Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISON

JOSEPH SORRENTINO and LABRON C. NEAL, on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated people,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
Defendants.

No. _____________

COMPLAINT PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. 2012 was one of the hottest summers on record in Illinois.1 Cellhouses throughout the Illinois prison system are poorly ventilated, and generally hold two men in spaces designed for one. When the outside temperature reaches 95—as it did repeatedly this summer, temperatures inside cells on upper tiers at Stateville Correctional Center, Menard Correctional Center, and Pontiac Correctional Center can reach 120 degrees and more. Prisoners have died from this heat.
1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office. http://www.crh.noaa.gov/news/display_cmsstory.php?wfo=lot&storyid=86523&source=0, last visited August 22, 2012.

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:2
2. In anticipation of this deadly heat, in June, prisoners were told they could buy extra fans. Many did. All fans are approved by the Department, and can only be purchased from the prison commissary. A copy of Warden’s Bulletin #201237 is attached as Exhibit #1.
3. Then on July 17th, with no warning, the Department reversed course, and announced that it was confiscating all “extra” fans. A copy of Warden’s Bulletin #2012-54 is attached as Exhibit #2. Prisoners were not compensated for the costs, and no other means for cooling the cells was provided.
4. At the same time, the Department began confiscating prisoners’ typewriters—again, typewriters that had been approved by the Department and purchased through the prison commissary. A copy of Warden’s Bulletin #2012-51 is attached as Exhibit #3.
5. In Count One of their complaint, plaintiffs---on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated prisoners---complain that the Department confiscated their property without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count Two, they allege that the Department’s confiscation violated the contracts clause of the United States Constitution, Article I §10. In Count Three, plaintiffs allege that the confiscation constituted a breach of their property contracts with the Department.
2

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 3 of 11 PageID #:3
JURISDICTION 6. This Court, has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action arises under the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), as Plaintiffs allege that Defendants deprived them of their rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution. 7. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ common law breach of contract claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because that claim is so related to those claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction. 8. This Court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9. This Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
VENUE 10. Venue is proper in this judicial district, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because Plaintiffs reside at Stateville Correctional Center, which is located in Joliet, Illinois, in this district and a substantial number of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.
PARTIES I. Plaintiffs 11. Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino is an individual currently incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”).
3

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 4 of 11 PageID #:4
12. On November 29, 2011, Mr. Sorrentino purchased a typewriter from the Stateville commissary at a cost of $266.16.
13. On July 23, 2012, Mr. Sorrentino’s typewriter was confiscated on orders pursuant to Warden’s Bulletin #2012-51. A copy Warden’s Bulletin #2012-51 is attached as Exhibit #3.
14. Mr. Sorrentino purchased a fan for which he paid approximately $26, which he received from the Stateville Commissary on March 27, 2012. A copy of Mr. Sorrentino’s fan contract is attached as Exhibit #4.
15. On July 16, 2012, Mr. Sorrentino’s fan was confiscated pursuant to Warden’s Bulletin #2012-54. A copy of Warden’s Bulletin is attached as Exhibit #2.
16. Plaintiff LaBron C. Neal is currently incarcerated at Stateville. 17. He purchased a fan sometime prior to July, 2012 from the Stateville Commissary. A copy of Mr. Neal’s fan contract is attached as Exhibit #5. 18. On July 16, 2012, Mr. Neal’s fan was confiscated pursuant to Warden’s Bulletin #2012-54. II. Defendant 19. Salvador A. Godinez is the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“Department”) and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Department. Mr. Godinez is sued in his individual and official capacities. III. Class Allegations 20. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
4

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:5
behalf of a class of all prisoners housed in maximum security prisons operated by the Illinois Department of Corrections who have had fans or typewriters confiscated pursuant to policies implemented by Director Godinez.
21. Numerosity: The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). As of August 1, 2012, there are over 6,500 prisoners confined in maximum security prisons operated by the Department. Upon information and belief over 10% of those prisoners have had either a fan or a typewriter confiscated pursuant to the policies implemented by Director Godinez.
22. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to members of the class. Such questions include, but are not limited to: whether Director Godinez implemented a policy of confiscating fans and typewriters which had been purchased from prison commissaries in compliance with Department rules; whether Director Godinez offered compensation to any of the prisoners whose property was confiscated; and whether Director Godinez’s confiscation of prisoners’ property without compensation violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, the contracts clause of the Constitution of the United States, or breached the Department’s contracts with the prisoners.
23. Typicality: The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of those of the Plaintiff Class, as their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or course of conduct; and their claims are based on the same theory of law as the class’s claims.
24. Adequacy: Plaintiffs are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Plaintiff class because Plaintiffs do not have any interests
5

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:6
antagonistic to the class. Plaintiffs are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
25. Rule 23(b)(1): This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because, upon information and belief, the number of class members is in excess of 600, and the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant.
26. Rule 23(b)(2): This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Class Defendants’ policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this complaint are common to, and apply generally to, all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. The policy requiring confiscation of prisoners’ fans and typewriters was implemented statewide and was promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of Department.
27. Rule 23(b)(3): The common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions, and a class action is superior to all other means of resolving the issues raised in this complaint.
COUNT I (Takings Clause Violation) 28. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each of the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 27.
6

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 7 of 11 PageID #:7
29. In Count I, Plaintiffs seek damages based on Defendant’s Takings Clause violation.
30. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of private property without just compensation.
31. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
32. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino had a vested property right in the confiscated typewriter.
33. At no time was Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino provided with just compensation for the confiscated typewriter.
34. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiffs had a vested property right in the confiscated fans.
35. At all times relevant hereto, the confiscated fans were private property of the Plaintiffs.
36. At no time were Plaintiffs provided with just compensation for the confiscated fans.
Count II (Contract Clause Violation) 37. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each of the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 36. 38. In Count II, Plaintiffs seek damages based on the Department’s Contract Clause violation.
7

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:8
39. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .”
40. The benefit of receiving personal property is a promise made by the Department to the Plaintiffs.
41. This promise is relied upon by the Plaintiffs, who supported their promise by paying money from their prison accounts.
42. The contract between Plaintiffs and the Department was memorialized in a “Property Contract” entered into by Plaintiffs, which set forth their rights and responsibilities in connection with their purchase and possession of fans and typewriters. Exhibits 4 and 5.
43. The Department’s promise and the Plaintiffs paying of money out of their accounts create and constitute legally enforceable contract rights.
44. The Department’s actions, of confiscating personal property which had been properly acquired in valid and enforceable contracts, coupled with unjust compensation, is an impairment of Plaintiffs’ contract rights.
Count III (Breach of Contract) 45. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each of the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 44. 46. In Count III, Plaintiffs seek damages based on the Department breaching the Contracts. Plaintiffs seek, as actual damages, benefits to which the Plaintiffs are due under the Contracts.
8

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:9
47. On or around November 29, 2011, IDOC agreed to sell Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino a typewriter in consideration for the agreed upon sum of $266.16.
48. The Department agreed to sell Plaintiffs’ fans in consideration for the agreed upon sum of $26.00.
49. At all times relevant hereto, the Contracts constituted valid and enforceable contracts between the Plaintiffs and the Department.
50. The contract between Plaintiffs and the Department was memorialized in Contracts entered into by Plaintiffs, which set forth their rights and responsibilities in connection with their purchase and possession of fans and typewriters. Exhibits 4 and 5.
51. Plaintiffs performed all of their obligations under the Contracts. 52. IDOC breached the Contracts by confiscating the fans and the typewriter. 53. As a direct and proximate result of the Department's breach of the Contracts with Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino, Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino has been damaged in the amount exceeding $292.16. 54. As a direct and proximate result of the Department's breach of the Contract with Plaintiff LaBron C. Neal, Plaintiff LaBron C. Neal has been damaged in the amount exceeding $26.00. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs ask that this Honorable Court enter a judgment: a. Declaring that the Defendant’s confiscation of Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino’s typewriter, and the taking of typewriters from all members of the
9

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:10
plaintiff class constitutes a taking without just compensation, and thus violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
b. Declaring that the Defendant’s confiscation of the property/fans/typewriters owned by Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Class is a taking without just compensation, and thus violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
c. Declaring that the Defendant’s confiscation of the typewriter owned by Joseph Sorrentino and all typewriters owned by members of the Plaintiff Class which had been properly acquired pursuant to a valid and enforceable contract, coupled with no just compensation, is an impairment of Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino’s contract rights in violation of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States.
d. Declaring that the Defendant’s confiscation of the fans owned by Plaintiffs and by members of the Plaintiff Class which had been properly acquired in valid and enforceable contracts, coupled with no just compensation, is an impairment of Plaintiffs’ contract rights in violation of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States.
e. Declaring that the Defendant breached a valid and enforceable contract by confiscating the typewriter owned by Joseph Sorrentino and the typewriters owned by the Plaintiff Class.
f. Declaring that the Defendant breached valid and enforceable contracts by confiscating Plaintiffs’ fans.
10

Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 1 Filed: 08/22/12 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:11 g. Directing the Defendant to either return or provide just compensate to
Plaintiffs for their confiscated personal property. h. Awarding Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs i. Granting such other relief as the Court deems proper.
Respectfully submitted, _S/Alan S. Mills __________
Attorney for the Plaintiffs Alan Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, Illinois 60640 (773) 769-1411
11

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Joseph Sorrentino and LaBron C. Neal,

)

on their own behalf and on behalf of all

)

similarly situated people,

)

No. 12 C 6757

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

)

v.

)

)

Salvador A. Godinez, Director of the

)

Illinois Department of Corrections,

)

)

Defendant.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Joseph Sorrentino and LaBron C. Neal bring this class action

lawsuit against defendant Salvador A. Godinez, Director of the Illinois Department

of Corrections, alleging that prison employees confiscated several items of personal

property from their cells in violation of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs assert

claims under the Takings Clause (Count I) and the Contracts Clause (Count II) of

the United States Constitution, as well as a state law claim for breach of contract

(Count III). R. 1 ¶¶ 29, 38, 46. Director Godinez has moved to dismiss the complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). R. 12. For the following

reasons, Director Godinez’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Background

The following facts, drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint, are accepted as true,

and all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor. Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d

1

859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court considers “the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court may also consider elaborations made by plaintiffs in opposing the motion to dismiss, so long as those elaborations are consistent with the facts alleged in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs are two individuals incarcerated at the Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) in Joliet, Illinois. R. 1 ¶¶ 11, 16. Over the course of several months, plaintiffs purchased several items from the prison commissary that are now at the center of this dispute. Specifically, on November 29, 2011, plaintiff Sorrentino purchased a typewriter from the commissary for $266.16. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs also purchased two fans from the commissary for $26 each. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. Sorrentino purchased his fan on March 27, 2012, and plaintiff Neal purchased his fan “sometime prior to July 2012.”1 Id. Each of these items had been approved for prisoner use by the Department, and plaintiffs were permitted to keep these items in their cells if they agreed to abide by the rules and policies regarding personal property. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, Exh, 4, Exh. 5.
Plaintiffs contend that they derived significant benefits from having these items in their cells. For example, Sorrentino regularly used his typewriter to communicate with the outside world, and due to his limited access to the prison’s
1 As demonstrated by Neal’s Personal Property Contract, however, Neal had possession of this fan on May 25, 2011, more than one year earlier. R. 1, Exh. 5.
2

law library, he also used it to prepare pleadings for court. R. 30 at 6. Plaintiffs’ fans apparently provided even greater benefits. According to the complaint, Stateville is “poorly ventilated, and generally hold[s] two men in spaces designed for one.” R. 1 ¶ 1. During the summer, when the outside temperature rises above the mid-90s, “temperatures inside cells on upper tiers at Stateville . . . can reach 120 degrees and more.” Id. According to plaintiffs, “[p]risoners have died from this heat.” Id. By using fans in their prison cells, however, plaintiffs are able to combat this “deadly heat.” Id. ¶ 2.
In anticipation of the heat that was predicted to occur during the summer of 2012, inmates at Stateville were told that they could buy extra fans to use in their cells. Id. Additionally, on June 1, 2012, Marcus Hardy, the Warden at Stateville, issued Warden’s Bulletin #2012-37, which provided that “offenders will be able to purchase a fan regardless of grade or shipping status . . . not to exceed the current authorized amount of fans owned by one offender.”2 Id., Exh. 1.
In the middle of July 2012, however, “the Department reversed course” and decided to remove all “extra” fans from its prison cells. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Specifically, on July 17, 2012, Warden Hardy issued Warden’s Bulletin #2012-54, which provided that “offenders are allowed possession of one (1) fan per offender in each assigned cell” and that “all additional fans [would] be collected and inspected . . . [and] transported to and stored in offender personal property.” Id., Exh. 2. Pursuant to
2 Plaintiffs have attached Warden’s Bulletin #2012-37 to their complaint. R. 1, Exh. 1. The Court notes, however, that this bulletin could not have affected plaintiffs’ decision to purchase their fans, because they had both purchased their fans prior to June 1, 2012.
3

this directive, plaintiffs’ fans were removed from their cells. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18. Plaintiffs maintain that they “were not compensated for the costs [of the fans], and no other means for cooling the cells was provided.” Id. ¶ 3.
A few days later, on July 23, 2012, Warden Hardy issued Warden’s Bulletin #2012-51, which directed the removal of all typewriters from prisoners’ cells. Id., Exh. 3. Prisoners were given several options for disposing of their typewriters, including (1) giving the typewriter to a visitor; (2) mailing it to another person at the prison’s expense; (3) donating it to the law library; (4) destroying it; or (5) storing it in their personal property. Id. Sorrentino’s typewriter was subsequently removed from his cell, and he elected to donate it to the law library. R. 30 at 4. Sorrentino maintains that his typewriter was confiscated without just compensation. R. 1 ¶ 5.
In this federal action, plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that their personal items were confiscated in violation of the United States Constitution, entitling them to either just compensation or return of their property. Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiffs have brought suit against Director Godinez based on his responsibility “for the day-to-day operations of the Department.” Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiffs assert claims under the Takings Clause (Count I) and the Contracts Clause (Count II) of the United States Constitution, as well as a state law claim for breach of contract (Count III). Id. ¶¶ 29, 38, 46.
4

Legal Standard Director Godinez has moved to dismiss Count III of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Counts I and II under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs have since voluntarily withdrawn Count III to the extent that it seeks money damages. Accordingly, the Court focuses its attention on Director Godinez’s challenges under Rule 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This “standard demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In
5

applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
Analysis Director Godinez grounds his motion to dismiss on two bases. First, he contends that he lacks the capacity to be sued, both in his individual and official capacities, based on the allegations of the complaint. Second, even if he were capable of being sued, Director Godinez maintains that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court will address each argument in turn. I. Director Godinez’s Capacity to Be Sued A. Individual Capacity Director Godinez argues that he cannot be sued in his individual capacity because plaintiffs have not alleged enough facts to demonstrate that he is “personally responsible” for the decision to remove their personal items from their cells. The Court agrees. A defendant is not individually liable for a constitutional deprivation unless he is “personally responsible” for that deprivation. Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply). In each case, the complaint must allege enough facts to show the defendant’s “personal involvement.” Crowder, 687 F.2d at 1005. A defendant “will be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility if he directed the conduct causing the
6

constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his knowledge or consent.” Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). This rule recognizes that the defendant is not required to participate directly in the deprivation. Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740. Thus, supervisors may be liable for “deliberate, reckless indifference” to the misconduct of their subordinates if the supervisors “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Chavez, 251 F.3d at 651.
In Crowder, the Seventh Circuit dismissed allegations against the Commissioner of Corrections of the State of Indiana, finding that his general familiarity with prison conditions did not suggest any actual knowledge of the terms of the plaintiff’s confinement. 687 F.2d at 1005-06. The prison’s assistant warden and its classifications director, however, were held liable, because they were directly responsible for refusing plaintiff legal help and were personally accountable for keeping plaintiff in a specialized seclusion unit. Id. at 1006.
Similarly, in Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit upheld a complaint of inadequate medical treatment against a prison hospital administrator, stating that his “position . . . justifies the inference at this state of the proceeding that he does bear some responsibility for the alleged misconduct.” But the court dismissed the warden from the case because of his greater distance from the situation. Id. at 656. “It is doubtful,” the Seventh Circuit wrote, “that a prison warden would be directly involved in the day-to-day operation
7

of the prison hospital such that he would have personally participated in, or have knowledge of, the kinds of decisions that led to the delay in treatment.” Id.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that their personal property was confiscated pursuant to Warden’s Bulletin #2012-51 (regarding the typewriter) and Warden’s Bulletin #2012-54 (regarding the fans). R. 1 ¶¶ 13, 15, 18. These bulletins were signed by Warden Hardy. Id., Exh. 2, Exh. 3. The only allegation against Director Godinez, however, is that he “is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Department.” Id. ¶ 19. As in Duncan, this suggests a distance from the allegations of the complaint that is too great to permit a finding of “personal responsibility.” Plaintiffs make the kind of allegation that does not permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In their response to Director Godinez’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs further assert that Director Godinez “approved this change in policy, and implemented it by directing prison officials to confiscate all additional fans.” R. 30 at 3. To be sure, it is proper for plaintiffs to “elaborate on [their] factual allegations [in opposing a motion to dismiss,] so long as the new elaborations are not inconsistent with the pleadings.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745 n.1. Indeed, in Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit explained that “a plaintiff is free, in defending against a motion to dismiss, to allege without evidentiary support any facts he pleases that are consistent with the complaint, in order to show that there
8

is a state of facts within the scope of the complaint that if proved . . . would entitle him to judgment.” However, the new facts that plaintiff assert in responding to the motion to dismiss appear to be inconsistent with the facts alleged in the complaint. As already mentioned, the Warden’s Bulletins were signed and issued by Warden Hardy – not Director Godinez. Moreover there are no specific allegations that Director Godinez conferred with Warden Hardy or expressly approved of any decisions, aside from mere speculation. For these reasons, after careful review of plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to plead facts to sufficiently demonstrate that Director Godinez can be sued in his individual capacity.
B. Official Capacity Director Godinez next argues that he cannot be sued in his official capacity because the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for money damages against state officials in their official capacity, as opposed to in their individual capacity. The Court agrees with this argument, to the extent that plaintiffs ask for money damages. However, plaintiffs may still pursue declaratory or injunctive relief. Under the Eleventh Amendment, states enjoy immunity from suits brought in federal court by their own citizens. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). Even where a state is not a named party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of State of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from
9

the state, the state is the real, substantive party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” Id. Consequently, Eleventh Amendment protection extends to state officials acting in their official capacity, because any money damages that the plaintiff obtained would be paid out of the state treasury. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
However, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception where the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from a state official. Id. at 677. Although courts cannot make the state official use state funds to make reparations for the past, courts can tell a state official to comply with federal standards in the future. Id. at 664-65. A federal court’s remedial power, therefore, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury. Id. at 677.
As a state official, Director Godinez cannot be sued for money damages. Plaintiffs concede, as they must, that any such damages would necessarily come from the state treasury, which is protected from private suit by the Eleventh Amendment. However, plaintiffs in this case also seek other types of redress, including declaratory relief and return of their confiscated property. Such relief may be properly awarded by a federal court, and therefore plaintiffs’ suit could proceed to the extent that they sued Director Godinez in his official capacity and sought prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. However, for the reasons explained
10

below, no proper claim has been brought with respect to plaintiffs’ substantive claims. II. Failure to State a Claim
A. Takings Clause (Count I) Plaintiffs allege that the confiscation of their typewriter and fans violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment because these items were removed from their cells without the provision of just compensation. Director Godinez maintains that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. In support of his motion to dismiss, Director Godinez sets forth two arguments: (1) plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the items that were removed from their cells; and (2) the actions of the prison officials did not constitute a taking. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The aim of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Therefore, “the Takings Clause bars the state from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010). Director Godinez’s first argument, that plaintiffs did not have a property interest in their personal items, is without merit. Director Godinez cites several cases for the proposition that prisoners have no constitutional right to a typewriter.
11

R. 12 at 5-6 (citing Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 1989)). According to Director Godinez, it follows that Sorrentino had no property interest whatsoever in the typewriter that he purchased from the prison commissary. Id. at 5. The Court is not willing to draw that conclusion.
On the contrary, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that inmates do have the right to possess property, while those rights are subject to limitations. See Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a property interest in photocopies of cases printed from the prison’s law library); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir 1978) (finding a property interest in AM/FM radio/cassette recorder, accompanying adapter plug and AC power cord, and stereo headphones). In Nance, the court recognized that while the plaintiff did not have a property interest in visiting the prison commissary to purchase new items, the plaintiff did have a property interest in personal items that he already possessed. 147 F.3d at 590. Moreover, in the context of a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court has held that “prison attendants can[not] ride roughshod over inmates’ property rights with impunity.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
In this case, plaintiffs purchased a typewriter and two fans from the prison commissary. They used their own money to buy these items, $266.16 for the typewriter and $26 for each fan, and then transported them to their cells. Plaintiffs thus acquired a property interest in these items that is subject to the strictures of the Fifth Amendment.
12

Director Godinez next argues that the removal of these items from plaintiffs’ cells did not constitute a taking because there was no deprivation of property, and it is here that the Court agrees. Lawful incarceration necessarily entails limitations upon many of the rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Among the rights obviously subject to curtailment is an inmate’s right to possess property. Ford v. Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1977). As the Seventh Circuit noted in Secret, 584 F.2d at 830, “[t]here is no constitutional right that prohibits prison officials from confiscating most of a prisoner’s personal property pending release from prison. The constitutional violation arises only if they confiscate that property without due process of law.”
A prisoner receives adequate process when an adequate post-deprivation remedy is available to redress confiscations of property. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit has explained that the postdeprivation remedy must be “meaningless or nonexistent” in order to be inadequate. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.3d 1387, 1406 (7th Cir. 1990). In their complaint, plaintiffs did not allege that there was no post-deprivation remedy available to them, or even that they attempted to make any formalized grievance with prison officials.
Additionally, placing reasonable restrictions upon the quantity and type of property that an inmate may possess does not violate due process. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 554-55 (1979); see also Williams v. Bierman, 46 F.3d 1134, 1134 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is without doubt that prisons may place reasonable restrictions on
13

the quantity and type of property that an inmate may possess without violating due process.”); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The security status of a prisoner may justify reasonable steps restricting his direct access to legal materials.”). As the Supreme Court explained in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2602, “a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be [a taking], depending on its nature and extent.” Because plaintiffs were given reasonable options to store or dispose of their fans and typewriter, no deprivation under the Takings Clause has occurred. See, e.g., Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Although plaintiff no longer has possession of the property, he still retains control over it and, therefore has not been ‘deprived’ of the property.”); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 271 (D.D.C. 1995) (“Where an inmate’s personal property is seized and sent to an address of his choosing, such action is not a deprivation.”); Stringer v. DeRobertis, 541 F. Supp. 605, 606 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (prisoners who ordered $900 worth of printed materials with alleged consent of prison officials but who subsequently were not allowed to take possession of the materials suffered no “deprivation” where officials offered to relinquish possession to someone designated by the prisoners).
As Director Godinez points out, Sorrentino was given several options regarding the disposition of his typewriter. Pursuant to Warden’s Bulletin #201251, Sorrentino could elect to (1) give the typewriter to a visitor; (2) mail it to another person at the prison’s expense; (3) donate it to the law library; (4) destroy it; or (5) store it in his personal property. R. 1, Exh. 3. Sorrentino chose to donate his
14

typewriter to the law library for other prisoners to use. R. 30 at 4. While this decision certainly limited his access to the typewriter, it did not constitute a taking, because Sorrentino voluntarily made this choice among many reasonable options. Especially in light of the offered option of storing the typewriter in his personal property, the Court finds that no taking occurred.
Plaintiffs’ claim regarding their fans fares no better. Although the “extra” fans were taken from their cells,3 Warden’s Bulletin #2012-54 provided that “[a]ll fans collected that are in appropriate conditions, with no alterations[,] will be transported to and stored in offender personal property.” R. 1, Exh. 2. This did not constitute a taking under the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which requires “a transfer of property to the State or to another private party.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ fans were stored in their own personal property, and thus no taking occurred.
Plaintiffs contend that Sorrentino was entitled to possess a typewriter based on 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 525.140(k), which states that prisoners “may receive typewriters ordered directly from a supplier through the commissary.” However, as Director Godinez points out, this section confers no right to own a typewriter. It merely states that the only way that inmates may receive typewriters is from a supplier through the commissary. Moreover, several courts in this district have held that prisoners are not entitled to a typewriter. See, e.g., Bullock v. McGinnis, No. 91 C 1353, 1992 WL 13001, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1992) (prisoner had no legitimate
3 Each inmate could still have one fan in their cell, for a total of two fans in each cell.
15

claim to electric typewriter); Woods v. Maxwell, No. 84 C 9118, 1989 WL 76135, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 1989) (prisoner was not deprived of any protected property interest in the possession or use of a new typewriter where prison officials advised him that such property was unauthorized, a family member retrieved the typewriter on his behalf, and he suffered no cognizable economic loss).
Finally, plaintiffs maintain that even though the fans that were taken from their cells were stored in their personal property, the action effectively constituted a taking because they are both serving life sentences and have no direct access to their storage. However, the Fifth Amendment does not compel just compensation in this case, where their property was not effectively transferred to the state or another private party. Instead, this was a restriction that was placed on plaintiffs’ property, and given that each prisoner was still allowed one fan, for a total of two fans in each cell, the restriction appears to be reasonable.
For these reasons, after assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, the Court grants Director Godinez’s motion to dismiss Count I with prejudice.
B. Contracts Clause (Count II) Plaintiffs allege that the confiscation of their typewriter and fans violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution because the state impaired a contract that permitted plaintiffs to keep these items in their cells at all times. They attach a document titled “Personal Property Contract” to their complaint, alleging that this is the contract that was impaired. Director Godinez contends that
16

plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief, arguing that no contractual impairment occurred because plaintiffs had remedies available for the decision to remove these items from their cells.
The Contracts Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. However, this language does not impose “the [d]raconian provision that its words might seem to imply.” Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240 (1978). As the Supreme Court has recognized, “literalism in the construction of the [C]ontracts [C]lause . . . would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of self-protection.” W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934). Still, the Contracts Clause is not without meaning, and in order to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must allege that he “has a contract with the state, which the state, through its legislative authority, has attempted to impair.” E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Du Page County, Ill., 613 F.2d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing City Ry. Co. v. Citizens’ Street R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 557, 563 (1897)).
Based on the allegations of the complaint and the accompanying attachments, the Court finds that plaintiffs did not enter into a contract with the state when they purchased their fans from the prison commissary. In determining whether a contract exists for purposes of the Contracts Clause, courts generally look to the law of the state where the alleged contract was formed. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Branson, 82 F. Supp. 2d 844, 869-70 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Under Illinois law, a contract is “an agreement between competent parties, upon consideration
17

sufficient in law, to do or not to do a particular thing,” La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Vega, 167 Ill. App. 3d 154, 159 (2d Dist. 1988), the formation of which requires an offer, acceptance, and consideration, Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 528 (7th Cir. 2003). The test for an offer is “whether it induces a reasonable belief in the [offeree] that he can, by accepting, bind the [offeror].” Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 561 (7th Cir. 2012). This inquiry requires looking at “objective evidence” of the offeror’s intent. Cohen Dev. Co. v. JMJ Props., Inc., 317 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2003).
In this case, the complaint and its attachments reveal no facts which, taken as true, demonstrate that prison officials were bound by a contract to do anything with respect to the fans. The document attached to the complaint, misleadingly titled “Personal Property Contract,” simply contains an inventory of personal items that plaintiffs kept in their cells, including the fans at issue. See R. 1, Exh. 4, Exh. 5. By signing the bottom of the document, plaintiffs agreed “to observe and follow all Illinois Department of Corrections rules and Stateville Correctional Center institutional policies concerning the use, ownership, possession and transfer of the items.” Id. Plaintiffs further agreed that if they used the items inappropriately, the items would be “confiscated, classified as contraband[,] and disposed of.” Id. However, there is nothing in the language of the document that prohibits prison officials from confiscating the items for other reasons. The document simply sets forth what would happen if the inventory items were used inappropriately.
18

There was simply no “contract” where the prison committed itself, on pain of breach of that contract, to allow prisoners to have certain items in their cell. Common sense would make clear that making such a contract with a prisoner would be foolhardy and even dangerous in a prison setting. There is nothing on the face of the document that binds prison officials in the way that plaintiffs suggest, i.e., unfettered use of the items so long as they followed the rules, and no reasonable reading of the document provides otherwise.
Additionally, there are no facts alleged in the complaint that demonstrate the existence of sufficient consideration, again negating the existence of a contract. Consideration requires a bargained-for exchange, i.e., a reciprocal obligation on the part of both parties. Voelker, 353 F.3d at 528. However, the documents that plaintiffs signed refers to several other items of personal property, and thus it is reasonable for the Court to infer that plaintiffs signed the document at some point after they purchased their fans. See Johnson v. Johnson, 244 Ill. App. 3d 518, 528 (1st Dist. 1993) (“[I]f the alleged consideration for a promise has been conferred prior to the promise upon which [the] alleged agreement is based, there is no valid contract.”). Moreover, the plain language of the document imposes no obligations on prison officials, which demonstrates that there was no bargained-for exchange between the parties; instead, plaintiffs were merely promising to follow prison rules and policies regarding their use of the fans.
Plaintiffs argue that the document must have been a contract by virtue of its title: “Personal Property Contract.” While they correctly note the document’s label,
19

which may lead to some initial confusion, it is well-settled that “the legal effect of an instrument is not determined by its label.” Harris v. Am. Gen. Fin. Corp., 54 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839 (3d Dist. 1977); see also BPI Energy Holdings, Inc. v. IEC (Montgomery), LLC, 664 F.3d 131, 136 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen a document says it isn’t a contract, it isn’t a contract.”). In this case, the language in the body of the documents expressly states they are “permit[s].” Moreover, noticeably absent from these documents is any obligation on the part of Director Godinez or the prison to do anything. The documents are nothing more than an inventory sheets that impose some restrictions on the prisoners who signs them. For these reasons, the Court finds that no contract existed between plaintiffs and the prison, and therefore there was no violation of the Contracts Clause.
Even if the document did constitute a contract, however, the Court finds that there was no impairment by the state. The distinction between a constitutional “impairment” and a contractual “breach” is crucial to this determination, and the difference between the two depends on whether the non-breaching party has an available remedy. If a state exercises legislative power in a way that eliminates the availability of a remedy or action for damages by the non-breaching party, the state has impaired the contract. Horowitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1996). On the other hand, if a legislative action announces the state’s mere refusal to perform its contractual obligation, the state has simply breached the contract. Id. The Seventh Circuit itself has “rejected the notion that a breach of contract alone is enough to constitute a constitutional impairment of a
20

contractual obligation.” Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 2012).
In this case, Director Godinez did not impair any contract with plaintiffs. The Court reiterates that there was no contract between Director Godinez and plaintiffs to begin with. However, even if there was a contract that had been breached by removing the typewriter and fans from plaintiffs’ cells, plaintiffs still had remedies available to them with regard to this property. One such remedy would have been to file a case in the Illinois Court of Claims, which has jurisdiction over “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois.”4 705 ILCS 505/8(a). As a result, there was no impairment of any contract under the meaning of the Contracts Clause.
For these reasons, after assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, the Court grants Director Godinez’s motion to dismiss Count II with prejudice. C. Breach of Contract (Count III)
In their response to Director Godinez’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their state law breach of contract claim, recognizing that damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. R. 30 at 4 n.3. Moreover, as the Court explained in the previous section, the facts alleged in the complaint
4 The Illinois Court of Claims has previously awarded damages to prisoners for claims involving confiscated property. For example, in Olson v. State, 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 277, 279-80 (1994), several articles of clothing were confiscated from a prisoner’s cell and destroyed. The prisoner introduced credible evidence of the value of the clothing and of the fact that he lawfully acquired and possessed some articles of like clothing. The court awarded the prisoner $147.48 in satisfaction of his claim.
21

demonstrate that no contract existed between plaintiffs and the prison, and therefore plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. Finally, even if Count III were to state a claim, the Court would be unable to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a single remaining state law claim. Count III is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Director Godinez’s motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and Counts I, II, and III are dismissed with prejudice.
ENTERED:

Dated: October 3, 2013

__________________________ Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

22

 
 Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________ No. 13-3421 JOSEPH SORRENTINO and LABRON C. NEAL, on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated people,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 12 C 6757 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 23, 2015 ____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge. Joseph Sorrentino and Labron C. Neal are inmates at Illinois’s Stateville Correctional Center. They purchased several items from Stateville’s commissary, but the prison later forbade inmates to possess those items in

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

2

No. 13-3421

their cells. Sorrentino and Neal were among those whose property was removed, as the new rule required. They responded by filing a proposed class action in the district court, alleging that the confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. We conclude that the district court was correct to dismiss the action, though the dismissal should have been without prejudice.
I
The district court concluded that Sorrentino and Neal failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and thus that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). It took no action on class certification. Our fresh assessment of the case relies on the facts that they set forth in their complaint, including all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). Our review is de novo. Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2013).
Our two plaintiffs purchased goods from Stateville’s commissary throughout 2011 and 2012. Around May 25, 2011, Neal purchased a fan and signed a “personal property contract,” which obligated him to follow all Department of Corrections (DOC) rules related to use, ownership, and possession of the fan. Sorrentino purchased a typewriter on November 29, 2011, and a fan on March 27, 2012. He also signed a personal property contract for his fan.
At the time Neal and Sorrentino made their purchases, Stateville allowed inmates to keep typewriters and multiple fans in their cells. It changed the fan policy in July 2012, and memorialized that action in a bulletin that Warden Marcus Hardy issued on July 17, 2012. The bulletin announced that

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

No. 13-3421

3

henceforth inmates were prohibited from possessing more than one fan in their cells. On July 23, 2012, Hardy issued a similar bulletin altogether prohibiting typewriters in cells. The new policy offered several options for inmates who owned the newly prohibited types of property. Inmates with typewriters could have them destroyed; give them to visitors; ship them to someone outside the prison at no cost; store them in “offender personal property,” which is returned to inmates upon release from prison; or donate them to the prison library. Extra fans were simply placed in storage as “offender personal property.”
Prison officials removed both plaintiffs’ fans on July 16, 2012, and Sorrentino’s typewriter sometime after July 23, 2012. The fans are currently in storage, and Sorrentino’s typewriter is in the prison library. Although the complaint and briefs did not clearly indicate that Sorrentino voluntarily gave the typewriter to the library, at oral argument counsel stated that he opted to donate it (given his restricted range of choice).
Some time later, Sorrentino and Neal filed this suit, on behalf of themselves and an alleged class. (Unless the context requires otherwise, we will refer only to Sorrentino in the remainder of this opinion, for the sake of simplicity. The district court took no action on the class allegations and they are not mentioned on appeal; we thus do not discuss that aspect of the case.) The complaint alleged violations of the Takings and Contracts Clauses of the Constitution as well as a breach of contract; plaintiffs sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. After Director Godinez filed a motion to dismiss, Sorrentino withdrew the claim for breach of contract to the extent it sought damages. The district court then

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

4

No. 13-3421

dismissed the entire action, finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims for money damages against Godinez and that the complaint failed to state a Takings Clause, Contracts Clause, or breach of contract claim. At this point, Sorrentino has abandoned the Contracts Clause claim and all claims for damages. We are thus left with the individual claims for injunctive and declaratory relief for the alleged takings and breaches of contract. The plaintiffs are pursuing those claims only against Godinez, and only in his official capacity (apparently on the theory that the Director of the Department of Corrections is the person with the authority to change the policy).
II
A
We consider first the claim that Stateville’s revised policy effected a “taking” of Sorrentino’s property. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision “does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.” Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). Nor does the clause require a state to pay compensation prior to or at the same time as a taking. Id. Therefore, “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” Id. at 195.

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

No. 13-3421

5

The latter rule is what dooms Sorrentino’s claims. Illinois provides such a procedure, but he has not tried to use it. Even when no Illinois constitutional provision or statute provides a remedy for a particular taking, “the common law, which affords a remedy for every wrong, will furnish the appropriate action for the redress of such grievance.” Roe v. Cook Cnty., 193 N.E. 472, 473 (Ill. 1934). Illinois courts distinguish between a true taking, which requires a physical taking of property for public use, and an action that damages property in some way, such as through restrictions on access. See Patzner v. Baise, 552 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Ill. 1990); Granite City Moose Lodge No. 272 v. Kramer, 449 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ill. 1983). Illinois circuit courts have authority to hear true takings claims, which if proven, result in a writ of mandamus ordering the government to institute eminent domain proceedings. See Patzner, 552 N.E.2d at 717. The Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over suits asserting damages to property. See id.
The distinction between a taking and a “damaging” (as the Illinois courts dub it) is sometimes unclear. See John Martinez, A Proposal for Establishing Specialized Federal and State "Takings Courts," 61 ME. L. REV. 467, 482 (2009) (discussing the Illinois Court of Claims and noting “the indistinct line between the jurisdiction of a state’s court of claims and circuit court in takings cases”). Sorrentino describes Godinez’s actions as a “damaging.” This characterization seems sensible: the DOC bulletins limited his access to and enjoyment of his fan and typewriter but did not completely extinguish his rights in his property. The broader point, however, is that some Illinois forum is available; nothing in federal law requires the state to send these cases to one tri-

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

6

No. 13-3421

bunal versus another. If the confiscation of Sorrentino’s property is a true taking, he may pursue his claim in the appropriate Illinois circuit court. If it is a damaging, state law directs him to the Illinois Court of Claims. Neither Sorrentino nor Neal has explored either of these avenues under Illinois law and given the state a chance to provide compensation. The takings claims are thus not ripe. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194–95.
Sorrentino tries to avoid this outcome with a futility argument: the Illinois procedures are functionally nonexistent, he charges, because the Court of Claims lacks the power to grant the equitable relief he wants. A plaintiff need not avail himself of state procedures if those procedures are futile, meaning inadequate or unavailable. See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n of Allen Cnty., 306 F.3d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 2002). Sorrentino urges us to find futility here and to allow him to present his claim in federal court without turning first to the state courts. But his argument does not hold together. Even if he is correct that the Court of Claims is the proper court and that it cannot grant equitable relief, see Garimella v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350, 353 (1996) (concluding that the Court of Claims cannot grant equitable relief but citing Illinois cases that imply the opposite), that limitation does not automatically mean that he may seek an injunction in a different court. He and Neal complain of a taking, and the normal remedy for a taking is monetary relief, which the Illinois Court of Claims can provide. See Peters v. Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting the “strong presumption that damages, not injunctive relief, is the appropriate remedy in a Takings Clause action”).

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

No. 13-3421

7

The question thus becomes whether Sorrentino has presented the kind of case in which equitable relief may be available for a takings claim. We have identified only two such situations: “when the government has taken property for a private, rather than a public, use” and when a “facial challenge[] to legislative action authorizing a taking” is possible. Id. Neither exception is applicable here. Whatever “taking” occurred with respect to the typewriter and fans at issue here was not for private use. Furthermore, Sorrentino has not mounted a facial challenge of the kind we contemplated in Peters. There, we relied on San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) and Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). In those cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the relevant regulation did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest regardless of how it was applied. See San Remo Hotel, L.P., 545 U.S. at 345; Yee, 503 U.S. at 534. Sorrentino has not made such an argument against the Stateville bulletins, and it is hard to see how he could, given the important state interest of safety in prisons. He and Neal thus are not exempt from Williamson’s ripeness requirement just because Illinois may require them to file their claim in a court that cannot grant equitable relief.
Because the plaintiffs filed their takings claim in federal court before seeking compensation in an Illinois tribunal, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claim. The dismissal, however, should have been without prejudice, so that they may avail themselves of whatever procedures may still be available under Illinois law.

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

8

No. 13-3421

B
Sorrentino also asserts that Director Godinez breached an implied-in-fact contract formed at the time of each purchase from the Stateville commissary. (He no longer relies on the “personal property contracts” that he signed as the basis of his breach of contract claim, as he did earlier in this suit.) He argues that the terms of these alleged contracts prohibited the state from altering the policies regarding the possession of fans and typewriters in inmate cells in force at the time.
We need not wade into the merits of this state-law claim. It appears not to be one that could be heard in a state court of general jurisdiction, because the State Lawsuit Immunity Act grants immunity to the state from suit “in any court” and provides for specifically defined exceptions to that immunity. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1. Nevertheless, the state Court of Claims remains available for “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois.” 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(b). A person with a claim against Illinois based on a contract with the state must bring suit in the Illinois Court of Claims, rather than in the relevant Illinois circuit court or federal district court. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that 745 ILCS 5/1’s stipulation that tort actions against Illinois must be brought in the Court of Claims means that Illinois is immune from such claims in federal court). We note for the sake of completeness that such a claim may not be heard in federal court, regardless of the state’s limitations on its own tribunals, because federal courts may not entertain suits against states based on state

Case: 13-3421 Document: 40

Filed: 01/23/2015 Pages: 9

No. 13-3421

9

law. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
Sorrentino and Neal sued Director Godinez rather than Illinois, but this distinction is irrelevant. Sovereign immunity normally does not bar suits for injunctive relief in federal court alleging that a state official violated the federal constitution or laws. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But the plaintiffs are not asserting such a claim. Sorrentino claims only that the Director (acting for the state) breached a contract. The State Lawsuit Immunity Act forbids state-law suits outside of the Court of Claims that allege that the official merely “exceeded his authority by breaching a contract.” Smith v. Jones, 497 N.E.2d 738, 740–41 (Ill. 1986). Sovereign immunity and Pennhurst thus bar this claim in federal court, and the district court was correct to dismiss it. Once again, however, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. See Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006).
III
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Sorrentino and Neal’s Takings Clause and breach of contract claims. The judgment is modified, however, to be one without prejudice. While they may not refile this action in federal court, Sorrentino and Neal may seek to pursue their claims in the appropriate Illinois forum.

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-06757 Document #: 50 Filed: 02/17/15 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:179

Case: 13-3421 Document: 00712473442

Filed: 02/17/2015 Pages: 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov

January 23, 2015 Before:

FINAL JUDGMENT
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

JOSEPH SORRENTINO, et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants

No. 13-3421

v.

SALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Defendant - Appellee
Originating Case Information:
District Court No: 1:12-cv-06757 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Thomas M. Durkin

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Sorrentino and Neal’s Takings Clause and breach of contract claims. The judgment is modified, however, to be one without prejudice. While they may not refile this action in federal court, Sorrentino and Neal may seek to pursue their claims in the appropriate Illinois forum.
The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. Costs are assessed against the Appellants.

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-6757 As of: 02/23/2016 06:23 PM CST 1 of 5
TERMED,VALDEZ
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12−cv−06757

Sorrentino et al v. Godinez Assigned to: Honorable Thomas M. Durkin Demand: $1,000 Case in other court: 13−03421 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff Joseph Sorrentino on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated people
Plaintiff Labron C. Neal−Bey on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated people

Date Filed: 08/22/2012 Date Terminated: 10/03/2013 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Michael C Kasdin Dentons US LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 5900 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 368−4000 Email: michael.kasdin@dentons.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C. 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 201 Chicago, IL 60604−6107 (312) 427−3200 Email: knf@kenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60646 (773) 769−1411 Fax: 9773) 769−2224 Email: alanmills@comcast.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Kasdin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Salvador A. Godinez Director of the Illinois Department of

represented by James Patrick Doran Office of the Illinois Attorney General

Case: 1:12-cv-6757 As of: 02/23/2016 06:23 PM CST 2 of 5

Corrections

100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−7202 Email: jdoran@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Service List

represented by Illinois Department of Corrections 100 West Randolph, Suite 4−200 Chicago, IL 60601 Email: DOC.ILNDNotices@doc.illinois.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Prisoner Correspondence − Internal Use Only Email: Prison1_ILND@ilnd.uscourts.gov TERMINATED: 09/12/2012

Date Filed 08/22/2012 08/23/2012 08/23/2012 08/24/2012 09/12/2012
09/13/2012 10/03/2012
10/04/2012 10/22/2012 10/22/2012 10/22/2012 10/29/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Joseph Sorrentino, Labron C. Neal−Bey; Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 0752−7477790. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Mills, Alan) (Entered: 08/22/2012)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Maria Valdez. (daj, ) (Entered: 08/23/2012)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino by Alan S. Mills (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 08/24/2012)
4 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. Plaintiffs have paid the statutory filing fee and are represented by counsel. Plaintiffs' complaint has been screened pursuant to 28 § 1915A. Plaintiffs' complaint is accepted. Mailed notice (lw, ). (Entered: 09/13/2012)
5 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 9/13/2012. (jmp, ) (Entered: 09/17/2012)
6 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Initial status hearing is set to 9:00 a.m. on 11/5/12 before Judge Kennelly, in Chambers, Room 2188. Parties are to review and comply with Judge Kennelly's standing initial order, which may be found on his web page, located at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx. Counsel for plaintiff(s) are ordered to cause a copy of this order to be delivered forthwith to each defendant in the same manner that summons has been or is being served on each defendant. (mk) (Entered: 10/03/2012)
7 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Joseph Sorrentino, Labron C. Neal−Bey. Salvador A. Godinez waiver sent on 8/22/2012, answer due 10/22/2012. (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Salvador A. Godinez by James Patrick Doran (Doran, James) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
9 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A. Godinez for extension of time within which to answer (Doran, James) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
10 NOTICE of Motion by James Patrick Doran for presentment of extension of time 9 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 10/30/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Doran, James) (Entered: 10/22/2012)
11 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Defendant's motion for extension of time is granted. Response to complaint is to be filed by 11/30/12. The

Case: 1:12-cv-6757 As of: 02/23/2016 06:23 PM CST 3 of 5

11/30/2012 11/30/2012 12/04/2012
12/06/2012 01/14/2013 01/14/2013 01/14/2013
01/16/2013
01/17/2013
02/05/2013 02/05/2013 02/06/2013 03/05/2013

motion hearing date of 10/30/12 is vacated. The initial status hearing of 11/5/12 is also vacated and is reset to 12/4/12 at 9:00 a.m. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures are to be made by 11/30/12.Judicial staff mailed notice (gl, ) (Entered: 10/29/2012)
12 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Doran, James) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
13 NOTICE of Motion by James Patrick Doran for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 12 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 12/5/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Doran, James) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
14 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly:Status hearing pursuant to Rule 16(b) held. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures are to be made by 1/15/2013. : Response to motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 12 due by 1/15/2013; Reply is due by 2/5/2013. Status hearing continued to 2/26/2013 at 09:30 AM. Kenneth Flaxman has leave to file his appearance on behalf of plaintiff. (or, ) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
15 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino by Kenneth N Flaxman (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/06/2012)
16 MOTION by Plaintiffs Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino for extension of time to file response/reply as to terminate deadlines and hearings,, status hearing,, set motion and RRdeadlines/hearings, 14 (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
17 NOTICE of Motion by Alan S. Mills for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief,, 16 before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 1/22/2013 at 09:30 AM. (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
19 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that, pursuant to the Executive Committee Order entered on January 3, 2013, the civil cases on the attached list have been selected for reassignment to form the initial calendar of the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin, therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the attached list of 330 cases be reassigned to the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall become effective on Tuesday, January 15,2013. Case reassigned to the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 1/14/13. (ef, ) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
18 MINUTE entry before Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: Case having been reassigned to the initial calendar for Judge Thomas Durkin, status hearing set for 2/26/2013 and noticed motion hearing set for 1/22/2013 before Judge Kennelly, are vacated. Parties are to contact Judge Durkin's courtroom deputy, Sandy Newland to find out when Judge Durkin will hear the motion for extension of time. (or, ) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
20 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Motion for extension of time to 2/6/13 to file a response to defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 12 16 is granted. Responses due by 2/6/2013.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/17/2013)
21 MOTION by Plaintiffs Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino for extension of time to file Response to Motion to Dismiss (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 02/05/2013)
22 NOTICE of Motion by Alan S. Mills for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 21 before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 2/13/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 02/05/2013)
23 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Plaintiff's Motion for extension of time to 3/6/13 to file a response to defendant's motion to dismiss and to make their initial Rule 26 disclosures 21 is granted. No appearance required on 2/13/13.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
24 MOTION by Plaintiffs Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino for extension of time to file response/reply as to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 12 (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 03/05/2013)

Case: 1:12-cv-6757 As of: 02/23/2016 06:23 PM CST 4 of 5

03/05/2013 03/06/2013 03/06/2013 03/20/2013
04/17/2013 04/22/2013 05/10/2013 05/10/2013 05/13/2013
05/30/2013 05/30/2013 05/31/2013 05/31/2013 06/14/2013 07/22/2013 10/03/2013

25 NOTICE of Motion by Alan S. Mills for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 24 before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 3/12/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
26 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Motion for extension of time to file response is reset to 3/18/13 at 9:00 a.m.24] Status hearing set for 3/18/2013 at 09:00 AM. Status Report due by 3/14/2013.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/06/2013)
27 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:At the request of counsel the Status hearing and hearing on motion for extension of time 24 is reset for 3/20/2013 at 09:15 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/06/2013)
28 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Motion for extension of time to file response to motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 12 is granted. 24 Motion hearing held on 3/20/2013. Responses due by 4/17/2013 Replies due by 5/8/2013. Status hearing set for 6/19/2013 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
29 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:By agreement of the parties the time in which to file a response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 12 is due by 4/22/2013. Replies due by 5/13/2013.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
30 MEMORANDUM by Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 12 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
31 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A. Godinez for extension of time to file response/reply (Doran, James) (Entered: 05/10/2013)
32 NOTICE of Motion by James Patrick Doran for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 31 before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 5/16/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Doran, James) (Entered: 05/10/2013)
33 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Motion for extension of time to file reply to Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 12 31 is granted. Replies due by 5/31/2013. Status hearing reset for 7/8/2013 at 09:00 AM. The 6/19/13 status date is vacated. No appearance required on 5/16/13. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
34 MOTION by Defendant Salvador A. Godinez for extension of time to file response/reply as to memorandum in opposition to motion 30 (Doran, James) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
35 NOTICE of Motion by James Patrick Doran for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 34 before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 6/4/2013 at 09:00 PM. (Doran, James) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
36 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:Defendant's motion for extension of time to 6/17/13 to file a reply to defendant's motion to dismiss 12 is granted. 34 Replies due by 6/17/2013. No appearance required on 6/4/13. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 05/31/2013)
37 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:The 7/8/13 status date is vacated. Status hearing reset for 7/25/2013 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 05/31/2013)
38 REPLY by Salvador A. Godinez to memorandum in opposition to motion 30 to dismiss (Doran, James) (Entered: 06/14/2013)
39 MINUTE entry before Honorable Thomas M. Durkin: The 7/25/13 status date is vacated. The Court will rule by mail on the pending motion to dismiss. Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 07/22/2013)
40 Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the foregoing reasons, Director Godinez's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and Counts I, II, and III are dismissed with prejudice. 12 Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on

Case: 1:12-cv-6757 As of: 02/23/2016 06:23 PM CST 5 of 5

10/03/2013 10/29/2013
10/30/2013 10/30/2013 10/31/2013 11/12/2013 11/12/2013 07/10/2014 02/17/2015 02/17/2015 02/17/2015

10/3/2013:Mailed notice(srn, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
41 ENTERED JUDGMENT Signed on 10/3/2013:Mailed notice(srn, ) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
42 NOTICE of appeal by Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino regarding orders 41 Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 0752−8878068. (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 10/29/2013)
43 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record. (smm) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
44 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 42 . Notified counsel (smm) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
45 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 42 ; USCA Case No. 13−3421. (kj, ) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
46 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino (Kasdin, Michael) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
47 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Labron C. Neal−Bey, Joseph Sorrentino by Michael C Kasdin (Kasdin, Michael) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
48 LETTER from Albert Lee dated 7/7/14. (mr, ) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
49 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit USCA no. 13−3421 no record to be returned. (rb, ) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
50 MANDATE of USCA dated 1/23/2015 regarding notice of appeal 42 ; USCA No. 13−3421 (rb, ) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
51 OPINION from the USCA for the 7th; Argued 9/10/2014; Decided 1/23/2015 in USCA case no. 13−3421 (rb, ) (Entered: 02/18/2015)