this action, restricts the availability and amount of attorney's fees recoverable by prisoners under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d).
III.
This appeal presents three issues. First, are the PLRA's limitations on attorney's fees applicable to juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities? Second, if applicable to juveniles, are the limitations applicable to fee awards for work performed, but not compensated, prior to the enactment of the PLRA? And third, do the PLRA's 1381 limitations on attorneys' *1381 fees impose new standards for determining the appropriateness of a fee award in a prison conditions suit? We address these issues in turn. Although we generally review a district court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion, see Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277-78 (4th Cir.1990), we review the applicability of statutory amendments de novo, see United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir.1994) ("Interpreting a statute is a legal issue that successive courts freely review, and hence our review is plenary.").
A.
The State contends that the PLRA's limitations on attorney's fees apply to the district court's award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs arising from the Plaintiffs' successful § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement in South Carolina's juvenile facilities. Section 1988 provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (West Supp.1997). Therefore, § 1988 is the statutory mechanism under which Plaintiffs sought attorney's fees before the district court. Section 803 of the PLRA, however, limits the district court's ability to award attorney's fees in lawsuits brought on behalf of "a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988." § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(1)). Whether the State is correct in arguing that these limitations apply to the attorney's fees awarded in the May, August, and October orders depends on whether juveniles detained in the State's juvenile facilities are "prisoners" confined to a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility."
It is undisputed that the term "prisoner" in § 803(d) of the PLRA encompasses incarcerated juveniles. Section 803 (d) provides that "the term `prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(h)). "Prisoner" is similarly defined in § 802 of the PLRA.[7] Therefore, resolution of whether Plaintiffs attorney's fees may be limited turns on whether Congress intended the phrase "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" to include juvenile detention facilities when it enacted the PLRA.

1.
Section 803 of the PLRA does not expressly define the phrase "jail, prison, or correctional facility." However, § 802 of the PLRA, which sets forth the procedures through which a class of prisoners such as Plaintiffs may contest constitutional violations pertaining to prison conditions, defines "prison" as "any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law." § 802(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(5)). Accordingly, the State contends that because Congress, when enacting the PLRA, intended prisons to include juvenile facilities for the purpose of stating a cause of action under § 802, this court should construe prisons to include juvenile facilities for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees under § 803(d).
Plaintiffs, however, present four arguments in support of their position that the attorney's fees limitations set forth in § 803(d) are inapplicable to this case. First, relying on the definition of "institution" found in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 (West 1994), Plaintiffs contend that Congress did not intend § 803(d) of the PLRA to apply to juvenile facilities. Section 1997, the definitional section applicable to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (the statutory provision containing the 1382 attorney's fees limitations of the PLRA), was left *1382 unrevised by the PLRA. It defines "institution" as any facility or institution owned and operated by the State which is
(i) for persons who are mentally ill, disabled, or retarded, or chronically ill or handicapped;
(ii) a jail, prison, or other correctional facility;
(iii) a pretrial detention facility;
(iv) for juveniles 0907
(I) held awaiting trial;
(II) residing for any State purpose in such facility or institution (other than a residential facility providing only elementary or secondary education that is not an institution in which reside juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent, in need of supervision, neglected, placed in State custody, mentally ill or disabled, mentally retarded, or chronically ill or handicapped); or
(v) providing skilled nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial or residential care.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(1). In defining "institution," § 1997 differentiates between a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" and facilities for juveniles, like the ones that are the subject of this action. Therefore, as Plaintiffs argue, one could conclude by negative implication that since the PLRA attorney's fee limitations in § 803(d) of the Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e), apply only to prisoners confined to a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility," and since 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(1) distinguishes between a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" and a juvenile facility, the PLRA's limitations on attorney's fees do not apply to juvenile Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that if Congress had intended for the all-encompassing definition of "prison" in § 802 to apply to the attorney's fees limitations in § 803, it would have modified the definition of "institution" in § 1997 to omit the three separate categories of facilities and to keep the terminology in Title 42 consistent. See United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602 (4th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is proper to consider that Congress acts with knowledge of existing law, and that absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction." (quotations omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 797, 133 L.Ed.2d 745 (1996). Therefore, Plaintiffs urge this court to adopt the more limited definition of "jail, prison, or other correctional facilities" found in § 1997, which, by implication, does not include juvenile facilities.
Second, Plaintiffs rely upon the fact that, while both §§ 802 and 803 of the PLRA contain definitions of "prisoner," which includes juveniles, Congress defined "prison" to include juvenile facilities only in § 802. The district court agreed, reasoning that this omission was intentional, "[g]iven the ease with which the[§ 802] definition could have been included in [§ 803]." (J.A. at 71.)

Third, Plaintiffs cite Congress's historically different treatment of adult and juvenile prisoners. Again, the district court agreed, relying on (1) the distinct difference between the ability of juveniles and adults to protect their own interests; (2) the probability that juveniles' rights will be pursued only in class actions which require a higher level of legal skill and long-term commitment of counsel; and (3) that the clear distinction made between juvenile facilities and adult prisons in 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1997 and 1997a (West 1994) was left unchanged by the PLRA.[8] Because Congress did not amend these provisions, the district court reasoned that Congress intended to maintain the distinction between juvenile facilities and adult prisons.
Finally, Plaintiffs rationalize the apparent inconsistency of defining a juvenile not incarcerated in a "prison" as a "prisoner." The district court reconciled the definitions by concluding that "[t]his would simply place juveniles who 1383 have been transferred to adult *1383 facilities on the same footing as other adult prisoners." (J.A. at 72.) Therefore, according to the district court, all inmates in adult prisons are subject to the same rules, regardless of age.
2.
In a case that turns on statutory construction, we begin by examining the literal and plain language of the statute. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 843, 846, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997); Williams v. U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 15 F.3d 46, 49 (4th Cir.1994). If the "statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent," our inquiry ends. Robinson, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 846 (quotation omitted); Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145. "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 846 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2595, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992)). In interpreting statutory language, words are generally given their common and ordinary meaning. See Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145.
Although Congress did not define the phrase "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" in § 803 of the PLRA, the plain meaning of the phrase undoubtedly encompasses juvenile detention facilities. "Jail" is commonly defined as a "place for the lawful confinement of persons" or a "prison." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 650 (1988). It is also defined as a "prison" or a place "usually used to hold persons either convicted of misdemeanors (minor crimes) or persons awaiting trial or as a lockup for intoxicated and disorderly persons." Black's Law Dictionary 834 (6th ed.1990). "Correctional institution" is a "generic term describing prisons, jails, reformatories and other places of correction and detention." Id. at 344. And, "house of correction" is defined as a "prison for the reformation of petty or juvenile offenders." Id. Congress did not add any language limiting the scope of these words to adult facilities. Rather, Congress prefaced the phrase with the word "any." In a similar context, the Supreme Court has noted that "the word `any' has an expansive meaning." United States v. Gonzales, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1035, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (defining "any" as "one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind" (citation omitted)). Therefore, we must construe the phrase to include all jails, prisons, and correctional facilities, including those housing juveniles. See id. (construing the statutory phrase "any other term of imprisonment" as referring to "all terms of imprisonment"). Further, the language "or other correctional facility," is broad and inclusive, rather than exclusive. Therefore, the plain meaning of the statutory language suggests that juvenile detention facilities should be included within the scope of the phrase "jail, prison, or other correctional facility."
We acknowledge that Congress placed the attorney's fees limitations provision, applicable to prisoners confined to "jail, prison, or other correctional facility," into Title 42, and that § 1997 of Title 42 distinguishes between a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" and facilities housing juveniles. Therefore, we address the apparent conflict. Because, however, the PLRA's definition of "prison" (which includes juvenile facilities) is inconsistent § 1997's implicit definition of "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" (which excludes juvenile facilities), we conclude that the phrase is ambiguous. Cf. Robinson, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 847 (holding that the term "employee" standing alone is ambiguous in Title VII because some sections of Title VII define the term to include former employees, while other sections do not).

Having determined that the phrase at issue is ambiguous, we apply the traditional tools of statutory construction. Id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 848. In doing so, "[w]e begin with the premise that all parts of the statute must be read together, neither taking specific words out of context, nor interpreting one part so as to render another meaningless." United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir.1974) (citations omitted). A cardinal rule of 1384 statutory construction is that statutes which are originally part of the same Act *1384 should be construed together. Cf. Robinson, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 849 (interpreting ambiguous statutory term so as to be "more consistent with the broad context of [the Act] and the primary purpose of the [section at issue]"); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) ("[W]e begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs."); United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182-83, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) ("Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor and, at a minimum, must account for a statute's full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter." (quotation and citation omitted)). More specifically, identical terms within an Act should be given the same meaning. See Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 479, 112 S.Ct. at 2596 (1992); Director v. Newport, 8 F.3d 175, 184 n. 8 (4th Cir.1993). In other words, we must define § 803(d)'s "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" phrase so that it harmonizes with the other provisions of the PLRA, promotes the goals of the PLRA, and gives each provision purpose.
Section 802 of the PLRA defines the term "prison" as any facility that "detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, [or] adjudicated delinquent for" violating criminal law. § 802(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(5)). Given this, and the fact that § 803(d) includes an incarcerated juvenile within its definition of "prisoner", we conclude that the phrase "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" found in § 803(d) of the PLRA (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e) must include juvenile facilities such as the ones that are the subject of this action. This construction of the statute makes the PLRA internally consistent and best furthers Congress's intentions.
In enacting the PLRA, Congress had farreaching goals, and nothing in the Act indicates an intent to omit juveniles confined in juvenile facilities from its impact. To the contrary, by enacting § 803 of the PLRA, Congress affirmatively amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e to replace the word "adult" with the word "prisoner," and then defined "prisoner" to expressly include juveniles adjudicated delinquent of crimes. In addition, § 809(a) of the PLRA (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1932 (West Supp.1997)) specifically limits the revocation of earned release credit to "adult[s] convicted of a crime and confined in a Federal correctional facility" if the district court concludes that they filed a civil claim for a malicious purpose, solely to harass the party against which it was filed, or if the claimant presents false evidence to the court. It would be unnecessary to expressly limit § 809 to adults if the term "correctional facility" only applied to detention facilities housing adults. A comparison of these two sections of the PLRA demonstrates that Congress recognized the difference between juveniles and adults when enacting the PLRA, and intended to impose the new provisions of § 803 of the Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e), including the restrictions on attorney's fees found in subsection (d), on all "prisoners," including juvenile prisoners.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs concede that § 802 of the PLRA (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626) limits the remedies available to juveniles confined in juvenile facilities in prison conditions lawsuits. We can discern no reason for Congress to limit the more important substantive remedies available to juveniles under § 802 of the PLRA, yet not limit the availability of attorney's fees under § 803. The purpose of the attorney's fees provision is to encourage private attorneys to represent plaintiffs bringing meritorious lawsuits to expose unconstitutional prison conditions. The limitations placed on fee awards by § 803 do not undermine this purpose. If private attorneys find that fee limitations hinder their ability effectively to litigate these cases, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997a (West 1994 & Supp.1997), left intact by the PLRA, authorizes the Attorney General to institute actions on behalf of persons residing in or confined to a jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that such persons are being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997a(a).
1385 *1385 Moreover, we are not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that Congress intended the definition of "prisoner" in § 803 to include juveniles only when they are confined to adult prisons. This construction does not harmonize

the provisions of the PLRA. The Juvenile Prosecution Act of 1994 prohibits the placement of juveniles in adult federal facilities. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5039 (West Supp.1997) ("No juvenile committed, whether pursuant to an adjudication of delinquency or conviction for an offense, to the custody of the Attorney General may be placed or retained in an adult jail or correctional institution...."). Also, a juvenile who is simply "accused of" a crime or even "adjudicated delinquent" would not, under normal circumstances, be confined to an adult state facility. Therefore, to adopt Plaintiffs' reasoning would render the "accused of" and "adjudicated delinquent" language in the definition of "prisoner" superfluous. Therefore, while we recognize the apparent conflict with the definition of "institution" found in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997, we hold that a limitation of the phrase "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" to adult prison facilities in § 803 of the PLRA would be inconsistent with other language within the section, other sections of the Act, and the plain and usual meanings of the relevant terms. As a result, we conclude that Plaintiffs are subject to the attorney's fees limitations of the PLRA because they are "prisoner[s] ... confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility." § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)).
B.
Having determined that the PLRA's limitations on attorney's fees apply to Plaintiffs, we next address the applicability of the provisions to the fees awarded in the May and August orders for services performed by Plaintiffs' counsel prior to the enactment of the PLRA.
1.
Plaintiffs argue that the State waived application of the provisions to work performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA during oral arguments before this court on May 6, 1996. At that time, the State was appealing a November 22, 1995 order in which the district court awarded Plaintiffs attorneys' fees for work related to this ongoing litigation. As previously noted, see supra n. 4, in response to inquiry during oral argument as to whether the State had any argument based on the attorney's fees provisions contained in the recently enacted PLRA, the State "specifically disavowed any such claims." Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished).
We do not consider the State's waiver of application of the PLRA's attorney's fees provision to the November 1995 order to be a waiver of the statute's applicability to all future awards based on work completed prior to April 26, 1996. The November order is a separate order, independent of the February, May, August, and October orders currently being appealed. To restrict the State's arguments in this appeal to those argued in a previous appeal is obviously impermissible. Furthermore, because the parties have not, prior to this appeal, litigated the applicability of the PLRA's attorney's fees limitations before this Court, we are not bound by res judicata.
The State timely raised the statute's applicability for the district court's consideration prior to the issuance of the May order. In its memorandum, the State argued that the restrictions of § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (d)) applied to Plaintiffs' pending fee applications for work performed from May 1995 until February 1996. The State reiterated this position in later memorandums filed in objection to Plaintiffs' subsequent fee applications. As a result, we conclude that the State preserved the issue of the amendments' application to all awards made by the district court subsequent to the enactment of the PLRA.
2.
Section 803(d) of the PLRA provides that "[n]o award of attorney's fees" ordered in an action brought by a prisoner claiming unconstitutional conditions of confinement "shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 1386 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, for *1386 payment of court-appointed counsel." § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(3)) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute mandates that all attorney's fees awarded after April 26, 1996, in any prison conditions lawsuit comply with the restrictions imposed by the PLRA.[9]See Williams v. U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 15 F.3d 46, 49 (4th Cir.1994) (stating that "[s]tatutory construction begins with an examination of the literal language of the statute" (quotations

omitted)). There is, quite simply, no award until an order is issued, and all of the orders appealed were entered after the statute's enactment.[10] Congress could have easily inserted language to restrict the application of these limitations to awards for work performed subsequent to the PLRA's enactment, but it did not do so. Accordingly, the plain language of § 803(d) of the PLRA (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)) mandates that the attorney's fees limitations apply to the awards made in the May, August, and October orders, regardless of when the work being compensated was performed.
We acknowledge that other courts that have addressed the applicability of the attorney's fees provisions of § 803 of the PLRA to pending cases have refused to apply the limitations, concluding that such application would have an impermissible retroactive effect. See Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1201-03 (8th Cir.1996) (concluding that application of the attorney's fees provisions in § 803(d) to Plaintiffs and their attorneys who had worked for "literally years" on the assumption that their fees would be based on 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 would be "manifestly unjust"); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir.1996) (same); see also Weaver v. Clarke, 933 F.Supp. 831, 834 (D.Neb.1996) (refusing to apply § 803(d)'s limitations when determining attorney's fees awarded after the enactment of the PLRA for work performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA). But cf. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1113, 1114-15 (E.D.Mich.1996) (concluding that § 803 of the PLRA applies when determining attorney fee awards for work completed after enactment of the PLRA in a prison conditions case arising prior to enactment of the PLRA). With all due respect to our sister Circuits, we find their analyses flawed.[11]
1387 *1387 In Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Supreme Court outlined a three-step inquiry to be undertaken when determining whether a court should apply a new statute to actions that occurred prior to the enactment of the statute. See id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. First, we ascertain whether Congress expressly prescribed the reach of the statute. Although we are bound by Congress's directive, see id., nothing in § 803 of the PLRA expressly prescribes its reach. Unlike § 802, which Congress expressly made applicable to pending cases, § 803 contains no stated effective date. We decline to draw any negative inferences from the express inclusion of a provision making § 802 applicable to pending cases and the absence of the same from § 803. Cf. id. at 259-61, 114 S.Ct. at 1494 (rejecting argument that "because Congress provided specifically for prospectivity in two places ... we should infer that it intended the opposite for the remainder of the statute").
Absent an express directive from Congress, we must apply a newly enacted statute to pending cases unless doing so would give the statute "retroactive effect." Id. at 277, 114 S.Ct. at 1503 ("`[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.'" (quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974))). If application of the new statute would have retroactive effect, then "our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result." Id. at 1505, 114 S.Ct. at 1487. However, "[a] statute does not operate `retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law." Id. at 269, 114 S.Ct. at 1499 (citation omitted); see also id. at 267, 114 S.Ct. at 1498 ("[T]he potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope."). Rather, the Supreme Court has instructed us that application of a new statute to a pending case has a retroactive effect only when "it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed."[12]Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. In other words, the court must determine "whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." Id. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. at 1499.
In Landgraf, the Supreme Court recognized several types of statutes that, even though enacted after the events giving rise to the underlying lawsuit, could be applied to pending cases without having a retroactive effect. For example, the Court noted that application of a new statute that affects only secondary, rather than primary, 1388 conduct does not give rise to concerns about retroactivity.[13]See id. at 274-76, 114 S.Ct. at 1502. *1388 The Court then specifically cited attorney's fee determinations as an example of secondary conduct that "[does] not resemble the cases in which we have invoked the presumption against statutory retroactivity." Id. at 277, 114 S.Ct. at 1503; see also id. ("Attorney's fee determinations ... are `collateral to the main cause of action' and

`uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial.'" (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 1166-67, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982))).
We conclude, therefore, that application of the PLRA's fee limitations to the awards made in the district court's May and August orders does not have an impermissible retroactive effect because the determination of attorney's fees awards, which are collateral to the main cause of action, does not attach new legal consequences to completed events. Moreover, the modifications made by § 803 of the PLRA to a plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees are not so fundamentally unfair as to result in manifest injustice. Cf. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S.Ct. 566, 575, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (instructing that § 1988 was "never intended to produce windfalls to attorneys" (quotation omitted)); see also id. at 122, 113 S.Ct. at 578-79 (stating that § 1988 "is not a relief Act for lawyers" (quotation omitted) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). As a result, the district court erred when it failed to apply the law in effect at the time it entered its May and August orders.
C.
Finally, we address the new standards imposed by the PLRA for determining a fee award in a prison conditions suit. Section 803(d) of the PLRA requires the district court to conduct a three-step analysis when reviewing attorney's fees requests. First, the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff is eligible for fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, a plaintiff in a prison conditions lawsuit obtained attorney's fees solely through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. Section 1988 allows the district court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b). "[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573 (citation omitted); accord S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc). Moreover, the fee request must be "reasonable." This Court has articulated twelve factors which the district court should consider when determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee request. See Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1978). Second, § 803(d) of the PLRA requires the plaintiff to prove that "the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights ... and ... is proportionately related to the court ordered relief ... or ... was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered" before fees can be awarded. § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(1)). And finally, § 803(d) of the PLRA imposes a cap on the hourly rate available to a plaintiff's counsel of 150 percent of the hourly rate available to court-appointed counsel. See § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(3)). Therefore, the district court must compute the maximum hourly rate allowable and determine whether a plaintiff's counsel is entitled to the maximum rate or a reduced amount.[14]
1.
The State challenges the district court's finding that Plaintiffs were eligible for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1389 1988 on two grounds. First, the State contends that the *1389 district court erred when it awarded Plaintiffs
attorney's fees for work relating to the December modification hearing because, they argue, Plaintiffs were not the "prevailing party" in that proceeding. Second, the State argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to expressly consider all the Barber factors when evaluating the "reasonableness" of Plaintiffs' fee requests. We address the State's arguments in turn.
a.
The State argues that Plaintiffs failed to prove their initial eligibility for fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 for work relating to the December staffing hearing and modification motion. The State contests Plaintiffs' status as prevailing party in the resulting February order because (1) the order was only an "interim," rather than a final order, and (2) the State consented to the revised plan, rendering the Plaintiffs' motion nothing more than a

"catalyst" for the modification. We disagree and hold that the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs were the "prevailing party" in the February order and, therefore, were eligible for fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988.
Part of the remedial plan initially proposed by the State included an increase in the number of security staff to provide minimal levels of physical safety for the juveniles housed in the State's juvenile facilities. The proposed plan, in addition to increasing staff, included a population reduction of 100 juveniles by July 15, 1996, and 200 juveniles by July 15, 1997. During the June 1994 trial, the juvenile population ranged from 670 to 730 at institutions that had a rated capacity of 299. By July 13, 1995, however, the juvenile population had risen to 851, rather than declining. As a result, Plaintiffs moved for emergency relief, requesting additional staffing. Also, at the August 1995 status conference, the special master appointed to monitor the State's compliance with the plan lamented that the facilities remained unsafe and that an emergency situation existed.
In response, the State asked the district court to grant it time to implement the original remedial plan. The State also argued that there had been no change in circumstances warranting the relief sought by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs nevertheless moved for a modification of the remedial plan based on the unexpected increase in the juvenile population. Plaintiffs argued that the modification was necessary because the State's original plan was predicated upon a reduction in population.
During the subsequent three-day hearing in December 1995, Plaintiffs presented testimony from several juvenile witnesses, Department of Juvenile Justice employees, and two experts. At the time of the hearing, the juvenile population had increased to approximately 1000. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the hearing the State maintained there had been no change in conditions at the juvenile facilities and that the modifications requested by Plaintiffs were premature and unnecessary. However, at the completion of Plaintiffs' case, the State conceded the need for additional security staffing and proposed its revised remedial plan. The State also conceded that it had begun increasing personnel shortly before the December hearing, and that it planned additional increases due to the rise in the juvenile population.
The district court issued an order on February 16, 1996, requiring the State to increase staffing to "at least that level of staffing set forth in [the State's revised] plan." (J.A. at 24.) The court further found that the order was "only interim and [was] subject to further modification after an appropriate amount of time has passed to allow evaluation of [the State's] modified staffing plan." (J.A. at 24.) The district court specifically concluded that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the December action and provided for the submission of affidavits for an award of attorney's fees for the staffing issue and monitoring activities since the January 1995 order.
The State contends that Plaintiffs were not a prevailing party, but merely a catalyst which encouraged the State to adopt an increased staffing plan. This Court has clearly rejected the "catalyst theory" as a means of acquiring prevailing party status for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. See Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of 1390 Baltimore, *1390 31 F.3d 196, 198 (4th Cir.1994) (citing S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc)). To acquire prevailing party status, Plaintiffs must "succeed on[a] significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit." Arvinger, 31 F.3d at 200 (quotation omitted). Moreover, "[t]he plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573. "In short, a plaintiff `prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Id. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573. The February 16 order was an enforceable order against the State requiring it to increase security staffing levels at the juvenile facilities pursuant to a modified plan. Thus, it materially altered the "legal relationship" between Plaintiffs and the State. See id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. at 574 ("No material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.").
Under these circumstances, the fact that the new plan was "voluntarily" proposed by the State rather than the court is irrelevant. Plaintiffs moved for a modification of the State's original remedial plan. The State opposed Plaintiffs' motions, arguing that their original plan should be given time to work. It was not until the conclusion of Plaintiffs' presentation at the December hearing, during which the State attempted to discredit many of Plaintiffs' witnesses, that the State conceded that increased staffing was necessary to protect the juveniles housed in the State's juvenile facilities. Furthermore, while the State implemented some of the ordered changes prior to the

hearing, many were not instituted until afterwards, in accordance with the district court's order. As a result of Plaintiffs' motions and the subsequent hearing, the district court ordered the State to modify its original remedial plan to provide for increased staffing at the levels proposed by the State during the hearing. This order memorialized the "resolution of [a] dispute which change[d] the legal relationship between [the State] and [Plaintiffs]." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in the December modification hearing. See S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed., 6 F.3d 160, 171 (4th Cir.1993) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("[A] voluntary change in conduct[,] formalized in a legally enforceable settlement agreement[, will] transform a plaintiff into a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988."), adopted as majority opinion, 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc).
b.
The State also challenges the awards of attorney's fees in the February 16, May 29, and August 30, orders, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to expressly consider all the factors articulated in Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1978). "It is well settled that district courts have considerable discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, and we must not overturn an award by the district court unless it is clearly wrong." Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger Co., 38 F.3d 133, 138 (4th Cir.1994) (citation omitted).
We have enunciated twelve factors that the district court must consider when determining the reasonableness of 1391 an attorney fee request. See Barber, 577 F.2d at 226 n. 28.[15] We have also held that any award of *1391
attorney's fees must be accompanied by detailed findings of fact with regard to the factors. See id. at 226. With that having been said, we conclude that the State forfeited any error made by the district court in failing to expressly address the Barber factors in each of the appealed orders. In its February 16 order, the district court set forth its "Fee application procedures" for counsel. It instructed both parties as follows:
The court will not require plaintiffs to file affidavits which duplicate the general attorney background information and billing rates filed in support of the prior fee application except as to any new attorneys or attorneys for whom plaintiffs are now claiming a different billing rate. The court will rely on the affidavits previously filed in this matter absent specific objection from defendants.
(J.A. at 30 (emphasis added).)[16] The district court further provided that after Plaintiffs' counsel submitted fee affidavits, the State had ten days to "draw the court's attention to any perceived inadequacies in the form of Plaintiffs' fee submission to the court." (J.A. at 30.) Plaintiffs then had an opportunity to respond, after which the State had fifteen additional days to object to the submission of fees. The State, however, neither objected to the fees on the basis of any of the Barber factors nor objected to the district court's failure to expressly address the Barber factors.
Nevertheless, we may correct a forfeited error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). A review of the record, however, reveals that the district court did not err. To the contrary, there is ample evidence demonstrating that the district court carefully reviewed the fee applications and determined their reasonableness. As noted, the district court set forth a specific procedure for attorney's fee applications such that the State had ample opportunity to object to any submissions by the Plaintiffs. The State made several objections to the fee applications, including general claims of overbilling, billing time for secretarial services, and billing for multiple people unnecessarily attending the same proceedings. The district court examined the objections and, agreeing with the State in part, reduced one fee award by $6,500 (J.A. at 62), and another by $800 (J.A. at 66).[17] These reductions are strong evidence that the district court, while not specifically addressing each Barber factor, carefully considered each fee application. See Colonial Williamsburg, 38 F.3d at 138 (holding that the district court's disallowance of all requested fees was evidence of adequate review of petition for attorney's fees, despite the court's failure to address all Barber factors). Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by not addressing each of the Barber factors, and we affirm the district court's determination that the fees awarded were "reasonable" under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988.[18]

2.
Although we conclude that the district court properly found that Plaintiffs were entitled to fees for the work 1392 performed relating to the December motion and that the fee *1392 affidavits submitted were not unreasonable
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, the district court erred when it found that the PLRA's attorney's fees limitations were inapplicable to this case. The PLRA requires Plaintiffs to prove that the fees requested were "directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff[s'] right[s or] in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation." § 803(d)(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(1)). This Court, of course, expresses no opinion as to whether Plaintiffs have met the above requirements. However, if upon reconsideration, the district court determines that Plaintiffs have satisfied the criteria set forth in § 1997e(d)(1) for entitlement to attorney's fees, we instruct the district court to recompute its fee award in light of the hourly cap imposed by § 803(d). Again, we express no opinion as to whether Plaintiffs' counsel should be compensated at the maximum rate allowable or a reduced rate. These determinations are left to the discretion of the district court.
IV.
In conclusion, we reverse the district court's holding that the attorney's fees limitations set forth in § 803(d) of the PLRA (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)) are limited to prisoners confined to adult facilities. Rather, we conclude that § 803(d)'s attorney's fee limitations apply to any action brought by an incarcerated juvenile challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of confinement pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 or any other Federal law in which the attorney's fee is awarded subsequent to the enactment of the PLRA. We find no evidence in the express language of the PLRA or its legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to exclude juveniles confined in juvenile facilities from the far-reaching effects of the PLRA. To the contrary, an examination of the entire Act reveals a concerted effort to include juveniles within the scope of the PLRA.
We affirm the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs are eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. However, we remand the appealed orders and direct the district court to apply the attorney's fees limitations of the PLRA when determining the amount of, and Plaintiffs' entitlement to, attorney's fees.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Parts, I., II., III.A. and C., IV., and in the judgment:
Section III.B. of Judge Williams' opinion applies the Supreme Court's Landgraf analysis to determine whether 42 U.S.C.A. § 1977e(d)(3) (West Supp.1997) has a "retroactive effect." I write separately to state why I believe that application of § 1997e(d)(3) to the fees at issue here presents no retroactivity question.
Section 1997e(d)(3) provides that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 "shall not be awarded, except to the extent that" the hourly rate is capped at "150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18." (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute directs that it applies when a court makes its award, not when an attorney completes his work, or totals his time, or submits his fee request, but when a court awards fees. Therefore, the only "retroactivity" question involving § 1997e(d)(3) is whether it applies to fees awarded before its enactment. Because the fees at issue here were awarded on May 29, 1996, a month after the effective date of the statute (April 26, 1996) this case presents no retroactivity question.
I cannot accept Judge Murnaghan's suggestion that the district court awarded fees on February 16, 1996. The district court's February 16 order declared plaintiffs entitled to fees; it awarded them nothing. Even after a victory on the merits or a declaration of entitlement to fees an attorney has no right to a specific fee under § 1988 until the actual fees are awarded. A district court must apply a twelve factor test, and can always grant an attorney less than he requests. In short, because § 1997e(d)(3) only affects the rate at which attorneys are compensated it has no "retroactive effect" on their entitlement to some fees 0907 it does not "impair rights a party possessed when 1393 he *1393 acted." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). [*] For this reason, the Landgraf analysis, which bedevils my colleagues, is unnecessary here.

I note that, if Landgraf did apply, its initial step would resolve this case. That step requires determination of whether "Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach." Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. If so, "there is no need to resort to judicial default rules." Id. By expressly stating that § 1997e(d)(3) applies to an "award" of fees Congress clearly evidenced its intent to affect a fee "award" regardless of when legal work was completed. To hold otherwise would require us to add the following clause to § 1997e(d)(3): "such fees shall not be awarded [for work completed after the passage of this Act]."
MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge dissenting:
Because I would follow the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and find that the attorney's fee provision in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e does not apply retroactively, I dissent as to part II. B.2.
Section 803(d) of the PLRA provides that in cases such as the case at bar, "[n]o award of attorney's fees" shall be awarded greater than 150% of the local hourly rate for court-appointed counsel.[1] Since the PLRA was passed on April 26, 1996, the Court must determine whether the fee-limiting provisions in the PLRA apply retroactively to work done before the passage of the act.
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Court set out the procedures for determining whether a statute should apply retroactively. First, the court should determine whether "Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach." Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. If Congress has not done so, "the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id. If the statute has language indicating possible retroactive effect, the presumption against retroactivity prevails unless there is "clear congressional intent favoring such a result." Id. If the statute does not indicate retroactive effect, then the court should "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice." Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).
Nothing in the section 803(d) "expressly prescribed [its] proper reach." (emphasis added). The Majority argues that the language "no award of attorney's fees" expressly prescribes the statute's reach in that it indicates that the statute applies when fees are awarded. However, such language certainly does not "expressly" indicate that the Congress intended § 803(d) to apply retroactively. See also Leland v. Federal Ins. Adm'r, 934 F.2d 524, 528 (4th Cir.1991) ("[E]ven where some substantial justification for retroactivity is presented, courts should be reluctant to find such authority absent an express statutory grant.")
In fact, there is evidence that Congress intended that § 803(d) should apply prospectively. Section 802 of the PLRA specifically provides that § 802 applies to relief "granted or approved before, on, or after the date of enactment of this title." Section 803, however, is silent in that regard. Although the fact that Congress expressly 1394 indicated that § 802 applies retroactively and did not do so for *1394 § 803 may not "expressly" indicate that the Congress intended § 803(d) to apply retroactively, it does, however, indicate that when Congress chooses to expressly indicate that a provision is retroactive it can clearly do so.
Secondly, a plain reading of the statutory language in the instant case does not weigh in favor of retroactivity. Based on the Majority's argument, the statute applies on the date attorney's fees were awarded. Thus, if attorney's fees are awarded after the date of the PLRA, the PLRA applies even if the work was done prior to the enactment of the PLRA. It concludes that attorney's fees were awarded after the date of passage of the PLRA and therefore the PLRA applies. However, under the facts in the instant case, attorney's fees were awarded well before the passage of the PLRA.[2]
As the Majority concedes, the Appellees were awarded fees for monitoring activities. In its February 16th order, the district court set up specific instructions regarding how the fees would be paid. Moreover, there was no question that the February 16th order granted attorney's fees to the parties for monitoring activities, the only questions were at what rate and for how many hours. Therefore, the "award" of attorney's fees occurred on February 16, 1996 when the court set out its instructions regarding how further fees would be paid. These fees were not "ordered" until after the passage of the PLRA, but they were "awarded."[3]

Even if this reading of the statute is inaccurate, it certainly indicates that the statement "award of attorney's fees" is insufficient to establish that Congress clearly proscribed the reach of the statute. Since Congress did not expressly prescribe the reach of § 803, the Court must determine whether the statute would have retroactive effect. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505.
In the instant case, plaintiffs' attorneys had a legitimate expectation that they would receive payment for services rendered. The district court awarded such payment in its February 16 order. The court clearly set out procedures, which, if followed by the plaintiffs' attorneys, would entitle plaintiffs' attorneys to receive compensation at the prevailing rate. Plaintiffs' attorneys continued their monitoring activities based on such an understanding. Thus, the statute would certainly have retroactive effect.
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have reached similar results. In Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1202 (8th Cir.1996), the court determined that applying 803(d) retroactively would "have the retroactive effect of disappointing reasonable reliance on prior law." In addition, the court further stated that "when the attorneys were exerting what the District Court quite fairly described as herculean efforts on [plaintiffs'] behalf, they expected to have their fee determined under Section 1988. If we apply the Act, those expectations will be foiled." Id. at 1202 (internal quotations omitted); see also Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir.1996) (to apply the statute retroactively would "attach (without clear indication of congressional intent to do so) new legal consequences to completed conduct, mainly the services rendered by the plaintiffs' counsel in advance of the passage of the new Act."). I agree with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and believe that applying the Act retroactively would have retroactive effect.
The Majority argues, based on Bradley, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, that changes regarding fee determinations do not have retroactive effect. In Bradley, the Supreme Court determined that a statute allowing courts to award fees to prevailing parties in school desegregation cases could be applied retroactively. Id. at 723-24, 94 S.Ct. at 1395 2022. However, the Court based this decision on *1395 the fact that applying the statute retroactively would not have changed the liabilities of the parties or the parties' expectations. Id. at 721, 94 S.Ct. at 2021. The Court determined that since the district court had already awarded fees based on common law principles, applying the fee determination retroactively did not upset the parties' expectations and did not create an "unforeseeable obligation." Id.
However, in the case at bar, the parties' expectations, pursuant to the February order, were that they would be paid the prevailing rate for attorney's fees. Since the parties had previously been awarded fees, the rate for such fees was already set by the court. The district court's order recognized this and did not require plaintiff's attorneys to refile affidavits regarding fees. Therefore, unlike in Bradley, the attorneys in the instant case had an expectation that they would be paid. Reducing these fees would place an "unforeseeable obligation" on plaintiff's attorneys because, after services had been provided, they would be required to provide those services at a reduced rate.
Since Congress did not expressly provide that § 803(d) applied retroactively and since applying the statute retroactively would have retroactive effect, the traditional presumption against retroactivity should apply. However, even if the statute does not have retroactive effect, the statute should not be applied retroactively because doing so would result in "manifest injustice." Id. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016.
In Bradley, the Court held that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in `manifest injustice' or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Id. Applying this statute retroactively would clearly result in "manifest injustice."
The parties in the instant case have been embroiled in litigation for several years. Plaintiffs have sought and been awarded fees on several occasions. In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys were involved in continued monitoring activities. Holding § 803(d) retroactive and applying a reduced rate for attorney's fees for work already done will certainly create a manifest injustice on the parties. See Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203 ("It would be `manifestly unjust' to upset those reasonable expectations and impose new guidelines at this late date."); Weaver v. Clarke, 933 F.Supp. 831, 835 (D.Neb.1996) ("[R]etroactive imposition of the section of the PLRA ... would cause `manifest

injustice' to lawyers like Plaintiff's counsel who have performed their ethical obligations to the courts upon settled expectations premised upon precedent that if they `prevailed' they would be compensated.")
Moreover, Bradley also held that a statute should not be applied retroactively if "there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016. Although there is no language which "expressly" applies the statute retroactively or prospectively, there is evidence that Congress did not intend for § 803(d) to apply retroactively. When Congress passed the PLRA it expressly made § 802 applicable to relief granted before the passage of the Act. § 802(b)(1). However, § 803(b) is silent as to its application. Since Congress saw fit to clarify that § 802(b) applied retroactively, it can be inferred that the exclusion of such clarifying language in § 803 indicates that Congress did not intend § 803 to apply retroactively.[4]See Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203.
Since I believe that § 803(d) does not apply to work completed before the passage of the PLRA, and because I believe it is manifestly unjust to apply § 803(d) retroactively in the instant case, I dissent as to part III.B.2.
[1] Plaintiffs do not dispute the State's computation that the maximum rate is $112.50 per hour under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(3) (West Supp. 1997). However, the State does not concede that Plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rate should automatically be set at the maximum rate for all attorneys involved. The district court, finding that the attorney's fees limitations of the PLRA were inapplicable to this case, awarded Plaintiffs' lead counsel $225.00 per hour and associate counsel $100.00 per hour. Paralegal services were compensated at an hourly rate of $65.00.
[2] We consolidated the State's appeal of the February 16, 1996, May 29, 1996, and August 30, 1996 orders (No. 96-1950) with its later appeal of the October 2, 1996 order (No. 96-2589). The February order does not award fees. The State's appeal of that order is limited to the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs achieved "prevailing party" status and therefore were eligible for fees related to a December 1995 hearing. The State challenges the amount of fees awarded in the May, August, and October orders for work related to the December 1995 hearing and subsequent monitoring services.
[3] The district court joined the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in reviewing the conditions at state juvenile facilities under the standards of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431-32 (9th Cir.1987); H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir.1986); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir.1983); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 & n. 10 (10th Cir.1982). But see Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying the cruel and unusual punishment test of the Eighth Amendment). This issue was not appealed.
[4] Specifically, the State was asked
if it made any additional argument based on the recent amendments to the Civil Rights of the Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994). The State specifically disavowed any such claims. We note that it is not at all clear whether the 1996 amendments, which apply only to persons confined to a "jail, prison or other correctional facility" apply to juveniles confined in juvenile institutions, or even if they did whether they would apply retroactively. However, we need not reach that question here in view of the State's decision not to pursue any argument under the Act.
Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished).
[5] The district court stated that it would rely on previously filed affidavits regarding general attorney background information and billing rates, except as to any new attorneys, absent specific objection from the State. The district court then instructed:
[The State] shall be allowed ten days after service of plaintiffs initial affidavits and billing documents to draw the court's attention to any perceived inadequacies in the form of plaintiffs' fee submission to the court. Plaintiffs shall be allowed ten days after the filing of [the State's] specification of inadequacy to supplement the previously filed documents. [The State] shall then be allowed the usual fifteen days after service of plaintiffs' supplementation to provide any objections to the content of plaintiffs' submission.

(J.A. at 30.)
[6] Although the present appeal focuses on the language of §§ 802 and 803 of the PLRA, the Act amended numerous sections of Titles 18, 28, and 42. Section 802 amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 to narrow the relief available to prisoners claiming unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Section 803, in addition to completely revising 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e, made technical revisions to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1997a, 1997b, and 1997c. Section 804 of the PLRA amended 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 to require, among other things, prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis to pay a partial filing fee before filing a lawsuit or proceeding with an appeal, and § 805 created 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915a which requires district courts to dismiss any frivolous claims brought by a prisoner. Section 806 of the PLRA amended 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 and now prohibits a convicted felon from bringing a civil action alleging mental or emotional injury while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. Section 807 directs that any damages awarded to a "prisoner" in connection with a civil action brought against any "jail, prison or correctional facility" shall be used to satisfy any pending restitution orders against the prisoner, and § 808 provides that the victims of the crime for which the prisoner is incarcerated are to be notified of the pending payment of these damages. Section 809 created 28 U.S.C.A. § 1932 which provides for the revocation of earned released credit from an "adult convicted of a crime and confined in a Federal correctional facility" upon the filing of a claim for a malicious purpose or solely for harassment, or for falsely testifying before the court, and amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624 regarding the revocation of earned released credit.
[7] Specifically, § 802(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g) (West Supp.1997)), defines prisoner as "any person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program."
[8] Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997a (West 1994), the Attorney General has the authority to institute a civil action on behalf of a person residing in or confined to an "institution," as defined by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 (West 1994), seeking relief for violations of statutory or constitutional rights. However, § 1997a specifically limits the Attorney General's authority to bring actions on behalf of a person confined to a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" to constitutional violations only.
[9] While we are specifically analyzing the language codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(3) in this section to determine its applicability to fees incurred prior to, but awarded subsequent to the enactment of the PLRA, the same analysis applies to the fee restrictions contained in subsections (d)(1) (heightening eligibility requirements for attorney's fees) and (d)(2) (limiting fees available when a monetary judgment is awarded). Both § 1997e(d)(1), discussed at III.C.2., and (d)(2), which is inapplicable to this case, expressly apply to all fee awards made subsequent to the enactment of the PLRA.
[10] The Dissent argues that "the`award' of attorney's fees occurred on February 16, 1996 when the court set out its instructions regarding how further [monitoring] fees would [be] paid." Dissenting Op. at 1394. We disagree. While the district court recognized that Plaintiffs were "entitled" to attorney's fees for future monitoring activity in the February 16 order, it did not award fees. Rather, its limited ruling on this issue was a finding that it was "appropriate ... for plaintiffs' counsel to play some role in this monitoring process" and to be compensated. The district court stated that its decision to "consider fee applications for monitoring activity [was] not ... prior approval of any fee request." (J.A. at 29.) As the Dissent concedes, the district court had yet to determine "at what rate and for how many hours" counsel was to be compensated. Dissenting Op. at 1394. To conclude, as the Dissent does, that the district court awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees on February 16 for all future monitoring activity, without assessing the reasonableness of such fees, is to condone pure speculation and arbitrariness by the district court. We decline to interpret the district court's order in such a way. Moreover, to adopt the Dissent's rationale would require us to find the PLRA's fee restrictions inapplicable to all attorney's fees awarded in this case for monitoring activity related to the implementation of the remedial plan, even when the monitoring occurred subsequent to April 26, 1996. Even the Dissent does not propose this result.
[11] Contrary to the Dissent's assertion that we are creating a circuit split as to the retroactive application of the PLRA's attorney's fees restrictions, Plaintiffs' case is distinguishable from both Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir.1996), and Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.1996), in one key aspect 0907 the district court made the

attorney's fee awards in both Jensen and Cooper prior to the enactment of the PLRA. Therefore, the attorney's fees limitations of § 803 were inapplicable to the awards based on the plain language of the statute regardless of any possible retroactivity problems. Nevertheless, the courts conducted a retroactivity analysis and both courts concluded that applying the fee limitations to pending cases would be "manifestly unjust" because, as the Eighth Circuit lamented, Plaintiffs and their attorneys "have litigated for literally years under ... the assumption that Section 1988 would apply to this case." Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1203 (8th Cir.1996). "If we apply the Act, those expectations will be foiled. Thus, application of the Act in this case would have the retroactive effect of disappointing reasonable reliance on prior law." Id. at 1202.
[12] While application of the PLRA's fee limitations may upset the expectations of Plaintiffs' counsel, it cannot be said that the imposition of the restrictions directly affects the Plaintiffs. Therefore, because a statute has a retroactive effect under Landgraf only when it negatively impacts a party's expectations or rights, statutory restrictions as to the amount and availability of attorney's fees will not generally raise retroactivity problems. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 276-78, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1503, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994).
[13] In Landgraf, the Court noted several additional examples of new statutes whose application to pending cases was proper. These included statutes whose plain language unambiguously requires application to pending cases, see United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch [5 U.S.] 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801); statutes authorizing or affecting the propriety of prospective relief, see American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921); statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, see Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 72 S.Ct. 581, 96 L.Ed. 786 (1952); and statutes revising procedural rules, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272-76, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1501-02, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (collecting cases).
[14] The district court ruled that if it had applied the fee limitations of § 803(d), it would have awarded counsel for Plaintiffs the maximum hourly rate available. We express no opinion as to the appropriateness of such an award. The district court may, of course, reconsider the award on remand.
[15] The Barber factors include:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. See Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n. 28 (4th Cir.1978) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)).
[16] We note that the district court had dealt with the issue of attorney's fees awards in the underlying case since the submission of the first motion for attorney's fees by Plaintiffs on April 24, 1992. As a result, the district court and the parties were intimately familiar with the necessary background information used to evaluate each attorney and the type of work involved in this case.
[17] Also, Plaintiffs voluntarily reduced fees by $8,143 in response to the State's objections. (J.A. at 59.)
[18] In concluding that the district court carefully considered all the pertinent factors when determining the reasonableness of the fees awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, we further rely on our affirmance of an earlier district court order awarding attorney's fees in this case. In Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished), we rejected the State's same argument that the district court failed to adequately address all the Barber factors and affirmed the award which was based, in part, on the same general attorney background information and billing rates relied upon by the district court in these appealed orders.
[*] I recognize that Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir.1996), and Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir.1996), found that it would be "`manifestly unjust' to upset [an attorney's] reasonable expectations and impose new guidelines at this late date." Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1203; see also Cooper, 97 F.3d at 921. But regardless of the

statute's "fairness" it only changes the rate of renumeration, it does not strip an attorney of any previously established right to a specific award of attorney's fees, because there is no such right until the court awards the fees.
[1] As the majority points out, plaintiffs do not dispute that the rate under the PLRA is $112.50. Although the state does not concede that plaintiff's counsel's hourly rate should be set at $112.50, the district court specifically stated that if the PLRA applied it would set counsel's fees at the maximum amount.
[2] The fees were not "ordered" until after the passage of the PLRA. In addition, the court's August 30, 1996 order referenced and incorporated the previous order. The specific fee amount in the August 30th order dated back to the February 16th award and amounted to a nunc pro tunc award. The fact that the specific fee calculation was made after the award does not mean that the award itself was not made on an earlier date.
[3] In its February 16, 1996 order, the district court stated: "The court further finds that plaintiffs are entitled to fees ... related to monitoring activities." J.A. at 31. In my view, this is an award of attorney's fees.
[4] I concede that this does not express clear intent; however, it does indicate that there is "statutory or legislative history to the contrary" regarding retroactivity. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016.
Furthermore, the Majority indicates that one of the major purposes of the Act was to stem frivolous law suits. Applying the statute retroactively in no way furthers this goal. In fact, in the instant case, it is clear that the lawsuit was not frivolous in that plaintiffs were determined to be the prevailing parties. Obviously their suit could not have been frivolous if they prevailed in their action.
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 Alexander S. v. Byars, 122 Fed.Appx. 662 (2005)
122 Fed.Appx. 662 This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter. Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter See
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also Fourth Circuit Rule 32.1
(Find CTA4 Rule 32.1) United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
ALEXANDER S.; Alfred S.; Benny B.; Christopher M.; Lafayette M.; Ricky S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; Nancy C. McCormick, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Inez Moore Tenenbaum, individually and as representatives of a class of juveniles; Lesly A. Bowers, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs, v. William R. BYARS, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendant-Appellee, Joseph Younginer, Special Master, Appellee, and Gina E. Wood, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice; Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of
South Carolina; John F. Henry, individually and in his official capacities as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; Frank Mauldin, individually and in his official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; Kathleen P. Jennings, individually and in her official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; Joseph W. Hudgens, individually and in his official capacity as a former Board Member of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; Karole Jensen, individually and in her official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; J.P. Neal, individually and in his official capacity as a former Board Member for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; South Carolina Department of Youth Services; Flora Brooks Boyd, individually and in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice; Defendants, Richard A. Harpootlian, Amicus Curiae,

v. Vincent F. Rivera, Movant-Appellant. Michael W. Moore, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Movant.
No. 04-7421. | Submitted: Feb. 24, 2005. | Decided: March 7, 2005.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CA-90-3062-3-17).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Vincent F. Rivera, Appellant pro se.
W. Gaston Fairey, Fairey, Parise & Mills, PA, Columbia, South Carolina; Rochelle Romosca McKim, Nancy C. McCormick, South Carolina Protection & Advocacy for the Handicapped, Inc., Columbia, South Carolina; Larry Leroy Vanderbilt, Department of Juvenile Justice, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Vincent F. Rivera appeals from the district court’s orders denying his motion to reopen a district court case or for relief from the judgment, and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Bowers v. Boyd, No. CA90-3062-3-17 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2004 & Oct. 6, 2004); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). We deny Rivera’s motions to amend the caption and to supplement the record. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED Parallel Citations 2005 WL 548250 (C.A.4 (S.C.))

1

 
 Davis v. Boyd, 116 F.3d 1473 (1997)
116 F.3d 1473 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. See CTA4 Rule 32.1. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
THOMAS J. DAVIS, Special Master, JAMES E. CARTER; ALEXANDER S.; ALFRED S.; BENNY B.; CHRISTOPHER M.; LAFAYETTE M.; RICKY S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; LESLY A. BOWERS, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and INEZ MOORE TENEBAUM, individually and as a representative
of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v.
FLORA BROOKS BOYD, Defendant-Appellant, and RICHARD E. MCLAWHORN, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; JOHN F. HENRY; FRANK MAULDIN; KATHLEEN P. JENNINGS; JOSEPH W. HUDGENS; KAROLE JENSEN;
J.P. NEAL, individually and in their official capacities as former board members for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, Defendants, MICHAEL W. MOORE, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Party in Interest, RICHARD
A. HARPOOTLIAN, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Movant.
No. 96-2540. | Argued: June 6, 1997. | Decided: June 27, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-90-3062-3-17)
Attorneys and Law Firms
ARGUED: Carolyn Cason Matthews, WOODWARD, COTHRAN & HERNDON, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. W. Gaston Fairey, Rochelle Romosca McKim, FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Edward W. Woodward, Jr., WOODWARD, COTHRAN & HERNDON, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Nancy C. McCormick, PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, INC., Columbia, South Carolina; Lesly A. Bowers, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
PER CURIAM:
OPINION
*1 The Plaintiffs-Appellees, a class of juveniles confined in institutions operated by the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”), filed suit in December 1990 against various DJJ officials (collectively, the “State”). They alleged that various conditions of their confinement at four DJJ institutions located in Columbia, South Carolina (the “DJJ Columbia Facilities”) violated their constitutional and statutory rights. On March 7, 1991, the district court certified the lawsuit as a class action and defined the class as “all persons presently and in the future housed within the correctional facilities of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services.”1 After a bench trial, the district court held that many of the conditions at three of the DJJ Columbia Facilities violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights. The district court instructed the State to submit a remedial plan, and the court approved the State’s proposed plan on June 28, 1995.
As part of the remedial plan to eliminate overcrowding in the DJJ Columbia Facilities, the State transferred all of the female juveniles from the existing DJJ Columbia Facilities to a renovated adult women’s correctional facility that the DJJ began operating in Greenwood, South Carolina (the “DJJ Greenwood Facility”). The State also transferred approximately 400 male
1

Davis v. Boyd, 116 F.3d 1473 (1997)
juveniles from the DJJ Columbia Facilities to a renovated facility at the Crafts Farrow State Mental Hospital in Columbia. The DJJ contracted with a private correctional service provider, Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), to staff and operate that facility, which was renamed the Columbia Training Center (“CTC”).
On August 8, 1996, the Plaintiffs moved the district court to clarify that the juveniles that the State had transferred to the DJJ Greenwood Facility and to the CTC remained members of the certified class subject to the district court’s supervision. The Plaintiffs alleged that the State had refused to allow the Plaintiffs’ attorneys access to the juveniles that it had transferred to those facilities. The State filed a motion in opposition claiming that the juveniles at those facilities were no longer members of the certified class because they were no longer housed within the DJJ Columbia Facilities at issue in the initial litigation.
On September 27, 1996, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion. The court clarified that the juveniles transferred to the Greenwood Facility and to the CTC remained members of the certified class. The court ordered the State to allow the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, the court monitor, and the guardian ad litem reasonable access to the juveniles in both facilities. The court further held that its order also applied to other similarly situated facilities operated by the DJJ or by private parties with whom the DJJ contracted or subcontracted. The State now appeals that order.
Since the district court issued its order, and after the State filed its appellate brief, the Governor of South Carolina announced that the State will not renew its contract with the CCA because of CCA’s failure to perform under the contract. The Plaintiffs and the State have stipulated that the Department of Juvenile Justice, not the CCA, will operate the CTC after July 1, 1997.
*2 We have reviewed all of the arguments that the State raised in its brief and at oral argument, and we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons convincingly stated by the district court in its thorough opinion. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, No. 3:90-3062-17 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 1996).2
AFFIRMED

Parallel Citations

1997 WL 355626 (C.A.4 (S.C.))

Footnotes

1

As part of a state government restructuring in 1993, the name of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services was changed to

the DJJ.

2

Although the DJJ will begin operating the CTC on July 1, 1997, the Plaintiffs and the State both argue that the State’s action will

not moot the instant appeal. Since any mootness question will not even arise, if at all, until July 1, 1997, we agree that the appeal is

not moot. As of the date of this opinion, the case still presents “live” issues. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).

2

 
 Burnside v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (1996)
89 F.3d 827 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. See CTA4 Rule 32.1. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
ALEXANDER S.; Alfred S.; Benny B.; Christopher M.; Lafayette M.; Ricky S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; Lesly A. Bowers, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and
Inez Moore TENENBAUM, individually and as a representative of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v.
Flora Brooks BOYD, individually and in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice; Richard E. McLawhorn, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; John F. Henry; Frank Maudlin; Kathleen P. Jennings; Joseph W. Hudgens; Karole Jensen; J.P. Neal, individually and in their official capacities as former Board Members for
the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendants-Appellants, and
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, Defendant, MICHAEL W. MOORE, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Movant. RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Amicus
Curiae.
No. 96-1036. | Argued May 6, 1996. | Decided June 6, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-90-3062-3-17)
Attorneys and Law Firms
ARGUED: Frank S. Potts, LIDE, MONTGOMERY, POTTS & MEDLOCK, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
W. Gaston Fairey, FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; C. Mitchell Brown, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Vinton DeVane Lide, Michael Stephen Pauley, LIDE, MONTGOMERY, POTTS & MEDLOCK, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Rochelle L. Romosca, FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Claude M. Scarborough, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina; Nancy C. McCormick, SOUTH CAROLINA PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM FOR THE HANDICAPPED, INC., Columbia, South Carolina; Leslie A. Bowers, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
D.S.C.
AFFIRMED.
Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
OPINION
1

Burnside v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (1996)
PER CURIAM:
*1 The sole question presented in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs who prevailed in a class action challenging the conditions of juvenile confinement in state institutions. Finding no error, we affirm.
Brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), this action was initiated in December, 1990 to challenge the constitutionality of the policies, practices, and conditions at four juvenile correctional institutions operated by the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice. The district court certified the case as a class action in which the plaintiffs represented all persons presently, or in the future, housed in these institutions.
After the parties attempted, but were unable to settle the case, they engaged in extensive pretrial activity. The plaintiffs raised a number of complex legal issues, which the district court found, they probably could not have pursued without the assistance of a large law firm. This was the first case involving such legal issues that ever went to trial in the United States. That trial consumed several months in the summer of 1994 before the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Sixty-six witnesses, including seventeen expert witnesses, testified at trial and thousands of pages of exhibits were introduced. On January 25, 1995, the district court issued an exhaustive opinion finding that the plaintiffs “have proved that certain conditions of confinement” in the institutions “violate their constitutional and statutory rights” and ordering the State to create and implement a comprehensive remedial plan. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F.Supp. 773, 778 (D.S.C.1995). No party appealed this ruling.
On May 26, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, supported by a memorandum of law, affidavits, and billing records. The State did not challenge plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties but generally took issue with the rates, hours, and documentation submitted by the plaintiffs. After asking for supplemental materials from the plaintiffs, on November 22, 1995, the district court issued another comprehensive opinion in which it made extensive findings of fact. Applying controlling legal principles to these facts, the court did not award all of the requested fees and costs but did award $1,185,108.91 in attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs.1 On appeal, the State argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding even the reduced amount of fees and costs because: (1) the plaintiffs “knowingly made improper and misleading claims in the documentation submitted to the court in support of their motion;” (2) the “descriptions of time submitted [by the plaintiffs] ... were insufficient;” and (3) the trial court requested that plaintiffs submit additional materials. Brief of Appellants at 1.2 After carefully considering the briefs and arguments of the parties and reviewing the extensive record in this case, we conclude that the district court did not in any respect abuse its substantial discretion.
*2 First, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs knowingly made any misleading claim. Indeed, it is uncontroverted that, when claims for computer services and project assistants were questioned by the State, the plaintiffs withdrew those claims, even though there is case law permitting such charges. See, e.g., Trimper v. Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 75 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997, 116 S.Ct. 535 (1995). The State never suggested in the district court that the court should penalize the plaintiffs for attempting to obtain reimbursement for such expenses by denying all fees, and there is no authority supporting such an argument.
Second, the plaintiffs submitted numerous billing records substantiating and describing the time spent on the case. The district court found, and we agree, that these records were sufficiently detailed to permit the district court to make a proper award. Although claiming to have general problems with these awards, the State never availed itself of the opportunity given to it to depose plaintiffs’ counsel or otherwise substantiate its general concerns. Thus, there is no basis in the record from which we could conclude that the district court’s detailed factual findings are clearly erroneous. Finally, nothing prevents a court from requesting additional materials of any party. Indeed, the district court’s request that plaintiffs submit additional materials is indicative of the court’s care in examining the fee request. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s thorough opinion. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, C/A No. 3:90-3062-17 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 1995).
AFFIRMED
Parallel Citations
1996 WL 329529 (C.A.4 (S.C.))
Footnotes
2

Burnside v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827 (1996)

1

Over the course of this litigation, one law firm representing the plaintiffs absorbed more than $200,000 in fees and expenses.

Moreover, that firm indicated to the district court its intent to contribute its portion of the fees awarded, $661,212.45, to an

appropriate charity for children.

2

At oral argument, the court asked the State if it made any additional argument based on the recent amendments to the Civil Rights

of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994). The State specifically disavowed any such claims. We note that it is not

at all clear whether the 1996 amendments, which apply only to persons confined to a “jail, prison or other correctional facility”

apply to juveniles confined in juvenile institutions, or even if they did whether they would apply retroactively. However, we need

not reach that question here in view of the State’s decision not to pursue any argument under the Act.

3

 
 Alexander S. v. Boyd, 522 U.S. 1090 (1998)
118 S.Ct. 880 Supreme Court of the United States ALEXANDER S., et al., petitioners,
v. Flora Brooks BOYD, et al. No. 97-737. | Jan. 26, 1998.
Case below, 113 F.3d 1373.

Opinion Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Parallel Citations 118 S.Ct. 880 (Mem), 139 L.Ed.2d 869, 66 USLW 3325, 66 USLW 3490, 66 USLW 3489
	  

1

 
 Davis v. Boyd
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit June 6, 1997, Argued ; June 27, 1997, Decided No. 96-2540

Reporter: 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15559 THOMAS J. DAVIS, Special Master, JAMES E. CARTER; ALEXANDER S.; ALFRED S.; BENNY B.; CHRISTOPHER M.; LAFAYETTE M.; RICKY S., by and through their Guardian ad Litem; LESLY A. BOWERS, Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and INEZ MOORE TENEBAUM, individually and as a representative of a class of juveniles, Plaintiff, v. FLORA BROOKS BOYD, Defendant-Appellant, and RICHARD E. MCLAWHORN, individually and in his official capacity as former Commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice for the State of South Carolina; JOHN F. HENRY; FRANK MAULDIN; KATHLEEN P. JENNINGS; JOSEPH W. HUDGENS; KAROLE JENSEN; J. P. NEAL, individually and in their official capacities as former board members for the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, Defendants, MICHAEL W. MOORE, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Party in Interest, RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, in his official capacity as the Solicitor for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Movant.
Notice: [*1] RULES OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
Subsequent History: Reported in Table Case Format at: 116 F.3d 1473, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22047.
Prior History: Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-90-3062-3-17). Davis v. Boyd, 116 F.3d 1473, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22047 (4th Cir. S.C., 1997)
Disposition: AFFIRMED.
Counsel: ARGUED: Carolyn Cason Matthews, WOODWARD, COTHRAN & HERNDON, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.

ON BRIEF: Edward W. Woodward, Jr., WOODWARD, COTHRAN & HERNDON, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Nancy C. McCormick, PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, INC., Columbia, South Carolina; Lesly A. Bowers, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Judges: Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
The Plaintiffs-Appellees, a class of juveniles confined in institutions operated by the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ"), filed suit in December 1990 against various DJJ officials (collectively, the "State"). They alleged that various [*2] conditions of their confinement at four DJJ institutions located in Columbia, South Carolina (the "DJJ Columbia Facilities") violated their constitutional and statutory rights. On March 7, 1991, the district court certified the lawsuit as a class action and defined the class as "all persons presently and in the future housed within the correctional facilities of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services." 1 After a bench trial, the district court held that many of the conditions at three of the DJJ Columbia Facilities violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights. The district court instructed the State to submit a remedial plan, and the court approved the State's proposed plan on June 28, 1995.
As part of the remedial plan to eliminate overcrowding in the DJJ Columbia Facilities, the State transferred all of the female juveniles from the existing DJJ [*3] Columbia Facilities to a renovated adult women's correctional

W. Gaston Fairey, Rochelle Romosca McKim, FAIREY, PARISE & MILLS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

1 As part of a state government restructuring in 1993, the name of the South Carolina Department of Youth Services was changed to the DJJ.

1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15559, *3

Page 2 of 2

facility that the DJJ began operating in Greenwood, South remained members of the certified class. The court ordered

Carolina (the "DJJ Greenwood Facility"). The State also the State to allow the Plaintiffs' attorneys, the court monitor,

transferred approximately 400 male juveniles from the DJJ and the guardian ad litem reasonable access to the juveniles in

Columbia Facilities to a renovated facility at the Crafts both facilities. The court further held that its order also

Farrow State Mental Hospital in Columbia. The DJJ applied to other similarly situated facilities operated by the

contracted with a private correctional service provider, DJJ or by private parties with whom the DJJ contracted or

Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA"), to staff and subcontracted. The State now appeals that order.

operate that facility, which was renamed the Columbia

Training Center ("CTC").

Since the district court issued its order, and after the State

filed its appellate brief, the Governor of South Carolina

On August 8, 1996, the Plaintiffs moved the district court to announced that the State will not renew its contract with the

clarify that the juveniles that the State had transferred to the CCA because of CCA's failure to perform under the contract.

DJJ Greenwood Facility and to the CTC remained members The Plaintiffs and the State have stipulated that the

of the certified class subject to the district court's supervision. Department of Juvenile Justice, not the CCA, will operate the

The Plaintiffs alleged that the State had refused to allow the CTC after July 1, 1997.

Plaintiffs' attorneys access to the juveniles that it had transferred to those facilities. The State filed a motion in opposition claiming that the juveniles at those facilities were no longer members of the certified class because they were no

We have reviewed all of the arguments that the State raised in its brief and at oral argument, and we find no reversible error. Accord ingly, we affirm for the reasons convincingly stated

longer housed within the DJJ Columbia Facilities at issue in by the district court in its thorough opinion. See

the initial litigation.

Alexander [*5] S. v. Boyd, No. 3:90-3062-17 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 1996). 2

On September 27, 1996, [*4] the district court granted the Plaintiffs' motion. The court clarified that the juveniles AFFIRMED

transferred to the DJJ Greenwood Facility and to the CTC

2 Although the DJJ will begin operating the CTC on July 1, 1997, the Plaintiffs and the State both argue that the State's action will not moot the instant appeal. Since any mootness question will not even arise, if at all, until July 1, 1997, we agree that the appeal is not moot. As of the date of this opinion, the case still presents "live" issues. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969).