United States District Court Western District of Michigan (Southern Division (1)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG

Signature Sothbeys International Realty, Inc. et al v. Whitmer et al Assigned to: District Judge Paul L. Maloney Referred to: Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green Related Case: 1:20-cv-00570-PLM-PJG Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question

Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

plaintiff
Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.

represented by Daniel J. McCarthy Butzel Long PC (Detroit) 150 W Jefferson Ave., Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 Email: mccarthyd@butzel.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph E. Richotte Butzel Long PC (Bloomfield Hills) Stoneridge West 41000 Woodward Ave. Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 (248) 258-1616 Email: richotte@butzel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff
Executive Property Maintenance, Inc.

represented by Daniel J. McCarthy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph E. Richotte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff Intraco Corporation Inc.

represented by Daniel J. McCarthy (See above for address)

plaintiff Casite Intraco LLC
plaintiff Bahash & Company LLC doing business as Hillsdale Jewelers
plaintiff William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C. doing business as Shortt Dental
plaintiff Midwest Carwash Association

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph E. Richotte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel J. McCarthy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph E. Richotte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel J. McCarthy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph E. Richotte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joseph E. Richotte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel J. McCarthy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Joseph E. Richotte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel J. McCarthy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. defendant Gretchen E. Whitmer

represented by Christopher M. Allen MI Dept Attorney General (Solicitor General) 525 W Ottawa St. P.O. Box 30212 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7628 Email: allenc28@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darrin F. Fowler MI Dept Attorney General (Community Health) Community Health Division 525 W Ottawa P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 373-1160 Fax: (517) 335-6755 Email: fowlerdf@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Fedynsky Michigan Department of Attorney General Civil Litigation, Employment & Elections 525 W Ottawa St. P.O. Box 30736 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-3055 Fax: (517) 335-7157 Email: fedynskyj@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph T. Froehlich MI Dept Attorney General (State Operations) State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573

defendant Robert Gordon
movant Michigan Epidemiologists

Fax: (517) 335-7157 Email: froehlichj1@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth MI Dept Attorney General (Licensing/Regulation) Licensing and Regulation Division 525 W Ottawa St., 3rd Floor P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7569 Email: Boothj2@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Allen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darrin F. Fowler (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Fedynsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph T. Froehlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jonathan R. Kay Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP 350 Fifth Ave., Ste. 7110 New York, NY 10118 (212) 763-0883 Fax: (212) 564-0883 Email: jkay@kaplanhecker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. interested party United States of America

Joshua Adam Matz Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP 350 Fifth Ave., Ste. 7110 New York, NY 10118 (212) 763-0883 Fax: (212) 564-0883 Email: jmatz@kaplanhecker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mahrah M. Taufique Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP 350 Fifth Ave., Ste. 7110 New York, NY 10118 (212) 763-0883 Email: mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Raymond P. Tolentino Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP 350 Fifth Ave., Ste. 7110 New York, NY 10118 (212) 763-0883 Fax: (212) 564-0883 Email: rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew Byerly Birge U.S. Attorney (Grand Rapids) The Law Bldg. 330 Ionia Ave., NW P.O. Box 208 Grand Rapids, MI 49501-0208 (616) 456-2404 Email: andrew.birge@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # Docket Text

04/28/2020
04/28/2020 04/29/2020 04/29/2020 04/30/2020
04/30/2020 04/30/2020 04/30/2020 04/30/2020 05/11/2020

1 COMPLAINT with jury demand for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer filed by Signature Sothebys International Realty, Inc., Casite Intraco, LLC, Intraco Corporation, INC., Executive Pproperty Mintenance, Inc., Bahash & Company, LLC, d/b/a Hillsdale Jewelers (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (McCarthy, Daniel) Modified text on 4/29/2020 to change unnecessary capitalization (ns). (Entered: 04/28/2020)
2 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Casite Intraco, LLC, (McCarthy, Daniel); Modified text on 4/29/2020; Casite Intraco, LLC is the only entity listed by the corporate disclosure statement (ns). (Entered: 04/28/2020)
3 NOTICE that this case has been assigned Paul L. Maloney ; with NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY re filing fee re corporate disclosure statement (ns) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
SUMMONS NOT ISSUED ; filing fee due, none provided (ns) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
FILING FEE PAID re 1 by plaintiffs Bahash & Company LLC, Casite Intraco LLC, Executive Property Management, Inc., Intraco Corporation Inc., Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. in the amount of $400, receipt number AMIWDC-5192417 (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
4 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. identifying Corporate Parent Signature Sothebeys International Realty, Inc. for Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
5 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Executive Property Management, Inc. identifying Corporate Parent EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC. for Executive Property Management, Inc. (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Intraco Corporation Inc. identifying Corporate Parent INTRACO CORPORATION, INC. for Intraco Corporation Inc. (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
7 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Bahash & Company LLC (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 04/30/2020)
8 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against All Defendants filed by Intraco Corporation Inc., Executive Property Management, Inc., Casite Intraco LLC, Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Bahash & Company LLC, William

A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C., d/b/a Shortt Dental, Midwest Carwash Association (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (McCarthy, Daniel) Modified text on 5/12/2020 to change unnecessary capitalization (ns). (Entered: 05/11/2020)

05/11/2020 9 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 8 (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 05/11/2020)

05/11/2020

10 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Midwest Carwash Association (McCarthy, Daniel) Modified text on 5/12/2020 to change unnecessary capitalization (ns). (Entered: 05/11/2020)

05/11/2020

11 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C., d/b/a Shortt Dental (McCarthy, Daniel) Modified text on 5/12/2020 to change unnecessary capitalization (ns). (Entered: 05/11/2020)

05/12/2020 12 SUMMONS ISSUED as to defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (ns) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

05/15/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joseph E. Richotte on behalf of plaintiffs Bahash & Company LLC, Casite Intraco LLC, Executive Property Maintenance, Inc., Intraco Corporation Inc., Midwest Carwash Association, Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C. (Richotte, Joseph) (Entered: 05/15/2020)

05/18/2020

13 SUMMONS returned executed; Robert Gordon served on 5/15/2020, answer due 6/5/2020; Gretchen E. Whitmer served on 5/15/2020, answer due 6/5/2020 (McCarthy, Daniel) Modified text on 5/18/2020 (ns). (Entered: 05/18/2020)

05/20/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of John G. Fedynsky on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 05/20/2020)

05/20/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joseph T. Froehlich on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Froehlich, Joseph) (Entered: 05/20/2020)

05/20/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joshua O. Booth on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Booth, Joshua) (Entered: 05/20/2020)

05/20/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Christopher M. Allen on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Allen, Christopher) (Entered: 05/20/2020)

05/22/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Darrin F. Fowler on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fowler, Darrin) (Entered: 05/22/2020)

05/29/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Andrew Byerly Birge on behalf of interested party United States of America ; party United States of America added (Birge, Andrew) (Entered: 05/29/2020)

05/29/2020 14 BRIEF by interested party United States of America statement of interest (Birge, Andrew) (Entered: 05/29/2020)

06/05/2020

15 MOTION for leave to file excess pages /Exceed Word Limit by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer; (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: Defs. Whitmer and Gordon's Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Brief in Support of Defs. Whitmer and Gordon's Motion to Dismiss, # 3 Index of Exhibits, # 4 Exhibit A: April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for, # 5 Exhibit B: Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, World Health, # 6 Exhibit C: Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, Centers for, # 7 Exhibit D: Flattening the Coronavirus Curve (March 27, 2020), New York, # 8 Exhibit E: E.O. No. 2020-4, # 9 Exhibit F: E.O. No. 2020-5, # 10 Exhibit G: E.O. No. 2020-9, # 11 Exhibit H: E.O. No. 2020-11, # 12 Exhibit I: E.O. 2020-17, # 13 Exhibit J: E.O. 2020-96, # 14 Exhibit K: E.O. No. 2020-21, # 15 Exhibit L: E.O. 2020-110, # 16 Exhibit M: South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom,) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 06/05/2020)

06/08/2020

16 ORDER granting 15 motion for leave to file excess pages/exceed word limitations; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 06/08/2020)

06/08/2020 17 MOTION to dismiss by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer; (ns) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/08/2020

18 BRIEF in support of MOTION to dismiss 17 filed by Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Attachments: # 1 Index, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M) (ns) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

06/12/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joshua Adam Matz on behalf of amicus Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists ; party Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists added (Matz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/12/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Raymond P. Tolentino on behalf of amicus Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists (Tolentino, Raymond) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/12/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Jonathan R. Kay on behalf of amicus Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists (Kay, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/12/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Mahrah Taufique on behalf of amicus Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists (Taufique, Mahrah) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/12/2020

19 MOTION for leave to file Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by amicus Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists ; (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss) (Matz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/15/2020

20 ORDER regarding Motion for Leave to File amicus brief 19 and certificate of concurrence; motion held in abeyance pending filing of certificate; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 06/15/2020)

06/16/2020

21 CERTIFICATE regarding compliance with LCivR 7.1(d) re MOTION for leave to file Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 19 filed by Michigan Epidemiologists (Matz, Joshua) (Entered: 06/16/2020)

06/30/2020

22 RESPONSE in opposition to MOTION for leave to file Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 19 filed by Bahash & Company LLC, Casite Intraco LLC, Executive Property Maintenance, Inc., Intraco Corporation Inc., Midwest Carwash Association, Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (McCarthy, Daniel) (Entered: 06/30/2020)

07/02/2020

23 REPLY to response to motion 19 for leave to file Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Michigan Epidemiologists (Matz, Joshua) (Entered: 07/02/2020)

07/06/2020

24 MOTION for leave to file excess pages FOR RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS by plaintiffs Bahash & Company LLC, Casite Intraco LLC, Executive Property Maintenance, Inc., Intraco Corporation Inc., Midwest Carwash Association, Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C.; (Attachments:

# 1 Proposed Response to Government's Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Proposed Index of Exhibits, # 3 Proposed Exhibit 1, # 4 Proposed Exhibit 2, # 5 Proposed Exhibit 3, # 6 Proposed Exhibit 4) (Richotte, Joseph) (Entered: 07/06/2020)

07/08/2020

25 ORDER granting 24 motion for leave to file excess pages/exceed word limitations; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 07/08/2020)

07/08/2020

26 RESPONSE TO MOTION to dismiss 17 filed by Bahash & Company LLC, Casite Intraco LLC, Executive Property Maintenance, Inc., Intraco Corporation Inc., Midwest Carwash Association, Signature Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C. (Attachments: # 1 Index, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4) (ns) (Entered: 07/09/2020)

 
 Case 1:20-cv-00360 ECF No. 1 filed 04/28/20 PageID.1 Page 1 of 30

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, and BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS,
Plaintiﬀs, v.
GRETCHEN E. WHITMER, and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.

Civil No. HON.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

BUTZEL LONG, P.C. Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiﬀs

Plaintiﬀs allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION 1. Based on speculative modeling on the infectiousness and lethality of a new coronavirus, Governor Whitmer has issued executive orders that have shuttered civil society,

Case 1:20-cv-00360 ECF No. 1 filed 04/28/20 PageID.2 Page 2 of 30
placed 10 million people under house arrest, and taken jobs away from nearly 1.2 million people, all without due process of law. The Governor has not disclosed the data or methodology used to create the modeling that purportedly justifies this extreme action. At the same time, through Executive Order 2020-38, she has suspended the Freedom of Information Act through June 4, 2020, preventing any independent assessment of whether the modeling used to justify locking down the entire State is reliable.
2. The Governor’s initial Executive Order was premised on the perceived need to “ﬂatten the curve” so as to avoid overwhelming the State’s hospitals and healthcare centers, not to eradicate the virus. Although the curve has been ﬂattened, the Governor has nonetheless issued stricter and confusing executive orders that unreasonably and unnecessarily interfere with Plaintiﬀs’ constitutional rights.
3. Governor Whitmer’s executive orders are unprecedented. For the first time in our State’s history—indeed, in our nation’s history—the State government is mass quarantining healthy people instead of the sick. As a free people, we have the unalienable right to pursue happiness, which includes the freedom to make our own choices about our safety and welfare without unconstitutional interference. In the face of the coronavirus, it means the freedom to choose whether to stay at home, or to keep calm and carry on with the things that make life worth living.
4. Plaintiffs are affected by the Governor’s orders. Under threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or significantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process. At the same time, without offering any justiﬁcation, the Governor has allowed, and is still allowing, other businesses deemed “critical” to stay open, even though: (a) “critical” businesses must adhere to guidance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) on “social distancing”; and (b) Plaintiffs are fully capable of adhering to those same guide-lines if allowed to reopen.
5. Although Michigan, like all States in the Union, is expressly guaranteed a republican form of government under Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the
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Governor has unilaterally suspended civil liberties and announced that this state of aﬀairs will continue even over the Legislature’s objection. When the Legislature announced bills to limit unilateral action and ensure constitutional government remains intact, Governor Whitmer said “I’m not going to sign any bill that takes power away from me or any future governor.”
6. Government by executive order—over 50 of them so far—stirs echoes of royal prerogative.
7. Ours is a constitutional republic that empowers government to act within deﬁned limits. Those limits apply at all times and under all circumstances. In war, in peace, and in pandemics. “No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism….” Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–122 (1866).
8. Plaintiﬀs seek a judicial declaration that the executive orders keeping people in their homes and away from their businesses—and all other orders, rules, and enforcement activity related to them—are unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and State law. Such a declaration, and a corresponding injunction, will yield a more rational, pragmatic response to the virus that saves lives, saves livelihoods, and preserves constitutional norms all at the same time.
9. In short, Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to define the limits of a State’s police power. Whatever its limits, this legal term of art is not some shibboleth that unlocks absolute executive power and casts our Constitution to the wind. The issues raised in this Complaint are novel, and they will not be rendered moot if the executive order is lifted before the Court issues judgment. The issues presented are capable of repetition and are of such importance that they cannot evade judicial review.
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PARTIES 10. Plaintiﬀ Signature Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc. (“Sotheby’s”), is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business at 415 South Old Woodward, Birmingham, Michigan 48009. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Sotheby’s is a full-service residential brokerage that represents all price points and practices throughout the State of Michigan. Sotheby’s normally has 282 real estate agents and 18 employees. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, none of its real estate agents are working, and it has had to lay oﬀ six employees. 11. Plaintiﬀ Executive Property Maintenance, Inc. (“EPM”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business at 42245 East Ann Arbor Road, Suite 107, Plymouth, Michigan 48170. It engages in intrastate commerce, but depends on interstate commerce for the goods necessary to perform it intrastate services. EPM provides to commercial, municipal, and residential clients lawn, snow, and ice maintenance; fertilization; property maintenance; planting; softscape; hardscape; design and build; irrigation; and water-feature services. EPM is an ISO9001/SN9001 certiﬁed company and participates in the Safe Company Program through the National Association of Landscape Professionals. During its peak season, EPM employs up to 45 employees. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, all EPM employees were ordered to stop work. Even though EO 2020-59 released restrictions on EPM, it still suﬀers substantial injuries from the restrictions placed on its vendors and customers. 12. Plaintiﬀ Intraco Corporation, Inc. (“Intraco”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business at 530 Stephenson Highway, Troy, Michigan 48083. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Intraco is a major diversiﬁed exporter of architectural and automotive glass, automotive chemicals, and other goods. Its business model and success is based on maintaining personal face-to-face relationships
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with current and prospective customers in Michigan and elsewhere. Videoconferencing is not conducive to Intraco’s operations. Intraco’s revenue has decreased substantially because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue. Although some of Intraco’s employees in Michigan are performing limited functions at home, Intraco will soon face the harsh reality of laying oﬀ its staﬀ if the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue are not enjoined or rescinded.
13. Plaintiﬀ Casite Intraco, LLC (“Casite”), is a Michigan limited liability company, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Intraco, with its principal place of business at 530 Stephenson Highway, Troy, Michigan 48083. Casite engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. It distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market products for automobiles. Like Intraco, Casite’s business model and success is based on maintaining personal face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers in Michigan and elsewhere. Casite contracts through two separate sales representatives, both of which are prohibited from calling on customers directly; videoconferencing is not conducive to Casite’s operations. Casite’s revenue has decreased substantially because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue.
14. Plaintiff Bahash & Company, LLC, doing business as Hillsdale Jewelers, is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business at 77 North Howell Street, Hillsdale, Michigan 49242. Hillsdale Jewelers engages in interstate and intrastate commerce. It is a storefront retailer of jewelry and oﬀers jewelry-repair services. Hillsdale Jewelers has been forced to close because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue. All three of its employees, including owner-employee Chris Bahash, are unemployed.
15. Defendant Gretchen E. Whitmer is the Governor of the State of Michigan. Plaintiﬀs sue her in her oﬃcial capacity only.
16. Defendant Robert Gordon is the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. Plaintiﬀs sue him in his oﬃcial capacity only.
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JURISDICTION 17. This action challenges Governor Whitmer’s Executive Orders 2020-43 and 2020-59 (and their predecessors and future iterations of these orders) (the “EOs”) and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule (all collectively, the “Lockdown Orders”), which Plaintiﬀs believe violate the following clauses of the U.S. Constitution: (a) Dormant Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 ; (b) Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 1; (c) Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (d) Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (e) Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court therefore has federal-question jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 18. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Lockdown Orders and similarly crafted orders and rules issued in the future. Accordingly, they bring this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201– 2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 19. Plaintiﬀs also challenge the EOs as exceeding the Governor’s authority under the separation-of-powers doctrine enshrined in Article III, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963; the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (“Emergency Powers Act”), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.31–10.33; and the Emergency Management Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 30.401–30.421. Accordingly, Plaintiﬀs also invoke the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
VENUE 20. Governor Whitmer is a resident of, and the principal oﬃce of the Governor is located in, Lansing, Michigan. 21. Director Gordon’s principal oﬃce is located in Lansing, Michigan.
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22. A substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this Complaint occurred in Lansing, Michigan.
23. The city of Lansing is the seat of government for the State of Michigan. Michigan Const. art. III, § 1 (1963). It is located within Ingham County, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Western District of Michigan. 28 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1). This Court is therefore a proper venue for this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(2).
EXECUTIVE ACTION Executive Orders
24. The Emergency Powers Act permits a governor, “during times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the State, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled, … [to] proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area involved … [and to] promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency situation within the aﬀected area under control.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1) (emphasis added). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.
25. The Emergency Management Act permits a governor, upon the declaration of an emergency or a disaster, to compel evacuation, to control entry to, exit from, and the occupancy of premises within, the aﬀected area, among other things. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.405(1). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.
26. On March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-04, which declared a “state of emergency” under both Acts based upon two presumptive diagnoses of coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”), a respiratory illness caused by virus named the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus two (“SARS-CoV-2” or the “coronavirus”).
27. On March 22, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-20 under both Acts. This order closed to the public a wide range of public accommodations, including all restaurants, food courts, cafes, coﬀeehouses, and other places of public
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accommodation oﬀering food or beverages for on-site consumption. A willful violation of EO 2020-20 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and ﬁned up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
28. On March 23, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-21 under both Acts. This order prohibits all in-person work that the Governor deems “not necessary to sustain or protect life.” A willful violation of EO 2020-21 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and ﬁned up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
29. On April 9, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-42 under both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-21 through April 30, 2020, while imposing even greater restrictions on the general public than before. A willful violation of EO 2020-42 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and ﬁned up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(17).
30. On April 13, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-43 under both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-20 through April 30, 2020. A willful violation of EO 2020-43 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(7).
31. On April 24, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-59 under both Acts. This Order extends EO 2020-42 through May 15, 2020. It purports to loosen some restrictions imposed under EO 2020-42 as part of a phased reopening of the economy. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
Action by MDHHS 32. On April 2, 2020, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Order under the
Michigan Public Health Code. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2253(1). This order requires every person in Michigan to comply with EO 2020-20 and EO 2020-21, and authorizes police
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and prosecutors to enforce those EOs as incorporated through the Emergency Order. https:// perma.cc/K6ZH-HS6N. This order also applies to EOs 2020-42, 2020-43, and 2020-59. A violation of an MDHHS order is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and a ﬁne of $200, or both. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2261. Thus, Director Gordon’s Emergency Order eﬀectively doubles the period of incarceration authorized under the Governor’s executive orders.
33. At the same time, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Rule establishing a $1,000 civil penalty for violations of Director Gordon’s Emergency Order. https://perma.cc/ 8W5C-E98N.
34. So, since April 2, 2020, any person who violates Governor Whitmer’s EOs (and thereby automatically violates Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and the Emergency Rule) can now be imprisoned for up to six months, assessed a penal fine of up to $500, and assessed a civil ﬁne of up to $1,000.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 35. Although the coronavirus is highly contagious, it does not invariably result in COVID-19. For those who do develop COVID-19, the mortality rate is low. As of April 27, 2020, the State reported on its oﬃcial coronavirus webpage 38,210 conﬁrmed cases of COVID-19, which is roughly 0.38% of the State population. Even for the known fractional percent of those who have developed COVID-19, the State reports a 91% survival rate. As a result, only 0.03% of the State’s population has succumbed to the virus. 36. In all likelihood, the survival rate in Michigan is far higher. Recent antibody testing conducted in New York State and a study in Los Angeles suggest that millions more have been infected with the coronavirus than previously known, and that the supermajority of those previously infected were either asymptomatic or experienced mild reactions to it. In New York, this new information has dropped the mortality rate to 0.5%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.5%. In Los Angeles, it dropped the mortality rate to 0.1–0.3%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.7–99.9%. There is no reason to believe that Michigan is exempt from this good news.
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As more Michiganders are tested, increases in positive tests will yield a higher survival rate. 37. The number of deaths caused by COVID-19, while unquestionably tragic, is
not “unprecedented,” as routinely claimed. What is unprecedented is Governor Whitmer’s response to it.
38. In 1918, in response to the Spanish Flu, Governor Albert Sleeper issued an order closing places of public amusement. Individual cities decided whether to close schools. Work continued. Governor Sleeper wisely balanced public health while preserving commerce. The current executive orders fail to do so, overreaching to such extent that the State’s economy is spiraling toward a depression.
39. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, annual summer polio epidemics killed thousands of children before a vaccine was found. Even under such dire circumstances, several Michigan governors of both parties, including Governor G. Mennen Williams, refrained from violating constitutional norms with excessive executive orders during those years.
40. In the late 1960s, the Hong Kong Flu swept across the globe killing more than 1 million people. The CDC estimated that 100,000 people died in the U.S. Michigan, like other States, was aﬀected. Governor George Romney did not place residents under house arrest or shutdown the economy then, either.
41. Governor Whitmer repeatedly states that decisions must be made on data. Yet, despite the positive State-speciﬁc data, the Governor tightened restrictions through an executive order that the Wall Street Journal described as the “most excessive” in the country.
42. Among other enhancements, the new order imposed harsher restrictions on the ability to travel and banned people from visiting their families, working, and purchasing a variety of everyday items at stores. The new order was announced at 3:00 p.m. on April 9th, and became eﬀective at 12:01 a.m. on April 10th—i.e., on less than 12 hours’ notice. The Governor timed EO 2020-42 to prohibit families from gathering to celebrate Easter Sunday and Passover.
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43. Although her previous order allowed “critical infrastructure workers” to perform in-person work—deﬁned as those workers described as critical by the director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”) in guidance issued March 19th—in compliance with CDC guidance on “social distancing,” Governor Whitmer has expressly, arbitrarily, and capriciously refused to adopt CISA’s updated definition of “critical infrastructure workers,” in EO 2020-42 and EO 2020-59. Other governors who have issued similar executive orders have adopted the updated federal definitions. Governor Whitmer has never explained why these new deﬁnitions have not been, and cannot be, adopted in Michigan. This is further evidence that the Governor is unreasonably keeping more Michiganders locked up in their homes than necessary.
44. Taking Governor Whitmer at her word that she wants to make decisions based on data, and lacking conﬁdence in the Governor’s modeling because the underlying data and methodology is unavailable to the public, Sotheby’s, Intraco, and others hired Anderson Economic Group (“AEG”) to analyze the infection curve and the economic effects of her EOs, and they provided the expert’s report to the Governor on April 13, 2020. The Governor has not responded. At a press conference on April 27, 2020, the Governor confirmed that she has not read the expert’s report in the two weeks since it was delivered.
45. An economic depression is predictable following the shutdown of civil society caused by the Lockdown Orders. Businesses around Michigan are permanently closing because they cannot pay employees and vendors. More will be forced to permanently close the longer that the Lockdown Orders and any similarly drafted successor orders are in place.
46. Consistent with the assessments in the AEG report, nearly 1.2 million Michiganders have reportedly filed for unemployment, the largest number of unemployment claims in the State’s history. Michigan is among the top ﬁve worst states for unemployment. Exhibit 1, AEG Report. According to Jeﬀ Donofrio, Director of the Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity, this means more than 25% of Michigan’s
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workforce filed for unemployment in the span of four weeks because of the Lockdown Orders. For context, the national average unemployment rate during the Great Depression of 1929 was 26%.
47. Employers fund unemployment beneﬁts. Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.13. The Governor has not explained how the unemployment system can keep paying beneﬁts if employers can’t operate their businesses. If businesses can’t operate, then they can’t generate revenue. And, if they can’t generate revenue, then they have no way of paying into the unemployment fund.
48. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as of March 31, 2020, Michigan’s unemployment trust fund balance was $4.55 billion. State oﬃcials predict that the fund will be drained in July. https://perma.cc/R54P-GTMU. One recent prediction is that the Michigan Unemployment Trust Fund will be drained within two months and incur a $15 billion deﬁcit. Taxes on businesses may double to pay back the loans that the State would require to keep paying unemployment. This will leave less money for businesses to rehire workers and prolong the economic devastation.
49. Unemployment is not the only factor in play. For those fortunate enough to remain employed during this time, many of them are subject to furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. According to a recent study by the Anderson Economic Group, nearly 1.5 million Michiganders will lose signiﬁcant income because of the coronavirus and the Governor’s orders by the end of April. Exhibit 1, AEG Report.
50. Plaintiﬀs want to reopen their business to help their current and former employees (whom they hope to rehire) put food on their tables, keep roofs over their heads, and clothes on their backs. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon forbid them from doing so under pain of criminal punishment and civil ﬁnes. Plaintiﬀs should not be forced to choose between risking criminal prosecution and economic sanctions on the one hand, or exercising their constitutional rights on the other.
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51. Plaintiﬀs incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs into each of the following causes of action.
COUNT I DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 52. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 53. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 54. In its dormant state, often called the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Commerce Clause precludes States from enacting legislation that discriminates against or impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. State laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce are invalid per se under the Commerce Clause. This is true also of State laws that are facially neutral, if they impermissibly burden interstate commerce in practice. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–195 (1994). 55. Although the Dormant Commerce Clause is usually invoked to challenge protectionist laws that favor in-state businesses over out-of-state businesses, the Clause has a broader function: to guarantee for all citizens the right to access and participate in interstate commerce. Just as no State can prevent out-of-staters from engaging in commerce with its residents, no State may prevent its residents from participating in commerce with those located in another State. 56. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiﬀs from exercising the right to engage in interstate commerce:
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(a) Sotheby’s. Approximately 15–20% of Sotheby’s annual business involves customers who buy and sell homes in Michigan while located outside of Michigan. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Sotheby’s from securing new out-ofstate customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Sotheby’s from showing homes and performing the other customary services provided by realtors and real estate brokers. Sotheby’s is even prohibited from conducting video showings of homes and showing vacant homes to prospective buyers.
(b) Intraco. The Lockdown Orders preclude Intraco from using its oﬃces to conduct the face-to-face meetings that are necessary to establish new relationships and maintain existing relationships with vendors and customers located inside and outside of Michigan. Intraco has suﬀered a 20% drop in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
(c) Casite. The Lockdown Orders preclude Casite from using its oﬃces to conduct the face-to-face meetings that are necessary to establish new relationships and maintain existing relationships with vendors and customers located inside and outside of Michigan. Casite has suﬀered a 30% drop in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
(d) Hillsdale Jewelers. The Lockdown Orders has prevented Hillsdale Jewelers from importing precious metals and stones to create custom jewelry, from engaging in retail jewelry purchases and sales, and from performing jewelry-repair services. Hillsdale Jewelers has suﬀered a 99% drop in revenue because of the Lockdown Orders.
57. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an oﬃcial capacity and within the scope of their oﬃcial duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
58. Plaintiﬀs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
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COUNT II PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 59. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 60. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 61. The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than the State in which he is a resident. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). 62. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising these rights: (a) Sotheby’s. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Sotheby’s from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Sotheby’s from showing homes and performing the other customary services provided by realtors and real estate brokers, even though real estate companies like Sotheby’s located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so, and even though real estate is speciﬁcally identiﬁed by CISA as a critical business. (b) Intraco. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Intraco from nurturing existing and establishing new client relationships with vendors and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Intraco’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, has been and remains prohibited under the Lockdown Orders. (c) Casite. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Casite from nurturing existing and establishing new client relationships with vendors and
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customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Casite’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, have been and remain prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(d) Hillsdale Jewelers. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Hillsdale Jewelers from engaging in commerce with customers who travel to its storefront from locations outside the state.
63. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an oﬃcial capacity and within the scope of their oﬃcial duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
64. Plaintiﬀs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT III PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 65. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 66. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State [can] make or enforce any law [that] abridge[s] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 67. The right to travel between States is a privilege of federal citizenship. 68. The right to engage in interstate commerce is also a privilege of federal citizenship. 69. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising these rights:
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(a) Sotheby’s. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Sotheby’s from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Sotheby’s from showing homes and performing the other customary services provided by realtors and real estate brokers, even though real estate companies like Sotheby’s located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so, and even though real estate is speciﬁcally identiﬁed by CISA as a critical business.
(b) Intraco. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Intraco from nurturing, existing, and establishing new client relationships with vendors and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Intraco’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, has been and remains prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(c) Casite. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Casite from nurturing, existing, and establishing new client relationships with vendors and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Casite’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, have been and remain prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(d) Hillsdale Jewelers. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Hillsdale Jewelers from engaging in commerce with customers who travel to its storefront from locations outside the state.
70. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an oﬃcial capacity and within the scope of their oﬃcial duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
71. Plaintiﬀs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
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COUNT IV PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 72. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 73. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 74. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from depriving Plaintiﬀs of liberty and property interests without providing any process before or after the deprivations occurred. 75. To establish a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiﬀ must show that (1) it had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) it was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the state did not aﬀord it adequate procedural rights. See Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 904 (CA6 2014). 76. Plaintiﬀs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988). 77. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added).
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78. Plaintiﬀs had protected liberty and property interests, which Defendants infringed through the Lockdown Orders:
(a) Sotheby’s. Sotheby’s has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: facilitating the sale of homes.
(b) EPM. EPM has been denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: selling its services to maintain the value of real property.
(c) Intraco. Intraco has been, and is being, denied the right to interstate travel, the right to intrastate travel, and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: growing and maintaining its distributorship business.
(d) Casite. Casite has been, and is being, denied the right to interstate travel, the right to intrastate travel, and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: growing and maintaining its distributorship business.
(e) Hillsdale Jewelers. Hillsdale Jewelers has been, and is being, denied the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: buying, selling, and repairing jewelry.
79. Neither Governor Whitmer nor Director Gordon provided any procedural due process before issuing the Lockdown Orders. Nor do the Lockdown Orders provide any mechanism for post-deprivation review.
80. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an oﬃcial capacity and within the scope of their oﬃcial duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
81. As a direct and proximate cause of the failure to provide any pre- or postdeprivation process, Plaintiﬀs suﬀered prejudice under threat of criminal and civil sanctions.
82. These orders and rules acknowledge that so-called “critical” businesses and those “noncritical” can safely operate by adhering to “social distancing” rules delineated in Section 11 of EO 2020-59, including the arbitrary “enhanced social distancing” rules that apply only to the “noncritical” businesses allowed to resume operations.
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83. Plaintiﬀs can operate in full compliance with all of these rules. 84. By failing to provide any pre- or post-deprivation review of the orders and rules shuttering their businesses, Plaintiﬀs are suﬀering substantial losses of liberty and property: (a) Sotheby’s. Sotheby’s has lost roughly $1 million in revenue over the four weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into eﬀect. April 2020 business has dropped 67% compared to one year ago. Pending sales for May 2020 are down 92% compared to one year ago. Approximately 20% of pending deals have been lost. Sotheby’s will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders. (b) EPM. EPM has experienced lost and delayed contracts. Securing groundskeeping contracts for condominium and other customers has been substantially delayed because condo association boards are unable to meet to sign contracts. Customers have been and still are withholding landscape deposits out of fear that EPM will permanently shutter its operations. Customers on installment plans have been and still are withholding installment payments; they do not want to pay invoices if EPM can’t provide the services they’re paying for. Other existing and potential customers have been and still are unwilling to enter into new service contracts for 2020, citing the Governor’s executive orders. The lost revenue from the multi-week delay in starting spring projects has created ﬁnancial hardship in paying bills, making payroll, and meeting other ﬁscal demands. EPM will continue to experience financial losses because of the Lockdown Orders. (c) Intraco. Intraco has lost over 20% of expected revenues for the ﬁrst quarter of 2020 as compared to last year. It has also lost business opportunities and expectancies because of the restrictions imposed under the Lockdown Orders. Intraco also owns the building at the site of its principal place of business. Intraco will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders.
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(d) Casite. Casite has lost over 30% of expected revenues for the ﬁrst quarter of 2020 as compared to last year. It has also lost business opportunities and expectancies because of the restrictions imposed under the Lockdown Orders. Casite will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders.
(e) Hillsdale Jewelers. Hillsdale Jewelers was experiencing year-over-year growth in the ﬁrst quarter of 2020 before the Lockdown Orders ﬁrst went into eﬀect. Because of the Lockdown Orders, it ended the ﬁrst quarter of 2020 with no growth and has lost 99% of expected revenues since closing. Even if the Lockdown Orders are enjoined or rescinded in the coming weeks, Hillsdale Jewelers will experience a nearly 50% drop in revenue (or more) for the second quarter of 2020. It has therefore suffered, and will continue to suffer, financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders.
85. The prejudice each Plaintiﬀ has suﬀered would not have occurred but for Defendants’ deprivations of their liberty and property interests.
86. Plaintiﬀs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESSS 87. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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88. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
89. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from taking action that “shocks the conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (cleaned up).
90. Plaintiﬀs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988).
91. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added).
92. The Lockdown Orders shock the conscience and interfere with Plaintiﬀs’ deeply-rooted liberty and property rights, including the to work, right to contract, and right to engage in commerce, for all of the reasons described in the General Allegations and in each of the Counts of this Complaint, which are incorporated into this Paragraph by reference.
93. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the in-person operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
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94. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiﬀs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate.
95. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
96. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an oﬃcial capacity and within the scope of their oﬃcial duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
97. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V EQUAL PROTECTION 98. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 99. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 100. The Lockdown Orders deprive Plaintiﬀs of the equal protection of the law because they allow some businesses to operate but not Plaintiﬀs’ businesses, even though they are similarly situated.
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101. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the in-person operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
102. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiﬀs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate.
103. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
104. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an oﬃcial capacity and within the scope of their oﬃcial duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
105. Plaintiﬀs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Equal Protection Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VI DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
VOID FOR VAGUENESS 106. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 107. Plaintiﬀs contend that the Lockdown Orders are unconstitutionally vague under the void-for-vagueness doctrine under the U.S. and Michigan constitutions. 108. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires penal laws to deﬁne criminal conduct with suﬃcient precision that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983). This doctrine ﬂows
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from the Due Process Clause. Michigan Dep’t of State Compliance & Rules Div. v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n, 251 Mich. App. 110, 116 (2002); U.S Const., am. XIV; Mich. Const. (1963), art. I, § 17.
109. The Lockdown Orders purport to carry the force of law and (with the exception of Director Gordon’s Emergency Rule) makes any willful violation of their terms a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a ﬁne. It is therefore subject to the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
110. EO 2020-42 allows certain businesses to continue operations if they fall within certain “sectors” of the economy, but it does not identify any criteria by which a business owner can safely determine whether his or her business falls within that sector. Incongruities are evident within the order.
111. The very fact that the Governor needs a webpage to answer “frequently asked questions” about the scope of the order shows that it’s vague. Michiganders are smart people. If “ordinary people” could understand the Lockdown Order, then there would be no need for 125+ FAQs on these orders on the State’s coronavirus webpage.
112. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
113. Plaintiﬀs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders are void for vagueness, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS 114. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 115. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-59 (and their predecessors) violate the Separation of Powers Clause in Article III, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, and that the EOs prohibit them—directly through the executive
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order itself and indirectly through Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule—from engaging activities in which they would otherwise be free to engage under threat of criminal sanction.
116. The Separation of Powers Clause provides that “[t]he powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Mich. Const. (1963) art. III, § 2.
117. The Emergency Powers Act violates the Separation of Powers Clause because it vests governors with total legislative power whenever a governor asserts the existence of an emergency.
118. The Emergency Management Act does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause on its face, but it does as Governor Whitmer has applied it. As the Governor appears to construe it, the Emergency Management Act gives her limitless powers equal in scope to the Emergency Powers Act. The language of the Act does not confer such unlimited powers on the Governor.
119. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
120. Plaintiﬀs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Separation of Powers Clause, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VIII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS ACT 121. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 122. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-59 (and their predecessors) violate the Emergency Powers Act, if they pass constitutional muster.
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123. Viruses, like SARS-CoV-2, and the diseases they can cause, like COVID-19, are not the kind of emergencies contemplated under the Emergency Powers Act, which applies “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled….” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31.
124. Public health and public safety are distinct legal concepts. Governor Whitmer has not identiﬁed a public safety emergency in any of the EOs. Instead, she has only selectively quoted from the portion of the Act that allows her to issue orders necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency under control. EO 2020-42, Preamble ¶ 4. Absent a public safety emergency, the Governor has no power to issue orders under the Emergency Powers Act at all. Neither SARS-CoV-2 nor COVID-19 have presented a public safety emergency.
125. Alternatively, even if SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 qualify as a public safety emergency, the Emergency Powers Act does not authorize the de facto statewide house arrest imposed under the EOs. The Act says a governor may “designat[e] speciﬁc zones within the area in which occupancy and use of buildings and ingress and egress of persons and vehicles may be prohibited or regulated.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1). Governor Whitmer, however, has regulated occupancy and use of buildings statewide. The EOs violate the Act because it is not limited to speciﬁc zones within Michigan.
126. Alternatively, the Emergency Powers Act only authorizes a governor to issue reasonable orders that are considered necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency under control. Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1).
127. The EOs are objectively unreasonable. There can be nothing more unreasonable than keeping 10 million people under house arrest because 0.38% of the population has contracted a disease that has killed less than 0.03% of the population.
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128. Likewise, it is unreasonable to cause nearly 1.2 million men and women to lose their jobs virtually overnight, or to cripple businesses, or to cause businesses to permanently close on those same facts, especially when many of these people reside in counties with less than 25 cases and far fewer (or even no) deaths.
129. Michigan has 83 counties. As of April 27, 2020, ﬁve counties in Michigan still had no conﬁrmed cases, and 37 counties had fewer than 25 cases. As of that same date, 25 counties had no deaths, and 59 counties had less than 10 deaths.
130. Similarly, it is unreasonable to maintain these EOs when the policies contained within them have plunged the State into Depression-level unemployment.
131. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
132. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the EOs violate the Emergency Powers Act, an injunction against enforcement of the Lockdown Orders, and an injunction against similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT IX DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACT 133. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 134. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-59 (and their predecessors) violate the Emergency Management Act, if they pass constitutional muster. 135. The Emergency Management Act permits a governor to declare a disaster in response to the occurrence of threat of widespread loss of life resulting from natural causes, including an epidemic. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.402(e) (including epidemics in the list of causes of disasters). Thus, infectious diseases by themselves are not a permissible reason to invoke the Act—the disease must reach or threaten to reach epidemic status.
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136. Although the World Health Organization has classiﬁed SARS-CoV-2 as a pandemic, that is not controlling under Michigan law. The existence of an epidemic must be determined solely from the perspective of the facts as they exist on the ground in Michigan.
137. With conﬁrmed infections aﬀecting only 0.38% of the State as of the date of this Complaint, no epidemic actually exists throughout all of Michigan. While a regional epidemic likely exists in a few densely populated areas, one does not exist in all 83 counties in Michigan, as demonstrated by persistently low numbers of infections and deaths in the majority of Michigan’s counties.
138. In addition, the Emergency Management Act does not contemplate declaring the entire State a disaster area. Among other things, the Act allows a governor to issue orders affecting a “stricken” or “threatened” area, including mandatory evacuation orders, controlling ingress and egress from that area, and the occupancy of premises within that area. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.405(1)(e)–(g).
139. Moreover, even when grounds exist to declare a disaster, the executive order must indicate, among other things, the nature of the conditions permitting the termination of the state of disaster. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403(3). None of Governor Whitmer’s executive orders have articulated objective conditions that, when satisﬁed, would permit the termination of the state of disaster.
140. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
141. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the EOs violate the Emergency Management Act, an injunction against enforcement the Lockdown Orders, and an injunction against similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiﬀs respectfully ask the Court to grant them the following relief:
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1. A declaratory judgment that the Lockdown Orders: (a) violate Plaintiﬀs’ constitutional rights as set forth in this Complaint; (b) are void for vagueness; and/or (c) violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution, the Emergency Powers Act, and/or the Emergency Management Act; 2. Enjoin Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon from enforcing the Lockdown Orders and from issuing any future orders or rules similar to the invalid ones described in this action; 3. Award Plaintiﬀs their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law; and 4. Any other such further relief to which Plaintiﬀs may be entitled as a matter of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.

JURY DEMAND Under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S Constitution and Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiﬀs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: April 28, 2020
BH2889693.22

Respectfully submitted,
BUTZEL LONG, P.C.
/s/ Daniel J. McCarthy DANIEL J. McCARTHY (P59457) JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiﬀs

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 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 8 filed 05/11/20 PageID.85 Page 1 of 31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S. & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, P.C., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs, v.
GRETCHEN E. WHITMER, and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.
BUTZEL LONG, P.C. Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) 150 West Jefferson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiffs

Civil No. 20-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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Plaintiffs allege: INTRODUCTION
1. Based on speculative modeling on the infectiousness and lethality of a new coronavirus, Governor Whitmer has issued executive orders that have shuttered civil society, placed 10 million people under house arrest, and taken jobs away from nearly 1.2 million people, all without due process of law. The Governor has not disclosed the data or methodology used to create the modeling that purportedly justifies this extreme action. At the same time, through Executive Order 2020-38, she has suspended certain provisions of the Freedom of Information Act through June 4, 2020, preventing any timely, independent assessment of whether the modeling used to justify locking down the entire State is reliable.
2. The Governor’s initial Executive Order was premised on the perceived need to “flatten the curve” so as to avoid overwhelming the State’s hospitals and healthcare centers, not to eradicate the virus. Objective data and reporting shows that the curve was flattened during the first week of April 2020:
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3. This data also tracks with publicly released hospital-level data. See, e.g., Beaumont Hosp. Chart:
4. Although the curve has been flattened, the Governor has nonetheless continued to issue stricter and unclear executive orders that unreasonably and unnecessarily interfere with constitutional rights under the rubric of an indefinite “emergency.”
5. Governor Whitmer’s executive orders are unprecedented. For the first time in our State’s history—indeed, in our nation’s history—the State government is mass quarantining millions of healthy people instead of the sick. As a free people, we have the unalienable right to pursue happiness, which includes the freedom to make our own choices about our safety and welfare without unconstitutional interference. In the face of the coronavirus, it means the freedom to choose whether to stay at home, or to keep calm and carry on with the things that make life worth living.
6. Plaintiffs are affected by the Governor’s orders. Under threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or significantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process. At the same time, without offering any justification, the Governor has allowed, and is still allowing,
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other businesses deemed “critical” to stay open, even though: (a) “critical” businesses must adhere to guidance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) on “social distancing”; and (b) Plaintiffs are fully capable of adhering to those same guidelines if allowed to reopen.
7. Although Michigan, like all States in the Union, is expressly guaranteed a republican form of government under Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the Governor has unilaterally suspended civil liberties and decided that this state of affairs will continue even over the Legislature’s express objection.
8. Ours is a constitutional republic that empowers government to act within defined limits. Those limits apply at all times and under all circumstances. In war, in peace, and in pandemics. “No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism….” Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–122 (1866).
9. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the executive orders keeping people in their homes and away from their businesses—and all other orders, rules, and enforcement activity related to them—are unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and State law. Such a declaration, and a corresponding injunction, will yield a more rational, pragmatic response to the virus that saves lives, saves livelihoods, and preserves constitutional norms all at the same time.
10. In short, Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to define the limits of a State’s police power. Whatever its limits, this legal term of art is not some shibboleth that unlocks absolute executive power and casts our Constitution to the wind. The issues raised in this Complaint are novel, and they will not be rendered moot if the executive order is lifted before the Court issues judgment. The issues presented are capable of repetition and are of such importance that they cannot evade judicial review.
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PARTIES 11. Plaintiff Signature Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc. (“Sotheby’s”), is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business at 415 South Old Woodward, Birmingham, Michigan 48009. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Sotheby’s is a full-service residential brokerage that represents all price points and practices throughout the State of Michigan. Sotheby’s normally has 282 real estate agents and 18 employees. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, none of its real estate agents were working, and it had to lay off six employees. Although EO 2020-70 released restrictions on EPM as of May 7, 2020, it still suffers substantial injuries from the remaining restrictions imposed under EO 2020-70 and EO 2020-77. 12. Plaintiff Executive Property Maintenance, Inc. (“EPM”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business at 42245 East Ann Arbor Road, Suite 107, Plymouth, Michigan 48170. It engages in intrastate commerce, but depends on interstate commerce for the goods necessary to perform it intrastate services. EPM provides to commercial, municipal, and residential clients lawn, snow, and ice maintenance; fertilization; property maintenance; planting; softscape; hardscape; design and build; irrigation; and water-feature services. EPM is an ISO9001/SN9001 certified company and participates in the Safe Company Program through the National Association of Landscape Professionals. During its peak season, EPM employs up to 45 employees. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, all EPM employees were ordered to stop work. Although EO 2020-59 released restrictions on EPM, it still suffers substantial injuries from the restrictions placed on its vendors and customers. 13. Plaintiff Intraco Corporation, Inc. (“Intraco”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business at 530 Stephenson Highway, Troy, Michigan 48083. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Intraco is a major diversified
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exporter of architectural and automotive glass, automotive chemicals, and other goods. Its business model and success is based on maintaining personal face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers in Michigan and elsewhere. Videoconferencing is not conducive to Intraco’s operations. Intraco’s revenue has decreased substantially because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue. Although some of Intraco’s employees in Michigan are performing limited functions at home, Intraco will soon face the harsh reality of laying off its staff if the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue are not enjoined or rescinded.
14. Plaintiff Casite Intraco, LLC (“Casite”), is a Michigan limited liability company, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Intraco, with its principal place of business at 530 Stephenson Highway, Troy, Michigan 48083. Casite engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. It distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market products for automobiles. Like Intraco, Casite’s business model and success is based on maintaining personal face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers in Michigan and elsewhere. Casite contracts through two separate sales representatives, both of which are prohibited from calling on customers directly; videoconferencing is not conducive to Casite’s operations. Casite’s revenue has decreased substantially because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue.
15. Plaintiff Bahash & Company, LLC, doing business as Hillsdale Jewelers, is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business at 77 North Howell Street, Hillsdale, Michigan 49242. Hillsdale Jewelers engages in interstate and intrastate commerce. It is a storefront retailer of jewelry and offers jewelry-repair services. Hillsdale Jewelers has been forced to close because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue. All three of its employees, including owner-employee Chris Bahash, are unemployed.
16. Plaintiff William A. Shortt, D.D.S & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C., doing business as Shortt Dental, is a Michigan professional corporation with its principal place
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of business at 12756 Ten Mile Road, South Lyon, Michigan 48178, and a second location at 720 West Houghton Avenue, West Branch, Michigan 48661. Shortt Dental engages in intrastate commerce, but depends on interstate commerce for the goods necessary to perform intrastate services. Both of Shortt Dental’s locations have been forced to close because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue. Shortt Dental employs 2 dentists, 4 dental hygienists, 12 office assistants, and 4 front desk workers, most of whom are unemployed. Shortt Dental’s revenue has decreased at least 75% due to the Lockdown Orders. The only service it provides is emergency care limited to patient complaints of acute pain.
17. Plaintiff Midwest Carwash Association, Inc. (“MCA”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business at 120 North Washington Square, Suite 11A, Lansing, Michigan 48933. MCA is an association of carwashes located in Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, that provides members with programs and services at discount rates and networking opportunities with other carwash operators, manufacturers, and suppliers. In 2019, MCA had 119 members, consisting of 71 carwash operators and 48 vendors. In 2020, due to the Lockdown Orders, MCA’s membership reduced to 86 members, consisting of 51 operators and 35 vendors. On information and belief, all staffed carwashes have been shut down, even though each are able and uniquely qualified to operate exterior washes safely and without risk to the public. Exterior-only carwash operations can safely operate with limited staff to sanitize wash equipment, and can restrict payment to online or by an outside worker, wearing a safety mask.
18. Defendant Gretchen E. Whitmer is the Governor of the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs sue her in her official capacity only.
19. Defendant Robert Gordon is the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. Plaintiffs sue him in his official capacity only.
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JURISDICTION 20. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and challenges Governor Whitmer’s Executive Orders 2020-17, 2020-69, and 2020-77 (and their predecessors and future iterations of these orders) (the “EOs”) and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule (all collectively, the “Lockdown Orders”), which Plaintiffs believe violate the following clauses of the U.S. Constitution: (a) the Dormant Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 ; (b) the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 1; (c) the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (d) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (e) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court therefore has federal-question jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 21. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Lockdown Orders and similarly crafted orders and rules issued in the future. Accordingly, they bring this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
VENUE 22. Governor Whitmer is a resident of, and the principal office of the Governor is located in, Lansing, Michigan. 23. Director Gordon’s principal office is located in Lansing, Michigan. 24. A substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this Complaint occurred in Lansing, Michigan. 25. The city of Lansing is the seat of government for the State of Michigan. Michigan Const. art. III, § 1 (1963). It is located within Ingham County, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Western District of Michigan. 28 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1). This Court is therefore a proper venue for this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(2).
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Executive Orders

EXECUTIVE ACTION

26. The Emergency Powers Act provides that a governor, “during times of great

public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the State,

or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when

public safety is imperiled, … [may] proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area

involved … [and may] promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she

considers necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency situation within

the affected area under control.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1) (emphasis added).

Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.

27. The Emergency Management Act provides that a governor, upon the

declaration of an emergency or a disaster, to compel evacuation, to control entry to, exit

from, and the occupancy of premises within, the affected area, among other things. Mich.

Comp. Laws § 30.405(1). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.

28. On March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-04,

which declared a “state of emergency” under both Acts based upon two presumptive

diagnoses of coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”), a respiratory illness caused by virus

named the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus two (“SARS-CoV-2” or the

“coronavirus”).

29. On March 22, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-20 and

cited both Acts. This order closed to the public a wide range of public accommodations,

including all restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffeehouses, and other places of public

accommodation offering food or beverages for on-site consumption. A willful violation of

EO 2020-20 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and

fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).

30. On March 23, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-21 and

cited Acts. This order prohibits all in-person work that the Governor deems “not

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necessary to sustain or protect life.” A willful violation of EO 2020-21 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
31. On April 9, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-42 and cited both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-21 through April 30, 2020, while imposing even greater restrictions on the general public than before. A willful violation of EO 2020-42 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(17).
32. On April 13, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-43 and cited both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-20 through April 30, 2020. A willful violation of EO 2020-43 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(7).
33. On April 24, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-59 and cited both Acts. This Order extends EO 2020-42 through May 15, 2020. It purports to loosen some restrictions imposed under EO 2020-42 as part of a phased reopening of the economy. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
34. On April 30, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-67 and cited the Emergency Powers Act. This order extends the original declaration of a state of emergency under the Act through May 28, 2020. Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.33; EO 2020-67(1).
35. The same day, the Governor issued Executive Orders 2020-66 and 2020-68 and cited the Emergency Management Act. EO 2020-66 declared an end to the state of emergency and the state of disaster declared under the Emergency Management Act because the Legislature declined to grant an extension of those declarations, as is its right under the Act. EO 2020-68 purports to declare a “new” state of emergency and a “new” state of disaster, citing the same public-health grounds as before.
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36. The same day, the Governor also issued Executive Order 2020-69 and cited both Acts. This order effectively extends EO 2020-43, but under the authority of the “new” declared emergencies under EO 2020-67 and 2020-68. A willful violation of EO 2020-69 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-69(7).
37. On May 1, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-70 and cited both Acts. This order effectively extends EO 2020-59, while purporting to loosen some additional restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. A willful violation of EO 2020-70 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 202070(20).
38. On May 7, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-77 and cited both Acts. This order effectively extends EO 2020-70, while purporting to loosen some additional restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. A willful violation of EO 2020-70 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-70(20).
Action by MDHHS 39. On April 2, 2020, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Order under the
Michigan Public Health Code. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2253(1). This order requires every person in Michigan to comply with EO 2020-20 and EO 2020-21, and authorizes police and prosecutors to enforce those EOs as incorporated through the Emergency Order. https:// perma.cc/K6ZH-HS6N. This order also applies to EOs 2020-42, 202043, and 2020-59. A violation of an MDHHS order is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of $200, or both. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2261. Thus, Director Gordon’s Emergency Order effectively doubles the period of incarceration authorized under the Governor’s executive orders.
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40. At the same time, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Rule establishing a $1,000 civil penalty for violations of Director Gordon’s Emergency Order. https://perma.cc/ 8W5C-E98N.
41. So, since April 2, 2020, any person who violates Governor Whitmer’s EOs (and thereby automatically violates Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and the Emergency Rule) can now be imprisoned for up to six months, assessed a penal fine of up to $500, and assessed a civil fine of up to $1,000.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 42. Although the coronavirus is highly contagious, it does not invariably result in COVID-19. For those who do develop COVID-19, the mortality rate is low. As of May 8, 2020, the State reported on its official coronavirus webpage 46,326 confirmed cases of COVID-19, which is roughly 0.46% of the State population. Even for the known fractional percent of those who have developed COVID-19, the State reports a 90.5% survival rate. As a result, only 0.04% of the State’s population has succumbed to the virus. 43. In all likelihood, the survival rate in Michigan is far higher. Recent antibody testing conducted in New York State and a study in Los Angeles suggest that millions more have been infected with the coronavirus than previously known, and that the supermajority of those previously infected were either asymptomatic or experienced mild reactions to it. In New York, this new information has dropped the mortality rate to 0.5%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.5%. In Los Angeles, it dropped the mortality rate to 0.1– 0.3%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.7–99.9%. There is no reason to believe that Michigan is exempt from this good news. As more Michiganders are tested, increases in positive tests will yield a higher survival rate. 44. Moreover, the method of counting COVID-19 deaths is designed to artificially inflate the statistics that justify the alleged emergency and that are supposedly driving the Lockdown Orders at issue.
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45. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) has created two emergency COVID-19 death codes: (1) “U07.1, COVID-19, virus identified”; and (2) “U07.2, COVID-19, virus not identified,” which is used when laboratory confirmation is inconclusive or not available. WHO guidelines allow both to be used to code COVID-19 as a cause of death. https://perma.cc/SP9D-XXU2. Stated differently, even when the coronavirus is not identified in the person, it can still be listed as a COVID-19 death.
46. The WHO has also rolled out an ICD-11 code for living patients: (1) RA01.0, which is used for a laboratory-confirmed case of COVID-19; and (2) RA01.1, which is used for suspected or probable cases. https://perma.cc/SP9D-XXU2.
47. The CDC relies on three death codes: the U07.1 code and two codes for pneumonia, J12.0 and J18.9. While this appears more reasonable than the WHO guidance, the CDC still allows physicians to use the U07.1 code for laboratory-confirmed cases or when the death was presumed to have been caused by COVID-19. https://perma.cc/E7CR-CBLY (See “Understanding the Numbers, How It Works”). This still artificially increases the number of COVID-19 deaths, although to a lesser extent.
48. The State counts all deaths coded on a death certificate under U07.1 as COVID-19 deaths. But, on information and belief, it also looks beyond death certificates and counts as COVID-19 deaths where a person was coded RA01.0 and RA01.1. In other words, a person can be counted as a COVID-19 death even when it was never confirmed that they had the coronavirus and an attending physician or medical examiner concluded that the person died of something other than COVID-19.
49. For example, a patient with heart disease can be diagnosed as a having contracted coronavirus, die of a heart attack because of the heart disease, and the physician could code the cause of death as heart disease, but the State would still list the patient as having died from COVID-19.
50. Take another example: the same patient, instead of dying of a heart attack in the hospital, recovers and is discharged, but dies at home from another heart attack.
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The State would still list the patient as having died from COVID-19, not from heart disease.
51. This results in grossly distorted mortality rates and misleads the public about the threat that COVID-19 poses. For example, as of May 8, 2020, the CDC lists 2,529 deaths in Michigan, while Michigan’s official coronavirus webpage lists nearly double the number of deaths: 4,393.
52. Simply put, the State appears to be intentionally inflating COVID-19 death statistics to justify an emergency.
53. Yet, even when considering the inflated number of deaths caused by COVID19, the number of deaths is not “unprecedented,” as routinely claimed. What is unprecedented is Governor Whitmer’s response to it.
54. In 1918, in response to the Spanish Flu, Governor Albert Sleeper issued an order closing places of public amusement. Individual cities decided whether to close schools. Work continued. Governor Sleeper wisely balanced public health while preserving commerce. The current executive orders fail to do so, overreaching to such extent that the State’s economy is spiraling toward a depression.
55. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, annual summer polio epidemics killed thousands of children before a vaccine was found. Even under such dire circumstances, several Michigan governors of both parties, including Governor G. Mennen Williams, refrained from violating constitutional norms with excessive executive orders during those years.
56. In the late 1960s, the Hong Kong Flu swept across the globe killing more than 1 million people. The CDC estimated that 100,000 people died in the U.S. Michigan, like other States, was affected. Governor George Romney did not place residents under house arrest or shutdown the economy then, either.
57. Governor Whitmer repeatedly states that decisions must be made on data. Yet, despite the positive State-specific data, the Governor tightened restrictions through an
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executive order that the Wall Street Journal described as the “most excessive” in the country.
58. Among other enhancements, the new order imposed harsher restrictions on the ability to travel and banned people from visiting their families, working, and purchasing a variety of everyday items at stores. The new order was announced at 3:00 p.m. on April 9th, and became effective at 12:01 a.m. on April 10th—i.e., on less than 12 hours’ notice. The Governor timed EO 2020-42 to prohibit families from gathering to celebrate Easter Sunday and Passover.
59. Although her previous order allowed “critical infrastructure workers” to perform in-person work—defined as those workers described as critical by the director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”) in guidance issued March 19th—in compliance with CDC guidance on “social distancing,” Governor Whitmer has expressly, arbitrarily, and capriciously refused to adopt CISA’s updated definition of “critical infrastructure workers,” in EOs 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, and 2020-77. Other governors who have issued similar executive orders have adopted the updated federal definitions. Governor Whitmer has never explained why these new definitions have not been, and cannot be, adopted in Michigan. This is further evidence that the Governor is unreasonably keeping more Michiganders locked up in their homes than necessary.
60. Taking Governor Whitmer at her word that she wants to make decisions based on data, and lacking confidence in the Governor’s modeling because the underlying data and methodology is unavailable to the public, Sotheby’s, Intraco, and others hired Anderson Economic Group (“AEG”) to analyze the infection curve and the economic effects of her EOs, and they provided AEG’s report to the Governor on April 13, 2020. The Governor has not responded. At a press conference on April 27, 2020, the Governor confirmed that she had not read AEG’s report in the two weeks since it was delivered. The Governor has still not responded as of the date of this First Amended Complaint.
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61. An economic depression is predictable following the shutdown of civil society caused by the Lockdown Orders. Businesses around Michigan are permanently closing because they cannot pay employees and vendors. More will be forced to permanently close the longer that the Lockdown Orders and any similarly drafted successor orders are in place.
62. Consistent with the assessments in the AEG report, nearly 1.2 million Michiganders have reportedly filed for unemployment, the largest number of unemployment claims in the State’s history. Michigan is among the top five worst states for unemployment. Exhibit 1, AEG Report. According to Jeff Donofrio, Director of the Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity, this means more than 25% of Michigan’s workforce filed for unemployment in the span of four weeks because of the Lockdown Orders. For context, the national peak in the unemployment rate during the Great Depression of 1929 was 26%.
63. Employers fund unemployment benefits. Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.13. The Governor has not explained how the unemployment system can keep paying benefits if employers can’t operate their businesses. If businesses can’t operate, then they can’t generate revenue. And, if they can’t generate revenue, then they have no way of paying into the unemployment fund.
64. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as of March 31, 2020, Michigan’s unemployment trust fund balance was $4.55 billion. State officials predict that the fund will be drained in July. https://perma.cc/R54P-GTMU. One recent prediction is that the Michigan Unemployment Trust Fund will be drained within two months and incur a $15 billion deficit. Taxes on businesses may double to pay back the loans that the State would require to keep paying unemployment. This will leave less money for businesses to rehire workers and prolong the economic devastation.
65. Unemployment is not the only factor in play. For those fortunate enough to remain employed during this time, many of them are subject to furloughs, pay cuts, and
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mandatory sick leave. According to a recent study by the Anderson Economic Group, nearly 1.5 million Michiganders will lose significant income because of the coronavirus and the Governor’s orders by the end of April. Exhibit 1, AEG Report.
66. All Plaintiffs want to fully reopen their business, to help their current and former employees (whom they hope to rehire) put food on their tables, keep roofs over their heads, and clothes on their backs. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon forbid them from doing so under pain of criminal punishment and civil fines. Plaintiffs should not be forced to choose between risking criminal prosecution and economic sanctions on the one hand, or exercising their constitutional rights on the other.
67. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
68. Plaintiffs incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs into each of the following causes of action.
COUNT I DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 69. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 70. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 71. In its dormant state, often called the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Commerce Clause precludes States from enacting legislation that discriminates against or impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. State laws that facially discriminate against
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interstate commerce are invalid per se under the Commerce Clause. This is true also of State laws that are facially neutral, if they impermissibly burden interstate commerce in practice. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–195 (1994).
72. Although the Dormant Commerce Clause is usually invoked to challenge protectionist laws that favor in-state businesses over out-of-state businesses, the Clause has a broader function: to guarantee for all citizens the right to access and participate in interstate commerce. Just as no State can prevent out-of-staters from engaging in commerce with its residents, no State may prevent its residents from participating in commerce with those located in another State.
73. Plaintiffs contend that The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restricted and still impermissibly restrict them from exercising the right to engage in interstate commerce:
(a) Sotheby’s. Approximately 15–20% of Sotheby’s annual business involves customers who buy and sell homes in Michigan while located outside of Michigan. Before May 7, 2020, the Lockdown Orders wholly prevented Sotheby’s from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan, even though: (1) real estate was specifically identified by CISA as a critical business; and (2) other States with comparable or more serious coronavirus and COVID-19 statistics allowed real estate operations to continue.
(b) Intraco. The Lockdown Orders have prevented and still prevent Intraco from using its offices to conduct the face-to-face meetings that are necessary to establish new relationships and maintain existing relationships with vendors and customers located inside and outside of Michigan. Intraco has suffered a 20% drop in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
(c) Casite. The Lockdown Orders have prevented and still prevent Casite from using its offices to conduct the face-to-face meetings that are necessary to establish new relationships and maintain existing relationships with vendors and customers located inside and outside of Michigan. Casite has suffered a 30% drop in revenue and has lost
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business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders. (d) Hillsdale Jewelers. The Lockdown Orders have prevented and continue to
prevent Hillsdale Jewelers from importing precious metals and stones to create custom jewelry, from engaging in retail jewelry purchases and sales, and from performing jewelryrepair services. Hillsdale Jewelers has suffered a 99% drop in revenue because of the Lockdown Orders.
(e) Midwest Carwash Association. The MCA includes members from Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The Lockdown Orders have caused a significant membership reduction. In 2019, the MCA had 119 members throughout the Midwest and Michigan. But since the execution of the Lockdown Orders, the MCA lost over 30 members, including carwash operators and vendors. Other States, including Ohio, have enacted different and much less restrictive measures to allow exterior service carwash members to operate.
74. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
75. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT II PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
42 U.S.C. § 1983 76. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 77. The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than the State in which he is a resident. Baldwin v. Fish &
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Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). 78. The Lockdown Orders have impermissibly restricted and still impermissibly
restrict Plaintiffs from exercising these rights: (a) Sotheby’s. Before May 7, 2020, the Lockdown Orders wholly prevented
Sotheby’s from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan, even though: (1) real estate was specifically identified by CISA as a critical business; and (2) other States with comparable or more serious coronavirus and COVID-19 statistics allowed real estate operations to continue.
(b) Intraco. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Intraco from nurturing existing and establishing new client relationships with vendors and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Intraco’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, has been and remains prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(c) Casite. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Casite from nurturing existing and establishing new client relationships with vendors and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Casite’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, have been and remain prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(d) Hillsdale Jewelers. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Hillsdale Jewelers from engaging in commerce with customers who travel to its storefront from locations outside the state.
(e) Midwest Carwash Association. The MCA includes members from Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The Lockdown Orders have caused a significant membership reduction. In 2019, the MCA had 119 members throughout the Midwest and Michigan. But since the execution of the Lockdown Orders, the MCA lost over 30 members, including carwash operators and vendors. Other States, including Ohio, have enacted different and much less restrictive measures to allow exterior service carwash
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members to operate. The Lockdown Orders have prevented carwash operators to operate and to purchase necessary goods and equipment across State lines, whereas other carwash operators in less-restrictive States are able to continue in transacting business.
79. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
80. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT III PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
42 U.S.C. § 1983 81. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State [can] make or enforce any law [that] abridge[s] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1. 82. The right to travel between States is a privilege of federal citizenship. 83. The right to engage in interstate commerce is also a privilege of federal citizenship. 84. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restricted and still impermissibly restrict them from exercising these rights: (a) Sotheby’s. Before May 7, 2020, the Lockdown Orders wholly prevented Sotheby’s from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan, even though: (1) real estate was specifically identified by CISA as a critical business; and (2) other States with comparable or more serious coronavirus and COVID-19 statistics allowed real estate operations to continue. (b) Intraco. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Intraco from nurturing, existing, and establishing new client relationships with vendors
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and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Intraco’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, has been and remains prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(c) Casite. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Casite from nurturing, existing, and establishing new client relationships with vendors and customers out of state. Travel for in-person meetings, essential to Casite’s business model but deemed “noncritical” by the Governor, have been and remain prohibited under the Lockdown Orders.
(d) Hillsdale Jewelers. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Hillsdale Jewelers from engaging in commerce with customers who travel to its storefront from locations outside the state.
(f) Midwest Carwash Association. The MCA includes members from Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The Lockdown Orders have caused a significant membership reduction. In 2019, the MCA had 119 members throughout the Midwest and Michigan. But since the execution of the Lockdown Orders, the MCA lost over 30 members, including carwash operators and vendors. Other States, including Ohio, have enacted different and much less restrictive measures to allow exterior service carwash members to operate. The Lockdown Orders have prevented car wash operators to operate and to purchase necessary goods and equipment across State lines, whereas other carwash operators in less-restrictive States are able to continue in transacting business.
85. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
86. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
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COUNT IV PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 87. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 88. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from depriving Plaintiffs of liberty and property interests without providing any process before or after the deprivations occurred. 89. To establish a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) it had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) it was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the state did not afford it adequate procedural rights. See Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 904 (CA6 2014). 90. Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988). 91. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added). 92. Plaintiffs had and have protected liberty and property interests, which Defendants infringed through the Lockdown Orders: (a) Sotheby’s. Until May 7, 2020, Sotheby’s was denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: facilitating the sale of homes.
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(b) EPM. EPM has been denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: selling its services to maintain the value of real property.
(c) Intraco. Intraco has been, and is being, denied the right to interstate travel, the right to intrastate travel, and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: growing and maintaining its distributorship business.
(d) Casite. Casite has been, and is being, denied the right to interstate travel, the right to intrastate travel, and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: growing and maintaining its distributorship business.
(e) Hillsdale Jewelers. Hillsdale Jewelers has been, and is being, denied the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: buying, selling, and repairing jewelry.
(f) Shortt Dental. Shortt Dental has been, and is being, denied the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: selling dental services.
(g) Midwest Carwash Association. MCA’s members have been, and are being, denied the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: selling carwash services.
93. Neither Governor Whitmer nor Director Gordon provided any procedural due process before issuing the Lockdown Orders. Nor do the Lockdown Orders provide any mechanism for post-deprivation review.
94. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
95. As a direct and proximate cause of the failure to provide any pre- or postdeprivation process, Plaintiffs suffered prejudice under threat of criminal and civil sanctions.
96. These orders and rules acknowledge that so-called “critical” businesses can safely operate by adhering to “social distancing” rules delineated in the Lockdown Orders, and that so-called “noncritical” businesses can safely operate by adhering to these same rules plus addition, arbitrary “enhanced social distancing” rules that apply only to the “noncritical” businesses allowed to resume operations.
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97. Plaintiffs can operate consistent with social distancing rules. 98. By failing to provide any pre- or post-deprivation review of the orders and rules shuttering their businesses, Plaintiffs have suffered and are suffering substantial losses of liberty and property: (a) Sotheby’s. Sotheby’s has lost roughly $1 million in revenue over the four weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. April 2020 business has dropped 67% compared to one year ago. Pending sales for May 2020 are down 92% compared to one year ago. Approximately 20% of pending deals have been lost. Sotheby’s will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders. (b) EPM. EPM has experienced lost and delayed contracts. Customers have been and still are withholding landscape deposits out of fear that EPM will permanently shutter its operations. Customers on installment plans have been and still are withholding installment payments; they do not want to pay invoices if EPM can’t provide the services they’re paying for. Other existing and potential customers have been and still are unwilling to enter into new service contracts for 2020, citing the Governor’s executive orders. The lost revenue from the multi-week delay in starting spring projects has created financial hardship in paying bills, making payroll, and meeting other fiscal demands. EPM will continue to experience financial losses because of the Lockdown Orders. (c) Intraco. Intraco has lost over 20% of expected revenues for the first quarter of 2020 as compared to last year. It has also lost business opportunities and expectancies because of the restrictions imposed under the Lockdown Orders. Intraco also owns the building at the site of its principal place of business. Intraco will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders. (d) Casite. Casite has lost over 30% of expected revenues for the first quarter of 2020 as compared to last year. It has also lost business opportunities and expectancies
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because of the restrictions imposed under the Lockdown Orders. Casite will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders.
(e) Hillsdale Jewelers. Hillsdale Jewelers was experiencing year-over-year growth in the first quarter of 2020 before the Lockdown Orders first went into effect. Because of the Lockdown Orders, it ended the first quarter of 2020 with no growth and has lost 99% of expected revenues since closing. Even if the Lockdown Orders are enjoined or rescinded in the coming weeks, Hillsdale Jewelers will experience a nearly 50% drop in revenue (or more) for the second quarter of 2020. It has therefore suffered, and will continue to suffer, financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders.
(f) Shortt Dental. Shortt Dental has suffered an over 75% loss in revenue due to the Lockdown Orders. Its two offices have been closed, save for select emergencies from patients complaining of acute pain. Critical and necessary oral cancer examinations and other necessary examinations are suspended, including necessary diagnoses of cancers and other life-threatening ailments and illnesses. Because dentists regularly combat airborne disease, they are uniquely qualified and able to safely operate their dental offices, much safer than grocery stores and the other businesses and services that have been deemed “essential.” Indeed, during HIV and Hepatitis C epidemics, dentists were required by law to see such infected patients. As part and parcel of the profession, dentists have been implementing the most stringent anti-viral protocols in healthcare.
(g) Midwest Carwash Association. MCA lost over 25% of its members from Michigan in 2019. Of its remaining members, all are closed and have suffered substantial losses of revenue.
99. The prejudice each Plaintiff has suffered would not have occurred but for Defendants’ deprivations of their liberty and property interests.
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100. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESSS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 101. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 102. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from taking action that “shocks the conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (cleaned up). 103. Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988). 104. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added). 105. The Lockdown Orders shock the conscience and interfered, and continue to interfere, with Plaintiffs’ deeply-rooted liberty and property rights, including the to work, right to contract, and right to engage in commerce, for all of the reasons described in the General Allegations and in each of the Counts of this Complaint, which are incorporated into this Paragraph by reference.
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106. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the inperson operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
107. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate.
108. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
109. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
110. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VI EQUAL PROTECTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983 111. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 112. The Lockdown Orders deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the law because they allow some businesses to operate but not Plaintiffs’ businesses, even though they are similarly situated. See e.g., Grocers Dairy Co. v. McIntyre, 377 Mich. 71, 75
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(1966) (“The Constitution guarantees to citizens the general right to engage in any business which does not harm the public.”)
113. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the inperson operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
114. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate.
115. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
116. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
117. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Equal Protection Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
VOID FOR VAGUENESS 118. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 119. Plaintiffs contend that the Lockdown Orders are unconstitutionally vague under the void-for-vagueness doctrine under the U.S. and Michigan constitutions. 120. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires penal laws to define criminal conduct with sufficient precision that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
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prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983). This doctrine flows from the Due Process Clause. Michigan Dep’t of State Compliance & Rules Div. v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n, 251 Mich. App. 110, 116 (2002); U.S Const., am. XIV.
121. The Lockdown Orders purport to carry the force of law and (with the exception of Director Gordon’s Emergency Rule) makes any willful violation of their terms a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine. It is therefore subject to the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
122. EO 2020-77 allows certain businesses to continue operations if they fall within certain “sectors” of the economy, but it does not identify any criteria by which a business owner can safely determine whether his or her business falls within that sector. Incongruities are evident within the order.
123. The very fact that the Governor needs a webpage to answer “frequently asked questions” about the scope of the order shows that it’s vague. Michiganders are smart people. If “ordinary people” could understand the Lockdown Order, then there would be no need for 125+ FAQs on these orders on the State’s coronavirus webpage.
124. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
125. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders are void for vagueness, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to grant them the following relief: 1. A declaratory judgment that the Lockdown Orders violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as set forth in this Complaint and/or are void for vagueness;
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2. Enjoin Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon from enforcing the Lockdown Orders and from issuing any future orders or rules similar to the invalid ones described in this action;
3. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law; and
4. Any other such further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled as a matter of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.

JURY DEMAND Under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S Constitution and Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted, BUTZEL LONG, P.C.

Dated: May 11, 2020
BH2920970.12

DANIEL J. McCARTHY (P59457) JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE (P70902) 150 West Jefferson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiffs

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 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 14 filed 05/29/20 PageID.172 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL )

REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY

)

MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO

)

CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, )

LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a

)

HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A.

)

SHORTT, D.D.S. & THERESE F. SHORTT,

)

D.D.S., P.C., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and

)

MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER, and ROBERT

)

GORDON,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG

STATEMENT OF INTEREST ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES The United States of America respectfully files this Statement of Interest, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which permits the Attorney General to direct any officer of the Department of Justice to attend to the interests of the United States in any case “pending in a court of the United States.” The United States frequently files statements of interest on federal constitutional issues. See, e.g., Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 20-cv-204 (E.D. Va. filed May 3, 2020); Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, No. DA 17-0492 (Mont. filed Jan. 18, 2018); Shaw v. Burke, No. 2:17-cv-02386 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 24, 2017); Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, No. 1:16-cv-04658 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 26, 2017).

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INTRODUCTION In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the state and federal governments have a shared interest in promoting the best possible public health strategies to combat the virus to protect the people of the United States from harm. But that interest does not justify government restrictions imposed upon its citizens without legal authority. Indeed, action contrary to law is likely to erode public confidence in, and compliance with, legitimate efforts taken to address the COVID19 pandemic. Moreover, jurisprudence interpreting the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution prevents States from impairing interstate commerce, including when States act locally. This case accordingly implicates issues of national public importance regarding the interplay between a state’s interest in combatting COVID-19, the constitutional protections that protect individual liberties, and the integrity of a cohesive national economy for all 50 States and all Americans. The facts alleged suggest that Michigan has imposed arbitrary and irrational limits on Plaintiffs that, if established, could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The facts alleged also raise serious questions, particularly at this stage of the State’s response to COVID-19, whether the putative local benefit of imposing these restrictions on Plaintiffs’ economic activity outweighs the harm to interstate commerce. As the President and many States have recognized, the onerous restrictions on civil liberty that Americans have tolerated to slow the spread of COVID-19 cannot continue forever, and the Constitution will not allow them to do so.
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BACKGROUND1 This suit is brought by seven Michigan businesses, including Signature Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., (“Sotheby’s”) a residential brokerage; Executive Property Maintenance, which provides lawn and property maintenance, among other services, to commercial, municipal, and residential clients; Intraco Corporation, Inc., (“Intraco”) an exporter of architectural and automotive glass, automotive chemicals, and other goods; Casite Intraco, LLC, (“Casite”) which distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market products for automobiles; Hillsdale Jewelers, a storefront retailer of jewelry that offers jewelry-repair services; Shortt Dental; and Midwest Carwash Association (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Governor Gretchen Whitmer (the “Governor”) and Robert Gordon, the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, (the “Director”) (collectively, the “State”) alleging that the Governor has issued “executive orders that unreasonably and unnecessarily interfere with constitutional rights.” ECF 8, ¶¶ 4, 11-19, PageID.87, 89-91. Plaintiffs allege that “[u]nder threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or significantly restrict their businesses” while other businesses have been permitted to stay open if they adhere to social distancing guidance that Plaintiffs could adhere to if allowed to reopen. ECF 8, ¶ 6, PageID.8889. On March 23, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-21, effective March 24, 2020, which “prohibits all in-person work that the Governor deems ‘not necessary to sustain or protect life.’ A willful violation of EO 2020-21 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be
1 The United States submits this statement of interest based on the facts alleged in the amended complaint and reflected in the accompanying exhibits and publicly available sources. The discussion in this statement of interest, in order to be most helpful to the Court, reflects those limitations in force as of May 29, 2020.
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imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500.” ECF 8, ¶ 30, PageID.93-94 (citations omitted). On April 2, 2020, the Director issued an Emergency Order that requires every person in Michigan to comply with Executive Order 2020-21; a violation of this order is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of $200, or both, as well as by a civil fine of up to $1,000. ECF 8, ¶¶ 39-41, PageID.95-96.
The Governor subsequently issued a series of orders modifying and extending Executive Order 2020-21 (collectively, the “Orders”). ECF 8, ¶¶ 31, 33, 37, & 38, PageID.94-95. Two of those Orders were issued after Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint—on May 18, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-92, and on May 21, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-96.
The Orders include Executive Order 2020-59 in which, effective April 24, 2020, the Governor permitted certain workers to leave their homes to perform defined “resumed activit[ies],” including “[w]orkers who process or fulfill remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pickup,” “[w]orkers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair,” “[w]orkers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping operations,” specified “[m]aintenance workers and groundskeepers,” and “[w]orkers for moving or storage operations.” See Exec. Order No. 2020-59, § 10.
The Governor expanded the list of “resumed activities,” effective May 7, 2020, in Executive Order 2020-70 to include the business activities of “workers who perform work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors,” “workers in the construction industry,” and “workers in the real-estate industry.” Exec. Order No. 2020-70, § 10. However, “workers in the real-estate industry” were permitted to resume “showings, inspections, appraisals, photography
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or videography, or final walk-throughs” only “by appointment” and “limited to no more than four people on the premises at any one time.” Id. § 10(h).
The Governor further expanded the list of resumed activities, effective May 26, 2020, in Executive Order 2020-96, which permitted, among other activities, “retail activities by appointment, provided that the store is limited to 10 customers at any one time.” See Exec. Order No. 2020-96, § 11(q).2 Executive Order 2020-96 also rescinded restrictions on medical and dental procedures effective May 29, 2020, and, effective May 21, 2020, further permitted individuals to “leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary . . . [t]o attend a social gathering of no more than 10 people.” Exec. Order No. 2020-96, p. 2 & § 8(a)(21). Though they have required Plaintiffs to close or significantly restrict their businesses since March 24, 2020, the Orders have permitted delivery and curbside pickup of recreational marijuana without interruption,3 and as of May 26, marijuana dispensaries are permitted to operate in person by appointment, see id. § 11(q).
Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint on May 11, 2020, raising claims under, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the dormant Commerce Clause.4 They “seek declaratory relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction against [the Orders] and similarly crafted orders and rules issued in the future.”5 ECF 8, ¶ 21, PageID.92.
2 The Governor permitted “retail activities” to resume on May 22, 2020, in Regions 6 and 8 without the “by appointment” restriction, see Exec. Order No. 2020-96, § 11(l); Hillsdale Jeweler is located in Region 7, see id. § 2(g). 3 See Francis X. Donnelly, “Marijuana sales bloom during COVID-19 outbreak,” The Detroit News (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/03/31/ marijuana-sales-skyrocket-covid-19-outbreak/5083310002/. 4 Five of the plaintiffs initially filed suit on April 28, 2020. 5 Plaintiffs allege that the issues raised in this lawsuit “are novel, and they will not be rendered moot if the executive order is lifted before the Court issues judgment” because they “are capable
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ARGUMENT I. Constitutional Rights Are Preserved During a Public Health Crisis
The Orders at issue implicate a national issue about constitutional rights in the time of a pandemic. The federal government, the District of Columbia, and all 50 States have declared states of emergency and taken essential steps to contain the spread of the COVID19 pandemic.6 And more recently, President Trump “unveiled Guidelines for Opening Up America Again, a three-phased approach based on the advice of public health experts” to “help state and local officials when reopening their economies, getting people back to work, and continuing to protect American lives.”7
The Constitution does not hobble States from taking necessary, temporary measures to meet a genuine emergency. According to the Supreme Court, “in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). In Jacobson, for example, the Supreme Court explained that “[a]n American citizen arriving at an American port” who had traveled to a region with yellow fever “may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will.” Id.
of repetition and are of such importance that they cannot evade judicial review.” ECF 8, ¶ 10, PageID.88. 6 See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-nationalemergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ (last visited May 28, 2020). 7 Guidelines: Opening Up America Again (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ openingamerica/ (last visited May 28, 2020).
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For that reason, courts generally review state action taken to preserve public health during a pandemic under a deferential standard of review. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (“Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and not justified by the necessities of the case.”).
But that deferential standard of review is not an abdication of judicial review. Even in the context of a pandemic, state actions undertaken pursuant to the police power are subject to important limitations. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31, 38-39; Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d. 1171, 1179 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[J]ust as constitutional rights have limits, so too does a state’s power to issue executive orders limiting such rights in times of emergency.”). That is, even during a pandemic, state actions undertaken in service of the public health cannot clearly infringe constitutional rights. Thus, “if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
State action may impermissibly deviate from having a “real or substantial relation” to the public health if it is “exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons” in “an arbitrary, unreasonable manner.” Id. at 28. For example, rules that allow recreational marijuana dispensaries to operate, but not flower shops, may be a sign that state action is impermissibly arbitrary and bears “no real or substantial relation” to its proffered public health end.
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A State also may exceed the bounds of its police power when it “go[es] so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.” Id. (upholding Massachusetts’ mandatory vaccination requirement in part because smallpox was “prevalent and increasing at Cambridge”). Although “the day is gone when th[e Supreme] Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought,” the Supreme Court still requires that a law be “rationally related to the public health and welfare.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
II. Arbitrary and Irrational Economic Regulations Violate the Equal Protection Clause A. State action that regulates economic activity in a discriminatory manner violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless there is a “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001). “The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); see also United States Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1973) (holding that “the classification here in issue is not only ‘imprecise’ it is wholly without any rational basis”).
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Cleburne illustrates how such arbitrariness or irrationality may be identified. There, the Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for the Featherston home, a home for individuals with disabilities, but did not require a special use permit “for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals,
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sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged . . . , private clubs or fraternal orders, and other specified uses.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447. While acknowledging that individuals with intellectual disabilities have unique needs, the Supreme Court explained that “this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses and hospitals would not.” Id. at 448. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that “the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests.” Id.
To be sure, rational basis affords States significant deference in regulating economic activity, and economic distinctions often survive it. See, e.g., Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. at 488-89 (upholding a classification that made it unlawful for a person not a licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist to fit or duplicate lenses without a prescription). However, Plaintiffs have identified what appear to be arbitrary distinctions among business and activities in the State of Michigan that lack a rational basis.
Responding to a pandemic is clearly a legitimate governmental purpose, but a pandemic does not justify any and all governmental action. As noted above, the Supreme Court has exhorted courts to correct action that is “beyond all question, a plain, palpable” violation of equal protection principles or “so arbitrary and oppressive” as to justify judicial intervention “to prevent wrong and oppression.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31 & 38; see also In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784-85 (5th Cir. 2020) (same). Thus, if the Orders restrict Plaintiffs’ businesses in an arbitrary or irrational manner, or are so arbitrary and oppressive that judicial action is necessary to prevent wrong and oppression, the Court should strike down the restrictions.
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B. Here, Plaintiffs have made an initial showing that the Orders arbitrarily and oppressively limit their business operations by prohibiting and restricting Plaintiffs’ business operations while permitting similarly situated businesses to continue to operate, or to operate with lesser restrictions, and permitting social gatherings of as many as ten people.
To begin, Plaintiff Midwest Carwash Association, Inc., alleges that members have been forced by the Order to close all staffed car washes “even though each [is] able and uniquely qualified to operate exterior washes safely and without risk to the public.” ECF 8, ¶ 17, PageID.91. The “[e]xterior-only carwash operations can safely operate with limited staff to sanitize wash equipment, and can restrict payment to online or by an outside worker, wearing a safety mask.” Id. Yet the Governor has not allowed them to operate since March 24, 2020, while allowing retail establishments to welcome customers who will interact directly with employees and likely come into contact with other customers. See Exec. Order No. 2020-96, § 11(q).
It is hard to conceive of a rational basis for permitting retail establishments, including marijuana dispensaries, to welcome customers who will interact directly with employees and likely come into contact with other customers while prohibiting car washes from providing exterior washes purchased online with the customer separated from the employee by a closed car window. The permitted activities seem to pose an equal, if not greater, risk of personal contact than Plaintiffs’ proposed business activities. And the business activities of retail establishments as an entire category seem no more essential to daily life than service establishments like the car wash plaintiffs.
The Orders also raise concerns about arbitrariness with respect to the restrictions imposed on face-to-face interactions of businesses like Plaintiffs Intraco and Casite. These plaintiffs are
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engaged in export and distribution activities that rely heavily on face-to-face relationships with current and prospective clients. ECF 8, ¶¶ 13-14, PageID.89-90. The Orders, however, prohibit such face-to-face interactions because Intraco and Casite are not exempt from the general prohibitions. In contrast, the Orders permit real-estate workers, workers at motor vehicle dealerships, and workers performing retail activities to meet with customers in person. See Exec. Order No. 2020-96, § 11. Consequently, individuals can meet with a real-estate agent or a car salesman, but they cannot meet with employees of Intraco or Casite, even by appointment. As in City of Cleburne, the record does not reveal that Plaintiffs’ proposed activities would pose any special threat to the City’s legitimate interests in addressing COVID-19, at least based on the activities that the City itself has decided its interests can tolerate. Nor, as noted above, is it apparent that the now- permitted in-person business activities are somehow more essential at this point than Plaintiffs’ business activities.
The Orders also draw apparently arbitrary distinctions between businesses permitted to operate by appointment and those permitted to operate for walk-ins as well as between businesses with customer limits and those without such limits. Plaintiff Sotheby’s, for example, can operate only by appointment with a limit of no more than four people on the premises at any one time. See Exec. Order No. 2020-96, § 11(g); see also Exec. Order No. 2020-59, § 10. Plaintiff Hillsdale Jewelers can operate only by appointment with a limit of only ten customers at any one time. See Exec. Order No. 2020-96, § 11(q). But the “by appointment” and customer limit restrictions do not apply to shops that perform bicycle maintenance or repair or to auto supply stores, pet supply stores, garden stores, or hardware stores, Exec. Order No. 2020-96, §§ 10(f) & 11(b) & (c), and the customer limit restrictions do not apply to motor vehicle dealerships. Id. § 11(p).
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Consequently, the Orders permit an individual to go to a bicycle shop to repair a bike without an appointment; however, they criminalize going to a jewelry store without an appointment. See id. § 11(b) & (q). It is permissible to buy a Carhartt jacket at a local hardware store. But it is a crime to buy the identical jacket inside a Carhartt store without making an appointment. See id. §§ 10(f) & 11(q). It is hard to conceive of a rational basis for imposing these restrictions on Sotheby’s and Hillsdale Jewelers and declining to impose them on bicycle shops, auto supply stores, pet supply stores, hardware stores, garden stores, and motor vehicle dealerships, where customers will have comparable interactions with, and exposure to, employees and other customers.
Not only do the Orders impose these disparate restrictions on at least some of Plaintiffs’ businesses, they limit their businesses (and thereby livelihood) while permitting social gatherings of as many as ten people. The examples of arbitrary situations created by the Orders are numerous. Staffed car washes are prohibited from operating entirely; however, a group of ten people may organize a community car wash for their neighbors. Running a community car wash is permitted under the Orders, but running a staffed car wash is a crime subject to imprisonment.
While States are entitled to some deference in responding to a pandemic, they are not entitled to engage in arbitrary or oppressive action. For the reasons outlined above, Plaintiffs have identified what appear to be arbitrary distinctions among businesses and activities in the State of Michigan, distinctions that are having severe economic consequences on Plaintiffs and others. Unless the State or this Court is able to identify a rational basis for the Orders’ disparate treatment of similarly situated businesses and gatherings, Plaintiffs will succeed on their claims. A pandemic does not excuse arbitrary or irrational action that causes such harm, and this Court should not hesitate to remedy it.
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III. State Actions That Impose Undue Burdens on Interstate Commerce Are Prohibited A. Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”
Art. I § 8, cl. 3. The Constitution’s Commerce Clause “reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that . . . the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has thus held that the Commerce Clause “imposes limitations on the States absent congressional action.” South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018). “Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules to preserve the free flow of interstate commerce.” Id. at 2090 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
“Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.” Id. at 2090-91.
This case involves this second principle, namely, whether the Orders impose “undue burdens on interstate commerce.” See ECF 8, ¶ 72, PageID.102 (“Although the Dormant Commerce Clause is usually invoked to challenge protectionist laws that favor in-state businesses over out-of-state business, the Clause has a broader function: to guarantee for all citizens the right to access and participate in interstate commerce.”). Under this principle, actions by a State that “regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (emphasis added and citation omitted) (invalidating an Arizona statute requiring Arizona-grown
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cantaloupes to advertise their state or origin on each package); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945) (holding that “examination of all the relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest is outweighed by the interest of the nation” such that a law regulating the capacity and length of trains was invalid); Am. Bev. Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the requirement that returnable containers have a unique-to-Michigan mark violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it impermissibly regulated interstate commerce by controlling conduct beyond the State of Michigan).
A court must first determine if the challenged action furthers “a legitimate local purpose.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. Then, “the question becomes one of degree” and “the extent of the burden [on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated . . . depend[s] on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” Id.
B. To determine whether the Orders unduly burden interstate commerce, this Court must carefully evaluate both the putative benefits of the Orders under the totality of the circumstances and the burdens on interstate commerce that they impose.
First, whether the Orders “effectuate a legitimate local public interest,” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, depends both on a careful evaluation of their purpose, and the fit between Michigan’s actions and that purpose. The United States does not dispute the importance of appropriate, informed public health responses to COVID-19. “But the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack.” Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (plurality opinion). To the contrary, “[r]egulations designed for that salutary purpose . . . may further the purpose so
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marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.” Id.
Here, a careful analysis of the Orders suggests that the current restrictions, in late-May 2020, may not effectuate a legitimate local public interest, even if they once did. The amended complaint alleges that the objective of the Orders was “to ‘flatten the curve’ so as to avoid overwhelming the State’s hospitals and healthcare centers, not to eradicate the [COVID-19] virus.” ECF 8, ¶ 2, PageID.86. It further alleges, citing information Plaintiffs claim reflects infection rates and confirmed COVID-19 cases in Michigan, that “[o]bjective data and reporting shows that the curve was flattened during the first week of April 2020.” ECF 8, ¶ 2, PageID.86; see also ECF 8, ¶ 3, PageID.87. If true, and absent some further justification by Michigan, in the balancing called for under Pike, these facts would tend to lower the degree of permissible burden on interstate commerce at this time. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (explaining that “the extent of the burden that will be tolerated . . . depend[s] on the nature of the local interest involved”).
Moreover, as Part II above explains, that there are serious questions as to whether the Orders are drawing rational and non-arbitrary lines among businesses and activities that may bring people into contact with each other. Even if the extent of deprivations currently in force could be justified in the abstract, Michigan cannot establish a legitimate local interest if its response—in terms of what is permitted and what is prohibited—is irrational.
Second, the Court must determine if “the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The amended complaint here alleges specific ways in which each plaintiff’s participation in interstate commerce has been impaired. For example, “[a]pproximately 15-20% of Sotheby’s annual business involves customers who buy and sell homes in Michigan while located outside of
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Michigan” and they allege that, at least prior to May 7, they were “wholly prevented . . . from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan.” ECF 8, ¶ 73(a), PageID.102. Hillsdale Jewelers alleges a 99% drop in revenue generally due to the Orders and claims that they “have prevented and continue to prevent [it] from importing precious metals and stones to create custom jewelry.” ECF 8, ¶ 73(d), PageID.103. “Intraco is a major diversified exporter of architectural and automotive glass, automotive chemicals, and other goods.” ECF 8, ¶ 13, PageID.89-90. “Casite engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce” and “distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market products for automobiles.” ECF 8, ¶ 14, PageID.90. Intraco and Casite each allege that the Orders prevent them “from using [their] offices to conduct the face-to-face meetings that are necessary to establish new relationships and maintain existing relationships with vendors and customers located inside and outside of Michigan.”8 EFC 8, ¶ 73(b) & (c), PageID.102. Intraco and Casite allege that, as a result of the Orders, their revenue has dropped by 20% and 30%, respectively. EFC 8, ¶ 73(b) & (c), PageID.102.
If the foregoing impairments of interstate commerce are established, particularly in light the current data about the COVID-19 response in Michigan, Plaintiffs may be able to establish a constitutional violation under the Commerce Clause.
8 It would be no answer for Michigan to argue that in Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1902), the Supreme Court upheld the quarantine of passengers on a vessel “for days or for weeks” to prevent the spread of infectious or contagious diseases. The magnitude of the imposition on commerce involved there pales in comparison to the impositions brought about by state orders in response to COVID-19. See, e.g., ECF 8, ¶ 1, PageID.86 (alleging that “Governor Whitmer has issued executive orders that have shuttered civil society, placed 10 million people under house arrest, and taken jobs away from nearly 1.2 million people”).
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CONCLUSION The United States respectfully requests that the Court consider the arguments set forth above in evaluating this case. The facts alleged suggest that the State has arbitrarily and irrationally imposed limits on Plaintiffs not imposed on other businesses or social gatherings. If demonstrated to be irrational and arbitrary, the Orders would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The facts alleged also suggest that Michigan’s Orders may be unduly burdening interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.

Dated: May 29, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
ERIC S. DREIBAND Assistant Attorney General
ALEXANDER V. MAUGERI Deputy Assistant Attorney General
MATTHEW SCHNEIDER United States Attorney Eastern District of Michigan
HILARY F. PINION Attorney
s/ANDREW BYERLY BIRGE Andrew B. Birge United States Attorney Western District of Michigan 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 telephone E-mail: Andrew.Birge@usdoj.gov
Counsel for the United States of America

17

 
 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.366 Page 1 of 56

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs,

No. 1:20-cv-00360
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN
DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.367 Page 2 of 56
Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI 49501-0208 (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Dana Nessel Attorney General
/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov
Dated: June 5, 2020

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ i
Concise Statement of Issues Presented .......................................................................iii
Controlling or Most Appropriate Authority................................................................. iv
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts......................................................................................................... 5
Standard of Review...................................................................................................... 12
Argument ..................................................................................................................... 13
I. Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because Governor Whitmer has issued a series of executive orders that permit the very activities Plaintiffs allege are prohibited. ........................................................................................ 13
A. Without a live case-or-controversy, Article III Courts lack jurisdiction. ............................................................................................. 14
B. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims. .......... 18
C. Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe................................................................. 19
D. Plaintiff MCA lacks organizational standing........................................ 21
II. Plaintiffs’ claims lack merit. ............................................................................. 23
A. The States have wide latitude in dealing with great dangers to public health. .......................................................................................... 23
1. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts ........................... 23
2. Application of Jacobson to the current health crisis and the restrictions challenged by Plaintiffs. .................................... 29
B. Even absent Jacobson’s deferential standard, Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges fail. ................................................................ 34
1. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable dormant commerce clause claim. ............................................................................................ 34
i

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.369 Page 4 of 56 2. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable privileges and/or immunities claim. ........................................................................ 36 3. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable procedural due process claim. ............................................................................................ 39 4. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable substantive due process claim. ............................................................................................ 41 5. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable equal protection challenge......... 43 6. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable void for vagueness challenge. ..................................................................................... 44
III. Response to Statement of Interest on Behalf of the United States ................ 46 Conclusion and Relief Requested ................................................................................ 49
ii

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.370 Page 5 of 56 CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Are Plaintiffs’ claims moot under the newly issued executive orders? 2. Are Plaintiffs’ claims also not justiciable for lack of standing and
ripeness? 3. Do Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state a claim concerning their federal
constitutional challenges?
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.371 Page 6 of 56 CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
Authority: Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2003). Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013). FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2016). Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 1997). Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014).
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INTRODUCTION Under settled law, the government may temporarily restrict commercial activity when sufficient public health concerns take priority. The seriousness of the current pandemic is beyond dispute. The temporary nature of the restrictions that Plaintiffs have challenged in this case is also undisputed. Indeed, those restrictions have been lifted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are moot and otherwise not justiciable as presented. On their merits, they fail under the same law that authorized the restrictions in the first place. The necessary and appropriate legal outcome is dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ claims. The requirement that a case or controversy exists is one of the threshold conditions of every legal dispute. On May 21, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-96, which among other things rescinded Executive Order 2020-17 effective May 29, 2020, removing any requirement that health care facilities continue to implement a plan to postpone nonessential medical and dental procedures. As of May 29, nothing inhibits the dental Plaintiffs from safely reopening their dental practice in full.1 For the commercial Plaintiffs, limitations on their business operations have been incrementally lifted over the past five to six weeks through a series of orders, leaving them free to engage in the very commercial activity they claim was restricted by previous, rescinded orders. As a
1 The one-week delay in the effective date of the rescission was designed to ensure adequate time for facilities to implement the workplace safeguards required under E.O. 2020-96’s companion order on that topic, E.O. 2020-97.
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result, the case is moot. This Court should dismiss the case for that reason alone. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ claims also fail for lack of ripeness and standing, including lack of organizational standing for at least one Plaintiff.
On their merits, Plaintiffs’ claims fare no better. Claims similar to those raised by the Plaintiffs have already been evaluated and rejected as unlikely to be successful on the merits in other federal courts as well as the Michigan Court of Claims. That court’s reasoned analysis applies just as well in this case, recognizing the significant judicial deference due to the reasonable and temporary measures challenged here.2
It is well established that, “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). To that end, “[t]he possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community.” Id. at 26. And when acting on questions fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, the broad authority given to and duly exercised by state officials should not be “subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise
2 Martinko, et. al. v. Governor Whitmer, et. al., Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM, April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, p. 14 (Attached as Exhibit A).
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to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) slip op., p. 2 (summary order released May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985)).
The well-settled rule of law from Jacobson permits a state, in times of public health crises, to reasonably restrict the rights of business and individuals alike in order to secure the safety of the community. The scourge of COVID-19—a novel virus that quickly spread across the entire planet, infecting millions, and killing over three hundred and fifty thousand—presents such a crisis. Jurisdictions across the globe have had to impose aggressive measures to stem the viral tide that has overwhelmed healthcare systems worldwide. Schools have been shuttered, gatherings have been postponed, and business operations have been curtailed.
Michigan is one of the states hardest hit by the pandemic. As of June 4, 2020, there have been 58,241 persons confirmed infected and 5,595 have died, all in less than three months. There is no dispute that in the absence of any vaccine, social distancing has been the most effective way to combat the virus and keep these numbers from escalating. Recognizing this, Defendant Governor Gretchen Whitmer and Director Robert Gordon have taken bold, yet reasonable and necessary, steps to prioritize social distancing in Michigan.
In a series of executive orders, Governor Whitmer exercised her authority under Michigan law to put measures in place to suppress the spread of the virus
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and protect the public health. The restrictions that Plaintiffs challenge here are part of this broader network of response efforts to suppress the spread of COVID-19, protect the State’s health care resources from rapid depletion, and avoid many needless deaths.
These temporary response measures are designed to strike a reasonable balance between the need for unnecessary in-person contact to be regulated and the need for essential services to continue. Most importantly, they have worked for the benefit of the public health of everyone who lives in Michigan. As a result of them, countless lives have been saved, the curve of the virus’s spread has been flattening, and the Governor has been able to gradually and correspondingly lift a number of the previously imposed restrictions—including the very ones challenged here.
Providing Plaintiffs with their requested relief would unduly disregard the deference that is owed the executive branch’s management of this public health crisis and would undermine its effectiveness in a time of most dire need. The judicial creation of exceptions to these public health measures on a case-by-case, piecemeal basis infringes on the state’s authority to act in a public health crisis and threatens its overarching plan to cope with the dangers and protect the lives and welfare of all Michiganders. Even if they were justiciable, the claims Plaintiffs raise lack merit and they should be dismissed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic are well established. SARSCoV-2 is similar to other coronaviruses (a large family of viruses that cause respiratory illnesses), but the strain is novel. There is no general or natural immunity built up in the population (meaning everyone is susceptible), no vaccine, and no known treatment to combat the virus itself (as opposed to treatment to mitigate its symptoms). It is widely known and accepted that COVID-19, the disease that results from the virus, is highly contagious, spreading easily from person to person via “respiratory droplets.”3 Experts agree that being anywhere within six feet of an infected person puts you at a high risk of contracting the disease.4 But even following that advice is not a sure-fire way to prevent infection. The respiratory droplets from an infected person can land on surfaces, and be transferred many hours later to the eyes, mouth, or nose of others who touch the surface. Moreover, since many of those infected experience only mild symptoms, a person could spread the disease before he even realizes he is sick. Most alarmingly, a person with
3 World Health Organization, Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-oftransmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precautionrecommendations. (Attached as Exhibit B). 4 Centers for Disease Control, Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/socialdistancing.html. (Attached as Exhibit C).
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COVID-19 could be asymptomatic, yet still spread the disease.5 Everyone is vulnerable either as a potential victim of this scourge or a carrier of it to a potential victim.
Because there is no way to immunize or treat for COVID-19, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have indicated the best way to prevent illness is to “avoid being exposed.”6 And as experience from prior pandemics such as smallpox and the 1918 Spanish Influenza indicates, early intervention to slow COVID-19’s transmission is critical.
In keeping with this advice, governmental entities have stressed the critical import of “social distancing,” the practice of avoiding public spaces and limiting movement.7 The objective of social distancing is what has been termed “flattening the curve,” that is, reducing the speed at which COVID-19 spreads. If the disease spreads too quickly, the limited resources of our healthcare system could easily become overwhelmed.8
On March 10, 2020, in response to the growing pandemic in Michigan, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and invoked the emergency
5 (Id.) 6 (Id.) 7 (Id.) 8 See New York Times, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve (March 27, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html. (Attached as Exhibit D). Take Italy, for example, where the healthcare system was so overloaded in just three weeks of dealing with the virus that it could not treat all patients infected, essentially leaving some to die.
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powers available to the Governor under Michigan law.9 On March 13, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-5, prohibiting assemblages of 250 or more people in a single shared space with limited exceptions, and ordering the closure of all K-12 school buildings.10 Yet, even in the face of the social distancing recommendations and the six-foot rule, on Saturday, March 14, the public was out in droves.
On March 16, 2020, the Governor ordered various places of public accommodation, like restaurants, bars, and exercise facilities, to close their premises to the public.11 And on March 17, 2020, the Governor issued an order rescinding Executive Order 2020-5, changing the cap on assemblages to fifty persons in a single shared indoor space, and expanding the scope of exceptions from that cap.12 In response to impending healthcare shortages, the Governor puts in place a temporary requirement that certain medical and dental care facilities to implement plans postponing non-essential medical and dental procedures.
On March 20, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-17, entitled “Temporary restrictions on non-essential medical and dental procedures.” E.O.
9 E.O. No. 2020-4, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521576--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit E). 10 E.O. No. 2020-5, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521595--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit F). 11 E.O. No. 2020-9, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521789--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit G) (Replaced by E.O. 202020). 12 E.O. No. 2020-11, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521890--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit H).
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2020-17 required “all hospitals, freestanding surgical outpatient facilities, and dental facilities, and all state-operated outpatient facilities . . . must implement a plan to temporarily postpone . . . all non-essential procedures.” (E.O. 2020-17, ¶ 1, Exhibit I.) As the order signaled in its preamble, this postponement-plan requirement was imposed “[t]o mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, provide essential protections to Michiganders, and ensure the availability of health care resources,” such as personal protective equipment, hospital beds, and other health care resources – which were in high and immediate demand as a result of this aggressively spreading pandemic, but in troublingly short supply.
The scope of the postponement plan required by the order was flexible and deferential to the judgment of the medical providers responsible for the care and treatment of the patient. Indeed, the order defined “non-essential procedure” as “a medical or dental procedure that is not necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a patient, as determined by a licensed medical provider.” (E.O. 2020-17, ¶ 1) (emphasis added). The order was thus designed to ensure that patients would continue to receive the treatment and care that, in the best clinical judgment of their medical providers, was necessary to preserve their health and safety during this pandemic.
Correspondingly, the order offered a few basic guideposts for its requisite postponement plan, which tracked this general principle. For instance, the order provided that “[a] plan . . . must exclude from postponement emergency or trauma-
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related procedures where postponement would significantly impact the health,
safety, and welfare of the patient.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Similarly, a plan
must postpone, at a minimum, any cosmetic or aesthetic procedures (such as veneers, teeth bleaching, or cosmetic bonding); any routine hygiene appointments; any orthodontic procedures that do not relieve pain or infection, do not restore oral function, or are not traumarelated; initiation of any crowns, bridges, or dentures that do not relieve pain or infection, do not restore oral function, or are not trauma-related; any periodontal plastic surgery; any extractions of asymptomatic non-carious teeth; and any recall visits for periodontally healthy patients. [E.O. 2020-17, ¶ 3.] On May 21, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-96, which
rescinded Executive Order 2020-17 effective May 28, 2020 at 11:59 p.m. (E.O. 2020-
96, ¶ 19, Exhibit J.) As that order’s preamble explained, the rescission was
“reasonable” at that time because the urgent concerns that had required the order’s
issuance had shown sufficiently reliable signs of abatement: “our health-care
capacity has improved with respect to personal protective equipment, available
beds, personnel, ventilators, and necessary supplies.” (E.O. 2020-96.)
The Governor issues and continually revises Stay Home orders to stem the tide of COVID-19 infections.
These concerns abated, and E.O. 2020-17 was able to be rescinded, as a result
of a series of swift and targeted responsive measures the Governor took to mitigate
the spread of COVID-19 across this State. Namely, three days after the issuance of
E.O. 2020-17, on March 23, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order No.
2020-21, which essentially ordered all persons not performing essential or critical
infrastructure job functions to stay in their place of residence, other than to obtain
groceries, care for loved ones, engage in outdoor activity consistent with social
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distancing, and other limited exceptions.13 The order also prohibited, with limited exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people that are not part of a single household.14
Over the weeks that followed, the Governor reissued that Stay Home order periodically, adjusting its scope as needed and appropriate to match the everchanging circumstances presented by this pandemic.15
In addition to rescinding 2020-17 discussed above, on June 1, 2020, the Governor issued another executive order, E.O. 2020-110, (Exhibit L), which continued the incremental and data-driven reopening of the State by rescinding E.O. 2020-96 and replacing its Stay Home restrictions with narrower and more permissive limitations on certain gatherings, events, and businesses. Plaintiffs remain free under this order to engage in the commercial conduct they allege was unduly restricted under prior executive orders.
13 E.O. No. 2020-21, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-522626--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit K). 14 (Id.) 15 See E.O. Nos. 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, and 2020-92. Alongside these Stay Home executive orders, Director Gordon, acting pursuant to his authority under MCL 333.2253, issued emergency orders concluding that COVID-19 had reached epidemic status in Michigan and that the measures imposed in the Stay Home orders and certain related executive orders were necessary to control the epidemic and protect the public health. The first of these emergency orders was issued on April 2, 2018, with subsequent versions rescinding and replacing the prior versions of the order issued May 18, 2020 and May 21, 2020. As presented, Plaintiffs challenges appear directed primarily at the Governor’s executive orders and only nominally against Director Gordon’s April 2 Order.
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Plaintiffs before the Court and their constitutional claims.
The following Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief specific to their respective
claims of diminished economic activity:
Signature Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc. (“Sotheby’s”) – “a full service residential brokerage” claiming injuries under E.O. 2020-70 and 2020-77 (Am. Compl., ¶ 11.)
Executive Property Maintenance, Inc. (“EPM”) – a business that provides services to commercial, municipal, and residential clients in the form of lawn, snow, ice, fertilization, property maintenance, planting, softscape, hardscape, design and build, irrigation, and water feature services and claiming injuries under E.O. 2020-59 (Id., ¶ 12.)
Intraco Corporation, Inc. (“Intraco”) – an exporter of automotive glass, automotive chemicals, and other goods. It claims for unspecified reasons that its business is based on personal face-to-face relationships and is not conducive to videoconferencing. (Id., ¶ 13.)
Casite Intraco, LLC (“Casite”) – a wholly owned subsidiary of Intraco that distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market automobile products. It also claims for unspecified reasons that its business is based on personal face-to-face relationships and is not conducive to videoconference. (Id., ¶ 14.)
Bahash & Company, LLC (“Hillsdale Jewelers) – a storefront jewelry retailer that also provides jewelry repair services. (Id., ¶ 15.)
William A. Shortt, D.D.S. & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S. (“Shortt Dental”) – a professional corporation that provides dental services. (Id., ¶ 16.)
Midwest Carwash Association, Inc. (“MCA”) – an association of car washes in Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, which provides members with “programs and services at discount rates and networking opportunities with other carwash operators, manufacturers, and suppliers.” (Id., ¶ 17.)
Plaintiffs assert the following theories of constitutional violation:
Count I – Dormant Commerce Clause
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Count II – Privileges and Immunities Count III – Privileges or Immunities Count IV – Procedural Due Process Count V – Substantive Due Process Count VI – Equal Protection Count VII – Void for Vagueness Threshold issues of justiciability stand in the way of each of these claims. And on their merits, each theory of constitutional violation is unfounded on its face. For the reasons stated below, dismissal of all claims is appropriate.
STANDARD OF REVIEW In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), this Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and then determine whether the statements are sufficient to make out a right of relief. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991). However, although it must accept well-pled facts as true, the Court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, this Court may make reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor, “but [this Court is] not required to draw [p]laintiffs’ inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
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ARGUMENT As an initial matter, there are threshold issues of justiciability that Plaintiffs cannot overcome. In particular, Plaintiffs’ claims are moot and are not ripe for judicial review, and Plaintiffs lack standing to bring them.
I. Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because Governor Whitmer has issued a series of executive orders that permit the very activities Plaintiffs allege are prohibited. Since the filing of the complaint, the Governor has issued an executive order
rescinding the challenged restrictions on non-essential dental procedures, effective May 29, 2020. Other commercial restrictions were also lifted incrementally over the course of various reissuances of the Stay Home order, including the June 1, 2020 issuance of E.O. 2020-110. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Director Gordon’s April 2, 2020 epidemic order are also moot. That order was expressly rescinded by Director Gordon through an order issued on May 18, 2020.16
Considering this change in circumstances, the Plaintiffs have no legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this litigation and their claims are moot. This Court should dismiss on this basis alone.
16 https://www.michigan.gov/documents/coronavirus/MDHHS_epidemic_order__reinforcing_governors_orders_5-18_SIGNED_691125_7.pdf
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A. Without a live case-or-controversy, Article III Courts lack jurisdiction.
A case is moot and is outside of this Court’s Article III authority “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (cleaned up). An “advisory opinion[] on abstract propositions of law” must be avoided. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam).
In fact, “[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation” within Article III “of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (internal quotes omitted). “If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). The limits of Article III jurisdiction are “built on separation-of-powers principles,” which “serve[] to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407 (2013)).
Generally, and pertinent here, the legislative repeal of a statute renders a case challenging that statute moot. Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir 1997); see also Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 582-84 (1989) (refusing to reach First Amendment overbreadth challenge because legislative amendment of the challenged statute while the case was pending rendered the issue moot). The U.S. Supreme Court has also applied this principle
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to the rescission of executive orders, holding that that when “temporary restrictions” in an executive order “expire[ ] before . . . [a] [c]ourt [takes] any action” the action is rendered moot. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018) (citing Trump v. IRAP, 138 S.Ct. 353 (2017), and Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 377 (2017)).
Such circumstances are present here. The Governor has rescinded Executive Order 2020-17, see Executive Order 2020-96, as well as the restrictions challenged in the Stay Home Order, see, e.g., Executive Order 2020-110. Accordingly, there is nothing left to remedy in this case. Plaintiffs’ claims are mooted.
In an attempt to avoid mootness, Plaintiffs may argue that the Governor’s action amounts to a “voluntary cessation.” While mere “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000), where “interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation,” a case is moot. Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). And, where the government is the actor sought to be enjoined, a course change “has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than similar action by private parties.” Id. (cleaned up). Official government action “provides a secure foundation for dismissal based on mootness so long as it appears genuine.” Mosley v. Hairston, 920 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Ragsdale
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v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988), in turn citing 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.7, at 353 (2d ed. 1984)).
The Governor’s new executive orders are not mere “voluntary cessation.” In fact, the challenged executive orders no longer have any legal force. They are extinct. The lifting of the temporary restrictions, like the various other modifications made in these executive orders, is “genuine” and driven by the Governor’s ongoing assessment of the pandemic and the changing needs of the state to combat it. Mosely, 920 F.2d at 415. This is not a circumstance in which the Governor was or is dead-set on enjoining specific activities, and the new orders are simply a shadow to avoid litigation.
To the contrary, the now-rescinded executive orders imposed temporary regulations, see, e.g., 2020-17’s Title (“Temporary restrictions on non-essential medical and dental procedures”), responding to the needs of the evolving public health crisis and the scarcity of medical resources. And as E.O. 2020-110 well summarized, these temporary restrictions were put in place, and then incrementally lifted, as part of the Governor’s overarching strategy to move this State and its residents as swiftly and safely as possible through the surge of COVID-19’s spread that began to ravage Michigan this spring:
In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic. . . . With this order, I find it reasonable and necessary to move the state to Stage 4 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan. As a result, Michiganders are no longer required to stay home. [E.O. 2020-110, Preamble.]
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The novelty of the virus and the rapidity of its spread required such nimble action. And as data evolved (and continues to evolve) and circumstances changed (and continue to change), with additional executive orders, the Governor has modified the scope of the temporarily restricted activities to appropriately balance the stringent measures necessary to protect the public health with carveouts to sustain the basic needs of society.
Viewed as a continuum, the Governor’s Executive Orders show an evolution of responses framed by an increasing body of knowledge being brought to bear on ever-changing conditions. For Plaintiffs to survive the mootness test, they must convince the Court that the Governor will be in a position to invoke the same responses in the future to identical conditions. The notion the Governor will again put into place the same restrictions is speculative, and the notion that identical conditions will exist in this dynamic situation in the future is conjecture premised on an impossibility.
The mootness here is confirmed by comparison to cases in which the concept of “voluntary cessation” has been illustrated. The Governor’s new executive orders are not merely a governor’s “announcement” to apply a law differently after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 fn.1 (2017), or akin to a private party’s temporary compliance with a pollution permit, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). See also Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (after the Supreme Court granted
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certiorari on the issue whether a public-sector union could require all members to pay a fee supporting the union’s political activities, the union’s sending of a notice offering a refund to all class members was an insufficient voluntary cessation). These types of “cessations” lack the force of law and are easily reversed.
But here, “there is no reasonable expectation that the [alleged] wrong will be repeated.” Mosley, 920 F.2d at 415 (cleaned up). The Governor has not simply voluntarily halted the enforcement of the challenged executive orders. Instead, the Governor has taken an official executive action that rescinds and replaces them, to match the changed needs and conditions presented by this pandemic. Those needs and conditions will surely continue to change, but whether, as a result, Plaintiffs might at some point find themselves again subject to and aggrieved by the same restrictions challenged in this case is a matter of pure speculation, not “reasonable expectation.” And, as mentioned, the above legal analysis showing the mootness of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the executive orders applies with equal force to its claims regarding the order issued by Director Gordon. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are moot and should be dismissed.
B. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims. Even if Plaintiffs’ claims were somehow not moot, they would nonetheless be nonjusticiable for lack of standing. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, and that stake must be in the form of an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158. An allegation of future
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injury may suffice if the threatened injury is “certainly impending,” or there is a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Id. And as the Supreme Court has made clear, when—as here—the merits of a constitutional question pit the judiciary to pass on the constitutionality of the other branches of government, the standing inquiry is “especially rigorous.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408.
Plaintiffs bring their claims in a pre-enforcement posture. As such, to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III standing, they must allege (1) an intention to engage in the conduct they claim is unconstitutionally proscribed and (2) a credible threat of prosecution. McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied neither of these requirements. They face no credible threat of prosecution for violating the restrictions because the restrictions they challenge no longer exist. Furthermore, even when the orders were in effect, Plaintiffs commendably acknowledge that they did not violate the orders and they have given no reason to believe that they had any intent to do so. Plaintiffs’ standing cannot survive cursory scrutiny, let alone the “especially rigorous” sort that applies to their claims. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408. As a result, dismissal for lack of Article III standing is warranted.
C. Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. Relatedly, Plaintiffs’ claims are also unripe. “Ripeness . . . is a question of timing,” and “becomes an issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 1997); see id. (“A case is ripe for pre-enforcement review under the
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Declaratory Judgment Act only if the probability of the future event occurring is substantial and of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” (cleaned up)). Where, as here, the claims at issue arise in the pre-enforcement context, the ripeness of the claims depends on: (1) whether “legal analysis [of the claims] would benefit from having [the] concrete factual context” afforded by an enforcement action; (2) “the extent to which the enforcement authority’s legal position is subject to change before enforcement”; and (3) “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 706 (6th Cir. 2003).
Under these standards, Plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement challenges are plainly not ripe. With the challenged restrictions fully rescinded, “the enforcement authority’s legal position” has already changed prior to Plaintiffs experiencing any enforcement action under those orders, and Plaintiffs face no limitation in, or threat of enforcement for, engaging in their desired conduct. The restrictions which Plaintiffs now challenge were never held out to be anything other than temporary, and so they have proven to be.
While Plaintiffs may claim the restrictions may return, that assertion, as discussed, is entirely speculative and based only on the general possibility that a resurgence of COVID-19 at some point in the future might require the imposition of emergency response measures that are currently not necessary. But there is nothing to indicate that any such resurgence is at all certain or imminent; indeed, the Governor and Director are doing, and will continue to do, everything in their
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power to avert it. Nor is there anything to indicate that, should a resurgence occur at some undetermined point in the future, it will be necessary to reimpose the same particular restrictions that were required to combat the virus’s initial surge. The necessary response will instead depend on a number of factors, including the nature and extent of the resurgence and the state’s preparation for it—all of which may differ substantially from the circumstances the State has confronted over these past few months.
None of these factors, or how they might impact the Plaintiffs at some point in the future, is (or even can be) known at this time: there is no “concrete factual context” by which this Court could measure the constitutionality of any future limitations Plaintiffs might experience, nor any assurance or even indication that any such limitations would resemble the ones that Plaintiffs have challenged. And there is no hardship that might befall Plaintiffs from this Court waiting for these circumstances to materialize, if they ever do, before attempting to adjudicate any potential claim of constitutional infringement that Plaintiffs might allege to arise from them. There is simply nothing in this case that is “substantial” enough “and of sufficient immediate and reality” for this Court to consider at this time. Magaw, 132 F.3d at 284. Plaintiffs’ claims are thus not ripe, and they warrant dismissal on that basis as well.
D. Plaintiff MCA lacks organizational standing. For additional reasons, Plaintiff MCA lacks standing. An organization can establish standing two ways. First, it may assert “organizational standing” on its
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own behalf because it has suffered a palpable injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2002). Second, an organization may claim standing as a representative of its members who would have standing to sue individually. Id. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and (3) it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–181 (2000).
Here, MCA contends that it has suffered its own injury by way of a reduction in membership. (Am. Compl., ¶ 73(e).) But MCA offers nothing to support drawing such a causal connection between that reduction and the executive orders. As a result, the contention is conjecture and insufficient to establish standing. In addition, MCA claims members in several states other than Michigan. It is therefore unclear from the complaint what real injury MCA has suffered that is not simply derivative of its members’ putative claims – or, for that matter, what proportion of the injury arose in Michigan as opposed to Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, or Wisconsin.
Further, regardless of whether MCA is asserting standing on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, in light of the fact that MCA and its member car washes can now operate in Michigan, neither MCA nor any of its members can establish the “injury in fact” or “redressability” elements of standing. As a result,
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MCA’s claims must be dismissed. See Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If Plaintiffs cannot establish constitutional standing, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”) II. Plaintiffs’ claims lack merit.
Even if Plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable, they fail to state any viable claim for relief. First, the restrictions in the Governor’s executive orders are a proper exercise of the authority given to the States to combat a public health crisis. And even if the Court were not evaluating the claims under the deferential standard set forth in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), but instead under a more standard analysis of the alleged constitutional violations, the restrictions pass muster.
A. The States have wide latitude in dealing with great dangers to public health.
The worldwide impact of COVID-19 is recognized by all. Such an extraordinary circumstance requires extraordinary governmental measures. The measures taken in the Governor’s executive orders were necessary to meet the demands of these extraordinary times and are reasonable and constitutional. Accordingly, judicial invalidation of those orders is not warranted.
1. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Faced with “great danger[ ],” state actors are permitted great latitude to secure the public health. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). And in this time of crisis, securing the public health requires temporary
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sacrifices by each of us: “Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.” Id. at 26.
In Jacobson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim that the state’s mandatory vaccination law, which applied to every person in Cambridge, Massachusetts, due to a growing smallpox epidemic, violated the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right “to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. The Supreme Court upheld this sweeping, invasive measure as a proper exercise of the States’ police power because of the exigencies and dangerousness of the public health crisis. It affirmed that “a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Id. at 27. As the Court stated,
in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. Jacobson even highlighted the circumstance, without hesitation, in which seemingly healthy people were quarantined against their will aboard a ship on which others had cases of serious diseases. Id. at 29. The Court noted that such a drastic measure was reasonable “until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the
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community at large has disappeared.” Id. Recognizing the separation of powers, and the limits on the judiciary to invade the authority of a co-equal branch, the Court refused to “usurp the functions of another branch of government” by secondguessing the executive’s exercise of police power in such circumstances. Id. at 28.
Of course, constitutional rights do not disappear in the face of a public health crisis, but the analysis of the government’s action changes. Review is “only” available if the challenged action “has no real or substantial relation to those objects [of securing public health and safety], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
Jacobson’s principle is no outlier. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La State Bd of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902) (upholding Louisiana’s right to quarantine even apparently healthy passengers aboard a vessel over a due process challenge).
And Jacobson not only remains good law, see, e.g., Kansas v Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (block quoting Jacobson in support of the proposition that “an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context”), but federal circuits have recently had occasion to apply Jacobson to COVID-19-related regulations, upholding certain restrictions that burden a fundamental right. See, e.g., In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 786 (5th Cir., April 7, 2020) (“Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may be reasonably
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restricted to combat a public health emergency.”) (emphasis in original); In re
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir., April 22, 2020).17
Recently, the Sixth Circuit has confirmed that Jacobson is the proper
starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19
crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. See Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, ___
F.3d ___ (6th Cir., issued April 24, 2020); Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear,
___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir., issued May 2, 2020) ); Roberts v. Neace, ___ F.3d ___ (6th
Cir., issued May 9, 2020). In those cases, the Court determined that despite the
very deferential standard of Jacobson, the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
17 Numerous other federal courts across the country have recognized that Jacobson is the proper starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19 crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. And those courts have routinely held, across a wide range of challenges, that state actions like those at issue here were an appropriate and constitutional response to the scourge of COVID-19. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); Geller v. de Blasio, No. 20CV3566 (DLC), 2020 WL 2520711 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020); McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 2308479 (D. Ariz., May 8, 2020); Givens v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2307224 (E.D. Cal., May 8, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Cross Culture Christian Center v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2121111 (E.D. Cal., May 5, 2020); Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 WL 2110416 (E.D. Va., May 1, 2020); Shows v. Curtis, 2020 WL 1953621 (W.D. N.C., April 23, 2020); Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 1979970 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020); Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. April 23, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020); Lawrence v. Colorado, No. 120CV00862DDDSKC, 2020 WL 2737811 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2020); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 2020 WL 1905586 (D. N.M. April 17, 2020).
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merits of their claims challenging a complete abortion ban in Tennessee and a total ban on group religious services in Kentucky.
Quite plainly, the restrictions considered by the Sixth Circuit in Adams & Boyle, Maryville Baptist Church, Inc., and Roberts were different in kind and severity than the limited and temporary (and now rescinded) restrictions challenged by the Plaintiffs in this case. Unlike those cases, Governor Whitmer’s executive orders did not impose a complete ban on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. Instead, the Plaintiffs challenge temporary and partial restrictions on certain commercial activity—none of which comes close to plainly or palpably invading a fundamental right beyond all question, and all of which had a real and substantial relation to stopping the spread of the virus, preventing the overwhelming of this state’s health care system, and avoiding needless deaths.18
And just last week, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief for a party challenging under the First Amendment a California executive order that created limitations on public gatherings, including those of public worship,
18 It is also worth noting that Governor Whitmer’s orders have not sought to place restrictions on the fundamental constitutional rights asserted by the Plaintiffs in Adams & Boyle and Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. – abortion and free exercise of religion. And when courts have evaluated constitutional challenges of the sort at issue here – i.e., to restrictions on business activities – they have consistently rejected those challenges. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020).
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based on considerations of health and safety. South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (summary order released May 29, 2020) (Attached as Exhibit M). In his opinion concurring in the denial of relief, Chief Justice Roberts expressly relied on Jacobson in explaining that the Constitution “principally entrusts” these questions of safety to “the politically accountable officials of the States.” Id. at slip op., p. 2 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38). Notably, as here, when those officials act “in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” Chief Justice Roberts explained that “their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’ ” Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)). And when operating within those broad limits, he explained, these officials “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the federal judiciary, which lacks comparable expertise in public health. Id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985).)
There is no viable path for Plaintiffs around Jacobson’s well-settled rule of law. Plaintiffs cannot dispute the gravity of the pandemic in Michigan. It is a oncein-a-century kind of epidemiological public health crisis. In such times, the State has wide plenary authority to temporarily restrict activity that presents a diffuse but real threat to the public health.
Thus, under Jacobson and applicable principles of separation of powers, judicial deference to the Governor’s authority responding to the crisis is paramount. Indeed, the Michigan Court of Claims has recognized as much in denying a motion for a preliminary injunction. As so aptly stated by the Michigan Court of Claims:
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The role courts play under Jacobson and Lansing Bd of Ed is not to “second-guess the state’s policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures,” In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784, but is instead to determine whether the state regulation has a “real or substantial relation to the public health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’” Id., quoting in part Jacobson, 197 US at 31. Part of this review includes looking to whether any exceptions apply for emergent situations, the duration of any rule, and whether the measures are pretextual. Id. at 785.
(Ex A, p. 11.) Plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive this settled standard. Therefore, the
Court should dismiss the complaint.
2. Application of Jacobson to the current health crisis and the restrictions challenged by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege the impingement of constitutional rights as a result of E.O.
2020-17’s (now-rescinded) requirement that certain health care facilities
temporarily implement a postponement plan for non-essential procedures, and also
object to various (now-rescinded) restrictions on retail and other commercial
activity. These claims plainly fail under Jacobson’s duly deferential review.
Under Jacobson, in the face of the current public health crisis, the Governor’s
executive orders are entitled to great deference, despite any impingement on
individual rights, and must be upheld unless there is “no real or substantial
relation” to the public health crisis, or the orders were, “beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”
With this standard in mind, Jacobson requires that the Governor’s executive
orders be upheld in their entirety. While the impact of any restriction on some
aspect of normalcy outside of a pandemic is no doubt important, the restrictions
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were temporary and in specific response to a widespread public health crisis. The Court should view each restriction through the lens of the general public health justifications and the over-arching and urgent goal of limiting the spread of this novel virus. A myopic, activity-specific framing of any issue is not a proper part of the analysis. Appropriate understanding of the nature of the pandemic and the four corners of the executive orders is adequate to the task before the Court.
In responding to this pandemic, the Governor has had to make countless difficult decisions, in short order and with many lives at stake. Plaintiffs disagree with some of these decisions. While no line-drawing is immune to disagreement, judicial deference is owed to the Governor’s assessment of how to most effectively limit the spread of the virus while not restricting life-sustaining activity and services. That assessment included consideration of the temporary nature of any restriction and what as a general matter could be endured while flattening the curve.
The point is not to imagine how each specific activity of daily life might be accomplished safely by using social distancing and other recommended prophylactic measures. In a drought, where the point is to avoid uncontrolled wildfires, there can be no allowance for those who promise to be really careful with their campfire. In a deadly pandemic such as this, the point—the necessity—is to only allow those risks to public health that can and must be taken; the stakes are too high to do otherwise.
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To wit, a simple trip to a dentist, retailer, or other such business might appear both innocuous and inoculated for purposes of the virus.
But appearances are deceiving. To get to that position, the individual patient, customer or employee likely had to handle multiple objects – vehicles, gas pumps, handles and door knobs, etc. – as did each of the other workers, patients, and/or patrons at the business or facility. These individuals then all share space, breathe the same air, and touch common surfaces. Each of these contacts increases the incidence of this highly contagious and asymptomatically transmittable virus spreading. Like innumerable small breezes against a sail, enough will push a sailboat over a waterfall if the course is not changed and the sail not brought under control. Use of personal protective equipment (PPE), sanitizers, and the like will only do so much to avoid these harms and presents the downside of depleting resources critically needed to provide emergency care to those afflicted by COVID19 and other conditions immediately threatening their health and safety.
This last point merits emphasis. Until recently, Michigan, like other states, had been in the throes of an impending and dangerous shortage of health care resources available to handle the steep and immediate demands created by this pandemic, from PPE for medical professionals (and other critical infrastructure workers), to ventilators and other necessary medical supplies, to hospital beds. As the virus began to ravage the State, health systems were quickly reaching or exceeding their capacity. Medical supplies were dwindling, and beds in intensive care units were in short supply. There was a very real and imminent danger that
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hospitals could be completely overrun. Indeed, the TCF Center (formerly Cobo Center) – typically the home of auto shows and black-tie galas – was retrofitted as a makeshift field hospital in anticipation of local bed shortages.19 That it has not seen thousands of patients is a blessing, and a result of the carefully calibrated measures put in place—like E.O. 2020-17 and the Stay Home orders—to stem the tide.
Accordingly, there was ample good reason to temporarily regulate health care interactions and business activities, as the executive orders challenged in this case did. Those restrictions served to protect the public health of the State and its residents, and to prevent its health care system from collapsing under the strain of easily transmittable, potentially fatal, and still untreatable virus. They—like the broader set of measures regarding travel and in-person work and activities that were put in place by the Governor’s emergency orders—were temporary, tailored, and aimed at guiding the state as swiftly and safely as possible through the severe dangers posed by this pandemic.
Plaintiffs complain that the restrictions they challenge lasted too long. But adequate time must be given for the public health goals to be served and a transition to economic normalcy to return—and due deference must be given under
19 Detroit Free Press, TCF Center transformation ahead of schedule, ready for patients April 8 (April 4, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/04/coronavirus-covid-19tcf-center-field-hospital/2948726001/
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Jacobson to the Governor’s assessment and actions in that regard.20 See, e.g., South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in summary denial order) (explaining that “[t]he precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement,” and the judgment of “the politically accountable officials” to whom those decisions are entrusted “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the courts).
And indeed, this careful and gradual transition is exactly what has been happening with the rescission of various executive orders and the promulgation of new ones. While circumstances rapidly escalated and the virus began to ravage the State, more restrictive measures were necessary to combat the spread and save lives. As circumstances have improved and the number of infections and deaths have trended downward, the restrictive measures have eased. This is the very essence of the emergency management authority afforded the Governor under the principles announced in Jacobson.
Judicial deference is appropriate not just on the substance of this challenge but the timing as well. As a matter of separation of powers, distinctions between
20 The incubation period of the virus and its duration of contagion are other important variables not yet well understood. Accordingly, a variable dial approach to reopening should be preferred over the flipping of a switch that Plaintiffs’ legal position might suggest.
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essential and non-essential and safe and unsafe are best left to the branch designed for and equipped to make those calls. The Governor’s executive orders should not be undercut by disparate preliminary judicial carveouts in the wake of a particular litigant’s race to the courthouse.
In sum, the limited and temporary restrictions in the Governor’s orders have been necessary and appropriate, with a “real [and] substantial relation” to stopping the spread of the virus, and they most certainly do not constitute, “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. As stated by the Michigan Court of Claims:
What the Court must do—and can only do—is determine whether the Governor’s orders are consistent with the law. Under the applicable standards, they are. (Martinko Opinion, Ex A, p. 14, citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot overcome Jacobson and their claims fail as a matter of law. B. Even absent Jacobson’s deferential standard, Plaintiffs’
constitutional challenges fail.21 1. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable dormant commerce clause
claim. By empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause is interpreted to, correspondingly, prohibit states from interfering with the same. U.S. Const., Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3. This negative implication, commonly known as
21 There is no plausible claim for relief against Director Gordon because none of the constitutional challenges in the complaint contain any allegations against Director Gordon.
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the “dormant commerce clause” “prohibit[s] outright economic protectionism or regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic actors by burdening outof-state actors.” E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court, 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 1997). A two-tiered analysis applies to such claims. “The first prong targets the core concern of the dormant commerce clause, protectionism – that is ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’” Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). The second applies where, as here, the order invokes no inkling of in-state protectionism but, instead, applies to all businesses operating with this state. In this situation, the order is presumed valid unless its burden on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating this second prong weighs in their favor. It is a burden they cannot meet here.
Any burden of the executive orders on interstate commerce or out-of-state actors is minuscule compared to the benefit to the state and local communities as a whole. The challenges presented by the spread of COVID-19 required swift action throughout Michigan to stop the spread of a highly contagious and deadly disease. This includes the complained-of restrictions on business and dental activity raised in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Many businesses and individuals throughout the State have faced these necessary and temporary restrictions.
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But nothing in the executive orders regulates interstate commerce as interstate commerce. Impacts on such commerce may be inevitable, but that is not the focus of any of the challenged restrictions. This factor alone distinguishes this case from recognized dormant commerce clause challenges. Additionally, none of the challenged orders seek to regulate any conduct outside of the State of Michigan. While Plaintiffs were impacted by the restrictions and presumably engaged in interstate commerce, those factors alone fall far short of a viable commerce clause challenge.
Further, in Pike, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that its holding was influenced by the fact that it was not dealing with “state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 143. This is not the case here. Dealing with public health in general and a pandemic in particular fall squarely within deeply rooted local and state police powers, and Plaintiffs offer nothing to show that the limited and temporary restrictions they challenge were somehow “clearly excessive” in comparison to the critical protections those restrictions provided to the residents, communities and health care system of this State during this pandemic. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to state a valid claim for relief under dormant commerce clause doctrine.
2. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable privileges and/or immunities claim.
Plaintiffs bring claims under both the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, Sec. 2, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment, U.S. Const. amnd. XIV, Sec. 1.22 Plaintiffs’ claims under these clauses fail because under settled law the clauses do not provide Plaintiffs protection from the laws of their own state.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause states: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, Sec. 2. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; . . . [U.S. Const. amnd. XIV, Sec. 1]. The Supreme Court has long held that the two clauses do not establish or protect any rights of citizens against their own states. See Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984) (holding that in-state “residents have no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause” against their own state”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1872) (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not “profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens” and applying that restriction to the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
22 There is no meaningful difference between the two clauses as pled by Plaintiffs.
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The reason for this is sound. The clauses are meant to protect noncitizens from discrimination by other states when they travel to those states. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 180 (“It was undoubtedly the object of the [Privileges and Immunities Clause] to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.”) The clauses do not create an independent, fundamental right to travel. Instead, they facilitate travel between the states by guaranteeing certain rights to all citizens of the United States as they travel between states. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (“[B]y virtue of a person’s state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the ‘Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States’ that he visits.”)
Plaintiffs argue that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than the State in which he is a resident, and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause guarantees the right to travel between States and the right to engage in interstate commerce. They argue that prior executive order restrictions violated their rights to conduct business in and out of state and to travel out of state for business.
Plaintiffs’ argument is fundamentally untenable. First, and most importantly, they do not have a claim under the clauses against their own state. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180; United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cty. & Vicinity, 465 U.S. at 217; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77-78. Second, the
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clauses do not guarantee the right to travel and conduct business out of state. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501. Indeed, the case Plaintiffs cite in their complaint, Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978), held that “a nonresident’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, [is] a right that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Finally, even if Plaintiffs could bring a claim under the clauses, the challenged restrictions did not treat non-residents any differently than residents. Its restrictions applied to anyone and everyone in Michigan. Thus, none of the lifted restrictions would have violated the clauses even as to nonresidents. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985) (requiring some level of unjustifiable discrimination against nonresidents to violate the clauses).
3. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable procedural due process claim.
It is difficult to discern what process Plaintiffs claim is lacking here for purposes of their procedural due process claim. The general touchstone for such claims is notice and an opportunity to be heard on a pre- or post-deprivation basis. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976). But under the holding of Mathews, none of the instant Plaintiffs have suffered a final deprivation of any protected interest. The challenged executive orders contain temporary restrictions, not final ones. Additionally, Mathews concerned termination of disability benefits and not a generally applicable emergency order in a pandemic that need only be disseminated to the public through the usual media channels. Indeed, due process
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is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Here, Plaintiffs seem to be seeking some sort of process by which they can challenge a determination that their dental or commercial activity is “nonessential.” But that is not a question that is amenable to any declaratory relief. Further, the dental Plaintiffs wholly overlook the fact that, under the executive orders, they themselves had flexibility and discretion to determine what procedures were essential on a case-by-case, patient-by-patient basis. The dental Plaintiffs can point to nothing to indicate that, given this “particular situation,” due process would somehow “demand[]” further “procedural protections” regarding their determinations of what procedures are or are not necessary to preserve the health and safety of their patients during this pandemic. Id. And while the dental Plaintiffs may very well prefer not to have had to make these determinations over the preceding weeks, it is inevitable that any effective response to a rapidly unfolding and deadly pandemic will involve some measure of disruption to the normal operations of dental businesses.
For the commercial Plaintiffs, the amended complaint fails on its face to present a viable claim that any additional process was due here to realtors, jewelers, property managers, sellers of the goods described in the complaint, car wash associations, and the like. Many millions of individuals, businesses, and enterprises were all subject to the same general, temporary orders. Plaintiffs have offered nothing in the federal constitution or cases construing it that would have
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required any more here than general promulgation of the temporary executive orders issued under emergency authority. See, e.g., Hartman v Acton, No. 2:20-CV1952, 2020 WL 1932896, at *6-10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (in the context of a TRO, rejecting a plaintiff business owner’s procedural due process challenge to Ohio’s COVID-19-related “Stay-at-home order” that “direct[ed] non-essential businesses to cease operating their physical locations”).
4. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable substantive due process claim.
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that a substantive due process violation occurs when arbitrary and capricious government action deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected property interest. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216-1217 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) (holding that a court should not interfere unless the locality’s action “has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
While challenges to arbitrary and capricious government action appear most frequently in cases involving zoning and other ordinances, see, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974), they are not necessarily limited to such cases, see, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82–83 (1978) (noting that federal economic regulations will be upheld “absent proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Congress”) (citation omitted).
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Here, however, there was nothing illogical, arbitrary, or capricious about the Governor’s promulgation of the executive orders. Given the characteristics of COVID-19, the restrictions ordered in the executive orders were necessary to protect the public from the rapid spread of an aggressive, untreatable, and potentially fatal disease, and to ensure this State’s health care system had the capacity and resources to manage that spread. The same is true of any of the challenged pandemic orders signed by Director Gordon. “The fundamental nature of an individual’s interest in liberty . . . may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51. Such was the case here.
In addition, there is nothing conscience-shocking about prioritizing types of medical care during a pandemic for purposes of not depleting or misdirecting scarce health-care resources (PPE, drugs, emergency room capacity, ICE capacity, etc.), nor about placing temporary limitations on certain types of business activities within the State in order to strike a necessary and carefully tailored balance between reducing in-person work and travel—and therefore human interactions and community spread of this deadly virus throughout the State—and allowing citizens to engage in essential functions. There is no substantive due process issue with these measures, and Plaintiffs’ claims on that basis should be dismissed for failure to state a recognized claim for relief.
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5. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable equal protection challenge. Plaintiffs fall far short of establishing an equal protection claim. “[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Id. Courts apply a “strong presumption” that a challenged law is valid and plaintiffs have the heavy burden of negating “every conceivable basis” which might support the law. Id. at 314-15. For the reasons already stated, each challenged restriction had a rational basis. During a pandemic, it makes eminent sense to adopt measures that require social distancing, limit person to person contact, and preserve valuable PPE. This unsurprisingly meant different things for different businesses. For the dental Plaintiffs, for instance, it meant the temporary postponement of non-emergency dental care. For Sotheby’s, realtor activity had to be remote for a few weeks. And for an organization like MCA, which itself does not allege to operate car washes, it had to limit its in-person programs, services, and networking opportunities that it provides to its members. The amended complaint incorrectly presumes that each of these businesses was meaningfully similarly situated to different businesses that may have faced
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looser restrictions under the prior orders. Not so. Even in a lockdown, people have to eat. So it is both rational and expected that grocery stores and food businesses would continue limited in-person operations while Plaintiffs could not. The same goes for pet shops, car repair businesses, and other industries more closely linked to life-sustaining activity and thus not similarly situated to Plaintiffs. The rational basis is the overarching response to the virus, and not the microscopic view of how each area of regulation might impact a particular business that takes exception to any particular line-drawing.
The efficacy of contact tracing provides yet another rational basis for how various lines are drawn as phases of society and the economy reopen. Allowing some social gatherings, for instance, does not imply that restricting commercial gatherings is irrational. In the case of families and social networks, the ability to perform contact tracing is easier than in the case of businesses that are less capable of identifying each person who might have had an appointment or stopped in for business (accompanied or unaccompanied). Simply put, there are multiple, readily apparent rational bases—from suppressing the spread of the virus, to preserving the supply of PPE, to ensuring workable conditions for contact tracing—that inform and support what restrictions have put in place and when and how they have been lifted. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge.
6. Plaintiffs fail to state a viable void for vagueness challenge.
Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a law is unconstitutionally vague: first, the law must give a person of “ordinary intelligence a reasonable
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opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly[;]” and second, the standards of enforcement must be precise enough to avoid “involving so many factors of varying effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor the jury after the fact can safely and certainly judge the result.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (internal citation omitted); Columbia Natural Resources v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995).
There is no claim here that any of the Plaintiffs have been subject to selective enforcement or otherwise unsure about what is or is not permitted in their particular situations. Indeed, the stated purpose of their lawsuit is to reopen their dental and other commercial businesses and to conduct in-person economic activity. Even absent the mootness of this purpose in light of new executive orders, nothing signals any vagueness in the restrictions that Plaintiffs claim to have improperly impeded it.
At bottom, Plaintiffs are attempting to use the doctrine of vagueness to secure retroactive exemptions from executive orders they had no problem understanding, but simply would rather have not followed. While the orders’ restrictions no doubt impacted the lives of many, Plaintiffs included, that impact has been necessary and tailored to meet an overarching, critical public health need. There is nothing unconstitutionally vague about the content of these restrictions, and Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable void for vagueness challenge.
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III. Response to Statement of Interest on Behalf of the United States On May 29, 2020, the United States filed a statement of interest pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 517. Scant examples of other such statements are cited, with only one concerning the current pandemic and none ever filed in this judicial district or circuit. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 378 F.Supp.3d 1195 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (religious speech on college campus); Shaw v. Burke, 2018 WL 459661 (C.D. Ca. No. 2:17-cv-02386) (free speech on college campus); Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 393 Mont. 446 (2018) (tax credit for religiously affiliated private school); Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 WL 2110416 (E.D. Va. No. 2:20-cv204) (criminal citation for violation of COVID-19 executive order).
The statement is helpful to the extent that it confirms that Jacobson deference and rational basis review provide the proper legal frameworks to apply. Additionally, the statement only addresses the equal protection and dormant commerce clause claims. Therefore, it can be inferred that the United States has no similar interest or concern to share with the Court regarding the other claims – privileges and immunities, privileges or immunities, procedural due process, substantive due process, and void for vagueness.
The statement is not helpful to the extent that it airs hypothetical concerns and merely pulls at the edges of reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious linedrawing in certain prior executive orders. Collectively and individually, these points fail to establish that Plaintiffs have stated any viable, recognized claims for relief under the law of the dormant commerce clause or equal protection clause.
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First, the points are stale and moot under the executive orders currently in effect. Second, they raise academic hypotheticals that often fail to relate to any specific Plaintiff here and that fall well short of negating the rational bases supporting the challenged restrictions.23 Indeed, the statement scarcely engages with those bases, such as flattening the curve of the virus’s spread, preserving PPE, or setting favorable conditions for contact tracing – all of which are eminently rational and compelling, but which the statement only acknowledges in passing, if at all, while suggesting the orders might be unconstitutionally “arbitrary and oppressive.”
Any rule of legislation or executive order is susceptible to this sort of superficial nitpicking. To illustrate, one might question the rationality of any regulation by simply noting its boundaries. Is a person exceeding a speed limit by one mile per hour necessarily less safe than the one driving a mile below it? For voting, is the eighteen-year-old necessarily more qualified than the person aged seventeen years and 355 days? Is the same true for drafting soldiers into the military? For alcohol consumption, why draw the line at twenty-one years old?
23 For instance, while the statement of interest fixates on car washes, it wholly disregards that Plaintiff MCA is an organization and does not allege that its business operations include operating a car wash impacted by any executive orders. The statement’s references to marijuana businesses and flower shops are (accuracy aside) even further beside the point. And as illustrated by its example of purchasing a Carhartt jacket, the statement’s proffered legal analysis is prone not only to straying well beyond the scope of the actual case in which it claims an interest, but to drawing specious comparisons between dissimilar businesses and activities on the basis of a single and/or superficial point of overlap between them.
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“Even if the classification involved here is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this perfection is by no means required. The provision does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (quotations, citations omitted) (rational basis review met for mandatory age sixty retirement for foreign service officers); see also Breck v. Michigan, 203 F.36 392 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding state law imposing mandatory age limit for running for judicial office).
But skepticism and implications about the margins of a rule do not make the rule itself irrational. In a dynamic and fluid pandemic situation, there is no single set of lines to be drawn and rules to be promulgated. Instead, there are overarching goals to serve and details to decide, adjust, and rework – all in the context of imperfect information, countless variables, time delays between input and output, developing data about causation and correlation, and untold other factors. In that sense, the federal statement picks cherries from a conjured, imagined tree. As Chief Justice Roberts made clear on the very same day this statement was filed, such grasping and “second-guessing” have no place here. South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in summary denial order). For the reasons already stated, and with all due respect to the statement of interest, Plaintiffs’ commerce clause and equal protection claims can bear no fruit.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED There are no longer any live controversies underlying Plaintiffs’ challenges,
and Plaintiffs have no legally cognizable interests in the outcome of this litigation.
Thus, their claims are moot. Further, Plaintiffs never violated the orders, and there
is no chance that the now extinct orders will be enforced against them. As a result,
Plaintiffs also lack standing and their claims are unripe.
Even if Plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable, they fail as a matter of law. A
piecemeal lifting of restrictions by this Court as Plaintiffs’ desire, without the
ability to globally coordinate the State’s carefully considered, deliberate, ongoing
plan to combat the crisis and transition back to normalcy, is not only legally
unwarranted, but would increase the risk and potential harm to everyone. For the
reasons already briefed, a particular party’s race to the courthouse should not
control who is and is not excepted, particularly in a time of great public need when
all in Michigan must grab hold of an oar and row in the same direction.
Defendants Whitmer and Gordon respectfully request that the grant this
motion, dismiss all claims, and grant any other appropriate relief to Defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Whitmer & Gordon State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754
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Lansing, MI 48909 517.335.7573 fednyskyj@michigan.gov P65232 Dated: June 5, 2020 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on June 5, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record, and I certify that my secretary has mailed by U.S. Postal Service the papers to any non-ECF participant. /s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants Whitmer & Gordon State Operations Division
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 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.422 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN
Index of Exhibits

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.423 Page 2 of 3

Exhibit A
B
C
D
E F G H I J K L

Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Index of Exhibits
Description
April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Martinko, et. al. v. Governor Whitmer, et. al., Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM
Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, World Health Organization
Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, Centers for Disease Control
Flattening the Coronavirus Curve (March 27, 2020), New York Times
E.O. No. 2020-4
E.O. No. 2020-5
E.O. No. 2020-9
E.O. No. 2020-11
E.O. 2020-17
E.O. 2020-96
E.O. No. 2020-21
E.O. 2020-110

2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.424 Page 3 of 3

M

South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom,

Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (summary order

released May 29, 2020)

3

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.425 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.426 Page 2 of 20 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit A
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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

STEVE MARTINKO, et al, Plaintiffs,

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ APRIL 23, 2020 MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v

Case No. 20-00062-MM

GRETCHEN WHITMER, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, DANIEL EICHINGER, in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, and DANA NESSEL, in her official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Michigan,

Hon. Christopher M. Murray

Defendants. ___________________________/

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter was filed by five Michigan residents who claim that three of Governor

Whitmer’s executive orders, Executive Orders 2020-21 and 2020-42,1 and now Executive Order

2020-59, infringe on their constitutional rights to procedural due process and substantive due

1 Plaintiffs recognize that EO 2020-21 was rescinded by EO 2020-42, and they claim that EO 2020-42 “extended the timeline originally set by [EO] 2020-21 and grossly expands its restrictions on businesses’ and individuals’ fundamental rights.” After the verified complaint was filed, EO 2020-42 was rescinded by EO 2020-59, which (among other things) eliminated the prohibitions on traveling intrastate to another residence, from not using motorized boats on the waterways, and to an extent allows the re-opening of some businesses and state parks. Although plaintiffs challenge the same restrictions set forth in EO 2020-42, the Court will for clarity sake refer to the restrictions within the current executive order, EO 2020-59, unless the timing period is relevant to any issue.
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process. Specifically, plaintiffs’ verified complaint alleges that the “mandatory quarantine” imposed by EO 2020-59 violates their right to both procedural due process (Count I) and substantive due process (Count II), and that the intrastate travel restrictions contained in EO 202042 also violate their rights to procedural due process (Count III) and substantive due process (Count IV). They also allege in Count V of their verified complaint that the Emergency Management Act, MCL 30.401 et seq., is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor. Plaintiffs have requested the Court issue a preliminary injunction—but not a permanent one—restraining these defendants from continuing to implement the provisions of EO 2020-59.2 Once restrained, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the challenged restrictions and the EMA are invalid.3
II. JURISDICTION Defendants first argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief based upon federal constitutional claims, which deprives the Court of jurisdiction to decide the matter. Defendants rely upon MCL 600.6440, which provides:
No claimant may be permitted to file claim in said court against the state nor any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof who has an adequate remedy upon his claim in the federal courts, but it is not necessary in the complaint filed to allege that claimant has no such adequate remedy, but that fact may be put in issue by the answer or motion filed by the state or the department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof.
2 On April 23, 2020, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order on the ground that plaintiffs had not shown the threat of immediate and irreparable harm of physical injury or loss of property. 3 The Court appreciates the speed at which counsel submitted briefs, and for the high caliber of the briefs submitted.
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Because a federal court can exercise jurisdiction against state officers in their official capacity when seeking only prospective injunctive relief, defendants argue, MCL 600.6440 applies and the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter.
The legal principles put forward by defendants are sound, but they do not apply to plaintiffs’ case. First, the statute refers to claims filed in the Court of Claims against the state, its departments, agencies, etc., and does not pertain to claims brought in this Court against individuals, as plaintiffs have done here. Thus, it is irrelevant whether claims against state officers in their official capacity brought in federal court might essentially be considered claims against the state. Second, with respect to defendants’ argument, plaintiffs seek declaratory rulings on each of their three challenges, and one of those challenges—the claim that the EMA violates the separation of powers doctrine—is based upon state law. So too is their challenge to the intrastate ban on travel to vacation rentals. Additionally, in their complaint plaintiffs seek “other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate,” which whatever that could end up being, it would go beyond the declaratory and limited injunctive relief requested in the complaint, and could include damages, even if only nominal. Because plaintiffs’ claims and forms of relief do not meet all the requirements of MCL 600.6440, this Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction.
III. MOOTNESS Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ case is moot because they only challenge EO 202021 and EO 2020-42, which have been rescinded, and EO 2020-59 is the only existing executive order containing these restrictions. True enough, but as defendants seem to recognize, it was after plaintiffs’ filing last week that the Governor issued EO 2020-59, and plaintiffs have not had time to seek to amend their complaint, and several of plaintiffs’ challenges to the prior EOs—the stayat-home provision and the ban on intrastate travel to vacation rentals—remain within EO 2020-
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59. Those two challenges are therefore not moot, as the Court can still render complete relief against those provisions. See CD Barnes Assoc, Inc v Star Haven, LLC, 300 Mich App 389, 406; 834 NW2d 878 (2013). The remainder of the challenges to EOs 2020-21 and 2020-42, as well as to the Department of Natural Resources rule4, have been removed by EO 2020-59, and are now moot.
The Court therefore concludes that the only remaining ripe challenges to the executive orders are (1) the stay-at-home provision, (2) the prohibition of traveling to a third-party vacation rental, and (3) the limited public access to certain public land. And, of course, plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the EMA remains a live controversy.
IV. STANDARDS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION “The objective of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final hearing regarding the parties’ rights.” Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Mich v Dep’t of Community Health, 231 Mich App 647, 655–656; 588 NW2d 133 (1998). The status quo has been defined as “ ‘the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’ ” Buck v Thomas Cooley Law School, 272 Mich App 93, 98 n 4; 725 NW2d 485 (2006), quoting Psychological Services of Bloomfield, Inc v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 144 Mich App 182, 185; 375 NW2d 382 (1985). In Mich AFSCME Council 25 v Woodhaven–Brownstown Sch
4 Specifically, plaintiffs challenge a Department of Natural Resources rule, implemented in furtherance of EO 2020-42, that “restricts the use of powerboats on public waterways yet allows sailboats and kayaks.” Plaintiffs likewise question a DNR rule, also implemented in furtherance of EO 2020-42, that “further restricted access to public lands, parks and trails to residents of ‘local communities.’ ” Much to the pleasure of outdoor enthusiasts, EO 2020-59 seems to have eliminated the restrictions on use of powerboats and use of state parks during certain hours of the day.
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Dist, 293 Mich App 143, 146; 809 NW2d 444 (2011), the Court of Appeals instructed that, “[w]hen deciding whether to grant an injunction under traditional equitable principles,
a court must consider (1) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will prevail on the merits, (2) the danger that the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, (3) the risk that the party seeking the injunction would be harmed more by the absence of an injunction than the opposing party would be by the granting of the relief, and (4) the harm to the public interest if the injunction is issued.[5] Not surprisingly, the Court will first turn to the initial consideration, i.e., whether plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Though plaintiffs do not have to prove they will succeed on the merits, they do have to prove that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Int’l Union v Michigan, 211 Mich App 20, 25; 535 NW2d 210 (1995).
V. THE MERITS A. BACKGROUND AND FACTS Michigan residents, like all other Americans, cherish their liberty. We always have, though the liberties and freedoms we seek to protect have changed over time. At and before our founding, our forefathers fought for the inalienable right to own property, freely engage in commerce, represent ourselves through our own elected representatives, worship where and how we wanted, etc. The Declaration of Independence’s list of grievances against the King of England prove as much, as do several of the amendments to the United States Constitution, and in particular, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Today we have all the freedoms and liberties that the founders fought for, and our branches of government exist in large part to ensure that those rights remain intact. See Declaration, ¶ 2.6
The liberty and freedoms at stake in this matter do not in large part involve those rights and liberties
the founders fought so hard for; instead, plaintiffs focus on the right to freely move about one’s
community and state, to do commerce when one pleases, and to travel about the state for vacation
purposes. It is the restrictions to those activities within EO 2020-59 that plaintiffs challenge here.
As any reader of this opinion knows, the challenged executive orders were issued to address
the public health crisis occasioned by the world-wide spread of the novel coronavirus, which hit
our great state in early March. Specifically, on March 10, 2020, was when the first two cases of the virus were diagnosed in our state7, while the first death resulting from the virus occurred on March 18, 2020.8 As a result of the quick spread of the virus within our state borders, and to meet
the myriad challenges that immediately arose Governor Whitmer issued numerous executive
orders, including EO 2020-21, EO 2020-42 and EO 2020-59. The main element of the executive
6 The Court realizes that the Declaration is a political document, not a legal one, but it is good evidence of the founding political theories and objectives. See Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 91; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000)(SCALIA, J., dissenting)(“The Declaration of Independence ... is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts[.]”); Derden v McNeel, 978 F2d 1453, 1456 n4 (CA 5, 1992)(“[G]eneral statements about inalienable rights ... tell us little about the prerogatives of an individual in concrete factual situations.”); Coffey v United States, 939 F Supp 185, 191 (EDNY, 1996)(“While the Declaration of Independence states that all men are endowed certain unalienable rights including ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,’ it does not grant rights that may be pursued through the judicial system.” (citation omitted)). 7 Executive Order No, 2020-21; Detroit Free Press, Coronavirus Timeline https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/03/18/coronavirus-timeline-first-casemichigan-first-death/5069676002/ (accessed April 28, 2020). This article contains a compilation of information from the state Department of Health and Human Services. 8 Detroit Free Press, First Michigan Death Due to Coronavirus is Southgate Man in his 50s https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2020/03/18/coronavirus-deathsmichigan/5054788002/ (accessed April 28, 2020).
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orders is the requirement that most residents remain in their home unless engaging in certain essential activities, or certain limited outdoor activities. The result of the order, from an economic standpoint, was thousands of Michigan residents being unable to work unless they could do so remotely, the closing of all restaurants, bars, and other small and large businesses.9
At the time the first stay-at-home order was issued on March 23, 2020—only 13 days since the first confirmed case in this state—there were already 1,328 confirmed cases and 15 deaths.10 Today, just over one month later, Michigan has over 36,000 confirmed cases of the virus and over 3,000 related deaths.
B. THE MERITS In their complaint, plaintiffs do not challenge the Governor’s authority to issue the executive orders on this subject-matter. Instead, plaintiffs challenge the scope of the order through separate claims based on procedural due process and substantive due process. Although these claims entail different considerations and standards, see In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App 562, 573-574; 892 NW2d 388 (2016), the Court will address the claims together since, under these circumstances, each protected right is subject to the same overriding principle. In other words, the constitutional right asserted does not make a difference when considering this issue, because both are subject to a balancing with the state’s interest to protect the public health. This holds true because, and perhaps contrary to common knowledge, most, if not all, individual constitutional rights are not absolute and are subject to a balancing with the
9 Michigan was not alone in this regard. The Court takes notice that the worldwide economy has come to a virtual standstill as a result of state and national actions taken to control the virus. 10 Detroit Free Press, Michigan Coronavirus Cases, Tracking the Pandemic, https://www.freep.com/in-depth/news/nation/coronavirus/2020/04/11/michigan-coronaviruscases-tracking-covid-19-pandemic/5121186002/ (accessed April 28, 2020).
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countervailing state interest. See New Rider v Board of Ed of Independent School Dist No 1, 480
F2d 693, 696 (CA 10, 1973) (“Constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are not
absolutes.”) and In re Abbott, 954 F3d 772, 784 (CA 5, 2020) (Recognizing, when addressing
Texas emergency rules during the coronavirus pandemic, that individual rights secured by the
Constitution could be reasonably restricted during a health crisis).
As can be seen, then, there are two competing constitutional principles at play. First, as
plaintiffs note in their verified complaint, in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2, 120-121; 18 L Ed 281
(1866), the United States Supreme Court recognized—in a case that arose during the height of the
Civil War—that our rights enshrined in the Constitution do not become less important or
enforceable because of exigent circumstances:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. Though our individual constitutional rights cannot be suspended or eliminated, they are, as noted,
subject to reasonable regulation by the state. And, when it comes to the power of the state to act
in the best interests of the public health when faced with a serious contagious disease, which is the
state interest acted upon by the Governor,
“[w]e are plowing no virgin field in considering the questions here involved. Numerous decisions, both federal and state, have considered the questions now before us. They are not all in accord and in some instances are not reconcilable. There is, however, a very marked trend in them in one direction, that which upholds the right of the state, in the exercise of its police power and in the interest of the public health, to enact such laws, such rules and regulations, as will prevent the spread of this dread disease.” [People ex rel Hill v Lansing Bd of Ed, 224 Mich
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388, 390; 195 NW 95 (1923). See, also, Jacobsen v Commonwealth of Mass, 197 US 11, 25-26; 25 S Ct 358; 49 L Ed 643 (1905) (upholding state’s power to require vaccination over plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to not be told what to do), and In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784-785.] As noted earlier, plaintiffs’ due process claims set out in Counts I and III are challenges to the quarantine11 requirement and (as amended by the changes contained in EO 2020-59), the prohibition on intrastate travel to a vacation rental. Plaintiffs’ specific assertion is that, although the state may have the ability to quarantine those who are infected with the virus, the state cannot quarantine everyone without some showing that the individual(s) are infected. Because EO 202059 does so, the executive order violates their right to procedural due process. The same holds true, they argue, for the prohibition of intrastate travel to a third parties’ vacation home.12
In addressing this argument, it is imperative to recognize the limited question the Court is empowered to decide. Except in limited circumstances mentioned later, it is not for the courts to pass on the wisdom of state action that is granted to it by the general police power or by statute. Certainly the state cannot simply ignore the individual rights enshrined in our federal (or state) constitution in the name of a public health threat. Judicial review of state actions is therefore (and quite obviously) appropriate and necessary. But the depth of that review is limited, and does not include delving deep into the pros and cons of what is the better plan of action between two reasonable alternatives. This point was well-made by three concurring Justices in Rock v Carney,
11 Plaintiffs characterize the “stay-at-home” provision as a quarantine, which defendants quarrel with, but quarantine is defined as “a restraint upon the activities or communications of persons … designed to prevent the spread of disease or pests.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed). 12 Plaintiffs have not asserted that they own a second home in Michigan or that they had rented a third parties’ vacation home for use during a time in which any executive order remained in place.
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216 Mich 280, 283; 185 NW 798 (1921), a case involving the state’s response to the spread of
venereal diseases during World War I:
The questions involved in this litigation are of supreme importance, not only to the individuals composing this commonwealth, but also to the numerous boards of health and to the state itself. We approach their consideration with a due regard of their importance. Neither a desire to sustain the state, nor a supersensitiveness prompted by the delicacy of the examination here involved, should in any way enter into or control our decision. Policies adopted by the legislative and executive branches of the state government are not submitted to this branch for approval as to their wisdom. They stand or fall in this court because valid or invalid under the law, and their wisdom or want of wisdom in no way rests with us. If valid, they must be upheld by this court; if invalid, they must be so declared by this court. If these defendants have transcended their power, they must be held liable, and they may not be excused from liability by the fact that their motives were of the highest. If they had not transcended their power, they are not liable, and supersensitiveness or preconceived notions of proprieties, no matter of how long standing, do not render them liable. The case must be determined by the application of cold rules of law. Thus, whether and to what extent this Court agrees with policy implemented in the executive orders
is of no moment or consideration. Instead, the Court must dutifully apply the “cold rules of law”
to determine the validity of the challenged provisions of the executive order.
Binding authority from the United States Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court
compels this Court to conclude that plaintiffs do not have a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits. This is not because the rights asserted by plaintiffs are not fundamental—being forced
(with some important exceptions) by the state to remain in one’s home, in turn causing many
residents to be unable to work, visit elderly relatives, and to generally move about the state. But
those liberty interests are, and always have been, subject to society’s interests—society being our
fellow residents. They—our fellow residents—have an interest to remain unharmed by a highly
communicable and deadly virus, and since the state entered the Union in 1837, it has had the broad
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power to act for the public health of the entire state when faced with a public crisis. As the
Jacobsen Court so aptly held:
The defendant insists that his liberty is invaded when the state subjects him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to submit to vaccination; that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against one who objects to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon his person. But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned.’ In Crowley v Christensen, 137 US 86, 89; 34 L Ed 620, 621; 11 S Ct 13 (we said: ‘The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law.’ [Jacobson, 197 US at 26; citations omitted in part; emphasis supplied.]
The role courts play under Jacobson and Lansing Bd of Ed is not to “second-guess the state’s
policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures,” In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784, but is
instead to determine whether the state regulation has a “real or substantial relation to the public
health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law.’ ” Id., quoting in part Jacobson, 197 US at 31. Part of this review includes
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looking to whether any exceptions apply for emergent situations, the duration of any rule, and whether the measures are pretextual. Id. at 785.13
Turning to plaintiffs’ specific challenges, the stay-at-home provision, the most restrictive portion of the executive order, was first implemented by the Governor on March 23, 2020, thirteen days after the first case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the state. Though there were at that point approximately 1,328 cases in the state and 15 reported deaths, Governor Witmer was not acting on a blank slate. Instead, it was common knowledge that the virus had already rapidly spread throughout the state of Washington, was prevalent in several other states, and was devastating parts of Italy, China, and other countries. Indeed, the speed at which the virus spread was well known at the time the stay-at-home provision was implemented. It is true that this measure is a severe one, and greatly restricts each of our liberties to move about as we see fit, as we do in normal times. But the governor determined that severe measures were necessary, and had to be quickly implemented to prevent the uncontrolled spreading of the virus. As noted, Michigan was not alone in this regard:
To be sure, [the order] is a drastic measure, but that aligns it with the numerous drastic measures Petitioners and other states have been forced to take in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Faced with exponential growth of COVID-19 cases, states have closed schools, sealed off nursing homes, banned social gatherings, quarantined travelers, prohibited churches from holding public worship services, and locked down entire cities. These measures would be constitutionally intolerable in ordinary times, but are recognized as appropriate and even necessary responses to the present crisis. [In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 787.]
13 Plaintiffs’ correctly note that Jacobson did not involve a state-wide requirement to stay at home, and instead addressed an involuntary vaccination program. But most cases have different facts, and it is the legal principle set forth in the decision that guides future courts. Thus, despite some factual differences, the Court relies (as did the In re Abbott court) upon Jacobson as it is the most relevant decision on this issue from the Supreme Court.
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Plaintiffs suggest that the better—and more constitutionally sound decision—would have been to quarantine only those who have the virus. It may have been a better option to some, as doing so may have had a less severe impact on the movement of the Michigan population, and may have reduced unemployment. Or, as plaintiffs argue, a more narrowly tailored order by region may have been more reasonable for the entire state. But some of that is simply hindsight, and to accept it would be to impermissibly delve too deep into the choices made. Additionally, the Governor’s concerns were not limited to what was most convenient or palatable at the time, as she also had to protect, to the extent possible, the health and safety of all Michigan residents and to not overburden the health care system. The introduction to EO 2020-59 outlines some of the other serious considerations that went into issuing the stringent order:
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. And, contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, the Supreme Court has upheld, against a constitutional challenge, a state’s quarantine of individuals even when they are not infected with the disease being controlled. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v Louisiana, 186 US 380, 393; 22 S Ct 811; 46 L Ed 1209 (1902).
As noted, the Court’s role is not to pick which alternative may be more reasonable, more preferential, or more narrowly tailored, as the latter is in deciding some constitutional cases. Monday morning quarterbacking is the role of sports fans, not courts reviewing the factual basis supporting executive action to protect the public health. Instead, it is the role of the executive and legislative branches to determine what steps are necessary when faced with a public health crisis.
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In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 792 (“Such authority [to determine what measures are best to take] properly belongs to the legislative and executive branches of the governing authority”); Rock, 216 Mich at 296; Lansing Bd of Ed, 224 Mich at 397.14 Under federalism principles, it is the States that retained the police power, and that power—though not unlimited—is quite broad. See Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519, 536; 132 S Ct 2566; 183 L Ed 2d 450 (2012) (“The States thus can and do perform many of the vital functions of modern government— punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few—even though the Constitution’s text does not authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Government, as the “police power”) and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich v Governor, 422 Mich 1, 73; 367 NW2d 1 (1985) (discussing the scope of the police power and how that power extends to enacting regulations to promote public health, safety, and welfare, and providing that regulations “passed pursuant to the police power carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality.”).
What the Court must do—and can only do—is determine whether the Governor’s orders are consistent with the law. Rock, 216 Mich at 283. Under the applicable standards, they are. The undisputed facts known at the time the first stay-at-home order was made, and the undisputed facts known today, compel the conclusion that the order had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. The challenged measures relate to limiting human interaction which helps control the spread of a virus considered to be extremely communicable. To make it voluntary, or more limited in scope, were perhaps other avenues to pursue, but even accepting that proposition does
14 As will be discussed shortly, the Legislature has also spoken on the issue of how to address emergent situations. MCL 10.21; MCL 30.401 et seq. Additionally, the Court takes notice that the Legislature recently established an oversight committee to review the measures implemented through the Governor’s various executive orders.
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not make what the Governor reasonably chose to do invalid. Instead, the Governor’s determination as to the speed and ease with which the virus spreads, and the potential impact that spread would have on the health care system, and the threat it had to the lives of thousands of Michigan residents in a short period of time, allows for the conclusion that the two challenged provisions had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. Jacobson, 197 US at 31. There is nothing presented to the Court to draw any other legal conclusion.15
Nor is there any evidence (or even a suggestion) that the stay-at-home provision was a pretext to accomplish some other objective. Additionally, the record is clear that these measures are temporary, and limited in time to address the speed at which the virus spreads, the status of the available health care system, and the need to get Michigan residents back to enjoying their liberties. Indeed, since this lawsuit was filed last week, the Governor issued EO 2020-59, easing some of the very restrictions challenged by plaintiffs, and has indicated more lifting of restrictions are imminent. Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in their challenge to the executive order restrictions.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMA16 Turning again to In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, the Court set forth the rather difficult standards governing a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute:
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving the law's invalidity. Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v
15 Plaintiffs submitted documentary evidence which, if believed, could allow a governor to issue a more narrowly tailored order. But because this Governor made a different conclusion that was likewise based on other supporting evidence related to the virus, her decision had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. 16 Plaintiffs do not challenge the Governor’s exercise of authority under either statute, nor whether she needs legislative approval to continue her emergency declaration.
-15-

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.442 Page 18 of 20
Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich App 394, 414-415; 878 NW2d 891 (2015). The challenging party must overcome a heavy burden because “[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional, and we have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Mayor of Cadillac v Blackburn, 306 Mich App 512, 516; 857 NW2d 529 (2014). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to “give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Superior Hotels, LLC v Mackinaw Twp, 282 Mich App 621, 628; 765 NW2d 31 (2009). To do so, we examine the plain language of the statute itself, and “[i]f the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted.” Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). [In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App at 569.]
As far as the Court can discern, plaintiffs’ challenge to the EMA is an as-applied one:
A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one of two ways: by either a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. This is an as-applied challenge, meaning that claimant has alleged “ ‘a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution’ of government action.” Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 223 n 27; 848 NW2d 380 (2014), quoting Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365, 395; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926). “The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative.” Ada v Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 US 1011, 1012; 113 S Ct 633; 121 L Ed 2d 564 (1992) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). See also United States v Frost, 125 F3d 346, 370 (CA 6, 1997). [In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App at 569-570.]
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the delegation of power from the Legislature to the executive will
likely not succeed. It is certainly true that the Legislature cannot grant some vague, unfettered
discretion to the executive to carry out what is a legislative function. But if the challenged
legislation contains sufficient guidance to the executive on how to execute the law to further the
Legislature’s policy, it does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. City of Ann Arbor v Nat’l Ctr
for Mfg Sciences, Inc, 204 Mich App 303, 308; 514 NW2d 224 (1994) (“[T]he standards must be
sufficiently broad to permit efficient administration so that the policy of the Legislature may be
complied with, but not so broad as to give uncontrolled and arbitrary power to the
administrators.”).
-16-

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.443 Page 19 of 20
As defendants point out, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the powers granted to the Governor are “limited,” and none of the provisions in the act are such that the executive would have “uncontrolled, arbitrary power.” Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308; 240 NW2d 206 (1976). The provisions of the EMA are not vague, and contain specific procedures and criteria for the Governor to declare a state of disaster or emergency, and what conditions qualify as a disaster or emergency. See MCL 30.402(e) and (h); MCL 30.403(3) and (4). The EMA also grants the Governor additional, specific duties and powers when addressing any declared disaster or emergency, MCL 30.405, and sets for a comprehensive state and local jurisdictional system to address declared state-wide disasters or emergencies. MCL 30.407-MCL 30.411. As a result, plaintiffs are unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits on this claim.
D. HARM TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST Finally, and for many of the same reasons, the Court concludes that entry of a preliminary injunction would be more detrimental to the public than it would to plaintiffs. Although the Court is painfully aware of the difficulties of living under the restrictions of these executive orders, those difficulties are temporary, while to those who contract the virus and cannot recover (and to their family members and friends), it is all too permanent. That is not to say that every new virus will require the action taken here, but given the authority of the Governor to do so in the face of these circumstances, the Court must conclude issuing injunctive relief would not serve the public interest, despite the temporary harm to plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
-17-

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.444 Page 20 of 20 VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Date: April 29, 2020

__________________________________ Christopher M. Murray Judge, Court of Claims

-18-

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.445 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.446 Page 2 of 8 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit B
2

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.447 Page 3 of 8

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Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations

Scientific brief

29 March 2020 ‫ العربية‬中文

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This version updates the 27 March publication by providing definitions of droplets by particle size and adding three relevant publications.
Modes of transmission of the COVID-19 virus
Respiratory infections can be transmitted through droplets of different sizes: when the droplet particles are >5-10 μm in diameter they are referred to as respiratory droplets, and when then are <5μm in diameter, they are referred to as droplet nuclei.1 According to current evidence, COVID-19 virus is primarily transmitted between people through respiratory droplets and contact routes.2-7 In an analysis of 75,465 COVID-19 cases in China, airborne transmission was not reported.8
Droplet transmission occurs when a person is in in close contact (within 1 m) with someone who has respiratory symptoms (e.g., coughing or sneezing) and is therefore at risk of having his/her mucosae (mouth and nose) or conjunctiva (eyes) exposed to potentially infective respiratory droplets. Transmission may also occur through fomites in the immediate environment around the infected person.8 Therefore,
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.448 Page 4 of 8 transmission of the COVID-19 virus can occur by direct contact with infected people and indirect contact with surfaces in the immediate environment or with objects used on the infected person (e.g., stethoscope or thermometer).
Airborne transmission is different from droplet transmission as it refers to the presence of microbes within droplet nuclei, which are generally considered to be particles <5μm in diameter, can remain in the air for long periods of time and be transmitted to others over distances greater than 1 m.
In the context of COVID-19, airborne transmission may be possible in specific circumstances and settings in which procedures or support treatments that generate aerosols are performed; i.e., endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, open suctioning, administration of nebulized treatment, manual ventilation before intubation, turning the patient to the prone position, disconnecting the patient from the ventilator, noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation, tracheostomy, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
There is some evidence that COVID-19 infection may lead to intestinal infection and be present in faeces. However, to date only one study has cultured the COVID-19 virus from a single stool specimen.9 There have been no reports of faecal−oral transmission of the COVID-19 virus to date.
Implications of recent findings of detection of COVID-19 virus from air sampling
To date, some scientific publications provide initial evidence on whether the COVID-19 virus can be detected in the air and thus, some news outlets have suggested that there has been airborne transmission. These initial findings need to be interpreted carefully.
A recent publication in the New England Journal of Medicine has evaluated virus persistence of the COVID-19 virus.10 In this experimental study, aerosols were generated using a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum under controlled laboratory conditions. This is a high-powered machine that does not reflect normal human cough conditions. Further, the finding of COVID-19 virus in aerosol particles up to 3 hours does not reflect a clinical setting in which aerosol-generating procedures are performed—that is, this was an experimentally induced aerosol-generating procedure.
There are reports from settings where symptomatic COVID-19 patients have been admitted and in which
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.449 Page 5 of 8 no COVID-19 RNA was detected in air samples.11-12 WHO is aware of other studies which have evaluated the presence of COVID-19 RNA in air samples, but which are not yet published in peer-reviewed journals. It is important to note that the detection of RNA in environmental samples based on PCR-based assays is not indicative of viable virus that could be transmissible. Further studies are needed to determine whether it is possible to detect COVID-19 virus in air samples from patient rooms where no procedures or support treatments that generate aerosols are ongoing. As evidence emerges, it is important to know whether viable virus is found and what role it may play in transmission.
Conclusions
Based on the available evidence, including the recent publications mentioned above, WHO continues to recommend droplet and contact precautions for those people caring for COVID-19 patients. WHO continues to recommend airborne precautions for circumstances and settings in which aerosol generating procedures and support treatment are performed, according to risk assessment.13 These recommendations are consistent with other national and international guidelines, including those developed by the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine and Society of Critical Care Medicine14 and those currently used in Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom.15-17
At the same time, other countries and organizations, including the US Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, recommend airborne precautions for any situation involving the care of COVID-19 patients, and consider the use of medical masks as an acceptable option in case of shortages of respirators (N95, FFP2 or FFP3).18-19
Current WHO recommendations emphasize the importance of rational and appropriate use of all PPE,20 not only masks, which requires correct and rigorous behavior from health care workers, particularly in doffing procedures and hand hygiene practices.21 WHO also recommends staff training on these recommendations,22 as well as the adequate procurement and availability of the necessary PPE and other supplies and facilities. Finally, WHO continues to emphasize the utmost importance of frequent hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and environmental cleaning and disinfection, as well as the importance of maintaining physical distances and avoidance of close, unprotected contact with people with fever or respiratory symptoms.
WHO carefully monitors emerging evidence about this critical topic and will update this scientific brief as more information becomes available.
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
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References
1. World Health Organization. Infection prevention and control of epidemic- and pandemic-prone acute respiratory infections in health care. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014 Available from: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/112656/9789241507134_eng.pdf?sequence=1
2. Liu J, Liao X, Qian S et al. Community transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, Shenzhen, China, 2020. Emerg Infect Dis 2020 doi.org/10.3201/eid2606.200239
3. Chan J, Yuan S, Kok K et al. A familial cluster of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-person transmission: a study of a family cluster. Lancet 2020 doi: 10.1016/S01406736(20)30154-9
4. Li Q, Guan X, Wu P, et al. Early transmission dynamics in Wuhan, China, of novel coronavirus-infected pneumonia. N Engl J Med 2020; doi:10.1056/NEJMoa2001316.
5. Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, et al. Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. Lancet 2020; 395: 497–506.
6. Burke RM, Midgley CM, Dratch A, Fenstersheib M, Haupt T, Holshue M,et al. Active monitoring of persons exposed to patients with confirmed COVID-19 — United States, January–February 2020. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2020 doi : 10.15585/mmwr.mm6909e1external icon
7. World Health Organization. Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 16-24 February 2020 [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 Available from: https://www.who.int/docs/default- source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-finalreport.pdf
8. Ong SW, Tan YK, Chia PY, Lee TH, Ng OT, Wong MS, et al. Air, surface environmental, and personal protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient. JAMA. 2020 Mar 4 [Epub ahead of print].
9. Zhang Y, Chen C, Zhu S et al. [Isolation of 2019-nCoV from a stool specimen of a laboratory-confirmed case of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)]. China CDC Weekly. 2020;2(8):123–4. (In Chinese)
10. van Doremalen N, Morris D, Bushmaker T et al. Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as compared with SARS-CoV-1. New Engl J Med 2020 doi: 10.1056/NEJMc2004973
11. Cheng V, Wong S-C, Chen J, Yip C, Chuang V, Tsang O, et al. Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2020 Mar 5 [Epub ahead of print].
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.451 Page 7 of 8 12. Ong SW, Tan YK, Chia PY, Lee TH, Ng OT, Wong MS, et al. Air, surface environmental, and personal
protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient. JAMA. 2020
13. WHO Infection Prevention and Control Guidance for COVID-19 available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/infectionprevention-and-control
14. Surviving Sepsis Campaign: Guidelines on the Management of Critically Ill Adults with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Intensive Care Medicine DOI: 10.1007/s00134-020-06022-5 https://www.sccm.org/SurvivingSepsisCampaign/Guidelines/COVID-19
15. Interim guidelines for the clinical management of COVID-19 in adults Australasian Society for Infectious Diseases Limited (ASID) https://www.asid.net.au/documents/item/1873
16. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): For health professionals. https://www.canada.ca/en/publichealth/services/diseases/2019-novel-coronavirus-infection/health-professionals.html
17. Guidance on infection prevention and control for COVID-19 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/wuhan-novel-coronavirus-infection-prevention-and-control
18. Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/infection-control/control-recommendations.html
19. Infection prevention and control for COVID-19 in healthcare settings https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/infection-prevention-and-control-covid-19-healthcaresettings
20. Rational use of PPE for COVID-19. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331498/WHO-2019nCoV-IPCPPE_use-2020.2-eng.pdf
21. Risk factors of Healthcare Workers with Corona Virus Disease 2019: A Retrospective Cohort Study in a Designated Hospital of Wuhan in China. https://academic.oup.com/cid/advancearticle/doi/10.1093/cid/ciaa287/5808788
22. Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Course. https://openwho.org/courses/COVID-19-IPC-EN
WHO continues to monitor the situation closely for any changes that may affect this interim guidance. Should any factors change, WHO will issue a further update. Otherwise, this scientific brief will expire 2 years after the date of publication.
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.452 Page 8 of 8 © World Health Organization 2020. Some rights reserved. This work is available under the CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO license.
WHO reference number: WHO/2019-nCoV/Sci_Brief/Transmission_modes/2020.2
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Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.453 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.454 Page 2 of 6 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit C
2

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.455 Page 3 of 6
Search


Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Social Distancing

Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread
OOtthherr LLaanngguaugaegses PPrriinnt PPaaggee
Limiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
What is social distancing?
Social distancing, also called “physical distancing,” means keeping space between yourself and other people outside of your home. To practice social or physical distancing:
Stay at least 6 feet (2 meters) from other people Do not gather in groups Stay out of crowded places and avoid mass gatherings
In addition to everyday steps to prevent COVID-19, keeping space between you and others is one of the best tools we have to avoid being exposed to this virus and slowing its spread locally and across the country and world.
When COVID-19 is spreading in your area, everyone should limit close contact with individuals outside your household in indoor and outdoor spaces. Since people can spread the virus before they know they are sick, it is important to stay away from others when possible, even if you have no symptoms. Social distancing is especially important for people who are at higher risk of getting very sick.

Why practice social distancing?
COVID-19 spreads mainly among people who are in close contact (within about 6 feet) for a
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.456 Page 4 of 6 prolonged period. Spread happens when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, and droplets from their mouth or nose are launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby. The droplets can also be inhaled into the lungs. Recent studies indicate that people who are infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of COVID-19.
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or eyes. However, this is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads. COVID-19 can live for hours or days on a surface, depending on factors such as sun light and humidity. Social distancing helps limit contact with infected people and contaminated surfaces.
Although the risk of severe illness may be different for everyone, anyone can get and spread COVID-19. Everyone has a role to play in slowing the spread and protecting themselves, their family, and their community.
Tips for social distancing
Follow guidance from authorities where you live. If you need to shop for food or medicine at the grocery store or pharmacy, stay at least 6 feet away from others.
Use mail-order for medications, if possible. Consider a grocery delivery service. Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when around others, including when you have to go out in public, for example to the grocery store.
Stay at least 6 feet between yourself and others, even when you wear a face covering.
Avoid large and small gatherings in private places and public spaces, such a friend’s house, parks, restaurants, shops, or any other place. This advice applies to people of any age, including teens and younger adults. Children should not have in-person playdates while school is out. To help maintain social connections while social distancing, learn tips to keep children healthy while school’s out. Work from home when possible. If possible, avoid using any kind of public transportation, ridesharing, or taxis. If you are a student or parent, talk to your school about options for digital/distance learning.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.457 Page 5 of 6 Stay connected while staying away. It is very important to stay in touch with friends and family that don’t live in your home. Call, video chat, or stay connected using social media. Everyone reacts differently to stressful situations and having to socially distance yourself from someone you love can be difficult. Read tips for stress and coping.
What is the difference between quarantine and isolation?
Quarantine
Quarantine is used to keep someone who might have been exposed to COVID-19 away from others. Someone in self-quarantine stays separated from others, and they limit movement outside of their home or current place. A person may have been exposed to the virus without knowing it (for example, when traveling or out in the community), or they could have the virus without feeling symptoms. Quarantine helps limit further spread of COVID-19.
Isolation
Isolation is used to separate sick people from healthy people. People who are in isolation should stay home. In the home, anyone sick should separate themselves from others by staying in a specific “sick” bedroom or space and using a different bathroom (if possible).
What should I do if I might have been exposed? If I feel sick? Or have confirmed COVID-19?
If you think you have been exposed to COVID-19, read about symptoms.
If you or someone in your home might have been exposed
Self-Monitor
Be alert for symptoms. Watch for fever,* cough, or shortness of breath.
Take your temperature if symptoms develop.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.458 Page 6 of 6 Practice social distancing. Maintain 6 feet of distance from others, and stay out of crowded places. Follow CDC guidance if symptoms develop.
If you feel healthy but: Recently had close contact with a person with COVID-19, or Recently traveled from somewhere outside the U.S. or on a cruise ship or river boat
Self-Quarantine Check your temperature twice a day and watch for symptoms. Stay home for 14 days and selfmonitor. If possible, stay away from people who are high-risk for getting very sick from COVID-19.
If you: Have been diagnosed with COVID-19, or Are waiting for test results, or Have symptoms such as cough, fever, or shortness of breath
Self-Isolate
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.459 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.460 Page 2 of 8 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit D
2

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.461 Page 3 of 8
SCIENCE |
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Flattening the Coronavirus Curve
One chart explains why slowing the spread of the infection is nearly as important as stopping it.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
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The longer it takes for coronavirus to spread the population, the more time hospitals have to prepare. Drew Harris
By Siobhan Roberts March 27, 2020
At the end of February, Drew Harris, a population health analyst at Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, had just flown across the country to visit his daughter in Eugene, Ore., when he saw an article on his Google news feed. It was from The Economist, and was about limiting the damage of the coronavirus. The accompanying art, by the visual-data journalist Rosamund Pearce, based on a graphic that had appeared in a C.D.C. paper titled “Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza,” showed what Dr. Harris called two epi curves. One had a steep peak indicating a surge of coronavirus outbreak in the near term; the other had a flatter slope, indicating a more gradual rate of infection over a longer period of time. The gentler curve results in fewer people infected at this critical moment in time — preventing a surge that would inundate the healthcare system and ultimately, one hopes, resulting in fewer deaths. “What we need to do is flatten that down,” said Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, during the coronavirus task force briefing at the White House on a Tuesday evening in early March. “You do that with trying to interfere with the natural flow of the outbreak.” The infographic reminded Dr. Harris of something similar that he had designed years earlier for a pandemic preparedness training program. “Folks in the preparedness and public health community have been
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
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thinking about all of these issues for many years,” Dr. Harris said in an email. “Understanding and managing surge is an important part of preparedness.” But during the training course, Dr. Harris’s students had struggled with the concept of reducing the epidemic curve, so he added a dotted line indicating hospital capacity — “to make clear what was at stake,” he said.
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After his visit with his daughter, Dr. Harris was waiting for his return flight in Portland when the first Oregon coronavirus case was announced; he had dinner at a busy airport bar and thought about how quiet the place would be in a week or two when the reality of the outbreak set in. Once home, he recreated his graphic and posted it on Twitter and LinkedIn, and was pleased to see the enthusiastic interest in flattening the curve.
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“Now I know what going viral means,” Dr. Harris said. (For a more detailed analysis, see a recent paper in The Lancet, “How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?”)
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The following is an edited version of our email conversation.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.464 Page 6 of 8
What does it mean to “flatten the curve”?
The ideal goal in fighting an epidemic or pandemic is to completely halt the spread. But merely slowing it — mitigation — is critical. This reduces the number of cases that are active at any given time, which in turn gives doctors, hospitals, police, schools and vaccine-manufacturers time to prepare and respond, without becoming overwhelmed. Most hospitals can function with 10 percent reduction in staff, but not with half their people out at once. Some commentators have argued for getting the outbreak over with quickly. That is a recipe for panic, unnecessary suffering and death. Slowing and spreading out the tidal wave of cases will save lives. Flattening the curve keeps society going.
What exactly do those two curves show?
Both curves add up the number of new cases over time. The more people reporting with the virus on a given day, the higher the curve; a high curve means the virus is spreading fast. A low curve shows that the virus is spreading slower — fewer people are diagnosed with the disease on any given day. Keeping the curve down — diminishing the rate at which new cases occur — prevents overtaxing the finite resources (represented by the dotted line) available to treat it.
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Think of the health care system capacity as a subway car that can only hold so many people at once. During rush hour, that capacity is not enough to handle the demand, so people must wait on the platform for their turn to ride. Staggering work hours diminishes the rush hour and increases the likelihood that you will get on the train and maybe even get a seat. Avoiding a surge of coronavirus cases can ensure that anyone who needs care will find it at the hospital.
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How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.465 Page 7 of 8
What sorts of mitigation measures help transform the red curve into the blue curve?
Diseases spread when one person gives it to one or more others, who go on to give it to more people, and so on. How fast this occurs depends on many factors, including how contagious the disease is, how many people are vulnerable and how quickly they get sick.
The difference between seasonal flu and coronavirus is that many people have full or partial immunity to the flu virus because they have had it before or were vaccinated against it. Far more people are vulnerable to coronavirus, so it has many more targets of opportunity to spread. Keeping people apart in time and space with social distancing measures, selfisolation and actual quarantine decreases opportunities for transmission.
To take the subway example again, a packed car — or a packed subway platform — is a great place to spread the virus. But reducing the number of people on the train or platform, by asking people to work from home or to stagger their working hours, enables individuals to stay farther apart, limiting the spread of the virus. That is social distancing in action.
Mitigation efforts keep people farther apart, making every transmission opportunity marginally less likely. This slows the spread. We should, and will, take the most vulnerable people out of the population altogether by keeping them totally separate. This is what Washington State is trying to do by limiting visitors to nursing homes. Think of this as a reverse quarantine.
What are you doing day-to-day in response to these unusual times?
Like most everyone else, I’m more aware of my surroundings and behaviors. I try to use a sleeve or elbow to open doors, and I wash my hands or use hand sanitizers after I touch a surface that might be contaminated. And I made sure to have a good supply of my prescription and nonprescription medications, just in case any shortages occur after the shutdown of Chinese pharmaceutical suppliers. I’m following the lead of my public health officials here in Philadelphia, where there is only one case as of Tuesday, and travel isn’t restricted. I’m avoiding crowds and sick people. I am going out, and will continue to do so unless a quarantine is ordered or public places are closed.
I know there is a good chance that I will catch the virus before a vaccine becomes available, but I also believe I’m very likely to do fine. I’m not in any high-risk group. But I worry about the more vulnerable folks and want
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.466 Page 8 of 8
to do what I can to prevent the spread. I also worry about people who lack the resources I have. What happens to the self-employed, hourly workers and people in the gig economy when business stops? What about the homeless who depend upon charity and services for support? It’s these second-order effects that could be just as devastating if this epidemic really takes off.
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Coronavirus and statistics The Exponential Power of Now March 13, 2020
The Coronavirus, by the Numbers March 5, 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-6 filed 06/08/20 PageID.467 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-6 filed 06/08/20 PageID.468 Page 2 of 4 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit E
2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-6 filed 06/08/20 PageID.469 Page 3 of 4

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-7 filed 06/08/20 PageID.471 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-7 filed 06/08/20 PageID.472 Page 2 of 4 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit F
2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-7 filed 06/08/20 PageID.473 Page 3 of 4

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-8 filed 06/08/20 PageID.475 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-8 filed 06/08/20 PageID.476 Page 2 of 5 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit G
2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-8 filed 06/08/20 PageID.477 Page 3 of 5

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-9 filed 06/08/20 PageID.480 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-9 filed 06/08/20 PageID.481 Page 2 of 5 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit H
2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-9 filed 06/08/20 PageID.482 Page 3 of 5

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.485 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.486 Page 2 of 5 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit I
2

5/22/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.487 Page 3 of 5
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF MICHIGAN.GOV

THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER



WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Order 2020-17 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-17

Temporary restrictions on non-essential medical and dental procedures
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identiﬁed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.

On March 10, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services identiﬁed the ﬁrst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401-.421, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31-.33.
 The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e]
with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and eﬀect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the aﬀected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).

https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522451--,00.html

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5/22/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.488 Page 4 of 5 To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, provide essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders, and ensure the availability of health care resources, it is reasonable and necessary to impose temporary restrictions on non-essential medical and dental procedures.

Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:

1. Beginning as soon as possible but no later than March 21, 2020 at 5:00 pm, and continuing while the state of emergency declared in Executive 2020-4 is in eﬀect, all hospitals, freestanding surgical outpatient facilities, and dental facilities, and all state-operated outpatient facilities (collectively, “covered facilities”), must implement a plan to temporarily postpone, until the termination of the state of emergency under section 3 of Executive Order 2020-4, all non-essential procedures (“non-essential procedure postponement plan” or “plan”). For purposes of this order, “non-essential procedure” means a medical or dental procedure that is not necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a patient, as determined by a licensed medical provider.

2. A plan for a covered facility that performs medical procedures, including any medical center or oﬃce that performs elective surgery or cosmetic plastic surgery, must postpone, at a minimum, joint replacement, bariatric surgery, and cosmetic surgery, except for emergency or trauma-related surgery where postponement would signiﬁcantly impact the health, safety, and welfare of the patient. A plan for a covered facility that performs medical procedures should exclude from postponement: surgeries related to advanced cardiovascular disease (including coronary artery disease, heart failure, and arrhythmias) that would prolong life; oncological testing, treatment, and related procedures; pregnancyrelated visits and procedures; labor and delivery; organ transplantation; and procedures related to dialysis. A plan for a covered facility that performs medical procedures must exclude from postponement emergency or trauma-related procedures where
 postponement would signiﬁcantly impact the health, safety, and welfare of the patient.

3. A plan for a covered facility that performs dental procedures must postpone, at a minimum: any cosmetic or aesthetic procedures (such as veneers, teeth bleaching, or cosmetic bonding); any routine hygiene appointments; any orthodontic procedures that do not relieve pain or infection, do not restore oral function, or are not trauma-related; initiation of any crowns, bridges, or dentures that do not relieve pain or infection, do not restore oral function, or are not trauma-related; any periodontal plastic surgery; any extractions of asymptomatic non-carious teeth; and any recall visits for periodontally healthy patients. If a covered facility that performs dental procedures chooses to remain

https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522451--,00.html

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5/22/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.489 Page 5 of 5 open, its plan must exclude from postponement emergency or trauma-related procedures where postponement would signiﬁcantly impact the health, safety, and welfare of the patient.
4. A covered facility must comply with the restrictions contained in its non-essential procedure postponement plan.
5. This order does not alter any of the obligations under law of an a ected health care facility to its employees or to the employees of another employer.
6. The director of the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Aﬀairs shall issue orders or directives pursuant to law as necessary to enforce this order.
7. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.490 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.491 Page 2 of 14 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit J
2

5/22/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.492 Page 3 of 14
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF MICHIGAN.GOV

THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER



WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Order 2020-96 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-96
Temporary requirement to suspend certain activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-17, 2020-34, and 2020-92
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identiﬁed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identiﬁed the ﬁrst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, conﬁrmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of
 emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of
the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, ﬁnding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 202067 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and eﬀect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the

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5/22/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.493 Page 4 of 14 Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the aﬀected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, and 202092, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been eﬀective: the number of new conﬁrmed cases each day has started to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 20, 2020, Michigan reported 53,009 conﬁrmed cases and 5,060 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We can now start the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities that were temporarily suspended under my prior orders. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to inﬂict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
With this order, I ﬁnd it reasonable and necessary to reaﬃrm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-92, while also allowing gatherings of no more than ten people statewide, eﬀective immediately, and permitting retailers and motor vehicle dealerships to see customers by appointment, beginning on May 26, 2020. In addition, because our health-care capacity has improved with respect to personal protective equipment, available beds, personnel, ventilators, and necessary supplies, I ﬁnd it reasonable to rescind Executive Orders 2020-17 and 2020-34, which required health-care and veterinary facilities to implement plans to postpone some medical and dental procedures. Those rescissions will take eﬀect on May 29.
 Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
I. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life.
II. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions: a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne. b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia. c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.

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d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson. h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton,
Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa. III. Subject to the exceptions in section 8 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited. IV. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances. V. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life, to conduct minimum basic operations, or to perform a resumed activity within the meaning of this order. a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are deﬁned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 9 and 10 of this order. b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee beneﬁts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely. Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to
  conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it. c. Workers who perform resumed activities are deﬁned in section 11 of this order. VI. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities may continue in-person operations, subject to the following

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conditions: a. Consistent with sections 9, 10, and 11 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate: 1. Workers in health care and public health. 2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 7 of this order. 3. Workers and volunteers described in section 10(d) of this order. b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life or to perform a resumed activity must be suspended. c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it. d. Any business or operation that employs workers who perform resumed activities under section 11(a) of this order, but that does not sell necessary supplies, may sell any goods through remote sales via delivery or at the curbside. Such a business or operation, however, must otherwise remain closed to the public.
VII. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) are suspended unless: a. They are performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and ﬁrst responders, as deﬁned in sections 9 and 10 of this order. b. They are performed by workers who are permitted to resume work under section 11 of this order. c. They are necessary to support the activities of workers described in sections 9, 10, and 11 of this order, or to enable transactions that support businesses or operations that employ such workers. d. They involve public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and
  composting), the management and oversight of elections, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order. e. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in 5(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated. f. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it. VIII. Exceptions.
a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary:

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1. To engage in outdoor recreational activity, consistent with remaining at least six

feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor recreational

activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, boating, golﬁng, or other

similar activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited

mobility.

2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so

designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be

designated under section 6(a) of this order may leave their home for work

without being designated.)

3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 5(b) of this

order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.

4. To perform resumed activities, as described in section 11 of this order, after

being designated to perform such work by their employers.

5. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 7 of this

order.

6. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health

and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals

may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or

to seek medical or dental care for themselves or a household or family

member.

7. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or

household members, their pets, and their motor vehicles.

A. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the

maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the

home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline,

needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain

the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences or motor

vehicles.

B. Individuals may also leave the home to pick up or return a motor vehicle

as permitted under section 10(i) of this order, or to go to a motor vehicle

dealership showroom by appointment, as permitted under section 11(p)

of this order.



 C. Individuals may leave the home to have a bicycle repaired or maintained.

D. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible,

the number of household members who leave the home for any errands.

8. To pick up non-necessary supplies at the curbside from a store that must

otherwise remain closed to the public.

9. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.

10. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other

vulnerable persons.

11. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care

facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.

12. To visit a child in out-of-home care, or to facilitate a visit between a parent and

a child in out-of-home care, when there is agreement between the child placing

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5/22/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.497 Page 8 of 14
agency, the parent, and the caregiver about a safe visitation plan, or when, failing such agreement, the individual secures an exception from the executive director of the Children’s Services Agency. 13. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court. 14. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonproﬁt organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities. 15. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance. 16. To attend a meeting of an addiction recovery mutual aid society, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance. 17. To view a real-estate listing by appointment, as permitted under section 11(g) of this order. 18. To participate in training, credentialing, or licensing activities permitted under section 11(i) of this order. 19. For individuals in Regions 6 or 8, to go to a restaurant or a retail store. 20. To go to a retail store by appointment, as permitted under section 11(q) of this order. 21. To attend a social gathering of no more than 10 people. b. Individuals may also travel: 1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state. 2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere. 3. Between two residences in this state, including moving to a new residence. 4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement. c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals. IX. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.
 Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers
include some workers in each of the following sectors: a. Health care and public health. b. Law enforcement, public safety, and ﬁrst responders. c. Food and agriculture. d. Energy. e. Water and wastewater. f. Transportation and logistics. g. Public works. h. Communications and information technology, including news media. i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions. j. Critical manufacturing.

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k. Hazardous materials.

l. Financial services.

m. Chemical supply chains and safety.

n. Defense industrial base.

X. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:

a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to

the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure

workers, workers who conduct minimum basic operations, workers who perform

necessary government activities, or workers who perform resumed activities. This

category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for

the children or dependents of such workers.

b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below.

1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued

operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or

operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical

infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person

presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so

designated.

2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued

operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of

suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in sub-provision

(1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure

workers provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is

necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.

3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under sub-provision (2) of this

subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further

down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable,

support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers,

or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical

infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person

presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so

designated.



 4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their

designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the

fullest extent of the law.

c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be

done by telephone or remotely.

d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and

secular nonproﬁt organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of

life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who

need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.

e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer

health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union

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members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or

monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.

f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary

to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences or motor

vehicles, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair

stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers.

g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners.

h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not oﬀer

additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment

facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities.

i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and

electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that

showrooms remain closed to in-person traﬃc until May 26, 2020 at 12:01 am.

XI. For purposes of this order, workers who perform resumed activities are deﬁned as

follows:

a. Workers who process or fulﬁll remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pick-

up.

b. Workers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair.

c. Workers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping

operations.

d. Workers for moving or storage operations.

e. Workers who perform work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors,

including but not limited to forestry workers, outdoor power equipment technicians,

parking enforcement workers, and outdoor workers at places of outdoor recreation

not otherwise closed under Executive Order 2020-69 or any order that may follow

from it.

f. Workers in the construction industry, including workers in the building trades

(plumbers, electricians, HVAC technicians, and similar workers).

g. Workers in the real-estate industry, including agents, appraisers, brokers, inspectors,

surveyors, and registers of deeds, provided that:

1. Any showings, inspections, appraisals, photography or videography, or ﬁnal

walk-throughs must be performed by appointment and must be limited to no



 more than four people on the premises at any one time. No in-person open

houses are permitted.

2. Private showings may only be arranged for owner-occupied homes, vacant

homes, vacant land, commercial property, and industrial property.

h. Workers necessary to the manufacture of goods that support workplace modiﬁcation

to forestall the spread of COVID-19 infections.

i. Workers necessary to train, credential, and license ﬁrst responders (e.g., police

oﬃcers, ﬁre ﬁghters, paramedics) and health-care workers, including certiﬁed

nursing assistants, provided that as much instruction as possible is provided

remotely.

j. Workers necessary to perform manufacturing activities. Manufacturing work may not

commence under this subsection until the facility at which the work will be

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performed has been prepared to follow the workplace safeguards described in

section 4 of Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it.

k. Workers necessary to conduct research activities in a laboratory setting.

l. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, 2020, workers necessary to

perform retail activities. For purposes of this order, retail activities are deﬁned:

1. As the selling of goods and the rendering of services incidental to the sale of the

goods (e.g., any packaging and processing to allow for or facilitate the sale and

delivery of the goods).

2. To exclude those places of public accommodation that are closed under

Executive Order 2020-69 and any orders that may follow from it.

m. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, 2020, workers who work in an

oﬃce setting, but only to the extent that such work is not capable of being

performed remotely.

n. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, 2020, workers in restaurants

or bars, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in

Executive Order 2020-97. Nothing in this subsection should be taken to abridge or

otherwise modify the existing power of a local government to impose further

restrictions on restaurants or bars. For restaurants and bars subject to this

subsection, this subsection supersedes the limitations placed on those restaurants

and bars by Executive Order 2020-69 and any order that may follow from it.

o. Workers necessary to prepare a workplace to follow the workplace standards

described in Executive Order 2020-97 and to otherwise ready the workplace for

reopening.

p. Beginning at 12:01 am on May 26, 2020, workers at motor vehicle dealerships,

provided that showrooms are open only by appointment.

q. Beginning at 12:01 am on May 26, 2020, workers necessary to perform retail

activities by appointment, provided that the store is limited to 10 customers at any

one time. For purposes of this order, retail activities are deﬁned:

1. As the selling of goods and the rendering of services incidental to the sale of the

goods (e.g., any packaging and processing to allow for or facilitate the sale and

delivery of the goods).

2. To exclude those places of public accommodation that are closed under



Executive Order 2020-69 and any orders that may follow from it.



r. Consistent with section 10(b) of this order, workers at suppliers, distribution centers,

or service providers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or

facilitate another business’s or operation’s resumed activities, including workers at

suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers along the supply chain whose in-

person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of

another supplier, distribution center, or service provider in enabling, supporting, or

facilitating another business’s or operation’s resumed activities. Suppliers,

distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority

under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.

XII. Any store that is open for in-store sales under section 10(f), section 11(c), or section 11(q)

of this executive order:

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a. May continue to sell goods other than necessary supplies if the sale of such goods is in the ordinary course of business.
b. Must consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store traﬃc and mitigate outdoor lines.
XIII. No one shall rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional aiding in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a volunteer who is aiding the same.
XIV. Michigan state parks remain open for day use, subject to any reductions in services and speciﬁc closures that, in the judgment of the director of the Department of Natural Resources, are necessary to minimize large gatherings and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
XV. Rules governing face coverings. a. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any individual able to medically tolerate a face covering must wear a covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space. b. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identiﬁcation purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering while seated at a restaurant or bar. c. All businesses and operations whose workers perform in-person work must, at a minimum, provide non-medical grade face coverings to their workers. d. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, ﬁrst responders (e.g., police oﬃcers, ﬁre ﬁghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public. e. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
XVI. Except as otherwise expressly stated in this order, nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in eﬀect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject
 topenalty under section 22 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No
individual is subject to penalty under section 22 of this order for engaging in or traveling to engage in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating section 15(a) of this order. XVII. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances. XVIII. This order takes eﬀect immediately, unless otherwise speciﬁed in this order, and continues through May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. XIX. Executive Order 2020-17, which imposed temporary requirements regarding the postponement of non-essential medical and dental procedures, is rescinded as of May 28,

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5/22/2020Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.502 Page 13 of 14 2020 at 11:59 pm. Executive Order 2020-34, which imposed temporary requirements regarding the postponement of veterinary services, is rescinded as of May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Outpatient health-care facilities, including veterinary oﬃces, are subject to the workplace safety rules described in Executive Order 2020-97.
XX. Executive Orders 2020-92 is rescinded. All references to that order in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order.
XXI. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether suﬃcient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
XXII. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
Date: May 21 2020
Time: 9:49 am

RELATED CONTENT
Executive Order 2020-95 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020) Executive Order 2020-97 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020) Executive Order 2020-93 (COVID-19) (May 20, 2020)
 Executive Order 2020-94 (May 19, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-85 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-88 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-92 (COVID-19) (May 18, 2020) - Rescinded Executive Order 2020-91 (COVID-19) (May 18, 2020) - Rescinded Executive Order 2020-86 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-87 (COVID-19)
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
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5/22/2020Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.503 Page 14 of 14 Executive Order 2020-89 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-90 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-84 (COVID-19) - Rescinded Executive Order 2020-81 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-83 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-82 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-79 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-80 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-78 (COVID-19) Executive Order 2020-75 (COVID-19)
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-529860--,00.html

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-12 filed 06/08/20 PageID.505 Page 2 of 10 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit K
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-13 filed 06/08/20 PageID.514 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-13 filed 06/08/20 PageID.515 Page 2 of 9 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit L
2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-13 filed 06/08/20 PageID.516 Page 3 of 9
EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-110
Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses
Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identified in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identified the first two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, confirmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, finding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.
GEORGE W. ROMNEY BUILDING • 111 SOUTH CAPITOL AVENUE • LANSING, MICHIGAN 48909 www.michigan.gov
PRINTED IN-HOUSE

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-13 filed 06/08/20 PageID.517 Page 4 of 9
On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a sufficient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the effects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a sufficient legal basis for this order.
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 202077, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been effective: the number of new confirmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 31, 2020, Michigan reported 57,397 confirmed cases and 5,491 deaths— the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to inflict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
With this order, I find it reasonable and necessary to move the state to Stage 4 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan. As a result, Michiganders are no longer required to stay home. Instead, certain businesses will remain closed and specific activities that present a
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heightened risk of infection will remain prohibited. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely must be performed remotely.
Under this order, retailers will be allowed to resume operations on June 4. Restaurants and bars may reopen fully on June 8. Swimming pools and day camps for kids will also be permitted to reopen on the same day. Those businesses and activities will be subject to safety guidance to mitigate the risk of infection. Other businesses and activities that necessarily involve close contact and shared surfaces, including gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, casinos, and similar establishments, will remain closed for the time being.
Michiganders must continue to wear face coverings when in enclosed public spaces and should continue to take all reasonable precautions to protect themselves, their co-workers, their loved ones, and their communities. Indoor social gatherings and events of more than 10 people are prohibited. Outdoor social gatherings and events are permitted so long as people maintain six feet of distance from one another and the assemblage consists of no more than 100 people.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
(a) Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
(b) Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
(c) Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
(d) Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
(e) Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
(f) Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
(g) Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
(h) Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
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2. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) must be performed remotely.
3. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
4. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
(a) Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
(b) Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
(1) An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identification purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
(2) Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
(3) Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, first responders (e.g., police officers, fire fighters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
(4) The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
5. Indoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but may not exceed 10 people.
6. Outdoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but only to the extent that:
(a) The gathering or event does not exceed 100 people, and
(b) People not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.
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7. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modifications necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as defined by MCL 333.12521(d), may open as of June 8, 2020, provided that they are outdoors and limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code, and subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. Indoor public swimming pools must remain closed.
9. Day camps for children, as defined by Rule 400.11101(i) of the Michigan Administrative Code, may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code must remain closed for the time being.
10. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, libraries and museums may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to the rules governing retail stores described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
11. Stores that were closed under Executive Order 2020-96 (or that were open only by appointment under the same order) must remain closed to the public (or open only by appointment) until June 4 at 12:01 am. Such stores may then resume normal operations, subject to local regulation and to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
12. Subject to the exceptions in section 14, the following places are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
(a) Indoor theaters, cinemas, and performance venues.
(b) Indoor gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, sports facilities, exercise facilities, exercise studios, and the like.
(c) Facilities offering non-essential personal care services, including hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that involve close contact of persons.
(d) Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board.
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(e) Indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes, such as amusement parks, arcades, bingo halls, bowling alleys, indoor climbing facilities, indoor dance areas, skating rinks, trampoline parks, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
13. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffeehouses, bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and like places may be open to the public as follows:
(a) For delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and may permit up to five members of the public at one time for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
(b) In Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, beginning at 12:01 am on June 8, 2020, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
(c) In Regions 6 and 8, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
14. The restrictions imposed by sections 12 and 13 of this order do not apply to any of the following:
(a) Outdoor fitness classes, athletic practices, training sessions, or games, provided that coaches, spectators, and participants not from the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times during such activities, and that equipment and supplies are shared to the minimum extent possible and are subject to frequent and thorough disinfection and cleaning.
(b) Services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
(c) Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities.
(d) Crisis shelters or similar institutions.
(e) Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
(f) Employees, contractors, vendors, or suppliers who enter, use, or occupy the places described in section 12 of this order in their professional capacity.
15. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge
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protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
16. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 4(b) of this order.
17. Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96 are rescinded. Except as specified, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes effect immediately unless otherwise specified.
18. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether sufficient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
19. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.

Date: June 1, 2020 Time: 2:27 pm

___________________________________ GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
By the Governor:
___________________________________ SECRETARY OF STATE
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-14 filed 06/08/20 PageID.523 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) Butzel Long, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 150 W. Jefferson Avenue, Ste. 100 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Joseph Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov fowlerd1@michigan.gov

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-14 filed 06/08/20 PageID.524 Page 2 of 8 Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan Attorney for Interested Party United States of America 330 Ionia Avenue, N.W. Grand Rapids, MI (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov
Exhibit M
2

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-14 filed 06/08/20 PageID.525 Page 3 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A1044
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[May 29, 2020]
The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is denied.
JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH would grant the application.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief.
The Governor of California’s Executive Order aims to limit the spread of COVID–19, a novel severe acute respiratory illness that has killed thousands of people in California and more than 100,000 nationwide. At this time, there is no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine. Because people may be infected but asymptomatic, they may unwittingly infect others. The Order places temporary numerical restrictions on public gatherings to address this extraordinary health emergency. State guidelines currently limit attendance at places of worship to 25% of building capacity or a maximum of 100 attendees.
Applicants seek to enjoin enforcement of the Order. “Such a request demands a significantly higher justification than a request for a stay because, unlike a stay, an injunction does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.” Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 562 U. S. 996 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 18-14 filed 06/08/20 PageID.526 Page 4 of 8
2 SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
power is used where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear” and, even then, “sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §17.4, p. 17-9 (11th ed. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases).
Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.
The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety and the health of the people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard and protect.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 38 (1905). When those officials “undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad.” Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). Where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985).
That is especially true where, as here, a party seeks

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Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

3

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
emergency relief in an interlocutory posture, while local officials are actively shaping their response to changing facts on the ground. The notion that it is “indisputably clear” that the Government’s limitations are unconstitutional seems quite improbable.

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Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A1044
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[May 29, 2020]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief.
I would grant the Church’s requested temporary injunction because California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses. Such discrimination violates the First Amendment.
In response to the COVID–19 health crisis, California has now limited attendance at religious worship services to 25% of building capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower. The basic constitutional problem is that comparable secular businesses are not subject to a 25% occupancy cap, includ-
ing factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries.
South Bay United Pentecostal Church has applied for temporary injunctive relief from California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services. Importantly, the Church is willing to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses, including the rules regarding social distancing and hygiene. But the Church objects to a 25% occupancy cap that is imposed on religious worship services but not imposed on those comparable secular businesses.

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2 SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM
KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
In my view, California’s discrimination against religious worship services contravenes the Constitution. As a general matter, the “government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). This Court has stated that discrimination against religion is “odious to our Constitution.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. , (2017) (slip op., at 15); see also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618.
To justify its discriminatory treatment of religious worship services, California must show that its rules are “justified by a compelling governmental interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 531–532. California undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID–19 and protecting the health of its citizens. But “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little to further these goals and do much to burden religious freedom.” Roberts v. Neace, 958 F. 3d 409, 414 (CA6 2020) (per curiam). What California needs is a compelling justification for distinguishing between (i) religious worship services and (ii) the litany of other secular businesses that are not subject to an occupancy cap.
California has not shown such a justification. The Church has agreed to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses. That raises important questions: “Assuming all of the same precautions are taken, why can someone safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew? And why can someone safely interact with a brave deliverywoman but not with a stoic minister?” Ibid.

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Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable secular businesses. California already trusts its residents and any number of businesses to adhere to proper social distancing and hygiene practices. The State cannot “assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings.” Ibid.
California has ample options that would allow it to combat the spread of COVID–19 without discriminating against religion. The State could “insist that the congregants adhere to social-distancing and other health requirements and leave it at that—just as the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.” Id., at 415. Or alternatively, the State could impose reasonable occupancy caps across the board. But absent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories, and offices while imposing stricter requirements on places of worship.
The State also has substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency. But as relevant here, the Constitution imposes one key restriction on that line-drawing: The State may not discriminate against religion.
In sum, California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services indisputably discriminates against religion, and such discrimination violates the First Amendment. See Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers). The Church would suffer irreparable harm from not being able to hold services on Pentecost Sunday in a way that comparable secular businesses and persons can conduct their activities. I would therefore grant the Church’s request for a temporary injunction. I respectfully dissent.

 
 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 19 filed 06/12/20 PageID.531 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION INC., CASITE INTRACO LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY LLC d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs, v.

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON
Defendants.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE MICHIGAN EPIDEMIOLOGISTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Jennifer L. McManus (P65976) FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodard Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Telephone: (248) 542-6300 Facsimile: (248) 542-6301 jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Joshua Matz Raymond P. Tolentino Jonathan R. Kay Mahrah M. Taufique KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com jkay@kaplanhecker.com mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 19 filed 06/12/20 PageID.532 Page 2 of 5
Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists, through their counsel, in support of their Motion for Leave to File a Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, state as follows:
1. Amici are renowned epidemiologists and public health scholars with professional expertise on the transmission of infectious diseases in Michigan. They include scientists who have served in both Republican and Democratic administrations in various public health roles. They have a strong interest in restraining the spread of COVID-19 in Michigan.
2. Amici respectfully seek this Court’s leave to submit the brief attached as Exhibit A in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
3. “[T]he decision to allow an appearance as amicus curiae falls under the district court’s inherent authority.” Kollaritsch v. Michigan State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 1:15 Civ. 1191, 2017 WL 11454764, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2017) (Maloney, J.) (citation omitted). In reviewing a motion for leave to file an amicus brief, this Court has considered such factors as the “usefulness” and “timeliness” of the brief, as well as “the opposition of the parties, interest of the movants, partisanship, and adequacy of representation.” Id. Amici respectfully submit that those factors support granting leave here.
4. For three reasons, amici’s proposed brief would be useful to the Court in evaluating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. a. First, an understanding of the scientific basis for the Governor’s actions supports Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe and are not well suited to speculative evaluation in a pre-enforcement setting. See Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 706 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring consideration of “the extent to which the legal analysis would benefit from having a concrete factual context” and how “the enforcement authority’s legal position is subject to change before enforcement”).

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 19 filed 06/12/20 PageID.533 Page 3 of 5
b. Second, the data that amici summarize is crucial to assessing whether and how to apply deference under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).
c. Finally, as a matter of black letter law, this Court must account for the realities we describe in undertaking the constitutional balancing required by many of Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (equal protection); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (dormant commerce clause); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216-1217 (6th Cir. 1992) (substantive due process). The Court may permissibly do so under Rule 12(b)(6) because much of the information set forth in this brief is derived from public records, subject to judicial notice, or incorporated by reference into the First Amended Complaint (which discusses WHO and CDC publications). See Cooper v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 1:16 Civ. 471, 2019 WL 912123, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2019).
5. Amici include scientists who have served honorably in both Republican and Democratic administrations. They do not seek to advance any partisan agenda in their proposed brief.
6. Granting amici’s motion for leave to file this amicus brief would not cause any delay or prejudice to the parties. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on June 5, 2020. (ECF Nos. 17-18.) Plaintiffs have not yet submitted their response.
7. Defendants Gretchen E. Whitmer and Robert Gordon do not object to the filing of this amicus brief; Plaintiffs have indicated that they do object.
8. Amici are represented by counsel with substantial experience in federal constitutional law who have represented experts in medicine and public health in other constitutional cases.

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For all these reasons, amici respectfully request that they be granted leave to file the attached Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Dated: June 12, 2020
/s/ Jennifer L. McManus Jennifer L. McManus (P65976) FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodard Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Telephone: (248) 542-6300 Facsimile: (248) 542-6301 jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Joshua Matz Joshua Matz Raymond P. Tolentino Jonathan R. Kay Mahrah M. Taufique KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com jkay@kaplanhecker.com mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Attorney for amici curiae certifies that on June 12, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan by using the CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

Dated: June 12, 2020

By: /s/ Joshua Matz Joshua Matz Attorney for Amici Curiae KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 19-1 filed 06/12/20 PageID.536 Page 1 of 28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION INC., CASITE INTRACO LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY LLC d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs, v.

MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE MICHIGAN EPIDEMIOLOGISTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Jennifer L. McManus (P65976) FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodard Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Telephone: (248) 542-6300 Facsimile: (248) 542-6301 jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Joshua Matz Raymond P. Tolentino Jonathan R. Kay Mahrah M. Taufique KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com jkay@kaplanhecker.com mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 19-1 filed 06/12/20 PageID.537 Page 2 of 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ....................................................................... 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 2 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4 I. COVID-19 POSES A DIRE THREAT TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF
MICHIGAN RESIDENTS.................................................................................................. 4
A. COVID-19 Is Deadly and Highly Infectious .......................................................... 4
B. COVID-19 Has Ravaged the State of Michigan, Infecting Over 59,000 Michiganders and Killing Over 5,700 .................................................................... 5
II. THE GOVERNOR’S STATEWIDE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE SUPPORTED BY SCIENCE AND HAVE SAVED THOUSANDS OF LIVES ............................................ 7
A. The Governor Has Used Scientifically Proven Methods to Combat the Spread Of COVID-19............................................................................................................... 7
B. The Governor’s Emergency Orders Have Saved an Estimated 3,500 Lives ........ 11
C. The Governor’s Statewide Implementation of Emergency Measures Was Necessary to Curtail Rapid Community Spread Of COVID-19 ........................... 14
III. LIMITING THE GOVERNOR’S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT, ENFORCE, REVISE, AND LIFT EMERGENCY ORDERS WOULD RISK FURTHER INFECTION AND DEATH THROUGHOUT MICHIGAN........................................................................... 16
A. Michigan’s Current Testing Infrastructure Alone Will Not Prevent and Control the Spread of COVID-19 without Emergency Measures ..................................... 16
B. The Governor’s Executive Orders Remain Necessary to Avoid Further Outbreaks and Death .............................................................................................................. 18
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 21

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s)
Cases Ammex, Inc. v. Cox,
351 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................... 2 Cooper v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,
No. 1:16 Civ. 471, 2019 WL 912123 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2019)............................................ 3 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993).................................................................................................................... 3 Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905).................................................................................................................. 2, 3 Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc,
961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................... 3 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970).................................................................................................................... 3 South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
590 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op.) .................................................................................. 2, 3, 20 Other Authorities Executive Order 2020-65 .................................................................................................................7 Executive Order 2020-69 .................................................................................................................7 Executive Order 2020-71 .................................................................................................................7 Executive Order 2020-72 .................................................................................................................7 Executive Order 2020-77 .............................................................................................................7, 8 Executive Order 2020-92 .................................................................................................................8 Executive Order 2020-96 .................................................................................................................8 Executive Order 2020-97 .................................................................................................................7 Executive Order 2020-104 .............................................................................................................17 Executive Order 2020-110 ...............................................................................................................8
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE Amici are renowned epidemiologists and public health scholars with professional expertise on the transmission of infectious diseases in Michigan. They include scientists who have served in both Republican and Democratic administrations in various public health roles. They have a strong interest in containing COVID-19 and reducing further community spread in Michigan. They submit this brief to offer the Court their scientific assessment of the Executive Orders that Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued in response to the current public health crisis in Michigan, and in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. A full list of amici is attached as an appendix to this brief.1
1 Amici state that this brief was not authored by counsel representing a party in this case in whole or in part, nor did such counsel or a party make a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Other than amici curiae and their counsel, no person made a monetary contribution to assist in preparation of this brief. The positions of amici presented in this brief are theirs alone. Amici do not purport to speak on behalf of their employers or any other organization or society with which they are affiliated.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Over the span of twelve weeks, Michigan has seen confirmed cases of COVID-19 go from 1 to over 59,000. Over 5,700 people have died. And “[a]t this time, there is no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op., at 1). The rapid COVID-19 outbreak thus presents a continuing, life-threatening emergency across the state. Responding to that threat, the Governor has invoked her authority to issue carefully crafted emergency measures. These orders have saved thousands of lives. Disease modeling reveals that ~28,000 more cases across the state would likely have occurred if the Governor’s measures had not been implemented, resulting in ~3,500 more deaths. Simply stated, swift, forceful, and nimble emergency government action based on high-quality data is the only defense that Michigan currently has against COVID-19. In this brief, amici provide crucial context for understanding the public health judgments at issue here. The Court can and should consider all this in assessing Defendants’ motion to dismiss. For starters, an understanding of the scientific basis for the Governor’s actions—and of how such public health interventions can be refined, reformed, and lifted in highly fact-dependent ways— supports Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe and are not well suited to speculative evaluation in a pre-enforcement setting. See MTD Br. at 18-21; see also Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 706 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring consideration of “the extent to which the legal analysis would benefit from having a concrete factual context” and how “the enforcement authority’s legal position is subject to change before enforcement”). Further, the data that we summarize is crucial to an assessment of whether and how to apply the deference doctrine articulated in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). See South Bay, 590
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U.S., at ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op. at 2) (“The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and factintensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts the safety and the health of the people to the politically accountable officials of the States to guard and protect.” (citations omitted)). Finally, much of the information set forth in this brief is derived from public records, subject to judicial notice, or incorporated by reference into the First Amended Complaint (which discusses WHO and CDC publications). See Cooper v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 1:16 Civ. 471, 2019 WL 912123, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2019). Moreover, as a matter of black letter law, this Court must account for the realities we describe in undertaking the constitutional balancing required by many of Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (equal protection); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (dormant commerce clause); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1992) (substantive due process).
Like many families in Michigan, we appreciate the devastating toll that certain emergency measures may have on Michigan’s economy. But it is our considered judgment as public health scholars and epidemiologists that the Governor’s orders rest firmly on the best available data and science. They constitute a reasoned and reasonable effort to protect the people of Michigan while respecting countervailing interests. Lives will be lost if the Court invalidates these safeguards. And in our professional opinion, the suggestion that the orders challenged here are irrational, or reflect an arbitrary set of distinctions, is not remotely credible. Contra Statement of Interest on Behalf of the United States at 6-16. Particularly given the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 crisis, this “community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. It
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also has the right to make tough judgments—based in science—about how best to achieve that
goal. We therefore respectfully submit that Defendants’ motion should be granted and the FAC
should be dismissed in its entirety.
ARGUMENT
I. COVID-19 POSES A DIRE THREAT TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF MICHIGAN RESIDENTS
A. COVID-19 Is Deadly and Highly Infectious
The novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, is causing a new and complex illness in humans
that is not yet fully understood from a virology, epidemiological, or medical perspective. What
is known, however, is that this virus has attributes that make it challenging to contain, including
an incubation period during which people are infectious but may not show symptoms as well as the possibility of transmission to others while experiencing mild symptoms or none at all.2
Only a small proportion of people who get COVID-19 will experience serious illness,
hospitalization, or death. But the ratio of deaths to known COVID-19 cases—currently about one to ten—suggests a higher case-fatality rate than for many other infectious diseases.3 And
even among those who survive COVID-19, emergent clinical evidence suggests that many people are experiencing ongoing respiratory and vascular effects over an extended period.4 The
2 Xi He et al., Temporal Dynamics in viral shedding and transmissibility of COVID-19, Nature Medicine, 672-675 <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0869-5> (accessed May 21, 2020); McIntocsh K., Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Epidemiology, Virology, Diagnosis and Prevention <https://www.uptodate.com/contents/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-epidemiology-virology-clinical-featuresdiagnosis-and-prevention> (accessed May 21, 2020). 3 Coronavirus, Michigan Data <https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98163_98173---,00.html> (accessed May 21, 2020). 4 Lili Chan et al., Acute Kidney Injury in Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19 <https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.04.20090944v1> (accessed May 21, 2020); Lois Parshley, Vox, The emerging long-term complications of Covid-19, explained <https://www.vox.com/2020/5/8/21251899/ coronavirus-long-term-effects-symptoms> (accessed May 21, 2020); Yuhui Wang et al., Radiology, Temporal Changes of CT Findings in 90 Patients with COVID-19 Pneumonia: a Longitudinal Study <https://doi.org/10.1148/radiol.2020200843> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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scientific community continues to gather and analyze data regarding higher-risk populations and communities, but it remains the case that both the geographic patterning and the clinical course of this new disease are not predictable. For example, while available scientific evidence suggests that individuals older than 65 are considered high risk for respiratory infections caused by COVID-19, the virus has also had significant health effects on adults of all ages, with approximately 60% of cases in Michigan under the age of 60.
Given all of the characteristics of this novel virus, we face an unprecedented emergency in which every single Michigander—all 10 million people living in all 83 counties—remains at risk of contracting COVID-19 and experiencing very serious illness or death. There is no way to predict exposure, infection, or severity of illness once infected. In fact, all communities in Michigan remain vulnerable to this devastating disease.
B. COVID-19 Has Ravaged the State of Michigan, Infecting Over 59,000 Michiganders and Killing Over 5,700
Michigan has endured a rapid expansion of confirmed COVID-19 cases, reaching high levels of community spread within a matter of days. The first case of COVID-19 in Michigan was reported on March 10, 2020. Each day thereafter, over 100 new cases were diagnosed in southeast Michigan. By March 15, 2020, infections were found in every public health region in the state. In late March and early April, the epidemic grew and remained uncontained. By April 4, 2020, Michigan was experiencing 42 hospitalizations per 100,000 residents, over twice the rates seen in other states, including New York and Tennessee.5 And by May 10, 2020, just two
5 United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Hospitalizations <https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/covidnet/COVID19_3.html> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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months after the first reported case, Michigan had nearly 48,000 reported cases and over 4,500 deaths.6
To date, the death toll in Michigan has exceeded 5,700, and even that figure is likely an underestimate. In Detroit alone, nearly 1,400 people have died, which means that COVID-19 has been forty times deadlier than influenza in that city. Other areas of Michigan have likewise experienced extensive illness and death: Macomb and Oakland counties combined have had nearly 1,900 deaths, and Genesee County has lost over 250 residents to COVID-19. To put those figures in perspective, the total number of COVID-19 deaths in Michigan (less than halfway through 2020) has already surpassed the annual number of deaths in 2018 caused by influenza/pneumonia (1,871), suicide (1,547), kidney disease (1,943), Alzheimer’s disease (4,474), or diabetes (2,824).7 Lurking behind those numbers is a troubling racial disparity. The current data indicate that the burden of illness and death fall disproportionately on communities of color, with Black residents accounting for over 40% of COVID-related deaths, but only 14% of Michigan’s population.8
Michigan was one of the first states to be hit hard by the new coronavirus. By way of comparison, it is eighth in the nation in confirmed COVID-19 cases and eighth in the nation in deaths, despite being the eleventh most populous state. In April 2020, Wayne County
6 Coronavirus, Michigan Data <https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98163_98173---,00.html> (accessed May 21, 2020). 7 Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, Michigan Cause of Death Information <https://www.mdch.state.mi.us/pha/osr/deaths/causrankcnty.asp> (accessed May 21, 2020). 8 Michigan State Government, Coronavirus Michigan Data <https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-40698163_98173---,00.html> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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(Michigan’s most populous county) ranked eleventh among most impacted counties in the country and fifth in the country in COVID-related deaths.9 II. THE GOVERNOR’S STATEWIDE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE SUPPORTED
BY SCIENCE AND HAVE SAVED THOUSANDS OF LIVES A. The Governor Has Used Scientifically Proven Methods to Combat the
Spread Of COVID-19 In a series of Executive Orders, Governor Gretchen Whitmer implemented a coordinated set of emergency public health interventions with a strong basis in epidemiological science. For example, Executive Order 2020-77 limited public gatherings, required non-essential workers to stay at home (subject to certain exceptions), closed non-essential physical business offices, required social distancing measures recommended by the CDC, and required face coverings for individuals walking in public. EO 2020-77(1)-(4); (15); see also EO 2020-69(1) (closing restaurants, bars, theatres, museums, and gymnasiums for immediate occupancy by the public); EO 2020-65 (closing K-12 schools for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year); EO 2020-72 (temporarily restricting entry into health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities). For certain businesses and operations that remained open or reopened, such as construction, manufacturing, grocery, and pharmacy establishments, the Governor required establishments to provide handwashing and sanitizing stations for their employees, perform frequent cleaning and hygiene practices, allow for distance between employees, and limit overall entry and occupancy. EO 2020-77(10)-(11); see also EO 2020-71 (temporary safety measures for food-selling establishments and pharmacies); EO 2020-97 (safeguards and awareness plans to protect all Michigan workers who return to work).
9 Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, COVID-19 United States Cases by County <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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While the Governor recently loosened some restrictions, allowing limited social gatherings and permitting restaurants and retail stores to open at limited capacity with safety precautions, EO 2020-110(5)-(6), (11), (13),10 she kept social distancing requirements and has also continued to require all persons to wear face coverings in public. Id. (4); (12) (continuing restrictions on businesses that necessarily require close contact, such as gyms, indoor theatres, and tattoo salons).
The emergency interventions employed by Governor Whitmer are generally referred to as infectious disease “non-pharmaceutical interventions”—i.e., interventions aimed at populations (rather than medical interventions given to individuals). Non-pharmaceutical interventions are designed to prevent the further spread of an infectious disease by quickly reducing potential exposure to the virus through improved hygiene measures and by decreasing the amount and density of physical interaction between people.11 Such interventions also seek to “flatten the curve” of the epidemic by reducing the peak number of cases of an infectious disease during the time period of a community outbreak.
According to the American Society for Microbiology, there is a long history and strong scientific basis for the use of social distancing.12 Over the past century, interventions similar to those being used in Michigan have been implemented and studied as frontline responses to infectious disease outbreaks.13 Public hygiene measures—including requirements regarding
10 EO 2020-77 was modified by EO 2020-92 on May 18, 2020, which was subsequently modified by EO 2020-96 on May 21, 2020. EO 2020-110 modified EO 2020-96 on June 1, 2020. 11 World Health Organization, Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures for Mitigating the Risk and Impact of Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza <https://extranet.who.int/sph/docs/file/3848> (accessed May 21, 2020). 12 American Society for Microbiology, The Science of Social Distancing <https://asm.org/Articles/2020/April/TheScience-of-Social-Distancing> (accessed May 30, 2020). 13 Allison E. Aiello et al., American Journal of Infection Control, Research findings from nonpharmaceutical intervention studies for pandemic influenza and current gaps in the research <https://www.ajicjournal.org/
8

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surface cleaning in businesses and wearing face masks in public—are proven, indispensable tools in reducing community spread.14 Similarly, closures of businesses, facilities, and public spaces have been a frequent and fundamental strategy in responding to outbreaks.15 There is
strong historical evidence supporting the use of these measures. An analysis of 17 cities during
the 1918 influenza pandemic found that death rates were 50% lower in cities that implemented
multiple social distancing measures such as school, church, and business closures, as compared to cities that did not implement such emergency measures.16
To control a highly infectious disease like COVID-19, additional public health measures
must be layered on top of the hygiene, physical/social distancing, stay-at-home, and closure
interventions. States must also develop the infrastructure for extensive and rapid testing and
contact tracing (a standard public health practice that involves following up with people who
have come in contact with someone who has been diagnosed with COVID-19 so they can self-
isolate and be tested). Emerging data and research suggest that several countries (including New
Zealand, Greece, and Taiwan) have achieved remarkable success in their initial responses to
COVID-19 by implementing emergency public health interventions and by adopting a cautious
article/S0196-6553(10)00039-8/fulltext> (accessed May 21, 2020); Richard Albert Stein, International Journal of Clinical Practice, The 2019 coronavirus: Learning curves, lessons, and the weakest link <https://doi.org/10.1111/ ijcp.13488 > (accessed May 21, 2020) (surveying hygiene recommendations, social distancing practices, limitations on crowd sizes, school closures, workplace closures, and quarantine orders, among others, as effective tools for fighting pandemics). 14 World Health Organization, Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures for Mitigating the Risk and Impact of Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza. <https://extranet.who.int/sph/docs/file/3848> (accessed May 21, 2020); Allison E. Aiello et al., American Journal of Infection Control, Research findings from nonpharmaceutical intervention studies for pandemic influenza and current gaps in the research <https://www.ajicjournal.org/article/S01966553(10)00039-8/fulltext> (accessed May 21, 2020). 15 Christopher I. Jarvis et al., BMC Medicine, Quantifying the impact of physical distance measures on the transmission of COVID-19 in the UK < https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-02001597-8> (accessed May 21, 2020). 16 Richard J. Hatchett, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic < https://www.pnas.org/content/104/18/7582> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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and gradual approach to lifting restrictions consistent with public health science and ongoing testing and tracing.17
COVID-19 has an unfortunate long lag time between infection and the first signs of disease, in stark contrast to many other respiratory viruses. Even though epidemiologists measure the ultimate impact of the disease in hospitalizations and death rates, these events occur weeks or even a month after COVID-19 infection. In a quickly growing epidemic with high transmissibility, the size of the epidemic can double as many as six times before the first infected individual is identified. For this reason, the epidemiology of COVID-19 requires that public health interventions be proactive, responsive, and implemented (and reimplemented) as quickly as possible in response to even small changes in the incidence of new cases, without waiting for additional doubling times to pass and for even more cases and deaths to accrue. The nature of COVID-19 is such that responses and interventions are necessary before a new spike in infections is ever recorded. To limit the Governor’s ability to respond to COVID-19 only after a new spike occurs could cost lives.
Multiple COVID-19 vaccines are currently undergoing accelerated development and testing, although it will be quite some time before a safe and effective vaccine is available.18 Even if an effective vaccine is developed, states and municipalities would also need to establish a robust vaccine-delivery infrastructure, maintain sufficient rates of acceptance and uptake, and guarantee affordable access to all residents to establish population-level herd immunity. COVID-19 will continue to present a health emergency to the state of Michigan until a vaccine is
17 C. Jason Wang et al., Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762689> (accessed May 21, 2020); Sophie Cousins, The Lancet, New Zealand Eliminates COVID-19 <https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS01406736(20)31097-7.pdf> (accessed May 21, 2020). 18 Nicole Lurie et al., New England Journal of Medicine, Developing Covid-19 Vaccines at Pandemic Speed <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005630> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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developed and delivered to the vast majority of people of all ages. Given the attributes of the novel coronavirus and the fact that we do not yet have effective medical treatments or a vaccine, non-pharmaceutical interventions and emergency public health actions—like those adopted by Governor Whitmer—are the cornerstone of prevention and control of COVID-19 in Michigan.
B. The Governor’s Emergency Orders Have Saved an Estimated 3,500 Lives Michigan’s science-based approach to the COVID-19 pandemic mirrors the approach of other jurisdictions (including 43 other states) that have responsibly implemented stay-at-home and other emergency public health orders. A recently released national, peer-reviewed study reports that adoption of four fundamental social distancing measures in March and April—(1) large event bans; (2) school closures; (3) entertainment/restaurant/bar/gym closures; and (4) shelter-in-place orders—significantly reduced the daily growth rate of COVID-19: the rate of increase in cases was reduced by 5.4% after 1-5 days, 6.8% after 6-10 days, 8.2% after 11-15 days, and 9.1% after 16-20 days.19 The results from this study also demonstrate that without the adoption of these four social distancing measures, the virus would have spread 35 times faster by April 27, 2020, with about 35 million more cases of the disease nationwide. Two studies in the journal Nature also concluded that government-imposed “anticontagion policies” such as school and business closures and other movement restrictions had a significant negative impact on the rate of growth of overall number of COVID-19 cases worldwide.20 Public health emergency interventions in six countries (China, South Korea, Italy, Iran, France the United States) prevented or delayed a total of 62 million confirmed cases of
19 Charles Courtemanche et al., Health Affairs, Strong Social Distancing Measures in the United States Reduced the COVID-19 Growth Rate <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00608> (accessed May 21, 2020). 20 Solomon Hsiang et al., Nature, The Effect of Large-Scale Anti-Contagion Policies on the COVID-19 Pandemic <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2404-8> (accessed June 8, 2020); Seth Flaxman et al., Nature, Estimating the effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in Europe <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2405-7> (accessed June 8, 2020).
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COVID-19.21 In addition, another recently published study compared the rate of increase in COVID-19 infections in Clarke County, Georgia—which implemented a local shelter-in-place order two weeks before a statewide order went into effect—to adjacent counties, revealing that the rate of growth in cases was 30% slower in Clarke County which resulted in a significantly reduced number of infections overall.22
Epidemiologic indicators of Michigan’s COVID-19 outbreak have demonstrated a clear reduction in the growth of new cases following the implementation of social distancing measures. Indeed, within just a couple weeks of the stay-at-home directive going into effect, the state saw marked reductions in new cases and deaths.23 Sophisticated disease modeling of COVID-19 in Michigan, conducted by University of Michigan epidemiologists, has estimated that approximately 28,000 more cases and 3,500 deaths would likely have occurred in Michigan had the Governor not implemented her emergency measures.24 Figure 1 below compares the actual course of new COVID-19 cases in Michigan to the projected incidence of new cases that would be expected absent the Governor’s emergency measures focused on social distancing:
21 Id. 22 Mark H. Ebell et al., American Journal of Preventive Medicine, Mandatory Social Distancing Associated with Increased Doubling Time: An Example Using Hyperlocal Data <https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S07493797(20)30185-9/fulltext> (accessed May 30, 2020). 23 Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard, <https://epimath.github.io/covid-19-modeling/> (accessed June 2, 2020). 24 Id.
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With social distancing Without social distancing

Figure 1. Disease Model Simulations With and Without Social Distancing Interventions. The black dots with grey shading represent the actual number of COVID-19 cases in Michigan with social distancing. The coral shading represents the range of expected cases without social distancing from different modeling simulations, with the median across the simulations shown as a solid line. Based on the median estimates, the model predicts that without emergency interventions, there would have been 28,000 more cases by June 1, 2020.

The median results from different modeling exercises estimate that by June 1, 2020 the difference between the actual number of COVID-19 cases in Michigan and the expected number without social distancing interventions is 28,000. This translates into an estimated 3,500 deaths from COVID-19 that were averted by June 1, 2020 because of the emergency orders. In addition, the Michigan COVID-19 modeling exercises estimate that the epidemiologic curve of COVID-19 was indeed flattened such that the peak number of cases seen in April would likely have been 2.7 times the actual number experienced in Michigan without the emergency orders. In the same vein, absent Governor Whitmer’s executive orders, Michigan hospital systems would have exceeded their capacity for treating COVID-19 patients in mid- to late-April, leading to even more suffering and deaths due to COVID-19.25
25 Id.
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C. The Governor’s Statewide Implementation of Emergency Measures Was Necessary to Curtail Rapid Community Spread Of COVID-19
COVID-19 is an insidious disease that quietly infiltrates communities, goes undetected for days and weeks, and then explodes exponentially into an outbreak that can quickly overwhelm a community and its health care capacity. Governor Whitmer therefore had little choice but to adopt a statewide public health response to curb the spread of COVID-19.
Epidemiologists classify how contagious an infectious agent is by what is referred to as its “basic reproduction number” or R0 (pronounced “R naught”). The R0 value refers to how many other people, on average, a single person with the disease will infect. Once a virus hits a community, the rate of spread can be modeled based upon this reproduction number. Importantly, the reproduction number of an infectious agent needs to be below 1.0 for it to cease spreading within a population in the absence of a vaccine, thus eventually ending the epidemic.
Seasonal influenza typically has a basic reproduction number of 1.3, meaning that 3 people with influenza will on average infect 4 other people. By contrast, the basic reproduction number of the coronavirus is not yet fully understood, but appears to range somewhere between 2.2 and 5.7.26 Even assuming a rate of only 3.0, the result is that a single person with COVID-19 will infect on average 3 other people, who in turn will infect 3 other people who themselves will infect 3 other people, and so on. In just 4 cycles of spread, one single person with COVID-19 in a community could cause 81 other cases wherever she lives, works, shops, worships, or socializes.
This is consistent with developments in Michigan. Levels of hospitalization and death related to COVID-19 were remarkably high in southeast Michigan at the peak of the epidemic in
26 Steven Sanche et al., Emerging Infectious Diseases, High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 <https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2607.200282> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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April, though they have since trended downward. As southeast Michigan began to see a decrease in severe cases and death, other areas of Michigan continued on an upward trajectory which has only recently begun to slow. The Governor’s statewide stay-at-home and other emergency measures went into place before areas in western and northern Michigan reached exponential levels of growth and high case levels, saving not only lives, but valuable resources and capacity at hospitals and in healthcare systems, especially those in rural regions. Thus, the statewide orders had the additional benefit of limiting the growth phase of the epidemic across the entire state, ultimately reducing the toll in the west and north. Early statewide intervention saved additional lives even in those regions that have seen fewer confirmed cases than the rest of the state.
A recent study by a large independent group of researchers at the Imperial College of London focusing on the global COVID-19 pandemic confirms that the aggressive actions implemented in Michigan and other U.S. states significantly lowered the transmission rates of the virus, thus reducing the number of cases and deaths.27 The research revealed that after the Governor’s emergency orders were implemented in March, the basic reproduction or infection rate in Michigan decreased first to 2.5 people, then 1.25 people, and then to 0.8 people in April. The emergency public health orders are what drove the basic reproduction rate below 1.0, which must happen if the epidemic of cases and deaths is to be contained and stopped.
27 Imperial College of London, Report 23: State-Level Tracking of COVID-19 in the United States. <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/mrc-gida/2020-05-21-COVID19-Report-23.pdf> (accessed June 11, 2020).
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III. LIMITING THE GOVERNOR’S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT, ENFORCE, REVISE, AND LIFT EMERGENCY ORDERS WOULD RISK FURTHER INFECTION AND DEATH THROUGHOUT MICHIGAN Michigan’s first battle with the novel coronavirus has been intense and devastating to
both the health and economic welfare of the state. The good news is that, in early June 2020, all indicators—including the number of new cases, hospitalizations and deaths—suggest that the amount of virus circulating in Michigan communities has been significantly reduced. Even so, every sophisticated simulation model predicts further serious outbreaks of COVID-19 in the near future.28 In fact, several states, including Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Utah, are currently experiencing pockets of COVID-19 resurgence after social distancing measures were relaxed.
Based on our epidemiological expertise, the Governor’s emergency measures have had a successful and positive impact on the safety and health of Michiganders. Lifting those measures all at once for the entire state, or removing her ability to quickly adopt, revise, refine, and lift certain measures if needed in the future, will likely result in increased cases of infection and death. The frontline emergency public health interventions must be implemented very fast, with targeted and decisive action without delay. A delay of just a few days to consider and debate action can make a significant difference in the level of spread and toll from the disease.
A. Michigan’s Current Testing Infrastructure Alone Will Not Prevent and Control the Spread of COVID-19 without Emergency Measures
Accurate and reliable testing has always been a core countermeasure in tracking and controlling infectious diseases like COVID-19. Widespread, easily accessible testing allows
28 Wu JT et al., The Lancet, First-Wave COVID-19 Transmissibility and Severity in China Outside Hubei After Control Measures, and Second-Wave Scenario Planning: A Modeling Impact Assessment. <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30746-7> (accessed June 7, 2020).
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public health officials to quickly ascertain who has COVID-19, to isolate such persons to limit further transmission, and to trace close contacts so that they can self-quarantine and get tested.29 While the Governor has recently undertaken efforts to expand the state’s testing infrastructure and contact-tracing abilities, see EO-2020-104, it will take additional time before the state reaches recommended testing and contact-tracing levels.
A research group from the Harvard Global Health Institute has developed estimates for the minimum daily number of tests needed for each state based on its population, the actual and projected numbers of infections, and the probable close contacts to cases. To achieve optimal contact tracing, they recommend that Michigan conduct at least 58,000 tests per day, which is significantly higher than Michigan’s current capacity.30
Moreover, even if Michigan could consistently achieve a sufficiently high testing volume to enable contact tracing, more contact-tracing resources and personnel are needed. The National Association of County & City Health Officials estimates that there should be 30 contact tracers per 100,000 members of a population, translating to approximately 3,000 contact tracers needed in Michigan, also significantly higher than Michigan’s current capacity.31 The removal of emergency social distancing orders must be coordinated with the state’s and local public health agencies’ capacity to conduct high levels of testing and contact tracing.
29 Kent T. D. Eames et al., The Royal Society, Contact Tracing and Disease Control <https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspb.2003.2554> (accessed May 21, 2020). 30 Ashish K. Jah et al., Harvard Global Health Institute, Pandemics Explained, HGHI and NPR Publish New State Testing Targets < https://globalepidemics.org/2020/05/07/hghi-projected-tests-needed-may15/> (accessed May 11, 2020). 31 National Association of County & City Health Officials, NACCH Position Statement, Building COVID-19 Contact Tracing Capacity in Health Departments to Support Reopening American Society Safely <https://www.naccho.org/uploads/full-width-images/Contact-Tracing-Statement-4-16-2020.pdf> (accessed May 21, 2020); Selena Simmons-Duffin, National Public Radio, States Nearly Doubled Plans for Contact Tracers Since NPR Surveyed Them 10 Days Ago <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/04/28/846736937/we-asked-all-50states-about-their-contact-tracing-capacity-heres-what-we-learned> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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B. The Governor’s Executive Orders Remain Necessary to Avoid Further Outbreaks and Death
Given the need for expanded testing and contact tracing in Michigan, the Governor’s emergency measures serve as a necessary tool in combating the continued spread of COVID-19. Prematurely lifting those measures or not being able to reinstate them quickly if the virus resurges would likely result in a rapid increase in infections and deaths.
History serves as a guide. A study of 23 U.S. cities in the 1918 influenza pandemic found that jurisdictions who lifted controls earlier had greater mortality and a higher peak during a second wave of infections as compared to those jurisdictions with controls in place for longer duration.32 During a 1916 outbreak of polio in Oyster Bay, New York, the city initially banned children under 16 from attending public gatherings, but then removed these restrictions due to pressure from the local population. The result was a large citywide outbreak of polio with a rate of 9 per 1,000 members of the population compared to 0.6 per 1,000 in upstate New York, where restrictions remained in place.33
What was true then remains true today. Public health interventions—including social distancing and restrictions on certain high-contact businesses, testing, and contact tracing—are essential in mitigating the health, economic, and social costs of an ongoing global pandemic. To be sure, such emergency measures may come with painful costs, but state and local governments cannot even begin to meaningfully assess or address those consequences without first getting the virus under control. Moreover, emerging cost-benefit analysis confirms that the social and
32 Martin C. J. Bootsma et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, The Effect of Public Health Measures on the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in U.S. Cities < https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17416677/> (accessed May 21, 2020). 33 Guenter B. Risse, Transactions & Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, Revolt against quarantine: community responses to the 1916 polio epidemic, Oyster Bay, New York <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21550198_Revolt_against_quarantine_community_responses_to_the_19 16_polio_epidemic_Oyster_Bay_New_York> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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economic value of the lives saved through emergency public health measures outweighs the near-term costs.34
Even under the most optimistic estimates, at least 90% of the Michigan population remains susceptible to COVID-19. We are far from the level of herd immunity required to slow the virus without population-based interventions. Abrupt and uncoordinated relaxation of restrictions will lead to increased virus circulation. Disease models demonstrate that if social distancing is abruptly stopped in Michigan, a second resurgence of COVID-19 would likely occur, with peak disease rates potentially nearing or exceeding levels experienced in the current outbreak.35 If social distancing is lifted gradually over a longer period of time in a calibrated and coordinated manner with other public health interventions, as is happening in most states, the number of new cases could still increase, but worst-case scenario estimates from an abrupt opening up could be cut nearly in half.36
* ** COVID-19 is a complex and dangerous disease. To date, it has taken the lives of more than 5,700 Michiganders over the span of less than three months since the first diagnosis. Until there is an effective and affordable vaccine with high enough uptake and infrastructure to create herd immunity, Michigan’s only defense is savvy and nimble emergency action grounded in the
34 Linda Thunstrom et al., Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, The Benefits and Costs of Using Social Distancing to Flatten the Curve for COVID-19 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561934> (accessed May 21, 2020). 35 Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard <https://epimath.github.io/covid-19-modeling/> (accessed May 21, 2020). 36 COVID Act Now Modeling Results for Michigan <https://covidactnow.org/us/mi?s=38532> (accessed May 31, 2020).
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best available science.37 See South Bay, 590 U.S., at ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op. at 1-3).
The Governor’s carefully tailored Executive Orders—and her ability to implement, change, rescind, and re-implement them quickly—remain crucial to containing COVID-19 and saving lives. As shown above, the Governor’s orders do not reflect slipshod or arbitrary infringements on personal liberty. Nor do they reflect deliberate indifference (or overt antipathy) to important constitutional values. Instead, they reflect a strategy, thus far successful in important respects, to protect the people of Michigan by drawing on high-quality data and lessons from history. There are undoubtedly tough judgment calls to be made, some of which are not neatly answered by public health principles. But those calls belong to the state’s elected officials—particularly its Governor, under Michigan law—and this authority has been wielded with admirable seriousness. The Governor’s orders are therefore consistent with the Constitution and reflect a reasonable balance under impossible circumstances. To lift these measures prematurely, or to impose rigid limitations on the Governor’s ability to respond to COVID-19, would risk a public health disaster. The Court can and should consider that context in assessing whether Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe; whether it must defer to state officials under Jacobson; and whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief under constitutional provisions that afford Defendants great latitude in defining public policy.
37 David S Jones, New England Journal of Medicine, History in a Crisis – Lessons for Covid-19 <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32163699/> (accessed May 21, 2020).
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CONCLUSION Amici respectfully submit that the Court should grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Dated: June 12, 2020
/s/ Jennifer L. McManus Jennifer L. McManus (P65976)
FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodard Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Telephone: (248) 542-6300 Facsimile: (248) 542-6301 jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Joshua Matz Joshua Matz Raymond P. Tolentino Jonathan R. Kay Mahrah M. Taufique
KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com jkay@kaplanhecker.com mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

21

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APPENDIX
Paula M. Lantz, PhD, MS Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and James B. Hudak Professor of Health Policy Professor of Health Management and Policy Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
Matthew L. Boulton, MD, MPH Senior Associate Dean for Global Public Health Pearl L. Kendrick Collegiate Professor of Global Public Health Professor of Epidemiology & Preventive Medicine Editor-in-Chief, American Journal of Preventive Medicine School of Public Health University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
Emily Martin, PhD, MPH Associate Professor of Epidemiology School of Public Health University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
Mona Hanna-Attisha, MD, MPH C.S. Mott Endowed Professor of Public Health Director, Michigan State University and Hurley Children’s Hospital Pediatric Public Health Initiative Pediatrician, Hurley Medical Center Flint, Michigan
Abram L. Wagner, PhD, MPH Research Assistant Professor Department of Epidemiology School of Public Health University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
Loretta Bush, MHSA President and CEO Authority Health Detroit, Michigan
22

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Marisa Eisenberg, PhD, MS Associate Professor of Epidemiology, School of Public Health Associate Professor of Complex Systems and Mathematics, College of Literature, Science and the Arts University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
Joseph Eisenberg, PhD, MPH Chair and Professor of Epidemiology Professor of Global Health School of Public Health University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
C. Debra Furr-Holden, Ph.D. Associate Dean for Public Health Integration Director, Division of Public Health Associate Chair of Public Health and Clinical Integration, Department of Family Medicine C.S. Mott Endowed Professor of Public Health Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics College of Human Medicine Michigan State University Director, Flint Center for Health Equity Solutions
Howard Markel, MD, PhD George E. Wantz Distinguished Professor of the History of Medicine Director, Center for the History of Medicine Professor of Pediatrics and Communicable Diseases Professor of Health Management and Policy University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
James S. Marks, MD, MPH Rear Admiral, United States Public Health Service (retired) Assistant Surgeon General (retired) Executive Vice President, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (retired) Ann Arbor, Michigan
Phyllis Meadows, PhD, MSN, RN Senior Fellow and Health Advisor, Kresge Foundation Former Director of Public Health, City of Detroit Former Associate Dean for Public Health Practice, University of Michigan School of Public Health Ann Arbor, Michigan

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Dawn Misra, PhD Professor and Chair Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics College of Human Medicine Michigan State University Lansing, Michigan
Nigel Paneth MD MPH University Distinguished Professor Departments of Epidemiology & Biostatistics and Pediatrics & Human Development College of Human Medicine Michigan State University Lansing, Michigan
James Sunstrum, MD Clinical Associate Professor, Wayne State University School of Medicine Infectious Disease Physician Beaumont Hospital Dearborn, Michigan

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Attorney for amici curiae certifies that on June 12, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan by using the CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

Dated: June 12, 2020

By: /s/ Joshua A. Matz Joshua A. Matz Attorney for Amici Curiae KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com

 
 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 22 filed 06/30/20 PageID.568 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S. & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, P.C., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiﬀs,
v.
GRETCHEN E. WHITMER, and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 20-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO AMICI’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF

In the midst of a constitutional crisis, and in the context of the Government’s motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a group comprised mostly of university professors retained the New York law firm of Kaplan, Hecker & Fink, LLP (“Kaplan”) to submit what they assert is a non-partisan “amicus curiae” brief. None of the listed amicus group members have provided any affidavit or declaration demonstrating any personal work with the coronavirus or the disease that it can cause, COVID-19. The proposed brief likewise contains no discussion or legal analysis of the

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 22 filed 06/30/20 PageID.569 Page 2 of 8
standards that govern motions to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs respectfully object to the Kaplan filing, especially because at least two of the university professors listed are material fact witnesses in this matter.
1. Kaplan did not comply with the letter or spirit of Local Civil Rule 7.1(d). On June 10, 2020, just days after the Government filed its motion to dismiss,
Kaplan emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel asking for concurrence to file an amicus brief on behalf of “epidemiologists and public health scholars” in support of the Government’s motion, without identifying its amicus clients. Exhibit 1, Taufique Email (Jun. 10, 2020). Without knowing their identities, Plaintiffs had no basis to grant consent. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded as follows:
Dear Ms. Taufique, We appreciate your interest in seeking our consent to file Amici Curiae briefs in these cases, but we must respectfully decline. As you know, the Defendants have sought dismissal only under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Under this limited pleading standard, we don’t see any basis, factual or legal, for outside Amici interest, especially at this early stage of the proceedings. Moreover, you have not identified your group of clients, nor have you identified the legal issues that they supposedly support on behalf of the Defendants. We have, therefore, no basis to discern whether your clients have any present or past connection or relationship with the named Defendants. Should you wish to discuss these issues further, we’d be happy to schedule a time to discuss. Sincerely, Dan McCarthy and Joseph Richotte
Exhibit 1, McCarthy Email (Jun. 11, 2020). Kaplan never sought to discuss or resolve Plaintiffs’ concerns. Instead, it
proceeded to file the motion. The Court then promptly held the Kaplan filing in abeyance
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for not filing the required Local Rule 7.1(d) certificate. ECF 20, PageID.564. Instead of contacting Plaintiffs’ counsel, Kaplan filed a certificate of compliance with the Local Rule. ECF 21, PageID.565.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Kaplan did not comply with Local Rule 7.1(d), which provides:
Attempt to obtain concurrence. With respect to all motions, the moving party shall ascertain whether the motion will be opposed. In addition, in the case of all nondispositive motions, counsel or pro se parties involved in the dispute shall confer in a good-faith effort to resolve the dispute. All nondispositive motions shall be accompanied by a separately filed certificate setting forth in detail the efforts of the moving party to comply with the obligation created by this rule.
Rule 7.1(d) (WD Mich. 2019) (emphases added). Again, Kaplan never disclosed to Plaintiffs the identity of its proposed amicus
clients when it first sought concurrence. Even after counsel for Plaintiffs brought this omission to Kaplan’s attention, it took no steps to “confer in a good faith effort to resolve the dispute.” Instead, Kaplan filed its certificate, stating that Plaintiffs “advised that they appreciated amici’s interest in seeking Plaintiffs’ consent but did not consent to amici’s motion.” ECF 21, PageID.565. With all due respect, Kaplan’s “certificate” left out some important details regarding Plaintiffs’ dispute—namely Kaplan’s failure to identify the referenced amicus group.
Plaintiffs did not learn the true identity of Kaplan’s amicus until after the motion for leave was filed. In an Appendix, Kaplan listed 15 amici, mostly professors from the University of Michigan and Michigan State University. ECF 19-1, PageID.560–562. Critically, two of the professors from the University of Michigan—Emily Martin, PhD, MPH, and Marisa Eisenberg, PhD, MS—are material fact witnesses. They have been reputedly and actively working with the Government in developing the very policies, methodologies, and lockdown orders at issue in this litigation.
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On about May 26, 2020, the Governor announced that Emily Martin, PhD, MPH, Associate Professor of Epidemiology at the University of Michigan, had “joined” Governor Whitmer in constructing the “Coronavirus Dashboard,” another alleged modeling tool to predict certain COVID-19 trends in various Michigan regions. See Michigan Pub. Health News Ctr., Michigan public health professor joins Michigan governor to announce new coronavirus dashboard, Mich. Sch. of Pub. Health (May 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/XW3C-5DUK.
Likewise, Marisa Eisenberg, PhD, MS, Associate Professor of Epidemiology at the University of Michigan has been working with the Government on certain coronavirus prediction models and appeared at the Governor’s press conference on April 22, 2020. See Center for the Study of Complex Sys., Marisa Eisenberg modelling COVID-19 scenarios for state health department, Mich. Coll. of Lit., Sci., and the Arts (Mar. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/X9WS-FDHK.
Thus, although Kaplan asserts that proposed amici “do not seek to advance any partisan agenda,” ECF 19, PageID.566, it failed to disclose that at least two of the proposed amici have been working directly with the Government and are material witnesses in this litigation.
Kaplan will probably argue that the Court should still accept and consider the proposed amicus brief, even if the Court discounts Professors Eisenberg and Martin’s participation in the amicus group. But their inclusion in the group, and Kaplan’s failure to disclose their active affiliation with the Government on matters related to the Lockdown Orders betrays the amicus filing as a partisan maneuver. And, as will be further explained, the proposed Kaplan brief, which merely cites to various medical journals and articles authored by others not part of the proposed amicus group, does nothing to assist this Court.
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2. The proposed amicus brief is not useful in addressing the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the “decision to grant amicus status is within the
sound discretion of the court and depends upon ‘a finding that the proffered information of amicus is timely, useful, or otherwise necessary to the administration of justice.’” United States v. Michigan Dept. of Cmty. Health, No. 1:10-mc-109, 2011 WL 2412602, at *9 (WD Mich. Jun. 3, 2011) (quoting United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (CA6 1991) (denying motion for leave to file amicus briefs that “contain[ed] little information that is useful or otherwise necessary to resolve the immediate petition before the court”)).
“The orthodox view of amicus curiae was, and is, that of an impartial friend of the court—not an adversary party in interest in the litigation[—]however, over the years, some courts have departed from the orthodoxy of amicus curiae as an impartial friend of the court and have recognized a very limited adversary support of given issues through brief and/or oral argument.” Michigan Dept. of Cmty. Health, 2011 WL 2412602, at *9 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).
In Voices for Choices v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 (CA7 2003), the Seventh Circuit briefly outlined the factors considered with respect to a proposed amicus filing:
No matter who a would-be amicus curiae is … the criterion for deciding whether to permit the filing of an amicus brief should be the same: whether the brief will assist the judges by presenting ideas, arguments, theories, insights, facts, or data that are not to be found in the parties’ briefs. The criterion is more likely to be satisfied in a case in which a party is inadequately represented; or in which the would-be amicus has a direct interest in another case that may be materially affected by a decision in this case; or in which the amicus has a unique perspective or specific information that can assist the court beyond what the parties can provide.
Ibid. (citations omitted). Interestingly, the proposed amici cite this Court’s decision in Kollaritsch v.
Michigan State University Board of Trustees, No. 1:15-cv-1191; 2017 WL 11454764, at *1
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(WD Mich. Oct. 30, 2017) (Maloney, J.), where the Court applied similar factors and denied a motion to file an amicus brief because it was both untimely and not useful; the proposed brief did not address the legal issues facing the court.
The proposed amicus brief should be viewed similarly, as it is not useful. The Government filed a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The same standard of review applies to both components of the motion. See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (CA6 1994) (on a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the court applied the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6), taking the petitioner’s material allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party). The proposed amicus brief does not speak to these standards. Instead, the proposed amici argue that COVID-19 is deadly and highly infectious (while admitting that only a small proportion of people who are infected will experience serious illness, hospitalization or death), and that the Lockdown Orders are good public policy to combat the spread of the coronavirus (while admitting there is no way to predict exposure, infection, or the severity of the illness if infected). ECF 19-1, PageID.542–543. None of this is relevant to the legal questions before the Court under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).1 Such matters are, at best, potential fact issues to be resolved at trial, not on a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs also note that the proposed amicus brief relies heavily on epidemiological studies. In support of their arguments, the proposed amici weave a tapestry of medical articles and journals that are based on questionable assumptions and raise more questions than answers. As another court observed in In re Welding Fume Products Liability Litigation, No. 1:03-cv-17000; 2005 WL 1868046, at *33 (ND Ohio Aug. 8, 2005), epidemiological studies “have flaws” and as such, they are subject to cross-examination:
1 In this opposition brief, Plaintiffs limit themselves to the procedural defects that should cause the Court to deny leave to file the proposed amicus brief. If the Court grants the motion, Plaintiffs will address the substance of the proposed brief in their opposition to the Government’s motion to dismiss.
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As the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence makes clear, it is important to emphasize that most [epidemiological] studies have flaws. Some flaws are inevitable given the limits of technology and resources. In evaluating epidemiologic evidence, the key questions, then, are the extent to which a study’s flaws compromise its findings and whether the effect of the flaws can be assessed and taken into account in making inferences. Given that no epidemiological study is flawless, in most cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Vigorous cross-examination of a study’s inadequacies allows the jury to appropriately weigh the alleged defects and reduces the possibility of prejudice.”
Ibid. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, to the extent that this Court
considers the cited epidemiological articles, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they
should have an opportunity to cross-examine the cited sources, including the proposed
amici, should they in the future be admitted as expert witnesses in this matter.

CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny Kaplan’s Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Epidemiologists in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted, BUTZEL LONG, P.C.

Dated: June 30, 2020
BH2943090.2

DANIEL J. McCARTHY (P59457) JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE (P70902) 150 West Jefferson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Under Local Civil Rule 7.2(b)(ii), I certify that this brief complies with the word limit for dispositive briefs. This brief contains 1,853 words, excluding the items to which the word count does not apply. This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word 2013, which generated the word count.

Respectfully submitted, BUTZEL LONG, P.C.

Dated: June 30, 2020
BH2943090.2

DANIEL J. McCARTHY (P59457) JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiﬀs

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EXHIBIT 1

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 22-1 filed 06/30/20 PageID.577 Page 2 of 4

Richotte, Joseph E.
From: Sent: To: Subject:

McCarthy, Daniel J. Tuesday, June 30, 2020 9:07 PM Richotte, Joseph E. Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: Consent to File Briefs of Amici Curiae in Sotheby’s v. Whitmer and Mitchell v. Whitmer

Sent from my iPhone
Begin forwarded message:
From: Joshua Matz <jmatz@kaplanhecker.com> Date: June 11, 2020 at 10:58:20 AM EDT To: "McCarthy, Daniel J." <mccarthyd@butzel.com>, Mahrah Taufique <mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com>, "Richotte, Joseph E." <richotte@butzel.com>, "allenc28@michigan.gov" <allenc28@michigan.gov>, "fowlerdf@michigan.gov" <fowlerdf@michigan.gov>, "fedynskyj@michigan.gov" <fedynskyj@michigan.gov>, "froehlichj1@michigan.gov" <froehlichj1@michigan.gov>, "Boothj2@michigan.gov" <Boothj2@michigan.gov>, "barrancok@michigan.gov" <barrancok@michigan.gov> Cc: "Raymond P. Tolentino" <rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com>, "Jonathan R. Kay" <jkay@kaplanhecker.com>, Jennifer McManus <jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com>, "Guardiola, Michelle" <guardiola@butzel.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Consent to File Briefs of Amici Curiae in Sotheby’s v. Whitmer and Mitchell v. Whitmer
Dear Mr. McCarthy,
We appreciate this response and understand your position.
All my best Joshua Matz
From: McCarthy, Daniel J. <mccarthyd@butzel.com> Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 10:55 AM To: Mahrah Taufique <mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com>; Richotte, Joseph E. <richotte@butzel.com>; allenc28@michigan.gov <allenc28@michigan.gov>; fowlerdf@michigan.gov <fowlerdf@michigan.gov>; fedynskyj@michigan.gov <fedynskyj@michigan.gov>; froehlichj1@michigan.gov <froehlichj1@michigan.gov>; Boothj2@michigan.gov <Boothj2@michigan.gov>; barrancok@michigan.gov <barrancok@michigan.gov> Cc: Raymond P. Tolentino <rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com>; Jonathan R. Kay <jkay@kaplanhecker.com>; Jennifer McManus <jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com>; Joshua Matz <jmatz@kaplanhecker.com>; Guardiola, Michelle <guardiola@butzel.com> Subject: RE: Consent to File Briefs of Amici Curiae in Sotheby’s v. Whitmer and Mitchell v. Whitmer
Dear Ms. Taufique,
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We appreciate your interest in seeking our consent to file Amici Curiae briefs in these cases, but we must respectfully decline. As you know, the Defendants have sought dismissal only under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Under this limited pleading standard, we don’t see any basis, factual or legal, for outside Amici interest, especially at this early stage of the proceedings.
Moreover, you have not identified your group of clients, nor have you identified the legal issues that they supposedly support on behalf of the Defendants. We have, therefore, no basis to discern whether your clients have any present or past connection or relationship with the named Defendants.
Should you wish to discuss these issues further, we’d be happy to schedule a time to discuss.
Sincerely,
Dan McCarthy and Joseph Richotte
Daniel J. McCarthy
Shareholder mccarthyd@butzel.com Direct: 248.258.1401
Stoneridge West 41000 Woodward Ave. Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 Office: 248.258.1616 | Fax: 248.258.1439 www.butzel.com Michigan | New York | Washington, D.C.
From: Mahrah Taufique [mailto:mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com] Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2020 8:26 PM To: Richotte, Joseph E. <richotte@butzel.com>; McCarthy, Daniel J. <mccarthyd@butzel.com>; allenc28@michigan.gov; fowlerdf@michigan.gov; fedynskyj@michigan.gov; froehlichj1@michigan.gov; Boothj2@michigan.gov; barrancok@michigan.gov Cc: Raymond P. Tolentino <rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com>; Jonathan R. Kay <jkay@kaplanhecker.com>; Mahrah Taufique <mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com>; Jennifer McManus <jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com>; Joshua Matz <jmatz@kaplanhecker.com> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Consent to File Briefs of Amici Curiae in Sotheby’s v. Whitmer and Mitchell v. Whitmer
Good afternoon,
I write on behalf of epidemiologists and public health scholars with professional expertise on the transmission of infectious diseases in Michigan. We intend to submit briefs of amici curiae in the cases
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Signature Sothbeys International Realty, Inc. et al. v. Whitmer et al., No. 20‐cv‐00360 (W.D.Mich filed Apr. 28, 2020) and Mitchell v. Whitmer et al., No. 20‐cv‐00384 (W.D.Mich filed May 4, 2020). We respectfully request your consent to file a Motion For Leave To File as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in each of these cases. Regards, Mahrah Taufique
Mahrah Taufique | Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP Associate 350 Fifth Avenue | Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
This email and its attachments may contain information that is confidential and/or protected from disclosure by the attorney-client, work product or other applicable legal privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of the email, please be aware that any unauthorized review, use, disclosure, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and destroy all copies of the message from your computer system. Thank you.
Confidentiality Statement: This message, including attachments, may be confidential, legally privileged, and/or subject to data privacy protections. If not for you, do not review, use or share it; notify us immediately and delete it. Thank you. This email and its attachments may contain information that is confidential and/or protected from disclosure by the attorney-client, work product or other applicable legal privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of the email, please be aware that any unauthorized review, use, disclosure, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and destroy all copies of the message from your computer system. Thank you.
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 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 23 filed 07/02/20 PageID.580 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION INC., CASITE INTRACO LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY LLC d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S., & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,

No. 1:20-cv-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

Plaintiffs, v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMICI CURIAE MICHIGAN EPIDEMIOLOGISTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Jennifer L. McManus (P65976) FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodard Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Telephone: (248) 542-6300 Facsimile: (248) 542-6301 jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Joshua Matz Raymond P. Tolentino Jonathan R. Kay Mahrah M. Taufique KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com jkay@kaplanhecker.com mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 23 filed 07/02/20 PageID.581 Page 2 of 8
Amid a pandemic that has touched all corners of Michigan, Plaintiffs seek to prevent the Court from even considering a brief submitted by 15 of Michigan’s leading, bipartisan public health experts and epidemiologists. This position is without merit. Amici have complied with Local Civil Rule 7.1(d). They are well positioned to serve as “friends of the court” and to aid the Court’s decisional process. And their filing is properly considered at this stage of the case. For these reasons, amici respectfully submit that this Court should grant leave to file their brief. I. AMICI COMPLIED WITH LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7.1(d).
On June 10, 2020, counsel for amici sought consent from both Plaintiffs and Defendants for their motion for leave to file a brief “on behalf of epidemiologists and public health scholars with professional expertise on the transmission of infectious diseases in Michigan.” The next day, counsel for Plaintiffs offered a categorical response: they declined to offer consent because they did not “see any basis, factual or legal, for outside Amici interest.” Plaintiffs also noted that they would not consent because counsel for amici had not identified their “group of clients.” Because Plaintiffs had taken a categorical position about the role of amici—and because nothing about their e-mail suggested that they would consent if provided with a list of specific epidemiologists and public health scholars—there were obviously irreconcilable differences between the parties. Rather than persist in a futile dialogue, counsel for amici formally acknowledged Plaintiffs’ refusal to consent and filed their motion on June 12, 2020.
This course of conduct was perfectly consistent with W.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(d). “The importance of the communication required by [Local] rule [7.1(d)] cannot be overstated.” ECM Converting Co. v. Corrugated Supplies Co., LLC, No. 1:07 Civ. 386, 2009 WL 385549, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2009) (Maloney, C.J.). Recognizing that fact, counsel for amici communicated with Plaintiffs’ counsel in good faith and sought their concurrence before filing this
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motion. These steps fulfill the requirements of 7.1(d). See Griffin v. Reznick, 609 F. Supp. 2d 695, 704–05 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (Maloney, C.J.) (finding Rule 7.1(d) satisfied where counsel sought concurrence by email and opposing counsel responded, “I will object to the motion. I see no basis for a motion for summary [judgment] on your part.”); Bell-Coker v. City of Lansing, No. 1:7 Civ. 812, 2009 WL 891722, at *1–3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2009) (Maloney, C.J.) (finding Rule 7.1(d) satisfied where counsel had sent email requesting concurrence and received no response).
Plaintiffs’ suggestion that amici should have followed up after Plaintiffs articulated their position is misplaced. It was evident that Plaintiffs and amici had reached an impasse on June 11, 2020. Further discussion would not have changed the fact that Plaintiffs saw no “basis, factual or legal, for outside Amici interest, especially at this early stage of the proceedings.” Under these circumstances, counsel for amici were under no obligation under Local Rule 7.1(d) to share their brief with Plaintiffs before filing or to provide them with a detailed list of signatories. Plaintiffs’ Opposition only confirms their categorical position—and thus further confirms that a follow-up phone call would have been an exercise in futility. Cf. Aslani v. Sparrow Health Sys., No. 1:8 Civ. 298, 2008 WL 4642617, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2008) (Maloney, C.J.) (“The applicable local rule does not state that the movant may or must use only the telephone to attempt to obtain concurrence, and the court finds no decisions interpreting the rule that way.”). II. AMICI OFFER A USEFUL, NONPARTISAN PERSPECTIVE.
In deciding whether “to allow an appearance as amicus curiae” under their inherent authority, district courts consider—among other things—“the usefulness of the brief.” Kollaritsch v. Michigan State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 1:15 Civ. 1191, 2017 WL 11454764, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2017) (Maloney, C.J.). Here, Plaintiffs suggest that the proposed amicus brief is not useful. According to Plaintiffs, amici are at once insufficiently knowledgeable about the
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COVID-19 pandemic in Michigan and yet too knowledgeable about the Governor’s response to the pandemic. (See Opp. at 1, 3-4). Both of these arguments miss the mark.
First, amici include some of Michigan’s leading experts on public health, epidemiology, and infectious disease. They have served as professors and researchers in Michigan; they have worked on the front lines in Michigan hospitals; and they have held senior public health and epidemiological roles in both Democratic and Republican administrations here in Michigan. There is no merit to the claim that they lack a useful perspective on the issues before the Court.1
Second, as confirmed by their credentials and professional backgrounds, amici offer a neutral, scientific, and bipartisan perspective. Plaintiffs claim otherwise by asserting that they might, at some point, designate two amici (Dr. Emily Martin and Dr. Marisa Eisenberg) as witnesses. Given the sheer number of experts who have advised policymakers in Michigan—far, far more than could ever reasonably be called as witnesses—this appears to be an effort to use a speculative fact-witness designation as a sword to exclude consideration of amici’s entire brief (and to imply a partisan agenda).2 That effort should not be validated. Dr. Martin and Dr. Eisenberg stand in the company of many other experts from diverse backgrounds who all agree on the contents of the brief. To the extent this Court’s determination turns on their inclusion, however, they are prepared to withdraw as amici, leaving the remaining 13 Michigan scientists.
1 In addition to their criticism of amici, Plaintiffs imply that there is something improper about amici’s retention of a “New York law firm.” We are aware of no policy or practice barring a “New York law firm” from representing clients in Michigan or appearing in this Court. The undersigned counsel have all been duly admitted to practice in the Western District of Michigan—and include lawyers with substantial, unique experience representing public health experts. Moreover, amici are also represented by well-respected members of the Michigan bar at Fagan McManus, P.C. Plaintiffs’ insinuation of improper out-of-state interference is offensive and mistaken. 2 Plaintiffs also state that Dr. Martin and Dr. Eisenberg may be “admitted as expert witnesses in this matter.” (Opp. at 7). Amici are unaware of any efforts made to retain Dr. Martin or Dr. Eisenberg as expert witnesses here.
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III. AMICI’S BRIEF MAY PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED AT THIS STAGE. The Court can and should consider amici’s submission in evaluating the issues before it.
As a threshold matter, courts within the Sixth Circuit routinely welcome contributions from amici curiae at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 680 (6th Cir. 2016) (relying on statistics from amicus briefs in appeal of motion to dismiss); F.H. ex rel. Hall v. Memphis City Sch., 764 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2014) (considering argument and briefing from amici curiae in appeal of motion to dismiss); Brott v. United States, No. 1:15 Civ. 38, 2016 WL 5922412, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2016), aff’d, 858 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 2017) (accepting amicus briefs in considering motion to dismiss). In suggesting otherwise, Plaintiffs rely almost completely on a Seventh Circuit case. (Opp. at 5 (citing Voices for Choices v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003)). But the Seventh Circuit maintains a stricter bar on amici involvement than this Court. See, e.g., Kollaritsch, 2017 WL 11454764, at *1; see also United States v. Columbus, No. 2:99 Civ. 1097, 2000 WL 1745293, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2000) (“Factors relevant to the determination of amicus status [in the Sixth Circuit] include whether or not the proffered information is timely, useful, or otherwise necessary to the administration of justice.” (quotations and citations omitted)).
For the reasons we have already given, amici’s proposed brief is not only appropriate but also helpful in resolving the issues at hand. (Amici Mot. For Leave at 2-3). To start, amici’s data regarding how the Governor’s public health interventions can be refined in highly fact-dependent ways are directly relevant to Defendants’ position that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe in a preenforcement setting and provides important context for the Governor’s actions affecting Plaintiffs. See (MTD Br. at 18-21); Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 706 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring consideration of “the extent to which the legal analysis would benefit from having a concrete
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factual context” and how “the enforcement authority’s legal position is subject to change before enforcement”).
In addition, the data that amici summarize are crucial to an assessment of whether and how to apply the deference doctrine articulated in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. See South Bay, 590 U.S. ___, at ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op. at 2) (“The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States to guard and protect.’” (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 38 (1905)). We are unaware of any case holding that a plaintiff may tactically plead its away around this binding deference rule by ignoring relevant facts and objecting to amicus briefs illuminating the issue.
Finally, much of the information set forth in amici’s brief is derived from public records, subject to judicial notice, and incorporated by reference into the First Amended Complaint (which discusses various WHO and CDC publications). See, e.g., Cooper v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 1:16 Civ. 471, 2019 WL 912123, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2019). In light of that, the Court can and should account for amici’s submission in undertaking the balancing required by many of Plaintiffs’ claims. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (equal protection); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (dormant commerce clause); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1992) (due process).
* * * * * Although this amicus submission complies with all relevant rules and is properly before the Court, Plaintiffs appear eager to deprive the Court of the scientific perspective afforded by amici. That is unfortunate. Given Plaintiffs’ professed commitment to a proper understanding of
5

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the threat posed by COVID-19 in Michigan, it is dismaying that they seek to rid these proceedings of a brief authored by Michigan’s leading authorities on public health and epidemiology.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, amici respectfully request that the Court grant their motion for leave to file a brief in support of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Dated: July 2, 2020
/s/ Jennifer L. McManus Jennifer L. McManus (P65976)
FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodard Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Telephone: (248) 542-6300 Facsimile: (248) 542-6301 jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Joshua Matz Joshua Matz Raymond P. Tolentino Jonathan R. Kay Mahrah M. Taufique
KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com jkay@kaplanhecker.com mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 23 filed 07/02/20 PageID.587 Page 8 of 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Attorney for amici curiae certifies that on July 2, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan by using the CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

Dated: July 2, 2020

By: /s/ Joshua A. Matz Joshua A. Matz Attorney for Amici Curiae KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 Telephone: (212) 763-0883 Facsimile: (212) 564-0883 jmatz@kaplanhecker.com

 
 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.741 Page 1 of 83

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S. & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, P.C., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiﬀs, v.
GRETCHEN E. WHITMER, and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 20-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.742 Page 2 of 83

COUNSEL OF RECORD

BUTZEL LONG, P.C. Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiﬀs
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Eric S. Dreiband Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
Alexander V. Maugeri Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
Hilary Y. Pinion Civil Rights Division
Matthew Schneider (P62190) United States Attorney Eastern District of Michigan
Andrew B. Birge (P62409) United States Attorney Western District of Michigan 330 Ionia Avenue, NW Post Oﬃce Box 208 Grand Rapids, Michigan 49501 (616) 456-2404 andrew.birge@usdoj.gov Counsel for the United States of America

MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL Christopher M. Allen (P75329) John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Darrin F. Fowler (P53464) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Assistant Attorney General 525 West Ottawa Street Post Oﬃce Box 30736 Lansing, Michigan 48933 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov Counsel for Defendants

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNSEL OF RECORD ....................................................................... i TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................... ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................. iv QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................................ xii TIMELINE OF RELEVANT STATE ACTION......................................... xiii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................... 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................... 8 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 8
I. Jurisdiction: Plaintiffs’ claims are neither moot nor unripe, and they have Article III standing to pursue their claims..................... 9 Mootness: Plaintiffs’ claims are capable of repetition yet evading review ........................................................ 9 Pre-Enforcement Standing: Plaintiffs have preenforcement standing to challenge the Governor’s executive actions because they would have conducted business but for the lockdown orders and a credible threat of prosecution if they violated the orders ...................... 16 Ripeness: Plaintiffs’ claims are constitutionally and prudentially ripe .........................................................20 Organizational Standing: MCA has standing to pursue its own claims and claims on behalf of its members..................22
II. Stating a Claim: The Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted .............................................................24 Governing Standard: Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to strict-scrutiny review to the extent they assert infringements upon fundamental rights or class distinctions that are subject to heightened review ...................25
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.744 Page 4 of 83 Otherwise Jacobson applies, but it does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims.........................................................27 The Dormant Commerce Clause .......................................34 Privileges and Immunities Clause......................................37 Privileges or Immunities Clause ....................................... 37 Substantive Due Process ................................................38 Equal Protection .........................................................43 Procedural Due Process .................................................46 Void for Vagueness ......................................................49
III. Epidemiology Amici: The amicus brief submitted by epidemiologists not only ignores the standard of review, but the information provided lacks value ..........................................53
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 64 PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................67
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.745 Page 5 of 83
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578 (1897)...........................................................................39 Ammex, Inc. v. Cox,
351 F.3d 697 (CA6 2003) .................................................................... 21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................... 8, 24 Bangura v. Hansen,
434 F.3d 487 (CA6 2006)....................................................................26 Barsky v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y.,
347 U.S. 442 (1954) ............................................................................1 Bigelow v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources,
970 F.2d 154 (CA6 1992) ..................................................................... 9 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal.,
23 U.S. 441 (1915) ............................................................................48 Board of State Colls. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972) .................................................................... 27, 38 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
573 U.S. 682 (2014) .................................................................... 46, 47 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Livestock
Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884)...................................40 Case of the Tailors,
77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1615) ...............................................................39 Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano,
648 F.3d 365 (CA6 2011) ....................................................................43 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) ..........................................................................46 City of Memphis v. Winﬁeld,
27 Tenn. 707 (1848) ..........................................................................39 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,
455 U.S. 283 (1982) .......................................................................... 14
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.746 Page 6 of 83
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) ..........................................................................44
Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513 (CA6 2001) ............................................................... 10, 14
Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893 (CA6 2014) ....................................................................46
Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1574) ................................................................39
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) ..........................................................................38
Department of Commerce v. New York, —U.S.—; 139 S.Ct. 2551 (2019) ............................................................. 9
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Gp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) ............................................................................ 21
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)........................................................................... 10
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 67 (2000)..................................................................10, 16, 23
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) ............................................................................47
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)...........................................................................47
Griﬃn v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) ............................................................................38
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ..........................................................................35
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ..........................................................................38
Hall v. Hall, 738 F.2d 718 (CA6 1982) ....................................................................20
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ..........................................................................48
Hartman v. Acton, —F. Supp. 3d—; No. 20-1952; 2020 WL 1932896 (SD Ohio Apr. 21, 2020)..........48
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.747 Page 7 of 83
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) .................................................................... 27, 38
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)...........................................................................24
In re Flint Water Cases, —F.3d—; 2020 WL 2611546 (CA6 May 22, 2020)........................................ 8
In re Omnicare, Inc. Secs. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (CA6 2014) .................................................................... 18
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)....................................................................... 28, 30
Johnson v. United States, —U.S.—; 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).............................................................50
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ..........................................................................46
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) ..........................................................................35
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)..............................................................39
Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d, 601 (CA6 2014).................................................................... 21
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)...........................................................................49
Lac Vieux Desert Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397 (CA6 1999)......................................................44
League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, —F.3d—, No. 20-1581; 2020 WL 3468281 (CA6 Jun. 24, 2020) .................25, 41
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) ........................................................................... 9
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) ........................................................................... 21
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..........................................................................23
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) ..........................................................................47
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.748 Page 8 of 83
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)...........................................................................47
Miller v. City of Wickliﬀe, 852 F.3d 497 (CA6 2017) .................................................................... 21
Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266 (CA6 1990)..................................................................... 9
MX Gp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326 (CA6 2002)....................................................................22
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ..........................................................................47
Northeastern Fla. Chap. of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) .......................................................................... 14
Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs., LLC, 700 F.3d 829 (CA6 2012) ..................................................................... 8
Patel v. Texas Dept. of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W. 69 (Tex. 2015) ................................................................41, 42
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) ................................................................. 37
Privett v. Pellegrin, 798 F.2d 470 (CA6 1986) (Table) ........................................................... 18
Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573 (CA6 2014) ....................................................................38
Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57 (CA7 1974) ......................................................................46
Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (CA6 2020).............................................................. 25, 48
Saleh v. Barr, 801 F. Appx. 384 (CA6 2020) ............................................................... 21
Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858 (CA6 2019) .................................................................... 17
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1946) ............................................................................46
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) ............................................................................ 41
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.749 Page 9 of 83
Sessions v. Dimaya, —U.S.—; 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018) ............................................................50
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 509 U.S.—; 140 S.Ct. 1613 (2020)..........................................................26
South Macomb Disposal Authority v. Washington Twp., 790 F.2d 500 (CA6 1986) ...............................................................37, 38
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911) ........................................................................... 10
State v. Town Council of Columbia, 40 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 404 (1853)...............................................................39
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014).................................................................. 8, 16, 21
Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328 (CA6 2019) ..................................................................... 8
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ............................................................................39
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) .................................................................. 9, 10, 14
United States v. De Leon, —F. Appx.—; 2020 WL 1877688 (CA6 Apr. 15, 2020) .................................. 21
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) .................................................................... 27, 38
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1965) ..........................................................................46
United States v. Sanchez–Gomez, —U.S.—; 138 S.Ct. 1532 (2018).............................................................. 9
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920) .......................................................................... 37
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) ..........................................................................50
Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (CA6 2008) ....................................................................20
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)......................................................................38, 41
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.750 Page 10 of 83
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) ............................................................................47
Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812 (CA6 2017) ................................................................ 8, 17
Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390 (CA6 1991) ....................................................................48
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 221 U.S. 229 (1911) ..........................................................................35
Wittman v. Personhuballah, —U.S.—; 136 S.Ct. 1732 (2016)............................................................. 18
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)...........................................................................40
Organic Laws U.S. Decl. of Indep. (1776) ......................................................................40 Virginia Decl. Rights § 1 (1776) ................................................................40
Statutes MCL 10.31(1) ..................................................................................... 10 MCL 333.50207..................................................................................29 MCL 333.5203 ...................................................................................29
Executive Orders EO 2020-09 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-17 .......................................................................................49 EO 2020-20 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-21 ....................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-42 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-43 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-59 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-67 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-69 ...................................................................................... 11
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EO 2020-70.................................................................................. 11, 45 EO 2020-77............................................................................. 11, 45, 51 EO 2020-92 ....................................................................... 11, 12, 45, 51 EO 2020-96 ................................................................................. 11, 45 EO 2020-99 ...................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-100 ..................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-110 ................................................................................ 11, 45 EO 2020-115 ................................................................................ 11, 45 EO 2020-127 ..................................................................................... 11 EO 2020-143 ..................................................................................... 14
Rules Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) .................................................................................. 10
Other Materials 2020 SB 0858 .................................................................................... 11 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries (1765) .................................................39 Courtemanche, Strong social distancing measures in the United States reduced the
COVID-19 growth rate, 39 Health Aﬀairs 7 (Jul. 2020) ............................ 57, 58 Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (1882) ................................. 41 Ebell, et al., Mandatory social distancing associated with increased doubling times,
Am. J. or Preventative Medicine (May 30, 2020)..........................................59 Eisenberg, et al., Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard, (Apr. 25, 2020) .......33, 53 Fleming, Goldﬁnger (Cape ed. 1959) ........................................................... 16 Franklin, The Works of Benjamin Franklin Vol. VII: Letters and Miscellaneous
Writings 1775–1779 (Putnam ed. 1904) ....................................................62 GDPNow™ Estimate for 2020:Q2, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atl. (Jun. 26, 2020) ...........63 Hatchett, Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918
inﬂuenza pandemic, 104 Proceedings of the Natl. Acad. of Sciences of the United States of Am. 18 (Feb. 14, 2007) .............................................. 55, 56
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Hinsdale, Epidemics of Inﬂuenza in 1647, 1789–90 and 1807: As Recorded by Noah Webster, Benjamin Rush, and Daniel Drake 723–728 (1919).............................32
Hslang, et al., The eﬀect of large-scale anti-contagion policies on the COVID-19 pandemic, Nature (Jun. 8, 2020) ............................................................58
Jarvis, et al., Quantifying the impact of physical distance measures on the transmission of COVID-19 in the UK, BMC Medicine 18:124 (May 7, 2020) ..... 54, 55
Krebs, Memorandum on Identiﬁcation of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response (Mar. 19, 2020)................................50, 51
Lane, Remaining Questions About Clinical Variola Major, Emerging Infectious Diseases 17(4): 676–680 (Apr. 2011) .......................................................30
Risse, Revolt against quarantine: Community responses to the 1916 polio epidemic, Oyster Bay, New York, 14 Transactions & Studies of the Coll. of Phys. of Phila. 1, 23–50 (1992) ........................................................................62
Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 Chap. L. Rev. 207 (2003) ................ 1, 39, 41 Thunström, et al., The beneﬁts and costs of using social distancing to ﬂatten the
curve for COVID-19, J. Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis (Apr. 14, 2020) ...........................63 U.S. Bureau of the Census and Mich. Dept. of Mgmt. & Budget, Oﬃce of State
Demographer, Michigan Population by County 1990–2019 (May 27, 2020) ........... 12 Unwin, Report 23: State-level tracking of COVID-19 in the United States,
Imperial Coll. (May 24, 2020) ......................................................... 60, 61 Walker, The global impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and
suppression, Imperial Coll. (Mar. 26, 2020) ............................................... 60 Whitmer, MI Safe Start Plan (May 7, 2020).............................................. 11, 12 Whitmer Press Conf. (May 13, 2020) ..........................................................33 Whitmer, Oﬃcial Facebook Post (Jun. 4, 2020).............................................. 13 Whitmer, Press Conf., Mich. State Police Facebook Live Video (Jun. 1, 2020) ........... 14 Whitmer, Written Testimony, p. 10, Hearing on “On the Front Line: How
Governors are Battling the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Reps., 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jun. 2, 2020)........................................................ 13
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.753 Page 13 of 83

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

QUESTION NO. 1:

Are Plaintiﬀs’ claims concerning rescinded executive action moot?

QUESTION NO. 2: Are Plaintiﬀs’ claims concerning present and threatened executive action ripe?

QUESTION NO. 3: Do Plaintiﬀs have standing to pursue the claims alleged in the First Amended Complaint?

QUESTION NO. 4:

If Plaintiﬀs’ claims are ripe, not moot, and at least one of them has standing, does the First Amended Complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted?

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.754 Page 14 of 83
TIMELINE OF RELEVANT STATE ACTION EO-4. On March 11, 2020, citing the Michigan Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (“EPGA”) and the Michigan Emergency Management Act (“EMA”), the Governor declared a “state of emergency” based upon two presumptive diagnoses of coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”), a respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2, which stands for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus two (the “coronavirus”). EO-21. On March 23, 2020, the Governor prohibited all in-person work that she deemed “not necessary to sustain or protect life.” EO-33. On April 1, 2020, the Governor expanded the emergency declaration to include a state of disaster under the EMA. 2020 SCR 24. On April 7, 2020, the Legislature voted to extend the emergency and disaster declarations under the EMA through April 30, 2020. EO-42. On April 9, 2020, the Governor extended EO-21 through April 30, 2020, while imposing greater restrictions on the general public than before. EO-59. On April 24, 2020, the Governor extended EO-42 through May 15, 2020, two weeks beyond the April 30th deadline approved by the Legislature. EO-59 loosened restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. 2020 SB 858. On April 28, 2020, the Legislature passed a bill terminating the declared emergency and disaster while extending 28 executive orders through dates ending in May, June, July, and December 2020. EO-66. On April 30, 2020, the Governor declared an end to the states of emergency and disaster under the EMA. EO-67. On April 30, 2020, the Governor unilaterally extended the declared state of emergency under the EPGA. EO-68. On April 30, 2020, the Governor declared a “new” emergency and a “new” disaster under the EMA, citing the same grounds as before.
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.755 Page 15 of 83
EO-70. On April 30, 2020,the Governor replaced EO-59 with EO-70. She maintained the expiration date of May 15, 2020, while further loosening restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy.
2020 SJ 39. On May 4, 2020, the Governor vetoed Senate Bill 858 of 2020. EO-77. On May 7, 2020, the Governor extended EO-70 through May 28, 2020, while further loosening restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. MI Safe Start Plan. Also on May 7, 2020, the Governor announced MI Safe Start: A Plan to Re-Engage Michigan’s Economy. EO-92. On May 18, 2020, the Governor replaced EO-77 with EO-92. She maintained the expiration date of May 28, 2020, while further loosing restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. EO-96. On May 20, 2020, the Governor replaced EO-92 with EO-96. She maintained the expiration date of May 28, 2020, while further loosening restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. EO-99. On May 22, 2020, the Governor unilaterally extended the declared states of emergency and disaster through June 19, 2020. EO-100. On May 22, 2020, the Governor extended EO-96 through June 12, 2020. EO-110. On June 1, 2020, the Governor extended EO-96 indeﬁnitely—it has no expiration date—while further loosing restrictions as part of a phased re-opening of the economy. EO-110 did not contain a stay-home order, but it continued to keep certain parts of the economy closed. EO-115. On June 5, 2020, the Governor partially modiﬁed EO-110. This latest EO likewise lacks an expiration date or a stay-home order, and it further loosens restrictions as part of a phased re-opening of the economy. Parts of the economy remain fully closed in 51 of Michigan’s 83 counties, including the counties where Plaintiﬀs’ businesses are located. Both EO-110 and EO-115 remain in eﬀect.
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26 filed 07/08/20 PageID.756 Page 16 of 83 EO-143. On July 1, 2020, the Governor closed indoor bar service across the Lower
Peninsula, except for those counties in Region 6 (the Traverse City region) that are already in Stage 5 of the Governor’s six-stage plan. None of Plaintiﬀs businesses are directly aﬀected by this order, but it demonstrates the Governor’s willingness to retighten restrictions.
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Under Local Rule 7.2(c), Plaintiﬀs respectfully submit this Memorandum in opposition to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.
INTRODUCTION The right to work … is the most precious liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to own property … To work means to eat. It also means to live.
– Justice William O. Douglas * Where there is no work, there is no dignity.
– Pope Francis †
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits every state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Of course, you cannot be deprived of something unless you already have it. So then, logically, every person already “possesses life, liberty, and property to begin with, and … he may be deprived of it subsequently, only when due process standards are met. In other words, freedom is the rule, and government action is the exception.” Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 Chap. L. Rev. 207 (2003) (“SANDEFUR”) (emphasis added).
This rule has been turned on its head. Commerce has been deemed “nonessential” unless Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon ( jointly, the “Government”) say it is. For months, no one could leave their homes or put in an honest day’s work without the Government’s permission. Over 1.7 million hardworking Michiganders were forced onto the dole. Scores of business owners have been robbed of the fruits of their labor, their storefronts never to reopen. All of this over a virus with a projected survival rate better than 99%. A virus that has infected 0.6% of the state and claimed the lives of only 0.06%
* Barsky v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
† Pope Francis, @Pontifex Tweet (Jun. 11, 2014, 1:11 a.m.), https://twitter.com/ Pontifex/status/608909299704709120.
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of the population. A disease that disproportionately manifests in seniors and has swept through nursing homes—accounting for 35% of all deaths in Michigan—because of “rational” Government policies guided by “experts.”
But, perhaps most audaciously, we are now told that these radical and unprecedented infringements on our freedoms, and the economic devastation they have wrought, are so perfectly consistent with our Constitution and so indisputably reasonable that summary dismissal is warranted. Judicial review cannot be had. At least not today, says the Government. Plaintiﬀs are somehow both too early and too late in raising their claims. The Court should reject this “catch me if you can” attitude toward this lawsuit. The evading-review doctrine prevents such gamesmanship.
In Argument I, Plaintiﬀs explain why the Court has jurisdiction to declare the Governor’s executive orders and the Director’s emergency orders and emergency rules (collectively, the “Lockdown Orders”) invalid, and to enjoin the Government from infringing on their constitutional rights through similar orders in the future. In Argument II, Plaintiﬀs explain why they have adequately pleaded claims upon which relief can be granted.1 Finally, in Argument III, Plaintiﬀs respond to the putative amici’s brief.
The Court should hold that it has jurisdiction to reach Plaintiﬀs’ claims, and that the First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) states claims upon which relief can be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Despite acknowledging that the Court’s review of the Government’s Motion is limited to the factual allegations in the Complaint, ECF 18, PageID.214, the Government oﬀers several pages of “facts” without a single citation to the Complaint. The Court should reject the Government’s statement of facts as procedurally improper, and limit
1 Plaintiﬀs concede that Counts II and III, which state claims for violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, should be dismissed, but not for the reasons advanced by the Government. See Argument II.D and II.E.
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itself to (and accept as true) the factual allegations in the pleadings, as required under the applicable standard of review.
* * * Although the coronavirus is highly contagious, it does not invariably result in COVID-19. ECF 8, ¶ 42, PageID.96. For those who do develop the disease, the mortality rate is low. Ibid. As of May 8, 2020, the State reported on its oﬃcial coronavirus webpage 46,326 conﬁrmed cases of COVID-19, which is roughly 0.46% of the state’s population. Ibid. Even for the known fractional percent of those who have developed COVID-19, the State reports a 90.5% survival rate. Ibid. As a result, only 0.04% of the State’s population has succumbed to the virus.2 Ibid. In all likelihood, the survival rate in Michigan is far higher. Recent antibody testing conducted in the State of New York and a study in Los Angeles suggest that millions more have been infected with the coronavirus than previously known, and that the supermajority of those previously infected were either asymptomatic or experienced mild reactions to it. Id., at ¶ 43, PageID.96. In New York, this new information has dropped the mortality rate to 0.5%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.5%. Ibid. In Los Angeles, it dropped the mortality rate to 0.1–0.3%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.7–99.9%. Ibid. There is no reason to believe that Michigan is exempt from this good news. As more Michiganders are tested, increases in positive tests will yield a higher survival rate. Moreover, the method of counting COVID-19 deaths is designed to artiﬁcially inﬂate the statistics that justify the alleged emergency and that are supposedly driving the Lockdown Orders at issue. Id., at ¶ 44, PageID.96.
2 Plaintiffs acknowledge that the data has changed in the two months since filing their Complaint. Because this is a motion to dismiss and the Court must accept the pleadings as true, Plaintiffs rely on the facts as pleaded. The current data is not, however, materially different. As of July 3, 2020, roughly 0.65% of the population reportedly has caught the virus, 0.06% have succumbed to it, and the official survival rate has increased to 90.9%. https://bit.ly/MichCoronavirusDashboard.
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The World Health Organization (“WHO”) has created two emergency COVID-19 death codes: (1) “U07.1, COVID-19, virus identiﬁed”; and (2) “U07.2, COVID-19, virus not identiﬁed,” which is used when laboratory conﬁrmation is inconclusive or not available. ECF 8, ¶ 45, PageID.97. WHO guidelines allow both to be used to code COVID-19 as a cause of death. Ibid. Stated diﬀerently, even when the coronavirus is not identiﬁed in the person, it can still be listed as a COVID-19 death. Ibid.
The WHO has also rolled out an ICD-11 code for living patients: (1) RA01.0, which is used for a laboratory-conﬁrmed case of COVID-19; and (2) RA01.1, which is used for suspected or probable cases. Id., at ¶ 46, PageID.97.
The CDC relies on three death codes: the U07.1 code and two codes for pneumonia, J12.0 and J18.9. Id., at ¶ 47, PageID.97. While this appears more reasonable than the WHO guidance, the CDC still allows physicians to use the U07.1 code for laboratoryconﬁrmed cases or when the death was presumed to have been caused by COVID-19. Ibid. This still artiﬁcially increases the number of COVID-19 deaths, although to a lesser extent. Ibid.
Michigan counts all deaths coded on a death certiﬁcate under U07.1 as COVID-19 deaths. Id., at ¶ 48, PageID.97. But it also looks beyond death certiﬁcates and counts as COVID-19 deaths those people who were coded RA01.0 while living. Ibid. In other words, a person can be counted as a COVID-19 death even when an attending physician or medical examiner concluded that the person died of something other than COVID-19. Ibid.
For example, a patient with heart disease can be diagnosed as having contracted coronavirus, die of a heart attack because of the heart disease, and the physician could code the cause of death as heart disease, but the State would still list the patient as having died from COVID-19. Id., at ¶ 49, PageID.97.
Take another example: the same patient, instead of dying of a heart attack in the hospital, recovers and is discharged, but dies at home from another heart attack. Id., at ¶ 50, PageID.97. The State would still list the patient as having died from COVID-19, not
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from heart disease. Id., PageID.98. This results in grossly distorted mortality rates and misleads the public about the
threat that COVID-19 poses. ECF 8, ¶ 51, PageID.98. Simply put, the State appears to be intentionally inﬂating COVID-19 death statistics to justify an emergency. Id., at ¶ 52, PageID.98
Yet, even when considering the inﬂated number of deaths caused by COVID-19, the number of deaths is not “unprecedented,” as routinely claimed. Id., at ¶ 53, PageID.98. What is unprecedented is the Government’s response to it: it shuttered civil society and conﬁned 10 million people to their homes. Id., at ¶¶ 1, 6, 26–41, PageID.86–88, 93–96.
In 1918, in response to the Spanish Flu, Governor Albert Sleeper issued an order closing places of public amusement. Id., at ¶ 54, PageID.98. Individual cities decided whether to close schools. Ibid. Work continued. Ibid. Governor Sleeper wisely balanced public health while preserving commerce. Ibid. The current executive orders fail to do so, overreaching to such extent that the State’s economy is spiraling toward a depression. Ibid.
In the 1940s and the early 1950s, annual summer polio epidemics killed thousands of children before a vaccine was found. Id., at ¶ 55, PageID.98. Even under such dire circumstances, several Michigan governors of both parties, refrained from violating constitutional norms with excessive executive orders during those years. Ibid.
In the late 1960s, the Hong Kong Flu swept across the globe killing more than 1 million people. Id., at ¶ 56, PageID.98. The CDC estimated that 100,000 people died in the U.S. Ibid. Michigan, like other states, was aﬀected. Ibid. Governor George Romney did not place residents under house arrest or shutdown the economy then, either. Ibid.
Governor Whitmer repeatedly states that decisions must be made on data. Id., at ¶ 57, PageID.98. Yet, despite data showing that the curve was ﬂattened, the Governor tightened restrictions through an executive order that the Wall Street Journal described as the “most excessive” in the country. Id., at ¶ 57, PageID.98–99.
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Among other enhancements, the new order imposed harsher restrictions on the ability to travel and banned people from visiting their families, working, and purchasing a variety of everyday items at stores. ECF 8, ¶ 58, PageID.99. The new order was announced at 3:00 p.m. on April 9th, and became eﬀective at 12:01 a.m. on April 10th— i.e., on less than 12 hours’ notice. Ibid. The Governor timed EO 2020-42 to prohibit families from gathering to celebrate Easter Sunday and Passover. Ibid.
Although a previous order allowed “critical infrastructure” workers—those described as critical by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”)—to perform in-person work in compliance with CDC guidance on “social distancing,” the Governor expressly, arbitrarily, and capriciously refused to adopt CISA’s updated deﬁnitions of “critical infrastructure workers,” in EOs 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, and 2020-77. Id., at ¶ 59, PageID.99. Other governors who issued similar executive orders adopted the updated federal deﬁnitions. Ibid. Governor Whitmer never explained why these new deﬁnitions were not, and could not have been, adopted in Michigan. Ibid. This is further evidence that the Governor unreasonably kept more Michiganders locked up in their homes than necessary. Ibid.
Taking the Governor at her word that she wanted to make decisions based on data, but lacking conﬁdence in the Governor’s modeling because the underlying data and methodology was unavailable to the public, Sotheby’s, Intraco, and others hired Anderson Economic Group (“AEG”) to analyze the infection curve and the economic eﬀects of her EOs. Id., at ¶ 60, PageID.99. They provided AEG’s report to the Governor on April 13, 2020. Ibid. The Governor has never responded. Ibid.
Consistent with the assessments in the AEG report, nearly 1.2 million residents reportedly ﬁled for unemployment, the largest number of unemployment claims in the state’s history.3 Id., at ¶ 62, PageID.100. Michigan is among the top ﬁve worst states for
3 The actual number who filed for unemployment is higher, but Plaintiffs are using the as-pleaded facts to comply with the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. See Note 2, supra.
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unemployment. Ibid. See also ECF 8-1, PageID.126. According to the Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity, this means more than 25% of Michigan’s workforce ﬁled for unemployment in the span of four weeks because of the Lockdown Orders. ECF 8, ¶ 62, PageID.100. For context, the national peak in the unemployment rate during the Great Depression of 1929 was 26%. Ibid.
Employers fund unemployment beneﬁts. Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.13. The Governor has not explained how the unemployment system can keep paying beneﬁts if employers can’t operate their businesses. Id., at ¶ 63, PageID.100. If businesses can’t operate, then they can’t generate revenue. Ibid. And, if they can’t generate revenue, then they have no way of paying into the unemployment fund. Ibid.
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as of March 31, 2020, Michigan’s unemployment trust fund balance was $4.55 billion. Id., at ¶ 64, PageID.100. State oﬃcials predicted that the fund will be drained in July. Ibid. One recent prediction is that the Michigan Unemployment Trust Fund will be drained within two months and incur a $15 billion deﬁcit. Ibid. Taxes on businesses may double to pay back the loans that the State would require to keep paying unemployment. Ibid. This will leave less money for businesses to rehire workers and prolong the economic crisis. Ibid.
Unemployment is not the only factor in play. ECF 8, ¶ 65, PageID.100. For those fortunate enough to remain employed, many were subject to furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. Id., at ¶ 65, PageID.100–101.
Plaintiﬀs wanted to fully reopen their business, to help their current and former employees (whom they hope to rehire) put food on their tables, keep roofs over their heads, and clothes on their backs. ECF 8, ¶ 66, PageID.101. The Government forbade them from doing so under pain of criminal punishment and civil ﬁnes, ibid., even though they could safely operate by adhering to existing social distancing rules or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of their in-person operations, id., at ¶¶ 96–97, 106, 113, PageID.108–109, 112–113.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW Subject-matter jurisdiction. There are two ways to challenge a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1): facial attacks and factual attacks. Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812, 816 (CA6 2017). The Government asserts a facial attack on the Court’s jurisdiction. A facial attack challenges the suﬃciency of the pleading itself. When reviewing facial attacks, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, just like they do under Rule 12(b)(6). Ibid. As the parties invoking subject-matter jurisdiction in this case, Plaintiﬀs bear the burden of proving that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). Statement of a claim. When a defendant asserts that a plaintiﬀ has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must satisfy itself that the complaint plausibly pleads that the defendant acted unlawfully and injured the plaintiﬀ. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–679 (2009). In doing so, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiﬀs, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiﬀ’s favor.4 In re Flint Water Cases, — F.3d—; 2020 WL 2611546, at *12 (CA6 May 22, 2020). Defendants bear the burden of proving that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (CA6 2019).
ARGUMENT The Government asks the Court to dismiss this action, arguing that the claims are simultaneously unripe and moot, that MCA lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of its members, and that the complaint generally fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
4 The Government says that the Court “may” make reasonable inferences, citing caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit. ECF 18, PageID.383. Controlling authority mandates those reasonable inferences in the Sixth Circuit. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs., LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 835 (CA6 2012) (“We must … draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiﬀ.” (emphasis added)).
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granted. None of these arguments has merit. Attacks on the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction must be decided ﬁrst; a Rule
12(b)(6) challenge becomes moot if the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (CA6 1990). Ripeness, mootness, and standing are threshold jurisdictional questions under Article III. Bigelow v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 970 F.2d 154, 157 (CA6 1992) (ripeness); United States v. Sanchez–Gomez, —U.S.—; 138 S.Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018) (mootness); Department of Commerce v. New York, —U.S.—; 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019) (standing). Plaintiﬀs therefore address these three issues ﬁrst, before deconstructing the Government’s challenge under Rule 12(b)(6).
I. Jurisdiction: Plaintiﬀs’ claims are neither moot nor unripe, and they have Article III standing to pursue their claims. Mootness: Plaintiﬀs’ claims are capable of repetition yet evading review. Article III courts may adjudicate only live cases or controversies where a plaintiﬀ
claims to have suﬀered, or to be threatened with, an actual injury that is traceable to the defendant and can be redressed by judicial decree. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990). The Government argues that it mooted Plaintiﬀs’ claims by rescinding or modifying the executive orders at issue in the complaint. ECF 18, PageID.384–389. Anticipating the Government would continue its pattern of modifying executive orders to moot lawsuits challenging its exercise of power, Plaintiﬀs pleaded that the orders are capable of repetition yet evading review. ECF 8, ¶ 10, PageID.88. The Government does not address this doctrine in its brief.
A case falls within this special category of disputes and remains a live controversy if: (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends; and (2) the plaintiﬀ reasonably expects to be subject to the same action again. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439–40 (2011). The party asserting mootness—here, the Government—bears the “formidable burden” of persuading a court that “it is absolutely
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clear” that the challenged action cannot reasonably be expected to recur. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 67, 189 (2000).5 The Government must also show that “interim relief and events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the eﬀects of the [challenged action].” Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 530–31 (CA6 2001) (emphasis added). The Government has not met this heavy burden.
1. The challenged actions were too short in duration to be fully litigated.
The Supreme Court has ruled that challenged actions lasting 12 months are too short to permit full litigation. Turner, 564 U.S., at 440 (holding that a 12-month jail term was capable of repetition yet evading review, citing in support First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978), which held that an 18-month period was too short, and Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514–516 (1911), which held that a two-year period was too short). The executive orders at issue in our case were in force for mere days. The shortest were EO-92 and EO-96, tied for two days. The longest was EO21, which lasted 21 days. It is impossible to fully litigate a case in such time. Indeed, the court rules give a defendant a minimum of 21 days just to answer the complaint or ﬁle a motion to dismiss. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
2. Plaintiﬀs reasonably expect to be subject to the same action again. The executive orders assert the Governor has the power to issue lockdown orders under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act upon the declaration of an emergency in her sole discretion. See also MCL 10.31(1). The Governor has extended the declared emergency three times. EO-4; EO-67; EO-99; EO-127. The extension orders declare that
5 Friends of the Earth involved the application of a diﬀerent doctrine: the doctrine of voluntary cessation. Plaintiﬀs do not rely on that doctrine, but the decision is instructive on which party carries the burden in as much as both the evading-review doctrine and the voluntary-cessation doctrine share this element.
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a state of emergency will continue until “the threats posed by COVID-19 to life and the public health, safety, and welfare of th[e] state have been neutralized.” EO-67, at 3, ¶ 2; EO-99, at 4, ¶ 1; EO–127, at 3–4, ¶ 5. When used in connection with biology and medicine, the word “neutralized” means “to render a virus non-infective.”6 In other words, the Governor has thrice stated her intent to continue the state of emergency until a vaccine is available.7
Since declaring an emergency, the Governor has exercised broad executive powers over the Legislature’s objection. ECF 8, ¶ 7, PageID.88; 2020 SB 0858; House of Reps. & Senate v. Governor, No. 20-79-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl.). Given how power has been autocratically exercised during the asserted emergency, Plaintiﬀs can reasonably expect that the Government will keep suppressing civil liberties and closing businesses. There have been 12 orders closing “noncritical” businesses and forbidding in-person work. EO9; EO-20; EO-21; EO-42; EO-43; EO-59; EO-69; EO-70; EO-77; EO-92; EO-96; EO100; EO-110; EO-115. In those orders, the Governor reserves the right to “maintain, strengthen, or relax the restrictions” that she has imposed at any time. EO-21(13); EO42(16); EO-59(19); EO-70(19); EO-77(19); EO-92(19); EO-96(21); EO-100(3); EO110(18); EO-115(14).
The Governor has also adopted a plan for reopening the economy in six phases. See MI Safe Start Plan (May 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/ED25-4YM2. Under Phases 1 and 2, residents are ordered to stay at home, and only those portions of the economy that the Governor unilaterally deems to be “critical infrastructure” can continue to operate. Id., at 2. Under Phase 3, residents are still required to stay at home, but select “noncritical”
6 “Neutralize, v.,” Sense 6a, Biology & Medicine. Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Jun. 2020), www.oed.com/view/Entry/126463.
7 See also Livengood, Pﬁzer’s Michigan team works to produce COVID-19 vaccine by fall, A18, Crain’s Det. Bus. (May 11, 2020) (“ʻWe can’t resume normal life until we have a vaccine,’ Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer said last week.”) Plaintiﬀs do not oﬀer this quotation to go beyond the four-corners of the Complaint. Instead, it is oﬀered only to show that Plaintiﬀs are not twisting words to manufacture an unreasonable inference.
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industries may resume operations under strict, unilaterally imposed regulations. Ibid. For the eight weeks between March 23rd and May 18th, every Michigander was in Phase 1–3. Although the Governor relaxed restrictions in the Upper Peninsula and part of the northern Lower Peninsula after eight weeks, over 90% of Michiganders remained in Phases 1–3 for a full 10 weeks. This despite the virus peaking during Week 3, with hospitalizations steadily decreasing thereafter.8 ECF 8, ¶¶ 2–3, PageID.86–87; ECF 8-1 at 14, PageID.153. Indeed, the Governor strengthened the lockdown orders after the peak to keep people apart over Easter and Passover. ECF 8, ¶¶ 31, 57–58, PageID.94, 98–99. When the Governor disregards “facts and data” in this manner, Plaintiﬀs can reasonably expect that she will do so again until a vaccine is produced and we reach Phase 6 of her plan.9
In addition, the Governor’s plan states “[i]t is also possible to move backwards if risk increases and if we stop adhering to safe practices.” The Court can take judicial notice that there have been mass protests in Grand Rapids, Lansing, and Kalamazoo, where people marched without regard to social distancing rules. Fed. Rule Evid. 201(b)(1), (d). The Governor herself recently marched shoulder to shoulder with
8 Before May 18th, the entire state was subject to the lockdown orders. On May 18th, the Governor divided the state into eight regions and started loosening restrictions in the Upper Peninsula and in the northern part of the Lower Peninsula. EO-92(2), (8)(a)(19). These two regions represent just 7.5% of the state’s population—92.5% of the state remained under more restrictive terms. See U.S. Bureau of the Census and Mich. Dept. of Mgmt. & Budget, Oﬃce of State Demographer, Michigan Population by County 1990–2019 (May 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/FWL8-5WLW.
9 We will not reach Phase 6 until there is “suﬃcient community immunity” or a vaccine. See MI Safe Start Plan at 2 (May 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/ED25-4YM2. By forcing people to remain in their homes and forcing businesses to shutter for nearly three months, the Governor has prevented society from naturally reaching herd immunity. There is as yet no vaccine for SARS-CoV-2, and the record for the fastest vaccine—against the mumps—is four years. Because it is unlikely that a vaccine for SARS-CoV-2 will be available in the near future, it is reasonable to infer that the Governor will keep issuing executive orders for the foreseeable future.
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protestors in Highland Park. Whitmer, Oﬃcial Facebook Post (Jun. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/QY3E-N37S; Fed. Rule Evid. 201(b)(2), (d). Based on such representations, Plaintiﬀs can reasonably anticipate spikes in infections because of the protests and riots.10 Based on the MI Safe Start plan, they can also reasonably expect that the Governor will return us to some level of lockdown.
In its brief, the Government says that “[t]he notion that [it] will again put into place the same restrictions is speculative, and the notion that identical conditions will exist in this dynamic situation in the future is conjecture premised on an impossibility.” ECF 18, PageID.388. One hopes the Government isn’t trying to gaslight the Court. Days earlier, the Governor told Congress that stricter stay-home measures would be considered if a second wave occurred:
As my state moves to reopen its industries and economy, we are cautious to remain ever vigilant against this virus … [A] second wave is a real possibility come the fall and winter … Beyond the health implications, the economic pain associated with a second wave of Covid-19 would be tremendous should stricter stay home measures need to be considered again to contain the virus.
Whitmer, Written Testimony, p. 10, Hearing on “On the Front Line: How Governors are Battling the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jun. 2, 2020) (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/3HUV-7P4U.11 The Governor’s congressional testimony is consistent with her oft-repeated warning that we “don’t want
10 Indeed, the press has been reporting increases in cases nationwide for the last few weeks, especially among young adults in their 20s and 30s. Although many of these reports attribute the increases to reopening businesses around Memorial Day, common sense says that weeks of mass protests by young people across the country are the primary cause of the uptick in cases among young people.
11 The Court can take judicial notice of the Governor’s testimony because it can be accurately and readily determined from the oﬃcial records of the U.S. House of Representatives, a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. Rule Evid. 201(b)(2).
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to be in the same posture” in the fall if a second wave of the virus appears. For example, at a June 1st press conference addressing the virus, ﬂooding, protests, and riots, the Governor said: “No one wants to move backwards, but, if we see a spiking coming, we may have to.” Whitmer, Press Conf., Mich. State Police Facebook Live Video, 16:38 (Jun. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/WhitmerPressConference06012020.
The Governor has also repeatedly characterized her power as a “dial,” which she can use to turn civil liberties up and down at will. As noted earlier, the Governor must show that “interim relief and events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the eﬀects of the [challenged action].” Cleveland Branch, 263 F.3d, at 530–31 (emphasis added). If she can turn her dial at will until the emergency is “neutralized,” then the relaxed posture now prevailing can be turned back up at any time. See, e.g., EO-143 (closing bars). By deﬁnition, the Governor has given revocable interim relief, and the standard requires the relief to be irrevocable.
Moreover, Plaintiﬀs are not required to show that the Governor would take identical action. Under Turner, 564 U.S., at 439–40, Plaintiﬀs need only reasonably expect the same type of action to occur again. See also, e.g., Northeastern Fla. Chap. of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662 (1993) (“City of Mesquite [v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982),] does not stand for the proposition that it is only the possibility that the selfsame statute will be enacted that prevents a case from being moot … [It is suﬃcient that] it disadvantages them in the same fundamental way.” (emphasis in original)). Here, any future lockdown order that directly closes businesses or indirectly closes them by preventing in-person work would disadvantage Plaintiﬀs in the same fundamental way.
Finally, Plaintiﬀs take issue with the Government’s suggestion that the Governor has not lifted or modiﬁed her executive orders to avoid judicial review. ECF 18, PageID.387. They contend she has done exactly that. After being sued in Belanger for criminalizing pro-life protests, the Governor “clariﬁed” the then-prevailing executive
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order with an FAQ that authorized “expressive activities” protected by the First Amendment. Belanger v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00291 (WD Mich.) (Neﬀ, J.), PageID.119. After being sued in Beemer and Michigan Nursery for infringing on religious liberty, the right to bear arms, the right to intrastate travel, the right to work, and the use of motorized watercraft, the Governor modiﬁed her executive order to moot the need for injunctive relief.12 She now argues that the Beemer claims are moot.13 After being sued in Mitchell for infringing on free speech, the right to medical care, and other liberty and property interests, the Governor modiﬁed her orders and now argues that those claims are moot.14 After being sued in Midwest Institute of Health for infringing on the right to medical care, the Governor yet again modiﬁed her orders to permit medical care and now argues that those claims are moot.15 And, after Plaintiﬀs ﬁled an amicus brief in the Michigan Court of Claims showing that it was unreasonable to keep rural counties locked down after months of low infection rates, low or no deaths, and in some counties no cases, the Governor began implementing a regional approach to lockdowns.16 Ian Fleming’s version of the Moscow rules rings true: “Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The
12 Compare Beemer v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00323 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.), PageID.1 (Compl., Apr. 15, 2020) with EO-59 (Apr. 24, 2020) and Beemer, PageID.390– 391 (Stip. Order re: Inj. Mot., Apr. 27, 2020).
Compare also Michigan Nursery & Landscape Assn v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00331 (WD Mich. Maloney, J.), PageID.1 (Compl., Apr. 17, 2020) with EO-59 (Apr. 24, 2020) and Michigan Nursey, Page.116 (Notice of Withdrawal of Motion as Moot, Apr. 24, 2020).
13 The parties agreed that the Michigan Nursery plaintiﬀs would dismiss their claims without prejudice before the Government’s deadline to respond to the complaint.
14 Compare Mitchell v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00384 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.), PageID.75 (First Am. Compl., May 11, 2020), with EO-96(19) (May 21, 2020) and Mitchell, PageID.161–162 (Gov.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Jun. 5, 2020).
15 Compare Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00414 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.), PageID.1 (Compl., May 12, 2020) with EO-96(19) (May 21, 2020) and Midwest Institute, PageID.1795–1800 (Pls.’ Reply re: Mootness, May 26, 2020).
16 Compare Exhibit 1, Pls.’ Amicus Br., House of Reps. & Senate v. Governor, 20-79MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. May 14, 2020), with EO-92(2), (8)(a)(19) (May 18, 2020).
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third time, it’s enemy action.” Fleming, Goldﬁnger, Chap. 14 (Cape ed. 1959). The count now stands at six.
Litigation is not dodgeball. For as long as the Governor claims the power to shutter the economy and conﬁne residents to their homes in the name of public health, Plaintiﬀs will have a concrete stake in the outcome of this litigation. Their claims are not moot.

Pre-Enforcement Standing: Plaintiﬀs have pre-enforcement standing to challenge the Governor’s executive actions because they would have conducted business but for the lockdown orders and a credible threat of prosecution if they violated the orders.
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiﬀ bears the burden of showing: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a suﬃcient causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) the likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Driehaus, 573 U.S., at 157–158. Although a plaintiﬀ must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought, Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S., at 185, the Governor contends only that Plaintiﬀs have suﬀered no injury in fact. ECF 18, PageID.389–390
Before turning to the required analysis, Plaintiﬀs note that the Government’s position is at odds with the argument it advanced in the Michigan Court of Claims. There, it argued that the Legislature lacks standing to challenge her position. Exhibit 2, Opp’n, Immediate Decl. J. 11–19, House of Reps., No. 20-79-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. May 12, 2020). When pressed on this point at oral argument, the Assistant Solicitor General argued that the only people with standing to contest the executive orders are those aﬀected by them:

The Court: Mr. Allen:

You said they [the Legislature] didn’t have the authority to do that [standing to sue]. So okay, the only person, the only entity then, that can come in and say to the Governor, we know you’ve got good faith, but we think you’re wrong, this is not, in fact, an emergen[cy] condition or it is not a crisis situation would have to be a private citizen, wouldn't it?
I think that—that—that would be the case, Your Honor.

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Exhibit 3, Motion Hrg. Tr. 34:16–24, House of Reps., No. 20-79-MZ (May 15, 2020). Now the Government is arguing in every pending case that those aﬀected by the Lockdown Orders do not have standing.17 Apparently, no one has standing to challenge the Government.
1. Injury in Fact: With all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiﬀs’ favor, the pleadings allege that Plaintiﬀs would have engaged in normal business operations but for the credible threat of prosecution under the Lockdown Orders.
In the pre-enforcement context, a plaintiﬀ satisﬁes the injury-in-fact requirement where he has “[1] an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably aﬀected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, and [2] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (CA6 2016). A threat of future enforcement may be “credible” when the same conduct has drawn enforcement actions or threats of enforcement in the past. Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858, 865 (CA6 2019).
On the intent-to-engage element, the Government argues that Plaintiﬀs have not satisﬁed this element because they have not expressly alleged that they intended to engage in business during the lockdown. ECF 18, PageID.390. Of course, Plaintiﬀs are entitled all reasonable inferences at this stage of the proceedings. Wayside Church, 847 F.3d, at 816. Plaintiﬀs pleaded that, “[u]nder threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or signiﬁcantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process.” ECF 8, ¶ 6, PageID.87. And, in their prayers for relief, Plaintiﬀs repeatedly request a permanent injunction against such action in the
17 Governor’s Mot. Dismiss, Beemer v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00323 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.), PageID.666–670; Governor’s Mot. Dismiss, Mitchell v. Whitmer, No. 1:20cv-00384 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.), PageID.166–168 (discussed under the rubric of ripeness); Governor’s Mot. Dismiss, Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00414 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.), PageID.1800–1801.
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future. Id., at ¶¶ 9, 75, 80, 86, 100, 110, 117, 125 and Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–2, PageID.88, 103, 105–106, 111–115. It can be reasonably inferred from the word “forced” that Plaintiﬀs would have continued to operate their businesses but for the Lockdown Orders. It can also be reasonably inferred from the requested injunction that they wish to resume their operations and never have the Government shut them down again. From these inferences, Plaintiﬀs satisfy the burden of pleading their intent to engage in business during the lockdowns but for the challenged orders. Of course, should the Court disagree, this is a point easily remedied by amending the pleadings. An outright dismissal on this basis is unnecessary and unwarranted.
On the threat-of-prosecution element, the Government argues that Plaintiﬀs “face no credible threat of prosecution for violating the restrictions because the restrictions they challenge no longer exist.” ECF 18, PageID.390. Implicitly, then, it concedes that Plaintiﬀs faced a credible threat of prosecution when the restrictions were in place. Indeed, one need only look to the pending criminal prosecution against Karl Manke, the Owosso barber who faces two misdemeanor charges for operating his barbershop during the lockdown, Exhibit 4, Register of Actions, Michigan v. Manke¸ No. 20-ST0337-SM (Shiawassee Dist. Ct.) (May 4, 2020), and the threatened prosecution of Paul Glantz and Emagine Theatres for announcing a protest ﬁlm festival, Emagine Theatres v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00570, ECF 1-1, PageID.21.18
Although standing requirements persist throughout the life of a lawsuit, Wittman v. Personhuballah, —U.S.—; 136 S.Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016), the Government conﬂates standing with mootness, a distinct jurisdictional doctrine. The threat of prosecution is not the injury; the injury was the forced shutdown or curtailment of normal business
18 A court can take judicial notice of entries on its own docket and entries on another court’s docket, as long as it does not treat disputable facts contained within docketed ﬁlings as true. Privett v. Pellegrin, 798 F.2d 470 (Table), 1986 WL 17206, at *1 (CA6 Jun. 27, 1986) (own records); In re Omnicare, Inc. Secs. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 468 (CA6 2014) (other courts); Fed. Rule Evid. 201(b)(2).
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operations. The threat need merely exist at the time of the injury to make it a concrete injury. Once those two things occurred in tandem, Plaintiﬀs sustained a permanent injury.
Plaintiﬀs satisfy both elements of the pre-enforcement standing test, and they therefore satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.
2. Causation: Plaintiﬀs have pleaded a causal connection between the Lockdown Orders and their injuries.
The Government does not dispute that the pleadings satisfy the causality requirement. ECF 18, PageID.389–390 (challenging only the injury-in-fact requirement). Nor can it. Plaintiﬀs allege that the Lockdown Orders forced them to shut down or radically limited normal business operations: “Plaintiﬀs are aﬀected by the Governor’s orders. Under threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or signiﬁcantly restrict their businesses … At the same time, without oﬀering any justiﬁcation, the Governor has allowed, and is still allowing, other businesses deemed ʻcritical’ to stay open.” ECF 8, ¶ 6, PageID.87–88
To satisfy the Iqbal plausibility standard, Plaintiﬀs individually pleaded how the Governor’s orders aﬀected their businesses on a claim-by-claim basis, satisfying the causality factor. Sotheby’s real estate agents were unable to work, and the company had to lay oﬀ six employees. Id., at ¶¶ 11, 73(a), 78(a), 84(a), 92(a), 98(a), 105–108, 112–115, PageID.89, 102, 104–105, 107, 109, 108–114. EPM was unable to perform landscaping or maintenance work. Id., at ¶ 12, 92(b), 98(b), 105–108, 112–115, R.8, PageID.89, 108– 114. Intraco and Casite’s businesses rely on live, face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers; the executive orders prevented them from engaging in those activities, resulting in 20–30% lost revenue. Id., at ¶¶ 13–14, 73(b)–(c), 78(b)–(c), 84(b)– (c), 92(c)–(d), 98(c)–(d), 105–108, 112–115, PageID.89–90, 102–106, 108–114. Hillsdale Jewelers was forced to close, resulting in a 99% drop in revenue and leaving all of its employees—including its owner—unemployed. Id., at ¶¶ 15, 73(d), 78(d), 84(d), 92(e),
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98(e), 105–108, 112–115, PageID.90, 103–104, 106, 108–114. Shortt Dental had to close two oﬃce locations, leaving most employees unemployed and causing a 75% decrease in revenue. Id., at ¶¶ 16, 92(f), 105–108, 112–115, R.8, PageID.90–91, 108–114. MCA lost members, and its members lost revenue. Id., at ¶¶ 17, 73(e), 78(e), 84(f), 92(g), 98(g), 105–108, 112–115, PageID.91, 103–106, 108–114.
3. Redressability: Declaratory and injunctive relief can redress Plaintiﬀs’ injuries.
In Count I, Plaintiﬀs who engage in interstate commerce seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders unconstitutionally interfered with interstate commerce, and an injunction that prevents the Government from denying them access to our national market. If the Court grants this relief, it will ensure that the Government cannot again indiscriminately shutter entire sectors of the economy statewide.
In Counts II–VII, Plaintiﬀs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders unconstitutionally infringed on their liberty and property interests, and a permanent injunction against such infringements in the future. If the Court grants this relief, it would vindicate their civil rights, which is “the very purpose of § 1983.” Hall v. Hall, 738 F.2d 718, 721 (CA6 1982).
Plaintiﬀs seek relief that would redress their injuries and would prevent future injuries, satisfying the redressability requirement. All three standing factors are adequately pleaded.
Ripeness: Plaintiﬀs’ claims are constitutionally and prudentially ripe. The ripeness doctrine avoids “premature adjudication of legal questions” and prevents courts from “entangling themselves in abstract debates that may turn out diﬀerently in diﬀerent settings.” Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (CA6 2008). This doctrine has both constitutional and prudential roots. A case is constitutionally ripe if a plaintiﬀ satisﬁes the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements for standing. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Gp., Inc.,
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438 U.S. 59, 81–82 (1978). A case is prudentially ripe if the court would be in “no better position” later than it
is now to decide the case. Id., at 82. To ascertain if that is so, courts look to the hardship it would cause the parties if the court declined to exercise jurisdiction, and the ﬁtness of the record for review. Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d, 601, 607 n.2 (CA6 2014). The “ﬁtness” factor assesses whether the legal analysis would beneﬁt from a concrete factual context and whether the government’s legal position is subject to change before enforcement. Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 706 (CA6 2003).
Prudential ripeness is, however, in tension with the “unﬂagging” duty of federal courts to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction. Driehaus, 573 U.S., at 167; Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125–126 (2014). Since Driehaus, the Sixth Circuit exercises jurisdiction when constitutional requirements are met; it has dismissed cases as prudentially unripe sparingly, if ever. United States v. De Leon, —F. Appx.—; 2020 WL 1877688, at *3 (CA6 Apr. 15, 2020); Saleh v. Barr, 801 F. Appx. 384, 390 (CA6 2020); Miller v. City of Wickliﬀe, 852 F.3d 497, 503 n.2 (CA6 2017); Kiser, 765 F.3d, at 606–607.
Plaintiﬀs seek two forms of relief: (1) a declaration that the business-closure orders violated their constitutional rights; and (2) an injunction prohibiting such lockdowns in the future. ECF 8, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–2, PageID.114–115. The Government argues that Plaintiﬀs’ claims are unripe for declaratory relief. ECF 18, PageID.390–392. Plaintiﬀs disagree. There is nothing abstract about the Lockdown Orders and the eﬀect they had on Plaintiﬀs. The Government shut down the vast majority of businesses in the state, Plaintiﬀs are among those who were aﬀected, and they seek a declaratory ruling that the Lockdown Orders were unconstitutional. Plaintiﬀs satisfy the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements for standing. See Arguments I.B(1) and I.B(3), supra. Their request for declaratory relief is therefore constitutionally ripe.
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It seems, then, that the Government’s ripeness challenge targets Plaintiﬀs’ request for prospective injunctive relief. The Government says it is premature to enjoin future shutdowns because it might never shut down businesses again. ECF 18, PageID.390– 392. This misses the point: the Government has ordered businesses closed over a dozen times, and it reserves the right to do so again. Plaintiﬀs aim to prove that arbitrarily classifying and shutting down entire industries as nonessential, as a means of suppressing a communicable disease with a low mortality rate, violates the dormant Commerce Clause and fundamental rights. Such action cannot pass strict scrutiny review (or even review for reasonableness). Alternatively, Plaintiﬀs argue that procedural due process requires, at a minimum, post-deprivation procedures that would allow them to reopen their businesses if they can operate as safely as the “essential” businesses. If they succeed, injunctive relief would ensure that the Government knows in advance that it is forbidden from reinjuring Plaintiﬀs in exactly the same way—i.e., that its “dial” doesn’t turn that far.
The Government doesn’t explain how the Court would be in a better position to decide these questions in the future. Plaintiﬀs conceive of no scenario where future factual development would better concretize the record for judicial review. At the same time, forcing Plaintiﬀs to endure another round of business closures in the future would unacceptably harm their liberty and property interests. Given the concrete facts pleaded in the Complaint, the Government’s refusal to forswear business-closure orders, and the weighty public interests at stake—interests that aﬀect nearly 10 million people and more than 850,000 businesses—this case is prudentially ripe as well.
Organizational Standing: MCA has standing to pursue its own claims and claims on behalf of its members. An organization has Article III standing to assert its own claims and claims on behalf of its members. MX Gp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 332–333 (CA6 2002). When an organization asserts claims on its own behalf, it must satisfy the same constitutional standing rules that apply to all other plaintiﬀs: an injury in fact that is
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traceable to the defendant’s action and is redressable. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992). A voluntary association can also have standing to sue on behalf of its members when “[1] its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and [3] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S., at 181.
MCA asserts claims for itself and on behalf of its members. The facts pleaded, together with all reasonable inferences drawn in its favor, establish direct and organizational standing.
MCA has adequately pleaded direct standing. It lost 33 members—28% of its membership—an injury-in-fact that is actual and concrete. ECF 8, PageID.91. MCA speciﬁcally alleges that it lost those members “due to the Lockdown Orders,” thereby tracing the injury to the Government’s actions. Ibid. The Government questions how many of these members were based in Michigan, suggesting that some loss may be attributable to other states where MCA has members. ECF 18, PageID.393. But, under the applicable standard of review, the Court must assume the pleaded facts are true, and MCA has pleaded: (1) that it has lost 28% of its members due to the Lockdown Orders; and (2) that it lost more than “25% of its members from Michigan in 2019.” Compare ECF 8, ¶ 17, PageID.91 (pleading that, due to the Governor’s executive orders, MCA’s membership declined from 119 members to 86 members, which is a decline of 28%), with ¶ 98(g), PageID.110 (pleading that “MCA lost over 25% of its members from Michigan in 2019) (emphasis added). Moreover, MCA pleads that “[o]ther States, including Ohio, have enacted diﬀerent and much less restrictive measures to allow exterior service carwash members to operate.” ECF 8, ¶¶ 73(e), 78(e), and 84(f), PageID.103–106. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that MCA lost most of its members from Michigan. Finally, MCA’s claims are redressable. By forbidding carwash operations, the Lockdown Orders deprived members of revenue, and cash-strapped businesses cut costs to avoid
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losses. Membership in a voluntary organization is an easy cost to cut. An injunction precluding indiscriminate statewide closures of businesses would avoid artiﬁcial losses that lead to lost membership.
MCA has also pleaded organizational standing on behalf of its members. Like the named business Plaintiﬀs, MCA’s individual members would have standing to sue over the lockdown orders. The interests are germane to the organization’s purpose: promoting the operation of carwashes. Finally neither the claims nor relief requested requires the participation of individual members in this litigation. “If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the beneﬁt of those members of the association actually injured.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). “Indeed, in all cases in which [the Court] expressly recognized standing in associations to represent their members, the relief sought has been of this kind.” Ibid. MCA seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, thereby satisfying this requirement, as well.
Accordingly, MCA has direct and organizational standing to pursue the claims and relief sought in the Complaint on behalf of itself and its members.
II. Stating a Claim: The Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. After attacking the Court’s jurisdiction, the Government argues the merits without
acknowledging that this is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court’s objective is to determine whether Plaintiﬀs state a claim, not whether they are likely to prevail. Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 678 (holding that “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ʻprobability requirement’…”). Of course, Plaintiﬀs are conﬁdent in their claims; they would not have ﬁled this lawsuit otherwise.
For the Government to prevail, it must prove that Jacobson bars Plaintiﬀs claims. This it cannot do because Jacobson does no such thing. Jacobson accepted that public-
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health regulations fall within the states’ historical police powers, and accepted the commonwealth’s asserted public-health interest in combatting smallpox. Even so, the Court repeatedly noted that there are limits to how far a state can go in the name of public health.
Although Jacobson’s core holding remains sound—states retain their police power to act in the interest of public health—Plaintiﬀs contend that modern due process and equal protection jurisprudence has overtaken Jacobson’s standard of review. Today, courts must apply strict scrutiny where a public-health regulation infringes upon a fundamental right. They must apply intermediate scrutiny when a public-health regulation treats people diﬀerently based on a protected classiﬁcation and in certain First Amendment contexts. Only when strict or intermediate scrutiny do not apply may courts then apply Jacobson’s reasonableness standard.
Governing Standard: Plaintiﬀs’ claims are subject to strict-scrutiny review to the extent they assert infringements upon fundamental rights or class distinctions that are subject to heightened review. The Government leans heavily on Jacobson, arguing that its deferential standard is the “starting point” in the Sixth Circuit for analyzing COVID-19 restrictions that touch upon constitutional rights. ECF 18, PageID.397. Not so, at least when fundamental rights are at issue. The Government cites a number of decisions from outside the Sixth Circuit for its proposition that Jacobson controls, even when fundamental rights are at issue. Id., at PageID.397. None of those cases is controlling. It is a maxim of law that district courts are bound to apply the published decisions of the circuit in which they sit. The Sixth Circuit has ruled that modern strict scrutiny applies when fundamental rights are at issue. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (CA6 2020); League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, —F.3d—, No. 20-1581; 2020 WL 3468281 (CA6 Jun. 24, 2020) (“LIFFT”) (applying rational basis by stipulation of the parties, but noting that
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fundamental rights are subject to higher scrutiny). The Government repeatedly cites Chief Justice Roberts’s recent opinion
concurring the Supreme Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction to churches impacted by an executive order by the governor of California capping attendance at church services. ECF 18, PageID.373–374, 398–399, 404, 419 (citing and quoting South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 509 U.S.—; 140 S.Ct. 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Government glosses over some key facts that warrant mention here.
First, this was not a merits decision. The South Bay plaintiﬀs asked the Supreme Court for a preliminary injunction that had been denied by the lower courts. The Chief Justice noted that such relief is granted “sparingly and only in the more critical and exigent circumstances,” even when “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.” South Bay, 140 S.Ct., at 1613. In our case, Plaintiﬀs are not seeking a preliminary injunction. Before the Court is a routine motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The standard of review is far lower than the one at issue in South Bay.
Second, although the Chief Justice relied on Jacobson, he did so for the general proposition that elected oﬃcials have broad authority to respond to public-health crises, while acknowledging that their decisions are subject to judicial review. Ibid. He then concluded that the plaintiﬀs, who had the burden of persuasion, could not show it was “indisputably clear” that they were entitled to emergency, interlocutory injunctive relief in light of rapidly changing facts. Id., at 1614. In our case, the Government bears the burden of demonstrating that the pleadings fail to state a claim, Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 498 (CA6 2006), and the Government’s burden is very high under Iqbal, inasmuch as Plaintiﬀs need only plead a plausible claim for relief.
Third, although the Chief Justice’s views are owed respect, none of the other justices joined in his concurring opinion. Indeed, four other justices dissented; they would have applied strict scrutiny. South Bay, 140 S.Ct., at 1614–1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The other four justices gave no reason for denying the application. Under
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such circumstances, the Chief Justice’s opinion is one vote among nine. His views do not displace Roberts as binding authority in this Circuit, which holds that strict scrutiny applies.
Plaintiﬀs assert that the Lockdown Orders have infringed upon their fundamental rights: the right to engage in interstate commerce, “which is not a gift of the state,” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807–808 (1976); the right to engage in interstate travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–760 (1966); and the right of individuals to contract and engage in the common occupations of life, and to “enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (cleaned up). See ECF 8, ¶¶ 73, 78, 82–84, 102–105, PageID.102–103, 105–106, 111. Accordingly, these claims are subject to strict scrutiny.
Otherwise Jacobson applies, but it does not bar Plaintiﬀs’ claims. To the extent one or more of their asserted interests cannot be classiﬁed as a fundamental right, such claims are subject to review under Jacobson. The Government reads Jacobson as a de facto bar to relief, overstating the holding as aﬃrming a “sweeping, invasive measure” as a proper exercise of police power in response to a public health crisis. ECF 18, PageID.395. The Government is wrong on several levels. First, the Supreme Court acknowledged—no fewer than four times in Jacobson— that public-health regulations are subject to judicial review: • “A local enactment or regulation, even if based on the acknowledged
police powers of a state, must always yield in case of conﬂict with the exercise by the general government of any power it possesses under the Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives or secures. • “[I]t might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or
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might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.
• “[I[f a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health … has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give eﬀect to the Constitution.
• “[W]e deem it appropriate, in order to prevent misapprehension as to our views…that the police power of a state, whether exercised directly by the legislature, or by a local body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.”
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 28, 31, 38 (1905). Plainly, then, Jacobson does not foreclose constitutional challenges to public-health regulations.
Second, Jacobson dealt with a state legislature’s express authorization for local boards of health to inoculate residents. The Court held that it was “for the legislative department to determine” the appropriate responses to contagion in community:
[T]he legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. In a free country, where the government is by the people, through their chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of no other standard of action, for what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact or not. Any other basis would conﬂict with the spirit of the Constitution, and would sanction measures opposed to a Republican form of government.
Id., at 35. Here, the Michigan Legislature has passed no law expressly authorizing the Governor to conﬁne people to their homes under pain of imprisonment to combat contagion, much less on the dubious theory that everyone might be a carrier of the coronavirus. Indeed, the Legislature has established a procedure in the Public Health
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Code that balances resident’s interests in due process against the state’s interest in protecting public health.
The Department of Health and Human Services (“MDHHS”) or a local health oﬃcer must issue a written warning notice to the suspected carrier and can order the person to undergo medical tests to verify that they are a carrier. MCL 333.5203(1). Critically, “[a] warning notice shall be individual and speciﬁc and shall not be issued to a class of persons.” MCL 333.5203(2) (emphasis added). The warning notice must inform the suspected carrier that he has a right to a hearing to contest his designation as a carrier. MCL 333.5203(3). The executive orders are not warning notices, are impermissibly aimed at a class of persons (all Michiganders) instead of an individual, and provide no procedural due process as required under the Public Health Code.
The Code applies even during emergencies. MCL 333.50207(1). “To protect the public health in an emergency,” an MDHHS or local health oﬃcer can obtain ex parte a temporary detention order to facilitate observation, examination, testing, diagnosis, and treatment. Ibid. (emphasis added) A detention cannot last longer than 72 hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, without a court hearing to determine whether it should continue. MCL 333.50207(3). The executive orders forcibly detained 10 million people for 70 days without a hearing.
Here, Michigan’s Public Health Code is the point of comparison to Jacobson, not the Governor’s executive orders. The Public Health Code is Michigan’s equivalent to the Massachusetts law authorizing compulsory vaccinations in Jacobson. Of course, that is not the statute that the Governor has proceeded under. Instead, she has disregarded that law and implemented her own policy—over the Legislature’s objection at that. The Governor is not on the same footing as Massachusetts was in Jacobson.19
19 The Government may argue here, as it did recently in Emagine Theatres, that the EPGA gives the Governor equivalent power. Under Pennhurst, the Court cannot reach the state-law question (unless the Government wants to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity). But, even if Pennhurst were not a bar, the Lockdown Orders exceeded the
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Third, the executive orders are not remotely similar to the state action at issue in Jacobson. There is no comparison between: (i) a one-time inoculation of the residents of a single town to treat a historical scourge; and (ii) shuttering the economy and placing 10 million people under de facto house arrest. The ﬁrst is reasonable, the latter is not.
Fourth, Jacobson involved a “dangerous” disease. Jacobson, 197 U.S., at 34. The city of Cambridge suﬀered a smallpox epidemic. Smallpox killed 30–80% of its victims on average, depending on the strain of the virus, the person’s sex, and pregnancy status.20 And, of course, the judiciary could take judicial notice of how deadly smallpox was; it was a well-known disease that had ravaged the world for centuries. As the Government has repeatedly noted, the strain of coronavirus that can cause COVID-19 is novel. Proof of dangerousness is necessary in this case. It cannot be declared by executive ﬁat.
The Government says “Plaintiﬀs cannot dispute the gravity of the pandemic in Michigan,” ECF 18, PageID.399, but the fact is they do. Plaintiﬀs challenge the prevailing narrative, alleging that public oﬃcials have overstated the risk posed by the coronavirus and COVID-19.
Plaintiﬀs question the existence of an epidemic throughout Michigan, noting that only 0.46% of the State’s population was reportedly positive for the disease at the time of ﬁling, and that only 0.04% of Michiganders had succumbed to the virus. ECF 8, ¶ 42,
Governor’s powers under those acts. See Exhibit 1, Pls.’ Amicus Br. House of Reps. & Senate v. Governor, 20-79-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. May 14, 2020). In any event, Jacobson did not deal with some general power to act during an emergency. It involved specific legislative approval to act in the very manner in question. This still makes the point of comparison the Public Health Code, not a general emergency law stretched to fit a situation it was never designed for.
20 U.S. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, What is Smallpox?, https://perma. cc/9YPP-EFF2 (noting a 30% fatality rate); Lane, Remaining Questions About Clinical Variola Major, Emerging Infectious Diseases 17(4): 676–680 (Apr. 2011), https://perma. cc/P7PR-HP7G (noting “the case-fatality rate for early hemorrhagic smallpox approached 100%,” with a 70% fatality rate for unvaccinated women, and unborn children dying nearly 80% of the time).
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PageID.96. Plaintiﬀs also question the way in which the State is counting COVID-19 deaths, alleging that the State has a chosen a method to “artiﬁcially inﬂate the statistics” to justify the claimed emergency and drive the lockdown orders. Id., at ¶ 44, PageID.96.
To satisfy Iqbal’s plausibility requirement, the Complaint explains how deaths are coded and supplies the deﬁnition of those codes, showing how presumed cases are treated as actual cases. Id., at ¶¶ 45–48, PageID.97. For a disease that mimics many symptoms of inﬂuenza and the common cold, and entered the population during the annual ﬂu season, treating presumed cases as actual cases will skew numbers higher. Plaintiﬀs also allege that the State looks beyond death certiﬁcates and counts as conﬁrmed COVID-19 deaths those who died of natural causes, including when an attending physician or a medical examiner concluded that the person died of something other than COVID-19. Id., at ¶ 48, PageID.97. Plaintiﬀs give concrete examples of how this occurs. Id., at ¶¶ 48– 52, PageID.97–98. Removing inﬂated death counts, Plaintiﬀs allege, would show that the true mortality rate in Michigan is far less than the advertised rate of 9.5%. Speciﬁcally, when factoring in other data, they allege that the mortality rate is likely 0.1–0.5%, based on medical studies conducted in New York and California, two other states deemed “hard hit” by the coronavirus in the press. Id., at ¶ 43, PageID.97. The Government does not address any of these allegations. However, a motion to dismiss requires the Court to accept these well-pleaded facts as true.
Plaintiﬀs also plead historical reference points to plausibly allege that the lockdown orders are unprecedented, shutting down civil society in a way that has never been done in Michigan’s history. They noted that Governor Sleeper balanced public health while preserving commerce during the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918. Id., at ¶ 54, PageID.98. Governors from both political parties refrained from the kind of lockdown imposed by Governor Whitmer during the annual summer polio epidemics of the 1940s and 1950s. Id., at ¶ 55, PageID.98. Governor Romney never placed residents “under house arrest or shutdown the economy” when the Hong Kong Flu swept across the globe
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in the 1960s, killing more than 1 million worldwide and 100,000 in the United States. Id., at ¶ 56, PageID.98.
There are also pre-twentieth century examples of epidemics in this country. For instance, in September 1789, mere months after George Washington gave his ﬁrst inaugural address and James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights to the House of Representatives, our new nation experienced its ﬁrst epidemic. Inﬂuenza spread from New York City, our ﬁrst capitol, to Philadelphia, the birthplace of our great nation. Hinsdale, Epidemics of Inﬂuenza in 1647, 1789–90 and 1807: As Recorded by Noah Webster, Benjamin Rush, and Daniel Drake 723–728 (1919), http://hdl.handle.net/ 2027/spo.7850ﬂu.0016.587. The aﬄicted suﬀered from headaches, diﬃculty breathing, bloody coughs, loss of taste, loss of voice, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and acute pains in their limbs. Id., at 723–725. The illness “proved fatal (with few exceptions) only to old people, and to people who had been previously debilitated by consumptive habits.” Id., at 726. (“Consumption” is an old-fashioned term referring to tuberculosis.) This at-risk population generally succumbed to pneumonia. Id., at 725. The epidemic lasted six weeks, spreading “from New York and Philadelphia in all directions, and in the course of a few months, pervaded every state in the union.” Id., at 726. Yet the nation did not shut down. Although “[n]o profession or occupation escaped” the virus, commerce continued. Id., at 725. “Many thousand people had the disease … but transacted business as usual out of doors” in the marketplaces. Id., at 725–726 (emphasis added).
Plaintiﬀs also allege that the Government tightened restrictions after receiving independent evidence that the rate of infection had ﬂattened. ECF 8, ¶ 60, PageID.99; ECF 8-1, PageID.117–139. The new restrictions resulted in the “most excessive” lockdown in the country. ECF 8, ¶ 57, PageID.98–99. Among other things, the Government criminalized family gatherings over Easter and Passover, and refused to revise its deﬁnitions of “critical infrastructure,” leaving businesses and employees closed who could meet CDC safety guidelines. Id., at ¶¶ 58–59, PageID.99. As a result,
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unemployment soared to levels not seen since the Great Depression. Id., at ¶ 62, PageID.100. More than 25% of Michigan’s workforce is unemployed. Ibid. Michigan’s unemployment fund is inadequate to meet the demand for unemployment assistance. Id., at ¶¶ 63–64, PageID.100. And the State is now projecting a $3.6 billion budget shortfall. Senate Fiscal Agency, Michigan’s Economic Outlook & Budget Review: FY 2019–20, FY 2020–21, and FY 2021–22, at 2 (May 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/9SMM-68FZ.21
These facts are not exhaustive. They are illustrative and designed only to pass Iqbal muster. Discovery will yield additional facts about what the Government knew and when. For example—and for the sake of clarity, these examples are also not exhaustive— Plaintiﬀs anticipate that discovery will show that rural counties with low population density were at a lower risk of transmission. The basic reproductive number, R0, is the expected number of cases directly generated by one infected person. If R0 is less than 1.0, then the contagion generally will not spread in the community. Plaintiﬀs anticipate that discovery will establish that the majority of the state never experienced or came close to R0=1.0.
Plaintiﬀs also anticipate that discovery will prove that the Government has erroneously claimed credit for saving 3,500 lives based on modeling that was “highly preliminary and uncertain” and could not be used “for prediction of speciﬁc numbers.” See, e.g., Eisenberg, et al., Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard, Current Forecasts and Social Distancing Tabs (Apr. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/P7X7-GQF7.22
21 The Court can judicially notice this public document. Fed. Rule Evid. 201(b)(2). 22 Epidemiologists who have sought leave to participate as amici cited this dashboard. The dashboard itself says that it is “highly preliminary and uncertain” and could not be used “for prediction of speciﬁc numbers.” This didn’t stop the Governor from asserting that “without the Stay Home, Stay Safe order, the median estimate is that we would have had 32,000 more cases today, and at least 3,480 more deaths.” Whitmer Press Conf. 11:20–11:37 (May 13, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= z2pX0iw_UNI. Neither the corresponding graphic nor her comments acknowledged the “highly preliminary and uncertain” nature of the information. Nor did the Governor tell Michiganders that the data she cited said it could not be used to predict speciﬁc numbers.
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Discovery is further expected to show that: (1) seniors are the class most susceptible to developing COVID-19 if they contract the coronavirus; (2) seniors make up less than 20% of the state’s population; (3) most people in the prime working age of 18–64 are likely to develop only mild-to-moderate symptoms—only a small minority are likely to develop severe or critical symptoms requiring hospitalization; and (4) the Governor and her advisors knew this when they locked down the entire state (ostensibly to save lives) while putting COVID-19 patients in senior nursing homes where the virus spread to the most vulnerable. Indeed, nearly 2,000 deaths in Michigan can be traced to the Governor’s nursing home policy, which represents a third of all deaths statewide. Wilkinson, et al., More than 1,900 coronavirus deaths in Michigan nursing homes, Bridge Magazine (Jun. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/7DR2-BCDU. In other words, discovery will show that the Government needlessly locked down the State, and needlessly infringed on Plaintiﬀs’ rights in the process, while channeling the virus to those most likely to die from it.
Given what is pleaded in the Complaint—independent of (but buttressed by) public developments that have come to light since then—Plaintiﬀs plausibly challenge whether coronavirus is a dangerous disease; whether it is truly epidemic statewide; whether the lockdown was arbitrary, oppressive, and so far beyond what was reasonably required for public safety; and whether it constituted a plain, palpable invasion of constitutional rights.
These factual disputes are key to, and incorporated by reference into, each of Plaintiﬀs’ claims. ECF 8, ¶ 68, PageID.101. With this context in mind, Plaintiﬀs now analyze each count in the Complaint.
The Dormant Commerce Clause The Government’s challenge to the dormant Commerce Clause claim disregards the standard of review. It argues that the burden on interstate commerce was “miniscule” and that “Plaintiﬀs oﬀer nothing to show that the [challenged restrictions] were somehow ʻclearly excessive’ in comparison to [their asserted beneﬁts].” ECF 18, PageID.406–407.
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But, at the pleading stage, Plaintiﬀs need only plead a plausible claim, not prove their case. The Complaint satisﬁes that low threshold.
The Government insists that its actions were necessary to stop the spread of a highly contagious and deadly disease. Id., at PageID.407. But, as shown in the Statement of Facts and Argument II.B, supra, Plaintiﬀs factually dispute that assertion. As the United States noted in its Statement of Interest, “the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack.” ECF 14, PageID.185 (quoting Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (plurality op.)).
Before assessing the suﬃciency of the claim, it is worth recalling the ﬁrst principles that animate the Commerce Clause. Those principles provide valuable context for assessing Plaintiﬀs’ claim.
“[T]he right to engage in interstate commerce is not a gift of the state….” H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). “What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.” Id., at 538 (citation omitted). “Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the nation.” Id., at 539 (emphasis added). “The material success that has come [from our] federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce, [and] the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions.” Id., at 539.
Sotheby’s pleads that the challenged executive orders prevented realtors from seeking work and clients located outside of Michigan. ECF 8, ¶ 73(a), PageID.102. This plainly burdens interstate commerce. Cf. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 249 (1911) (observing that “prohibit[ing] interstate commerce is more than to indirectly aﬀect it,” when invalidating a law that forbade the export of natural gas from one state to
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another). Other states aﬀected by the coronavirus did not shut down realtors, and those that did reopened far earlier than Michigan. ECF 8, ¶ 73(a), PageID.102. The federal government classiﬁed the real estate sector as critical infrastructure, from which it can be inferred that federal authorities believed that the ability to buy and sell real estate remained essential despite the public health concerns. Id., at ¶¶ 59, 73(a), PageID.99, 102. This suﬃciently pleads that the Government’s actions were excessive. Whether the burden on interstate commerce was “miniscule,” or whether the restrictions were “clearly excessive” are fact-based defenses that cannot be decided at the pleading stage.
Intraco is a diversiﬁed exporter of architectural and automotive glass, chemicals, and other goods, in both interstate and foreign commerce. Id., at ¶ 13, PageID.89–90. Its subsidiary, Casite, distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market products for automobiles. Id., at ¶ 14, PageID.90. Both these companies were unable to meaningfully operate because their business models hinge upon maintaining personal face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers outside of Michigan, both in the United States and abroad. Id., at ¶¶ 13–14, 73(b)–(c), PageID.90, 102–103. The Lockdown Orders caused a 20–30% drop in revenue. Ibid. As with Sotheby’s, whether such burdens on interstate and foreign commerce were “miniscule,” or whether the restrictions were “clearly excessive” are fact-based defenses that cannot be decided at the pleading stage.
The analysis is much the same for Hillsdale Jewelers. It has alleged a 99% drop in revenue because of the Lockdown Orders, alleging that those orders prevented it from importing precious metals and stones to create custom jewelry. Id., at ¶ 73(d), PageID.103. This adequately pleads a burden on interstate commerce. Whether the burden is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local beneﬁts is a fact-based defense that it not yet before the Court.
Finally, MCA is an interstate organization that claims the Lockdown Orders caused a signiﬁcant reduction in membership, including carwash operators and vendors.
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Carwashes can service vehicles driven into Michigan from all of the country. Again, whether such burdens on interstate commerce are “clearly excessive” is beyond the scope of the Government’s pleadings-based challenge.
Privileges and Immunities Clause In Count II, Plaintiﬀs assert a claim predicated upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause under Article IV of the Constitution. The Government challenges this claim, arguing that a plaintiﬀ cannot assert claims under this clause against his home state. Although Plaintiﬀs disagree—the clause protects a citizen’s right to leave his own state, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 297–299 (1920), such claims can only be brought against his home state, and each Plaintiﬀ claims that its home state has infringed on that right—Plaintiﬀs nonetheless concede that Count II must be dismissed. While researching the Government’s arguments, counsel discovered South Macomb Disposal Authority v. Washington Twp., 790 F.2d 500, 503–504 (CA6 1986), where the Sixth Circuit held that a corporation “can never assert the denial of privileges and immunities under Section 1983” because they are not “citizens” within the meaning of the Constitution. Ibid. Although South Macomb addressed a claim predicated upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment, its reasoning applies here with equal force because the Supreme Court has held that corporations are not citizens for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause under Article IV, either. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Count II.
Privileges or Immunities Clause In Count III, Plaintiﬀs assert a claim predicated upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Government does not acknowledge that this clause protects the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, which are diﬀerent from those interests protected under Article IV. For example, it protects as rights of national citizenship the right to interstate travel, Griﬃn v. Breckenridge, 403
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U.S. 88, 105–106 (1971), and the right to engage in interstate commerce, Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991). Nonetheless, as with Count II, Plaintiﬀs concede that Count III must also be dismissed because, as corporate persons, they are not citizens of the United States for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. South Macomb, 790 F.2d, at 503–504 (citing Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939)).
Substantive Due Process Although they may not be citizens, corporations are “clearly” persons within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. South Macomb, 790 F.2d, at 503. Substantive due process is “the doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed.” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (CA6 2014). “It protects a narrow class of interests, including those enumerated in the Constitution, those so rooted in the traditions of the people as to be ranked fundamental, and the interest in freedom from government actions that ʻshock the conscience.’” Ibid. “It also protects the right to be free from ʻarbitrary and capricious’ governmental actions, which is another formulation of the right to be free from conscience-shocking actions.” Ibid. To state a claim of substantive due process, a plaintiﬀ must allege that the defendant deprived him of a fundamental right or a liberty interest that is accorded special constitutional protection. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–720 (1997). Plaintiﬀs allege infringements on fundamental rights, including the right to engage in interstate commerce, which “is not the gift of the state,” Hughes, 426 U.S., at 807–808; the right to engage in interstate travel, Guest, 383 U.S., at 757–760; and the right of individuals to contract and engage in the common occupations of life, and to “enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Roth, 408 U.S., at 572 (cleaned up). ECF 8, ¶¶ 73, 83–84, 102–105, PageID.102–103, 105–106, 111. Due process protects man’s freedom to enjoy “all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
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any lawful calling; [and] to pursue any livelihood or avocation ….” Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
At its core, the Complaint posits that the right to engage in business, a right both deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. “At common law, every man might use what trade he pleased.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *427 (1765). Government may regulate a trade, “[b]ut the suppression of a trade is not a regulation. To be regulated, the trade must subsist.” State v. Town Council of Columbia, 40 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 404, 415 (1853). See also Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (K.B. 1707) (every man has a right to earn a living, holding that “he that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering him”); Case of the Tailors, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1615) (“[A]t the common law, no man could be prohibited from working in any lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness”); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1574) (laws that regulate trade are proper, but laws that restrain trade are unjust).
American courts have long struck down laws designed to stop people from gainful employment. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915) (“The right to earn a livelihood and to continue in employment unmolested by eﬀorts to enforce void enactments should similarly be entitled to [constitutional] protection…”); City of Memphis v. Winﬁeld, 27 Tenn. 707 (1848) (the supreme court of a slave state invalidated an ordinance making it illegal for free blacks and slaves to be out after 10 p.m., noting that the plaintiff—a free black man—“must live, and in order to do so he must work[;] everyone knows that in cities, very often, the most profitable employment is to be found in the night,” and any ordinance punishing the earning of a living was “unnecessary and oppressive.”).
American aversion to government picking winners and losers runs back to the Boston Tea Party. When George III granted the East India Company the right not only to ship tea, but the exclusive right to sell it in the colonies, workers who were legally closed out of a livelihood reacted with the famous protest. See SANDEFUR, at 218. Everyone has
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an inalienable “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” U.S. Decl. of Indep. (1776). Jeﬀerson’s inspiration for this phrase was the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which declared that “all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights … namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Virginia Decl. Rights § 1 (1776). See also, Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (tracing the “inalienable right” to “follow any of the common occupations of life” to the “pursuit of happiness clause” in the Declaration of Independence); National Archives, America’s Founding Documents (2016), https://perma.cc/EX35-GVQW. “[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems intolerable in any country where freedom prevails….” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).23
Plaintiﬀs anticipate that the Government will argue that they are relying on preNew Deal cases for principles of fundamental economic rights. Plaintiﬀs oﬀer two responses to such reasoning.
First, Jacobson, a case upon which the Government leans so heavily, was a pre-New Deal case, at a time when the Court (rightly) was skeptical of all encroachments on personal freedoms, not just those favored by the courts—i.e., what we today call “fundamental” rights. This counsels in favor of interpreting Jacobson’s “reasonableness” review as a far higher bar for the Government than mere rational-basis review. It is for this reason that Plaintiﬀs oppose “rational basis” review of the Lockdown Orders.
Second, however much it has been criticized in the modern era, the Supreme Court has never repudiated the centuries-old right to earn a living—a right as old as the common
23 Plaintiﬀs submit that Yick Wo was as much a case about economic freedom as it was about racial discrimination.
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law itself. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 760 (Souter, J., concurring) (criticizing how the
principle was applied from the Founding through the Lochner-era, but agreeing with the
principle itself); SANDEFUR, supra (tracing the history of the right to earn a living back to
Magna Carta).24 There remains today a distinction between the right to work and the
24 Justice Souter’s criticism of pre-New Deal economic liberty decisions is itself wanting. He claimed that the Court treated as constitutionally suspect economic regulations that abrogated the common law, likening decisions from that era to Dred Scott. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). This is stunningly inaccurate, both as a matter of logic and experience.
As a matter of logic, the Court recognized that the Constitution incorporated common-law and natural rights as a baseline—the life, liberty, and property that preexist government and cannot be deprived by government without due process. If the government wanted to enact legislation in the interest of the public welfare, that was ﬁne even at common law. But the pre-New Deal Court understood (rightly) that the judiciary needed to determine if that was really the government’s aim, or just a ﬁg leaf. Since the New Deal, ﬁg leaves are enough, since “rational speculation” is apparently all that’s necessary—no evidence is needed to justify destroying people’s businesses and threatening them with imprisonment for daring to put in an honest day’s work to feed their families. LIFFT, 2020 WL 3468281, at *3. Justice Willet nicely explained the poverty of this approach in Patel v. Texas Dept. of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W. 69, 92–123 (Tex. 2015), before his appointment to the Fifth Circuit. Plaintiﬀs contend it is time to revisit modern economic liberty jurisprudence as incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment as originally understood if this is where “rational” basis review has led us.
As for experience, one need only reﬂect on the words of Frederick Douglass:
To understand the emotion which swelled my heart as I clasped this money, realizing that I had no master who could take it from me— that it was mine, that my hands were my own, and could earn more of the precious coin … I was not only a freeman but a free-working man, and no master Hugh stood ready at the end of the week to seize my hard earnings.
Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass 259 (1882). It is hard to fathom anyone forming any conclusion from these words other than the one penned by Justice Willet:
Frederick Douglass’s irrepressible joy at exercising his hard-won freedom captures just how fundamental—and transformative— economic liberty is. Self-ownership [what some today call a person’s
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government’s ability to regulate the manner in which the work is performed. Plaintiﬀs submit that the right to earn a living—which in corporate form is the right to engage in business—is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. Since the New Deal, government has a freer hand in dictating how commerce can be conducted, with such regulation usually subject to rational-basis review. But the Lockdown Orders did not just regulate commerce (as in the case of so-called essential businesses), but it outright forbade work—indeed criminalized it. Plaintiﬀs challenge that portion of the Lockdown Orders, which is why they advocate for strict scrutiny of the Government’s actions in this case.
The Government does not, however, acknowledge that Plaintiﬀs have pleaded infringements of fundamental rights. Instead, it tries to characterize their substantive due process claim as one alleging arbitrary and capricious action only. ECF 18, PageID.412–413. To be sure, Plaintiﬀs allege that the Government has acted arbitrarily and capriciously, but only as to those constitutionally protected interests that the Court may deem non-fundamental.
As it relates to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the Government argues that the Lockdown Orders were not “illogical, arbitrary, or capricious” because they were “necessary” to protect the public from “the rapid spread of an aggressive, untreatable, and potentially fatal disease, and to ensure that th[e] State’s healthcare system had the capacity and resources to manage that spread.” ECF 18, PageID.413. As Plaintiﬀs have already explained, they dispute the Government’s assertions. They have questioned with well-pleaded facts whether the coronavirus is as aggressive, untreatable, and fatal as the Government claims, and whether the state’s healthcare system truly lacked the capacity
“agency”], the right to put your mind and your body to productive enterprise, is not a mere luxury to be enjoyed at the suﬀerance of governmental grace, but is indispensable to human dignity and prosperity. Patel, 469 S.W., at 92.
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and resources to treat patients. They also question whether locking down the entire state was “necessary” when cases of, and deaths attributed to, the virus were clustered in urban areas and nursing homes, and when the disease overwhelmingly targeted the elderly. See Argument II.B.
Plaintiﬀs again emphasize that this is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Court must accept Plaintiﬀs’ well-pleaded facts as true, not the counter-narrative that the Government is trying to push in its Motion. With the appropriate standard in mind, Plaintiﬀs submit that they have pleaded a plausible claim that the Government has violated their substantive due process rights under the standards for fundamental rights, protected liberty interests, and arbitrary and capricious action.
Equal Protection To state an equal-protection claim, a plaintiﬀ must plead that: (1) the government treated him diﬀerently than another, similarly situated person; and (2) this diﬀerence in treatment burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (CA6 2011). Plaintiﬀs plead disparate treatment. The Lockdown Orders allow some businesses to operate while prohibiting others from doing so. Although the Government may argue that Plaintiﬀs are not among the class of public accommodations and amusements that were categorically closed, such an approach would misapprehend the nature of the Lockdown Orders. Those orders forbade customers from leaving their homes to do business with Plaintiﬀs, and the nature of each Plaintiﬀs’ business necessitates in-person business transactions. Real estate cannot be shown virtually with the same level of meaningful inspection attendant to in-person showings—and they absolutely cannot be done if photographers cannot travel to homes to take proper images for 3-D rendering. Landscaping cannot be done remotely. Dental cleanings cannot be performed digitally. Jewelry cannot be created, inspected, valued, or repaired by videoconference. Cars can’t drive themselves to the carwash. So, even when the Lockdown Orders technically
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permitted businesses to remain open, it still criminalized the means of conducting business. Functionally, that is no diﬀerent than outright closure.
Plaintiﬀs also plead that they are similarly situated to those businesses allowed to operate. They can operate just as safely as the so-called essential businesses that could remain open under the Lockdown Orders. ECF 8, ¶¶ 96–97, 113, PageID.108–109, 113. The Court must accept that allegation as true at this stage of the proceedings. The Government contends that Plaintiﬀs were not similarly situated, but that is a fact-driven argument on the merits. Such arguments are premature under Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiﬀs plead that this diﬀerence in treatment burdened their fundamental rights. See Argument II.F. Strict scrutiny applies when disparate treatment burdens fundamental rights. Lac Vieux Desert Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 410 (CA6 1999) (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Classiﬁcations … aﬀecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny.”)). The Government does not address Plaintiﬀs’ assertion of fundamental rights, acknowledge their factual challenge to the compelling governmental interest factor, or acknowledge their assertion that the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted governmental interest. Compare, e.g., ECF 8, ¶¶ 11–17, 42–68, 113, PageID.89–91, 96–101, 113.
If the Court should hold that Plaintiﬀs assert nonfundamental rights, then they have pleaded in the alternative that there was no rational basis for the mass closure of all businesses throughout the State, ECF 8, ¶¶ 114–115, PageID.113, especially given the fractional and localized infections, the nature of the at-risk population, and the misleading statistics aﬀecting the death count. See Argument II.B. The Government reﬂexively oﬀers purportedly “rational” bases, but this is premature argument on the merits.
Discovery and trial will probe what constitutes a life-sustaining activity. However it is deﬁned, is such activity safely conducted by “essential” businesses if they follow CDC guidance, or is it merely that the Government believes there is an acceptable level of
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risk? If safety is the metric, and Plaintiﬀs can operate their businesses with the same level of safety, then how are they diﬀerently situated? On the other side of the coin is the issue of acceptable levels of risk. But why wouldn’t other businesses operating with the same protocols in place carry the same (acceptable) level of risk?
The Government also says that preserving the supply of PPE are additional rational bases, ECF 18, PageID.415, but how is shuttering businesses statewide a “rational” way of preserving the supply of PPE when the Government says homemade masks are suﬃcient to accomplish this goal? See, e.g., EO-70(15)(a); EO-77(15)(a); EO-92(15)(a); EO-96(15)(a); EO-110(4)(a); EO-115(6)(b). And what constitutes a suﬃcient supply of PPE? According to Michigan’s oﬃcial coronavirus website, Regions 2N and 2S, which cover the Detroit area, have a combined 311,648 face shields, 8.1 million gloves, and 675,898 N95 masks. State of Michigan, Data About Places, Statewide Hospital Available PPE (Jun. 26, 2020), https://bit.ly/MichCorona virusDashboard. Plaintiﬀs understand that these are current numbers, and not reﬂective of the PPE supply in late March when the Lockdown Orders took eﬀect, but what were the numbers? Why was that supply so inadequate as to justify closing rural parts of the state? When did the supply stabilize when compared to the lifting of the stay-home orders and the closure orders?
Nor does the Government explain how shuttering businesses makes it “easier” for contact tracing. ECF 18, PageID.415. What constitutes a “contact?” Momentarily walking by someone, or a sustained interaction? What is necessary for tracing? Businesses routinely collect contact information from customers for marketing campaigns by mail, email, and texting. Businesses can facilitate tracing by recording the name, address, and telephone number of each customer.
These are not exhaustive questions, but they highlight the kind of fact-based merits questions that Plaintiﬀs have a right to explore during discovery to prove the absence of a rational basis (should the Court disagree with their fundamental-rights argument). At this point, however, merely to ask these questions, much less answering them, go beyond
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the pleadings. The Court cannot reach them on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) stops once the Court concludes that Plaintiﬀs have pleaded that they are similarly situated. And they have.
Procedural Due Process To state a procedural due process claim, a person must plead that: (1) he had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) that he was deprived of that interest; and (3) that the government did not aﬀord adequate procedural protections before depriving him of that interest, or within a reasonable time thereafter. Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 904 (CA6 2014). The Complaint pleads all three elements. First, Plaintiﬀs claim that the Government has deprived them of life, liberty and property interests without providing a pre- or post-deprivation process. ECF 8, ¶ 98, PageID.109–110. See also Argument II.F and II.G. Plaintiﬀs submit that, as people before the law, they have a constitutionally protected life interest against government action that endangers their very existence. “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state oﬃcials from taking life except in accordance with due process of law.” Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 59 (CA7 1974) (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1965), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1946)). Lockdown Orders that indeﬁnitely close businesses and deprive them of the revenue needed to survive are, functionally, corporate death warrants. Plaintiﬀs acknowledge that, like the virus, this is a novel argument; no case has recognized a lawful corporation’s right to life. They aim to establish that principle in this case. But, at the pleading stage, it is suﬃcient to assert the interest. Plaintiﬀs are not conjuring up an implausible life interest out of the ether. Corporate personhood has led to the recognition of a host of rights that natural persons enjoy—e.g., freedom of speech, Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); freedom of religion, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682 (2014), freedom of association, NAACP v. Alabama,
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357 U.S. 449 (1958); freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), and freedom from excessive ﬁnes, see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (framing the same as a deprivation of property without due process). Plaintiﬀs acknowledge that corporate personhood is a ﬁction to protect natural people; when constitutional rights are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of those people. Burwell, 573 U.S., at 706–707. Recognizing a life interest for corporations would protect the interests of owners and employees who rely on corporations for the income necessary to sustain life. This same logic supports Plaintiﬀs’ assertion that they have a right to engage in business.
Plaintiﬀs also assert more traditional interests. They claim a protected liberty interest in conducting their lawful business. ECF 8, ¶¶ 92, 98, PageID.107–109. Plaintiﬀs also claim that their businesses themselves are a protected property interest, along with lost revenue. Ibid. The Government does not dispute that these interests are adequately pleaded. ECF 18, PageID.410–412.
Second, Plaintiﬀs squarely allege that the Government deprived them of these interests through the Lockdown Orders. ECF 8, ¶¶ 26–41, 66, 87–100, PageID.93–96, 101, 107–111. Here, again, the Government does not appear to dispute that the Complaint adequately pleads this element. ECF 18, PageID.410–412.
Third, Plaintiﬀs allege that the Government provided no process before or after depriving them of their constitutionally protected interests. This appears to be the only element in dispute.
The Government argues no process is required—ever—if it classiﬁes its actions as “temporary” and not “ﬁnal,” citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). ECF 18, PageID.410. The Government misreads Mathews. The length of the deprivation is a factor in how much process is due, but some process is due as long as the deprivation is more than de minimis. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575–576 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). Government action closing businesses for months on end (with
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many never to reopen) meets the low threshold above which some process is required. Cf. Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390 (CA6 1991) (holding that a § 1985 claim premised on a theory that a ﬁre captain and police lieutenant conspired to shut down a lawful business early, for one night, without due process was suﬃcient to state a claim).25
The Government then argues, seemingly in the alternative, that it should prevail on the merits because “Plaintiﬀs have oﬀered nothing in the federal constitution or cases construing it that would have required any more here than general promulgation of the [Lockdown Orders].” ECF 18, PageID.411–412 (citing Hartman v. Acton, —F. Supp. 3d— ; No. 20-1952; 2020 WL 1932896 (SD Ohio Apr. 21, 2020)). See also Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 23 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). It is appropriate to emphasize once again that this a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; Plaintiﬀs are not required to prove their case in their Complaint. In any event, although enacting generally applicable laws satisﬁes due process, the Sixth Circuit recently held that, “at some point, an exception-ridden policy takes on the appearance and reality of a system of individualized exemptions, the antithesis of a neutral and generally applicable policy ….” Roberts, 958 F.3d, at 413–414. Plaintiﬀs expect discovery will show that the number and nature of the carve-outs in the Lockdown Orders—coupled with the constant revision of those orders aimed at mooting court challenges—render them an exception-ridden policy under Roberts.
The Government also says that Plaintiﬀs are “seeking some sort of process by which they can challenge” their classiﬁcation as nonessential under the Lockdown Orders, and it argues that this question is not amenable to declaratory relief. ECF 18,
25 Once it is determined that process is required, the Mathews balancing test guides how much process is due. The Government suggests that Mathews is not the right test because the Lockdown Orders are general, emergency orders, but it oﬀers no alternative method by which to decide how much process is due. Plaintiﬀs submit that Mathews remains the appropriate standard here. After all, the Supreme Court has applied the Mathews test even in wartime. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (applying the Mathews test to determine how much process to give an unlawful enemy combatant).
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PageID.411. That incorrectly characterizes Plaintiﬀs’ claim. Plaintiﬀs argue, as a matter of substantive due process, that the Government cannot indeﬁnitely and arbitrarily close businesses. See Argument II.F. But, if the Court decides otherwise, then the Government still cannot arbitrarily classify businesses as essential and nonessential under the Equal Protection Clause. See Argument II.G, supra. Yet, even if the Government can so classify and close businesses as “unsafe” in the name of public health, then the aﬀected businesses must be given some process to challenge that ﬁnding, to prove that they can safely operate on the same terms as those businesses allowed to remain open without posing an unreasonable risk to public health.26 Under Mathews, courts must balance (1) the private interest aﬀected by the oﬃcial action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value (if any) of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the ﬁscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail. Id., at 335. This is a fact-intensive inquiry; it is premature to decide this at the pleading stage, particularly since the level of process due may diﬀer based on the interest to be protected and the level of scrutiny due.
Void for Vagueness The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires penal laws to deﬁne criminal conduct with suﬃcient precision that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983). The Lockdown Orders purport to
26 This highlights why it is incorrect to treat Shortt Dental diﬀerently than other Plaintiﬀs, as the Government tries to do in its Motion. ECF 18, PageID.411. Although Shortt Dental was authorized to perform emergency procedures, it was not at liberty to perform all procedures. For several months, routine dental checkups and nonemergency surgeries and other procedures were banned. EO-17(2). In that posture, it was aﬀected in the same way as all other “nonessential” businesses. Moreover, the discretion purportedly given to dentists was still subject to a threat of criminal prosecution, meaning that the Government reserved the right to quarterback the exercise of that discretion. EO-17(7).
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carry the force of law, and (except for ER-1) they make any willful violation of their terms a misdemeanor punishment by imprisonment or a ﬁne.
The Government says that there is nothing vague about the orders. In its view, Plaintiﬀs understood that they were unable to operate, and that is enough. Plaintiﬀs respectfully disagree.
Although in years past a plaintiﬀ would be required to show that a law was constitutionally vague “in all of its applications,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982), the Supreme Court has recently relaxed that rule. No longer is a vague law constitutional “merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.” Sessions v. Dimaya, —U.S.—; 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1222 n.7 (2018); Johnson v. United States, —U.S.—; 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560–2561 (2015).
Plaintiﬀs allege that the Lockdown Orders are not suﬃciently precise that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. The Complaint notes that EO-77 allows certain businesses to keep operating if they fall within certain “sectors” of the economy, but it does not identify any criteria by which a business owner can safely determine whether his business falls within a favored sector. ECF 8, ¶ 122, PageID.114. Although EO-77(8) incorporates CISA’s guidance from March 19, 2020, this does not cure the defect. CISA’s guidance is equally vague.
Plaintiﬀs do not criticize CISA. CISA’s role was to provide strategic guidance to ensure homeland security and implement the President’s Coronavirus Guidance for America. Krebs, Memorandum on Identiﬁcation of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response at 1, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/ Z3UZ-6TLE. In fulﬁlling its statutory functions under the Homeland Security Act, CISA provided nonexhaustive, high-level guidance to state and local oﬃcials so that they could speciﬁcally and concretely identify and deﬁne essential industries and workers within their jurisdiction. Id., at 2, ¶ 3. Michigan chose to incorporate the high-level guidance by reference without concretizing it to Michigan’s economy and workforce.
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Take one example. CISA identiﬁes “employees supporting or enabling transportation functions,” and “employees of ﬁrms providing services that enable logistics operations.” Id., Attach. at 6. Would this include Plaintiﬀs Intraco, an exporter, and Casite, which distributes after-market products for automobiles? Even if it did, workers described by CISA only include “some workers” in the designated sectors. EO77(8). Employers were able to designate such workers who were “necessary” to enable, support, or facilitate certain types of work in these sectors, EO-77(8)(b), but “businesses … that abuse[d] their designation authority [would] be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.” EO-77(8)(b)(6). Businesses had to read together two documents from two diﬀerent governments writing to two different audiences. And if they misinterpreted those documents—seeing as lawyers were also deemed nonessential, businesses might not have had ready access to counsel—they could be criminally prosecuted for “abusing” their designation authority. Not only is this impermissibly vague, such vagueness encourages arbitrary enforcement.
There is also the matter of the voluminous publication of FAQs. If ordinary people could understand the Lockdown Orders, then there would be no need for 125+ FAQs.
Finally, after Plaintiﬀs ﬁled their Complaint, the executive orders were amended to include new language that created only more vagueness. Starting with EO-92, “nothing in [the orders] shall be taken to abridge the protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution….” EO-92(17). As Plaintiﬀs assert in their Complaint, the executive orders infringe on protected liberty interests (e.g., the right to engage in commerce, the right to engage in the common occupations of life, etc.) and on protected property interests (e.g., the right to operate a lawful business, lost revenue and value to the business, etc.). ECF 8, ¶¶ 87–117, PageID.107–113. After May 18, 2020, an ordinary person is left with conﬂicting messages: these constitutional interests remain fully protected, but you are forbidden from exercising them under threat of criminal prosecution. A prime example of this irreconcilable conﬂict can be observed in Emagine Theatres v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-
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00570 (WD Mich.) (Maloney, J.) (alleging that the Government threatened to prosecute a business for exercising its freedom of speech under the First Amendment despite the “no abridgment” clause).
Plaintiﬀs expect discovery will yield additional evidence of the vagueness problem. There have been media reports attesting to the confusion over the scope of the orders.27 The Attorney General also invited residents to submit requests for interpretations of the executive orders to miag@michigan.gov.28 She responded to at least some of those questions through various media, including YouTube,29 before it was later determined that the “Department of Attorney General is prohibited by law from providing legal advice to private individuals.”30
Accordingly, Plaintiﬀs have adequately stated a claim that the Lockdown Orders are void for vagueness.
27 See, e.g., Livengood, Whitmer’s extended shutdown order sows confusion as political opponents stoke resistance, Crain’s Detroit Business (Apr. 13, 2020); Beggin, Can you buy seeds in Michigan? Confusion reigns over Whitmer stay-home order, Bridge Magazine (Apr. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/2UH6-SFDF; Jaehnig, Ambiguous executive order has caused mass confusion statewide, The Daily Mining Gazette (Apr. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/ WCF2-N7L5; Egan & Gray, Businesses, police in Michigan face confusion on ﬁrst day of ʻstay home’ order, Detroit Free Press (Mar. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/2L7Q-EQCK; Lloyd, Breaking down the confusion behind COVID-19 executive orders, 9&10 News (May 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/792K-RSH3; DesOrmeau, After 102 executive orders, confusion is commonplace on what’s allowed in Michigan and what isn’t, MLive (May 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Z2Z-MYWH.
28 State of Michigan, AG Nessel addresses confusion over businesses deemed ʻcritical’ during stay safe, stay home order (Mar. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/7WL2-QG27.
29 See, e.g., Michigan AG Dana Nessel answers questions related to COVID-19 and Governor’s executive orders, MLive (Mar. 30, 2020), https://youtu.be/Ib09PFOKZ2I.
30 Department of Attorney General, Questions regarding the meaning of the Governor’s executive order (undated, last accessed Jun. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/49WM-2V3L.
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III. Epidemiology Amici: The amicus brief submitted by epidemiologists not only ignores the standard of review, but the information provided lacks value. Plaintiﬀs have already argued why the Court should deny amici leave to ﬁle their
brief. ECF 22, PageID.568–574. If the Court grants them leave to ﬁle their brief, Plaintiﬀs take this opportunity to address the substance of amici’s arguments.
1. Eisenberg Dashboard. Amici claim, without any real caveat or qualiﬁcation, that the Government’s actions in this case saved 3,500 lives. ECF 19-1, PageID.540, 549–551. This is a factual allegation outside the record. It therefore cannot be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). Even if it could be considered, amici’s claim isn’t as impressive as it seems after looking at the dashboard of data cited for this proposition. The dashboard says that it is “highly preliminary and uncertain” and cannot be used “for prediction of speciﬁc numbers.” Eisenberg, et al., Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard, Current Forecasts and Social Distancing Tabs (Apr. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/P7X7-GQF7. In other words, amici tout the “lives saved” statistic for the very purpose that the dashboard itself says it cannot be used for. It is surprising and deeply troubling to see the “lives saved” statistic presented in such ﬁrm terms when Dr. Eisenberg herself is one of the listed amici. ECF 19-1, PageID.561.
2. Inﬂuenza Comparison. Amici claim that Michigan’s death toll has exceeded 5,700, with nearly 1,400 dying in Detroit alone, a number that means COVID-19 is forty times deadlier than inﬂuenza. ECF 19-1, PageID.544. The asserted comparison to ﬂu statistics reaches outside the pleadings, and it cannot be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). Even if the Court could consider such information through judicial notice, amici’s allegations ignore Plaintiﬀs’ well-pleaded factual allegations that the Government’s method of counting deaths artiﬁcially inﬂates the death toll to maintain the ﬁction of an emergency. Amici are free to disagree with those allegations, but the Court must accept them as true at this stage of the proceedings.
3. NPIs. Amici write extensively about non-pharmaceutical interventions (“NPIs”). ECF 19-1, PageID.546–547. All of these averments are beyond the scope of
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the pleadings and are not properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6). Yet, even if the Court could consider them, the interventions listed by amici—e.g., sanitization and wearing masks—are not at issue in this case. Indeed, Plaintiﬀs have no qualms about enhanced cleaning procedures or adhering to the use of facial masks. ECF 8, ¶¶ 96, 97, 106, 113, PageID.108–109, 112–113. The issue is whether the Government has the power close down businesses statewide. Amici want to engage in a policy debate (i.e., is it a good idea), instead of a legal debate (i.e., is it lawful, however good the idea may seem to some). Amici go on to say that closing businesses has been a “frequent and fundamental strategy in responding to outbreaks.” ECF 19-1, PageID.547 (citing Jarvis, et al., Quantifying the impact of physical distance measures on the transmission of COVID-19 in the UK, BMC Medicine 18:124 at 2 (May 7, 2020) (“JARVIS”). Conceptually, Plaintiﬀs do not object to temporary, targeted closures for thorough sanitizing in response to outbreaks. But that isn’t what happened here. The entire state was locked down, including vast regions of the state where there were no cases and/or no deaths.
Plaintiffs also note with interest that amici support the “frequent and fundamental” assertion by citing a study of social-distancing policies in Great Britain, which noted that “many countries have adopted unprecedented physical distancing policies.”31 JARVIS, at 2 (emphasis added). We share a common history, but the current laws and policies of the United Kingdom cannot inform the constitutional question at hand: do the dormant Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment permit or prohibit a state from closing all businesses under threat of criminal prosecution? In that sense, the study of a foreign country’s response to the coronavirus is of no value to the constitutional questions at hand. Beyond that, the Jarvis authors themselves acknowledge that the policies implemented in response to the coronavirus are unprecedented. Something cannot be a
31 Another of amici’s articles makes the same observation: “the modern world has never confronted this pathogen, nor deployed anti-contagion policies of such scale and scope.” See ECF 19-1, PageID.549, which cites Hslang, et al., The eﬀect of large-scale anti-contagion policies on the COVID-19 pandemic, Nature (Jun. 8, 2020).
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“frequent and fundamental strategy” and “unprecedented” at the same time. In addition, the Jarvis study notes several limitations on the survey, including the
fact that those who adhere to social distancing measures may have been more likely to respond to the survey, “resulting in selection bias and in an overestimate of the impact of those measures.” Id., at 7. The study also noted that UK testing algorithms focus on people in hospitals, and that an actual decline in community spread could be oﬀset by the problem of nosocomial infections—i.e., infections caught while in the hospital. Id., at 8. So, in addition to having no real value to the constitutional questions at hand, the Jarvis article’s acknowledged shortcomings leave it with little weight.
4. Flu Pandemic of 1918. Amici point to the 1918 inﬂuenza pandemic and cite an analysis that found death rates to be 50% lower in cities that adopted social distancing measures as compared to those that did not. ECF 19-1, PageID.547 (citing Hatchett, Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 inﬂuenza pandemic, 104 Proceedings of the Natl. Acad. of Sciences of the United States of Am. 18 (Feb. 14, 2007) (“HATCHETT”). Although Plaintiﬀs do compare the Lockdown Orders to actions taken by Michigan governors in the past, the Complaint does not speak to actions taken in other states. Such information cannot be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). Even if it could be considered, there is much to unpack in the Hatchett article. As this is already a lengthy brief, and this material should not be considered at all, Plaintiﬀs will focus on only a few key points in the interest of judicial economy.
Perhaps most importantly, the Hatchett article admits that the non-pharmaceutical interventions only work while they are in place: “Altogether, we take these ﬁndings as evidence that NPIs were capable of reducing inﬂuenza transmission in 1918, but that their beneﬁts (as one would expect) were limited to the time that they remained in eﬀect.” HATCHETT, at 5. Once lifted, a second, larger wave appeared. Ibid.
If highly eﬀective NPIs are put into place early in the epidemic, and these result in a smaller epidemic, then a large proportion of the
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population will remain susceptible to the renewed spread of the virus once interventions are relaxed. In the absence of an eﬀective method of otherwise inducing immunity in the uninfected population (i.e., a well matched vaccine) such an epidemic is likely to have two phases, with the ﬁrst phase mitigated by NPIs and the second commencing after NPIs are relaxed. In our review of 17 cities, we observed that cities that implemented NPIs sooner had lower peak mortality rates during the ﬁrst wave and were at greater risk of a large second wave.”
Ibid. (emphases added). So, absent a vaccine, “ﬂattening the curve” can accomplish only one thing: not overwhelming hospitals. The same number of people will ultimately contract the coronavirus, and the same percentage of those people who would have developed COVID-19 will still do so, just spaced out over time. In other words, NPIs merely delay the inevitable.
The Hatchett article also notes that schools, churches, and theatres were closed, not all businesses. Id., at 5. Of these, researchers could not determine “the relative contributions of individual interventions.” Ibid. Stated diﬀerently, they do not know if one, two, or all three working together produced the desired result of ﬂattening the curve.
In addition, Hatchett’s appendix describes the NPIs instituted in the cities under study. Id., at SI Appx. Eight out of 17 staggered retail hours to reduce congestion in stores and on transit systems. Ibid. Only two implemented community-wide mask ordinances. Ibid. Only one city, St. Louis, declared a general business closure. Ibid. See also St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Wide Business Closing Order to Check Inﬂuenza in Eﬀect Today in St. Louis; Closing Order in Force, and is Generally Obeyed, Nov. 9, 1918, p.1, https://perma. cc/8C5F-2DNZ. This is no comparison to closing an entire state for months, including massive areas substantially unaﬀected by the virus. If anything, this only proves Plaintiﬀs’ point that the Lockdown Orders are unprecedented, not a “frequent and fundamental strategy” as amici contend.
5. Courtemanche Article. Amici cite a national, peer-reviewed study on four social distancing measures, claiming it supports the idea that these measures
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“signiﬁcantly reduced the daily growth rate of COVID-19,” and that the country would have faced about “35 million more cases of the disease nationwide.” ECF 19-1, PageID.549 (citing Courtemanche, Strong social distancing measures in the United States reduced the COVID-19 growth rate, 39 Health Aﬀairs 7 (Jul. 2020) (“COURTEMANCHE”)). Of course, as Plaintiﬀs have emphasized—and epidemiologists should know—there is a diﬀerence between the coronavirus and the disease it can (but does not invariably) cause. Even assuming arguendo that the 35 million ﬁgure was realistic (and it wasn’t), those are cases, not deaths. As Plaintiﬀs have pleaded, the supermajority of the infected are asymptomatic or experienced mild-to-moderate reactions to it (i.e., they did not require hospitalization). See ECF 8, ¶ 43, PageID.96. If anything, this supports Plaintiﬀs’ point that an increase in conﬁrmed cases, without a corresponding increase in deaths, only increases the survival rate. Ibid.
Courtemanche notably compares the study data to “counterfactual simulations” to determine whether NPIs aﬀected the growth rate for the virus. COURTEMANCHE, at 5. To develop the simulation, he assumed a growth rate based on modeling predictions that relied on data from before the introduction of NPIs and shelter-in-place orders (“SIPOs”). Ibid. There were, however, eight states that did not introduce SIPOs, from which actual data could have been drawn. In addition, no eﬀort was made to determine which of the NPIs had real eﬀect, because researchers elected to limit the counterfactuals to no NPIs and no SIPOs. Moreover, the NPIs studied did not include general business closures. Researchers looked at SIPOs, school closures, bans on large social gatherings, and closures of entertainment-related businesses. Id., at 2. Even so, they still found that school closures and bans on large social gatherings did not inﬂuence the growth rate. Id., at 4.
Courtemanche, like the Eisenberg dashboard, speciﬁcally “urge[s] caution about taking the speciﬁc numbers of cases averted too literally. Simulations that use estimated parameters to predict outside the range of observed policy variation are inherently subject
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to a high level of uncertainty that is diﬃcult to quantify.” Id., at 5. Courtemanche acknowledged, for example, that the simulations were unrealistic because “voluntary social distancing by individuals and businesses would have likely increased” had governments not instituted NPIs. Id., at 6.
Perhaps most noteworthy about the Courtemanche paper is this: “[O]ur results are not informative about the eﬀectiveness of intermediate measures, such as lifting a[n] SIPO but requiring masks in public or opening restaurants at reduced capacity.” Id., at 6. In other words, this study sheds no light on whether less restrictive alternatives—like those in place now—could have achieved the same outcome without the economic devastation the Lockdown Orders visited upon us. Of course, given the alleged infringement upon fundamental rights, strict scrutiny saddles the Government with the burden of proving that it used the least restrictive means to achieve its interest. This study doesn’t move the needle on that issue.
6. Hslang Article. Amici cite Hslang for the proposition that school and business closures signiﬁcantly reduced the virus’s growth rate worldwide. ECF 19-1, PageID.549 (citing Hslang, et al., The eﬀect of large-scale anti-contagion policies on the COVID-19 pandemic, Nature (Jun. 8, 2020) (pre-peer review publication) (“HSLANG”)). There are at least three points to consider about Hslang.
First, it conﬂicts with Courtemanche, inasmuch as it claims to have detected growth-limiting eﬀects from school closures. Although school closures are not at issue in this case, Plaintiffs note that disagreement amongst the “experts” on the efficacy of individual NPIs undercuts the “medical consensus” amici try to portray (and which was important to the Jacobson Court).
Second, Hslang only analyzed conﬁrmed infections, not hospitalizations or death, which were the two metrics that purportedly drove the lockdown. HSLANG, at 4.
Third, as Plaintiﬀs allege in the Complaint, there is a diﬀerence between the virus and the disease, one does not inevitably cause the other, and the supermajority of people
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who catch the virus are asymptomatic (i.e., they do not develop the disease) or they suﬀer only mild-to-moderate disease symptoms that do not require hospitalization. ECF 8, ¶¶ 42–43, PageID.96. Thus, the number of cases alone does not move the needle on whether a public health emergency exists. It is the virus’s alleged lethality that purportedly justiﬁes dynamiting constitutional bedrock.
7. Ebell Article. Amici cite another recently published study comparing the rate of increase in coronavirus infections in Clarke County, Georgia, against surrounding counties that implemented a local SIPO later than Clarke County. ECF 19-1, PageID.550 (citing Ebell, et al., Mandatory social distancing associated with increased doubling times, Am. J. or Preventative Medicine (May 30, 2020) (pre-proof copy) (“EBELL”)). Beyond the limitations acknowledged by the authors, a key assumption has since been tested in the real world, and the results may or may not match expectations. Ebell assumes a 5-day median for incubation, plus a 5-day lag in test results. This article was prepared based on data from March and April 2020. Two months later, we aren’t seeing explosions of cases after weeks of close-quarters protests and riots; at least that’s the oﬃcial story (one that deﬁes common sense). If the policies are so successful, and the Hatchett article tells us that second waves follow the lifting of NPIs, then why aren’t we seeing massive spikes after a month of protests if Ebell and others are right that NPIs and SIPOs limit the speed of the spread? Does this not empirically undercut their counterfactual models? Expert discovery will yield more deﬁnite answers.
If the Court could reach any of this at the pleading stage, it would have to draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiﬀs’ favor, including shortcomings and limitations in the research articles themselves, as compared to each other, and countervailing data. For example, AEG has analyzed mobility trends in Michigan using Apple data, which show a massive drop in queries for direction during the two weeks before the Lockdown Orders went into place. This suggests that voluntary behavior—which, of course, does not offend the Constitution in the slightest—was far more responsible for limiting the spread
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of the virus than mandatory and constitutionally-suspect orders:
8. Imperial College. Amici also rely on a June 2020 report from Imperial College on state-level tracking of COVID-19 in the United States, despite the College’s earlier and wildly inaccurate predictions of death rates. ECF 19-1, PageID.553 (citing Unwin, Report 23: State-level tracking of COVID-19 in the United States, Imperial Coll. (May 24, 2020) (“IMPERIAL COLLEGE”).32 As with all of the other articles, none of the factual averments in amici’s brief or in the article can be judicially noticed; they cannot be properly considered under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Still, there are a few observations worth making here.
First, the College admitted that its results “must be heavily caveated: our results do not account for additional interventions that may be introduced such as mass testing,
32 Compare with Walker, The global impact of COVID-19 and strategies for mitigation and suppression, at Table 1, Imperial Coll. (Mar. 26, 2020) (originally projecting 3 million dead in 8 months without mitigation eﬀorts and 520,000 dead in 8 months even with mitigation eﬀorts).
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contact tracing, and changing workplace / transit practices … Therefore, our scenarios are pessimistic in nature and should be interpreted as such.” IMPERIAL COLLEGE, at 16, § 3. Amici make no mention of these caveats. Nor do they acknowledge that the College refrained from studying whether workplace could reopen with new practices that could mitigate the spread of the virus.
Second, the College found that transmission of the coronavirus is “correlated with population density.” Id., at 5, § 2.2. This actually supports Plaintiffs’ thesis that a statewide closure of business does not square with the asserted public health concerns, since most of the state is rural with low population density.
Third, amici say that the College “confirms” that the “aggressive actions implemented in Michigan … significantly lowered the transmission rates of the virus, thus reducing the number of cases and deaths.” ECF 19-1, PageID.553. Yet the College does not say this in its report. The College assumes NPIs decrease mobility and hypothesizes that increasing mobility (when lockdown orders are relaxed or lifted) will cause an increase in infections. That’s hardly news. It’s as intuitive as applying pressure to a wound; it’ll start to bleed again if you stop applying pressure. It is consistent with what Hatchett observed back in 2007: NPIs are only effective while they are in place. Amici— like the Government—need to be clear on what the goal is. Is it to keep the curve manageable so that hospitals can keep pace with cases requiring hospitalization? If so, the Anderson Economic Group’s report shows that mission was accomplished within three weeks, in which case any suppression of constitutional freedoms beyond that date are void ipso facto, apart from any argument about the lawfulness of those suppressions during the three-week period. Or is their goal to reach and maintain zero cases and deaths while we wait for a vaccine that may never come, at the indefinite expense of our inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—especially for the 80%+ who are at low risk? If that’s the objective, constitutional rights must always trump epidemiologists’ policy preferences. Life is not, and has never been, a risk-free endeavor.
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Freedom is not contingent on safety. “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” Franklin, The Works of Benjamin Franklin Vol. VII: Letters and Miscellaneous Writings 1775–1779, p.58 (Putnam ed. 1904), https://perma.cc/9RLB-4W4K.
9. Oyster Bay Polio Outbreak. Amici point to a polio outbreak in Oyster Bay, New York, in 1916, as proof that questioning medical experts causes death. ECF 19-1, PageID.556 (citing Risse, Revolt against quarantine: Community responses to the 1916 polio epidemic, Oyster Bay, New York, 14 Transactions & Studies of the Coll. of Phys. of Phila. 1, 23–50 (1992) (“RISSE”)). The paternalism is palpable. Risse noted that Oyster Bay was a vacation community with a poorer year-round population compared to wealthier urbanites who summered there. The locals could not aﬀord improvements to public sanitation. They were skeptical that public health oﬃcers were ginning up health scares to press them into spending money they couldn’t aﬀord on infrastructure they didn’t need. RISSE, at 23–27. A polio outbreak coincided with this public debate. Id., at 27–30. Quarantine measures were put in place, with arbitrary enforcement. Id., at 30, 37. About two months later, the number of cases (not deaths) reached 100. Id., at 37. Suﬀering increased unemployment and remaining skeptical of the “experts,” who had reputations to protect for continuing quarantine measures (lest they be proved wrong about instituting them in the ﬁrst place), residents revolted and the town council lifted restrictions. Id., at 37–43. A whopping six additional cases occurred. That’s it. Six. Id., at 44. Although Risse notes that Oyster Bay had a greater per capita rate of infection than anywhere else in New York, he does not tell us what the death toll was. Id., at 46. The Government has identiﬁed two objectives: (1) ﬂattening the curve; and (2) saving lives. Risse’s article tells us little about ﬂattening and nothing about lives saved.
10. Thunström Economics Article. Finally, amici proﬀer a cost-beneﬁt analysis, citing an article that says that the damage lockdowns will cause is far less than the value of lives saved when assigning a dollar value to human life. ECF 19-1, PageID.556–557
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(citing Thunström, et al., The beneﬁts and costs of using social distancing to ﬂatten the curve for COVID-19, J. Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis (Apr. 14, 2020, publication forthcoming) (“THUNSTRÖM”)). Plaintiﬀs disagree, analytically and philosophically.
Analytically, Thunström’s math rests upon a key assumption: GDP will decline by 6.2% in 2020, and then rebound 5.5% in 2021, 3.5% in 2022, and 2.0% in 2023. THUNSTRÖM, at 7. Perhaps at the beginning of pandemic, that seemed reasonable. Unfortunately, the near total shutdown of the national economy lasted for months. Consequently, the economic news is far bleaker. The blue-chip consensus is that GDP has dropped 35% through June 4, and the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow estimate is that GDP actually dropped by as much as 55% through June 4. Atlanta Fed GDPNow™ Estimate for 2020:Q2, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atl. (Jun. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/S6ZP-WZK2. Fortunately, GDPNow estimates that the economy has “improved” to -39% GDP as of June 26, 2020. https://perma.cc/9WM4-7QJK. Many states are announcing a new round of closures, so the positive trend is far from assured. Nonetheless, we are looking at a far greater drop than Thunström assumed. And, Plaintiﬀs note, Thunström’s research says the tipping point where the costs exceed the beneﬁt is a decline in GDP (with social distancing) of 8.5% or more. THUNSTRÖM, at 12. We are looking at a decline in GDP far beyond that.
Yet philosophically—and more importantly—Plaintiﬀ’s reject amici’s cost-beneﬁt premise. You cannot put a price on human life. This case is not about money versus lives. It is about saving lives on both sides of the equation. People are dying from COVID-19, but people are also dying from suicide, drug overdoses, alcohol abuse, and domestic violence because they can’t work. “Doctors in Northern California say they have seen more deaths from suicide than they’ve seen from the coronavirus during the pandemic. ʻThe numbers are unprecedented,” Dr. Michael deBoisblanc of John Muir Medical Center in Walnut Creek, California, told ABC 7 News about the increases of deaths by suicide, adding that he’s seen a ʻyear’s worth of suicides’ in the last four weeks alone.” Miller,
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California doctors say they’ve seen more deaths from suicide than coronavirus since lockdowns, Washington Examiner (May 21, 2020), https://bit.ly/CalifLockdownSuicides. A recent study estimates that the United States will experience up to 150,000 excess “deaths of despair” than it otherwise would have because of SIPOs and other NPIs that shuttered the economy. Patterson, et al., Projected Deaths of Despair During the Coronavirus Recession 11, Table, Well Being Trust (May 8, 2020) (“PATTERSON”), https://perma.cc/Y6XH-9JYM. Michigan alone is conservatively projected to see an extra 1,588 deaths of despair.33 Id., at Appx. Michigan is also seeing spikes in domestic violence from 25–48% around the state. See, e.g., Hogan, Domestic violence cases spike 48%; prosecutor calls it a worrisome trend, ABC 13 News (Apr. 3, 2020), https:// perma.cc/VW44-T527; WWJ News, Domestic violence calls spike 25% under Michigan ʻstay home’ order, WWJ Newsradio 950 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/MEL5-F3H5. Opioid-related deaths are up. “ʻIf you’re alone, there’s nobody to give you the Narcan,’ said one coroner.” Sanchez & Eldeib, Overdose deaths have skyrocketed in Chicago, and the coronavirus pandemic may be making it worse, ProPublica Illinois (May 30, 2020),
These are our family, our friends, our neighbors, our coworkers, our employees. The Government wants to claim it is acting to save lives. It doesn’t get to do that by imposing conditions that kill others. That’s picking who lives and who dies, and that is emphatically not the proper role of government in a free society.
CONCLUSION The Government and amici focus their time arguing whether the Lockdown Orders are good public policy and have a rational basis. That debate is for another day. Today,
33 In fairness, the Patterson study says it is not advocating to fully reopen the economy immediately and without restrictions. PATTERSON, at 14, Policy Solutions. Of course, neither are Plaintiﬀs. It is plain, though, that work provides dignity and meaning to people’s lives—it is how we pursue happiness. Taking that away from them does much more than violate abstract notions of constitutional rights.
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there are only two questions before the Court: (1) does it have subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) does the Complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted?
The standard of review for both questions is the same. The Court must accept Plaintiﬀs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor.
Jurisdiction. The Government argues that the claims are moot and unripe, that Plaintiﬀs lack pre-enforcement standing, and that MCA lacks organizational standing. The claims are not moot under the evading-review doctrine. The claims are ripe, and Plaintiﬀs have pre-enforcement standing, because Plaintiﬀs have already suﬀered an injury-in-fact. They would have conducted business but for the Lockdown Orders, and they faced a credible threat of prosecution if they violated those orders. MCA has organizational standing. Its individual members would have standing to sue over the lockdown orders. The interests are germane to the organization’s purpose: promoting the operation of carwashes. Finally neither the claims nor the relief requested requires the participation of MCA’s individual members in this litigation.
Rule 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiﬀs concede that the Court should dismiss Counts II–III, the rest of the claims in the Complaint state causes of action upon which relief can be granted.
In Count I, Plaintiﬀs allege that the Lockdown Orders impermissibly interfere with interstate commerce. The Government disagrees, but that is a merits question. The Court is not tasked at this stage with evaluating the likelihood of success on the merits.
In Count IV, Plaintiﬀs assert a procedural due process claim. They claim the Government violated several of their constitutionally-protected interests without providing process. Some process is due; how much is a fact-intensive question under Mathews v. Eldridge that must await an adjudication on the merits.
In Count V, Plaintiﬀs assert a substantive due process claim. They claim that the Government violated their fundamental rights. This requires the Government to prove
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that it had a compelling governmental interest and that it selected the least restrictive means available to achieve that interest. The Government claims that COVID-19 established a compelling governmental interest in protecting public health, but Plaintiﬀs have factually challenged that assertion. In addition, Plaintiﬀs have alleged that they can operate their businesses just as safely as those allowed to remain open. At this stage, the Court cannot decide whether the Government had a compelling interest or whether the Lockdown Orders were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Those are fact-intensive inquiries that must be resolved on summary judgment or after trial. Even if the Court determines that Jacobson reasonableness review applies (which Plaintiﬀs contend is higher than rational-basis review), the question of whether the Lockdown Orders were reasonable can be answered only after discovery.
In Count VI, Plaintiﬀs assert an equal protection claim. They claim that they have been treated diﬀerently than other businesses, that they are similarly situated with those other businesses, and that the disparate treatment burdened fundamental rights (or, in the alternative, was unreasonable). The Government again disagrees on the merits, but the Court is only concerned with whether Plaintiﬀs’ have stated a claim—not with whether they will ultimately prevail. Count VI states a claim for the same reason as Count V.
Finally, in Count VII, Plaintiﬀs claim that the Lockdown Orders are void for vagueness. Again, the Government disagrees. Yet the Complaint identiﬁes bases for Plaintiﬀs’ vagueness challenge, and carve-outs for constitutional rights in subsequent executive orders further support a plausible view that the Lockdown Orders are vague.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF For these reasons, Plaintiﬀs respectfully ask the Court to deny the Government’s motion.
Respectfully submitted, BUTZEL LONG, P.C.

Dated: July 6, 2020
BH2933225.3

DANIEL J. McCARTHY (P59457) JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Plaintiﬀs

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-1 filed 07/08/20 PageID.824 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC., EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HILLSDALE JEWELERS, WILLIAM A. SHORTT, D.D.S. & THERESE F. SHORTT, D.D.S, P.C., d/b/a SHORTT DENTAL, and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiﬀs, v.
GRETCHEN E. WHITMER, and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 20-00360 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
INDEX OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT 1 EXHIBIT 2 EXHIBIT 3 EXHIBIT 4

Plaintiﬀs’ Amicus Br, House of Reps. & Senate v. Governor, No. 20-79-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. May 14, 2020)
Opp’n, Immediate Decl. J. 11–19, House of Reps., No. 20-79-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. May 12, 2020)
Motion Hrg. Tr. 34:16–24, House of Reps., No. 20-79-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. May 15, 2020)
Register of Actions, Michigan v. Manke, No. 20-ST0337-SM (Shiawassee Dist. Ct.) (May 4, 2020)

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EXHIBIT 1

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IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS STATE OF MICHIGAN

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, and THE SENATE,
Plaintiﬀs, v.
GOV. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER,
Defendant.

Case No. 20-000079-MZ HON. CYNTHIA D. STEPHENS

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SIGNATURE SOTHEBY’S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC.,
EXECUTIVE PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., INTRACO CORPORATION, INC., CASITE INTRACO, LLC, BAHASH & CO., LLC,
WILLIAM A SHORTT D.D.S. & THERESE F. SHORTT D.D.S., P.C., and MIDWEST CARWASH ASSOCIATION

BUTZEL LONG, P.C. Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Amici Curiae

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COUNSEL OF RECORD

BUSH SEYFERTH, PLLC Patrick G. Seyferth (P47475) Susan M. McKeever (P73533) 100 West Big Beaver Road, Suite 400 Troy, Michigan 48084 (248) 822-7800 seyferth@bsplaw.com mckeever@bsplaw.com Counsel to the House of Representatives and the Senate

ATTORNEY GENERAL Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Assistant Attorney General 525 West Ottawa Street PO Box 30736 Lansing, Michigan 48933 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov Counsel to Governor Whitmer

BUSH SEYFERTH, PLLC Michael R. Williams (P79827) Frankie A. Dame (P81307) 151 South Rose Street, Suite 707 Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007 (269) 820-4100 williams@bsplaw.com dame@bsplaw.com Counsel to the House of Representatives and the Senate
HASSAN W. BEYDOUN (P76334) PO Box 30014 Lansing, Michigan 48909 (517) 373-0935 Counsel to the House of Representatives hbeydoun@house.mi.gov

BUTZEL LONG, P.C. Daniel J. McCarthy (P59457) Joseph E. Richotte (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Counsel for Amici Curiae in Support of the House of Representatives and Senate

WILLIAM R. STONE (P78580) PO Box 30036 Lansing, Michigan 48909 (517) 373-2449 bstone@senate.michigan.gov Counsel to the Senate

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNSEL OF RECORD ...................................................................... ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. v INDEX OF EXHIBITS...................................................................... viii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................................................... ix AMICI CURIAE ................................................................................. x JURISDICTION.............................................................................. xiii QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................................................... xiii TIMELINE OF RELEVANT EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION..... xiv PREVALENCE BY THE GOVERNOR’S RECOVERY COUNCIL REGION .... xvi INTRODUCTION ................................................................................1 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 2
I. EMA: The Governor has exceeded her statutory powers under the Emergency Management Act............................................................. 2
A. The EMA prohibits a Governor from unilaterally declaring a “new” emergency or a “new” disaster after the initial 28-day period has lapsed under the Act ......................................... 2
B. Even assuming arguendo that the Governor can declare new emergencies and disasters without Legislative approval, she has still exceeded her powers in four ways .................................. 5 1. The Governor cannot prove that an epidemic exists throughout the entire state or that there is a statistically signiﬁcant threat of a statewide epidemic ...................... 5 2. The Governor’s power to respond to the epidemic is limited by the Public Health Code, which she has not suspended or modiﬁed........................................................... 10
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3. The EOs fail to identify objective conditions permitting the end of the declared emergency and disaster ................... 11
4. The Lockdown Orders are not “necessary and appropriate” because they are substantively unreasonable ................. 13
II. EPGA: The Governor has exceeded her statutory powers under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act ............................................... 18
A. The EPGA applies to local instances of civil unrest, not to statewide public health emergencies................................... 18
B. Even assuming arguendo that the EPGA applies here, the Governor has still exceeded her powers because the Lockdown Orders are unreasonable. ................................................ 21 1. Jacobson does not apply; the Court can and must decide whether the Governor’s orders are reasonable................ 21 2. The Lockdown Orders are objectively unreasonable .........23
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS: The Lockdown Orders violate the Separation of Powers Clause. ...........................................................24 CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 28
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases 46th Circuit Court v Crawford Cty,
476 Mich 131; 719 NW2d 553 (2006) .......................................................25
Apsey v Memorial Hosp, 477 Mich 120; 730 NW2d 695 (2007) ...................................................... 5
County Com’rs of Oakland Co v Oakland Co Exec, 98 Mich App 639; 296 NW2d 621 (1980) .................................................25
Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588; 648 NW2d 591 (2002) ...................................................... 4
Detroit City Council v Mayor of Detroit, 283 Mich App 442; 770 NW2d 117 (2009) ................................................25
Ex parte Landaal, 273 Mich 248; 262 NW 897 (1935) ........................................................... 5
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US (4 Wall) 2; 18 L Ed 281 (1866) ..................................................... viii
Herald Wholesale, Inc v Department of Treas, 262 Mich App 688; 687 NW2d 172 (2004)................................................... 5
Horne v US Dep’t of Agric, 575 US 350; 135 S Ct 2419; 192 L Ed 2d 388 (2015) ....................................27
In re AGD, 327 Mich App 332; 933 NW3d 751 (2019)................................................. 19
In re Compl of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).......................................................25
Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 US 11; 25 S Ct 358; 49 L Ed 643 (1905) ................................... 22, 23, 24
Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304; 645 NW2d 34 (2002) ...................................................... 21
Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180; 735 NW2d 628 (2007) ...................................................... 4
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.831 Page 7 of 48
Mac’s Shell Serv, Inc v Shell Oil Prods Co, LLC, 559 US 175; 130 S Ct 1251; 176 L Ed 2d 36 (2010)........................................ 4
McCartney v Attorney Gen, 231 Mich App 722; 587 NW2d 824 (1998) ................................................25
Omne Fin, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305; 596 NW2d 591 (1999) .....................................................20
People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152; 749 NW2d 257 (2008) ....................................................... 5
Ranke v Mich Corp & Secs Comm’n, 317 Mich 304; 26 NW2d 898 (1947) .......................................................28
Roberts v Mecosta Cty Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) ....................................................... 4
Sweatt v Department of Corrections, 468 Mich 172; 661 NW2d 201 (2003) ....................................................... 4
Trentadue v Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 479 Mich 378; 738 NW2d 664 (2007) ........................................................ 5
United States v Carolene Prods Co, 304 US 144; 58 S Ct 778; 82 L Ed 1234 (1938) ...........................................23
Walsh v City of River Rouge, 385 Mich 623; 198 NW 2d 318 (1971)......................................................20
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579; 72 S Ct 863; 96 L Ed 1153 (1952) .................................... viii, 27
Organic Laws Const 1963, art 3, § 2............................................................................24 Const 1963, art 4, § 1 ............................................................................25
Statutes MCL 10.31 ........................................................................................24 MCL 10.31(1) ...........................................................................17, 19, 20 MCL 10.32 ........................................................................................20
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.832 Page 8 of 48
MCL 30.402(e) .................................................................................... 3 MCL 30.402(f) .................................................................................... 2 MCL 30.402(h)................................................................................. 2, 3 MCL 30.403(3) ........................................................................ 2, 4, 5, 12 MCL 30.403(4)........................................................................ 2, 4, 5, 12 MCL 30.405(1) ................................................................................... 13 MCL 30.405(1)(a) ................................................................................ 11 MCL 333.50207(1) .............................................................................. 11 MCL 333.50207(3) .............................................................................. 11 MCL 333.5203(1) ................................................................................ 11 MCL 333.5203(2)................................................................................ 11 MCL 333.5203(3) ................................................................................ 11 MCL 8.3a........................................................................................... 4 Other Authorities Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ................................................... 4, 21 Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (Little, Brown & Co., 1886)..... 25, 27 Corrigan & Thomas, “Dice Loading” Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
59 NYU Ann Surv Am L 231, 231–33 (2003) .............................................. 21 Lane, Remaining Questions About Clinical Variola Major,
Emerging Infectious Diseases 17(4): 676–680 (Apr. 2011) ..............................22 Oxford English Dictionary .................................................................. 6, 19
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.833 Page 9 of 48
INDEX OF EXHIBITS EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-04 (Mar. 11, 2020)...........................................1 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-20 (Mar. 22, 2020).......................................... 2 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-21 (Mar. 23, 2020) .......................................... 3 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-33 (Apr. 1, 2020) ............................................ 4 SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 24 OF 2002 (Apr. 1, 2020)............... 5 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-42 (Apr. 9, 2020)............................................ 6 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-43 (Apr. 13, 2020) ...........................................7 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-59 (Apr. 24, 2020) .......................................... 8 SENATE BILL 858 OF 2020 (Apr. 28, 2020) ............................................. 9 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-66 (Apr. 30, 2020) ......................................... 10 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-67 (Apr. 30, 2020) ......................................... 11 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-68 (Apr. 30, 2020) ......................................... 12 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-69 (Apr. 30, 2020) ......................................... 13 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-70 (Apr. 30, 2020) ......................................... 14 GUBERNATORIAL VETO OF SENATE BILL 858 OF 2002 (May 4, 2020) ...... 15 EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-77 (May 7, 2020) ........................................... 16 ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP REPORT (Apr., 2020) ............................ 17 JOHNS HOPKINS CORONAVIRUS GRAPH (May 12, 2020) ........................ 18 MICHIGAN SMALL BUSINESS PROFILE (SBA 2019) ............................... 19
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.834 Page 10 of 48
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE *
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, … at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism[.] Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US (4 Wall) 2, 121; 18 L Ed 281 (1866).
When [the executive] takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of [the legislature], [her] power is at its lowest ebb … [Executive] claim[s] to power … must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 637–638; 72 S Ct 863; 96 L Ed 1153 (1952).
Although the parties will surely advocate well for their respective institutional interests, an important viewpoint is missing from this dispute: the perspective of some who are aﬀected by the Governor’s executive orders (“EOs”), suﬀering the loss of both self-government and civil liberties. Amici, businesses that are subject to the EOs, can provide the Court with this perspective.
Amici are people in the eyes of the law who enjoy constitutional rights. Before the EOs, their owners and employees were the beating hearts of our economy. Now these men and women are either jobless, struggling to make ends meet, or both, while their government threatens their licenses and their freedom if they dare work to put food on their tables and keep roofs over their heads.
* Rule 7.212(H)(3) Disclosure: No one except for the listed amici made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. None of the parties’ attorneys authored this brief in whole or in part.
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.835 Page 11 of 48
AMICI CURIAE Signature Sotheby’s International Realty (“Sotheby’s”), is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business in Birmingham, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Sotheby’s is a full-service residential brokerage that represents all price points and practices throughout the State of Michigan. Sotheby’s normally has 282 real estate agents and 18 employees. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders, none of its real estate agents worked for several weeks, and it had to lay oﬀ six employees. Even though EO 2020-70 released many restrictions on Sotheby’s, it remains deeply troubled by the Governor’s suggestion that her powers are like a “dial” that she can turn up and down at will, and her suggestion that she may issue similar orders, without legislative approval, if there is a “second wave” of infections. Executive Property Maintenance, Inc. (“EPM”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Plymouth, Michigan. It engages in intrastate commerce, but depends on interstate commerce for the goods necessary to perform it intrastate services. EPM provides to commercial, municipal, and residential clients lawn, snow, and ice maintenance; fertilization; property maintenance; planting; softscape; hardscape; design and build; irrigation; and water-feature services. EPM is an ISO9001/SN9001 certiﬁed company and participates in the Safe Company Program through the National Association of Landscape Professionals. During its peak season, EPM employs up to 45 employees. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders, all EPM employees were ordered to stop work. Even though EO 2020-59 released many restrictions on EPM, it still suﬀers substantial injuries from the restrictions placed on its vendors and customers. EPM is also concerned about the Governor’s suggestion that she may re-impose her job-killing orders in the future without legislative approval. Intraco Corporation, Inc. (“Intraco”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Troy, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.836 Page 12 of 48
commerce. Intraco is a major diversiﬁed exporter of architectural and automotive glass, automotive chemicals, and other goods. Its business model and success is based on maintaining personal face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers in Michigan and elsewhere. Videoconferencing is not conducive to Intraco’s operations. Intraco’s revenue has decreased substantially because of the Governor’s executive orders. Although some of Intraco’s employees in Michigan are performing limited functions at home, Intraco will soon face the harsh reality of laying oﬀ its staﬀ if the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue are not enjoined or rescinded.
Casite Intraco, LLC (“Casite”), is a Michigan limited liability company, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Intraco, with its principal place of business in Troy, Michigan. Casite engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. It distributes engine oil, fuel additives, and other after-market products for automobiles. Like Intraco, Casite’s business model and success is based on maintaining personal face-to-face relationships with current and prospective customers in Michigan and elsewhere. Casite contracts through two separate sales representatives, both of which are prohibited from calling on customers directly; videoconferencing is not conducive to Casite’s operations. Casite’s revenue has decreased substantially because of the executive orders and agency orders and rules at issue.
Bahash & Company, LLC, doing business as Hillsdale Jewelers, is a Michigan limited liability company with its principal place of business in Hillsdale, Michigan. Hillsdale Jewelers engages in interstate and intrastate commerce. It is a storefront retailer of jewelry and oﬀers jewelry-repair services. Hillsdale Jewelers has been forced to close because of the executive orders at issue. All three of its employees, including owner-employee Chris Bahash, are unemployed.
William A. Shortt, D.D.S & Therese F. Shortt, D.D.S, P.C., doing business as Shortt Dental, is a Michigan professional corporation with its principal place of business in South Lyon, Michigan, with a second location in West Branch, Michigan. Shortt Dental
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.837 Page 13 of 48
engages in intrastate commerce, but depends on interstate commerce for the goods necessary to perform intrastate services. Both locations have been forced to close because of the EOs. Shortt Dental normally employs 2 dentists, 4 dental hygienists, 12 oﬃce assistants, and 4 front desk workers, most of whom are currently unemployed. Shortt Dental’s revenue has decreased at least 75% due to the EOs. The only service it currently provides is emergency care limited to patient complaints of acute pain.
Midwest Carwash Association, Inc. (“MCA”), is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Lansing, Michigan. MCA is an association of carwashes located in Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. It provides members with programs and services at discount rates and networking opportunities with other carwash operators, manufacturers, and suppliers. In 2019, MCA had 119 members, consisting of 71 carwash operators and 48 vendors. In 2020, due to the EOs, MCA’s membership reduced to 86 members, consisting of 51 operators and 35 vendors. On information and belief, all staﬀed carwashes have been shut down, even though each are able and uniquely qualiﬁed to provide exterior carwashes safely and without risk to the public.
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.838 Page 14 of 48 JURISDICTION
Amici agree with the House of Representatives and the Senate (the “Legislature”) that the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this action for declaratory relief against the Governor under MCL 600.6419(1)(a).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED QUESTION NO. 1: Has the Governor exceeded her powers under the EMA? QUESTION NO. 2: Has the Governor exceeded her powers under the EPGA? QUESTION NO. 3: If not, has the Governor applied these Acts in a manner that
violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution of 1963?
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.839 Page 15 of 48
TIMELINE OF RELEVANT EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
EO 2020-04. On March 11, 2020, citing the EPGA and the EMA, the Governor declared a “state of emergency” based upon two presumptive diagnoses of coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”), a respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2, which stands for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus two (the “coronavirus”). Exhibit 1.
EO 2020-20. On March 22, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor closed to the public a wide range of public accommodations, including all restaurants, coﬀeehouses, and other places oﬀering food or beverages for on-site consumption. Exhibit 2.
EO 2020-21. On March 23, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor prohibited all inperson work that she deemed “not necessary to sustain or protect life.” Exhibit 3.
EO 2020-33. On April 1, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor expanded the emergency declaration to include a state of disaster under the EMA. Exhibit 4.
2020 SCR 24. On April 7, 2020, the Legislature voted to extend the emergency and disaster declarations under the EMA through April 30, 2020. Exhibit 5.
EO 2020-42. On April 9, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor extended EO 2020-21 through April 30, 2020, while imposing greater restrictions on the general public than before. Exhibit 6.
EO 2020-43. On April 13, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor extended EO 2020-20 through April 30, 2020. Exhibit 7.
EO 2020-59. On April 24, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor extended EO 2020-42 through May 15, 2020—beyond the April 30th deadline that the Legislature approved. It purports to loosen restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. Exhibit 8.
2020 SB 858. On April 28, 2020, the Legislature passed a bill terminating the declared emergency and disaster while extending 28 executive orders through dates ending in May, June, July, and December 2020. Exhibit 9.
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.840 Page 16 of 48
EO 2020-66. On April 30, 2020, the Governor declared an end to the states of emergency and disaster under the EMA. Exhibit 10.
EO 2020-67. On April 30, 2020, the Governor unilaterally extended the declared state of emergency under the EPGA. Exhibit 11.
EO 2020-68. On April 30, 2020, the Governor declared a “new” emergency and a “new” disaster under the EMA, citing the same public-health grounds as before. Exhibit 12.
EO 2020-69. On April 30, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor extended EO 2020-43 through May 28, 2020. Exhibit 13.
EO 2020-70. On April 30, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor extended EO 2020-59 through May 15, 2020, while also loosening restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. Exhibit 14.
2020 SJ 37. On May 4, 2020, the Governor vetoed Senate Bill 858 of 2020. Exhibit 15.
EO 2020-77. On May 7, 2020, citing both Acts, the Governor extended EO 202070 through May 28, 2020, while also purporting to loosen restrictions as part of a phased reopening of the economy. Exhibit 16.
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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.841 Page 17 of 48

PREVALENCE BY THE GOVERNOR’S RECOVERY COUNCIL REGION
AS OF MAY 12, 2020 ALPHABETICAL WITHIN REGION

Region 1—Detroit Region

County
Genesee Lapeer Livingston Macomb Monroe Oakland St. Clair Washtenaw Wayne

Approx. 2010 Census
163,000 88,000
181,000 841,000 152,000 1,202,000 163,000 345,000 1,820,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
366 175 377 6,097 399 7,784 366 1,206 18,274

% Conﬁrmed
0.225 0.199 0.208 0.725 0.263 0.648 0.225 0.350 1.004

Deaths % Deceased

28 30 22 710 18 872 28 82 2,140

0.017 0.034 0.012 0.084 0.012 0.073 0.017 0.024 0.118

Region 2—Grand Rapids Region

County
Clare Ionia Isabella Kent Lake Mason Mecosta Montcalm Muskegon Newaygo Oceana Osceola Ottawa

Approx. 2010 Census
31,000 64,000 70,000 602,000 11,000 29,000 43,000 63,000 172,000 48,000 27,000 23,000 264,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
12 110
61 2,416
2 23 16 47 401 36 34
9 430

% Conﬁrmed
0.039 0.172 0.087 0.401 0.018 0.079 0.037 0.075 0.233 0.075 0.126 0.039 0.163

Deaths % Deceased

2

0.006

3

0.005

7

0.010

45

0.007

0

---

0

---

2

0.005

1

0.002

20

0.012

0

---

1

0.004

0

---

20

0.008

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.842 Page 18 of 48

Region 3—Kalamazoo Region

County
Allegan Barry Berrien Branch Calhoun Cass Kalamazoo St. Joseph Van Buren

Approx. 2010 Census
111,000 59,000
157,000 45,000
136,000 52,000
250,000 61,000 76,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
161 52
411 82 52 43
636 71 94

% Conﬁrmed
0.145 0.088 0.262 0.182 0.038 0.083 0.254 0.116 0.124

Deaths % Deceased

2

0.002

1

0.002

25

0.016

2

0.004

1

0.001

2

0.004

36

0.014

1

0.002

4

0.005

Region 4—Saginaw Region

County
Alcona Arenac Bay Gladwin Huron Iosco Midland Ogemaw Oscoda Saginaw Sanilac Tuscola

Approx. 2010 Census
11,000 16,000 108,000 26,000 33,000 26,000 84,000 22,000
9,000 200,000
43,000 56,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
4 28 214 18 36 55 67 15
5 829
38 162

% Conﬁrmed
0.036 0.175 0.198 0.069 0.109 0.212 0.080 0.068 0.056 0.415 0.088 0.289

Deaths % Deceased

1

0.009

1

0.006

10

0.009

1

0.004

1

0.003

8

0.031

8

0.010

0

---

1

0.011

87

0.044

5

0.012

17

0.030

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.843 Page 19 of 48

Region 5—Lansing Region

County
Clinton Eaton Gratiot Ingham Shiawassee

Approx. 2010 Census
75,000 108,000
42,000 281,000
70,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
126 152
33 594 214

% Conﬁrmed
0.168 0.141 0.079 0.211 0.306

Deaths % Deceased

10

0.013

6

0.006

4

0.010

17

0.006

18

0.026

Region 6—Traverse City Region

County
Alpena Antrim Benzie Charlevoix Cheboygan Crawford Emmet G. Traverse Kalkaska Leelanau Manistee Missaukee Montmorency Otsego Presque Isle Roscommon Wexford

Approx. 2010 Census
29,000 23,000 17,000 26,000 26,000 14,000 33,000 87,000 17,000 22,000 25,000 15,000 10,000 24,000 14,000 24,000 33,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
87 10
4 13 19 57 21 21 17
9 11 16
5 98 11 20 11

% Conﬁrmed
0.300 0.043 0.024 0.050 0.073 0.407 0.064 0.024 0.100 0.041 0.044 0.107 0.050 0.408 0.079 0.083 0.033

Deaths % Deceased

8

0.028

0

---

0

---

1

0.004

1

0.004

4

0.029

2

0.006

5

0.006

2

0.012

0

---

0

---

1

0.007

0

---

10

0.042

0

---

0

---

2

0.006

Region 7—Jackson Region

County
Hillsdale Jackson Lenawee

Approx. 2010 Census
46,000 160,000
99,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
152 401 129

% Conﬁrmed
0.330 0.251 0.130

Deaths % Deceased

22

0.048

26

0.016

2

0.002

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.844 Page 20 of 48

Region 8—Upper Peninsula

County
Alger Baraga Chippewa Delta Dickinson Gogebic Houghton Iron Keweenaw Luce Mackinac Marquette Menomenee Ontonagon Schoolcraft

Approx. 2010 Census
10,000 9,000
38,000 37,000 26,000 16,000 37,000 12,000
2,000 7,000 11,000 67,000 24,000 7,000 8,000

Conﬁrmed Cases
0 1 2 14 5 4 2 0 0 1 6 51 6 0 4

% Conﬁrmed
--0.011 0.005 0.038 0.019 0.025 0.005
----0.014 0.055 0.076 0.025 --0.050

Deaths % Deceased

0

---

0

---

0

---

2

0.005

2

0.008

1

0.006

0

---

0

---

0

---

0

---

0

---

10

0.015

0

---

0

---

0

---

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Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-2 filed 07/08/20 PageID.845 Page 21 of 48
INTRODUCTION Michigan is now two weeks deep into a constitutional crisis. It is not some abstract turf war between the political branches. For the ﬁrst time in our state’s history, power has been consolidated into the hands of one person. The Legislature—the voice of the people—has objected and been ignored. The judiciary, too, has been directly challenged. Inconvenient rulings are sidestepped with summary administrative action, as recently happened after a court insisted on giving a 77-year-old barber due process. With the importance of this matter so framed, amici oﬀer to the Court their views on the legality of the Governor’s continued stay-home and closure orders (“Lockdown Orders”) over the Legislature’s objection. The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 (“EPGA”) and the Emergency Management Act of 1976 (“EMA”) do not give governors indeﬁnite, unlimited, and unfettered power for as long as they please. Yet this is, at bottom, the Governor’s contention. She posits that the judiciary must defer to her assessment that an emergency exists, and that the Legislature is powerless to limit her exercise of power unless it can muster a veto-proof majority. Emergencies are deﬁned in the EMA and limited to 28 days absent legislative approval. The Governor violated the Act when she re-declared an emergency after the Legislature declined to approve an extension. Even if this time limit did not exist, the Lockdown Orders still exceed the powers granted to her under the Act. On an objective view of the facts, no epidemic currently exists within the meaning of the statute. Even if one did exist, the Public Health Code limits how the Governor can restrict the freedom of those who are uninfected, even if they are suspected carriers of the virus. In addition, the Lockdown Orders fail to specify the conditions that, when achieved, will mark the end of the emergency, as is required under the Act. Moreover, the Lockdown Orders are substantively unreasonable. The Governor has also exceeded her authority under the EPGA. This Act applies during local instances of civil unrest, not to statewide public health emergencies. Even if
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the Act applied to the current situation, the EPGA only authorizes reasonable actions, and the Lockdown Orders are substantively unreasonable.
Assuming arguendo that one or both of the Acts applies and that the Governor is in full compliance with their terms, then the Court must reach the constitutional question of whether these statutes violate the Separation of Powers Clause as applied. Amici submit that the Lockdown Orders are unconstitutional exercises of legislative power by the Governor.
ARGUMENT I. EMA: The Governor has exceeded her statutory powers under the Emergency
Management Act. A. The EMA prohibits a Governor from unilaterally declaring a “new”
emergency or a “new” disaster after the initial 28-day period has lapsed under the Act. Under the Emergency Management Act (“EMA”), a governor may declare an emergency if an emergency has occurred or the threat of an emergency exists. MCL 30.403(4). An “emergency” is “an occasion or instance in which the governor determines that state assistance is needed to supplement local eﬀorts and capabilities to save lives, protect property, and the public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the state.” MCL 30.402(h). A governor may also declare a disaster if a disaster has occurred or the threat of a disaster exists. MCL 30.403(3). A “disaster” includes an “epidemic.” MCL 30.402(f). Neither the EMA nor any other statute deﬁnes the term “epidemic.” Both types of declarations are limited to 28 days, unless the Legislature approves an extension of the emergency or disaster declaration for a speciﬁc number of days. MCL 30.403(3)–(4). If the Legislature does not approve an extension (or does not approve additional extensions), then the governor must declare the emergency and/or the disaster terminated after 28 days (or at the end of the authorized extension). Ibid.
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On March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency under the EMA. Exhibit 1, EO 2020-04. Absent legislative approval, this declared emergency would have automatically terminated 28 days later on April 8, 2020.
On April 1, 2020, the Governor expanded the emergency declaration to include a state of disaster under the EMA. Exhibit 4, EO 2020-33. Absent legislative approval, this declared disaster would have automatically terminated 28 days later on April 29, 2020.
On April 7, 2020, at the Governor’s request, the Legislature voted to extend both the emergency and disaster declarations under the EMA through April 30, 2020. Exhibit 5, 2020 SCR 24. This had the salutary eﬀect of aligning the dates for both declarations and setting a single end date for emergency management under the Act.
As the April 30th deadline approached, the Governor asked the Legislature to grant a second extension of the declared emergency and disaster. The Legislature declined to do so. Instead, it passed a bill on April 28th that would have terminated the emergency and disaster while codifying some of the Governor’s executive orders into May, June, July, and December 2020. Exhibit 9, 2020 SB 858. The Governor vetoed the bill on May 4, 2020. Exhibit 15, 2020 SJ 37.
Between passage and veto, the April 30th deadline occurred without the Legislature approving an extension. As required by the EMA, the Governor declared the emergency and disaster terminated. Exhibit 10, EO 2020-66. Literally one minute later, she redeclared an emergency and a disaster under the EMA. Exhibit 12, EO 2020-68. The new declaration cites the same alleged epidemic as justiﬁcation for invocation of the Act.1 Ibid. However pure the Governor’s motives might be, and however serious one might believe the coronavirus to be, we remain a people committed to the rule of law. Her actions cannot be squared with the plain language of the statute.
1 EO 2020-68 also cites the economic fallout from the coronavirus—fallout largely attributable to the Governor’s own executive orders locking down the state and criminalizing most forms of commerce. Economic harm does not qualify as an “emergency” or a “disaster,” as those terms are deﬁned in the EMA. See MCL 30.402(e), (h).
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Statutory interpretation begins with the statutory text. Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180, 187; 735 NW2d 628 (2007). “[W]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written.” Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002). “[A] court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Cty Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). Courts must construe the text as a whole. See Sweatt v Department of Corrections, 468 Mich 172, 179; 661 NW2d 201 (2003).
EO 2020-68 conﬂicts with the plain language of the EMA. The Act requires that declared emergencies and disasters be “terminated” after 28 days absent an approved extension by the Legislature. MCL 30.403(3)–(4). The word “terminate” is not a technical word; it must therefore be construed and understood according to its common and approved usage. MCL 8.3a. In both civilian and legal dictionaries, the verb “terminate,” means “[t]o put an end to” or “to bring to an end.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Mac’s Shell Serv, Inc v Shell Oil Prods Co, LLC, 559 US 175, 182–183; 130 S Ct 1251; 176 L Ed 2d 36 (2010) (same, citing Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary). Simply put, the EMA authorizes governors to act unilaterally for up to 28 days without legislative approval. MCL 30.403(3)–(4). After that, governors can act under the EMA only with legislative approval. Ibid. If the Legislature withholds its approval, then the Governor must declare the emergency or disaster terminated. Ibid.
Up through April 30th, Governor Whitmer conformed to the statutory scheme.2 After declaring an emergency and a disaster, she requested—and the Legislature approved— an extension of both. Exhibit 5, 2020 SCR 24. When she asked for another extension, the Legislature declined to grant one. She then terminated the emergency and disaster.
2 Although she may have adhered to the EMA’s procedural requirements, the Governor still exceeded her powers in substance, both before and after April 30th. See Part I.B, infra.
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A statutory violation occurred when the Governor declared a “new” emergency and a “new” disaster premised upon the same circumstances that existed 60 seconds earlier when she terminated the original declarations. This new declaration eliminates the legislative oversight built into the EMA. If a governor can re-declare emergencies and disasters after 28 days (or after the expiration of an approved extension), then the approval process is pointless theater and the 28-day limit is no limit at all. This result is at odds with the canons of statutory construction. “Whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given meaning. And no word should be treated as surplusage or made nugatory.” People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 158; 749 NW2d 257 (2008). A provision “is rendered nugatory when an interpretation fails to give it meaning or effect.” Apsey v Memorial Hosp, 477 Mich 120, 131; 730 NW2d 695 (2007). Courts have also said that interpretations must avoid rendering a portion of a statute “meaningless” or “unnecessary.” Herald Wholesale, Inc v Department of Treas, 262 Mich App 688, 699; 687 NW2d 172 (2004); Trentadue v Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 479 Mich 378, 399; 738 NW2d 664 (2007). In short, the Court must apply “any reasonable construction” before it accepts a reading that renders part of a statute “unnecessary.” Ex parte Landaal, 273 Mich 248, 252; 262 NW 897 (1935).
B. Even assuming arguendo that the Governor can declare new emergencies and disasters without Legislative approval, she has still exceeded her powers in four ways.
1. The Governor cannot prove that an epidemic exists throughout the entire state or that there is a statistically signiﬁcant threat of a statewide epidemic.
When declaring an emergency or a disaster, the EMA requires a governor to specify the “area or areas threatened.” MCL 30.403(3)–(4). Since March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer has declared the entire state to be threatened by an epidemic: COVID-19. Exhibit 1, EO 2020-04(1); Exhibit 4, EO 2020-33(1); Exhibit 12, EO 2020-68(1). Yet, over the past two months, we have seen that the entire state has not been uniformly aﬀected. A review of the eight regions comprising the Governor’s Economic Recovery
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Council reporting regions, in light of the data on the state’s oﬃcial coronavirus webpage as of May 12, 2020, makes this plain.3
Before turning to a regional analysis, amici pause to deﬁne the term “epidemic.” As noted earlier, the term is not deﬁned in any statute. The venerable Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes the term to mean “prevalent among a people or a community at a special time, and produced by some special causes not generally present in the aﬀected locality,” or more simply “widespread, widely prevalent, universal.” OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/63307 (Mar. 2020). The OED traces the modern origin of this term to Dr. Thomas Lodge’s treatise on plagues, which deﬁned an epidemic to be a sickness common to all people or to most of them. Ibid.
As will be seen in this section, COVID-19 is not epidemic throughout Michigan, and the Governor has put forward no evidence to establish that it is. Instead, she has oft repeated the mantra that “this is a global pandemic.” But the EMA speaks to epidemics in Michigan. Amici submit that Michigan law must be applied based on the facts as they actually exist in Michigan, not as they are elsewhere in the world.
Region 8—Upper Peninsula. There are 15 counties in the Upper Peninsula. Four of them still have no reported cases or deaths from COVID-19. In the 11 counties with conﬁrmed cases, there are a total 96 reported cases and 15 deaths. The supermajority of
3 The data on the state’s webpage is misleading because it fails to distinguish between the coronavirus and the disease it can cause, COVID-19. The webpage reports “conﬁrmed cases” of COVID-19, but it does not distinguish between: (1) the number of positive tests where a person never developed the disease; and (2) the number of positive tests where the person actually went on to develop the disease. By amalgamating the data in this way, it conveys a much higher incidence of the disease than actually exists. Yet even these inﬂated numbers do not add up to an epidemic, as will be seen in this section. To prove this point, amici will assume for purposes of their analysis that “confirmed cases of COVID-19” means confirmed cases of the disease and not merely to positive tests for the virus. Consequently, amici’s statistical analyses of these regions represent the maximum rates of disease diagnosis as of May 12, 2020. The numbers could only be smaller if asymptomatic positives for the virus were factored into the analysis.
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cases and deaths are located in Marquette County, which reports 51 cases and 10 deaths, and Delta County, which reports 14 cases and two deaths. Each of the remaining counties with conﬁrmed cases in the Upper Peninsula have had six cases or less, and only two of them have reported any deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 311,000 people live in the Upper Peninsula. This means, over an eight-week period, only 0.03% of people in the UP have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.005% have died from this disease. Any loss of life is tragic, but one cannot credibly claim that COVID19 qualifies as an “epidemic” in the Upper Peninsula.
Region 7—Jackson Region. There are three counties in the Jackson region: Jackson, Hillsdale, and Lenawee counties. Combined, they have 682 cases and 50 deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 307,000 people live in this region. This means only 0.22% of the residents in this region have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.016% have died from it. This rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic.”
Region 6—Traverse City Region. There are 17 counties in the Traverse City region, where there are a total of 430 conﬁrmed cases and 36 deaths. Only three counties in this region have recorded more than 25 confirmed cases: Alpena, Otsego, and Crawford counties. More than half the cases (242) and nearly all of the deaths (31) occurred in these counties. Of the remaining 14 counties, none have reached 25 cases of COVID-19. Seven counties in this region still have no deaths, and another six counties have only 1–2 deaths. None of the 17 counties have exceeded 10 deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 439,000 people live in this region. This means that only 0.10% of residents in these counties have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.007% of them have died from this disease. Again, this rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic.”
Region 5—Lansing Region. There are ﬁve counties in the Lansing region, where there are a total of 1,119 conﬁrmed cases and 55 deaths.4 According to the 2010 census,
4 This marked disparity between conﬁrmed cases and deaths in the Lansing region, compared to the Upper Peninsula, Traverse City, and Jackson regions underscores the
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approximately 576,000 people live in this region. This means that only 0.19% of residents in the Lansing region have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.009% of residents have died from this disease. Again, this rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic.”
Region 4—Saginaw Region. There are 12 counties in the Saginaw region, where there are a total of 1,471 conﬁrmed cases and 140 deaths.5 One county has no deaths, and six other counties have ﬁve or fewer deaths. Well over half of the conﬁrmed cases and deaths are in Saginaw County, which has 829 conﬁrmed cases and 87 deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 634,000 people live in this region. This means that only 0.23% of residents have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.022% have died from this disease. This rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic.”
Region 3—Kalamazoo Region. There are nine counties in the Kalamazoo region, where there are a total of 1,602 conﬁrmed cases and 74 deaths—61 of which occurred in Kalamazoo and Berrien counties.6 Six of the remaining seven counties have recorded only 1–2 deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 954,000 people live in this region. This means that only 0.17% of residents have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.008% have died from this disease. This rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic.”
Region 2—Grand Rapids Region. There are 13 counties in the Grand Rapids region, where there are a total of 3,597 conﬁrmed cases and 101 deaths.7 Four of the counties in this region still have no deaths. Of the remaining nine, ﬁve counties have between just 1–
point amici make in Note 3, supra. It is highly likely that more testing has occurred in the Lansing region and that the state has miscounted asymptomatic positives for the virus as conﬁrmed cases of the disease.
5 See Note 4, supra. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. Of the 3,597 conﬁrmed cases, more than half—2,416—were recorded in Kent County, which has experienced only 45 deaths.
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3 deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 1,447,000 people live in this region. This means that only 0.25% of residents have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and only 0.007% have died from this disease. This rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic.”
Region 1—Detroit Region. There are nine counties in the Detroit region, where there are a total of 36,460 conﬁrmed cases and 4,127 deaths. According to the 2010 census, approximately 5,217,000 people live in this region. This means that 0.70% of residents have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and 0.080% have died from this disease. Although this rate of infection and death does not qualify as an “epidemic” when viewed at a regional level, Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties have thousands of cases each. The Governor may therefore have a plausible claim that an epidemic exists in those counties. But, as noted earlier, the “conﬁrmed” cases are inﬂated by an unknown number of non-disease cases because the state appears to be reporting all positive tests for the virus as a conﬁrmed case of the disease. Thus, it is far from certain that an epidemic exists in those counties, either.
Statewide Assessment. When viewed statewide—which is a reasonable view to consider given that the Governor and the Director of MDHHS claim there is a statewide epidemic—there are 48,021 conﬁrmed cases and 4,674 deaths. The state’s population is about 10,000,000 people, meaning that 0.48% of Michiganders have been diagnosed with COVID-19, and 0.047% have died from it.
Notably, these numbers to do not break out the number of case and deaths occurring within nursing homes. It is widely reported nationally that nursing homes are hot spots where the coronavirus is more likely to cause COVID-19. There is evidence this is true in Michigan, too. For example, as of May 8, 2020, the City of Detroit reported 1,215 deaths, and attributed 293 of those deaths to nursing homes—a full 24% of all deaths in the city. City of Detroit, COVID-19 Cases Dashboard, http://detroitmi.gov. Wayne County has attributed 365 of the 938 deaths it has recorded in the county
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(excluding Detroit) to nursing homes—i.e., 39% of all “out-county” deaths. Statistics by age are also telling. The state reports that 86% of all deaths have
involved those who are 60 years of age or older. Wayne County reports that 821 of the 938 people who have died were over 60 years of age—i.e., 87.5% of all out-county deaths According to the Census Bureau, those in this age bracket represent about 17% of the state population. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts: Michigan, Age and Sex Pop. Estimates, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MI.
The data do not suggest an epidemic. Instead, the data suggest that senior citizens—a group sadly prone to health challenges in the best of times—are prone to develop COVID-19 if they contract the coronavirus. Even assuming arguendo that the virus is prevalent within the state, the supermajority of people will never experience symptoms requiring medical treatment. For those who do, the survival rate approaches the upper 90th percentile.
With nonstop media reports and gubernatorial press conferences about a “global pandemic,” it has become an article of faith that an epidemic exists in Michigan. But the WHO’s declaration of a “pandemic” does not control the facts on the ground in our peninsulas. The data do not support the existence of an epidemic in Michigan within the meaning of the EMA. Absent proof of a statewide epidemic, the Governor has no authority to declare a statewide emergency or disaster. Accordingly, the Court should hold that EO 2020-68 is improper to the extent that it relies on the EMA.
2. The Governor’s power to respond to the epidemic is limited by the Public Health Code, which she has not suspended or modiﬁed.
The EMA permits a governor to suspend a statute, order, or rule that regulates the conduct of state business, when strict compliance would “prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the disaster.” MCL 30.405(1)(a). Invoking this clause, Governor Whitmer has suspended a host of state laws by executive order. She has not, however, suspended any portion of the Public Health Code. Nor could she do so because it
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is not a statute governing state business. EO 22-77 orders Michiganders to stay at home (subject to certain exceptions not
relevant here). The Governor justiﬁes this massive restriction on liberty by assuming everyone is a potential carrier who could infect someone else. But the Public Health Code includes a detailed procedure that must be followed before the state can deprive someone of their freedom as a carrier of a communicable disease. The executive order makes no eﬀort to conform to the Code and violates it in at least two ways.
First, the Department of Health and Human Services (“MDHHS”) or a local health oﬃcer must issue a written warning notice to the suspected carrier and can order the person to undergo medical tests to verify that they are a carrier. MCL 333.5203(1). Critically, “[a] warning notice shall be individual and speciﬁc and shall not be issued to a class of persons.” MCL 333.5203(2) (emphasis added). The warning notice must inform the suspected carrier that he has a right to a hearing to contest his designation as a carrier. MCL 333.5203(3). The Governor’s executive order is not a warning notice, is impermissibly aimed at a class of persons (all Michiganders) instead of an individual, and provides no procedural due process as required under the Public Health Code.
Second, the Code applies even during emergencies. MCL 333.5207(1). “To protect the public health in an emergency,”an MDHHS or local health oﬃcer can obtain ex parte a temporary detention order to facilitate observation, examination, testing, diagnosis, and treatment. Ibid. (emphasis added) A detention cannot last longer than 72 hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, without a court hearing to determine whether it should continue. MCL 333.50207(3). As of this ﬁling, the Governor’s executive orders have forcibly detained 10 million people for 51 days without a hearing.
3. The EOs fail to identify objective conditions permitting the end of the declared emergency and disaster.
The EMA requires governors to specify, among other things, “the conditions permitting the termination of the state of emergency [and/or disaster]” in their
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proclamation or executive order declaring an emergency or disaster (the “Conditions Clause”). MCL 30.403(3)–(4). The reason for this requirement is implicit yet plain: if a governor is to exercise broad, unchecked powers in the name of an emergency, then she must also provide a clear goalpost by which the Legislature and the general public can judge when the emergency is over. Absent legislative approval, the 28-day period is the absolute maximum duration of the emergency; the duty to specify conditions for terminating the emergency establishes an objective metric by which an earlier end date can be identiﬁed and enforced.
EO 2020-04, by which the Governor ﬁrst declared an emergency under the EMA, states only that the emergency will be “terminated when emergency conditions no longer exist and appropriate programs have been implemented to recover from any eﬀects of the emergency conditions….” Exhibit 1, EO 2020-04(3). The executive order did not, however, identify what the emergency conditions were, other than to note that MDHHS identiﬁed the ﬁrst two presumptively positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. Id., at Preamble ¶ 4. The Governor provided no objective criteria against which to judge when conditions would permit the termination of the emergency.
EO 2020-33, by which the Governor expanded the emergency to include a disaster declaration, parrots the same vague language from EO 2020-04. It states, in relevant part, that “[t]he state of emergency and the state of disaster will terminate when emergency and disaster conditions no longer exist and appropriate programs have been implemented to recover from any eﬀects of the emergency conditions….” Exhibit 4, EO 2020-33(3). The executive order says that hospitals in four counties were reporting that they were at full or nearly full capacity, that ventilators and personal protective equipment (“PPE”) were in short supply and in high demand, and that Michigan needed more medical personnel than were available to care for COVID-19 patients. Id., at Preamble ¶ 2. To comply with the Conditions Clause, EO 2020-33 needed to specify, for example, what hospital capacity would be suﬃcient, how many ventilators and how much
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PPE would satisfy demand, and how many medical personnel were needed to adequately care for COVID-19 patients, such that the emergency and disaster could be declared terminated. No such goalposts are identiﬁed in the order.
Finally, EO 2020-68 re-declared an emergency and disaster under the EMA, citing the same public-health grounds as before. Exhibit 12, EO 2020-68. This re-declaration of an emergency and disaster occurred literally one minute after the Governor declared the emergency and disaster terminated in EO 2020-66. EO 2020-68 makes no attempt to comply with the Conditions Clause. Rather it states only that Governor Whitmer “will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration.” Id., at EO 2020-68(4). The Governor’s failure to comply with the Conditions Clause seems to be a calculated decision. An undeﬁned emergency helps her to justify a perpetual emergency under the EPGA, in case the Court holds her to the 28-day limit under the EMA.
4. The Lockdown Orders are not “necessary and appropriate” because they are substantively unreasonable.
The EMA authorizes governors to take “necessary and appropriate” action to respond to emergencies and disaster. MCL 30.405(1). Amici contend that executive actions cannot be necessary and appropriate if they are substantively unreasonable, as is the case here.
a. The Stay-Home Orders The blanket stay-home orders are an objectively unreasonable response to COVID19. Even before it reached the shores of our pleasant peninsulas, it was widely reported that the elderly and the sick are most at risk. The overwhelming majority of people who contract the coronavirus outside of those risk groups are impacted only mildly.8 The
8 Shamus, Seniors, sick are most vulnerable in coronavirus outbreak. Here’s how to keep them safe, Detroit Free Press (Mar. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/JX5J-QNDM; Marchione, Flu vs. coronavirus: How they compare, (Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/ 7RU7-PEGT; BBC News, Coronavrus: Largest study suggests elderly and sick are most at
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Governor did not appear to tailor her executive orders to the facts and data, which she often claims are driving her decisions. Instead of quarantining the sick, or even limiting her stay-home order to seniors, she imposed overly restrictive limits on everyone— regardless of risk, regardless of exposure, regardless of location—limits that are akin to house arrest. Ostensibly, this was done to “ﬂatten the curve,” the rate of infection, to avoid overwhelming hospitals. Deeply troubled by the Governor’s reaction to the virus and perceiving that this goal had been achieved, amici provided the Governor with an independent expert report showing that the curve had been ﬂattened in the ﬁrst week of April 22. Exhibit 17, Anderson Economic Group Report.
risk, https://perma.cc/5284-VXYG (Feb. 18, 2020); McCarthy, New Chinese study ﬁnds that the elderly are most at risk from the coronavirus, Forbes (Feb. 18, 2020), https:// perma.cc/3X2G-94BW; Kelley, CDC oﬃcials emphasize older Americans are at highest risk for serious coronavirus illness, The Hill (Mar. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/N55E9AKT; Rong-Gong, King & Tchekmedyian, As coronavirus spreads, warnings become more urgent for the elderly and frail, LA Times (Mar. 8, 2020) (also noting that 80% of all infections are mild), https://perma.cc/JNU7-G3QU.
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This tracks with hospital-level data that was recently released to the public by one of the largest hospital systems in the state:
Yet, despite this data, the Governor increased restrictions on Michiganders, outright forbidding them from visiting family over Easter and Passover. It is unreasonable to set a goal, achieve it, and then maintain restrictions, much less to increase them. The current stay-home order still requires all Michiganders to stay at home unless granted permission to leave their residence for listed activities. Exhibit 16, EO 2020-77(2). Businesses around the state remain confused by Governor Whitmer’s inconsistent policies:
“I’m getting asked every day by businesses, ʻWhat do we do?’ or ʻWhen can we open?’” said Hackel. “If they haven’t been cleared to open already, I don’t know what to tell them. Especially when. Or if ever. The executive orders are pretty vague and undeﬁned. All we hear from the governor’s oﬃce is they need more information, more data, and more testing before the state is completely opened up,” Hackel said. “But no one can say if they are looking for speciﬁc numbers. Or percentages. It’s frustrating.” Martindale & LeBlanc, Hackel: Businesses need to know when they can reopen, Detroit News (May 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/DetroitNews_Hackel.
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Experiences in other states demonstrate that stripping residents of their liberty is an unnecessary (and therefore unreasonable) response to the virus. Seven states did not impose stay-home orders: Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming. When adjusted for population, these states have experienced lower numbers of infections and deaths than Michigan and other states that have imposed such orders. Exhibit 18, Johns Hopkins Univ. & Med, Coronavirus Resource Ctr, Graph of Cases, Deaths, and Testing in All 50 States per 100,000 People (May 12, 2020), https:// coronavirus.jhu.edu/testing/states-comparison.
Indeed, it is particularly “shocking” that the newly hospitalized are those who had been staying home as ordered, as Governor Cuomo of New York recently acknowledged. Higgins-Dunn & Breuninger, Cuomo says it’s ʻshocking’ most new coronavirus hospitalizations are people who had been staying home, CNBC (May 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/TXZ3-ZDWR. The cognitive dissonance between the source of admissions and the mantra at the bottom of the graphic—similar to Governor Whitmer’s “stay home, stay safe, save lives” catchphrase—is jarring:
Ibid. Even if the Court concludes that stay-home orders are not per se unreasonable, they certainly are not based on the “facts and data.”
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b. The Closure Orders Second, the mass closure of businesses statewide is unreasonable because it destroys property interests, when the Act requires an executive order to protect both life and property. The EPGA permits a governor to issue reasonable orders as he or she deems “necessary to protect life and property.” MCL 10.31(1). The Act contemplates that the governor will act to preserve both. Governor Whitmer, however, has pitted life against property. Shuttered businesses cannot generate revenue. A company that cannot generate revenue cannot pay its bills. Closure or bankruptcy becomes inevitable. Businesses, of course, are owned by people. Their investments of time and money to grow their business produces a valuable property interest. The closure orders in EO 2020-68 and EO 2020-77 (and their predecessors) have damaged, and continue to damage, the property interests of small business owners in Michigan. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration Oﬃce of Advocacy, Michigan has nearly 900,000 small businesses that make up 99.6% of all businesses in the state. Exhibit 19, 2019 Michigan Small Business Proﬁle. A recent survey conducted by the Small Business Association of Michigan estimates that 1 in 7—or 14%—of small businesses may not survive the closure orders. Gardner, Q&A with Brian Calley: 1 in 7 Michigan small businesses worry about survival, Bridge Magazine (May 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/BridgeMagazine_Calley. That’s roughly 126,000 small businesses that are projected to fail, not because of bad decisions or old-fashioned competition, but because of unnecessary closures mandated by the Governor’s executive orders. The EPGA directs the Governor save lives and property. The closure orders are having the opposite eﬀect. In fact, more recent executive orders expressly acknowledge the economic disaster facing Michigan business owners.
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Governor Whitmer stresses that she is working to keep Michiganders safe, and has repeatedly stated that it isn’t “safe” to reopen businesses. “Safe” cannot mean “risk free.” Risk is an inescapable element of daily life.
The Court should insist upon an objective deﬁnition for safe operations, so that it can judge the reasonableness of the closure orders. The CDC has issued guidance on social distancing, and the Governor has adopted that guidance in her closure orders, which allow so-called “critical” businesses to operate if they follow the CDC’s guidance. The Governor has also allowed some “noncritical” businesses to reopen under limited conditions. They, too, must adhere to the CDC guidelines. Since these guidelines have for the past two months served as the baseline for “safe” operations, amici contend that it is objectively unreasonable to keep closed any business that can adhere to those guidelines.
II. EPGA: The Governor has exceeded her statutory powers under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act. A. The EPGA applies to local instances of civil unrest, not to statewide public health emergencies. Although the EPGA provides broad emergency powers to governors, the manner in
which those powers is exercised must be consistent with its purpose: to address local emergencies. The EPGA does not authorize de facto statewide house arrest.
Under the EPGA, a governor may “designat[e] speciﬁc zones within the area in which occupancy and use of buildings and ingress and egress of persons and vehicles may be prohibited or regulated.” MCL 10.31(1) (emphasis added). Governor Whitmer, however, has regulated the occupancy and use of buildings statewide. See, e.g., Exhibit 13, EO 2020-69; Exhibit 16, EO 2020-77. Her orders are inconsistent with the text of the Act because they encompass the whole state, and are not limited to speciﬁc zones.
The statutory text does not support a ﬁnding that the entire state can be a “speciﬁc zone.” When analyzing the text, the Court must presume that the Legislature knows the rules of grammar, as such laws must be read in grammatical context. In re AGD, 327
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Mich App 332, 344; 933 NW3d 751 (2019). The Act authorizes the Governor to respond to a public emergency “within” the aﬀected area of the state. MCL 10.31(1). As a preposition, “within” means “in the inner part or interior of, inside of, in (a space, region, receptacle, etc.). OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/229671 (Mar. 2020). Although grammatically used as a preposition in the EPGA, the adverbial deﬁnition of “within” is also informative here: “in the limits of, or in the inner part of, a space or region, esp. a city or country; in the place or realm.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The use of “within” relative to something else implies that the former is engulfed by the latter. It follows that a place “within” the state is not coterminous with the entire state itself. If the Legislature meant for the EPGA to apply to the state as a whole, then it could have said so. “[N]othing may be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the act itself.” Omne Fin, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999).
Other provisions in the Act reinforce this reading of the text. The scope of a governor’s emergency power under the EPGA is limited to “the area involved,” and any orders she promulgates must be calibrated to “bring the emergency situation within the aﬀected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1) (emphasis added). The Governor’s powers include controlling traﬃc “within the area or any section of the area” designated as the emergency area. Ibid. (emphasis added). And when the Governor controls the “ingress and egress of persons and vehicles” to and from properties, she does so within “designat[ed] zones within the area.” Ibid.
The limited caselaw interpreting the EPGA further supports localized application. In Walsh v City of River Rouge, 385 Mich 623, 640; 198 NW 2d 318 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the EPGA preempted municipal emergency orders in response to local race riots. The Court explained that the Act provides a “broad grant of extraordinary powers with a speciﬁc provision that mayors may apply to the Governor for the exercise by him of such powers[.]” Id., at 640. See also MCL 10.31(1). County sheriﬀs may apply for a
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declaration as well. MCL 10.31(1). Although the director of state police may also apply for a declaration and a governor may declare an emergency sua sponte, ibid., the Court’s ruling reinforces that the Act is intended to address crises that befall local municipalities or regions of the state—not matters aﬀecting the whole state.
Finally, the Governor relies on the construction provision in the EPGA, which provides that “[t]he provisions of this act shall be broadly construed to eﬀectuate this purpose.” MCL 10.32. This begs a few questions.
What is the purpose of the Act? If it is to respond to local emergencies as the text provides, then allowing declarations of statewide emergencies means much more than “broadly construing” the statute to eﬀectuate its purpose—it would mean judicially rewriting the statute and usurping the Legislature’s lawmaking powers. Corrigan & Thomas, “Dice Loading” Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 59 NYU Ann Surv Am L 231, 231–33 (2003).
Similarly, what types of emergencies are covered? Does a “broad construction” require courts to jettison normal canons of statutory construction like noscitur a sociis? Under that canon, ambiguous words in a list should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 318; 645 NW2d 34 (2002); Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Phrases like “public crisis” and “public emergency,” when viewed through the lens of their neighboring terms “disaster,” “catastrophe,” and “rioting,” are reasonably understood to mean natural disasters (e.g., wildﬁres, ﬂooding and earthquakes) and various forms of civil unrest (e.g., insurrection, bombings, and terrorist attacks). Sickness and disease are not with these classes of crises and emergencies. Does a “broad construction” mean abandoning this kind of reasoned analysis simply because the executive branch—which stands to beneﬁt from exceptionally broad powers conferred under the Act—can couch a current event as an “emergency” or a “crisis” from the gubernatorial pulpit?
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Likewise, when deciding how broadly to construe the Act, how broad is too broad? Does it mean that intent will always prevail over the literal sense of the statute’s terms? Corrigan, supra, at 231–33. Do “speciﬁc zones” and “aﬀected areas” become “the entire state” because a governor says that construction is helpful to addressing the situation at hand?
The construction clause cannot mean complete deference to executive will. Nor does it serve as a license to impose a judge’s own policy preferences. Amici submit that a reasonable construction of the Act using existing canons of statutory construction provides a suﬃciently broad interpretation to satisfy MCL 10.32. See, e.g., Koontz, 466 Mich, at 312 (“[w]hen interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute … [b]ecause the proper role of the judiciary is to interpret and not write the law ….”).
B. Even assuming arguendo that the EPGA applies here, the Governor has still exceeded her powers because the Lockdown Orders are unreasonable. 1. Jacobson does not apply; the Court can and must decide whether the Governor’s orders are reasonable.
The Governor leans on Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 US 11; 25 S Ct 358; 49 L Ed 643 (1905), for the proposition that states can do what they please, so long as they claim to be acting in the public health. Governor’s Opp’n 20–21. Amici submit that the Governor misreads Jacobson, and it does not apply here in any event.
First, the Governor overstates Jacobson as upholding a “sweeping, invasive measure” as a proper exercise of police power in response to a public health crisis. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state can mandate vaccinations in the face of a communicable disease that killed 30–70% of its victims on average, depending on the type of the virus, the person’s sex, and pregnancy status. See CDC, What is Smallpox?, https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/about/index.html; Lane, Remaining Questions About Clinical Variola Major, Emerging Infectious Diseases 17(4): 676–680 (Apr. 2011),
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https://bit.ly/SmallpoxArticle_Lane. As shown in Argument I.B(1), supra, and the Prevalence Charts, supra, at xvii–xix, COVID-19’s mortality rate in Michigan is, statistically, nearly zero. And there is a no comparison between: (i) a one-time inoculation of the residents of a single town; and (ii) the Governor’s decisions to shutter the economy and place 10 million people under de facto house arrest. The ﬁrst is reasonable, the latter is not.
Second, Jacobson dealt with a state legislature’s express authorization for local boards of health to inoculate residents. The Court held that it was “for the legislative department to determine” the appropriate responses to contagion in the community:
[T]he legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. In a free country, where the government is by the people, through their chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of no other standard of action, for what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact or not. Any other basis would conﬂict with the spirit of the Constitution, and would sanction measures opposed to a Republican form of government.
Jacobson, 197 US, at 35. Here, the Legislature has passed no law expressly authorizing the Governor to keep people eﬀectively locked in their homes under pain of imprisonment to combat contagion on the theory that everyone might be a carrier of the coronavirus. Indeed, as explained in Argument I.B(2), supra, the Legislature has established a procedure in the Public Health Code that balances residents' interests in due process against the state’s interest in protecting public health. Governor Whitmer has disregarded that law. She is not on the same footing as Massachusetts was in Jacobson.
Third, Jacobson pre-dates modern substantive due process jurisprudence. In that case, the Court was asked to decide, among other things, whether the inoculation statute deprived a resident of liberty without due process of law. Jacobson, 197 US, at 14. The dawn of strict scrutiny is generally traced back to United States v Carolene Prods Co, 304
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US 144; 58 S Ct 778; 82 L Ed 1234 (1938), a decision issued nearly 30 years after Jacobson. Since then, infringements upon fundamental rights are subject to a much more exacting standard than the Court applied in Jacobson. Although Jacobson remains “good law,” in the sense that it is still quoted for the proposition that state police powers include the power to act for the beneﬁt of public health, any modern challenges to public health actions should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Even if that were not the case, Jacobson itself acknowledges that judicial deference has limits:
[The] acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons. Jacobson, 197 US, at 28 (emphasis added). That is the case here. See Argument I.B(4), supra. Finally, Jacobson doesn’t apply in this context. The Legislature has not presented a federal question. Before the Court is a question of state law. The Court has a duty to determine whether the constitution and laws of this state prevent the Governor from imposing the kind of lockdown orders at issue here over the Legislature’s objection. Jacobson cannot speak to that duty, arising as it does under the constitution and laws of a separate sovereign.
2. The Lockdown Orders are objectively unreasonable. The EPGA permits governors to issue “reasonable” orders necessary to protect “life and property.” MCL 1.31. EOs 22-68 and 22-77 are objectively unreasonable under the EPGA for the same reasons argued in Argument I.B(4), supra.
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III. SEPARATION OF POWERS: The Lockdown Orders violate the Separation of Powers Clause. The Michigan constitution expressly provides for the separation of powers: “The
powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Const 1963, art 3, § 2. This clause plays a vital role in our constitutional order. It ensures that no branch of government can amass so much power that it presents a threat to liberty:
The framers of Michigan’s Constitution understood well the importance of separating the powers of government. The doctrine of separation of powers rests on the notion that the accumulation of too much power in one governmental entity presents a threat to liberty.” James Madison expressed this sentiment more than 200 years ago when he wrote, “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very deﬁnition of tyranny.” Thus, governmental power was separated—with the Legislature exercising the “legislative power,” the Governor exercising the “executive power,” and the judiciary exercising the “judicial power.”
46th Cir Ct v Crawford Cty, 476 Mich 131, 141; 719 NW2d 553 (2006) (citations omitted). “The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of
representatives.” Const 1963, art 4, § 1. Legislative power is the power to make laws, In re Compl of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90, 98; 754 NW2d 259 (2008), and the power “to make law for the benefit and welfare of the state.” 46th Cir Ct, 476 Mich, at 141, quoting Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 92 (Little, Brown & Co., 1886).
Under our constitution, the Governor has no lawmaking power, except as expressly provided in the constitution.9 Const 1963, art 3, § 2. “[I]f the Governor acts outside the
9 The constitution grants the governor only two legislative powers: (1) the power to reorganize executive branch agencies; and (2) the power to veto legislation. County Com’rs of Oakland Co v Oakland Co Exec, 98 Mich App 639, 651; 296 NW2d 621 (1980).
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scope of his authority, his actions are considered ultra vires.” McCartney v Attorney Gen, 231 Mich App 722, 726; 587 NW2d 824 (1998) . The Lockdown Orders constitute improper executive lawmaking.
The Governor has repeatedly described her authority as a “dial,” meaning that she alone has the authority to enact a number of executive orders declaring the entire state to be under an emergency, and that she alone can determine what the emergency entails, where the emergency exists, and the duration of the emergency. Since April 30th, the Governor has issued a host of legislative mandates, including extensions of the expiration dates of personal protection orders, adjournment of FOIA requests, and determining arbitrarily which businesses are permitted to operate and which are required to remain closed.
Indeed, the Governor has relied upon the EPGA to issue executive orders that classify and designate whether certain businesses and life activities are “essential” or “non-essential.” These orders have permitted people to canoe and kayak in Michigan’s waters, but not to use motorboats. The orders have permitted people to walk outdoors, but not in parks or on golf courses. Businesses selling alcohol, cigarettes, lottery tickets—even recreational marijuana—have been deemed essential and are permitted to be open, but dental and other medical procedures are deemed nonessential. People are allowed to congregate in grocery stores and “big-box” retailers, but real estate oﬃces (for a time), car washes, retail stores, and other commercial businesses that require far less engagement with the public must remain closed.
All of these arbitrary classiﬁcations are imposed under the very real threat of penal sanctions, licensing sanctions, and civil ﬁnes. The state is, for example, prosecuting a 77-year-old man for barbering, has issued him at least one $1,000 civil ﬁne under an emergency rule issued by MDHHS, and has summarily suspended his license—even after
See also Detroit City Council v Mayor of Detroit, 283 Mich App 442, 456; 770 NW2d 117 (2009).
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a circuit judge refused to issue a TRO because the state couldn’t show that giving the man a chance to defend himself in court would cause “irreparable injury.” Berg, AG: State suspends Owosso barber’s license for refusing to shut down shop, Lansing State Journal (May 13, 22), https://bit.ly/LSJ_OwossoBarber. Even with a mask, washing hands between haircuts, and sterilizing equipment between customers, the government deems it too “risky” for this man to operate. In the name of “saving lives,” the state is out to destroy one. Food, shelter, and medicine are not free, yet the Governor has decreed that honest work to meet these basic human needs must take a backseat to “saving lives” (even though “facts and data” show that the curve has been ﬂattened—the original justiﬁcation for the Lockdown Orders).10
The Governor’s argument for indeﬁnite unilateral authority is, at bottom, a plea of necessity to combat what she sees as an historic emergency. Such pleas for power are rightly resisted as incompatible with the rule of law, for “the unarticulated assumption [is] that necessity knows no law.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 646; 72 S Ct 863; 96 L Ed 1153 (Jackson, J., concurring). “The Constitution . . . is concerned with means as well as ends. The Government has broad powers, but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” Horne v US Dep’t of Agric, 575 US 350; 135 S Ct 2419, 2428; 192 L Ed 2d 388 (2015). “[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way.” Id. The separation of powers sacriﬁces speed in lawmaking for the sake of liberty of Michigan citizens.
10 General Nessel is quoted in the article as saying, “[w]hen [this barber] is within inches of someone who is not wearing a mask—even if he’s wearing one himself—it wouldn’t be a stretch to believe he could become infected with COVID-19 [sic: the virus] and spread it [to] the people who came to him for haircuts.” Governor Whitmer has likewise expressed hypothetical concerns about people inadvertently spreading the virus by touching gas pumps if she allows more people out of their homes. Rampant “whatiffery” is driving public policy, not “facts and data.”
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It is no answer that the EPGA and the EMA purport to give governors legislative authority. Chief Justice Cooley considered it a “settled maxim[] in constitutional law” that “the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.” Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 116 (2d ed. 1868). The Legislature may not “relieve itself of the responsibility” to make laws, nor may it “substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body” for its own. Id., at 116-17. At most, “the Legislature, within limits deﬁned in the law, may confer authority on an administrative oﬃcer or board to make rules as to details, to ﬁnd facts, and to exercise some discretion, in the administration of a statute.” Ranke v Mich Corp & Secs Comm’n, 317 Mich 304, 309; 26 NW2d 898 (1947). Enabling executive agencies to execute and administer the law is a far cry from executive lawmaking of the type seen in the Lockdown Orders.
Governor Whitmer recently told the press, “[t]here’s no textbook speciﬁc number that will tell you it is safe to reengage a particular sector of the economy. It depends on human nature,” noting that it “depends on human activity” and “proper protocols.” Durr, No formula can determine when Michigan moves to next reopening phase, oﬃcials say, MLive (May 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/MLive_WhitmerNoFormula. Such remarks reveal a stark truth: we have moved beyond any “emergency” that might have once existed. The Governor is now making long-term policy judgments for a new virus that may well be with us indeﬁnitely—science, after all, has managed to eradicate only two viruses from existence, even with vaccines. This kind of policymaking is quintessentially legislative in nature, not executive.
Constitutional government in Michigan has survived through a civil war, two world wars, a cold war, and past epidemics and disasters in part because our elected oﬃcials respected the separation of powers. No one branch has ever claimed a right to seize unilateral power—until now.
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CONCLUSION For these reasons, amici respectfully urge the Court to grant the Legislature’s motion for immediate declaratory judgment and declare the Governor’s executive orders null and void retroactive to May 1, 2020.

Respectfully submitted, BUTZEL LONG, P.C.

Dated: May 14, 2020
BH2923875.3

DANIEL J. McCARTHY (P59457) JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE (P70902) 150 West Jeﬀerson Avenue, Suite 100 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 225-7000 mccarthyd@butzel.com richotte@butzel.com Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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EXHIBIT 2

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and MICHIGAN SENATE,
Plaintiffs,
v

No. 20-000079-MZ HON. CYNTHIA DIANE STEPHENS

GRETCHEN WHITMER, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan,

Defendant.

Patrick G. Seyferth (P47475)

Christopher Allen (P75329)

Susan M. McKeever (P73533)

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Joshua Booth (P53847)

Bush Seyferth PLLC

John Fedynsky (P65232)

100 W. Big Beaver Rd., Suite 400

Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General

Troy, MI 48084

Assistant Attorneys General

248.822.7800

Attorneys for Defendant

seyferth@bsplaw.com

P.O. Box 30754

mckeever@bsplaw.com

Lansing, MI 48909

517.335.7573

Hassan Beydoun (P76334)

allenc28@michigan.gov

General Counsel

froehlichj1@michigan.gov

Michigan House of Representatives

boothj2@michigan.gov

Attorney for Plaintiff

fedynksyj@michigan.gov

P.O. Box 30014

Lansing, MI 48909

Michael R. Williams (P79827)

hbeydoun@house.mi.gov

Frankie A. Dame (P81307)

Bush Seyferth PLLC

William R. Stone (P78580)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

General Counsel

151 S. Rose Street, Suite 707

Michigan Senate

Kalamazoo, MI 49007

Attorney for Plaintiff

269.820.4100

P.O. Box 30036

williams@bsplaw.com

Lansing, MI 48909

dame@bsplaw.com

bstone@senate.michigan.gov

/

GRETCHEN WHITMER’S MAY 12, 2020 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

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under Const 1963, art 5, § 1; and the Governor’s ongoing COVID-19 executive
orders violate the separation of powers. (Compl, Request for Relief.) The Governor
now responds.
ARGUMENT I. The Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing.
Dissatisfied by the Governor’s issuance of Executive Orders 2020-67 and
2020-68, the Legislative Plaintiffs have a clear, unique, and powerful remedy at
law: they can change the law, even over the Governor’s objection. Instead, they
have chosen to sue the Governor, asking this Court to do their work for them. This,
they cannot do: they lack standing under the law to use the courts in that way.14
On this basis alone, the request for a declaratory judgment should be denied.
“‘Standing is the legal term used to denote the existence of a party’s interest
in the outcome of the litigation; an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous
advocacy.’” League of Women Voters of Michigan v Secretary of State, ___ Mich App
14 Furthermore, the Legislative Plaintiffs have even failed to meet the requirements that their own laws impose on all who may seek relief from this Court. Namely, they failed to verify their complaint “before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” MCL 600.6431(1). As a condition precedent for bringing a claim against the state, Fairley v Dep’t of Corrections, 497 Mich 290, 297 (2015), this requirement renders the complaint legally lacking. Here, the Legislative Plaintiffs sue Governor Whitmer in her official capacity. And since “ ‘a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is . . . no different from a suit against the State itself,’ ” Mays v Snyder, 323 Mich App 1, 88–89 (2018), quoting Will v Mich Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58, 66 (1989), their claim is one “against the state” that is subject to the verification requirements of MCL 600.6431(1). Lacking proper verification, the Complaint is inadequate as a matter of law. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ failure to cure this dispositive defect would mean any action of this Court other than dismissing the complaint would be void ab initio. Fox v Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, 375 Mich 238, 242–243 (1965).
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___, ___ (2020) (Docket Nos. 350938, 351073), slip op at *6 (Exhibit D), quoting Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68 (1993) (citations omitted). When standing is at issue, “the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Id., slip op at *6–7 (cleaned up). “[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment.” Id., slip op at *7, citing Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372 (2010).
“A plaintiff must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” League of Women Voters of Michigan, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at *7, quoting Fieger v Comm’r of Ins, 174 Mich App 467, 471 (1988). Where a cause of action has not been provided by law, a plaintiff must have “a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large.” Id., slip op at *7, quoting Lansing Schools Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372. Thus, relevant here, a litigant has standing if the litigant has a special right that will be detrimentally affected in a manner distinct from the citizenry at large, or has met the requirements of MCR 2.605. Id.
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A. The Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing because they have no special interest in challenging the executive orders of the Governor that differs in any way from the general interest of the citizenry at large.
In House Speaker (Dodak) v State Administrative Board, 441 Mich 547 (1993), several individual members of the House and Senate sued challenging interdepartmental transfers by the State Administrative Board. Id. at 550–554. The Supreme Court observed that standing ensures that “a party’s interest in the outcome of litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Id. at 554. But evidence that a party will engage in full and vigorous advocacy, by itself, is insufficient. Instead, standing requires a demonstration that the plaintiff’s substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large. Id. at 554. In Dodak, the plaintiffs claimed “standing on the basis of their status as legislators” and alleged that the transfers “reduced their effectiveness as legislators and nullified the effect of their votes.” Id. at 555.
Citing federal precedent, the Dodak Court stated that “[u]nder limited circumstances, the standing of legislators to challenge allegedly unlawful executive actions has been recognized.” Id. at 555 (citation omitted). But a legislator bears a “heavy burden” to establish standing, especially where a dispute “may interfere with the separation of powers between the branches of government.” Id. (citation omitted). “For these reasons, plaintiffs who sue as legislators must assert more than ‘a generalized grievance that the law is not being followed.’ Instead, they must establish that they have been deprived of a ‘personal and legally cognizable interest peculiar to [them].’” Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
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Here, the plaintiffs are nominally the legislative bodies, but the Dodak analysis is relevant to both individual legislators and to the body as a whole. As with an individual legislator, to establish standing, a legislative body must allege that it has been deprived of a cognizable interest peculiar to the body. Tennessee General Assembly v US Dep’t of State, 931 F3d 499, 507 (CA 6, 2019), citing Ariz State Legislature v Ariz Independent Redistricting Comm, 135 S Ct 2652, 2664 (2015).
But just as “a generalized grievance that the law is not being followed” is not a sufficient injury to confer standing on an individual legislator, Dodak, 441 Mich at 556, neither is it a sufficient “institutional injury” to support standing as a legislative body. See, e.g, Virginia House of Delegates v Bethune-Hill, 139 S Ct 1945, 1953 (2019) (discussing legislative standing to defend constitutionality of statutes).
These principles were reaffirmed in League of Women Voters, where the Legislature brought an action against the Secretary of State. Slip op at *4. The suit sought a declaration that 2018 PA 608 was constitutional and a valid exercise of the Legislature’s authority. Id. The Legislature further sought an injunction compelling the Secretary to implement and enforce the Act in question. Id.
At the outset, the trial court determined that the Legislature had no standing to sue because it had not demonstrated a particularized injury. Id., slip op at *4. The Court, applying Dodak, ultimately affirmed, stating:
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the Legislature is suing to reverse actions by the Secretary, a member of the Executive Branch. The Legislature is thus plainly challenging the actions of members of the Executive Branch. Dodak stands for the proposition that courts should not confer standing in matters that have the real possibility of infringing upon the separation of powers. [Id., slip op at *8.] The situation at hand is analogous. Here, the Legislative Plaintiffs are suing to reverse the actions of the Governor and are plainly challenging executive action. Undoubtedly, their success in this case would infringe upon the separation of powers by invalidating her implementation of the law and her exercise of the powers vested in her by law. Indeed, that is explicitly the relief that the Legislative Plaintiffs seek. Under League of Women Voters and Dodak, they cannot obtain that relief in a judicial forum. The Legislative Plaintiffs claim that the Governor’s actions violate the EPGA and the EMA. But even if that were true (it is not), such an alleged injury is not personal or unique to them. Those allegations amount to a contention that the law as contained in the EPGA and EMA is not being followed, which is insufficient to confer standing on the Legislative Plaintiffs. As the court noted in League of Women Voters, “once the votes of legislators have been counted and the statute enacted, their special interest as lawmakers has ceased.” ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at *7. The Legislative Plaintiffs fare no better by attempting to cast their claims as Michigan constitutional violations. Whether they frame the Governor’s action as allegedly unlawful or unconstitutional, they lack standing to challenge the actions
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for the same reasons. In either instance, the alleged injury or deprivation is no different than that accruing to the ordinary citizen. As stated by the Court of Appeals in League of Women Voters:
To accept the Legislature’s argument that it has standing here would open the door for the Legislature to seek a declaratory judgment whenever the constitutionality of a statute was challenged. [___ Mich App at ___; slip op at *9.] In short, the Legislative Plaintiffs simply have not demonstrated a special interest in challenging the executive orders of the Governor that differs in any way from the general interest of the citizenry at large. Where the Legislature has not shown a sufficient injury to an institutional interest, and where its action against the Governor raises separation of powers concerns, it has not “overcome [its] heavy burden” to establish standing. Dodak, 441 Mich at 555. B. The Legislative Plaintiffs cannot meet their obligation to show
that an actual controversy exists under MCR 2.605. Nor can the Legislative Plaintiffs sidestep this result by framing their claims as requests for declaratory relief; League of Women Voters makes that clear. MCR 2.605 states that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.” An “actual controversy” under MCR 2.605(A)(1) exists when a declaratory judgment is necessary to guide a plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve that plaintiff’s legal rights. League of Women Voters of Michigan, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at *7, citing UAW v Cent Michigan Univ Trustees, 295 Mich App 486, 495 (2012). Where no such actual controversy exists, a plaintiff does
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not have standing to bring a declaratory action. Id., slip op at *4, citing City of South Haven v Van Buren Cty Bd of Comm’rs, 478 Mich 518 (2007).
A case of actual controversy is a “condition precedent to invocation of declaratory relief.” Citizens for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 55 (2000). “In the absence of an actual controversy, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment.” Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ (On Remand), 293 Mich App 506, 515 (2011).
“In general, ‘actual controversy’ exists where a declaratory judgment or decree is necessary to guide a plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.” Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Grp Health & Ins Tr Bd of Trustees v Pontiac No 2, 309 Mich App 611, 624 (2015), quoting Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Associated Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Indus Servs Director, 472 Mich 117, 126 (2005), overruled in part on other grounds, 487 Mich at 371 n 18.
Here, the gravamen of the Legislative Plaintiffs’ complaint is that they passed laws that are not being followed by the Governor, and that the Governor’s actions violate the Michigan Constitution. But if that were enough to create an actual controversy, the Legislature would have standing to bring a lawsuit against any government entity that, in the Legislature’s eyes, has allegedly violated the Constitution or failed to enforce or comply with a statute. That outcome would be both an abuse of the court system and an improper curtailing of the legislative and political processes.
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Nor do the Legislative Plaintiffs adequately explain how declaratory relief is needed here to guide their future conduct in order to preserve their legal rights. Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 293 Mich App at 515. To be sure, the future conduct that the Legislative Plaintiffs seek to “guide”—that is, curtail—is the that of the Governor, not the Legislature. The law does not provide standing for the Legislature to seek such relief. Indeed, the Court of Appeals came to that conclusion in League of Women Voters:
Given the definition of “actual controversy” for purposes of MCR 2.605, we are not convinced that the Legislature has demonstrated standing to pursue a declaratory action here. No declaratory judgment is necessary to guide the Legislature’s future conduct in order to preserve its legal rights. The Legislature’s authority to enact laws is separate and distinct from this Court’s role in determining whether any law passes constitutional muster. These “rights” and obligations of the two separate branches of government will remain the same, no matter what the outcome in this matter, such that the preservation of the Legislature’s legal rights is not at issue. [League of Women Voters, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at *7.] The Legislative Plaintiffs contend that they have a special right that is affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large in their right to enact legislation – but this is more spin than reality. Any such contention is belied by the allegations of the complaint, where the Legislative Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have continued significant legislative activities throughout the COVID-19 crisis notwithstanding the Governor’s executive orders. In fact, the complaint specifically alleges that the Legislature has passed more than 100 bills on COVID-19 related issues. (Compl, ¶ 43). There is nothing in the Governor’s actions that interferes
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with the Legislature’s ability to legislate. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief fails because there is no threat to their power to enact legislation.
Courts are wisely reluctant to hear disputes that may interfere with the separation of powers between the branches of government. “It would be imprudent and violative of the doctrine of separation of powers to confer standing upon a legislator simply for failing in the political process.” Dodak, 441 Mich at 544–545. That is exactly the situation in this case.
“[A] proper understanding of the doctrine of separation of powers suggests that the personal desires of legislative and executive officers to exercise their authority are not within the ‘zone of interests’ protected by the provisions of the Constitution and laws conferring such authority. Only the interests of particular individuals who would be aided by the exercise of that authority—and have been harmed by its unlawful deprivation—come within that zone, since the authority was conferred for the benefit not of the governors but of the governed.” Dodak, 441 Mich at 544 n 17, quoting Moore v United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 960 (CA DC, 1984). This is particularly applicable here, given that once the votes of the legislators have been counted and the statutes enacted, “their special interest as lawmakers has ceased.” League of Women Voters, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at *9.
The Legislative Plaintiffs have not established an actual controversy under MCR 2.605, and they therefore lack standing to bring this lawsuit.
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EXHIBIT 3

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-4 filed 07/08/20 PageID.885 Page 2 of 3

05/15/2020

·

·1· · · · · · · · · · · · · · STATE OF MICHIGAN

·2· · · · · · · · · · · · · · COURT OF CLAIMS

·3

·4· ·MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

·5· ·and MICHIGAN SENATE,

·6· · · · · · · Plaintiffs,

·7· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · Case No. 20-000079-MZ

·8· ·v· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · Hon. Cynthia Diane Stephens

·9

10· ·GOV. GRETCHEN WHITMER,

11· · · · · · · Defendant.

12· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · /

13· ·PAGE 1 TO 60

14

15· · · · ·The Hearing before the Honorable

16· · · · ·Judge Cynthia D. Stephens,

17· · · · ·Taken via Hanson Remote,

18· · · · ·Commencing at 10:00 a.m.,

19· · · · ·Friday, May 15, 2020,

20· · · · ·Before Shacara V. Mapp, CSR-9305.

21

22· ·Court reporter, attorneys & witness appearing remotely.

23

24

25

Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26-4 filed 07/08/20 PageID.886 Page 3 of 3

05/15/2020

Page 34

·1· ·doesn't matter.· But it would have to be to the private

·2· ·citizenry.· Because first, you said they had no

·3· ·standing to begin with.

·4· · · · · · ·So if they had no standing to begin with,

·5· ·certainly, it's not going to get more standing.· But

·6· ·you believe this is a private citizen issue; is that

·7· ·correct?

·8· · · · · · ·MR. ALLEN:· Your Honor, I don't believe it's

·9· ·a private citizen issue.· I think the characterization

10· ·that the governor can completely decide whether there's

11· ·an emergency or not is -- that's not our position.· The

12· ·emergency and disaster are defined by the statute as

13· ·contained in certain --

14· · · · · · ·JUDGE STEPHENS:· But if the people don't --

15· ·okay.· I get it.· If the legislature doesn't agree,

16· ·they act one certain way.· You said they didn't have

17· ·the authority to do that.· So okay, the only person,

18· ·the only entity then, that can come in and say to the

19· ·governor, we know you've got good faith, but we think

20· ·you're wrong, this is not, in fact, an emergent

21· ·condition or it is not a crisis condition would have to

22· ·be a private citizen, wouldn't it?

23· · · · · · ·MR. ALLEN:· I think it -- that -- that would

24· ·be the case, Your Honor.· And again this is not --

25· · · · · · ·JUDGE STEPHENS:· Okay.

YVer1f

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EXHIBIT 4

7/3/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26R-e5gisftieler odf A0c7tio/n08/20 PageID.888 Page 2 of 4
66TH DISTRICT COURT 110 E Mack Street Corunna, MI 48817

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Register of Action
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Shiawassee County 66th District Court ROA Details

_____________________________________________________________________________

|STATE OF MICHIGAN

|

| CASE NO: 20-ST0337 D01 SM |

|66TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT| REGISTER OF ACTIONS |

|

|ORI780025J

|

| STATUS: PEND

|

|PIN: 2064500556

|

|

|

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUDGE OF RECORD:

JUDGE: CLARKSON,WARD L.,

P-36073

STATE OF MICHIGAN v

CTN:

MANKE/KARL/WILLIAM

TCN:

SID:

ENTRY DATE: 05/08/20

OFFENSE DATE: 05/04/20

ARREST DATE:

VEHICLE TYPE:

VPN:

DOB:

SEX: M RACE: W

DL:

VEH YR:

VEH MAKE:

VIN:

PAPER PLATE:

_______________________________________________________________________________

DEFENSE ATTORNEY ADDRESS

BAR NO.

KALLMAN,DAVID A.,

P-34200

5600 W MOUNT HOPE HWY

Telephone No.

LANSING

MI 48917

(517) 322-3207

_______________________________________________________________________________

OFFICER: LENKART/KEVIN CHIEF

|DEPT: CITY OF OWOSSO

|

PROSECUTOR: KOERNER,SCOTT A.,

| P-60295

VICTIM/DESC:

|

_______________________________________________________________________________

CNT: 01 C/M/F: M 3332443

PACC#333.2443

HEALTH DEPARTMENT VIOLATION OF LOCAL HEALTH DEPT ORDER

roa.shiawassee.net/roawebinq/ROACase.aspx?CRTNO=6600&PFIX=D&CASE=20-ST0337 &PTY=D01&FILENAME=D070253516

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ARRAIGNMENT DATE: 06/29/20 PLEA:

PLEA N-GLTY PLEA DATE: 06/29/20

FINDINGS:

DISPOSITION DATE:

SENTENCING DATE:

FINE

COST ST.COST

CON

MISC.

REST TOT FINE TOT DUE

0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

JAIL SENTENCE:

PROBATION:

VEH IMMOB START DATE:

NUMBER OF DAYS:

VEH FORFEITURE:

_______________________________________________________________________________

CNT: 02 C/M/F: M 1033

PACC#10.33

EXECUTIVE ORDERS VIOLATION

ARRAIGNMENT DATE: 06/29/20 PLEA:

PLEA N-GLTY PLEA DATE: 06/29/20

FINDINGS:

DISPOSITION DATE:

SENTENCING DATE:

FINE

COST ST.COST

CON

MISC.

REST TOT FINE TOT DUE

0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

JAIL SENTENCE:

PROBATION:

VEH IMMOB START DATE:

NUMBER OF DAYS:

VEH FORFEITURE:

_______________________________________________________________________________

DATE

ACTIONS, JUDGMENTS, CASE NOTES

INITIALS

_______________________________________________________________________________

05/04/20

1 ORIGINAL CHARGE

HLTH DEP VIO

2 ORIGINAL CHARGE

VIO EXEC ORD

05/06/20

1 AUTHORIZATION OF COMPLAINT DATE

PROS KOERNER,SCOTT A.,

05/07/20

1 COMPLAINT ISSUANCE DATE

05/08/20

FILING DATE

050720

SLD SLD
SLD P-60295 SLD
SLD
SLD

NAME: MANKE/KARL/WILLIAM

CASE NO: 20-ST0337 PAGE 2

_______________________________________________________________________________

DATE

ACTIONS, JUDGMENTS, CASE NOTES

INITIALS

_______________________________________________________________________________

MISCELLANEOUS ACTION

ALL COUNTS

SLD

SCHEDULED FOR ARRAIGNMENT 062320 830A CLARKSON,WARD L., P-36073 SLD

NOTICE TO APPEAR GENERATED

ALL COUNTS

SLD

05/15/20

PREV. 1847 E. KILBOURN AVE.

SK

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7/3/2020 Case 1:20-cv-00360-PLM-PJG ECF No. 26R-e5gisftieler odf A0c7tio/n08/20 PageID.890 Page 4 of 4

ADDR: OWOSSO

MI 48867

SK

06/23/20

SCHEDULED FOR ARRAIGNMENT 062920 130P CLARKSON,WARD L., P-36073 SNH

APPEARANCE FILED BY ATTY DAVID A. KALLMAN

SNH

MISCELLANEOUS ACTION

ALL COUNTS

SNH

JDG CLARKSON,WARD L.,

P-36073 SNH

ATT KALLMAN,DAVID A.,

P-34200 SNH

NOTICE TO APPEAR GENERATED

ALL COUNTS

SNH

MISCELLANEOUS ACTION

ALL COUNTS

SNH

STIPULATION AND ORDER FILED BY ATTY DAVID

SNH

KALLMAN AND SIGNED BY JUDGE CLARKSON

SNH

06/25/20

1 MISCELLANEOUS ACTION

HLTH DEP VIO

SMW

DEMAND FOR DISCOVERY FILED BY THE PEOPLE

SMW

06/29/20

ARRAIGNMENT HELD

ALL COUNTS

SNH

JDG CLARKSON,WARD L.,

P-36073 SNH

PLEAD NOT GUILTY

SNH

SCHEDULED FOR PRE-TRIAL 071420 1100A DIGNAN,TERRANCE P., P-27180 SNH

ADVISED OF RIGHTS

SNH

DEFENSE ATTORNEY PRESENT

SNH

RECORDED BY CER 3352

SNH

NOTICE TO APPEAR GENERATED

ALL COUNTS

SNH

06/30/20

SCHEDULED FOR PRE-TRIAL 071320 1100A CLARKSON,WARD L., P-36073 SNH

NOTICE TO APPEAR GENERATED

ALL COUNTS

SNH

***** END OF REGISTER OF ACTIONS ***** 07/02/20 15:35

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