2:80-cv-73581-JF Doc # 1468 Filed 10/30/03 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 3

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Supreme Court of the United States

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October 6, 2003

WilJium K. Suter
Clerk of the Court (202) •I7D-3011

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United States Co~ of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 524 Potter Stewart 'courthouse 100 East Fifth Street Cincinnati, OH 45202
Re: C. Pepper Moore v. Perry Johnson, et al. No. 02-11088 (Your No. 01-2247)

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OCT 2 1 2003
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Dear Clerk: The Court today entered the following order in the abov entitled case: The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

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 45 F.Supp.2d 584 (1999)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 80-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
March 18, 1999.
Neal Bush, Detroit, MI, Jeanne E. Mirer, Roy, Shecter, Bloomfield Hills, MI, Larry W. Bennett, Cox, Hodgman, Troy, MI, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, MI, Deborah A. LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI for Plaintiffs.
Thomas C. Nelson, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, Donald S. McGehee, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Tort Defense Division, Lansing, MI, Theodore E. Hughes, Janet Van Cleve, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, Leo H. Friedman, Michael A. Nickerson, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, Richard M.C. Adams, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Michigan Department of Attorney General Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, Jann R. Baugh, Michigan Department of Attorney General, International Trade & Agriculture Div., Lansing, MI, Ann Arbor, MI, Barbara A. Schmidt, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Mental Health Division, Lansing, MI, Lisa C. Ward, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER and ORDER OF TRANSFER
FEIKENS, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case continues to be subject to a defense motion to terminate its consent decree. Two state prison cases have been on my docket for many years. This case involves male inmates at the State Prison of Southern 585 Michigan (SPSM) in Jackson. A similar case, Glover et al. v. Johnson, *585 Case No. 77-71229, involves female inmates in Michigan prisons. In that case, the female inmates prevailed and remedial orders were entered to bring about parity. Recently in that case, I filed an opinion which brings it, hopefully, to a conclusion. I have long sought finality in both cases.
Congress has stated, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, that consent decrees which have been entered in prison cases in federal courts should be reconsidered and terminated if the statutory indications are met.
Commenting on this statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) has stated that "The interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison cases remain at all times with the judiciary." Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.1998). The consent decree in this case provides for an Out-of-Cell Activity Plan and for a Break-Up Plan, which seeks to correct alleged constitutional violations in the confinement of inmates.
SPSM was constructed many years ago when it was believed that it would be cost efficient to house all male inmates in one very large facility. It has frequently been referred to as the "Big House." It became apparent over time that many confinement problems were caused by housing all prisoners in one facility; consequently, the Break-Up Plan provided for in the consent decree sought to correct these conditions. The prison is now being restructured so that there will be five autonomous facilities, hereinafter referred to as Facilities A, B, C, D and E.

I conclude that where compliance with the consent decree has been achieved, those portions of the consent decree should be terminated. Heretofore, I have begun to do so.[1] I continue that process in this opinion and order. The Break-Up Plan (the Plan) in the consent decree has brought about compliance in many instances, and it is realistic to provide for termination of those aspects of the Plan which have achieved their goals.
II. BACKGROUND
The history of this case is stated in the previous decisions of this court. See, Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1113 (E.D.Mich.1996); 947 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Mich.1996); 933 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich.1996); 879 F.Supp. 743 (E.D.Mich.1995); 896 F.Supp. 697 (E.D.Mich.1995); 792 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.Mich.1992); 740 F.Supp. 433 (E.D.Mich.1990); 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D.Mich.1989); 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988).
In 1980, plaintiffs, inmates at SPSM, brought a class action against various state prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties entered into a court-approved consent decree designed to remedy the constitutional violations alleged in plaintiffs' complaint in 1985.[2] In 1996, defendants filed a motion to terminate the consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3). On November 1, 1996, I denied defendants' motion to terminate (947 F.Supp. 1100), finding that the relevant provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. On January 13, 1998, the Sixth Circuit reversed, Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943. That court concluded that the PLRA is constitutional and that the powers of the 586 federal courts are not restricted as the defendants contended. Accordingly, the *586 case has been remanded to me for consideration of the merits of defendants' motion to terminate.
A. FACILITIES SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT DECREE
The consent decree and concomitant Break-Up Plan encompass the former Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. According to the Plan, the Central Complex will be divided into five mostly autonomous facilities, Facilities A through E. These facilities are designated in the plan as follows:
FACILITY A: Physically comprised of the former Egeler Facility, this facility is designated to receive, process, evaluate, classify and place incoming male State prisoners. This facility also houses and provides services for prisoners from throughout the State who are receiving shortterm medical treatment rendered through Duane L. Waters Hospital, and provides custody, security and support services for the hospital.
FACILITY B: This facility is designated to house and provide services for prisoners classified as Level IV inmates, including prisoners in need of protective or segregated custody.
FACILITY C: This facility is designated to house and provide services for prisoners classified as Level V inmates, including prisoners in need of administrative segregation.
FACILITY D: This facility is designated to house and provide services for prisoners classified as Level I inmates, including sex offenders. Services for these prisoners include participation in public works programs and jobs outside the security perimeter when appropriate.

FACILITY E: This facility is designated to provide centralized food production, laundry, warehouse, vehicular maintenance, and some building maintenance operations to serve Facilities A through D.

Of these facilities, Facility B is the first prison to be opened. The renovations required under Section VIII., Management, of the consent decree have been completed. It consists of former cellblocks 4 and 5, and provides exercise, medical and dental areas, a school, a library, a dining hall and a gym, services available to inmates classified at security level four.

Defendants have repeatedly contended that these facilities, as they are completed, are "new" facilities and not part of the "Central Complex," and thus are not subject to the terms of the consent decree. In particular, defendants have argued that Facility B, because it is now complete, is not subject to the terms of the consent decree. I have previously rejected this notion:

Defendants also introduce the notion that the facilities resulting from the implementation of

Section VIII of the Decree are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Hadix Consent Decree.

However, defendants are obligated to implement all sections of the Consent Decree, including

Section VIII, until, pursuant to Section XII of the Decree, the court terminates jurisdiction.

Furthermore, I previously ordered, in the Order accepting Consent Judgment (dated May 13,

1985), that physical or operational modification of the facilities located within the walls of SPSM

does not affect the jurisdiction of this court, especially when the process of modification was

587

anticipated by and conducted under the jurisdiction of the court. *587 Hadix v. Johnson, 896

F.Supp. 697, 704 n. 8 (E.D.Mich.1995). In that opinion, I also ordered that all references in the

Out-of-Cell Activity Plan to "Central Complex" be changed to "Facilities subject to the Hadix

Decree" in an attempt to settle that matter. Id., at 705. I reiterate that Facilities A-E, including the

completed Facility B, are Hadix facilities, subject to the consent decree.

III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TERMINATE

I now turn to defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree as it pertains to these facilities.

A. Facility A

Despite the deadline and timetable for completion, which I ordered based on defendants' proposal and their agreement, the major work on Facility A has not yet begun. In a letter dated January 8, 1999,[3] defendants have proposed a substitute plan, to replace the court-approved plan, and have stated that renovations to this facility are subject to obtaining legislative approval for funding.
This is most troubling, since the defendants had previously represented to me at the time of the original project approval that funds were available for the entire project. Furthermore, there is already in place an agreement by the defendants, expressly stated by the then-director of the Department of Corrections, Kenneth McGinnis, that if modifications of plans for this (or any other) facility were necessary, those modifications could be approved by the SPSM Decentralization Team (SDT)[4], and further consideration by me would be unnecessary. I have already authorized SDT to approve such changes.
In any event, because of the special nature of this facility, I find that the evaluation of the adequacy of defendants' alternative proposal is best left to a determination of this matter at an upcoming health care compliance hearing before Judge Enslen. Evaluation of defendants' proposed alternatives is primarily a medical issue, involving assessments of the effect that such proposed changes would have on unclassified prisoners and prisoners with severe or chronic medical conditions who are housed in this facility.
Jurisdiction, therefore, is transferred to Chief Judge Enslen of the Western District of Michigan, subject to his approval.[5]

B. Facility B

On June 25, 1998, the Court Monitor, Dr. F. Warren Benton, filed a Compliance Evaluation as to the renovations of the former 4 and 5 cellblocks and related programs. Facility B, which is also known as the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, is currently re-occupied and operational. Based on recommendations contained in the Court Monitor's report and the responses filed by the parties, I conducted an on-site hearing on December 10, 1998. At the hearing, each of Dr. Benton's findings was reviewed.

I find that there has been substantial compliance with nearly all of the provisions of the consent decree; the provisions of the consent decree are therefore terminated with the following exceptions:

First, section I, paragraphs P (Water Temperature), Q (Temperature in Housing), and S (Ventilation) are not terminated. These paragraphs read as follows:

P. Water

588

*588 Hot water (within 6° F of 110° F) and cold water shall be provided in all cells, sinks and

showers.

Q. Temperatures

Inmates will be housed in cells where the temperature is healthy and safe in any season. Temperatures in activity areas similarly shall be maintained healthy and safe. The Department will monitor and record the temperatures on housing unit base floors and highest galleries, and take whatever reasonable steps are necessary to assure safe and healthy temperatures.

S. Ventilation

The Department, within fourteen (14) months after the entry of the Judgment, shall provide ventilation of seven (7) cubic feet per minute per inmate. In summer months, a mechanical exhaust system shall operate to exhaust a total of 54 cubic feet per minute in each cell block.

These paragraphs set forth the general and technical requirements for safe and healthy prison conditions regarding both water and air temperature, as well as air quality. I conclude that as of December 10, 1998, problems still exist in each of these areas. There is not, however, sufficient evidence whether the continued noncompliance constitutes serious health risks of constitutional dimension to the prisoners housed in Facility B. To determine potential harmful effects on prisoners, or sufficiency of attempts to mitigate these possible harmful effects, evidence must be produced as to the extent of non-compliance (for example, how high are the temperatures in the summer months), the medical condition of any prisoners affected, and the effectiveness of any further efforts to mitigate problems that still exist. Like the issues in Facility A, these issues are essentially medical issues, and can be considered by Judge Enslen at an upcoming health care compliance hearing. Therefore, jurisdiction over these three paragraphs of the consent decree is transferred to Judge Enslen, subject to his approval.

Second, termination of the consent decree with respect to the Break-Up Plan does not affect the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, referenced in the consent decree in Section IV. paragraph H.2. The Out-of-Cell Activity Plan remains in effect, and will be the subject of a further hearing.

Finally, while the provisions of the Break-Up Plan in the consent decree are terminated with respect to Facility B, it is likely that a final compliance evaluation of Facility E (food service) will require access to Facility B for the purpose of evaluating food service quality associated with Facility A.

C. Facilities C, D and E
Facilities C, D and E, unlike Facility B, have yet to be completed under the provisions of the Break-Up Plan. Nonetheless, under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3), supervision of these facilities will terminate now, subject to the following three conditions:
(1) Defendants must demonstrate that the renovation projects of Facilities C, D and E have reached a point of inevitability (substantial completion).
(2) If there is a variance from the approved Break-Up Plan, it must be shown to be de minimis, or that the variance has been approved by the SDT.
(3) A hearing must be held demonstrating substantial compliance following the same procedure as has been utilized for the termination of the Break-Up Plan as to Facility B.
This approach meets the requirements of the PLRA, in that without the need for a further hearing to determine whether constitutional violations exist, this procedure, already successfully implemented as to Facility B, provides for minimal intrusion by me, the Court Monitor, or plaintiffs. Compliance can be monitored through the SDT.
589 *589 I find that these three conditions are the least intrusive, most narrowly drawn conditions on which I can terminate the consent decree. Defendants have been given previous opportunities to terminate the consent decree simply by demonstrating the inevitability of the renovations and assuring me of their substantial compliance, and they need only satisfy the three conditions set out above to terminate the consent decree now.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX A
590 *590
591 *591
PROPOSED RENOVATIONS TO THE EGELER CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (FACILITY A)
Set out below are the renovations which the Department believes are necessary for efficient operation of the Egeler Correctional Facility as a reception center. Except where it is indicated that funding is currently available, all renovations are subject to obtaining legislative approval for funding to accomplish them.
0905 Security Data Loop0907Duress System and Fence System Upgrade 0907This involves enhancements to the facility's security systems.
0905 Cell Blocks 1, 2 and 30907Ventilation System0907Install access hatches to allow servicing of the ventilation system.
0905 Cell Blocks 1, 2 and 30907Plumbing Stacks0907New plumbing stacks will be installed in all three cell blocks. This project is funded for FY 99.
0905 Cell Block 30907Electrical Work0907This cell block will be re-wired. This project is funded for FY 99.
0905 Handicap Accessible Cells and Shower Area0907Twenty-four handicap accessible cells will be constructed in Cell Block 1 and the shower area will be modified for handicap use.
0905 Special Management Cells A 0907 number of cells will be modified in both Cell Blocks 1 and 2 for use by high 592 security prisoners. The changes will include solid *592 cell fronts, stainless steel toilets and sinks, and high
security beds.

0905 Modifications to Building 142 (Programs)0907Additional space will be added for intake processing and a sally port will be constructed. The additional space will include holding cells, medical interview rooms, property and clothing storage and processing rooms, and processing areas.
0905 Modifications to Building 141 (Food Service)0907Walls will be built to separate the serving lines from the dining area.
0905 Modifications to Building 140 (Administration)0907The Control Center will be enlarged and improved, and noncontact visiting booths will be added to the visiting area.
ORDER OF TRANSFER
In my June 5, 1992 order of transfer, I transferred the mental health provisions and medical health provisions (Sections II.B. and II.A., respectively) of the Hadix consent decree to the Honorable Richard A. Enslen, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan. Those sections of the consent decree were related to another case before Judge Enslen, United States v. Michigan, File No. 1:84:CV:63. I transferred jurisdiction "for the sake of uniformity, and in the hope of attaining finality," and because transfer would "permit Judge Enslen to conduct combined evidentiary hearings" and avoid "duplicative proceedings."
In my March 18, 1999, opinion and order, I considered defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree. I found substantial compliance with some of the provisions of the consent decree and concomitant Break-Up Plan, and those provisions have been terminated. The March 18, 1999 opinion finds, however, that several provisions of the consent decree will require further hearings before the determination can be made as to whether termination is appropriate. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1404(a), I now ORDER that, as to former cell blocks four and five, now known as Facility B, the following provisions of the consent decree are transferred to Judge Enslen in the Western District of Michigan:
I.P. Water
Hot water (within 6° F of 110° F) and cold water shall be provided in all cells, sinks and showers.
I.Q. Temperatures
Inmates will be housed in cells where the temperature is healthy and safe in any season. Temperatures in activity areas similarly shall be maintained healthy and safe. The Department will monitor and record the temperatures on housing unit base floors and highest galleries, and take whatever reasonable steps are necessary to assure safe and healthy temperatures.
I.S. Ventilation
The Department, within fourteen (14) months after the entry of the Judgment, shall provide ventilation of seven (7) cubic feet per minute per inmate. In summer months, a mechanical exhaust system shall operate to exhaust a total of 54 cubic feet per minute in each cell block.
Pursuant to § 1404(a), and in accordance with my March 18, 1999 opinion and order, I also ORDER that, as to Facility A, the determination of the adequacy of defendants' proposed alternatives to the Break-Up Plan is transferred to Judge Enslen.
While these provisions are not "on their face" medical issues, the pertinent legal question in each case will be whether continued noncompliance (or in the case of Facility A, substitution of defendants' proposed alternatives) endangers the health of prison inmates. At an upcoming hearing, Judge Enslen will receive medical evidence from the same expert witnesses who can best address these issues.
ACCORDINGLY, in order to again avoid duplicative hearings and in the hope of attaining finality, Sections I.P, I.Q. 593 and *593 I.S. as to Facility B as well as defendants' proposed alternatives as to Facility A are transferred to Judge
Enslen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for further proceedings as he deems appropriate. All other provisions of

the Hadix consent decree, to the extent that they are not terminated by my March 18, 1999 opinion, remain under the jurisdiction of this court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] See Order Denying Defendant's Motion Seeking Modification Of The 1985 Out-Of-Cell Activity Provision Of The Hadix Consent Decree, April 7, 1995.
[2] The consent decree states:
The complaint in this case alleges that the rights of the Plaintiffs secured by the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated. The provisions contained herein are intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSM-CC. (emphasis added).
[3] The January 8, 1999, letter and the attached proposal are included as Appendix A.
[4] The SDT is comprised of three representatives chosen by defendants and one representative chosen by plaintiffs.
[5] On June 5, 1992, this court transferred provisions of this case relating to medical and mental health care to Judge Enslen because of their potential relationship to a related case.
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 947 F.Supp. 1100 (1996)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 80-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
November 1, 1996.
1101 *1101 Patricia A. Streeter, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Susan Przekop-Shaw and Leo Friedman, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
FEIKENS, District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Issues
Defendants move to terminate relief ordered by a consent decree entered into and approved by me in 1985. Numerous remedial orders were triggered by the mandates of the consent decree. References to these matters are recorded in Hadix cases: 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988), 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D.Mich.1989), 740 F.Supp. 433 (E.D.Mich.1990), 792 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.Mich. 1992), and 896 F.Supp. 697 (E.D.Mich.1995).
Defendants' motion is based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or "the Act"), effective as of April 26, 1996. The specific section of the Act on which defendants rely is 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), which reads:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervenor shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. Defendants contend that § 3626(b)(3)[1] does not apply to this case. Intervenor,[2] the U.S. Department of Justice, contends that § 3626(b)(3) is applicable and that, without it, the statute is unconstitutional.
Thus defendants and the intervenor raise two issues and both must be addressed. Defendants argue that the Act terminates the consent decree and orders stemming from the decree because the consent decree was not based on findings by the court that the relief afforded was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal rights involved, and is not the least intrusive means to correct the violation of the Federal right.
Intervenor argues that what saves the termination provisions of the Act from being unconstitutional is § 3626(b) 1102 (3), which prohibits termination if the court makes findings of constitutional violations and then uses the *1102
requisite tests to determine whether such relief shall continue.
Plaintiffs argue that the PLRA violates separation of powers principles, as well as their due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. I need only address one of these issues: Is the constitutional

doctrine of separation of powers implicated in the PLRA as the defendants and the intervenor seek to apply it to this case?
Also pending before me on remand is defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 (b), on which I originally ruled in an opinion on March 14, 1995.

B. Hadix Consent Decree

In 1980 a complaint was filed by prisoners of the State Prison of Southern Michigan ("SPSM") against officials of the State of Michigan alleging that conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs were certified as a class in 1981, and ten other cases filed between 1979 and 1985 raising similar issues were consolidated with Hadix. In 1985, after numerous conferences between the parties, a comprehensive consent decree was entered into, filed, and approved by me.

A sampling of prison cases reveals that the constitutionality of the areas at the heart of this judgment continue to be extensively litigated in other jurisdictions throughout this nation. See, for example, the following cases raising constitutional issues obviated by the consent decree here:

Sanitation, Safety and Health: Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (While the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, "neither does it permit inhumane ones." Since inmates are forced to be there, and are stripped "of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid" prison officials "are not free to let the state of nature take its course.");

Health Care: Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D.Cal.1995) (Where prison official hired a visiting psychiatrist for periodic visits and then substituted a psychiatrist who resigned after one month, further substitution of nine on-call psychiatrists still did not meet the mental health needs of prisoners in a population of 1,000 to 1,500 in the Security Housing Unit alone.);

Fire Safety: Masonoff v. DuBois, 899 F.Supp. 782, 789 (D.Mass.1995) ("There is no question that fire safety is a legitmate concern under the Eighth Amendment....");

Overcrowding and Protection from Harm: LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1993) (Pervasive risk of harm was found where prisoners were exposed to constant violence in dark, overcrowded cells.); Smith v. Norris, 877 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.Ark.1995) (Prison must take reasonable measures to protect inmates, including regular spot checks of open barracks.); Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370 (8th Cir. 1993) (Work assignments are considered conditions of confinement subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.);

Access to Courts: McMaster v. Minnesota, 819 F.Supp. 1429 (D.Minn.1993), aff'd, 30 F.3d 976 (8th Cir.1994) (Where plaintiffs allege specific actions, such as ransacking the cells of plaintiffs and layoffs in prisoner-staffed jobs, taken by prison officials to deter their lawsuit, a claim has been stated upon which relief may be granted.); Hodges v. Jones, 873 F.Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (While jailhouse lawyers do not have a constitutional right to that status, they may challenge any official action which impedes them from aiding other prisoners);

Food Service: Williams v. Coughlin, 875 F.Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y.1995) (Where prisoner alleged that he was denied food for two consecutive days, an Eighth Amendment challenge may be mounted.);

Management: Smith v. Norris, 877 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.Ark.1995) (Where 92 prison guard positions were needed for adequate supervision of open barracks, an Eighth Amendment violation existed.);

1103

Mail: Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir.1994) (Prison's policy of treating mail to inmate from state Attorney General as ordinary mail and opening *1103 it was invalid, as it burdened inmate's First Amendment rights.); and Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3d. Cir.1995) ("The pattern

and practice of opening plaintiff's properly marked incoming mail outside his presence ... violates the Constitution.")[3]
The parties themselves found the purpose of the decree so important that they spelled it out in Paragraph 3 of the introduction to the decree: "The provisions contained herein are intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSM-CC."
The significance of this consent decree[4] can not be overstated. The plaintiff class and the defendant, Michigan Department of Corrections, with this court's involvement, labored between 1981 and 1985 to reach an agreement which recognized the existence of constitutional violations in prison conditions and spelled out terms in intricate detail as to how these conditions would be remedied. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) such a consent decree or judgment does not require court findings. U.S. v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.1979). The consent judgment's terms provide for the judgment without the necessity of making constitutional findings. Such a judgment has the same res judicata effect as a judgment after trial unless there is a reservation of issues discerned from the four corners of the decree. Epic Metals Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855, 110 S.Ct. 160, 107 L.Ed.2d 117 (1989).
It would therefore be improper to conclude from this settlement that no constitutional violations exist. The strength of a consent decree is that it allows parties to save the exhausting time, money, and resources involved in making this finding of past violations in order to concentrate on present conditions.[5] By now requiring termination of this judgment unless those constitutional findings are made, the PLRA imperiously transforms a consent decree's strength into a nullity.
If violations no longer exist at SPSM, the consent decree can be terminated according to its own terms. The judgment provides that "[a]fter Defendants have complied with all of the provisions of this Consent Judgment, Defendants may apply to terminate the jurisdiction of the Court." Consent Decree, § XI, 33. Consistent with this possibility, I have repeatedly sought to secure finality. In a March 14, 1995 opinion, I ruled that I would consider defendants' motion for termination of this judgment upon a review of their substantial compliance with the terms of this decree within 60 days of December 31, 1996.
C. Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion for Modification
In 1994 defendants filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for modification of the consent decree. Based on the testimony of the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Warden of SPSM that they could no longer 1104 comply with certain elements of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, I held that *1104 modification was required and relieved defendants of certain requirements altogether. Specifically, I eliminated the requirement for a capacity of prisoners in the Hadix facilities as well as the requirement for a specific proportion of capacity for levels of segregation. Modification also included adjusting percentage requirements for compliance, substituting comparable groups for involvement in activities, and changing yard assignments. Last, to facilitate finality, I held: "For any provision of the plan involving a numerical measure of compliance, defendants may demonstrate compliance for each Hadix facility separately, or for all Hadix facilities considered in combination."
D. Rufo Standard for Modification
My determination that some modification was appropriate because of significant changes in factual circumstances was mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). In that case, the Court held that "[m]odification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous." Id., 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. Faced with a consent decree which provided for construction of a new jail with single cells and a motion by the prison officials under Rule 60(b) to modify the consent decree to allow double-bunking in the new jail, the Court, in a 6-2 opinion, held that a party seeking modification of a consent decree can do so by showing a significant change in fact or in law. If this standard is met, it is the court's

responsibility to ensure that "the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." Id., 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 760.
The Court illuminated this standard by citing three situations in which lower courts correctly modified a consent decree: 1) "when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous"; 2) "when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles"; or 3) "when enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest". Id., 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. The Court also refused to limit modification to only those situations in which unforeseen changes occurred. Id., 502 U.S. at 385, 112 S.Ct. at 760-61.
I note with emphasis the Court's mandate that "[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor." Id., 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. at 764. Instead, once a court finds that modification is required, it should focus solely on whether the proposed modification best suits the change in circumstances. Id., The Court's reasoning is critical to this case: "A court should do no more, for a consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent that equity requires" (emphasis added). Id., 502 U.S. at 392, 112 S.Ct. at 764.
The Court then added:
Within these constraints, the public interest and considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system require that the district court defer to local government administrators, who have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving the problems of institutional reform, to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification.
Id., 502 U.S. at 392, 112 S.Ct. at 764 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Thus the Rufo decision represents a determination by the Supreme Court how to weigh the vested rights of inmates seeking enforcement of consent decrees in institutional reform settings against the public's right of local control over their institutions without the unnecessary supervision of the federal judiciary.
Through the PLRA, Congress has in effect declared that that determination does not act swiftly and decisively enough in one specific area of institutional reform. The PLRA completely re-writes the standard for modification in prison litigation, making consent decrees subject to the constitutional floor 0907 in direct contrast to Rufo. As I will discuss more fully below, the PLRA's requirement that a court make new findings for a consent decree, already ordered, represents an unjustifiable encroachment of the legislative and executive branches into the domain of 1105 the judiciary. For these reasons, I find *1105 §§ 3626(b) and (c) of the PLRA unconstitutional.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF CONSENT DECREES
The Rufo decision took consent decrees in institutional reform cases out of the confines of the strict standard for modification of consent decrees first enunciated by Justice Cardozo in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). I review the Supreme Court's treatment of consent decrees not only for a clearer understanding of what the law is, but also for a better understanding of the unique, and changing, nature of consent decrees.
A. The Grievous Wrong Test
In Swift, the leading meatpackers in the nation were charged by the government of violating the Sherman AntiTrust Act. These charges were resolved by a consent decree which stipulated that it shall not "be considered as an adjudication that the defendants, or any of them, have in fact violated any law of the United States." Id., 286 U.S. at 111, 52 S.Ct. at 461. In exchange, the decree enjoined the meatpackers from participating in a number of transactions that would have the effect of restraining trade and commerce. In 1930, the defendants filed a petition to modify the consent decree, claiming the conditions that justified entering the decree in 1920 had become "useless and oppressive." Id., 286 U.S. at 113, 52 S.Ct. at 462.

The Court recognized that even if the consent decree did not retain the power to modify itself by its terms, a court would still possess the power to adapt the decree under the inherent powers of its chancery jurisdiction. Id., 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S.Ct. at 462. In making this determination, the Court explicitly rejected the view that a consent decree "is to be treated as a contract and not as a judicial act." Id., 286 U.S. at 115, 52 S.Ct. at 462.
Most important in this case is the standard the Court adopted for modifying a consent decree. The Court first limited the scope of the inquiry:
We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting.... The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow.
Id., 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464. The Court then stated that the decree should not be changed absent a "clear showing of grievous wrong." Id. This was a burden the defendants could not meet. Over the next six decades, the grievous wrong test proved to be a formidable obstacle to modifying consent decrees in cases where a change in circumstances may have warranted it.
B. The Consent Decree's Statutory Basis

In two such cases, the Supreme Court circumvented the grievous wrong test by emphasizing the statutory basis underlying the consent decree and adhering to that. In System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961), a consent decree was entered into as a result of a pattern of discrimination by the defendant railroad and labor union against non-union employees. At the time, the Railway Labor Act prohibited union shops. The decree, entered in 1945, settled the claims of 28 non-union employees by releasing the railroad and union from all claims of discrimination against them in consideration of a $5,000 payment to each plaintiff and an injunction against further discrimination. Six years later the Railway Labor Act was amended to permit union shops, and the union moved to modify the consent decree under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b).

Avoiding the grievous wrong test, the Court ruled that a court's power to adopt a consent decree does not stem from the consideration exchanged between the parties, but from the statute the decree was designed to enforce. Thus the parties in this case were only incidental to enforcement of the Railway Labor Act, and the court "must be free to continue to further the objectives of that Act when its provisions are amended." Id., 364 U.S. at 651, 81 S.Ct. at 373. The Court concluded:

1106

The parties could not become the conscience of the equity court and decide for it *1106 once and for all what was equitable and what was not, because the court was not acting to enforce a promise but to enforce a statute.

Id., 364 U.S. at 652-653, 81 S.Ct. at 373. The consent decree was therefore modified, not because a grievous wrong had been shown, but because adherence to the underlying law required it.

This approach was revisited in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). There a class action was certified charging that the Memphis, Tennessee Fire Department and certain city officials were engaged in a pattern of discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. A consent decree was entered into in 1980 in which the City denied violating any laws, rules, or regulations, as the plaintiffs charged. The consent decree also made provisions for the hiring and promotion of more blacks in the fire department; it did not contain any provisions regarding layoffs or reductions in rank.

One year after the consent decree was signed, city budget deficits required layoffs of employees, and the most recently hired employees were laid off first 0907 a method which had the effect of vitiating the progress in hiring and promoting blacks made under the consent decree. The district court therefore granted an injunction blocking layoffs that would have a racially discriminatory effect. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, phrasing the issue not as one of a preliminary injunction, but as a modification of the consent decree. 679 F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir.1982).

The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower courts, held that modification of the consent decree in this manner would be in violation of Title VII absent a finding that the seniority system was established with discriminatory intent or a finding that the modification was necessary to make whole a victim of discrimination. Id., 467 U.S. at 561 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2586 n. 9. In strictly adhering to the law that gave rise to the consent decree, the Court avoided the change in circumstances that may have warranted modification, but clearly did not constitute a grievous wrong.
C. The Contractual Nature of Consent Decrees
In Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986), the Court elaborated on the consent decree's contractual undertakings of the parties' intentions. In that case, a consent decree settling discrimination claims was entered between the City of Cleveland and a group of Hispanic and Black firefighters over the objection of the firefighters' union. The Supreme Court ruled that a district court could issue a consent decree even if it might not have been able to do so after trial under applicable provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In doing so, it discussed the "hybrid nature" of consent decrees and rejected the union's position that a consent decree was an order contemplated by the Civil Rights Act. It stated:
[C]onsent decrees "have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes.... The question is not whether we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judgment," for we can do both.
Id., 478 U.S. at 519, 106 S.Ct. at 3073, quoting United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235 -237 and n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 926, 934 and n. 10, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975).
Thus consent decrees evolved from not being contractual in nature in Swift to being recognized as contractual in ITT. A change in circumstances allowed for modification by adherence to the underlying statute in Local 93, but not in Stotts. Throughout this evolution, the Swift grievous wrong test remained intact 0907 and imposing.
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), the Court held that the grievous wrong test did not apply in school desegregation cases. Although this 1107 case involved a desegregation decree, and not a consent decree, the Court, *1107 in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, required only that the school district show that it was acting in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and that it was unlikely to return to its policies of segregation. It reasoned:
Considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system, we think, support our view that quoted language from Swift does not provide the proper standard to apply to injunctions entered in school desegregation cases. Such decrees, unlike the one in Swift, are not intended to operate in perpetuity. Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in decision-making, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs.
Id., 498 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. at 637. The lingering question of how to reconcile the pull between the need to give lasting effect to consent decrees and the constitutional requirement to return power over local institutions to the local government was resolved by the Court one year later in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, supra.
D. Rufo's Resolution of Competing Interests
In Rufo, the Supreme Court explained that consent decrees were not intended to act as a herculean hurdle in the way of local governments trying to maintain control of their institutions. The Court in Swift, noted the Court in Rufo, observed the different situations giving rise to a consent decree:
The distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative.... The

consent is to be read as directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment of the right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become necessary in adaptation to events to be.
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379-380, 112 S.Ct. at 758, quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-115, 52 S.Ct. at 462-463.
The ability of a court to allow room for a decree to meet changing circumstances has assumed a more pressing need through the years. As the Court explained in Rufo:
The upsurge in institutional reform litigation since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), has made the ability of a district court to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances all the more important. Because such decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased. The experience of the District Courts of Appeals in implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation.... The Courts of Appeals have also observed that the public interest is a particularly significant reason for applying a flexible modification standard in institutional reform litigation because such decrees "reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public's right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions."
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380-381, 112 S.Ct. at 758-759 (citations omitted), quoting Heath v. DeCourcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir.1989).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has resolved the conflict between the public and private rights involved in public reform litigation. The public's right in maintaining control over its institutions is protected through modification of a consent decree when a change in circumstances so requires. The parties' right to rely on a court order is protected by the limitation precluding a court, or Congress, from stripping a consent decree down to the constitutional floor.
III. REQUIREMENTS AND EFFECT OF THE PLRA
In spite of the clear requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in Rufo for modification of a consent decree as circumstances compel, the role of the federal judiciary in prison litigation cases was sought to be completely revised through the PLRA. To what extent a court's jurisdiction has been changed by the PLRA is a source of 1108 contention *1108 between the defendants and the intervenor United States.
A. The Different Interpretations of Defendants and Intervenor
Defendants contend that § 3626(b)(3) of the PLRA does not even apply in the present situation. According to defendants, when a decree has been entered without the findings required by § 3626(b)(2), the court's inquiry need go no further; termination is required at that point.[6]
Intervenor states in its brief that this interpretation raises "a serious constitutional question." To avoid the constitutional issues, intervenor argues that the finding of a current or ongoing violation a Federal right under the PLRA "encompasses not only unlawful conduct that is actually in progress at the very moment the court rules, but also failure to remedy the proximate effects of past unlawful acts." (Intervenor's Brief at 16.) It contends that a consent decree can continue if a constitutional violation has not been fully remedied or that the defendant is poised to resume the unconstitutional conduct. Thus intervenor's position is that the PLRA does not require new findings to be made regarding settled orders as much as it requires a court to tailor the decree to satisfy the PLRA standards.
The problem with intervenor's position is that some finding of past unlawful acts is still required 0907 a finding that consent decrees were designed to avoid:

Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation. Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971).
Even under intervenor's less stringent reading of the Act, I am still required to open a final judgment to make findings that both parties agreed was in their best interest to circumvent. This fact is not changed by intervenor's position that "the record may include supplemental information that is presented to the court" when additional evidence is necessary (Intervenor's Brief at 14 n. 5), for I would still need to make findings of unlawful conduct. The "careful negotiation" that has gone into this decree; the parties' strategy to save "time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation"; the compromises made in exchange for giving up a risk; and the resulting decree 1109 embodying each party's bargaining power are all made futile by a *1109 requirement to make these findings. Thus the PLRA cuts a swath through the judicial process. Under the analysis of either intervenors or defendants, I am still required by the PLRA to reopen this judgment to make findings that are antithetical to it.
B. The Effect of Prospective Relief
This fact is not changed by the Act's references to "prospective relief." The Act defines prospective relief as "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). The enabling provision stipulates that § 3626 "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title." Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (§ 802(b)(1)) 178.
The Act's use of the term "prospective relief" masks the real issue. Injunctive relief affects conditions as they arise. Past injunctive relief cannot be changed as time cannot be turned back. The issue then is this: can injunctive relief based on past negotiations, cost assessments, and compromises between parties be overturned by an act of Congress?
I conclude that it is not prospective relief that is being altered, but the consent judgment itself. A court possesses the power to modify a consent decree to fit a substantial change in fact or in law. Rufo, supra. Extending modification of a decree by a court to the virtual termination of an entire group of decrees by Congress exceeds the limits of congressional authority.
There is no question but that Congress possesses the right to determine the jurisdiction of the lower courts. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1. Whether it can preclude district courts from ever exercising jurisdiction in a particular area, such as prison litigation, is a highly debated topic (see, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr., Dialogue, 66 Harvard Law Review 1362 (1953)), but that is not the issue here. Through the PLRA, Congress is attempting to rescind a consent decree entered in this court eleven years ago. This, Congress cannot do.
IV. THE PLRA'S VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
A. Plaut's Application to this Case
Sections 3626(b)(2) and (3) represent an unconstitutional intrusion by Congress into the domain of the judiciary. "A legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, ___, 115 S.Ct.

1447, 1455, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995), quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 545 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Ruling on a similar action by Congress last year, the Supreme Court concluded that "[b]y retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated [the] fundamental principle" that Congress cannot reverse a court's decision. Plaut, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1453.
The Supreme Court in Plaut was confronted with legislation which circumscribed the Court's previous decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2782, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). In that case, the Court held that particular types of securities suits were subject to a three-year statute of limitation after the violation and a one-year statute of limitation after discovery of the violation. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision, Congress amended the statute in question to allow suits that would not have been time-barred before the decision in Lampf. The law, then, opened for adjudication suits which were effectively closed by the decision in Lampf. The Supreme Court held Congress' action unconstitutional, stating:
Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case of controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was.
1110 Plaut, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1457. Similarly, the PLRA applies law to the consent *1110 decree at issue here that was clearly not the law when it was entered into.
The Plaut decision issued a clarion call that the separation of powers doctrine must be strictly adhered to: The doctrine "is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict." Id., 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1447.
Despite this strong language, the Court twice intimated that its decision may not apply to prospective relief, thereby raising a question whether the rationale of Plaut extends to consent decrees such as the one at issue here. First, in response to the dissent's assertion that statutes do exist that retroactively open final judgments as an "ordinary product of the exercise of legislative power," the Court defended its interpretation of the statute cited by dissent as "consistent with the only case the dissent cites, which involved a court-ordered consent decree not yet fully executed. Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 734, 738-739 (2d Cir.1988)." Id., 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1461. This language could be construed as authorizing legislative action over consent decrees whose injunctive effect is ongoing.
However, the scope of §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3) extends too far to fit into the narrow exception that could be inferred from Plaut. The Court in Plaut noted that the statutes involved in Dow did not necessitate adjudication of previously settled claims. Dow involved a curative statute which allowed for the award of attorney fees in suits for handicapped children after the Court held in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), that such fees were not available from the underlying statute. The Court in Plaut observed that the amendment allowing fees "says nothing about reopening final judgments, and the retroactivity provision may well mean nothing more than that it applied not merely to new suits commenced after the date of its enactment, but also to previously filed (but not yet terminated) suits", of which Dow is an example. Plaut, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1461.
The second point in Plaut which raised a question regarding its application to consent decrees was the Court's declaration that "Congress could undoubtedly enact prospective legislation permitting, or indeed requiring, this Court to make equitable exceptions to an otherwise applicable rule of finality, just as district courts do pursuant to Rule 60(b)." Id., 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1462. The provisions of the PLRA at issue here are indisputably retroactive in application. I therefore find that the rationale of Plaut applies to the separation of powers issues raised by § 3626(b)(2) and (3) of the PLRA.

B. The Meaning of Finality
By distinguishing different types of finality, defendants and intervenors hope to break the link between Plaut's holding that final judgments cannot be reopened by Congress and Rufo's holding that a consent decree is a final judgment. According to this argument, the jurisprudence developed regarding consent decrees, as epitomized in Rufo, involves a court's inherent power, which can be overridden by Congress, as opposed to its constitutional power, which cannot, as shown in Plaut. The accuracy of this distinction is vital to resolving the clash between Rufo's mandate that a consent decree not be pared down to the constitutional floor and the PLRA's requirement that it be so.
In Carlisle v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613. (1996), the Court refused to allow a district judge, under the inherent powers of the court, to grant a motion filed one day late under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). Similarly, the Court ruled in Degen v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996), that a district court could not use its inherent powers to apply to a doctrine that had been developed and applied in criminal cases to a civil forfeiture case. Both these cases, then, involve the question of a district court judge's power to act without the authorization of a statute or the Supreme Court. In these situations, the Supreme Court has clearly limited a district court's exercise of its inherent power.
1111 *1111 Just as clearly, that is not the situation here. I apply the law here regarding the power of a district court to modify its orders as it has been developed over the course of two centuries and crystallized in Rufo. My decision is not grounded on inherent authority but on constitutional authority. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Nor can it be said that the law regarding the modification of consent decrees, as developed by the Supreme Court, merely expresses a court's inherent power and is therefore subject to congressional override. Nothing could be more important to the exercise of a court's Article III power than the power to enforce a decision. To the extent that this power can be characterized as inherent, it is indispensably inherent. "Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice, from the nature of their institution.... To fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, enforce the observance of order, & c., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others ...." United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) (emphasis added). In abrogating a court's power to enforce one of its orders, Congress has invaded one of the most vital constitutional powers of the judiciary.
C. Principles Behind The Separation of Powers Doctrine
Consent decrees have been used by government agencies and private entities as the most expeditious route to resolution on a variety of issues, including the improvement of special education programs, the desegregation of schools systems, the cleanup of toxic wastes, the reformulation of exclusionary zoning lines, and the betterment of mental health institutions. Vitiating the finality of consent decrees in the area of prison reform makes the consent decrees in all other areas equally subject to congressional judgment, thus chilling a party's incentive to enter into one. Reform in these areas would consequently be impeded.
This danger was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution in warning that the accumulation of power in any one branch "may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Not favoritism, nor even corruption, but power is the object of the separation-of-powers prohibition. The prohibition is violated when an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very best of reasons, such as the legislator's genuine conviction (supported by all the law professors in the land) that the judgment was wrong; and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments are legislatively dissolved.
Plaut, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1457.

As Justice Scalia explained in Plaut, the framers were attempting to prohibit exactly this form of government when it established separation of powers safeguards.
Before and during the debates on ratification, Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton each wrote of the factional disorders and disarray that the system of legislative equity had produced in the years before the framing; and each thought that the separation of the legislative from the judicial power in the new Constitution would cure them.
Plaut, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1454. Justice Scalia reiterated James Madison's "famous description of the process by which `[t]he legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." Id. quoting The Federalist No. 48, 333 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Similarly, Justice Brandeis pronounced seventy years ago:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293, 47 S.Ct. 21, 85, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1112 *1112 I note the approach taken by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in Plaut that a separation of powers inquiry should focus on the principle of protecting individual liberty. Plaut, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1447.[7] A review of the effects of §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3) demonstrates that individual liberty is being curtailed by its requirements. Plaintiffs originally brought this action challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. In the course of negotiation with defendants, they traded a potential finding of unconstitutionality for defendants' commitment to assure the constitutionality of their confinement. The consent decree embodying this exchange received the imprimatur of this court, and "[a] legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases." Plaut at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1455, quoting The Federalist No. 81, 545 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Instead of working to fulfill their compliance requirements, defendants now move to terminate the decree altogether. Such a result would unjustifiably deny plaintiffs the relief to which they are entitled by the power of this court 0907 a power that cannot be taken away by Congress. Sections 3626(b) and (c) are therefore unconstitutional, and a determination of the required findings is unnecessary.
V. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR TERMINATION UNDER RULE 60
Two routes remain available for termination of this judgment. Defendants' may move for termination upon achieving compliance with the consent decree pursuant to its terms, or termination may be required upon a substantial change in fact or in law. Under either of these approaches, completion of the S-2 Alternative Plan is key.
Built in 1926, Jackson "is still considered to be the largest walled prison in the world with over 57½ acres inside the Central Complex." Michigan Manual at 452 (The Legislative Service Bureau 1995-96). Integral to the consent decree is the plan in § VIII which provides for the break-up of the prison into four autonomous units instead of one large prison.
Pursuant to § VII of the consent decree, defendants conducted a study of the organization, staffing, and administration at SPSM, provided it to plaintiffs to be returned with input, and sculpted that information into a management plan for SPSM. The management plan originally submitted eventually proved to be unsatisfactory to both defendants and plaintiffs, and I refused to approve it. Following negotiation, the plan was redeveloped and

the parties stipulated to the establishment of the SPSM Decentralization Team (SDT) which consisted of three representatives of the defendants and one representative of the plaintiffs.
The SDT was given broad authority to approve changes during the further development and implementation of the plan with the reservation that, should the SDT members not achieve consensus as to such a decision, then the court monitor, counsel for both parties, and I would get involved.
Following a hearing in October 1992, I approved what has been termed the "S-2 Alternate Plan." This plan was proposed by defendants, and adopted by the court, after the SDT was unable to agree on certain aspects of the plan before them. At the hearing, defendants stated on the record and in their written submissions that the S-2 Alternate Plan was deemed acceptable by the Department of Corrections and other State officials. (Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Set For Hearing, October 13, 1992, at 2.) The project was subsequently funded with the approval of the State Legislature and the Office of Management and Budget.
1113 On September 20, 1996, as has been my practice in the past, I personally inspected, *1113 and was impressed by, the progress of the break-up plan's construction. Phase I of the plan is nearly complete; Phases II and III have been stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pending appeal of my July 5, 1996 order holding unconstitutional the automatic 30-day stay provision of the PLRA. I remain convinced that completion of the S-2 Alternate Plan is necessary for termination of this consent judgment for two reasons.
First, the S-2 Alternate Plan that defines defendants' obligations was developed by the defendants and submitted to the court as an alternative to other plans under consideration by the SDT and plaintiffs. Plans generated by defendants are inferentially the least intrusive alternative as well as being least likely to contain unworkable elements. Furthermore, the plan provides that the SDT function by consensus. Since no dispute within the SDT has been raised before this court since approval of the S-2 Alternate Plan, I conclude from the record that defendants have not had objections to the way that implementation has proceeded.
Second, the S-2 Alternate Plan was formulated to correct structural deficiencies in venting, plumbing, hygienic and heating conditions that may rise to the level of constitutional violations as they currently exist. The new units are also being re-built to ensure protection of the prisoners from harm and to provide adequate space for prisoners' out-of-cell activities. The continuation of the S-2 Alternative Plan is therefore most vital to actualizing the purpose of the consent decree. When the final phases are completed, termination of this decree should be warranted both by the decree's provision for termination upon achievement of compliance with its terms and also under Rufo's requirement for a substantial change in fact or in law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because it violates separation of powers principles, I hold §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act unconstitutional, and therefore deny defendants' motion for termination pursuant to it. Defendants' motion for termination under Rule 60(b), on remand before me to be reconsidered in light of the PLRA, is consequently denied as well.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] That section provides:
Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
[2] The United States may intervene as of right when the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is at issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403.
[3] The final areas of the decree cover the presence of volunteer groups, operations, compliance with the decree, and inspection of the facilities under the decree. Supervision over health care and access to the courts was

transferred by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to now-Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen in the Western District of Michigan in 1992 and 1993, respectively.
[4] With the abolition of the distinction between law and equity, the terms "consent judgment" and "consent decree" are often used synonymously. But the term consent judgment is more comprehensive and includes "decree." In this case consent of the parties and the approval of the court make this more aptly a consent judgment.
[5] Congressional support for consent judgments is found in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. It provides that the U.S. Attorney General may institute a civil action against any state or political subdivision thereof "for such equitable relief as may be appropriate to insure the minimum corrective measures necessary to insure the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities" if the state "is subjecting persons residing in or confined to an institution ... to egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive such persons of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States...." 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(2)(B), which supports "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion...."
[6] Their interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent as expressed by one of the Act's cosponsors, in presenting the Bill to the Senate:
The legislation I am introducing today will return sanity and State control to our prison systems. It will do so by limiting judicial remedies in prison cases and by limiting frivolous prisoner litigation.
First, we must curtail interference by the Federal courts themselves in the orderly administration of our prisons. This is not to say that we will have no court relief available for prisoner suits, only that we will try to retain it for cases where it is needed while curtailing its destructive use.
. . . . .
No longer will prison administration be turned over to Federal judges for the slightest reason. Instead, the States will be able to run prisons as they see fit unless there is a constitutional violation, in which case a narrowly tailored order to correct the violation my be entered.
. . . . .
No longer, then, will we have consent decrees, such as those in Michigan under which judges control the prisons literally for decades.
141 Cong.Rec.S. 14316-17 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
[7] See also, Note, Congressional Authority to Reopen Final Judgments, Harvard Law Review, November, 1995.
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 712 F.Supp. 550 (1989)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 80-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.
April 21, 1989.
551 *551 Patricia A. Streeter, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FEIKENS, District Judge.
Before me is Plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Section VI, Paragraph 13, of the consent judgment entered in this case on May 13, 1985. The consent judgment settled the large portion of a class action brought against the Michigan Department of Corrections (Department). The plaintiff class consists of inmates who are now or in the future will be confined at the Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. The consent judgment, some forty pages in length, has twelve sections covering various aspects of prison life including such areas as sanitation, fire safety, overcrowding and protection of inmates from harm, use of volunteers, prison management, inmate legal mail, compliance and inspection procedures and access to the courts.[1]
Section VI, Paragraph 13 (paragraph 13), concerns class members' rights to possess and store legal papers and law books in their cells. It reads as follows:
Any property limitation imposed on prisoners shall not apply to legal papers and law books except that if the quantity thereof conflicts with important institutional goals such as security or fire safety, a limitation may be sought through the administrative hearing process. The standard for imposition of a limitation shall be whether the material in question is reasonably necessary to assist the prisoner with respect to his pending litigation.
Consent Judgment, Section VI, Paragraph 13.
Plaintiffs' motion challenges the Department's use of a blanket standard, the "one footlocker rule," to determine the existence of a security or fire safety hazard.[2] It also seeks clarification of the procedures and standards to be applied to the administrative hearings required by paragraph 13.
I conclude that the one footlocker rule is not inconsistent with the consent judgment and that the Department may 552 seize excess *552 legal material prior to completing an administrative hearing. I find, however, that the
Department has not conducted the required administrative hearings in accordance with paragraph 13. Therefore, I establish procedures for conducting future hearings.
I. Legal Framework
Before addressing plaintiffs' contentions, I set forth the legal framework. A consent decree is considered to be a contract between the parties. Thus, it has been held that a consent decree, like a contract, must be construed within its four corners. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757-58, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). The words of a consent decree, like any writing, have meaning only in the context in which they are

written. The court must look to the circumstances under which a contract was formed, and the purposes to be served by it, to determine its proper construction. See Corbin, Contracts, Section 542. Moreover, a consent judgment is a judgment of the court which the court has broad authority to enforce. United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F.Supp. 512, 520 (E.D.Mich. 1979) (Feikens, J.) (court has broad range of equitable powers to enforce its judgments).
This is particularly true given the complex consent judgment here. Its execution is to occur over a period of years. Paragraph 5 of the introduction recites that I have retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent judgment. Several of its sections require periodic submissions to the court. Section XI, entitled "Compliance," sets forth detailed provisions establishing my role in monitoring compliance and in settling compliance disputes. The parties have established an expanded role for the court to fulfill the objectives of the consent judgment. Therefore, I must have "a degree of flexibility in enforcement of the judgment that does not result in a modification; the flexibility is within `the four corners' rule of Armour because the consent judgment itself provides for it." N.Y.S. Ass'n For Retarded Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27, 37 (CA2 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Coughlin, Commissioner, New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, et al. v. New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc., et al., 444 U.S. 836, 100 S.Ct. 70, 62 L.Ed.2d 46 (1979).
II. One Footlocker Rule
Plaintiffs maintain that the Department may not apply a blanket rule when determining whether a prisoner's legal materials pose a threat to security or fire safety. I do not agree. The State of Michigan, through the Department, has the sole responsibility to determine what conditions within its prison system threaten security or fire safety. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 86-1701, slip op. at 14 (CA6 March 17, 1988) [842 F.2d 331 (table) ]. The Department has chosen to fulfill this responsibility by establishing a standard applicable to all prisoners, the "one footlocker rule." The Department's approach is neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome to prisoners' right of access to the courts.
At the evidentiary hearing conducted on this motion, Dr. Richard Hinds, the Department's fire safety expert, testified that legal materials chiefly threaten fire safety. There are two necessary conditions to a fire: a source of ignition, and fuel. Paper, legal or otherwise, is fuel. One department-approved footlocker, fully loaded, can stow over a hundred pounds of paper. I cannot fault the Department's desire to limit prisoners to one footlocker of paper. Moreover, the one footlocker rule has appeal because it presents a bright line test; it is easy for both prisoners and guards to comprehend and apply. Paragraph 13 balances the prisoners' right of access to the courts against the Department's interest in security and fire safety. The balance struck by the Department with the one footlocker rule may, or may not be, the optimal balance, but I am not disposed to disturb it. Thus, a class 553 member may possess and stow in his cell any legal papers or law books that come within the one *553 footlocker rule.[3]
III. Procedure With Respect to Excess Legal Materials
Plaintiffs raise two related concerns with respect to the Department's present procedure for handling excess legal materials. First, plaintiffs maintain that paragraph 13 requires the Department to conduct the administrative hearing prior to seizing excess legal materials. The Department's present practice is to remove excess materials pending the administrative hearing. Second, plaintiffs allege that the hearing process is subject to inordinate delay.
Plaintiffs' first complaint is without merit. By definition, excess legal papers and law books pose security or fire safety hazards. The consent decree was not intended to require the Department to attend disaster idly while an administrative hearing is completed. However, with the authority to seize excess legal materials immediately comes the concomitant obligation to proceed diligently with the required administrative hearing. The testimony of Karl Battle-el and Pepper Moore indicates that the Department has been remiss in this respect.
On September 29, 1988, while Battle-el was being treated at a local hospital, a Department officer completed a form entitled "Notice of Intent to Conduct an Administrative Hearing" with respect to Battle-el's legal papers. P.Ex.

7. It appears that on that day, or shortly thereafter, Battle-el's legal papers were seized. On October 30, 1988, Battle-el filed the first of several grievances regarding his legal papers. On November 2, 1988, Battle-el received the Notice of Intent. P.Ex. 7. On December 22, 1988, the last of Battle-el's grievances was returned to him. The following day, Battle-el received notice from the Clerk of Ingham County Circuit Court indicating that a lawsuit he had filed there had been dismissed for lack of service. P.Ex. 8. Battle-el testified that he was unable to complete service because he could not access his legal papers. On January 9, 1989, Battle-el's papers were returned to him. The Department did not conduct a hearing with respect to Battle-el's legal materials.
Moore's legal papers were seized May 5, 1988. An administrative hearing was convened on May 13, 1988 and completed on June 6, 1988. On June 9, 1988, the hearing officer submitted his report. P.Ex. 1. The hearing officer ordered the return of materials related to Moore's criminal conviction, and to his participation in this suit. These materials were returned to Moore. The hearing officer also ordered returned materials related to cases Moore was preparing to file. Yet, these materials were not returned. Indeed, Moore received these materials only after the Department's failure was revealed at the hearings on this motion and I directed the Department to explain the lapse.
I find from this evidence that the Department has failed to comply fully with the terms of paragraph 13. Paragraph 13 requires that an administrative hearing follow the seizure of excess legal materials. No hearing was held during the more than three months that the Department retained Battle-el's property. As a consequence, his state court lawsuit was dismissed. Moore's difficulty was not in obtaining an administrative hearing, but in receiving the relief that the hearing officer found him entitled to. The Department did not suggest at the hearing on this matter that the cases of Battle-el or Moore were aberrational. Indeed, no attempt was made by the Department to rebut the testimony offered by either prisoner. I am also struck by the timing of the return of their papers. Battle-el's 554 papers were returned only three days prior to commencement of the hearings *554 on this motion. As indicated above, the Department returned Moore's papers only after my inquiry. While the correlation between the evidentiary hearing on this motion and the Department's increased attention to its obligations under paragraph 13 may be purely coincidental, a mephitic odor pervades. I conclude that further guidance concerning the procedural aspects of paragraph 13 is needed.
Henceforth, the Department shall commence and complete the required administrative hearing within thirty days from the date it seizes a prisoner's legal papers or law books. Moreover, the prisoner shall have two days from the date of seizure to present the Department with a list of legal materials needed to complete legal work due prior to the running of the thirty-day period. With respect to these materials only, the Department shall convene and complete the required administrative hearing within seven days of the date that the list is received from the prisoner.
It is implicit in the class members' right to an administrative hearing under paragraph 13 that the hearing will be convened and completed with reasonable promptness. What is reasonable depends on balancing class members' right of access to the courts and the Department's interest in maintaining secure prisons. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1815, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) ("The extent to which [a prisoner's right of access to the courts] is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be weighed against the legitimate interests of penal administration and the proper regard that judges should give to the expertise and discretionary authority of correctional officials.") I have chosen thirty days for two reasons. First, a prompt hearing is needed given that class members' right of access to the courts has been, and may again be, compromised by delay in conducting the administrative hearing. Second, the Department has indicated that a thirty-day requirement would not impose a substantial burden. Marjorie Van Ochten, Administrator of the Department's hearings division, testified that in most cases, excess legal materials hearings can be completed within thirty days.
The burden imposed on the Department by the seven-day hearing requirement is not excessive. Both Van Ochten and Thomas Craig, the Department hearing officer who conducted Moore's legal paper hearing, testified that the large part of time spent on excess legal material hearings is consumed by the need to organize the prisoner's property. This process is minimized in the seven-day hearing because the prisoner must specifically identify the legal materials needed, and because the seven-day hearing would not ordinarily encompass all of a prisoner's legal material, but only those needed in connection with specific due dates.

IV. Clarification of Terms
There is little real conflict between the Department and plaintiffs with respect to the meaning of the phrase "reasonably necessary to pending litigation." Van Ochten has acknowledged that the Department treats as "pending" litigation any lawsuit that a prisoner has filed or is preparing to file. Letter from Van Ochten to the Court (January 24, 1989).[4] This comports with plaintiffs' interpretation of "pending litigation." Plaintiff's Post Hearing Brief at 5 nn. 6, 13.
There is a superficial conflict between paragraph 13's "reasonably necessary" standard as construed by plaintiffs [5] and P.D. 53.01 which provides that the hearing officer is to determine if the material is "essential" to pending 555 litigation. P.Ex. 3 (P.D. 53.01(III)(B)(25)). I directed Van Ochten to prepare a written statement addressing *555 the application of P.D. 53.01. Letter to Van Ochten Confirming Verbal Order of January 17, 1989. In response, Van Ochten added the following gloss to subsection (III)(B)(25):
[H]earing officers have been given verbal guidance on several occasions and have been instructed to construe these standards liberally, in favor of the prisoner, if he states that something is needed or relates to a lawsuit he is pursuing and it appears on the face of the matter that there is indeed a lawsuit pending or being prepared for filing.
Letter from Van Ochten at 2 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Department will accept a prisoner's representation as to materials needed unless it is belied by a cursory examination of the material in question.[6]
The remaining dispute concerns the Department's policy requiring prisoners to show that the law books they wish to retain are not available in the prison law library. Presumably, such books are not "reasonably necessary" because the prisoner can use them in the library. Paragraph 13 does not expressly distinguish between law books available in the library and those that are not. If the parties had intended Section VI, Paragraph 13, to contain such a distinction, then it would have been stated expressly therein, especially given the detailed treatment of library access issues in paragraphs 1-8 of the same section.
I also take note of the high degree of difficulty that attends use of the prison library. See Hadix, 694 F.Supp. at 266-269, 283, 291. The length of time it takes to be "called out" to the library, combined with the high demand for library materials, highlights the prisoners' need to have their own copies of library materials. Testimony of hearing officer Craig adds to the unreality of the Department's position. Craig testified that he relied solely on the list of publications supposedly available in the library, and did not check to determine if the books he confiscated were in fact available. Given the frequent need to repair or replace lost, destroyed or damaged volumes, see Hadix, supra at 267, the hearing officer's list is likely to be unreliable. Therefore, I conclude that the availability of law books in the prison library is immaterial to determining whether the law book is "reasonably necessary" within the meaning of paragraph 13. The sole test for law books, like legal papers, is whether "on the face of the matter" the law book is "needed for" or "related to" pending litigation.[7]
Finally, I address plaintiffs' suggestion that prisoners are entitled to retain as legal papers or law books a bare necessity of supplies such as pens and pencils, "whiteout," writing pads and the like. The Department may treat such materials as personal property. The general approach I have adopted with respect to paragraph 13 is, to the extent possible, to require prisoners to self-select the materials they will retain. This self-selection occurs 556 naturally as prisoners conform to the one footlocker rule.[8] Prisoners desiring to keep writing *556 supplies on hand will have to discard other less desirable property. This is a far more sensible approach than my, under the guise of interpreting paragraph 13, becoming the supply master for the prison.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section VI, Paragraph 13, of the consent judgment:

(a) Prisoners may stow in their cells legal papers and law books ("legal materials") satisfying the "one footlocker" rule as promulgated in P.D. 53.01(II) and legal materials so stowed may not be seized on account of security or fire safety;
(b) Excess legal materials shall be those legal materials not conforming to the "one footlocker" rule;
(c) The Department may seize excess legal materials without first conducting an administrative hearing;
(d) The Department shall convene, and complete, an administrative hearing within thirty days from the date it removes excess legal materials from a prisoner's cell;
(e) The prisoner whose excess legal materials have been seized shall have two days from the date of seizure to present the Department with a list of legal materials needed to complete legal work due prior to the running of the thirty-day period set forth in paragraph (d);
(f) With respect to excess legal materials listed by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (e) only, the Department shall convene and complete an administrative hearing within seven days of the date that the list is received from the prisoner;
(g) "Pending litigation" shall mean any lawsuit filed or in preparation for filing before any court or administrative agency, state or federal. "Pending litigation" shall include any lawsuit filed or in preparation for filing by one prisoner on behalf of a second prisoner pursuant to a written legal assistance agreement recognized by the Department;
(h) Legal materials shall be deemed to be "reasonably necessary" to pending litigation if on the face of the matter they appear to be needed for, or related to, litigation that is "pending" within the meaning of paragraph (g);
(i) The Department may not confiscate at the administrative hearing a prisoner's excess materials on account of the availability of such materials or their equivalent in the prison library. The sole standard to be applied at the administrative hearing is that described in paragraphs (g) and (h);
(j) The Department may treat pens, pencils, "whiteout," legal pads and all writing supplies as personal property not subject to the limitations imposed by Paragraph 13.
(k) The Department shall provide each hearing officer with the hearings division a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and direct each officer to familiarize himself with its contents.[9]
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] For a detailed history of this case, see Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al., 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D. Mich.1988).
[2] The one footlocker rule limits prisoner property to that which can be "placed in one state-issued duffel bag and one footlocker, if purchased by the prisoner." See P.Ex. 3 (Department Policy Directive (P.D.) 53.01(II) (1985)).
[3] The Department's present practice, upon a finding that a prisoner possesses excess legal materials, is to seize all of the prisoner's legal materials, both the excess and the materials conforming to the one footlocker rule, pending the administrative hearing. The Department has determined in P.D. 53.01(II) that legal materials stowed in the prisoner's single footlocker pose no threat to security or fire safety. In the future, therefore, only excess legal materials not contained within the single footlocker may be seized and subjected to an administrative hearing. The legal materials contained within the single footlocker may not be seized.
[4] The Department also recognizes a prisoner's right to retain excess legal material needed for, or related to, a pending lawsuit prepared by the prisoner on behalf of another prisoner pursuant to a proper legal assistance agreement between the first prisoner and the second. Letter from Van Ochten at 2.
[5] Plaintiffs contend that the hearing officers must accept prisoners' representations as to the materials needed for pending litigation.

[6] The limited nature of the hearing officer's examination of the legal materials suggests that the hearing officer will have little ability to share a prisoner's legal strategy with the Department as plaintiffs fear. If the hearing officer learns that strategy, he has ventured beyond his role in the excess legal materials hearing.
[7] Collections of Xerox cases and exemplars of pleadings and forms used in cases previously filed by the prisoner, commonly known as "brief banks," have been seized summarily on the theory that the prior research can be readily repeated in the library. As I have rejected this approach with respect to law books, I reject it with respect to brief banks. Like other legal materials, the rule is that a prisoner may possess a brief bank to the extent that it comes within the one footlocker rule. To the extent that a brief bank violates the one footlocker rule, the prisoner may retain only such specific Xerox cases or exemplars which on the face of the matter appear to be needed for, or related to, pending litigation.
[8] The rational prisoner will protect his more important legal materials by placing them in the single footlocker allowed under P.D. 53.01(II). Prisoners who gamble with the one footlocker rule by filling their footlocker with relatively unimportant legal materials run the risk that the more precious legal materials thereby exposed to seizure as excess materials will not survive the administrative hearing. Prisoners who so gamble and lose will not find this Court sympathetic to their plight.
[9] Although hearing officer Craig had conducted excess legal paper hearings, he testified that the Department had not called Section VI, Paragraph 13, to his attention. Apparently, officer Craig read paragraph 13 for the first time during his testimony at the hearing on this motion.
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 740 F.Supp. 433 (1990)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 80-73581-DT.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.
June 22, 1990.
Patricia A. Streeter, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FEIKENS, District Judge.
Plaintiffs are a class of prisoners who entered into a consent judgment with Michigan's Corrections Commission regarding prison conditions. An order approved by all parties provides that defendants are to pay to plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs semi-annually. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiffs' attorneys seek fees and costs for the period June 30, 1989 through December 31, 1989. They are entitled to these fees and costs for reasons and in amounts stated below.
I. BACKGROUND
434 Plaintiffs' attorneys claim fees pursuant to my "Order Regarding Monitoring Fees" *434 entered in this case on November 19, 1987 ("Order") for efforts expended monitoring defendants' compliance with the consent judgment.
Defendants have paid the amount they consider legitimate monitoring fees, but object to fees they suspect were incurred litigating classification and contempt issues. Defendants say the charges so incurred are objectionable because (1) plaintiffs are not yet prevailing parties (I transferred the classification issue to Judge Enslen;[1] it was litigated before him, and is now on appeal (USCA No. 90-1367)); (2) the charges are for litigation rather than monitoring, and the Order applies only to monitoring activity; (3) plaintiffs' attorneys have duplicated services; and (4) plaintiffs' attorneys' bill is too vague to enable defendants to evaluate which efforts were spent on nonclassification and non-contempt issues, which defendants concede are reimbursable.
Plaintiffs' attorneys reply that defendants' objections violate the objection procedure set forth in the November 19, 1987 Order, in that (1) defendants may object only to "documentation," not the underlying charges; (2) defendants' objections were filed after the Order's fifteen-day cut-off; and (3) the objections are too vague, because they do not identify specific hours.
Plaintiffs' attorneys say that with respect to their amicus work on classification and contempt issues in United States v. Michigan, ("USA"), the defendants misunderstand the concept of "prevailing party." Plaintiffs' attorneys say that the "prevailing party" inquiry is inapposite, and a pending appeal is irrelevant, since Hadix plaintiffs never "prevail" in USA by their very nature as amici. Rather, the question is whether the plaintiffs' attorneys' work is "reasonably necessary" to enforce the consent judgment, citing Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that the work was necessary in USA to safeguard gains in this case ("Hadix").
Plaintiffs' attorneys note that classification and contempt are proper subjects of fee recovery under the Order: First, although the USA classification issues are on appeal from Judge Enslen's non-compliance order, attorney

fees are available because classification is central to other Hadix issues. Second, the contempt issue is also relevant to Hadix, in that it alleges that defendants were "laundering" information in their required reports.
Alternatively, plaintiffs' attorneys contend that they prevailed when the consent judgment was entered, having obtained "significant relief" under Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). These cases hold that when assessing fees, the court should not look to assess fees on a claim-by-claim basis, but rather to the significance of the overall relief obtained.
Plaintiffs' attorneys say that defendants are too late in challenging prevailing party status in the monitoring phase, since the parties settled fees leading up to the consent judgment, after the magistrate found plaintiffs to be prevailing parties as to the underlying issues, a finding which defendants never challenged, and since this case is now in the monitoring phase.
I held a hearing in this matter on June 7, 1990. The Order plainly states, "There will be no reduction of hours expended as amicus in USA v. Michigan." At the hearing, defendants admitted that the intent of the Order's amici provision was to allow plaintiffs' attorneys to act as monitors in the USA case, and conceded that the recoverable amount is limited to those monitoring activities that were reasonably necessary. However, defendants contended that plaintiffs' attorneys were acting as litigators rather than monitors with regard to classification and contempt 435 issues. Thus, defendants *435 argue, the Order would permit a reduction for amici hours that were not monitoring hours. Defendants conceded that if plaintiffs' attorneys were acting as monitors, their fees and costs would be reimbursable, although defendants preserved objections to the documentation.
Hence, the principal question for me to decide is whether plaintiffs' attorneys acted as litigators or monitors. Defendants conceded that the outcome turns on this single point. The rest is a question of accounting.
II. ANALYSIS
First, I dispose of the procedural objections. Plaintiffs' attorneys are correct that defendants' objections are untimely under the Order. But the Order's language that defendants may object to "documentation" does not prevent defendants from objecting to the underlying charges. Although defendants' procedural objections may be valid in part, I nevertheless exercise my discretion and consider defendants' arguments.[2]
I hold that plaintiffs' attorneys engaged in monitoring of both classification and contempt issues.
Some time ago, for consistency reasons, all parties to this litigation agreed to submit classification issues to Judge Enslen, because they impact the entire prison population, including the Hadix plaintiffs. That I never transfered these issues by formal order is irrelevant. The transfer, in fact, was accomplished. The parties have conducted the case on that basis. A consent judgment entered in USA states that the Corrections Commission will implement a "professionally-based classification plan." Plaintiffs' attorneys have been involved as amici in presenting briefs and witnesses to Judge Enslen on the meaning of that phrase. The obligation has been determined; there is no longer a need to litigate. Plaintiffs' attorneys are involved to convey their clients' views of how that phrase should be interpreted. That is monitoring.
The issue before Judge Enslen regarding contempt is whether the Corrections Commission was secretly altering its records. Corrections Commission records are critical to monitoring in the Hadix case, and it was within plaintiffs' attorneys' monitoring function to participate in resolving this issue.
Since I decide that these are monitoring hours, there is no need to address defendants' vagueness objection.
The remaining relevant issue is whether plaintiffs' attorneys are legitimately entitled to fees. Northcross holds that the "prevailing party" issue is a predicate to applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988. After a party is deemed to have prevailed, it is entitled under the statute to "all time reasonably spent on the matter." Northcross, id. at 636. Hence, monitoring activity is justified if "reasonable," id. at 637; i.e., reasonably necessary to ensure that the plan is working.

This leads to the defendants' point that it is impossible to say whether plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts were reasonably necessary to ensure that the consent judgment is working until the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled on Judge Enslen's non-compliance order. Defendants' position assumes that the USA plaintiffs' success on the merits determines whether the amici efforts were reasonably necessary. That is not the test.
While Northcross did not elaborate upon the meaning of "reasonable," I hold that what is reasonably necessary will be determined by examining whether the efforts expended appear reasonably related to monitoring, and whether the hours and costs expended for the efforts claimed appear to be in reasonable amount.
Based upon the affidavits of plaintiffs' attorneys, I find all the efforts reasonably related to monitoring, because they unquestionably relate to hours I have deemed to be appropriate subjects of monitoring; namely, classification and contempt. The hours spent by Attorney Michael Barnhart on the Cain case are related to 436 monitoring. The hours spent communicating with Elizabeth *436 Alexander, who represents other amici in USA, are related to monitoring. Defendants have not shown otherwise. Moreover, the descriptions of these hours are clear.
I also find that the hours and costs are in reasonable amount. The Order provides that work and travel time will each be billed at $110 per hour for Barnhart and $95 per hour for Attorney Patricia Streeter, and that "[t]here will be no reduction for duplication of attorney time, provided that counsel continue to divide responsibilities."
At the hearing, defendants did not develop their objections to plaintiffs' attorneys' fee statement. Thus, I must rely upon Attachment 2 to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Attachment 2 is a letter from defendants' counsel to plaintiffs' attorneys that details objections to their statement,[3] which is itself attached to the letter.
The letter states that defendants' counsel have directed defendants to pay Barnhart $34,293.50 of the $48,686.00 he requested in fees, and $29.85 of the $589.56 he requested in non-telephone costs.[4] This leaves an unpaid difference of $14,392.50 in fees; $559.71 in non-telephone costs; totaling $14,952.21.
Defendants' counsel has directed defendants to pay Streeter $38,627.00 of the $53,556.25 she requested in fees, and none of the $3,508.73 she requested in non-telephone costs. This leaves an unpaid difference of $14,929.25 in fees; $3,508.73 in non-telephone costs; totaling $18,437.98. The governing perspective is this: I find that plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to all amounts billed, except telephone charges. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys receive the difference between what they billed and what defendants said would be paid. Given the ambiguous accounting of contested hours, the approach attempted at the hearing, i.e., figuring out which hours are in contest, resolving those, and multiplying by the hourly rate, yields confusion and error.[5]
437 *437 Only defendants' objection that the attorneys' duplicated effort bears on the reasonableness of these amounts. Defendants have not supported their duplication argument with specific examples, but hinted, I believe, that the bill was too vague to determine whether duplication existed. By doing so, defendants suggest simply that there must be duplication somewhere. I find that argument untenable as to duplication; it is really a vagueness argument. Upon review of the bill, I find the descriptions sufficiently detailed to permit review for duplication. I find that the bill is not vague and that the efforts were not duplicated.[6]
I find that the amounts are reasonable, guided by the considerations set forth in Northcross at 642-43.
Hence, plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to the full amounts of their bills, less telephone costs. For Barnhart, this means $49,569.76, less $294.20, which leaves $49,275.56. For Streeter, this means $58,042.01, less $977.03, which leaves $57,064.98.
Since I have found no reason to reduce the amounts sought, I GRANT plaintiffs' motion and ORDER defendants to pay to Michael Barnhart forthwith the lump sum of $49,275.56, and to pay to Patricia Streeter forthwith the lump sum of $57,064.98. Defendants may deduct any amounts already paid for these services.
[1] Judge Enslen of the Western District of Michigan is hearing a related case, United States v. Michigan, No. G 84-63-CA, which deals with prison conditions in other parts of the same prison.

[2] In so deciding, I do not mean to vitiate the Order's requirement that all objections be filed within fifteen days. I expect literal compliance in the future.
[3] This bill is identical to plaintiffs' attorneys' affidavits.
[4] At the hearing, the parties agreed to resolve issues of telephone costs separately from those disposed of here.
[5] Defendants' accounting of their objections is difficult to reconcile with their letter objecting to fees and costs. Defendants marked the bill with handwritten asterisks next to the items to which they object. Sub-total figures are handwritten on the bottom margin of each page. Since the sum of asterisked items on a given page does not always match the sub-total marked in the margin, it appears that defendants object to only some portion of some asterisked line-items. This seems to have something to do with the fact that some of the asterisked items contain multiple sub-parts. It is unclear to which sub-parts defendants object. For purposes of illustration, I presume the marginal sub-totals accurately reflect the objections, though as will be shown, the choice does not matter.
Adding the marginal sub-totals, defendants object to the hours as follows:

Michael Barnhart: Classification Contempt
TOTAL Patricia Streeter:
Classification Contempt:
TOTAL

138.70 hrs. +23.30 hrs. ______ 162.00 hrs.
142.50 hrs. +14.65 hrs. ______ 157.15 hrs.

For Streeter, multiplying these hours by the hourly rate leads to the same result as the difference obtained by subtracting the uncontested amount from the billed amount. But for Barnhart, the contested hours exceed the difference. I choose to award the difference between the uncontested amount and the billed amount rather than multiplying contested hours by hourly rate, because to choose the latter would result in a windfall for Barnhart.

The costs claimed are also governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Northcross, id. at 639. The unpaid difference in non-telephone costs for Barnhart is $559.71. The asterisked cost items total $471.52. The unpaid difference in non-telephone costs for Streeter is $3,508.73. The asterisked cost items total $389.13. The letter suggests that these discrepancies exist because defendants object to all costs, though they have only marked some with asterisks, for a reason known only to them. They object to all costs because they cannot tell whether costs have been duplicated. I agree that the bill does not precisely say what documents were copied or transmitted by facsimile or why, and that these costs are fairly substantial. However, all the other costs are quite clearly delineated. Given the size and complex nature of this case, I am reluctant to second-guess plaintiffs' attorneys, and am satisfied that a higher level of detail (and administrative bureaucracy) than that provided is not necessary. I find the costs to have been reasonably necessary for monitoring and in reasonable amount.

If defendants wish to propose a more detailed accounting method for the future, they may do so. Since defendants periodically bring in new counsel, perhaps a uniform agreement on this matter would be desirable to avoid prospective disputes.

[6] The only colorable area where duplication might be asserted would be in preparation for and attendance at the classification meeting on August 17, 1989, and hearings on September 27-28, 1989, and November 2-3, 1989. However, given the complex and unwieldy case, any duplication of effort is surely minimal.

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 792 F.Supp. 527 (1992)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 80-CV-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.
June 5, 1992.
528 *528 Patricia A. Streeter, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.
ORDER OF TRANSFER
FEIKENS, District Judge.
At a hearing held May 1, 1992, I denied, without prejudice, plaintiffs' motion to adopt the mental health orders entered in USA v. Michigan, File No. 1:84:CV:63, Honorable Richard A. Enslen, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan. I likewise denied, without prejudice, defendants' motion for this court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree.[1] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), I now ORDER that the medical and mental health provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section II), be TRANSFERRED to Judge Enslen for further proceedings as he deems appropriate.
In 1984 the Hadix plaintiffs were granted amicus curiae status in the USA case, and since that time have monitored compliance with the Hadix mental health provisions by their involvement in that case. I find that by tacit understanding the Hadix parties did not pursue the mental health provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree before this court because those issues were being dealt with by Judge Enslen in the USA case. I now find that for the sake of uniformity, and in the hope of attaining finality, Judge Enslen should have jurisdiction over the mental health provisions (Section II.B.) of the Hadix Consent Decree. I also find that the medical health provisions (Section II.A.) of the Hadix Consent Decree are so intertwined with the mental health provisions that all of Section II should be transferred to Judge Enslen.
Section II of the Hadix Consent Decree is entitled "Health Care." Subsection A is entitled "Medical Care," and subsection B is entitled "Mental Health Care." It is important to note that medical care and mental health care both fall under the more general rubric of health care. The two sections are more intertwined than that, however. In the Medical Care subsection, Section II.A.2 provides for the construction of a hospital facility adequate to meet inmates' medical and mental health needs. Section II.A.4.a., which provides for the submission of a plan for access to health care, details that for cases of serious mental illness, the Department of Corrections (Department) will provide immediate access to professional mental health staff. Section II.A.8.b., which provides for the training of Department personnel, requires such training to include recognition of the signs and symptoms of mental illness, mental retardation, and chemical dependency. Section II.A.12.d., discussing quality assurance, provides that mental health audits shall be prepared annually.
In the Mental Health Care subsection, Section II.B.1.c. provides that the subsections on access to health care (II.A.4.), outside alternative care (II.A.5.d.), staffing at the new hospital at SPSM (II.A.5.c.), training (II.A.8.), medication distribution (II. A.10.), records (II.A.11.), and quality assurance (II.A.12.) shall apply to the provision of care for serious mental illness as well.
529 Furthermore, in defendants' tri-annual compliance report, submitted by Barbara *529 Hladki, the Consent Decree Coordinator, defendants' reports on medical services compliance, mental health services compliance, and medical provisions as applied to mental health all appear together in one section of the report. March 11, 1992 tri-

annual compliance report for Hadix v. Johnson. This further reinforces my conclusion that these two areas are best dealt with together.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Section II (Health Care) of the Hadix Consent Decree is hereby TRANSFERRED to Judge Enslen for further proceedings as he deems appropriate. The related law of the case, including general provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree, plans and orders that pertain to jurisdiction, inspection, compliance, monitoring, and enforcement, shall continue to apply to Section II. This action will permit Judge Enslen to conduct combined evidentiary hearings in the Hadix and USA cases, thereby avoiding duplicative proceedings. This order is also consistent with defendants' motion to transfer for purposes of consolidation, filed in August of 1989. All other provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree remain under the jurisdiction of this court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] Adopted by order of this court dated May 13, 1985.
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 879 F.Supp. 743 (1995)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 80-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
March 14, 1995.
744 *744 Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, MI, for plaintiffs.
David G. Edick, Kim G. Harris, Asst. Mich. Attys. Gen., Lansing, MI, for defendants.
OPINION
FEIKENS, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Mary Glover, et al. v. Perry Johnson, et al., Civil Action No. 77-71229 (ultimately a class action), began on May 19, 1977. The case of Everett Hadix, et al. v. Perry Johnson, et al., as captioned above (ultimately a class action), began on September 18, 1980.
In all of the years since these cases were filed until now, the parties have sought this court's active involvement. See Glover v. Johnson: 478 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Mich.1979); 510 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D.Mich.1981); 855 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.1988); 721 F.Supp. 808 (E.D.Mich.1989); and 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991). See Hadix v. Johnson: 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988); aff'd, 871 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir.1989); 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D.Mich. 1989); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, vacated, in part, remanded, sub nom., Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir.1992); cert. denied, Knop v. McGinnis, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 786 (1993).
745 *745 The key result of the several actions in Glover, both at the level of this court's involvement and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, was a 1981 Final Order stemming from a negotiated settlement between the parties and a resultant Remedial Plan dated December 6, 1991. See Glover, 934 F.2d at 708. On a parallel track, the various actions outlined in Hadix culminated in an Order, filed May 13, 1985, accepting the Consent Judgment (the "Hadix Consent Decree" or the "Decree," filed February 13, 1985). An Out-of-Cell Activity Plan (or the "plan"), dated November 9, 1985, was submitted to the court as required under the Consent Decree.
This common introduction to these two cases results from parallel actions initiated by defendant Michigan Department of Corrections (or "Department of Corrections") to modify the Remedial Plan and the Plan for Vocational Programs and Work Pass, in Glover, and the 1985 Out-of-Cell Activity Plan mandated by the Hadix Consent Decree, in Hadix.
While in their motion to modify the Out-of-Cell Activity Provision of the Consent Decree in Hadix, defendants rely on Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), defendants in Glover apply the Rufo principles in seeking modification of the Remedial Plan. Before discussing and deciding the respective motions filed in these two cases, it is important to point out the lengthy and arduous work which these cases have required in order to secure compliance with the Consent Decree and the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan in Hadix, and the negotiated settlement and Remedial Plan in Glover. Even now, after years of attempted compliance, the parties are at odds as to whether the goals have been achieved.

It may be indigenous to the nature of this litigation that it is seemingly endless. For example, with the exception of Michael Barnhart, counsel now for both plaintiff classes, all of the numerous attorneys who have represented the plaintiff classes or have been on the staff of the Attorney General are no longer in the cases. The office of Director of the Department of Corrections has had a number of individuals, beginning with Perry Johnson, and now Kenneth McGinnis. The population of the prisons is under constant change and, thus, the inmates who arrive at the prison facilities and are represented in both class actions are unacquainted with the past history of these cases, and see their confinement problems as new matters. Finality, in these cases is, accordingly, elusive 0907 even though it is highly desired.
What is striking, too, is the argument that is now marshalled in favor of modification. Curiously, defendant Department of Corrections has argued that public opinion with regard to the "rights" of prisoners has changed.
This court is necessarily concerned with the status of compliance with the various orders, plans, the negotiated settlement and Consent Decree mandates, should this court's involvement be terminated.
These are matters that are at the nerve center of these motions seeking modifications and termination; and they must be dealt with, if possible, in each of the respective opinions and decisions.
Before me is Defendants' Motion Seeking Modification of the 1985 Out-of-Cell Activity Provision of the Hadix Consent Decree pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) and (6).[1]
746 *746 II. BACKGROUND
In 1980, a class of inmates housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex ("SPSM-CC" or Central Complex) filed a complaint, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated. Five years after the complaint was filed, the parties agreed to the entry of a Consent Decree. The scope of the Decree was defined in one of the introductory paragraphs: "The provisions contained herein are intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSMCC." (Hadix Consent Decree at ¶ 3.) Section IV.H.2 of the Decree required the development and implementation of a plan concerning out-of-cell activity for prisoners. Specifically, the provision required:
Within 180 days from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan which will provide for meaningful out-of-cell activity. It is recognized that no particular activity is itself required. The objective of the plan is to provide meaningful activity outside of cells including access to general and law libraries, education, industrial or other work activity, religious activity, other group activities, etc. For the activities to be provided, there shall be reasonably adequate staffing, facilities, and equipment. The plan shall provide access to these various activities such that at the facility 75% of all inmates may be active out of their cells, including exercise, meal, shower, and law library time no fewer than seven hours daily on weekdays and five hours daily on weekends. The plan shall provide for full and continuing implementation within an additional 180 days after its approval or adoption.
(Hadix Consent Decree at 26.) (Emphasis added.) In November 1985, defendants submitted an Out-of-Cell Activity Plan to which plaintiffs did not object. Defendants now seek to modify that plan by substitution of an alternative plan.[2] Because I conclude that there has been no significant factual or legal change to warrant modification, defendants' motion is denied.
III. RUFO ANALYSIS
A. In General.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) provides that a

party may obtain relief from a court order for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment." In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the Supreme Court adopted a test for district courts to utilize when considering requests to modify, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation. Under the Rufo test, defendants, as the party seeking modification of the Consent Decree, bear the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the Decree. If defendants meet this standard, the court will consider whether defendants' proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances. Id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 759-60.
Defendants may meet their initial burden by showing a significant change in either factual conditions or in the law which makes compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous. Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. Modification of the Decree is also appropriate if defendants show that the Decree is unworkable because of unforeseen 747 obstacles *747 or when enforcement of the Decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest. Id. Modification is not appropriate, however, where defendants simply rely upon events that actually were anticipated at the time they entered into the Decree. Id. at 385, 112 S.Ct. at 760-61. If it is clear that defendants anticipated changing conditions that would make performance of the Decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the Decree, defendants must satisfy a heavy burden to convince the court that it agreed to the Decree in good faith, and made a reasonable effort to comply with the Decree, before they would be relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b)(5). Id.
B. The Out-of-Cell Activity Plan and Defendants' Basis for Modification.
The purpose of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan is to make it certain that over seventy-five percent (75%) of the prisoners residing at the Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan have the opportunity to participate in meaningful out-of-cell activities at least seven (7) hours daily on weekdays and five (5) hours daily on weekends. (Hadix Consent Decree, supra.) The activities range from such basic ones as meals, showers, and yard accessibility, to work, college and vocational programming, general and law library access, family visits and religious and leisure activities.
Defendants cite various changes which they believe make the current provisions of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan unworkable and "contrary to public interest."[3] The changes can be classified into four areas: (1) factual changes; (2) physical and operational changes pursuant to Section VIII of the Consent Decree and planned and implemented by defendants; (3) a marked improvement in the levels of violence; and (4) the remedying of overcrowding.
1. Factual changes.
Defendants point to several facts which the court will, for the purpose of this motion, assume have changed. However, defendants have not shown how the various factual changes make compliance with the Consent Decree substantially more onerous or unworkable. Defendants point out that: (a) the demand for Michigan State Industries products has changed; (b) level 5 inmates are present; (c) lack of interest (on the part of inmates) and shorter periods of time (prisoner turnover) prevent attainment of the academic and vocational percentages outlined in the Decree; and (d) public opinion has changed.
(a) The demand for Michigan State Industries products has changed.
Defendants believe that the decrease in the demand for industries products is sufficient to relieve them of the inmate work requirement under the plan. The decrease in demand, according to defendants, is caused by a number of factors including a decrease in public interest in the products and a restructuring of the industry by the state legislature. The industry is now an independent business rather than a subsidized governmental entity. Thus, defendants have had to adjust the workforce due to a decline in profit.

The plan requires that not less than 54% of the prisoners be assigned work. (Central Complex Out-of-Cell Activity Plan at 1.) In 1994 a 49% level was reached at Central Complex alone.[4] (Defs. Exh. 2.) Defendants thus reached 91% of the target percentage. Although the decrease in the demand for industries products, along with the restructuring of the industry, has had some effect, it has not made compliance with the plan "substantially 748 more onerous" as required by *748 Rufo, supra. In fact, defendants have almost reached 100% compliance. Although the percentages in this area may need to be revisited if the demand for industries products continues to decline, defendants' request for modification at this juncture is premature.
(b) Level 5 inmates are present.
Defendants also argue that the presence of level 5 inmates is a factual change which makes compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous or unworkable. According to defendants, the limitations associated with level 5 activities have changed. Under the Decree, the increased presence of level 5 inmates in the general population does not affect defendants' ability to reach the required proportion of inmates participating in out-of-cell activity.[5] Thus, although the presence of level 5 inmates may be a factual change, it does not affect defendants' ability to comply with the current Out-of-Cell Activity Plan.
(c) Lack of interest (on the part of inmates) and shorter periods of time (prisoner turnover) prevent attainment of the academic and vocational percentages outlined in the Decree.
Defendants argue that there is a lack of interest (on the part of inmates) for academic and vocational activities which prevents attainment of the percentages outlined in the plan. However, defendants' exhibit 23 reveals that there was a waiting list for academic programming at both the Central Complex and Egeler facilities in 1994. According to defendants, it would be in the best interest of the inmates to have General Equivalency Degree ("GED") and other remedial programming instead of college programming because many inmates are functionally illiterate.
Under the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan 14% of the inmates population must participate in academic and vocational activity. (Central Complex Out-of-Cell Activity Plan at 1.) In 1994 defendants reached 12% for Central Complex alone.[6] (Defs' Exh. 2.) Thus defendants attained 86% of the requirement. If defendants were able to accommodate the inmates on waiting lists they would have reached, more likely than not, the percentage targets. Although there may be an increased need for remedial-type academic programming, the facts do not indicate that compliance with the Decree, as relates to college and vocational programming, is substantially more onerous because of this increase.[7]
Additionally, defendants argue that shorter periods of time and high prisoner turnover prevent attainment of the academic and vocational percentages outlined in the plan because inmates cannot continue college 749 programming if they are transferred to a nonconsent Decree facility. The requirement *749 looks at enrollment at any one particular time, not completion or attainment of a degree. More important, there is no proof that increased turnover has had any effect on the ability of defendants to reach the required percentages. The evidence presented by defendants indicates that they had reached 86% of the target in 1994. Because there was a significant number of prisoners on waiting lists for academic and vocational programming, it is clear that once defendants make arrangements to accommodate those inmates on waiting lists, they will have no problem gaining the additional two percentage points required.
(d) Public opinion has changed.
Finally, defendants argue that the change in public opinion is a factual change which warrants modification of the Out-of-Cell Provision of the Decree. Specifically, defendants point out that the sentiment of the public is against

college programming for prison inmates. Defendants contend that it is the desire of the public that its prisons discontinue providing college programming for prisoners. According to defendants, enforcement of the Decree is contrary to the public interest under Rufo.
Defendants have misinterpreted Rufo on this point. A decree is detrimental to the public interest when there is an increased risk of harm to the public if the decree is enforced. The Supreme Court cited Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir.1985), as an example of this test. In Duran, modification was allowed to avoid pretrial release of accused violent felons. Id. at 756-761. Defendants have not pointed to any increased risk of harm to the public if college programming is continued in spite of the public sentiment. In fact, numerous studies reveal that prisoners who receive college programming are less likely to commit crimes upon release. A change in public opinion does not mean that the continuation of college programming is detrimental to the public interest and does not warrant modification of the Consent Decree under Rufo.
2. Physical and operational changes pursuant to Section VIII of the Consent Decree and planned and implemented by defendants.
Section VIII of the Consent Decree requires the development and implementation of a Management Plan for SPSM which, as developed, calls for the decentralization of SPSM into four facilities that are substantially autonomous. The requirement for this plan was included in the original Hadix Consent Decree. The plan is substantially developed and is under implementation.
Defendants assert that the implementation of the breakup of the SPSM complex, including the Hadix facilities, into four separate facilities, constitutes a change that warrants modification of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan.[8] Defendants argue that the breakup will make compliance with the plan more difficult because of changes in demographics and changes in the physical structure during the breakup only. Upon completion, however, defendants acknowledge that there will be no hindrance. According to defendants, the process of the breakup is preventing complete compliance with the plan and there will be even less compliance in the future. However, at the current time, defendants have no problem complying with the 75% requirement of the plan and are currently at 12% of the 14% academic and vocational requirement for the Central Complex.[9]
Defendants also cite certain changes that they implemented in order to improve the management and operation 750 of SPSM and other facilities. Examples include the reorganization (McGinnis Aff. at ¶ 4.B.), the construction *750
of new facilities (McGinnis Aff. at ¶ 7.), and the implementation of a new movement schedule and related operational reorganizations (Jabe Aff. at ¶ 8.). However, these changes should make ongoing compliance with the plan less onerous and more workable, and therefore they do not provide a justification for modification under Rufo. Furthermore, since the changes were planned and implemented by defendants, they cannot now claim that their own actions create unforeseen circumstances.
3. Improvement in levels of violence.
Defendants allege that the levels of violence have decreased since 1985 and that this is an indication that the facilities are better managed and under control. Defendants cite various changes in conditions of confinement including a reduction in the mixing of prisoners with incompatible security classifications, and a decline in the number of major misconduct hearings. As a result of these changes, defendants conclude that there is no longer a need for the plan.
To meet the Rufo standard, defendants must show that the changes make compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous, or unworkable, or detrimental to the public interest. Defendants have failed to establish that the changes, as they occur, make compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous, or unworkable, or detrimental to the public interest. In any event, the decrease in violence levels does not affect defendants' ability to comply with the current Out-of-Cell Activity Plan. If anything, the changes facilitate compliance with the requirements of the plan.

4. The remedying of overcrowding.

While defendants do not clearly state their case on this point, I construe part of the defendants' claim to be that it would be detrimental to the public interest to continue to mandate implementation of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, if the conditions that the plan was intended to alleviate have been remedied. Defendants claim that the Out-ofCell Activity Provision was intended to assure "the protection from harm and/or adverse impact from overcrowding." They cite, as proof, the fact that the title of the section of the Consent Decree under which the provision appears is "IV. Overcrowding and Protection from Harm". (Hadix Consent Decree at 23-26.)
Since there was an extrinsic purpose in the plan to improve certain conditions, and some of those conditions are actually improving as the plan is being implemented, it would be perverse to modify the plan simply because it contributed to improving the very conditions that it was intended to improve. Furthermore, there is no linkage in the language of the Consent Decree that defendants claim. Section IV contains a wide range of provisions, some of which are related to the prevention of potential future crowding, such as provisions to continue single celling. Other provisions relate to the mitigation of other types of harm. The purpose of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan was not to remedy overcrowding; the requirement of continued single celling solved this problem. Thus, the remedying of overcrowding is not a factual or legal change which makes compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous as required under Rufo, supra.

IV. ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Defendants McGinnis and Jabe testified that defendants could no longer comply with certain elements of the Outof-Cell Activity Plan; that they were out of compliance with certain provisions; and that modification was therefore warranted. They cited conditions such as the closing of certain cell-blocks due to implementation of the Management Plan, supra, and changes in schedules for certain programs and services as reasons for noncompliance.

I am persuaded that certain elements of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan need to be modified because they were written with specificity that no longer applies to current circumstances. The appropriate approach is to relieve the defendants of the obligation to comply with certain specific requirements altogether. I therefore order the following modifications to the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan:

751

*751 1. Defendants shall not be required, pursuant to the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, to maintain a

capacity for 2,340 prisoners in the Hadix facilities.

2. Defendants shall not be required to maintain a specific proportion of capacity for administrative segregation, protective custody, or punitive segregation.

3. The categories of prisoners identified in the second and third paragraphs of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, including prisoners in administrative segregation, punitive segregation, protective custody, the hospital, reception, and prisoners who are temporarily confined, may exceed 25% of the population of Hadix facilities. The provisions of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan shall continue to apply to the remaining prisoners.

4. Defendants may substitute other comparable groups for the Special Activities groups named in paragraph 10 of the plan.

5. In paragraphs 11 and 14, the plan refers to specific numbers of hours of activities associated with specific yards. Defendants may modify yard assignments and schedules consistent with the remaining provisions of the Consent Decree and the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan.

6. All references to "Central Complex" in the Plan shall be changed to "Facilities subject to the Hadix Decree."

7. Schedules provided in the plan as Appendices 1 and 2 are hereby deleted from the plan.
8. For any provision of the plan involving a numerical measure of compliance, defendants may demonstrate compliance for each Hadix facility separately, or for all Hadix facilities considered in combination.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendants have pointed to a number of changes which they believe warrant modification of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan incorporated into the Hadix Consent Decree. None of the changes alleged by defendants warrant modification. Thus, defendants' motion is denied. Additionally, because some specific requirements of the Decree are no longer applicable, I order that certain specific requirements of the Decree be modified as discussed in Section IV, supra.
VI. FINALITY IN THESE PROCEEDINGS
As has been indicated, both Hadix v. Johnson and Glover v. Johnson have been before this court for many years. Defendant Department of Corrections has frequently raised the question of finality in these proceedings. There must come a time when the involvement of the court is no longer either required or necessary. The plaintiff class in each case argues that until the conditions that brought these cases to this federal court initially have been corrected, there is no basis for the contention of finality. The issue is complicated additionally by the argument that, in this case, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment which cannot be modified or terminated unless the requirements of Rufo are met.
Nonetheless the matter of finality must be addressed. Where, as in these cases, the parties (inmates versus Department of Corrections) are in a continuing relationship, the concept of finality becomes even more complicated.
For example, it would be an exercise in futility for me to hold that finality has been attained, only to have a group of plaintiff inmates begin a new case, citing the allegations of constitutional violations. The perplexing issue is: How is finality reached in these public agency-public law cases? Arguably, permanent involvement by a federal court in the work of a state agency such as the Department of Corrections is not desirable and, at some point, unwarranted.
As it is so often a need in the administration of justice, a balance must be reached. That balance is reached, it seems, when there is substantial compliance with the goals of either a consent judgment, as in Hadix, or a negotiated settlement, as in Glover. As the analysis of these factors has been made in each of these cases, as indicated in the foregoing Opinion, that requirement of compliance has not yet completely been reached. That 752 fact may not be used, however, to avoid addressing finality. Even though progress *752 has been slow in both cases, there has been substantial progress toward finality.
It is this court's view that a further test period is still required. That test period can be measured in a discrete time frame.[10]
This court, with the aid of its Monitors, will determine within a period of sixty (60) days after December 31, 1996, whether compliance has been substantially accomplished. During the period prior to December 31, 1996, each of the monitors will perform quarterly reviews which will be submitted to the court and the parties detailing the compliance status in each program in each case. In making this judgment and adopting this approach, I have followed the teaching of U.S. v. State of Mich., 18 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.1994). The procedure for the determination of finality, as outlined in that case, is a method for reaching a balance in these cases.
The plaintiff class may submit a proposed order.

[1] This motion is in response to the remand by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit of defendants' appeal of my May 10, 1990 Order. In addition to enjoining defendants from canceling, abridging and/or impeding post-secondary education programs offered by Jackson Community College for prisoners subject to the Hadix Consent Decree, the May 10, 1990 Order denied Defendants' Motion to Modify or Vacate the State Plan for Outof-Cell Activity. The court of appeals remanded defendants' motion to modify for reconsideration, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Defendants subsequently filed a motion to modify the entire Out-of-Cell Activity Plan of the Hadix Consent Decree. Oral argument was heard and evidence was taken on defendants' motion during a series of hearings held on June 28, August 2, October 27, and November 10, 1994. These hearings followed an intensive period of negotiations which were not successful.
[2] In their appeal, supra note 1, defendants argued that the nature and enforceability of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan is questionable. Defendants claim that the plan that was submitted was intended to demonstrate compliance with Section IV.H.2 of the Hadix Consent Decree, and was not intended to specifically bind defendants to any particular program.
However, the Consent Decree specifically provides that "the [out-of-cell activity] plan shall be appended to the judgment in this matter" where plaintiffs have no objection. (Hadix Consent Decree at 33.) Additionally, in my August 23, 1990 Opinion, I found that the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan submitted was the plan required by Section IV.H.2 of the Consent Decree; that the plan is not simply a compliance report; that the specific provisions of the plan are enforceable; and that the plan became part of the Consent Judgment.
[3] In place of the current plan, defendants propose a modified out-of-cell activity plan which they believe effectively balances this court's constitutional concerns with the needs of the Department of Corrections to effectively administer this state's correctional population. Because none of the changes advanced by defendants warrant modification of the plan under Rufo, an analysis of defendants' proposal is not necessary.
[4] The percentage of inmates participating in assigned work at Egeler was 66% in June of 1994. (Defs.' Exh. 2.) In 1988, the Egeler Facility which was previously included as a part of Central Complex was separately named. Subsequently, defendants began separate reporting for Egeler.
[5] An increased presence of level 5 inmates in administrative segregation, however, could affect defendants' ability to comply with the 75% out-of-cell participation requirement if the number of inmates in the general population remained constant or decreased as the number of inmates in administrative segregation increased. In June of 1994 the number of inmates in administrative segregation was 156 out of a total population of 1,554, or 10%. (Defs.' Exh. 40). Thus, the increase in level 5 inmates, assuming this increase directly increases the number of inmates in administrative segregation, does not affect defendants' ability to reach the 75% requirement.
[6] The Egeler facility reached a level of 11% in 1994. (Defs.' Exh. 2.) See supra, note 4.
[7] Defendants' arguments and proposed modification, as related to college programming, aim to delete such programming altogether. However, defendants contracted in the Consent Decree, and through the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, to provide college programming to qualified inmates in the Central Complex. I note that defendants are not opposed to the idea of this type of academic training. They have indicated that they would have no objection to a continued offering of college programming if this was not financed with state taxpayer funds. I note too, that, in the breakup plan, the new facilities are so constructed that classroom and distance education can be provided to inmates. With this in mind, I direct that the parties explore ways and means in which distance education can be provided to the inmates. Either the public universities or private colleges can form a consortium and, with the aid of seed money of one or more interested Michigan foundations, such a program may be begun. Ways and means can also be explored to see if there are available funds for the continuation of such a program through the Inmate Benefit Fund.
[8] Defendants also introduce the notion that the facilities resulting from the implementation of Section VIII of the Decree are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Hadix Consent Decree. However, defendants are obligated to implement all sections of the Consent Decree, including Section VIII, until, pursuant to Section XII of the Decree,

the court terminates jurisdiction. Furthermore, I previously ordered, in the Order accepting Consent Judgment (dated May 13, 1985), that physical or operational modification of the facilities located within the walls of SPSM does not affect the jurisdiction of this court, especially when the process of modification was anticipated by and conducted under the jurisdiction of the court.
[9] Testimony of Defendant Director Kenneth McGinnis (cross examination) Aug. 2, 1994.
[10] This approach has already been endorsed by Defendant Director McGinnis. (Letter from Director McGinnis to the court of 2/15/95.)
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 933 F.Supp. 1360 (1996)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 80-CV-73581-DT.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
July 5, 1996.
Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Susan Przekop-Shaw, Asst. Attorney General, Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING A STAY OF THE CONSENT DECREE
FEIKENS, District Judge.
On June 10, 1996, defendants moved for immediate termination of the consent decree in this case pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L.No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
The complaint originating this action was filed on August 12, 1980; I quote from the Introduction to the Consent Decree ("consent decree" or "decree"). It reads: "[Paragraph] 3. The complaint in this case alleges that the rights of the Plaintiffs secured by the First, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated." The consent decree goes on to state that the "provisions contained herein are intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which the prisoners are incarcerated at SPSMCC (Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan).
I approved a consent decree that addressed these claims.
The terms of the consent decree involve twelve broad areas: Sanitation, Safety and Health; Health Care; Fire Safety; Overcrowding and Protection from Harm; Volunteers; Access to Courts; Food Service; Management; Operations; Mail; Compliance; and Inspection. The portions of the case involving medical and mental health care and access to the courts were transferred to now-Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen of the Western District of Michigan in 1992 and 1993, respectively.[1]
The defendants also moved on June 10, 1996, to terminate the consent decree in that portion of the case before 1361 Judge Enslen. In *1361 their brief, and oral argument heard on July 2, 1996, the defendants cited § 3626(e)(2) of
the PLRA, which provides that "prospective relief subject to a pending motion [for termination] shall be automatically stayed" beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed until the date "the court enters a final order ruling on the motion." Thus, all agreements and orders that have been made throughout the eleven years of this consent decree would abruptly cease on July 9, 1996, until this court enters a final order on the defendants' motion for termination of the consent decree, an order which could only be issued after an indeterminable amount of time because of the factual and legal complexities involved in adjudicating this motion.
Suspending the consent decree could have profound effects: Presently the State Prison of Southern Michigan is undergoing vast structural and organizational changes in accordance with a Break-Up Plan approved by the parties and the court in accordance with the requirements of the consent decree. This Break-Up Plan[2] is underway, and phases of it already are completed; but much is still to be done. While reason would probably dictate that this project would not be suspended, under § 3626(e)(2) of the PLRA, defendants would have the power so to do.

It has been suggested by plaintiffs' counsel that I avoid the constitutional question of the automatic stay provision by suspending it under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)[3], which enables a court to "preserve the court's jurisdiction or maintain the status quo" pending the questions before it. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry. Col., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n. 22, 83 S.Ct. 984, 991 n. 22, 10 L.Ed.2d 52 (1963). However, this provision is such a palpable constitutional violation in which Congress takes over a court's docket and intrudes on a court's final judgment that I find it unnecessary to use the All Writs Act as a stopgap for what is perfectly clear.
The automatic stay provision is not an attempt by Congress to limit the jurisdiction of Article III courts, it is an encroachment by Congress into a court's final order, overturning it until a later date. Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution says that "the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." In his momentous decision discussing the separation of powers, Justice Storey stated:
If, then, it is a duty of congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language, if imperative as to one part, is imperative as to all. If it were otherwise, this anomaly would exist, that congress might successively refuse to vest the jurisdiction in any one class of cases enumerated in the constitution, and thereby defeat the jurisdiction as to all; for the constitution has not singled out any class on which congress are bound to act in preference to others.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). Similarly, two of the original Supreme Court justices, while sitting as judges of a circuit court, observed that Congress may not infringe, even temporarily, on decisions of the judiciary:
And we beg leave to add, with all due deference, that no decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances in our opinion, agreeable to the constitution, be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested, but the important one relative to impeachments.
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (U.S.1792) (emphasis added).
1362 Judge Enslen has filed an opinion and order on the automatic stay provision. I *1362 concur with his opinion and incorporate it herein as Appendix A.[*]
I conclude that § 3626(e) is unconstitutional.
THEREFORE, the prospective relief that has been awarded to plaintiffs pursuant to the consent decree will not be stayed pending a determination of defendants' motion to terminate the decree.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] In part, this transfer came about by stipulation of the parties and by order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
[2] Until recently this large state prison housed all inmates under one roof. Hereafter there will be at least four autonomous prisons on the same site.
[3] The All Writs Act provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
[*] Editor's Note: The opinion and order appear separately in the Federal Supplement at 1996 WL 393737, 933 F.Supp. 1362.

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 947 F.Supp. 1113 (1996)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 80-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
December 4, 1996.
1114 *1114 Patricia A. Streeter, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Susan Przekop-Shaw, Leo Friedman, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
FEIKENS, District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs' counsel in this case request fees for work performed between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 1996 pursuant to established billing procedures in this case. Defendants contend that hours billed for work performed after April 26, 1996, the enactment date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 1996 ("the Act" or "PLRA"), are subject to its limitation on fees.
Amending 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the provision of the PLRA at issue stipulates:
No award of attorney's fees in an action [brought by a prisoner in which attorney fees are authorized] shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel.
§ 803(d). The hourly rate for court-appointed attorneys is $60 per hour unless the Judicial Conference of the United States determines that a higher rate not in excess of $75 per hour is justified for a particular circuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). The rate of pay for plaintiffs' counsel in this case has been established at $150 per hour. Under the PLRA, their rate would be reduced to $112.50 per hour (150% of the $75 maximum hourly rate for time expended in the Eastern District of Michigan).
The PLRA was enacted eleven years after a consent judgment was entered in this case. The issue before me is whether the PLRA's limitation on attorney fees applies to work done on this case after the effective date of the Act.[1]
For reasons set forth below, I conclude that the PLRA-mandated cap on attorney fees applies to this case for work performed after April 26, 1996. As to the only other source of contention, 23 hours' work provided by plaintiffs' counsel in preparation of a brief regarding the constitutionality of the PLRA, I find that the length of time involved was not excessive.
II. APPLICATION OF THE PLRA TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Supreme Court clarified how to resolve the conflict between the presumption that a statute should not be applied retroactively

and the presumption that a court "should apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision." Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).
When a statute affects events which transpired in the suit before its enactment, a "court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1505.
The PLRA is comprised of ten sections, only one of which (§ 802) specifies that it is to be applied to pending cases. The provisions that limit attorney fees are found in § 803 of the Act, which, plaintiffs contend, signals the congressional intent for prospective application. As further evidence, plaintiffs point out that attorney fees provisions were originally included in § 802 of the Act, but were removed from that section in the final version of the bill. Application of the PLRA to this case, they argue, would specifically read into the statute the very fee limitation Congress eliminated.
The negative inference plaintiffs urge me to draw is too attenuated to support a finding of congressional intent. In 1115 Hutto v. Finney, *1115 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), a prison conditions case in which
attorney fees were granted against a state government, the Court referred to express indications of congressional intent in the legislative history to uphold the award of fees. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2575. But in Landgraf, the Court tempered its reliance on statements made in the Congressional Record in observing that conflicting opinions more closely reveal partisan statements than congressional intent. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1495. Here there are no statements at all concerning the issue of retroactivity; there are only conflicting placements of a provision in a bill as it made its way through Congress. This fact is insufficient to evince congressional intent.
Absent legislative guidance, my next inquiry is whether application of the statute would have a retroactive effect. If so, it will not be applied to this case. To determine whether a statute operates retroactively,
the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates "retroactively" comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1499. Factors to be considered to determine a statute's retroactive effect are whether it "would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id., 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1505.
Plaintiffs' counsel have been entitled to fees in this case, and a specific system of payment and rate of pay has been established. Changing the rate from $150 to $112.50 per hour, according to plaintiffs, is a drastic reduction over market rates, particularly in light of the spiraling litigiousness of this case in the last two years. They contend that application of § 803(d) would fail to protect their "reasonable reliance" and "settled expectations" in having their counsel paid comparably to the prevailing market rate and that such a change would occur without providing them "ample notice" since this case was filed so long before the introduction of the PLRA.
It is true that "settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted." Id., 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1483. As explained by the Court in Landgraf, a free and changing society needs to be protected from the danger of arbitrary or vindictive power exercised over past conduct. Id. at ___ - ___, 1497-98. This principle was encapsulated in the Supreme Court's admonition that a law should not be applied retroactively if doing so "would result in manifest injustice." Bradley, at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016.
I conclude that this Act would not impair plaintiffs' or their counsel's rights to the extent that its application would be impermissibly retroactive. I am guided by the Supreme Court's observation that application of a statute which "authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief" is not retroactive, Landgraf, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1501, the rationale being that "`relief by injunction operates in futuro' and that plaintiff has no `vested right' in the decree entered by the trial court." Id., citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921).

The rate of pay in this case has been adjusted in keeping with the prevailing market rate. Considering the fact that court-appointed counsel in this district are paid the maximum amount allowed by statute, and the fact that the PLRA's cap is 150% of that amount, I cannot say that Congress's intent to limit plaintiffs' counsel to $112.50 per hour is so fundamentally unfair as to result in manifest injustice. Nor can I say that this legislation unreasonably disrupts settled expectations. "If every time a man relied on existing law in arranging his affairs, he were made secure against any change in legal rules, the whole body of our law would be ossified forever." Id., 511 U.S. at ___, n. 24, 114 S.Ct. at 1499, n. 24, quoting L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 51-62 (1964).
1116 *1116 III. 23 HOURS IN DISPUTE ON THE PLRA BRIEF
Defendants object to 23 hours of attorney fees (17.2 hours for Patricia Streeter and 5.8 hours for Michael Barnhart) accumulated in preparing a brief in response to defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree in this case pursuant to the PLRA. It has been acknowledged by both parties that the brief is based on a memorandum of law prepared by the Legal Aid Society 0907 Prisoner Rights Project and submitted in Benjamin v. Jacobsen, United States District Court (S.D.N.Y.) No. 75-Civ-3073. Claiming that only seven original sentences were added by plaintiffs' counsel, defendants object to the 23 hours spent as unreasonable.
The brief submitted to this court was 83 pages long, presented three distinct constitutional arguments, and included a detailed factual affidavit explaining facts from the 16-year history of this case. I note that without the memorandum at their disposal plaintiffs' counsel would have been required to spend far greater than 23 hours to prepare an adequate response. Considering the magnitude and complexity of this issue, I believe that 23 hours of preparation time is well within the realm of reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the PLRA's limits on attorney fees apply to this case for work performed after the PLRA's enactment on April 26, 1996.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs re-submit fee requests for work performed between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 1996 in which counsel's fees are limited to $112.50 per hour for time worked after April 26, 1996.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receiving this revised request defendants pay plaintiffs' counsel for the contested 23 hours' work provided.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[1] In an opinion and order dated May 30, 1996, I held that the PLRA's provisions on attorney fees do not apply to work performed before its enactment.
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 Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 1 of 85
CLOSED,APPEAL,HABEAS,reassigned
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:80−cv−73581−VAR

Hadix, et al v. Johnson, et al Assigned to: District Judge Victoria A. Roberts Demand: $0
Plaintiff Everett Hadix

Date Filed: 09/18/1980 Date Terminated: 06/27/2001 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
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Plaintiff Richard Mapes

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Brent Koster

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Plaintiff Theodore Rhode

represented by Neal Bush (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 10 of 85

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Orvel Simmons

represented by Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Neal Bush (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ted Sullivan

represented by Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Neal Bush (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mark Coleman

Plaintiff Danny Walker

represented by Patricia A. Streeter PO Box 871578 Canton, MI 48187 734−222−0088 Email: pas@patstreeter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 11 of 85

Plaintiff Ronald Kovaleski

Plaintiff C. Moore

represented by C. Moore 100885 Southern Michigan Correctional Facility 4010 Cooper Street Jackson, MI 49201−7510 PRO SE

Plaintiff Alfredo Robinson

represented by Alfredo Robinson 136864 State Prison of Southern Michigan Central Complex 4008 Cooper Street Jackson, MI 49201 PRO SE

V. Defendant Perry M. Johnson

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt MI Dept of Atty Gen Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division P.O. Box 30755 Lansing, MI 48909−8255 517−373−7540 Email: SchmidtBA@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville Civil Rights Clinic 610 Abbot East Lansing, MI 48823 51−336−8088, x1137 Fax: 517−336−0646 Email: daniel.manville@law.msu.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee MI Dept of Atty Gen Alcohol & Gambling Enforcement Division 1500 Abbott Road Suite 300 East Lansing, MI 48823 517−741−0210 Email: mcgeheed1@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve Michigan Department of Attorney General Habeas Corpus Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909−7717 517−373−4875

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 12 of 85
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jann R. Baugh Michigan Department of Attorney General International Trade & Agriculture Div. P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−6514 Fax: 517−373−6514 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman MI Dept of Atty Gen Corrections Division P. O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517−335−7021 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward 4131 Okemos Rd. Suite 12 Okemos, MI 48864 517−347−8100 Fax: 517−347−8102 Email: LisaCWard@aol.com TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson MI Dept of Attorney General 6545 Mercantile Way Suite 15 Lansing, MI 48911 517−241−6680 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams Michigan Department of Attorney General Corrections Division P. O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909−7717 517−335−7021 Fax: 517−334−6020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw MI Dept of Attorney General 525 W. Ottawa 6th Floor, Suite G P.O. Box 30755 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−7540 Fax: 517−241−3473 Email: przekopshaws@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 13 of 85

Michigan Department of Attorney General Habeas Corpus Division 120 N. Washington Square, 1st Floor P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−4875 Fax: 517−373−4875 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson Michigan Department of Attorney General State Affairs Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−1162 Fax: 517−373−1162 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Barry Mintzes

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 14 of 85

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Charles Anderson

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 15 of 85

Defendant William F. Grant Warden
Defendant

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 16 of 85

Dale Foltz

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Daniel Trudell

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 17 of 85

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Duane Sholes

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 18 of 85

Defendant John Jabe

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 19 of 85

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James Pogats

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 20 of 85

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Roy Rider

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 21 of 85

Defendant Charles Ustess

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 22 of 85

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Don P. LeDuc

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 23 of 85

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Brown, Jr.

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 24 of 85

Defendant Graham Allen

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Elton Scott

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 25 of 85

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Pam Withrow

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 26 of 85

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Frank Elo

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 27 of 85

Defendant Marjorie Van Ochten

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 28 of 85

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Prelesnik

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Susan Przekop−Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 29 of 85
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Movant Marvin Mayberry
Movant United States of America

represented by Marvin Mayberry 123320 State Prison of Southern Michigan Central Complex 4008 Cooper Street Jackson, MI 49201 PRO SE
represented by Margo Schlanger U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division P.O. Box 66400 Washington, DC 20035−6400 202−616−8657 Fax: 202−616−8657 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H. Rosenbaum U.S. Department of Justice Housing and Civil Enforcement Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 202−305−1311 Fax: 202−305−1311 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/19/1987 10/20/1988
10/20/1988
10/20/1988

# Docket Text
773 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, regarding monitoring fees (Copy of order that was originally omitted from docket) (lh) (Entered: 02/05/1991)
MOTION hearing held on plaintiff's motion to clarify consent judgment for evidenitary hearing − motion granted − evidentiary hearing to be held at a date and time to be set by the court − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) Modified on 10/21/1988 (Entered: 10/21/1988)
MOTION hearing held on defendants motion to modify consent decree − motion to modify consent decree denied without prejudice; to be considered by monitor in his first report, defendants may bring motion subsequent to report − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) (Entered: 10/21/1988)
MOTION hearing held on defendants motion to appoint Benton monitor and transfer cases − defendants motion to appoint Benton monitor and transfer cases granted in part as to appointment of Benton as monitor and denied as to the transfer of cases − − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) Modified on 10/21/1988 (Entered: 10/21/1988)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 30 of 85

10/20/1988
10/20/1988
01/06/1989 01/09/1989 01/10/1989 01/11/1989 01/11/1989 01/12/1989
01/12/1989 01/13/1989
01/16/1989
01/17/1989 01/17/1989 01/25/1989 02/08/1989 02/09/1989 02/21/1989 02/22/1989

MOTION hearing held on plaintiffs motion to modify consent decree − plaintiffs motion to modify consent decree denied without prejudice as to plaintiff's right to bring motion re: sanitation after Warden Jabes report due 12/01/88 − − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) Modified on 10/21/1988 (Entered: 10/21/1988)
MOTION hearing held on plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with Court's order of 11/30/87 − plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with Court's order of 11/30/87 denied with prejudice − − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) (Entered: 10/21/1988)
592 RESPONSE of defendants' to plaintiffs' motion to clarify section VI, paragraph 13 of consent judgment with memorandum and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/11/1989)
593 APPEAL record certified and transmitted to USCA − appeal case # 88−1144,88−1879,88−1905 − # of volumes: 7 − # of transcripts: 26 by UPS. (lh) Modified on 01/11/1989 (Entered: 01/10/1989)
594 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of notice of appeal. − appeal case # 88−2111 (lh) (Entered: 01/19/1989)
596 ANSWER (response) of plaintiffs' to Warden Jabe's Report regarding the Status of Sanitation Issues with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/19/1989)
597 ORDER by Judge John Feikens to transport C. Pepper Moore , Alfredo A Robinson, raymon Walen, Karl Battle−El and Brent Koster from State Prison to Federal Courthouse on 1/12/89 @ 8:30 am. (lh) (Entered: 01/19/1989)
MOTION hearing held and continued on − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *Motion hearing held on Pltf's Motion for Clarification of Section VI, Paragraph 13 of the Consent Judgment (filed on 10/07/88) − hearing con't. to 01/17/89 at 9:00 a.m..* (cd) (Entered: 01/12/1989)
598 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying defendants' motion to transfer jurisdiction of case to Western District without prejudice and for appointment of F. Warren Benton as Monitor is granted. (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
599 ORDER by Judge John Feikens that the Michigan Department of Corrections is ordered to transport C Pepper Moore, Alfredo A Robinson, Raymond Whalen, KAral Battle−El and Brent Koster to Federal Court on 1/17/89 @ 8:30 am with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
MOTION hearing held on − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Ellen Alexander − *Motion by pltf. for clarification of Part VI, Paragraph 13 of the consent judgment − heard − evidentiary hearing − TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT.8 (cd) (Entered: 01/18/1989)
600 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from UPS of receipt of record appeal [593−1] − appeal case # 88−1905,88−1879,88−1144 (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
601 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from UPS of receipt of record appeal [593−1] (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
602 RESPONSE (post hearing brief) of plaintiffs' in support to their motion for clarification of section VI, paragraph 13 of the consent judgment with proof of service. (lh) (Entered: 01/30/1989)
603 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of record on appeal − appeal case # 88−1144 and 88−1879 (lh) (Entered: 02/09/1989)
604 REPLY of defendants' to motion response (post hearing brief) [602−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 02/10/1989)
605 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA dismissing appeal − appeal case # 88−2111 − record not returned. (lh) (Entered: 02/23/1989)
606 NOTICE of Philip W. Berryman for violations of the Haddix and USA Consent Decree with attachment. (lh) (Entered: 02/24/1989)

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04/03/1989 04/07/1989 04/07/1989 04/07/1989 04/10/1989 04/21/1989 04/27/1989 05/03/1989 05/04/1989 05/04/1989 05/15/1989 06/12/1989
06/12/1989
06/14/1989 06/16/1989 06/16/1989 07/07/1989

607 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA vacating injunction − appeal case # 88−1144. See order for details − record not returned (lh) (Entered: 04/05/1989)
608 NOTICE of filing report of the Monitor concerning the Stipulation regarding the implementation of COnsent Decree Provision VIII, E, F, and G (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
609 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, approving stipulation regarding implemenation of Consent decree Proviss ion VIII E, F, and G. See stip and order for details (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
610 NOTICE of plaintiffs' of taking deposition of Roger Roberts 4/13/89 @ 1:00 pm NSI with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
611 MOTION of plaintiffs' for temporary restraining order with brief, and attachments (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
612 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens regarding plaintiff's motion to clarify Section VI, paragraph 13 of the consent judgment. See memorandum opinion and order for details. (lh) (Entered: 04/24/1989)
613 MANDATE from USCA vacating order for injunction − appeal case # 88−1144 − record Not returned. (lh) (Entered: 05/08/1989)
614 MANDATE from USCA vacating − appeal case # 88−1144 order for temporary injunction − record not returned, will be returned at later date. (lh) (Entered: 05/08/1989)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 6/14/89 *between 9:00 and 11:30 a.m.* before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 05/04/1989)
615 NOTICE of status conference regarding remaining issues by telephone (lh) (Entered: 05/08/1989)
616 ANSWER (response) of plaintiffs' to defendants' revised proposal and administrative structure of the State Prison of Southern Michigan of 2/15/89 with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1989)
617 NOTICE by defendant John Prelesnik, defendant Marjorie Van Ochten, defendant Frank Elo, defendant Pam Withrow, defendant Elton Scott, defendant Graham Allen, defendant Robert Brown Jr, defendant Don P. LeDuc, defendant Charles Ustess, defendant Roy Rider, defendant James Pogats, defendant John Jabe, defendant Duane Sholes, defendant Daniel Trudell, defendant Dale Foltz, defendant William F. Grant, defendant Charles Anderson, defendant Barry Mintzes, defendant Perry M. Johnson of to substitute Theodore E Hughes, Susan Przekop−Shaw and Richard Adams as counsel for defendants instead of Susan A Harris. (lh) (Entered: 06/13/1989)
618 SUBSTITUTION for defendant John Prelesnik, defendant Marjorie Van Ochten, defendant Frank Elo, defendant Pam Withrow, defendant Elton Scott, defendant Graham Allen, defendant Robert Brown Jr, defendant Don P. LeDuc, defendant Charles Ustess, defendant Roy Rider, defendant James Pogats, defendant John Jabe, defendant Duane Sholes, defendant Daniel Trudell, defendant Dale Foltz, defendant William F. Grant, defendant Charles Anderson, defendant Barry Mintzes, defendant Perry M. Johnson of attorney Theodore E. Hughes, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Richard M.C. Adams in place of Susan A. Harris with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/13/1989)
STATUS conference held − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 06/15/1989)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 8/9/89 *between 9:30 and 11:30 a.m* before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 06/19/1989)
619 PRETRIAL ORDER by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe scheduling status conference with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/21/1989)
620 MOTION by plaintiffs for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class with brief, exhibits, proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 07/10/1989)

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07/07/1989 07/10/1989 07/13/1989
07/17/1989 07/17/1989 07/20/1989 07/20/1989 07/20/1989 07/27/1989 07/28/1989
07/28/1989 08/01/1989
08/01/1989
08/01/1989
08/01/1989
08/02/1989 08/03/1989 08/03/1989

621 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel inspection with brief, proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 07/10/1989)
622 RESPONSE (report to court monitor) by plaintiffs' to defendants' motion to modify the access to courts provision of the consent judgment regarding electric typewriters with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/11/1989)
623 MOTION by plaintiffs' for clarification of order accepting consent judgment to permit enforcement of the consent judgment at the Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries at the Egeler Facility with exhibit "A", amended notice of hearing and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/14/1989)
624 MOTION by defendant for leave to appearance of lead counsel with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/18/1989)
625 REMARK − Plaintiffs Status report regarding Clarence Moore Hearings with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/18/1989)
626 NOTICE by defendants' of hearing on motion for leave to appearance of lead counsel by Perry M. Johnson [624−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/21/1989)
627 RESPONSE and memorandum by defendant Perry M. Johnson to motion for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class [620−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/21/1989)
628 RESPONSE and memorandum by defendant to motion to compel inspection [621−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/21/1989)
629 REPLY by plaintiff to motion response by Perry M. Johnson [627−1] with attachments and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 07/28/1989)
630 REPLY by plaintiff to motion response by Perry M. Johnson to compel inspection and [628−1], motion response by Perry M. Johnson to clarify order to permit enforcement at Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries [627−1] with exhibit "A" and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 07/31/1989)
631 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for (lh) (Entered: 07/31/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for leave to appearance of lead counsel by Perry M. Johnson − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *motion granted conditionally − JF will review each hearing on this case and will notify Harris in advance if he wants her to attend hearing.* (cd) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for clarification of order accepting consent judgment to permit enforcement of the consent judgment at the Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries at the Egeler Facility by James V. Haddix − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Melina Khammo − Motion granted − Egeler Facility is within Consent Judgment − plaintiffs' attorney to enter order. (cd) Modified on 08/03/1989 (Entered: 08/03/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *motion granted − Pltf's expert Dr. Powitz may inspect without Pltfs' atty. (& committee to resolve disputes may be established.)* (cd) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class by James V. Haddix − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *motion granted − Pltfs' atty. may meet with 12 mixed custody inmates, Warden will select guard to stay in room during meeting.* (cd) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
632 PROOF of mailing of copy of motion to transfer for purposes of consolidation and brief (not on docket) (lh) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
633 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, to file brief in excess 20 pages (lh) (Entered: 08/04/1989)
634 MOTION by defendant to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation with brief, attachments "A" thru "G" and notice of hearing without date.(lh) Modified on 08/04/1989 (Entered: 08/04/1989)

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08/07/1989 08/07/1989 08/09/1989 08/10/1989 08/10/1989 08/14/1989 08/15/1989 08/17/1989 08/21/1989 08/29/1989 08/31/1989 09/05/1989
09/11/1989 09/18/1989 09/19/1989 09/19/1989 09/25/1989 09/25/1989 09/26/1989

635 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for leave to appearance of lead counsel by Perry M. Johnson [624−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/08/1989)
636 STATEMENT (Status report regarding contempt proceedings) by defendants with attachments "1" thru "4". (lh) (Entered: 08/09/1989)
STATUS conference held. *Written order to be prepared by Magistrate Pepe regarding status conference proceedings* − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/10/1989)
SCHEDULE: deadline for filing motion *to expand the scope of the contempt proceedings and memorandum of law by Pepper Moore* set for 9/11/89 before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/10/1989)
639 PRETRIAL ORDER − regarding contempt proceedings by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe, and deadline for filing motions (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1989)
637 MOTION by plaintiffs' counsel for attorney monitoring fees and costs with exhibits, proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 08/15/1989)
638 MOTION by plaintiffs' for attorney monitoring fees and costs with brief, exhibits, proposed order, exhibits and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1989)
640 MOTION by plaintiffs' to extend time for defendant to answer motion to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation by defendants' [634−1] with brief, proposed order and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/18/1989)
641 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation by Perry M. Johnson [634−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/22/1989)
642 NOTICE by plaintiff of hearing on motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [638−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/29/1989)
643 MOTION by defendants' for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641−1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/01/1989)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [638−1], motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [637−1] − Judge John Feikens − *MOTION − WITHDRAWN.* (cd) (Entered: 09/05/1989)
644 MOTION by plaintiffs' to extend time to file a motion and memorandum to expand the scope of contempt proceedings to 9/15/89 with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/12/1989)
645 NOTICE by defendant of hearing on motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641−1] by Perry M. Johnson [643−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1989)
646 MOTION by plaintiffs' to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/20/1989)
647 SUPPLEMENTAL (memorandum of law) regarding motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646−1] (lh) (Entered: 09/21/1989)
648 REQUEST by defendants' for admissions as to plaintiffs with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/26/1989)
649 NOTICE by plaintiff of hearing on motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/26/1989)
650 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order to establish procedures for inspections with brief (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)

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09/26/1989 09/26/1989 09/26/1989 09/28/1989 09/28/1989 09/29/1989 09/29/1989 10/03/1989
10/05/1989
10/05/1989
10/05/1989 10/05/1989
10/05/1989
10/05/1989
10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/05/1989

650 PROOF of mailing of pleading 650 (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
651 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them with brief and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
651 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order regarding jurisdiction over the Egler Facility with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 1:00 10/11/89 before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
652 NOTICE of status conference (lh) (Entered: 09/29/1989)
653 RESPONSE (memorandum in opposition) by plaintiff to motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641−1] [643−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/02/1989)
654 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation for Alfredo A Robinson and James Chipman from State Prison to Federal Courthouse on 10/1/89 (lh) (Entered: 10/02/1989)
655 AMENDED ex parte order by Judge John Feikens, that the Michigan Department of Corrections transport Alfredo A. Robinson No. 136864 and James Chipman No 130130 from the State Prioson of Southern Michigan to the Federal Courthouse in Detroit on 10/5/89 for a scheduled hearing at 9:00 a.m. (mm) (Entered: 10/04/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641−1] by Perry M. Johnson [643−1] − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Tyler − *TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − this will be discussed after Sixth Circuit decision and MDOC has 2 weeks to brief again.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646−1] − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Tyler − *TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge Feikens will discuss this matter w/Magistrate Pepe.* r (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for entry of order regarding jurisdiction over the Egler Facility by Everett Hadix [651−1] − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Tyler − GRANTED − orde submitted.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them by Everett Hadix [651−1] − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Tyler *TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Deft. has 2 weeks to file brief & then Judge Feikens will decide this motion on the papers.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for entry of order to establish procedures for inspections by Everett Hadix [650−1] − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Tyler − *GRANTED − order submitted with changes to page 3 of the proposed order.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
656 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order regarding jurisdiction over the Egler Facility by Everett Hadix and that these areas specifically include work areas within the Egeler Facility, all food service areas, housing unit Block 3 and Dwayne Waters Hospital [651−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
657 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order to establish procedures for inspections by Everett Hadix [650−1] See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
658 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, regarding group meetings with plaintiffs counsel See order for details (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
659 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by defendants' to motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore [646−1] with attachments "1" thru "8" (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)

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10/05/1989 10/11/1989
10/18/1989 10/20/1989 10/23/1989 10/26/1989 11/17/1989 11/17/1989 11/22/1989 11/22/1989 11/29/1989 12/01/1989 12/08/1989 12/08/1989 12/08/1989
12/20/1989
01/22/1990
01/23/1990

660 DEPOSITION SUBPOENA returned executed by Process Server on 9/28/89 as to deponent Dr. F. Warren Benton (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
STATUS conference held. *Defendant's response to petitioner's memo on contempt law to be filed by October 19, 1989. Any supplement by petitioner to be filed by October 19, 1989. Magistrate Pepe to meet with Judge Feikens on October 24, 1989. − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 10/12/1989)
661 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/5/89. (lh) (Entered: 10/18/1989)
662 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum of plaintiffs to motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646−1] with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 10/23/1989)
663 MEMORANDUM of law by defendants' regarding contempt. (lh) (Entered: 10/25/1989)
664 RESPONSE by defendant Perry M. Johnson to motion for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them [651−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/27/1989)
665 LETTER, from Various prisoners in support of the Memorandum Opinion and Order that stated the need for the Department of Corrections to hire regular legal director and legal assistances to help prisoners (lh) (Entered: 11/20/1989)
666 AFFIDAVIT for Warden H. N. Grayson and Warden John Jabe marked as exhibit "2" with attachment. (lh) (Entered: 11/20/1989)
667 MOTION by plaintiffs' for payment of monitoring costs related to their experts with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 11/24/1989)
668 REQUEST by plaintiffs for defendants to produce documents with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 11/24/1989)
669 NOTICE by plaintiff James V. Haddix of hearing on motion for payment of monitoring costs related to their experts by James V. Haddix [667−1] with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 11/30/1989)
670 REPLY by plaintiffs' to motion response by Perry M. Johnson to plaintiffs' motion for an order adding nan med plaintiffs and providing protections to them [664−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 12/04/1989)
671 REQUEST by plaintiffs for defendants to produce documents with proof of mailing. (lp) (Entered: 12/12/1989)
672 INTERROGATORIES by plaintiffs to defendants with proof of mailing. (lp) (Entered: 12/12/1989)
673 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them by Everett Hadix [651−1]. It is further ordered that originally named plaintiffs William Lovette and Lee McDonald are not members of the class because they do not reside in 3 Block with proof of mailing. (see order) (lp) Modified on 12/12/1989 (Entered: 12/12/1989)
674 APPEARANCE for John Prelesnik, Marjorie Van Ochten, Frank Elo, Pam Withrow, Elton Scott, Graham Allen, Robert Brown Jr, Don P. LeDuc, Charles Ustess, Roy Rider, James Pogats, John Jabe, Duane Sholes, Daniel Trudell, Dale Foltz, William F. Grant, Charles Anderson, Barry Mintzes, Perry M. Johnson of attorney Donald S. McGehee with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 12/21/1989)
675 MOTION by plaintiff to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13 and court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property with brief, attachment "A" and proof of mailing. (lh) Modified on 03/30/1990 (Entered: 03/30/1990)
676 NOTICE by plaintiff of hearing on motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13, and the court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property [675−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/25/1990)

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01/25/1990 02/09/1990 02/12/1990
02/13/1990
02/13/1990 02/13/1990 02/22/1990 03/06/1990 03/07/1990 03/08/1990 03/13/1990 03/19/1990 03/27/1990 03/27/1990 03/28/1990

677 MOTION by plaintiffs' to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section IV, H. 2 regarding meaningful out−of−cell activity with exhibits "A" thru "C", proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 01/26/1990)
678 MOTION by defendant for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs , and to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 02/12/1990)
679 RESPONSE (reply memorandum) by plaintiff to motion for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs by John Prelesnik [678−1], motion to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures by John Prelesnik [678−2] with attachments 1 thru 8 and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 02/13/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs by John Prelesnik [678−1], motion to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures by John Prelesnik [678−2] − disposition: discovery stayed − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 02/16/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section IV, H. 2 regarding meaningful out−of−cell activity by James V. Haddix [677−1] − disposition: withdrawn − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 02/16/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13, and the court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property [675−1] − disposition: withdrawn − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 02/16/1990)
680 MOTION by defendants' for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis with brief, and exhibits. (lh) (Entered: 02/23/1990)
681 NOTICE of hearing on motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 03/06/1990)
682 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge George E. Woods, for transportation for plaintiff Alfredo Robinson (136864) and Perry Davis (136531) to appear before Judge Feikens on 3/19/90 @ 2:00 pm Order signed by Judge Woods in absence of Judge Feikens (lh) (Entered: 03/08/1990)
683 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court regarding order − appeal case # 88−1905 (lh) (Entered: 03/09/1990)
684 RESPONSE and brief (in opposition) by plaintiff to motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680−1] with attachments "1" thru "6" and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 03/15/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680−1] − disposition: GRANTED − defendant will present order − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Elizabeth Higdon (bK) (Entered: 03/20/1990)
685 MOTION by plaintiffs' for preliminary injunction with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
686 MOTION by plaintiff for temporary restraining order with brief, exhibits. (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
689 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [686−1] and that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction will be heard 4/12/90 @ 9:00am with exhibit "5" attached. (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 37 of 85

03/29/1990
03/29/1990 03/29/1990 03/30/1990
03/30/1990 04/09/1990 04/10/1990 04/10/1990
04/11/1990 04/12/1990 04/12/1990
04/16/1990
04/18/1990 04/18/1990 05/01/1990 05/01/1990 05/01/1990

STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Elnora Williams − record made of in−chambers conference in which Pltf's requested TRO. TRO was granted, order was submitted and entered. Hearing on preliminary injunction set for 4/12/90 at 9:00 a.m.. (cd) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for preliminary injunction [685−1] set for 9:00 4/12/90 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
688 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680−1] (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
687 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685−1], motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [686−1] with exhibits, affidavit and proof of mailing. (lh) Modified on 04/10/1990 (Entered: 03/30/1990)
690 MANDATE from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court regarding of order dated 7/28/88 for [631−1] [631−2] − appeal case # 88−1905 − record not returned. (lh) (Entered: 04/02/1990)
691 MOTION by defendants for modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training , with brief, and attachments. (ep) (Entered: 04/10/1990)
692 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation as to Alfredo Robinson No. 136864 and Al Buttons No. 99366 to appear before Judge Feikens on 4/12/90 @ 9:00 am (lh) Modified on 07/23/1993 (Entered: 04/11/1990)
693 Sealed matter. (unsealed on 7/23/93 see #932 on docket) Order to suppress March 19, 1990 hearing record on defendants' motion authorizing transfer of plaintiffs' representatives James Chapman and Perry A. Davis with transcript of March 29, 1990 on cover of transcript and March 19, 1990 on first page of transcript. (lh) Modified on 07/23/1993 (Entered: 04/12/1990)
694 RESPONSE brief by plaintiffs to defendants motion for modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training [691−1], with exhibits (ep) (Entered: 04/16/1990)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685−1] to 9:00 4/16/90 − disposition: HEARD & ADJOURNED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 04/13/1990)
695 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, that the defendants transport plaintiffs Alfredo Robinson and Al Buttons, plaintiffs detained in the State Prison of Southern Michigan to appear before Judge Feikens on 4/16/90 at 9:00 a.m.. (see order for details) (ep) (Entered: 04/17/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Tyler − Pltf. and Deft. to submit simultaneous proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by May 1, 1990; Court will rule by May 8, 1990. (cd) (Entered: 04/16/1990)
696 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, directing preparation of hearing transcript at defendants' expense (sd) (Entered: 04/19/1990)
697 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 4/16/90 (sd) (Entered: 04/19/1990)
699 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by plaintiff with proof of mailing (ld) (Entered: 05/03/1990)
698 MOTION by plaintiff Everett Hadix to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction with brief,exhibits and proof of mailing. (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
698 RESPONSE by plaintiff Everett Hadix to motion modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training by defendant [691−1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (ld) (Entered:

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05/02/1990 05/04/1990 05/07/1990 05/07/1990 05/08/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990
05/22/1990 05/22/1990 05/24/1990 05/24/1990 05/24/1990 05/24/1990 05/25/1990 05/29/1990 05/30/1990 06/05/1990

05/11/1990)
700 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law in opposition to plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction regarding educational programming at Jackson Community College by defendants with affidavit. (ld) (Entered: 05/03/1990)
703 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction and opposition to defendants' motion for modification by plaintiff,,, [698−1] with proof of mailing (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
701 MOTION by plaintiffs' counsel Patricia A. Streeter and Michael Barnhart for attorney fees , and for costs with memorandum, proof of mailing and attachments (ld) (Entered: 05/08/1990)
701 MOTION by plaintiff Everett Hadix for attorney fees , and for costs with memorandum, proof of mailing and attachments. (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
702 RESPONSE in opposition by defendants to motion to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction opposition to defendants' motion for modification by plaintiff,,, [698−1] with proof of mailing (ld) (Entered: 05/08/1990)
(cd) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701−1] set for 2:00 5/29/90, motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701−2] set for 2:00 5/29/90 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
704 NOTICE of hearing on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701−1], motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701−2] (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1990)
705 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685−1] with proof of mailing. See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1990)
705 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training by defendant [691−1] with proof of mailing. See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1990)
706 MOTION by defendant to file brief instanter with brief, affidavit and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 05/23/1990)
711 RESPONSE by defendants Perry M. Johnson, et al to motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701−2], motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
STATUS conference held − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 05/24/1990)
707 REPLY by defendant Perry M. Johnson to motion response by James V. Haddix to motion for monitoring fees and costs and proof of mailing. [679−1] (lh) (Entered: 05/25/1990)
708 REMARK − April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out of cell Activity provisions (lh) (Entered: 05/25/1990)
709 NOTICE of hearing on re: comments and/or objections to the April 1990 report of the monitor concerning out of cell activity provisions [708−1] (lh) (Entered: 05/25/1990)
712 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to file brief instanter by Perry M. Johnson [706−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701−1] set for 9:00 6/7/90, motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701−2] set for 9:00 6/7/90 before Judge John Feikens (jz) (Entered: 06/05/1990)
710 NOTICE of hearing on commentws and or objectiond to 4/90 report of the Monitor RE: Out of Cell Activity [708−1] (lh) (Entered: 06/05/1990)
STATUS conference held and continued to 10:00 7/24/90 − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 06/06/1990)

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06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/08/1990 06/08/1990 06/13/1990 06/13/1990 06/14/1990 06/14/1990 06/15/1990 06/20/1990
06/20/1990
06/20/1990
06/20/1990
06/20/1990 06/20/1990 06/22/1990

MOTION hearing held on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701−1], motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701−2] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
716 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of plaintiffs Alfredo Robinson # 99366 and C. Pepper Moore #100885 to appear on 6/26/90 @ 1:30 before Judge Feikens with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/19/1990)
713 APPEAL by defendants of order [705−1] to USCA − FEE: $100.00 paid − Receipt #: 254702 (mb) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
717 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, adopting stipulated agreement regarding plan element one and the implementation of paragraphs VIII E, F, and G of the Consent Judgment with attachment and proof of mailing. See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 06/19/1990)
718 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646−1] with proof of mailing (bK) (Entered: 06/21/1990)
719 ORDER by Judge John Feikens Granting plaintiffs' motion of 12/08/87, #408 to amend relief requested with proof of mailing (bK) (Entered: 06/21/1990)
714 PROOF of mailing of #713. (mb) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
715 CERTIFIED copy of appeal by defendants [713−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (mb) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
720 MOTION by plaintiffs' to adopt the April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out−of−cell activity provisions, with modifications, and to address the Monitoring Process with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (bK) (Entered: 06/21/1990)
721 APPEARANCE and notice of entry of appearance for plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, and Everett Hadix of attorney Neal Bush with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/22/1990)
ATTORNEY added for Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, William Ramsey, Carl Proctor−Bey, Earl Pannell, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix − Michael J. Barnhart (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
722 APPEARANCE and notice for plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix of attorney Jeanne E. Mirer with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
723 APPEARANCE and notice for plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, and Everett Hadix of attorney Deborah A. Labelle with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
724 AFFIDAVIT of Patricia Streeter regarding motion for attorney fees [701−1] and motion for costs [701−2] with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
725 AFFIDAVIT of Michael Barnhart regarding motion for attorney fees [701−1] and motion for costs [701−2] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
726 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion for costs by counsel for plaintiff Michael Barnhart the lump sum of $49,275.66 and Patricia

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06/27/1990 06/29/1990 07/17/1990
07/18/1990
07/18/1990
07/20/1990 07/24/1990 07/24/1990 07/24/1990
07/24/1990 07/31/1990 07/31/1990
07/31/1990 08/02/1990
08/02/1990
08/06/1990
08/09/1990 08/14/1990 08/14/1990

Streeter the lump sum of $57,064.98 with proof of mailing. See memorandum opinion and order for details [701−2] (lh) (Entered: 06/26/1990)
727 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal by defendant [713−1] − appeal case # 90−1685 (lh) (Entered: 06/28/1990)
728 NOTICE of hearing on comments and/or objections to 4/90 report of the Moniotr RE: Out of Cell Activity (lh) (Entered: 07/03/1990)
729 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant for appeal by defendant [713−1] requesting transcript of: 4/12/90 (Margaret Lewis) and 4/16/90 (Lynn Spietz) already on file in Clerk's office − appeal case # not received yet (lh) (Entered: 07/18/1990)
730 MOTION by defendants' to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and aopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree with brief, affidavit, and1 proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 07/20/1990)
731 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion to adopt the April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out−of−cell activity provisions, with modifications, and to address the Monitoring Process [720−1] with brief, affidavit and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/20/1990)
732 APPEAL by defendant of order [726−1] to USCA with proof of service − FEE: paid − Receipt #: 257447 (mb) (Entered: 07/24/1990)
733 PROOF of mailing of #732. (mb) (Entered: 07/24/1990)
734 CERTIFIED copy of appeal by defendants [732−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (mb) (Entered: 07/24/1990)
STATUS conference held and all hearing dates should be adjourned. The attorneys think this case may be resolved. − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 07/25/1990)
735 MOTION by defendants to approve supersedeas bond on appeal with brief and proof of mailing (dg) (Entered: 07/26/1990)
736 MOTION by plaintiffs' for preliminary injunction with brief. (lh) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
737 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiffs' for temporary restraining order with brief, exhibits, proposed TRO, and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
738 PROOF of mailing of pleading 735 and 736. (lh) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [737−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED W/OUT DATE − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
739 RESPONSE (in opposition) by defendants' to emergency motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [737−1] with proof of mailing and affidavits. (lh) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
740 MOTION by defendants' to dismiss (rule 12 (b) , or alternatively for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) with brief, attachments and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/08/1990)
741 AFFIDAVIT by defendant Frank Elo and defendant John Jabe regarding (lh) (Entered: 08/10/1990)
742 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal by defendants [732−1] − appeal case # 90−1810 (lB) (Entered: 08/14/1990)
SCHEDULE: deadline for response to motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) [740−1] or in the alternative for summary judgment (rule 56 (b)) by Perry M. Johnson [740−2] set for 8/24/90 , deadline for reply to response motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) or in the alternative for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson set for 8/31/90 (kd) (Entered: 08/14/1990)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 41 of 85

08/14/1990
08/14/1990
08/16/1990 08/21/1990 08/21/1990 08/21/1990 08/24/1990
08/24/1990
08/28/1990 09/07/1990 09/07/1990
09/07/1990 09/10/1990 09/10/1990 09/11/1990 09/12/1990 09/13/1990
09/25/1990
09/25/1990 09/27/1990

743 ORDER by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe, to file response to motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) [740−1] and to motion for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson no later than 7/24/90 [740−2] to file reply to response by 8/31/90 (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1990)
744 DECLARATION of plaintiffs Alfredo Allen and C. Pepper Moore in support of emergency motion for a temporary restraining order with attachments and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1990)
745 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 6/07/90 of hearing on motion (bK) (Entered: 08/20/1990)
746 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 12/8/87 before Magistrate Pepe (lh) (Entered: 09/04/1990)
747 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 12/8/90 before Magistrate Pepe. (lh) (Entered: 09/04/1990)
748 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/2/87 before Magistrate Pepe (lh) (Entered: 09/04/1990)
749 RESPONSE and brief by plaintiffs to motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) [740−1] or alternatively motion for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson [740−2] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/10/1990)
750 FINDINGS of fact and conclusions of law by Judge John Feikens in support of 5/10/90 order fr preliminary injunctin and opinion in support of 5/10/90 order denying defendant's motion to modify consent judgment. (lh) (Entered: 09/11/1990)
751 RECORD of appeal by defendant [713−1] transmitted to USCA − appeal case # 90−1810 − # of volumes: 1 (Pleading 730 per phone call ) (lh) (Entered: 09/12/1990)
752 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiff for enforcement with brief, affidaivt, attachment and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
753 REPLY by defendant to motion response by James V. Haddix to defendants' rule 12 (b) Motion for dismissal or alternatively motion for summary judgment with proof of mailing. [749−1] (lh) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
754 REQUEST by defendant for leave to file file enlarged reply brief with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
755 NOTICE of hearing on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
756 NOTICE of hearing on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752−1] (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
757 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion for enforcement by plaintiffs'[752−1] with brief, attachments and affidavit. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
758 REPLY by plaintiff to motion response by Perry M. Johnson to emergency motion for enforcement [757−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752−1] to 2:00 9/25/90 − disposition: ADJ. if necessary − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 09/24/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752−1] to 2:00 10/5/90 − disposition: ADJ TO 10/5/90 2:00 − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 09/26/1990)
759 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 9/13/90 before Judge Feikens RE: Motion (lh) (Entered: 09/27/1990)
760 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for defendant to show cause why they should not be held in contempt at hearing om 10/5/90 @ 2:00 pm with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1990)

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09/28/1990 09/28/1990 10/01/1990 10/01/1990 10/01/1990
10/01/1990
10/04/1990 10/04/1990 10/04/1990 01/04/1991 01/09/1991
01/09/1991
01/11/1991 01/11/1991 01/11/1991 01/11/1991 02/06/1991 02/06/1991 02/21/1991 02/21/1991

761 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for defendant to show cause why cause should not be held in civil contempt on 10/1/90 @ 2:30 pm with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1990)
762 PROOF of mailing of copy of pleading 761. (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1990)
763 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of record (per phone conversation − pleading 730) − appeal case # 90−1810 (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1990)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752−1] − disposition: MOOT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
MINUTE SHEET of proceedings before Judge John Feikens − − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry − ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFTS. SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT − MOOT − Defts. presented contract to Jackson Community College. (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying emergency motin of defendants to stay the district court's hearing scheduled for 9/25/90 in the Hadix action [0−1] of − appeal case # 89−2191 & 90−1685 − record not returned (see 77−71229 #618) (dg) (Entered: 10/05/1990)
764 SUBPOENA returned as to Melody Wallace executed by process server on 9/20/90 (dg) (Entered: 10/05/1990)
765 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 6/7/90 for motion hearing [0−0] (dg) (Entered: 10/09/1990)
766 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 8/2/90 for motion hearing [0−0] (dg) (Entered: 10/09/1990)
767 MOTION by plaintiffs' to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 with brief, attachments and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/08/1991)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767−1] set for 2:00 2/5/91 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 01/10/1991)
768 NOTICE of hearing on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix on 2/5/91 @ 2:00 pm before Judge Feikens [767−1] (lh) Modified on 02/05/1991 (Entered: 01/10/1991)
769 MOTION by plaintiff for temporary restraining order with brief, and exhibits. (SB) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
771 NOTICE by plaintiffs of hearing on motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiffs [770−1] (SB) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
772 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order, plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and notice of hearing. (SB) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
770 MOTION by plaintiffs' for preliminary injunction with brief and exhibits. (lh) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
774 APPEARANCE for defendants of attorney Janet VanCleve with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
775 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, regarding monitoring fees for the period 7/1/90 to 12/31/90 (lh) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [770−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 43 of 85

02/22/1991
03/28/1991 04/19/1991 05/08/1991 05/10/1991 05/16/1991
06/14/1991 06/25/1991
06/28/1991
07/03/1991 07/10/1991 07/22/1991 07/23/1991 07/24/1991 07/25/1991 07/25/1991

by James V. Haddix [767−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE − Judge John Feikens − Pltfs. reserve right to renotice within 30 days. (cd) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
776 REPORT and recommendation by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe that motion to dismissor for summary judgment (rule 12 (b) by Perry M. Johnson et al [740−1] should be denied with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 04/08/1991)
777 ORDER by Judge John Feikens accepting report & recommendation [776−1] denying motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) by Perry M. Johnson [740−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 04/23/1991)
778 MOTION by plaintiffs' to enjoin harassment of class representative with brief, exhibits "A"−"C", "1 thru "3", and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 05/10/1991)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion to enjoin harassment of class representative by Everett Hadix [778−1] set for 2:30 5/16/91 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 05/10/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to enjoin harassment of class representative by Everett Hadix [778−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − Judge John Feikens − per telephone conversation with David Franklyn, Law Clerk, and Pltfs' counsel Pat Streeter at 11:00 a.m. on 5/15/91. (cd) (Entered: 05/16/1991)
779 NOTICE of telephone status conference (lh) (Entered: 06/19/1991)
780 MOTION by plaintiffs' to enjoin the use of misconducts for possession of personal property based upon fire safety provisions and to direct defendants to promulgate a "Professionally Designed" Inspection Format with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/26/1991)
781 NOTICE of taking depositions of Lamar A Erb on 7/8/91 2 10:00 am, Cindy Avery @ 11:30 am, Robin Pratt @ 2:00 pm, Steve Racibowski @ 10:00 am, Marcus Robinson @ 11:00 am, and Sgt. Dale Lammers @ 2:00 pm NSI with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/01/1991)
STATUS conference held and continued to 10:00 8/2/91 − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 07/26/1991)
782 MOTION by defendants' for protective order restricting discovery with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/11/1991)
783 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff with brief, attachment and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/23/1991)
784 NOTICE of hearing on motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783−1] (lh) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783−1] set for 2:00 8/8/91 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 07/25/1991)
785 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens adjourning plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the use of Misconducts for possession of personal property based upon Ffire Satefy Provisions and to direct defendants to Promulgate a "Professionallyu Designed" Inspection format and Defendants' motion for protective order restricting discovery with proof of mailing. See stip and order for details (lh) (Entered: 07/26/1991)

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08/02/1991 08/02/1991 08/05/1991 09/04/1991
09/06/1991 09/09/1991
09/13/1991 09/27/1991 09/27/1991 09/27/1991 09/30/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991
10/02/1991
10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991

STATUS conference held and the parties are to contact the court next week to set up dates for the hearings at the prison − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/08/1991)
STATUS conference held and the parties to contact court next week to set up dates for hearings at prison. − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/21/1991)
786 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783−1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/06/1991)
787 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order vacating fee award and remanding the case for reconsideration in light whatever disposition is ultimately made of the classification issue in USA − appeal case # 90−1810 − record not returned (lh) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
788 NOTICE of hearing on report and recommendation on re: report of 8/31/91 and informal report re: tasks #100, 200 and 300 as provided in the master project schedule before Judge Feikens (lh) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
SCHEDULE: for special hearing set for 10/17/91 at 9:00 a.m. re: 1) Report and Recommendation re: report of 8/13/91; and 2) Informational report re: tasks #100,200, and 300 as provided in the master project schedule. (cd) (Entered: 09/09/1991)
789 NOTICE of hearing on report and recommendaqtion re: report of 8/13/91 and on informational report re: tasks #100, 200 and 300 provided in the master project schedule (lh) (Entered: 09/16/1991)
790 WITNESS list by plaintiffs (evidentiary hearing to be set) (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
791 LETTER by counsel for plaintiff' dated 9/6/91 to Magistrate Judge Pepe's Chambers re: scheduling evidentiary hearing for 11/6/91, 11/7/91 and 11/8/91 (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
792 LETTER by counsel for defendants to Magistrate Judge Pepe's chambers confirming the scheduling of evidentiary hearinf on 11/6/91, 11/7/91 and 11/8/91 at Jackson State Prison (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
793 MANDATE from USCA vacating the fee award and remanding for reconsideration − appeal case # 90−1810 − record not returned (pd) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion motion to clarify consent judgment for evidenitary hearing [0−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/20/88 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion motion to modify consent decree [0−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/20/88 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion − defendants motion to appoint Benton monitor and transfer cases granted in part as to appointment of Benton as monitor and denied as to the transfer of cases − [0−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/20/88 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion − plaintiffs motion to modify consent decree denied without prejudice as to plaintiff's right to bring motion re: sanitation after Warden Jabes report due 12/01/88 − [0−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/20/88 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion − plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with Court's order of 11/30/87 denied with prejudice − [0−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/20/88 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class by James V. Haddix [620−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 8/1/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [621−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 8/1/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 45 of 85

10/02/1991
10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991

RESOLUTION of motion for clarification of order accepting consent judgment to permit enforcement of the consent judgment at the Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries at the Egeler Facility by James V. Haddix [623−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 8/1/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [637−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 9/5/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [638−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 8/15/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to extend time for defendant to answer motion to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation by defendants' [634−1] by James V. Haddix [640−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 8/21/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13 and court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property by James V. Haddix [675−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 2/13/90 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section IV, H. 2 regarding meaningful out−of−cell activity by James V. Haddix [677−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 2/13/90 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction by Everett Hadix [698−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 5/4/90 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson [740−2] − disposition: terminated − date: 4/19/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/1/90 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 3/21/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for temporary restraining order by Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons [769−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 1/17/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to extend time to file a motion and memorandum to expand the scope of contempt proceedings to 9/15/89 by James V. Haddix [644−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 9/15/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
SCHEDULE: evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt filed 3/6/87 set for 9:30 11/6/91 at Jackson State Prison − to be continued thru 11/8/91 if necessary − before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (lb) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for temporary restraining order [611−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − date: 09/27/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for payment of monitoring costs related to their experts by James V. Haddix [667−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − date: 09/27/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701−1], motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701−2] − disposition: TERMINATED − date: 6/21/90 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)

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10/07/1991
10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/08/1991 10/08/1991
10/24/1991 10/24/1991 10/24/1991
10/31/1991 11/06/1991 11/08/1991 11/12/1991 11/15/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/10/1991
12/11/1991

RESOLUTION of motion to adopt the April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out−of−cell activity provisions, with modifications, and to address the Monitoring Process [720−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − date: 09/27/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to approve supersedeas bond on appeal by defendant [735−1] − disposition: MOOT − date: 09/27/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [770−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − date: 3/21/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
794 NOTICE of evidentiary hearing regarding plaintiff's motion for contempt filed 3/6/87 (lh) (Entered: 10/09/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641−1] by Perry M. Johnson [643−1] − disposition: terminated − date: 10/29/89 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/08/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs by John Prelesnik [678−1], motion to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures by John Prelesnik [678−2] − disposition: terminated − date: 2/13/90 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/08/1991)
STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry − re: Pltfs' motion for temporary restraining order (filed 7/31/90. (cd) (Entered: 10/24/1991)
MINUTE SHEET of proceedings before Judge John Feikens − − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry − Hearing re: monitor's report on compliance. (cd) (Entered: 10/24/1991)
795 ORDER by Judge John Feikens extending deadline for submission of a fully compliant Mmaster schedule to 7/15/92 and that the SPM Decentralization Team may submit alternate master schedules for each option presented in its 7/15/92 report with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/25/1991)
796 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/24/91 before Judge Feikens re: monitor's report (lh) (Entered: 11/01/1991)
EVIDENTIARY hearing held and testimony concluded. Documents to be submitted by counsel. − Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 04/13/1992)
797 SCHEDULING order by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe setting deadline for proposed findings of fact, conslusions of law and any related briefs with proof of mailing (mm) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to enjoin harassment of class representative by Everett Hadix [778−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − date: 5/16/91 − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 11/12/1991)
798 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/6/91 (mm) (Entered: 11/19/1991)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 10:00 12/12/91 before Judge John Feikens re:defts' motion to adopt USA plan. (cd) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
799 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs regarding adverse inference to be taken against defendants in C. Pepper Moore contempt proceedings (mm) (Entered: 12/10/1991)
800 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and adopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730−1] and response in opposition to plaintiffs' request for modifitions and to address the monitoring process with attachment and proof of mailing (mm) (Entered: 12/18/1991)
801 EX−PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation with proof of mailing. (mc) Modified on 12/18/1991 (Entered: 12/18/1991)

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12/12/1991 12/12/1991
01/07/1992 01/15/1992
02/07/1992
02/10/1992 02/13/1992 02/21/1992 02/25/1992 02/28/1992 03/02/1992 03/03/1992 03/06/1992 03/10/1992 03/10/1992 03/11/1992 03/11/1992 03/17/1992
03/18/1992
03/23/1992
03/24/1992 03/24/1992

STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Johnetta Curry, Court Recorder − RE:Defts' motion to adopt USA Plan. (cd) (Entered: 12/12/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and aopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730−1] − disposition: HELD IN ABEYANCE − Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 12/12/1991)
802 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by plaintiffs regarding retaliation against C. Pepper Moore with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/10/1992)
803 RESPONSE brief by defendants to findings of fact (memorandum regarding adverse inference to be taken against defendants in C. Pepper Moore contempt proceedings) by plaintiffs [802−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/21/1992)
STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry − Plaintiffs to file motion to adopt USA Plan by 3/10/92; Defendants to file their response to plaintiffs' motion to adopt USA Plan and they will file their motion to modify the Consent Decree by 4/14/92. (cc) (Entered: 02/10/1992)
804 LETTER from independent monitor, Ff. Warren Benton regarding participation of U. S. Department of Justice in status conference (MM) (Entered: 02/12/1992)
805 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 2/7/92 (MM) (Entered: 02/14/1992)
806 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees , and costs with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 02/25/1992)
807 NOTICE of deadline for response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiff, [806−1], motion costs by plaintiff, [806−2] (MM) (Entered: 02/27/1992)
808 FEBRUARY 1992 report of the independent monitors (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
809 MOTION by plaintiffs to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
810 NOTICE of deadline for response to motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiffs [809−1] (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
813 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, that this be appended to consent judgment with attached letter. (mc) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
814 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by defendants regarding C. Pepper Moore retaliation issue. (mc) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
815 FINDINGS of fact and conclusions of law of defendants. (mc) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
811 MOTION by plaintiffs to adopt mental health orders with brief and exhibits (MM) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
812 EXHIBITS to motion and brief to adopt mental health orders filed by plaintiffs (MM) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
816 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by defendants to motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809−1] with exhibit (MM) (Entered: 03/19/1992)
817 PROOF of mailing of defendants' brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities (MM) (Entered: 04/01/1992)
818 ORDER by Judge John Feikens that defendants transport plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper Moore", Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to the U.S. District Court in Detroit to appear on 3/26/92 (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
819 PETITION by defendants for leave to take deposition of plaintiff William D. Lovett with brief and proof of mailing (MM) Modified on 11/17/1993 (Entered: 04/07/1992)
RESOLUTION of petition for leave to take deposition of plaintiff William D. Lovett by defendants [819−1] − Judge John Feikens (cc) Modified on 12/27/1993 (Entered: 06/14/1993)

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03/25/1992 03/25/1992 04/01/1992 04/06/1992 04/14/1992 04/15/1992 04/15/1992 04/16/1992 04/21/1992 04/21/1992
04/21/1992 04/24/1992 04/24/1992 04/24/1992 04/27/1992 04/28/1992 04/28/1992 04/30/1992 05/01/1992

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809−1] set for 2:00 4/30/92 (cc) (Entered: 03/30/1992)
820 NOTICE of hearing on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiffs [809−1] (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
821 MOTION by plaintiff for finding of contempt and to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
822 ANSWER by plaintiffs to findings of fact proposed by defendants regarding retaliation against C. Pepper Moore [814−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/10/1992)
823 REPLY by plaintiffs to motion response by defendants [816−1] to plaintiffs' motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
824 MOTION by defendant to file enlarged brief with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
825 MOTION by defendants for the court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decreee with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for protective order restricting discovery by Perry M. Johnson [782−1] − disposition: RESOLVED − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/16/1992)
826 RESPONSE brief by defendants to motion to adopt mental health orders by plaintiffs [811−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
827 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for finding of contempt by plaintiffs [821−1], motion to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment by plaintiffs [821−2] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
828 MOTION by defendants for the court to relinquish control an dsupervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
830 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
831 AMENDED STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens regarding attorney fees and costs. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
832 STATEMENT − April 1992 Report of the Monitor regarding compliance with Section VIII of consent decree. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
829 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for the court to relinquish control an dsupervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree by defendant [828−1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
MOTION hearing adjourned on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809−1] to 9:00 5/1/92 − disposition: ADJOURNED − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
921 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear on 4/30/93 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/29/1993)
833 AMENDED ex parte order by Judge John Feikens, for transportation (MM) (Entered: 05/05/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion for the court to relinquish control an dsupervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree by defendant [828−1] − disposition: DENIED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Michael Lang − Mental Health and Medical Health aspects of "Hadix" will be transferred to Judge

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05/01/1992
05/01/1992
05/01/1992
05/15/1992
05/15/1992 05/15/1992 05/28/1992 06/04/1992 06/05/1992
06/10/1992 06/12/1992 06/12/1992 06/15/1992 06/23/1992
06/23/1992
06/30/1992 07/24/1992

Enslen. (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809−1] − disposition: DENIED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Michael Lang − SDT has authority to investigate any and all options. (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to adopt mental health orders by plaintiff,,, [811−1] − disposition: DENIED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Michael Lang − Mental Health and Medical Health aspects of "Hadix" will be transferred to Judge Enslen. (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
MOTION hearing adjourned on motion for finding of contempt by plaintiff,,, [821−1] to 9:00 8/10/92, motion to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment by plaintiff,,, [821−2] to 9:00 8/10/92 − disposition: ADJOURNED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Michael Lang (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for the court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decreee by defendant [825−1] − disposition: DENIED − date: 5/1/92 − Judge John Feikens − this was a duplicate motion. (cc) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to file enlarged brief by defendant [824−1] − disposition: GRANTED − date: 4/24/92 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney fees by plaintiff,,, [806−1], motion costs by plaintiff,,, [806−2] − disposition: ORDER ENTERED − date: 4/24/92 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
834 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 5/1/92 (MM) (Entered: 05/29/1992)
837 LETTER from attorney Michael Barnhart advising that neither plaintiffs nor defendants believe there is a need for closing argument (MM) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
835 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for the court to relinquish control an supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree by defendant [828−1] and ordering that the medical and mental health provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section II) be TRANSFERRED to Judge Enslen for further proceedings as appropriate., with proof of mailing. (ep) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
838 ERRATA sheet (MM) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
836 NOTICE of transferring case to Western Dist of MI (ep) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
836 NOTICE of transferring case to Western District of Michigan (ep) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
839 JUNE 1992 report of the monitor regarding compliance with section I.C.F. of the consent decree (MM) (Entered: 06/17/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and aopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − date: 6/23/92 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/23/1992)
840 NOTIFICATION by defendant of withdrawing motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and adopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730−1] with proof of mailing (MM) Modified on 01/13/2003 (Entered: 06/25/1992)
841 REMARK − plaintiffs' designation of documents to be transmitted to the Western District Court (MM) (Entered: 07/06/1992)
842 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, amending deadlines for submission of the master schedules for the SPSM decentralization/reorganization and independent monitor's out−of−cell activity proposal (MM) (Entered: 07/31/1992)

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07/29/1992
08/03/1992
08/04/1992 08/11/1992
08/11/1992 08/31/1992 09/01/1992
09/11/1992 09/17/1992
09/29/1992 10/05/1992 10/06/1992 10/06/1992 10/07/1992 10/07/1992
10/08/1992
10/13/1992
10/13/1992 10/13/1992 10/13/1992 10/13/1992

843 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, that this case should be remanded to the District Court by the Sixth Ccircuit Court of Appeals with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 08/03/1992)
844 LETTER sending medical portion of file to the Honorable Richard A. Enslen, United States District Court, Western District of Michigan, 410 West Michigan, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49005. (ep) (Entered: 08/06/1992)
845 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from Judge Enslen of receipt of letter [844−1] and portion medical portion of file. New case #4:92CV110. (ep) (Entered: 08/06/1992)
846 LETTER to the court from Susan Przekom−Shaw attaching a copy of the defendants responses to the outstanding sanitation and MIOSHA issues in this case with an attached letter from the Dept. of Corrections. (LS) (Entered: 08/12/1992)
847 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 90−1685 (pr) (Entered: 08/24/1992)
848 MOTION by plaintiffs to permit inspection by expert with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/03/1992)
849 NOTICE of attorneys, Janet VanCleve, Jann Ryan Baugh, Thomas C. Nelson, Donald S. McGehee, Richard M.C. Adams and Theodore E. Hughes to withdraw appearance as attorney for defendants (MM) (Entered: 09/10/1992)
850 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by defendants to motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiffs [848−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/14/1992)
851 REPLY by plaintiffs to motion response by defendant [850−1] (supplemental brief in support of motion to permit inspection by expert) with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/18/1992)
852 MANDATE from USCA remanding case − appeal case # 90−1685 − record will be returned under separate cover` (MM) (Entered: 10/05/1992)
853 PLAINTIFF'S position regarding defendants' compliance report dated August 1992 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/07/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff,,, [848−1] set for 2:00 10/22/92 (cc) (Entered: 10/06/1992)
854 NOTICE of hearing on motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff [848−1] (MM) (Entered: 10/07/1992)
855 DESIGNATION of record by defendant − appeal case # 90−1685 (MM) (Entered: 10/08/1992)
856 REPORT and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe that plaintiffs' motion to hold George Graham and Bernard Toland in contempt of court should be denied; and plaintiffs' motion for further orders of the court with respect to the issue of retaliation against C. "Pepper" Moore or any of the plaintiffs should be denied with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/13/1992)
857 REMARK − memorandum from Magistrate Judge Pepe with notification that page 61 was missing from original and all copies of report and recommendation with page 61 attached and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/13/1992)
858 MOTION by defendants for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order with brief and exhibits 1−5 (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
859 EXHIBIT 6 (vol I) filed by defendant (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
860 EXHIBIT 6 (vol II) filed by defendant (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
861 EXHIBITS 7−10b filed by defendant (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
862 MOTION by defendants to set for hearing motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and

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10/13/1992 10/15/1992 10/16/1992 10/20/1992 10/21/1992 10/22/1992 10/22/1992 10/23/1992
10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992
10/23/1992
10/23/1992

modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order [858−1] with brief (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
864 ERRATA for report & recommendation [856−1] (mc) (Entered: 10/19/1992)
865 PROOF of mailing of defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options, brief in support, motion to set for hearing as to the defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept with brief in support on 10/13/92. (lt) (Entered: 10/19/1992)
863 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, for plaintiffs to file objections by 11/5/92 (mc) (Entered: 10/19/1992)
866 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order with brief in support and proof of mailing (lt) (Entered: 10/20/1992)
867 STATEMENT − OCTOBER 1992 report of monitor regarding compliance (mc) (Entered: 10/23/1992)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff,,, [848−1] to 2:00 10/23/92 − disposition: ADJOURNED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 10/23/1992)
868 EX PAARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation with proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 10/23/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by Ted Rhode, Orvel Simmons, Ted Sullivan [866−1] − disposition: Granted − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens deadline for response to motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858−1] set for 11/4/92 (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
STATUS conference as to the presentation of defendants' decentralization plan − hearing set for defendants' mtoion seeking approval of the site and housing options − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858−1] set for 9:00 11/12/92 (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to set for hearing motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order [858−1] by defendant [862−1] − disposition: Granted per status conference − date: 10/23/92 − Judge John Feikens (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by Ted Rhode, Orvel Simmons, Ted Sullivan [866−1] − disposition: GRANTED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Michael Lang (Jc) (Entered: 10/29/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens deadline for response to motion to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by Ted Rhode, Orvel Simmons, Ted Sullivan [866−1] set for 11/4/92 (Jc) (Entered: 10/29/1992)

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10/23/1992 10/29/1992 10/29/1992 10/30/1992 11/05/1992 11/05/1992
11/09/1992 11/09/1992 11/10/1992 11/12/1992 11/12/1992 11/12/1992 11/12/1992
11/17/1992 11/17/1992 11/23/1992 11/27/1992
11/27/1992 11/27/1992

MINUTE SHEET of conference to listen to presentation of defendants' decentralization plan − before Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Michael Lang (Jc) (Entered: 10/29/1992)
869 TRANSCRIPT of decentralization plan proceedings taken on 10/23/92 (mc) (Entered: 10/30/1992)
870 STATEMENT and lists by plaintiffs of issues regarding defendants' compliance with sanitation provisions of consent judgment with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 10/30/1992)
871 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/22/92 before Judge John Feikens (lt) (Entered: 11/02/1992)
872 MOTION by plaintiff to file nlarged brief with brief and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
873 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by plaintiffs to motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendants with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to file nlarged brief by plaintiff,,, [872−1] − disposition: MOOT − date: 11/5/92 − Judge John Feikens − Carol J. Cohron ok'd document for filing without order. (cc) (Entered: 11/09/1992)
874 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time for plaintiffs to file objections to report and recommendation regarding C. Pepper Moore's claim of retaliation with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/10/1992)
875 EXPARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for defendants to arrange transportation as to plaintiffs, Clarence Moore, Mark Coleman, Al Button, Alfredo Robinson (lt) (Entered: 11/12/1992)
876 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff to report & recommendation [856−1] with exhibits (MM) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
877 REQUEST by plaintiffs for oral argument on objection to report and recommendation [876−1] (MM) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
878 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of documents 876−877 (MM) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 11/17/1992)
879 MANDATE from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 88−1563, 88−1634, 88−1879 − record not returned and remanding the case to the USDC − Western District of Michigan. (at) (Entered: 11/18/1992)
880 LETTER (copy) from Michigan Attorney General to the court with enclosures regarding the sanitation issues (MM) (Entered: 11/19/1992)
881 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/12/92 (MM) (Entered: 11/24/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858−1] − disposition: ORDER ENTERED − date: 11/27/92 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/27/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff,,, [848−1] − disposition: ORDER ENTERED − date: 11/27/92 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/27/1992)
882 MEMORANDUM opinion by Judge John Feikens with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1992)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 53 of 85

11/27/1992 11/27/1992 12/11/1992
12/15/1992 12/22/1992
12/22/1992 01/04/1993 01/05/1993
01/08/1993 01/11/1993
01/11/1993 01/12/1993
01/12/1993 01/15/1993 01/19/1993
01/19/1993
01/19/1993 01/26/1993 02/08/1993 02/09/1993 02/10/1993 02/16/1993

883 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion to permit inspection by expert [848−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1992)
884 ORDER by Judge John Feikens (in accordance with opinion − see order for details) with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1992)
885 MOTION by plaintiff for reconsideration of order denying access to the institution for inspection [883−1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/14/1992)
886 MOTION by defendant to reconsider and alter order of 11/27/92 [884−1] with brief and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/21/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens objections to report and recommendation hearing set for 9:00 1/11/93 RE: as to Pepper Moore's Claim of Retaliation. (cc) (Entered: 12/28/1992)
887 NOTICE of hearing on objection by plaintiff to report and recommendation [876−1] (MM) (Entered: 12/29/1992)
888 PROOF of mailing of proposed ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 01/05/1993)
889 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens, for transportaiton of plaintiff Clarence "Pepper" Moore from the state Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear on 1/11/93 (MM) (Entered: 01/06/1993)
890 PROOF of mailing of ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 01/12/1993)
OBJECTIONS to report and recommendation hearing held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang − re: Pepper Moore's Claim of Retaliation − TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (cc) (Entered: 01/11/1993)
891 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to reconsider and alter order of 11/27/92 [884−1] by defendant [886−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/12/1993)
892 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting in part and denying in part motion to reconsider and alter order of 11/27/92 [884−1] by defendant [886−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/13/1993)
893 ORDER by Judge John Feikens amending order of 11/27/92 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/13/1993)
894 ANSWER by plaintiffs to the monitor's proposal on academic and vocational programs with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for finding of contempt by plaintiff,,, [821−1], motion to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment by plaintiff,,, [821−2] − disposition: RESOLVED PER LETTER − date: 1/12/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for reconsideration of order denying access to the institution for inspection [883−1] by plaintiff,,, [885−1] − disposition: RESOLVED PER LETTER − date: 1/12/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
895 RESPONSE of MI Dept of Corrections to the "monitors proposed substitute plan" on out−of−cell activity submitted on 10/2/92 (MM) (Entered: 01/20/1993)
896 NOTICE of SDT meeting (MM) (Entered: 01/28/1993)
897 REMARK − documents submitted by F. Warren Benton, Ph.D., Independent Monitor (MM) (Entered: 02/11/1993)
898 MOTION by plaintiffs for transfer of classification issue with brief (MM) (Entered: 02/11/1993)
899 PROOF of mailing of motion for transfer of classification issue (MM) (Entered: 02/12/1993)
900 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper Moore", Mark Coleman and Alfrdo Robinson (MM) (Entered: 02/19/1993)

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02/26/1993 02/26/1993 03/02/1993 03/02/1993 03/02/1993
03/10/1993
03/12/1993 03/18/1993 03/24/1993
03/26/1993 03/31/1993 04/05/1993 04/05/1993 04/12/1993
04/12/1993 04/12/1993 04/20/1993 04/22/1993 04/22/1993 04/22/1993 04/23/1993 04/23/1993 04/23/1993 04/28/1993

901 RESPONSE brief by defendants in opposition to motion for transfer of classification issue by plaintiff,,, [898−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 03/01/1993)
902 EXHIBITS filed by William H. Walker #183367 − pieces of what appears to be mattress in brown grocery bag. (mc) (Entered: 03/02/1993)
903 LETTER from William Walker re: exhibit #904 pillow. (mc) (Entered: 03/03/1993)
904 EXHIBIT filed by William Walker (pillow) (mc) (Entered: 03/03/1993)
905 LETTER from independent monitor, F. Warren Benton with minutes of the decentralization project meeting held on 2/18/93 attached (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1993)
906 PETITION by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 03/11/1993)
907 PROOF of mailing of notice of records deposition (MM) (Entered: 03/15/1993)
908 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time to answer petition for attorney fees and costs [906−1] (MM) (Entered: 03/23/1993)
909 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation for plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear before Judge Feikens on 3/31/93 at 8:30 a.m. (MM) (Entered: 03/29/1993)
910 PROOF of mailing of ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 03/30/1993)
MINUTE SHEET of proceedings before Judge John Feikens − monthly SDT meeting − held − Court Reporter: Michael Lang (Jc) (Entered: 04/01/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for transfer of classification issue by plaintiff,,, [898−1] − disposition: MOOT − date: 3/31/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/05/1993)
911 ORDER by Judge John Feikens regarding sanitation meetings (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1993)
912 RESPONSE by defendants to petition for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/13/1993)
913 RECORD of appeal returned from USCA − appeal case # 90−1685/1810 (MM) (Entered: 04/20/1993)
914 RECORD of appeal returned from USCA − appeal case # 88−1879 (applicable to case numbers 86−1701, 88−1144/1905/2111) (MM) (Entered: 04/20/1993)
915 STIPULATED order by Judge John Feikens extending time for filing a reply brief in support of plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs (MM) (Entered: 04/21/1993)
916 EXPARTE motion by plaintiffs to file excess pages reply brief with brief (mb) Modified on 04/26/1993 (Entered: 04/26/1993)
917 REPLY BRIEF by plaintiffs to petition response by defendants [912−1] with attachment (O.K. to file, Betsy T. Yntema) (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
918 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of #916−917. (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
919 NOTICE of status conference regarding santitation of C. Pepper Moore before J. Feikens (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
920 PROOF of mailing of stipulated order to extend time to file reply brief in support of plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 9:00 5/4/93 (cc) (Entered: 04/28/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906−1] set

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 55 of 85

04/30/1993 04/30/1993 05/03/1993 05/04/1993 05/04/1993
05/04/1993 05/04/1993
06/02/1993 06/02/1993 06/02/1993
06/02/1993
06/08/1993 06/14/1993 06/14/1993

for 9:00 5/4/93 (cc) (Entered: 04/28/1993)
922 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum by defendants in support of petition response [912−1] in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 05/03/1993)
922 ANSWER by defendants to reply by plaintiffs [917−1] to defendants' response to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 05/03/1993)
923 MOTION by plaintiff to strike response in reply to plaintiffs' reply brief by defendants [922−1], suppelmental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs by defendants [922−1] with brief and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 05/05/1993)
STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang − Re: Claim of Retaliation by C. Pepper Moore. (cc) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
PETITION hearing held on petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition for leave to take deposition of plaintiff William D. Lovett by defendantssssssssssssssssss [819−1] − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
MOTION hearing held on motion to strike response in reply to plaintiffs' reply brief by defendants [922−1], suppelmental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs by defendants [922−1] by plaintiffsssssssssssssssssss,,,sss [923−1] − disposition: DENIED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 05/06/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [736−1] − disposition: DISMISSED W/OUT PREJUDICE − date: 6/2/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [737−1] − disposition: DISMISSED W/OUT PREJUDICE − date: 6/2/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion to enjoin the use of misconducts for possession of personal property based upon fire safety provisions and to direct defendants to promulgate a "Professionally Designed" Inspection Format by Everett Hadix [780−1] − disposition: DISMISSED W/OUT PREJUDICE − date: 6/2/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
924 ORDER by Judge John Feikens dismissing without prejudice motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiffs [736−1], motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiffs [737−1], motion to enjoin the use of misconducts for possession of personal property based upon fire safety provisions and to direct defendants to promulgate a "Professionally Designed" Inspection Format by plaintiffs [780−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/04/1993)
925 RECORD returned from USCA − appeal case # 88−1879 (MM) (Entered: 06/11/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906−1] − disposition: OPINION & ORDER ENTERED − date: 6/14/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/14/1993)
926 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs [906−1] and awarding Mr. Barnhart $8,370.50, Ms. Streeter $734.69, Ms. LaBelle $10,929.00 and Mr. Bush $13,343,80 with appendix and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/15/1993)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 56 of 85

06/22/1993 06/23/1993
06/24/1993 06/28/1993 06/28/1993 07/23/1993 07/28/1993 08/02/1993 08/09/1993 08/10/1993 08/10/1993 08/17/1993 08/18/1993
08/20/1993 08/20/1993 08/20/1993 08/24/1993 09/03/1993 09/08/1993 09/10/1993

927 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear before Judge Feikens on 6/25/93 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/23/1993)
928 APPEARANCE for defendants' John Prelesnik, Marjorie Van Ochten, Frank Elo, Pam Withrow, Elton Scott, Graham Allen, Robert Brown Jr, Don P. LeDuc, Charles Ustess, Roy Rider, James Pogats, John Jabe, Duane Sholes, Daniel Trudell, Dale Foltz, William F. Grant, Charles Anderson, Barry Mintzes, Perry M. Johnson of attorney Barbara A. Schmidt, with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 06/24/1993)
929 PROOF of mailing of ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 06/25/1993)
930 MOTION by plaintiffs for reconsideration of order [926−1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 06/29/1993)
931 PRETRIAL scheduling order by Judge John Feikens with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 06/29/1993)
932 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for disposition of sealed materials. Order to supress March 19, 1990 hearing and transcript of March 19, 1990 unsealed and returned to public file. (ep) (Entered: 07/23/1993)
967 MISSION, oranizational plan and executive summary of Michigan Prison of Southern Michigan, OPERATIONAL AND ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM. (received in Clerk's Office on 7/14/94) (ep) (Entered: 01/13/1994)
933 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting in part and denying in part motion for reconsideration of order [926−1] by plaintiffs [930−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 08/04/1993)
934 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 5/4/93 before Judge Feikens. (cd) (Entered: 08/10/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 11:00 8/16/93 with defendant's counsel, etc. and at 2:00 p.m. with plaintiffs' counsel, etc. (cc) (Entered: 08/10/1993)
946 RE NOTICE of meeting with counsel for plaintiffs at one time and counsel for defendants at a later time. (ep) (Entered: 10/04/1993)
935 SEALED matter by Judge John Feikens (MM) (Entered: 08/17/1993)
936 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation oof Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear before Judge Feikens on 8/20/93 at 9:30 a.m. with proof of mailing (MM) Modified on 11/10/1993 (Entered: 08/19/1993)
937 EXHIBITS A−B re: the functional, operational and space program (MM) (Entered: 08/20/1993)
938 EXHIBITS C−D−E re: finctional, operational and space program (MM) (Entered: 08/20/1993)
939 LETTER from MI Attorney General regarding order on approval of management plan with attachment (MM) (Entered: 08/24/1993)
940 MOTION by plaintiff for clarification of opinions and orders of 8/2/93 and 6/14/93 with brief, attachment, notice of hearing date to be set and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 08/25/1993)
941 MOTION by Marvin D. Mayberry to enforce judgment with brief, exhibits, proof of mailing. (pr) (Entered: 09/07/1993)
942 RESPONSE by defendants to motion for clarification of opinions and orders of 8/2/93 and 6/14/93 by plaintiffs [940−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/10/1993)
943 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens regarding motion for clarification of opinions and orders of 8/2/93 and 6/14/93 [940−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/13/1993)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 57 of 85

09/15/1993
09/21/1993 09/27/1993 10/04/1993 10/04/1993
10/07/1993 10/08/1993
10/15/1993
10/15/1993 10/20/1993 10/20/1993 10/26/1993 11/02/1993
11/05/1993
11/08/1993 11/16/1993 11/16/1993
11/23/1993 11/30/1993 12/03/1993
12/13/1993

RESOLUTION of motion to enforce judgment by Marvin D. Mayberry [941−1] − disposition: MOOT − Judge John Feikens − Mayberry was not allowed to intervene − document was referred to counsel for pltfs. (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1993)
944 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' request for production of documents. (cd) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
945 STATEMENT by John Jabe, David Bogard, Curtiss Pulitzer and Barbara Hladki. (ep) (Entered: 10/04/1993)
947 MOTION by defendants for protective order staying discovery on out−of−cell activity with brief, attachment and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/06/1993)
948 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion for protective order staying discovery on out−of−cell activity by defendants [947−1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/06/1993)
949 PETITION by plaintiffs for costs , for attorney fees with brief, attachments and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
950 ORDER by Judge John Feikens dismissing with prejudice motion to amend which was granted on 6/12/90 and petitions for attorney fees to be filed within 30 days with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on petition for costs by plaintiffs [949−1] set for 2:00 11/8/93, petition for attorney fees by plaintiffs [949−2] set for 2:00 11/8/93 (cc) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
951 NOTICE hearing on petition for costs by plaintiffs [949−1], petition for attorney fees by plaintiffs [949−2] (MM) (Entered: 10/19/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 10:00 11/23/93 − SDT Meeting in Ann Arbor. (cc) (Entered: 10/21/1993)
952 NOTICE of rescheduled status conference (SDT meeting) (MM) (Entered: 10/25/1993)
953 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time for defendant to file objectins to plaintiff's petition for costs (MM) (Entered: 10/29/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition for costs by plaintiffs [949−1], petition for attorney fees by plaintiffs [949−2] − disposition: WITHDRAWN/RESOLVED − date: 11/2/93 − John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/02/1993)
954 PETITION by plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs related to the retaliation of plaintiffs' representative C. Pepper Moore wtih brief, attachment and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/08/1993)
955 PETITION by plaintiffs for attorney fees for time and costs expended by Larry Bennett with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/08/1993)
956 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens dismissing plaintiff's petition for costs [949−1], and for attorney fees [949−2] (ep) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
957 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Clarence Moore, and Mark Coleman from Jackson and Alfredo Robinson from Egeler at Jackson to appear on November 23, 1993 at 9:30 in Ann Arbor and return. (ep) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Ed Wisniewski − SDT Meeting in Ann Arbor. (cc) (Entered: 12/02/1993)
958 SEALED matter by Judge John Feikens (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1993)
959 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time to answer petition for attorney fees and costs related to the retaliation of plaintiffs' representative C. Pepper Moore by plaintiffs [954−1] (MM) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
960 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens dismissing petition for attorney fees and costs related to the retaliation of plaintiffs' representative C. Pepper Moore by plaintiffs [954−1] (MM) (Entered: 12/14/1993)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 58 of 85

12/21/1993
12/21/1993
12/27/1993 12/27/1993 01/05/1994 01/05/1994 01/05/1994 01/19/1994
01/19/1994 01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/24/1994
02/01/1994 02/02/1994
02/04/1994
02/08/1994
02/08/1994
02/08/1994 02/08/1994 02/08/1994
02/14/1994

RESOLUTION of petition for attorney fees for time and costs expended by Larry Bennett by plaintiffs [955−1] − disposition: DISMISSED − date: 12/21/93 − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 12/22/1993)
961 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens dismissing petition for attorney fees for time and costs expended by Larry Bennett by plaintiffs [955−1] (MM) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
962 TRI−ANNUAL compliance report of Department of Corrections (MM) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
963 LETTER from Department of Corrections with out−of−cell proposal attached (MM) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
964 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment (ep) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
965 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion to compel [964−1] (ep) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
966 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of motion to compel and brief #964 and #965. (ep) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
968 LETTER by attorney Susan Prezekop−Shaw for defendants to Ms Streeter confirming the extension of time to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for compliance (lt) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
969 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 8/20/93 (Status conference) (lt) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 10:00 2/8/94 − re: SDT Committee Report. (cc) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
970 NOTICE of SDT Meeting with proof of mailing (lt) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
971 NOTICE to attorneys that the extension agreed between counsel re plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance is not acceptable to the Court with attachment (MM) (Entered: 01/25/1994)
972 REQUEST by plaintiffs for a contempt of court order for violations of consent decree with exhibits (MM) (Entered: 02/02/1994)
973 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of Mark Coleman, Grant Glover and C. Pepper Moore on 2/8/94 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 02/03/1994)
974 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Alfredo Allen Robinson to appear on 2/8/94 at 9:30 a.m. with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 02/07/1994)
975 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge John Feikens, setting dates for proposal for modification of remedial plan to be filed and responses and etc. (see order for details) (ep) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
976 RESPONSE in opposition by defendants to plaintifs' motion to compel complaince with secton XI (Compliance Provision) of the decree [964−1] (ep) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
977 MEMORANDUM by defendants in support of motion response [976−1] with exhibits. (ep) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Alan Burnham − Re: SDT Committee Report. (cc) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
978 ORDER by Judge John Feikens setting date for hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964−1] (MM) (Entered: 02/15/1994)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by

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02/14/1994 02/14/1994 02/14/1994 03/08/1994 03/18/1994 03/28/1994 03/28/1994 03/31/1994 04/05/1994 04/12/1994 04/14/1994 04/15/1994 04/15/1994 04/15/1994 05/19/1994 05/24/1994 06/07/1994 06/10/1994 06/10/1994 06/24/1994

plaintiffs [964−1] set for 2:00 4/8/94 (cc) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens deadline for (miscellaneous) set for 2:00 5/20/94 − Re: hearing re: Modification of the Remedial Plan and Alternative Proposal for Out−Of−Cell Activity. (cc) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
979 NOTICE of hearing re: modification of the remedial plan and alternative proposal for out−of−cell activity (MM) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
980 NOTICE of hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964−1] (MM) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964−1] set for 2:00 4/15/94 (cc) (Entered: 03/08/1994)
981 EX PARTE motion by plaintiff to file enlarged reply brief with brief (MM) Modified on 03/30/1994 (Entered: 03/21/1994)
982 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to file enlarged reply brief by plaintiffs [981−1] (MM) (Entered: 03/30/1994)
983 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendants response to plaintiffs motion to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment [964−1] with exhibits and proof of (MM) (Entered: 03/30/1994)
984 MOTION by defendants seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree with brief in support, attachments and proof of mailing (lt) (Entered: 04/01/1994)
985 PROOF of mailing by defendants of objections to interrogatories and request for production of documents and response to plaintiffs' interrogatories and request for production of documents ed 3/4/94 (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1994)
986 FINAL report of the court appointed sanitation committee prisoner representatives with exhibit and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
987 ES PARTE order by Judge John Feikens, for transportation for Mark Coleman, Alfredo Robinson and Clarence "Pepper" Moore" (MM) (Entered: 04/19/1994)
Text not available. (Entered: 04/25/1994)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri−annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964−1] − disposition: WITHDRAWN − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/25/1994)
MISCELLANEOUS hearing on cancelled − Judge John Feikens − re: modification of the remedial plan and alternative proposal for out−of−cell activity − was set for 5/20/94. (cc) (Entered: 04/25/1994)
988 REPORT − Tri−annual compliance report by Michigan Department of Corrections (MM) (Entered: 05/23/1994)
989 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, substituting Danny Walker, No. 197243 as a named plaintiff in place of Michael Gray, No. 147217 (MM) (Entered: 05/26/1994)
990 LETTER from plaintiff Mark LeMothe advising that he is withdrawing from this action (MM) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
991 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
992 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery with brief, attachment and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
993 WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to C. Pepper Moore, Alfredo Allen Robinson and Mark Coleman to appear on 6/28/94 at 2:00 p.m. (MM) (Entered:

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06/29/1994)

06/27/1994 994 RESPONSE brief by defendant in opposition to motion to compel discovery by plaintiffs [992−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/29/1994)

06/28/1994

MOTION hearing held and continued on motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984−1] to 9:00 8/2/94 − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (cc) (Entered: 06/28/1994)

06/28/1994

MOTION hearing held on motion to compel discovery by plaintiffs [992−1] − disposition: GRANTED IN PART DENIED IN PART − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: fRED PRATT (cc) (Entered: 06/28/1994)

06/28/1994 995 ORDER by Judge John Feikens That compenstion of Dr. F. Warren Benton is increased to $95.00 per hour (MM) (Entered: 07/07/1994)

07/22/1994 996 WITNESS list by plaintiffs, with proof of service (ep) (Entered: 07/27/1994)

07/25/1994 997 PROPOSED WITNESS list by defendants with proof of mailing (ep) (Entered: 07/27/1994)

07/25/1994 998 PETITION for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to C. Pepper Moore, Mark Coleman, Grant Glover and Alfredo Allen Robinson to appear on August 2, 1994 at 9:00 writs issued (db) (Entered: 07/29/1994)

07/27/1994 999 NOTICE by defendant of taking deposition of Michigan Thompson on 7/29/94 at 11:00 a.m., with request for records and proof of mailing. (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)

07/27/1994 1000 NOTICE by defendant of taking deposition of Patrick Clark on 7/29/84 at 11:00 with request for production of records (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)

07/27/1994 1001 NOTICE by defendant of taking deposition of Phil Frederick 7/29/94 at 11:00 a.m. with request for production of documents (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)

07/27/1994 1002 NOTICE by Dale Foltz, William F. Grant of record deposition as to C. Pepper Moore, Mark Coleman, Alfredo Allen Robinson, Grant Glover and Hadix Plaintiffs. (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)

08/02/1994

MOTION hearing held on motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED W/OUT DATE − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Sherri Ruff − Pltf. to call with date witness is available. (cc) (Entered: 08/03/1994)

08/08/1994 1003 TRANSCRIPT of status conference proceedings taken on 2/8/94 before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 08/09/1994)

09/08/1994

RESOLUTION of motion for protective order staying discovery on out−of−cell activity by defendants [947−1] − disposition: MOOT − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/08/1994)

10/24/1994 1004 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus under 28:2254 (state custody) as to Grant Glover, C. Pepper Moore, Mark Coleman, Alfredo Allen Robinson WI (mc) (Entered: 10/25/1994)

10/27/1994

MOTION hearing held and continued on motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984−1] to 10:00 11/10/94 − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Melina Bazi − for closing arguments only. (cc) (Entered: 10/31/1994)

11/08/1994 1005 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for C. Pepper Moore to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)

11/08/1994 1006 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Mark Coleman to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)

11/08/1994 1007 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Alfredo Allen Robinson to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)

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11/08/1994 1008 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Grant Glover to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)

11/10/1994

MOTION hearing held on motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Marie Metcalf (cc) (Entered: 11/15/1994)

11/23/1994 1009 ORDER by Judge John Feikens amending order adopting stipulated agreement regarding plan element one and the implementation of paragraphs VIII E, F, and G of the Consent Judgment [717−1], [717−2] (see order), with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 11/29/1994)

12/01/1994 1010 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/10/94 (RH) (Entered: 12/05/1994)

01/27/1995 1011 TRI−ANNUAL compliance report for the period ending 12/94 filed by the Michigan Department of Corrections (RH) (Entered: 02/01/1995)

03/14/1995 1012 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens requesting plaintiff to submit proposed order. (mc) (Entered: 03/15/1995)

03/31/1995 1013 OBJECTIONS by defendants to plaintiffs proposed order denying defendants motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 04/03/1995)

04/04/1995 1014 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to objections by defendants [1013−1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/05/1995)

04/07/1995 1015 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion seeking modification of the 1985 out−of−cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984−1], with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 04/11/1995)

04/07/1995 1016 ANSWER by plaintiff to report [1011−1], with attachment, and proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 04/11/1995)

04/14/1995 1017 TRANSCRIPT of motion proceedings taken on 4/6/95 (mc) (Entered: 04/18/1995)

05/03/1995 1018 APPEAL by defendants of orders [1012−1] and [1015−1] to USCA − FEE: PAID − Receipt #: 315845 (lb) (Entered: 05/05/1995)

05/05/1995 1019 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart and Susan Przekop−Shaw (lb) (Entered: 05/05/1995)

05/05/1995 1020 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1018−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 05/05/1995)

05/11/1995 1021 CROSS−APPEAL by all plaintiffs of order [1015−1], order [1012−1] to USCA with proof of mailing − FEE: paid, Receipt #: 316166 (mb) (Entered: 05/15/1995)

05/15/1995 1022 PROOF of mailing by clerk of cross appeal to USCA, Michael Barnhart/Deborah LaBelle and Susan Przekop−Shaw (mb) (Entered: 05/15/1995)

05/15/1995 1023 CERTIFIED copy of appeal cross by plaintiffs [1021−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (mb) (Entered: 05/15/1995)

05/22/1995 1024 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice of appeal & docket [1020−1] − appeal case # 95−1522 (PP) (Entered: 05/25/1995)

05/22/1995 1025 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice of appeal & docket [1023−1] − appeal case # 95−1523 (PP) (Entered: 05/25/1995)

05/29/1995 1066 RESPONSE by defendants to application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 by [1064−1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 06/04/1996)

05/31/1995 1026 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/27/94 (RH) Modified on 08/29/1995 (Entered: 06/06/1995)

05/31/1995 1027 DESIGNATION of record by defendants for appeal. (LS) (Entered: 06/09/1995)

06/01/1995 1028 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding requesting transcript(s) of: 6/28/94, 8/2//94, 10/27/94 −appeal case # 95−1522 (LS) (Entered: 06/09/1995)

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06/05/1995 1029 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/27/94 (LS) Modified on 08/29/1995 (Entered: 06/09/1995)
06/06/1995 1030 TRANSCRIPT order form by plaintiffs regarding requesting transcript(s) of: transcript already on file −appeal case # 95−1523 (LS) (Entered: 06/09/1995)
06/08/1995 1032 DESIGNATION of record by plaintiff for − appeal case # 95−1522 (LS) (Entered: 06/14/1995)
06/08/1995 1033 DESIGNATION of record by plaintiffs for cross appeal by plaintiffs [1021−1] − appeal case # 95−1523 (LS) (Entered: 06/14/1995)
06/13/1995 1031 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 8/2/94 (RH) (Entered: 06/13/1995)
07/25/1995 1034 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens regarding quarterly reports (see order for details) with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 07/27/1995)
07/25/1995 1035 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal notice by defendants [1018−1] requesting transcript(s) of: 7/20/95 −appeal case # 95−1522/95−1523 (lg) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
08/03/1995 1036 COPY of letter from F. Warren Benton to Attorney General re: letter dated 7/28/95 to Judge Feikens regarding certain aspects of opposition of the Judge's opinion. (LS) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
08/09/1995 1037 LETTER to Dept of Corrections from Dr. F. Warren Benton. PhD. (mc) (Entered: 08/11/1995)
08/14/1995 1038 LETTER b court appointed monitor F. Warren Benton to Mr. Michael Barnhart regarding letter dated 8/4/95. (PP) (Entered: 08/15/1995)
08/29/1995 1039 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 6/28/94 (mb) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
09/08/1995 1040 ANSWER by plaintiffs' to response to defendants' tri−annual compliance report dated 5/31/95 and request for information, with attachments, and proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 09/11/1995)
10/03/1995 1377 TRIANNUAL compliance report; filed by Michigan Department of Corrections (dp) (Entered: 08/25/1999)
11/27/1995 1041 ANSWER by plaintiffs' to defendants' tri−annual compliance report dated 9/29/95 and request for information with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
12/07/1995 1042 APPEARANCE for defendants' of attorney Leo H. Friedman, with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
12/11/1995 1043 DECEMBER 1995 REPORT of the independent monitor (lg) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
01/08/1996 1044 MOTION by defendants' to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities with brief, exhibits, and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 01/09/1996)
01/12/1996 1045 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to respond to defendant's motion to permit Motcalm Community College to Replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the HADIX facilites dated 1/5/96 with brief and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 01/17/1996)
01/29/1996 1046 MOTION and brief by defendants' for enlargement of time with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
01/31/1996 1047 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for enlargement of time by defendants' [1046−1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
02/05/1996 1048 REPLY by defendant's to response to motion for enlargement of time by defendants [1046−1] with proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
02/05/1996 1049 RESPONSE by plaintiff's to motion to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities by defendants [1044−1] with attachments (lg) (Entered: 02/06/1996)

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02/21/1996 1050 REPLY by defendants' to response (document #1049) to motion to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities by defendants [1044−1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 02/22/1996)

03/05/1996 1051 MARCH 1996 report of the independent monitor (PP) (Entered: 03/05/1996)

03/12/1996 1052 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief, exhibits A−F and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 03/14/1996)

03/21/1996 1053 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052−1] with attachment and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/22/1996)

03/21/1996 1054 NOTICE of hearing on motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052−1] set before Judge Feikens with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/22/1996)

04/11/1996 1055 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by plaintiffs' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052−1], with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 04/15/1996)

04/18/1996 1056 MOTION by plaintiffs for order substituting named plaintiff with brief, attachment, notice of hearing and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/19/1996)

04/30/1996 1058 LETTER by F. Warren Benton(independent monitor) recommending adopting of plaintiff's motion concerning substitution of Montcalm Community College for Jackson Community College. (PP) (Entered: 05/10/1996)

05/06/1996 1057 RESPONSE (supplemental) by defendants' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052−1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/07/1996)

05/14/1996 1059 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum by plaintiffs regarding attorney fees of Michael Barnhart (kg) (Entered: 05/15/1996)

05/14/1996 1060 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum by plaintiffs regarding attorney fees of Deborah Labelle, with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 05/15/1996)

05/14/1996 1061 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities by defendants [1044−1] (kg) (Entered: 05/15/1996)

05/15/1996 1062 BRIEF by defendants in support of retroactivity of attorney fee provision of prison reform litigation act, with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 05/16/1996)

05/16/1996 1064 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff regarding the application of the prison litigation Reform Act of 1995 (lg) (Entered: 05/17/1996)

05/16/1996 1063 MOTION and order by Judge John Feikens, to file an oversize brief (lg) (Entered: 05/17/1996)

05/29/1996 1065 RESPONSE by defendant to supplemental memorandum regarding attorney fees of Michael Barnhart and Deborah Labelle [1060−1] and [1059−1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 06/04/1996)

05/30/1996 1067 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052−1] (RH) (Entered: 06/04/1996)

06/10/1996 1068 MOTION by defendants for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending with brief (lg) (Entered: 06/12/1996)

06/10/1996 1069 ANSWER by movant Skinner Corp to second amended complaint (with is not on the docket) with jury demand (lg) (Entered: 06/12/1996)

06/13/1996 1070 MOTION and brief by defendants for approval of defendants bond staying judgment on appeal with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 06/18/1996)

06/13/1996

ATTORNEY added for defendants John Prelesnik, Marjorie Van Ochten, Frank Elo, Pam Withrow, Elton Scott, Graham Allen, Robert Brown Jr, Don P. LeDuc, Charles Ustess, Roy Rider, James Pogats, John Jabe, Duane Sholes, Daniel Trudell, Dale William F. Grant, Charles Anderson, Barry Mintzes and Perry M. Johnson − Lisa C. Ward (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)

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06/13/1996 1071 APPEAL by defendants of order [1067−1] to USCA − FEE: PAID − Receipt #: 329486 (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)

06/24/1996 1072 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Lisa Ward, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart and SUsan Przekop−Shaw (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)

06/24/1996 1073 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1071−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)

06/28/1996 1074 MOTION and order by Judge John Feikens, to file brief in excess of 20 pages (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)

06/28/1996 1075 DESIGNATION of record by defendant for appeal notice by defendants [1071−1] (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)

06/28/1996 1076 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068−1] with attachments (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)

06/28/1996 1077 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)

06/28/1996 1078 PROOF of mailing of response to motion for immedite termination of the consent decree and motion to file brief in excess of 20 pages with brief (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)

07/01/1996 1080 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for plaintiffs and defendants to appear for a hearing to show cause why the automatic stay provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act should not be indefinitely stayed pending full consideration of its applicability and constitutionality with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)

07/01/1996 1081 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for approval of defendants bond staying judgment on appeal by defendants [1070−1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)

07/03/1996 1079 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding requesting transcript(s) of: 5/7/96 (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)

07/05/1996 1082 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068−1] with appensix A (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)

07/08/1996 1083 SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION of record by plaintiffs (lg) (Entered: 07/10/1996)

07/09/1996 1084 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying motion for immediate termination [0−1] − appeal case # 95−1522/1523 (lg) (Entered: 07/11/1996)

07/09/1996 1085 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1071−1] − appeal case # 96−1851 (lg) (Entered: 07/11/1996)

07/11/1996 1086 APPEAL by defendants of order [1082−1] to USCA − FEE: PAID − Receipt #: 330473 (lb) (Entered: 07/12/1996)

07/11/1996 1089 REPORT (July 1996) of the independent monitor. (cf) (Entered: 07/15/1996)

07/12/1996 1087 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Leo Friedman and Lisa Ward (lb) Modified on 07/31/1996 (Entered: 07/12/1996)

07/12/1996 1088 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1086−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 07/12/1996)

07/15/1996

1090

LETTER by defendants' to Judge Feikens, with attached copy of Memorandum of Law of United States of America With Respect To The Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which was filed with the United States District Court, Souther Division of New York, Benjamin v Jacobson, No. 75 CIV.3073 (HB). (PP) (Entered: 07/17/1996)

07/18/1996 1091 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of request for attorney fees and costs (RH) (Entered: 07/22/1996)

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07/18/1996 1092 AFFIDAVIT of publication of complaint on 7/11/96 (RH) (Entered: 07/22/1996)

07/22/1996 1093 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1086−1] − appeal case # 96−1889 (lg) (Entered: 07/24/1996)

07/23/1996 1094 TRANSCRIPT taken on 5/7/96 of motion for attorney fees (lg) Modified on 07/24/1996 (Entered: 07/24/1996)

07/24/1996 1096 MOTION by defendants' to file brief in excess of 25 pages with brief and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1996)

07/26/1996 1095 BRIEF by defendant's in support of constitutionality of the Prison Litigaiton Reform Act with attachments (lg) (Entered: 07/29/1996)

07/26/1996 1100 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, fexcpg. allowing filing of brief in excess of 25 page limit (lg) (Entered: 08/02/1996)

07/29/1996 1097 APPEAL by defendants of order [1082−1] to USCA − FEE: NO FEE PAID (lb) (Entered: 07/31/1996)

07/29/1996 1101 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal notice by defendants [1097−1] requesting transcript(s) of: 7/2/96 −appeal case # 96−1889 (lg) (Entered: 08/06/1996)

07/29/1996 1102 DESIGNATION of record by defendant for appeal notice by defendants [1097−1] − appeal case # 96−1889 (lg) (Entered: 08/09/1996)

07/31/1996 1098 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Leo Friedman and Lisa Ward (lb) (Entered: 07/31/1996)

07/31/1996 1099 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1097−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 07/31/1996)

07/31/1996 1103 MANDATE from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 95−1523 (lg) (Entered: 08/09/1996)

08/06/1996 1104 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/2/96 of motion for termination of consent decree (lg) (Entered: 08/12/1996)

08/07/1996 1105 RESPONSE by Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, William Ramsey, Al Buttons, James E. Alexander, Brent E. Koster, Danny Walker to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 08/16/1996)

08/12/1996 1106 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1097−1] − appeal case # 96−1943 (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/13/1996 1107 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of named plaintiffs to the courthouse for hearing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/15/1996 1108 STATEMENT of plaintiff class representative Alfredo Robinson concerning the termiantion of the S−2 Break Up Plan (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/15/1996 1109 RESPONSE by prisoners to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068−1] with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/15/1996 1109 MOTION by plaintiffs to dismiss S−2 plan from the 1985 consent decree with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/15/1996 1110 STATEMENT by plaintiff class representative C. Pepper Moore concerning the termination of the S−2 break−up plan. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/15/1996

1111

REPLY by defendants to response by the plaintiffs to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068−1] and response to motion to dismiss S−2 plan from the 1985 consent decree by plaintiffs [1109−1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)

08/19/1996 1112 EXPARTE motion by plaintiff to file excess pages with brief (PP) (Entered: 08/21/1996)

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08/19/1996 1113 REPLY by plaintiffs' to defendants' brief in support of the constitutionality of the prison litigation reform act, with proof of service and exhibits A−F (PP) (Entered: 08/21/1996)

08/19/1996 1114 TRANSCRIPT taken on 8/15/96 (PP) (Entered: 08/21/1996)

08/20/1996 1115 BRIEF in support by defendants of the constitutionality of the prison litigation reform act, with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 08/22/1996)

08/30/1996 1116 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees and costs with brief and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 09/03/1996)

08/30/1996 1117 MOTION by defendants to dismiss all orders preventing the transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives currently housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex with brief, and attachments A−D (LS) (Entered: 09/03/1996)

08/30/1996 1118 OBJECTIONS by defendants to this court's scheduled tour of Hadix facilities on 9/20/96 and a tour of the new correctional facilities and request for immediate consideration of defendants 6/10/96 motion for immediate termination. (LS) (Entered: 09/03/1996)

09/06/1996 1119 OPINION by Judge John Feikens regarding 1983 consent decree, etc. with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 09/09/1996)

09/10/1996 1120 MOTION by USA to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) with brief, and memorandum (PP) (Entered: 09/12/1996)

09/13/1996 1121 MOTION and order by Judge John Feikens to file oversized brief with brief and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/16/1996)

09/13/1996 1122 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief and exhibits (kg) (Entered: 09/16/1996)

09/16/1996 1123 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) [1120−1], with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 09/17/1996)

09/17/1996

1124

RESPONSE by plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, William Ramsey, Carl Proctor−Bey, Earl Pannell, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James E. Alexander, Mark A. Coleman, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix, Danny Walker to motion to dismiss all orders preventing the transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives currently housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendants [1117−1] with brief, exhibits & proof of mailing (sh) (Entered: 09/18/1996)

09/19/1996

1125

MOTION by plaintiffsTed Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, William Ramsey, Carl Proctor−Bey, Earl Pannell, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Perry Alan Davis, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix to defer final decisions implementing facility C development with brief, exhibits & proof of mailing (sh) (Entered: 09/20/1996)

09/23/1996 1126 TRANSCRIPT taken on 8/9/96 of telephonic status conference (kg) (Entered: 09/24/1996)

09/24/1996 1127 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA dismissing case [0−1] − appeal case # 96−1889 (PP) (Entered: 10/03/1996)

09/24/1996 1128 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA granting motion to intervene [0−1], granting motin for stay − appeal case # 96−1943 (PP) (Entered: 10/03/1996)

09/30/1996 1129 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, deadline for response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs[1122−1] , deadline for reply to respone to motion for attorney fees (PP) (Entered: 10/03/1996)

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10/07/1996 1130 PROOF of mailing of copy of an order to Deborah LaBelle and Michael Barnhart (RH) (Entered: 10/17/1996)

10/10/1996 1131 ORDER by Judge John Feikens referring motion to dismiss all orders preventing the transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives currently housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendants [1117−1] to Dr. Benton for a report within the nex two weeks (RH) (Entered: 10/17/1996)

10/10/1996 1132 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1122−1] with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 10/17/1996)

10/17/1996 1133 TRANSCRIPT taken on 10/4/96 of hearing (lg) (Entered: 10/18/1996)

10/25/1996 1134 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1122−1] with attachment and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 10/28/1996)

10/29/1996 1135 RESPONSE by defendants to Dr. F. Warren Benton's report to the court with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 10/29/1996)

11/01/1996 1136 ANSWER (titled "response") by plaintiffs' to the report of the independent monitor regarding class representatives with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 11/04/1996)

11/01/1996 1137 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068−1]. (cf) (Entered: 11/04/1996)

11/13/1996 1138 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by plaintiffs' to the report of the independent monitor regarding class representatives answer [1136−1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/15/1996)

11/14/1996 1140 APPEAL by defendants of order [1137−1] to USCA − FEE: paid − Receipt #: 335812 (pr) (Entered: 11/20/1996)

11/14/1996 1143 ORDER by Judge John Feikens approving the appointment of Rich Wheeldon as additional class member and requesting a report from defendant regarding their plans for Facility C by November 29,1996 (see order) (RH) (Entered: 11/21/1996)

11/20/1996 1141 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Leo Friedman, Lisa Ward, Deborah LaBelle, and Michael Barnhart (pr) (Entered: 11/20/1996)

11/20/1996 1142 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1140−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 11/20/1996)

11/29/1996 1144 DESIGNATION of record by defendants' for appeal notice by defendants [1140−1] (RH) (Entered: 11/29/1996)

12/02/1996 1145 LETTER from Susan Przekop−shaw, Assistant Attorney General regarding Decentralizaion Plan (RH) (Entered: 12/02/1996)

12/04/1996

1146

ORDER by Judge John Feikens that the PLRA's limits on attorney fees apply to this case for work performed after the PLRA's enactment on 4/26/96; the plaintiffs re−submit fee requests for work performed between 1/1/96 and 6/30/96 in which counsel's fees are limited to $112.50 per hour for time worked after 4/26/96;upon receiving the revised request defendants pay plaintiffs counsel for the contested 23 hours' work provided (RH) (Entered: 12/05/1996)

12/06/1996 1147 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA granting defendants−appellants' motion to file instanter reply brief to plaintiffs−appellees proof brief and USA's intervenor's brief [0−1] − appeal case # 96−1943 (PP) (Entered: 12/10/1996)

12/10/1996 1148 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1140−1] − appeal case # 96−2463 (RH) (Entered: 12/11/1996)

12/13/1996 1149 REPORT (10/8/96) of the independent monitor. (cf) (Entered: 12/17/1996)

12/18/1996 1157 RESUBMISSION REQUEST by plaintiffs' for attorney fees , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 12/24/1996)

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12/19/1996 1150 F.R.A.P. RULE 11 regarding appeal cases 96−1851 and 96−1943 (RH) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/19/1996 1158 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal notice by defendantssssssssssssssssss [1151−1] requesting transcript(s) of: 10/4/96 −appeal case # 96−2463 (RH) (Entered: 12/24/1996)

12/20/1996 1151 APPEAL by defendant of order [1146−1] to USCA − FEE: paid (no receipt number given) (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/20/1996 1154 CROSS−APPEAL by plaintiffs of order [1146−1] to USCA FEE: paid Receipt #: 21374 (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/20/1996 1159 MOTION by defendants' for approval of defendants; bond staying judgment on appeal , with brief and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 12/30/1996)

12/23/1996 1152 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Leo Freidman, Lisa Ward, Deborah LaBelle, and Michael Barnhart (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/23/1996 1153 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1151−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/23/1996 1155 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Debroah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Leo Friedman, and Lisa Ward (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/23/1996 1156 CERTIFIED copy of appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

12/23/1996 1163 DESIGNATION of record by plaintiffs' for appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154−1] (RH) (Entered: 12/31/1996)

12/27/1996 1160 APPEAL by movant USA of order [1137−1] to USCA − FEE: not paid − USA (pr) (Entered: 12/30/1996)

12/30/1996 1161 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Margo Schlanger, Steven Rosenbaum, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop−Shaw, Leo Friedman, Lisa Ward, and Patricia Blake (pr) (Entered: 12/30/1996)

12/30/1996 1162 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by USA [1160−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 12/30/1996)

01/03/1997

1164

NOTICE by defendant of to withdraw attorney Lisa C. Ward for Perry M. Johnson, for Barry Mintzes, for Charles Anderson, for William F. Grant, for Dale Foltz, for Daniel Trudell, for Duane Sholes, for John Jabe, for James Pogats, for Roy Rider, C. Ward for Charles Ustess, for Don LeDuc, for Robert Brown Jr, for Graham Allen, for Elton Scott, for Pam Withrow, for Frank Elo, C. for Marjorie Van Ochten, for John Prelesnik with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 01/10/1997)

01/07/1997 1165 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1151−1] − appeal case # 96−2567 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)

01/07/1997 1166 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by USA [1160−1] − appeal case # 96−2582 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)

01/07/1997 1167 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154−1] − appeal case # 96−2568 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)

01/07/1997 1168 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/14/96 of motion hearing (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)

01/09/1997 1169 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154−1], appeal notice by defendants [1151−1] requesting transcript of: 11/14/96 −appeal case # 96−2567, 96−2568 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)

01/09/1997 1170 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for approval of defendants; bond staying judgment on appeal by defendants [1159−1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)

01/21/1997 1171 TRANSCRIPT order form by movant USA regarding appeal notice by USA [1160−1] requesting transcript(s) of: none −appeal case # 96−2582 (RH) (Entered: 01/27/1997)

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01/21/1997 1172 TRANSCRIPT order form by plaintiffs' regarding appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154−1] requesting transcript(s) of: 11/14/96 −appeal case # 96−2567/96−2568 (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1997)
02/06/1997 1173 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for approval of defendants bond staying judgment on appeal by defendants [1159−1] (LB) (Entered: 02/07/1997)
02/13/1997 1174 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs for the period of 7/1/96 − 12−31/96 (LB) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
03/11/1997 1175 STIPULATION by plaintiffs and defendants, to extend time to file a motion for remaining disputed portion of attorney fees and costs (kg) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
03/12/1997 1176 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting stipulation to extend time to file a motion for remaining disputed portion of attorney fees and costs [1175−1] and granting stipulation by plaintiffs and defendants [1175−2] (kg) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
04/04/1997 1177 MOTION and brief by plaintiffs to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 04/08/1997)
04/09/1997 1178 MOTION and order by Judge John Corbett O'Meara, to allow filing of brief in excess of page limit (kg) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
04/09/1997 1179 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief and exhibits A − J (kg) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
04/09/1997 1180 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of motions and briefs (kg) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
04/21/1997 1181 APRIL 1997 report of the independent monitor (lg) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
04/28/1997 1182 NOTICE by plaintiff of renewal of motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development until defendants establish to the Court compliance with programmatic requirements for facility B as mandated by the consent decree and implementing orders [1125−1] (LB) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
04/29/1997 1183 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1177−1] (LB) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
04/29/1997 1184 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending deadline for response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1179−1] (LB) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
05/06/1997 1186 MOTION by plaintiff to compel inspection with brief, attachment & proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
05/06/1997 1187 MOTION by plaintiffs to clarify jurisdiction over housing units 4 and 5, together with supporting services, following renovation prusuant to section VIII of the Consent judgment with brief, attachment and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
05/07/1997 1185 RULE 11 completed on appeal case # 96−2567/68 and mailed to the USCA. (LS) (Entered: 05/07/1997)
05/09/1997 1188 RESPONSE brief by defendants' in opposition to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1179−1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
05/13/1997 1189 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens "that issues involving the PLRA in Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees (document #1179), dated April 9, 1997, are hereby deferred until the conclusion of the appellate process in the pending appeals" and with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
05/13/1997 1190 MOTION by plaintiffs' for temporary restraining order , or, in the alternative emergency and enhanced SDT monitoring with brief, exhibits, notice of hearing and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
05/14/1997 1191 APPEARANCE for defendants' of attorney Michael A. Nickerson with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/15/1997)
05/16/1997 1192 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development by plaintiff [1125−1] with brief (lg) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
05/16/1997 1193 MOTION by defendants to file instanter defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development until defendants establish

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to the court compliance with programmatic requirements for facility B as mandated by the consent decree and implementing orders (lg) (Entered: 05/19/1997)

05/19/1997

1194

MOTION and brief by defendants' to enlarge response times to motion to clarify jurisdiction over housing units 4 and 5, together with supporting services, following renovation prusuant to section VIII of the Consent judgment by James V. Haddix [1187−1] and motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186−1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/20/1997)

05/20/1997

1196

RESPONSE in opposition by plaintiffs to motion to enlarge response times to motion to clarify jurisdiction over housing units 4 and 5, together with supporting services, following renovation prusuant to section VIII of the Consent judgment by James Haddix [1187−1] and motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186−1] by defendant [1194−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 05/23/1997)

05/21/1997 1195 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1179−1] (lg) (Entered: 05/23/1997)

05/22/1997 1197 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development by plaintiff [1125−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 05/23/1997)

05/27/1997 1198 TRANSCRIPT taken on 05/09/97 of conference call (dp) (Entered: 05/28/1997)

06/18/1997 1199 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186−1] with attachments and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 06/19/1997)

06/18/1997 1200 MOTION by defendants to file instanter defendants' response in opposiiton to plaintiffs' motion compel inspection with brief and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 06/19/1997)

06/23/1997 1201 TRI−ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT for the State Prison of Southern Michigan − Central Complex and 3 block of the Charles Egeler Correctional Facility (lg) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

06/30/1997 1202 MOTION by plaintiff to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/01/1997)

06/30/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1] set for 2:00 8/5/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

07/02/1997 1203 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Alfredo obinson and Rick Wheeldon from Jackson to Detroit for court on July 10, 1997 by 9:00 a.m. with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/03/1997)

07/21/1997 1204 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/10/97 of motion to compel inspection and motion to defer final decisions before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 07/21/1997)

07/22/1997 1205 RESPONSE by defendants' in opposition to motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 07/23/1997)

07/24/1997 1206 CORRECTED cover page to transcript of 7/10/97 filed on 7/21/97, document #1204. (cf) (Entered: 07/25/1997)

07/29/1997 1207 NOTICE by plaintiffs' of hearing on motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1] before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1997)

07/29/1997 1208 REPLY by plaintiffs' to response (document #1205) in opposition to motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1] with exhibits. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1997)

07/29/1997 1209 PROOF of mailing of documents #1207 and #1208. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1997)

08/01/1997 1210 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of C. Pepper Moore, No. 100885; Danny Walker, No. 197243 and James Alexander, No. 136531 to appear

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before Judge John Feikens (RH) Modified on 08/04/1997 (Entered: 08/04/1997)

08/01/1997 1211 PROOF of mailing of pleading 1210 (RH) (Entered: 08/04/1997)

08/01/1997 1212 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs (RH) (Entered: 08/04/1997)

08/05/1997

MOTION hearing held on motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1] − disposition: GRANTED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − Parties agreed to telephone hours for named pltfs.. Pltfs. will submit an order, with input from Defts. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

08/18/1997 1213 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1]; plaintiff's class representatives can make collect telephone calls to class counsel only on Hadix consent decree matters (see order for for all provisions) (dp) (Entered: 08/19/1997)

08/19/1997 1214 AMENDMENT to order by Judge John Feikens granting motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202−1] (only prisoner phones are to be utilized; see text of amendment) (dp) (Entered: 08/20/1997)

08/22/1997 1215 TRANSCRIPT taken on 8/5/97 of motion hearing (LS) (Entered: 08/22/1997)

08/29/1997 1216 MOTION by plaintiff for contempt of out−of−cell requirement with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 09/03/1997)

09/04/1997 1217 MOTION and brief by defendants' for enlargement of time to file a response to the motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216−1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 09/04/1997)

09/09/1997 1218 AUGUST 1997 report of the independent monitor (lg) (Entered: 09/10/1997)

09/10/1997 1219 MOTION by plaintiff Danny Walker to add named plaintiff with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 09/11/1997)

09/10/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to add named plaintiff by Danny Walker [1219−1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

09/12/1997 1220 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1177−1] (dp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)

09/15/1997 1221 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216−1] with attachments and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)

09/17/1997 1222 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion to add named plaintiff by Danny Walker [1219−1] with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 09/18/1997)

09/18/1997 1223 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for round trip transportation of defendants John Worthington, Alfredo Robinson, Melvin Garza, Billy Kidd, Thomas McDonald, C. Pepper Moore and Joseph B. Bibbs−Bey from Jackson to Detroit on 9/19/97 by 2:00 for court appearance with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/23/1997)

09/19/1997 1224 MOTION by defendant to quash with exhibits and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/23/1997)

09/19/1997

MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216−1] to 11:00 9/22/97 − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

09/22/1997

MOTION hearing held on motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − Parties to file post−hearing proposed findings of fact/conclusions of law by 10/6/97. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

09/23/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226−1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

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09/24/1997 1225 NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Dan Herman at 10:00 on 9/25/97 with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/25/1997)

09/24/1997 1226 MOTION by plaintiff for attorney fees with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/25/1997)

09/29/1997 1227 AMENDED NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Dan Herman on 9/29/97 at 2:30 , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 10/01/1997)

09/29/1997 1228 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186−1] (RH) (Entered: 10/01/1997)

09/30/1997 1229 TRANSCRIPT taken on 9/19/97 of motion for contempt − Vol. 1 (kg) Modified on 10/01/1997 (Entered: 10/01/1997)

09/30/1997 1230 TRANSCRIPT taken on 9/22/97 of motion for contempt − Vol. 2 (kg) (Entered: 10/01/1997)

10/01/1997 1231 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to quash by defendant [1224−1] with exhibits 1−4 (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)

10/01/1997 1232 DEPOSITION of Danny Herman taken on 9/29/97, with exhibit 1 (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)

10/01/1997 1233 MOTION by defendants' for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex , with brief (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)

10/01/1997 1234 MOTION by defendants' to quash subpeonas duces tecum , with brief, exhibit 2, affidavit and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)

10/01/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to quash subpeonas duces tecum by defendant [1234−1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/03/1997 1235 COMPLIANCE REPORT for the State Prison of Southern Michigan− Central Complex and 3 block of the Charles Engler Correctional Facility (LB) (Entered: 10/06/1997)

10/06/1997 1236 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226−1] with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 10/06/1997)

10/07/1997 1237 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226−1] with attachments (LB) (Entered: 10/07/1997)

10/07/1997 1238 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of reply in support of motion for attorney fees and motion for order allowing their reply brief in excess of five pages (LB) (Entered: 10/07/1997)

10/09/1997 1239 AFFIDAVIT of Jerry Hofbauer (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)

10/09/1997 1240 AFFIDAVIT of Barbara Hladki (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)

10/09/1997 1241 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by defendants with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)

10/10/1997 1242 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs', motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirements; filed by plaintiffs (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)

10/14/1997 1243 BRIEF by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendant [1233−1] with proof mailing (dp) (Entered: 10/20/1997)

10/17/1997 1244 MOTION by plaintiffs to supplement the relief requested and correct clerical errors in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs' motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirements with brief and proof of mailing (dp) Modified on 10/20/1997 (Entered: 10/20/1997)

10/17/1997 1245 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of Danny Walker to appear at USDC Eastern District of Michigan (dp) Modified on 10/20/1997 (Entered: 10/20/1997)

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10/17/1997 1246 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of C. Pepper More to USDC Eastern District of Michigan (dp) (Entered: 10/20/1997)

10/17/1997 1247 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of James Alexander to USDC Eastern District of Michigan (dp) (Entered: 10/20/1997)

10/17/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to supplement the relief requested by plaintiff [1244−1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/20/1997 1248 MOTION by defendants to amend motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendants [1233−1] with proof of mailing (no brief) (dp) (Entered: 10/21/1997)

10/20/1997 1249 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226−1]; defendants shall pay the uncontested attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel (see order); with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 10/21/1997)

10/20/1997

MOTION hearing held on motion to add named plaintiff by Danny Walker [1219−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − until compliance hearings on Facility B; until hearings Mr. Gibb−Bey may act as a de facto class rep. he may not be transferred and must be permitted phone access during regular business hours. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/20/1997

MOTION hearing held on motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226−1] − disposition: GRANTED IN PART − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − Uncontested fees and those for monitoring Facility B and C must be paid forthwith (no later than 5 p.m. 10/21/97); In addition, Pltfs' will receive 1/2 of fees for Barnhart's Sixth Circuit trip (10.5 hrs.) and hours spent on staffing issues (8 hrs.); All other contested hours may be re−submitted after a ruling from the Sixth Circuit. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/20/1997

MOTION hearing not held on motion to supplement the relief requested by plaintiff [1244−1] − disposition: MOOT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/20/1997

MOTION hearing not held on motion to quash subpeonas duces tecum by defendant [1234−1] − disposition: MOOT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/20/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to amend motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendants [1233−1] by defendant [1248−1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/20/1997

MOTION hearing held on motion to amend motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendants [1233−1] by defendant [1248−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − until compliance hearing; parties will negotiate with regard to the timing of transfer. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

10/24/1997 1250 MOTION by plaintiff Danny Walker to strike findings of fact proposed by defendant [1241−1] with brief & proof of mailing (sh) (Entered: 10/27/1997)

11/04/1997 1251 RESPONSE and brief by defendants to motion to strike findings of fact proposed by defendant [1241−1] by Danny Walker [1250−1] with proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 11/06/1997)

11/04/1997 1252 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, amending order [1249−1] (lg) (Entered: 11/06/1997)

11/06/1997 1254 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendants' response to motion to strike findings of fact proposed by defendant [1241−1] by Danny Walker [1250−1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/17/1997)

11/07/1997 1260 ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)

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11/07/1997 1261 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Alfredo Robinson from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)

11/07/1997 1262 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Brent Koster from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)

11/07/1997 1263 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Danny Walker from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)

11/07/1997 1264 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, of payment regarding defendants' specific objections to attorneys fees and costs (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)

11/07/1997 1265 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to supplement the relief requested by plaintiff [1244−1] and granting motion correct clerical errors in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs' motion for contempt of out−of−cell requirements by plaintiff [1244−2] (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)

11/07/1997 1266 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1226−1] (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)

11/12/1997 1253 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan−Central Complex by defendant [1233−1] (RH) (Entered: 11/17/1997)

11/13/1997 1257 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation for James Alexander from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson, to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/20/97 at 10am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)

11/13/1997 1258 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Albert Button from State Prison of Southern Michigan to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/20/97 at 10am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)

11/13/1997 1259 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Orvel (Duke) Simmons from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/20/97 at 10am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)

11/14/1997

1255

EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiff Danny Walker, plaintiff Ted Sullivan, plaintiff Orvel Simmons, plaintiff Ted Rhode, plaintiff William Ramsey, plaintiff Carl Proctor−Bey, plaintiff Earl Pannell, plaintiff Cylester Nunnally, plaintiff Mark LeMothe, plaintiff Perry Alan Davis, plaintiff James Chipman, plaintiff Al Buttons, plaintiff James E. plaintiff Mark A. Coleman for clarification and reconsideration of order [1253−1] , with brief and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/18/1997)

11/14/1997

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for clarification and reconsideration of order [1253−1] by plaintiff [1255−1] set for 2:00 11/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

11/17/1997 1256 NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Roy Piggot 11/19/97 at 2pm , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/18/1997)

11/18/1997 1257 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/10/97 of closing arguments on motion for modification of the consent decree; motion for relief from an order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives (RH) Modified on 11/18/1997 (Entered: 11/18/1997)

11/20/1997 1267 AMENDED NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Roy Piggott 11/25/97 at 10am , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/21/1997)

11/20/1997 1268 AFFIDAVIT of Marjorie VanOchten (dp) (Entered: 11/25/1997)

11/20/1997

MOTION hearing held on motion for clarification and reconsideration of order [1253−1] by plaintiff [1255−1] − disposition: DENIED − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

12/03/1997 1269 SECOND AMENDED NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Roy Piggott 12/4/97 at 3:00 , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 12/04/1997)

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12/08/1997 1270 NOTICE by movant USA of taking deposition of Roy Piggott 12/8/97 at 10:00 − with proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 12/09/1997)

12/11/1997 1271 DEPOSITION of Roy Piggott taken on 12/8/97 (lg) (Entered: 12/16/1997)

12/11/1997 1272 DEPOSITION of Roy Piggott taken on 12/4/97 (lg) (Entered: 12/16/1997)

01/05/1998 1273 POINT brief of the deposition testimony of Roy Piggott [1272−1] [1271−1]; filed by plaintiff; with proof of mailing(dp) Modified on 01/07/1998 (Entered: 01/07/1998)

01/09/1998 1274 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for Danny Walker, Albert Button, Orville Simmons, William Ramsey and James Alexander to appear before Judge Feikens and be transferred back to prison institution with proof of mailing (see order for complete details) (dp) (Entered: 01/12/1998)

01/09/1998 1275 PROOF of mailing of order of transportation (document 1274); filer not known (dp) (Entered: 01/12/1998)

01/09/1998 1276 EMERGENCY motion by plaintiffs for temporary restraining order with brief, exhibits A−H and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 01/12/1998)

01/09/1998

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276−1] set for 2:00 1/12/98 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

01/12/1998

MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276−1] to 2:00 1/22/98 − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

01/15/1998 1277 BRIEF by defendant Perry M. Johnson regarding deposition of Roy Piggott, with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 01/16/1998)

01/16/1998 1278 SLIP opinion from USCA reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 96−2463/2582 (lg) (Entered: 01/22/1998)

01/20/1998 1290 TRANSCRIPT taken on 1/23/98 of motion hearing (lg) (Entered: 02/02/1998)

01/22/1998 1280 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant William Ramsey (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)

01/22/1998 1281 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant Orville Simmons (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)

01/22/1998 1282 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant Danny Walker (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)

01/22/1998 1279 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant Albert Button (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)

01/23/1998 1286 SLIP opinion from USCA case [0−1] reversing and remanding for further proceedings − appeal case # 96−2463/2582 − record not returned (RH) (Entered: 01/29/1998)

01/23/1998

MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276−1] to 9:30 1/27/98 − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

01/26/1998 1283 TRI−ANNUAL Compliance Report from the State Prison of southern Michigan (RH) (Entered: 01/26/1998)

01/27/1998 1284 RESPONSE and brief in opposition by defendants to motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276−1] with attachment A and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 01/28/1998)

01/27/1998 1285 PROOF of mailing of the ex−parte order for transportation (LS) (Entered: 01/28/1998)

01/27/1998

MOTION hearing held on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276−1] − disposition: MOOT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − except with regard to Danny Walker; Motion with regard to Walker is UNDER ADVISEMENT pending investigation of whether he has enemies at Facility B. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

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01/29/1998 1287 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/20/97 of motion hearing (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1998)

01/29/1998 1288 TRANSCRIPT taken on 12/17/97 of telephonic proceedings (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1998)

01/29/1998 1289 TRANSCRIPT taken on 1/12/98 of motion hearing (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1998)

02/04/1998 1291 TRANSCRIPT taken on 1/27/98 of motion hearing (lg) (Entered: 02/05/1998)

02/04/1998 1292 LETTER, from the 6th Circuit correcting decision (lg) (Entered: 02/05/1998)

02/17/1998 1293 MOTION by plaintiff Ted Sullivan, plaintiff Orvel Simmons, plaintiff Ted Rhode, plaintiff William Ramsey, plaintiff Perry Alan Davis, plaintiff Mark A. Coleman to add Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative , with brief and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 02/18/1998)

02/18/1998 1294 MOTION by plaintiffs' for contempt and clarification , with brief, exhibits A−E and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 02/19/1998)

02/24/1998 1295 MOTION by plaintiffs' for order of payment of uncontested attorneys' fees , with brief, exhibit A−C and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 02/26/1998)

03/02/1998 1296 RESPONSE and brief by defendants' in opposition to motion for contempt and clarification by plaintiff [1294−1] with affidavit of Barbara Hladki and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/02/1998)

03/02/1998 1297 RESPONSE and brief by defendants' to motion to add Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative by plaintiff [1293−1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/03/1998)

03/13/1998 1299 SLIP opinion from USCA case [0−1] reversing and remanding for further proceedings − appeal case # 94−2463/2582 − record not returned (RH) (Entered: 03/23/1998)

03/13/1998 1300 MANDATE from USCA reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 96−2463 (RH) (Entered: 03/23/1998)

03/20/1998 1298 PROOF of mailing of defendants' response and objections to plaintiffs' request for production of documents. (cf) (Entered: 03/23/1998)

04/08/1998 1301 TRANSCRIPT taken on 03/23/98 of motion re inspections (dp) (Entered: 04/09/1998)

04/22/1998

SLIP opinion from USCA dismissing appeal 97−1218 as moot, in appeals 96−2567/2568, 96−2586/2588 and 97−1272, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the cases to the District Court for a recalculation of the fee awards in a manner consistent with this opinion (see 77−71229 #1308) (LS) (Entered: 04/24/1998)

04/30/1998

MOTION hearing held on motion to add Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative by plaintiff [1293−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − Court to grant motion if plaintiffs submits a satisfactory affidavit and order. (cc) (Entered: 05/07/1998)

05/05/1998 1302 BRIEF IN RESPONSE by defendants to request by court to address applicbility of Benjamin v. Jacobson to the instant case with proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 05/06/1998)

05/05/1998 1303 TRANSCRIPT taken on 4/30/98 of hearing on motion to add plaintiff (nh) Modified on 05/07/1998 (Entered: 05/06/1998)

05/06/1998 1304 MEMORANDUM of law by plaintiffs' regarding jurisdictional authority with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/07/1998)

05/07/1998 1305 COPY OF LETTER, from Supreme Court stating that a writ of certiorari has been filed on 4/13/98 and placed on the docket (lg) (Entered: 05/11/1998)

05/27/1998 1306 REPORT (compliance) − facility, SPSM Central Complex − January through April, 1998. (cf) (Entered: 05/28/1998)

05/27/1998 1307 REPORT (compliance) − facility, Charles Egeler Facility − January 1998 to April 1998. (cf) (Entered: 05/28/1998)

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05/29/1998 1308 MOTION by plaintiff to compel production of documents , with brief, exhibits A−G and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 06/02/1998)

06/11/1998 1309 RESPONSE in opposition by defendants to motion to compel production of documents by plaintiff [1308−1] with affidavit, exhibits 1−2 and proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 06/12/1998)

06/12/1998 1310 MOTION by plaintiff for order adding Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative with brief and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 06/15/1998)

06/12/1998 1312 MANDATE from USCA case reversing decision of the district court − appeal case # 96−1943 (dp) (Entered: 06/17/1998)

06/15/1998 1311 MANDATE from USCA affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the District Court − appeal case # 96−1851 (dp) (Entered: 06/17/1998)

06/23/1998 1313 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA recalling the appeal mandate − appeal case # 96−1907/1908/1943 (lg) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

06/25/1998 1314 COMPLIANCE Evalution for facility B which consists of blocks 5 and 5 of former State Prison of Southern Michigan (lg) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

07/02/1998

MOTION hearing held on motion to compel production of documents by plaintiff [1308−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Larry Przbysz − Defts' are to give Curtiss Pulitzer a copy of the plans for Blocks 10 & 11 and allow him access to the general contractor; Defts' are to produce an extra copy of the "punch list" if they have one; Pltf. to submit the appropriate order. (cc) (Entered: 07/02/1998)

07/13/1998 1315 COPY of order from USCA staying the mandate for thirty days unless the court is advised the the petition for writ of certiorari has been filed − appeal case # 96−2567/2568/2586/2588 (LS) Modified on 07/23/1998 (Entered: 07/23/1998)

07/22/1998 1316 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for order adding Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative by plaintiff [1310−1] with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 07/23/1998)

08/11/1998 1317 MOTION by plaintiff for entry of order with brief, exhibits A−C and proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 08/13/1998)

08/19/1998 1318 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to compel production of documents by plaintiff [1308−1] (see order for complete provisions); with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 08/20/1998)

08/24/1998 1319 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for entry of order by plaintiff [1317−1] with attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 08/25/1998)

08/25/1998 1320 MOTION by defendants for reconsideration of order [1318−1] with attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 08/26/1998)

08/28/1998 1321 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for reconsideration of order [1318−1] by defendant [1320−1] (lg) (Entered: 08/31/1998)

09/15/1998 1322 MOTION by plaintiff for order of payment of uncontested attorney's fees and to overrule defendants objections with brief, exhibit A−C and proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 09/16/1998)

09/15/1998 1325 COMPLIANCE report as to SPSM Central Complex (dh) (Entered: 10/23/1998)

09/15/1998 1326 COMPLIANCE report as to Charles Egeler Facility (dh) (Entered: 10/23/1998)

09/21/1998 1323 COPY OF ORDER, from the Supreme Court denying writ of certiorari (lg) (Entered: 09/22/1998)

10/05/1998 1324 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion for order of payment of uncontested attorney's fees and to overrule defendants objections by plaintiff [1322−1] (lg) (Entered: 10/09/1998)

10/26/1998 1327 PROOF of mailing of notice of deposition of Leo Friedman. (cf) (Entered: 10/27/1998)

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10/26/1998 1328 PROOF of mailing of notice of deposition duces tecum of Leo Friedman. (cf) (Entered: 10/27/1998)

10/26/1998 1329 PROOF of mailing of copy of notice of deposition. (cf) (Entered: 10/30/1998)

11/06/1998

STATUS conference held − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/06/1998)

11/06/1998 1330 OBJECTIONS by defendants to report [1314−1] with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 11/09/1998)

11/24/1998 1331 LETTER from U.S. Court of Appeals regarding writ of certiorari − granted (dh) (Entered: 11/30/1998)

12/09/1998 1332 ORDER by Judge John Feikens for C. Pepper Moore, Danny Walker and Joseph Gibbs−Bey to appear at status conference set for December 10, 1998; with attachment and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 12/10/1998)

12/09/1998 1333 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to report [1314−1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 12/11/1998)

01/07/1999 1334 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of interrogatories and requests for production of documents regarding food service (LS) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

02/01/1999 1335 PROOF of mailing of defendants objections to interogatories and requests for document production regarding food service (kg) (Entered: 02/02/1999)

02/02/1999 1336 TRI−ANNUAL compliance report (kg) (Entered: 02/04/1999)

02/02/1999 1337 TRI−ANNUAL compliance report (kg) (Entered: 02/04/1999)

02/18/1999 1338 RECORD of appeal notice by USA [1160−1] consisting of: 82 volumes of pleadings 78 transcripts and 3 depositions transmitted to Supreme Court (kg) Modified on 07/18/2000 (Entered: 02/18/1999)

03/01/1999 1339 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from Supreme Court of receipt of appeal record [1338−1] − appeal case # 98−262 (LS) (Entered: 03/02/1999)

03/16/1999 1340 ORDER by Judge John Feikens with stipulation, extending time to file motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs to 4/9/99 (kg) (Entered: 03/17/1999)

03/18/1999 1341 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens of partial termination with appendix A and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/19/1999)

03/18/1999 1342 ORDER of transfer by Judge John Feikens with proof of mailing. "Sections I.P., I.Q. and I.S. as to Facility B as well as defendants' proposed alternatives as to Facility A are transferred to Judge Enslen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) for further proceedings as he deems appropriate." (cf) (Entered: 03/19/1999)

04/06/1999 1343 MOTION by defendants' for stay , and for expedited consideration with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 04/06/1999)

04/06/1999 1344 APPEAL by defendants of orders [1342−1] and [1341−1] to USCA with proof of service − FEE: PAID − Receipt #: 378152 (do) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

04/07/1999 1345 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Leo Friedman, Michael Nickerson, Patricia Streeter, Deborah LaBelle and Michael Barnhart (do) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

04/07/1999 1346 CERTIFIED copy of appeal by defendants [1344−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (do) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

04/12/1999 1347 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for stay [1343−1] and motion for expedited consideration by defendants [1343−2] with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/13/1999)

04/13/1999 1348 ORDER by Judge John Feikens with motion for second extension of time to file a motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs with brief and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/14/1999)

04/13/1999 1349 NOTICE by Judge John Feiken's chambers setting hearing on out−of−cell activity issue for 2:00 on 4/22/99 with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/14/1999)

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04/13/1999 1352 CROSS−APPEAL by plaintiffs of orders [1342−1] and [1341−1] to USCA with proof of service − FEE: PAID Receipt #: 3182 (do) (Entered: 04/19/1999)

04/14/1999 1350 ERRATA by plaintiffs for certificate of service for plaintiffs' notice of cross appeal, filed 04/13/99 (not on docket); with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/15/1999)

04/15/1999 1351 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs with brief, attachments A−I and proof of mailing (dp) Modified on 04/15/1999 (Entered: 04/15/1999)

04/19/1999 1353 PROOF of mailing of notice of cross appeal to USCA, Patricia Streeter, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Leo Friedman and Michael Nickerson (do) (Entered: 04/19/1999)

04/19/1999 1354 CERTIFIED copy of appeal cross by Everett Hadix [1352−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (do) (Entered: 04/19/1999)

04/20/1999 1355 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice & docket [1346−1] − appeal case # 99−1413 (dh) (Entered: 04/20/1999)

04/22/1999

MISCELLANEOUS hearing held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak − Re: Out−Of−Cell Activity Issue. (cc) (Entered: 04/23/1999)

04/22/1999 1356 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying case [0−1] − appeal case # 99−1413 (dh) (Entered: 04/23/1999)

04/22/1999 1357 MOTION by defendant's to extend time to answer motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1351−1] with brief, proof of mailing (dh) (Entered: 04/23/1999)

04/26/1999 1358 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying motion for stay pending appeal − appeal case # 99−1413 (dp) (Entered: 04/27/1999)

04/27/1999 1359 TRANSCRIPT taken on 4/22/99 of Hearing on Out−Of−Cell Activity Issue (nh) (Entered: 04/28/1999)

04/27/1999 1360 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding requesting transcript(s) of: 1/28/98; 3/23/98; 7/2/98; and 4/22/99 −appeal case # 99−1413 (nh) (Entered: 04/28/1999)

04/30/1999 1361 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to extend time to answer motion for attorney fees [1351−1] by defendants [1357−1] and setting deadline for filing a response to motion for attorney fees [1351−1] and for costs by plaintiffs [1351−2] for 5/10/99 with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 05/03/1999)

05/03/1999 1362 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of notice of cross appeal & docket [1354−1] − appeal case # 99−1457 (LS) (Entered: 05/04/1999)

05/10/1999 1363 RESPONSE brief by defendants' in opposition to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs' [1351−1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/10/1999)

05/18/1999 1364 REPLY by plaintiffs to response and in support of motion for attorney fees [1351−1], and for costs by plaintiffs [1351−2] with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 05/19/1999)

05/18/1999 1365 TRI−ANNUAL compliance reports by the Michigan Department of Corrections − reports cover the period of January through April 1999. (LS) (Entered: 05/19/1999)

05/19/1999 1366 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/2/98 of motion hearing before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 05/19/1999)

05/27/1999 1367 TRANSCRIPT order form by plaintiff's/cross−appellants requesting transcript(s): −appeal case # 99−1457 with proof of mailing (nh) Modified on 05/28/1999 (Entered: 05/28/1999)

06/09/1999 1368 ERRATA: document titled "defendants' brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees" removed from docket and placed on correct docket 95−76273 (dp) (Entered: 06/07/2000)

06/23/1999 1369 ERRATA: document titled "defendants' supplemental brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees" removed from docket and placed on docket 95−76273 (dp) (Entered: 06/07/2000)

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07/15/1999 1370 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA granting in part and denying in part motion for stay, and denying motion to strike − appeal case # 99−1413; 99−1457 (cm) (Entered: 07/19/1999)

07/20/1999 1371 PROOF of mailing of plaintiff's interrgatories and requests for production of documents regarding out−of−cell activities (lg) (Entered: 07/21/1999)

07/23/1999 1372 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens [EOD Date: 7/26/99] granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1351−1], and granting motion costs by plaintiffs [1351−2] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 07/26/1999)

08/13/1999 1373 SLIP opinion from the Supreme Court of the USA regarding fee limitation, etc. − appeal case # 96−2567/68/88 & # 97−1218/1272. (cf) (Entered: 08/17/1999)

08/13/1999 1374 NON−CERTIFIED copy of judgment from the Supreme Court of the USA affirming in part and reversing in part and remanding case to the USCA for further proceedings, etc. (SC #98−262) − appeal case # 96−2567/68/88 & # 97−1218/1272. (cf) (Entered: 08/17/1999)

08/17/1999 1375 PROOF of mailing (amended) of response and objections to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (cf) (Entered: 08/18/1999)

08/19/1999 1376 MOTION by defendants' to modify record with proof of mailing. (no brief − ok without brief via court clerk) (cf) (Entered: 08/20/1999)

09/07/1999 1378 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees and expenses with proof of mailing (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/07/1999 1379 ORDER by Judge John Feikens with stipulation granting motion to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees and expenses by plaintiffsssssssssssssssssssssssssss [1378−1], setting (miscellaneous) for 9/30/99 [EOD Date: 9/8/99] (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/07/1999 1380 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to modify record by defendants [1376−1] to supplement record on appeal with additional items [EOD Date 9/8/99] (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/07/1999 1381 TRANSCRIPT taken on July 2, 1998 of motion hearing (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/07/1999 1382 LETTER by Michael A. Nickerson to Honorable John Feikens dated 2/12/98 (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/07/1999 1383 LETTER from Michael A. Nickerson to Honorable John Feikens dated 12/1/98 (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/08/1999 1384 SUPPLEMENTAL record of appeal [1354−1] consisting of: 1 volume(s) of pleadings 1 transcript(s) sent to USCA − appeal case # 99−1457 " (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)

09/08/1999 1385 REPORT from the Department of Corrections regarding medical and mental health issues (dh) (Entered: 09/09/1999)

09/13/1999 1386 EXPEDITED motion by defendants to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative with brief, attachments 1,2,3 and proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 09/14/1999)

09/13/1999 1387 NOTICE by Judge John Feikens chambers of setting civil trial for 9:00 9/27/99 with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 09/14/1999)

09/14/1999 1388 PROOF of mailing of interrogatories and request for document production (kg) (Entered: 09/15/1999)

09/14/1999 1389 MOTION by defendants to relieve compliance with the court's 7/22/98 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/16/1999)

09/15/1999

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting hearing on motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendantssssssssssssssssss [1386−1] for 10:00 9/16/99 (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1999)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 81 of 85

09/15/1999

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting hearing on motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1386−1] for 10:00 9/16/99 (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1999)

09/15/1999

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting settlement conference for 10:00 9/16/99 (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1999)

09/16/1999

SETTLEMENT conference held − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/16/1999)

09/16/1999

MOTION hearing cancelled on motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1386−1] − disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/16/1999)

09/17/1999 1390 LETTER from the Department of Corrections regarding:corrected page to pleading 1385 (report) (dh) (Entered: 09/20/1999)

09/22/1999 1391 NOTICE of plaintiff's of inspection and request for production of documents with proof of mailing (dh) (Entered: 09/23/1999)

09/23/1999

CIVIL jury trial cancelled − Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/23/1999)

09/23/1999 1392 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1386−1] with brief, exhibits A−C and proof of mailing (cm) (Entered: 09/24/1999)

09/27/1999 1393 MOTION by defendants for protective order with brief and attachments (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)

09/27/1999 1394 OBJECTIONS by defendant to notice of inspection and request for production of documents [1391−1] (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)

09/27/1999 1395 PROOF of mailing of pleading #'s 1393−1394 (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)

09/27/1999 1396 PROOF of mailing of defendants' first interrogatories and request for production of documents (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)

09/30/1999 1397 MOTION by plaintiff for attorney fees and costs with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 10/01/1999)

10/06/1999 1398 REPLY by defendants to response to motion to relieve compliance with the court's 7/22/98 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1389−1] with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)

10/06/1999 1399 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of notice of deposition of Gerald w. Whiting, Larry Bennett along with persons designated by defendants, along with request for documens (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)

10/06/1999 1400 PROOF of mailing by patricia Streeter of notices of inspection and requests for production of documents (date corrected) (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)

10/06/1999 1401 PROOF of mailing by Patricia Streeter of notices of inspection and request for production of documents (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)

10/07/1999 1402 ANSWER by plaintiff's to objections to plaintiffs' notice of inspection, request for production of documents by defendants [1394−1], and motion for protective order by defendants [1393−1] with proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 10/12/1999)

10/12/1999 1403 MOTION by defendants for protective order with attachments 1 and 2 (dp) (Entered: 10/13/1999)

10/12/1999 1404 PROOF of mailing by defendants of objections to plaintiffs' notice of inspection and request for production of documents (dp) (Entered: 10/13/1999)

10/18/1999 1405 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion for protective order and to defendants objections to plaintiffs notice of inspection andrequest for documents by defendants [1403−1] with attachments 1−3 and proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 10/19/1999)

10/20/1999 1406 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion for protective order by defendants [1403−1] with proof of mailing [EOD Date 10/22/99] (LS) (Entered: 10/22/1999)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 82 of 85

10/21/1999 1407 PROOF of mailing by defendants of response to plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for documents dated 9/10/99 (LS) (Entered: 10/22/1999)

10/28/1999 1408 MOTION by defendant to compel answers to interogatories and production of documents with brief and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 10/29/1999)

11/01/1999 1409 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by plaintiff motion for attorney fees and costs by plaintiffs [1397−1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 11/02/1999)

11/03/1999 1410 ORDER by Judge John Feikens staying motion to compel answers to interogatories and production of documents by defendants [1408−1] with proof of mailing [EOD Date 11/5/99] (kg) (Entered: 11/05/1999)

01/07/2000 1411 TRI−ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORTS which are required to be submitted for this case. (lg) (Entered: 01/10/2000)

03/01/2000 1412 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs' request for procution of documents and interrogatories regarding facility renovation (dh) (Entered: 03/02/2000)

03/31/2000 1413 PROOF of mailing of defendants' response to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and interrogatories to defendants regarding facility renovation (nh) (Entered: 04/03/2000)

05/01/2000 1414 MOTION and brief by defendants for immediate consideration of that portion of defendants pending motion for immediate termination of consent decree and associated orders pursuant to the PLRA relating to college programming with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 05/02/2000)

05/17/2000

Text not available. (Entered: 05/19/2000)

05/17/2000 1415 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for immediate consideration of that portion of defendants pending motion for immediate termination of consent decree and associated orders to the PLRA relating to college programming by defendants [1414−1] with exhibits 1−10 and proof of mailing proofof (nh) (Entered: 05/19/2000)

05/22/2000 1416 COMPLIANCE REPORT covering January through April, 2000, by MDOC (cm) (Entered: 05/23/2000)

06/07/2000 1417 NOTICE by plaintiffs of change of address of counsel Patricia A. Streeter (cm) (Entered: 06/08/2000)

06/19/2000 1418 MOTION by defendants to relieve compliance with section IV−A of the consent decree providing for the housing of inmates in single cells at the State Prison of Southern Michigan − Central Complex with brief and proof of maiing (cm) (Entered: 06/20/2000)

06/30/2000 1419 RESPONSE and brief by plaintiffs to motion to relieve compliance with section IV−A of the consent decree providing for the of inmates in single cells at the State Prison of Southern Michigan − Central Complex by defendants [1418−1] with attachment 1 and 2 and proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 07/05/2000)

07/11/2000 1420 MOTION by plaintiffs for reconsideration of resolution of motion to relieve compliance with Section IV−A of the consent decree with brief and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 07/12/2000)

07/12/2000 1421 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, transferring Section I−P,I−S of the Consent Decree to Judge Enslen in the Western District of Michigan with proof of mailing [EOD Date 7/14/00] (kg) (Entered: 07/14/2000)

07/17/2000 1422 LETTER from attorney for defendants, to Judge Feikens, regarding deadlines set forth in attached memorandum of understanding of 06/26/00 (cf) Modified on 10/07/2003 (Entered: 07/18/2000)

07/18/2000 1423 RECORD of appeal returned from the Supreme Court (file actually returned on 7/26/99 the acknowledgement was never filed − appeal case SC # 98−262 (LS) (Entered: 07/18/2000)

08/28/2000 1424 MEMO from Eric Ciccoretti to Judge Feikens regarding compliance with the MOU (LS) (Entered: 08/30/2000)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 83 of 85

09/21/2000 1425 NOTICE by the court of conference (re:record from Pepper Moore) for 2:00 on 10/10/00 with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 09/22/2000)

10/10/2000 1426 NON−CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 99−1413;99−1457 (lg) (Entered: 10/11/2000)

10/10/2000 1427 MONTHLY REPORT out of cell activity memorandum of understanding from the M.D.O.C (lg) (Entered: 10/11/2000)

10/10/2000

SLIP opinion from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court − appeal case # (HADIX 96−2567/2568) GLOVER 96−2586/2588) − record not returned (see 77−71229, pleading 1460 for original) (lh) (Entered: 10/12/2000)

10/10/2000

NON−CERTIFIED copy of Judgment from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court − appeal case # (HADIX 96−2567/2568) and (GLOVER 96−2586/2588) See 77−71229, pleading 1461) (lh) (Entered: 10/12/2000)

10/10/2000 1428 SLIP opinion from USCA reversing the District Court's order terminating the Hadix consent decree because it fails to comply with the requirements of the PLRA and remand the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 99−1413/1457 (lg) (Entered: 10/24/2000)

10/11/2000

MISCELLANEOUS CONF. − held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 10/11/2000)

10/27/2000 1429 TRANSCRIPT of status conference filed for appeal purposes taken on 10/10/00 regarding appeal filed by defendants [1344−1] (lh) (Entered: 11/01/2000)

11/01/2000 1431 MANDATE from USCA reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings − appeal case # 99−1413/99−1457 (lg) (Entered: 11/06/2000)

11/03/2000 1430 NOTICE by Michael Barnhart (attorney for plaintiffs) of change of address ; with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 11/03/2000)

11/15/2000 1432 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, to transfer case to Western District of Michigan with attachment [EOD Date 11/22/00] (lg) (Entered: 11/22/2000)

11/16/2000 1433 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/6/00 of telephonic proceeding (lg) (Entered: 11/22/2000)

11/21/2000 1434 RECORD of appeal by defendants [1344−1] returned from USCA − appeal case # 99−1413/1457 (lg) (Entered: 12/04/2000)

12/04/2000

TELE−CONFERENCE held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Larry Przybysz − w/Dr. Benton, Leo Friedman and Michael Barnhart. (cc) (Entered: 12/04/2000)

12/05/2000 1435 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/22/00 of telephonic proceeding (lg) (Entered: 12/11/2000)

12/12/2000 1463 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for October 2000) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)

12/12/2000 1464 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for November 2000) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)

01/11/2001 1465 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for December 2000) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)

01/23/2001 1436 TRANSCRIPT taken on 12/4/00 of telephone conference (LS) (Entered: 01/24/2001)

01/24/2001 1437 MANDATE from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court − appeal case # 96−2567, 96−2568, 96−2586, 96−2588 (LS) (Entered: 01/25/2001)

02/02/2001 1438 ORDER by Judge John Feikens authorizing disbursement of funds to Wayne State University [EOD Date 2/5/01] (cm) (Entered: 02/05/2001)

02/02/2001 1439 ORDER by Judge John Feikens of withdrawal of funds [EOD Date 2/5/01] (cm) (Entered: 02/05/2001)

02/09/2001 1466 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for January 2001) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 84 of 85

03/23/2001 1467 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (February 2001) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)

06/15/2001 1440 MOTION and brief by plaintiffs to extend time to file brief on due process issues to 7/16/01 with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 06/18/2001)

06/18/2001

TELE−CONFERENCE held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Karin Dains − Re: Due Process Issue. (cc) (Entered: 06/18/2001)

06/18/2001

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting response from pltfs. re: due process issue for 7/2/01 , setting hearing re: due procee issue for 10:00 7/10/01 (cc) (Entered: 06/18/2001)

06/26/2001 1441 MOTION by Everett Hadix for costs with brief, affidavit, verification and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 06/27/2001)

06/27/2001 1442 ORDER by Judge John Feikens of termination [EOD Date 6/28/01] (cm) (Entered: 06/28/2001)

07/05/2001 1443 DESIGNATION of due process issues by plaintiffs; with exhibits 1−5 and proof of mailing [EOD Date: 7/6/01] (dp) (Entered: 07/06/2001)

07/06/2001 1444 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for C. Pepper Moore to be transported to appear before Judge John Feikens at 10:00 on 7/10/01 [EOD Date 7/9/01] (jg) (Entered: 07/09/2001)

07/10/2001

MISCELLANEOUS hearing Re: Due Process Issue − held − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Karin Dains − A conference call with counsel, etc. will be set up by Michael Barnhart on 7/25/01 at 10:00 a.m. to continue the discussion re: due process issue. C. Pepper Moore's Motion for Costs and an Incentive Award was also heard and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (cc) (Entered: 07/10/2001)

07/10/2001

MOTION hearing held on motion for costs and an incentive award by C. Pepper Moore [1441−1] − disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT − Judge John Feikens − Court Reporter: Karin Dains (cc) (Entered: 07/10/2001)

07/10/2001

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting telephone conference for 10:00 7/25/01 (cc) (Entered: 07/25/2001)

07/24/2001 1445 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/10/01 of due process hearing (nh) (Entered: 07/25/2001)

07/25/2001

TELE−CONFERENCE held − Judge John Feikens − Re: Due Process Issue − Parties have 30 days (8/27) to resolve this issue on their own. At that point Pltfs' counsel will report to JF if unresolved; parties will then have 2 weeks (9/10) to brief issue of whether JF has jurisdiction to address this issue. (cc) (Entered: 07/25/2001)

08/08/2001 1446 OPINION by Judge John Feikens denying motion for incentive award and costs by Everett Hadix [1441−1] with proof of mailing [EOD Date: 8/10/01] (LS) (Entered: 08/10/2001)

09/04/2001 1447 APPEAL by plaintiff C Pepper Moore of order [1446−1] to USCA − FEE: NO FEE PAID − IFP PENDING (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)

09/04/2001 1448 APPLICATION by plaintiff C Pepper Moore to appeal in forma pauperis with signed authorization and certificate of prison account activity statement (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)

09/04/2001 1449 PROOF of mailing by C Pepper Moore of notice of appeal and application to proceed in forma pauperis (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)

09/04/2001 1450 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, C Pepper Moore, Patricia Streeter, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Leo Friedman and Court Reporter Karen Dains (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)

09/04/2001 1451 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by C Pepper Moore [1447−1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)

09/06/2001 1452 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting application to appeal in forma pauperis by C. Moore [1448−1] and directing payment of the initial partial filing fee and subsequent payments [EOD Date 9/6/01] (lb) (Entered: 09/06/2001)

Case: 2:80-cv-73581 As of: 01/19/2018 02:57 PM EST 85 of 85

09/17/2001 1453 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief, exhibits A−B and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 09/18/2001)

09/18/2001 1454 ACKNOWLEDGMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by C. Moore [1447−1] − appeal case # 01−2247 (dp) (Entered: 09/19/2001)

11/13/2001 1455 RECORD consisting of: 1 volume of pleadings and 1 transcript (documents #1441−#1448 & #1452) transmitted to USCA − appeal case # 01−2247. (UPS #1Z 467 088 03 1210 232 1) (Will actually be picked−up by UPS on 11/14/01.) (cf) (Entered: 11/13/2001)

12/04/2001 1456 ACKNOWLEDGMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal record [1455−1] − appeal case # 01−2247 (cm) (Entered: 12/06/2001)

11/20/2002 1457 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for the appeal bonds posted in action be disbursed in the amount of $2,445.75 to the Department of Corrections with proof of service [EOD Date 11/25/02] (nh) (Entered: 11/25/2002)

03/18/2003 1458 COPY of judgment affirming the decision of the District Court from the USCA − Appeal# 01−2247 (nh) (Entered: 03/19/2003)

03/18/2003 1459 SLIP opinion from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court − appeal case # 01−2247 (nh) (Entered: 03/19/2003)

04/04/2003 1460 MANDATE from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court − appeal case # 01−2247 (lg) (Entered: 04/07/2003)

04/14/2003 1461 RECORD of appeal [1455−1] returned from USCA − appeal case # 01−2247 (lg) (Entered: 04/15/2003)

07/01/2003 1462 NOTICE from the US Supreme Court that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed and placed on the docket; appeal no. 01−2247 (dp) (Entered: 07/03/2003)

10/30/2003 1468 ORDER from the U.S. Supreme Court denying writ of certiorari regarding appeal notice by C. Moore [1447−1] − appeal case # SC 02−11088/COA 01−2247 [EOD Date: 10/31/03] (jg) (Entered: 10/31/2003)

09/04/2014 1469 Document filed by C. Moore ( (1) Document Continuation) (KKra). (Entered: 09/05/2014)

09/09/2014

TEXT ONLY NOTICE REASSIGNING CASE from District Judge John Feikens to District Judge Victoria A. Roberts pursuant to Administrative Order 10−AO−037. (ATee) (Entered: 09/09/2014)

09/18/2014 1470 OPINION AND ORDER Denying Request to Reopen the Class Action re 1469 Docket Annotation. Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (CPin) (Entered: 09/18/2014)

09/18/2014

TEXT−ONLY CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 1470 Order on C. Moore Pris. No. 100885 at 17600 Ryan Road, Detroit MI 48212. (CPin) (Entered: 09/18/2014)

 
 1
DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

ATfORfEY GENERAL CORRECTIONS DIVISION

SOUTHERN DIVISION

HAD3X, EVERETT, MAPES, RICHABD, SOMERVILLE. PATRICK C., HUDSON, ROOSEVELT JR.. KOSTER, BRENT E., MCDONALD, UEE A., STURGES, DARRYL, FLEMSTER, ROBERT, LOVETT, WILIAM, COVINGION, JAMES, THCMAS, FRANK, INMATES OF SOUTHERN MICHIGAN PPISON AND ALL
OTHER SIMILARALY CONFINED,
Plaintiffs, /

Civil Action No:
s .' W - '.-I-.- .{ '

n
vs

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM G. MTTJ.TKFM
individually and in his capacity as Governor of the State ofMichigan, PERRY M. JOHNSON, .idividually an in his capacity asDirector of the Michigan Department of Corrections, BARRY MINTZES, idividually and in his capacity asWarden, Southern Michigan Prison, at Jackson, Michigan CHARTIS ANDERSON, individually and in '
his capacity asPast-Warden of the
State Prison of Southern Michigan, WILLIAM F. GRANT, individually and in ' his capacity as Deputy Warden of the State Prison of Southern Michigan,. DANIEL TRUDELL, individually and in his capacity asDeputy Warden of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, DUANE SIDLES, individually and in his capacity asDeputy Warden of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, JOttt JABE, individually and inhis c capacity Bussiness Manager of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, JAMES POGATS, individually and in his Capacity as Adm. Assistant to the Warden of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, ROY RIDER, individually and inhis capacity as Classification Director of the State Prison of Southern Michigan,
CHARLES USTESS, individually and in his capacity asResident Services Director of the State Prison ef Southern Michigan, DON P. Le WC, individually and in his capacity as Chairman of the Corrections Cannission of the State ofMichigan, THE MICHIGAN CORRECTIONS COMMISSION,
individually and in their capacity as
Cansissioners of the Michigan Dept.
of Corrections. . Defendants. /

CCMPIAJNT FOR DECLARATORY INJUNCnVE 6.M0NTIARY

irr
./;•-

U.SX. 1983

-1 -•

Hadix v. Johnson

PC-MI-003-001

(.

I

I.

.PRFI.TMINftRY STATEMENT

1

1. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other persons

I

similarly situated, bring this action based upon the United States Constitution and £2 USC Sec. 1983, to seek redress for the deprivation

I

under color of state law, of rights, privileges and isnunities secured by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments

I

to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the unconstitutional policies and practices

of Defendants and damages for the injuries the named Plaintiffs suffered

as a result of said policies and practices.

2. In this action Plaintiffs assert their Constitutionaly guarenteed rights and freedoms not to be subjected to the existing inhumane conditions within the Southern Michigan Prison, at Jackson.

JURISDICTION
3. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by 28 USC Sec. 1343 (3) (4), which provide for original jurisdiction of this court in all suits authorized by 42 USC Sec. 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of state law, of any right, privilege, or innunity secured by the Constitution of the united States or by an Act of Congress providing for equal or civil rights of all persons vithinthe jurisdiction of the United States.
4. Jurisdiction is also conferred on the Court by 28 USC Sec. 1331, vftiich provides for original jurisdiction of this Court wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and arises under Constitution, laws and treaties of the united States.
5. Plaintiffs' actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, and for damages, are authorized by:
-1-

a. 28 USC Sec. 2201 & 2202, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceedures, which relate to declaratory judgments;
b. 42 USC Sec. 1983 which provides redress for the deprivation under color of law of rights, privileges and innunities secured to all citizens and persons wihtin the jurisdiction of the United States by the Constitution of the United States.
6. This action is also brought directly under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth," Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
7. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters, and state claims raised in this suit under its power of pendent jurisdiction.

III. CLASS ACTION

8. Plaintiffs bring this- action pursuant to Rule 23 (a), (b),

(1), and (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceedure, on behalf

~'~

of a class of all persons similarly situated.

9. The class is composed and defined as consisting of all

past, present, and funire innates of the State Prison of Southern Michigan,

Jackson.

10. (a) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members

is impractical; (b) There are questions of law and fact connon to the

class; (c) The claims of the representitive parties are typical of the

claims of the class, and (d) the representitive parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.

11. The prosecution of seperate actions by individual members

of the class would create a risk of: (a) inconsistant or varying adju-

dications with respect to individual members of the class which would

establish incoaqpatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and

-2-
61

?••

(b) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class

which would as a practical matter be dispositive on the Interests of the

other mentoers not party to the adjudication or substantially iopede

their ability to protect their interests.

12. The defendants and their agents have (a) acted on grounds generally applicable to the class and (b) refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.
13. Declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate if any relief is appropriate.

NAMED PLAINTIFFS 14. All Named Plaintiffs are adult citizens of the united States of America and the State of Michigan. 15. All named Plaintiffs are now and have been, for all intents and purposes of the Complaint prisoners of the State of Michigan in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan , Jackson, Michigan. 16. Plaintiff JOHN DOE is an adult citizen of the United States and State of Michigan who is currently incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson, Michigan.

DEFENDANTS

17. All Defendants are adult citizens of the united States

and the State of Michigan and are sued individually and in their capacities

as officials of the State Prison of Southern Michigan and the State of

Michigan. They are either responsible for the administration of the prison
i !
and the care ; and custody of the Innates or have power to alleviate

conditions there but have not exercised that power.

i 1

18. Defendant WILLIAM G. MULIKEN is the duly elected Governor

of the State of Michigan and is ultimately responsible for Administration

of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. ( Michigan Constitution Art. Sec

t:

(w u

19. Defendant PERRY M. JOHNSON, is^Director of the Michigan

Department of Corrections and is duly charged with the sound maintenance

of all Regional Facilities within that Department.

20. Defendant BARRY MINIZES AND CHARLES E. ANDERSON, are or

have been Regional Administrators for the Dept. of Corrections and dulv

charged with the care and custody of all iixiates at the State Prison of

Southern Michigan.

21. Defendants WILLIAM F. GRANT, DANIEL TRUDELL, DUANE SHDLES,

are Deputy Wardens of the State Prison of Southern Michigan . They are

duly charged with the care, security and sound maintenance of all inoates

of the State Prison of Southern Michigan.

22. Defendants JAMES POGAXS and CHARLES UTESS, are duly charged

with Resident Treatment Programs and innplementiug Administrative policy

at die State Prison of Southern Michigan.

' ."

23. Defendant JOHN JABE is charged with appropriation of

monies to the individual depts. within the State Prison of Southern

Michigan.

24. Defendant ROY RIDER,".and his successor is Director of

Classification of the State Prison of SOuthern Michigan and is duly

charged with the classification of Innates for security and treatment

programs.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

25. Plaintiff inmates and the class they represent while incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan have been, are and will continue to be subjected to the illegal, unconstitutional and dehumanizing conditions described in this Complaint.
26. The conditions described hereinafter exist pursuant to the willful and intentional acts, practices, policies and admissions of Defendants in this action.
27. The State Prison of Southern Michigan was built in the early 1900's.

\- "

,; 28. 1. r te Prison of Southern Michi^jj ^ent^i Complex, is

designed and operated as a Maxinun security placement unit.

' i

29. The- architecture of the Central Complex is maximm in the

penological sense.

t) ^ 3 0 ^ Most inmates of the State Prison of SOuthem Michigan are

housed in'"multiple dwelling" units', (see MSA 5.2855, MCLA 125.402)

31. Inmates are only provided with 55.3 sq. ft. of living space

which accord ing to modern Correctional Standards, is inadequate. C^hese standards have been set down by the American Correctional Association and

I

according to Michigan Scatues, MCLA. 125.483, 124.409, 125.410, 125.440)

32. 32. Southern Michigan Prison is antiquated and shows scars

left by years of neglect.

,

33. All cell blocks are infested with cockroaches.

34. Cell blocks 3,4,5,7,8 and 6 are plauaged by flying and nesting

birds.

35. Bird droppings and feces are prevelant in the above listed cell

blocks.

36. Ventilation equiotment is non-exLstant.

37. In the summer months, odors, excessive heat and humidity

are unbearable.

t

*

"Y\ 38. Poor house keeping practices are prevelant throughout the -s-

prison.

39. Pluming throughout the prison fails to meet health or building

codes for Correctional institutions, (see MCLA 125.435, 125.409, 125.410)

40. Showers in most blocks are rusted and in need of new drains.

41. The ratio of showers to inmates is seriously below Modem

Correctional Standards and Michigan Statues. (One (1) shower per 60 sixty

Men)

42.Shower tiles are of the recessed grout type and can not be

prooerly cleaned.

43. Tiolets (water closets) on the upper levels back up, when

toilets on the same line are flushed causing feces and stagnent water to

sit in die bowl, (this is in violation of MCLA 125.435, 125.409, 125.410

125.482, 125.495 &496)

c

(•

r.

44. In the sunner months showers are scalding hot, In winter months showers are iced cold.

^p 45. Outside toilet facilities are backed up and are a breeding

ground for bacteria and mold. £-> v ^ s ^es^^ent traffic around the yard is always congested pre-
cluding observation from the guard towers.

c. 47. Theft from cells has increased 5007. in the last two years.

£ 4 8 . Security has the manpower to protect iimates and their

property yet they can be seen standing around in groups "kicking it".

z$g Because of the lack of security, thefts occur more frequently

and then residents are. forced to prove "staff negligence" in order to

recieve reimbursment for their lost property. This is a "Catch 22".

SO. Rules set forth in DOC Policy Directives are not being

enforced concerning the congregation of more than four (4) iimates.

T ) 51. Mare than one half (%) of the innate population does not

have a working assignment.

^ — T ^ 52. Iimate job opportunities have decreased because of die removal

of the laundry, textiles, and carpentry shops to the outside.

Because jobs are scarce, inmates are allowed to "run free"

in the vard.

V 54. Security fails to issue tickets because of the unrealistic
amount of paperwork required for each ticket.

<-^. . 5 5 . Security is also precluded from issueing tickets because

the invetigators cannot handle the amount of tickets issued and have to

"tear up" the tickest because they exceed the time limit for hearings.

^ 56. Fourty acres (40) of "prime" recreation land has been

closed. "Nfo^Z) Fi8hts- stabbings, and robberies occur on the average of
ons (1) per day.

~^v 58. The nvnber of serious injury cases admitted to the infirmary

or Foote East Hospital has increased twofold in the last year.

The uniwer of "reported" suicides has wreasefl drasticly

y

•.

in thelast year.

• ••

• •

i ' ~~-p60. Known homosexuals are allowed tc$ roam the yard increasing \

^-the-chances of asualts and reprisals.

'

61. There has not been a npjr "shake-down" for weapons in the

last six (6) months.

-^-s 62. The hunger of residents who have "locked up" forfear of

j

violence is approx. 200. This farexceeds the per-cent ratio for a normal J

63. Residents are not permitted to call witnesses for minor

ticket violations.

64. Tickets are not followed through on because of the

snail nuobex of "hearings investigators".

65. Cell blocks have only one (1) guard tower that mist control

and secure the blocks and the yard area.

.

66. Cell blocks 3.4,5, 7, & 8 have only one gaurd station which

cannot adequately secure the top two (2) levels from theft and violence.

67. Lighting in the cell blocks is antiquated and poses a

security problem.

T } 68. Cell blocks are totally void of sound insulation andthe din

that is caused creates helth problems.

J A59) No limits are placed on the amount of shouting and loud in cell blocks 3,4,5,6.7,8,

[W. Psychologically ill patients have been relesed to the
/V
general copulation.
^ 72. Resident Unit Mgrs. are unschooled for the services they are

hired to provide.

~\\ 73. Resident unit Mgrs. employ inmate clerks who have access to

inmate psychological files.

.' 74. The mess hall is infested with mice and cockroachs.

7§. The "yard area" is totally void of grass andisworn beyond

repair.

-\\ 76. Resident walkways arefilled with "chuckhole" and are in

need of repair.

_ . <—^ >"•'*"
—

78. Walkways flood during the summer and inmates must walk through

puddles of standing water.

79. Walkways are not cleaned in the winter nonths and innates

must wade through drifts of snow.

80. The back dock area is constantly flooded and smells of

decaying food and slime.

/C~\ f 81. Toilets in the cell blocks are so low to the ground that

they cause~hemroids and urine splatters on the walls and floor.

\\y 82. Inmates personal and legal mail is handled with little or

no respect and comes to the inmate in cut up pieces.

¥\/> *^\ 83. The diet that innates recieve is unhealthy and inadequate. 84. Innates recieve little fresh fruits and vegtables.

85. Although the Adm. details officers to the blocks, regular

scheduled rounds are not enforced.

86. Inmates from other blocks are stealing from blocks that they

donot belong in.

' O ySU Qootionally unstable officers are being hired by the DOC.

"7) 88. Little inservice training is done by the Administration.

•—rp 89. Administration turnover has contributed to an unstable

environment and the high tension among staff and innates.

•_-»

— v 90. The resident visiting room is inadequte for the innate

population.

91. Resident visitors are often forced to wait up to three (3)

hours for their visits.

92. Security and staff are indifferent to visitors complaints.

93. The visiting room is void of fire saftey features.

/f9p) For all intents and purposes Plaintiffs are forced to serve

a dual sentence, jieing at the mercy of other innates and serving the sentence

imposed by the Courts.

95. The offical system plays a vital role in regulating the types

of inmate roles.that emerge, the social functions they serve, and the

relationship between them.

(

:

•:.;

•}••

TREATMENT PROGRAbJS:

96. The nusber of drug and alcohol programs is totally inadequate

for the innate population.

97. Because of the above, inmates are precluded from getting the

tj»acment and programning required to meet Darole standards.

/{98^Parole "flops" are contigent on programs inmates cannot

stain.

"TN 99. Unlicensed counselors are treating inmates, for psychological

pathologies.

100. Inmates in segregation, "blue hold" card, and 5-west are

precluded from recieving educational programs.

101. There is a lack of adequate vocational training programs

for the inmate populations.

LIBRARY SERVICES:

102.There is no civilian staff to. assist inmates in preperation

of legal documents.

.

103. Law books may not be checked out overnight.

104. The Prison Legal Services of Michigan are precluded,

-'~

by contract, from assisting inmates with suits against the institution.

105. Although Prison T,egffi Services of Michigan is under contract

to provide for legal services to the inmate populations, low funding and an

inadequate staff preclude them from working on a meaningful basis.

106 .Although the library (law) does contain a partial fulfillment

of needs for inmates, it is still far from adequate in Federal reporters

and out of state reports.

107. Photo copies of law material are outragiously priced

which precludes inmates from a meaningful research aidv

108. Smoke detectors are non-existant in most critical areas. 109. Stroke barriers are non-existant in the cell blocks. 110. Cell blocks or other critical areas are not divided into departmentalized fire zones.

C w

111. Fire drills are non-existant.

112. Fife extinghishers are non-existant in all critical areas.

113. The prison fails to meet life safety codes, building codes,

or fire safety codes as set down by the major corrections standards.

114. Without the above, innates are in danger and serious threat

if a fire were to break out.

CLOTHING:

115. Inmates are only issued two (2) lightweight pairs of socles

that must be worn throughout the year.

116. Only low-top shoes are issued to inmates.

117. No boots are issued to innates..

118. Inmates are only issued one (1) lightweight jacket for

year round wear.

119. No long underwear is issued.

120. No hats are issued.

121. Because innates are forced to buy clothing only foom the

innate store, they are precluded from buying competitivly and must pay

an inflated price for goods.

,

122. Poor inmates are discriminated against by DOC policy

allowing only new clothing to be brought into the institution.

MEDICAL:

'"TN 123. Prisoners are allowed to work in -such sensitive areas as

x-ray department, physical therapy department and the psychiatric services

unit.

124. The use of innates in these areas violates the American

Medical Associations Standards, for Correctional Health Care Facilities.

/T\ 125. Over the years, bureacratic indifference has caused an on-

going conflict of interest between custody and medical staff.

<~-v 126. The present dentist-inmate ratio is Inadequate and precludes

proper treatment for Plaintiffs.

~^) 127.There is a serious backlog of innates awaiting dental treatment.

•p 128. There are no beds for inmates requiring long-term psychiatric care.

\\-

STN 129. Handicap inmates are forced to stand in long feeding, and

pharmasuteical lines.

130. The Southern Michigan Prison Infirmary is forced to handle

medical cases from five (5) ajoining farms, TRUSTY Division, and the

Northaide Complex, which it is totally understaffed to provide.

OASIFICATION: 131. Inmate classification is based on one Ten (10) minute
transcase interview which is totally inadequate to asses a inmates educational or security needs.
132. The classification sytem used results in an over classifcation both to and within the nwxim.ni security facility.
133. Despite a clear mandate from the Dept. of Corrections, stating that no prisoner will be classified to a more secure status than security, and program needs-dictate at the present time, over 600 prisoners above the rated capacity have been classified to Sothem Michigan Prison, Central Complex.
134. No indepth psychological evaluation is given when classification is being done.
135. Inmates are classified according to the sentence they recieved ' precluding any meaningful placement.

RESULTS OF CONDITIONS CITED
136. Plaintiffs and the class they represent are subjected to long term degradation and demoralizing conditions. This traumatizing atmosphere is a gross violation of modem penialogical standards and the United States Constitution. These persons are subject to life-threatening environment and are punished twice for one crime. Any dignity that they had as human beings is taken from them by the experience of being incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan.

- f
;•

•

FIRST CLAIM

137. As a first cause of action. Plaintiffs hereby and reallege paragraphs 1 through 136.
138. The lack of recreation area, lack of adeqaute sanitation in the food area and in the blocks, lack of adequate ventilation, the absence of noise control, and the lack of critical fire safety features, and the other above listed conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishnent and the denial of Due Process in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Artnpnrtiwnrfi of the United States Constitution.

SBOQND CLAIM

139. As a second cause of action, Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incoperate paragraphs 1 through 136.
140. The lack of adequate legal materials, restrictive visitation proceedures, as well as. a general defeatist atmosphere created by the above -described other conditions deprived Plaintiffs and their class rights secured under the Sixth and Fourteenth Adnendments to the United States Constitution.

THIBD CLAIM
141. As a Third cause of action. Plaintiffs herby reallege and .incoperate paragraphs 1 through 136.
142. The denial of adequate visitation and cunmunication opportunities to Plaintiffs and the Class they represent deprives them of their rights to privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Ninth, and fourteenth Admendments to the United States Constitution.
FOURTH C L A M
143. As a Fourth cause for action, Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorperate paragraphs 1 through 136.
144. The arbitrary and suamary disipline administered by the prison administration, the failure to enforce departmental rules, and the right to meaningfull classification proceedures constitutes a violation of rights guaranteed by Che Sixth and Fourteenth Adraendments to the United

y

}:-^

Constitution.

FITCH CLAIM

145. As a Fifth cause for action, Plaintiffs reallege and incoperate paragraphs 1 through 136.
146. The effects of being incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan are psychologically and physically debilitating and damaging. The Defendants have by their acts and admissions, inflicted emotional and psychological as well as physical injury upon the named Plaintiffs in violation of the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Admendments of the United States Constitution. As a direct and proximate result thereof Plaintiffs have sustained damages as follows:
(a) Permenant and sever psychological and emotional truama;
(b) Pain and suffering, past and future; (c) Loss of earnings and economic capacity; (d) Medical expenses; past and future.

SIXTH CLAIM

fj

ii

147. The tenth cause for action Plaintiffs hereby reallege

\\

and incooperate paragraphs 1 through 136.

|j

it

148. Defendants acts and omissions described herein, are in

',!

i

gross violation of Michigan Statatory law and regulations of- the Michigan

Department of Corrections; which claims this court should assume by means

of pendent jurisdiction.

IRREPARABLE HARM

149. Plaiitiffs and the class they represent have been, will be and are subjected to gross violations of their rights as citizens of the State of Michigan and of the United States. They are compelled to live in a demoralizing, dehumanizing, and barbaric environment which threatens their very lives.

11

150. Plaintiffs and the class they represent have no plan, or adequate remedy at law to redress thses herein described wrongs; Plaintiffs and the class they represent continue to suffer irreparable harm fran the conditions and practices setforth herein unless and until the Declaratory relief sought is granted by this Court.
151. The'public interest iswell served when public officials obey the law and that to this endthis court shouldexercise its' equity power.
REMEDIES AND RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the

class they represent, pray that this court:

1. Assume jurisdiction of this case andset. down this cause

promtly for hearing.

2. Determine by order, pursuant to Rule 23 a, B 1, and b 2

of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceedure, that this action should be

mainfa-inpH 35 £ claSS action.

"•

3. Pending a full hearing and determination by this Court,

grant pursuant to Federal Rules of .Civil Proceedure 65 (a), a preliminary

injunction enjoining the Defendants, their successors in office, agents

and employees andall other persons in active concert and participation

with them from:

a> Threatening or punishing the Plaintiffs and all others

cooperating with them for initiating, prosecuting and investigating this

action.

b) Barring Plaintiffs attorneys, any designated representitive

of such attonreys, and any expert witness available for use in this case

from entering andinspecting the State Prison of Southern Michigan in

order to interview clients orwitnesses for all purposes related to

this litigation andIn order to insure that the provisions of this pro-

tective injunction are complied with.

c) Incarcerating any additional persons within the Central

Coriplex of Southern Michigan Prison until the present and incoming innates

are provided with:

/

(1) Sufficient living and recreation space and protection

from harm to suure their physical safety;

(2) Sanction from placing irraates in any cell unless that cell meets the requirements of the Michigan Department of Corrections, and regulations issued by the American Correctional Association of the United States: (3) Establishment of sufficient sanitation and janatorial

services to maintain a clean and vermin free environment;

(4) Enforce DOC regulations concerning Health and Food requirements.

(5) Secure cell blocks to prevent theft,

(il) Such additional or alternative.relief as the Court may

deem just, proper and eq:

4. Issue a Declaratory Judgement. Pursuant to 28 USC Sec. 2201,

2202, that through the individual and collective effort and their acts,

practices and omissions, the Defendants have; : - . ' - . . .

a) Subjected Plaintiffs and the class they represent to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Admendments of die united States Constitution.

b) Failed to sercure Plaintiffs rights that insure Plaintiffs

be safe from harm and that their -property be secure,

§

c) Deprived Plaintifs and the class they representto the right

to be housed in prisons that meet requirements set forth by the American

Correctional Association, and the Michigan Department of Corrections.

5. Order Defendants, within thirty (30) days, to submit a plan to the Court for assuring that all Plaintiffs and the class they represent are accorded all rights and privileges guarenteed to them by the united States Constitution and as citizens of the United States of America and

the Plaintiffs and the class they represent are not subjected to punishment

or violation of their constitutionally protected freedoms.

6. Order Defendants to refrain from harrassing, punishing,

abusing, or retaliating against Plaintiffs for initiating this suit.

Also, that Plaintiffs will not be transferred without their prior individual

approval.

74

i. uroer uetenoanus, within tiurcy (,JU; aays co,« •'mix. a plan to the Court for ongSing "aaicus currie" inspection'to insure that the Defendants are coupling with this Courts Orders,
8. That if a satisfactory plan is not submitted and iroplimented within thirty (30) days, the Defendats be enjoined and restrained from incarcerating any and all Plaintiffs and the class Chey represent in the State Prison of Southern Michigan.

9. Ihat if the Department of Corrections cannot come up with

• ••

-

a comprehensive plan to allieviate the above conditions, that the court

order the United States Government to assume control the State Prison of

Southern Michigan.

10. That the Court grant damages to the Named Plaintiffs,

in the amount of twenty million dollars (20,000,000.00) for the psychological

physical and economic loss incured as inmates of the State Prison of Southern

Michigan, plus costs, interests, and reasonable attorney fees.

11. That the Court retain jurisdiction over the Defendants and each of them, until such a time as the court is satisfied that the practices, conditions, policies and ountisions alleged herein no longer exsist and will not reoccur.

12. That the Court issue an order, appointing Plaintiffs and the class they represent a Federal attorney to assist Plaintiffs in this suit.

Dated:

 
 ORIGINAL

I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION "-

I

Hadix v. Johnson

I :;:;„;;,;;. IlllIlPll

I

v

PERRY JOHNSON, et al,

I

Defendants.

Civil No. 80-73581 HONORABLE JOHN FEIKENS
^ ' "5
~r'^. '•

I CONSENT DECREE

I

The parties herein s t i p u l a t e and consent t o the entry of the fallowing consent decree by t h i s Court which c o n s t i t u t e s the final judgment and

settlement in this matter except as to those issues specified in introduc-

I

tory paragraphs 6 and 7 herein:

INTRODUCTION

I

1. This was an action brought pursuant to 42 USC 1983 and other a p p l i -

cable s t a t u t e s seeking declaratory and equitable r e l i e f with respect t o the

I

conditions of confinement at the Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, including the Reception and Guidance Center {hereinafter

referred t o as SPSM-CC).

I

. 2 . P l a i n t i f f s are prisoners at the SPSM-CC and represent themselves and the c l a s s of a l l prisoners who are now or will be confined within said

i n s t i t u t i o n . Defendants are state officials charged under Michigan law with

I

the operation of SPSM-CC. '

3. The complaint in this case a l l e g e s that the rights of the P l a i n -

I

t i f f s secured by the F i r s t , Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution have been v i o l a t e d . The provisions contained

herein are intended by the parties to assure the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the

conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSM-CC. The p a r t i e s

•

further recognize that this consent judgment in certain respects incorpor-

a t e s the present practice and procedures of the Michigan Department of

^

Corrections.

*

4 . By entry of t h i s judgment, the Defendants make no admission of l i a -

b i l i t y on the claims of the Plaintiffs.

•

5. The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this judg-

ment.

J|

5. The parties agree that they will submit the following questions for

m

resolution by the Court after a hearing on the merits:

\ n

-2a. With respect to access to the courts (section VI, infra):
1) Whether andto what extent Defendants are constitutionally required to provide attorneys to assist prisoners with legal matters.
2) If attorneys must be provided, whether andto what extent these attorneys must be independent.
b. Classification. c. Oue Process. 7. Visitation is not addressed herein as Plaintiffs' claims in this regard were previously dismissed on motion by Defendants.
I I
•"

SO STIPULATED: Counsel for P l a i n t i f f s :

Larryxjfy Bennett (P25294)

Attorney at Law

\

DATED:

N

h t h t, Magid(P24525) Cttorney at Law DATED:

Oeborah L. Brouwer (P34872) Attorney at Law DATED:
Counsel for Defendants:
\77 /*
Thomas c. Nelson Assistant Attorney General DATED:

Assistant Attorney

DATED:

(

Thomas M. Loeb (P259J3) Attorney at Law OATED:
atncia Attorney DATED:
hhcnael J . Barnhart (P1046 7) Attorney^at Law
Patrick Apol ' A t t o r n e y a t Law DATED:
Elaine Dierwa Pischhoff (P24520) Assistant Attorney General DATED:

I8DEX

Page

I. Sanitation, Safety andHealth

3

A. Environmental Sanitation

3

B. Housekeeping

3

C. Inspection forSanitation

4

D. Personal Hygiene of Prisoners

.:.. 4

E. Vermin Control

4

F. Occupational Safety andHealth

4

G. Requirement forCell Lighting

4

H. Other Electrical

5

I. Solid Waste Disposal

5

J. Plumbing Maintenance

5

K. Windows

5

L. Food Service Sanitation

5

M. Training

•

5

N. Bartering

6

0. Noise

•••••

•

• 6

p. Water

6

Q. T&nperatures

6

R. Electrical

6

S. Ventilation

7

T. Plumbing

•

7

u• waIKways •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• /

V. Shower Panels

•

7

W. Handicap Access

7

79

Page

II. Health Care

7

A. Medical Care

~

7

1. General Provision

7

2. Hospital Facility

8

3. Medical Screening...................

8

4. Access to Health Care

9

5. Staffing andProcedures

in

6. Prostheses

11

7. Chronic Disease Plan

11

8. Training

11

9. Special Diets

12

10. Medication Distribution

13

11. Problem-Oriented Health Records

13

12. Quality Assurance

13

B. Mental Health Care

14

1. General P r o v i s i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . * * . . . • • . . . . . . . . • 14

2. Li censure

15

3. Staffing and Procedure

15

4. Housing

17

5\ Screening

18

I

III. Fire Safety

18

A. Facilities

18

B. Plans for Smoke Detectors and Egress

19

C. Fire Suppression

19

D. General Provisions - Egress

19

E. Sprinklering Plan

21

80

Page

F. Operation Plan

21

G. General Provisions-Fire, Safety Officer and Prevention . 22

H. Outside Reporting and Inspection

23

I. Internal Reporting and Inspection

24
i

IV. Overcrowding and Protection from Harm
A. Provision of Adequate Space

24

i

i'

24

j

B. Housing Assignments - Plan
C. Staff

24

,

I'

24

I|

It

0. Training

25

<;[

E . Surveillance and Security

25

F. Supervision and Inspection

25

G. Locking Mechanisms

26

H. Out-of-Cell Activity

26

1. Other Protection Measures

26

J. Segregation

27

V. Volunteers

29

VI. Access to Courts

29

VII. Food Service

31

VIII. Management

31

IX. operations

32

X. Mail

32

XI. Compliance

33

XII. Inspection

33

Appendi ces

-3-
AGREEMENTS
I. Sanitation, Safety, and Health
A. Environmental Sanitarian
1. The Department shall employ an Environmental Sanitarian at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex and Reception and Guidance Center (hereinafter referred to as SPSM-CC) as a full-time, fully qualified professional.
2. The qualification for Environmental Sanitarian shall be licensure as a Sanitarian in Michigan which requires three years of work experience as a Sanitarian and a degree in Environmental Sanitation or a related science.
3 . The Environmental Sanitarian shall have responsibility for inspection and identification of environmental deficiencies regarding housing and food service sanitation, including without limitation, rodent and vermin control. The Environmental Sanitarian shall report to the Harden and shall be authorized to coordinate management resources to correct deficiencies of the above nature, including recommending for purchase and distribution of necessary services, supply and equipment. The Environmental Sanitarian shall advise the Warden regarding appropriate action for prevention of problems in the area of sanitation.
B. Housekeeping
The Department shall implement at the facility the housekeeping plan which i s attached hereto and incorporated herein as Appendix A.I. The plan shall be fully implemented within 90 days of the entry of the Judgment in this matter.
C. Tnspection for Sanitation
1. The Department will obtain complete, annual inspections of SPSM-CC by qualified non-Corrections agricultural inspectors and qualified non-Corrections Building Construction Trades inspectors, and appropriate follow-up inspections. Said inspectors shall inspect for compliance with applicable law in each area upon which this area (sanitation) touches and shall be reflected in a signed inspection report. This report shall be provided to the Michigan Department of Corrections promptly following each inspection.
2. As to each cited improper condition on each report, the Department of Corrections shall make all indicated corrections within 60 days unless funding requirements (including

procedures for hiring and bidding) OP purchase of equipment require further time, not to exceed 180 days. In any event, correction shall be accomplished more quickly i f required pursuant to this plan. On occasion extraordinary measures might be necessary to make required corrections and in such, a case, these corrections shall be made within a reasonable time*
D. Personal Hygiene of Prisoners
The Department shall implement at SPSM-CC the continuing plan for personal hygiene of prisoners. This plan is attached hereto and incorporated herein as.Appendix A.I I .
E. Vermin Control
The Department shall implement at SPSM-CC the continuing plan to control vermin. This plan is attached hereto and incorporated herein asAppendix A.III.
F. Occupational Safety and Health
The Department shall have a program of compliance with the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act to ensure safety in prison work areas.
G. Requirement for Cell Lighting
The Department shall house inmates only in cells with adequate operational, interior lighting. Only in the case of an emergency, as determined by the Warden and documented by him in writing, shall an inmate be placed in a cell where the lighting does not function.
H. Other Electrical
1*. TheDepartment shall provide one duplex outlet receptacle '' or two single outlets forinmate use in each cell. As an
interim provision, within 90 days, the Department shall make available U-L approved extension cords to allow reasonable electrical service ineach cell.
2. TheDepartment shall provide adequate, lighting (10footcandles ambient lighting and 20footcandles for reading and work unless more in work areas areneeded forsafety) in housing and activity areas toenable inmates to read, and in work areas to assure safety. This includes without limitation, 10 footcandles lighting on base activity areas in cell blocks, unless greater light is needed for planned activities for that area.
83

-5-
3. The items set forth in H.I and 2 will be accomplished at SPSM-CC by July 1 , 1986 unless major increases in electrical generating and distribution are necessary at that f a c i l i t y , in which case this shall be accomplished by July 1 , 1987.
I . Solid Waste Disposal
A solid waste disposal plan for all areas of the f a c i l i t y will be prepared by the Environmental Sanitarian. With regard to solid waste containers, the plan will include, without limitation, provisions for appropriate, safe, fire safe, clean, solid waste containers in all areas, including housing areas. The plan will be fully implemented within 180 days after entry of the Judgment in this matter.
J . Plumbing Maintenance
On a continuing basis the Department shall maintain pipe chases free of a l l standing water and f i l t h , shall maintain all sewer lines properly closed, and shall maintain with proper plumbing fittings all clean-out ports.
K. Windows
On a continuing basis, the Department shall inspect windows and reasonably promptly replace glass where broken and missing. Where replacement windows are necessary* non-opaque windows shall be installed. Where screening is presently absent, greater efforts through adequate screening shall be made. Where window openings are screened, the screening shall be sufficient to exclude birds and flying insects including mosquitoes.
L. Food Service Sanitation
Within 15 months after entry of the Judgment in this matter, all necessary sanitation will be assured in food production operat'ons. Other provisions of this plan to the contrary notwithstanding, SPSM-CC w i l l , in its food service f a c i l i t i e s , meet a l l applicable requirements of the 1976 Food Service Sanitation Manual (U.S.P.H.S.). The Department shall comply with each item specified in Appendix E of the 1976 Food Service Sanitation Manual (U.S.P.H.S.).
M. Training
The Department will i n i t i a t e professionally-designed and executed continuing training programs for both pre-service and in-service training of all employees and inmate workers involved in areas regarding sanitation, including the sanitation plan set out in Appendix A. Each employee or inmate worker will be required to complete the training program appropriate to the particular
84

employee's or inmate worker's responsibilities. The program shall include a method for evaluating the employee's or inmate worker's performance in the training program, which performance must be adequate for continued employment in areas where sanitation is critical. The training program will be initiated within 90 days after entry of the Judgment in this matter.
N. Barber! ng
Barbering f a c i l i t i e s and equipment will be supplied ..for SPSM-CC and maintained in compliance with relevant administrative regulations. A licensed barber will be available as a consultant. No person shall be permitted to barber inmates without appropriate training in the public health aspects of barbering. Professional personnel at SPSM-CC, specifically the Environmental Sanitarian and the professional barber consultant, shall provide such training. Barbering pursuant to the above requirements will be implemented within 180 days after entry of the Judgment in this matter.
0 . Noise
Noise levels incell blocks will not exceed 70 decibels - day,45 decibels - night where inmates are housed, not more than 90 decibels in work areas for an eight-hour exposure period, and not more than 85decibels ineating areas.
P. Water
Hot water (within 6°F of 110*F) and cold water shall be provided in all c e l l s , sinks and showers in housing units.
Q. Temperatures
Inmates will be housed in cells where the temperature is healthy and safe in any season. Temperatures in activity areas similarly s^all be maintained healthy and safe. The Department will monitor and record the temperatures on housing unit base floors and highest galleries, and take whatever reasonable steps are necessary to assure safe and healthy temperatures.
R. Electrical
Within 180 days of the entry of the Judgment in this matter, any exposed wiring will be corrected, each cell shall have an operational switch (e.g., a pull chain) for cell lights, and any short-circuited wiring will be corrected.

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S. Ventilation
The Department, within fourteen (14) months after the entry of the Judgment, shall provide ventilation of seven (7) cubic feet per minute perinmate. In summer months, a mechanical exhaust system shall operate to exhaust a total of 54 cubic feet per minute per inmate in each cell block.
T. PIumbi ng
•
Any cross connected plumbing, including any potential siphonage hazards, w i l l be corrected within 30 months of the entry of the Judgment in this matter. The Department will correct any plumbing (including sewerage) and fixture leaks and will not house prisoners in cells lacking operable plumbing and fixtures, including a functional commode and sink in each c e l l . Corrections shall be made in accordance with acceptable codes and standards. In the interim, the Department will take reasonable temporary measures, such as the addition of free chlorine to the drinking water, the monitoring of reports of disease related to plumbing conditions, and appropriate testing of water to reduce any hazard from plumbing inadequacies.
U. Prisoner walkways shall be repaired and maintained in a reasonable condition.
V. Metal panels currently installed in the showers shall be repaired, replaced or removed.
W. Housing space which is modified to comply with handicap access requirements shall be provided to house those inmates requiring such areas, i f such inmates shall be housed in the f a c i l i t y .
I I . Health Care
A. Medical Care
1. General Provision
The standard for health care for prisoners supervised by the Michigan Department of Corrections has been established by administrative rule and policy. For the purposes of this decree, defendants adopt as a standard",' and they shall provide, medical services consistent with contemporary professional health care standards. This standard is entirely consistent with long-established Michigan corrections' policy. Each prisoner at SPSM-CC shall receive adequate health care as measured against contemporary professional standards.
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2. Hospital Facility
The existing hospital facility at SPSM-CC is scheduled for replacement by early 1986 with a new 94-bed facility. Final building plans for the hospital shall be adequate to receive full approval by the Michigan Department of Public Health Licensure Division. Because of the prison setting, variances might become necessary, but the services and practices shall be no less than those that would be required for licensure in a non-prison setting. Reconstfuction or rehabilitation of dental and primary ambulatory care facilities in the Central Complex currently is occurring, and shall be completed within a reasonable time.
By December 31, 1986, the Department will conclude construction and commence the operation of the hospital facility described above. In case of unavoidable construction delay, a reasonable rescheduling of the completion date not to exceed January 1, 1988, may be necessary. Within two months following the completion of the replacement facility, the Department will cease to use for medical purposes the current hospital at SPSM-CC. The new facility shall be accessible to all SPSM-CC inmates, and shall be adequate to meet these inmates1 serious medical and mental health needs, except to the extent that the Department provides appropriate care elsewhere. The facility shall, in addition, be adequate to meet the serious medical and serious mental health needs of any other person brought from elsewhere for care at SPSM-CC.
In the interim at SPSM-CC, while new facilities are being constructed, defendants shall continue to assure in the current SPSM-CC hospital professionally sanitary and safe conditions, including the appropriate storage of anesthetic gases.
3- Medical Screening
a. All prisoners, upon entry to the Michigan Department of Corrections at SPSM, are given a physical examination by qualified medical personnel. A physician shall consult on each inmate received. Dental screening is performed by qualified dental hygienists. Where. not already implemented, these procedures shall be implemented and continued.
b. Prior to transfer to another facility or other substantial travel, each inmate shall continue to be evaluated by qualified health care personnel to assess suitability for travel or institutional reassignment.
87

-9c. Within 90 days from the entry of the Judgment in this
matter, the Department will submit a professionally designed plan by which they will take appropriate precautions to prevent the occurrence of potentially epidemic contagions such as tuberculosis, aids, gonorrhea, and syphilis. The plan shall provide for implementation within an additional 180 days after the approval or adoption of the plan.

4. Access to Health Care

a. Within 60 days from the date of the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan by which all inmates w i l l be afforded daily access on each weekday to a sick call register. Any inmate who registers for sick call shall within 24 hours receive an appointment to be seen by medical staff within a reasonable time given the particular medical complaint, except those registering on a Friday may receive appointments on the following Monday. Inmates shall be afforded direct access to a register, which health care staff then collect.

The Department's plan for direct access to health care must provide at least equivalent daily access on weekdays for inmates in segregation units (administrative, punitive, protective). While the procedure may differ for such inmates, the access may be no less.

The Department's plan shall make adequate provisions to assure that inmates w i l l be transported as needed from housing or other areas to the health care f a c i l i t y .

In a case where a correctional officer suggests that an inmate might be seriously mentally i l l , the Department w i l l provide immediate access to professional mental health staff.

The Department's plan shall provide for implementation within 90 days after i t s adoption or approval.

** b. No staff shall i n h i b i t , interfere with, or delay any

1

aspect of the health care delivery system.

c. Inmates brought for medical care from other prisons to

I

SPSM w i l l be treated promptly and returned to an appropriate penal f a c i l i t y .

I

d. Within 120 days of the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a professionally

designed emergency medical procedure. I t shall be suf-

I

f i c i e n t l y specific to assure adequate emergency access to medical care from each area of each f a c i l i t y . The plan shall be implemented within 90 days of its adop-

tion or approval.

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5. Staffing and Procedures

a . Professional staff are responsible to provide adequate medical care to meet each inmate's serious medical needs. The physicians are the health authority in all cases requiring medical judgment. Physicians shall assure continued, appropriate supervision and direction of all health care. To accomplish this supervision, the physician will meet appropriate contemporary professional standards for supervision, including appropriate use of standing orders and protocols. Dental staffs &r& to be professionally supervised by dentists.

b. Uncredentiaied staff ( e . g . , corrections medical aides), a l l of whom must be supervised, shall not be assigned to perform tasks which, under contemporary professional standards, require appropriate licensed, registered, accredited, or certified staff. Within 18 months after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, uncredentialed staff will not make triage decisions. Contemporary professional standards of care will be followed. Corrections medical aides may be used, i f properly trained and supervised, as aides or technicians consistent with other provisions herein. The provisions of this paragraph to the contrary notwithstanding, the Department may continue to employ corrections medical aides in their present functions for 18 months after entry of the Judgment in this matter.

c. Within 180 days after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will employ and maintain employed medical and dental care staffs at SPSM of 145 full-time equivalent positions. The Department will allocate these positions to provide medical and dental care necessary to meet the inmates' serious medical and serious dental needs on a continuing basis. The staffing requirements of SPSM FTE's is an interim requirement pending the completion of the new hospital f a c i l i t y at that institution as further defined in Section I I . A . 2 . Staffing for SPSM after the completion of the new facility is discussed below.

d. The Department may, after the implementation of this

.

plan, make major reductions in prison population or

I

i n i t i a t e new programs by which certain health care ser-

vices are provided to inmates of this institution at

other f a c i l i t i e s . In such a case staffing may be

I

amended pursuant to a plan, which the Department will

9

submit. Any revision will not diminish the quality of

care received by inmates.

I

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e. Staff for mental health care (including psychiatrists, psychologists, and those nurses, social workers, secretaries and others involved in mental health care), is discussed elsewhere herein. The FTE staffing positions required in this subsection are. to be used to provide only medical and dental care and to provide care only at SPSM. In exceptional circumstances, staff may temporarily be employed elsewhere to accomplish necessary tasks.
f. Within 270 days after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a staffing plan for the new facility to be constructed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan. This plan shall be professionally documented and designed. It shall provide a staff adequate to meet contemporary professional standards for staffing.
g. Inmates shall not be employed in direct patient care or in any support activity with the exception of supervised dental aides, other than in tasks such as housekeeping and laundry.
h. Health profess1on students or interns may be used in the delivery of health care; provided, however, they may be used only consistent with the following: (1) they may be used only commensurate with their level of training; (2) they may be used only under direct professional supervision; and (3) they may be used only pursuant to professionally written policies and procedures.
6. Prostheses
The Department will provide medical and dental prostheses v when necessary to meet the serious health needs of any
inmate, consistent with professional judgment;
7. Chronic Disease Plan
Within 120 days of the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a professionally designed plan to provide for systematic follow-up care for inmates with chronic disease. Said plan shall be implemented within 120 days after approval or adoption.
8. Training
a. Within 120 days after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan to provide appropriate in-service training of all health care
90

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staff (professional and non-professional). The plan shall be professionally designed. Training shall be professionally executed on a continuing basis. The plan shall be implemented within an additional 90 days after i t is adopted or approved.
b. Within 120 days of the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan by which correctional and other personnel are trained pursuant to a professionally designed and executed continuing pre-service and in-service training program to respond to health-related emergencies within a four-minute response time. This training shall include, without limitation:
(1) recognition of signs and symptoms of serious illnesses, and knowledge of action required in emergency situations;
(2) administration of f i r s t aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR);
(3) methods of obtaining assistance;
(4) signs and symptoms of mental illness, mental retardation, and chemical dependency; and,
(5) procedures for patient access or transfer to appropriate medical facilities or health care providers.
The. plan shall provide for this training to be accomplished within 270 days of the adoption of the plan.
9. Special Diets
Special therapeutic diets are provided for any prisoner determined by medical staff to require this service. Patients requiring these diets shall be housed only in a f a c i l i t y providing them. Such prisoners who are confined to t h e i r cells at SPSM-CC are delivered special diet trays. Correctional officers may deliver medically prescribed d i e t s ; however, no inmate may deliver special diets. Inmates may carry food trays for special diets only under the direct, Immediate supervision of a correctional officer.
10. Medication Distribution
Pharmaceutical services ire and shall continue to be caref u l l y controlled in conformity with state and federal statutes. The dispensing and administration of medication is

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the responsibility of health care personnel. To be involved in delivering medication, correctional officers must be qualified by successful conclusion of specialized, professionally designed and executed training.

11. Problem-Oriented Health Records

Health records are maintained in accord with the Modified Problem-Oriented Health Record format. Within one year of the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will take appropriate measures to assure that this medical record keeping procedure has been and continues to be fully implemented.

12. Quality Assurance

The Central Office of Health Care presently conducts and shall continue audits of health care at the SPSM-CC as follows:

a. Medical audits shall beperformed annually by physician reviewers and medical record administrators who shall examine retrospectively all death cases and a random sample of health records, assessing the quality of medical decisions, the adequacy of medical supervision of care, and the quality of medical record documentation.

b. Administrative audits shall be performed annually by Health Care administrators and persons qualified in various specialized support services to assess the organization of health services, quality and quantity of health care staff, adequacy of policies and procedures, processing of grievances, and inmate perception of quality of care. These audits also serve as the occasion for problem-solving and technical assistance to institutional staff,

c. Dental audits shall be performed annually by dentist reviewers to assess the quality of dental care through observation of the clinic, review of charts, and inspection of a sample of patients who have been treated.

d. Mental health audits shall be prepared annually by

psychiatrists of the Office of Health Care or of an

I

independent agency.

. e. Consistent with principles of peer review confiden-

I

t i a l i t y , a professional report shall summarize the findings of each audit, including an enumeration of any

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condition inconsistent with contemporary professional health care standards.
f. As to each cited condition of each summary report, the Department will make all indicated corrections within 90 days; unless funding requirements (including provisions for hiring and bidding) or purchase of equipment requires further time not to exceed 180 days. In any event, correction shall be accomplished within a more rapid time if more rapid correction is required pursuant to this Judgment or otherwise by law. As to any section of this Judgment the requirements of which are not yet applicable under the terms of this Judgment, the Department need not meet these correction deadl i n e s . It is recognized that on occasion extraordinary measures might be necessary to make required correct i o n s , and in such a case, these corrections shall be made within a reasonable time.
g. Within three years after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, where not already done, the Department will include in each audit conducted fully independent, outside professionals.
B. Mental Health Care
1. General Provisions
a. A prisoner shall be provided with psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical certainty:
(1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious mental illness or injury;
(2) that such mental illness or injury 1s curable or may be substantially alleviated; and,
(3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial. The right to treatment i s , of course, limited to that which may be provided upon a reasonable cost and time basis and the essential t e s t is one of medical necessity and not simply that which may be considered merely desirable.
b. The Department shall provide timely and appropriate mental health care to those inmates who are required by statute, rule, policy directive, or practice of the
93

-15-
Michigan Parole Board to have mental health treatment prior to release from confinements.
c. Thesubsections on access to Health Care (II.A.4), outside alternative care (II.A.5.d), staffing at the new hospital at SPSM (II.A.S.c), training (II.A.8), medication distribution (II.A.10), records (II.A.ll), and quality assurance (II.A.12) shall apply to the provisions of care for serious mental illness. Specific provisions of this subsection on mental illness care further explicate these general provisions for a mental health context.
Li censure
The hospital facility at SPSM will be maintained so as to retain licensure as a hospital by the Michigan Department of Public Health.
Staffing and Procedure
a. Professional staff are responsible for provision of adequate mental health care to meet each inmate's serious mental health needs.
b. Uncredentialed staff ( e . g . , Corrections Medical Aides), all of whom must be supervised, shall not be assigned to perform tasks which, under contemporary professional standards, require appropriately licensed, registered, accredited or certified staff. Contemporary professional standards of care will be followed.
c. Within 270 days after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department shall submit a professionally designed plan to assure that prisoners with serious mental illnesses have adequate access to the Riverside Psychiatric Center or to other similar f a c i l i t i e s fully licensed or operated by the Michigan Department of Mental Health. The decision to admit patients to inpatient services shall be ba«ed upon professional mental health criteria in a stated uniform policy. The plan shall provide access to the in-patient care f a c i l i t y except for involuntary admissions within 48 hours after diagnosis for those needing inpatient care for serious mental illness. The plan shall provide for systematic outpatient care, follow-up care, as well as continuity of care for inmates with serious mental illness. The plan shall include appropriate provision for staffing for outpatient services and staffing for inpatient services to be available to each inmate for care of serious mental illness. Staffing provisions shall meet contemporary professional mental health standards to
94

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provide necessary outpatient psychiatric and psychological care for seriously mentally i l l inmates.

All treatment, either on an outpatient or inpatient basis, shall commence as soon as i t is determined by qualified psychiatric or psychological staff that an inmate has serious mental Illness.

The plan shall provide for full and continuous implementation of the entire said plan within an additional three years unless a shorter period is provided herein, after its adoption or approval. Interim measures not requiring major reconstruction, renovation or new construction shall be implemented within one year after the adoption or approval of the plan. Established state funding procedures for staffing appropriations might require additions to the time allotted interim staffing measures not to exceed an additional six months.

d. Prisoners shall not be employed in direct patient ment a l health care or in any support activity other than in tasks such as housekeeping and laundry.

e. Health profession students or interns may be used in the delivery of mental health care, provided however that they may be used only consistent with the following:

(1) they be used only commensurate with their level of training;

(2) they may be used only under direct professional supervision; and,

(3) they may be used only pursuant to professionally

written policies and procedures.

I

f . At least twice monthly, or more frequently i f required

by policy, a licensed clinical psychologist or

I

psychiatrist shall visit each housing unit which houses

any segregation Inmate (protective, punitive, or

administrative). On these v i s i t s , the psychiatrist or

(

psychologist shall take appropriate steps to be informed of the mental health status of the inmates

housed in these areas (including e . g . , discussions with

(

staff and inmates and review of the log). I f the psychologist or psychiatrist observes conditions pre-

senting serious threats to the mental health of the

inmates, s/he shall inform the warden in writing of

I

these conditions, requesting that prompt corrective

*

action be taken.

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g. The Department shall meet contemporary professional standards in the care of serious mental illness. These standards are understood to include the provision of reasonable protection of suicidal or self-mutilating inmates from suicide or self-mutilation.
h. The use of psychotropic drugs for the treatment of an individual prisoner shall be prescribed by a psychiatrist or, in a mental health emergency, by a physician in accordance with applicable Michigan law. All necessary steps will be taken to detect and control the side effects of psychotropic drugs. Written protocols will be developed for the use of the various classes of psychotropic medications.
i. The Department shall take appropriate measures to assure that psychiatric/medical care 1s coordinated with psychological care. This will include the coordination of record keeping between psychiatrists and psychologists.
4. Housing
a. The Department will include in the new hospital at SPSM a 21-bed, fully licensed psychiatric unit for treatment of serious mental illness.
b. Within one year from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, there will be provided within the facility suitable separated housing to house every inmate at the facility who exhibits serious threat of suicide or who attempts suicide or who is determined to have a serious mental illness and is not suitable for general population housing outside a protective environment. This housing area shall be staffed continuously, 24 hours daily by staff appropriately trained pursuant to a professionally developed training program. It shall be equipped to allow continuous 24-hour daily observation of each Inmate housed in this area. The Department will establish an appropriate professional protocol for suicidal inmates and those determined to be seriously mentally ill which will include periodic determination as to the place of housing such inmates. The protocol shall include a procedure for evaluation by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist of each inmate determined to be seriously mentally ill to determine whether the inmate should be housed in this separated housing or housed in general population and treated on an outpatient basis. The results of this evaluation shall be promptly implemented.
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5. Screeni ng
All inmates upon i n i t i a l entry at the Reception and Guidance Center at SPSM shall be given a psychological evaluation u t i l i z i n g professionally designed, approved and administered tests and procedures. This includes, in addition to testing, a personal interview by a licensed professional staff with those inmates whose offense, test results or behavioral history indicate a need for further-screening. The recommendations resulting from the screening shall be implemented in a program plan developed for each inmate at SPSM.
I I I . Fire Safety
The following plan for f i r e safety is an integrated system designed to achieve f i r e safety at SPSM-CC. Each provision of this section on f i r e safety depends on compliance with each of the other provisions, whether physical plant and equipment are involved or human skills are required.
A. Facilities
Within 120 days from the implementation of the f i r e safety plan, the Department shall:
1 . Unblock and keep clear all exit ways.
2 . Cease storing any combustible materials in cell blocks or other housing areas, unless the storage occurs in an approp r i a t e , f i r e safe storage cabinet or room. This paragraph does not apply to inmate persona! property stored in the inmate's cell including reasonable quantities of publications and legal materials.
3> Remove from all cell blocks and other housing areas all combustible trash containers.
4 . Remove and cease to use all polyurethane pillows, cushions or other furnishings in all cell blocks and other housing areas. Mattresses shall be made of, or treated with, an acceptable flame retardant material.
5. Remove a l l cardboard and all other combustible materials from the bars of the cells in all inmate housing areas. The Department may, in its discretion, replace these materials with noncombustible materials.
6. Cease storing compressed gas cylinders unless and u n t i l , on a continuous basis, the storage complies with National Fire Protection Association Standards No. 56A and 56B.
Q7

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7. Provide in each cell block a minimum of two fire extinguishers per floor or gallery, with each of two extinguishers placed at each end of the respective floor or gallery. Water-type extinguishers are adequate.

8. Provide water flow alarms and valve supervision on all existing sprinkler systems and provide automatic alarms on all kitchen hood dry chemical systems.

9. Provide fixed dry chemical extinguishing systems for all operating range hoods in all kitchens.
B. Within 180 days from the implementation of the plan, the Department will submit professionally-designed plans:

1. To provide smoke detectors in each cell block.

2. To provide adequate means of egress from places of assembly.

Both plans shall provide for accomplishment of all necessary tasks within an additional one year and six months after adoption or approval of each plan and for continuous maintenance thereafter. In a documented case of unavoidable construction delay, a reasonable extension of construction deadlines not to exceed an additional six months may be necessary.

C. Within three years from the implementation of this plan, as to the interiors of cell blocks, the Department will remove, or provide necessary fire suppression to protect all nonstructural combustible materials including cardboard, plywood, hardboard, and those found in cell block guard shelters. As well, in all inmate use areas, including cell blocks, the Department agrees that ceiling t i l e s and paneling will have a flame spread lower than 75 in exit ways and 200 in other areas, and i t will remove nonconforaring ceiling t i l e s and paneling, provided that in sprinklered areas i t shall be adequate to meet the NFPA Class C requirements.

D. Within two years from the implementation of this plan, the Department wi 11:

1. Provide in each housing area in the f a c i l i t y , locks that will allow for the remote immediate' unlocking of all occupied c e l l s .

2. Provide in each cell block or other housing area, and in

each activity, work, or indoor recreation area, no fewer

than two operational remote exits with doors properly

swinging to facilitate the flow of egress. To meet this

requirement, each floor shall have a minimum of two exits;

each room of 1,000 square feet or more shall have two exit

access doors. Rooms of less than 1,000 square feet may have

a single exit access door.

gg

I i i | . I
I
1
I I
IMM!
I
I I
(
1 I
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3 . Provide for automatic transmission of fire alarm signals to the control center, which will transmit the signal to the local fire department by means of specialized equipment.
4. Enclose stairs with two-hour fire resistant construction in the following areas:
(1) Central stair at SPSM - Building 18 (school, administrati on, and shop);
(2) Central stair in SPSM - Central Complex kitchen (three-story stair).
Fixed wire glass vision panels shall be permitted in such partitions provided that they do not individually exceed 1,296 square inches in area and are mounted and approved steel frames.
5. Provide self-contained breathing apparatus sets so that two sets are readily available in each cell block. Breathing apparatus sets shall be installed in quick-release wall mounts.
6. Pursuant to professionally-designed plan, provide an ade-
quate number of emergency lights to light all means of egress in each cell block or other housing area and in each activity, work or indoor recreation area.
7. Provide two-hour fire separation:
(1) between all cell blocks;
(2) between rotunda and cell blocks. Fixed wire glass vision panels shall be permitted in such partitions provided that they do not individually exceed 1,296 square inches in area and are mounted in approved steel frames.
8. Provide magnetic hold open devices on fire and smoke doors in areas where these doors are kept open.
9. Subdivide the basement of Buildings 18 and 19 with appropriate fire separations, and provide auttoommaatitic snprinklers all opursuant tno a pnrronffeessssiioonnaallyiv--ddeessigiined plan.
10. Provide in all work, activity, and assembly areas (e.g., auditoriums, dining areas, gymnasiums, visiting areas) appropriate exit signs and directional signs.
11. Provide remote electric release locks on security grills on each gallery. 99

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I

Sprinklering

I

Within 180 days from the implementation of this plan, the

Department will submit a professionally-designed plan to equip

I

all housing areas consistent with National Fire Protection Association Standard No. 13, with sprinkler systems adequate to

provide sprinkler protection to each cell within the main walled

i

prison structure. The plan shall provide for f u l l implementation within an additional 30 months following the adoption or approval of the plan.

Ooerati ons

.

,,

•

Within 180 days from the implementation of this plan, the Department will submit a professionally-designed comprehensive f i r e safety operations plan.

1. The plan shall include, without limitation, the following:

(a) emergency procedures for each respective area that i n mates might use or occupy;

(b) evacuation procedures for each respective area;

(c) a systematic f i r e drill.procedure;

(d) inspection and maintenance procedures for all equipment for f i r e emergencies or suppression;

(e) appropriate training of staff and inmates;

(f) inspection and control of fuels present in the prison;

(g) responsibility for and supervision of all fire safety measures and procedures;

(h) coordination with local f i r e officials; and,

( i ) consultation with and appropriate inspection by the State Fire Marshal.

2. The training required in the plan shall 'include training of correctional officers to accomplish all emergency, d r i l l , inspection, maintenance or other tasks assigned to correctional officers pursuant to the plan. I t shall include at least pre-service plus semi-annual refresher training on the use of fire equipment and at least pre-service plus annual refresher training on all emergency procedures. No correctional officer shall be assigned to any cell block or other housing area without f i r s t having received particularized instruction on the f i r e safety procedures for that cell block.
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3. The fire drills required in the plan shall occur at least every fourth month in each cell block, shall be unannounced, and shall require full evacuation (except in segregation) of each area being drilled, except that staff may conduct a drill without evacuating inmates in. those instances where, in the opinion of the Warden, reflected in a document signed by him, the evacuation of the inmates would be inconsistent with the requirements of prison order.
4. The training of inmates required in the plan shall be adequate to inform them of expected behavior in case of fire emergency. It shall be offered to each new inmate andthen at least annually to all inmates.
5. The training of maintenance staff required in theplan shall be appropriate for the functions contemplated in the plan to be accomplished by such staff members.
6. The plan shall require the prominent and permanent posting in each housing area of a fire evacuation procedure designed specifically for that housing area.
7. The plan shall require that keys necessary for evacuation of inmates shall be identifiable by both sight and touch and shall be immediately available to the correctional officer who is to coordinate evacuation of a particular housing area. An emergency set of evacuation keys shall be maintained at accessible locations within each institution.
8. All provisions of theplan shall be accomplished within one year after the adoption or approval of the plan and maintained thereafter.
6. Within 90 days after the implementation of this plan, the Department will:
1* Negotiate with local fire officials to assure that fire fighters on each of their shifts may tour the facility annually. Prison officials shall coordinate with local fire officials the security needs of the prison in order to facilitate proper emergency planning.
i
2. Assure that a professionally-trained Fire Safety Officer shall be responsible without limitation for f i r e safety and for the continuous implementation of the f i r e safety plan for the institution, and the coordination of all required inspection, maintenance, and training.
3. Never house any inmate in housing areas where there is less than 24-hour per day physical presence of correctional o f f i cers.
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4. For the interim, until the fire safety operations plan is adopted, inspect and provide continuing proper operation of all present fire suppression or emergency equipment, including without limitation, sprinklers, standpipes, f i r e extinguishers, kitchen hood fire suppression systems, and self-contained breathing apparatus sets.
H. Reporting and Inspection Regarding Fire Safety
1 . Within 30 days after entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will request annual inspections by the Michigan State Fire Marshal Division to determine compliance with all provisions of this section regarding f i r e safety. The findings of the compliance inspection shall be reflected in a signed, written report which will be provided to the Michigan Department of Corrections and available to P l a i n t i f f s 1 attorneys promptly following each inspection.
2. As to each cited condition on the compliance inspection report, the Department shall make all indicated corrections within 60 days unless funding requirements (including procedures for hiring and bidding) or purchase of equipment require further time not to exceed 180 days. In any event, correction shall be accomplished within a shorter time i f more rapid correction is required pursuant to this plan or otherwise by law. I t is recognized that on occasion extraordinary measures might be necessary to make required corrections, and in such a case, these corrections shall be made within a reasonable time.
I . The Department of Corrections shall provide a system of at least monthly internal inspection and reporting, using a professionally-designed, written checklist. The written l i s t , after completion, shall be retained for at least three years.
IV. Overcrowding and Protection from Harm
A. Provision of Adequate Space
The Department's practice of housing inmates in single cells shall continue. Space requirements for administrative segregation are set out elsewhere herein.
B. Housing Assignments
Within one year from the date of entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department shall submit a plan, to assure that the following groups each shall be housed outside of physical contact and, within reason, outside of verbal contact, with inmates in housing areas assigned to other groups, provided however that Punitive Detention inmates may be housed in the same units as

-24-
Administrative Segregation inmates, and that, i f otherwise consistent with this decree and i f medically appropriate, inmatepatients transferred from other institutions may be housed with nonpatients of the same Michigan Department of Corrections classification. Subject to this proviso, the separate groups are General Population inmates, Protective Custody inmates, Administrative Segregation inmates, Punitive Detention inmates, inmates undergoing reception processing and inmates transferred from other institutions.
The administrative segregation unit, currently located in five (5) block, shall be moved to the current infirmary building by June 1 , 1989, or within twelve (12) months after the completion and occupancy of the new infirmary whichever occurs f i r s t .
The plan shall provide for full and continuous implementation of the entire said plan within an additional three years after its adoption or approval. Interim measures not requiring major reconstruction, renovation, or new construction shall be implemented within one year after the plan's adoption or approval. Established state funding procedures for staffing appropriations might require additions to the time allotted for interim staffing measures not to exceed an additional six months.
C. Staff
Staffing for all relevant functions in SPSM-CC shall be adequate to comply with all provisions ofthis proposed Judgment.
As to housing, in each cell block, a single staff employee shall be assigned accountability for all conditions for all three shifts within that block including implementation of the instant plan. Within 270 days from the implementation ofthis plan, each such person shall be trained pursuant to a professionallydesigned training program to accomplish these responsibilities. &thin 180 days from the implementation of this plan, the Department shall provide the full staffing complements in each housing area as approved by the Department on November 20, 1983. Where change in design of function takes place in a housing area, the staffing may beadjusted ifconsistent with this plan toprovide adequate services and protection.
D. Training
The Department shall provide training which meets or exceeds American Correctional Association standards.
103

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E. Surveillance and Security

Corrections staff shall circulate throughout each cell block to maximize surveillance. Rounds by correctional staff shall be organized and supervised to assure that each cell is directly observed by a correctional staff member at least once each hour on an irregular schedule, 24 hours daily; provided, however, that no more than ninety minutes elapse between rounds,

F. Supervision and Inspection

The Department shall take those steps necessary to assure the effective supervision of all correctional employees. All staff shall be instructed promptly as to the requirements of the Judgment in this matter.

The Department will conduct an annual audit of SPSM-CC for compliance with the provisions regarding overcrowding and protec-

tion from harm and other pertinent managerial factors. The audit shall consider as many sources of information as feasible, such as personal observation, grievances, inmate letters, and inmate

and staff discussion. The audit team findings shall be reflected in a signed written report to be completed promptly.

I"

As to each cited condition on the compliance inspection audit,

the Department will make all indicated corrections within 60 days

I

unless funding requirements (including procedures for hiring or bidding) or purchase of equipment require further time not to

exceed 180 days. In any event, correction shall be accomplished

t

within a shorter time i f more rapid correction is required pursuant to this plan or otherwise by law. I t is recognized that on

occasion, extraordinary measures might be necessary to make

required corrections, and in such a case, these corrections shall

I

be made within a reasonable time.

ti. Locking Mechanisms

I

Within 1-1/2 years from the entry of the Judgment in this matter,

the Department shall provide and maintain thereafter in each cell

I

block for each occupied c e l l , a fully operational lock. To be adequate, when locked, the lock must reasonably retain the cell

door in a closed and locked position to protect the inmate.

I

H. Out-of-CeTl Activity

The Department will make the following provisions for out-of-cell activity.
•

1 . Two hours of yard time shall be staffed and scheduled each

I

day, five days weekly, for those inmates desiring to part i c i p a t e subject to the stay and the final decision after

104

-26-

ail appeals in Walker v Johnson. One hour weekly will be scheduled for general population prisoners in the gymnasium. To the extent possible, scheduling for access to exercise shall be flexible enough to allow inmates to combine minimal exercise with other scheduled activities. Exercise in segregation is discussed elsewhere. Yard will not be cancelled during hours of inmate access on any day due to weather except when storm warnings require that prisoners remain inside for reasons of safety.
2. Within 180 days from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan which will provide for meaningful out-of-celi activity. It is recognized that no particular activity is itself required. The objective of the plan is to provide meaningful activity outside of cells including access to general and law libraries, education, industrial and other work activity, religious activity, other group activities, etc. For the activities to be provided, there shall be provided reasonably adequate staffing, facilities and equipment. The plan shall provide access to these various activities such that at the facility 75% of all inmates may be active out of their cells, including exercise, meal, shower, and law library time no fewer than seven hours daily on weekdays and five hours daily on weekends. The plan shall provide for full and continuing implementation within an additional 180 days after its approval or adoption.

I. Other Protection Measures

On a continuing basis, prison officials will assure ready inmate access to required grievance forms and assure confidential delivery of completed forms to appropriate prison personnel with appropriate action taken in response to expressed grievances.

«j. Apartnistrati ve Segregation, Punitive Detention, Protective Custody (all generically termed "segregation") and Reception and Guidance Center

1. If deemed necessary by the Deputy Warden for the safety of

the segregation prisoner, staff or others involved and if

justified in writing by the Deputy Warden, requirements

I

elsewhere set out in this decree for the provision of mattresses, linens, shaving, other personal hygiene articles, a stool, and a writing space may be diminished

only so long as and to the extent necessary.

I

2. Prisoners in Segregation shall continue to be served three

meals per day, essentially the same as those served to

I

general population. Food sanitation shall comply with all

applicable provisions of the decree subsection on food sani-

-27-
t a t i o n , supra. Where prisoners are served food in their c e l l s , provision is to be made for delivery of sanitary food at safe temperatures, also in compliance with the food sanitation subsection, supra including the provision of food pass slots in all cells not less than 30 inches above the floor, each slot with a shelf wide enough to support a food tray and a slot high enough to allow the passage of the tray without food touching the slot. Food slots shall be cleaned daily.
3. In addition to other lighting requirements herein, within one year from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will provide that all segregation inmates can view natural light from their cells. Each cell in segregation will be furnished with a bunk above floor level, a writing space with stool or other suitable seating arrangement, a l l of which shall be in reasonable condition.
4. A supervisor of Captain rank or above will inspect each unit daily and record each visit and any unusual circumstances in the segregation log book. Members of the Administrative Segregation/Punitive Detention housing team will visit each prisoner in each such unit daily, recording each visit and any unusual circumstances. A qualified member of the medical staff will make rounds in administrative segregation and punitive detention daily. Medical staff will visit more often than once per day as necessity dictates. Housing and custody staff shall continue to refer all matters of a medical or psychiatric nature to the medical staff. Unit staff shall continue to log in the unit log all complaints or indications of medical and psychiatric problems. The log shall be reviewed daily by qualified medical staff. Prisoners will be provided with prescribed daily medication and with prosthetic devices, including eye glasses, unless medical staff otherwise determines.
5. Within one year from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, each prisoner in Administrative Segregation and the Reception and Guidance Center will receive the opportunity to engage in exercise away from his cell at least one hour per day, five days per week, including protected or indoor exercise in inclement weather.
Indigent inmates will be provided suitable outerwear for use in inclement weather and a change of clothing after exercise i f necessary.
Indoor exercise need not be provided to those inmates who have been segregated or in Reception and Guidance fewer than 60 days in the preceding 180-day period. Any restrictions on exercise are to be justified in writing by the Deputy Warden.

-28-
6. Programming in the following areas will be provided for prisoners in Administrative Segregation and Protective Custody: education, commissary, library, religion, counseling, and recreation. Such programs will be provided in a manner consistent with the safety of prisoners and good order of the institution. Each prisoner in Segregation will be allowed to have access to reading materials of reasonable quantity. Opportunity to borrow reading materials from the institution lending library will be provided. •• Excepting education, these programs similarly shall be made available at the Reception and Guidance Center.
7. The Department shall continue to house segregation inmates in single occupancy cells.
8. Prisoners in administrative segregation will be permitted the same clothing and other property permitted to prisoners in general population, except that shoes may be soft soled. The Deputy Warden may order restrictions of clothing or other items in order to prevent suicide attempts or other danger to the prisoners, staff or others.
9. No inmate may be held in isolation (no sight or sound contact) from all other inmates for more than two days in any month, unless the isolation occurs for medical reasons in a medical area or unless the isolation 1s evaluated on a daily basis by a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist who states in writing that the inmate is not suffering serious harm.
10. Protective Custody inmates shall be accorded substantially equivalent privileges (including activities, work and recreation) to those accorded to General Population inmates unless inmate security demands a reasonable reduction thereof. Protective custody inmates will receive at least one and one-half hours per aay of exercise outside their cells and shall be escorted and permitted to eat separately in the central dining hall if they so choose. Protective custody inmates shall have access to educational, psychological and vocational counseling within the block.
11* The Segregation cell block and units will be painted in washable light reflecting colors, painting to be performed on an as-needed basis, to begin immediately and completed within six months. Prior to painting, necessary repairs to paint surfaces shall be completed including plastering. Paint surfaces will be maintained in a reasonable condition.

-29-
V. Volunteers
The Department of Corrections encourages the presence of volunteer groups to work with prisoners inside the institution. Every General Population prisoner is permitted to participate in volunteer groups. Prisoners in protective custody, upon the request of the individual prisoner and insofar as security requirements allow, will be permitted to participate in volunteer groups.
V I . Access to Courts
1 . Each General Population inmate may use the law library at least six hours per week in two-hour segments. To accommodate this use, the law library shall remain open at least 55 hours per week, with at least one-third of those hours during evenings after 5:00 p.m. and weekends. The law library will remain open additional hours as staff becomes available. Prisoners who have pending court cases requiring additional law library time in excess of the six-hour guarantee will be allowed the additional access necessary.
2. Within 30 days after the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will i n i t i a t e procedures to order for the main law l i b r a r y , to the extent not currently provided, each of the publications listed in Appendix B, "Minimum Collection for Main Law Libraries," with the addition of a complete edition of Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated. FOP each required publication, the Department shall have a subscription for revised additions, pocket parts, or advance sheets which shall be made available for prisoner use forthwith upon delivery to the institution. Periodically, at six-month intervals, Defendant shall survey each collection to identify missing or mutilated volumes. All missing or mutilated volumes, however discovered to be missing or mutilated, will be replaced or restored promptly.
o. iamates in Administrative Segregation or Protective Custody shall be guaranteed two hours per week direct personal access to a limited law library collection as indicated in Appendix 8, "Minimum Collection for Administrative Segregation Law Libraries." In addition, on three days each week, such inmates may request five volumes brought to them from the main law library collection unless the particular volumes are loaned to another inmate. These volumes shall be delivered to the inmate in segregation on the day following the day on which requests are collected. The book(s) may be collected after 24 hours.
4. Law library f a c i l i t i e s shall be maintained with adequate vent i l a t i o n and lighting with sufficient space to accommodate the reasonable needs of the inmates.
5. The allotted time per prisoner for law library use shall not include the time necessary to travel to and from the library, tO8

^JlmMiL
\ i I
(
I

-30-

will include only the amount of time actually spent in the library.

1

6. The detail system by which inmates in general population pre-

3

sently gain access to the law library shall be continued in order

|

to assure prisoner access to the law library.

7. Special and additional library time shall be allowed on a call

out system to an individual prisoner as needed, provided that he

can demonstrate a bona fide need as determined by the supervisor

of the law library. Such a bona fide need shall include, but not

be limited to, situations such as a deadline for filing briefs,

pleadings, responses to a pleading, or other such documents with

a court.

8. Inmate staff working in the law library shall not have the authority to deny other prisoners access to the law library. Inmate staff shall be supervised by a professional librarian and staff clerk.

9. The Department of Corrections shall continue to provide notarial services as necessary. Pursuant to the request of plaintiffs, the Department of Corrections shall post a notice at the prison law library indicating that in many cases declarations under penalty of perjury, in lieu of formal affidavits, are allowed.

10. The Department shall enforce its policy for treatment of privileged legal mail, including mail from Federal, State and local courts, governmental agencies, and attorneys, which provides that such mail will not be read, that upon the inmate's written demand, such nail will not be opened except in the presence of the inmate to whom the mail is addressed, and that such mail may be opened to search for contraband. The Department further shall provide that inmates shall seal all outgoing legal mail which prison officials shall then cause to be posted unopened in the U.S. mail.
11. Paralegal training will be instituted at the State Prison of Southern Michigan as a regular educational program under the auspices of Jackson Community College.
12. Electric typewriters shall be permitted.

13. Any property limitation imposed on prisoners shall not apply to
legal papers and law books except that if the quantity thereof
conflicts with important institutional goals such as security or fire safety, a limitation may be sought through the administrative hearing process. The standard for imposition of a limitation shall be whether the material in question is reasonably necessary to assist the prisoner with respect to his pending litigation.
109

-31-
14. Each visiting attorney shall be afforded a table and chair in a space providing suitable privacy.
VII. Food Service
Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that concerns in the area of food service will be met through installation of the quick-chill system as proposed in "A Study for the Michigan Department of Corrections: TSI Food Service System Installation at the Jackson Prison" submitted to Gatha McClellan, Food Service Administrator, Michigan Department of Corrections by Technology Systems, Inc., Berwyn, Illinois, dated November 21, 1982. The menu development, training, follow-up training and post installation monitoring as developed by TSI, including completion of all monitoring forms provided by TSI shall be utilized.
All foods prepared and served shall be nutritionally adequate and balanced consistent with recommended daily dietary allowances developed by the Food and Nutrition Board, National Academy of Sciences National Research Council.
The Department of Corrections will continue to request that the Department of Public Health conduct an annual inspection of food service areas within State Prison of Southern Michigan.
VIII. Management
A. The Department shall proceed with a management and organization study of the facility by the Office of Management and Information Systems in the Department of Management andBudget.
B. The focus of the study is to provide recommendations to the Department of Management and Budget regarding organization, staffing, and administration at SPSM. The study's scope is to include all activities at SPSM — management, custody, rehabilitation, and general services.
C. Counsel and experts for the Plaintiffs shall have a reasonable opportunity to provide the study team with input.
D. Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall be provided a copy of the Interim and final reports of the study.
E. Within six months of receiving the final study report, the Department will draft a management plan for the facility addressing the recommendations contained within the study report.
F. Plaintiffs' counsel shall review themanagement plan.
6. If the parties agree upon the adequacy of the plan, the Department shall begin implementation within 90 days of the agreement. 110

-32-
H. I f the parties disagree on the adequacy of the plan:
1. First, the parties shall attempt to negotiate the areas of disagreement.
2. I f negotiations f a i l , the disputed issues within the plan shall be submitted to the neutral entity described in Section XII herein for mediation.
3. I f mediation f a i l s , parties may submit issues within the plan which remain in dispute to the Court for resolution.
IX. Operations
A. Applicable statutes, policies, procedures and operating principles shall continue to be enforced by the administration. Staff and inmates must know that deviation from expected behavior w i l l not be disregarded or selectively sanctioned.
B. Enforcement of written cell block rules and regulations shall be uniform. There shall be continuity of block personnel insofar as possible.
C. The Department shall prepare a plan to assure efficient and effective prisoner property movement and control within the f a c i l i t y . The plan shall be completed within 90 days from the date of the Judgment in this matter.
D. When available, an inmate whose cell is being searched may stand by outside the cell i f not detailed or assigned elsewhere. I f staff approves, a block representative, i f available, may stand by outside the cell i f the inmate is not present. However, cell searches may be performed by staff without the presence of either t*»e inmate or block representative.
E. There shall be no housing of inmates on the bulkheads or on base floors at the institution.
F. Inmate personnel shall not have access to sensitive inmate information, files maintained in the cell blocks and any other information not obtainable by FOIA request.
X. Mail
The Department of Corrections agrees that delivery of f i r s t class mail within the f a c i l i t y will take no longer than two business days, unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as a mobilization. Outgoing mail will leave the f a c i l i t y forthwith.
111

-33-
XI. Compliance
This plan provides for a number of plans that Defendants shall submit at specified times. Each plan shall be submitted to Plaintiffs' counsel of record by a specified submission time. Each shall set forth a detailed statement of the measures that Defendants will take to achieve timely compliance with the plan along with a detailed timetable setting forth dates for interim and final compliance measures. Each plan also shall establish a method for continuing maintenance of each item to be accomplished pursuant to the plan. Upon submission, Plaintiffs' attorneys shall review each plan. If the Plaintiffs have no objection to the Department's proposed plan, the plan shall be appended to the Judgment in this matter. If Plaintiffs object to any portion of Defendants' proposed plan, the parties shall attempt to conciliate any differences between them.
If conciliation cannot be achieved, Defendants agree to the submission of the area of dispute to a neutral entity for mediation. The neutral entity shall be a person approved by all the parties. If mediation is not successful, Plaintiffs may then submit the particular area of dispute to the Court for resolution.
The parties or their attorneys have the right to seek appointment of a monitor or expert at the expense of the state on demonstration of need at any time after three months from the date of entry of this Consent Judgment.
Beginning 180 days after the entry of this Consent Judgment, Defendants will file with the Court and serve upon the Plaintiffs' counsel of record detailed Compliance Reports at 90-day intervals for three years thereafter, and at 120-day intervals after that, describing Defendants' compliance with this Consent Judgment. Each compliance report shall state with particularity the condition of each area addressed in the decree, including subsequent plans, and shall specifically identify all relevant documents. The report shall be signed and submitted by an individual designated by Defendants to be responsible on an ongoing basis for this function.
After Defendants have complied with all of the provisions of this Consent Judgment, Defendants may apply to terminate the jurisdiction of the Court.
XII. Inspection
During business hours and nonemergencies, the Department shall give full access to Plaintiffs' attorneys, and the neutral entity, to the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex and Reception and Guidance Center for the purpose of inspection for compliance with the Order in this matter.
11?

-34-
I f conciliation cannot be achieved, Defendants agree to the submission of the area of dispute to a neutral entity for mediation. The neutral entity shall be a person approved by all the parties. I f mediation is not successful, Plaintiffs may then submit the particular area of dispute to the Court for resolution.
The parties or their attorneys have the right to seek appointment of a monitor or expert at the expense of the state on demonstration of need at any time after three months from the date of entry of tfris Consent Judgment.
Beginning 180 days after the entry of this Consent Judgment, Defendants- will f i l e with the Court and serve upon the Plaintiffs' counsel of record detailed Compliance Reports at 90-day intervals for three years thereafter, and at 120-day intervals after that, describing Defendants' compliance with this Consent Judgment. Each compliance report shall state with particularity the condition of each area addressed in the decree, including subsequent plans, and shall specifically identify all relevant documents. The report shall be signed and submitted by an individual designated by Defendants to be responsible on an ongoing basis for this function.
After Defendants have complied with all of the provisions of this Consent Judgment, Defendants may apply to terminate the jurisdiction of the Court.
XIII. Inspection
During business hours and nonemergencies, the Department shall give f u l l access to P l a i n t i f f s ' attorneys, and the neutral entity, to the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex and Reception and Guidance Center for the purpose of inspection for compliance with the Order in this matter.
I
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113

APPENDIX A: SANITATION P U N S
I. Housekeeping
A. The Assistant Deputy Warden for Housing at SPSM is charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of clean and healthful conditions in prisoner living units,
1. The Assistant Deputy Warden or designate of rank-of captain or above shall conduct a monthly inspection of all prisoner living units and shall complete the appropriate monthly inspection report for review by the Warden. A follow-up procedure will be implemented to assure correction of any deficiencies noted in the report* Corrections will also be timely reported to the Warden for follow-up review.
2. The Assistant Deputy Warden or designate will assure that all staff in living units are appropriately trained in housekeeping techniques and instructed as to their individual responsibilities.
B. The Resident Unit Manager (RUM) for each living unit has direct supervisory responsibility for maintenance and housekeeping in the unit,
1. The RUM will assure that prisoners within the housing unit are informed that they are responsible for general housekeeping in their own cells, and will assure that each prisoner appropriately cleans his cell on a routine basis.
2. The RUM will assure that appropriate cleaning supplies are available at all times within the unit and will assure that each prisoner has access to cleaning supplies for his own cell, including minimally, a substance and an implement for the toilet and sink within the cell.
3. The RUM will inspect all cells and common areas in the RUM's unit at least weekly and will complete weekly inspection reports for review by the Assistant Deputy Warden for Housing or designate. Deficiencies will be monitored and corrected immediately. Any deficiencies beyond the control of the RUM will be reported to the Assistant Deputy Warden for Housing for remedy.
4. The RUM is responsible for the supervision of housing staff and inmate workers in the unit. The RUM may delegate responsibility for housekeeping in specific areas to appropriate staff.

ii
5, The RUM will assure that prisoner workers in the unit who are assigned to housekeeping of common areas will receive appropriate training for the tasks assigned. Common areas will be swept at least daily and showers will be maintained clean. Scrubbing of floors and walls will be performed as needed.
6. The RUM will assure that empty cells are clean before assignment to a prisoner.
C. Housing unit sergeants who report to the RUM are responsible for supervision of day-to-day housekeeping tasks for officers and prisoner workers. Sergeants maintain work schedules for prisoner workers and staff for all necessary tasks, and assure these tasks are performed through inspection and follow-up.
0 . Unit officers are assigned to specific areas in the unit for purposes of housekeeping and sanitation, and are directly responsible for the instruction and supervision of prisoner workers as to cleaning procedures and for the provision of supplies and equipment in these areas. Officers assure that personal cells in assigned areas are maintained in a sanitary condition by their occupants.
E. The Assistant Oeputy Warden for Housing will develop a plan to accomplish all housekeeping goals set forth herein including ongoing cell painting and refurbishment of all cells on a regular basis. This plan shall include treatment of plumbing fixtures
.with disinfectant at least every 90 days. Cells will be painted in light reflecting colors, plaster will be repaired as necessary and paint surfaces will be maintained in good condition. Painting is ongoing at present and will proceed on a continuous basis in order to maintain premises in good condition.
I I . Personal Hygiene of Prisoners
A. Mattresses - Defendants shall provide each prisoner moving into a cell with a sanitized f i r e retardant mattress and pillow and with a freshly laundered blanket. No prisoner shall be assigned to a cell lacking a sanitized mattress and pillow or lacking a freshly laundered blanket.
B. Bedding and Towels - Each prisoner shall be provided with clean bed linen (including, without limitation, two sheets and one pillow case) once per week. A blanket and a mattress covering shall be provided to each prisoner and laundered every three months. A clean towel shall be provided to each prisoner at least three times per week.
I
115

iii

C. Each prisoner shall be afforded the opportunity to shave and shower at least five times per week. The Defendants will endeavor to afford daily showers. With respect to at least three of the weekly showers, no prisoner shall be required to forego exercise as required herein, employment, assigned programs or meals in order to avail himself of a shower. Each prisoner worker shall be afforded the opportunity to shave and shower at the end of his work day. Shower and shave time shall be of adequate duration, at least five minutes physically in the shower.

D. Each prisoner, upon entry into the correctional system, is provided with soap, toothbrush, toothpaste and powder, comb and toilet paper. Prisoners shall continue to receive these items upon entry. Thereupon, each prisoner who is indigent shall continue to be provided these items as needed as well as shaving equipment, shaving soap or depilatories as needed. All other prisoners will have access to materials for personal hygiene for purchase at resident stores on a regular basis. The state shall make available for purchase or use nonelectric sanitary shaving equipment, shaving soap or an appropriate depilatory. Inmates shall not be asked to use shaving equipment used by other inmates unless sanitary. Inmates shall be provided with a means of clipping or filing finger and toe nails.

E. All clothing including personal clothing, linens, and bedding, shall be laundered so as to meet institutional laundry standards such as those of the International Fabricare Institute. Washing machines shall be operated pursuant to all manufacturer's specifications, including water temperature, pounds per load and
. amount of detergent.

I

III. Vermin Control A. A contract with commercial pest and vermin control companies for

periodic preventive maintenance in both food service and housing

1

areas shall be maintained.

I. Food Service Supervisors are responsible for day-to-day

i

inspection of food service areas, including commissaries and other food storage areas, for evidence of vermin (as well as

birds) and shall assure immediate control should problems

(

develop. Appropriate inventory techniques for food storage are already in place and will be constantly monitored by

Food Service Supervisors in order to prevent infestation, as

I

well as spoilage. 2. In housing units, Resident Unit Managers are specifically

charged with weekly inspection for evidence of vermin (as

I

well as birds) and corrective action should such evidence be apparent.

I 116

iv B. The Environmental Sanitarian is specifically designated to
inspect the food service areas as well as housing units for evidence of vermin (as well as birds) on a monthly basis. Any evidence of vermin (as well as birds) will be brought to the attention of the appropriate supervisor by the Sanitarian for remedy. All measures necessary to assure eradication and control of such vermin and birds, including additional or different professional, commercial, f u l l y licensed pest control, shall be taken promptly. Any serious infestation will be reported to the Assistant Deputy Warden for Housing for immediate control measures. C. Informal education of prisoners and staff in sanitary housekeeping techniques and control of perishables in prisoner l i v i n g areas will be continual in order to prevent, so far as possible, the introduction of vermin. D. Prisoner workers w i l l continue to be trained in eradication techniques under the supervision of staff to supplement contract services for vermin control.
117

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I I i.4S*
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* I I
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V
APPENDIX B
MINIMUM COLLECTION FOR MAIN LAW LIBRARIES
MICHIGAN MATERIALS 1. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (Vol. 1-2, 38-39, 40-41)
OR
Michigan Statutes Annotated (Vol. 1, 24, 24A, 25, 25A) 2. Michigan Digest (West) ( a l l )
OR Michigan Digest (Callaghan) (all) 3. Michigan Supreme Court Reports (Vol. 358(1960) to the present plus
subscription to advance sheets) 4. Michigan Appeals Reports (Vol. 1 to the present plus subscription
to advance sheets) 5. Shepard's Michigan Citations (all) 6. Sillespie - Michigan Criminal Law andProcedure (all) 7, Honigman andHawkins - Michigan Court Rules Annotated (all) 8. Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions (all) 9. Hensel - Appeals in the Michigan Courts
FEDERAL MATERIALS 1. United States Code Annotated (Constitution volumes, Titles 18, 28, 42) 2. Supreme Court Reporter (From Vol. 80 (1959) to the present plus
subscription to advance sheets)

United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition, 2nd Series

I

(From vol. 4 (1959) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets)

sheets)

I

3. Feder£a1l Reporter, 2ndSeries (From Vol. 300(1962) to the present

plus subscription to advance sheets)

I

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vi

4. Federal Supplement (From Vol. 200 (1961) to the present plus subscription to advance sheets)

5. Federal Practice Digest, 2d ( a l l )

6. Shepard's United States Citations ( a l l )

\

7. Shepard's Federal Citations ( a l l )

\

8. Wright - Federal Practice and Procedures (Vols. 1 , 2 and 3)'

\

(Criminal)

f

9.

Sokol - Federal Habeas Corpus (latest edition)

GENERAL MATERIALS
1. Corpus Juris Secundum (22, 22A, 23, 23A, 24, 24A, 24B (Vols. covering Criminal Law)
2. Black - Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed. (1968) OR Ballentine - Ballentine's Law Dictionary. 3rd Ed. (1969)
3. Cohen, M, - Legal Research in a Nutshell (latest edition) OR Elias - Legal Research; How to Find and Understand the Law
4. Bailey and Rothblatt - Complete Manual of Criminal Forms. 2nd Ed. (2 volumes)
5. Israel and LaFave - Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell, 2nd Ed. (1975) 6. Criminal Law Reporter 7. Rubin - Law of Criminal Correction, 2nd Ed. (1973) 8. Werner - Manual for Prison Law Libraries (1976) 9. Dorsen, N. - The Rights of Prisoners (1973)
OR Rudovsky, D. - The Rights of Prisoners (1973) OR
110

vi 1 Palmer, J.W. - Constitutional Rights of Prisoners (1977) 10. LaFave, W.R, - Principles ofCriminal Law (1978) OR LaFave and Scott, Handbook in Criminal Law (1972) OR
Loewy, A.R. - Criminal Law In a Nutshell, 2nd Ed. (1972) Additional Volumes A complete edition of MCLA for SPSM Main Law Library.
190

I

I

MINIMUM COLLECTION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION LAW LIBRARIES

1. Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (Vol. 1-2, 38-39, 40-41} OR Michigan Statutes Annotated (Vol. 1 , 24, 24A, 25, 25A)
2 . A t r e a t i s e on Michigan criminal law and procedure 3. Superseded "advance sheets" of Shepard's Citations (United States,
Federal, and Michigan); 4 . A t r e a t i s e ( e . g . , Nutshell s e r i e s ) on prisoners1 rights; 5. A t r e a t i s e on habeas corpus; 6. A general t r e a t i s e on criminal law and on criminal procedure; 7. A legal dictionary; 8. Federal rules of c i v i l and criminal procedure; 9. A Michigan Department of Corrections Resident Guidebook; and 10. A l i s t of the main law library holdings as periodically updated.

I ix

APPENDIX C

I

MAJOR MISCONDUCTS

I

001 * Escape; Attempt to Escape

I

Leaving or failing to return to lawful custody without authorization and with

the intent to remain away. Failure to

I

return within two hours after designated time, or within 24 hours i f

assigned to community residential

I

prcgrams, from furlough or pass.

002 Felony

1

Any act that would be a felony under state law is also a major misconduct violation. Reference must be made

to the specific statutory citation

I

in all cases where this charge 1s alleged.

010 * Homicide
Causing thedeath of another person by any means.

I 011 * Assault andBattery

Physical attack on, or intentional,

I

non-consensual touching of, another person, done either in anger, or with thepurpose of abusing or

injuring another. Injury 1s not

1

necessary butcontactis.

012 * Threatening behavior
Words, actions or other behavior expressing an intent to injure, which intends to place another in fear of being physically harmed or assaulted; includes attempted assault and battery.

1 013 * Sexual Assault
Sexual penetration of, or sexual contact with, another person without that person's consent; non-consensual physical contact for sexual purposes.

014 » Fighting Physical confrontation between two or more personsr including a swing and miss, done with anger or intent to injure.
020 uPiissooobeeyying a Direct Order Refusal or failure to follow a valid, reasonable order.
021 Possession of Forged Documents; Forgery Knowingly possessing a f a l s i f i e d or altered document; altering or falsifying a document with the intent to deceive or defraud.
022 * Incite to Riot or Strike, Rioting or Striking Advocating or instigating actions which are intended to seriously endanger the physical safety of the facility, persons or property or to disrupt operation of the facility by group cessation of normal activity; or anyother reason; participation in such action.
023 Interference with the Administration of Rules Acts intending to impede, disrupt or mislead the disciplinary processes forstaff or prisoners.
024 Bri bery.of an Employee uttering to give or withhold anything to persuade an employee to neglect duties or perform favors.
026 Insolence words, actions or other behavior which is intended to harass or cause alarm in an employee.

027 Destruction or Misuse of Property with Value of S10 or More Any destruction, removal, alteration, tampering or other misuse of property which hasa value of $10 or more.
028 failure to Maintain Employment Failure of a prisoner in community residential or work pass programs to immediately report to appropriate department staff anyabsence from employment or training for illness, layoff, termination or any other reason; failure to obtain prior staff approval forplanned absences from, or voluntary termination of, employment or training.
030 * Possession of Dangerous Contraband
Unautnonzed possession of weapons, explosives, acids, caustics, materials for incendiary devices, or escape materials; possession of " c r i t i c a l " tools and materials or dangerous tools and materials as defined by policy.
031 Possession of Money Possession of unauthorized amounts of money or money from unauthorized sources. Money is defined as either cash or a negotiable instrument.
032 Creating a Disturbance Actions or words of a prisoner which result In disruption or disturbance among others, but not endangering persons or property.
033 Sexual Misconduct Consensual touching of thesexual or other parts of another person for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party, except that an embrace of a visitor at the beginning and end of a visit, or holding hands with a visitor during a visit, is not sexual misconduct; intentional exposure of the sexual organs to another person in a location or manner where

such exposure has no legitimate " purpose; imitating the appearance
of the opposite sex; words or actions of a sexual nature directed at another person in order to harass or degrade that person.
034 Substance Abuse
Possession, use, selling or providing to others, or under the influence of, any intoxicant, inhalant, controlled substance (as defined by Michigan statutes), alcoholic beverage, marijuana or an> other substance which is used to cause a condition of intoxication, euphoria, excitement, exhilaration, stupefaction or dulling of the senses or nervous system: unauthorized possession of restricted medication; possession of narcotics paraphemali failure or refusal to voluntarily su to testing, including but not limite to urinalysis, blood analysis, or breath testing, which is requested b: the Department for the purpose of determining the presence in the pris; of any substance included in this charge.
035 Unauthorized Occupation of Cell or Room Being in another prisoner or prisoners1 cell or room without specific authorization from staff; being present in any c e l l , room or other walled area, with other prisoner(s) or members of the public, without staff authorization.
036 Out of Place or Bounds/AWOL Being anywnere without the proper authorization; being absent from where required to be; breaking "toplock" without authorization.
037 Theft; Possession of Stolen Property Any unautnorized taking of property which belongs to another; possession of property which the prisoner knows, or should have known, has been stolen.

I
xi

1
•
B I I I I

038 Gambling; Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia Playing games or making bets for money or anything of value; possession of gambling equipment, or other materials commonly associated with wagering.

I 1 fl 1 i

• •
124

I I I 1 I I I 1 I I I
1
I I I I I
I

xii

MINOR MISCONDUCTS

(All are coded 049)

Misdemeanor
Any act that would be a misdemeanor i f prosecuted under Michigan law is also a minor misconduct v i o l a t i o n , unless specified elsewhere as a major. Reference must be made to the specific statutory citation in a l l cases where this charge is alleged.

Lying to an Employee
Knowingly providing false information to
an employee.
Destruction or Misuse of Property with Value of Less than S10 Any aestruction, removal, alteration, tampering, or other misuse of property which has a replacement value of less than $10.

Abuse of Privileges Intentional violation of any department or institutional regulation dealing with resident privileges, unless i t is specified elsewhere as a major.

Excessive Noise Creation of sound, whether by use of human voice, a radio, TV, or any other means, at a level which could disturb
others.

Contraband Possession or use of non-dangerous property which a resident has no authorization to have, where there i s no suspicion of theft or f r a u d .

Health, Safety or F1re Hazard Creating a health, safety or f i r e hazard by act or omission.

Temporary Out of Place/Bounds In own housing u n i t , during the day. Out of place for a brief time or adjacent to where supposed t o be.

Unauthori zed Communicati ons Any contact, by l e t t e r , gesture or v e r b a l l y , with an unauthorized person or i n an unauthorized manner.

Violation of Posted Rules Violation of rules or community residential programs, housing u n i t s , dining room, furlough, work or school assignment which is not covered elsewhere.

orseplay

Any physical contact, or attempted

physical contact, between two or

more persons, done ina prankish or

playful manner without anger or

125

intent to injure or intimidate

 
 Hadix v. Johnson

• • ••

••••

VII

•

!••

• • • • • • • • • * * • *• • * • • m m B H

PC-MI-003-004

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EVERETT HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs,
v PERRY JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.

CA No. 80-73581 Hon. John Feikens

ORDER ACCEPTING CONSENT JUDGMENT The Court having conducted a FRCivP 23(e) hearing on February 13, 1985 at which certain agreements were reached, the Court having issued an Opinion dated April 4, 1985, and the Court being fully advised; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Consent Judgment submitted by the parties is accepted with the following agreed upon changes:
1. All references to "Department" or "State" shall be changed to "Defendants and their successors";
2. Due to anticipated structural changes Which may result in renaming of certain portions of the facility at issue in this lawsuit. State Prison of Southern Michigan Central Complex, including the Reception and Guidance Center, shall be defined as "all areas within the walls of the State Prison of Southern Michigan at the time this cause commenced and all areas which will supply support

services under the provisions of t h i s Consent Judgment, e.g., food service and Boiler Plant operations";
3. The phrase "shall continue to" shall be removed from Paragraph 9 o f SECTION VI ACCESS TOCOURTS and Paragraph A o f SECTION IX OPERATIONS.

0 1QQC

JOHH JEIXENS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

A TRUE COPY
CLERK. U. S. DiS'RiCT COURT EASTERN D:STR;CT Cf MiCHiGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EVERETT HADIX, et al, Plaintiffs,
v. PERRY JOHNSON, et al.
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 80-73581 HON. JOHN FEIKENS

OPINION
The parties have moved for approval of a consent decree* settling their dispute over the conditions of confinement at the Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan (CC-SPSM). Notice has been provided to all individuals who may-be affected by the decree, and the Court has conducted a hearing at which the reasonableness of the decree, as well as objections to the decree, were considered at length. After review of the record before me, I conclude that the consent decree is fair and reasonable, and it is hereby approved.
In determining the reasonableness of a decree, a court must consider "the fairness of the decree to those affected, the adequacy of the settlement to the class, and the public interest." Williams v. Vuckovich, 720 P.2d 909, 921 (6th Cir. 1983). The decree before me is the product of extensive negotiation
* I note that the preferable term is "consent judgment." Since the usage of the term "consent decree" is still dominant, I will use it in this instance.

- 2-

and compromise by very able counsel on both sides. These

negotiations covered a broad array of complaints, as the scope

I

of the decree reflects.

This Court has considered the terms of the decree, both in

I

relation to plaintiffs1 original claims and in light of objec-

tions to the decree, with great care. Although the scope of the

™

decree defies a detailed explanation here, it is clear that the

•

decree promises substantial improvement in conditions of confine-

ment at CC-SPSM, and establishes workable monitoring mechanisms

•

to insure that these goals are realized. In view of the skill

and zeal of counsel, the magnitude and nature of improvements

™

required by the decree, and the support of the overwhelming

tm

majority of affected class members, I have no trouble concluding

that the decree is a fair and adequate settlement of this dis-

•

pute. Moreover, by better assuring the constitutional treatment

of inmates in a manner that is agreeable to the State, it is

•

evident that the decree is in the public interest.

I

While the vast majority of affected prisoners did not object

to the decree, a significant number of prisoners did raise objec-

I

tions. Many of these inmates praise the decree, and few indicate

general opposition to it. The gist of almost every objection

M

is that the decree might be improved in particular respects.

_

Without derogating these objections in any way, it is worth

-

observing that because of the very breadth of this complaint and

I

the fact that compromise requires the relinquishment of claims

I

1

I

1

that each side considers meritorious, some disappointed expecta-

I

tions are inevitable. As the objections illustrate, the decree

•

is not a panacea for the hardships of life in prison. Neverthe-

less, assuming the good faith compliance with the decree's terms

I

that this Court will expect, the decree represents a reasonable

settlement of the dispute.

I

The objections to the decree, which have been summarized by

•

plaintiffs' counsel in a document appended to this decision,

fall roughly into four categories. First, a number of prisoners

I

have asked to opt out of this action. It is well established,

however, that class members do not have a right to opt out of a

I

class action of this sort brought under Pederal Rule of Civil

•

Procedure 23(b)(2). E.g.. Rincade v. General Tire fc Rubber Co.,

'

635 P.2d 501, 506-08 (5th Cir. 1981).

I

The second group of objections raise questions concerning the

decree's enforcement or application to a variety of particular

I

circumstances. None of these objections indicate that the decree

•

should be rejected as unfair or unreasonable. Instead they

'

present compliance problems that can be dealt with by the moni-

I

toring provisions in the decree. Absent some reason to believe

these provisions are insufficient, further discussion of these

I

objections is unnecessary.

-

Third, a number of objections pertain to the three issues

'

that the decree expressly sets aside for trial. As the decree

I

leaves these matters open for later resolution, such objections

I *

•• •

I

do not render the decree unfair or unreasonable. Resolution c

'

these issues would also be premature at this juncture.

|

Finally, there are objections that do not fit into the

preceding categories, some of which have been supported by

I

plaintiffs' counsel. In essence, these objections seek further

concessions from defendants ~ concessions which defendants are

•

unwilling to agree to. . As defendants correctly point out,

I

"[t]hese objections fail to recognize that the Decree is a

negotiated compromise reached after careful assessment of the

I

risks, expense and delay of further litigation." Defendants1

Comments Respecting Objections to the Proposed Consent Decree,

I

p. 4. Even if I assume that these complaints are meritorious,

they provide no basis for concluding that the decree is not a

fair and reasonable settlement by the parties.

I

For the reasons stated herein, the consent decree is

approved. An appropriate order may be submitted.

Dated:

J( Chief United States District Judge

 
 Hadix v. Johnson
PC-M1-003-007 No. 96-2582
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
EVERETT HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees
v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
PROOF REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER Acting Assistant Attorney General
DAVID K. FLYNN MARIE K. McELDERRY MARGO SCHLANGER
Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 514-3068

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CONCLUSION

. . . . . . . . . . . 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Benjamin v. Jacobson. 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) . . . . 3

Blodgett v. Holden. 275 U.S. 142 (1927)

1

In rs Clinton Bridge. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 (1870) . . . . . . 3

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.. 511 U.S. 244 (1994) . . . . . . . 4

Louisiana v. United States. 380 U.S. 145 (1965)

8

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line , 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm. Inc.,115 S. Ct. 1447
(1995)

3, 4 2, 3 2, 3, 4

Plyler v. Moore. 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . 3 , 9

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. 367

(1992)

. . . . . . . . . . 8, 9

Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

STATUTES:
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 3626
18 U.S.C.A. 3626(b)(2) . . . . . . . . 18 U . S . C . A . 3626(b)(3) . . . . . . . . 18 U.S.C.A. 3626(e)(2) . . . . . . .

passim
1, 5 passim
6

-l-

RULES: Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)
MISCELLANEOUS: T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1868)

PAGE 8
... 6

-li-

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2582 EVERETT HADIX, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. PERRY JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
PROOF REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
ARGUMENT In their brief, plaintiffs misconstrue the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA or the Act), exaggerating its impact in order to support their constitutional challenges to its immediate termination provisions, 18 U.S.C.A. 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3). " [T] o declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional * * * is the gravest and most delicate duty that [a court] is called on to perform." Blodgett v. HQldfin, 275 U.S. 142, 147-148 (1927) (Holmes, J. concurring). Plaintiffs urge this Court to undertake the task without proper "respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations." Rust v. Sullivan,

-2500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991). Because the termination provisions of the PLRA, properly read, do not violate separation of powers principles, equal protection, or due process, this Court should uphold the statute.
1. The PLRA's termination provisions require a court applying Section 3626(b)(3) to focus on the future appropriateness of injunctive relief, not on the past validity of the court's judgment. It is this that distinguishes them from the statute at issue in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm. Inc.. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). The principle of separation of powers highlighted in Plaut is the requirement that Congress not undo judgments that represent "the last word of the judicial department." Id. at 1457. Such judgments the Plaut Court labeled "final," for separation of powers purposes. See ibid. At the same time, Plaut expressly ratified the long-established rule of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855) (Nelson, J . ) . See Elau_L, 115 S. Ct. at 1459. In Wheeling Bridge, the Court held that a valid Act of Congress could require prospective alteration of an otherwise final injunctive judgment, because injunctions are executory and may affect parties and non-parties alike. But, the Court noted, a judgment for damages is different, because its entry is onetime and its benefit accrues to the individual plaintiff. See isL. at 431.
Plaintiffs would superimpose on Plaut. Wheeling Bridge and the other related case law a distinction those cases do not

-3support. They would hinge the analysis on the statutory or constitutional nature of the claim, and would have this Court hold that Congress may require courts to apply new law in statutory but not constitutional injunction cases. Neither Wheeling Bridge nor the cases plaintiffs cite support their attempt to divide constitutional from statutory rights. In Wheeling Bridge,, the Court's holding was clearly based on the nature of the relief granted — not the nature of the claim. See In re Clinton Bridge. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454, 463 (1870) (Nelson, J.) (the distinction between damages and injunctions was dispositive in Wheeling Bridge); Benjamin v. Jacobsonr 935 F. Supp. 332, 344-349 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Plyler v. Mo_Q_r_£, 100 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1996) (under ElaziLand Wheeling Bridge "[a] judgment providing for injunctive relief * * * remains subject to subsequent changes in the law"). Similarly, Plaut does not hint that Congress has any more authority with respect to statutory cases than with respect to constitutional ones. See 115 S. Ct. at 1457. Indeed, the Court overturned the statute in Plaut notwithstanding the fact that it regulated a statutory cause of action.
Plaintiffs rely on Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.. 458 U.S. 50, 83-84 (1982), in support of a different rule for injunctive judgments relating to statutory rights and those relating to constitutional rights. Northern Pipeline is simply not relevant here. It concerned the limits on Congress's control of adjudication of constitutional versus

-4-
statutory rights, holding that Article I tribunals could not have
final authority over litigation of constitutional rights. Id. at
80-84. Northern Pipeline said nothing about congressional
authority to require courts to modify their prospective judgments
to reflect valid statutory changes in remedial law.
In sum, under Plaut, the distinction between backward- and
forward-looking relief, court-ordered damages and court-ordered
injunctions, already-executed and executory remedies, completed
and pending cases, controls. The rule is that congressional
alteration of legal rights, if otherwise constitutionally proper,
should be applied in pending cases,17 even where the judgment is
"final" for other purposes.-7
17 In a related area, the Supreme Court has said that "[w]hen [an] intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief," a court should apply the newly enacted law to cases before it. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273-274 (1994). Indeed, far from being disfavored under the law, such application is "unquestionably proper" -"application of [such a] new provision [to a prospective order] is not [considered] retroactive." Ibid..
11 Plaintiffs' Plaut argument, which emphasizes a purported difference between changes in "substantive" versus changes in "remedial" law, reflects their doubts that Congress has the power to limit the remedial authority of courts in constitutional cases. Of course, if congressional power were not extensive enough to authorize the remedial restrictions of the PLRA, then those restrictions could not constitutionally be applied either in cases where courts have already ordered relief, or those in which no judgment has been entered. But while we agree with plaintiffs that Congress's power is not plenary with respect to constitutional remedies, that power more than suffices here, because none of the remedial limitations restrict a court's ability to issue effective remedies for violations of constitutional rights. See pp. 7-8, infra, and Proof Brief for the United States As Intervenor-Appellant at 31-39.

-52. Plaintiffs argue that the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA violate separation of powers principles because they impermissibly hinder the district court's ability to grant effective relief to remedy constitutional violations of the rights of inmates. In contending (Br. 42) that the termination provisions "strip [] the courts of their inherent power and duty to enforce effective remedies in constitutional cases," however, plaintiffs overstate the effect of the statute.17 First, plaintiffs' contention (Br. 30 n.28) that the "PLRA first terminates a valid consent judgment and requires the matter to be tried," misstates the statutory scheme established by Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3). Section 3626(b)(3) specifically operates as a "limitation" on the immediate termination mandate of Section 3626(b)(2). While Section 3626(b)(2) provides for the termination of prospective relief approved or granted in the absence of specified findings, Section 3626(b)(3) states that "[p]rospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes" findings, in the present, that the relief "remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right," and is narrowly tailored within the meaning of the PLRA. The inquiry into the ongoing appropriateness of prospective relief may or may not, at its conclusion, require judicial alteration of the prospective judgment — but the termination provisions do not dictate the outcome of the inquiry, or interfere with the
-3/' "Br." refers to Plaintiffs-Appellees' Proof Brief.

-6judgment while that inquiry goes forward.17

Plaintiffs also

argue that the PLRA violates separation of powers principles by

"dictat[ing] the particular steps to be taken in the judicial

inquiry" (Br. 20) and "compelling [the courts] to grant new

trials" (Br. 27, quoting T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations

94-95 (1868)). Again, they are incorrect. The statute requires

courts periodically to examine the continuing appropriateness of

court-ordered prospective relief, but there is no requirement

that Article III courts "retry" old cases. Section 3626(b)(3)

does not mandate a hearing, let alone a new trial. Rather, the

statute permits limited litigation where a court has insufficient

information about current conditions to make the Section

3626(b)(3) findings. Assuming that a district court has enough

current knowledge about the facts of a given case to make the

requisite findings, no new evidence would be needed at all.

A/As we have argued in United States v. Michiganr No. 961907, and Hadix v. Johnson. Nos. 96-1908, 96-1943 (pending), the PLRA's automatic stay provision, 18 U.S.C.A. 3626(e)(2), which states that "prospective relief subject to a pending motion [for immediate termination] shall be automatically stayed" beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and continuing until the court enters a final order ruling on the motion, is properly interpreted to preserve the courts' inherent authority to make considered decisions based on the application of law to pertinent facts. We read 18 U.S.C.A. 3626(e)(2) to direct that thirty days after a defendant makes a motion to terminate previously granted relief, the court should stay the relief — unless it finds the existence of a good reason not to. One reason that might justify a judicial refusal to enter a stay is that the complexity of the factual issues precludes the court from assuring itself within the thirty days that the relief is not necessary to remedy federal rights. In any event, this provision and its constitutionality are not at issue in this appeal.

-7Even where the court finds some additional factual development necessary, moreover, plaintiffs' contention that the PLRA requires a new trial (Br. 39) is an overstatement. The new litigation that is contemplated by Section 3626(b)(3) need not be extensive. All that is required is that the court have sufficient evidence to assure itself that any relief retained is necessary to remedy a current or ongoing violation of federal law and is narrowly tailored, within the meaning of the Act, to remedy that violation. Moreover, plaintiffs erroneously equate whatever additional inquiry the court requires with the trial that would have occurred if the consent decree had not been entered. Any hearing held pursuant to Section 3626(b)(3), however, would be about the future, not the past. The hearing's purpose would be to gauge the appropriateness of the relief granted in the decree for the future. As discussed below, this distinction is crucial. Finally, plaintiffs are incorrect in suggesting that the PLRA impedes a court's ability to enforce constitutional rights by making compliance with decree obligations irrelevant to an inquiry whether relief should be retained. See Br. 34, 46-47. As we argued in our opening brief (pp. 37-38), the PLRA would raise grave constitutional concerns if it required a district court to terminate relief previously granted where unconstitutional conduct has ceased but the violation has not been fully remedied or the defendant is poised to resume the unconstitutional conduct when the enforcement power of the court

-8 is withdrawn. Because courts have "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the [unconstitutional] effects of the past as well as bar like [unconstitutionality] in the future," Louisiana v. United States. 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965), the PLRA should be read so that the concept "current or ongoing violation of the Federal right" encompasses not only present unlawful conduct but also the failure to remedy the proximate effects of past unlawful acts and the present danger of imminent recurrence of the violation.
3. Plaintiffs rest heavy weight upon Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. 367 (1992), arguing that its standard for modification of consent decrees is constitutionally compelled, and that Congress therefore may not alter it. Nothing in Rufo casts constitutional doubt on the PLRA. In Rufo, the Supreme Court held that in ruling on a motion to modify made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), district courts may alter decrees to reflect unanticipated "significant change[s] either in factual conditions or in law." 502 U.S. at 384. The Court emphasized that "[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor," and cautioned that changes should be "tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances." 502 U.S. at 391. The PLRA in one sense alters the modification standard set out in Ell£o_, by requiring courts to modify consent decrees to meet the new statutory limitations — examining prospective relief to see if it "extends no further

-9than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and * * * is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." 18 U.S.C.A. 3626(b)(3). In another sense, however, the Rufo standard remains the same — the PLRA simply amounts to a "significant change in * * * law," and Congress has set out some procedures for a motion to modify decrees in response to that change. Either way, Rufo. which was not a separation of powers case but one guiding district court discretion in modifying institutional injunctions, does not stand in the way of the PLRA. See RLL£O_, 502 U.S. at 388 ("A consent decree must of course be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law.").
Because the remedial principles established by the PLRA are constitutionally permissible limits on the authority of district courts, Congress has the authority to require that any relief that a court will enforce henceforward, from the time of the PLRA's passage, meets those principles. See Plylerr 100 F.3d at 371-372. The statutory termination provisions are a proper and constitutional vindication of that authority, and should be upheld by this Court.

-10-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in our
opening brief, this Court should reverse the judgment below.
Respectfully submitted,
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER Acting Assistant Attorney General
K. FLYNN MARIE K. McELDERRY MARGO SCHLANGER
Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 514-3068

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Proof Reply Brief For

The United States As Intervenor-Appellant was served by first

class mail, postage prepaid, on the following individuals and

counsel of record:

Susan Przekop-Shaw
Assistant Attorney General Corrections Division Plaza One Building 101 South Washington Square Lansing, Michigan 48909

Suite 900

Dr. F. Warren Benton 149 Beach Avenue Larchmont, New York 10538

Elizabeth Alexander National Prison Project 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 410 Washington, DC 20009

Patricia A. Streeter One Kennedy Square, 1816 Detroit, Michigan 48226

Michael Barnhart One Kennedy Square, 1420 Detroit, Michigan 48226

Deborah LaBelle 3310 Cadillac Tower Detroit, Michigan 48226

This 17th day of April, 1997.

Marie K. McElderry Attorney U.S. Department of Justice Post Office Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 514-3068

 
 Hadix v. Johnson
PC-MI-003-010 NO. 96-2582
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
EVERETT HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees
v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
FINAL BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER Acting Assistant Attorney General
DAVID K. FLYNN MARIE K. MCELDERRY MARGO SCHLANGER
Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 514-3068

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT The United States believes that oral argument is warranted in this appeal. The district court held unconstitutional a portion of an Act of Congress, i.e., the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT

STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2 .......... 2

A. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below

2

1. Prior History

.2

2. Motions Under The PLRA

.4

B. Statutory Background: The Prison Litigation

Reform Act

7

C. Facts

10

D. The Decision Below

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

14

ARGUMENT:

I. THE PLRA'S TERMINATION PROVISIONS DO NOT

VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

18

A. The Separation Of Powers Doctrine

And The PLRA

18

B. Requiring Courts To Apply The PLRA's

Standards To Existing Decrees And Orders

Does Not Violate Separation Of Powers

Principles

22

C. The PLRA Termination Provisions Do

Not Prescribe Impermissible Rules Of

Decision . . . .

. . . . . . . . . 28

D. The PLRA's Limitations On The Equity

Powers Of The Courts Do Not Violate

Separation Of Powers Principles

31

TABLE OP CONTENTS (continued):

PAGE

E. The PLRA Termination Provisions' Revision Of The Standards Governing Modification Of Consent Decrees Does Not Violate Article III

. 40

II. SECTIONS 3626(b)(2) AND (b)(3) OF THE PLRA

DO NOT VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS' EQUAL PROTECTION

RIGHTS

42

III. SECTIONS 3626(b)(2) AND (b)(3) DO NOT VIOLATE

PLAINTIFFS'- DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

45

CONCLUSION . . . . .

. . . . . 46

ADDENDUM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Benjamin v. Jacobsonf 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), appeal pending, No. 96-7957
Board of Regents v. RoJJl, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) CFTC v. Schor. 478 U.S. 833 (1986)

. . . passim 45 19

Chambers v. NASCO. Inc.. 501 U.S. 32 (1991)

41

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.. 473 U.S.

432 (1985)

42

City of New Orleans v. Djjj££S_, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)

42

Djsgeji v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 1777 (1996)

41, 42

Fleming v. Rhodes. 331 U.S. 100 (1947)

46

Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 (1992)

38, 39

Grubbs v. Bradley. 821 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)
Lx v. Johnson. 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996) -ii-

..........

38 passim

CASES (continued):

PAGE

Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Mich. 1996)

5, 45

ix v. Johnson. 933 P. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996)

4, 5, 6

x v. Johnson. 66 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table) (Unpublished Disposition)

. . 12

x v. Johnson. 792 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich. 1992) . . 4, 12

x v. Johnson. 943 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1991)

11

Hadix v. Johnson. 694 F. Supp. 259

(E.D. Mich. 1988)

. . . . . . . . . . 10, 11, 12

v. Plumer. 380 U.S. 460 (1965)

20

v. D££, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)

17, 43

J_am£S_ v. Strange. 407 U.S. 128 (1972)

45

Knop v. Johnson. 685 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Mich. 1988),

aff'd in part and vacated in part, 977 F.2d 996

(6th Cir. 1992), cert, denied sub nom. Knop

v. McGinnis. 507 U.S. 973 (1993) .

11

Kn<2p v. Johnson. 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992), cert, denied sub nom. Knop v. McGinnis. 507 U.S. 973 (1993)

4, 11

Lampfr Pleva. Lipkind. Prupis & Petigrow v.

Gilbert son. 501 U.S. 350 (1991)

23

Landgraf v. USI Film Products. 511 U.S. 244

(1994)

27

Lauf. v. E.G. Shinner & Co. . 303 U.S. 323 (1938) .

19

Lewis v. Casey. 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) . . . . . . . . . 33, 43

Long v. Norrisf 929 F.2d 1111 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,

sub nom. Jones v. Long. 502 U.S. 863 (1991)

2

Louisiana v. United States. 380 U.S. 145 (1965)

38

Loving v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996)

18

Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) . . . . 18, 29 -iii-

CASES (continued):

PAGE

McCullough v. Virginia. 172 U.S. 102 (1898)

. . . . 45

McLendon v. Continental Can Co.. 908 F.2d 1171
(3d Cir. 1990)
Milliken v. Bradley. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I)
Milliken v. Bradley. 433 U.S. 267 (1977)

33
37 . 33

Missouri v. Jenkins. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)

37

Moss v. Clark. 886 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1989)

42

Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas. 89 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996)
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) . . . . .
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)
£lant v. Spendthrift Farm. Inc.. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farmf Inc..
115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)

26, 27 18, 19 26, 27
25 passim

Plyler v. Mj2ojt£, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996)

passim

Porter v. Warner Holding Co.f 328 U.S. 395 (1946)

39

Pryor v. Brennan. 914 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1990)

42

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society. 503 U.S.

429 (1992)

passjLm

Rojnej: v. Evansr 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. 367 (1992)
Eliii v. Estelle. 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983)
Scher v. Chief Postal Inspector. 973 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1992)

45 passim
33 42

-iv-

CASES (continued) :

PAGE

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. . 312 U.S. 1 (1941)

20

Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction. 103 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 1996)

32, 34

Swann v. Charlotte-Meek^ ^nb/U-^cr Bd. of Educ. . 402 U.S. 1 (1971)

33, 38

Sweet on v. BrQHIl, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994), (en bane),

cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995)

, 25

System Federation No. 91 v. Wright. 364 U.S. 642 (1961) . . 25

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.

1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987)

33

United States v. Klfiin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128

(1871)

passim

United States v. Lo_ck£, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) . . . . . . . . . 46

United States v, Michigan. 680 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
United States v. Michigan. 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991)

....

United States v. Michigan. 18 F.3d 348 (6th C i r . ) , cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 312 (1994)

passim 11 24

United States ex. rel. the Attorney General v.

Delaware & Hudson Co.. 213 U.S. 366 (1909) . . . . . . . 38

Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . 43

v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944)

20, 21

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579

(1952)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Zipkin v. Heckler. 790 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1986)

42

-v-

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

PAGE

U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 9

19

art. Ill, §§ 1-2

19

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA),

42 U.S.C. 1997 fit Sfisu

3

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, §§ 801-810, 18 U.S.C. 3626

passim

§ 810

.9

18 U.S.C. 3626

7, 9

18 U.S.C. 3626(a)-(b)

22

18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(l) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 34

18 U.S.C. 3626(a) (1) (A)

7, 32

18 U.S.C. 3626(b) . . . . . . . . . . .

22, 35

18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(l)

8, 35, 36

18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2)

18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(3)

p

18 U.S.C. 3626(e)(2) . . . . .

4

18 U.S.C. 3626(e) (2) (B)

4

18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(2)

7

18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(7)

9

18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(9)

......

9

28 U.S.C. 1292(a) (1)

2

28 U.S.C. 1343

1

28 U.S.C. 2349

21

28 U.S.C. 2403

4

42 U.S.C. 1983

1, 2, 10, 11

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

H.R. Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) . . . . 9, 34, 4 5

RULES:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 62 (a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (5) Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (b) Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (c) Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d)

21
3 21 40, 41 35 21 21 21

-vi-

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2582 EVERETT HADIX, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. PERRY JOHNSON, et al. ,
Defendants-Appellants and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
FINAL BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION This suit was brought by plaintiffs-appellees, inmates of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, concerning the constitutionality of the conditions of their confinement. The district court's jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. 1343. These appeals were taken from an order denying defendantsappellants1 motion for termination of the prospective relief in a consent decree entered in that litigation, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, §§ 801-810 (April 26, 1996, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2)). This

-2Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) of this interlocutory order continuing an injunction by refusing to dissolve or modify it in light of the PLRA.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1. Whether the PLRA's termination provisions and limitations on the equitable authority of district courts violate the separation of powers doctrine. 2. Whether the PLRA's termination provisions are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. 3. Whether the PLRA's termination provisions deprive plaintiffs of a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment without due process of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW These appeals involve solely legal issues, which are subject to de novo review by this Court. Long v. Norris. 929 F.2d 1111 (6th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom. Jones v. Longr 502 U.S. 863 (1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.
1. Prior History. In 1980, suit was filed by prisoners confined at the State Prison of Southern Michigan (SPSM) against various state officials of the Michigan Department of Corrections pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conditions of their confinement violated the Constitution of the United States and state law. In 1985, the district court approved a consent decree designed to address those claims. Hadix v. Johnson. 947 F. Supp. 1100, 1101-

-31102 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (Feikens, D.J.) (R. 199: Consent Decree, 96-2463 Apx. at pp. 127-176).
On January 18, 1984, the United States filed a complaint against the State of Michigan and certain of its officials under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997 eJL S££U (R- 2- Complaint, 96-2463 Apx. at pp. 110126). United States v. Michigan. 680 F. Supp. 928, 935 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (Enslen, J.) (compilation of opinions). The United States' complaint alleged unconstitutional conditions, not only in the SPSM facility involved in the Hadix litigation, but also in the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison. A proposed Consent Decree, accompanied by a "State Plan for Compliance," was filed simultaneously with the complaint. Prior to ruling on the motion to enter the Consent Decree, the court granted the Hadix plaintiffs the right to appear as amicus curiae.17 Michigan. 680 F. Supp. at 935-943. On July 13, 1984, the district court approved a Consent Decree dealing with five aspects of conditions of confinement: Medical and Mental Health Care; Fire Safety; Sanitation, Safety and Hygiene; Crowding and Protection from Harm; and Access to Courts and Legal Mail (R. 65; Michigan Consent Decree).
In 1992, the portions of the Hadix Decree involving medical and mental health care were transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan (Judge
17 The court denied the Hadix plaintiffs' motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a), Michigan. 680 F. Supp. at 935-941; R. 63: Michigan Order dated June 25, 1984.

-4Enslen) . Hadix v. Johnson. 792 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich, 1992) . The United States participates as amicus in the medical and mental health portion of the Hadix. case that is before Judge Enslen. Jurisdiction over the part of the Hadix case concerning access to courts was likewise transferred to the Western District. Kno£ v. Johnson. 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992), cert, denied sjib. nojiL. Knop v. McGinnisr 507 U.S. 973 (1993) ; see Hadix v. Johnson. 933 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996) .
2. Motions Under The PLRA. On June 10, 1996, the defendants filed motions pursuant to Section 802(b)(2) of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2), in both district courts having jurisdiction over the Hadix Consent Decree, for immediate termination of that Decree and subsequent orders granting prospective relief (R. 715 & R. 1068: Defendants' Motion for "Immediate Termination" of the Consent Decree Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 96-2463 Apx. at pp. 390-401) .*•' The defendants asserted that, by operation of Section 802(e)(2) of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. 3626(e)(2), all prospective relief in the Decree would be stayed automatically beginning on the 30th day after the filing of the motion for immediate termination and ending on the date "the court enters a final order ruling on the motion." 18 U.S.C. 3626(e)(2)(B). The United States intervened in the district courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403, because the constitutionality of an Act of Congress
11 On the following day, Michigan filed a motion for immediate termination of the Consent Decree and subsequent orders in United States v. Michigan (R. 2047: Michigan Motion).

-5was at issue (R. 1120: Motion Of The United States To Intervene, 96-2582 Apx. at pp. 7-10; R. 1123: Order Granting Motion To Intervene, 96-2582 Apx. at p. 11) .
On July 3, 1996, Judge Enslen issued decisions concerning defendants1 motions to terminate the Michigan Decree and the portions of the Hadix Decree under his jurisdiction. Hadix v. Johnson. 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Mich.); R. 2056: Michigan Opinion. The court stated that there was "no possible way" that it could decide the motions to terminate before the automatic stay provision would take effect, given the "complexity of the issues presented" and the need for thorough briefing. Hadix, 933 F. Supp. at 1364; R. 2056: Michigan Opinion at 6, It held, therefore, that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA "usurped a role that is exclusively judicial," 933 F. Supp. at 1366; R. 2056: Michigan Opinion at 10, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The court also held that the automatic stay provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by abrogating plaintiffs' vested property right in the Consent Decree without an opportunity for hearing. 933 F. Supp. at 1366-1369; R. 2056: Michigan Opinion at 16-17. Accordingly, it ruled that the automatic stay will not take effect pending its decision on the pending motions for immediate termination. 933 F. Supp. at 1369-1370; R. 2056: Michigan Opinion at 17-18.
Two days later, on July 5, 1996, Judge Feikens issued a similar opinion and order concerning the portions of the Hadix. Decree under his jurisdiction. 933 F. Supp. at 1360. That decision incorporated Judge Enslen's opinion by reference, and

-6likewise concluded that the automatic stay provision is unconstitutional and should not take effect. 933 F. Supp. at 1361-1362.
The defendants appealed the orders of both district courts. In addition, they filed emergency motions in this Court seeking a stay of proceedings in all three cases, in both district courts, to the extent that those courts proposed to hold evidentiary hearings on the motions for immediate termination. They also sought relief, in the nature of mandamus, for an order requiring the district courts to rely solely on the existing record in ruling on the motions for immediate termination, or, alternatively, to have this Court rule on the motions for immediate termination directly. This Court denied the motions for mandamus, and denied stays of further proceedings in the Michigan case and in the portion of the Hadix litigation before Judge Enslen (R. 2093: Michigan Order, Sept. 17, 1996). In this case, i.e.. the portion of the Hadix litigation before Judge Feikens, the Court issued a partial stay that relieved the defendants of their obligation, pending that appeal, to implement Phases 2 and 3 of the Breakup Plan for the SPSM complex (Hadix Order, Sept. 19, 1996, p. 3 ) . The Court consolidated the three appeals for purposes of submission, and oral argument was heard on February 4, 1997.
On November 1, 1996, Judge Feikens issued the Opinion and Order that is the subject of this appeal. That order denied the defendants1 motion for termination of the Hadix Decree and associated orders because of the court's conclusion that Sections

-7-
3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the PLRA violate separation of powers
principles and are, therefore, unconstitutional. Hadix. v.
Johnson. 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
B. Statutory Background; The Prison Litigation Reform Act.
On April 26, 1996, the President signed into law the PLRA.1
Section 802 of the Act, which consists of amendments to 18 U.S.C.
3626, establishes standards for the entry and termination of
prospective relief in civil actions concerning conditions in
prisons, jails, and juvenile detention facilities.4' With regard
to the entry of such relief, Section 3626(a)(1) provides:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A).
Termination of relief is governed by several sections of the
Act. In general, defendants are entitled to request the
termination of prospective relief according to a time schedule
set out in Section 3626(b)(1)(A), which provides:
11 A copy of the relevant portions of the Act is appended to this brief.
17 Section 802 of the PLRA does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings challenging "the fact or duration of confinement in prison." 18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(2).

-8-
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party * * * --
(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief;
(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief under this paragraph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after such date of enactment.
Section 3626(b)(2), however, provides for the immediate
termination of relief that was entered without the findings
required by Section 3626(a) (1) :
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2).
When termination is sought under either subsection (b)(1) or
(b)(2), the standard applicable to the termination decision is
set out in Section 3626(b)(3), which provides that relief shall
not terminate
if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the

-9least intrusive means to correct the violation. For purposes of all of these provisions, "prospective relief" includes injunctive relief accorded under a consent decree. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(g)(7), (g)(9). The Act contains a provision concerning retroactivity, which provides that "IN GENERAL" its amendments to 18 U.S.C. 3626 "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the [PLRA's enactment]." Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802(b). Finally, the Act contains a severability provision that preserves the remainder of the Act if any portion is held to be unconstitutional. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 810. Taken together, these provisions reflect Congress's concern that relief in prison reform cases be narrowly tailored to address violations of federal rights. See H.R. Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. at 24 n.2, 26 (1995). As applicable to relief entered after the PLRA's effective date, the Act is designed to establish a uniform remedial structure, and to provide for periodic review of individual decrees to determine whether they remain necessary to remedy violations of federal rights. As applicable to decrees entered before the PLRA's passage, the Act seeks to ensure that continuing relief comports with present legal standards.

-10C. EacjLS.. On September 18, 1980, a class of prisoners incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan (SPSM) filed suit against various state officials charged with the operation of SPSM, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Hadix v. Johnson. 694 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1988). They asserted that the conditions of confinement at SPSM violated their rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (R. 199: Hadix Consent Decree, Introduction, K 3, p. 1, 96-2463 Apx. at p. 127). On May 13, 1985, the district court approved a consent decree designed "to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated" at SPSM (R. 199: Hadix Decree at p. 1, 96-2463 Apx. at p. 127; R. 213: Order Accepting Consent Judgment, 96-2582 Apx. at pp. 5-6). The Decree addressed sanitation, safety, and health; health care; fire safety; overcrowding and protection from harm; use of volunteers; access to courts; food service; management; operations; inmate legal mail; compliance; and inspection procedures (R. 199: Hadix. Decree, 96-2463 Apx. at pp. 127-176). In addition, it provided that the areas of classification and due
-' This brief factual statement is taken from the record of proceedings in Hadix. Before intervening in the district court, the United States had not participated in the portion of the Hadix. litigation in the Eastern District of Michigan, and thus has no firsthand knowledge of the facts. Since the United States has intervened in the Hadix litigation solely for purposes of defending the constitutionality of the PLRA, we take no position on the merits of defendants-appellants' motions for immediate termination in that case.

-11-
process, and two issues concerning access to courts, would be submitted to the court for a hearing on the merits.-7
On July 1, 1988, the district court issued a decision
finding that SPSM's library, legal assistance, and grievance
programs failed to provide meaningful access to the courts as
required by the Constitution. Hfidix. v. Johnson. 694 F. Supp. 259
(E.D. Mich. 1988). An appeal from that judgment was consolidated with an appeal of an order issued by Judge Enslen in &1QJ2 v-
Johnson. 685 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Mich. 1988), concerning not only
SPSM, but also Michigan Reformatory, Marquette Branch Prison and
a fourth facility not involved in either the Hadix or Michigan litigation.2' This Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
vacated the entire remedial order in Hadix and portions of the
remedial order in Knopr and remanded both cases to the United
States Court for the Western District of Michigan. Knop v.
Johnson. 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992), cert, denied siih nojiL.
v. McGinnis. 507 U.S. 973 (1993).
k' The classification issue was referred by stipulation for resolution in United States v. Michigan. Hadix v. Johnson. 943 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1991).
-' The procedural history of the Knop litigation is described in detail in this Court's decision in United States v. Michigan. 940 F.2d 143, 147 (1991). Briefly, Knop was a class action filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in June 1984, that challenged many of the same conditions in Michigan prisons as did the United States suit. The Knop class was granted amicus curiae status in the U.S. suit, but its motions to intervene were denied. However, in 1987, the district court changed their status to that of "litigating amicus curiae" with the full litigating rights of a party. In its 1991 decision, this Court reversed the district court's order and limited the Knop class to the traditional amicus curiae role. 940 F.2d at 163-167.

-12The portions of the Hadix Decree addressing medical and mental health care were also transferred to the Western District. Hadix. 792 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich. 1992). As this Court has noted, because the provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree overlap somewhat with the provisions of the Consent Decree entered by Judge Enslen in United States v. State of Michigan, the United States has participated as amicus curiae in the medical and mental health portions of the Hadix litigation, and the Hadix plaintiffs have participated on those issues as amici curiae in the Michigan litigation. Hadix v. Johnson. 66 F.3d 325 (6th Cir, 1995)(Table) (Unpublished Disposition)„ The Management section of the Hadix Decree required the Michigan Department of Corrections to proceed with a management and organization study of SPSM, described by the district court as "[a]n integral part of the settlement," to break-up the SPSM complex into "five autonomous units." Hadix. 694 F. Supp. at 262. Phase I of the "Break Up" plan has been implemented; implementation of Phases II and III were stayed by this Court's order of September 19, 1996. D. The Decision Below. The district court held that the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3), violate separation of powers principles, and are, therefore, unconstitutional. Hadix. 947 F. Supp. at 1113. Tracing the Supreme Court's historic treatment of consent decrees to its "crystalliz[ation] " in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), the court held that the Supreme Court has

-13"resolved the conflict between the public and private rights involved in public reform litigation" by establishing two principles (947 F. Supp. at 1107):
The public's right in maintaining control over its institutions is protected through modification of a consent decree when a change in circumstances so requires. The parties' right to rely on a court order is protected by the limitation precluding a court, or Congress, from stripping a consent decree down to the constitutional floor. The court concluded that, in enacting the immediate termination provisions, which require that a consent decree be "pared down to the constitutional floor," "Congress has invaded one of the most vital constitutional powers of the judiciary" by "abrogating a court's power to enforce one of its orders." 947 F. Supp. at 1111.
The court concluded that the inclusion of subsection (b)(3) does not save subsection (b)(2) from violating the separation of powers doctrine. Although subsection (b)(3) permits a court to retain prospective relief in a decree if it finds that such relief "remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation," the district court held that the requirement that a court make findings of "past unlawful acts" as to a consent decree already entered by the court as a judgment, as a condition to continued enforcement of the decree, "represents an unjustifiable encroachment of the legislative and

-14executive branches into the domain of the judiciary." 947 F. Supp. at 1104.
The court found that the PLRA "applies law to the consent decree at issue here that was clearly not the law when it was entered into," 947 F. Supp. at 1109-1110, and, by doing so, violates the holding in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995), that Congress cannot "retroactively cotnmandC] the federal courts to reopen final judgments." 115 S. Ct. at 1453. The court rejected the argument that the holding in Plaut does not apply to prospective relief because it found that the PLRA attempts to alter not only the prospective relief of the decree, but also to rescind the "consent judgment itself," 947 F. Supp. at 1109. Although acknowledging that there is language in Plaut suggesting that "legislative action over consent decrees whose injunctive effect is ongoing" is authorized, the court held that this exception is a narrow one that would not accommodate a statute with as broad a scope as Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3). 947 F. Supp. at 1110.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In Parts I A. & B., we argue that the PLRA's termination provisions do not violate the separation of powers principles articulated in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). In Plaut. the Court held that Congress cannot reverse a final judgment in a suit for money damages. In contrast, this case involves application of the PLRA's termination provisions to prospective relief. In Plaut. the Court distinguished decisions approving statutes "that altered the prospective effect of

-15injunctions." 115 S. Ct. at 1459. Unlike a final moneyjudgment, the issuance of a "final" prospective order does not represent "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457. A district court continues to play an active role in the interpretation, enforcement, supervision, and modification of its prospective orders. Unlike with a money judgment, a court always possesses the power to revisit continuing injunctive orders in light of the evolving factual or legal landscape, and to modify or terminate the relief accordingly. It does not offend separation of powers principles to require a court, when deciding whether to modify or terminate its prospective orders, to apply the current federal law -- the PLRA.
Part I C. demonstrates that the PLRA does not improperly prescribe "rules of decision," as prohibited by United States v. Klfiin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). As explained by the Court in Plaut. whatever the precise scope of Klein, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress amends "applicable law." Plaut. 115 S. Ct. at 1452. In enacting the PLRA, Congress has amended the applicable law to establish standards and procedural rules for the courts to apply when deciding whether to grant or terminate a prospective order regarding prison conditions. It makes no difference that the PLRA does not amend the substantive law upon which relief was sought here. In Plaut itself, the Court held that a change in the applicable statute of limitations was a change in the "applicable law" and, thus, did not implicate Klein. Likewise,

-16here, although Congress has not amended the underlying substantive rights, the PLRA "indisputably does set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply." Plaut. 115 S. Ct. at 1453.
In addition, as we argue in Part I D., the PLRA's limitations on the equity powers of the courts do not violate separation of powers principles. It is well-established that Congress has the authority to regulate the injunctive powers of the federal courts. In the PLRA, Congress has prescribed rules and standards for courts to follow when issuing prospective relief regarding prison conditions. Some of the PLRA's provisions formalize existing standards; others establish new requirements and procedures for the courts to apply. The PLRA's provisions regarding the entry and termination of prospective relief at issue here do not, however, unduly encroach upon the judiciary's core Article III powers. While the PLRA imposes standards and procedures to be followed by the courts, the courts retain the power to resolve the cases brought before them challenging prison conditions and to issue injunctive relief necessary to remedy any violation of federal law. Moreover, while the PLRA requires that the court examine existing prospective orders under the PLRA's standards, a court may always continue prospective relief that it finds necessary to remedy a constitutional violation.
Finally, in Part I E . , we argue that the PLRA's revision of the standards governing modification of consent decrees does not violate Article III. The standard for modification of consent

-17decrees that was announced by the Supreme Court in Elif-Q V . Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. 367 (1992), is not compelled by constitutional principles. It may be overridden by Congress so long as Congress is otherwise acting, as it has in the PLRA, within the confines of its Article I authority.
In Part II, we argue that the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA do not violate equal protection principles. As an initial matter, there is no basis for the application of heightened scrutiny in this case because prisoners are not a suspect class, and the immediate termination provisions do not impinge upon a fundamental right. In particular, these provisions do not impair plaintiffs' right of access to the courts because prisoners continue to have an opportunity to establish current or ongoing violations of their constitutional rights.
Under the rational basis standard, a legislative classification must be upheld if there is any reasonable, conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Heller v. Doe. 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The PLRA clearly satisfies that standard. In enacting the PLRA, Congress rationally sought to promote principles of federalism, security, and fiscal restraint in the context of prison conditions litigation.
In Part III, we argue that the immediate termination provisions do not violate plaintiffs' due process rights. Injunctive relief is always subject to possible modification or termination. Accordingly, injunctive decrees in prison

-18conditions suits are not protected "property" interests under the Due Process Clause, and the immediate termination provisions do not impair any interest protected by due process.
ARGUMENT I
THE PLRA'S TERMINATION PROVISIONS DO NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE Plaintiffs bring a variety of constitutional challenges to the termination provisions' constitutionality. As explained below, each should be rejected. See Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 370-375 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the same constitutional challenges to the PLRA's termination provisions). A. The Separation Of Powers Doctrine And The PLRA The doctrine of separation of powers flows from the Constitution's division of the federal government into three branches. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.. 458 U.S. 50, 57-58 (1982). Under the constitutional division of power, the Legislature is to enact laws of general application and the courts are to decide particular cases arising under those laws, exercising their exclusive authority to "say what the law is" in particular cases. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). "[I]t remains a basic principle of our constitutional scheme that one branch of the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another." Loving v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (1996) (citations omitted). For example, the separation of powers doctrine prevents Congress from assigning core Article III powers to non-Article III

-19entities. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.. supra; CFTC v. Schor. 478 U.S. 833, 850-856 (1986). The separation of powers doctrine also prohibits Congress from itself assuming the role assigned by the Constitution to the Judicial Branch. Accordingly, it is established that Congress may not itself decide cases. See United States v. Klein. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) . Although Congress may amend law applicable to pending cases, see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society. 503 U.S. 429 (1992), such amendments must "set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.. 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453 (1995).
Although the doctrine of separation of powers is a "structural safeguard" that establishes "high walls" between the three branches of government, see Plaut. 115 S. Ct. at 1463, the Constitution itself creates an interrelationship and interdependence among the branches. Consistent with the structural safeguards erected by the Constitution, Congress possesses and exercises broad authority over federal court jurisdiction and procedure. Under the Constitution, it is the role of Congress to create and structure the inferior courts, and to establish the confines of the jurisdiction of those courts (within the outer limits set out in Article III). See U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. Ill, §§ 1-2. See also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.. 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) ("[t]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States"). Moreover, Congress not only establishes the substantive federal law to be applied by the

-20-
federal judiciary, it has the constitutional authority to
establish the procedural rules and evidentiary standards to apply
in proceedings before the federal courts. See Hauna v. Plumer.
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) ("the constitutional provision for a
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules
governing the practice and pleading in those courts"); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co.. 312 U.Si 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts").
It is well established that, in carrying out these
constitutional powers, Congress has the authority to regulate and
restrict the injunctive powers of the federal courts. See, e.g..
Y_aj£US_ v. United States. 321 U.S. 414, 442 n.8 (1944) (setting out
examples where Congress has restricted the power of federal
courts to grant injunctions) .-' The entire practice for the
6/ The seven examples cited by the Court in Yakus are:
1. Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, * * * 28 U.S.C. § 384, denying relief in equity where there is adequate remedy at law. 2. Section 5 of the Act of March 2, 1793, * * * 28 U.S.C. § 379, prohibiting injunction of state judicial proceedings. 3. Act of March 2, 1867, * * * 26 U.S.C. § 3653, prohibiting suits to enjoin collection or enforcement of federal taxes. 4. The Johnson Act of May 14, 1934, * * * 28 U.S.C. § 41 (l), restricting jurisdiction to enjoin orders of state bodies fixing utility rates. 5. Act of Aug. 21, 1937, * * * 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1), similarly restricting jurisdiction to enjoin collection or enforcement of state taxes. 6. Section 17 of the Act of June 18, 1910, * * * 28 U.S.C. §§ 380 and 380(a), requiring the convening of a three-judge court for the granting of temporary
(continued...)

-21issuance of an injunctive order by a federal court is subject to standards, procedures, and timing rules, and other limitations established through Congress's Article I powers. For example, the rules set forth by Congress: dictate the standards to be applied by a federal district court in issuing a temporary restraining order, and limit the duration of such orders to ten days, absent specified findings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); prohibit the issuance of an injunction absent the posting of adequate security, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); require a court issuing injunctive relief to set forth the reasons for the issuance of the injunction and to describe the terms of the decree in reasonable detail, Fed. R. Civ. P, 65(d); mandate specific findings for the issuance of class-wide injunctive relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); provide that, unlike other forms of judgments, injunctive orders are not automatically stayed by the filing of an appeal, Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a); and for original jurisdiction agency review cases, provide the standards and procedures to be applied by the courts of appeals in deciding whether to issue an interlocutory injunction, 28 U.S.C. 2349.
(...continued) injunctions in certain cases and allowing a temporary restraining order by one judge only to prevent irreparable injury. 7. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, * * * 29 U.S.C. §§ 10115, regulating the issue of injunctions in labor disputes and prohibiting their issue "contrary to the public policy" declared in the Act.
321 U.S. at 442 n.8.

-22In enacting the PLRA, Congress has properly exercised its Article I authority to prescribe rules and standards for courts to follow when issuing prospective relief. In the PLRA, Congress has established standards for the courts to apply in deciding whether to grant or continue in effect a prospective order regarding prison conditions, and has required that a court make specific types of findings when issuing such relief. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)-(b). Congress also established timetables for periodic review of such prospective orders to determine whether they are still warranted under the standards articulated by the PLRA. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(b). Some of the PLRA's provisions formalize existing standards applied by the courts; others establish new requirements and procedures for the courts to apply. The PLRA's provisions regarding the entry and termination of prospective relief at issue here do not, however, unduly encroach upon the judiciary's core Article III powers. As demonstrated below, although the PLRA imposes standards and procedures to be followed by the courts, the courts retain the power to resolve the cases before them challenging prison conditions and to issue injunctive relief necessary to remedy any violation of federal law. B. Requiring Courts To Apply The PLRA's
Standards To Existing Decrees And Orders Does Not Violate Separation Of Powers Principles. Plaintiffs' primary argument below was that the consent decree and associated relief are final judgments, and applying the PLRA's termination standard to a final judgment is contrary to the separation of powers principles announced in Plaut v.

-23Spendthrift Farm, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently considered and correctly rejected that precise argument. See Plyler v. Moore. 100 F.3d at 370-372. As explained by the Fourth Circuit, the rationale of Plaut has no application to the PLRA provisions speaking to prospective orders. Plylerf 100 F.3d at 370-372. See also Benjamin v. Jacobson. 935 F. Supp. 332, 343-349 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), appeal pending, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir.) (argued Nov. 15, 1996).
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.. supra. the Supreme Court overturned an effort by Congress to force courts to apply new law to existing final monetary judgments. At issue in Plaut was legislation that retroactively allowed plaintiffs in certain securities fraud suits to revive actions that had been previously dismissed as time barred as a result of the statute of limitations rule announced and applied by the Supreme Court in Lampf. Pleva. Lipkind. Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). In Plaut, the Court held that the legislation represented an attempt by Congress to "set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation," 115 S. Ct. at 1458, and thus violated separation of powers principles.
Plaut involved suits for monetary damages. In that context, the Court stated that "[h]aving achieved finality, * * * a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the

-24courts said it was." £laiit, 115 S. Ct. at 1457 (emphasis in original). The termination provisions of the PLRA do not violate the principles announced in Plaut because a prospective order issued by a court, whether in the form of a litigated judgment or a consent decree, does not similarly represent the "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Plaut. 115 S. Ct. at 1457.
It is true that injunctive orders and consent decrees are "final" for certain purposes, see Rufof 502 U.S. at 378; United States v. Michigan. 18 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 312 (1994), such as appeal rights. Unlike a final money judgment, however, the issuance of a "final" prospective order does not end the district court's role once the appeal rights of the parties are exhausted (or expire). A district court continues to play an active role in the interpretation, enforcement, and supervision of its prospective orders. Here, for example, the consent decree cannot be said to represent the "final word" of the judicial department in this case. Indeed, the entry of the decree here, like many consent decrees, marked the beginning of a long relationship between the district court and the parties, and under the terms of the decree, the district court maintains an active role in this case.
Moreover, as the district court noted, it retained the authority to modify or terminate its prospective orders to accommodate changes in the facts or legal principles supporting the decree. Unlike with a money judgment, a court always possesses the power -- indeed the obligation - - t o revisit

-25continuing injunctive orders in light of the evolving factual or legal landscape, and to modify or terminate the relief accordingly. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farmf Inc.. 1 F.3d 1487, 1495 (6th Cir. 1993), a f f d , 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). The district court here, like all courts overseeing and administering consent decrees, retained the authority and duty to modify the decree to accommodate unanticipated changes in fact or law. See Rufo. 502 U.S. at 383-385, 388-393 (setting forth the common law standards for modification of a consent decree); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166-1167 (6th Cir. 1994) (onfcancj, cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995)(applying Rufo in context of change in law).lf See also System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650-651 (1961). Obviously, then, the consent decree here is quite different from a final money judgment like that at issue in Plaut, and was never intended to represent "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Plaut. 115 S. Ct. at 1457. The prospective order here is a live matter, and the district court plays an active role in monitoring, enforcing and deciding whether to modify or terminate its decree. In that context, it does not offend constitutional separation of powers principles to require a court, when addressing this live case, to apply the currently
11 In Rufo. the Supreme Court explained that a lenient standard for modification applied to details of consent decrees "unrelated to remedying the underlying constitutional violation." 502 U.S. 383-384 n.7. The moving party needed only provide a "reasonable basis" to support the modification of the decree in regard to such matters. 502 U.S. at 383-384 n.7.

-26applicable federal law -- the PLRA. See Plyler. 100 F.3d at 371372.
In Plaut itself, the Court explained that its ruling regarding a final monetary judgment was distinguishable from decisions approving statutes "that altered the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts." 115 S. Ct. at 1459 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.r 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)). See also Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas. 89 F.3d 554, 556-557 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Plant was careful * * * to point out that cases like * * * Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. * * * in which congressional legislation 'altered the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts' were different"). In Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., the Court had earlier declared that a bridge across the Ohio River unlawfully impeded navigation, and ordered that the bridge be raised or removed. Soon after the injunction issued, an Act of Congress declared the bridge to be a "lawful structure," designated the bridge as a United States post-road, and authorized the bridge's owners to maintain it at the same height. See Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.. 59 U.S. at 429. The Supreme Court upheld the legislation, against a separation of powers challenge, as a lawful exercise of congressional power, and held that the legislation mandated termination of the court's prior injunctive order. In so holding, the Court drew an explicit distinction between the prospective relief and monetary awards. The Court held that although the prospective relief previously entered in a final judgment must be vacated in light of the new

-27legislation, the court costs awarded to the plaintiff could not be affected by the subsequent change in the law. 59 U.S. at 436.
The rule of Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. is that, where Congress validly alters the law, courts have a responsibility to prospectively modify an injunctive order to take into account the changed legal circumstances. See Mount Graham Coalition. 89 F.3d at 556-557. That rule was reaffirmed in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. 511 U.S. 244 (1994), where the Court explained, "[w]hen the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief," a court must apply the newly-enacted law and the "application of the new provision [to a prospective order] is not [considered] retroactive." 511 U.S. at 273-274.
The district court's opinion in this case never distinguishes Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (indeed never mentions it), but the rule articulated by the Supreme Court more than 140 years ago in that case is directly applicable here. As 11 [a] judgment providing for injunctive relief * * * [the decree here] remains subject to subsequent changes in the law." Plylerf 100 F.3d at 371. Hence, it does not offend separation of powers principles to require a court to apply the PLRA's standards when reviewing and examining this prospective order. 100 F.3d at 371372. The fact that the statutory change applicable here involves a restriction on the remedial powers of the courts rather than a change in the underlying substantive law that was a predicate for relief, as in Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.f is of no moment. As discussed above, the authority of Congress to regulate and restrict the injunctive powers of the federal courts is well-

-28established. There is no question that the district court maintains jurisdiction to determine whether to modify or terminate its prospective orders here. The question is what legal standards and timetables should the court apply when rendering those decisions today. Given that Congress has authority to prescribe the standards and timetables established by the PLRA, it is the duty of a court to apply the law enacted by Congress to the prospective orders before it. See Plyler 100 F.3d at 371-372; Benjamin. 925 F. Supp. at 343-349.
C. The PLRA Termination Provisions Do Not Prescribe Impermissible Rules Of Decision
As recently explained by the Fourth Circuit in Plyler v. Moore. 100 F.3d at 372, the termination provisions of the PLRA, Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3), do not impermissibly "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department * * * in cases pending before it." Plautf 115 S. Ct. at 1452 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146). The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Klein is plainly distinguishable.
In Kleinf the President pardoned, among others, V.F. Wilson for giving aid and comfort to officers of the rebel confederacy during the Civil War on the condition that he take an oath of allegiance. Wilson took the oath of allegiance and, thereafter, passed away. Wilson's estate sued the United States under a federal statute permitting loyal citizens to obtain compensation from the U.S. Treasury for cotton seized or destroyed during the war. The Court of Claims ruled in the estate's favor. United States v. Klein. 80 U.S. at 130-133. While the case was on

-29appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress passed a new statute mandating that presidential pardons could not be considered as evidence of loyalty, rather that such pardons were conclusive evidence of disloyalty. 80 U.S. at 133-134, 143-144. The Supreme Court struck down the new statute. The Court held that Congress could not compel courts to discount the legal or evidentiary effect of a presidential pardon and impose a rule of decision in a pending-case. 80 U.S. at 146-148.
"ftlein has been interpreted to hold that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision for the courts to follow without any independent exercise of their judicial powers." Benjamin, 935 F. Supp, at 349. Thus, Congress may not usurp the judicial function and dictate the outcome of a specific case or cases. 935 F. Supp. at 349. Congress may, however, always amend the applicable law and require the courts to apply the amended law to a case before it. See Robertson. 503 U.S. at 441. As explained by the Supreme Court in Plautf "[w]hatever the precise scope of Klein. * * * later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 'amend[s] applicable law.'" Plaut. 115 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting Robertson. 503 U.S. at 441).
In enacting the PLRA, Congress has done just that. Congress has properly invoked its legislative authority to establish standards and procedural rules for the courts to apply when deciding whether to grant or continue in effect a prospective order regarding prison conditions. Congress has enacted standards, leaving to the courts the judicial function of determining "what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 177,

-30and of applying that law to the facts of each case. As in Robertson. Congress has "replaced the [original] legal standards * * * without directing particular applications under either the old or the new standards." 503 U.S. at 437.
While Section 3626(b)(2) "requires a district court to terminate prospective relief that was approved in the absence of a finding that the relief is no greater than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, it does not purport to state how much relief is more than necessary." Plyler, 100 F.3d at 372. See also Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 350. Moreover, under Section 3626(b)(3), even in the absence of such findings in an existing prospective order, a court may continue a prospective order if it finds that the relief is "necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and * * * is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(3). As the Fourth Circuit held in Plyler:
In short, [the PLRA termination provisions provide] only the standard to which the district court must adhere, not the result they must reach. 100 F.3d at 372. Thus, Congress has not imposed an arbitrary outcome or an improper "rule of decision." See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1452. Plaintiffs argued below that Congress violates the rule set forth in Klein, unless it amends the underlying substantive law upon which relief was sought in their complaint -- here the

-31Eighth Amendment. That argument is refuted by the Supreme Court's decision in Plaut- In Plautf the Court held that Klein has no application where Congress amends the applicable law. £laii£, 115 S. Ct. at 1452. The Court then held that the amendment before it in Plaut did not implicate Klein because it "indisputably * * * set out substantive legal standards" for the courts to apply. 115 S. Ct. at 1453. The amendment at issue in Plaut altered the statute of limitations for federal securities fraud cases and attempted to apply the new limitations period to cases that had already been dismissed as time barred. It did not alter the underlying substantive standards for securities fraud. Yet, the Court held that it was a change in the "substantive legal standards," and, hence, did not implicate Klein. Here, while Congress has not amended the underlying substantive rights upon which plaintiffs sought relief in their complaint, it has changed applicable law that is within its power to change. Thus, likewise, the PLRA "indisputably does set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply," 115 S. Ct. at 1453. Because the PLRA "compel[s] changes in law, not findings or results under old law," Robertson. 503 U.S. at 438, it does not violate the separation of powers principles established in Klein. See Plyler. 100 F.3d at 372; Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 350.
D. The PLRA's Limitations On The Equity Powers Of The Courts Do Not Violate Separation Of Powers Principles
Plaintiffs also argued below that the PLRA violates the separation of powers doctrine by improperly circumscribing the power of the federal courts to enter equitable relief to remedy

-32constitutional violations in the prison setting. We agree with plaintiffs that, having granted the inferior courts jurisdiction over constitutional and statutory challenges to prison conditions, Congress may not deprive the courts of the ability to actually and effectively decide those challenges. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.. 115 S. Ct. at 1453 (the Article III power is "not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them") (emphasis in original). The power to decide constitutional claims and render equitable relief to remedy a constitutional violation by an executive official is one of the core federal judicial powers. See, e.g.. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Here, however, contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, Congress has not deprived the courts of the authority to decide constitutional challenges to prison conditions. As the PLRA's plain language demonstrates, courts continue to have the authority to decide constitutional challenges and to grant or continue equitable relief to remedy any constitutional violation found.
The PLRA requires that prospective relief regarding prison conditions be "narrowly drawn," extend "no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," and be "the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), (b)(2), (b)(3). These limitations are fully consistent with the well-established limitations already imposed by the courts for issuing prospective relief in a litigated judgment. See Smith v. Arkansas Dep't nf Correction. 103 F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996). It is well

-33settled that in constitutional cases "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of E d u c . 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) . The "remedymust therefore be related to ^the condition alleged to offend the Constitution.1" Milliken v. Bradley. 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (citation omitted). See also McLendon v. Continental Can Co.r 908 F.2d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[i]n granting injunctive relief, the court's remedy should be no broader than necessary to provide full relief to the aggrieved plaintiff"); Ruiz, v. Estelle. 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 (5th Cir.) ("[r]eparative injunctive relief must be targeted at elimination of the unconstitutional conditions * * *. Therefore, a court can order only relief sufficient to correct the violation found"), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Toussaint v. McCarthy. 801 F.2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986) ("our goal is to cure only constitutional violations"), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). Recently, in addressing equitable remedies that may be imposed for constitutional violations in the prison setting, the Supreme Court endorsed the basic rule that the remedy must be tailored to redress the constitutional wrong. See Lewis v. £asey_, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179, 2183 (1996). In Lewis, the Supreme Court explained, "[t]he remedy [imposed] must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has established." 116 S. Ct. at 2183. See also 116 S. Ct. at 2184 (systemwide relief cannot be granted unless the constitutional violation has "been shown to be systemwide").

-34Congress was well aware of the state of the law in this area when it enacted the PLRA. As noted in the House JudiciaryCommittee Report on the provisions that ultimately became the PLRA, the "dictates of the provision are not a departure from current jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief." H.R. Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. at 24 n.2 (1995). In enacting Section 3626(a)(1), Congress attempted to ensure that courts adhere to the standards governing the imposition of injunctive relief and directed that the standards were to be applied equally to both litigated and consent judgments. Moreover, by requiring courts to make particularized findings as to the necessity of prospective relief, the PLRA ensures that all future orders will comply with current remedial standards. While the statutory requirement that such findings appear on the record is a new feature of equity practice that has been introduced by the PLRA, the substance of what a court must find in fashioning relief for constitutional violations, however, is very much in keeping with pre-PLRA common law limitations on the scope of such relief in litigated judgments. See Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction. 103 F.3d at 647. As for consent decrees, the statutory requirement in Section 3626(a)(1) that courts find proof or admission of a constitutional or statutory violation before approving prospective relief regarding prison conditions is obviously a departure from prePLRA judicial practice. Congress has not, however, stripped federal courts of their authority under Article III to remedy constitutional violations. The court always retains the power to

-35provide all of the necessary prospective relief to remedy any constitutional wrong in the prison context. The PLRA's requirement that prospective relief in prison cases be accompanied by findings that the relief granted precisely addresses the defendant's unlawful conduct does not unduly impair the courts' performance of their Article III functions, or their ability to remedy constitutional violations, and it is well within Congress's authority.
Nor do the PLRA's provisions for periodic review of prospective relief, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), unduly impair a court's equitable powers and ability to redress violations of federal rights. Irrespective of the PLRA, parties are free to seek relief from a prospective order or judgment at any time, and a court may grant a party relief from the prospective ruling where "it is no longer equitable" that the ruling have "prospective application." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b){5).—' The PLRA provides a structured timetable for such requests, see 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(l), and also provides that relief will be kept in place if it continues to meet the remedial criteria established by Section 3626(b)(3). In formalizing periodic review of prospective relief, in order to ensure that relief that does not satisfy the Act's legal standards can be modified or terminated, Congress has effected no radical reworking of the courts' powers. Rather, it
w Rule 60(b)(5) applies to both litigated decrees and consent decrees, such as the one issued in the present case. See Riifo. v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. at 378, 383-384 (explaining the application of Rule 60(b)(5) to consent decrees).

-36-
has exercised its prerogative to establish a remedial mechanism,
and has left to the courts the task of applying that mechanism in
particular cases. See Robertson. 503 U.S. at 441. As long as
the mechanism chosen is not inadequate of remedying
constitutional conduct, it withstands constitutional challenge.
Section 3626(b)(2) provides that where prospective relief
regarding prison conditions is unsupported by prior findings
required by the PLRA -(that such "relief is narrowly drawn,
extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right"),117 a movant is
entitled to the immediate termination of that relief unless the
court finds, under subsection (b)(3), that the relief currently
satisfies the Act's remedial criteria. As with the provisions
for periodic review, the immediate termination provisions do not
deprive the courts of their core equitable power to redress
constitutional violations. Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) do not
require the termination or modification of relief that a court
finds necessary, and narrowly drawn, to remedy constitutional or
statutory violations. Rather, only those portions of a prior
order that do not remain necessary to remedy such violations are
^' Of course, a court need not have anticipated and used the precise language of the PLRA for its prior findings to satisfy the standards set forth by Section 3626(b)(2). If a court previously made findings with respect to the challenged prospective relief that meet the substance of subsection (b)(2)'s requirements, then the relief is ineligible for "immediate termination" under (b)(2). The relief would, however, be subject to termination in the future under Section 3626 (b) (1), at which point it would have to meet the standards of Section 3626(b)(3) in order to continue.

-37affected. If a court determines that an existing decree is too broadly drawn in view of current conditions, but that same, measure of relief remains necessary, the Act does not prohibit the court from imposing new or revised relief that complies with narrow-tailoring requirements, while affording an effective remedy.
Pursuant to subsection (b)(3), a court must terminate its decree (if that decree was entered without the requisite findings) unless it finds, now, that prospective relief, inter alia, "remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right." A serious constitutional question would be raised if the PLRA were read to require a court to terminate relief upon a finding that unconstitutional conduct has halted, notwithstanding the court's additional finding that the violation has not been fully remedied, or that the defendant is poised to resume the unconstitutional conduct, because such a reading might interfere with the court's ability to effectively redress constitutional violations. A court's traditional equitable authority is not limited to ordering the cessation of unconstitutional conduct, but includes the power to restore the victims of that conduct "to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (Milliken I ) . See also Missouri v. Jenkins. 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 (1995) (same).^ Indeed, courts have "not
w Milliken and Missouri v. Jenkins are school desegregation cases. The Supreme Court has admonished, however, that "a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases
(continued...)

-38-
merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so
far as possible eliminate the [unconstitutional] effects of the
past as well as bar like [unconstitutionality] in the future."
Louisiana v. United States. 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). Thus a
better reading of the Act -- and one that clearly comports with
Article III—7 - - i s that the "current or ongoing violation of the
Federal right," for purposes of the Act, encompasses not only
unlawful conduct actually in progress at the very moment the
court rules, but also the failure to remedy the proximate effects
of past unlawful acts and the present danger of imminent
recurrence of a violation of the Constitution or federal
statutory right.^ (The present danger of imminent recurrence of
(...continued) involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution." Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. at 487 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971)). Courts in prison litigation cases have applied the remedial principles of school desegregation cases. See, e.g.. Grubbs v. Bradleyf 821 F. Supp. 496, 503 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (prison conditions).
n/ "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [the courts'] duty is to adopt the latter." United States ex. rel. the Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.f 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) .
w Under the PLRA, once a court finds a "current or ongoing violation of the Federal right," the court must go on to ensure that continued prospective relief "extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(3). Thus, even after finding that sojne relief is necessary, because there exists a "current or ongoing violation," as that term is construed above, a court may have to modify an order or decree
(continued...)

-39-
a found or admitted constitutional or statutory violation plainly
points to the existence of a "current or ongoing violation of the
Federal right" because it demonstrates a failure to remedy the violation.) .li/ This reading of the Act comports with the
accepted understanding of what constitutes an "ongoing"
constitutional violation, and respects the courts' inherent
authority to remedy constitutional violations. See Freeman v.
Eittfi, 503 U.S. 467, 486-489 (1992). See also Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.. 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("Unless a statute in so
many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of
that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.").
(...continued) going forward to ensure that its scope satisfies the PLRA standards.
2^/ Where a court has found the existence of a constitutional or statutory violation and ruled certain action necessary to remedy that violation (either under the PLRA or prior to the new statute's enactment), noncompliance with a previous remedial order or decree may represent a failure to remedy the violation and hence a "current or ongoing violation of the Federal right." However, it is important to note that violation of a consent decree does not constitute a "current or ongoing violation of the Federal right" so as to justify continuing the injunctive relief, if the decree is not based on an admitted or proven violation of a constitutional right. To regard a violation of such a decree as justification for continuation of relief would be at odds with the intent of the PLRA, which was enacted to ensure that courts redress only constitutional or statutory violations. See Plylerf 100 F.3d at 370 (both subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) use the term "Federal right" to refer to the underlying or current violation of rights afforded by the Constitution or federal statute, not rights conferred by a consent decree).

-40E. The PLRA Termination Provisions' Revision Of The
Standards Governing Modification Of Consent Decrees Does Not Violate Article III The district court found that "[t]he PLRA's requirement that a court make new findings for a consent decree, already ordered, represents an unjustifiable encroachment of the legislative and executive branches into the domain of the judiciary." Hadix. 947 F. Supp. at 1104. The district court erred. As the district court stated, in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 502 U.S. 367 (1992), the Supreme Court held that consent decrees in institutional reform litigation should be modified under a somewhat more relaxed standard than other kinds of consent decrees. The Court noted the importance of the "ability of a district court to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances," and held that, in ruling on a motion to modify made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), district courts should alter decrees to reflect unanticipated "significant change[s] either in factual conditions or in law." Rufo. 502 U.S. at 384. The Court emphasized, however, that "[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor," and cautioned that changes should be "tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances." 502 U.S. at 391. It is undeniable that the PLRA's termination provisions modify the Rnf_Q. standard. But nothing in Rufo suggests that its holding was constitutional in stature. Rather, Rufo's standard was established by the Court as a gloss on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which states in pertinent part:

-41On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. . . . "
The equitable power to modify a judgment, codified in Rule 60(b)
and elaborated in Ruf6f is one aspect of that "inherent
authority" possessed by "[c]ourts invested with the judicial
power of the United States * * * to protect their proceedings and
judgments in the course of discharging their traditional
responsibilities." Degen v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780
(1996). But where Congress speaks clearly to abrogate a prior
judicially developed standard, "the exercise of the inherent
power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and
rule." Chambers v. NASCQ. Inc.. 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991).
Congress has spoken clearly in the PLRA, and its will governs.
As demonstrated above, the PLRA's standard for imposition and
continuation of prospective relief lies well within the powers of
Congress, and infringes no Article III authority of the judicial
branch. The mere fact that the standard Congress has chosen is
not identical in every respect to prior equity practice should
pose no additional obstacle to its constitutionality. As the
Supreme Court cautioned just last year, "The extent of [inherent
authority] must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of
overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit

-42of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority." Degen. 116 S. Ct. at 1780.
II SECTIONS 3626(b)(2) AND (b)(3) OF THE PLRA DO NOT VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS1 EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the PLRA also pass muster under the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Legislation is presumed to be valid, and will be sustained against an equal protection challenge "if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest," and the statute does not classify individuals by race, alienage, national origin, gender, or illegitimacy, or impinge upon a fundamental right. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.. 473 U.S. 432, 440-441 (1985) . See also City of New Orleans v. Dukes. 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). There is no basis for heightened scrutiny in examining the PLRA's termination provisions. See Plylerr 100 F.3d at 373; Benjamin. 935 F. Supp. at 352-353.
The PLRA does not target a suspect class. It is well established that inmates are not members of a suspect class supporting heightened equal protection scrutiny.—' Nor do the PLRA provisions at issue substantially burden a fundamental right. Plyler. 100 F.3d at 373. The right of access to the courts cited by plaintiffs "assures that no person will be denied
w See ScJaej: v. Chief Postal Inspector. 973 F.2d 682, 683-684 (8th Cir. 1992); EQSS. v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 689-690 (4th Cir. 1989); P_XYQX v- Brennan. 914 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1990);
n v. Heckler. 790 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) ("incarcerated felons are not a suspect classification").

-43the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."
v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). That access right "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability -- the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." Lewis v. Casey. 116 S. Ct. at 2182. That capability is not unconstitutionally impaired, however, by Sections 3626(b)(2) or (b)(3). "The provisions granting immediate termination of prospective relief in the PLRA do not implicate th[e] right of initial access to commence a lawsuit." Benjamin. 935 F. Supp. at 352. Moreover, prisoners continue to have an opportunity to establish current or ongoing violations of their constitutional rights, see Plyler, 100 F.3d at 373, as well as failure to remedy past violations.
Under the rational basis standard, a legislative classification "must be upheld * * * if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Heller v. Doe. 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citation omitted). The "'burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it' * * * whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record." 509 U.S. at 320-321 (citation omitted). See also Plyler. 100 F.3d at 373-374. Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) clearly satisfy that deferential standard.
In enacting the PLRA's remedial and termination provisions, Congress sought to promote principles of federalism, security,

-44and fiscal restraint in the unique context of detentional and correctional institutions. Section 3626(b)(2) "is an eminently rational means of accomplishing" Congress1 legitimate interest "in preserving state sovereignty by protecting states from overzealous supervision by the federal courts in the area of prison conditions litigation." Plylerr 100 F.3d at 374. The PLRA "addresses the problem of overbearing court supervision by forbidding courts to intrude to any degree greater than that required by federal law." 100 F.2d at 374. "Congress could also have wanted to create a uniform national standard for consent and litigated judgments based on a belief that consent judgments, even though agreed to initially, imposed severe burdens on states and local governments and that these burdens exceeded what was constitutionally required." Benjamin. 935 F. Supp. at 354. "Congress was concerned that federal courts had maintained jurisdiction over consent decrees that provided relief beyond what the constitution required. In an effort to combat this, Congress mandated that defendants have the right to seek judicial review of the consent decrees that had been entered without any finding of an actual violation of a federal right and any consideration of whether the relief granted was narrowly tailored to address that violation." 935 F. Supp. at 355. Those objectives are unquestionably legitimate ones, and the challenged provisions are a rational method by which to achieve them. See Plyler. 100 F.3d at 374; Benjamin. 935 F. Supp. at 934-936.
Finally, because Congress found both frequent abuses and heightened dangers in the context of prison conditions litiga-

-45tion, see H.R. Rep. No. 21 at 24 & n.2, its decision to legislate in that area is distinguishable from statutes that single out disfavored groups based on a punitive or discriminatory animus. Cf. James v. Strange. 407 U.S. 128, 142 (1972); Romer v. Evans. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
Ill SECTIONS 3626(b)(2) AND (b)(3) DO NOT VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the PLRA plainly do not violate plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prospective relief, including relief provided under a consent decree, is subject to modification or termination to accommodate changes in pertinent law or fact, or where there are other equitable considerations supporting modification. As a result, prospective orders in prison conditions suits are clearly not protected "property" interests under the Due Process Clause. See Board of Regents v. Ro£2l, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972). For the same reason, plaintiffs do not have any vested rights in the prospective relief afforded under the prospective relief ordered here. See Plyler. 100 F.3d at 374-375; Benjamin. 935 F. Supp. at 356. But see Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Mich. 1996) . A final money judgment entered by a court creates a "vested right" and a constitutionally protected property interest. See McCullough v. Virginia. 172 U.S. 102, 123-124 (1898). But a prospective decree or order, which is always subject to modification based upon subsequent legislative enactments, changed facts, or other equitable considerations,

-46-
creates no such vested right. See United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84, 104 (1985). See also Fleming v. Rhodes. 331 U.S. 100,
107 (1947).
Nor do Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) deprive parties of
prior judgments without an opportunity to be heard. To the
contrary, existing relief is preserved where a court finds on the
record that the relief meets applicable remedial standards. No
greater process is due in this context.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER Acting Assistant Attorney General
DAVID K. FLYNN MARIE K. McELDERRY MARGO SCHLANGER
Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 514-3068

STATUTORY ADDENDUM

Copr. (C) West 1997 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. works 18 USCA 3626 18 U.S.C.A. s 3626
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CHAPTER 229 [FN1]--POSTSENTENCE ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER C--IMPRISONMENT Copr. (C) West 1997. All rights reserved. Current through P.L. 104-333, approved 11-12-96
s 3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions
(a) Requirements for relief.-(1) Prospective relief.--(A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
(B) The court shall not order any prospective relief that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates State or local law, unless--
(1) Federal law permits such relief to be ordered in violation of State or local law;
(ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right; and
(iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right.
(C) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts, in exercising their remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes, or to repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of the courts.
(2) Preliminary injunctive relief.--In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the extent otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary restraining order or an order for preliminary injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity set out in paragraph (1) (B) in tailoring any preliminary relief. Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the

date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before the expiration of the 90- day period.
(3) Prisoner release order.--(A) In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, no prisoner release order shall be entered unless--
(i) a court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner release order; and
(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders.
(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court in accordance with section 2284 of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E) have been met.
(C) A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal court shall file with any request for such relief, a request for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to demonstrate that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have been met.
(D) If the requirements under subparagraph (A) have been met, a Federal judge before whom a civil action with respect to prison conditions is pending who believes that a prison release order should be considered may sua sponte request the convening of a three-judge court to determine whether a prisoner release order should be entered.
(E) The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that--
(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and
(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.
(F) Any State or local official or unit of government whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of program facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not admitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order shall have standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such relief and to seek termination of such relief, and shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding relating to such relief.
(b) Termination of relief.-(1) Termination of prospective relief.--(A) In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener-(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief; (ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief under this paragraph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after such date of enactment.

(B) Nothing in this section shall prevent the parties from agreeing to terminate or modify relief before the relief is terminated under subparagraph (A).
(2) Immediate termination of prospective relief .--In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
(3) Limitation.--Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
(4) Termination or modification of relief.--Nothing in this section shall prevent any party or intervener from seeking modification or termination before the relief is terminable under paragraph (1) or (2), to the extent that modification or termination would otherwise be legally permissible.
(c) Settlements.-(1) Consent decrees.--In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, the court shall not enter or approve a consent decree unless it complies with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a).
(2) Private settlement agreements.--(A) Nothing in this section shall preclude parties from entering into a private settlement agreement that does not comply with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a), if the terms of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.
(B) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement agreement has been breached from seeking in State court any remedy available under State law.
(d) State law remedies.--The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law.
(e) Procedure for motions affecting prospective relief.-(1) Generally.--The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions. (2) Automatic stay.--Any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be automatically stayed during the period-(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); or (ii) beginning on the 180th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under any other law; and
(B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.
(f) Special masters.--

(1) In general.--(A) In any civil action in a Federal court with respect to prison conditions, the court may appoint a special master who shall be disinterested and objective and who will give due regard to the public safety, to conduct hearings on the record and prepare proposed findings of fact.
(B) The court shall appoint a special master under this subsection during the remedial phase of the action only upon a finding that the remedial phase will be sufficiently complex to warrant the appointment.
(2) Appointment.--(A) If the court determines that the appointment of a special master is necessary, the court shall request that the defendant institution and the plaintiff each submit a list of not more than 5 persons to serve as a special master.
(B) Each party shall have the opportunity to remove up to 3 persons from the opposing party's list.
(C) The court shall select the master from the persons remaining on the list after the operation of subparagraph (B).
(3) Interlocutory appeal,--Any party shall have the right to an interlocutory appeal of the judge's selection of the special master under this subsection, on the ground of partiality.
(4) Compensation.--The compensation to be allowed to a special master under this section shall be based on an hourly rate not greater than the hourly rate established under section 3006A for payment of court-appointed counsel, plus costs reasonably incurred by the special master. Such compensation and costs shall be paid with funds appropriated to the Judiciary.
(5) Regular review of appointment.--In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which a special master is appointed under this subsection, the court shall review the appointment of the special master every 6 months to determine whether the services of the special master continue to be required under paragraph (1). In no event shall the appointment of a special master extend beyond the termination of the relief.
(6) Limitations on powers and duties.--A special master appointed under this subsection--
(A) may be authorized by a court to conduct hearings and prepare proposed findings of fact, which shall be made on the record;
(B) shall not make any findings or communications ex parte; (C) may be authorized by a court to assist in the development of remedial plans; and (D) may be removed at any time, but shall be relieved of the appointment upon the termination of relief. (g) Definitions.--As used in this section-(1) the term "consent decree" means any relief entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include private settlements; (2) the term "civil action with respect to prison conditions" means any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact

or duration of confinement in prison; (3) the term "prisoner" means any person subject to
incarceration, detention, or admission to any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program;
(4) the term "prisoner release order" includes any order, including a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison;
(5) the term "prison" means any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law;
(6) the term "private settlement agreement" means an agreement entered into among the parties that is not subject to judicial enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled;
(7) the term "prospective relief" means all relief other than compensatory monetary damages;
(8) the term "special master" means any person appointed by a Federal court pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or pursuant to any inherent power of the court to exercise the powers of a master, regardless of the title or description given by the court; and
(9) the term "relief" means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Final

Brief For The United States As Intervenor-Appellant were served

by first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following

individuals and counsel of record:

Susan Przekop-Shaw, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General Corrections Division Plaza One Building 101 South Washington Square Lansing, Michigan 48909

Suite 900

Dr. F. Warren Benton 149 Beach Avenue Larchmont, New York 10538

Elizabeth Alexander, Esquire National Prison Project 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 410 Washington, DC 20009

Patricia A. Streeter, Esquire One Kennedy Square, 1816 Detroit, Michigan 48226

Michael Barnhart One Kennedy Square, 1420 Detroit, Michigan 48226

Deborah LaBelle 3310 Cadillac Tower Detroit, Michigan 48226

This 1st day of May, 1997.

Marie K. McElderry Attorney U.S. Department of Justice Post Office Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 514-3068

 
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APPEAL, CLOSED, HABEAS, TRO
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:80-cv-73581-JF

Hadix, et al v. Johnson, et al Assigned to: Honorable John Feikens Demand: $0
Plaintiff Everett Hadix

Date Filed: 09/18/1980 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Larry W. Bennett 101 W. Big Beaver Road, Ste 1000 Troy, MI 48084 248-457-7022 Email: lbennett@chglaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) One Kennedy Square Suite 1816 Detroit, MI 48226 313-962-1177 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle 221 N. Main Street Suite 300 Ann Arbor, MI 48104 734-996-5620 Fax: 734-996-5620 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer Pitt, Dowty, (Royal Oak) 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067-3804 248-398-9800 Fax: 248-398-9804 Email: jmirer@pdmmp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart 221 N. Main Street

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Plaintiff Richard Mapes
Plaintiff Patrick Sommerville

Suite 300 Ann Arbor, MI 48104-1166 734-213-3703 Fax: 734-213-3704 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address)

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Plaintiff Roosevelt Hudson, Jr.
Plaintiff Brent Koster
Plaintiff Lee McDonald

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett

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Plaintiff Darryl Sturges
Plaintiff Robert Flemster

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff William Lovett
Plaintiff James Covington

Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Frank Thomas
Plaintiff James Haddix

Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Larry W. Bennett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff James Alexander
Plaintiff Al Buttons

Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter 221 N. Main Street Suite 300 Ann Arbor, MI 48104 734-222-0088 Email: pas@patstreeter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff James Chipman
Plaintiff Perry Davis

Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Michael Gray TERMINATED: 05/24/1994
Plaintiff Mark LeMothe

Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/1994 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/1994 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/24/1994 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address)

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Plaintiff Cylester Nunnally
Plaintiff Earl Pannell

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address)

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Plaintiff Carl Proctor
Plaintiff William Ramsey
Plaintiff

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Theodore Rhode
Plaintiff Orvel Simmons
Plaintiff Ted Sullivan

represented by Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah A. LaBelle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Plaintiff Mark Coleman Plaintiff Danny Walker
Plaintiff Ronald Kovaleski Plaintiff C. Moore
Plaintiff Alfredo Robinson

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neal Bush (SUSPENDED) (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeanne E. Mirer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Barnhart (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Patricia A. Streeter (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by C. Moore 100885 Southern Michigan Correctional Facility 4010 Cooper Street Jackson, MI 49201-7510 PRO SE
represented by Alfredo Robinson 136864 State Prison of Southern Michigan Central Complex 4008 Cooper Street Jackson, MI 49201 PRO SE

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V. Defendant Perry M. Johnson

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt MI Dept of Atty Gen (Natural Resources) Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division P.O. Box 30755 Lansing, MI 48909-8255 517-373-7540 Email: SchmidtBA@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville Wayne State University (Ferndale) Civil Rights Litigation Clinic P.O. Box 20321 Ferndale, MI 48220 248-577-3348 Email: dmanville@wayne.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee MI Dept of Atty Gen (Alcohol & Gambling Enf.) Alcohol & Gambling Enforcement Division 1500 Abbott Road Suite 300 East Lansing, MI 48823 517-741-0210 Email: mcgeheed@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve Michigan Department of Attorney General Habeas Corpus Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909-7717 517-373-4875 Email: vanclevej@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Jann R. Baugh Michigan Department of Attorney General International Trade & Agriculture Div. P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517-373-6514 Fax: 517-373-6514 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman Michigan Department of Attorney General Corrections Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909-7717 517-335-7021 Email: friedmanl@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward 1300 N. Waverly Suite 5 Lansing, MI 48917 517-323-0300 Fax: 517-323-0300 TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson MI Dept of Attorney General (Public Service) 6545 Mercantile Way Suite 15 Lansing, MI 48911 517-241-6680 Email: NickersonM@michigan.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams Michigan Department of Attorney General Corrections Division P. O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909-7717 517-335-7021

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Defendant Barry Mintzes

Fax: 517-334-6020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw Michigan Department of Attorney General Corrections Division P. O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909-7717 517-335-7021 Fax: 517-335-7021 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes Michigan Department of Attorney General Habeas Corpus Division 120 N. Washington Square, 1st Floor P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517-373-4875 Fax: 517-373-4875 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson Michigan Department of Attorney General State Affairs Division P.O. Box 30217 Lansing, MI 48909 517-373-1162 Fax: 517-373-1162 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee

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Defendant Charles Anderson

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Defendant
William F. Grant Warden

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes

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Defendant Dale Foltz

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Daniel Trudell

Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address)

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Defendant Duane Sholes

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward

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Defendant John Jabe

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant James Pogats

Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address)

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Defendant Roy Rider

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Charles Ustess

represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Defendant Don P. LeDuc

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw

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Defendant Robert Brown, Jr.

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Graham Allen

Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997

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Defendant Elton Scott

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman

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Defendant Pam Withrow

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Frank Elo

Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address)

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Defendant Marjorie Van Ochten

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant John Prelesnik

Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara A. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel E. Manville (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald S. McGehee (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet Van Cleve (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leo H. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa C. Ward (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/03/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Nickerson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard M.C. Adams (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Przekop-Shaw (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore E. Hughes (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C. Nelson (See above for address)

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V. Movant Marvin Mayberry
Movant United States of America

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marvin Mayberry 123320 State Prison of Southern Michigan Central Complex 4008 Cooper Street Jackson, MI 49201 PRO SE
represented by Margo Schlanger U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division P.O. Box 66400 Washington, DC 20035-6400 202-616-8657 Fax: 202-616-8657 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H. Rosenbaum U.S. Department of Justice Housing and Civil Enforcement Section
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 202-305-1311 Fax: 202-305-1311 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 11/19/1987 10/20/1988
10/20/1988

#

Docket Text

773 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, regarding monitoring fees (Copy of order that was originally omitted from docket) (lh) (Entered: 02/05/1991)

MOTION hearing held on plaintiff's motion to clarify consent judgment for evidenitary hearing - motion granted - evidentiary hearing to be held at a date and time to be set by the court - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) Modified on 10/21/1988 (Entered: 10/21/1988)

MOTION hearing held on defendants motion to modify consent decree motion to modify consent decree denied without prejudice; to be considered by monitor in his first report, defendants may bring motion subsequent to report - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) (Entered: 10/21/1988)

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10/20/1988
10/20/1988
10/20/1988 01/06/1989 01/09/1989 01/10/1989 01/11/1989 01/11/1989 01/12/1989
01/12/1989 01/13/1989 01/16/1989

MOTION hearing held on defendants motion to appoint Benton monitor and transfer cases - defendants motion to appoint Benton monitor and transfer cases granted in part as to appointment of Benton as monitor and denied as to the transfer of cases - - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) Modified on 10/21/1988 (Entered: 10/21/1988)
MOTION hearing held on plaintiffs motion to modify consent decree plaintiffs motion to modify consent decree denied without prejudice as to plaintiff's right to bring motion re: sanitation after Warden Jabes report due 12/01/88 - - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) Modified on 10/21/1988 (Entered: 10/21/1988)
MOTION hearing held on plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with Court's order of 11/30/87 - plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with Court's order of 11/30/87 denied with prejudice - - Judge John Feikens Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (lt) (Entered: 10/21/1988)
592 RESPONSE of defendants' to plaintiffs' motion to clarify section VI, paragraph 13 of consent judgment with memorandum and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/11/1989)
593 APPEAL record certified and transmitted to USCA - appeal case # 881144,88-1879,88-1905 - # of volumes: 7 - # of transcripts: 26 by UPS. (lh) Modified on 01/11/1989 (Entered: 01/10/1989)
594 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of notice of appeal. appeal case # 88-2111 (lh) (Entered: 01/19/1989)
596 ANSWER (response) of plaintiffs' to Warden Jabe's Report regarding the Status of Sanitation Issues with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/19/1989)
597 ORDER by Judge John Feikens to transport C. Pepper Moore , Alfredo A Robinson, raymon Walen, Karl Battle-El and Brent Koster from State Prison to Federal Courthouse on 1/12/89 @ 8:30 am. (lh) (Entered: 01/19/1989)
MOTION hearing held and continued on - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *Motion hearing held on Pltf's Motion for Clarification of Section VI, Paragraph 13 of the Consent Judgment (filed on 10/07/88) - hearing con't. to 01/17/89 at 9:00 a.m..* (cd) (Entered: 01/12/1989)
598 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying defendants' motion to transfer jurisdiction of case to Western District without prejudice and for appointment of F. Warren Benton as Monitor is granted. (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
599 ORDER by Judge John Feikens that the Michigan Department of Corrections is ordered to transport C Pepper Moore, Alfredo A Robinson, Raymond Whalen, KAral Battle-El and Brent Koster to Federal Court on 1/17/89 @ 8:30 am with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
MOTION hearing held on - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Ellen

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01/17/1989 01/17/1989 01/25/1989 02/08/1989 02/09/1989 02/21/1989 02/22/1989 04/03/1989 04/07/1989 04/07/1989 04/07/1989 04/10/1989 04/21/1989
04/27/1989 05/03/1989

Alexander - *Motion by pltf. for clarification of Part VI, Paragraph 13 of the consent judgment - heard - evidentiary hearing - TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT.8 (cd) (Entered: 01/18/1989)
600 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from UPS of receipt of record appeal [593-1] appeal case # 88-1905,88-1879,88-1144 (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
601 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from UPS of receipt of record appeal [593-1] (lh) (Entered: 01/20/1989)
602 RESPONSE (post hearing brief) of plaintiffs' in support to their motion for clarification of section VI, paragraph 13 of the consent judgment with proof of service. (lh) (Entered: 01/30/1989)
603 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of record on appeal appeal case # 88-1144 and 88-1879 (lh) (Entered: 02/09/1989)
604 REPLY of defendants' to motion response (post hearing brief) [602-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 02/10/1989)
605 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA dismissing appeal - appeal case # 88-2111 - record not returned. (lh) (Entered: 02/23/1989)
606 NOTICE of Philip W. Berryman for violations of the Haddix and USA Consent Decree with attachment. (lh) (Entered: 02/24/1989)
607 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA vacating injunction appeal case # 88-1144. See order for details - record not returned (lh) (Entered: 04/05/1989)
608 NOTICE of filing report of the Monitor concerning the Stipulation regarding the implementation of COnsent Decree Provision VIII, E, F, and G (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
609 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, approving stipulation regarding implemenation of Consent decree Proviss ion VIII E, F, and G. See stip and order for details (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
610 NOTICE of plaintiffs' of taking deposition of Roger Roberts 4/13/89 @ 1:00 pm NSI with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
611 MOTION of plaintiffs' for temporary restraining order with brief, and attachments (lh) (Entered: 04/12/1989)
612 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens regarding plaintiff's motion to clarify Section VI, paragraph 13 of the consent judgment. See memorandum opinion and order for details. (lh) (Entered: 04/24/1989)
613 MANDATE from USCA vacating order for injunction - appeal case # 881144 - record Not returned. (lh) (Entered: 05/08/1989)
614 MANDATE from USCA vacating - appeal case # 88-1144 order for temporary injunction - record not returned, will be returned at later date. (lh) (Entered: 05/08/1989)

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05/04/1989 05/04/1989 05/15/1989 06/12/1989
06/12/1989
06/14/1989 06/16/1989 06/16/1989 07/07/1989 07/07/1989 07/10/1989 07/13/1989

SCHEDULE: status conference set for 6/14/89 *between 9:00 and 11:30 a.m.* before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 05/04/1989)
615 NOTICE of status conference regarding remaining issues by telephone (lh) (Entered: 05/08/1989)
616 ANSWER (response) of plaintiffs' to defendants' revised proposal and administrative structure of the State Prison of Southern Michigan of 2/15/89 with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1989)
617 NOTICE by defendant John Prelesnik, defendant Marjorie Van Ochten, defendant Frank Elo, defendant Pam Withrow, defendant Elton Scott, defendant Graham Allen, defendant Robert Brown Jr, defendant Don P. LeDuc, defendant Charles Ustess, defendant Roy Rider, defendant James Pogats, defendant John Jabe, defendant Duane Sholes, defendant Daniel Trudell, defendant Dale Foltz, defendant William F. Grant, defendant Charles Anderson, defendant Barry Mintzes, defendant Perry M. Johnson of to substitute Theodore E Hughes, Susan Przekop-Shaw and Richard Adams as counsel for defendants instead of Susan A Harris. (lh) (Entered: 06/13/1989)
618 SUBSTITUTION for defendant John Prelesnik, defendant Marjorie Van Ochten, defendant Frank Elo, defendant Pam Withrow, defendant Elton Scott, defendant Graham Allen, defendant Robert Brown Jr, defendant Don P. LeDuc, defendant Charles Ustess, defendant Roy Rider, defendant James Pogats, defendant John Jabe, defendant Duane Sholes, defendant Daniel Trudell, defendant Dale Foltz, defendant William F. Grant, defendant Charles Anderson, defendant Barry Mintzes, defendant Perry M. Johnson of attorney Theodore E. Hughes, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Richard M.C. Adams in place of Susan A. Harris with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/13/1989)
STATUS conference held - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 06/15/1989)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 8/9/89 *between 9:30 and 11:30 a.m* before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 06/19/1989)
619 PRETRIAL ORDER by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe scheduling status conference with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/21/1989)
620 MOTION by plaintiffs for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class with brief, exhibits, proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 07/10/1989)
621 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel inspection with brief, proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 07/10/1989)
622 RESPONSE (report to court monitor) by plaintiffs' to defendants' motion to modify the access to courts provision of the consent judgment regarding electric typewriters with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/11/1989)
623 MOTION by plaintiffs' for clarification of order accepting consent

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07/17/1989 07/17/1989 07/20/1989 07/20/1989 07/20/1989 07/27/1989 07/28/1989
07/28/1989 08/01/1989
08/01/1989
08/01/1989

judgment to permit enforcement of the consent judgment at the Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries at the Egeler Facility with exhibit "A", amended notice of hearing and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/14/1989)
624 MOTION by defendant for leave to appearance of lead counsel with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/18/1989)
625 REMARK - Plaintiffs Status report regarding Clarence Moore Hearings with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/18/1989)
626 NOTICE by defendants' of hearing on motion for leave to appearance of lead counsel by Perry M. Johnson [624-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/21/1989)
627 RESPONSE and memorandum by defendant Perry M. Johnson to motion for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class [620-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/21/1989)
628 RESPONSE and memorandum by defendant to motion to compel inspection [621-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/21/1989)
629 REPLY by plaintiff to motion response by Perry M. Johnson [627-1] with attachments and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 07/28/1989)
630 REPLY by plaintiff to motion response by Perry M. Johnson to compel inspection and [628-1], motion response by Perry M. Johnson to clarify order to permit enforcement at Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries [627-1] with exhibit "A" and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 07/31/1989)
631 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for (lh) (Entered: 07/31/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for leave to appearance of lead counsel by Perry M. Johnson - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *motion granted conditionally - JF will review each hearing on this case and will notify Harris in advance if he wants her to attend hearing.* (cd) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for clarification of order accepting consent judgment to permit enforcement of the consent judgment at the Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries at the Egeler Facility by James V. Haddix - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Melina Khammo - Motion granted - Egeler Facility is within Consent Judgment - plaintiffs' attorney to enter order. (cd) Modified on 08/03/1989 (Entered: 08/03/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *motion granted - Pltf's expert Dr. Powitz may inspect without Pltfs' atty. (& committee to resolve disputes may be established.)* (cd) (Entered: 08/03/1989)

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08/01/1989
08/02/1989 08/03/1989 08/03/1989
08/07/1989 08/07/1989 08/09/1989 08/10/1989 08/10/1989 08/14/1989 08/15/1989 08/17/1989
08/21/1989 08/29/1989

MOTION hearing held on motion for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class by James V. Haddix - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Melina Khammo *motion granted - Pltfs' atty. may meet with 12 mixed custody inmates, Warden will select guard to stay in room during meeting.* (cd) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
632 PROOF of mailing of copy of motion to transfer for purposes of consolidation and brief (not on docket) (lh) (Entered: 08/03/1989)
633 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, to file brief in excess 20 pages (lh) (Entered: 08/04/1989)
634 MOTION by defendant to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation with brief, attachments "A" thru "G" and notice of hearing without date.(lh) Modified on 08/04/1989 (Entered: 08/04/1989)
635 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for leave to appearance of lead counsel by Perry M. Johnson [624-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/08/1989)
636 STATEMENT (Status report regarding contempt proceedings) by defendants with attachments "1" thru "4". (lh) (Entered: 08/09/1989)
STATUS conference held. *Written order to be prepared by Magistrate Pepe regarding status conference proceedings* - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/10/1989)
SCHEDULE: deadline for filing motion *to expand the scope of the contempt proceedings and memorandum of law by Pepper Moore* set for 9/11/89 before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/10/1989)
639 PRETRIAL ORDER - regarding contempt proceedings by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe, and deadline for filing motions (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1989)
637 MOTION by plaintiffs' counsel for attorney monitoring fees and costs with exhibits, proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 08/15/1989)
638 MOTION by plaintiffs' for attorney monitoring fees and costs with brief, exhibits, proposed order, exhibits and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1989)
640 MOTION by plaintiffs' to extend time for defendant to answer motion to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation by defendants' [634-1] with brief, proposed order and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/18/1989)
641 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation by Perry M. Johnson [634-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/22/1989)
642 NOTICE by plaintiff of hearing on motion for attorney monitoring fees

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08/31/1989 09/05/1989
09/11/1989 09/18/1989
09/19/1989 09/19/1989 09/25/1989 09/25/1989 09/26/1989 09/26/1989 09/26/1989 09/26/1989 09/28/1989 09/28/1989 09/29/1989

and costs by James V. Haddix [638-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/29/1989)
643 MOTION by defendants' for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641-1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/01/1989)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [638-1], motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [637-1] - Judge John Feikens - *MOTION - WITHDRAWN.* (cd) (Entered: 09/05/1989)
644 MOTION by plaintiffs' to extend time to file a motion and memorandum to expand the scope of contempt proceedings to 9/15/89 with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/12/1989)
645 NOTICE by defendant of hearing on motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641-1] by Perry M. Johnson [643-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1989)
646 MOTION by plaintiffs' to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/20/1989)
647 SUPPLEMENTAL (memorandum of law) regarding motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646-1] (lh) (Entered: 09/21/1989)
648 REQUEST by defendants' for admissions as to plaintiffs with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/26/1989)
649 NOTICE by plaintiff of hearing on motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/26/1989)
650 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order to establish procedures for inspections with brief (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
650 PROOF of mailing of pleading 650 (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
651 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them with brief and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
651 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order regarding jurisdiction over the Egler Facility with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 1:00 10/11/89 before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 09/28/1989)
652 NOTICE of status conference (lh) (Entered: 09/29/1989)
653 RESPONSE (memorandum in opposition) by plaintiff to motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to

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09/29/1989 10/03/1989 10/05/1989
10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/05/1989

transfer [641-1] [643-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/02/1989)
654 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation for Alfredo A Robinson and James Chipman from State Prison to Federal Courthouse on 10/1/89 (lh) (Entered: 10/02/1989)
655 AMENDED ex parte order by Judge John Feikens, that the Michigan Department of Corrections transport Alfredo A. Robinson No. 136864 and James Chipman No 130130 from the State Prioson of Southern Michigan to the Federal Courthouse in Detroit on 10/5/89 for a scheduled hearing at 9:00 a.m. (mm) (Entered: 10/04/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641-1] by Perry M. Johnson [643-1] - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Tyler *TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - this will be discussed after Sixth Circuit decision and MDOC has 2 weeks to brief again.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646-1] - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Tyler - *TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge Feikens will discuss this matter w/Magistrate Pepe.* r (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for entry of order regarding jurisdiction over the Egler Facility by Everett Hadix [651-1] - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Tyler - GRANTED - orde submitted.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them by Everett Hadix [651-1] Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Tyler *TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Deft. has 2 weeks to file brief & then Judge Feikens will decide this motion on the papers.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
MOTION hearing held on motion for entry of order to establish procedures for inspections by Everett Hadix [650-1] - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Tyler - *GRANTED - order submitted with changes to page 3 of the proposed order.* (cd) (Entered: 10/05/1989)
656 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order regarding jurisdiction over the Egler Facility by Everett Hadix and that these areas specifically include work areas within the Egeler Facility, all food service areas, housing unit Block 3 and Dwayne Waters Hospital [651-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
657 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order to establish procedures for inspections by Everett Hadix [650-1] See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
658 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, regarding group meetings with plaintiffs

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10/05/1989 10/05/1989 10/11/1989
10/18/1989 10/20/1989 10/23/1989 10/26/1989 11/17/1989
11/17/1989 11/22/1989 11/22/1989 11/29/1989 12/01/1989
12/08/1989

counsel See order for details (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
659 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by defendants' to motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore [646-1] with attachments "1" thru "8" (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
660 DEPOSITION SUBPOENA returned executed by Process Server on 9/28/89 as to deponent Dr. F. Warren Benton (lh) (Entered: 10/06/1989)
STATUS conference held. *Defendant's response to petitioner's memo on contempt law to be filed by October 19, 1989. Any supplement by petitioner to be filed by October 19, 1989. Magistrate Pepe to meet with Judge Feikens on October 24, 1989. - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 10/12/1989)
661 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/5/89. (lh) (Entered: 10/18/1989)
662 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum of plaintiffs to motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646-1] with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 10/23/1989)
663 MEMORANDUM of law by defendants' regarding contempt. (lh) (Entered: 10/25/1989)
664 RESPONSE by defendant Perry M. Johnson to motion for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them [651-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/27/1989)
665 LETTER, from Various prisoners in support of the Memorandum Opinion and Order that stated the need for the Department of Corrections to hire regular legal director and legal assistances to help prisoners (lh) (Entered: 11/20/1989)
666 AFFIDAVIT for Warden H. N. Grayson and Warden John Jabe marked as exhibit "2" with attachment. (lh) (Entered: 11/20/1989)
667 MOTION by plaintiffs' for payment of monitoring costs related to their experts with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 11/24/1989)
668 REQUEST by plaintiffs for defendants to produce documents with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 11/24/1989)
669 NOTICE by plaintiff James V. Haddix of hearing on motion for payment of monitoring costs related to their experts by James V. Haddix [667-1] with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 11/30/1989)
670 REPLY by plaintiffs' to motion response by Perry M. Johnson to plaintiffs' motion for an order adding nan med plaintiffs and providing protections to them [664-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 12/04/1989)
671 REQUEST by plaintiffs for defendants to produce documents with proof of mailing. (lp) (Entered: 12/12/1989)

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12/08/1989 12/08/1989
12/20/1989
01/22/1990 01/23/1990 01/25/1990 02/09/1990 02/12/1990 02/13/1990
02/13/1990

672 INTERROGATORIES by plaintiffs to defendants with proof of mailing. (lp) (Entered: 12/12/1989)
673 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order adding named plaintiffs and providing protections to them by Everett Hadix [651-1]. It is further ordered that originally named plaintiffs William Lovette and Lee McDonald are not members of the class because they do not reside in 3 Block with proof of mailing. (see order) (lp) Modified on 12/12/1989 (Entered: 12/12/1989)
674 APPEARANCE for John Prelesnik, Marjorie Van Ochten, Frank Elo, Pam Withrow, Elton Scott, Graham Allen, Robert Brown Jr, Don P. LeDuc, Charles Ustess, Roy Rider, James Pogats, John Jabe, Duane Sholes, Daniel Trudell, Dale Foltz, William F. Grant, Charles Anderson, Barry Mintzes, Perry M. Johnson of attorney Donald S. McGehee with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 12/21/1989)
675 MOTION by plaintiff to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13 and court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property with brief, attachment "A" and proof of mailing. (lh) Modified on 03/30/1990 (Entered: 03/30/1990)
676 NOTICE by plaintiff of hearing on motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13, and the court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property [675-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/25/1990)
677 MOTION by plaintiffs' to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section IV, H. 2 regarding meaningful out-of-cell activity with exhibits "A" thru "C", proof of mailing and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 01/26/1990)
678 MOTION by defendant for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs , and to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 02/12/1990)
679 RESPONSE (reply memorandum) by plaintiff to motion for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs by John Prelesnik [678-1], motion to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures by John Prelesnik [678-2] with attachments 1 thru 8 and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 02/13/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs by John Prelesnik [678-1], motion to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures by John Prelesnik [678-2] - disposition: discovery stayed - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 02/16/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section IV, H. 2 regarding meaningful out-of-cell activity by James V. Haddix [677-1] - disposition: withdrawn

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02/13/1990
02/22/1990 03/06/1990 03/07/1990 03/08/1990 03/13/1990 03/19/1990
03/27/1990 03/27/1990 03/28/1990 03/29/1990

- Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 02/16/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13, and the court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property [675-1] - disposition: withdrawn - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 02/16/1990)
680 MOTION by defendants' for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis with brief, and exhibits. (lh) (Entered: 02/23/1990)
681 NOTICE of hearing on motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 03/06/1990)
682 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge George E. Woods, for transportation for plaintiff Alfredo Robinson (136864) and Perry Davis (136531) to appear before Judge Feikens on 3/19/90 @ 2:00 pm Order signed by Judge Woods in absence of Judge Feikens (lh) (Entered: 03/08/1990)
683 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court regarding order - appeal case # 88-1905 (lh) (Entered: 03/09/1990)
684 RESPONSE and brief (in opposition) by plaintiff to motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680-1] with attachments "1" thru "6" and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 03/15/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680-1] - disposition: GRANTED - defendant will present order - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Elizabeth Higdon (bK) (Entered: 03/20/1990)
685 MOTION by plaintiffs' for preliminary injunction with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
686 MOTION by plaintiff for temporary restraining order with brief, exhibits. (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
689 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [686-1] and that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction will be heard 4/12/90 @ 9:00am with exhibit "5" attached. (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Elnora Williams - record made of in-chambers conference in which Pltf's requested TRO. TRO was granted, order was submitted and entered. Hearing on preliminary injunction set for 4/12/90 at 9:00 a.m.. (cd) (Entered: 03/30/1990)

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03/29/1990 03/29/1990 03/30/1990 03/30/1990 04/09/1990 04/10/1990 04/10/1990
04/11/1990 04/12/1990 04/12/1990 04/16/1990
04/18/1990

SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for preliminary injunction [685-1] set for 9:00 4/12/90 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
688 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for order authorizing transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives James Chipman and Perry Davis by Perry M. Johnson [680-1] (lh) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
687 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685-1], motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [686-1] with exhibits, affidavit and proof of mailing. (lh) Modified on 04/10/1990 (Entered: 03/30/1990)
690 MANDATE from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court regarding of order dated 7/28/88 for [631-1] [631-2] - appeal case # 881905 - record not returned. (lh) (Entered: 04/02/1990)
691 MOTION by defendants for modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training , with brief, and attachments. (ep) (Entered: 04/10/1990)
692 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation as to Alfredo Robinson No. 136864 and Al Buttons No. 99366 to appear before Judge Feikens on 4/12/90 @ 9:00 am (lh) Modified on 07/23/1993 (Entered: 04/11/1990)
693 Sealed matter. (unsealed on 7/23/93 see #932 on docket) Order to suppress March 19, 1990 hearing record on defendants' motion authorizing transfer of plaintiffs' representatives James Chapman and Perry A. Davis with transcript of March 29, 1990 on cover of transcript and March 19, 1990 on first page of transcript. (lh) Modified on 07/23/1993 (Entered: 04/12/1990)
694 RESPONSE brief by plaintiffs to defendants motion for modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training [691-1], with exhibits (ep) (Entered: 04/16/1990)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685-1] to 9:00 4/16/90 - disposition: HEARD & ADJOURNED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Margaret Lewis (cd) (Entered: 04/13/1990)
695 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, that the defendants transport plaintiffs Alfredo Robinson and Al Buttons, plaintiffs detained in the State Prison of Southern Michigan to appear before Judge Feikens on 4/16/90 at 9:00 a.m.. (see order for details) (ep) (Entered: 04/17/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Tyler - Pltf. and Deft. to submit simultaneous proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by May 1, 1990; Court will rule by May 8, 1990. (cd) (Entered: 04/16/1990)
696 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, directing preparation of hearing

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04/18/1990 05/01/1990 05/01/1990 05/01/1990
05/02/1990
05/04/1990
05/07/1990 05/07/1990 05/08/1990
05/11/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990 05/11/1990

transcript at defendants' expense (sd) (Entered: 04/19/1990)
697 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 4/16/90 (sd) (Entered: 04/19/1990)
699 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by plaintiff with proof of mailing (ld) (Entered: 05/03/1990)
698 MOTION by plaintiff Everett Hadix to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction with brief,exhibits and proof of mailing. (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
698 RESPONSE by plaintiff Everett Hadix to motion modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent decress for paralegal training by defendant [691-1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
700 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law in opposition to plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction regarding educational programming at Jackson Community College by defendants with affidavit. (ld) (Entered: 05/03/1990)
703 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction and opposition to defendants' motion for modification by plaintiff,,, [698-1] with proof of mailing (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
701 MOTION by plaintiffs' counsel Patricia A. Streeter and Michael Barnhart for attorney fees , and for costs with memorandum, proof of mailing and attachments (ld) (Entered: 05/08/1990)
701 MOTION by plaintiff Everett Hadix for attorney fees , and for costs with memorandum, proof of mailing and attachments. (ld) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
702 RESPONSE in opposition by defendants to motion to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction opposition to defendants' motion for modification by plaintiff,,, [698-1] with proof of mailing (ld) (Entered: 05/08/1990)
(cd) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [7011] set for 2:00 5/29/90, motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701-2] set for 2:00 5/29/90 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 05/11/1990)
704 NOTICE of hearing on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [7011], motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701-2] (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1990)
705 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [685-1] with proof of mailing. See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1990)
705 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion modification of state plan for out of cell activity at Jackson Community College and consent

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05/22/1990 05/22/1990 05/24/1990 05/24/1990 05/24/1990 05/24/1990 05/25/1990 05/29/1990 05/30/1990 06/05/1990 06/07/1990
06/07/1990
06/08/1990 06/08/1990

decress for paralegal training by defendant [691-1] with proof of mailing. See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 05/16/1990)
706 MOTION by defendant to file brief instanter with brief, affidavit and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 05/23/1990)
711 RESPONSE by defendants Perry M. Johnson, et al to motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701-2], motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
STATUS conference held - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 05/24/1990)
707 REPLY by defendant Perry M. Johnson to motion response by James V. Haddix to motion for monitoring fees and costs and proof of mailing. [679-1] (lh) (Entered: 05/25/1990)
708 REMARK - April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out of cell Activity provisions (lh) (Entered: 05/25/1990)
709 NOTICE of hearing on re: comments and/or objections to the April 1990 report of the monitor concerning out of cell activity provisions [708-1] (lh) (Entered: 05/25/1990)
712 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to file brief instanter by Perry M. Johnson [706-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [7011] set for 9:00 6/7/90, motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701-2] set for 9:00 6/7/90 before Judge John Feikens (jz) (Entered: 06/05/1990)
710 NOTICE of hearing on commentws and or objectiond to 4/90 report of the Monitor RE: Out of Cell Activity [708-1] (lh) (Entered: 06/05/1990)
STATUS conference held and continued to 10:00 7/24/90 - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 06/06/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701-1], motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701-2] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
716 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of plaintiffs Alfredo Robinson # 99366 and C. Pepper Moore #100885 to appear on 6/26/90 @ 1:30 before Judge Feikens with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/19/1990)
713 APPEAL by defendants of order [705-1] to USCA - FEE: $100.00 paid Receipt #: 254702 (mb) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
717 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, adopting stipulated agreement regarding plan element one and the implementation of paragraphs VIII E, F, and G of the Consent Judgment with attachment and proof of mailing. See order for details. (lh) (Entered: 06/19/1990)

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06/13/1990 06/13/1990 06/14/1990 06/14/1990 06/15/1990 06/20/1990
06/20/1990
06/20/1990
06/20/1990

718 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion to amend pending motion regarding harassment of C. Pepper Moore by James V. Haddix [646-1] with proof of mailing (bK) (Entered: 06/21/1990)
719 ORDER by Judge John Feikens Granting plaintiffs' motion of 12/08/87, #408 to amend relief requested with proof of mailing (bK) (Entered: 06/21/1990)
714 PROOF of mailing of #713. (mb) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
715 CERTIFIED copy of appeal by defendants [713-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (mb) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
720 MOTION by plaintiffs' to adopt the April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out-of-cell activity provisions, with modifications, and to address the Monitoring Process with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (bK) (Entered: 06/21/1990)
721 APPEARANCE and notice of entry of appearance for plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, and Everett Hadix of attorney Neal Bush with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/22/1990)
ATTORNEY added for Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, William Ramsey, Carl Proctor-Bey, Earl Pannell, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix - Michael J. Barnhart (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
722 APPEARANCE and notice for plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix of attorney Jeanne E. Mirer with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
723 APPEARANCE and notice for plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Michael Gray, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James Alexander, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, and Everett Hadix of attorney Deborah A. Labelle with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)

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06/20/1990 06/20/1990 06/22/1990
06/27/1990 06/29/1990 07/17/1990
07/18/1990 07/18/1990
07/20/1990 07/24/1990 07/24/1990 07/24/1990 07/24/1990 07/31/1990 07/31/1990

724 AFFIDAVIT of Patricia Streeter regarding motion for attorney fees [7011] and motion for costs [701-2] with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
725 AFFIDAVIT of Michael Barnhart regarding motion for attorney fees [701-1] and motion for costs [701-2] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/25/1990)
726 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion for costs by counsel for plaintiff Michael Barnhart the lump sum of $49,275.66 and Patricia Streeter the lump sum of $57,064.98 with proof of mailing. See memorandum opinion and order for details [701-2] (lh) (Entered: 06/26/1990)
727 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal by defendant [713-1] - appeal case # 90-1685 (lh) (Entered: 06/28/1990)
728 NOTICE of hearing on comments and/or objections to 4/90 report of the Moniotr RE: Out of Cell Activity (lh) (Entered: 07/03/1990)
729 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant for appeal by defendant [713-1] requesting transcript of: 4/12/90 (Margaret Lewis) and 4/16/90 (Lynn Spietz) already on file in Clerk's office - appeal case # not received yet (lh) (Entered: 07/18/1990)
730 MOTION by defendants' to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and aopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree with brief, affidavit, and1 proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 07/20/1990)
731 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion to adopt the April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out-of-cell activity provisions, with modifications, and to address the Monitoring Process [720-1] with brief, affidavit and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/20/1990)
732 APPEAL by defendant of order [726-1] to USCA with proof of service FEE: paid - Receipt #: 257447 (mb) (Entered: 07/24/1990)
733 PROOF of mailing of #732. (mb) (Entered: 07/24/1990)
734 CERTIFIED copy of appeal by defendants [732-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (mb) (Entered: 07/24/1990)
STATUS conference held and all hearing dates should be adjourned. The attorneys think this case may be resolved. - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 07/25/1990)
735 MOTION by defendants to approve supersedeas bond on appeal with brief and proof of mailing (dg) (Entered: 07/26/1990)
736 MOTION by plaintiffs' for preliminary injunction with brief. (lh) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
737 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiffs' for temporary restraining order with brief, exhibits, proposed TRO, and notice of hearing without date. (lh) (Entered: 08/02/1990)

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07/31/1990 08/02/1990
08/02/1990 08/06/1990 08/09/1990 08/14/1990 08/14/1990
08/14/1990
08/14/1990 08/16/1990 08/21/1990 08/21/1990 08/21/1990 08/24/1990
08/24/1990

738 PROOF of mailing of pleading 735 and 736. (lh) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [737-1] - disposition: ADJOURNED W/OUT DATE Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 08/02/1990)
739 RESPONSE (in opposition) by defendants' to emergency motion for temporary restraining order by James V. Haddix [737-1] with proof of mailing and affidavits. (lh) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
740 MOTION by defendants' to dismiss (rule 12 (b) , or alternatively for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) with brief, attachments and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/08/1990)
741 AFFIDAVIT by defendant Frank Elo and defendant John Jabe regarding (lh) (Entered: 08/10/1990)
742 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal by defendants [732-1] - appeal case # 90-1810 (lB) (Entered: 08/14/1990)
SCHEDULE: deadline for response to motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) [740-1] or in the alternative for summary judgment (rule 56 (b)) by Perry M. Johnson [740-2] set for 8/24/90 , deadline for reply to response motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) or in the alternative for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson set for 8/31/90 (kd) (Entered: 08/14/1990)
743 ORDER by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe, to file response to motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) [740-1] and to motion for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson no later than 7/24/90 [740-2] to file reply to response by 8/31/90 (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1990)
744 DECLARATION of plaintiffs Alfredo Allen and C. Pepper Moore in support of emergency motion for a temporary restraining order with attachments and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/16/1990)
745 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 6/07/90 of hearing on motion (bK) (Entered: 08/20/1990)
746 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 12/8/87 before Magistrate Pepe (lh) (Entered: 09/04/1990)
747 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 12/8/90 before Magistrate Pepe. (lh) (Entered: 09/04/1990)
748 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/2/87 before Magistrate Pepe (lh) (Entered: 09/04/1990)
749 RESPONSE and brief by plaintiffs to motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) [7401] or alternatively motion for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson [740-2] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/10/1990)
750 FINDINGS of fact and conclusions of law by Judge John Feikens in

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08/28/1990 09/07/1990 09/07/1990
09/07/1990 09/10/1990 09/10/1990 09/11/1990 09/12/1990 09/13/1990 09/25/1990 09/25/1990 09/27/1990 09/28/1990 09/28/1990 10/01/1990

support of 5/10/90 order fr preliminary injunctin and opinion in support of 5/10/90 order denying defendant's motion to modify consent judgment. (lh) (Entered: 09/11/1990)
751 RECORD of appeal by defendant [713-1] transmitted to USCA - appeal case # 90-1810 - # of volumes: 1 (Pleading 730 per phone call ) (lh) (Entered: 09/12/1990)
752 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiff for enforcement with brief, affidaivt, attachment and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
753 REPLY by defendant to motion response by James V. Haddix to defendants' rule 12 (b) Motion for dismissal or alternatively motion for summary judgment with proof of mailing. [749-1] (lh) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
754 REQUEST by defendant for leave to file file enlarged reply brief with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/18/1990)
755 NOTICE of hearing on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
756 NOTICE of hearing on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752-1] (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
757 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion for enforcement by plaintiffs'[7521] with brief, attachments and affidavit. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
758 REPLY by plaintiff to motion response by Perry M. Johnson to emergency motion for enforcement [757-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/19/1990)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752-1] to 2:00 9/25/90 - disposition: ADJ. if necessary - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 09/24/1990)
MOTION hearing held on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752-1] to 2:00 10/5/90 - disposition: ADJ TO 10/5/90 2:00 - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 09/26/1990)
759 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 9/13/90 before Judge Feikens RE: Motion (lh) (Entered: 09/27/1990)
760 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for defendant to show cause why they should not be held in contempt at hearing om 10/5/90 @ 2:00 pm with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1990)
761 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for defendant to show cause why cause should not be held in civil contempt on 10/1/90 @ 2:30 pm with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 09/28/1990)
762 PROOF of mailing of copy of pleading 761. (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1990)
763 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of record (per phone conversation - pleading 730) - appeal case # 90-1810 (lh) (Entered:

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10/01/1990 10/01/1990
10/01/1990
10/04/1990 10/04/1990 10/04/1990 01/04/1991
01/09/1991
01/09/1991
01/11/1991 01/11/1991 01/11/1991 01/11/1991 02/06/1991

10/01/1990)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752-1] - disposition: MOOT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
MINUTE SHEET of proceedings before Judge John Feikens - - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry - ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFTS. SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT - MOOT - Defts. presented contract to Jackson Community College. (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1990)
NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying emergency motin of defendants to stay the district court's hearing scheduled for 9/25/90 in the Hadix action [0-1] of - appeal case # 89-2191 & 90-1685 - record not returned (see 77-71229 #618) (dg) (Entered: 10/05/1990)
764 SUBPOENA returned as to Melody Wallace executed by process server on 9/20/90 (dg) (Entered: 10/05/1990)
765 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 6/7/90 for motion hearing [0-0] (dg) (Entered: 10/09/1990)
766 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 8/2/90 for motion hearing [0-0] (dg) (Entered: 10/09/1990)
767 MOTION by plaintiffs' to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 with brief, attachments and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 01/08/1991)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767-1] set for 2:00 2/5/91 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 01/10/1991)
768 NOTICE of hearing on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix on 2/5/91 @ 2:00 pm before Judge Feikens [767-1] (lh) Modified on 02/05/1991 (Entered: 01/10/1991)
769 MOTION by plaintiff for temporary restraining order with brief, and exhibits. (SB) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
771 NOTICE by plaintiffs of hearing on motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiffs [770-1] (SB) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
772 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order, plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and notice of hearing. (SB) (Entered: 01/14/1991)
770 MOTION by plaintiffs' for preliminary injunction with brief and exhibits. (lh) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
774 APPEARANCE for defendants of attorney Janet VanCleve with proof of

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02/06/1991 02/21/1991 02/21/1991
02/22/1991
03/28/1991 04/19/1991 05/08/1991 05/10/1991 05/16/1991
06/14/1991 06/25/1991 06/28/1991

mailing. (lh) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
775 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, regarding monitoring fees for the period 7/1/90 to 12/31/90 (lh) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [770-1] - disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry (cd) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767-1] - disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767-1] - disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE - Judge John Feikens - Pltfs. reserve right to renotice within 30 days. (cd) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
776 REPORT and recommendation by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe that motion to dismissor for summary judgment (rule 12 (b) by Perry M. Johnson et al [740-1] should be denied with proof of mailing (lh) (Entered: 04/08/1991)
777 ORDER by Judge John Feikens accepting report & recommendation [776-1] denying motion to dismiss (rule 12 (b) by Perry M. Johnson [740-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 04/23/1991)
778 MOTION by plaintiffs' to enjoin harassment of class representative with brief, exhibits "A"-"C", "1 thru "3", and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 05/10/1991)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion to enjoin harassment of class representative by Everett Hadix [778-1] set for 2:30 5/16/91 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 05/10/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to enjoin harassment of class representative by Everett Hadix [778-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN Judge John Feikens - per telephone conversation with David Franklyn, Law Clerk, and Pltfs' counsel Pat Streeter at 11:00 a.m. on 5/15/91. (cd) (Entered: 05/16/1991)
779 NOTICE of telephone status conference (lh) (Entered: 06/19/1991)
780 MOTION by plaintiffs' to enjoin the use of misconducts for possession of personal property based upon fire safety provisions and to direct defendants to promulgate a "Professionally Designed" Inspection Format with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 06/26/1991)
781 NOTICE of taking depositions of Lamar A Erb on 7/8/91 2 10:00 am, Cindy Avery @ 11:30 am, Robin Pratt @ 2:00 pm, Steve Racibowski @

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07/03/1991 07/10/1991 07/22/1991 07/23/1991 07/24/1991 07/25/1991 07/25/1991
08/02/1991 08/02/1991 08/05/1991 09/04/1991
09/06/1991
09/09/1991

10:00 am, Marcus Robinson @ 11:00 am, and Sgt. Dale Lammers @ 2:00 pm NSI with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/01/1991)
STATUS conference held and continued to 10:00 8/2/91 - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 07/26/1991)
782 MOTION by defendants' for protective order restricting discovery with brief and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/11/1991)
783 MOTION by plaintiffs' for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff with brief, attachment and proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 07/23/1991)
784 NOTICE of hearing on motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783-1] (lh) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
SCHEDULE: hearing on motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783-1] set for 2:00 8/8/91 before Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 07/24/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 07/25/1991)
785 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens adjourning plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the use of Misconducts for possession of personal property based upon Ffire Satefy Provisions and to direct defendants to Promulgate a "Professionallyu Designed" Inspection format and Defendants' motion for protective order restricting discovery with proof of mailing. See stip and order for details (lh) (Entered: 07/26/1991)
STATUS conference held and the parties are to contact the court next week to set up dates for the hearings at the prison - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/08/1991)
STATUS conference held and the parties to contact court next week to set up dates for hearings at prison. - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 08/21/1991)
786 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for entry of order adding Mark Coleman as named plaintiff by Everett Hadix [783-1] with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 08/06/1991)
787 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order vacating fee award and remanding the case for reconsideration in light whatever disposition is ultimately made of the classification issue in USA - appeal case # 90-1810 - record not returned (lh) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
788 NOTICE of hearing on report and recommendation on re: report of 8/31/91 and informal report re: tasks #100, 200 and 300 as provided in the master project schedule before Judge Feikens (lh) (Entered: 09/11/1991)
SCHEDULE: for special hearing set for 10/17/91 at 9:00 a.m. re: 1)

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09/13/1991 09/27/1991 09/27/1991 09/27/1991 09/30/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991
10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991

Report and Recommendation re: report of 8/13/91; and 2) Informational report re: tasks #100,200, and 300 as provided in the master project schedule. (cd) (Entered: 09/09/1991)
789 NOTICE of hearing on report and recommendaqtion re: report of 8/13/91 and on informational report re: tasks #100, 200 and 300 provided in the master project schedule (lh) (Entered: 09/16/1991)
790 WITNESS list by plaintiffs (evidentiary hearing to be set) (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
791 LETTER by counsel for plaintiff' dated 9/6/91 to Magistrate Judge Pepe's Chambers re: scheduling evidentiary hearing for 11/6/91, 11/7/91 and 11/8/91 (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
792 LETTER by counsel for defendants to Magistrate Judge Pepe's chambers confirming the scheduling of evidentiary hearinf on 11/6/91, 11/7/91 and 11/8/91 at Jackson State Prison (lh) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
793 MANDATE from USCA vacating the fee award and remanding for reconsideration - appeal case # 90-1810 - record not returned (pd) (Entered: 10/01/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion motion to clarify consent judgment for evidenitary hearing [0-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 10/20/88 Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion motion to modify consent decree [0-1] disposition: terminated - date: 10/20/88 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion - defendants motion to appoint Benton monitor and transfer cases granted in part as to appointment of Benton as monitor and denied as to the transfer of cases - [0-1] - disposition: terminated date: 10/20/88 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion - plaintiffs motion to modify consent decree denied without prejudice as to plaintiff's right to bring motion re: sanitation after Warden Jabes report due 12/01/88 - [0-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 10/20/88 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion - plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with Court's order of 11/30/87 denied with prejudice - [0-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 10/20/88 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for order allowing attorney meetings with members of the plaintiff class by James V. Haddix [620-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 8/1/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [621-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 8/1/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)

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10/02/1991
10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991
10/02/1991
10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991 10/02/1991

RESOLUTION of motion for clarification of order accepting consent judgment to permit enforcement of the consent judgment at the Dwayne Waters Hospital and Michigan State Industries at the Egeler Facility by James V. Haddix [623-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 8/1/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [637-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 9/5/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney monitoring fees and costs by James V. Haddix [638-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 8/15/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to extend time for defendant to answer motion to transfer case to Western District of Michigan for the purpose of consolidation by defendants' [634-1] by James V. Haddix [640-1] disposition: terminated - date: 8/21/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section VI paragraph 13 and court order of 4/21/89 regarding excess legal property by James V. Haddix [675-1] disposition: terminated - date: 2/13/90 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel discovery regarding compliance with consent judgment section IV, H. 2 regarding meaningful out-of-cell activity by James V. Haddix [677-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 2/13/90 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to file amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' motion of preliminary injunction by Everett Hadix [698-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 5/4/90 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for summary judgment (rule 56 (b) ) by Perry M. Johnson [740-2] - disposition: terminated - date: 4/19/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for enforcement by James V. Haddix [752-1] disposition: terminated - date: 10/1/90 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to compel responses to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and to plaintiffs interrogatories to defendants dated 11/21/90 by James V. Haddix [767-1] - disposition: terminated date: 3/21/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for temporary restraining order by Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons [769-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 1/17/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to extend time to file a motion and memorandum to expand the scope of contempt proceedings to 9/15/89 by

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10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/07/1991 10/08/1991 10/08/1991
10/24/1991 10/24/1991

James V. Haddix [644-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 9/15/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/02/1991)
SCHEDULE: evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt filed 3/6/87 set for 9:30 11/6/91 at Jackson State Prison - to be continued thru 11/8/91 if necessary - before Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (lb) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for temporary restraining order [611-1] disposition: WITHDRAWN - date: 09/27/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for payment of monitoring costs related to their experts by James V. Haddix [667-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN date: 09/27/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney fees by Everett Hadix [701-1], motion for costs by Everett Hadix [701-2] - disposition: TERMINATED - date: 6/21/90 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to adopt the April 1990 report of the Monitor concerning out-of-cell activity provisions, with modifications, and to address the Monitoring Process [720-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN date: 09/27/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to approve supersedeas bond on appeal by defendant [735-1] - disposition: MOOT - date: 09/27/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [770-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN - date: 3/21/91 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/07/1991)
794 NOTICE of evidentiary hearing regarding plaintiff's motion for contempt filed 3/6/87 (lh) (Entered: 10/09/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for rehearing and reconsideration of order denying defenndants' motion to transfer [641-1] by Perry M. Johnson [643-1] - disposition: terminated - date: 10/29/89 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/08/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion for protective order terminating or restricting discovery by the Hadix plaintiffs by John Prelesnik [678-1], motion to compel the Hadix plaintiffs to implemetn the independent monitor procedures by John Prelesnik [678-2] - disposition: terminated - date: 2/13/90 - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 10/08/1991)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry - re: Pltfs' motion for temporary restraining order (filed 7/31/90. (cd) (Entered: 10/24/1991)
MINUTE SHEET of proceedings before Judge John Feikens - - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry - Hearing re: monitor's report on compliance. (cd) (Entered: 10/24/1991)

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10/24/1991
10/31/1991 11/06/1991 11/08/1991 11/12/1991 11/15/1991 12/06/1991 12/06/1991 12/10/1991
12/11/1991 12/12/1991 12/12/1991
01/07/1992 01/15/1992

795 ORDER by Judge John Feikens extending deadline for submission of a fully compliant Mmaster schedule to 7/15/92 and that the SPM Decentralization Team may submit alternate master schedules for each option presented in its 7/15/92 report with proof of mailing. (lh) (Entered: 10/25/1991)
796 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/24/91 before Judge Feikens re: monitor's report (lh) (Entered: 11/01/1991)
EVIDENTIARY hearing held and testimony concluded. Documents to be submitted by counsel. - Magistrate Steven D. Pepe (kd) (Entered: 04/13/1992)
797 SCHEDULING order by Magistrate Steven D. Pepe setting deadline for proposed findings of fact, conslusions of law and any related briefs with proof of mailing (mm) (Entered: 11/15/1991)
RESOLUTION of motion to enjoin harassment of class representative by Everett Hadix [778-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN - date: 5/16/91 Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 11/12/1991)
798 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/6/91 (mm) (Entered: 11/19/1991)
SCHEDULE: status conference set for 10:00 12/12/91 before Judge John Feikens re:defts' motion to adopt USA plan. (cd) (Entered: 12/06/1991)
799 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs regarding adverse inference to be taken against defendants in C. Pepper Moore contempt proceedings (mm) (Entered: 12/10/1991)
800 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and adopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730-1] and response in opposition to plaintiffs' request for modifitions and to address the monitoring process with attachment and proof of mailing (mm) (Entered: 12/18/1991)
801 EX-PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation with proof of mailing. (mc) Modified on 12/18/1991 (Entered: 12/18/1991)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Johnetta Curry, Court Recorder - RE:Defts' motion to adopt USA Plan. (cd) (Entered: 12/12/1991)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and aopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730-1] - disposition: HELD IN ABEYANCE - Judge John Feikens (cd) (Entered: 12/12/1991)
802 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by plaintiffs regarding retaliation against C. Pepper Moore with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/10/1992)
803 RESPONSE brief by defendants to findings of fact (memorandum

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02/07/1992
02/10/1992 02/13/1992 02/21/1992 02/25/1992 02/28/1992 03/02/1992 03/03/1992 03/06/1992 03/10/1992 03/10/1992 03/11/1992 03/11/1992 03/17/1992 03/18/1992

regarding adverse inference to be taken against defendants in C. Pepper Moore contempt proceedings) by plaintiffs [802-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/21/1992)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Johnetta Curry - Plaintiffs to file motion to adopt USA Plan by 3/10/92; Defendants to file their response to plaintiffs' motion to adopt USA Plan and they will file their motion to modify the Consent Decree by 4/14/92. (cc) (Entered: 02/10/1992)
804 LETTER from independent monitor, Ff. Warren Benton regarding participation of U. S. Department of Justice in status conference (MM) (Entered: 02/12/1992)
805 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 2/7/92 (MM) (Entered: 02/14/1992)
806 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees , and costs with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 02/25/1992)
807 NOTICE of deadline for response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiff, [806-1], motion costs by plaintiff, [806-2] (MM) (Entered: 02/27/1992)
808 FEBRUARY 1992 report of the independent monitors (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
809 MOTION by plaintiffs to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
810 NOTICE of deadline for response to motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiffs [809-1] (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
813 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, that this be appended to consent judgment with attached letter. (mc) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
814 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by defendants regarding C. Pepper Moore retaliation issue. (mc) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
815 FINDINGS of fact and conclusions of law of defendants. (mc) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
811 MOTION by plaintiffs to adopt mental health orders with brief and exhibits (MM) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
812 EXHIBITS to motion and brief to adopt mental health orders filed by plaintiffs (MM) (Entered: 03/12/1992)
816 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by defendants to motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809-1] with exhibit (MM) (Entered: 03/19/1992)
817 PROOF of mailing of defendants' brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities

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03/23/1992
03/24/1992 03/24/1992 03/25/1992 03/25/1992 04/01/1992 04/06/1992 04/14/1992 04/15/1992 04/15/1992 04/16/1992 04/21/1992 04/21/1992

(MM) (Entered: 04/01/1992)
818 ORDER by Judge John Feikens that defendants transport plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper Moore", Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to the U.S. District Court in Detroit to appear on 3/26/92 (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
819 PETITION by defendants for leave to take deposition of plaintiff William D. Lovett with brief and proof of mailing (MM) Modified on 11/17/1993 (Entered: 04/07/1992)
RESOLUTION of petition for leave to take deposition of plaintiff William D. Lovett by defendants [819-1] - Judge John Feikens (cc) Modified on 12/27/1993 (Entered: 06/14/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809-1] set for 2:00 4/30/92 (cc) (Entered: 03/30/1992)
820 NOTICE of hearing on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiffs [809-1] (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
821 MOTION by plaintiff for finding of contempt and to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1992)
822 ANSWER by plaintiffs to findings of fact proposed by defendants regarding retaliation against C. Pepper Moore [814-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/10/1992)
823 REPLY by plaintiffs to motion response by defendants [816-1] to plaintiffs' motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
824 MOTION by defendant to file enlarged brief with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
825 MOTION by defendants for the court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decreee with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for protective order restricting discovery by Perry M. Johnson [782-1] - disposition: RESOLVED - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/16/1992)
826 RESPONSE brief by defendants to motion to adopt mental health orders by plaintiffs [811-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
827 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for finding of contempt by plaintiffs [821-1], motion to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment by plaintiffs [821-2] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)

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04/21/1992 04/24/1992 04/24/1992 04/24/1992 04/27/1992 04/28/1992 04/28/1992 04/30/1992 05/01/1992
05/01/1992
05/01/1992 05/01/1992

828 MOTION by defendants for the court to relinquish control an dsupervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/24/1992)
830 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
831 AMENDED STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens regarding attorney fees and costs. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
832 STATEMENT - April 1992 Report of the Monitor regarding compliance with Section VIII of consent decree. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
829 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for the court to relinquish control an dsupervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree by defendant [828-1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
MOTION hearing adjourned on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809-1] to 9:00 5/1/92 - disposition: ADJOURNED - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/28/1992)
921 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear on 4/30/93 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/29/1993)
833 AMENDED ex parte order by Judge John Feikens, for transportation (MM) (Entered: 05/05/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion for the court to relinquish control an dsupervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree by defendant [828-1] - disposition: DENIED - Judge John Feikens Court Reporter: Michael Lang - Mental Health and Medical Health aspects of "Hadix" will be transferred to Judge Enslen. (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to clarify and harmonize orders regarding scope of SDT responsibilities by plaintiff,,, [809-1] disposition: DENIED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Michael Lang - SDT has authority to investigate any and all options. (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to adopt mental health orders by plaintiff,,, [811-1] - disposition: DENIED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Michael Lang - Mental Health and Medical Health aspects of "Hadix" will be transferred to Judge Enslen. (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)
MOTION hearing adjourned on motion for finding of contempt by plaintiff,,, [821-1] to 9:00 8/10/92, motion to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment by plaintiff,,, [821-2] to 9:00 8/10/92 - disposition: ADJOURNED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Michael Lang (cc) (Entered: 05/01/1992)

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05/15/1992
05/15/1992 05/15/1992 05/28/1992 06/04/1992 06/05/1992
06/10/1992 06/12/1992 06/12/1992 06/15/1992 06/23/1992
06/23/1992
06/30/1992 07/24/1992

RESOLUTION of motion for the court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decreee by defendant [825-1] - disposition: DENIED - date: 5/1/92 - Judge John Feikens - this was a duplicate motion. (cc) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to file enlarged brief by defendant [824-1] disposition: GRANTED - date: 4/24/92 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for attorney fees by plaintiff,,, [806-1], motion costs by plaintiff,,, [806-2] - disposition: ORDER ENTERED - date: 4/24/92 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 05/15/1992)
834 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 5/1/92 (MM) (Entered: 05/29/1992)
837 LETTER from attorney Michael Barnhart advising that neither plaintiffs nor defendants believe there is a need for closing argument (MM) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
835 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for the court to relinquish control an supervision of the mental health provisions of the Hadix consent decree by defendant [828-1] and ordering that the medical and mental health provisions of the Hadix Consent Decree (Section II) be TRANSFERRED to Judge Enslen for further proceedings as appropriate., with proof of mailing. (ep) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
838 ERRATA sheet (MM) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
836 NOTICE of transferring case to Western Dist of MI (ep) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
836 NOTICE of transferring case to Western District of Michigan (ep) (Entered: 06/12/1992)
839 JUNE 1992 report of the monitor regarding compliance with section I.C.F. of the consent decree (MM) (Entered: 06/17/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and aopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN - date: 6/23/92 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/23/1992)
840 NOTIFICATION by defendant of withdrawing motion to vacate or modify the Hadix Out of Cell Acitivity Plan and adopt the USA Plan for purposes of the Hadix Decree by Perry M. Johnson [730-1] with proof of mailing (MM) Modified on 01/13/2003 (Entered: 06/25/1992)
841 REMARK - plaintiffs' designation of documents to be transmitted to the Western District Court (MM) (Entered: 07/06/1992)
842 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, amending deadlines for submission of the master schedules for the SPSM decentralization/reorganization and independent monitor's out-of-cell activity proposal (MM) (Entered:

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07/29/1992 08/03/1992 08/04/1992 08/11/1992
08/11/1992 08/31/1992 09/01/1992
09/11/1992 09/17/1992 09/29/1992 10/05/1992 10/06/1992 10/06/1992 10/07/1992

07/31/1992)
843 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, that this case should be remanded to the District Court by the Sixth Ccircuit Court of Appeals with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 08/03/1992)
844 LETTER sending medical portion of file to the Honorable Richard A. Enslen, United States District Court, Western District of Michigan, 410 West Michigan, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49005. (ep) (Entered: 08/06/1992)
845 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from Judge Enslen of receipt of letter [844-1] and portion medical portion of file. New case #4:92CV110. (ep) (Entered: 08/06/1992)
846 LETTER to the court from Susan Przekom-Shaw attaching a copy of the defendants responses to the outstanding sanitation and MIOSHA issues in this case with an attached letter from the Dept. of Corrections. (LS) (Entered: 08/12/1992)
847 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings - appeal case # 90-1685 (pr) (Entered: 08/24/1992)
848 MOTION by plaintiffs to permit inspection by expert with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/03/1992)
849 NOTICE of attorneys, Janet VanCleve, Jann Ryan Baugh, Thomas C. Nelson, Donald S. McGehee, Richard M.C. Adams and Theodore E. Hughes to withdraw appearance as attorney for defendants (MM) (Entered: 09/10/1992)
850 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by defendants to motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiffs [848-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/14/1992)
851 REPLY by plaintiffs to motion response by defendant [850-1] (supplemental brief in support of motion to permit inspection by expert) with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/18/1992)
852 MANDATE from USCA remanding case - appeal case # 90-1685 record will be returned under separate cover` (MM) (Entered: 10/05/1992)
853 PLAINTIFF'S position regarding defendants' compliance report dated August 1992 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/07/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff,,, [848-1] set for 2:00 10/22/92 (cc) (Entered: 10/06/1992)
854 NOTICE of hearing on motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff [848-1] (MM) (Entered: 10/07/1992)
855 DESIGNATION of record by defendant - appeal case # 90-1685 (MM) (Entered: 10/08/1992)

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10/07/1992
10/08/1992
10/13/1992
10/13/1992 10/13/1992 10/13/1992 10/13/1992
10/13/1992 10/15/1992
10/16/1992 10/20/1992
10/21/1992 10/22/1992
10/22/1992

856 REPORT and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe that plaintiffs' motion to hold George Graham and Bernard Toland in contempt of court should be denied; and plaintiffs' motion for further orders of the court with respect to the issue of retaliation against C. "Pepper" Moore or any of the plaintiffs should be denied with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/13/1992)
857 REMARK - memorandum from Magistrate Judge Pepe with notification that page 61 was missing from original and all copies of report and recommendation with page 61 attached and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/13/1992)
858 MOTION by defendants for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order with brief and exhibits 1-5 (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
859 EXHIBIT 6 (vol I) filed by defendant (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
860 EXHIBIT 6 (vol II) filed by defendant (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
861 EXHIBITS 7-10b filed by defendant (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
862 MOTION by defendants to set for hearing motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order [858-1] with brief (MM) (Entered: 10/14/1992)
864 ERRATA for report & recommendation [856-1] (mc) (Entered: 10/19/1992)
865 PROOF of mailing of defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options, brief in support, motion to set for hearing as to the defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept with brief in support on 10/13/92. (lt) (Entered: 10/19/1992)
863 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, for plaintiffs to file objections by 11/5/92 (mc) (Entered: 10/19/1992)
866 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order with brief in support and proof of mailing (lt) (Entered: 10/20/1992)
867 STATEMENT - OCTOBER 1992 report of monitor regarding compliance (mc) (Entered: 10/23/1992)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff,,, [848-1] to 2:00 10/23/92 - disposition: ADJOURNED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 10/23/1992)
868 EX PAARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation with

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10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/23/1992 10/29/1992

proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 10/23/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by Ted Rhode, Orvel Simmons, Ted Sullivan [866-1] - disposition: Granted - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens deadline for response to motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858-1] set for 11/4/92 (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
STATUS conference as to the presentation of defendants' decentralization plan - hearing set for defendants' mtoion seeking approval of the site and housing options - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858-1] set for 9:00 11/12/92 (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to set for hearing motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order [858-1] by defendant [862-1] - disposition: Granted per status conference - date: 10/23/92 - Judge John Feikens (lt) (Entered: 10/27/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by Ted Rhode, Orvel Simmons, Ted Sullivan [866-1] - disposition: GRANTED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Michael Lang (Jc) (Entered: 10/29/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens deadline for response to motion to extend time to answer defendants' motion seeking approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix Facilities and modification, is necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by Ted Rhode, Orvel Simmons, Ted Sullivan [866-1] set for 11/4/92 (Jc) (Entered: 10/29/1992)
MINUTE SHEET of conference to listen to presentation of defendants' decentralization plan - before Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Michael Lang (Jc) (Entered: 10/29/1992)
869 TRANSCRIPT of decentralization plan proceedings taken on 10/23/92 (mc) (Entered: 10/30/1992)

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10/29/1992 10/30/1992 11/05/1992 11/05/1992
11/09/1992 11/09/1992 11/10/1992 11/12/1992 11/12/1992 11/12/1992 11/12/1992
11/17/1992 11/17/1992

870 STATEMENT and lists by plaintiffs of issues regarding defendants' compliance with sanitation provisions of consent judgment with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 10/30/1992)
871 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/22/92 before Judge John Feikens (lt) (Entered: 11/02/1992)
872 MOTION by plaintiff to file nlarged brief with brief and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
873 RESPONSE (brief in opposition) by plaintiffs to motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendants with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to file nlarged brief by plaintiff,,, [872-1] disposition: MOOT - date: 11/5/92 - Judge John Feikens - Carol J. Cohron ok'd document for filing without order. (cc) (Entered: 11/09/1992)
874 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time for plaintiffs to file objections to report and recommendation regarding C. Pepper Moore's claim of retaliation with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/10/1992)
875 EXPARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for defendants to arrange transportation as to plaintiffs, Clarence Moore, Mark Coleman, Al Button, Alfredo Robinson (lt) (Entered: 11/12/1992)
876 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff to report & recommendation [856-1] with exhibits (MM) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
877 REQUEST by plaintiffs for oral argument on objection to report and recommendation [876-1] (MM) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
878 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of documents 876-877 (MM) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
MOTION hearing held on motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 11/17/1992)
879 MANDATE from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings appeal case # 88-1563, 88-1634, 88-1879 - record not returned and remanding the case to the USDC - Western District of Michigan. (at) (Entered: 11/18/1992)
880 LETTER (copy) from Michigan Attorney General to the court with enclosures regarding the sanitation issues (MM) (Entered: 11/19/1992)

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11/23/1992 11/27/1992
11/27/1992 11/27/1992 11/27/1992 11/27/1992 12/11/1992 12/15/1992 12/22/1992 12/22/1992 01/04/1993 01/05/1993 01/08/1993 01/11/1993
01/11/1993

881 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/12/92 (MM) (Entered: 11/24/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion for approval of the site and housing concept options for the reorganization and decentralization of the Hadix facilities and modification, if necessary, of the 6/8/90 court order by defendant [858-1] - disposition: ORDER ENTERED - date: 11/27/92 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/27/1992)
RESOLUTION of motion to permit inspection by expert by plaintiff,,, [848-1] - disposition: ORDER ENTERED - date: 11/27/92 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/27/1992)
882 MEMORANDUM opinion by Judge John Feikens with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1992)
883 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion to permit inspection by expert [848-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1992)
884 ORDER by Judge John Feikens (in accordance with opinion - see order for details) with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1992)
885 MOTION by plaintiff for reconsideration of order denying access to the institution for inspection [883-1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/14/1992)
886 MOTION by defendant to reconsider and alter order of 11/27/92 [884-1] with brief and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 12/21/1992)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens objections to report and recommendation hearing set for 9:00 1/11/93 RE: as to Pepper Moore's Claim of Retaliation. (cc) (Entered: 12/28/1992)
887 NOTICE of hearing on objection by plaintiff to report and recommendation [876-1] (MM) (Entered: 12/29/1992)
888 PROOF of mailing of proposed ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 01/05/1993)
889 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens, for transportaiton of plaintiff Clarence "Pepper" Moore from the state Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear on 1/11/93 (MM) (Entered: 01/06/1993)
890 PROOF of mailing of ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 01/12/1993)
OBJECTIONS to report and recommendation hearing held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang - re: Pepper Moore's Claim of Retaliation - TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (cc) (Entered: 01/11/1993)
891 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to reconsider and alter order of 11/27/92 [884-1] by defendant [886-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/12/1993)

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01/12/1993 01/12/1993 01/15/1993 01/19/1993
01/19/1993
01/19/1993 01/26/1993 02/08/1993 02/09/1993 02/10/1993 02/16/1993 02/26/1993 02/26/1993 03/02/1993 03/02/1993 03/02/1993

892 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting in part and denying in part motion to reconsider and alter order of 11/27/92 [884-1] by defendant [886-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/13/1993)
893 ORDER by Judge John Feikens amending order of 11/27/92 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/13/1993)
894 ANSWER by plaintiffs to the monitor's proposal on academic and vocational programs with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for finding of contempt by plaintiff,,, [821-1], motion to compel compliance with the sanitation and MIOSHA provisions of the consent judgment by plaintiff,,, [821-2] - disposition: RESOLVED PER LETTER - date: 1/12/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for reconsideration of order denying access to the institution for inspection [883-1] by plaintiff,,, [885-1] - disposition: RESOLVED PER LETTER - date: 1/12/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 01/19/1993)
895 RESPONSE of MI Dept of Corrections to the "monitors proposed substitute plan" on out-of-cell activity submitted on 10/2/92 (MM) (Entered: 01/20/1993)
896 NOTICE of SDT meeting (MM) (Entered: 01/28/1993)
897 REMARK - documents submitted by F. Warren Benton, Ph.D., Independent Monitor (MM) (Entered: 02/11/1993)
898 MOTION by plaintiffs for transfer of classification issue with brief (MM) (Entered: 02/11/1993)
899 PROOF of mailing of motion for transfer of classification issue (MM) (Entered: 02/12/1993)
900 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper Moore", Mark Coleman and Alfrdo Robinson (MM) (Entered: 02/19/1993)
901 RESPONSE brief by defendants in opposition to motion for transfer of classification issue by plaintiff,,, [898-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 03/01/1993)
902 EXHIBITS filed by William H. Walker #183367 - pieces of what appears to be mattress in brown grocery bag. (mc) (Entered: 03/02/1993)
903 LETTER from William Walker re: exhibit #904 pillow. (mc) (Entered: 03/03/1993)
904 EXHIBIT filed by William Walker (pillow) (mc) (Entered: 03/03/1993)
905 LETTER from independent monitor, F. Warren Benton with minutes of the decentralization project meeting held on 2/18/93 attached (MM) (Entered: 03/04/1993)

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03/10/1993 03/12/1993 03/18/1993 03/24/1993
03/26/1993 03/31/1993 04/05/1993 04/05/1993 04/12/1993 04/12/1993 04/12/1993 04/20/1993 04/22/1993 04/22/1993 04/22/1993 04/23/1993

906 PETITION by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 03/11/1993)
907 PROOF of mailing of notice of records deposition (MM) (Entered: 03/15/1993)
908 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time to answer petition for attorney fees and costs [906-1] (MM) (Entered: 03/23/1993)
909 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation for plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear before Judge Feikens on 3/31/93 at 8:30 a.m. (MM) (Entered: 03/29/1993)
910 PROOF of mailing of ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 03/30/1993)
MINUTE SHEET of proceedings before Judge John Feikens - monthly SDT meeting - held - Court Reporter: Michael Lang (Jc) (Entered: 04/01/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for transfer of classification issue by plaintiff,,, [898-1] - disposition: MOOT - date: 3/31/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/05/1993)
911 ORDER by Judge John Feikens regarding sanitation meetings (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1993)
912 RESPONSE by defendants to petition for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/13/1993)
913 RECORD of appeal returned from USCA - appeal case # 90-1685/1810 (MM) (Entered: 04/20/1993)
914 RECORD of appeal returned from USCA - appeal case # 88-1879 (applicable to case numbers 86-1701, 88-1144/1905/2111) (MM) (Entered: 04/20/1993)
915 STIPULATED order by Judge John Feikens extending time for filing a reply brief in support of plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs (MM) (Entered: 04/21/1993)
916 EXPARTE motion by plaintiffs to file excess pages reply brief with brief (mb) Modified on 04/26/1993 (Entered: 04/26/1993)
917 REPLY BRIEF by plaintiffs to petition response by defendants [912-1] with attachment (O.K. to file, Betsy T. Yntema) (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
918 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of #916-917. (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
919 NOTICE of status conference regarding santitation of C. Pepper Moore

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04/23/1993 04/23/1993 04/28/1993
04/30/1993 04/30/1993 05/03/1993 05/04/1993 05/04/1993
05/04/1993 05/04/1993
06/02/1993 06/02/1993

before J. Feikens (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
920 PROOF of mailing of stipulated order to extend time to file reply brief in support of plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs (mb) (Entered: 04/26/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 9:00 5/4/93 (cc) (Entered: 04/28/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906-1] set for 9:00 5/4/93 (cc) (Entered: 04/28/1993)
922 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum by defendants in support of petition response [912-1] in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 05/03/1993)
922 ANSWER by defendants to reply by plaintiffs [917-1] to defendants' response to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 05/03/1993)
923 MOTION by plaintiff to strike response in reply to plaintiffs' reply brief by defendants [922-1], suppelmental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs by defendants [922-1] with brief and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 05/05/1993)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang - Re: Claim of Retaliation by C. Pepper Moore. (cc) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
PETITION hearing held on petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition for leave to take deposition of plaintiff William D. Lovett by defendantssssssssssssssssss [819-1] - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
MOTION hearing held on motion to strike response in reply to plaintiffs' reply brief by defendants [922-1], suppelmental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney fees and costs by defendants [922-1] by plaintiffsssssssssssssssssss,,,sss [923-1] - disposition: DENIED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mike Lang (cc) (Entered: 05/06/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for preliminary injunction by James V. Haddix [736-1] - disposition: DISMISSED W/OUT PREJUDICE - date: 6/2/93 Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion for temporary restraining order by James V.

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06/02/1993
06/02/1993
06/08/1993 06/14/1993 06/14/1993
06/22/1993 06/23/1993
06/24/1993 06/28/1993 06/28/1993

Haddix [737-1] - disposition: DISMISSED W/OUT PREJUDICE - date: 6/2/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
RESOLUTION of motion to enjoin the use of misconducts for possession of personal property based upon fire safety provisions and to direct defendants to promulgate a "Professionally Designed" Inspection Format by Everett Hadix [780-1] - disposition: DISMISSED W/OUT PREJUDICE - date: 6/2/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/02/1993)
924 ORDER by Judge John Feikens dismissing without prejudice motion for preliminary injunction by plaintiffs [736-1], motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiffs [737-1], motion to enjoin the use of misconducts for possession of personal property based upon fire safety provisions and to direct defendants to promulgate a "Professionally Designed" Inspection Format by plaintiffs [780-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/04/1993)
925 RECORD returned from USCA - appeal case # 88-1879 (MM) (Entered: 06/11/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs by Patricia A. Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael J. Barnhart, Neal Bush [906-1] disposition: OPINION & ORDER ENTERED - date: 6/14/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 06/14/1993)
926 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting petition by Neal Bush, Michael J. Barnhart, Deborah A. LaBelle, Patricia A. Streeter for attorney fees and costs [906-1] and awarding Mr. Barnhart $8,370.50, Ms. Streeter $734.69, Ms. LaBelle $10,929.00 and Mr. Bush $13,343,80 with appendix and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/15/1993)
927 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of plaintiffs Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear before Judge Feikens on 6/25/93 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/23/1993)
928 APPEARANCE for defendants' John Prelesnik, Marjorie Van Ochten, Frank Elo, Pam Withrow, Elton Scott, Graham Allen, Robert Brown Jr, Don P. LeDuc, Charles Ustess, Roy Rider, James Pogats, John Jabe, Duane Sholes, Daniel Trudell, Dale Foltz, William F. Grant, Charles Anderson, Barry Mintzes, Perry M. Johnson of attorney Barbara A. Schmidt, with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 06/24/1993)
929 PROOF of mailing of ex parte order for transportation (MM) (Entered: 06/25/1993)
930 MOTION by plaintiffs for reconsideration of order [926-1] with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 06/29/1993)
931 PRETRIAL scheduling order by Judge John Feikens with proof of

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07/23/1993 07/28/1993
08/02/1993 08/09/1993 08/10/1993 08/10/1993 08/17/1993 08/18/1993
08/20/1993 08/20/1993 08/20/1993 08/24/1993 09/03/1993 09/08/1993 09/10/1993

mailing. (mc) (Entered: 06/29/1993)
932 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for disposition of sealed materials. Order to supress March 19, 1990 hearing and transcript of March 19, 1990 unsealed and returned to public file. (ep) (Entered: 07/23/1993)
967 MISSION, oranizational plan and executive summary of Michigan Prison of Southern Michigan, OPERATIONAL AND ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM. (received in Clerk's Office on 7/14/94) (ep) (Entered: 01/13/1994)
933 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting in part and denying in part motion for reconsideration of order [926-1] by plaintiffs [930-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 08/04/1993)
934 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 5/4/93 before Judge Feikens. (cd) (Entered: 08/10/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 11:00 8/16/93 with defendant's counsel, etc. and at 2:00 p.m. with plaintiffs' counsel, etc. (cc) (Entered: 08/10/1993)
946 RE NOTICE of meeting with counsel for plaintiffs at one time and counsel for defendants at a later time. (ep) (Entered: 10/04/1993)
935 SEALED matter by Judge John Feikens (MM) (Entered: 08/17/1993)
936 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation oof Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Mark Coleman and Alfredo Robinson to appear before Judge Feikens on 8/20/93 at 9:30 a.m. with proof of mailing (MM) Modified on 11/10/1993 (Entered: 08/19/1993)
937 EXHIBITS A-B re: the functional, operational and space program (MM) (Entered: 08/20/1993)
938 EXHIBITS C-D-E re: finctional, operational and space program (MM) (Entered: 08/20/1993)
939 LETTER from MI Attorney General regarding order on approval of management plan with attachment (MM) (Entered: 08/24/1993)
940 MOTION by plaintiff for clarification of opinions and orders of 8/2/93 and 6/14/93 with brief, attachment, notice of hearing date to be set and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 08/25/1993)
941 MOTION by Marvin D. Mayberry to enforce judgment with brief, exhibits, proof of mailing. (pr) (Entered: 09/07/1993)
942 RESPONSE by defendants to motion for clarification of opinions and orders of 8/2/93 and 6/14/93 by plaintiffs [940-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/10/1993)
943 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens regarding motion for clarification of opinions and orders of 8/2/93 and 6/14/93 [940-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 09/13/1993)

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09/15/1993
09/21/1993 09/27/1993 10/04/1993 10/04/1993 10/07/1993 10/08/1993 10/15/1993 10/15/1993 10/20/1993 10/20/1993 10/26/1993 11/02/1993
11/05/1993 11/08/1993

RESOLUTION of motion to enforce judgment by Marvin D. Mayberry [941-1] - disposition: MOOT - Judge John Feikens - Mayberry was not allowed to intervene - document was referred to counsel for pltfs. (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1993)
944 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' request for production of documents. (cd) (Entered: 09/24/1993)
945 STATEMENT by John Jabe, David Bogard, Curtiss Pulitzer and Barbara Hladki. (ep) (Entered: 10/04/1993)
947 MOTION by defendants for protective order staying discovery on out-ofcell activity with brief, attachment and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/06/1993)
948 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion for protective order staying discovery on out-of-cell activity by defendants [947-1] with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 10/06/1993)
949 PETITION by plaintiffs for costs , for attorney fees with brief, attachments and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
950 ORDER by Judge John Feikens dismissing with prejudice motion to amend which was granted on 6/12/90 and petitions for attorney fees to be filed within 30 days with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 10/13/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on petition for costs by plaintiffs [949-1] set for 2:00 11/8/93, petition for attorney fees by plaintiffs [949-2] set for 2:00 11/8/93 (cc) (Entered: 10/15/1993)
951 NOTICE hearing on petition for costs by plaintiffs [949-1], petition for attorney fees by plaintiffs [949-2] (MM) (Entered: 10/19/1993)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 10:00 11/23/93 - SDT Meeting in Ann Arbor. (cc) (Entered: 10/21/1993)
952 NOTICE of rescheduled status conference (SDT meeting) (MM) (Entered: 10/25/1993)
953 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time for defendant to file objectins to plaintiff's petition for costs (MM) (Entered: 10/29/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition for costs by plaintiffs [949-1], petition for attorney fees by plaintiffs [949-2] - disposition: WITHDRAWN/RESOLVED - date: 11/2/93 - John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/02/1993)
954 PETITION by plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs related to the retaliation of plaintiffs' representative C. Pepper Moore wtih brief, attachment and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/08/1993)
955 PETITION by plaintiffs for attorney fees for time and costs expended by Larry Bennett with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 11/08/1993)

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11/16/1993 11/16/1993
11/23/1993 11/30/1993 12/03/1993
12/13/1993
12/21/1993 12/21/1993 12/27/1993 12/27/1993 01/05/1994 01/05/1994 01/05/1994 01/19/1994 01/19/1994

956 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens dismissing plaintiff's petition for costs [949-1], and for attorney fees [949-2] (ep) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
957 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Clarence Moore, and Mark Coleman from Jackson and Alfredo Robinson from Egeler at Jackson to appear on November 23, 1993 at 9:30 in Ann Arbor and return. (ep) (Entered: 11/23/1993)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Ed Wisniewski - SDT Meeting in Ann Arbor. (cc) (Entered: 12/02/1993)
958 SEALED matter by Judge John Feikens (MM) (Entered: 12/01/1993)
959 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending time to answer petition for attorney fees and costs related to the retaliation of plaintiffs' representative C. Pepper Moore by plaintiffs [954-1] (MM) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
960 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens dismissing petition for attorney fees and costs related to the retaliation of plaintiffs' representative C. Pepper Moore by plaintiffs [954-1] (MM) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
RESOLUTION of petition for attorney fees for time and costs expended by Larry Bennett by plaintiffs [955-1] - disposition: DISMISSED - date: 12/21/93 - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 12/22/1993)
961 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens dismissing petition for attorney fees for time and costs expended by Larry Bennett by plaintiffs [955-1] (MM) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
962 TRI-ANNUAL compliance report of Department of Corrections (MM) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
963 LETTER from Department of Corrections with out-of-cell proposal attached (MM) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
964 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel defendant's to file their tri-annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment (ep) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
965 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion to compel [964-1] (ep) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
966 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of motion to compel and brief #964 and #965. (ep) (Entered: 01/10/1994)
968 LETTER by attorney Susan Prezekop-Shaw for defendants to Ms Streeter confirming the extension of time to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for compliance (lt) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
969 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 8/20/93 (Status conference) (lt) (Entered: 01/21/1994)

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01/20/1994 01/20/1994 01/24/1994 02/01/1994 02/02/1994 02/04/1994 02/08/1994 02/08/1994 02/08/1994 02/08/1994 02/08/1994
02/14/1994
02/14/1994 02/14/1994 02/14/1994

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens status conference set for 10:00 2/8/94 - re: SDT Committee Report. (cc) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
970 NOTICE of SDT Meeting with proof of mailing (lt) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
971 NOTICE to attorneys that the extension agreed between counsel re plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance is not acceptable to the Court with attachment (MM) (Entered: 01/25/1994)
972 REQUEST by plaintiffs for a contempt of court order for violations of consent decree with exhibits (MM) (Entered: 02/02/1994)
973 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of Mark Coleman, Grant Glover and C. Pepper Moore on 2/8/94 with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 02/03/1994)
974 EX PARTE order by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Alfredo Allen Robinson to appear on 2/8/94 at 9:30 a.m. with proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 02/07/1994)
975 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge John Feikens, setting dates for proposal for modification of remedial plan to be filed and responses and etc. (see order for details) (ep) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
976 RESPONSE in opposition by defendants to plaintifs' motion to compel complaince with secton XI (Compliance Provision) of the decree [964-1] (ep) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
977 MEMORANDUM by defendants in support of motion response [976-1] with exhibits. (ep) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Alan Burnham - Re: SDT Committee Report. (cc) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
978 ORDER by Judge John Feikens setting date for hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri-annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964-1] (MM) (Entered: 02/15/1994)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri-annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964-1] set for 2:00 4/8/94 (cc) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens deadline for (miscellaneous) set for 2:00 5/20/94 - Re: hearing re: Modification of the Remedial Plan and Alternative Proposal for Out-Of-Cell Activity. (cc) (Entered: 02/14/1994)
979 NOTICE of hearing re: modification of the remedial plan and alternative proposal for out-of-cell activity (MM) (Entered: 02/16/1994)
980 NOTICE of hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their triannual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964-1] (MM) (Entered: 02/16/1994)

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03/08/1994
03/18/1994 03/28/1994 03/28/1994
03/31/1994 04/05/1994
04/12/1994 04/14/1994 04/15/1994 04/15/1994
04/15/1994 05/19/1994 05/24/1994 06/07/1994 06/10/1994

SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri-annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964-1] set for 2:00 4/15/94 (cc) (Entered: 03/08/1994)
981 EX PARTE motion by plaintiff to file enlarged reply brief with brief (MM) Modified on 03/30/1994 (Entered: 03/21/1994)
982 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to file enlarged reply brief by plaintiffs [981-1] (MM) (Entered: 03/30/1994)
983 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendants response to plaintiffs motion to compel defendant's to file their tri-annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment [964-1] with exhibits and proof of (MM) (Entered: 03/30/1994)
984 MOTION by defendants seeking modification of the 1985 out-of-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree with brief in support, attachments and proof of mailing (lt) (Entered: 04/01/1994)
985 PROOF of mailing by defendants of objections to interrogatories and request for production of documents and response to plaintiffs' interrogatories and request for production of documents ed 3/4/94 (MM) (Entered: 04/07/1994)
986 FINAL report of the court appointed sanitation committee prisoner representatives with exhibit and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 04/13/1994)
987 ES PARTE order by Judge John Feikens, for transportation for Mark Coleman, Alfredo Robinson and Clarence "Pepper" Moore" (MM) (Entered: 04/19/1994)
Text not available. (Entered: 04/25/1994)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to compel defendant's to file their tri-annual compliance reports in the manner required by consent judgment by plaintiffs [964-1] - disposition: WITHDRAWN - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 04/25/1994)
MISCELLANEOUS hearing on cancelled - Judge John Feikens - re: modification of the remedial plan and alternative proposal for out-of-cell activity - was set for 5/20/94. (cc) (Entered: 04/25/1994)
988 REPORT - Tri-annual compliance report by Michigan Department of Corrections (MM) (Entered: 05/23/1994)
989 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, substituting Danny Walker, No. 197243 as a named plaintiff in place of Michael Gray, No. 147217 (MM) (Entered: 05/26/1994)
990 LETTER from plaintiff Mark LeMothe advising that he is withdrawing from this action (MM) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
991 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion seeking modification of

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06/10/1994 06/24/1994 06/27/1994 06/28/1994
06/28/1994 06/28/1994 07/22/1994 07/25/1994 07/25/1994
07/27/1994 07/27/1994 07/27/1994 07/27/1994 08/02/1994

the 1985 out-of-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
992 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery with brief, attachment and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/14/1994)
993 WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to C. Pepper Moore, Alfredo Allen Robinson and Mark Coleman to appear on 6/28/94 at 2:00 p.m. (MM) (Entered: 06/29/1994)
994 RESPONSE brief by defendant in opposition to motion to compel discovery by plaintiffs [992-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (MM) (Entered: 06/29/1994)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion seeking modification of the 1985 out-of-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984-1] to 9:00 8/2/94 - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Fred Pratt (cc) (Entered: 06/28/1994)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel discovery by plaintiffs [9921] - disposition: GRANTED IN PART DENIED IN PART - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: fRED PRATT (cc) (Entered: 06/28/1994)
995 ORDER by Judge John Feikens That compenstion of Dr. F. Warren Benton is increased to $95.00 per hour (MM) (Entered: 07/07/1994)
996 WITNESS list by plaintiffs, with proof of service (ep) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
997 PROPOSED WITNESS list by defendants with proof of mailing (ep) (Entered: 07/27/1994)
998 PETITION for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued as to C. Pepper Moore, Mark Coleman, Grant Glover and Alfredo Allen Robinson to appear on August 2, 1994 at 9:00 writs issued (db) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
999 NOTICE by defendant of taking deposition of Michigan Thompson on 7/29/94 at 11:00 a.m., with request for records and proof of mailing. (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
1000 NOTICE by defendant of taking deposition of Patrick Clark on 7/29/84 at 11:00 with request for production of records (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
1001 NOTICE by defendant of taking deposition of Phil Frederick 7/29/94 at 11:00 a.m. with request for production of documents (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
1002 NOTICE by Dale Foltz, William F. Grant of record deposition as to C. Pepper Moore, Mark Coleman, Alfredo Allen Robinson, Grant Glover and Hadix Plaintiffs. (ep) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
MOTION hearing held on motion seeking modification of the 1985 outof-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984-

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08/08/1994 09/08/1994 10/24/1994 10/27/1994
11/08/1994 11/08/1994 11/08/1994 11/08/1994 11/10/1994
11/23/1994
12/01/1994 01/27/1995 03/14/1995

1] - disposition: ADJOURNED W/OUT DATE - Judge John Feikens Court Reporter: Sherri Ruff - Pltf. to call with date witness is available. (cc) (Entered: 08/03/1994)
1003 TRANSCRIPT of status conference proceedings taken on 2/8/94 before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
RESOLUTION of motion for protective order staying discovery on outof-cell activity by defendants [947-1] - disposition: MOOT - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/08/1994)
1004 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus under 28:2254 (state custody) as to Grant Glover, C. Pepper Moore, Mark Coleman, Alfredo Allen Robinson WI (mc) (Entered: 10/25/1994)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion seeking modification of the 1985 out-of-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984-1] to 10:00 11/10/94 - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Melina Bazi - for closing arguments only. (cc) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
1005 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for C. Pepper Moore to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)
1006 PETITION by plaintiff for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Mark Coleman to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)
1007 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Alfredo Allen Robinson to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)
1008 PETITION by plaintiffs for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for Grant Glover to appear on 11/10/94. WI (lg) Modified on 11/10/1994 (Entered: 11/10/1994)
MOTION hearing held on motion seeking modification of the 1985 outof-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [9841] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Marie Metcalf (cc) (Entered: 11/15/1994)
1009 ORDER by Judge John Feikens amending order adopting stipulated agreement regarding plan element one and the implementation of paragraphs VIII E, F, and G of the Consent Judgment [717-1], [717-2] (see order), with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
1010 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 11/10/94 (RH) (Entered: 12/05/1994)
1011 TRI-ANNUAL compliance report for the period ending 12/94 filed by the Michigan Department of Corrections (RH) (Entered: 02/01/1995)
1012 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens requesting

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03/31/1995
04/04/1995 04/07/1995 04/07/1995 04/14/1995 05/03/1995 05/05/1995 05/05/1995 05/11/1995 05/15/1995 05/15/1995 05/22/1995 05/22/1995 05/29/1995 05/31/1995

plaintiff to submit proposed order. (mc) (Entered: 03/15/1995)
1013 OBJECTIONS by defendants to plaintiffs proposed order denying defendants motion seeking modification of the 1985 out-of-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 04/03/1995)
1014 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to objections by defendants [1013-1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/05/1995)
1015 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion seeking modification of the 1985 out-of-cell activity provision of the Hadix consent decree by defendants [984-1], with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 04/11/1995)
1016 ANSWER by plaintiff to report [1011-1], with attachment, and proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 04/11/1995)
1017 TRANSCRIPT of motion proceedings taken on 4/6/95 (mc) (Entered: 04/18/1995)
1018 APPEAL by defendants of orders [1012-1] and [1015-1] to USCA - FEE: PAID - Receipt #: 315845 (lb) (Entered: 05/05/1995)
1019 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart and Susan Przekop-Shaw (lb) (Entered: 05/05/1995)
1020 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1018-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 05/05/1995)
1021 CROSS-APPEAL by all plaintiffs of order [1015-1], order [1012-1] to USCA with proof of mailing - FEE: paid, Receipt #: 316166 (mb) (Entered: 05/15/1995)
1022 PROOF of mailing by clerk of cross appeal to USCA, Michael Barnhart/Deborah LaBelle and Susan Przekop-Shaw (mb) (Entered: 05/15/1995)
1023 CERTIFIED copy of appeal cross by plaintiffs [1021-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (mb) (Entered: 05/15/1995)
1024 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice of appeal & docket [1020-1] - appeal case # 95-1522 (PP) (Entered: 05/25/1995)
1025 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice of appeal & docket [1023-1] - appeal case # 95-1523 (PP) (Entered: 05/25/1995)
1066 RESPONSE by defendants to application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 by [1064-1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
1026 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/27/94 (RH) Modified on 08/29/1995 (Entered: 06/06/1995)

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05/31/1995 06/01/1995
06/05/1995 06/06/1995
06/08/1995 06/08/1995 06/13/1995 07/25/1995
07/25/1995
08/03/1995
08/09/1995 08/14/1995 08/29/1995 09/08/1995
10/03/1995 11/27/1995

1027 DESIGNATION of record by defendants for appeal. (LS) (Entered: 06/09/1995)
1028 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding requesting transcript (s) of: 6/28/94, 8/2//94, 10/27/94 -appeal case # 95-1522 (LS) (Entered: 06/09/1995)
1029 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 10/27/94 (LS) Modified on 08/29/1995 (Entered: 06/09/1995)
1030 TRANSCRIPT order form by plaintiffs regarding requesting transcript(s) of: transcript already on file -appeal case # 95-1523 (LS) (Entered: 06/09/1995)
1032 DESIGNATION of record by plaintiff for - appeal case # 95-1522 (LS) (Entered: 06/14/1995)
1033 DESIGNATION of record by plaintiffs for cross appeal by plaintiffs [1021-1] - appeal case # 95-1523 (LS) (Entered: 06/14/1995)
1031 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 8/2/94 (RH) (Entered: 06/13/1995)
1034 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens regarding quarterly reports (see order for details) with proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 07/27/1995)
1035 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal notice by defendants [1018-1] requesting transcript(s) of: 7/20/95 -appeal case # 95-1522/95-1523 (lg) (Entered: 08/02/1995)
1036 COPY of letter from F. Warren Benton to Attorney General re: letter dated 7/28/95 to Judge Feikens regarding certain aspects of opposition of the Judge's opinion. (LS) (Entered: 08/04/1995)
1037 LETTER to Dept of Corrections from Dr. F. Warren Benton. PhD. (mc) (Entered: 08/11/1995)
1038 LETTER b court appointed monitor F. Warren Benton to Mr. Michael Barnhart regarding letter dated 8/4/95. (PP) (Entered: 08/15/1995)
1039 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings taken on 6/28/94 (mb) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
1040 ANSWER by plaintiffs' to response to defendants' tri-annual compliance report dated 5/31/95 and request for information, with attachments, and proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 09/11/1995)
1377 TRIANNUAL compliance report; filed by Michigan Department of Corrections (dp) (Entered: 08/25/1999)
1041 ANSWER by plaintiffs' to defendants' tri-annual compliance report dated 9/29/95 and request for information with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 11/28/1995)

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12/07/1995 12/11/1995 01/08/1996
01/12/1996
01/29/1996 01/31/1996 02/05/1996 02/05/1996
02/21/1996
03/05/1996 03/12/1996 03/21/1996 03/21/1996 04/11/1996 04/18/1996

1042 APPEARANCE for defendants' of attorney Leo H. Friedman, with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 12/07/1995)
1043 DECEMBER 1995 REPORT of the independent monitor (lg) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
1044 MOTION by defendants' to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities with brief, exhibits, and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 01/09/1996)
1045 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to respond to defendant's motion to permit Motcalm Community College to Replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the HADIX facilites dated 1/5/96 with brief and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 01/17/1996)
1046 MOTION and brief by defendants' for enlargement of time with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
1047 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for enlargement of time by defendants' [1046-1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
1048 REPLY by defendant's to response to motion for enlargement of time by defendants [1046-1] with proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
1049 RESPONSE by plaintiff's to motion to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities by defendants [1044-1] with attachments (lg) (Entered: 02/06/1996)
1050 REPLY by defendants' to response (document #1049) to motion to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities by defendants [1044-1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 02/22/1996)
1051 MARCH 1996 report of the independent monitor (PP) (Entered: 03/05/1996)
1052 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief, exhibits A-F and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 03/14/1996)
1053 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052-1] with attachment and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/22/1996)
1054 NOTICE of hearing on motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052-1] set before Judge Feikens with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/22/1996)
1055 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by plaintiffs' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052-1], with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 04/15/1996)
1056 MOTION by plaintiffs for order substituting named plaintiff with brief, attachment, notice of hearing and proof of mailing. (mc) (Entered: 04/19/1996)

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04/30/1996
05/06/1996 05/14/1996 05/14/1996 05/14/1996
05/15/1996 05/16/1996 05/16/1996 05/29/1996 05/30/1996 06/10/1996 06/10/1996 06/13/1996 06/13/1996
06/13/1996

1058 LETTER by F. Warren Benton(independent monitor) recommending adopting of plaintiff's motion concerning substitution of Montcalm Community College for Jackson Community College. (PP) (Entered: 05/10/1996)
1057 RESPONSE (supplemental) by defendants' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052-1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/07/1996)
1059 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum by plaintiffs regarding attorney fees of Michael Barnhart (kg) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
1060 SUPPLEMENTAL memorandum by plaintiffs regarding attorney fees of Deborah Labelle, with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
1061 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to permit Montcalm Community College to replace Jackson Community College as the provider of college programming at the Hadix facilities by defendants [1044-1] (kg) (Entered: 05/15/1996)
1062 BRIEF by defendants in support of retroactivity of attorney fee provision of prison reform litigation act, with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
1064 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff regarding the application of the prison litigation Reform Act of 1995 (lg) (Entered: 05/17/1996)
1063 MOTION and order by Judge John Feikens, to file an oversize brief (lg) (Entered: 05/17/1996)
1065 RESPONSE by defendant to supplemental memorandum regarding attorney fees of Michael Barnhart and Deborah Labelle [1060-1] and [1059-1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
1067 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1052-1] (RH) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
1068 MOTION by defendants for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending with brief (lg) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
1069 ANSWER by movant Skinner Corp to second amended complaint (with is not on the docket) with jury demand (lg) (Entered: 06/12/1996)
1070 MOTION and brief by defendants for approval of defendants bond staying judgment on appeal with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 06/18/1996)
ATTORNEY added for defendants John Prelesnik, Marjorie Van Ochten, Frank Elo, Pam Withrow, Elton Scott, Graham Allen, Robert Brown Jr, Don P. LeDuc, Charles Ustess, Roy Rider, James Pogats, John Jabe, Duane Sholes, Daniel Trudell, Dale William F. Grant, Charles Anderson, Barry Mintzes and Perry M. Johnson - Lisa C. Ward (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
1071 APPEAL by defendants of order [1067-1] to USCA - FEE: PAID -

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06/24/1996 06/24/1996 06/28/1996 06/28/1996 06/28/1996 06/28/1996 06/28/1996 07/01/1996
07/01/1996 07/03/1996 07/05/1996
07/08/1996 07/09/1996 07/09/1996 07/11/1996

Receipt #: 329486 (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
1072 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Lisa Ward, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart and SUsan Przekop-Shaw (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
1073 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1071-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 06/24/1996)
1074 MOTION and order by Judge John Feikens, to file brief in excess of 20 pages (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)
1075 DESIGNATION of record by defendant for appeal notice by defendants [1071-1] (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)
1076 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068-1] with attachments (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)
1077 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)
1078 PROOF of mailing of response to motion for immedite termination of the consent decree and motion to file brief in excess of 20 pages with brief (lg) (Entered: 07/02/1996)
1080 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for plaintiffs and defendants to appear for a hearing to show cause why the automatic stay provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act should not be indefinitely stayed pending full consideration of its applicability and constitutionality with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)
1081 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for approval of defendants bond staying judgment on appeal by defendants [1070-1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)
1079 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding requesting transcript (s) of: 5/7/96 (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)
1082 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068-1] with appensix A (kg) (Entered: 07/09/1996)
1083 SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION of record by plaintiffs (lg) (Entered: 07/10/1996)
1084 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying motion for immediate termination [0-1] - appeal case # 95-1522/1523 (lg) (Entered: 07/11/1996)
1085 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1071-1] - appeal case # 96-1851 (lg) (Entered: 07/11/1996)
1086 APPEAL by defendants of order [1082-1] to USCA - FEE: PAID -

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07/11/1996 07/12/1996 07/12/1996 07/15/1996
07/18/1996 07/18/1996 07/22/1996 07/23/1996 07/24/1996 07/26/1996 07/26/1996 07/29/1996 07/29/1996 07/29/1996 07/31/1996 07/31/1996

Receipt #: 330473 (lb) (Entered: 07/12/1996)
1089 REPORT (July 1996) of the independent monitor. (cf) (Entered: 07/15/1996)
1087 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Leo Friedman and Lisa Ward (lb) Modified on 07/31/1996 (Entered: 07/12/1996)
1088 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1086-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 07/12/1996)
1090 LETTER by defendants' to Judge Feikens, with attached copy of Memorandum of Law of United States of America With Respect To The Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which was filed with the United States District Court, Souther Division of New York, Benjamin v Jacobson, No. 75 CIV.3073 (HB). (PP) (Entered: 07/17/1996)
1091 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of request for attorney fees and costs (RH) (Entered: 07/22/1996)
1092 AFFIDAVIT of publication of complaint on 7/11/96 (RH) (Entered: 07/22/1996)
1093 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1086-1] - appeal case # 96-1889 (lg) (Entered: 07/24/1996)
1094 TRANSCRIPT taken on 5/7/96 of motion for attorney fees (lg) Modified on 07/24/1996 (Entered: 07/24/1996)
1096 MOTION by defendants' to file brief in excess of 25 pages with brief and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1996)
1095 BRIEF by defendant's in support of constitutionality of the Prison Litigaiton Reform Act with attachments (lg) (Entered: 07/29/1996)
1100 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, fexcpg. allowing filing of brief in excess of 25 page limit (lg) (Entered: 08/02/1996)
1097 APPEAL by defendants of order [1082-1] to USCA - FEE: NO FEE PAID (lb) (Entered: 07/31/1996)
1101 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal notice by defendants [1097-1] requesting transcript(s) of: 7/2/96 -appeal case # 961889 (lg) (Entered: 08/06/1996)
1102 DESIGNATION of record by defendant for appeal notice by defendants [1097-1] - appeal case # 96-1889 (lg) (Entered: 08/09/1996)
1098 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Leo Friedman and Lisa Ward (lb) (Entered: 07/31/1996)
1099 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1097-1] and docket

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07/31/1996 08/06/1996 08/07/1996
08/12/1996 08/13/1996 08/15/1996 08/15/1996 08/15/1996 08/15/1996 08/15/1996
08/19/1996 08/19/1996 08/19/1996 08/20/1996 08/30/1996

transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 07/31/1996)
1103 MANDATE from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings appeal case # 95-1523 (lg) (Entered: 08/09/1996)
1104 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/2/96 of motion for termination of consent decree (lg) (Entered: 08/12/1996)
1105 RESPONSE by Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, William Ramsey, Al Buttons, James E. Alexander, Brent E. Koster, Danny Walker to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 08/16/1996)
1106 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1097-1] - appeal case # 96-1943 (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1107 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation of named plaintiffs to the courthouse for hearing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1108 STATEMENT of plaintiff class representative Alfredo Robinson concerning the termiantion of the S-2 Break Up Plan (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1109 RESPONSE by prisoners to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068-1] with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1109 MOTION by plaintiffs to dismiss S-2 plan from the 1985 consent decree with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1110 STATEMENT by plaintiff class representative C. Pepper Moore concerning the termination of the S-2 break-up plan. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1111 REPLY by defendants to response by the plaintiffs to motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068-1] and response to motion to dismiss S-2 plan from the 1985 consent decree by plaintiffs [1109-1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 08/19/1996)
1112 EXPARTE motion by plaintiff to file excess pages with brief (PP) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
1113 REPLY by plaintiffs' to defendants' brief in support of the constitutionality of the prison litigation reform act, with proof of service and exhibits A-F (PP) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
1114 TRANSCRIPT taken on 8/15/96 (PP) (Entered: 08/21/1996)
1115 BRIEF in support by defendants of the constitutionality of the prison litigation reform act, with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 08/22/1996)
1116 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees

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08/30/1996 08/30/1996 09/06/1996 09/10/1996 09/13/1996 09/13/1996 09/16/1996 09/17/1996
09/19/1996
09/23/1996 09/24/1996

and costs with brief and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 09/03/1996)
1117 MOTION by defendants to dismiss all orders preventing the transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives currently housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex with brief, and attachments A-D (LS) (Entered: 09/03/1996)
1118 OBJECTIONS by defendants to this court's scheduled tour of Hadix facilities on 9/20/96 and a tour of the new correctional facilities and request for immediate consideration of defendants 6/10/96 motion for immediate termination. (LS) (Entered: 09/03/1996)
1119 OPINION by Judge John Feikens regarding 1983 consent decree, etc. with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 09/09/1996)
1120 MOTION by USA to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) with brief, and memorandum (PP) (Entered: 09/12/1996)
1121 MOTION and order by Judge John Feikens to file oversized brief with brief and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
1122 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief and exhibits (kg) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
1123 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to intervene pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) [1120-1], with proof of mailing. (PP) (Entered: 09/17/1996)
1124 RESPONSE by plaintiffs Ted Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, William Ramsey, Carl Proctor-Bey, Earl Pannell, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Perry Alan Davis, James Chipman, Al Buttons, James E. Alexander, Mark A. Coleman, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix, Danny Walker to motion to dismiss all orders preventing the transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives currently housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex by defendants [1117-1] with brief, exhibits & proof of mailing (sh) (Entered: 09/18/1996)
1125 MOTION by plaintiffsTed Sullivan, Orvel Simmons, Ted Rhode, William Ramsey, Carl Proctor-Bey, Earl Pannell, Cylester Nunnally, Mark LeMothe, Perry Alan Davis, James V. Haddix, Frank Thomas, James Covington, William Lovett, Robert Flemster, Darryl Sturges, Lee A. McDonald, Brent E. Koster, Roosevelt Hudson Jr., Patrick C. Sommerville, Richard Mapes, Everett Hadix to defer final decisions implementing facility C development with brief, exhibits & proof of mailing (sh) (Entered: 09/20/1996)
1126 TRANSCRIPT taken on 8/9/96 of telephonic status conference (kg) (Entered: 09/24/1996)
1127 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA dismissing case [0-1] - appeal case # 96-1889 (PP) (Entered: 10/03/1996)

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09/24/1996 09/30/1996 10/07/1996 10/10/1996
10/10/1996 10/17/1996 10/25/1996 10/29/1996 11/01/1996 11/01/1996
11/13/1996 11/14/1996 11/14/1996
11/20/1996 11/20/1996

1128 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA granting motion to intervene [0-1], granting motin for stay - appeal case # 96-1943 (PP) (Entered: 10/03/1996)
1129 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, deadline for response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs[1122-1] , deadline for reply to respone to motion for attorney fees (PP) (Entered: 10/03/1996)
1130 PROOF of mailing of copy of an order to Deborah LaBelle and Michael Barnhart (RH) (Entered: 10/17/1996)
1131 ORDER by Judge John Feikens referring motion to dismiss all orders preventing the transfer of Hadix plaintiffs representatives currently housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex by defendants [1117-1] to Dr. Benton for a report within the nex two weeks (RH) (Entered: 10/17/1996)
1132 RESPONSE by defendants' to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1122-1] with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 10/17/1996)
1133 TRANSCRIPT taken on 10/4/96 of hearing (lg) (Entered: 10/18/1996)
1134 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1122-1] with attachment and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
1135 RESPONSE by defendants to Dr. F. Warren Benton's report to the court with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 10/29/1996)
1136 ANSWER (titled "response") by plaintiffs' to the report of the independent monitor regarding class representatives with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
1137 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for immediate termination of the consent decree, pursuant to the prison litigation reform act amending by defendants [1068-1]. (cf) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
1138 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by plaintiffs' to the report of the independent monitor regarding class representatives answer [1136-1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/15/1996)
1140 APPEAL by defendants of order [1137-1] to USCA - FEE: paid - Receipt #: 335812 (pr) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
1143 ORDER by Judge John Feikens approving the appointment of Rich Wheeldon as additional class member and requesting a report from defendant regarding their plans for Facility C by November 29,1996 (see order) (RH) (Entered: 11/21/1996)
1141 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Susan PrzekopShaw, Leo Friedman, Lisa Ward, Deborah LaBelle, and Michael Barnhart (pr) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
1142 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1140-1] and docket

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11/29/1996 12/02/1996 12/04/1996
12/06/1996
12/10/1996 12/13/1996 12/18/1996 12/19/1996 12/19/1996 12/20/1996 12/20/1996 12/20/1996 12/23/1996 12/23/1996 12/23/1996

transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 11/20/1996)
1144 DESIGNATION of record by defendants' for appeal notice by defendants [1140-1] (RH) (Entered: 11/29/1996)
1145 LETTER from Susan Przekop-shaw, Assistant Attorney General regarding Decentralizaion Plan (RH) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
1146 ORDER by Judge John Feikens that the PLRA's limits on attorney fees apply to this case for work performed after the PLRA's enactment on 4/26/96; the plaintiffs re-submit fee requests for work performed between 1/1/96 and 6/30/96 in which counsel's fees are limited to $112.50 per hour for time worked after 4/26/96;upon receiving the revised request defendants pay plaintiffs counsel for the contested 23 hours' work provided (RH) (Entered: 12/05/1996)
1147 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA granting defendantsappellants' motion to file instanter reply brief to plaintiffs-appellees proof brief and USA's intervenor's brief [0-1] - appeal case # 96-1943 (PP) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
1148 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1140-1] - appeal case # 96-2463 (RH) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
1149 REPORT (10/8/96) of the independent monitor. (cf) (Entered: 12/17/1996)
1157 RESUBMISSION REQUEST by plaintiffs' for attorney fees , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 12/24/1996)
1150 F.R.A.P. RULE 11 regarding appeal cases 96-1851 and 96-1943 (RH) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1158 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal notice by defendantssssssssssssssssss [1151-1] requesting transcript(s) of: 10/4/96 appeal case # 96-2463 (RH) (Entered: 12/24/1996)
1151 APPEAL by defendant of order [1146-1] to USCA - FEE: paid (no receipt number given) (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1154 CROSS-APPEAL by plaintiffs of order [1146-1] to USCA FEE: paid Receipt #: 21374 (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1159 MOTION by defendants' for approval of defendants; bond staying judgment on appeal , with brief and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 12/30/1996)
1152 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Susan PrzekopShaw, Leo Freidman, Lisa Ward, Deborah LaBelle, and Michael Barnhart (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1153 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by defendants [1151-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1155 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Debroah

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12/23/1996 12/23/1996 12/27/1996 12/30/1996
12/30/1996 01/03/1997
01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/07/1997 01/09/1997
01/09/1997 01/21/1997 01/21/1997

LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Leo Friedman, and Lisa Ward (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1156 CERTIFIED copy of appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
1163 DESIGNATION of record by plaintiffs' for appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154-1] (RH) (Entered: 12/31/1996)
1160 APPEAL by movant USA of order [1137-1] to USCA - FEE: not paid USA (pr) (Entered: 12/30/1996)
1161 PROOF of mailing by clerk of notice of appeal to USCA, Margo Schlanger, Steven Rosenbaum, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Leo Friedman, Lisa Ward, and Patricia Blake (pr) (Entered: 12/30/1996)
1162 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by USA [1160-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (pr) (Entered: 12/30/1996)
1164 NOTICE by defendant of to withdraw attorney Lisa C. Ward for Perry M. Johnson, for Barry Mintzes, for Charles Anderson, for William F. Grant, for Dale Foltz, for Daniel Trudell, for Duane Sholes, for John Jabe, for James Pogats, for Roy Rider, C. Ward for Charles Ustess, for Don LeDuc, for Robert Brown Jr, for Graham Allen, for Elton Scott, for Pam Withrow, for Frank Elo, C. for Marjorie Van Ochten, for John Prelesnik with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 01/10/1997)
1165 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by defendants [1151-1] - appeal case # 96-2567 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
1166 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by USA [1160-1] - appeal case # 96-2582 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
1167 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154-1] - appeal case # 96-2568 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
1168 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/14/96 of motion hearing (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
1169 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154-1], appeal notice by defendants [1151-1] requesting transcript of: 11/14/96 -appeal case # 96-2567, 96-2568 (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
1170 RESPONSE by plaintiff to motion for approval of defendants; bond staying judgment on appeal by defendants [1159-1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
1171 TRANSCRIPT order form by movant USA regarding appeal notice by USA [1160-1] requesting transcript(s) of: none -appeal case # 96-2582 (RH) (Entered: 01/27/1997)
1172 TRANSCRIPT order form by plaintiffs' regarding appeal cross by plaintiffs [1154-1] requesting transcript(s) of: 11/14/96 -appeal case # 96-

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02/06/1997 02/13/1997 03/11/1997 03/12/1997
04/04/1997 04/09/1997 04/09/1997 04/09/1997 04/21/1997 04/28/1997
04/29/1997 04/29/1997 05/06/1997 05/06/1997

2567/96-2568 (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1997)
1173 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for approval of defendants bond staying judgment on appeal by defendants [1159-1] (LB) (Entered: 02/07/1997)
1174 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs for the period of 7/1/96 - 12-31/96 (LB) (Entered: 02/13/1997)
1175 STIPULATION by plaintiffs and defendants, to extend time to file a motion for remaining disputed portion of attorney fees and costs (kg) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
1176 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting stipulation to extend time to file a motion for remaining disputed portion of attorney fees and costs [11751] and granting stipulation by plaintiffs and defendants [1175-2] (kg) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
1177 MOTION and brief by plaintiffs to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees with proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 04/08/1997)
1178 MOTION and order by Judge John Corbett O'Meara, to allow filing of brief in excess of page limit (kg) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
1179 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief and exhibits A - J (kg) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
1180 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of motions and briefs (kg) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
1181 APRIL 1997 report of the independent monitor (lg) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
1182 NOTICE by plaintiff of renewal of motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development until defendants establish to the Court compliance with programmatic requirements for facility B as mandated by the consent decree and implementing orders [1125-1] (LB) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
1183 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1177-1] (LB) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
1184 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, extending deadline for response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1179-1] (LB) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
1186 MOTION by plaintiff to compel inspection with brief, attachment & proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
1187 MOTION by plaintiffs to clarify jurisdiction over housing units 4 and 5, together with supporting services, following renovation prusuant to section VIII of the Consent judgment with brief, attachment and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 05/09/1997)

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05/07/1997 05/09/1997 05/13/1997
05/13/1997 05/14/1997 05/16/1997 05/16/1997
05/19/1997
05/20/1997
05/21/1997 05/22/1997 05/27/1997

1185 RULE 11 completed on appeal case # 96-2567/68 and mailed to the USCA. (LS) (Entered: 05/07/1997)
1188 RESPONSE brief by defendants' in opposition to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1179-1] with attachments and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
1189 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens "that issues involving the PLRA in Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees (document #1179), dated April 9, 1997, are hereby deferred until the conclusion of the appellate process in the pending appeals" and with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
1190 MOTION by plaintiffs' for temporary restraining order , or, in the alternative emergency and enhanced SDT monitoring with brief, exhibits, notice of hearing and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
1191 APPEARANCE for defendants' of attorney Michael A. Nickerson with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/15/1997)
1192 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development by plaintiff [1125-1] with brief (lg) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
1193 MOTION by defendants to file instanter defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development until defendants establish to the court compliance with programmatic requirements for facility B as mandated by the consent decree and implementing orders (lg) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
1194 MOTION and brief by defendants' to enlarge response times to motion to clarify jurisdiction over housing units 4 and 5, together with supporting services, following renovation prusuant to section VIII of the Consent judgment by James V. Haddix [1187-1] and motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186-1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
1196 RESPONSE in opposition by plaintiffs to motion to enlarge response times to motion to clarify jurisdiction over housing units 4 and 5, together with supporting services, following renovation prusuant to section VIII of the Consent judgment by James Haddix [1187-1] and motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186-1] by defendant [1194-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
1195 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1179-1] (lg) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
1197 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion to defer final decisions implementing facility C development by plaintiff [1125-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
1198 TRANSCRIPT taken on 05/09/97 of conference call (dp) (Entered: 05/28/1997)

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06/18/1997 06/18/1997 06/23/1997 06/30/1997 06/30/1997 07/02/1997
07/21/1997 07/22/1997
07/24/1997 07/29/1997 07/29/1997
07/29/1997 08/01/1997

1199 RESPONSE by defendant to motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186-1] with attachments and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 06/19/1997)
1200 MOTION by defendants to file instanter defendants' response in opposiiton to plaintiffs' motion compel inspection with brief and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 06/19/1997)
1201 TRI-ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT for the State Prison of Southern Michigan - Central Complex and 3 block of the Charles Egeler Correctional Facility (lg) (Entered: 06/30/1997)
1202 MOTION by plaintiff to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1] set for 2:00 8/5/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1203 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Clarence "Pepper" Moore, Alfredo obinson and Rick Wheeldon from Jackson to Detroit for court on July 10, 1997 by 9:00 a.m. with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 07/03/1997)
1204 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/10/97 of motion to compel inspection and motion to defer final decisions before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 07/21/1997)
1205 RESPONSE by defendants' in opposition to motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1] with exhibits and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 07/23/1997)
1206 CORRECTED cover page to transcript of 7/10/97 filed on 7/21/97, document #1204. (cf) (Entered: 07/25/1997)
1207 NOTICE by plaintiffs' of hearing on motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1] before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1997)
1208 REPLY by plaintiffs' to response (document #1205) in opposition to motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1] with exhibits. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1997)
1209 PROOF of mailing of documents #1207 and #1208. (cf) (Entered: 07/30/1997)
1210 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of C. Pepper Moore, No. 100885; Danny Walker, No. 197243 and James Alexander, No. 136531 to appear before Judge John Feikens (RH) Modified on 08/04/1997 (Entered: 08/04/1997)

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08/01/1997 08/01/1997 08/05/1997
08/18/1997
08/19/1997
08/22/1997 08/29/1997 09/04/1997 09/09/1997 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 09/12/1997 09/15/1997 09/17/1997 09/18/1997

1211 PROOF of mailing of pleading 1210 (RH) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
1212 PROOF of mailing of plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs (RH) (Entered: 08/04/1997)
MOTION hearing held on motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1] disposition: GRANTED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak - Parties agreed to telephone hours for named pltfs.. Pltfs. will submit an order, with input from Defts. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1213 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1]; plaintiff's class representatives can make collect telephone calls to class counsel only on Hadix consent decree matters (see order for for all provisions) (dp) (Entered: 08/19/1997)
1214 AMENDMENT to order by Judge John Feikens granting motion to permit telephone communication between class representatives and their counsel by plaintiff [1202-1] (only prisoner phones are to be utilized; see text of amendment) (dp) (Entered: 08/20/1997)
1215 TRANSCRIPT taken on 8/5/97 of motion hearing (LS) (Entered: 08/22/1997)
1216 MOTION by plaintiff for contempt of out-of-cell requirement with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 09/03/1997)
1217 MOTION and brief by defendants' for enlargement of time to file a response to the motion for contempt of out-of-cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216-1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 09/04/1997)
1218 AUGUST 1997 report of the independent monitor (lg) (Entered: 09/10/1997)
1219 MOTION by plaintiff Danny Walker to add named plaintiff with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 09/11/1997)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to add named plaintiff by Danny Walker [1219-1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1220 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1177-1] (dp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
1221 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for contempt of outof-cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216-1] with attachments and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
1222 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion to add named plaintiff by Danny Walker [1219-1] with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 09/18/1997)
1223 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for round trip transportation of

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09/19/1997 09/19/1997 09/22/1997
09/23/1997 09/24/1997 09/24/1997 09/29/1997 09/29/1997 09/30/1997 09/30/1997 10/01/1997 10/01/1997 10/01/1997
10/01/1997 10/01/1997

defendants John Worthington, Alfredo Robinson, Melvin Garza, Billy Kidd, Thomas McDonald, C. Pepper Moore and Joseph B. Bibbs-Bey from Jackson to Detroit on 9/19/97 by 2:00 for court appearance with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/23/1997)
1224 MOTION by defendant to quash with exhibits and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/23/1997)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for contempt of out-ofcell requirement by Danny Walker [1216-1] to 11:00 9/22/97 - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
MOTION hearing held on motion for contempt of out-of-cell requirement by Danny Walker [1216-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak Parties to file post-hearing proposed findings of fact/conclusions of law by 10/6/97. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226-1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1225 NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Dan Herman at 10:00 on 9/25/97 with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/25/1997)
1226 MOTION by plaintiff for attorney fees with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/25/1997)
1227 AMENDED NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Dan Herman on 9/29/97 at 2:30 , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 10/01/1997)
1228 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to compel inspection by James V. Haddix [1186-1] (RH) (Entered: 10/01/1997)
1229 TRANSCRIPT taken on 9/19/97 of motion for contempt - Vol. 1 (kg) Modified on 10/01/1997 (Entered: 10/01/1997)
1230 TRANSCRIPT taken on 9/22/97 of motion for contempt - Vol. 2 (kg) (Entered: 10/01/1997)
1231 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to quash by defendant [1224-1] with exhibits 1-4 (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)
1232 DEPOSITION of Danny Herman taken on 9/29/97, with exhibit 1 (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)
1233 MOTION by defendants' for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex , with brief (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)
1234 MOTION by defendants' to quash subpeonas duces tecum , with brief, exhibit 2, affidavit and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 10/02/1997)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to quash subpeonas duces tecum by defendant [1234-1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc)

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10/03/1997 10/06/1997 10/07/1997 10/07/1997 10/09/1997 10/09/1997 10/09/1997 10/10/1997 10/14/1997
10/17/1997
10/17/1997 10/17/1997 10/17/1997 10/17/1997 10/20/1997

(Entered: 02/23/1998)
1235 COMPLIANCE REPORT for the State Prison of Southern MichiganCentral Complex and 3 block of the Charles Engler Correctional Facility (LB) (Entered: 10/06/1997)
1236 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [12261] with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 10/06/1997)
1237 REPLY by plaintiff to response to motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226-1] with attachments (LB) (Entered: 10/07/1997)
1238 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of reply in support of motion for attorney fees and motion for order allowing their reply brief in excess of five pages (LB) (Entered: 10/07/1997)
1239 AFFIDAVIT of Jerry Hofbauer (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
1240 AFFIDAVIT of Barbara Hladki (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
1241 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law by defendants with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
1242 PROPOSED findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs', motion for contempt of out-of-cell requirements; filed by plaintiffs (dp) (Entered: 10/14/1997)
1243 BRIEF by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex by defendant [1233-1] with proof mailing (dp) (Entered: 10/20/1997)
1244 MOTION by plaintiffs to supplement the relief requested and correct clerical errors in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs' motion for contempt of out-of-cell requirements with brief and proof of mailing (dp) Modified on 10/20/1997 (Entered: 10/20/1997)
1245 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of Danny Walker to appear at USDC Eastern District of Michigan (dp) Modified on 10/20/1997 (Entered: 10/20/1997)
1246 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of C. Pepper More to USDC Eastern District of Michigan (dp) (Entered: 10/20/1997)
1247 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for transportation of James Alexander to USDC Eastern District of Michigan (dp) (Entered: 10/20/1997)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to supplement the relief requested by plaintiff [1244-1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1248 MOTION by defendants to amend motion for relief from order

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10/20/1997 10/20/1997 10/20/1997
10/20/1997 10/20/1997 10/20/1997 10/20/1997
10/24/1997 11/04/1997

prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex by defendants [1233-1] with proof of mailing (no brief) (dp) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
1249 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226-1]; defendants shall pay the uncontested attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel (see order); with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 10/21/1997)
MOTION hearing held on motion to add named plaintiff by Danny Walker [1219-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak - until compliance hearings on Facility B; until hearings Mr. Gibb-Bey may act as a de facto class rep. he may not be transferred and must be permitted phone access during regular business hours. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
MOTION hearing held on motion for attorney fees by plaintiff [1226-1] disposition: GRANTED IN PART - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak - Uncontested fees and those for monitoring Facility B and C must be paid forthwith (no later than 5 p.m. 10/21/97); In addition, Pltfs' will receive 1/2 of fees for Barnhart's Sixth Circuit trip (10.5 hrs.) and hours spent on staffing issues (8 hrs.); All other contested hours may be re-submitted after a ruling from the Sixth Circuit. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to supplement the relief requested by plaintiff [1244-1] - disposition: MOOT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
MOTION hearing not held on motion to quash subpeonas duces tecum by defendant [1234-1] - disposition: MOOT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion to amend motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern MichiganCentral Complex by defendants [1233-1] by defendant [1248-1] set for 2:00 10/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
MOTION hearing held on motion to amend motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex by defendants [1233-1] by defendant [1248-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak until compliance hearing; parties will negotiate with regard to the timing of transfer. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1250 MOTION by plaintiff Danny Walker to strike findings of fact proposed by defendant [1241-1] with brief & proof of mailing (sh) (Entered: 10/27/1997)
1251 RESPONSE and brief by defendants to motion to strike findings of fact proposed by defendant [1241-1] by Danny Walker [1250-1] with proof of

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11/04/1997 11/06/1997 11/07/1997 11/07/1997 11/07/1997 11/07/1997 11/07/1997 11/07/1997
11/07/1997 11/12/1997
11/13/1997 11/13/1997 11/13/1997

mailing (lg) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
1252 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, amending order [1249-1] (lg) (Entered: 11/06/1997)
1254 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendants' response to motion to strike findings of fact proposed by defendant [1241-1] by Danny Walker [1250-1], with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
1260 ORDER by Judge John Feikens for transportation State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
1261 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Alfredo Robinson from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1262 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Brent Koster from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1263 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Danny Walker from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/10/97 at 9am (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1264 STIPULATION and order by Judge John Feikens, of payment regarding defendants' specific objections to attorneys fees and costs (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1265 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to supplement the relief requested by plaintiff [1244-1] and granting motion correct clerical errors in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs' motion for contempt of out-of-cell requirements by plaintiff [1244-2] (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1266 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1226-1] (RH) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
1253 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for relief from order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives from 11 block of State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex by defendant [1233-1] (RH) (Entered: 11/17/1997)
1257 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation for James Alexander from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson, to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/20/97 at 10am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
1258 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Albert Button from State Prison of Southern Michigan to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/20/97 at 10am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)
1259 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transportation of Orvel (Duke) Simmons from State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson to appear before Judge Feikens on 11/20/97 at 10am (RH) (Entered: 11/19/1997)

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11/14/1997
11/14/1997 11/17/1997 11/18/1997
11/20/1997 11/20/1997 11/20/1997 12/03/1997 12/08/1997 12/11/1997 12/11/1997 01/05/1998 01/09/1998
01/09/1998

1255 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiff Danny Walker, plaintiff Ted Sullivan, plaintiff Orvel Simmons, plaintiff Ted Rhode, plaintiff William Ramsey, plaintiff Carl Proctor-Bey, plaintiff Earl Pannell, plaintiff Cylester Nunnally, plaintiff Mark LeMothe, plaintiff Perry Alan Davis, plaintiff James Chipman, plaintiff Al Buttons, plaintiff James E. plaintiff Mark A. Coleman for clarification and reconsideration of order [1253-1] , with brief and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/18/1997)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for clarification and reconsideration of order [1253-1] by plaintiff [1255-1] set for 2:00 11/20/97 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1256 NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Roy Piggot 11/19/97 at 2pm , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/18/1997)
1257 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/10/97 of closing arguments on motion for modification of the consent decree; motion for relief from an order prohibiting the transfer of named plaintiffs' representatives (RH) Modified on 11/18/1997 (Entered: 11/18/1997)
1267 AMENDED NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Roy Piggott 11/25/97 at 10am , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 11/21/1997)
1268 AFFIDAVIT of Marjorie VanOchten (dp) (Entered: 11/25/1997)
MOTION hearing held on motion for clarification and reconsideration of order [1253-1] by plaintiff [1255-1] - disposition: DENIED - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1269 SECOND AMENDED NOTICE of taking deposition de bene esse of Roy Piggott 12/4/97 at 3:00 , with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
1270 NOTICE by movant USA of taking deposition of Roy Piggott 12/8/97 at 10:00 - with proof of mailing (LB) (Entered: 12/09/1997)
1271 DEPOSITION of Roy Piggott taken on 12/8/97 (lg) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
1272 DEPOSITION of Roy Piggott taken on 12/4/97 (lg) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
1273 POINT brief of the deposition testimony of Roy Piggott [1272-1] [12711]; filed by plaintiff; with proof of mailing(dp) Modified on 01/07/1998 (Entered: 01/07/1998)
1274 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for Danny Walker, Albert Button, Orville Simmons, William Ramsey and James Alexander to appear before Judge Feikens and be transferred back to prison institution with proof of mailing (see order for complete details) (dp) (Entered: 01/12/1998)
1275 PROOF of mailing of order of transportation (document 1274); filer not known (dp) (Entered: 01/12/1998)

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01/09/1998 01/09/1998
01/12/1998
01/15/1998 01/16/1998 01/20/1998 01/22/1998 01/22/1998 01/22/1998 01/22/1998 01/23/1998
01/23/1998
01/26/1998 01/27/1998
01/27/1998 01/27/1998

1276 EMERGENCY motion by plaintiffs for temporary restraining order with brief, exhibits A-H and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 01/12/1998)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens hearing on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276-1] set for 2:00 1/12/98 (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276-1] to 2:00 1/22/98 - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1277 BRIEF by defendant Perry M. Johnson regarding deposition of Roy Piggott, with proof of service (RH) (Entered: 01/16/1998)
1278 SLIP opinion from USCA reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings - appeal case # 96-2463/2582 (lg) (Entered: 01/22/1998)
1290 TRANSCRIPT taken on 1/23/98 of motion hearing (lg) (Entered: 02/02/1998)
1280 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant William Ramsey (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)
1281 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant Orville Simmons (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)
1282 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant Danny Walker (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)
1279 EX PARTE ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for transporation of defendant Albert Button (lg) (Entered: 01/23/1998)
1286 SLIP opinion from USCA case [0-1] reversing and remanding for further proceedings - appeal case # 96-2463/2582 - record not returned (RH) (Entered: 01/29/1998)
MOTION hearing held and continued on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276-1] to 9:30 1/27/98 - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)
1283 TRI-ANNUAL Compliance Report from the State Prison of southern Michigan (RH) (Entered: 01/26/1998)
1284 RESPONSE and brief in opposition by defendants to motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276-1] with attachment A and proof of mailing. (LS) (Entered: 01/28/1998)
1285 PROOF of mailing of the ex-parte order for transportation (LS) (Entered: 01/28/1998)
MOTION hearing held on motion for temporary restraining order by plaintiff [1276-1] - disposition: MOOT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak - except with regard to Danny Walker; Motion with regard to Walker is UNDER ADVISEMENT pending investigation of whether he has enemies at Facility B. (cc) (Entered: 02/23/1998)

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01/29/1998 01/29/1998 01/29/1998 02/04/1998 02/04/1998 02/17/1998
02/18/1998 02/24/1998 03/02/1998 03/02/1998 03/13/1998 03/13/1998 03/20/1998 04/08/1998 04/22/1998

1287 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/20/97 of motion hearing (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1998)
1288 TRANSCRIPT taken on 12/17/97 of telephonic proceedings (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1998)
1289 TRANSCRIPT taken on 1/12/98 of motion hearing (RH) (Entered: 01/30/1998)
1291 TRANSCRIPT taken on 1/27/98 of motion hearing (lg) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
1292 LETTER, from the 6th Circuit correcting decision (lg) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
1293 MOTION by plaintiff Ted Sullivan, plaintiff Orvel Simmons, plaintiff Ted Rhode, plaintiff William Ramsey, plaintiff Perry Alan Davis, plaintiff Mark A. Coleman to add Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative , with brief and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 02/18/1998)
1294 MOTION by plaintiffs' for contempt and clarification , with brief, exhibits A-E and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 02/19/1998)
1295 MOTION by plaintiffs' for order of payment of uncontested attorneys' fees , with brief, exhibit A-C and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 02/26/1998)
1296 RESPONSE and brief by defendants' in opposition to motion for contempt and clarification by plaintiff [1294-1] with affidavit of Barbara Hladki and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/02/1998)
1297 RESPONSE and brief by defendants' to motion to add Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative by plaintiff [1293-1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/03/1998)
1299 SLIP opinion from USCA case [0-1] reversing and remanding for further proceedings - appeal case # 94-2463/2582 - record not returned (RH) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
1300 MANDATE from USCA reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings - appeal case # 96-2463 (RH) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
1298 PROOF of mailing of defendants' response and objections to plaintiffs' request for production of documents. (cf) (Entered: 03/23/1998)
1301 TRANSCRIPT taken on 03/23/98 of motion re inspections (dp) (Entered: 04/09/1998)
SLIP opinion from USCA dismissing appeal 97-1218 as moot, in appeals 96-2567/2568, 96-2586/2588 and 97-1272, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the cases to the District Court for a recalculation of the fee awards in a manner consistent with this opinion (see 77-71229 #1308) (LS) (Entered: 04/24/1998)

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04/30/1998
05/05/1998 05/05/1998 05/06/1998 05/07/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/29/1998 06/11/1998 06/12/1998 06/12/1998 06/15/1998 06/23/1998 06/25/1998 07/02/1998

MOTION hearing held on motion to add Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative by plaintiff [1293-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak - Court to grant motion if plaintiffs submits a satisfactory affidavit and order. (cc) (Entered: 05/07/1998)
1302 BRIEF IN RESPONSE by defendants to request by court to address applicbility of Benjamin v. Jacobson to the instant case with proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 05/06/1998)
1303 TRANSCRIPT taken on 4/30/98 of hearing on motion to add plaintiff (nh) Modified on 05/07/1998 (Entered: 05/06/1998)
1304 MEMORANDUM of law by plaintiffs' regarding jurisdictional authority with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/07/1998)
1305 COPY OF LETTER, from Supreme Court stating that a writ of certiorari has been filed on 4/13/98 and placed on the docket (lg) (Entered: 05/11/1998)
1306 REPORT (compliance) - facility, SPSM Central Complex - January through April, 1998. (cf) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
1307 REPORT (compliance) - facility, Charles Egeler Facility - January 1998 to April 1998. (cf) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
1308 MOTION by plaintiff to compel production of documents , with brief, exhibits A-G and proof of service (RH) (Entered: 06/02/1998)
1309 RESPONSE in opposition by defendants to motion to compel production of documents by plaintiff [1308-1] with affidavit, exhibits 1-2 and proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 06/12/1998)
1310 MOTION by plaintiff for order adding Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative with brief and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 06/15/1998)
1312 MANDATE from USCA case reversing decision of the district court appeal case # 96-1943 (dp) (Entered: 06/17/1998)
1311 MANDATE from USCA affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the District Court - appeal case # 96-1851 (dp) (Entered: 06/17/1998)
1313 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA recalling the appeal mandate - appeal case # 96-1907/1908/1943 (lg) (Entered: 06/26/1998)
1314 COMPLIANCE Evalution for facility B which consists of blocks 5 and 5 of former State Prison of Southern Michigan (lg) (Entered: 06/26/1998)
MOTION hearing held on motion to compel production of documents by plaintiff [1308-1] - disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Larry Przbysz - Defts' are to give Curtiss Pulitzer a copy of the plans for Blocks 10 & 11 and allow him access to the general contractor; Defts' are to produce an extra copy of

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07/13/1998
07/22/1998 08/11/1998 08/19/1998 08/24/1998 08/25/1998 08/28/1998 09/15/1998 09/15/1998 09/15/1998 09/21/1998 10/05/1998
10/26/1998 10/26/1998 10/26/1998

the "punch list" if they have one; Pltf. to submit the appropriate order. (cc) (Entered: 07/02/1998)
1315 COPY of order from USCA staying the mandate for thirty days unless the court is advised the the petition for writ of certiorari has been filed appeal case # 96-2567/2568/2586/2588 (LS) Modified on 07/23/1998 (Entered: 07/23/1998)
1316 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion for order adding Ronald Kovaleski as an additional class representative by plaintiff [1310-1] with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 07/23/1998)
1317 MOTION by plaintiff for entry of order with brief, exhibits A-C and proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 08/13/1998)
1318 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to compel production of documents by plaintiff [1308-1] (see order for complete provisions); with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 08/20/1998)
1319 RESPONSE by defendant to motion for entry of order by plaintiff [13171] with attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 08/25/1998)
1320 MOTION by defendants for reconsideration of order [1318-1] with attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 08/26/1998)
1321 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for reconsideration of order [1318-1] by defendant [1320-1] (lg) (Entered: 08/31/1998)
1322 MOTION by plaintiff for order of payment of uncontested attorney's fees and to overrule defendants objections with brief, exhibit A-C and proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
1325 COMPLIANCE report as to SPSM Central Complex (dh) (Entered: 10/23/1998)
1326 COMPLIANCE report as to Charles Egeler Facility (dh) (Entered: 10/23/1998)
1323 COPY OF ORDER, from the Supreme Court denying writ of certiorari (lg) (Entered: 09/22/1998)
1324 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens granting motion for order of payment of uncontested attorney's fees and to overrule defendants objections by plaintiff [1322-1] (lg) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
1327 PROOF of mailing of notice of deposition of Leo Friedman. (cf) (Entered: 10/27/1998)
1328 PROOF of mailing of notice of deposition duces tecum of Leo Friedman. (cf) (Entered: 10/27/1998)
1329 PROOF of mailing of copy of notice of deposition. (cf) (Entered: 10/30/1998)

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11/06/1998 11/06/1998 11/24/1998 12/09/1998
12/09/1998 01/07/1999
02/01/1999
02/02/1999 02/02/1999 02/18/1999
03/01/1999 03/16/1999
03/18/1999 03/18/1999
04/06/1999 04/06/1999

STATUS conference held - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 11/06/1998)
1330 OBJECTIONS by defendants to report [1314-1] with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
1331 LETTER from U.S. Court of Appeals regarding writ of certiorari granted (dh) (Entered: 11/30/1998)
1332 ORDER by Judge John Feikens for C. Pepper Moore, Danny Walker and Joseph Gibbs-Bey to appear at status conference set for December 10, 1998; with attachment and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 12/10/1998)
1333 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to report [1314-1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 12/11/1998)
1334 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of interrogatories and requests for production of documents regarding food service (LS) (Entered: 01/08/1999)
1335 PROOF of mailing of defendants objections to interogatories and requests for document production regarding food service (kg) (Entered: 02/02/1999)
1336 TRI-ANNUAL compliance report (kg) (Entered: 02/04/1999)
1337 TRI-ANNUAL compliance report (kg) (Entered: 02/04/1999)
1338 RECORD of appeal notice by USA [1160-1] consisting of: 82 volumes of pleadings 78 transcripts and 3 depositions transmitted to Supreme Court (kg) Modified on 07/18/2000 (Entered: 02/18/1999)
1339 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from Supreme Court of receipt of appeal record [1338-1] - appeal case # 98-262 (LS) (Entered: 03/02/1999)
1340 ORDER by Judge John Feikens with stipulation, extending time to file motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs to 4/9/99 (kg) (Entered: 03/17/1999)
1341 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens of partial termination with appendix A and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 03/19/1999)
1342 ORDER of transfer by Judge John Feikens with proof of mailing. "Sections I.P., I.Q. and I.S. as to Facility B as well as defendants' proposed alternatives as to Facility A are transferred to Judge Enslen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) for further proceedings as he deems appropriate." (cf) (Entered: 03/19/1999)
1343 MOTION by defendants' for stay , and for expedited consideration with brief, exhibits and proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
1344 APPEAL by defendants of orders [1342-1] and [1341-1] to USCA with proof of service - FEE: PAID - Receipt #: 378152 (do) (Entered: 04/07/1999)

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04/07/1999 04/07/1999 04/12/1999 04/13/1999 04/13/1999 04/13/1999 04/14/1999 04/15/1999 04/19/1999 04/19/1999 04/20/1999 04/22/1999 04/22/1999 04/22/1999 04/26/1999

1345 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, Leo Friedman, Michael Nickerson, Patricia Streeter, Deborah LaBelle and Michael Barnhart (do) (Entered: 04/07/1999)
1346 CERTIFIED copy of appeal by defendants [1344-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (do) (Entered: 04/07/1999)
1347 MEMORANDUM opinion and order by Judge John Feikens denying motion for stay [1343-1] and motion for expedited consideration by defendants [1343-2] with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/13/1999)
1348 ORDER by Judge John Feikens with motion for second extension of time to file a motion regarding unresolved attorney fees and costs with brief and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/14/1999)
1349 NOTICE by Judge John Feiken's chambers setting hearing on out-of-cell activity issue for 2:00 on 4/22/99 with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/14/1999)
1352 CROSS-APPEAL by plaintiffs of orders [1342-1] and [1341-1] to USCA with proof of service - FEE: PAID Receipt #: 3182 (do) (Entered: 04/19/1999)
1350 ERRATA by plaintiffs for certificate of service for plaintiffs' notice of cross appeal, filed 04/13/99 (not on docket); with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 04/15/1999)
1351 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs with brief, attachments A-I and proof of mailing (dp) Modified on 04/15/1999 (Entered: 04/15/1999)
1353 PROOF of mailing of notice of cross appeal to USCA, Patricia Streeter, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Leo Friedman and Michael Nickerson (do) (Entered: 04/19/1999)
1354 CERTIFIED copy of appeal cross by Everett Hadix [1352-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (do) (Entered: 04/19/1999)
1355 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice & docket [1346-1] - appeal case # 99-1413 (dh) (Entered: 04/20/1999)
MISCELLANEOUS hearing held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak - Re: Out-Of-Cell Activity Issue. (cc) (Entered: 04/23/1999)
1356 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying case [0-1] - appeal case # 99-1413 (dh) (Entered: 04/23/1999)
1357 MOTION by defendant's to extend time to answer motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1351-1] with brief, proof of mailing (dh) (Entered: 04/23/1999)
1358 CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA denying motion for stay pending appeal - appeal case # 99-1413 (dp) (Entered: 04/27/1999)

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04/27/1999 04/27/1999 04/30/1999
05/03/1999 05/10/1999 05/18/1999 05/18/1999 05/19/1999 05/27/1999 06/09/1999 06/23/1999 07/15/1999 07/20/1999 07/23/1999

1359 TRANSCRIPT taken on 4/22/99 of Hearing on Out-Of-Cell Activity Issue (nh) (Entered: 04/28/1999)
1360 TRANSCRIPT order form by defendant regarding requesting transcript (s) of: 1/28/98; 3/23/98; 7/2/98; and 4/22/99 -appeal case # 99-1413 (nh) (Entered: 04/28/1999)
1361 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to extend time to answer motion for attorney fees [1351-1] by defendants [1357-1] and setting deadline for filing a response to motion for attorney fees [1351-1] and for costs by plaintiffs [1351-2] for 5/10/99 with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
1362 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT from USCA of receipt of notice of cross appeal & docket [1354-1] - appeal case # 99-1457 (LS) (Entered: 05/04/1999)
1363 RESPONSE brief by defendants' in opposition to motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs' [1351-1] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 05/10/1999)
1364 REPLY by plaintiffs to response and in support of motion for attorney fees [1351-1], and for costs by plaintiffs [1351-2] with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
1365 TRI-ANNUAL compliance reports by the Michigan Department of Corrections - reports cover the period of January through April 1999. (LS) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
1366 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/2/98 of motion hearing before Judge Feikens. (cf) (Entered: 05/19/1999)
1367 TRANSCRIPT order form by plaintiff's/cross-appellants requesting transcript(s): -appeal case # 99-1457 with proof of mailing (nh) Modified on 05/28/1999 (Entered: 05/28/1999)
1368 ERRATA: document titled "defendants' brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees" removed from docket and placed on correct docket 95-76273 (dp) (Entered: 06/07/2000)
1369 ERRATA: document titled "defendants' supplemental brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees" removed from docket and placed on docket 95-76273 (dp) (Entered: 06/07/2000)
1370 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA granting in part and denying in part motion for stay, and denying motion to strike - appeal case # 99-1413; 99-1457 (cm) (Entered: 07/19/1999)
1371 PROOF of mailing of plaintiff's interrgatories and requests for production of documents regarding out-of-cell activities (lg) (Entered: 07/21/1999)
1372 OPINION and order by Judge John Feikens [EOD Date: 7/26/99] granting motion for attorney fees by plaintiffs [1351-1], and granting motion costs by plaintiffs [1351-2] with proof of mailing. (cf) (Entered: 07/26/1999)

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08/13/1999 08/13/1999
08/17/1999 08/19/1999 09/07/1999 09/07/1999
09/07/1999 09/07/1999 09/07/1999 09/07/1999 09/08/1999 09/08/1999 09/13/1999
09/13/1999 09/14/1999

1373 SLIP opinion from the Supreme Court of the USA regarding fee limitation, etc. - appeal case # 96-2567/68/88 & # 97-1218/1272. (cf) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
1374 NON-CERTIFIED copy of judgment from the Supreme Court of the USA affirming in part and reversing in part and remanding case to the USCA for further proceedings, etc. (SC #98-262) - appeal case # 962567/68/88 & # 97-1218/1272. (cf) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
1375 PROOF of mailing (amended) of response and objections to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (cf) (Entered: 08/18/1999)
1376 MOTION by defendants' to modify record with proof of mailing. (no brief - ok without brief via court clerk) (cf) (Entered: 08/20/1999)
1378 MOTION by plaintiffs to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees and expenses with proof of mailing (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1379 ORDER by Judge John Feikens with stipulation granting motion to extend time to file a motion for attorney fees and expenses by plaintiffsssssssssssssssssssssssssss [1378-1], setting (miscellaneous) for 9/30/99 [EOD Date: 9/8/99] (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1380 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting motion to modify record by defendants [1376-1] to supplement record on appeal with additional items [EOD Date 9/8/99] (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1381 TRANSCRIPT taken on July 2, 1998 of motion hearing (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1382 LETTER by Michael A. Nickerson to Honorable John Feikens dated 2/12/98 (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1383 LETTER from Michael A. Nickerson to Honorable John Feikens dated 12/1/98 (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1384 SUPPLEMENTAL record of appeal [1354-1] consisting of: 1 volume(s) of pleadings 1 transcript(s) sent to USCA - appeal case # 99-1457 " (cm) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
1385 REPORT from the Department of Corrections regarding medical and mental health issues (dh) (Entered: 09/09/1999)
1386 EXPEDITED motion by defendants to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative with brief, attachments 1,2,3 and proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 09/14/1999)
1387 NOTICE by Judge John Feikens chambers of setting civil trial for 9:00 9/27/99 with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 09/14/1999)
1388 PROOF of mailing of interrogatories and request for document production (kg) (Entered: 09/15/1999)

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09/14/1999 09/15/1999
09/15/1999
09/15/1999 09/16/1999 09/16/1999
09/17/1999 09/22/1999 09/23/1999 09/23/1999
09/27/1999 09/27/1999 09/27/1999 09/27/1999 09/30/1999 10/06/1999

1389 MOTION by defendants to relieve compliance with the court's 7/22/98 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 09/16/1999)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting hearing on motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendantssssssssssssssssss [1386-1] for 10:00 9/16/99 (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1999)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting hearing on motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1386-1] for 10:00 9/16/99 (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1999)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting settlement conference for 10:00 9/16/99 (cc) (Entered: 09/15/1999)
SETTLEMENT conference held - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/16/1999)
MOTION hearing cancelled on motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1386-1] - disposition: ADJOURNED WITHOUT DATE - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/16/1999)
1390 LETTER from the Department of Corrections regarding:corrected page to pleading 1385 (report) (dh) (Entered: 09/20/1999)
1391 NOTICE of plaintiff's of inspection and request for production of documents with proof of mailing (dh) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
CIVIL jury trial cancelled - Judge John Feikens (cc) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
1392 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to relieve compliance with the court's July 22, 1998 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class representative by defendants [1386-1] with brief, exhibits A-C and proof of mailing (cm) (Entered: 09/24/1999)
1393 MOTION by defendants for protective order with brief and attachments (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)
1394 OBJECTIONS by defendant to notice of inspection and request for production of documents [1391-1] (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)
1395 PROOF of mailing of pleading #'s 1393-1394 (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)
1396 PROOF of mailing of defendants' first interrogatories and request for production of documents (lg) (Entered: 09/27/1999)
1397 MOTION by plaintiff for attorney fees and costs with brief, attachments and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
1398 REPLY by defendants to response to motion to relieve compliance with the court's 7/22/98 order adding Ronald Koveleski as an additional class

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10/06/1999 10/06/1999 10/06/1999 10/07/1999
10/12/1999 10/12/1999 10/18/1999
10/20/1999 10/21/1999 10/28/1999 11/01/1999 11/03/1999 01/07/2000 03/01/2000

representative by defendants [1389-1] with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)
1399 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs of notice of deposition of Gerald w. Whiting, Larry Bennett along with persons designated by defendants, along with request for documens (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)
1400 PROOF of mailing by patricia Streeter of notices of inspection and requests for production of documents (date corrected) (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)
1401 PROOF of mailing by Patricia Streeter of notices of inspection and request for production of documents (LS) (Entered: 10/07/1999)
1402 ANSWER by plaintiff's to objections to plaintiffs' notice of inspection, request for production of documents by defendants [1394-1], and motion for protective order by defendants [1393-1] with proof of mailing (nh) (Entered: 10/12/1999)
1403 MOTION by defendants for protective order with attachments 1 and 2 (dp) (Entered: 10/13/1999)
1404 PROOF of mailing by defendants of objections to plaintiffs' notice of inspection and request for production of documents (dp) (Entered: 10/13/1999)
1405 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion for protective order and to defendants objections to plaintiffs notice of inspection andrequest for documents by defendants [1403-1] with attachments 1-3 and proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 10/19/1999)
1406 ORDER by Judge John Feikens denying motion for protective order by defendants [1403-1] with proof of mailing [EOD Date 10/22/99] (LS) (Entered: 10/22/1999)
1407 PROOF of mailing by defendants of response to plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for documents dated 9/10/99 (LS) (Entered: 10/22/1999)
1408 MOTION by defendant to compel answers to interogatories and production of documents with brief and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 10/29/1999)
1409 SUPPLEMENTAL brief by plaintiff motion for attorney fees and costs by plaintiffs [1397-1] with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
1410 ORDER by Judge John Feikens staying motion to compel answers to interogatories and production of documents by defendants [1408-1] with proof of mailing [EOD Date 11/5/99] (kg) (Entered: 11/05/1999)
1411 TRI-ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORTS which are required to be submitted for this case. (lg) (Entered: 01/10/2000)
1412 PROOF of mailing by plaintiffs' request for procution of documents and interrogatories regarding facility renovation (dh) (Entered: 03/02/2000)

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03/31/2000 05/01/2000
05/17/2000 05/17/2000
05/22/2000 06/07/2000 06/19/2000
06/30/2000
07/11/2000 07/12/2000 07/17/2000 07/18/2000 08/28/2000 09/21/2000

1413 PROOF of mailing of defendants' response to plaintiffs' request for production of documents and interrogatories to defendants regarding facility renovation (nh) (Entered: 04/03/2000)
1414 MOTION and brief by defendants for immediate consideration of that portion of defendants pending motion for immediate termination of consent decree and associated orders pursuant to the PLRA relating to college programming with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 05/02/2000)
Text not available. (Entered: 05/19/2000)
1415 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to motion for immediate consideration of that portion of defendants pending motion for immediate termination of consent decree and associated orders to the PLRA relating to college programming by defendants [1414-1] with exhibits 1-10 and proof of mailing proofof (nh) (Entered: 05/19/2000)
1416 COMPLIANCE REPORT covering January through April, 2000, by MDOC (cm) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
1417 NOTICE by plaintiffs of change of address of counsel Patricia A. Streeter (cm) (Entered: 06/08/2000)
1418 MOTION by defendants to relieve compliance with section IV-A of the consent decree providing for the housing of inmates in single cells at the State Prison of Southern Michigan - Central Complex with brief and proof of maiing (cm) (Entered: 06/20/2000)
1419 RESPONSE and brief by plaintiffs to motion to relieve compliance with section IV-A of the consent decree providing for the of inmates in single cells at the State Prison of Southern Michigan - Central Complex by defendants [1418-1] with attachment 1 and 2 and proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 07/05/2000)
1420 MOTION by plaintiffs for reconsideration of resolution of motion to relieve compliance with Section IV-A of the consent decree with brief and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 07/12/2000)
1421 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, transferring Section I-P,I-S of the Consent Decree to Judge Enslen in the Western District of Michigan with proof of mailing [EOD Date 7/14/00] (kg) (Entered: 07/14/2000)
1422 LETTER from attorney for defendants, to Judge Feikens, regarding deadlines set forth in attached memorandum of understanding of 06/26/00 (cf) Modified on 10/07/2003 (Entered: 07/18/2000)
1423 RECORD of appeal returned from the Supreme Court (file actually returned on 7/26/99 the acknowledgement was never filed - appeal case SC # 98-262 (LS) (Entered: 07/18/2000)
1424 MEMO from Eric Ciccoretti to Judge Feikens regarding compliance with the MOU (LS) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
1425 NOTICE by the court of conference (re:record from Pepper Moore) for

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10/10/2000 10/10/2000 10/10/2000
10/10/2000
10/10/2000
10/11/2000 10/27/2000 11/01/2000 11/03/2000 11/15/2000 11/16/2000 11/21/2000 12/04/2000 12/05/2000 12/12/2000

2:00 on 10/10/00 with proof of mailing (LS) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
1426 NON-CERTIFIED copy of order from USCA remanding the case for further proceedings - appeal case # 99-1413;99-1457 (lg) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
1427 MONTHLY REPORT out of cell activity memorandum of understanding from the M.D.O.C (lg) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
SLIP opinion from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court appeal case # (HADIX 96-2567/2568) GLOVER 96-2586/2588) - record not returned (see 77-71229, pleading 1460 for original) (lh) (Entered: 10/12/2000)
NON-CERTIFIED copy of Judgment from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court - appeal case # (HADIX 96-2567/2568) and (GLOVER 96-2586/2588) See 77-71229, pleading 1461) (lh) (Entered: 10/12/2000)
1428 SLIP opinion from USCA reversing the District Court's order terminating the Hadix consent decree because it fails to comply with the requirements of the PLRA and remand the case for further proceedings - appeal case # 99-1413/1457 (lg) (Entered: 10/24/2000)
MISCELLANEOUS CONF. - held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Mary Vozniak (cc) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
1429 TRANSCRIPT of status conference filed for appeal purposes taken on 10/10/00 regarding appeal filed by defendants [1344-1] (lh) (Entered: 11/01/2000)
1431 MANDATE from USCA reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings - appeal case # 99-1413/99-1457 (lg) (Entered: 11/06/2000)
1430 NOTICE by Michael Barnhart (attorney for plaintiffs) of change of address ; with proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 11/03/2000)
1432 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, to transfer case to Western District of Michigan with attachment [EOD Date 11/22/00] (lg) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
1433 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/6/00 of telephonic proceeding (lg) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
1434 RECORD of appeal by defendants [1344-1] returned from USCA appeal case # 99-1413/1457 (lg) (Entered: 12/04/2000)
TELE-CONFERENCE held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Larry Przybysz - w/Dr. Benton, Leo Friedman and Michael Barnhart. (cc) (Entered: 12/04/2000)
1435 TRANSCRIPT taken on 11/22/00 of telephonic proceeding (lg) (Entered: 12/11/2000)
1463 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for

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12/12/2000 01/11/2001 01/23/2001 01/24/2001
02/02/2001 02/02/2001 02/09/2001 03/23/2001 06/15/2001
06/18/2001 06/18/2001
06/26/2001 06/27/2001 07/05/2001 07/06/2001
07/10/2001

October 2000) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
1464 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for November 2000) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
1465 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for December 2000) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
1436 TRANSCRIPT taken on 12/4/00 of telephone conference (LS) (Entered: 01/24/2001)
1437 MANDATE from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court appeal case # 96-2567, 96-2568, 96-2586, 96-2588 (LS) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
1438 ORDER by Judge John Feikens authorizing disbursement of funds to Wayne State University [EOD Date 2/5/01] (cm) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
1439 ORDER by Judge John Feikens of withdrawal of funds [EOD Date 2/5/01] (cm) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
1466 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (for January 2001) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
1467 REPORT on out of cell activity per memorandum of understanding (February 2001) (dp) (Entered: 10/07/2003)
1440 MOTION and brief by plaintiffs to extend time to file brief on due process issues to 7/16/01 with proof of mailing (kg) (Entered: 06/18/2001)
TELE-CONFERENCE held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Karin Dains - Re: Due Process Issue. (cc) (Entered: 06/18/2001)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting response from pltfs. re: due process issue for 7/2/01 , setting hearing re: due procee issue for 10:00 7/10/01 (cc) (Entered: 06/18/2001)
1441 MOTION by Everett Hadix for costs with brief, affidavit, verification and proof of mailing (lg) (Entered: 06/27/2001)
1442 ORDER by Judge John Feikens of termination [EOD Date 6/28/01] (cm) (Entered: 06/28/2001)
1443 DESIGNATION of due process issues by plaintiffs; with exhibits 1-5 and proof of mailing [EOD Date: 7/6/01] (dp) (Entered: 07/06/2001)
1444 EXPARTE order by Judge John Feikens for C. Pepper Moore to be transported to appear before Judge John Feikens at 10:00 on 7/10/01 [EOD Date 7/9/01] (jg) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
MISCELLANEOUS hearing Re: Due Process Issue - held - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Karin Dains - A conference call with counsel, etc. will be set up by Michael Barnhart on 7/25/01 at 10:00 a.m. to continue the discussion re: due process issue. C. Pepper Moore's Motion

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07/10/2001
07/10/2001 07/24/2001 07/25/2001
08/08/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/06/2001
09/17/2001 09/18/2001 11/13/2001

for Costs and an Incentive Award was also heard and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (cc) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
MOTION hearing held on motion for costs and an incentive award by C. Pepper Moore [1441-1] - disposition: TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT - Judge John Feikens - Court Reporter: Karin Dains (cc) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
SCHEDULE: by Judge John Feikens setting telephone conference for 10:00 7/25/01 (cc) (Entered: 07/25/2001)
1445 TRANSCRIPT taken on 7/10/01 of due process hearing (nh) (Entered: 07/25/2001)
TELE-CONFERENCE held - Judge John Feikens - Re: Due Process Issue - Parties have 30 days (8/27) to resolve this issue on their own. At that point Pltfs' counsel will report to JF if unresolved; parties will then have 2 weeks (9/10) to brief issue of whether JF has jurisdiction to address this issue. (cc) (Entered: 07/25/2001)
1446 OPINION by Judge John Feikens denying motion for incentive award and costs by Everett Hadix [1441-1] with proof of mailing [EOD Date: 8/10/01] (LS) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
1447 APPEAL by plaintiff C Pepper Moore of order [1446-1] to USCA - FEE: NO FEE PAID - IFP PENDING (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
1448 APPLICATION by plaintiff C Pepper Moore to appeal in forma pauperis with signed authorization and certificate of prison account activity statement (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
1449 PROOF of mailing by C Pepper Moore of notice of appeal and application to proceed in forma pauperis (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
1450 PROOF of mailing of notice of appeal to USCA, C Pepper Moore, Patricia Streeter, Deborah LaBelle, Michael Barnhart, Leo Friedman and Court Reporter Karen Dains (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
1451 CERTIFIED copy of appeal notice by C Pepper Moore [1447-1] and docket transmitted to USCA (lb) (Entered: 09/04/2001)
1452 ORDER by Judge John Feikens granting application to appeal in forma pauperis by C. Moore [1448-1] and directing payment of the initial partial filing fee and subsequent payments [EOD Date 9/6/01] (lb) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
1453 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees with brief, exhibits A-B and proof of mailing (dp) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
1454 ACKNOWLEDGMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal notice by C. Moore [1447-1] - appeal case # 01-2247 (dp) (Entered: 09/19/2001)
1455 RECORD consisting of: 1 volume of pleadings and 1 transcript (documents #1441-#1448 & #1452) transmitted to USCA - appeal case # 01-2247. (UPS #1Z 467 088 03 1210 232 1) (Will actually be picked-up

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12/04/2001 11/20/2002
03/18/2003 03/18/2003 04/04/2003 04/14/2003 07/01/2003
10/30/2003

by UPS on 11/14/01.) (cf) (Entered: 11/13/2001)
1456 ACKNOWLEDGMENT from USCA of receipt of appeal record [14551] - appeal case # 01-2247 (cm) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
1457 ORDER by Judge John Feikens, for the appeal bonds posted in action be disbursed in the amount of $2,445.75 to the Department of Corrections with proof of service [EOD Date 11/25/02] (nh) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
1458 COPY of judgment affirming the decision of the District Court from the USCA - Appeal# 01-2247 (nh) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
1459 SLIP opinion from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court appeal case # 01-2247 (nh) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
1460 MANDATE from USCA affirming the decision of the District Court appeal case # 01-2247 (lg) (Entered: 04/07/2003)
1461 RECORD of appeal [1455-1] returned from USCA - appeal case # 012247 (lg) (Entered: 04/15/2003)
1462 NOTICE from the US Supreme Court that a petition for writ of certiorari was filed and placed on the docket; appeal no. 01-2247 (dp) (Entered: 07/03/2003)
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 133 F.3d 940 (1998)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants (96-2463), United States of America, Intervenor-Appellant (96-2582).
Nos. 96-2463, 96-2582.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued December 8, 1997. Decided January 13, 1998.
941 *941 Patricia A. Streeter (briefed), Detroit, Michigan, Deborah A. LaBelle (briefed), Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI, Michael Barnhart (argued and briefed), Detroit, Michigan, for Everett Hadix in Docket No. 96-2463.
Susan Przekop-Shaw (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, Michigan, for Perry M. Johnson in Docket No. 96-2463.
Deborah A. LaBelle, Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI, Michael Barnhart (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, for Everett Hadix in Docket No. 96-2582.
Leo H. Friedman, Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Perry M. Johnson in Docket No. 96-2582.
David K. Flynn (briefed), Marie K. McElderry (argued and briefed), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, Margo Schlanger, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, Steven H. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Div.-Special Litigation, Washington, DC, for United States of America in Docket No. 96-2582.
Before: GUY, NELSON, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This is a prisoner civil rights case in which the defendants challenge the district court's denial of their motion to terminate injunctive relief. The motion was filed pursuant to Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 3626). The challenged relief is contained in a consent decree that was previously entered in the case. The district court found that the termination provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3), violate the doctrine of separation of powers and are unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court denied defendants' motion to terminate. The United States intervened in the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403. Because we conclude the provisions do not violate separation-of-powers doctrine, we reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of defendants' motion.
I.
In 1980, plaintiffs, inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex, brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various state prison officials. The inmates alleged unconstitutional 942 conditions of confinement. In 1985, a consent decree was entered between the parties *942 and approved by the court addressing various aspects of prison life, including safety, sanitation, hygiene, and protection from harm.

The State did not admit liability. Over the years, the district court has issued several remedial orders, some of which also have come before this court on appeal.
In 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA or Act) became law. The PLRA was designed to reduce judicial involvement in prison administration. To that end, it entitled defendants in prison condition lawsuits to
immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The Act further provides, however, that "[p]rospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." Id. § 3626(b)(3).[1] Accordingly, defendants moved to terminate the consent decree. They also invoked the Act's automatic stay provision, which provided that any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be stayed beginning 30 days after the motion to terminate is filed. Id. § 3626(e)(2)(A)(i).[2] The district court, in an order dated July 5, 1996, held that the automatic stay provision was unconstitutional. That ruling is currently on appeal in Hadix v. Johnson, No. 96-1943 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 5, 1996). On September 19, 1996, the Sixth Circuit issued an order granting defendants' motion seeking a stay of certain relief under the consent decree pending appeal of the automatic stay decision. On November 1, 1996, the district court denied defendants' motion to terminate on separation-of-powers grounds. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Mich.1996). Defendants now appeal.
II.
We consider whether the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3), violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. We review such a question of law under a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir.1991).
The district court concluded that the provisions violated the separation-of-powers doctrine in two ways. First, the court found that the Act required courts to reopen a final judgment in violation of the rule that Congress may not interfere with judgments of Article III courts. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 1452-53, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995). Second, it opined that the provisions mandate the result in a particular case. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871). We consider these issues in turn.
A. Reopening of a Final Judgment
Defendants contend that the district court erred in ruling that the PLRA termination provisions impermissibly reopen a final judgment. Several circuits have examined this issue and have found that the provisions do not require such a reopening; rather, they merely alter the prospective application of orders requiring injunctive relief. See, e.g., Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1426-27 (11th Cir.1997) (district courts retain jurisdiction to 943 amend consent decrees as significant changes in law and fact require); Inmates of Suffolk County *943 Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656-57 (1st Cir.1997) (consent decrees mandating forward-looking injunctions are final judgments subject to revision to the extent required by equity); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 173 (2d Cir.1997) (termination provision merely limits remedial jurisdiction of federal courts); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir.1997) (consent decree is an executory form of relief that remains subject to later developments); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1996) (judgment providing for injunctive relief remains subject to subsequent changes in the law). We agree with these courts and adopt their analysis in concluding that the prospective equitable relief contained in the Hadix consent decree remains subject to subsequent changes in the law. Although the parties entered into a consent decree containing provisions for prospective

relief, that does not mean they are guaranteed that implementation of the decree will proceed undisturbed by legislative action.
B. Prescribing a Rule of Decision
Defendants also challenge the district court's determination that the termination provision in effect prescribes a rule of decision by attempting to rescind the consent decree. Again, several circuits have rejected this view. See Inmates, 129 F.3d at 657-58; Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 174; Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1089; Plyler, 100 F.3d at 372. We agree with these courts and conclude that the termination provision only prescribes the standard for authorizing a remedy in any given case. It does not dictate the result a court must reach in determining whether relief is warranted. The interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison condition cases remain at all times with the judiciary. Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that the PLRA's termination provisions violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, and therefore we remand the matter for consideration of the merits of defendants' motion to terminate.[3]
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
[1] The phrase "current or ongoing violation" was recently amended to provide "current and ongoing violation." Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123(a)(2), 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). The amendment is not material, however, for purposes of this appeal.
[2] That provision has subsequently been amended to permit postponement of the effective date of an automatic stay by 60 days for good cause. § 123(a)(3)(C), 111 Stat. at 2470.
[3] The district court held the PLRA's immediate termination provisions unconstitutional solely on separation-ofpowers grounds. Plaintiffs, however, also challenged these provisions on due process and equal protection grounds. The First, Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all rejected these grounds as well in upholding the constitutionality of the termination provision. See Dougan, 129 F.3d at 1426-27; Inmates, 129 F.3d at 657-61; Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 174-76; Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1089-92. Were these grounds before us, we would similarly reject them. A consent decree in which the relief is provided subject to future modification cannot create a vested property right in that relief for due process purposes. See generally Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1501-02, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (injunctions operate prospectively and litigants have no vested rights in them). In addition, as the other circuits have held, the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA do not target a suspect class or burden a fundamental right. Applying rational-basis scrutiny, we find the statute is rationally-related to the legitimate state interest of curbing judicial involvement in prison administration.
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 228 F.3d 662 (2000)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Nos. 99-1413, 99-1457.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: August 3, 2000. Decided and Filed: October 5, 2000.
6634 *663 *664 Leo H. Friedman (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, Michigan, Michael A. Nickerson, Office of the Attorney General, Public Service Division, Lansing, Michigan, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Deborah A. LaBelle (briefed), Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michael J. Barnhart (argued and briefed), Detroit, Michigan, Patricia A. Streeter (briefed), Detroit, Michigan, for Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants.
Before: MOORE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; RICE,[*] Chief District Judge.
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
This case, which has a procedural history spanning twenty years, involves a civil rights action brought by Michigan prisoners alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The subject of this appeal is an order entered by the district court on March 18, 1999 relating to the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree that was entered into by the parties in 1985. Because the district court failed to comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, we REVERSE the district court's order and REMAND for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1980, Everett Hadix and ten other prisoners brought a class action suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on behalf of all prisoners incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex ("SPSM-CC") against various state prison officials. The suit, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. In 1985, the parties entered into a comprehensive consent decree, which was later approved by the district court, addressing various aspects of prison life, including safety, sanitation, hygiene, and protection from harm. The consent decree stated that its provisions were "intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSM-CC," although the decree contained no admission of liability on the part of the state prison officials nor any findings of constitutional violations. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 154 (Consent Decree).
The provisions of the consent decree most relevant to this appeal are the plan for out-of-cell activity and the new management plan. Section IV.H.2 of the consent decree provided that "[w]ithin 180 days from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan which will provide for meaningful out-of-cell activity." J.A. at 180C (Consent Decree). Although the consent decree "recognized that no particular activity is itself required," it noted that the "objective of the plan is to provide meaningful activity outside of cells including access to general and law libraries, education, industrial and other work activity, religious activity, other group activities, 665 etc." J.A. at 180C *665 (Consent Decree). Within the specified time period, the defendants submitted an out-ofcell activity plan, which included the implementation of Jackson Community College ("JCC") programming at SPSM-CC, and this plan was accepted by the plaintiffs. The defendants later sought to modify their plan for outof-cell activity (to cancel JCC programming), but the district court refused and instead granted the plaintiffs an injunction to enforce the plan. The district court explained that although the consent decree provided that no

particular out-of-cell activity was required, "the parties intended that the plan become a binding addendum to the judgment." J.A. at 242. Therefore, the district court ruled that the out-of-cell activity plan submitted by the defendants and approved by the plaintiffs became part of the consent decree.
Section VIII of the consent decree required the defendants to proceed with a management and organization study of SPSM-CC. Once the study was completed, the consent decree required the defendants to draft a management plan for the facility addressing the recommendations from the study. On June 8, 1990, the court adopted a stipulated agreement by the parties. This agreement acknowledged the importance of decentralization of the SPSM-CC facility, and it provided for the creation of the "SPSM Decentralization Team" ("SDT"), which was to oversee the plans for renovation. J.A. at 205 (Stipulated Agreement). The result of this effort was a break-up plan mandating the creation of four new correctional facilities and an administration facility (Facilities A through E) at the SPSM-CC.
In 1992, the district court transferred the medical and mental health care components of the consent decree to Chief Judge Enslen in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. These components of the consent decree were transferred to Judge Enslen in the interest of uniformity; Judge Enslen was at that time monitoring compliance with a consent decree in another Michigan prisoners' civil rights case involving similar issues.
In April of 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996). "Enacted in part in response to criticisms that federal courts had overstepped their supervisory authority in prison conditions cases, the PLRA was specifically intended to limit the use of court-enforced consent decrees and to restrict `the ability of Federal judges to affect the capacity and conditions of prisons and jails beyond what is required by the Constitution and Federal law.'" Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 931 (6th Cir.1998) (quotation omitted), abrogated by Miller v. French, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000). To that end, the PLRA established stringent standards for the entry and, more relevant for our purposes, the termination of prospective relief in suits challenging the constitutionality of prison conditions:
(2) Immediate termination of prospective relief. 0907 In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
(3) Limitation. 0907 Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b).
666 After enactment of the PLRA, the defendants moved for the termination of the *666 consent decree pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The defendants argued that the 1985 order approving the consent decree contained none of the requisite findings set forth in § 3626(b)(2); instead, the district court had simply ruled that the decree was fair and reasonable. The defendants contended, furthermore, that the consent decree was not narrowly drawn to correct constitutional violations. On November 1, 1996, the district court denied the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree, ruling that the termination provisions of the PLRA quoted above were unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds. See Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1100, 1113 (E.D.Mich.1996). On appeal, a panel of this court reversed the district court's judgment. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 941 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952, 118 S.Ct. 2368, 141 L.Ed.2d 737 (1998). We reasoned that § 3626(b)(2)-(3) did not impermissibly reopen a final judgment, but instead merely altered the prospective application of orders requiring injunctive relief. Furthermore, we concluded that the termination provisions did not impermissibly prescribe a rule of decision. Accordingly, we held that the termination provisions were

constitutional, and we remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the merits of the defendants' motion for termination.

On March 18, 1999, the district court issued the ruling that forms the basis for this appeal. See Hadix v. Johnson, 45 F.Supp.2d 584 (E.D.Mich.1999). In ruling on the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree, the district court focused its attention on determining whether there had been substantial compliance with the consent decree with regard to each of the five facilities designated in the break-up plan. The district court first considered Facility A, which is designed to receive, process, evaluate, classify, and place all incoming prisoners. Facility A will also house and provide services for prisoners who are receiving short-term medical treatment, and it will provide custody, security, and support services for the hospital. See id. at 586. The district court noted that major work on Facility A had not yet begun, and it explained that the defendants had proposed a substitute plan to replace the court-approved plan for that facility. See id. at 587. With regard to Facility A, the district court reasoned:

[B]ecause of the special nature of this facility, I find that the evaluation of the adequacy of defendants' alternative proposal is best left to a determination of this matter at an upcoming health care compliance hearing before Judge Enslen. Evaluation of defendants' proposed alternatives is primarily a medical issue, involving assessments of the effect that such proposed changes would have on unclassified prisoners and prisoners with severe or chronic medical conditions who are housed in this facility.

Jurisdiction, therefore, is transferred to Chief Judge Enslen of the Western District of Michigan, subject to his approval.

Id.

Facility B was the only facility that was re-occupied and operational at the time of the district court's decision. With regard to Facility B, the district court found that there had been substantial compliance with nearly all of the provisions of the consent decree. See id. The district court therefore terminated the consent decree with respect to Facility B, with two exceptions. First, the district court explained that problems still remained concerning water temperature, air temperature, and ventilation. The district court reasoned:

There is not, however, sufficient evidence whether the continued noncompliance constitutes

serious health risks of constitutional dimension to the prisoners housed in Facility B. To determine

potential harmful effects on prisoners, or sufficiency of attempts to mitigate these possible harmful

effects, evidence must be produced as to the extent of non-compliance (for example, how high are

667

*667 the temperatures in the summer months), the medical condition of any prisoners affected,

and the effectiveness of any further efforts to mitigate problems that still exist. Like the issues in

Facility A, these issues are essentially medical issues, and can be considered by Judge Enslen at

an upcoming health care compliance hearing. Therefore, jurisdiction over these three paragraphs

of the consent decree is transferred to Judge Enslen, subject to his approval.

Id. at 588. Second, the district court explained that termination of the break-up plan did not affect the out-of-cell activity plan; the district court ruled that the out-of-cell activity plan remained in effect and would be the subject of a further hearing. See id.

Finally, the district court explained that Facilities C, D, and E had yet to be completed. See id. With regard to these facilities, the court reasoned:

[U]nder 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3), supervision of these facilities will terminate now, subject to the following three conditions:

(1) Defendants must demonstrate that the renovation projects of Facilities C, D and E have reached a point of inevitability (substantial completion).

(2) If there is a variance from the approved Break-Up Plan, it must be shown to be de minimis, or that the variance has been approved by the SDT.

(3) A hearing must be held demonstrating substantial compliance following the same procedure as has been utilized for the termination of the Break-Up Plan as to Facility B.
This approach meets the requirements of the PLRA, in that without the need for a further hearing to determine whether constitutional violations exist, this procedure, already successfully implemented as to Facility B, provides for minimal intrusion by me, the Court Monitor, or plaintiffs. . . .
I find that these three conditions are the least intrusive, most narrowly drawn conditions on which I can terminate the consent decree. Defendants have been given previous opportunities to terminate the consent decree simply by demonstrating the inevitability of the renovations and assuring me of their substantial compliance, and they need only satisfy the three conditions set out above to terminate the consent decree now.
Id. at 588-89.
The defendants appealed this order, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed. On July 6, 1999, a panel of this court entered an order granting the defendants a stay pending appeal of the prospective relief authorized by the district court's March 18 order.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Because the district court's March 18 order is not a final order, we must first resolve a question as to our jurisdiction over this appeal. In analyzing the issue of jurisdiction, it is helpful to distinguish four types of rulings made by the district court in its March 18 order: unconditional termination of certain provisions of the consent decree; conditional termination of certain provisions of the consent decree; deferring a ruling on the termination of certain provisions of the consent decree pending further hearings; and transferring certain provisions of the consent decree to Chief Judge Enslen without ruling on the defendants' termination motion.
First, the district court unconditionally terminated the consent decree with respect to the break-up plan at Facility B. See Hadix, 45 F.Supp.2d at 587. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, 668 continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to *668 dissolve or modify injunctions." The district court's unconditional termination of certain provisions of the consent decree is appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as an order dissolving an injunction.
Second, the district court conditionally terminated other provisions of the consent decree. The district court explained that, although the defendants had not achieved substantial compliance with the consent decree as regards Facilities C, D, and E, "[n]onetheless, under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3), supervision of these facilities will terminate now, subject to . . . three conditions." Hadix, 45 F.Supp.2d at 588. Although the district court stated that it was terminating these provisions of the consent decree, in reality the court explicitly refused to so terminate; the conditions imposed required the defendants to continue the prospective relief set forth in the consent decree until substantial compliance had been achieved. The district court's ruling is tantamount to an order refusing to dissolve an injunction, and we therefore have jurisdiction to review it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See generally 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3924.2, at 200 (2d ed.1996) ("Refusals of explicit motions to modify or to dissolve injunctions are readily appealed.").
Third, the district court explained that termination of the consent decree with respect to the break-up plan did not affect the out-of-cell activity plan; the district court therefore ruled that the out-of-cell activity plan "remains in effect[ ] and will be the subject of a further hearing." Hadix, 45 F.Supp.2d at 588. Although the practical effect of this ruling was to continue or refuse to dissolve the injunction, the district court did not explicitly do so. The

Supreme Court, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), explained:
For an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1), . . . a litigant must show more than that the order has the practical effect of refusing an injunction. Because § 1292(a) (1) was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the final-judgment rule, we have construed the statute narrowly to ensure that appeal as of right under § 1292(a)(1) will be available only in circumstances where an appeal will further the statutory purpose of "permit[ting] litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence." Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence," and that the order can be "effectually challenged" only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal.
Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. 993 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original).[1] We have previously dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, appeals from similar district court rulings deferring a decision on the merits of motions to terminate consent decrees. See United States v. Michigan, 134 F.3d 745, 749 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that the district court's order granting the plaintiffs access to certain prison facilities for discovery purposes and failing to address the merits of the defendants' motion to terminate was not appealable pursuant to § 1292(a)(1); "While in a practical sense, any determination that defers a decision on the termination motion at least temporarily denies dissolution of injunctive relief, defendants' argument proves too much, since any interlocutory order, to the extent it diverts 669 the court's attention and consideration *669 from pending matters, necessarily prolongs litigation."); Haddix v. Johnson, No. 96-2548, 1998 WL 30820, *3 (6th Cir. Jan.22, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing an appeal from a district court ruling that explicitly reserved final determination on the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree until this court ruled on the constitutionality of the controlling statute, reasoning that "a demonstration of the order's `practical effect' is not, by itself, sufficient" to support jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1)).
Although the district court's decision to defer a ruling pending a further hearing is not itself appealable as an order continuing or refusing to dissolve an injunction under § 1292(a)(1), we may nevertheless exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over this issue. "The doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction allows an appellate court, in its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction over issues that are not independently appealable when those issues are `inextricably intertwined' with matters over which the appellate court properly and independently has jurisdiction." Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human Services, 145 F.3d 793, 797 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 964, 119 S.Ct. 408, 142 L.Ed.2d 331 (1998); see also Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir.1996) (reading dictum in the Supreme Court's decision in Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995), to permit the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction "where the appealable and non-appealable issues are `inextricably intertwined'"). We have interpreted "inextricably intertwined" to mean "coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on interlocutory appeal." Chambers, 145 F.3d at 797 (quotation omitted). We believe that the portion of the district court's order deferring a ruling on the defendants' motion is "inextricably intertwined" with the properly reviewable claims. Because each of the rulings involves the question of the proper application of the PLRA, the pendent claim is subsumed in the scope of the interlocutory injunction appeal. Even if the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction were inapplicable, however, our resolution of the properly reviewable claims will necessarily decide how the district court must proceed on remand.
Finally, the district court in the instant case transferred certain provisions of the consent decree to Chief Judge Enslen in the Western District of Michigan. An order granting or denying a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821, 79 S.Ct. 34, 3 L.Ed.2d 62 (1958); Bufalino v. Kennedy, 273 F.2d 71, 71 (6th Cir.1959); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3855, at 472 (2d ed.1986); 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.60[1], at 111-196 (3d ed.). Although the transfer order, too, is arguably "inextricably intertwined" with the reviewable claims, we need not decide whether the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction over this ruling would be proper. Chief Judge Enslen has already held a hearing and ruled on the defendants' motion to terminate the portions of the consent decree transferred to his jurisdiction. Because the defendants objected to

the transfer primarily on the ground that it would delay a ruling on their motion, the proceedings in Judge Enslen's court have largely answered their objection. At oral argument, the parties recognized this and agreed that they are no longer pursuing a challenge to the district court's transfer order. We will not, therefore, undertake to review the propriety of this order.
B. District Court's Termination of the Consent Decree
Neither party is satisfied with the district court's "termination" of the consent decree provisions. The defendants 670 argue that the termination is only illusory, and that the district court erroneously continued *670 the prospective
relief without making the requisite findings under the PLRA. The plaintiffs agree that the district court failed to comply with the PLRA, and they argue that the district court improperly terminated provisions of the decree without giving them an evidentiary hearing. Both parties are correct.
1. Conditional Termination
The defendants challenge the district court's failure to make any of the findings required by the PLRA. "In the absence of any finding of a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right," the defendants argue, "there is nothing to warrant continuation of the extraordinary prospective relief embodied in the Consent Decree, Break-Up Plan, or Out-of-Cell Activity Plan." Br. of Defendants-Appellants at 19. This claim involves determining whether the district court correctly applied the governing legal standard, and we review this legal question de novo. See Hadix, 133 F.3d at 942 (stating that questions of law are reviewed de novo); cf. Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that the district court erred by failing to comply with the mandates of the PLRA).
The PLRA mandates the "immediate termination of any prospective relief" that was approved in the absence of findings, unless the court "makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3). The statute defines "relief" to include consent decrees. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(9). Therefore, in ruling on a motion for termination, the district court must determine whether prospective relief is justified according to § 3626(b)(3)'s criteria; if the district court does not make the requisite findings, it must terminate the consent decree. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir.) (en banc) ("Since prospective relief, under the set of definitions provided in the Act, includes a consent decree to the extent that the decree does not award compensatory monetary damages, we think it clear from the statute itself that, if those findings were not made in connection with the entry of the decree, and if the court does not proceed to make the requisite findings that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, the Act requires the termination of such a consent decree." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 72, 145 L.Ed.2d 61 (1999).
In the instant case, the district court's opinion is wholly devoid of any of the findings required by § 3626(b)(3). Although the district court purported to "terminate" the consent decree provisions that it did not transfer to Chief Judge Enslen, the conditions imposed gave the court continuing jurisdiction over the decree essentially until the defendants substantially complied with all of its terms. Ordering the continuation of prospective relief in the absence of the requisite findings is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the PLRA. Moreover, if such a conditional termination could constitute termination for purposes of the PLRA, then district courts could routinely evade the dictates of that statute. Because the district court in the instant case failed to make the requisite findings, its continuation of prospective relief as a condition of termination was improper.
The fundamental problem with the district court's order is that it focused not on the inquiry required by the PLRA, but rather on the question whether the consent decree had been substantially complied with. Cf. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 242 (6th Cir.1998) (vacating district court's judgment denying the defendants' motion to 671 terminate federal court supervision in another prisoners' civil rights case where the district court improperly *671 misdirected its attention "to an inquiry into whether the state has complied with the details . . . of the requirements of the remedial plans" rather than focusing on whether there were ongoing constitutional violations). On remand,

the district court must direct its attention to § 3626(b)(3) and determine whether prospective relief is warranted under the criteria set forth in that provision.
2. Opportunity to Present Evidence of Ongoing Constitutional Violations
The plaintiffs object to the district court's order to the extent that it terminated portions of the consent decree without the court first having conducted an evidentiary hearing on the existence of ongoing constitutional violations.[2] This claim involves an interpretation of the governing statute, a legal question that we review de novo. See United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 482 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1026, 119 S.Ct. 560, 142 L.Ed.2d 466 (1998).
The plaintiffs' argument goes to the question of "[t]he proper evidentiary methods and materials that a district court may utilize in deciding a § 3626(b)(2) motion." Hadix, 144 F.3d at 949. We addressed, but did not resolve, this question in a previous opinion concerning the constitutionality of the PLRA's automatic stay provision. In that decision, we explained:
Michigan . . . contends that under the statute a motion for immediate termination of a consent decree must be considered on the record existing at the time the motion was filed, disallowing the district judge to engage in supplemental fact-finding. The state supports its argument by § 3626(b) (3)'s directive that "[p]rospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record" . . . that relief remains necessary and narrowly drawn. That language, the inmates respond, does not mean simply the existing record at the time the motion was filed. Rather, the statute necessarily enables a district judge to examine current conditions at the prisons which become part of the judicial record, since the very task before the judge is to ascertain the existence of "a current or ongoing violation" of a federal right. As the state would have it, the district court would be forbidden from supplementing the past record in a case to determine whether a current constitutional violation exists. . . .
We believe this debate is premature at this juncture and should await appellate review of the lower courts' actual rulings on the termination motions. The proper evidentiary methods and materials that a district court may utilize in deciding a § 3626(b)(2) motion is a question more aptly considered when this court has before it a concrete example of how a district court actually proceeded in ruling upon a motion under § 3626(b)(2).
Id.
Section 3626(b)(3) of the PLRA requires a district court to determine, based on the record, whether there exists a "current and ongoing violation of the Federal right." Because the PLRA directs a district court to look to current conditions, and because the existing record at the time the motion for termination is filed will often be inadequate for purposes of this determination, the party opposing termination must be given the opportunity to submit additional evidence in an effort to show current and ongoing constitutional violations. This position has been 672 taken by numerous other courts that have considered *672 the issue. See Loyd v. Alabama Dep't of Corrections, 176 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir.) (reversing the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to terminating the consent decree, reasoning that "[i]t would read all meaning out of [§ 3626(b)(3) ] to force the party opposing termination to show that the consent decree meets the requirements of § 3626(b)(3) and then not provide that party with the opportunity to present evidence on that point"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 613, 145 L.Ed.2d 509 (1999); Berwanger, 178 F.3d at 839-40 (holding that the district court erred by letting more than a year pass after the motion for termination was filed without action and then terminating the decree under § 3626(b)(2) without making any findings, and explaining that the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if there are disputed issues of material fact); Benjamin, 172 F.3d at 166 ("In sum, we interpret §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3), read together, to mean that, when the plaintiffs so request in response to a defendant's motion for termination, the district court must allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to show current and ongoing violations of their federal rights."); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir.1998) (agreeing with the argument that

proponents of prospective relief under the PLRA must be given an opportunity on remand to present evidence supporting such relief). But see Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir.1999) (holding that § 3626(b)(3) does not require a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing in all cases, although noting that a district court may do so in appropriate circumstances and stating that a hearing is mandated if "the party opposing termination alleges specific facts which, if true, would amount to a current and ongoing constitutional violation."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2723, 147 L.Ed.2d 987 (2000). Furthermore, as we have previously pointed out, see Hadix, 144 F.3d at 949, district courts considering motions for termination under the PLRA have allowed plaintiffs opposing termination to present evidence of ongoing violations prior to ruling. See, e.g., Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397, 406 (N.D.Ind.1997); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727, 733 (D.Vi.1997).
In the instant case, the plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the day of the status conference a response to the June 1998 compliance report regarding Facility B. However, prior to termination, the plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to present evidence of current and ongoing constitutional violations. On remand, the plaintiffs must be given such an opportunity.
C. Proper Relief
In their brief, the defendants argue that we should immediately terminate the Hadix consent decree rather than remanding to the district court for another round of proceedings. While the PLRA mandates swift resolution of motions to terminate consent decrees respecting prison conditions, and while the defendants are correct that there has been considerable delay in the district court, we must decline the defendants' request. Determination of whether prospective relief is justified according to the criteria set forth in § 3626(b)(3) is a precondition to termination of a consent decree under the PLRA. See Berwanger, 178 F.3d at 839. Such a determination cannot be made at this point due to the incompleteness of the current record; as we have explained, the plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to prove the existence of current and ongoing constitutional violations. Moreover, these findings should be made in the first instance by the district court, which has twenty-years' experience with this case.
Therefore, we reverse the district court's March 18 order insofar as it terminates portions of the consent decree without giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence regarding current and ongoing constitutional 673 violations, and insofar as it orders the continuation of prospective *673 relief without any finding that the relief is justified pursuant to the criteria set forth in § 3626(b)(3). We remand the case to the district court with strict instructions for the prompt resolution of the defendants' motion to terminate.
On remand, although the district court may encourage the parties to continue their settlement negotiations, which have been partially successful, the court should not indefinitely delay resolution of the defendants' motion in the hope that the parties will amicably resolve their differences. Therefore, we instruct the district court to allow the parties thirty days from the date our opinion is filed in which to resolve all issues by way of settlement. If the parties are unable to reach a complete agreement within thirty days, then the district court should schedule an evidentiary hearing to be held no more than thirty days from that date, i.e., no later than sixty days from the date our opinion issues.
Within sixty days of the commencement of the evidentiary hearing, the district court shall issue an opinion applying the PLRA to the defendants' motion to terminate. The district court must bear in mind that the relevant inquiry is not whether the defendants are in compliance with the consent decree; instead, pursuant to the PLRA, the district court must determine if the consent decree is currently necessary. To fulfill its statutory duty, the district court must make written findings as to whether "prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." § 3626(b)(3). If the court finds that the current conditions at SPSM-CC do not violate the Constitution, then it should terminate the consent decree, regardless of whether the objectives of the consent decree have been achieved. If, on the other hand, the court finds that constitutional violations persist, then it should retain jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the consent decree, provided that the prospective relief set forth in the decree is necessary, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means to correct the violations. If the district court is unable to issue a

ruling within the timetable we have specified, i.e., within 120 days from the date this opinion issues, then the case shall be assigned to another district judge whose calendar permits a prompt resolution of the matter. Cf. Berwanger, 178 F.3d at 840 (employing a similar approach).
We shall retain jurisdiction to see that our instructions are carried out and to ensure prompt review of the district court's ruling on the defendants' motion. See Glover, 138 F.3d at 243 (retaining jurisdiction after vacating the district court's judgment denying the defendants' motion to terminate federal court supervision over aspects of the Michigan women's correctional system); 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3937.1, at 697 (2d ed.1996) ("Power to deal with the issues presented on appeal inherently includes authority to enforce the court's decision or to regulate the course of further proceedings required to reach an effective decision."). The stay of prospective relief previously issued by a panel of this court shall remain in effect pending the district court's resolution of this matter.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we REVERSE the district court's order terminating the Hadix consent decree because it fails to comply with the requirements of the PLRA, and we REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion.
[*] The Honorable Walter Herbert Rice, Chief United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
[1] In United States v. Bayshore Associates, Inc., 934 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir.1991), we held that "the Carson Court's additional requirement of `a serious, perhaps, irreparable consequence' applies only to those court orders that have the `practical effect' of modifying, granting, or denying an injunction, not to orders specifically granting or denying injunctions." Id. at 1395.
[2] In its March 18 opinion, the district court mentioned that with regard to Facility B it conducted an "on-site hearing" on December 10, 1998 at which the court monitor's findings were reviewed. Hadix, 45 F.Supp.2d at 587. However, both parties agree that no hearing has ever been held regarding the defendants' June 1996 motion to terminate the consent decree. The December 10 meeting was a status conference at which no testimony was presented, no evidence was taken, and no record was made.
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 694 F.Supp. 259 (1988)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 80-73581. United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.
July 1, 1988. 2601 *260 *261 Larry Bennett, Butzel, Keidan, Simon, Myers & Graham, Patricia Streeter, Deborah A. LaBelle, Michael
J. Barnhart, and Charlene M. Snow, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs. Susan Harris and Elaine D. Fischhoff, Asst. Attys. Gen., Thomas C. Nelson, Lansing, Mich., for defendants.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Description

Page Number

I. Background ......................................................... 262 II. The Issue .......................................................... 262 III. Procedures Used to Compile a Record Upon Which to Determine the
Meaningfulness of Inmate Access to the Courts .................... 263 IV. Proofs Submitted by the Parties and Court-Appointed Experts ........ 265
V. Findings of Fact ................................................... 283 VI. The Law ............................................................ 286 VII. Conclusions of Law ................................................. 291 VIII. Remedy ............................................................. 293 IX. Conclusion ......................................................... 298

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FEIKENS, District Judge.
This is an action brought by a class of inmates against officials responsible for the administration of a portion of the state prison facility located in Jackson, Michigan known as the State Prison of Southern Michigan's Central Complex (hereinafter "Central Complex" or "SPSM-CC").
Plaintiff class consists of all inmates who are now or who in the future will be housed in the Central Complex. At the time of the trial, the Central Complex population had approximately 2,400 inmates. The transient population is nearly 10,000 persons each year.
262 *262 There are ten original defendants in this case. They are sued individually and in their official capacities: Perry M. Johnson, Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections (now Robert Brown); Robert Brown, Deputy Director for the Bureau of Correctional Facilities (now Daniel Bolden); Graham Allen, Food Service Supervisor; Dale Foltz, Regional Administrator and Warden (now John Jabe); Elton Scott, Deputy Warden; Pam Withroow, Deputy Warden; Frank Elo, Deputy Warden for Security; John Jabe, Business Manager; Charles Utess, Classification Director; Marjorie Van Ochten, Hearings Administrator; and John Prelesnik, Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center.

I. BACKGROUND
On September 18, 1980, the complaint in Everett Hadix v. Perry Johnson (hereinafter known as "Hadix") was filed. The complaint raised numerous questions regarding inmates at the State Prison for Southern Michigan (hereinafter "SPSM"), their rights, conditions of confinement, and general aspects of prison life.
Class certification was granted on August 28, 1981.
Ten cases, filed between 1979 and 1985, raised similar issues and were consolidated with Hadix.[1]
Numerous proceedings were undertaken following class certification. As the issues were sharpened, negotiation and settlement became a goal. Several conferences between the parties were held and, on February 13, 1985, a comprehensive consent judgment was entered and filed.
The consent judgment deals with issues of sanitation; health care; fire safety; overcrowding and protection of inmates from harm; use of volunteers; access to the courts; food service; management (the ordering of a study to provide recommendations regarding organization, staffing and administration at the Central Complex); inmate legal mail; and compliance and inspection procedures. An integral part of the settlement is the break-up of one vast prison complex into five autonomous units.
By stipulation of the parties, a basic issue as to what constitutes compliance by defendants with the United States Constitution in providing meaningful access to the courts for inmates bringing civil actions was reserved for decision.
Another issue not resolved in the consent judgment relates to the classification of inmates. This issue was referred by stipulation for resolution in a matter pending in United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, United States v. State of Michigan, Civil Action No. G84-63CA.
The issue of inmate access to the courts in Hadix has been refined as the case progressed. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged inadequate access to the courts as a civil rights violation based on Section 1983.[2] The consent judgment (of February, 1985), which reserved the issue for my determination, nevertheless settled related subjects such as library hours, facilities, and book collection; establishment of satellite libraries in certain segregated cell blocks; and inmate paralegal training.[3]
II. THE ISSUE
The central issue raised by the complaint and answer (as preserved for my determination under the consent 263 judgment) is this: whether, and to what extent, the defendants are constitutionally required to provide *263
access to the courts for inmates in the Central Complex through the provision of additional attorneys, paralegals (civilian or inmate), and other means to assist inmates with civil actions (including habeas corpus proceedings) and related matters (i.e., grievances).
Plaintiff class asserts that mere access to the law library system cannot provide meaningful access to the courts for inmates. The class argues that functionally illiterate inmates, indigent inmates, and those inmates housed in segregated cell blocks, do not have meaningful assistance in preparing civil matters for the courts merely through the state's furnishing a law library. The class also contends that the non-library resources available to Central Complex inmates (i.e., jailhouse lawyers and Prison Legal Services) are too unreliable to provide meaningful access to the courts for functionally illiterate, indigent, or segregated inmates who seek to bring civil actions.
Relying upon Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), reh'd following remand, Smith v. Bounds, 610 F.Supp. 597 (E.D.N.C.1985) (legal assistance by attorneys is required to provide meaningful access to North Carolina inmates), reconsideration den'd., 657 F.Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.C.1985), second order entered 657 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.N.C.1986), aff'd. 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.1987), aff'd. on rehearing en banc 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1988) (no reconsideration of district court judgment necessary), and related cases, defendants

assert that their duty to assist Central Complex inmates in the preparation of civil cases, in such a manner as to provide meaningful access to the courts, is met through the furnishing of a law library system containing a minimally sufficient collection of legal texts. They argue that the availability of any non-library resources is an enhancement of the library system.
III. PROCEDURES USED TO COMPILE A RECORD UPON WHICH TO DETERMINE THE MEANINGFULNESS OF INMATE ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Evidence on the access issue was submitted at a trial beginning May 31, 1985.
Plaintiff class, represented by a group of inmates from the Central Complex, was adjudicated to be indigent prior to the trial. Appointed attorneys presented plaintiffs' case and have continued in the role of counsel.
The presentation of proofs commenced on June 3, 1985 and continued intermittently thereafter.
Ten inmates testified on behalf of plaintiff class: Koster, Moore, Valeroso, Ramsey, Thornton, Martin, Ford, Beaudin, Douglas, and Moncure.
Plaintiffs also presented the testimony of James Wilbur and Sandra Girard, past and present directors of Prison Legal Services; James Neuhard, Director of the Michigan State Appellate Defender's Office; John Prelesnik, Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center; Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law (stipulated expert on delivery systems for incarcerated persons 0907 specializing in legal professional ethics); and Lonnie McIntyre, Associate Professor of Education at Michigan State University (stipulated expert in reading ability).
Plaintiffs' witness, John Prelesnik, Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center (intake unit), administers the placement test given to inmates. This test is the "standard achievement test, Form A," which measures reading and math skills. (Prelesnik, 6/4/85 pp. 155-156) The testing results are used to determine the educational level inmates have and what remedial education, if any, inmates should receive. The levels range from nonreaders (below the fourth grade) to above the twelfth grade (college level).
Plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Lonnie McIntyre, is an Associate Professor of Education at Michigan State University. McIntyre has taught in public schools in Illinois and Michigan. As an expert witness for plaintiffs, McIntyre 264 administered readability tests to inmates' writing samples. The samples were randomly selected. He also *264 determined the readability of legal materials to which an inmate might refer in preparing a case for submission to the judicial system.
The readability test as administered by McIntyre determines the difficulty of comprehension of written passages. McIntyre's readability test is actually comprised of four separate tests: the Gunning, the FRYE, the Rader, and the Fleshe. (McIntyre, 6/11/85 p. 398.)
Defendants are represented by assistant state attorneys general on behalf of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Defendants' presentation of testimony and documentary exhibits began June 16, 1986. Various Central Complex staff persons and Department of Corrections officials testified: Daniel Purple, SPSM Assistant Business Manager; Graydon Brown III, SPSM Mail Supervisor; Gerry Kunzelman, SPSM-CC Personal Affairs Officer; Herbert Grinage, SPSM-CC Assistant Deputy Warden for Housing; Lloyd Baker, SPSM-CC Grievance Coordinator; Paul Wreford, JCC Director of Prison Programs; Linda Hehl, Information Desk Sergeant; Stanley Januszka, 5 Block Assistant Resident Unit Manager; Chester Bristow, SPSM Fire Safety Officer; Melody Wallace, MDOC Litigation Coordinator; Arthur Barber, SPSM Sergeant; Lucinda Boyd, SPSM-CC Director of Library Services; James Thornton (adverse), inmate; Kenneth Limberg, SPSM-CC Academic School Principal; Clayton Birch, Legislative Corrections Ombudsman; Susan Herman, former MDOC Assistant for Prisoner Affairs; Frank Elo, SPSM Assistant Deputy Warden for Custody; Carl Little, SPSM-CC Grievance Coordinator; and Marjorie Van Ochten, MDOC Hearings Administrator.

Having heard testimony and read documentary evidence regarding the degree of meaningful access to the courts provided inmates at the Central Complex, I concluded that the parties were in basic disagreement as to what content an inmate's complaint required in order to present a legal question for which meaningful access to the courts had to be provided. The issue as to meaningful access to the courts is many sided. Usually, complaints by inmates, particularly in initial stages, are grievances regarding conditions of confinement. Many of these concerns raise no legal issues as that term is commonly understood. Yet, testimony clearly revealed that grievances, depending upon their nature and content, could and did result in legal questions if not resolved. It became apparent that a study of the grievance procedures used at Central Complex was vital to a resolution of the issue of meaningful access to the courts. At the same time, the existence and use of resources for the presentation of traditional legal issues had to be studied.
Accordingly, on June 23, 1986, I appointed two University of Michigan professors as experts: Charles Wolfson of the School of Social Work to study grievance procedures at the Central Complex and make recommendations and proposals, if any, for their reform; and Jerold Israel of the School of Law to study existing legal structures at the Central Complex and make recommendations and proposals, if any, for their reform.
These experts submitted written reports representing their joint findings in compliance with Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The reports were received as evidence. The experts were examined by each of the parties as to their work and their opinions.
Professor Jerold Israel, B.B.A., L.LB., the Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, prepared a study entitled "Report on the Extent of Inmate Legal Problems and Resources Available and Needed to Provide Meaningful Access to the Courts," (hereinafter "Israel"). Professor Charles Wolfson, M.S.W., of the School of Social Work, prepared a report entitled "A Study of the Grievance System at the Central Complex and Reception and Guidance Center, State Prison of Southern Michigan," (hereinafter "Wolfson"). Both professors have extensive practical experience in dealing with inmates' rights issues and have published a number of related materials. 265 Although the reports were separately prepared, Professors *265 Israel and Wolfson concur in their conclusions.
On June 30, 1986, plaintiffs presented rebuttal witnesses and concluded their proofs.
The parties presented additional proofs on November 17, 19, and 24, 1987 before agreeing to submit written closing arguments and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. That process is now completed and I now make my findings and conclusions as to the meaningfulness of Central Complex inmates' access to the courts.
IV. PROOFS SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES AND COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
A. Plaintiffs' Proofs
Herein are the contentions of plaintiff class:
Proofs presented by plaintiffs addressed the legal assistance available to Central Complex inmates from any source. The library system was explained. Additional resources in the form of assistance from agencies or individuals were examined. The ability of certain inmates to make sufficient use of the forms of legal assistance available in the Central Complex was evaluated in light of the inmates' ability to comprehend written or spoken English, ability to pay for legal help, and ability, if segregated, to gain access to persons providing the aid.
1. Description of the Central Complex
The Central Complex consists of cell blocks denominated 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12 and the old infirmary building. Most of these facilities are used to house inmates segregated for various reasons. Cell block 4 is maximum security housing. Cell block 5 is divided into east and west divisions. Cell block 5 east houses inmates classified

to punitive segregation, while cell block 5 west is used to house those in administrative segregation. Cell block 6 houses inmates classified to protective segregation. Cell block 7 serves as the Reception and Guidance Center (hereinafter "R & GC"). R & GC functions as an intake facility in which newly-arrived inmates are housed for the first weeks of incarceration. The old infirmary building also houses inmates classified to protective custody.
An inmate who is indigent, functionally illiterate, or for whom English is a second language may be housed in any cell block of the Central Complex, including the segregated units. One's status for purposes of placement in a cell block is not determined by ability or lack of ability to make use of available legal resource materials.
2. Description of Legal Assistance Resources
There presently exist several sources of legal assistance for Central Complex inmates. For example, Prison Legal Services, jailhouse lawyers, and complaint forms provided for pro se petitioners are offered as supplements to the legal texts contained in the library system. However, the Central Complex procedure relies primarily upon the provision of written sources of legal material for its entire inmate population regardless of housing situations. Other, non-library forms of assistance are not uniformly available for all inmates or for many types of civil actions an inmate might seek to initiate.
a. Libraries
The Central Complex furnishes a main library and several "satellite libraries." A library is also being furnished for inmates in maximum security custody (block 4). The satellite libraries are intended to assist inmates in segregated blocks who cannot use the main library because of special confinement.
The main law library is physically limited. The location of the facility is such that temperature control and adequate ventilation are not achievable. Only sixty-four inmates can be accommodated at one time. The heat, ventilation, and crowding problems are especially acute during popular use times such as Wednesdays and weekends. Prison work schedules effectively prevent spreading the use burden to other times during the week.
266 *266 No group work areas are available apart from the library itself. As a result, the library must serve many functions. Inmates talk among themselves in the same room while others do research. Inmates in and around the library are permitted to play radios, to converse, and to engage in behavior which interferes with the ability of this facility to serve its function as a place of study and research.
As required by the consent judgment, the library is open fifty-six hours per week for inmate use. The library hours are varied according to the day of the week, but at least half of the scheduled times are in the evening or on weekends.[4]
General population inmates in cell blocks 8, 11, and 12 (approximately 1,000 inmates) are allowed access during these hours. Inmates receive "details" to go to the library for three periods of two hours each per week. More time can be requested if an inmate submits written evidence of a need to do additional research on his own case. (The head librarian makes the determination to grant more time although she is not trained in legal research.) The system does not readily accommodate matching assigned library times so that two inmates may work together. Generally, an inmate's request for a library detail requires one week to process. Not all detail requests receive responses. Inmates who are allowed to use the law library during the final two-hour period of a day are somewhat restricted in that books must be returned fifteen minutes before closing time.
The library resources do exceed the minimum collection specified in Appendix B of the consent judgment (Plaintiffs' exhibit 12) and are consistent with recommendations made by professional associations for contents of prison libraries.[5] However, the system by which inmates use the materials, the condition of the materials, and number of inmates seeking to use the materials make the use of the collection most difficult.
The Central Complex library is managed by a head librarian and her assistant. This head librarian supervises the librarians of the North and South Complexes as well. While she holds a master's degree in library science from

the University of Michigan and has had experience in library work, neither the head librarian nor her assistant is trained to provide meaningful help in doing legal research. There is no evidence that either the head librarian or her assistant attempt to furnish inmates advice regarding legal research.
The library employs five or six inmates as library aides. These aides are not required to have training in legal research. The basic job qualification is an expressed interest in working at the library. The usual tenure of an inmate aide is one to eight months. (Boyd 6/24/86 pp. 94-100; 6/27/86 p. 21)
The work schedule for the aides is thirty to thirty-seven hours per week. Not all of the aides are at work in any one shift. Of the aides on duty, two are generally available to service inmate requests. Other aides on duty perform various clerical functions and miscellaneous tasks such as the segregated cell block check-out delivery runs. Only one aide is scheduled to work the evening shift, although at least one other aide is usually in the facility.
267 *267 This limited number of inmate aides must locate materials for the inmates as the library is not set up as an open stack facility. When the library aides are busy, book requests may take significant time to fill. Testimony reveals delays of hours or the necessity of multiple trips to the window in order to fill one legal resource request. (Martin, 6/30/86 pp. 14-15) Some inmates experience difficulties in obtaining service at all. (Valeroso, 6/12/86 p. 45) Inmates are often unable to obtain books because an exact title is unknown and the aides are not able to determine which volume is wanted from the information the inmate provides, or the inmate is unable to communicate in English. (See Valeroso, 6/12/86 pp. 45-49 (no non-English law books); Martin, 6/30/86 pp. 13-15; and Boyd 6/24/86 p. 98)
An inmate may use only three to five volumes in the library collection at any one time. Each volume of a set is counted for this limit including multi-volume service materials. (Shepard's is generally exempt from the threevolume rule.)
In most instances, only one copy or set of a particular legal resource is available for all inmates. Limited numbers of frequently used materials such as the rules of procedure and statutes are provided. The library cannot guarantee a ready copy of fundamental legal materials at any one time.
Volumes from the main library are not always available as inmates in segregated blocks may "check out" materials. Books may be out of the main library for more than twenty-four hours due to this program.
Although the consent judgment provides for maintaining and updating library materials through the purchase of replacements and pocket parts, the collection cannot be termed complete at any one time because the library cannot keep pace by furnishing replacements for missing or unusable items. The librarian stated a reluctance to immediately replace missing volumes once their absence is discovered. She said she prefers to wait to determine if the missing books will eventually be returned. Of the volumes actually available, several are partially or completely mutilated. Many books have sections torn out.
No systematic inventory procedure exists to monitor the condition of the collection on a consistent and timely basis.
The process by which damaged volumes or volumes missing pages are repaired is time-consuming. The librarian requests a complete text from another complex. A copy of the required materials is made. This copy is then glued into the Central Complex book. The procedure takes from two to three weeks to complete. Typically, ten to fortyfive volumes may be removed from circulation and undergoing some stage of this repair process. (Moncure, 6/30/86 pp. 26-27; Ramsey, 6/13/86 pp. 25-26)
Limited photocopying is available on the library premises. This issue is of particular importance to an inmate who has found legal materials he believes he needs to prepare his case. Unless he can copy the items, an inmate risks losing their use to another inmate who may check out the same materials.
An inmate who requires copies of any library materials has two choices. The inmate may handcopy materials or he may place a request for photocopying. In either case, the procedure ties up library resources for significant

periods. (Kunzelman, 6/17/86 p. 95 (approximately 2,000 to 3,000 copies per month are made for Central Complex inmates))
If an inmate is able to pay for the photocopying service (at ten cents per page 0907 Kunzelman, 6/17/86 p. 110; with 268 no limit on the number of pages 0907 Ibid. at p. 95) or has been classified as indigent,[6] the request *268 for
photocopies is processed. The library handles the procedure, but generally sends the materials to another section of the prison facility for the actual copying. A Personal Affairs Officer oversees the photocopying. The time required for copying varies with the request load, but generally takes at least three to four days.
Approximately 1,200 of the Central Complex inmates do not have direct access to the facilities of the main law library. Instead, inmates in the segregated cell blocks and the old infirmary have limited use of "satellite libraries" or may obtain legal library materials only by means of a checkout system from the main law library.
Minimal libraries have been established for use solely by inmates in segregated cell blocks. Former cells in blocks 5, 6, and 7 have been converted to satellite libraries for use by some of the segregated inmates. This conversion was accomplished pursuant to the consent judgment and a Department of Corrections policy directive (OP-SMI 61.04). Typically, a cell block satellite library consists of a regular-sized cell at the end of a gallery such as in block 5 west. These facilities contain approximately five shelves and a small table.
Appendix B of the consent judgment includes a list of the required "Minimum Collection for Administrative Segregation Law Libraries." That list indicates that annotated Michigan laws, basic treatises (e.g., Nutshell series publications), policy directives, outdated Shepard's Advance Sheets, and rules of procedure are to be provided. Testimony on behalf of plaintiff class indicated that the cell block satellite libraries contain little more than copies of the rules of procedure, policy directives, and outdated supplements.
The satellite libraries are not staffed.
No reliable inventory system has been established for the satellite libraries.
Supporting materials are generally not provided in the satellite libraries. The availability of writing supplies in these cell block libraries is unreliable. The facilities do not contain a typewriter.
Access to the satellite libraries is restricted and uncertain. Only inmates in a particular segregated cell block may use that cell block's facility. An inmate must file a request with a block sergeant for permission to use the satellite library at a certain time. Under the consent judgment, personal access is limited to two hours per week for each inmate. Only one inmate at a time may use the satellite library in the cell block. Scheduling conflicts are frequent. Inmates report that they are unable to have access to the satellite libraries on a regular basis.
Inmates held in segregated blocks may obtain materials directly from the main law library of the Central Complex by means of a check-out system. As plaintiffs note, this program is the only source of access to legal materials for segregated inmates who cannot obtain permission to use the limited facilities of the satellite libraries.
The check-out system allows inmates housed in the segregated cell blocks to request materials from the main law library. Processing time for a check-out request varies. Books requested by inmates are supposed to be brought to the segregated cell blocks by one of the library aides three to five days a week. An inmate can attempt to check out up to five volumes or other legal resource items at a time. The materials may be kept only twentyfour hours or until the next library run. Books are brought on an as-available basis (i.e., a book is not provided if another inmate has requested it, for use in the main library or by check-out, or if the volume is out for repair or photocopying). The delivery system is cumbersome and unreliable as one library clerk is given responsibility for the check-out program in all the segregated cell blocks.
A library is in the process of being constructed in the maximum security facility, cell block 4. Inmates housed in block 4 are to be provided the same basic materials as those available in the main law library, but this project is not yet complete and cannot be evaluated. Cell block 4 inmates may obtain materials through the check-out system in the interim.
269

*269 The law library system for the Central Complex is thus composed of three main components: (1) the main law library; (2) the satellite libraries of the segregated cell blocks; and (3) the check-out system by which inmates in segregated cell blocks may request materials from the main law library. The legal resources available from the library system take the form of texts written in the English language. The materials are to be used on-site in the library or are available in restricted numbers for overnight use under the check-out procedure.
This provision of a law library system is claimed by defendants to be a minimal, but constitutionally-sufficient, form of meaningful access to the courts as mandated in Bounds v. Smith, supra, for all the inmates of the Central Complex regardless of the inmates' ability to utilize the library materials. But see Smith v. Bounds, 610 F.Supp. 597, infra.
b. Needs and Resources for Non-Library Legal Assistance Available in the Central Complex
The bulk of plaintiffs' proofs regarded legal resources other than a library system. Plaintiff class presented proofs concerning their perceived needs as well as the means by which the Central Complex now attempts to meet those needs.
(1) Needs Are Based Upon Illiteracy, Indigency, and Segregated Confinement
Plaintiff class contends: (1) that functional illiteracy, indigency or near-indigency, and segregation prevent the meaningful use of written, English-language library materials offered in the Central Complex library system; (2) that the texts cannot be of assistance to those who cannot read them; and (3) that a scarcity of basic texts causes those without funds for copying materials or those who cannot directly use the materials in the main library to sustain significant delays in obtaining legal resources or to forego potentially advantageous legal resources.
Plaintiffs presented the needs for legal assistance other than that available in a law library system by offering proofs with regard to inmates' reading comprehension, their ability to pay for legal assistance from other inmates, and the problems created by confinement to segregated cell blocks. Plaintiffs emphasize that at least twelve hundred inmates of the Central Complex are housed in segregated cell blocks. I now outline plaintiffs' claims with respect to inmate illiteracy, indigency, and lack of means by which inmates who cannot use the library may seek non-library legal assistance in the Central Complex.
(2) The Acute Problem of Illiteracy
Illiteracy or an inability to use (read and write) and understand the English language precludes twenty to fifty per cent of the inmates from using any law library materials.[7] An inmate may be "actually" or "functionally" illiterate. 270 Status as an illiterate person is based upon an inmate's reading level (as demonstrated by the results *270 of the standard achievement tests administered upon intake into the Central Complex).
The reading level for Central Complex inmates was determined from a sample of over one hundred scores resulting from intake testing done in the Reception and Guidance Center (administered by the prison officials) and a review of inmates' writing samples.[8] (McIntyre, 6/11/85 pp. 394-403) Based on the results of McIntyre's examination, the average reading level (ability to comprehend) of the sample of inmates was grade six to six and one-half.[9] (McIntyre, 6/11/85 pp. 396-399)
Approximately twenty per cent of the inmates tested were "actually" illiterate (capable of reading only below the fourth grade (4.0) level).[10] (McIntyre, 6/11/85 p. 446)

The percentage of inmates who are "functionally" illiterate (i.e., who cannot read with adequate comprehension) was not determined with specificity. However, the average inmate (i.e., one reading at the sixth and one-half grade level) lacks ability to comprehend and reason using relatively unsophisticated legal materials according to plaintiffs' expert.[11]
(3) General Assistance Given the Illiterate
No formal program exists at the Central Complex to provide legal assistance to functionally illiterate inmates who cannot read and utilize the legal texts of the library system. Other, general assistance with reading is available.
(a) Adult Education
The Central Complex provides an adult education program for inmates who are characterized as "non-readers" (i.e., the average inmate who reads and writes at seventh grade equivalency or lower). (Limberg, 6/27/86 pp. 80-81) The program is also intended to serve as a tutorial aid for those inmates who do not possess sufficient command of the English language. This remedial course consists of a series of classes designed to assist an inmate in developing basic reading and writing skills. (Limberg, 6/27/86 pp. 80-81) The course does not address legal research or complaint preparation.
(b) Personal Affairs Officer
The Personal Affairs Officer will read mail for an inmate who has a reading deficiency. (Kunzelman, 6/17/86 p. 100) The service provided is limited. That Officer does not assist in preparing written materials for inmates and is not trained in legal research or in the preparation of legal papers.
(c) Inmate Organizations
Some inmate organizations at the Central Complex have attempted to provide translation services for fellow inmates. For example, HASTA, a group comprised of Hispanic inmates, attempts to assist Spanish-speaking inmates. The efficacy of this type of assistance is limited by the expertise of the inmates providing the services. [12] At most, a jailhouse lawyer who speaks the native, non-English language of an inmate might be available to assist in preparing a case for presentation to a court. (See the discussion of the value of jailhouse lawyers as a consistent source of reliable legal assistance, infra.)
271 *271 (4) Non-Library Legal Assistance
Coupled with proofs of functional illiteracy, plaintiffs presented a review of the types of non-library or non-written legal resources available to the inmates of the Central Complex.
(a) Jailhouse Lawyers
Perhaps the most prevalent form of assistance available to inmates is the advice and work of the writwriters or jailhouse lawyers. As many as a hundred inmates may be holding themselves out as jailhouse lawyers in the Central Complex. Their utility is severely restricted by factors of skill, fees charged, and prison regulations.
Skill levels of the jailhouse lawyers vary considerably. (Thornton, 6/13/86 p. 74; Ramsey, 6/13/86 pp. 33, 37, and 41) The quality of their work is thus questionable. "While some are able, others lack the capacity to either understand the law or to apply it to a specific fact situation. They rely almost entirely on a capacity to write documents that use legal terminology but say very little." (Israel, p. 48) Of those inmates who claim to be jailhouse lawyers, perhaps only a dozen have any competency in fact (see, for example, Thornton, 6/13/86 p.

74). Any expertise is traditionally limited to matters of criminal law, the jailhouse lawyer having learned his law by working on his own case, by taking some portion of the Jackson Community College paralegal training program, or by talking with other inmates. (Israel, p. 48; Ramsey, 6/12/86 pp. 87-91; and Thornton, 6/13/86 pp. 57-58)
The Central Complex has no program for permitting only competent jailhouse lawyers to offer assistance or of requiring a jailhouse lawyer to offer assistance only in legal areas with which he has some familiarity.
Even if an inmate could find a competent jailhouse lawyer, the cost of his services would be prohibitive. (Girard noted fees such as $2,000, Jordan noted fees of $700-$800 per appeal, Douglas noted having to pay a jailhouse lawyer or to do chores for a jailhouse lawyer in order to get help on his case, and Ramsey noted fees ranging from a jar of coffee and stamps to a few hundred dollars.)
Eighty-two per cent (some 1,774 out of the 2,168 inmates listed with spendable prison account balances in Defendants' exhibit 90) had balances of eighty dollars or less in October of 1987. At least 120 inmates have seven dollars or less in their accounts. (Kunzelman, 6/17/86 pp. 104-105) Thus, the majority of the Central Complex inmates are indigent or do not possess sufficient funds to pay fees charged by jailhouse lawyers. (See Defendants' exhibit 90)
Illiterate inmates are the least likely to have funds necessary to hire legal assistance. One who cannot function with adequacy in the use of the English language is least likely to be employable. Work available to an illiterate inmate is often low-paid, commensurate with comprehension skills.
Jailhouse lawyers said that they and their counterparts regularly charge fees for their services, despite prison regulations which prohibit this (See Rule 617 and Department of Corrections' Regulations Ad.Code R. 791.6617). The no-fee rules are ignored or not enforced. No incentive exists to induce jailhouse lawyers to perform work pro bono, and they do not.[13]
Prison regulations and practices also preclude a jailhouse lawyer from offering effective assistance to an inmate. The record already discussed notes difficulties due to scheduling conflicts and space constraints faced by inmates trying to work together. In the segregated cell blocks, inmates cannot work together at all. Similarly, as plaintiffs note, any additional library time is granted to inmates to work only on their own cases. The lack of 272 facilities also prevents any privacy of communications between an inmate and another acting *272 as his jailhouse lawyer if they are allowed to meet. The amount of materials an inmate may retain in his cell is controlled. Legal materials are exempt from this rule, but are interpreted to mean only materials pertaining to the inmate's own case. Administrative and security concerns act generally to prevent any inmate from effectively conferring with another inmate to enable preparation of cases for submission to the courts.
Once a jailhouse lawyer begins work on a case for another inmate, there is no guarantee that he or his client will remain in the same facility during the life of the case. If either inmate is transferred (the frequency and probability of transfer are illustrated by Thornton, Douglas, and others, 6/16/86 p. 52), legal assistance ends. The client inmate must start the search for legal advice anew even though he may have already expended significant sums of time and money in an effort to get competent assistance.
(b) Inmate Paralegals
Another legal assistance resource defendants offer to the inmates in the Central Complex is the inmate paralegal program. Plaintiffs' proofs noted that most of the drawbacks of utilizing jailhouse lawyers also apply to the inmate paralegals. No means exist to prevent an inmate paralegal from charging fees for his services. Further, as inmates, these paralegals are subject to prison practices and procedures governing the administration and maintenance of security of the facility. Thus, obstacles to arranging meetings, working together, obtaining any privacy, securing library research time, and retaining papers hamper the effectiveness of the inmate paralegal. The reality of frequent transfers likewise limits the ability of an inmate paralegal to proceed with a client inmate's case. (Girard, 6/16/86 pp. 62-64 0907 inmate assistant transferred and trial held in absence)

The term "paralegal" suggests a level of expertise not often possessed by an inmate. To claim that an inmate paralegal possesses skills beyond that of a jailhouse lawyer may be an overstatement. Both the jailhouse lawyer and the inmate paralegal have questionable credentials. Apart from the labels, both have merely had an opportunity to attend classes designated as part of a paralegal training program sponsored by a neighboring community college.
The Central Complex does not have an inmate paralegal training program. Instead, inmates may avail themselves of a series of classes offered by Jackson Community College ("JCC"). JCC is responsible for setting the standards for admission and for the subjects offered the inmates. These courses are generally taught by local lawyers and law students. No internship or practical experience is provided in the curriculum. No evaluation is made of the efficacy of the program.
Most inmates do not continue beyond the initial phase of the program at JCC, which concentrates on criminal law. Through June of 1986, less than two dozen out of some three hundred inmates enrolled had completed the training. Transfers, a lack of ability, or a willingness to start "practicing" in criminal law are reasons cited for the low graduation rate. (Wreford, 6/23/86 pp. 17-28)
The only supervised role for an inmate paralegal is in the Prison Legal Services Office ("PLS"). Inmates there work under the direction of attorneys in providing legal assistance to other inmates. However, as the PLS Program Director, Sandra Girard, has testified, even the inmates who have completed the paralegal training program are able to offer only limited aid.
(c) Prison Legal Services
Probably the most useful form of non-library legal aid available to Central Complex inmates is provided by Prison Legal Services. PLS was established as a source of legal assistance for all inmates in the entire prison facility at Jackson. The reality is far from the ideal, however. The staff is few in number. As indicated above, any expertise of the inmate staff is questionable. The subject matters addressable by the staff are restricted. Security 273 considerations restrict PLS from being *273 able to effectively assist inmates. A history of the facility is illustrative.
Initially funded by grants from the State Bar of Michigan and from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, PLS was conceived as an ameliorating office to deal with the growing number of pro se actions brought by inmates whose pleadings were often incomprehensible. The funding for PLS continued in the Department of Corrections' budget in the 1970's once the grants terminated. In the early 1980's, the Department of Corrections sought to terminate the PLS program. I issued a preliminary injunction requiring that the services of this facility continue pending the decision in this case.
PLS operates pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections (Plaintiffs' exhibit 40). This agreement governs such items as the budget, the governing board, the subject matters, and similar aspects of PLS operations.
According to its contract, "operational and administrative control and responsibility" are vested in the PLS Board of Trustees. This independence from the state seems illusory. Funding and other financial matters remain the province of the Department of Corrections. It is the Department of Corrections which inspects the PLS offices at least every quarter to determine whether programs are being carried out in compliance with the contract. Further pressure is exerted by the state in that the Department of Corrections has announced intentions to eliminate PLS. PLS attorneys may be providing legal services which facially appear to violate standards of professional ethics regarding independence.[14] The duty of PLS to responsibly provide legal assistance for inmates may be impaired by constraints on its ability to operate independent of the Department of Corrections.[15]
The professional staff of the PLS facility is limited. Sandra Girard, the director, is an attorney who divides her time between administrative matters and service to the inmates. Two other attorneys are on staff. One of these staff attorneys works full-time at the Central Complex except for one day of work each week at the North Complex.

The other spends at least sixty per cent (and usually eighty per cent) of his time at another institution. In effect, PLS devotes the services of perhaps 1.8 lawyers to inmate matters.
The PLS staff also includes three inmate paralegals and a few paralegal trainees (also inmates). These individuals do not work solely on Central Complex inmate matters.[16] The average tenure of these inmate paralegals is measured in terms of a few months or, at the other extreme, many years. Their training consists of portions of the program sponsored by JCC (see (b), this section, above) and such guidance as the staff attorneys are able to give.
In theory, most of the legal work done by PLS is to be performed by paralegals under the supervision of the attorneys. This necessarily presumes adequately trained paraprofessionals acting independently most of the time. The attorney's supervision would hopefully consist of a review of major issues and final products.
In reality, plaintiffs assert, the inmate paralegals can only attempt to do most of the work in PLS subject to an attorney's review. The staff inmates are not consistently capable of performing even simple legal reasoning and drafting functions because of the limited training available. Many of the security restraints applicable to inmates extend to those on the PLS staff. For example, inmate paralegals cannot visit Central Complex inmates housed in segregated cell blocks. Thus, plaintiff class contends, inmate paralegals cannot function as paraprofessionals 274 in the traditional sense, and the equivalent of two attorneys in PLS must bear the burden of *274 providing legal services with minimal assistance from inmates on the staff.
The staffing available for PLS results in an attorney-to-inmate ratio of approximately one to 1,200 (less than two attorneys for some 2,400 inmates).[17] Both the American Correctional Association and the American Bar Association have issued reports recommending a ratio of one attorney to 400 inmates.[18] Even where the support of civilian paralegals is available to a staff attorney, the American Bar Association recommends a ratio of one attorney to 800 inmates.[19]
Plaintiffs assert that the PLS attorney/inmate staff cannot meet the legal assistance needs for those inmates who are indigent, functionally illiterate, who speak no English, or who, because of their segregated status, have restricted access to a law library. The sheer number of requests for assistance overwhelms the capacity of this legal services arrangement to provide inmates meaningful access to the courts. The PLS staff has been adjudicated not adequate for the demands placed upon it.[20] PLS must place an inmate on a waiting list for aid in any of several civil actions categories. Plaintiffs offer this as evidence of the insufficiency of PLS as a legal resource.
Plaintiff class presented nothing in their proofs which would permit an assessment of PLS output in terms of documents produced or appearances made in courts on behalf of inmates.
The PLS operation, by contract and in fact, does not have the task of providing legal assistance for inmates who do not speak or write in English. Plaintiffs sum up their proofs with the contention that budgeting and other constraints on resources and operations prevent PLS staff members from meeting the particular legal assistance needs of Central Complex inmates who are functionally illiterate, indigent, or segregated.
PLS is the only formal program of legal assistance consistently available to Central Complex inmates seeking to bring civil cases to the courts.
B. Defendants' Proofs
Herein are the contentions of defendants:

1. In general
Defendants assert that meaningful access to the courts for Central Complex inmates filing civil actions is provided by means of a sufficiently stocked and maintained law library. The bulk of their proofs consequently addresses the state of that library system.
Defendants' proofs attest to the provision of a law library system within the Central Complex which is stocked with the minimal collection necessary under constitutional standards and which is accessible to inmates either directly or by means of a materials check-out program.
Like plaintiffs, defendants note the availability of jailhouse lawyers and other inmates to aid their fellow inmates in the unsegregated prison population.
While defendants note that the inmates who testified (seven of ten of whom are jailhouse lawyers) described only limited personal difficulties in bringing their complaints before the courts, plaintiffs argue that this is of little significance in light of the claims of plaintiff class as a whole. Plaintiffs claim that defendants have no program to 275 aid functionally illiterate, indigent or segregated inmates in the preparation of legal papers and that defendants *275 offer no assurance of future legal assistance for such inmates.
2. Additional Sources of Legal Assistance
Defendants presented proofs as to other, general forms of legal assistance available to Central Complex inmates.
Various entities outside the prison system offer limited assistance for judicial or administrative relief for Central Complex inmates. These resources include organizations such as the State Appellate Defenders Office ("SADO"), state agencies such as the Office of the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman, and individual attorneys who may be working pro bono or for contingency fees.
a. SADO
SADO was established primarily to provide representation to inmates convicted of crimes who are unable to afford counsel to assist in their appeals of right. (Neuhard, 6/3/85 p. 15)
Approximately twenty SADO attorneys represent inmates in the various state facilities. (Neuhard, 6/3/85 pp. 11-15)
The SADO process is straightforward. Upon order of appointment by a circuit court, SADO staff attorneys obtain the lower court record and interview the inmate client. (Neuhard 6/3/85 pp. 16-17) SADO attorneys make a determination of case merit and proceed with representation accordingly.[21]
SADO also informally assists inmates. The staff reviews some 500 pieces of correspondence each month from non-client inmates. (Neuhard, 6/3/85 p. 28) This correspondence consists of requests for representation on a variety of questions concerning civil litigation matters. (Neuhard, 6/3/85 p. 29) SADO is able to respond informally to more than 400 of these non-client requests each month by providing briefs from a brief bank and newsletters on related matters. (Neuhard, 6/3/85 pp. 28-29) SADO also refers inmates to private attorneys or a formal referral service for possible representation in potentially meritorious civil rights claims. (Neuhard, 6/3/85 p. 66)
b. Legislative Corrections Ombudsman
The Office of the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman has an oversight function with respect to the Department of Corrections. Its staff monitors and investigates complaints which allege that administrative action taken by the Department of Corrections is contrary to administrative rules and policies, contrary to law, or is arbitrary or

capricious. (Birch, Ombudsman and chief administrator of the Office, 11/17/87 pp. 8-9) The duties of the Office are established pursuant to M.C.L.A. Sections 4.351-364 (M.S.A. Sections 2.139(1)-2.139(14)).
The work of the Office of the Ombudsman may indirectly benefit the case of a particular inmate. Staff persons from the Office are sent to the prisons regularly to investigate, report, and make recommendations on matters which might comprise the basis of civil rights actions by inmates. (Birch, 11/17/87 pp. 8-9. See also Girard, 6/16/86 p. 83) The investigation and resulting information may serve to resolve the matter or may possibly be used by an inmate in presenting his claim to a court, but no direct assistance is provided.
c. Other Assistance Including Outside Attorneys
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has a pro bono attorney assignment program for inmate civil rights cases. (Defendants' exhibit 58) This program does not provide meaningful legal assistance in drafting inmates' complaints. Instead, an inmate's complaint is evaluated for merit. Frivolous or non-sufficient 276 complaints are dismissed and no attorney is appointed. If an inmate cannot *276 draft an effective complaint, he is unlikely to obtain an attorney.
Other attorneys may undertake to represent an inmate in a civil rights matter under a modified contingency fee arrangement. In all section 1983 cases, plaintiffs' counsel who prevail are entitled to a fee for all hours reasonably expended (42 U.S.C. Section 1988). The payment does not depend upon the size of any award to a plaintiff.
In addition to these direct forms of assistance for legal matters, an inmate may file a claim administratively through the Central Complex grievance process.
C. Court-Appointed Experts' Reports
1. Israel's Examination of Legal Assistance Available to Central Complex Inmates
Professor Jerold Israel of the University of Michigan Law School prepared a study primarily concentrating on the sources of legal assistance at the Central Complex.[22]
a. In General
Israel examined all sources of legal aid for inmates in the Central Complex. His findings and conclusions with regard to the library system and the non-library resources have been footnoted in the prior discussion where appropriate.
b. Nature and Extent of Assistance Rendered by PLS
In his analysis of PLS, Israel offers a detailed outline of the nature and extent of that facility's workload. This is significant in that PLS was established to service inmate requests for legal assistance. Any inquiry as to the meaningfulness of inmate access to the courts must necessarily include an evaluation of the scope of this program initiated with a goal of aiding inmates in the preparation of effective legal papers.
Because his treatment is both thorough and objective, I now draw upon Israel's work in my examination of the legal assistance actually available to Central Complex inmates through PLS.

(1) Categories of PLS Legal Aid
Israel first notes the broad categories by which PLS staff members classify inmate requests for legal aid. The categories are taken from a caseload log maintained by PLS. The log is used to record formal requests for assistance that come through the kite (written request) system. It does not reflect any informal or one-time questions coming through window, door or yard requests for information.
Inmate requests for legal assistance are divided into eight categories in the PLS log (roughly in the order of priority PLS would assign to the type of request):
1. Appeal of right matters;
2. Appeal of right exhausted matters (delayed appeals or delayed motions for a new trial);
3. Other post-conviction matters;
4. Prison administrative matters;
5. Other administrative matters;
6. Family law matters;
7. Other civil matters; and
8. Miscellaneous matters.
"Appeal of right" matters are those requests for legal aid by inmates who still have an appeal of right and who wish to challenge their conviction. Many of the requests in the Appeal of Right category are from inmates who already have counsel or for whom counsel might be appointed as a matter of right. Other entities outside the Central Complex have primary responsibility for assisting inmates in such matters. For example, SADO facilitates the voluntary appointment of counsel from the ranks of the state bar. (See Neuhard, 6/3/85 p. 1, et seq.) Nevertheless, PLS has taken on the task of assisting inmates in obtaining counsel in these instances. About twenty-five per cent of the inmate requests for limited assistance from PLS concern facilitating communications 277 between the inmate and an attorney representing *277 the inmate. (Girard, 6/5/85 pp. 266-268)
"Appeal of right exhausted" matters are requests by inmates who no longer have an appeal of right, but who wish to raise claims that can be presented to the state courts through a delayed appeal or, where the claim is outside the record, through a delayed motion for a new trial.
"Other post-conviction" matters include situations where an inmate seeks to challenge his conviction through a federal habeas corpus action.[23]
"Prison administrative" matters relate to requests regarding internal issues for the Central Complex. The administration is being questioned. Specific subjects include: (1) major misconducts or security classifications on which hearings have been or will be held; (2) complaints that may be presented through the grievance process, such as property loss or destruction, inaccurate time computations, inadequate medical treatment, etc.; and (3) any requests for assistance in parole proceedings.
The category of requests labeled "prison administrative" includes a significant number of requests for assistance on prison difficulties which could be characterized as civil rights (section 1983) suits. PLS staff members advise inmates on how to use the grievance procedure, as well as provide and assist the inmates with section 1983 complaint forms (obtained from the District Courts).[24]
As noted previously, the contract with the Department of Corrections restricts the types of cases in which PLS may offer assistance. PLS is not allowed to provide legal services with respect to "Civil Rights actions ... against the Department of Corrections." PLS does advise inmates on these matters as described above despite cautions by the Department of Corrections that such action violates the terms of the PLS contract.

Inmates also continue to seek informal assistance in challenging prison conditions. As Israel reports, "the challenging of prison conditions is among those subjects on which advice is most frequently sought."[25] (Israel, p. 33)
In his study, Israel recommends that a substantial number of the requests in the "prison administrative" matters category should be excluded in considering inmate problems for which some assistance may be necessary if, under Bounds, infra, assistance must be provided only for accessing the courts. (I will discuss provisions for assisting inmates with such matters in my examination of the grievance system in conjunction with the Wolfson study.) But, Israel also points out that the "category does include many requests for assistance on matters that are ripe for judicial action (e.g. judicial review of a misconduct finding, a possible section 1983 action on prison conditions, or a mandamus action to correct an erroneous time computation)." (Israel, p. 34)
278 "Other administrative" matters involve non-prison difficulties in areas such as deportation, *278 social security and veterans' benefits, workers' compensation claims, etc.
"Family law" matters include all family or domestic issues such as divorce, termination of parental rights, custodianship, and occasionally probate matters.
"Other civil" matters describe various actions in which the inmate is sued or wishes to bring suit with regard to some civil issue not in the family law category and not related to the prison administration (i.e., tort actions based on incidents occurring prior to imprisonment or insurance claims).
"Miscellaneous" matters predominantly take the forms of requests for notarization and photocopying by prisoners who prepare their own complaints.
(2) Types of Responses Made by PLS
Any response PLS makes to one of the eight categories of inmate requests are logged as one of the following activities:
(1) limited assistance;
(2) xerox;
(3) notary;
(4) wait list (delayed assistance);
(5) denied (no assistance); and
(6) file open.
"Limited assistance" covers the majority of the legal aid offered by PLS. This response category includes a variety of services (i.e., telephone calls, assistance in writing to the courts, and other work on an inmate's case such as obtaining depositions).
(See Israel, p. 30)
"Xerox" and "notary" are self-explanatory. These responses are usually made to inmate requests on a one-time basis.
"Wait list" denotes inmate matters in which PLS desires to assist the inmate, but which do not have a high priority because of the limited resources of PLS.
"Denied" indicates a determination by PLS that the facility will not aid an inmate on a particular request.

"File open" denotes a PLS response in matters for which PLS assumes full responsibility. In these instances, PLS will prepare the papers necessary to bring the matter to resolution, but will generally not make court appearances.
(3) Summary of PLS Workload
A summary of Central Complex inmate requests and PLS responses for 1984 and 1985 is presented by Israel as follows:

REQUESTS BY CATEGORY

Subject

1985 1984

Appeal of Right Appeal of Right Exhausted Other Post-Conviction Prison Administrative Other Administrative Family Law Other Civil Miscellaneous
TOTALS

276 449 113 286
35 483 466 346 _____ 2,454 ---------

208 120
88 256
35 174 364 165 _____ 1,410 ---------

Subject

TYPES OF ASSISTANCE RENDERED 0907 1985[*]

Limited Xerox,

Wait

Assist. Notary

List

Denied

File Open

Appeal of Right Appeal of Right Exhausted Other Post-Conviction Prison Administrative
279 *279 Other Administrative Family Law Other Civil Miscellaneous
TOTALS
(See Israel, p. 30)

233 368
92 213
34 227 431 149 ______ 1,747 -----------

3

0

7

3

2

0

73

0

0 2 5 190 ___ 282 -----

1 101
2 0 ___ 107 -----

24

15

14

57

7

11

7

2

0

0

81

80

18

9

7

0

___

___

158

174

---

---

---

---

c. Discussion of the Growth of PLS Efforts Given Limited Resources

There has been a steady increase in the number of formal requests since 1981.[26] As Israel notes in his report:

To some extent, this "growth" factor probably reflects increased awareness of (and confidence in) the services provided by P.L.S. At this point, P.L.S. is well known and further growth on that score alone is likely to be limited. However, sudden jumps in certain years (1982 and 1985) suggest other factors also played a significant role in the increased number of requests. These may include changes in the population or changes in the service rendered by P.L.S. with respect to a particular type of case. (Cf. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation, Civil Justice and the Public, 9 Law & Society Review 401 (1975) (a legal service project that is especially equipped to handle a particular type of problem is more likely to "find" such problems).) Similar changes may result in dramatic increases in the future. The 1985 figure, presenting a substantial jump over 1984, may reflect the probable level of requests for future years, a peak from which there will be a decrease (unlikely based on past experience), or the starting point for dramatic new increases.
(Israel, p. 32)
Despite this increase in the number of requests for legal assistance and an increase in the Central Complex population, the resources available to PLS have not changed significantly over the term of the injunction. The budget for PLS has remained relatively constant. As a result, the number of persons on the staff serving inmates has tended to remain stable for the past six years. Likewise, office space and other resources have not been allowed to keep pace with increased needs. Rather than allocating more resources to PLS, the Department of Corrections has announced a continued intention to decrease the monies spent on PLS or to abolish the program completely.
PLS has responded to budget and other operating constraints by allocating its resources. The most visible aspect of this program is the prioritizing of matters on which PLS will assist inmates. The practice of assigning priorities has led to wait-listing certain inmate requests for legal aid.
The PLS procedure for wait-listing certain requests for assistance is internally justified by referencing the substantially increased caseload of PLS in the last two years. The wait-listed matters are those which would ordinarily be serviced by PLS staff, but which are not now considered part of the group of cases marked for immediate attention. Requests for assistance on family law issues are generally given the lowest priority under this system. "Immediate attention is given to emergency situations, cases involving children, and responses to actions brought against the inmate, but other family law cases (primarily inmate requests for assistance in getting a divorce) are wait-listed." (Israel, p. 32)
280 *280 Israel cautions that the statistics may not reveal the full effect of the wait-listing practices of PLS. "Although there was a substantial jump in the number of family law requests presented in 1985 (483, as compared to 173 in 1984), it is possible that increase would have been even greater if not for the wait-list[ing] practice. Some inmates may have decided against seeking assistance because they anticipated waitlisting. (Although there is far less waitlisting for other types of cases, the image of P.L.S. as an overburdened facility may also have discouraged the presentation of other requests 0907 although the sharp jump in requests between 1984 and 1985 would suggest otherwise.)"[27]
2. Wolfson's Examination of the Grievance Program
a. Introduction
Professor Charles Wolfson of the University of Michigan School of Social Work prepared a study on the grievance system at the Central Complex.[28]
Wolfson analyzed the existing grievance system and made recommendations for its improvement. I now draw upon his work in my examination of the Central Complex grievance program.
The Michigan Department of Corrections has developed a formal grievance policy: "Grievance Procedure for Corrections Clients." (No. DD-DWA-62.02, effective June 1, 1983) Facially this plan meets the standards

established by the American Correctional Association. (See American Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (2d ed. 1981), at page 89.) According to Wolfson, the grievance policy conforms to the set standards in its requirements for a written response, time limit for that response, access to all inmates, and means for resolving questions. (Wolfson, p. 1) However, Wolfson finds that the Grievance Procedure differs from the set standards in that it does not provide for inmate and employee involvement in the design and operation of the grievance procedure. (Wolfson p. 2; see also 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e and 28 C.F.R. 40.1-40.10)
b. Description of the Central Complex Grievance Program
The Central Complex grievance program provides two avenues of presenting grievances: a Warden's Forum for presenting grievances concerning units or the prison as a whole, and a written grievance procedure for presenting individual grievances.
(1) Group Grievances 0907 Warden's Forum
The Warden's Forum is available for the presentation and hearing of group or unit grievances and prison-wide grievances. Although the Forum is not structured to handle such grievances, it appears that individual grievances are also presented.[29]
The Forum is composed of inmate representatives elected at the unit or block level. These inmates' representatives are given the responsibility of negotiating unit-level problems with the Resident Unit Manager. There are, however, no established procedures or recommendations. The Forum thus lacks structure and accountability. (Wolfson p. 7) Access to the Forum is restricted to inmates in cell blocks 5 and 6 of the Central Complex. (Wolfson, pp. 7-8)
281 Wolfson concludes that the Warden's Forum as it now exists cannot provide meaningful *281 and dependable resolution of grievances. He notes that "mechanisms for facilitating the mediation process are absent. The process is dependent upon the skills and persistence of the [inmate] representative and the level of interest, available time, and sympathies of the [prison administrator]." (Wolfson, p. 7)
(2) Individual Grievances
For individual problems, a formal written grievance procedure is available for all inmates of the Central Complex. The individual grievance system is divided into a number of steps once a written grievance is made by an inmate.
As a practical precursor to filing a written grievance, an inmate must approach the employee involved and attempt a resolution. If the inmate is unsuccessful in this informal effort, he submits a Step I, written grievance form.
The written grievance procedure consists of three steps: the first step at which the inmate's grievance is heard and initially resolved, and two steps of appeals.
(a) Step I 0907 Written Grievance Filed
At Step I, the completed grievance forms are forwarded to the Grievance Coordinator. The Grievance Coordinator determines the most suitable staff person to respond to the grievance and forwards the grievance to that person.
Wolfson's study highlights the irony of the current procedure: the person to whom the Coordinator sends the grievance may well be the staff member about whom the inmate is complaining and with whom he has already unsuccessfully attempted a resolution. The rationale is that the person closest to the problem can best offer explanation or resolution. (Wolfson, p. 3)

The Grievance Coordinator is responsible for monitoring the staff person's response. The Grievance Coordinator also compiles and disseminates data regarding grievances and responses.[30]
The grievance program at Step I is largely controlled by the employees who are alleged to have caused the dispute with an inmate. The staff member is given great discretion in resolving the grievance with the inmate. In addition, the procedure requires the Grievance Coordinator to rely upon the staff member's good faith and energy to follow the procedure for resolving the problem: to read the grievance, seek out the inmate, discuss the matter, and explain the matter or resolve the dispute. (Wolfson, p. 3) The staff member must then file a written account of his response within fifteen days. (Wolfson, p. 3)
Wolfson concludes that Step I is efficient in gathering information regarding the grievances. Through the information compiled from the grievances, the Grievance Coordinator is in touch with the temper of the institution: he knows where and what the problems are in the Central Complex. (Wolfson, p. 3)
(b) Step II 0907 First Appeal
Step II of the grievance procedure is available to inmates who wish to appeal the result of Step I.[31] The inmate must appeal within ten days of receipt of the Step I response. The appeal goes to the Warden, Deputy Warden, or a Superintendent. At the Central Complex and R & GC, the appeal goes to the Deputy Warden, who has a grievance worker to assist him. The Warden, Deputy Warden, or Superintendent must respond to the Step II grievance within fifteen days, with fifteen-day extensions routinely granted. (Wolfson, p. 4)
Fewer than ten per cent of the grievances filed at Step I are appealed to Step II. (Wolfson, p. 4) Wolfson notes that this may represent some 200 appeals at Step II for the Central Complex in one month. (Ibid.)
282 *282 (c) Step III 0907 Final Appeal
From the result at Step II, an inmate may appeal to the Office of the Director of the Department of Corrections. This procedure comprises Step III of the process.
Two persons in the Office of the Director of the Department of Corrections review appeals. The same time limitations that apply to Step II are in force at Step III. (Wolfson, p. 4)
c. Discussion of the Central Complex Grievance Program Given Its Current Focus
Wolfson notes that the current grievance program suffers from its focus on information gathering rather than resolution of the inmates' complaints:
The grievance procedure relevant to complaints of individuals is entirely bureaucratic and essentially amounts to the filing and classification of forms which funnel from step to step with minimal attention to resolving disputes or exacting remedies.
(Wolfson, p. 5)
The focus on information may contribute to the small number of grievance appeals at Step III which are not denied.[32] It is probable that the entire system is geared only to processing forms, with the overburdened decision makers at each level routinely approving the decisions of those below them.
There are no objective statistics with which to evaluate the actual number of grievances satisfactorily resolved. (Wolfson, p. 9) Wolfson was able to state positively only that the system probably provided some catharsis for inmates by committing their grievances to paper. (Wolfson, p. 9)

The grievance procedure lacks credibility in Wolfson's view. Neither inmates nor Central Complex employees believe that it will resolve their disputes. (Wolfson, p. 9) This is due largely to the lack of inmate and employee input into the formulation, implementation, and operation of the grievance procedure.[33] "It is a cynical system which ignores current knowledge and skills useful in mediating and resolving disputes." (Wolfson, p. 5)
In short, while grievances are expressed, there is no assurance that they are being heard. The current system, an information-gathering system, while enabling the prison authorities to keep in touch with the prison's problems, provides information after the fact and the resulting decisions are not timely. In a system focused on dispute resolution, timely response is the key characteristic and decisions and recommendations come from the levels of authority nearest dispute. The number of grievances with which the Grievance Coordinator must deal forces him primarily into the role of statistician.
"It is clear that the system now in place at [Central Complex] is an information processing system which serves the warden well but the prisoner grievant poorly." (Wolfson, p. 9)
In summary, Wolfson emphasized the goal of a grievance procedure. The objective is to provide a fair and prompt resolution to prisoners' legitimate complaints. To achieve this end, there must be means for inmates to present their complaints and means of assessing and responding to these complaints. In Wolfson's opinion, the Central 283 Complex grievance system, as it currently exists and in the form it is contemplated to have in the future, does *283 not accomplish this goal. (Wolfson, pp. 5-6)
V. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Central Complex provides an institution-run law library system which includes the main law library and several satellite libraries in segregated cell blocks. The library system is limited and only facially sufficient for inmates able to utilize its textual resources. The physical location and size of the library area do restrict use, but fairly generous, if not always reliable, hours of operation assist inmates in overcoming the physical plant limitations of the facilities. The arrangement of the limited collection prevents inmates from readily accessing the books. The system under which inmates utilize the library materials also precludes the availability of basic legal texts to more than one inmate at a time. Maintenance practices are not sufficient to guarantee updated or nonmutilated materials. Staffing and services procedures are not sufficient to meet inmate needs on a timely basis. The Central Complex library system does eventually allow literate inmates access to legal texts useful in preparing matters for judicial scrutiny, but cannot be said to furnish meaningful access to the courts.
Central Complex inmates who are not literate make up a substantial segment of the inmate population. At least twenty per cent of the inmates are totally illiterate and cannot read according to the results of achievement tests administered by prison officials to inmates upon entrance to the Central Complex. As many as fifty per cent of the inmates may be functionally illiterate and unable to comprehend basic, written legal resources offered in the Central Complex library system. The results of the readability analysis indicate that inmates comprehend the English language at the sixth grade level (on average). This precludes the meaningful use by Central Complex inmates of any materials written for readers beyond the sixth grade level.
The problem of functional illiteracy is compounded by indigency or near indigency for the majority of Central Complex inmates. At least 120 inmates had a balance of seven dollars or less in their prison accounts in October, 1987. Eighty-two per cent of the inmates had less than eighty dollars in their accounts for that period and were expected to pay for their basic supplies from that balance. Clearly, these 1,774 inmates (eighty-two per cent of the approximately 2,168 inmates listed in Defendants' exhibit 90 as having spendable balances) cannot afford to hire any legal assistance and must rely upon the non-library legal resources provided by the prison.
For the approximately 1,200 inmates housed in segregated cell blocks within the Central Complex (about half the inmate population is confined to segregated blocks for administrative or punitive reasons) the added burden of functional illiteracy, for those who thus cannot make use of the limited library materials permitted, is particularly onerous. Aside from a check-out procedure allowing a segregated inmate to request the use of three to five books for twenty-four hours from the main law library, confined inmates must generally make use of a satellite

library in a cell block or use the extremely limited non-library legal resources permitted by the terms of their special confinement.
In general, the non-library legal resources available in the Central Complex are provided sporadically, if at all, to the inmate population. While varied in number and nature, these types of non-library legal assistance are limited in scope and effectiveness. In most instances, security or funding concerns have prevented the non-library resources from providing meaningful assistance in the preparation of complaints adequate for submission to the courts.
The head librarian and her assistant are not sources of legal assistance. They have training in library science with no particular emphasis on legal texts. Their duties do not include assisting inmates with legal research.
The inmate library clerks are not sources of legal assistance. Their training emphasizes clerical functions and 284 does not include legal research techniques. Inmate library *284 clerks are primarily available to assist inmates by
locating library materials. Their responsibilities do not include assisting inmates with legal research.
The personnel involved in the adult education program at the Central Complex are not sources of legal assistance and the program itself does not attempt to teach legal research techniques. Rather, the education program is intended as a remedial reading class designed to inculcate only minimal skills.
The Personal Affairs Officer is not a source of legal assistance. He will help inmates read their mail or perform similar tasks. He does not aid inmates in drafting or otherwise assist in the preparation of legal materials. His duties do not include assisting inmates with legal research.
Various inmate groups are not a source of legal assistance for inmates. The inmate organizations are primarily ad hoc sources of interpreters for the inmate population of the Central Complex. No formal program exists to provide translations of legal materials for inmates who do not have English as a native language. Likewise, the Central Complex provides no formal means by which a non-English speaking inmate is guaranteed assistance in legal research or drafting materials for submission to the courts.
Unreliable legal assistance is available from jailhouse lawyers in the Central Complex. At most, ten per cent of the more than one hundred inmates who have declared themselves to be jailhouse lawyers possess rudimentary legal skills. Most jailhouse lawyers learn some law by preparing their own cases or by taking one of a handful of introductory criminal law courses offered by the local community college. No formal procedure exists to monitor the quality of assistance offered by the jailhouse lawyers at the Central Complex.
The ability of an inmate to utilize the limited resources of a jailhouse lawyer is restricted by financial, security, and other constraints. A typical fee of a jailhouse lawyer commonly runs to hundreds of dollars in contravention of prison policy that no fee may be charged. Central Complex regulations dictate that inmates are generally not free to consult with one another and segregated inmates may not confer with other inmates at all. Other security measures limit the efficacy of a jailhouse lawyer by curtailing his ability to gain additional library time to work on other inmates' matters or to possess legal materials pertaining to other inmates' cases. Population control concerns necessitate frequent transfers of inmates including jailhouse lawyers; a transfer effectively ends any involvement of a jailhouse lawyer with client inmates in his former institution.
Inmate paralegals offer no better source of legal assistance than the doubtful aid available from jailhouse lawyers. The same constraints regarding skill, security, etc., in operation for jailhouse lawyers are in force for inmate paralegals. The fact that an inmate paralegal may work in the Prison Legal Services facility does not ameliorate the basic deficiencies in the inmate paralegal's ability to offer meaningful legal assistance.
The State Appellate Defenders Office is not a source of general legal assistance for inmates of the Central Complex; the duties of the SADO staff are statutorily limited to those matters where an inmate has a right to appointed counsel. The workload of that office dictates that no further, formal help can be offered other than provision of written legal materials.
The Legislative Corrections Ombudsman's Office is not a source of legal assistance for Central Complex inmates. The Ombudsman's staff is charged with monitoring prison conditions in general. Unless the investigation

and report of the Ombudsman on a particular subject are germane to an inmate's specific civil rights action, the function of that office is not useful in providing meaningful access to the courts.
Outside attorneys do take some cases for inmates in the Central Complex on a volunteer basis, but they are not sources of general legal assistance in providing meaningful access to the courts. This pro bono or contingency 285 fee-based assistance is not *285 available with any certainty or with any guarantee of effective assistance. Generally, an inmate must draft a complaint which sufficiently states his case to interest the outside attorney or the court in appointing such an attorney. Obviously, such a program does not provide help in drafting and otherwise preparing the inmate's case for initial, meaningful consideration.
Prison Legal Services does not provide meaningful legal assistance for the inmates of the Central Complex. The equivalent of less than two attorneys must service between 2,400 and 10,000 inmates (if the transient inmate population is considered). The staff attorneys are assisted by only three or four inmate paralegals in their mammoth task. Inmate paralegals are unable to offer legal assistance of any quality. The variety of the workload, budgetary and other restraints upon independence, and the volume of inmate requests for aid also prohibit the PLS facility from providing meaningful legal assistance.
PLS is involved essentially in every matter an inmate seeks to bring to court. Inmates' pressing legal assistance needs have led to a PLS policy of general intercession on behalf of Central Complex inmates. Although PLS staff is severely limited, the facility assists inmates in post-conviction appeals as well as in administrative matters subject to the grievance procedure (but which are treated as judicial issues). Prohibited by contract from bringing actions against the Michigan Department of Corrections, PLS nevertheless assists inmates in completing forms provided by the courts to facilitate civil rights suits against the department. The PLS caseload also includes family, real estate, and other civil law matters.
The contract also limits the quality of the legal assistance PLS may provide. The Department of Corrections retains control over the operation of the facility by regulating its budget and its provision of services under the contract. Funding has remained relatively constant with a resultant decrease in the assistance which might be provided for an inmate due to an increasing prison population. The Department of Corrections has announced its intention to eliminate PLS; the service continues because of my injunction. Thus, while a Board of Trustees is appointed to oversee the functioning of PLS, actual control in large part is in the Department of Corrections.
The number of inmate matters serviced by the PLS staff also inhibits its ability to provide meaningful assistance. PLS has responsibility for inmate assistance in the entire State Prison of Southern Michigan; the Central Complex is but one of the facilities serviced. PLS responds to informal, one-time requests for information as well as formal requests by inmates for legal assistance. Because of the volume of inmate requests, certain family law and other civil law inmate cases are waitlisted for attention under a priority system which assigns highest rank to post-conviction items. These post-conviction matters comprise some twenty-five per cent of the PLS workload. No priority is given to concerns of inmates who are totally or functionally illiterate or otherwise unable to utilize the law library.
The ratio of attorneys to inmates exceeds recommended ratios and underscores the inadequacy of PLS to meet inmate legal assistance needs with any certainty. The American Bar Association recommends a ratio of one attorney to 800 inmates provided the attorneys are assisted by certified paraprofessionals. The American Corrections Association and the American Bar Association otherwise recommend a ratio of one attorney to 400 inmates. In the Central Complex, PLS has the equivalent of less than two attorneys to serve at least 2,400 inmates, or a ratio of one attorney to 1,200 inmates, and no assistance by certified paralegals.
PLS was instituted to assist inmates in preparing meaningful complaints for filing in the courts. The facility does provide assistance to the inmates it is able to service. However, the stagnant budget and program control in an 286 environment of burgeoning growth of the inmate population prevents PLS from providing the assistance *286 necessary and sufficient to constitute meaningful access to the courts.
The Grievance Program at the Central Complex hinders the ability of those agencies and programs that provide some inmate assistance to effectively aid them in instituting matters suitable for legal review. Matters which

should be resolved more effectively and efficiently within the prison system are submitted to the courts because the grievance procedure is not functioning.
Primarily viewed as an information-gathering system at best, the Central Complex grievance program consists of a series of appellate procedures within the prison bureaucracy. Inmate participation in the procedure is limited to filing grievances. Once filed, a grievance is subject to the control of the staff member who allegedly caused the underlying breach of the inmate's rights. Subsequent steps in the program provide no relief. Each level of appeal appears to result in rubber-stamping of prior reviews of the merits of an inmate's complaint.
Based on these findings of fact, I conclude that defendants do not provide meaningful access to the courts for Central Complex inmates because of the conditions of the present library system. For literate inmates, correcting the library system deficiencies would provide meaningful access to the courts. I find additionally that inmates who are illiterate (actually or functionally), indigent or nearly indigent, or in segregated confinement are unable to use a library system to meaningfully access the courts. For these inmates, correction of the library system conditions cannot provide meaningful access to the courts. I further find that the legal assistance now available to inmates in the Central Complex is not sufficient and does not constitute meaningful access to the courts.
VI. THE LAW
Many courts are engaged in a continuing analysis of the affirmative duty of the government to provide inmates with meaningful access to the courts. There is no shortage of caselaw. It illustrates the commitment required to insure this right under the Constitution and serves as a foundation for the remedies I order.
In Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853-855 (10th Cir.1985), cert. den'd, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit provides a recitation of decisions examining the right of meaningful access to the courts prior to and including the landmark case, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), reh'd following remand, Smith v. Bounds, 610 F.Supp. 597 (E.D.N. C.1985) (legal assistance by attorneys is required to provide meaningful access to N.C. inmates), reconsideration den'd, 657 F.Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.C.1985), second order entered 657 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.N.C.1986), aff'd. 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.1987), aff'd. on rehearing en banc 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1988) (no reconsideration of district court judgment necessary). Those decisions are informative as to the ties between essential, constitutional rights and an inmate's right to meaningfully petition the courts.
Meaningful access to the courts is a right basic to our system; it is well established as one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir.1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit notes that the Supreme Court "viewed the right of access to the courts as one of the privileges and immunities accorded citizens under article 4 of the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment." Ryland, 708 F.2d at 971, ref. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143 (1907). The court in Ryland added: "[there is] in the first amendment a second constitutional basis for this right of access: `Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.'" Ibid. ref. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). "A third constitutional basis for 287 the right of access to the courts is found in the due process clause." Ryland, *287 708 F.2d at 972. And, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he right of access to the courts, upon which [Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969)] was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."
In summary, the right of meaningful access to the courts "encompasses all the means [an inmate] might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances alleged by him." Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105, 110 (N.D.Cal.1970), aff'd sub nom, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971) (per curiam).
The right of an inmate to secure meaningful access to the courts was first protected in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941) (a Michigan case involving an inmate at the State Prison of Southern

Michigan). The Supreme Court held in Hull that "the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549, 61 S.Ct. 640, 641, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490, 89 S.Ct. 747, 751, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Hull and reinforced the right of meaningful access by saying that "the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas petitions is not always clear. The Court has already recognized instances where the same constitutional rights might be redressed under either form of relief."
In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), the Supreme Court established the affirmative duty of states to protect inmates' meaningful access to the courts. The Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or meaningful assistance from persons trained in the law."
The right of meaningful access to the courts requires that an inmate be assisted in getting his matter before a court in a form capable of remedy. That right is without substance if the inmate cannot prepare an understandable, effective complaint for a judge's consideration.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on access to the courts, Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971), has not been extended by this Court to apply further than protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint."
The Supreme Court has subsequently amplified this right by holding that the "right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers ...". Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. In announcing this focus, the Court recognized that "our main concern here is `protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or complaint,' Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S., at 576 [94 S.Ct. at 2984] ...." Ibid. at n. 17.[34]
288 *288 The United States District Court for the Third Circuit has more recently summarized the right; attention has now focused upon the means of providing meaningful access to the courts for inmates with special needs. The Court stated:
Courts have consistently held that the mere provision of an adequate law library does not necessarily satisfy the constitutional obligation set forth in Bounds. An adequate law library, by itself, cannot provide meaningful access to the courts for those inmates unable to read and understand library materials.
United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1105 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. den'd sub nom, Zimmerman v. Para-Professional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988).[35]
The alternative to a law library, necessary to assure meaningful access to the courts for an inmate unable to use the library, has not been given a bright-line definition. Courts have been required to fashion means of meaningful access to fit the facts of each case considered. On this point, the conclusions of the court in Stevenson v. Reed, 391 F.Supp. 1375 (N.D. Miss.1975), aff'd. 530 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944, 97 S.Ct. 365, 50 L.Ed.2d 315 (1976) are helpful as a means of concisely illustrating the burden upon defendants:
Acknowledging that "penitentiaries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose education attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited," the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), ... introduced a requirement of reasonably adequate access and placed on the state an affirmative obligation to provide ignorant prisoners with the means of intelligible communication to the judiciary to insure a fair hearing for their claims. The post-Johnson cases have uniformly recognized that irremediable ignorance forms a barrier to effective presentation of inmate legal

claims quite as real as did the more blatant physical impediments of the past. See e.g. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir.1973); United States v. Simpson, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 8, 436 F.2d 162 (1970); Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir.1969)

We therefore conclude that the right of court access requires that the State provide some source of assistance for literate and illiterate inmates alike, tailored to their differing needs and abilities, which is designed to and does make realistically possible their purposeful communication with the courts.

* * * * * *

Acceptable legal services programs may vary widely in their format, as do the demographics of

289

penal institutions. *289 But to a greater or lesser degree, dependent upon the circumstances of a

particular penitentiary setting, all permissible programs must affirmatively include at least these

aspects. First, some source of legal learning of a professional nature must be made available to

all inmates for full legal development of their claims. Such a source may consist of an adequate

law library or of qualified attorneys in sufficient number; again, some combination of books and

attorneys may suffice. Secondly, for those inmates who possess intellectual or educational

attainments insufficient to permit study and reasonable comphrehension of their legal claims,

provision must be made to allow them to communicate with someone who, after consultation with

the legal learning source, is capable of translating their complaints into an understandable

presentation.

Ibid., 391 F.Supp. at 1380-1382. See also Israel at 43 and Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1096-1098 (E.D.Mich.1979); Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F.Supp. 106, 111 (W.D.Ky. 1983); Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F.Supp. 1536, 1549 (W.D.Ky.1984); United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1105 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. den'd sub nom, Zimmerman v. ParaProfessional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988); and Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.1987). Thus the court in Stevenson, supra, highlights the obvious; a state must provide reliable and sufficient assistance in utilizing legal resource materials in order to be deemed to furnish meaningful access to the courts for totally or functionally illiterate inmates.

Recent decisions finding that law libraries provide meaningful access to the courts have ignored the second, commonsense aspect of the holding in Stevenson v. Reed, supra; no examination was made of the inability of functionally illiterate inmates to utilize the library in meaningfully accessing the courts. Both DuPont v. Saunders, 800 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.1986) and Cepulonis V. Fair, 732 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984), relied upon by defendants, fail to address whether mere provision of an adequate law library provides functionally illiterate inmates with meaningful access to the courts. Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.1986) cert. den'd, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 673, 93 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986) (likewise cited by defendants) did not consider whether the appellant lacked the capacity to use a law library.

These cases are but recent examples of the tendencies of many courts to look at only part of the issue in determining the sufficiency of inmates' access to the courts. The decision in Stevenson v. Reed, supra, clearly illustrates the inadequacy of such an approach; significant numbers of a prison's inmates are deprived of meaningful access to the courts if a law library is automatically deemed sufficient to satisfy the Bounds, supra, duty to assist inmates in the preparation of legal papers.

Judge Scott concluded in Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F.Supp. 1330 (M.D.Fla.1982), "no plan utilizing libraries alone could assure meaningful access to the courts, and ... defendants [must] provide `assistance of counsel, in some form.' Ibid. at 1349" (as cited in United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1105 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. den'd sub nom, Zimmerman v. ParaProfessional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed Judge Scott's decision on the grounds that Bounds, supra, does not require a state to necessarily provide only the aid of legal counsel in a program designed to assure inmates meaningful access to the courts if other, sufficient sources of legal aid are available to answer a particular inmate

need. Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir.1985), cert. den'd 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986).
Strikingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in which Bounds, supra, originated, does not agree with the decision in Hooks v. Wainwright, supra. When the Supreme Court set the standard for meaningful 290 access, it also sent *290 the Bounds case back to the district court on remand. District Judge Dupree was to oversee the implementation of a plan by which law libraries and assistance by inmates trained as paralegals were to be provided to North Carolina inmates. Bounds, supra.
The failure of the North Carolina Department of Corrections to actually provide meaningful access to the courts despite furnishing law libraries and some other aid by inmates led Judge Dupree to order the provision of attorneys as necessary to meet the requirements established by the Supreme Court in Bounds, supra. Smith v. Bounds, 610 F.Supp. 597 (E.D.N.C.1985), reconsideration den'd, 657 F.Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.C.1985), second order entered 657 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.N.C.1986), aff'd. 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.1987), aff'd. on rehearing en banc 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.1988) (no reconsideration of district court judgment necessary). As of the date of this writing, it appears that certiorari has not been sought.
Judge Dupree determined that the North Carolina Department of Corrections was constitutionally required to furnish some form of legal services for inmates which would provide inmates with the assistance of licensed counsel in Smith v. Bounds, 610 F.Supp. 597 (E.D.N.C.1985), reconsideration den'd, 657 F.Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.C. 1985), second order entered 657 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.N.C.1986), aff'd. 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.1987), aff'd. on rehearing en banc 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.1988) (no reconsideration of district court judgment necessary). The state was ordered to provide attorneys in view of findings that inmate paralegals did not provide their fellow inmates adequate legal assistance, that a high degree of illiteracy among the inmates made it virtually impossible for them to conduct meaningful legal research, and that certain segregated inmates did not have sufficient physical access to a law library to meet their legitimate legal research needs. Ibid.
Thus, in fact situations demonstrating deficiencies in a state's plan for providing inmates with meaningful access to the courts, the state has an obligation to furnish those inmates with effective legal assistance including the aid of counsel. Ibid. The standard established by the Supreme Court in Bounds, supra, has been applied to the facts upon which it arose and has been held to require the provision of attorneys to assist those inmates who are unable to utilize the law libraries provided by a prison. Ibid. Clearly, as the further proceedings in Bounds illustrate, mere provision of a law library does not automatically satisfy the standards set in Bounds, supra, for all inmates.
Finally, it is obvious that state governments cannot necessarily discharge their duty to provide meaningful access to the courts for all inmates regardless of literacy, indigency, or segregated status by providing the dubious assistance of other inmates in whatever capacity.
Courts have been reluctant to place any reliance on the work of inmates purporting to possess legal expertise. One judge aptly summarized:
This Court's experience with veteran writwriters has typically been that, while their petitions generally look nicer and read better than those prepared by most inmates, their legal reasoning remains convoluted and even nonsensical. The conclusions they draw from stated facts are often non sequiturs. The fact that their petitions are usually typed and their legal citations approach a recognizable form does not alter the foundational defect inhering in most of the petitions 0907 the content!
Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F.Supp. 1330, 1348 (M.D.Fla.1982) rev'd. as to required provision of attorneys 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir.1985), cert. den'd, 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986). See also Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467, 488-489 (W.D.Mich.1987). But see Battle v. Anderson, 614 F.2d 251, 255-256 (10th Cir. 1980) (a law library combined with writ writers and inmate clerks may suffice under Bounds, supra).
In addition to their unverifiable and often inadequate skills as jailhouse lawyers, inmate paralegals, etc., the fees 291 inmates *291 charge for services to other inmates as well as the interests of prison security in prohibiting inmates

from consulting privately with one another, preclude inmates from serving as necessary and sufficient sources of legal assistance. See Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467, (W.D.Mich.1987).
VII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As a matter of law, the main law library for the Central Complex is only facially sufficient for those able to utilize its resources. The physical location and size of the library restrict use. The arrangement of materials prevents inmates from readily accessing resources. The system under which inmates utilize the library materials precludes the availability of certain items to more than one inmate at a time. Maintenance practices are not sufficient to guarantee the availability of current or updated materials. Staffing and services procedures are not adequate to meet inmate needs on a timely basis.
As a matter of law, the law library system at the Central Complex is incapable of meeting the standard enunciated in Stevenson v. Reed, supra, for all inmates.
In addition, I agree with the holding of the court in United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1104 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. den'd sub nom, Zimmerman v. Para-Professional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988), as I also conclude that because the law library system at the Central Complex "is unavailable to prisoners in administrative or disciplinary custody, and is useless to those who are functionally illiterate, the library [system] is totally ineffectual to preserve the fundamental right of [meaningful] access to the courts of these prisoners." Ibid. at p. 1104.
Even if they had the time and inclination, the staff of the Central Complex library cannot furnish meaningful assistance for functionally illiterate inmates seeking access to the courts. The head librarian and her assistant are not sufficiently trained in legal research techniques and not expected to be. Inmate clerks are likewise unschooled and unskilled. Job descriptions for these positions do not allow for assisting inmates in the preparation of legal matters. The library staff has its hands full keeping the library functioning at the limited level of services now available. As a matter of law, the state cannot rely on the library staff to meet the duty to insure inmates meaningful access to the courts. See Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636, 640 (W.D. Mich.1988). See also Wade v. Kane, 448 F.Supp. 678 (E.D.Penn.1978), aff'd. without op. sub nom. Wade v. Kane, 591 F.2d 1338 (3rd Cir.1979), later proceeding United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987) cert. den'd sub nom., Zimmerman v. ParaProfessional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988) later proceeding slip op. [available on WESTLAW, 1988 WL 52099] 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4493 (E.D.Pa.1988); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467, 488 (W.D.Mich.1987); and Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F.Supp. 1536 (W.D.Ky.1984).
In Knop, Judge Enslen held: "the often-fabled jailhouse lawyers or writ-writers are, at least in the Michigan system, too few and often too uninformed to provide adequate assistance to the inmates." Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467, 488 (W.D.Mich.1987). Defendants have sought unsuccessfully to monitor and control the activities of jailhouse lawyers as the nonenforceable nature of its "no-charge" policy indicates. Without the means to insure the quality and quantity of services offered by jailhouse lawyers, defendants cannot insist that their duty to provide meaningful access to the courts is met by the presence of jailhouse lawyers in the Central Complex. (In fact, even the continuing availability of jailhouse lawyers is questionable. In Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636, 641 (W.D.Mich.1988), the court notes that the Department of Corrections has proposed abolishing inmate practitioners in other Michigan prison facilities.)
292 The fact that an inmate may have to pay a relatively high fee to a jailhouse lawyer *292 in return for services of uncertain quality further reduces the value of the "inmate lawyers" as a means by which an inmate might secure meaningful access to the courts. An indigent inmate would not have the means to hire a jailhouse lawyer and should not have that burden thrust upon his constitutional right to meaningful access.
Segregated confinement likewise denies an inmate the opportunity to use the services of a jailhouse lawyer. The status of segregation holds an inmate apart from other inmates. As a matter of law, another inmate may not

provide meaningful access to the courts for an inmate housed in the segregated cell blocks of the Central Complex.
For these reasons, any availability of jailhouse lawyers in the Central Complex is not enough to discharge the duty of defendants to furnish inmates meaningful access to the courts.
As essential equivalents to jailhouse lawyers, inmate paralegals cannot afford their fellow inmates any greater hope of meaningful access to the courts under the present system. Inmate paralegals can service only general population inmates in the Central Complex. Inmate paralegals cannot consistently offer legal assistance of any quality to insure an inmate's ability to exercise his rights to reach the courts. As a matter of law, the state may not meet its burden by providing inmate paralegals who are not graduates of a qualified training program or otherwise certified as being competent to provide legal assistance. As a matter of law, even if certified as paralegals, inmates cannot be effective sources of legal assistance for those they cannot consult with in segregated confinement.
As a matter of law, outside agencies such as SADO or the Legislative Ombudsman's Office cannot assist in preserving the constitutional promise of meaningful access to the courts for the inmates of the Central Complex. The role of SADO is too specific and the role of the Ombudsman too general. Neither SADO nor the Ombudsman's Office can offer direct assistance to inmates seeking meaningful access to the courts on civil matters.
Attorneys outside the Central Complex are available on a pro bono or contingency fee-basis only sporadically. Prison authorities cannot guarantee the provision of any legal assistance in this manner. I find that a constitutional right cannot be adequately protected on such a basis. Rather, the interest of an outside attorney in an inmate's situation must be viewed as a bonus, if it is present at all.
The Grievance Program does not provide effective administrative remedies for inmates. The procedure cannot be offered as a serious source of assistance in bringing an adequately prepared record before a court on an inmate's complaint.
As a matter of law, the adult education programs and similar tutorial aid offered in the Central Complex cannot constitute provision of the effective assistance necessary for an inmate's meaningful access to the courts. Judge Lord noted in United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. den'd sub nom, Zimmerman v. Para-Professional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988), "[t]he prison is to be commended for providing a variety of educational programs. However, effectively denying a functionally illiterate inmate meaningful access to the courts until he completes a remedial education program is simply not acceptable." 656 F.Supp. 1099 at 1106.
In its present posture, Prison Legal Services cannot provide legal assistance to inmates who are functionally illiterate or who are indigent or who are segregated. The constraints upon the operation of PLS prevent consistent and competent assistance to inmates. PLS is able to help some inmates, but it cannot assure meaningful access to the courts for inmates unable to read the materials in the law library and, therefore, unable to draft their own complaints.
293 *293 VIII. REMEDY
A. Introduction
PLS is the most consistent supplier of qualified legal assistance to inmates. As my injunction requiring its continued operation indicates, I find PLS to be necessary to provide meaningful access to the courts to Central Complex inmates.
A remedy mandating the assistance of PLS to inmates has merit for several reasons. First, an existing entity trusted by inmates is retained. Second, security and discipline interests of prison officials are less likely to be

impinged upon by enlarging the role of an entity already a part of the system. Third, the record of PLS is a strong foundation for continuing legal assistance to inmates and thus provision of meaningful access to the courts.

Utilization of PLS, a program already in place, as a primary part of the proposed remedy imposes the "least intrusive remedy available." Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438 (6th Cir.1984).

PLS is also the agency best able to completely fulfill the needs of inmates seeking meaningful access to the courts which includes access for inmates filing civil rights claims. An area of particular concern to this court is provision of effective assistance in matters where Central Complex inmates seek to bring an action against the Department of Corrections.

Having served as chief judge of this court and as a federal district judge for nearly eighteen years, I have observed firsthand the inadequacies of a program providing only pro bono assistance for inmates filing civil rights claims. Furnishing counsel on a volunteer basis cannot consistently and adequately protect the civil rights of inmates. See also Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1120 et seq. (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).

The increasing numbers of pro se filings for alleged civil rights violations within the Michigan prison system underscores the inability of the private bar to render meaningful legal assistance to inmates in such matters. There are a number of obvious problems under the current program. The attorneys who work under the pro bono system are not on the scene and often cannot understand the context in which a civil rights claim arises within a prison. Most of the available pool of lawyers practice in the Detroit area. The length of travel necessitates the use of a telephone in trying to assemble a case. However, conditions of confinement and general operating principles of the Central Complex prevent effective consultations over the telephone. Often firms must utilize their least trained professionals in pro bono matters. Firms perceive their senior attorneys as being too valuable to become embroiled in protracted litigation against the Department of Corrections or other state agencies. For these reasons, the appointment of attorneys acting as pro bono counsel to inmates in civil rights actions against the Department of Corrections or its employees does not provide meaningful access to the courts in many cases.

Meaningful access to the courts must include a program by which inmates are able to obtain effective legal assistance in civil rights actions. (See, for example, related discussion in "Appropriateness of Justice Department Advocacy to Enforce Federal Rights of the Institutionalized," 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 787, 803 et seq., regarding the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1997 (1982)). Such access requires skilled assistance which is consistently available and not subject to the conflicting time constraints of a legal practice far from the Central Complex.

As an on-site facility, PLS has an ability to assist inmates without disrupting the operations of the Central Complex. Any assistance PLS renders with regard to actions against the Department of Corrections may not be preemptorily challenged on grounds of prison security and discipline.

[P]rison officials may not restrict the scope of inmates' constitutional rights by making automatic

and conclusory assertions of discipline and security in the support of restrictive policies.

294

Cleavinger *294 v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 504, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985).

United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1107 (E.D.Penn.1987) aff'd. without op. 835 F.2d 285 (3rd Cir.1987), cert. den'd sub nom, Zimmerman v. Para-Professional Law Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 511 (1988). See also Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636, 637 (W.D.Mich. 1988); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 437 (6th Cir.1984); and Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145-1146 (5th Cir.1982), cert. den'd, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983).

I therefore find that PLS should be authorized to take up civil rights cases against the Department of Corrections.

Several states, including New York, now contract with legal services agencies to provide assistance to inmates who require aid in civil rights as well as other legal matters.[36] The availability of models for similar services will enable the Department of Corrections to implement a program of qualified legal assistance more efficiently and more quickly through PLS as PLS is utilized in a modification of its current contract status.

The right to petition the courts must include most legal actions involving inmates. Incarceration deprives an inmate of the ability to control his time and efforts. Persons outside the prison may freely initiate actions or allow statutes of limitation to run against the inmate. The fact of the inmate's separation from society must act to hamper his attempts to keep abreast of the actions of others not so confined. An inmate housed in the Central Complex is further constrained by the lack of meaningful access to the courts. Without effective assistance in preparing legal papers, an inmate may be fatally disadvantaged in actions where other parties are far more able to maneuver. He can neither discover legal problems as they arise nor take timely action to resolve such problems once he knows of them.
For these reasons, based on the facts and conclusions of this opinion, I find that PLS should continue to represent inmates in civil matters where an inmate (1) is a defendant; (2) did not initiate the action; and (3) where an inmate's rights will expire absent timely initiation of suit, as well as in matters questioning conditions of confinement (i.e., habeas corpus or civil rights actions). See e.g., the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Volume 10 (special pamphlet) at section 4-108; Israel, pp. 1-8; and Plaintiffs' exhibit 40.
I order the following components of a program for the continued, improved provision of legal assistance by PLS. As part of the remedy, I draw from the recommendations of the two court-appointed experts, Professors Israel and Wolfson. The experts' insights regarding the grievance procedures are particularly valuable in fashioning an efficient, effective means of providing inmates meaningful access to the courts. Inmate complaints which should reference administrative resolutions are now being brought for judicial review. An adequate grievance program would present a more appropriate forum for disposition of those complaints while lifting an inappropriate burden from the courts.
B. Remedy Provisions
1. Library System
Defendants are hereby ordered to provide Central Complex inmates with a constitutionally-sufficient law library. The law library shall be maintained in accordance with the Hadix consent judgment. The deficiencies noted in the findings of fact are to be remedied forthwith. Further, inmates must be allowed to consult with one another if 295 necessary in preparing *295 legal papers. Personnel shall be adequate in number and sufficiently trained to furnish inmates effective service in obtaining legal texts from the law library. These measures are necessary to provide a law library which is usable by Central Complex inmates.
2. PLS
The provision of legal assistance by PLS sufficient to assure Central Complex inmates meaningful access to the courts shall be set forth in a contract negotiated between PLS and the Department of Corrections and subject to comment by plaintiff class and review by this court.
The contract shall provide for and incorporate, at a minimum, the following:
a. Services provided by PLS shall be in accordance with the consent judgment and opinions of this court issued as part of the Hadix litigation.
b. Services provided pursuant to the contract terms are in no way intended as substitutes for existing programs by which inmates may obtain legal counsel (i.e., any pro bono representation, etc.) and should not diminish those programs.
c. Operational and administrative control and responsibility is vested in the Board of Trustees of Prison Legal Services of Michigan, Inc.
d. The members of the Board shall have responsibility for insuring the independent operation of PLS in providing effective legal assistance to qualified inmates.

e. The Board shall hire a Program Director licensed to practice law in Michigan.
f. The Department shall provide the necessary funding for PLS activities.
g. PLS shall provide the necessary staff, office space, supplies, and equipment to carry out the terms of the contract.
h. Minimum PLS staff levels are those necessary to achieve effective attorney to inmate ratios (i.e., one attorney per 800 inmates as recommended by the ABA, etc.) provided the services of certified paralegals are also utilized and shall include at least:
(1) One Program Director;
(2) Four Staff Attorneys;*
(3) Six certified paralegals; and
(4) Necessary auxiliary staff (i.e., one secretary to assist the Program Director).
* The number of inmates in the Central Complex varies; testimony indicated a transient population of nearly 10,000 inmates each year. Staff attorneys must be provided to serve the needs of inmates numbering between 2,400 and 10,000. Hence, I order provision of at least four attorneys.
i. Paraprofessional assistance must be under the direct, on-site supervision of experienced attorneys. "On-site supervision" occurs when the supervising attorney has direct contact with supervised persons at least three times per week. All paraprofessionals must have completed a course of training permitting certification or licensure before providing legal assistance through PLS.
j. Professional standards must be maintained in all provisions of legal assistance.
k. To assist PLS in the assessment and acceptance of case activities, the following general priorities will be used in screening new requests from inmates for legal assistance:
(1) Habeas corpus petitions;
(2) Civil rights claims including those challenging conditions of confinement; and
(3) Other civil claims involving matters such as domestic relations, personal injury, deportation, workers' compensation, social security, detainer, wills and estates, and taxation.
l. Within the general priority categories, specific case priorities may be set by PLS and reviewed annually.
m. The term of the contract shall not be less than five years with appropriate provision for renewal thereafter.
A legal services contract, used in the state of Washington, has been reviewed by the court. It is a comprehensive 296 document making provision for many of the concerns *296 at issue in Hadix. Because the contract might be of
guidance to PLS and the Department of Corrections in formulating their own agreement, the document utilized in Washington (see note 36, supra) is included, in full, as Appendix A to this opinion. (Because defendants have objected to the use of this material in a motion pending before the court, I note that the Washington contract is included only as an informative example. The Washington contract is in no way related to the findings of fact and conclusions of law presented in this opinion and has had no effect on the determination of the ultimate issues in Hadix.)
While this opinion affects the Central Complex, practical considerations suggest that PLS and the Department of Corrections make provision for a state-wide application of the programs implemented as part of the remedy for the Central Complex. Thus, although the principles enunciated in Hadix apply to Central Complex inmates, the

means by which PLS provides meaningful access might be re-structured to apply to the entire inmate population committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. For example, PLS may be responsible for an inmate's legal matters even upon the inmate's transfer to another prison facility. Problems could be avoided by a systemwide program of providing meaningful access to the courts.
Should there be any inconsistency between this opinion in Hadix and the opinion of Judge Richard Enslen in Knop v. Johnson, 685 F.Supp. 636 (W.D.Mich.1988) and accompanying order, as they relate to meaningful access to the courts for inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, joint motions should be filed before the courts to resolve any difficulties. Section IV (pages 323-27) of the Knop v. Johnson order pertaining to meaningful access to the courts is included as Appendix B to this opinion.
To the extent that the recently developed record in Knop v. Johnson, supra, presents a more current view of conditions in the State Prison for Southern Michigan than that developed in Hadix, I take judicial notice of the proofs in Knop v. Johnson, supra, relating to the Central Complex and PLS. See Detroit Audubon Society v. City of Detroit, No. 87-71577, slip op., (E.D.Mich. February 24, 1988); United States v. Author Services, Inc., 804 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir.1986); MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Flintkote Co., 760 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.1985); Green v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1983), cert. den'd, 461 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 2436, 77 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1983); and St. Louis Baptist Temple v. F.D.I.C., 605 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir.1979). Any differences in the operations of the Central Complex notable between Hadix and Knop have not diminished the need for the provision of legal assistance as meaningful access the courts as I order herein and I do not consider any such differences significant.
3. Grievance Program
Any remedy with respect to an inmate's meaningful access to the courts is incomplete if inmates cannot also make use of an administrative forum for administrative concerns. Legislatures as well as courts have recognized the need for non-judicial relief in appropriate situations. Congress lent its support to effective inmate grievance programs in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. section 1997. Congress sought to "encourage resolution of problems by the persons involved in prison administration," and noted that "[t]his should help to develop a sensitivity that may have been otherwise lacking." 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 787, 816. The experiences I have had as a judge make me agree that an effective grievance program is a necessary tool for protecting the rights of inmates and for reducing backlogs on court dockets.
The two court-appointed experts found that the current grievance program is ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of both the inmates and the Central Complex administration. I agree. The chief flaws of the present system are a lack of means for inmate participation and a lack of means for adequate, objective review of the incredible 297 number of grievances. The remedy ordered is intended to rectify these *297 deficiencies without unduly disrupting the functions of the grievance program.
First, I adopt as objectives the provisions of minimum grievance program standards promulgated by the United States Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. section 1997e with emphasis on:
a. inmate and employee participation, 28 C.F.R. 40.7(b) (7-1-87);
b. investigation and consideration, 28 C.F.R. 40.7(c) (7-1-87); and
c. review, 28 C.F.R. 40.7(f) (7-1-87).
Pursuant to these standards, inmates and employees must participate in the grievance procedure in an advisory capacity. They may exercise this advisory role in the disposition of grievances and in the review of the effectiveness and credibility of the grievance procedure.
However, no inmate or employee who is involved in a grievance may participate in any capacity in the resolution of that grievance.

An inmate is entitled to a review of the disposition of his grievance which is independent of the Central Complex administration under the standards. Specifically, an inmate may request "review by a person or other entity, not under the institution's supervision or control, of the disposition of all grievances, including alleged reprisals by an employee against an inmate." 28 C.F.R. 40.7(f) (7-1-87).

Second, I order the Department of Corrections to draft policy directives to accomplish these objectives by the following means:

a. inmate participation in the Warden's Forum shall include provisions for inmate review of the grievance program and for an advisory role for inmates in the modification and operation of the grievance program;

b. inmate participation in the grievance program must include, by representation, the entire inmate population of the Central Complex; and

c. provision shall be made for employee participation in the grievance program in an advisory role similar to that afforded inmates.

Third, while an inmate and an employee may seek informal resolution of a grievance, as under the current program, the parties to a grievance shall not be responsible for its resolution once a formal complaint is made.

Fourth, the following steps shall constitute the grievance procedure:

a. filing of written grievance;

b. investigation of grievance by a grievance investigator;

c. mediation between the parties to a grievance as moderated by a grievance investigator;

d. hearing by a grievance panel if mediation fails to resolve the matter 0907 the results of the steps below shall be presented to the panel in writing by the grievance investigator;

e. any appeals as under the present system (as modified to comply with the objectives stated in the minimum standards promulgated at 28 C.F.R. 40.1-40.10), but using the record produced by the grievance investigators and the grievance panels.

Fifth, the Department of Corrections shall implement personnel changes as recommended by Professor Wolfson in his study. This will insure more adequate staffing with resultant timely and comprehensive investigations of grievances constituting the first step in the grievance process. Specifically, the Department of Corrections shall provide qualified persons to serve as:

a. grievance investigators whose tasks shall include interviewing inmates and employees involved in a particular grievance, mediation attempts with the grievance parties, and the preparation of a written record for use in a grievance hearing should mediation fail;

b. members of grievance panels composed of staff, inmates, or others the Department of

298

Corrections may elect to hear grievances now resolved by *298 individual staff members;[37]

c. grievance coordinators, independent of the Department of Corrections, to oversee the work of the grievance investigators and the grievance panels and to insure that for all grievances at the Central Complex, the investigation, attempted mediation, and any hearing are completed in a timely fashion and under uniform applications of the policies of the Department of Corrections;[38]

d. other personnel as necessary for the objectives.

Sixth, the Department of Corrections shall provide training in investigation and mediation techniques for persons involved in the grievance process.

Seventh, the grievance coordinators shall provide a yearly report evaluating the performance of the grievance system for the Department of Corrections subject to comment by plaintiff class and review by this court.
Eighth, the Department of Corrections shall commission a periodic review of the grievance system at the Central Complex by an outside body. The results of this review shall be made available to the plaintiff class for comment. The Department of Corrections shall then submit the review results, any comments by plaintiff class, and any rebuttal by the Department to this court for review. This periodic evaluation might be accomplished by an agency such as the Office of the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman.
These modifications of the present grievance system are minimal but necessary if the system is to achieve its objectives. Accordingly, the Department of Corrections is to implement immediately a program enabling compliance with this order. Appropriate policies and procedures are to be drafted forthwith. Staff and supporting regulations are to be added as necessary following the provision of personnel and policies sufficient to accomplish the initial implementation.
4. Implementation Procedure
I hereby direct the parties and PLS to meet within a period of ninety (90) days of the date of this opinion and order to complete the contract(s) and program(s) necessary to implement these orders and to report on the status of that implementation.
IX. CONCLUSION
A guarantee is "something that ensures a particular outcome or condition" or "a promise or assurance." See The American Heritage Dictionary, 2d College Edition (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1982). An inmate's right to meaningful access to the courts is guaranteed under the Constitution with unequivocal clarity in Bounds v. Smith, supra. Yet, in 1988, nearly ten years after the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds, the Central Complex does not guarantee that all its inmates have meaningful access to the courts.
Accordingly, my orders to remedy deficiencies in the provision of meaningful access to the courts and effective resolution of grievances are to be implemented with all due speed and care.
This opinion constitutes the court's finding of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX A
Contract No. CDOP1162
Amendment No. 1
AMENDMENT TO THE CONTRACT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND EVERGREEN LEGAL SERVICES
299 PURPOSE OF CHANGE: To amend that Contract Agreement entered into the 1st *299 day of July 1985, by and between the Department of Corrections of the state of Washington and Evergreen Legal Services, and to make other necessary changes within the scope of the Contract Agreement.
The above-referenced Contract Agreement identified herein as Contract No. CDOP1162 is hereby amended as set forth below pursuant to the Changes and Modifications clause contained in Exhibit B, General Terms and Conditions, to Contract No. CDOP1162.

1. All citations referring generally to the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) contained in Contract No. CDOP1162 shall henceforth, where appropriate, be considered to refer to the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) as adopted by the State Supreme Court. 2. Article VI, DISCLOSURE, is amended to include reference to RPC 1.6 and to delete reference of DR4-101(C) (3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 3. The second sentence of Article XII, CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT, which reads as follows:
"DR5-105(a) of the CPR states that a lawyer shall decline proferred employment if the exercise of his/her independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will or is likely to be adversely affected by acceptance of such employment." is deleted in its entirety. 4. All citations to DR2-110 of the CPR contained in subsections 3.2 and 3.3 of Exhibit A to Contract No. CDOP1162, shall henceforth refer to RPC 1.15. 5. All other terms and conditions of Contract No. CDOP1162 shall remain in full force and effect. 6. The changes set forth in this Amendment to Contract No. CDOP1162 shall become effective on the 1st day of September 1985. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the below-named have affixed their signatures in execution thereof. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS APPROVED AS TO BINDING EFFECT:
(s)Robert E. Trimble 8/29/85 for Secretary, Amos E. Reed___________Date APPROVED AS TO FORM: [signature illegible] AAG for DOC______Date
______
Contract No. CDOP1162
CONTRACT AGREEMENT
THIS CONTRACT AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 1st day of July 1985, by and between the Department of Corrections of the state of Washington, hereinafter referred to as "Department," and Evergreen Legal Services, 2018 Smith Tower, Seattle, Washington, hereinafter referred to as "Contractor," for the purpose of providing legal services to inmates committed to the Department.
I. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE:
A. The Department and the Contractor agree that the objective and scope of this contract agreement are as described herein or by attachments if so noted.
1. The Contractor shall provide the necessary staff, office space, supplies, and equipment to carry out the duties of this contract agreement as set forth in the text of this contract agreement and in the attachments hereto.

2. Services provided by the Contractor shall be in accordance with the expressed intent of Section 72.09.190 RCW and this contract agreement.

3. Inmates eligible for services to be rendered by the Contractor under this contract agreement are

those individuals committed to the custody of the Department and whose individual or family's

yearly income meets or falls below the 125 percent (125%) of the Federal Poverty Income Level,

as established by the Community Services Administration, Office of Management and Budget,

300

United States Government. Unless otherwise provided herein, inmates eligible for legal services

*300 under this contract agreement shall not include those inmates who (a) can afford to pay for

such services, or (b) are customarily represented by the private bar on a contingency fee basis,

such as fee generating claims or money damages claims, or (c) are customarily afforded legal

representation in criminal matters by other public agencies or officials, i.e., public defender's

office.

4. The scope of the services provided under this contract agreement shall not include the solicitation of legal action or the initiation or support of class actions. Representation shall be individually oriented.

5. The services, priorities, and reporting requirements set forth herein are necessary to provide inmates access to the courts, to comply with Section 72.09.190 RCW and to comply with state budget and accounting requirements. In addition to any other remedies provided by law or stated herein, the Department and the Contractor agree that the failure to perform any of the duties of this contract agreement shall constitute a breach of contract and may result in the termination of this contract agreement.

B. The Department may award other contract agreements for legal services, and the Contractor shall use its best efforts to cooperate with such other contractors.

II. COMPENSATION:

A. The Department and Contractor agree that payment shall be as follows:
1. In consideration of all services provided under this contract agreement, the Department shall upon receipt of a properly executed invoice voucher (A19), made out in triplicate, pay in arrears to the Contractor the sum of $9,166.66 per month.
2. Maximum payment to the Contractor for all services rendered under the terms of this contract agreement shall not exceed $220,000.
B. Contractor shall document work hours for reimbursement purposes as set forth below:
1. All hours worked must be supported by documentation as required by the reports submitted in accordance with Article V, MONITORING AND EVALUATIONS; and with the paragraph entitled RECORDS, DOCUMENTS, AND AUDITS contained in the attached Exhibit "B," General Terms and Conditions.
2. Twice a year Contractor shall provide the Department with a summary staff hours provided under the terms of this contract agreement for the preceding six (6) months. This summary shall be due on January 31 and July 31, except that the summary due at the end of the initial term, and any renewal term, of this contract agreement shall be due on July 10.
3. If, as a result of the above summary, it is determined that the hours provided during the preceding six (6) months do not meet or exceed one-half of the minimum hours required for that period stated in subsection 2.1 of the STATEMENT OF WORK, a pro-rata adjustment will be made to the next month's billing with adjustments to the last six-month period of the agreement being

made on the final agreement billing. Adjustment rates will be those stated in subsection B(5) of this Article.

4. Hours in excess of the stated minimum may be carried over into the next six-month period upon approval from the Department. The actual number of hours approved to be carried over shall be at the discretion of the Department. Hours in excess of the stated minimum during each six month period shall not be reimbursed.

5. In addition to adjustments made in subsection II(b)(3), adjustments may be made to

Contractor's compensation should it be determined, on a quarterly basis, that Contractor failed to

provide any of the services required by this contract agreement, such as classes. Payment may

301

be withheld until such *301 time as the services are provided or may be reduced pro-rata in

accordance with the rate set forth below:

$13.18 per hour of attorney service

$17.04 per hour of litigation coordinator service

$ 8.41 per hour of support staff service

Provided, however, the Contractor may, with the approval of the Department, make up the deficiency in services required during the three (3) month period following the quarter. Should the Contractor's performance remain deficient at the end of the three (3) month make-up period, payment shall be reduced pro-rata in accordance with the above rates. Disputes regarding the reduced payment shall be resolved in accordance with the Department's policy directive on legal services contracts (Policy No. 130.410) prior to submission of the dispute to arbitration.

C. All invoice vouchers shall be mailed to the following address:

Department of Corrections Division of Management and Budget Accounting Section P O Box 9699, Mail Stop FN-61 Olympia, Washington 98504

All invoices shall reference this contract agreement number CDOP1162.

D. In accordance with RCW 72.09.190(5), the total due the Contractor as compensation, fees, or reimbursement under the terms of this contract agreement shall be reduced by the total of any other compensation, fees, or reimbursement received by the Contractor for the performance of legal services required under this contract agreement. Any amount received by the Contractor under this contract agreement which is not due under this section shall be returned by the Contractor to the Department within twenty (20) days.

III. TERM:

A. The term of this contract agreement will begin on the 1st day of July 1985, and shall continue through the 30th day of June 1986, unless sooner terminated as provided herein.
B. This contract agreement may be renewed as set forth below:
1. Unless sooner terminated prior to the renewal date, this contract agreement will be automatically renewed upon the expiration of the first agreement term of July 1, 1985, through June 30, 1986, unless any audit findings indicate the Contractor's performance did not meet the requirements, terms, and conditions specified herein. The Department reserves the right to modify or amend the contract agreement at the time of renewal. Renewal will authorize continuation of services required by this contract agreement for the period of July 1, 1986, through June 30, 1987. The Department reserves the right to renew this contract agreement, with any modifications or amendments it may want to include, subject to sufficient legislative appropriation for the renewal period, for an additional two (2), one-year terms, beginning on the 1st day of July 1987. Any modifications or amendments to the contract agreement at the time of renewal which result in an

increase or decrease in cost of performing the duties required herein shall include language to appropriately adjust the payment made under this contract agreement. The maximum period during which the Department may contract with the Contractor before issuing a new Request for Proposal is from the effective date of this contract agreement through June 30, 1989.
2. Unless sooner terminated, the Department will notify the Contractor, in writing, at least sixty (60) days prior to June 30 of each year stating the Department's intent to renew this contract agreement for an additional one-year term and any modifications or amendments it intends to include, or to terminate the contract agreement at the end of the term.
302 *302 IV. DEPARTMENT/CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL:
A. The Department representative who will act for the Department in coordinating work of the Contractor will be the Director, Division of Prisons, or his/her designee, hereinafter referred to as "Contract Monitor."
B. The Contractor shall designate a Contract Manager. The Contract Manager shall maintain supervision on a routine and continuing basis of all agreement activities and personnel involved with this contract agreement.
C. The Contractor agrees to list on separate attachment hereto, names and social security numbers of personnel supplying services to the Department at the time of execution of this contract agreement. If the names are not known at the time of the execution of the contract agreement, the Contractor will submit the name or names and social security number(s) as they become known. Such persons shall, for all purposes, be employees, or independent contractors operating under the control of the Contractor, and nothing herein shall be construed to create an employment relationship between the Department and the persons listed on separate attachment.
D. Contractor's Federal Identification Number is XX-XXXXXXX.
E. The Department shall exercise no managerial responsibilities over the Contractor or his/her employees. In carrying out this contract agreement, it is expressly agreed that there is no employment relationship between the contracting parties.
F. All employees of the Contractor directly involved with delivery of legal services requested by the inmates, and who must perform those duties/responsibilities within the confines of the institution(s) covered by this contract agreement, will be required to successfully pass a criminal history record check conducted by the Department as a pre-requisite for access to the institution(s) covered under this contract agreement. The criminal history record check may be conducted by the Washington State Patrol through fingerprint identification. Should the criminal history record check of Contractor's employee(s) show prior convictions, approval of the Secretary must be obtained in writing prior to continued access by Contractor's employee(s) to the covered institution(s).
The Contractor's employees visiting the institution(s) will be issued identification cards or tags. These cards or tags may include a photograph at the option of the Department. All cards or tags must be returned to the Department upon the Contractor's employee's cessation of services to the institution(s).
G. All Contractor employees whose duties include the visitation of the institution(s) covered under this contract agreement will be required to participate in an orientation session at each institution. The orientation session shall be conducted no later than August 1, 1985.
V. MONITORING AND EVALUATIONS:
A. The Department reserves the right to audit both the Contractor's compliance with this contract agreement and the qualitative work product. Audits will be performed in such manner as to preserve the attorney-client privilege.
B. The Department may conduct an audit of this contract agreement within six (6) months after the beginning date of performance. The results of this audit will be made known to the Contractor within thirty (30) days following the close of the audit. The Contractor will respond to the findings of the audit in accordance with established Department procedures. A follow-up audit may be conducted by the Department within six (6) months

after the initial audit and annually thereafter. This language shall not be construed to limit the number of audits that the Department may conduct during the term of this contract agreement.
C. At a minimum, a monthly report shall be submitted by the Contractor to the Contract Monitor no later than thirty (30) days after the end of each calendar month. The monthly report shall include, but is not limited to, hours 303 worked by Contractor's employees, activities conducted at the institution(s), *303 i.e., library classes, interviews, and intake summaries. The format for these reports shall be provided by the Department and shall be the same or equivalent to that in attached Exhibit "C." Monthly reports shall be made for each institution covered by this contract agreement.
A quarterly report shall be submitted by the Contractor to the Contract Monitor no later than thirty (30) days after the end of each calendar quarter. The quarterly report shall include, but is not limited to, case activity (pending cases, new cases, and closed cases), client contact hours, research hours, cumulative hours on cases, attorney calls at the institution(s), cumulative attorney time, number of inmates seen, and quarterly expenditures. The format for this report shall be provided by the Department and shall be the same or equivalent to that in attached Exhibit "D." Quarterly reports shall be submitted by contract area.
The format and the content of these reports may be changed by the Department with sixty (60) day's notice to the Contractor.
It is understood and agreed by the Contractor and the Department that the quarterly report identified as "Individual Case Activity" shall be coded to protect the identity of the individual inmate. Staff member's name and case numbers shall be coded by the Contractor to allow reference by the Contractor and/or independent auditor to the individual file. All case activity will be reported by the Contractor on a quarterly basis; provided, however, that should it be determined that the reporting of active cases violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by the Supreme Court of the state of Washington, then the Contractor shall report only those cases which have been closed.
VI. DISCLOSURE:
Pursuant to DR4-101(c)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as adopted by the Supreme Court of the state of Washington, a lawyer may reveal the intention of his/her client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. While both parties to this contract agreement recognize that the fiduciary relationship existing between the Contractor and the inmate is necessary for full development of facts essential to proper representation of the inmate, it is agreed that the disclosure of an expressed intent to commit a crime does not prevent the assimilation of facts essential to proper representation of the inmate for which the Contractor has agreed to provide services. Therefore, the Contractor will be expected to disclose the intention to commit a crime and the necessary information to prevent the crime as soon as practicable after receiving such information. Failure or refusal of the Contractor to comply with this Article may result in the individual possessing such knowledge being refused further visitations at the Department's institutions and/or the termination of this contract agreement.
VII. ACCESS TO RECORDS/SAFE-GUARDING INFORMATION:
A. Inmate's institutional records, which are a matter of public record, will be available for inspection or copying in accordance with Chapter 137-08 WAC, as now existing or as hereafter amended; provided, however, there shall be no charge to the Contractor for copying inmate records which are necessary for the representation of the inmate and which may not be removed from the institution. Indiscriminate copying of entire inmate files may result in the assessment of copying charges. Requests to review additional information must be presented by the attorney, paralegal, or law student seeking the information on a form approved by the institution and in accordance with applicable state and federal laws.
The Contractor shall not disclose the contents of any inmate record or the result of any psychological tests of inmates or interviews conducted under this contract agreement in a way which would allow the identification of a

304 particular inmate publicly or to persons employed by the Contractor who do not have specific need to know such *304 information. This provision shall not be construed to prohibit disclosure in any judicial or administrative action brought under this contract agreement.
VIII. ACCESS TO INMATES/OFFICE FACILITIES:
Only inmates scheduled for interviews in advance will be available for consultation; provided, however, that inmates may be seen by the Contractor without appointments upon written authorization from the inmate and with the approval of the institution authorities.
In the event of a lockdown, access by the Contractor to the inmates, their records, and any other material contained within the institution may be restricted by the superintendent of said institution. The restriction shall be discretionary on the part of the superintendent in view of the existing conditions at the institution.
The Department shall provide, in accordance with available space at each institution, an interview room for use by the Contractor. This room shall be available for all scheduled appointments with inmates and related activities on an as-needed basis and shall provide a confidential setting for inmate interviews.
IX. TRANSPORTATION OF INMATES:
The Department assumes responsibility for transporting the inmates to and from the appropriate court facilities for appearances related to actions brought under this contract agreement where a court of competent jurisdiction so orders. This paragraph shall not be construed to create any additional right of inmates to appear at the Department's expense. Nor shall this section create additional responsibility in the Department for providing security for these appearances.
X. WORK STANDARDS/INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS:
A. The performance of work and services under this contract agreement by the Contractor shall conform to high professional standards, and those of the Washington State Bar Association.
B. Contractor will provide and maintain current throughout the duration of the contract agreement malpractice, personal liability, property damage, and workmen's compensation insurance.
C. Contractor hereby warrants that all professional staff of the Contractor will be covered under professional liability insurance. Documentation attesting to this requirement will be provided the Department upon initiation of this contract agreement, and will be maintained current throughout the duration of this contract agreement.
XI. CONFLICT OF INTEREST/CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES:
In cases in which there is a conflict of interest which may result in an eligible inmate being denied legal services by the Contractor, the inmate shall be notified, in writing, consistent with the ethical responsibilities of the Contractor. Efforts will be made by the Contractor to secure other counsel at no cost to the Department.
Inmates seeking representation for claims which are fee generating or involve claims for money damages may be represented by the Contractor provided at least three (3) contacts/attempts are made to refer the inmate to members of the private bar not employed by the Contractor. If the Contractor is unable to secure other counsel and undertakes representation of the inmate, the Contractor shall document the efforts made and send a copy of such documentation to the Contract Monitor. No compensation, fees, or reimbursement other than that sum set forth in Section II(A) of this contract agreement shall be received by the Contractor for services provided for money damages claims.

XII. CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT:
As the attorney-client relationship exists between the inmate and the Contractor, the Contractor should not accept proffered employment if there is a reasonable probability that such employment will affect adversely the advice to 305 be given or services to be rendered present or future inmates for whom the Contractor has agreed to provide *305 legal services. DR5-105(a) of the CPR states that a lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his/her independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will or is likely to be adversely affected by acceptance of such employment. Therefore, to ensure full representation of the eligible inmate population to be served by his/her contract agreement, Contractor shall take affirmative action to avoid rendering legal assistance to individuals outside of this contract agreement where such assistance will or is likely to adversely affect his/her professional judgment on behalf of clients represented pursuant to this contract agreement. This provision shall not be construed to prevent representation of one inmate in an action involving another inmate.
XIII. GRIEVANCES:
The Contractor will comply with the procedures approved by the Department for inmate grievances. Remedies for inmate grievances shall not require performance on the part of the Contractor outside the scope of this contract agreement or inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this contract agreement.
EXHIBIT A
STATEMENT OF WORK
1. SERVICE AREA:
Except as provided in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 of Exhibit "A," the Contractor shall provide legal services for eligible inmates and perform other duties as set forth herein for the following institutions:
Washington Corrections Center, Shelton, Washington McNeil Island Corrections Center, Steilacoom, Washington Purdy Corrections Center for Women, Gig Harbor, Washington
2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS:
2.1 The Contractor shall provide the necessary staff, office space, supplies, and equipment to carry out the duties of this contract agreement as set forth herein. Minimum staff levels to be provided by the Contractor are as follows:
Full-time staff will include: 1. Staff Attorney 0907 A minimum of 1,540 hours per year; 2. Staff Attorney 0907 A minimum of 1,540 hours per year; 3. Secretary. Part-time staff will include: 1. Litigation Coordinator 0907 A minimum of 385 hours per year;

A minimum number of 200 attorney hours shall be worked each thirty (30) day period regardless of the cumulative number of hours worked during the period of this contract agreement.
2.2 Permanent changes in staffing levels or minimum number of service hours must be approved in writing by the Secretary of the Department. If the absence for more than three consecutive weeks of a staff member assigned by the Contractor to provide services under this contract agreement cannot be covered by comparable staff not assigned to the contract agreement, the Contractor shall notify the Department in writing. Provisions shall be made by the Contractor at no additional cost to the Department to secure the services of private attorneys who have relevant expertise to cover during this period. Appropriate adjustments shall be made in the rate of reimbursement.
2.3 Attorneys providing legal services under this contract agreement for which the Contractor seeks reimbursement from the Department, shall be active members of the Washington State Bar Association. Attorneys shall have a minimum of two years experience in practicing law (one of which occurred in the state of Washington). Attorneys with less than two years experience or with no experience practicing law in Washington may be utilized provided they are under the direct supervision of an attorney exceeding those requirements located in the same office.
2.4 Paraprofessional assistance must be under the direct on-site supervision of an experienced attorney. "On-site 306 supervision" shall be deemed to occur when the *306 supervising attorney is officed with those persons he/she is
supervising and has direct, face-to-face contact with such persons at least three time per week.
2.5 The Contractor is not obligated to provide legal service to all eligible inmates at the institutions covered under this contract agreement. Professional judgment regarding merit must be exercised prior to accepting any case within the priorities, time and staffing limitations set by this contract agreement.
The Contractor will maintain case load levels consistent with professional standards. To assist in the assessment and acceptance of case activities, the following general priorities will be used in screening new requests from inmates for legal assistance:
A. Provision of legal assistance regarding Washington State law issues for inmates transferred out of state; for example, personal restraint petitions or petitions for habeas corpus challenging convictions under Washington law;
B. Problems requiring legal assistance which may prejudice the inmate or the issue upon delay;
C. Personal restraint or habeas corpus matters;
D. Disciplinary or other adversary hearing before the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles.
E. Domestic relations issues (Purdy Corrections Center for Women inmates only).
F. Civil Rights claims dealing with conditions of confinement, segregation, detainer, medical, dental, etc.;
G. General civil problems such as dissolution, custody/support, non-physical injury claims;
H. Injury to inmate claims; and
I. Legal assistance relating to death penalty issues.
Within these broader categories, specific case priorities will be set by the Contractor and reviewed at least biannually. To the extent that the Contractor must prioritize otherwise meritorious claims, the Contractor will consider the following factors, among others:
A. The potential merit of an inmate's claims;
B. The impact on the client that the possible outcomes would carry;

C. The estimated resources necessary to adequately pursue a claim.

The Department places a high priority on the provision of legal services to minority inmates. The Contractor shall, subject to the above priorities, take affirmative action to ensure that minority inmates' requests for legal assistance for meritorious claims are reviewed and assisted expeditiously.

Consistent with professional and ethical considerations, the Contractor shall provide a detailed report to the Department further setting priorities within the broad categories set forth in this paragraph. Said report shall be sent to the Contract Monitor within sixty (60) days after the effective date of this contract agreement.

2.6 The Contractor shall exhaust all informal means of resolving a legal complaint or dispute prior to the filing of any court proceeding. When the Contractor determines that all reasonable means for informally resolving the complaint have been exhausted, the Contractor shall notify the Department's Attorney General's Division of a potential case thirty (30) days prior to filing the case, except in circumstances which, in the Contractor's judgment require that the case be filed more rapidly. In the event Contractor determines an action must be filed immediately, the Contractor shall make all reasonable effort to notify the Department's Attorney General's Division of the imminent action.

2.7 To ensure that claims from inmates requesting legal services are reviewed and appropriately handled according to those procedures required under Paragraphs 2.5 and 2.14, the Contractor shall integrate the provision of telephone access with written communications from the inmate and personal appointments by providing all or any combination of the following:

307

A. A local access number so that an inmate with access to a local line *307 may contact the legal

services provider;

B. A toll-free number for inmates to call; or

C. Accept collect calls.

2.8 Once per quarter, a class will be presented to interested inmates by staff attorneys on the proper use of legal process and the limitation of various legal and administrative remedies. Classes will run one and one-half hour to two hours each.

The Contractor shall offer education and training in the following areas:

A. General civil matters unrelated to institutional life.

B. Writ of Habeas Corpus and personal restraint petitions.

C. Basic principles and rights relating conditions and treatment within the institution.

The subject matter of any classes in addition to those mentioned above shall be approved in advance by the Secretary.

2.9 Once every six (6) months a class will be presented to interested inmates by staff attorneys on the proper use of the law library. Additional assistance in legal writing will be made available to the inmates through the use of standardized forms and class activities. Contractor shall develop standardized forms for use by the inmates as appropriate. Classes will run one and one-half hour to two hours each.

The Contractor may utilize video tapes to provide the basic skills for inmates in performing legal research and using a law library. Video tapes have been developed in this area by the Department. The video tapes may be available to inmates on a regular basis. Where appropriate, staff attorneys shall supplement the tapes and provide specialized training dealing with legal research and using the law library. Whenever possible, attempts will be made to obtain assistance from representatives of legal publishing companies or other volunteers to supplement the video tapes and classes. The content of the supplemental classes will depend both on the scope of the video presentation and the questions which are posed by inmates.

2.10 During the first year of the contract agreement, video tapes may, at the option of the Department, be prepared by the Contractor in coordination with other contracted legal services providers for the use of inmates in pre-release status. The Contractor may obtain volunteer assistance in preparing the video tapes from attorneys who specialize in the various substantive areas to be covered. Video tapes may be prepared in the following areas:
A. Housing/Tenants' Rights 0907 This would include basic rights of tenants as well as practical tips in dealing with landlords and in obtaining housing.
B. Debtor and Consumer Rights 0907 This would include advice in dealing with collection agencies or loan companies, signing contracts, and it would include advice as to what exemptions are available for individuals who have incurred debts. Practical consumer tips, such as how to buy a car, may also be included.
C. Family Law 0907 Information will be provided by video tape regarding marriage, divorce, paternity rights, child support, obligations, including support enforcement obligations and adoption.
D. Public Benefits 0907 A brief tape will be provided outlining the various types of programs which are available, who is eligible for such programs, and how to apply for benefit programs.
E. Miscellaneous tape including rights and responsibilities of parolees; employment and employees' rights and responsibilities.
Video tapes and other materials may be utilized to provide legal instruction or information to the inmate. Such tapes would be made available through the institution's law libraries. The Contractor shall provide staff attorneys at no additional charge to assist in the making of these tapes and other materials.
2.11 The Contractor shall conduct client interviews at least two (2) days per month at each institution. The 308 Department will *308 cooperate in assisting with the scheduling. If possible, the Contractor will provide twenty-
four hours notice to designated officers at the respective institutions of which clients are to be interviewed. The Contractor will also spend additional time in direct client contact by telephone with clients involved in existing cases. At the request of the Contractor, the Department and Contractor will review the appropriateness of the number of required interview days. Changes to the number of required interview days requires prior written consent of the Department.
2.12 Contractor's staff members will meet periodically with client groups and representative in order to inform them of legal developments or pending legal actions which affect the client population generally and in order to obtain from them input on where there is a need for Contractor's services and how Contractor's services could be improved. This paragraph shall not be construed to authorize the Contractor to participate or provide assistance in any class action suit involving prison conditions under this contract agreement.
2.13 The Contractor will purchase and/or acquire the necessary materials, equipment, and supplies for the program and shall maintain an inventory of said equipment. If the funds received under this contract agreement are not sufficient for the above items, the Contractor may request such items from other sources with the approval of the Secretary. Said equipment shall include, but not be limited to, copiers and office equipment.
2.14 Consistent with the Code of Professional Responsibility as adopted by the Supreme Court of the state of Washington and within thirty (30) days after the effective date of this contract agreement, the Contractor shall establish written procedures acceptable to the Department for the operation of this program. A copy of those procedures shall be sent to the Contract Monitor. The procedures shall clearly identify those individuals assigned by the Contractor to work under this contract agreement, the job titles, description, and responsibilities of those individuals assigned, case-load processing and limitations and any appropriate time frames or schedules. A copy of all substantive changes to these procedures shall be provided the Department. Noncompliance with this paragraph or with the procedures established pursuant to this paragraph may result in withholding of payment to the Contractor until compliance is had.

2.15 The Contractor shall provide information about the services they provide for use in the orientation at the Washington Corrections Center. In addition, the Contractor shall make printed information available for distribution at intake at the covered institution(s), maintain access information provided by other contractors for advising clients known to be leaving a covered institution if they requested services and the Contractor had not begun providing the service.
2.16 The Contractor may consult with the Contract provider of the other institutions when possible to prevent duplicative effort. Where relevant, the Contractor shall share internal brief bank material with other contract providers upon request. The Contractor shall cooperate with other contract providers in the preparation of records, interviews of witnesses, etc. No charges for these services will be assessed the other contract providers by the Contractor.
3. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS:
3.1 The Contractor shall be responsible to provide legal services to all eligible inmates transferred from a Washington institution covered under this contract agreement in accordance with those limitations set forth in the text of this contract agreement. Inmates placed in correctional facilities out of state shall be served by the Contractor in the same manner as are instate inmates with the exception that face-to-face interviews will be conducted only under exceptional circumstances. Travel by the Contractor to and from the state of confinement must be approved by the Department prior to the Contractor purchasing such travel services. The Contractor 309 shall accept requests from out-of-state inmates *309 for copies of Washington statutes, regulations, decisions, and other legal matter which is not available to the inmate at his/her place of confinement. The Contractor may transmit these requests to the institution's law library. The institutions will, in their discretion, loan or provide copies of the requested material to the Contractor to transmit to the requesting inmate. If in the day-to-day handling of requests for legal services by out-of-state inmates, there are problems for which the Contractor cannot provide assistance, but which raise access-to-the-courts issues, the Contractor will advise the Department of such problems in as much detail as possible (consistent with confidentiality restrictions) at the earliest possible date. Consistent with professional and ethical considerations, the Contractor shall report to the Department on a quarterly basis the types of requests received which were denied as lacking factual or legal merit or requiring excessive research time.
The Contractor shall attempt to handle all issues regarding Washington State law issues in a Washington forum. Court appearances in the out-of-state forum shall be a last resort and are subject to those limitations expressed within this contract agreement.
The Department shall provide the Contractor with the names and addresses of all inmates confined in out-ofstate institutions within thirty (30) days after the effective date of this contract agreement. This list shall be updated at least once each quarter or as otherwise necessary. The Contractor shall be responsible for notifying all inmates to be served by them of the legal services available to them, including any limitations and restrictions on that access. The Contractor shall, within its discretion, accept collect telephone calls for those out-of-state inmates who are eligible for legal services, have meritorious claims and who have an active file open or accepted by the Contractor.
3.2 If an inmate is transferred to another state institution not covered by this contract agreement after acceptance by the Contractor to provide legal services, the Contractor may cease to provide legal services to the transferred inmate consistent with DR2-110 of the CPR.
If representation of the inmate is ended, the inmate will be notified of the existence of the other providers of legal services covering the state institution to which the inmate has been transferred. If representation may not be ended consistent with DR2-110 of the CPR, the Contractor may count hours worked on the case of the transferred inmate toward the required number of hours to be provided under this contract agreement; provided, that the minimum number of service hours provided inmates residing in institutions covered under this contract agreement shall be no less than an average of 220 hours per month during a one-year term. This paragraph shall

not be construed to allow the Contractor to provide excessive legal services to inmates confined in other state institutions.
3.3 It is understood by the Contractor that the Department may terminate this contract agreement in accordance with the provisions contained herein or may elect not to extend the period of performance beyond the original term set forth in the text of this contract agreement. Legal representation of inmates under this contract agreement for which the Contractor does not desire or may not withdraw pursuant to DR2-110 of the CPR, shall be continued after the termination or expiration of this contract agreement at the sole expense of the Contractor; provided, however, that the Department may elect to extend this contract agreement up to thirty (30) days under this provision. The Contractor shall accept no new clients and will invoice the Department at the rate of $16.45 per attorney hours worked up to a maximum of $5,000 during the period of the extension. Such payments are contingent upon sufficient legislative appropriations and continuing statutory authority to provide legal services to inmates.
EXHIBIT B

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

DEFINITIONS 0907 As used throughout this contract agreement, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below:

310

*310 A. "Contractor" shall mean that agency, firm, provider, organization, individual or other entity

performing services under this contract agreement. It shall include any subcontractor retained by

the prime contractor as permitted under the terms of this contract agreement.

B. "Secretary" shall mean the Secretary of the department and his/her delegates authorized in writing to act on his/her behalf.

C. "Department" shall mean the Department of Corrections (DOC) of the state of Washington, any division, section, office, unit, or other entity of the department, or any of the officers or other officials lawfully representing that department.

D. "Subcontractors" shall mean one not in the employment of the contractor, who is performing all or part of those services under this contract agreement under a separate contract agreement with the contractor. The terms "subcontractor" and "subcontractors" mean subcontractor(s) in any tier.

E. "Contracts Administrator" shall mean the Administrator of the department's Office of Contracts and Regulations, or his/her delegates.

F. "Minority" means a person who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States and who is:

(1) Black: Having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa;

(2) Hispanic: Of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin, regardless of race;

(3) Asian American: Having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands; or

(4) American Indian or Alaskan Native: Having origins in any of the original peoples of North America.

G. "OMWBE" means the Office of Minority and Women's Business Enterprises of the state of Washington.

H. "Minority Business Enterprise," "Minority-Owned Business Enterprise," or "MBE" means a business organized for profit, performing a commercially useful function, which is owned and controlled by one or more minority individuals or businesses in which one or more minorities or MBEs certified by the OMWBE own at least 51 percent (51%), or in the case of a corporation at least 51 percent (51%) of the voting stock, and control at least 51 percent (51%) of the management and daily business operations of the business.

I. "Women's Business Enterprise," "Women-Owned Business Enterprise," or "WBE" means a business organized for profit, performing a commercially useful function, which is owned and controlled by one or more women or women's business enterprises certified by the OMWBE. Owned and controlled means a business in which one or more women or WBEs certified by the OMWBE own at least 51 percent (51%), or in the case of a corporation at least 51 percent (51%) of the voting stock, and control at least 51 percent (51%) of the management and daily business operations of the business. The women owners must be United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.

CONTRACTOR NOT EMPLOYEE OF DEPARTMENT 0907 The contractor, his/her employees or agents performing under this contract agreement are not employees or agents of the department. The contractor will not hold himself/herself out as nor claim to be an officer or employee of the department or of the state of Washington by reason hereof, nor will he/she make any claim of right, privilege, or benefit which would accrue to a civil service employee under Chapter 41.06 RCW.

NONDISCRIMINATION 0907 During the performance of this contract agreement, the contractor shall comply with all requirements of federal, state, and local nondiscrimination statutes and regulations. These requirements include, but are not limited to:

311

*311 A. Nondiscrimination in employment: The contractor shall not discriminate against any

employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, creed,

marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental or physical handicap. This requirement

does not apply, however, to a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society

with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected

with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its

activities.

The contractor shall take affirmative action to ensure that employees, including apprentices and volunteers, are employed and treated during employment without discrimination because of their race, color, religion, sex, national origin, creed, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap. Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: Employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer, recruitment, and selection for training.

B. Nondiscrimination in Client Services: The contractor shall not, on grounds of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, creed, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap:

1. Deny an individual any services or other benefits provided under this contract agreement.

2. Provide any service(s) or other benefits to an individual which are different, or are provided in a different manner, from those provided to others under this contract agreement.

3. Subject an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any manner related to the receipt of any service(s) or other benefits provided under this contract agreement.

4. Deny any individual an opportunity to participate in any program provided by this contract agreement through the provision of services or otherwise, or afford an opportunity to do so which

is different from that afforded others under this contract agreement. The contractor, in determining (1) the types of services or other benefits to be provided; (2) the class of individuals to whom, or the situation in which, such services or other benefits will be provided; or (3) the class of individuals to be afforded an opportunity to participate in any services or other benefits, will not utilize criteria or methods or administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, sex, religion, national origin, creed, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap.
C. Noncompliance with Nondiscrimination Requirements 0907 In the event of the contractor's noncompliance or refusal to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements this contract agreement may be rescinded, cancelled, or terminated, in whole or in part, and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further contracts with the department. The contractor shall, however, be given a reasonable time in which to cure this noncompliance. Any dispute may be resolved in accordance with the "Disputes" procedure set forth herein.
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 0907 In connection with such services rendered hereunder, the contractor agrees to comply with applicable Department policies and procedures relative to custody of inmates and security of the institution such as: fingerprinting, photographs for identification purposes, searches, and lockdown procedures. Failure to comply with these applicable policies and procedures may result in the contractor's employee(s) being refused access to the institution(s) or the termination of the contract agreement.
UTILIZATION OF MINORITY-OWNED AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES 0907 During the performance of this contract agreement the contractor shall comply with Chapter 39.19 RCW, as now existing or hereafter amended, 312 any rule adopted under that Chapter by OMWBE, and/or any policy or regulations adopted by the department *312 to effect agency compliance with that Chapter.
It is the policy of the Department that minority-owned and women-owned businesses shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts awarded by the Department. A goal of 9.1 percent of the total dollar volume of any contract awarded by the Department shall be awarded to minority business enterprises, and 3.0 percent of the dollar volume of any contract awarded by the Department shall be awarded to women's business enterprises. The Contractor shall use best efforts to carry out this policy in the award of any subcontracts and/or in the purchase of supplies and materials to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient performance of this contract agreement.
In the event that the contractor fails to comply with the requirements set forth in the above paragraph, the department may withhold payment, debar, suspend, or terminate this contract agreement. In addition, noncompliance may subject the contractor to civil penalties of 10 percent (10%) of the amount of the contract agreement or Five Thousand ($5,000) Dollars, whichever is less. Willful repeated violations, exceeding a single violation, may disqualify the contractor from further participation in state contracts for a period of one year. Compliance with this contract agreement provision must be met prior to receiving additional contract awards by any state or educational institution.
If the contractor prevents or interferes with any subcontractor's compliance with these provisions, or submits false or fraudulent information to the department regarding compliance with this provision, the contractor shall be subject to a fine not to exceed One Thousand ($1,000) Dollars, in addition to any other penalties or sanctions prescribed by law.
BILLING PROCEDURES 0907 The contractor's compensation for goods and services rendered under this contract agreement shall be as set forth in the text of the contract instrument attached hereto. Any additional goods or services furnished by the contractor in excess of that set forth in the text of the contract instrument attached hereto must have prior written approval of the Secretary.
At the intervals prescribed by the department, the contractor shall submit an Invoice Voucher (Form A19) prepared in triplicate (original and two signed copies) in the manner prescribed by the department. Such vouchers shall contain a statement of contract services performed for which the contractor is seeking compensation. These vouchers shall be submitted with those reports required by this contract agreement.

Payment shall be considered timely if made by the department within 45 days after the date of receipt. The department may, in its sole discretion, withhold payments due the contractor for services rendered if the contractor fails to satisfactorily comply with any term or condition of this contract agreement.
INDEMNIFICATION0907The contractor shall defend, protect and hold harmless the state of Washington, the department, or any employees thereof, from and against all claims, suits, or actions arising from any negligent or deliberate act or omission of the contractor or subcontractor, or agents of either, while performing under the terms of this contract agreement. Claims shall include, but not be limited to, assertions that the use of transfer of any software, book, document, report, film, tape or sound reproduction, or material of any kind, delivered hereunder, constitutes an infringement of any copyright, patent, trademark, tradename, or otherwise results in an unfair trade practice. The provisions of this section shall survive any termination or the expiration of this contract agreement.
COVENANT AGAINST CONTINGENT FEES 0907 The contractor warrants that no person or selling agency has been employed or retained to solicit or secure this contract agreement upon an agreement or understanding for a commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee, excepting bona fide employees or bona fide established 313 commercial or selling agency maintained by the contractor for the purpose of *313 securing business. The department shall have the right, in the event of breach of this clause by the contractor, to annul this contract agreement without liability or, in its discretion, to deduct from the contract price or consideration or otherwise recover the full amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee. The provisions of this section shall survive any termination or the expiration of this contract agreement.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 0907 The department may, by written notice to the contractor:
A. Terminate the right of the contractor to proceed under this contract agreement if it is found, after due notice and examination by the Contracts Administrator that gratuities in the form of entertainment, gifts, or otherwise are offered or given by the contractor, or an agent or representative of the contractor, to any officer or employee of the department, with a view towards securing this contract agreement or securing favorable treatment with respect to the awarding or amending or the making of any determinations with respect to this contract agreement.
B. In the event this contract agreement is terminated as provided in (A) above, the department shall be entitled to pursue the same remedies against the contractor as it could pursue in the event of a breach of the contract agreement by the contractor. The rights and remedies of the department provided for in this clause shall not be inclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law. The existence of facts upon which the Contracts Administrator makes any determination under this clause shall be an issue and may be reviewed as provided in the "Disputes" clause of this contract agreement.
TREATMENT OF ASSETS 0907
A. Title to all property furnished by the department shall remain in the department. Example: The department provides desks for contractor staff. Title to desks remain in the department.
B. Title to all property purchased by the contractor, the cost of which the contractor is entitled to be reimbursed as a direct item of cost under the contract agreement, shall pass to and vest in the department upon delivery of such property to the contractor. Example: The contractor purchases equipment which is a budget line item. Title passes to and vests in the department.
C. Title to all property, the costs of which is directly or indirectly reimbursed by the department, shall pass to and vest in the department upon delivery of such property to the contractor. Example: Contractor receives all income from the department. There are no other sources of funds. Although the item may not be listed in the budget, title will pass to and vest in the department upon delivery since the costs of the item has been paid by department funds.

D. Any property of the department furnished to the contractor shall, unless otherwise provided herein, or approved by the Contracts Administrator, be used only for the performance of this contract agreement.

E. The contractor shall be responsible for any loss or damage to property of the department which results from the negligence of the contractor or which results from the failure on the part of the contractor to maintain and administer that property in accordance with sound management practices, and shall maintain an inventory of department property.

F. Upon the happening of loss or destruction of, or damage to any department property, the contractor shall notify the Contracts Administrator thereof and shall take all reasonable steps to protect that property from further damage.

G. The contractor shall surrender to the department all property of the department prior to

314

settlement upon completion, *314 termination, or cancellation of this contract agreement.

H. All purchases of equipment by contractors for programs administered by contractors are to be received at the institution/location for control and tagging and entry into the Property Management System (PMS) before distribution to the contractor for use.

I. All references to the contractor under this clause shall include any of his/her employees, agents, or subcontractors.

NONASSIGNABILITY 0907 The contractor may not assign any of the contractor's duties, obligations, rights, or claims assumed or created under this contract without the express prior written consent of the department signed by the Secretary. The provisions of this section shall survive any termination or the expiration of this contract agreement.

RECORDS, DOCUMENTS, AND AUDITS 0907 The contractor shall maintain such books and records and utilize generally accepted accounting principles, practices, and internal controls necessary to reflect sufficiently, accurately, and properly all direct and indirect costs of any nature expended in the performance of this contract agreement. These records shall be subject at all reasonable times to inspection, review, or audit by personnel duly authorized by the department. Should an audit conducted under the authority of this section disclose that the contractor has been paid by the department in excess of the agreed upon costs (overpayment), or has been reimbursed by the department for direct or indirect costs which are disallowed as a result of that audit, then, in either event, the contractor shall, upon demand by the department, repay such overpayment or reimbursement to the department. The contractor will retain all books, records, documents, and other material relevant to this contract agreement for five years after settlement, and make them available for inspection by persons authorized under this provision. The provisions of this section shall survive any termination or the expiration of this contract agreement.

SAFEGUARDING OF INMATE INFORMATION 0907 The use or disclosure by any party of any information concerning an inmate for any purpose not directly connected with the administration of the department's or the contractor's responsibilities with respect to services provided under this contract agreement is prohibited, except by written consent of the department or inmate, or his/her legal representative.

The contractor agrees to abide by present and future federal and state laws and regulations in maintaining the confidentiality of agency files and records, including Criminal History Record Information (CHRI). In the event CHRI is provided to the contractor, the contractor shall abide by all present and future department rules and regulations governing the use of CHRI information and shall require any of the contractor's authorized personnel having access to CHRI to strictly adhere to the same. The provisions of this section shall survive any termination or the expiration of this contract agreement.

RIGHTS IN DATA 0907 Unless otherwise provided, data which originates from this contract agreement shall be "works for hire" as defined by the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 and shall be owned by the department. Data shall include, but not be limited to, reports, documents, pamphlets, advertisements, books, magazines, surveys,

studies, computer programs, films, tapes, and/or sound reproductions. Ownership includes the right to copyright, patent, register, and the ability to transfer these rights.
Data which is delivered under the contract agreement, but which does not originate therefrom, shall be transferred to the department with a nonexclusive, royaltyfree, irrevocable license to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, dispose of, and to authorize others to do so; Provided, that such license shall be limited to the extent which the contractor has a right to grant such a license. The contractor shall exert all reasonable efforts to advise the department, at the time of delivery of data furnished under this agreement, of all 315 known or potential invasions of privacy *315 contained therein and of any portion of such document which was not produced in the performance of this contract agreement. The department shall receive prompt written notice of each notice, claim, or copyright infringement received by the contractor with respect to any data delivered under this contract agreement. The department shall have the right to modify or remove any restrictive makings placed upon the data by the contractor. The provisions of this section shall survive any termination or the expiration of this contract agreement.
SUBCONTRACTING 0907 The contractor shall not enter into subcontracts for any of the work contemplated under this contract agreement without obtaining prior written approval of the Contracts Administrator of the department or his/her delegate.
LICENSING AND ACCREDITATION STANDARDS 0907 The contractor shall comply with all applicable local, state, and federal licensing and accrediting requirements/standards, necessary in the performance of this contract agreement.
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 0907 As required by statutes or regulations, the contractor shall provide or purchase industrial insurance coverage prior to performing work under this contract agreement. The department will not be responsible for payment of industrial insurance premiums or for any other claim or benefit for the contractor, or any subcontractor, or employee of the contractor, which might arise under the industrial insurance laws during performance of duties and services under this contract agreement.
RIGHT OF INSPECTION 0907 The contractor shall provide right of access to its facilities to the department, or any of its officers, or to any other authorized agent or official of the state of Washington or the federal government at all reasonable times, in order to monitor and evaluate performance, compliance, and/or quality assurance under this contract agreement.
ADVANCE PAYMENTS PROHIBITED 0907 No payment in advance or in anticipation of services or supplies to be provided under this contract agreement shall be made by the department.
SAVINGS 0907 In the event funding from state, federal, or other sources is unavailable, withdrawn, reduced, insufficient, or limited in any way, the department may terminate the contract agreement under the "Termination for Convenience" clause, (without the five-day notice requirement) subject to renegotiation under any new funding limitations and conditions.
WAIVER OF DEFAULT 0907 Waiver of any default shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent default. Waiver of breach of any provision of the contract agreement shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any other or subsequent breach and shall not be construed to be a modification of the terms of the contract agreement, unless stated to be such in writing, signed by the Secretary of the department, and attached to the original contract agreement.
CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS 0907 The Secretary may, at any time, by written notification to the contractor, and without notice to any known guarantor or surety, make unilateral changes in the scope of the services to be performed under the contract agreement, the period of performance, or the price. These unilateral changes shall be effective as set forth in the amendment to the contract agreement or upon signature by the Secretary, if no date has been set forth.
The contractor will be deemed to have accepted any such unilateral change unless the contractor notifies the department's Contracts Administrator of the contractor's nonacceptance of such unilateral change within fifteen (15) calendar days after the date the change notice is signed by the Secretary. If the contractor so notifies the

department of such nonacceptance, the contractor and the department will use good faith efforts to negotiate a change acceptable to both parties. Failure to agree on an acceptable change shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of these General Terms and Conditions entitled "Disputes." 316 However, nothing in this clause shall excuse *316 the contractor from proceeding with the contract agreement as changed, provided such unilateral changes do not require the contractor to violate the code of Professional Responsibility contained in the Rules of Court.
DISPUTES 0907 Except as otherwise provided in the contract agreement, should a dispute arise between the parties hereto, with respect to the terms of this contract or the performance thereof, and it cannot be resolved informally, the parties shall refer the dispute to an independent arbitrator selected by mutual agreement of the contractor and the department. The arbitrator so chosen shall establish procedures for an arbitration hearing and shall render a decision resolving the dispute. The arbitrator's decision shall be binding on both parties, unless either party delivers written objection to the decision to the non-objecting party within ten (10) days after receiving the decision by the arbitrator. The arbitrator's fee will be shared equally by the parties, but neither party shall be financially responsible for the costs incurred by the other party in connection with the arbitration. The parties agree that this dispute process shall precede the commencement of any legal action.
Should either party hereto commence any action in a state or federal tribunal with respect to the dispute decided by arbitration hearing, then the party bringing the action shall bear all court costs and attorney fees if the decision of the arbitrator is substantially upheld. If the decision of the arbitrator is not upheld, then each party shall bear its own costs and attorney fees. TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT 0907 The Secretary may, by written notice, terminate the contract agreement in whole or in part, for failure of the contractor to perform any of the provisions hereof. In such event, the contractor shall be liable for damages as authorized by law, including, but not limited to, any cost difference between the original contract agreement and the replacement or cover contract agreement and all administrative cost directly related to the replacement contract agreement, i.e., cost of the competitive bidding, mailing, advertising, and staff time; Provided, that if (i) it is determined for any reason the contractor was not in default, or (ii) the contractor's failure to perform is without his/her and/or his/her subcontractor's control, fault or negligence, the termination shall be deemed to be a Termination for Convenience.
TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE 0907 Except as otherwise provided in this contract agreement, the Secretary may, by thirty (30) days' written notice, or the contractor may, by ninety (90) days' written notice, beginning on the second day after the mailing, terminate this contract agreement, in whole or in part, when it is in the best interests of the department or the contractor. If this contract agreement is so terminated, the department shall be liable only for payment in accordance with the terms of this contract agreement for services rendered prior to the effective date of termination.
TERMINATION PROCEDURE 0907 Upon termination of this contract agreement, the department, in addition to any other rights provided in this contract agreement, may require the contractor to deliver to the department any property specifically produced or acquired for the performance of such part of this contract agreement as has been terminated. The provisions of the "Treatment of Assets" clause shall apply in such property transfer.
The department shall pay to the contractor the agreed upon price, if separately stated, for completed work and services accepted by the department, and the amount agreed upon by the contractor and the Secretary for (a) completed work and services for which no separate price is stated, (b) partially completed work and services, (c) other property or services which are accepted by the department, and (d) the protection and preservation of property, unless the termination is for default, in which case the Secretary shall determine the extent of the liability of the department. Failure to agree with such determination shall be a dispute within the meaning of the 317 "Disputes" clause of this contract agreement. The department may *317 withhold from any amounts due the contractor for such completed work or services such sum as the Secretary determines to be necessary to protect the department against potential loss or liability.
The rights and remedies of the department provided in this clause shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law or under this contract agreement.
After receipt of a notice of termination, and except as otherwise directed by the Secretary, the contractor shall:

1. Stop work under the contract agreement on the date, and to the extent specified, in the notice;
2. Place no further orders or subcontracts for materials, services, or facilities except as may be necessary for completion of such portion of the work under the contract agreement as is not terminated;
3. Assign to the department, in the manner, at the times, and to the extent directed by the Secretary, all of the rights, titles, and interest of the contractor under the orders and subcontracts so terminated, in which case the department has the right, at its discretion, to settle or pay any or all claims arising out of the termination of such orders and subcontracts;
4. Settle all outstanding liabilities and all claims arising out of such termination or orders and subcontracts, with the approval or ratification of the Secretary to the extent he/she may require, which approval or ratification shall be final for all the purposes of this clause;
5. Transfer title to the department and deliver in the manner, at the times, and to the extent, if any, as directed by the Secretary, any property which, if the contract agreement had been completed, would have been required to be furnished to the department;
6. Complete performance of such part of the work as shall not have been terminated by the Secretary; and
7. Take such action as may be necessary, or as the Secretary may direct, for the protection and preservation of the property related to this contract agreement which is in the possession of the contractor and in which the department has or may acquire an interest.
GOVERNING LAW 0907 This contract agreement shall be governed by the laws of the state of Washington. Any action brought hereunder must be brought in Thurston County, Washington.
SEVERABILITY If 0907 any provision of this contract agreement or any provision of any document incorporated by reference shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the other provisions of this contract agreement which can be given effect without the invalid provision, and to this end the provisions of this contract agreement are declared to be severable.
CONSTRUCTION 0907 Nothing in this contract agreement shall be construed to create a right enforceable by or in favor of any third party.
EXHIBIT C
DEFINITIONS
1. "Staff Member Name/Position" means the full name of the individual providing the legal service and his/her position within the structure of the law firm or legal services corporation. For example, John Q. Smith/Staff Attorney; Mary J. Williams/Litigation Coordinator; or Jack T. Allen/Paralegal.
2. "Total Hours Worked" means the cumulative number of hours worked in providing services under the contract by the staff member during the reporting period, including client contact hours, research hours, administrative hours, and travel hours.
3. "Client Contact Hours" means face-to-face and telephone consultations.
4. "Research Hours" means hours spent in preparation of litigation/hearings, drafting of legal documents, legal research or briefing, negotiation, factual investigation/discovery, correspondence.
318 *318 5. "Number of Inmates Seen" means the total number of individual inmates seen in face-to-face consultations at an institution. Multiple interviews of the same inmate shall be counted as one inmate seen.

6. "Number of Inmates Requesting Service" means the total number of individual persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections that have requested legal service by verbal or written means.
7. "Number of Inmates Refused Service" means the number of persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections for which the provision of legal services was denied on the basis of insufficient information, insufficient merit, ineligibility, law priority, or other like reasons.
8. "Number of New Cases Opened" means the total number of new individual files opened for a single inmate upon one request. The total number includes the inmates to whom legal consultation provided was limited to the rendering of a view or opinion by the attorney as to the relative merits of the inmate's request with no further legal services intended to be provided.
9. "Number of Cases Closed" means the total number of cases that are no longer active, not including closed cases/advice only.
10. "Number of Cases Closed/Advice Only" means the total number of cases that are no longer active that resulted in only an opinion or view of the attorney as to the relative merits of the inmate's request or direction as to legal self-help.
11. "Administrative Hours" means non-client related contact with the institution or headquarters, recruitment, staff training, and record keeping and reporting.
12. "Number of Inmates Out-of-State Requesting Service" means the total number of individual persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections and transfered to or are incarcerated in a penal institution outside of the state of Washington that have requested legal service by verbal or written means.
13. "Number of Fee Generating Cases" means the total number of cases retained by the legal service provider which are required by contract to be referred, if possible, to the private bar.

MONTHLY REPORT CDOP

TOTAL CLIENT

NUMBER

STAFF MEMBER HOURS CONTACT TRAVEL RESEARCH ADMINISTRATIVE OF INMATES

NAME/POSITION WORKED HOURS HOURS HOURS

HOURS

SEEN

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# OF INMATES # OF INMATES

# OF CASES

REQUESTING

REFUSED

# OF NEW CASES # OF CASES CLOSED/ADVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

OPENED

CLOSED

ONLY

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CLASSES

PROVIDED

STAFF MEMBER

INMATE

THIS MONTH

CONDUCTING

DAYS/DATE

TIMES/HOURS

ATTENDANCE

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

319 *319

MONTHLY REPORT CODOP
INTAKE SUMMARY

CASE CATEGORY CODE NUMBER CASE CATEGORY

NUMBER OF NEW CASES OPENED

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

101

Social Security

102

VA/Military

103

Internal Revenue Service

104

L & I/Workmen's Comp/Ins.

105

Bankruptcy/Debtor Creditor

106

Consumer

107

Wills, Trusts, Probates

108

Name Changes/Adoptions

109

Housing/Real Estate

110

Divorce/Annulment

111

Custody/Guardianship/Visit.Rts.

112

Torts/Damage Claims

113

Drivers License/Tickets

114

Crim. Contact Outside Atty.

201

Detainer

202

Habeas Corpus

203

Post-Conviction

204

Cert-Mandamus

205

Administrative Hearing

206

Parole Board Disciplinary Hearing

207

Parole Board .100 Hearing

208

Parole Board Minimum Term Setting

209

Other Parole Board Matters

210

Institutional Disciplinary Matters

211

Leave or Extended Leave

212

Visitation/Phone Privileges

213

Mailroom/Money

214

Medical/Dental

215

Placement/Transfer

216

Segregation

217

Treatment or Habilitation

218

Personal Restraint Petition

219

Inmate Marriages

220

Clothing

221

Shelter

222

Sanitation

223

Religion

224

Public Records

225

Sentencing Guidelines

226

Privacy

227

Protective Custody

228

Institutional Industries

229

Good Time/Earned Time

230

Death Penalty

231

Use of Force

232

Exercise

233

Other

320 *320

MONTHLY REPORT CDOP

SUMMARY

TOTAL

CLIENT

NUMBER

STAFF

HOURS CONTACT TRAVEL RESEARCH ADMINISTRATIVE OF INMATES

POSITION WORKED HOURS HOURS

HOURS

HOURS

SEEN

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# OF INMATES

# OF INMATES

# OF INMATES # OF INMATES

# OF INMATES

OUT-OF-STATE

OUT-OF-STATE

REQUESTING

ELIGIBLE FOR

REFUSED

REQUESTING

REFUSED

SERVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# OF NEW CASES

# OF CASES

# OF CASES

# OF

OPENED

CLOSED

CLOSED/ADVISE ONLY FEE GENERATING

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EXHIBIT D

DEFINITIONS

1. Excepting the Quarterly Report identified as "Individual Case Activity," "Staff Member Name/Position" means the full name of the individual providing the legal service and his/her position within the structure of the law firm or legal services corporation. For example, John Q. Smith/Staff Attorney; Mary J. Williams/Litigation Coordinator; or Jack T. Allen/Paralegal.
2. "Total Hours Worked" means the cumulative number of hours worked in providing services under the contract by the staff member during the reporting period, including client contact hours, research hours, administrative hours, and travel hours.
3. "Client Contact Hours" means face-to-face and telephone consultations.
4. "Research Hours" means hours spent in preparation of litigation/hearings, drafting of legal documents, legal research or briefing, negotiation, factual investigation/discovery, correspondence.
5. "Number of Inmates Seen" means the total number of individual inmates seen in face-to-face consultations at an institution. Multiple interviews of the same inmate shall be counted as one inmate seen.
6. "Number of Inmates Requesting Service" means the total number of individual persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections that have requested legal service by verbal or written means.
7. "Number of Inmates Refused Service" means the number of persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections for which the provision of legal services was denied on the basis of insufficient information, insufficient merit, ineligibility, law priority, or other like reasons.
8. "Number of New Cases Opened" means the total number of new individual files opened for a single inmate upon one request. The total number includes the inmates to whom legal consultation provided was limited to the rendering of a view or opinion by the attorney as to the relative merits of the inmate's request with no further legal services intended to be provided.
9. "Number of Cases Closed" means the total number of cases that are no longer active, not including closed cases/advice only.
321 *321 10. "Number of Cases Closed/Advice Only" means the total number of cases that are no longer active that resulted in only an opinion or view of the attorney as to the relative merits of the inmate's request or direction as to legal self-help.

11. "Administrative Hours" means non-client related contact with the institution or headquarters, recruitment, staff training, and record keeping and reporting.
12. "Number of Inmates Out-of-State Requesting Service" means the total number of individual persons committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections and transfered to or are incarcerated in a penal institution outside of the state of Washington that have requested legal service by verbal or written means.
13. "Number of Fee Generating Cases" means the total number of cases retained by the legal service provider which are required by contract to be referred, if possible, to the private bar.

QUARTERLY REPORT

CDOP

SUMMARY

TOTAL

CLIENT

NUMBER

STAFF

HOURS CONTACT TRAVEL RESEARCH ADMINISTRATIVE OF INMATES

POSITION

WORKED

HOURS HOURS

HOURS

HOURS

SEEN

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# OF INMATES

# OF INMATES

# OF INMATES # OF INMATES

# OF INMATES

OUT OF STATE

OUT OF STATE

REQUESTING

ELIGIBLE FOR

REFUSED

REQUESTING

REFUSED SERVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

SERVICE

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# OF NEW CASES

# OF CASES

# OF CASES

# OF FEE

OPENED

CLOSED

CLOSED/ADVICE

GENERATING CASES

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

QUARTERLY EXPENSES

PERSONNEL EXPENSES

NON-PERSONNEL EXPENSES

322 *322 POSITIONS
TOTAL PERSONNEL TOTAL PERSONNEL

COSTS $
$ $

ITEM
Telephone Postage Travel Office Supplies Copying Litigation Expenses Library Equipment Insurance Training
TOTAL NON-PERSONNEL

COST $
$

TOTAL NON-PERSONNEL

$

TOTAL EXPENSES

$

QUARTERLY REPORT C0DOP
INTAKE SUMMARY

CASE CATEGORY

NUMBER OF NEW

CODE NUMBER CASE CATEGORY

CASES OPENED

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

101

Social Security

102

VA/Military

103

Internal Revenue Service

104

L & I/Workmen's Comp/Ins.

105

Bankruptcy/Debtor Creditor

106

Consumer

107

Wills, Trusts, Probates

108

Name Changes/Adoptions

109

Housing/Real Estate

110

Divorce/Annulment

111

Custody/Guardianship/Visit.Rts.

112

Torts/Damage Claims

113

Drivers License/Tickets

114

Crim. Contact Outside Atty.

201

Detainer

202

Habeas Corpus

203

Post-Conviction

204

Cert-Mandamus

205

Administrative Hearing

206

Parole Board Disciplinary Hearing

207

Parole Board .100 Hearing

208

Parole Board Minimum Term Setting

209

Other Parole Board Matters

210

Institutional Disciplinary Matters

211

Leave or Extended Leave

212

Visitation/Phone Privileges

213

Mailroom/Money

214

Medical/Dental

215

Placement/Transfer

216

Segregation

217

Treatment or Habilitation

218

Personal Restraint Petition

219

Inmate Marriages

220

Clothing

221

Shelter

323 *323 222 223 224 225 226

Sanitation Religion Public Records Sentencing Guidelines Privacy

227

Protective Custody

228

Institutional Industries

229

Good Time/Earned Time

230

Death Penalty

231

Use of Force

232

Exercise

233

Other

QUARTERLY REPORT

CDOP

INDIVIDUAL CASE ACTIVITY

CASE

TOTAL

CLIENT

STAFF MEMBER

CASE

CATEGORY

HOURS

CONTACT

RESEARCH

NAME/POSITION NUMBER

CODE

WORKED

HOURS

HOURS

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPENDIX B

United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan

Gary Knop, John Ford, William Lovett, II, Ramando Valeroso, Gus Jansson, Pat Sommerville, Vernard Cohen, T. Jon Spytma, Robert Shipp, Butch Davis, Ron Mixon, and Kerwin Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v

Perry M. Johnson, Robert Brown, Jr., Dale Foltz, John Jabe, Theodore Koehler, John Prelesnik, and Jack Bergman, Defendants.
File No. G84-651

ORDER

Order issued: May 5, 1988 by Judge Richard Enslen, W.D.Mich. [EXERPT ONLY: Pages 9 through 18 concerning "Access to the Courts"]
IV. ACCESS TO COURTS

A. Legal Access Program

1. The MDOC shall contract with a non-profit corporation that will provide paralegal services in the subject institutions to assist prisoners in making collateral attacks upon their convictions and in challenging the conditions of their confinement.
a. The MDOC may choose to contract with an existing non-profit legal services corporation, such as Prison Legal Services at SPSM, provided that the authority and staff of such corporation are expanded consistent with the requirements of this Order.

b. The MDOC shall award the contract referred to in this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order, unless it shows cause why, acting with all deliberate speed, the contract cannot be awarded within that time period.
2. Board of Directors:
a. Composition: The Board of Directors of this corporation shall consist of seven members, selected as follows (unless the MDOC decides to contract with an already existing program which has a board of directors or its equivalent):
(i) three members selected by defendants;
(ii) three members selected by the plaintiffs;
(iii) one member selected by a vote of the appointed members who shall serve as chair.
b. Term: The members of the Board of Directors shall serve two-year terms, without compensation.
324 *324 c. The Board of Directors shall hire and supervise the Legal Program Director pursuant to paragraph IV(A) (3) of this Order.
d. Bylaws: The Board of Directors shall develop bylaws for the operation of the legal access program which bylaws shall be submitted to the Court for approval within ninety (90) days of the Board's appointment. The bylaws shall, at a minimum, address the following issues:
(i) Standards for determining which prisoners are entitled to receive the services of the program. These standards should, at a minimum, provide the following services;
(A) general research assistance to any prisoner using a law library;
(B) assistance in drafting pleadings, responding to motions or to reports and recommendations for inmates who are illiterate, who do not speak English or who are otherwise unable to translate their complaints into an organized presentation;
(C) the standards shall be designed to insure that the program provides only the minimum amount of service constitutionally required.
(ii) Duties of civilian paralegals hired pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4)(a) of this Order, which shall include:
(A) periodic visits to segregation units, protective custody units and other areas of the institutions where inmates do not have direct access to a main law library;
(B) the frequency with which these visits must be made;
(C) prompt response to written prisoner requests for paralegal assistance;
(D) conducting inventories of main and mini law libraries and submitting orders for replacement or duplicate copies of library materials;
(E) regular "desk hours" in law libraries to provide general research assistance to prisoners using the libraries, including the times such assistance will be available, and the portion of the paralegal's work hours devoted to such assistance;
(F) regular "office hours" to discuss particular cases with clients unable to use the library; including how such visits will be scheduled and supervised and the portion of the paralegal's work hours devoted to such assistance;
(G) scheduling of law library time for general population prisoners (call-outs), including scheduling time for meetings between "jailhouse lawyers" and other prisoners and between prisoner paralegals and other prisoners;

(H) delivery of materials from the main law library to prisoners who would not otherwise have access to the main law library.
(iii) Duties of prisoner paralegals, hired pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4)(b) of this Order, to include:
(A) regular "desk hours" at law libraries to provide general research assistance to prisoners;
(B) provision of research and drafting assistance to civilian paralegals;
(C) rules governing confidential conferences between prisoner paralegals and other prisoners, if any such conferences are to be allowed, and how those conferences should be scheduled and supervised.
(iv) Standards for denying program assistance, other than general research assistance to prisoners, and alternatives to be made available to prisoner if program assistance is denied. These standards should address the issues of:
(A) assaultive prisoners;
(B) prisoners who wish to proceed with frivolous complaints and/or prisoners who are excessively litigious;
(C) categories of cases the program shall not provide assistance for (e.g., cases for which equivalent services are already available).
e. Shakedowns and other security issues: The Board shall provide a means by which at least one civilian staff person is "on call" at all times (available 24 hours a day and within two hours of any department request) for the purpose of facilitating shakedowns pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(5)(d) of this Order. The Board shall insure that 325 the appropriate departmental staff at each subject institution are aware *325 at all times of the identity and location of the staff person designated pursuant to this paragraph.
f. Annual Report: The Board shall prepare an annual report to be submitted to the Court and the parties. This report shall include annual case statistics, prisoner utilization data, a review of library inventories and replacement of materials or provision of duplicate materials, a review of staffing levels required pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4)(a) and (b) of this Order and any recommendations the Board may have for the modification of any provision of this Order.
3. Program Director: The Board shall hire one program director who shall be an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Michigan. The Board shall conduct an annual performance evaluation of the Director.
a. The Director's salary and benefits shall be competitive with the salary and benefits provided to other attorneys employed by the State of Michigan.
b. The Director shall have the following duties:
(i) Hiring, training and supervision of civilian and prisoner paralegals at each institution;
(ii) Development of the training curricula for civilian and prisoner paralegals which shall include both substantive and procedural matters;
(iii) Processing of prisoner grievances regarding the law library, library collection and paralegals. All such grievances shall be made directly to the program director as a Step III grievance;
(iv) Approval of "jailhouse lawyer" contracts pursuant to the standards currently specified in PD-DWA-61.01 and Rule 791.6617.
(v) The presentation of an annual report to the Board which shall include:
(A) performance evaluations of civilian and prisoner paralegals;
(B) annual case statistics, prisoner utilization data and recommendations for changes in staffing requirements.

4. Staffing Requirements: In addition to the Program Director, the following staff shall be provided at each institution:
a. Civilian Paralegals: Each institution shall have full-time civilian paralegals, who shall possess at least a twoyear paralegal degree, as follows:
MBP: One for general population and trustee
One for segregation and protective custody
MR: One for general population and trustee
One for segregation and protective custody
SPSM North: One SPSM South: One
b. Prisoner Paralegals:
(i) Each institution shall hire paid prisoner paralegals as follows:
MBP: 4 MB-Trustee: 2 MR: 5 MR-Trustee: 1 SPSM North: 3 SPSM South: 3
(ii) This position shall be a paid prison job assignment with wages comparable to those in Industries.
(iii) The department shall retain the right to transfer prisoner paralegals for disciplinary and other reasons consistent with sound corrections management. The department shall, however, insure that prisoner paralegals are not transferred for arbitrary or retaliatory reasons.
(iv) Prisoner paralegals shall be hired by the program director upon recommendation of the civilian paralegal and shall not be restricted by the prison job classification requirements. In the hiring process, the program director and civilian paralegal shall consider the candidate's skill, interests and length of sentence. When prisoners have equal skills and interest, the civilian paralegal shall recommend the prisoner with the longest sentence.
326 c. Inmate Law Clerks: Defendants shall either retain the inmate law clerks with their current duties and training or *326 provide a corresponding increase in the number of prisoner paralegals hired and transfer duties currently given to law clerks to the prisoner paralegals.
5. Physical Requirements
a. Sufficient office space will be provided for all civilian paralegals at or near the main law libraries with suitable privacy to conduct interviews with prisoner clients.
b. Hours of operation shall not be limited by the hours of operation of the law library.
c. Existing equipment and supplies shall be available to the program and shall include the following at each main law library office:
(i) photocopy machine;
(ii) electric typewriters;
(iii) telephone lines with access to both institutional and outside lines (provided, however, that prisoner paralegals shall not be allowed access to outside telephone lines).
d. All shakedowns of the areas in which the employees of the corporation work shall be done in the presence of the civilian paralegal or other civilian employee of the program designated pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(2)(d)(v) of this Order. Shakedowns shall be conducted in such a manner that Department employees do not read the legal materials and that the civilian paralegal or other employee is able to observe each Department employee as the search is carried out. Department employees shall conduct the search in such a manner as to assure only searches for contraband and not the reading of client files.

B. Libraries
1. The defendants shall supplement the required minimum collection at each main law library with at least one copy of the following materials:
a. A complete set of Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure;
b. Michigan Civil Jury Instructions
c. Local state court rules and the local rules for the Western and Eastern Districts of Michigan and for the Sixth Circuit;
2. The defendants shall supplement the required minimum collection at the main law library at Marquette Branch Prison with the materials noted in paragraph IV(B)(1) of this Order, and with a recent treatise on Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Remedies.
3. Defendants shall maintain the mini law libraries at each of the subject institutions and shall supplement the collection at each mini law library with the following materials:
a. Current PDs and OPs;
b. State Administrative Rules regarding the MDOC;
c. Pencils, writing and carbon paper, kite and grievance forms, and forms to request books from the main law library collection;
d. Posted instructions on obtaining assistance from the civilian paralegal and obtaining books from the main law library collection;
e. At least two chairs and suitable surface space for interviews with the civilian paralegals.
4. As an alternative to the maintenance of the mini law libraries pursuant to paragraphs IV(A)(6) and IV(B) of this Order, the defendants may choose to abolish the mini law libraries and to provide, instead, increased paralegal assistance to prisoners in segregation units. If the defendants adopt the latter alternative, defendants shall provide appropriate increases in the civilian and prisoner paralegal staff pursuant to paragraph IV(A)(4) of this Order and shall authorize the legal access program to provide all necessary legal services to all prisoners in segregation units. This will include all general research assistance as well as assistance in drafting pleadings and other legal documents. Defendants shall insure that paralegal assistance is provided to segregation prisoners who might not otherwise require such assistance, in order to replace the previously available self-help assistance provided by the mini law libraries. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter segregation prisoners' 327 current level of access to materials from *327 the main law libraries on a call-out basis. Defendants shall inform the Court and the plaintiffs of their decision, as between these alternatives, within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.
5. Defendants shall assure that prisoners at the Michigan Reformatory Trustee Division have access to the courts through either of the following means:
a. Establishment of a main law library with the required minimum collection and the supplements ordered in paragraphs IV(B)(1) and IV(B)(2) of this Order plus general research assistance and advice for prisoners who require it from a civilian or prisoner paralegal; or
b. Establishment of a mini law library pursuant to paragraph IV(B)(3) of this Order with access to the services of a civilian paralegal and to books from a main law library without the necessity of requesting a temporary transfer to another institution.
c. Defendants shall inform the Court and the plaintiffs of their decision, as between these alternatives, within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.

6. Library Time:
a. Time in the mini law library shall not be restricted.
b. Time in main law libraries will be as follows:
(i) General population: Six (6) hours weekly, with additional time as needed and approved by the civilian paralegal;
(ii) Jailhouse Lawyers: No restriction for those prisoners providing legal assistance to other prisoners pursuant to defendant's policy directive PD-DWA-61.01 and Rule 791.6617.
c. Time spent in conference with the prisoner or civilian paralegals shall not be counted as law library time.
7. Inventories:
a. Defendants shall insure that each subject institution uses a standardized form to inventory main and mini law library collections. The current SPSM form is acceptable.
b. The civilian paralegal shall conduct inventories of the main and mini law libraries at lest semi-annually. Prisoner paralegals shall conduct inventories of the main law library collections for quarters during which the civilian paralegal does not conduct an inventory.
c. The semi-annual inventories conducted by civilian paralegals shall be submitted to the Program Director for review and to the librarian at each institution.
d. The civilian paralegal shall post the most recent inventories of the main and mini law library collections in each mini law library.
e. The Program Director shall submit to defendants a plan for standardizing the replacement of law library materials and for providing duplicate copies of those materials when needed. The plan shall create a standard for determining when a duplicate copy must be ordered and shall identify the individual(s) responsible for ordering duplicate and replacement materials.
[1] Cases consolidated for litigation with Hadix for various purposes are: Thompson v. Johnson, 79-74366; Sommerville v. Milliken, 80-70949; Harris v. Johnson, 81-73541; Harvey v. McCormick, 82-72377; Stapleton v. Anderson, 79-74041; Roberts v. Johnson, 83-6147AA; McGrary v. Foltz, 83-4433; Randolph v. Suitor, 81-71258; Luster v. Anderson, 78-72607; and Gibson v. Scott, 85-2530.
[2] Allegations pertaining to meaningful access to the courts for inmates in the Central Complex may be found at paragraphs 97 through 106 of plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed August 18, 1982.
[3] Terms pertaining to meaningful access to the courts for inmates in the Central Complex may be found primarily in Section VI of the consent judgment, filed February 13, 1985.
[4] On Monday, the facility is open from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 6:45 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. On Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, the library is available from 8:00 a.m. to noon, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., and from 6:45 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. The Friday schedule is from 8:00 a.m. to noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. On Saturday the library is open from 8:00 a.m. to noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. The Central Complex main law library is closed on Sunday. The library is also closed when the head librarian or her assistant are not scheduled or are not available.
[5] See American Corrections Association, Providing Legal Services for Prisoners: A Tool for Correctional Administrators (1982); American Bar Association, Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal Services to Prisoners: An Analysis and Report (1973); and American Association of Law Libraries, Collections for Institutional Law Libraries (1980).

[6] Indigency status takes a week to process after application and is subject to periodic review. In order to be determined indigent, an inmate must have an average monthly balance of seven dollars or less in his prison account. (Kunzelman, 6/17/86 p. 102)
Copying for indigent inmates is available only for items where handcopying is not at all feasible. (Ibid. at p. 95)
[7] See the literacy testing and results as analyzed by McIntyre (McIntyre, 6/11/85 pp. 396 et seq.). (Note: the percentage or population figures of inmates who have some English as a second language have not been made available to this court as of the date of this opinion.)
In addition to his examination of test results, McIntyre analyzed twenty kites, or requests, written by inmates and other documents. (McIntyre, 6/11/85 p. 394; Plaintiff's exhibits 17, 18 and 19.) McIntyre also examined the "readability" of the standard achievement tests given to the inmates by the prison officials: the GED test, the LSAT test, and various other materials (McIntyre, 6/11/85 p. 395). He also determined the level of difficulty of representative legal materials. (Ibid.) Results (in terms of grade levels) were as follows:
(references are to pages of testimony by McIntyre on 6/11/85)
(1) Letter from the Michigan Court of Appeals informing the inmate of his rights. 14.5. (p. 400);
(2) Glover v. Richardson, infra. 15.5. (p. 401);
(3) SAT (test, Exhibit 20). 12.68. (p. 401);
(4) GED (test, Exhibit 21). 7.41. (p. 401);
(5) LSAT (test, Exhibit 22). 14.27. (p. 401);
(6) Exhibit 26 (var. documents). 20.1. (p. 402);
(7) Exhibit 27 (var. documents). 17.47. (p. 402); and
(8) Rules, forms (Exhibit 23) (cf. p. 395). 16.011. (p. 402).
[8] Ibid.
[9] This average was obtained by treating those under 4.0 as 3.9 (as the test does not distinguish any level below 4.0), and by treating the scores over 12.0 as 12. (McIntyre, 6/11/85 p. 396). Plaintiffs' exhibit 24, the "reading spread" of the inmates tested, indicates that fifty per cent of the inmates tested read below the fifth grade level.
[10] See the literacy testing and results as analyzed by McIntyre. (McIntyre, 6/11/85 pp. 396 et seq.)
[11] McIntyre, 6/11/85 p. 446. McIntyre opined that the functionally illiterate inmates could not use legal materials to prepare meaningful papers for submission to the courts.
[12] See testimony of person who said he could speak Spanish, but who was not trained to provide assistance in doing legal research (Graydon Brown III, p. 33 lines 10-18).
[13] Retaliation or a perception of retaliation against a jailhouse lawyer by prison officials if the inmate works on a case against the prison or its officials is expected by inmates. The Hadix litigation has required entry of two antiretaliation orders. Hearings are pending on additional alleged retaliation.
[14] Lefstein, 6/4/85 pp. 101-131 referencing the Code of Professional Conduct, Michigan Bar Opinions, and American Bar Association standards.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Israel, p. 84, perhaps sixty to seventy-five per cent of staff time is devoted to Central Complex matters.

[17] Given a transient population of some 10,000 inmates, the ratio of attorneys to inmates might be calculated as one to 5,000.
[18] Lefstein, 6/4/85 p. 117 referencing "American Corrections Association brochure" at p. 4, as admitted with Plaintiffs' exhibit 8 (probably A.C.A., Providing Legal Services for Prisoners: A Tool for Corrections Administrators (1982)). See also note 19, infra.
[19] American Bar Association, Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal Services to Prisoners: An Analysis and Report (1973). See note 5, supra, and Israel at p. 43.
[20] See Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich.1987) and Israel at pp. 26-39 and pp. 54-56.
[21] Neuhard, 6/3/85 at p. 17, et seq. If no appealable issues are apparent after review by SADO staff attorneys, the case is dismissed with no further analysis if the client agrees. The rate of voluntary dismissals is approximately seventeen per cent. Ibid. No evidence indicates any situations in which SADO attorneys and their clients were in conflict as to the lack of merit of the client's case. Ibid. SADO does not have a policy of filing Anders briefs. Ibid at p. 18.
[22] Israel's report is entitled "Report on the Extent of Inmate Legal Problems and Resources Available and Needed to Provide Meaningful Access to the Courts." The study also reflects the views of Professor Wolfson. See Section III, supra.
[23] As Israel notes, there is an obvious overlap between the second and third categories. An inmate "may request habeas corpus relief, placing his request in the category of `other post-conviction' matters, but the staff attorney in PLS may conclude that the justiciable claim must first be exhausted by presentation through a delayed appeal." (Israel, p. 27, n. 42)
Further, Israel estimates that the first three categories, those involving criminal actions, may account for as much as fifty per cent of the PLS workload. (Israel, p. 65).
[24] The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has developed simplified forms accompanied by instructions for inmates who seek to file either 42 U.S.C. section 1983 or habeas corpus actions as well as forms to aid inmates in applying for in forma pauperis status. (Defendants' exhibit 30) A similar package of forms is available to inmates who ask for state circuit court review from adverse disciplinary hearing decisions. (See Defendants' exhibit 31).
[25] In 1985, for example, inmates from the Central Complex filed approximately 180 lawsuits against the Department of Corrections or its employees. (Wallace, 6/24/86 pp. 27 and 37. See also Defendants' exhibit 34).
As a point of comparison, inmates from other complexes at SPSM, also serviced by PLS, filed an additional seventy-three suits against the Department of Corrections or its employees in 1985. (Wallace, 6/24/86 p. 38).
[*] Note: Type of assistance line totals by category do not agree with the yearly totals presented in the prior table.
[26] Israel, p. 32. For the prison as a whole, there has been an increase from 853 requests in 1981 to 3,321 in 1985. (The annual figures are: 1981-853 requests; 1982-1,406 requests; 1983-1,941 requests; 1984-1,916 requests, and 1985-3,321 requests).
[27] Israel, p. 32. Israel also observes that "in this respect, [inmates] would be in no different situation than indigent persons seeking legal assistance from many legal aid offices. Plaintiff divorce cases traditionally are given lowest priority (and commonly wait-listed, sometimes for as long as a year) by legal aid offices with heavy caseloads. (The prisoner's situation is arguably distinguishable, however, since divorce may be more significant to him in light of its possible impact on parole opportunities and the prisoner faces greater obstacles in proceeding on his own, due to his inability to appear in court.)" Ibid.
[28] "A Study of the Grievance System at the Central Complex and Reception and Guidance Center, State Prison of Southern Michigan," March 30, 1987. Wolfson's study also reflects the views of Professor Israel. See Section III, supra.

[29] The number of grievances presented at each meeting is now being limited, according to the testimony of an inmate member, Koster; the emphasis may have shifted back to more widespread problems since Wolfson reviewed the Warden's Forum program.
[30] Under the current grievance procedure, the Grievance Coordinator's workload is heavy. For example, during the first five months of 1986, a monthly average of 940 grievances were filed by inmates as Step I of the grievance procedure. (See chart 0907 Wolfson, p. 10).
[31] Certain categories of appeals go directly to Step III (i.e., brutality and discrimination).
[32] In three months during 1986, of nearly 800 filings at the Step III, less than four per cent were resolved in favor of the inmate. Wolfson notes that it would be incredible that prisoners would continue to file almost 800 grievances were ninety-six per cent of them without merit. Because of the overwhelming workload, Wolfson concludes that the process at Steps I and II cannot be so painstaking that these figures reflect the lack of mistakes. (Wolfson pp. 9-10)
[33] See, e.g., the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. sections 1997-97j, which requests states to voluntarily incorporate inmates and employees into their grievance procedure in an advisory role in formulating, implementing, and operating the grievance procedure. Section 1997e(b)(2). See also 28 C.F.R. 40.1-40.10 for the minimum standards promulgated under the Act.
[34] See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 471 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2467 n. 4, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting, and citing Bounds, supra, stated that the Constitution has been applied to issues affecting prisoners including "right to assistance in the filing of legal papers."); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 n. 1 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (the explicit concern of Bounds, supra "was getting inmates through the courtroom door."); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 n. 22 (5th Cir.1980) (inmates are entitled to assistance in filing habeas corpus and civil rights actions, ref. Bounds, supra); Carter v. Kamka, 515 F.Supp. 825, 831 (D.Md. 1980) (Legal Assistance Program met "the `adequacy' requirement, not only in `the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers', as required by Bounds, [supra] but in the entire gamut of representing DOC inmates in civil rights cases, and habeas corpus cases as well."); Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (Inmate access to the courts is not "adequate, effective and meaningful" if "it embraces no more than being permitted to file a paper that, without determination of whether it states a claim legally sufficient and within the court's jurisdiction, is subject to dismissal on grounds of convenience to courts and litigants."); and Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856, 859 (10th Cir.1985).
[35] The court in Kane, supra, marshals the following to support this point: "Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 [(5th Cir.1980)] ("Library books, even if `adequate' in number, cannot provide access to the courts for those persons who do not speak English or who are illiterate"); Cody v. Hillard, 599 F.Supp. 1025, 1061 (D.S.D.1984), aff'd 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.1986), reh'g granted, 804 F.2d 440 ("a law library, without more, is not sufficient to enable prison inmates ... unschooled in the basics of legal writing to prepare a petition or complaint") [aff'd and rev'd in part, en banc 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir.1987), cert. den'd ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1078, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988)]; Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D.Mich.1979) (an adequate library "cannot provide meaningful aid to a prisoner unschooled in the most basic techniques of legal research"); Canterino [v. Wilson], 562 F.Supp. [106] at 108-112 [W.D. Ken.1983] (mere access to an adequate legal library is unavailing to prisoners lacking sufficient intellectual ability to use the facility)." Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099, 1105, supra.
[36] States which provide legal assistance by contract (or other funding arrangements) with services utilizing attorneys and/or paraprofessionals are Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington (pursuant to statutory and/or administrative authority.) See, e.g., Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1249, n. 8 and n. 9 (7th Cir.1983).
[37] For example, committees composed of both inmates and staff are used in New York. G. Cole & J. Gilbert, Alternative Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms for Prisoner Grievances, 9 The Justice System Journal 317 (1984).

[38] Wolfson states that locating personnel in the Bureau of Health Care rather than within the Bureau of Correctional Facilities would offer advantages with regard to emphasis of concern, independence, etc. (Wolfson, p. 16)
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 896 F.Supp. 697 (1995)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 80-73581.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
March 14, 1995.
6989 *698 *699 Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, MI, for plaintiffs.
David G. Edick, Kim G. Harris, Asst. Mich. Attys. Gen., Lansing, MI, for defendants.
OPINION
FEIKENS, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Mary Glover, et al. v. Perry Johnson, et al., Civil Action No. 77-71229 (ultimately a class action), began on May 19, 1977. The case of Everett Hadix, et al. v. Perry Johnson, et al., as captioned above (ultimately a class action), began on September 18, 1980.
In all of the years since these cases were filed until now, the parties have sought this court's active involvement. See Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Mich.1979); 510 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D.Mich.1981); 855 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.1988); 721 F.Supp. 808 (E.D.Mich.1989); and 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991). See Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988); aff'd, 871 F.2d 1087, 1989 WL 27984 (6th Cir.1989); 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D.Mich.1989); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, vacated, in part, remanded, sub nom., Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir.1992); cert. denied, Knop v. McGinnis, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 786 (1993).
The key result of the several actions in Glover, both at the level of this court's involvement and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, was a 1981 Final Order stemming from a negotiated settlement between the parties and a resultant Remedial Plan dated December 6, 1991. See Glover, 934 F.2d at 708. On a parallel track, the various actions outlined in Hadix culminated in an Order, filed May 13, 1985, accepting the Consent Judgment (the "Hadix Consent Decree" or the "Decree," filed February 13, 1985). An Out-of-Cell Activity Plan (or the "plan"), dated November 9, 1985, was submitted to the court as required under the Consent Decree.
This common introduction to these two cases results from parallel actions initiated by defendant Michigan Department of Corrections (or "Department of Corrections") to modify the Remedial Plan and the Plan for Vocational Programs and Work Pass, in Glover, and the 1985 Out-of-Cell Activity Plan mandated by the Hadix Consent Decree, in Hadix.
While in their motion to modify the Out-of-Cell Activity Provision of the Consent Decree in Hadix, defendants rely on Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), defendants in Glover apply the Rufo principles in seeking modification of the Remedial Plan. Before discussing and deciding the respective motions filed in these two cases, it is important to point out the lengthy and arduous work which 700 these cases have required in *700 order to secure compliance with the Consent Decree and the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan in Hadix, and the negotiated settlement and Remedial Plan in Glover. Even now, after years of attempted compliance, the parties are at odds as to whether the goals have been achieved.

It may be indigenous to the nature of this litigation that it is seemingly endless. For example, with the exception of Michael Barnhart, counsel now for both plaintiff classes, all of the numerous attorneys who have represented the plaintiff classes or have been on the staff of the Attorney General are no longer in the cases. The office of Director of the Department of Corrections has had a number of individuals, beginning with Perry Johnson, and now Kenneth McGinnis. The population of the prisons is under constant change and, thus, the inmates who arrive at the prison facilities and are represented in both class actions are unacquainted with the past history of these cases, and see their confinement problems as new matters. Finality, in these cases is, accordingly, elusive 0907 even though it is highly desired.
What is striking, too, is the argument that is now marshalled in favor of modification. Curiously, defendant Department of Corrections has argued that public opinion with regard to the "rights" of prisoners has changed.
This court is necessarily concerned with the status of compliance with the various orders, plans, the negotiated settlement and Consent Decree mandates, should this court's involvement be terminated.
These are matters that are at the nerve center of these motions seeking modifications and termination; and they must be dealt with, if possible, in each of the respective opinions and decisions.
Before me is Defendants' Motion Seeking Modification of the 1985 Out-of-Cell Activity Provision of the Hadix Consent Decree pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) and (6).[1]
II. BACKGROUND

In 1980, a class of inmates housed at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex ("SPSM-CC" or Central Complex) filed a complaint, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated. Five years after the complaint was filed, the parties agreed to the entry of a Consent Decree. The scope of the Decree was defined in one of the introductory paragraphs: "The provisions contained herein are intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSMCC." (Hadix Consent Decree at ¶ 3.) Section IV.H.2 of the Decree required the development and implementation of a plan concerning out-of-cell activity for prisoners. Specifically, the provision required:

Within 180 days from the entry of the Judgment in this matter, the Department will submit a plan

which will provide for meaningful out-of-cell activity. It is recognized that no particular activity is

itself required. The objective of the plan is to provide meaningful activity outside of cells including

access to general and law libraries, education, industrial or other work activity, religious activity,

other group activities, etc. For the activities to be provided, there shall be reasonably adequate

staffing, facilities, and equipment. The plan shall provide access to these various activities such

that at the facility 75% of all inmates may be active out of their cells, including exercise, meal,

701

shower, and *701 law library time no fewer than seven hours daily on weekdays and five hours

daily on weekends. The plan shall provide for full and continuing implementation within an

additional 180 days after its approval or adoption.

(Hadix Consent Decree at 26.) (Emphasis added.) In November 1985, defendants submitted an Out-of-Cell Activity Plan to which plaintiffs did not object. Defendants now seek to modify that plan by substitution of an alternative plan.[2] Because I conclude that there has been no significant factual or legal change to warrant modification, defendants' motion is denied.

III. RUFO ANALYSIS

A. In General.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) provides that a

party may obtain relief from a court order for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment." In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the Supreme Court adopted a test for district courts to utilize when considering requests to modify, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation. Under the Rufo test, defendants, as the party seeking modification of the Consent Decree, bear the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the Decree. If defendants meet this standard, the court will consider whether defendants' proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances. Id. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 759-60.
Defendants may meet their initial burden by showing a significant change in either factual conditions or in the law which makes compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous. Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. Modification of the Decree is also appropriate if defendants show that the Decree is unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles or when enforcement of the Decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest. Id. Modification is not appropriate, however, where defendants simply rely upon events that actually were anticipated at the time they entered into the Decree. Id. at 385, 112 S.Ct. at 760-61. If it is clear that defendants anticipated changing conditions that would make performance of the Decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the Decree, defendants must satisfy a heavy burden to convince the court that it agreed to the Decree in good faith, and made a reasonable effort to comply with the Decree, before they would be relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b)(5). Id.
B. The Out-of-Cell Activity Plan and Defendants' Basis for Modification.
The purpose of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan is to make it certain that over seventy-five percent (75%) of the prisoners residing at the Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan have the opportunity to participate in meaningful out-of-cell activities at least seven (7) hours daily on weekdays and five (5) hours daily on weekends. (Hadix Consent Decree, supra.) The activities range from such basic ones as meals, showers, and yard accessibility, to work, college and vocational programming, general and law library access, family visits and religious and leisure activities.
Defendants cite various changes which they believe make the current provisions of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan 702 unworkable and *702 "contrary to public interest."[3] The changes can be classified into four areas: (1) factual
changes; (2) physical and operational changes pursuant to Section VIII of the Consent Decree and planned and implemented by defendants; (3) a marked improvement in the levels of violence; and (4) the remedying of overcrowding.
1. Factual changes.
Defendants point to several facts which the court will, for the purpose of this motion, assume have changed. However, defendants have not shown how the various factual changes make compliance with the Consent Decree substantially more onerous or unworkable. Defendants point out that: (a) the demand for Michigan State Industries products has changed; (b) level 5 inmates are present; (c) lack of interest (on the part of inmates) and shorter periods of time (prisoner turnover) prevent attainment of the academic and vocational percentages outlined in the Decree; and (d) public opinion has changed.
(a) The demand for Michigan State Industries products has changed.
Defendants believe that the decrease in the demand for industries products is sufficient to relieve them of the inmate work requirement under the plan. The decrease in demand, according to defendants, is caused by a number of factors including a decrease in public interest in the products and a restructuring of the industry by the state legislature. The industry is now an independent business rather than a subsidized governmental entity. Thus, defendants have had to adjust the workforce due to a decline in profit.

The plan requires that not less than 54% of the prisoners be assigned work. (Central Complex Out-of-Cell Activity Plan at 1.) In 1994 a 49% level was reached at Central Complex alone.[4] (Defs.Exh. 2.) Defendants thus reached 91% of the target percentage. Although the decrease in the demand for industries products, along with the restructuring of the industry, has had some effect, it has not made compliance with the plan "substantially more onerous" as required by Rufo, supra. In fact, defendants have almost reached 100% compliance. Although the percentages in this area may need to be revisited if the demand for industries products continues to decline, defendants' request for modification at this juncture is premature.
(b) Level 5 inmates are present.
Defendants also argue that the presence of level 5 inmates is a factual change which makes compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous or unworkable. According to defendants, the limitations associated with level 5 activities have changed. Under the Decree, the increased presence of level 5 inmates in the general population does not affect defendants' ability to reach the required proportion of inmates participating in out-of-cell activity.[5] Thus, although the presence of level 5 inmates may be a factual change, it does not affect defendants' ability to comply with the current Out-of-Cell Activity Plan.
703 *703 (c) Lack of interest (on the part of inmates) and shorter periods of time (prisoner turnover) prevent attainment of the academic and vocational percentages outlined in the Decree.
Defendants argue that there is a lack of interest (on the part of inmates) for academic and vocational activities which prevents attainment of the percentages outlined in the plan. However, defendants' exhibit 23 reveals that there was a waiting list for academic programming at both the Central Complex and Egeler facilities in 1994. According to defendants, it would be in the best interest of the inmates to have General Equivalency Degree ("GED") and other remedial programming instead of college programming because many inmates are functionally illiterate.
Under the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan 14% of the inmates population must participate in academic and vocational activity. (Central Complex Out-of-Cell Activity Plan at 1.) In 1994 defendants reached 12% for Central Complex alone.[6] (Defs.' Exh. 2.) Thus defendants attained 86% of the requirement. If defendants were able to accommodate the inmates on waiting lists they would have reached, more likely than not, the percentage targets. Although there may be an increased need for remedial-type academic programming, the facts do not indicate that compliance with the Decree, as relates to college and vocational programming, is substantially more onerous because of this increase.[7]
Additionally, defendants argue that shorter periods of time and high prisoner turnover prevent attainment of the academic and vocational percentages outlined in the plan because inmates cannot continue college programming if they are transferred to a non-consent Decree facility. The requirement looks at enrollment at any one particular time, not completion or attainment of a degree. More important, there is no proof that increased turnover has had any effect on the ability of defendants to reach the required percentages. The evidence presented by defendants indicates that they had reached 86% of the target in 1994. Because there was a significant number of prisoners on waiting lists for academic and vocational programming, it is clear that once defendants make arrangements to accommodate those inmates on waiting lists, they will have no problem gaining the additional two percentage points required.
(d) Public opinion has changed.
Finally, defendants argue that the change in public opinion is a factual change which warrants modification of the Out-of-Cell Provision of the Decree. Specifically, defendants point out that the sentiment of the public is against

college programming for prison inmates. Defendants contend that it is the desire of the public that its prisons discontinue providing college programming for prisoners. According to defendants, enforcement of the Decree is contrary to the public interest under Rufo.
Defendants have misinterpreted Rufo on this point. A decree is detrimental to the public interest when there is an increased risk of harm to the public if the decree is enforced. The Supreme Court cited Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 704 756 (7th Cir. 1985), as an example of this test. In Duran, *704 modification was allowed to avoid pretrial release of accused violent felons. Id. at 756-761. Defendants have not pointed to any increased risk of harm to the public if college programming is continued in spite of the public sentiment. In fact, numerous studies reveal that prisoners who receive college programming are less likely to commit crimes upon release. A change in public opinion does not mean that the continuation of college programming is detrimental to the public interest and does not warrant modification of the Consent Decree under Rufo.
2. Physical and operational changes pursuant to Section VIII of the Consent Decree and planned and implemented by defendants.
Section VIII of the Consent Decree requires the development and implementation of a Management Plan for SPSM which, as developed, calls for the decentralization of SPSM into four facilities that are substantially autonomous. The requirement for this plan was included in the original Hadix Consent Decree. The plan is substantially developed and is under implementation.
Defendants assert that the implementation of the breakup of the SPSM complex, including the Hadix facilities, into four separate facilities, constitutes a change that warrants modification of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan.[8] Defendants argue that the breakup will make compliance with the plan more difficult because of changes in demographics and changes in the physical structure during the breakup only. Upon completion, however, defendants acknowledge that there will be no hindrance. According to defendants, the process of the breakup is preventing complete compliance with the plan and there will be even less compliance in the future. However, at the current time, defendants have no problem complying with the 75% requirement of the plan and are currently at 12% of the 14% academic and vocational requirement for the Central Complex.[9]
Defendants also cite certain changes that they implemented in order to improve the management and operation of SPSM and other facilities. Examples include the reorganization (McGinnis Aff. at ¶ 4.B.), the construction of new facilities (McGinnis Aff. at ¶ 7.), and the implementation of a new movement schedule and related operational reorganizations (Jabe Aff. at ¶ 8.). However, these changes should make ongoing compliance with the plan less onerous and more workable, and therefore they do not provide a justification for modification under Rufo. Furthermore, since the changes were planned and implemented by defendants, they cannot now claim that their own actions create unforeseen circumstances.
3. Improvement in levels of violence.
Defendants allege that the levels of violence have decreased since 1985 and that this is an indication that the facilities are better managed and under control. Defendants cite various changes in conditions of confinement including a reduction in the mixing of prisoners with incompatible security classifications, and a decline in the number of major misconduct hearings. As a result of these changes, defendants conclude that there is no longer a need for the plan.
To meet the Rufo standard, defendants must show that the changes make compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous, or unworkable, or detrimental to the public interest. Defendants have failed to establish that the changes, as they occur, make compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous, or unworkable, or detrimental to the public interest. In any event, the decrease in violence levels does not affect 705 defendants' ability to comply with the current Out-of-Cell *705 Activity Plan. If anything, the changes facilitate compliance with the requirements of the plan.

4. The remedying of overcrowding.
While defendants do not clearly state their case on this point, I construe part of the defendants' claim to be that it would be detrimental to the public interest to continue to mandate implementation of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, if the conditions that the plan was intended to alleviate have been remedied. Defendants claim that the Out-ofCell Activity Provision was intended to assure "the protection from harm and/or adverse impact from overcrowding." They cite, as proof, the fact that the title of the section of the Consent Decree under which the provision appears is "IV. Overcrowding and Protection from Harm". (Hadix Consent Decree at 23-26.)
Since there was an extrinsic purpose in the plan to improve certain conditions, and some of those conditions are actually improving as the plan is being implemented, it would be perverse to modify the plan simply because it contributed to improving the very conditions that it was intended to improve. Furthermore, there is no linkage in the language of the Consent Decree that defendants claim. Section IV contains a wide range of provisions, some of which are related to the prevention of potential future crowding, such as provisions to continue single celling. Other provisions relate to the mitigation of other types of harm. The purpose of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan was not to remedy overcrowding; the requirement of continued single celling solved this problem. Thus, the remedying of overcrowding is not a factual or legal change which makes compliance with the Decree substantially more onerous as required under Rufo, supra.
IV. ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
Defendants McGinnis and Jabe testified that defendants could no longer comply with certain elements of the Outof-Cell Activity Plan; that they were out of compliance with certain provisions; and that modification was therefore warranted. They cited conditions such as the closing of certain cellblocks due to implementation of the Management Plan, supra, and changes in schedules for certain programs and services as reasons for noncompliance.
I am persuaded that certain elements of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan need to be modified because they were written with specificity that no longer applies to current circumstances. The appropriate approach is to relieve the defendants of the obligation to comply with certain specific requirements altogether. I therefore order the following modifications to the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan:
1. Defendants shall not be required, pursuant to the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, to maintain a capacity for 2,340 prisoners in the Hadix facilities.
2. Defendants shall not be required to maintain a specific proportion of capacity for administrative segregation, protective custody, or punitive segregation.
3. The categories of prisoners identified in the second and third paragraphs of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, including prisoners in administrative segregation, punitive segregation, protective custody, the hospital, reception, and prisoners who are temporarily confined, may exceed 25% of the population of Hadix facilities. The provisions of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan shall continue to apply to the remaining prisoners.
4. Defendants may substitute other comparable groups for the Special Activities groups named in paragraph 10 of the plan.
5. In paragraphs 11 and 14, the plan refers to specific numbers of hours of activities associated with specific yards. Defendants may modify yard assignments and schedules consistent with the remaining provisions of the Consent Decree and the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan.
6. All references to "Central Complex" in the Plan shall be changed to "Facilities subject to the Hadix Decree."

7. Schedules provided in the plan as Appendices 1 and 2 are hereby deleted from the plan.

706

*706 8. For any provision of the plan involving a numerical measure of compliance, defendants

may demonstrate compliance for each Hadix facility separately, or for all Hadix facilities

considered in combination.

V. CONCLUSION

Defendants have pointed to a number of changes which they believe warrant modification of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan incorporated into the Hadix Consent Decree. None of the changes alleged by defendants warrant modification. Thus, defendants' motion is denied. Additionally, because some specific requirements of the Decree are no longer applicable, I order that certain specific requirements of the Decree be modified as discussed in Section IV, supra.

VI. FINALITY IN THESE PROCEEDINGS

As has been indicated, both Hadix v. Johnson and Glover v. Johnson have been before this court for many years. Defendant Department of Corrections has frequently raised the question of finality in these proceedings. There must come a time when the involvement of the court is no longer either required or necessary. The plaintiff class in each case argues that until the conditions that brought these cases to this federal court initially have been corrected, there is no basis for the contention of finality. The issue is complicated additionally by the argument that, in this case, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment which cannot be modified or terminated unless the requirements of Rufo are met.
Nonetheless the matter of finality must be addressed. Where, as in these cases, the parties (inmates versus Department of Corrections) are in a continuing relationship, the concept of finality becomes even more complicated.
For example, it would be an exercise in futility for me to hold that finality has been attained, only to have a group of plaintiff inmates begin a new case, citing the allegations of constitutional violations. The perplexing issue is: How is finality reached in these public agency-public law cases? Arguably, permanent involvement by a federal court in the work of a state agency such as the Department of Corrections is not desirable and, at some point, unwarranted.
As it is so often a need in the administration of justice, a balance must be reached. That balance is reached, it seems, when there is substantial compliance with the goals of either a consent judgment, as in Hadix, or a negotiated settlement, as in Glover. As the analysis of these factors has been made in each of these cases, as indicated in the foregoing Opinion, that requirement of compliance has not yet completely been reached. That fact may not be used, however, to avoid addressing finality. Even though progress has been slow in both cases, there has been substantial progress toward finality.
It is this court's view that a further test period is still required. That test period can be measured in a discrete time frame.[10]
This court, with the aid of its Monitors, will determine within a period of sixty (60) days after December 31, 1996, whether compliance has been substantially accomplished. During the period prior to December 31, 1996, each of the monitors will perform quarterly reviews which will be submitted to the court and the parties detailing the compliance status in each program in each case. In making this judgment and adopting this approach, I have followed the teaching of U.S. v. State of Mich., 18 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.1994). The procedure for the determination of finality, as outlined in that case, is a method for reaching a balance in these cases.
The plaintiff class may submit a proposed order.

[1] This motion is in response to the remand by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit of defendants' appeal of my May 10, 1990 Order. In addition to enjoining defendants from canceling, abridging and/or impeding post-secondary education programs offered by Jackson Community College for prisoners subject to the Hadix Consent Decree, the May 10, 1990 Order denied Defendants' Motion to Modify or Vacate the State Plan for Outof-Cell Activity. The court of appeals remanded defendants' motion to modify for reconsideration, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Defendants subsequently filed a motion to modify the entire Out-of-Cell Activity Plan of the Hadix Consent Decree. Oral argument was heard and evidence was taken on defendants' motion during a series of hearings held on June 28, August 2, October 27, and November 10, 1994. These hearings followed an intensive period of negotiations which were not successful.
[2] In their appeal, supra note 1, defendants argued that the nature and enforceability of the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan is questionable. Defendants claim that the plan that was submitted was intended to demonstrate compliance with Section IV.H.2 of the Hadix Consent Decree, and was not intended to specifically bind defendants to any particular program.
However, the Consent Decree specifically provides that "the [out-of-cell activity] plan shall be appended to the judgment in this matter" where plaintiffs have no objection. (Hadix Consent Decree at 33.) Additionally, in my August 23, 1990 Opinion, I found that the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan submitted was the plan required by Section IV.H.2 of the Consent Decree; that the plan is not simply a compliance report; that the specific provisions of the plan are enforceable; and that the plan became part of the Consent Judgment.
[3] In place of the current plan, defendants propose a modified out-of-cell activity plan which they believe effectively balances this court's constitutional concerns with the needs of the Department of Corrections to effectively administer this state's correctional population. Because none of the changes advanced by defendants warrant modification of the plan under Rufo, an analysis of defendants' proposal is not necessary.
[4] The percentage of inmates participating in assigned work at Egeler was 66% in June of 1994. (Defs.' Exh. 2.) In 1988, the Egeler Facility which was previously included as a part of Central Complex was separately named. Subsequently, defendants began separate reporting for Egeler.
[5] An increased presence of level 5 inmates in administrative segregation, however, could affect defendants' ability to comply with the 75% out-of-cell participation requirement if the number of inmates in the general population remained constant or decreased as the number of inmates in administrative segregation increased. In June of 1994 the number of inmates in administrative segregation was 156 out of a total population of 1,554, or 10%. (Defs.' Exh. 40). Thus, the increase in level 5 inmates, assuming this increase directly increases the number of inmates in administrative segregation, does not affect defendants' ability to reach the 75% requirement.
[6] The Egeler facility reached a level of 11% in 1994. (Defs.' Exh. 2.) See supra, note 4.
[7] Defendants' arguments and proposed modification, as related to college programming, aim to delete such programming altogether. However, defendants contracted in the Consent Decree, and through the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan, to provide college programming to qualified inmates in the Central Complex. I note that defendants are not opposed to the idea of this type of academic training. They have indicated that they would have no objection to a continued offering of college programming if this was not financed with state taxpayer funds. I note too, that, in the breakup plan, the new facilities are so constructed that classroom and distance education can be provided to inmates. With this in mind, I direct that the parties explore ways and means in which distance education can be provided to the inmates. Either the public universities or private colleges can form a consortium and, with the aid of seed money of one or more interested Michigan foundations, such a program may be begun. Ways and means can also be explored to see if there are available funds for the continuation of such a program through the Inmate Benefit Fund.
[8] Defendants also introduce the notion that the facilities resulting from the implementation of Section VIII of the Decree are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Hadix Consent Decree. However, defendants are obligated to implement all sections of the Consent Decree, including Section VIII, until, pursuant to Section XII of the Decree,

the court terminates jurisdiction. Furthermore, I previously ordered, in the Order accepting Consent Judgment (dated May 13, 1985), that physical or operational modification of the facilities located within the walls of SPSM does not affect the jurisdiction of this court, especially when the process of modification was anticipated by and conducted under the jurisdiction of the court.
[9] Testimony of Defendant Director Kenneth McGinnis (cross examination) Aug. 2, 1994.
[10] This approach has already been endorsed by Defendant Director McGinnis. (Letter from Director McGinnis to the court of 2/15/95.)
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 144 F.3d 925 (1998)
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants (96-1851/1908/1943), United States of America, Intervenor (96-1908/1943). UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants-Appellants (96-1907).
Nos. 96-1851, 96-1943, 96-1907 and 96-1908.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued February 4, 1997. Decided May 20, 1998.
926789 *926 *927 *928 *929 Susan Przekop-Shaw (argued and briefed), Michael A. Nickerson (briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendant-Appellant Perry Johnson in No. 96-1851.
Susan Przekop-Shaw (argued and briefed), Leo H. Friedman, Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendants-Appellants in Nos. 96-1907 and 96-1908.
Lisa C. Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen., Susan Przekop-Shaw (argued and briefed), Leo H. Friedman, Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendant-Appellant Perry Johnson in No. 96-1943.
Patricia A. Streeter (briefed), Detroit, MI, Deborah A. LaBelle (argued and briefed), Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI, Michael Barnhart (briefed), Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee Everett Hadix in No. 96-1851.
Lisa J Stark, Marie K. McElderry, (argued and briefed), Special Litigation Section, Steven H. Rosenbaum (briefed), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for PlaintiffAppellee.
Patricia A. Streeter (briefed), Detroit, MI, Elizabeth R. Alexander, Chief Staff Counsel (argued and briefed), National Prison Project, Washington, DC, Deborah A. LaBelle (argued and briefed), Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI, Michael Barnhart (briefed), Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee Everett Hadix in No. 96-1908.
Patricia A. Streeter (briefed), Detroit, MI, Deborah A. LaBelle (argued), Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI, Michael Barnhart (briefed), Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee Everett Hadix in No. 96-1943.
Marie K. McElderry (argued and briefed), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Intervenor.
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; NORRIS and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MARTIN, C. J., joined. NORRIS, J. (pp. 950-952), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
We are called upon in this appeal to perform the delicate task of determining whether Congress unconstitutionally encroached into matters reserved for the Judiciary in enacting the automatic stay provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or "Act"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), as amended by the

Department of the Judiciary Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (as amended in 1997). Under the PLRA, the filing of a motion to terminate a prison 930 conditions consent *930 decree triggers an automatic stay of all prospective relief under the decree on the thirtieth day after the filing of the motion, or the ninetieth day after the filing should the court postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by sixty days for good cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1997). The automatic stay remains effective until the court rules on the termination motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2).
In these consolidated cases the Michigan Department of Corrections moved to terminate longstanding consent decrees and sought to have prospective relief under the decrees automatically stayed pending resolution of the motions. The district courts invalidated the PLRA automatic stay provision on separation-of-powers and due process grounds. During the pendency of this appeal, Congress enacted Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), which amended the PLRA's automatic stay provision. The prisoners and the Department of Justice argue that under the amended statute Congress implicitly recognizes the inherent power of the courts to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with generally applicable equity standards, an interpretation with which the state officials disagree.
We believe the state officials' construction of the PLRA's automatic stay provision violates the separation-ofpowers doctrine because under their interpretation, the automatic stay amounts to a direct legislative suspension of a judicial order and, alternatively, intrudes impermissibly into the effective functioning of the Judiciary under certain circumstances. In contrast, the reasonable construction espoused by the prisoners and the Department of Justice does not violate separation-of-powers principles. Accordingly, we hold that the PLRA automatic stay provision, as construed to permit the courts to exercise their inherent equitable powers, does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary. The parties also raise several other issues that we address below, including whether the attorney fees provisions of the PLRA should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1980, Everett Hadix and other prisoners incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex ("SPSMCC") brought a class action suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against various state officials charged with the operation of SPSM-CC. The inmates asserted that their conditions of confinement violated their rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Five years later, the parties entered into a comprehensive consent decree covering most aspects of prison life, including medical and mental health care; fire safety; sanitation; safety and hygiene; overcrowding and protection from harm; volunteers; food service; management; operations; access to courts; and mail. The Hadix consent decree specifically excluded from the decree issues concerning classification[1]; due process; visitation; and access to courts as it relates to the provision of attorneys. See Joint Appendix (J.A.) # 96-1943 at 109-58. Though the state officials admitted no liability on the inmates' claims, the decree explicitly stated that it was "intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSMCC." J.A. # 96-1943 at 109. Under the decree's terms, the state officials could apply for termination of the decree when they were in compliance with all decree provisions. See J.A. # 96-1943 at 145. U.S. District Judge John Feikens approved the decree, ruling that it was both fair and reasonable. He has since issued several orders implementing the Hadix decree, several of which have been the subject of appeals to this court.[2]
931 *931 In 1982, the United States Department of Justice[3] began an investigation of conditions in certain Michigan prisons pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq. Two years later, after extensive investigation and negotiation with Michigan officials, the Justice Department filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the State of Michigan and various Michigan officials alleging that conditions in five Michigan prisons (SPSMCC, State Prison of Southern Michigan Trusty, Charles Egeler Facility, Marquette Branch Prison, and Michigan Reformatory) violated the constitutional rights of the prisoners confined therein. The issues were never adjudicated; simultaneously with the

filing of the complaint, the United States tendered a proposed consent decree and a "State Plan for Compliance." The United States agreed that implementation of the State Plan for Compliance would be adequate to bring the defendants into full compliance with the consent decree. U.S. District Judge Richard A. Enslen approved a revised version of the tendered decree that covered medical and mental health care; fire safety; sanitation; safety and hygiene; crowding and protection from harm; access to courts; and legal mail. See United States v. Michigan, 680 F.Supp. 928, 955 (W.D.Mich.1987); J.A. # 96-1907 at 181-92.
In the interest of uniformity, the medical and mental health care components of the Hadix decree were transferred in 1992 and 1993 from Judge Feikens in the Eastern District to Judge Enslen in the Western District. Judge Enslen has entered several orders implementing the USA decree and his portion of the Hadix decree.
In April 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Enacted in part in response to criticisms that federal courts had overstepped their supervisory authority in prison conditions cases, the PLRA was specifically intended to limit the use of court-enforced consent decrees and to restrict "the ability of Federal judges to affect the capacity and conditions of prisons and jails beyond what is required by the Constitution and Federal law." See H.R.REP. No. 104-21, at 21 (1995). Section 802(a)(1) of the Act directs that prospective relief in prison conditions cases "shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Correspondingly, § 802(b)(2) of the Act entitles the defendant "to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Such prospective relief, however, "shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary[, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means] to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (as amended in 1997).
On the basis of their new-found rights under the PLRA, the defendants moved to terminate the Hadix and USA decrees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The defendants sought to take advantage of a provision in the PLRA that at the time of their motion instituted an automatic stay of prospective relief thirty days after the filing of a such a motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (1996), amended by Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 932 (1997).[4] The defendants asserted that on the thirtieth day after the *932 filing of their termination motions, unless the court had made the findings required by § 3626(b)(3) during that period, all prospective relief under the decree would be automatically stayed pending the courts' rulings on the motions.
The district courts refused to allow the automatic stay to take effect in these cases, ruling that the automatic stay provision violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich.1996); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1362 (W.D.Mich.1996). Following the rulings, the defendants unsuccessfully moved in this court for emergency stays and mandamus relief to block the district courts from holding evidentiary hearings on the termination motions.
After this case was submitted to this court on appeal, Congress enacted Pub.L. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), which amended the PLRA's automatic stay provision. Whereas prior to the amendments the automatic stay provision instituted an automatic stay of all prospective relief on the thirtieth day after the filing of a motion to terminate such relief, the amended provision additionally permits a court to "postpone the effective date of an automatic stay ... for not more than 60 days for good cause." § 123(a)(3)(c), 111 Stat. at 2470, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e). Good cause does not include "general congestion of the court's calendar." Id. Although the amended provision enables a court to extend for good cause the effective date of the automatic stay by sixty days, it still provides that a courtenforced consent decree will be automatically stayed if the court fails to make the findings required by § 3626(b)(3) within the prescribed time period. Congress also added a subsection providing for interlocutory appeal of "[a]ny order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay," other than an order postponing the stay for up to sixty days pursuant to § 3626(e)(3).[5] § 123(a)(4), 111 Stat. at 2470, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e).
Subsequent to the congressional amendments to the PLRA automatic stay provision, the prisoners suggested that these appeals were now moot. We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing discussing the effect of

the amendments on these cases, specifically addressing the retroactive application of the amended statute, the authority the amended provision grants to a district court, the prisoners' claim of mootness, and whether the amendments affect the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The primary issue now before us is whether the automatic stay provision of the PLRA is constitutional. The plaintiffs, however, raise preliminary issues that must be addressed.
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the plaintiffs claim that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the denial of a stay is not 933 an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),[6] nor an appealable order *933 under the
collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.[7] The recent amendments to the PLRA's automatic stay provision provide that "[a]ny order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay ... shall be treated as an order refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction and shall be appealable pursuant to section 1292 (a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, regardless of how the order is styled or whether the order is termed a preliminary or a final ruling." Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123(a)(c)(3), 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). A court must "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision," Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), unless doing so affects "substantive rights, liabilities, or duties [pertaining] to conduct arising before their enactment." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Application of a new statute giving jurisdiction to the courts "takes away no substantive right," Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508, 36 S.Ct. 202, 60 L.Ed. 409 (1916) (quoted in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483), but simply "speak[s] to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (quotation omitted); see also Figueroa-Rubio v. INS, 108 F.3d 110, 112 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that statute regulating courts' jurisdiction affected power of courts rather than substantive rights of parties).
We therefore conclude that the recent amendments to the PLRA explicitly vest this court with the power to review a district court order barring the operation of the automatic stay prior to the termination of the underlying litigation, thereby providing a specific statutory authorization for immediate appellate review. We need not decide whether the collateral order doctrine affords an additional basis for immediate appellate review.
B. Mootness
During the pendency of this appeal, Congress enacted Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), amending § 802(e) of the PLRA. The prisoners assert that these amendments to the PLRA's automatic stay provision render this case moot. See Pls.-Appellees' Mem. in Supp. of Suggestion of Mootness. We disagree.
The case or controversy requirement continues through all stages of the litigation. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). To sustain our appellate jurisdiction, "it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed[;][t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit." Id. at 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249 (quotation omitted). "[A] controversy does not cease to exist by mere virtue of a change in the applicable law." Public Serv. Co. of Col. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir.1994). As the Supreme Court recognized in Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993), where the new statute is substantially similar to the old statute and operates in "the same fundamental way," the statutory change has not "sufficiently altered [the circumstances] so as to present a substantially different controversy," and the case is not moot. Id. at 662 & n. 3, 113 S.Ct. 2297; see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1548 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1820, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997). In other words, where the changes in the law arguably do not remove the harm or threatened harm

underlying the dispute, "the case remains alive and suitable for judicial determination." Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d at 1205.
We conclude that the controversy in this case is not moot for two reasons. First, the parties dispute whether the PLRA's automatic stay provision as amended preserves the courts' traditional equity powers. The state officials contend that the statute displaces the courts' inherent powers in equity, whereas the prisoners, as well as the 934 Justice *934 Department, argue that § 4 of the automatic stay provision implicitly recognizes and preserves the courts' power to stay the automatic stay in accordance with equitable principles.
Second, under the statutory construction advocated by the state officials, the objectionable aspects of the automatic stay provision remain. Under the prior version of § 3626(e)(2), all prospective relief under the challenged consent decrees would be automatically stayed on the thirtieth day after the filing of a motion to terminate the decrees under § 3626(b)(3) pending the courts' rulings on the motion. Before the expiration of the thirty-day automatic-stay safety period, both district judges entered orders finding the PLRA's automatic stay provision constitutionally flawed under separation-of-powers and due process principles.[8]See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich. 1996) (Feikens, J.) (hereinafter "Hadix I"); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1362 (W.D.Mich.1996) (Enslen, J.) (hereinafter "Hadix II"). Both judges concluded that the consent decrees and associated orders affording prospective relief were "final judgments" protected from congressional interference under the holding of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995). See Hadix I, 933 F.Supp. at 1361; Hadix II, 933 F.Supp. at 1367. In light of the finality of the decrees and orders, the district judges also found that the automatic stay abrogated vested property rights without affording due process. See Hadix II, 933 F.Supp. at 1369; Hadix I, 933 F.Supp. at 1361-62 (concurring with Hadix II). Moreover, the district judges believed that the automatic stay mandated the outcome of a pending case in an attempt by Congress to alter constitutional rights. See Hadix II, 933 F.Supp. at 1366-67; Hadix I, 933 F.Supp. at 1361-62 (concurring with Hadix II). If the PLRA as amended simply allows the courts to postpone by sixty days for good cause the effective date of the automatic stay without preserving the courts' equitable powers, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3)-(4) (as amended in 1997), the amendments do not cure these objections, and the controversy between the parties regarding the constitutionality of such legislation continues in full force. Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot.[9]
Where a change in law does not extinguish the controversy, the preferred procedure is for the court of appeals to remand the case to the district court for reconsideration of the case under the amended law. See Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg v. Sills, 567 F.2d 646, 650 (5th Cir.1978); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1208 (2d Cir.1972); cf. Faries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 909 F.2d 170, 173 (6th Cir.1990) 935 (holding that where the administrative law judge or Benefits Review Board erred by applying an incorrect *935 legal standard, remand of the case is normally appropriate for development of additional evidence pertinent to new standard). We normally pursue this course of action so that "`the district court [may have] an opportunity to pass [judgment] on the changed circumstances,'" Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg, 567 F.2d at 650 (quoting Korn, 456 F.2d at 1208), and so that we may be aided in our appellate review by the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, however, we see little to be gained from further delaying this litigation so that the district court may reconsider the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision as now amended. The prisoners challenge the validity of the PLRA's automatic stay provision on its face, and as such their challenge raises purely legal issues. Consequently, because this case does not necessitate any findings of fact, the district judges' expertise in evaluating factual matters cannot advance our appellate review of this action. Rather than further delay this case by remanding to the district court, we choose to reach the merits of this case in the interest of judicial economy. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1173 & n. 3 (6th Cir.1983) (choosing to reach the merits "in the interest of judicial economy" rather than remand where the district court failed to reach the merits because it erroneously held that it lacked jurisdiction, and where the case was submitted on the law and neither side argued that further fact-finding was necessary to decide the issues presented), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984); Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549-57 (reviewing constitutionality of amended campaign finance law without remanding to district court where amendment simply changed the mechanics of the expenditure limitation waiver and appellants assailed the validity of the amended law on primarily the same grounds); Probert v. INS, 954 F.2d 1253, 1255 (6th Cir.1992)

(interpreting statute amended while on appeal). We now turn to the constitutionality of the PLRA's automatic stay provision as amended.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLRA AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION
Section 802 of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, as amended by Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), imposes standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions concerning conditions in prisons, designed to ensure that relief in prison reform cases would be narrowly tailored to cure actual violations of federal rights. See H.R.REP. No. 104-21, 24 n.2 (1995). The Act defines "prospective relief" to include all relief, other than compensatory monetary damages, "in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements." 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (g)(7), (9). For prospective relief entered after the passage of the PLRA, § 802 provides for periodic review to determine whether the prescribed relief remains necessary and narrowly drawn to remedy violations of federal rights. For relief entered before the PLRA's effective date, April 26, 1996, § 802 requires that only prospective relief that comports with present legal standards should continue. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Congress stated explicitly that § 802 of the PLRA "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title." See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 note (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments). Congress also directed that the 1997 amendments to § 802 of the PLRA "shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to pending cases." Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123(b), 111 Stat. 2440, 2471 (1997). Congress included a severability provision that preserves the remainder of the PLRA should any portion be deemed unconstitutional. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 note (Severability of Provisions).[10]
936 *936 The filing of a motion to terminate a consent decree under the PLRA triggers an automatic stay of all prospective relief under the decree on the thirtieth day after the motion's filing, or upon the ninetieth day after the motion's filing should the court postpone the automatic stay's effective date by sixty days for good cause, pending a final ruling on the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1997). The parties dispute whether the statute, as amended, permits the courts to invoke their equitable authority and suspend the automatic stay.
The prisoners and the Justice Department argue that the PLRA as amended implicitly recognizes the lower courts' discretionary power to stay the automatic stay in accordance with principles of equity. Where courts improperly exercise power they do not possess or fail to take required action, the appropriate recourse for the aggrieved party is to petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, not interlocutory appellate review. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 257, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957). For example, Congress amended § 3626(e)(1) to provide for mandamus where the district court fails "to issue a prompt ruling" on a motion to terminate or modify a consent degree brought under § 3626(b), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1) (as amended in 1997), in order "to make clear that mandamus relief is available to compel the court to issue a ruling on a pending motion." H.R. CONF. REP. 105-405, at ___ (1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. H10845 (November 13, 1997). Rather than provide for a writ of mandamus to remedy "[a]ny order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay," other than an order postponing the automatic stay pursuant to § 3626(e)(3), Congress enacted § 3626(e)(4), which provides for interlocutory appeal of such orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(4) (as amended in 1997). The prisoners and the Justice Department logically argue that Congress would have no need to provide for expedited review of orders suspending the automatic stay if the courts did not have the power to issue such orders. In other words, had Congress intended to bar the courts from issuing orders suspending operation of the automatic stay, Congress would have explicitly stated as much and would have provided the remedy of mandamus rather than for appellate review of such orders.
Disagreeing with this interpretation, the state prison officials contend that the automatic stay provision as amended does not authorize any court to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by more than sixty days, and that in adding § 4 Congress merely established appellate jurisdiction over district court orders suspending the automatic stay. Noting that prior to the 1997 amendment, the prisoners in this case argued on appeal that the district courts' initial orders suspending the automatic stay were not appealable interlocutory

orders and that we therefore lacked jurisdiction over this appeal, the state officials suggest that Congress enacted § 4 in order to put to rest the prisoners' jurisdictional challenge.
In resolving this conundrum as to the proper interpretation of the PLRA automatic stay provision, we rely on two rules of statutory construction. First, we will not interpret a statute as limiting the equitable jurisdiction of federal courts absent a clear command from Congress to the contrary. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); see also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946). Because our review of the amended statute and its accompanying legislative history fails to reveal a clear congressional intent to displace the equitable powers of the federal courts, we must construe the 937 PLRA automatic stay provision as *937 preserving the courts' inherent power to suspend the automatic stay. Second, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the [courts] will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 628-29, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988)); see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962) ("[A] statute should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts."). For the reasons explained below, we believe the statutory construction advanced by the state prison officials constitutes an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary, whereas the alternative construction put forward by the prisoners and the Justice Department avoids such constitutional infirmities. Because "[f]ederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality," International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961), we agree with the prisoners' and Justice Department's construction of the PLRA's automatic stay provision and hold that the courts retain the power to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with general equitable principles. Given this construction, the amended automatic stay provision is constitutional.
A. Displacement of Courts' Inherent Powers
Certain inherent powers of the courts are said to be "rooted in the notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court ... to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion." ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.1978). Included among the courts' traditional inherent powers is the authority to issue injunctive relief, such as the power to stay court orders. This authority derives not only from the power of the Judiciary to manage its affairs, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (explaining that the courts' inherent powers are governed "by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases" (quotation omitted)); cf. Clinton v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1650, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (underscoring a district court's broad discretion "to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket"), but also furthers the pursuit of achieving complete justice by enabling the court to suspend those judgments whose enforcement leads to inequitable results. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 233-34, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (explaining that Rule 60(b) "merely reflects and confirms the courts' own inherent and discretionary power, `firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic,' to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity") (quoting HazelAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944)); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (stating that the historic power of equity allows a federal court to vacate its own judgment where induced by fraud). Although "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for [t]hese courts were created by act of Congress," Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original), "the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command." Porter, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086; see also Califano, 442 U.S. at 705, 99 S.Ct. 2545 ("Absent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction."). We require Congress to make plain its desire to limit the courts' inherent powers because "`[t]he great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'" Porter, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (quotation omitted).
938

*938 We do not think the language of the PLRA automatic stay provision or the statute's legislative history compels a departure from the courts' inherent power to stay judicial orders in order to achieve equity. As explained previously, the prisoners' and the Justice Department's statutory construction is based on the logical assumption that Congress would not have provided in § 3626(e)(4) for expedited review of orders suspending the automatic stay if the courts did not have the authority to issue such orders. Moreover, the legislative history does not reveal a clear congressional command limiting the courts' inherent powers. Although the Conference Report accompanying the 1997 bill amending the automatic stay provision explains that Congress wished "to make clear that mandamus relief is available to compel the court to issue a ruling on a pending motion [to terminate or modify the consent decree] and to provide the courts additional time (60 days) to rule on motions to terminate before the automatic stay takes effect," the report is silent as to the legislative intent behind § 4. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-405 (1997). Nor does the report indicate whether Congress sought to eliminate all judicial discretion over the operation of the automatic stay.[11] Accordingly, we must resolve the ambiguities surrounding the automatic stay provision in favor of the interpretation which preserves the courts' ability to consider proceedings brought under the PLRA termination provisions in accordance with traditional equitable practices. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944) (resolving the ambiguities of § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.App. § 925(a) (1944), "in favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings under this emergency legislation in accordance with their traditional practices"). We therefore accept the statutory construction advanced by the prisoners and the Department of Justice.
B. Constitutional Considerations: Separation-of-Powers Doctrine
We are committed to interpreting the PLRA automatic stay provision not only as preserving the courts' inherent powers absent clear congressional command to the contrary, but also in a manner that renders the statute constitutionally valid. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). We thus must confront the fundamental question of whether the state prison officials' construction of the statute raises serious constitutional problems, specifically, under that view whether the statute constitutes an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into powers reserved to the Judiciary. We conclude that the state officials' construction of the PLRA automatic stay provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. Because the prisoners' and the Justice Department's construction of the provision avoids the serious constitutional problems posed by the state officials' statutory construction, it is incumbent upon us to interpret the PLRA automatic stay provision as preserving the court's inherent authority to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with general equitable principles.
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, reviewable de novo. See United States v. Brown, 25 F.3d 939 307, 308 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045, 115 *939 S.Ct. 640, 130 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994). Our analysis
begins with a general presumption favoring the constitutionality of an act of Congress. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449, 74 S.Ct. 190, 98 L.Ed. 179 (1953); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 21 S.Ct. 648, 45 L.Ed. 862 (1901). Bearing this presumption in mind, we turn to the challenges to the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision of the PLRA as construed by the state prison officials.
1. State Officials' Interpretation 0907 Displacement of Courts' Equitable Powers
Under the state officials' construction of the PLRA automatic stay provision, the federal courts do not retain the authority in equity to suspend the automatic stay beyond sixty days as provided in § 3626(e)(3). The prisoners argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), as amended, violates the separation-ofpowers doctrine by unconstitutionally prescribing a rule of decision without changing the underlying substantive law. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871).[12] Prior to the enactment of the 1997 amendments, the Department of Justice identified two other aspects of the operation of the automatic stay which affect the balance of power

between the Legislature and the Judiciary 0907 that the PLRA automatic stay directly suspends existing court orders, and places mandatory time restrictions on judicial decisionmaking which preclude the effective functioning of the Judiciary. The amendment of the PLRA automatic stay provision to permit the courts to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay for up to sixty days does not dispel these concerns.
Although we do not believe that the state officials' construction of § 3626(e)(2), as amended, prescribes a rule of decision, we conclude that under the state officials' interpretation the automatic stay provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it amounts to a direct legislative suspension of a judicial order. Alternatively, under certain circumstances, the automatic stay as construed by the state officials impermissibly intrudes into the effective functioning of the Judiciary. We therefore conclude that the automatic stay as interpreted by the state officials results in an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary, and we decline to adopt that interpretation of the automatic stay provision.
a. Prescribing a Rule of Decision:
The inmates insist that through the PLRA's automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, Congress prescribed a rule of decision in a pending judicial case without changing the underlying law in contravention of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871). In Klein, the Supreme Court held that legislation dictating that acceptance of a presidential pardon constituted conclusive evidence of a person's disloyalty to the United States and directing the Court to dismiss actions pending on appeal in which property had been recovered based on a pardon was impermissibly "founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress." Id. at 146. Although Congress remains free to amend governing law and thereby affect the outcome of pending cases, see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438, 940 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (upholding statute against *940 separation-of-powers challenge where new statute "compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law"), the Legislature may not impose a rule of decision for pending judicial cases without changing the applicable law. Ultimately, the Judiciary must remain free to "say what the law is" in any given case or controversy. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
By contrast, the PLRA automatic stay provision does not mandate a rule of decision. The automatic stay will not take effect if the court within the prescribed time period finds that the relief is no greater than that necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of a federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1997). Although Congress has specified that certain timely findings are necessary to override the stay, the legislation does not direct any particular evidentiary findings nor dictate a result in a specific case. Courts are not restrained from giving "the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have." Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. Aside from its self-executing feature and its stringent time constraints, the interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison conditions cases at all times remains with the Judiciary. See Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1089 ("The PLRA leaves the judging to judges."); cf. Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.1998) ("[T]he termination provision ... does not dictate the result a court must reach in determining whether relief is warranted. The interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison condition cases remain at all times with the judiciary.") The PLRA automatic stay therefore technically withstands a separation-of-powers challenge based on Klein.
b. Direct Legislative Suspension of Court Order:
That the automatic stay provision does not manifestly prescribe a rule of decision in a pending case does not end our separation-of-powers inquiry. We also must closely examine the operation of the automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, in terms of the respective roles of Congress and the Judiciary in the suspension of existing court orders. We conclude that under the state officials' statutory construction the automatic stay provision is tantamount to direct legislative suspension of an existing court order, and we decline to embrace the state officials' construction of the statute because of this constitutional infirmity.
As has often been expressed, "the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution [was] that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the

preservation of liberty." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The Framers intended that, as nearly as possible, each branch of government should confine itself to its assigned powers, and "that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments," THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 146 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) (emphasis added); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). Thus, "each of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others." Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935) (quoted in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380, 109 S.Ct. 647) (alteration in Mistretta). Actions of one branch which undertake directly a role reserved exclusively to another branch disrupt this constitutional balance of power.
The constitutional principle drawn from Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), as articulated in Plaut, is "that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch." Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447. We make no impermissible leap to suggest that this principle carries weight as well in a legislative suspension of a judicial order. Review of decisions of Article III courts, whether final judgments or orders implementing consent decrees, must be confined within the judicial branch. Because the suspension of a judicial order is a judicial act not to be undertaken directly by the Legislature, the Judiciary must play some role in 941 the suspension of its *941 own orders. Automatic legislative suspension of existing and presumptively valid judicial decrees violates this principle.
The PLRA automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, runs afoul of the separation of constitutional powers because it makes the stay self-executing, taking effect without judicial action.[13] Under the state officials' interpretation, courts may not postpone the effective date of the stay beyond sixty days, and the sixty-day extension is limited to situations involving good cause (not including "general congestion of the court's calendar"). See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3) (as amended in 1997). Should the court fail to enter a final order ruling on the motion to modify or terminate prospective relief before the expiration of the sixty-day postponement, the automatic stay takes effect without judicial action. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (as amended in 1997). Thus, under the state officials' statutory construction, even if the court postpones the effective date of the automatic stay by the full sixty days allowed, on the ninety-first day after filing its motion, the state officials could simply refuse to comply with existing court orders implementing the consent decrees because the state could claim that pursuant to a congressional mandate those orders "automatically" have no force. Thus, if we applied the statute in the manner urged by the state officials, the "practical consequences" of the PLRA automatic stay would result, quite simply, in a temporary legislative veto over court-ordered relief in an ongoing case before the court. Such direct legislative suspension of orders of Article III courts simply cannot be harmonized with our tripartite system of governance.
It is of course true that at any time Congress can alter the outcome of pending cases, or those involving ongoing supervisory court jurisdiction, by changing the substantive law that courts use in rendering decisions. Cf. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226, 115 S.Ct. 1447 ("Congress can always revise the judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive" and thus is applied in pending cases). When that happens, however, the new law must still be applied in the particular case. The litigating parties are not entitled to act simply on Congress's command; they must go back to the court that issued the order to have the new law applied to their situation. Were Congress able to stay judicial orders directly, then any party subjected to a continuing court order might be able to bypass the issuing and reviewing courts entirely. The PLRA automatic stay, as construed by the state prison officials, impermissibly circumvents the judicial process.
The defendants argue that legislative authority to enact an automatic stay of judicial proceedings has long been established, as evidenced by the time-honored automatic stay in the bankruptcy arena. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, § 362(a) of Title 11 requires a stay of civil litigation against a debtor unless the bankruptcy court determines otherwise. In upholding the constitutionality of this bankruptcy automatic stay, the Supreme Court explained that although "[i]t is generally true that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction bears a presumption of regularity and is not thereafter subject to collateral attack," Congress, pursuant to its plenary constitutional power over bankruptcy, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, "may by specific bankruptcy legislation create an exception to that principle and render judicial acts taken with respect to the person or property of a debtor whom the bankruptcy law protects nullities and vulnerable collaterally." Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433,

438-39, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370 (1940) (footnotes omitted). Thus, under the exclusive constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate bankruptcy, "Congress can limit the jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law." Id. at 439, 60 S.Ct. 343. In contrast, once Congress establishes jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in an area outside Congress's 942 enumerated Article I plenary powers, "the courts are vested with judicial powers pursuant to Article III." *942 Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir.1985) (en banc). Having conferred jurisdiction upon the lower courts in this area, the Legislature cannot then displace the courts and itself exercise judicial power, save through impeachment. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L.REV. 1267, 1317 (1996) ("[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances ... agreeable to the constitution, be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested, but the important one relative to impeachments."). As articulated by Madison, "[t]he entire legislature can perform no judiciary act," and "[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 141 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) (quoting Montesquieu).
Our analysis convinces us that were we to interpret the PLRA's automatic stay provision as automatically suspending judicial orders without allowing for the exercise of the courts' equitable authority to stay the automatic stay, the PLRA automatic stay provision would be constitutionally deficient and could not stand.[14]
c. Encroachment into the Functioning of the Judiciary:
The state officials argue that the PLRA automatic stay, as they have construed it, amounts to no more than a legislative enactment in keeping with Congress's constitutional authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The express language of our Constitution confers in Congress the power to constitute inferior federal courts in which may be vested some or all of the judicial power of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Nevertheless, having granted the courts jurisdiction to entertain a particular case or controversy, Congress cannot then diminish the power of the courts to an extent which renders the courts unable to meet their obligation of providing adequate remedies. See Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 170; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 527 (1974) ("Congress ... may enact any jurisdictional statute that does not prevent vindication of a constitutional right."). We must therefore carefully consider whether in enacting the PLRA's automatic stay provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), the Legislature impermissibly conditioned the exercise of judicial power so as to render it ineffective.
To achieve separate yet balanced power among the branches, certain inherent powers issue by necessity to each of the three branches:
[I]f there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them. The interests and dignity of those who created them, require the exertion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation.
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). Recognizing this maxim, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the constitutional structure requires "that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) ("The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution."). Thus, we will only uphold a statute challenged as an impermissible legislative incursion into the workings of the judicial branch where it cannot "be construed as preventing the judicial branch `from accomplishing its constitutionally 943 assigned *943 functions.'" Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 647 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977)). A statutory scheme that poses a serious danger of encroachment or threatens the ability of the Judiciary to carry out its constitutional duties, however, so impinges upon the autonomy of the Judiciary as to run afoul of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Cf. Dean

Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 668, 712 (1990) ("The measure of the constitutionality of a government action challenged as violating the principle of separation of powers ... [is whether] it so hamstring[s] the ability of any of the branches independently to exercise its powers or to perform its functions that it is prevented from effectively carrying out its constitutional responsibilities....").
It is beyond dispute that there are certain inherent powers of the Judiciary that are untouchable by legislative act, see United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) ("Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution."); see also Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("That courts have inherent powers 0907 powers vested in the courts upon their creation, and not derived from any statute 0907 is not disputed." (citations omitted)). Although the exact boundaries of the courts' inherent powers thus far has eluded complete categorization, at a minimum those boundaries encompass "activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms `court' and `judicial power.'" Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. Because the denial of these fundamental powers renders courts practically inoperative, courts must be allowed to exercise those inherent powers essential to their constitutionally assigned role notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. Id.
The Judiciary's fulfillment of its Article III responsibilities requires, at its core, meaningful judicial decisionmaking. See United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir.) ("[S]eparation of powers would be implicated when the actions of another Branch threaten an Article III court's independence and impartiality in the execution of its decisionmaking function."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976, 116 S.Ct. 478, 133 L.Ed.2d 407 (1995). The preservation of this inherent power, so fundamental to the bestowal of evenhanded justice, requires that all federal courts be permitted to analyze relevant facts and the applicable substantive law untethered by the legislative branch. Otherwise, were the Legislature permitted to tie the deliberative hands of the Judiciary by erecting procedural hurdles that render thorough and thoughtful deliberation an impossibility, the will of the majority could effectively take control of the judicial process by sufficiently elevating the procedural hurdles in select areas of especially unpopular litigation. See J. Richard Doidge, Note, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation Powers?: Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 924 (1994) ("The legislature cannot do indirectly that which it cannot do directly."). Moreover, unconstrained deliberation by the Judiciary not only is necessary to preserve the independence of the Judiciary but also to protect due process rights of individual parties who come before the courts. Accordingly, Congress cannot restrict the independent and unconstrained judicial decisionmaking of the courts any more than it can directly stay the judicial order itself.[15]
944 *944 We fear that in many prisoner cases, the application of the PLRA automatic stay, as construed by the state officials, implicates the integrity and fairness of judicial decisionmaking by substantially impeding the courts' capability for thorough and thoughtful consideration. As interpreted by the state officials, the PLRA automatic stay requires nondiscretionary suspension of court-ordered prospective relief thirty days following the filing of a termination motion, or ninety days following the filing of the termination motion should the court postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by sixty days for good cause. This grace period is the only qualification on the otherwise compulsory suspension; beyond this grace period, under the state's view courts retain no discretion to defer the operation of, or dissolve, the automatic stay. In many cases, including those now before us on this appeal, the district courts' statutory task of ascertaining the presence of a current or ongoing violation of a federal right requires delving into complex factual or legal intricacies and a court record spanning many years. See, e.g., Hadix I, 933 F.Supp. at 1361; Hadix II, 933 F.Supp. at 1364. Consequently, thirty or ninety days before onset of the automatic stay may prove an inadequate period of time in which to find a constitutional violation where one has never before been explicitly recognized. By not allowing for judicial discretion in those cases where a court simply cannot exercise meaningful review within the prescribed time period, the PLRA automatic stay, as construed by the state officials, impedes the courts' substantive decisional role and can result in deleterious and distorting effects upon the outcome of the legal determination. Accordingly, in cases where the provision's deadline proves impossible to meet, if we were limited to the state officials' interpretation we would be obligated to declare that the automatic stay provision's time restriction unconstitutionally denigrates the Judiciary's status as a coequal branch in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.[16]

2. Prisoners' and Justice Department's Interpretation 0907 Preservation of Courts' Equitable Powers
Disagreeing with the state officials' reading of the PLRA automatic stay provision, the prisoners and the Justice Department argue that by its terms the provision implicitly recognizes the courts' inherent power to invoke the 945 injunctive process in order to do equity. As we explained previously, this construction *945 of the automatic stay provision is reasonable and not contrary to clear legislative intent. In order to assess whether the prisoners' and the Justice Department's construction of the automatic stay provision avoids the serious constitutional problems posed by the state officials' statutory construction, we must first identify the contours of the equitable powers retained by the courts.
Because the lower courts are created by Congress, a lower court's equitable powers are "conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect" in enacting the statute governing the case before the court. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330, 64 S.Ct. 587. We therefore begin our analysis with the policy objectives underlying the PLRA. Concern that the life of consent decrees in prisoner litigation cases often extended beyond the time necessary to correct violations of the prisoners' federal rights, Congress sought to terminate judicial supervision of prisons where the necessity for that supervision no longer exists. See H.R. REP. No. 104-21, at 24 n.2 (1995). To this end, Congress provided for review of all prospective relief and commanded that the federal courts terminate such relief absent proof of an ongoing violation of the prisoners' federal rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). In an effort to encourage speedy resolution of motions brought under the PLRA termination provisions, Congress enacted the automatic stay provisions because it believed that "[b]y providing that the prospective relief that is subject to the motion will be stayed if the motion is not decided promptly, judges will be motivated to decide the motions and avoid having the stay automatically take effect." H.R. REP. No. 104-21, at 26 (1995). At the same time, Congress did not seek to limit the courts' authority to grant or approve relief where prisoners "can prove a violation of [their] federal rights." Id. at 23.
Deference to Congress's intent of restricting prospective relief to only those prisoner cases where such relief is necessary to correct a proven violation of a federal right requires that courts invoke their equitable authority to suspend the automatic stay in very limited circumstances. Were district courts routinely to exercise their inherent power to suspend the automatic stay, the very tool Congress utilized in an effort to encourage expeditious review of motions to terminate prospective relief in prisoner reform cases would be rendered useless. Moreover, "[b]ecause of their very potency," the inherent powers of the courts "must be exercised with restraint and discretion." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123. At the same time, the lower courts' authority must remain flexible enough so that they may fulfill the guiding principle of equity 0907 "securing complete justice." Porter, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (quotation omitted).
We are satisfied that the traditional standard governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction in equity properly balances these considerations, although we do not rule out the possibility that a lower court may justifiably suspend the operation of an automatic stay under other equitable standards.[17] The determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction involves balancing the following factors:
(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary relief; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance of the injunction.
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir.1994); see also International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life 946 Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, *946 302 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 2941, 119 L.Ed.2d 565
(1992). Because these factors are not prerequisites but must be balanced, the likelihood of success required to support a suspension of the automatic stay depends on the strength of the other factors considered. See Washington, 35 F.3d at 1099.

While we do not attempt here to identify all scenarios in which the district court may appropriately suspend the automatic stay, we pause to note the fundamental importance of the courts' ability to provide meaningful review. As explained previously, where Congress impedes the Judiciary's capacity for thorough and thoughtful consideration so as to undermine inevitably the integrity and fairness of judicial decisionmaking, the constitutional principle of separation-of-powers is severely compromised. In those complex cases where the district court simply cannot exercise meaningful review before the effective date of the automatic stay, the public interest in protecting the courts' deliberative role militates in favor of suspending the automatic stay. We emphasize that although courts often may find it difficult to provide meaningful review, constitutional concerns about an unwarranted incursion by Congress into the province retained for the Judiciary arise only where thorough and thoughtful judicial decisionmaking is virtually impossible. Where a district court retains the ability, however difficult, to probe relevant factual and legal issues and deliberate upon matters before the court, it is in a position to protect its judicial orders against direct legislative suspension and to fulfill its "obligation to exercise its jurisdiction meaningfully," United States v. Michigan, 18 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925, 115 S.Ct. 312, 130 L.Ed.2d 275 (1994).
By preserving the federal courts' ability to suspend the automatic stay where necessary to ensure meaningful review and to protect judicial orders against direct legislative suspension, the prisoners' and Justice Department's construction of the PLRA automatic stay provision avoids the constitutional infirmities which plague the state officials' construction. Our commitment to construing federal statutes not only to preserve the federal courts' inherent powers but also to avoid where fairly possible serious doubt as to their constitutionality necessitates our rejecting the state officials' construction of the automatic stay provision in favor of the prisoners' and Justice Department's construction. Accordingly, we hold that the § 3626(e), as amended, does not interfere with the traditional inherent powers of the courts and therefore as so interpreted does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary. Because the time period prescribed by the automatic stay provision long ago expired in the cases before us, on remand the district courts should consider whether to exercise their inherent equitable powers to suspend the automatic stay in conformity with this opinion, to allow the automatic stay to take effect, or to terminate the decrees.
IV. RETROACTIVITY OF ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION
We now turn to the award of attorney fees entered in the Hadix litigation by Judge Feikens on May 30, 1996. See J.A. # 96-1851 at 464-69. What would have amounted to a rather commonplace judicial ruling on disputed attorney hours in an ongoing litigation has been complicated by its unfortunate timing. The inmates' entitlement to attorney monitoring fees and procedures for payment was established in the Hadix litigation in 1987. See J.A. # 96-1851 at 165-66. Pursuant to prescribed procedure, in early 1996 the inmates submitted to the state officials petitions for attorney fees covering the period of July through December 1995. The state officials objected to certain hours, and the parties could not resolve the dispute by themselves. The inmates therefore filed a motion for attorney fees with the court on March 12, 1996. J.A. # 96-1851 at 277-78. The motion, entirely for fees incurred in the latter half of 1995, was pending before the district judge on April 26, 1996, when the PLRA took effect.
Section 803(d) of the PLRA amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq., as it applied to awards of attorney fees. Prior to the passage of the PLRA, courts were authorized 947 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to award attorney *947 fees in this type of prison reform litigation based on the community's market rate for the services rendered. See Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir.1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989). Section 803(d) of the PLRA, however, limits attorney fees authorized in prison litigation to an amount "directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights" and proportional to or directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the court-ordered relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).[18] In addition, the rate upon which the award is based may not exceed 150 percent of the hourly rate established under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.[19] The 1995 established rate of pay in the Hadix litigation was $150 per hour. See J.A. # 96-1851 at 174, 392. Though the parties do not agree on how the PLRA would affect the rate of pay in this case, we assume, for illustrative

purposes only, that the PLRA would cap the maximum hourly rate for attorney fees in this case at $112.50 (150% of $75 maximum hourly rate).[20]See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3).
Seeking to take advantage of the lesser rate and more stringent standard, the state officials asked the district court to apply the PLRA's attorney fees provisions to the pending motion, arguing that the PLRA applies to all "awards" entered after the enactment date, April 26, 1996, regardless of when the fees were actually earned. Upon consideration, the district court denied application of the PLRA to the fees earned in 1995 and directed payment at the pre-established rate of $150 per hour. J.A. # 96-1851 at 464-69. Before us the state officials renew their arguments and ask us to hold that the PLRA's new attorney fees limitations apply to legal work completed prior to the passage of the PLRA. We decline their invitation.
We recently addressed the retroactivity of the PLRA's attorney fee provisions to legal work performed before its enactment, and held "that allowing the PLRA's limitations on attorney fees to alter the standards and rate for awarding fees for legal work competed prior to passage of the PLRA results in an impermissible retroactive effect by attaching significant new legal burdens to the completed work, and by impairing rights acquired under preexisting law." Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 250 (6th Cir.1998). Accordingly, we hold that the award of attorney fees for legal work performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and not § 803(d) of the PLRA.
As for the propriety of any given fee award, provided the district court explains its reasoning in a clear and concise manner, an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 "is entitled to substantial deference." Hadix, 65 F.3d at 534-35; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). "Accordingly, we review a district court's award of attorney fees, including the fee rate, only for abuse of discretion." Hadix, 65 F.3d at 534. The state officials assert that some of the hours to prepare an appellate brief 948 were excessive, duplicative, and thus unreasonable.[21] The contested brief was prepared for *948 an appeal to this court of a district court order refusing to modify the out-of-cell activity plan and mandating college programming following Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Judge Feikens, who was intimately aware of the work being performed by the attorneys, of the prior history of the case, and of the need to revisit the modification request following Rufo, found the hours at issue to be reasonable for the composition of a complex appellate brief. See J.A. # 96-1851 at 464-69 (Op. and Order Regarding Pls.' Mot. for Att'y Fees). Our primary concern is that the fee awarded was reasonable, and we are satisfied that it was. See Hadix, 65 F.3d at 535; cf. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 640-42 (6th Cir.1979) (discussing reasonableness of attorney fees award for large school desegregation case), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). Not having been persuaded that the district court's reasonableness finding was erroneous, we affirm the district court's May 30, 1996 order awarding attorney fees.
V. OTHER ISSUES
A. Termination of Security Classification
As part of the USA decree, the state officials agreed to design and implement a plan to classify prisoners' risks and security levels for the various facilities. Through his July 3, 1996 opinion, Judge Enslen refused to terminate federal court jurisdiction over the security classification system at the Michigan Reformatory, one of the five correctional facilities subject to the USA decree. That decision is now before us.
In April 1992, the parties to the USA decree filed a joint motion to dismiss most components of the decree and simultaneously asked the court to modify the USA decree's termination clause so that termination would occur as to any consent decree provision in isolation when the defendants are in compliance with constitutional requirements. The district court accepted the piecemeal termination proposal, but refused to allow termination solely upon compliance with constitutional requirements; rather, termination would depend upon compliance with the terms of the decree, but if constitutional requirements have been met, termination would not be precluded. J.A. # 96-1907 at 422. The court also refused to rule on the joint motion to dismiss until after it had received

updated compliance information from the independent expert monitoring the decree. Upon receipt of the compliance information, the court granted the joint motion for dismissal as to Michigan Reformatory and Marquette Branch Prison as to most issues excluding access to courts. J.A. # 96-1907 at 432-35. Following this court's decision, the parties entered into negotiations culminating in a Joint Review Process for addressing the remaining issues and a joint motion and stipulation filed with the court pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(5), (6), proposing dismissal of all provisions of the USA decree at the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison, excluding medical and mental health care. J.A. # 96-1907 at 249-364.
In its July 3, 1996 order which is the subject of this appeal, the district court addressed the joint motion for dismissal. The court ruled that it was "satisfied that the provisions with regard to sanitation, safety and hygiene; fire safety; crowding and protection from harm; access to the courts; and legal mail should be deleted from the State Plan and Consent Decree" as applied to the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison, yet the court retained jurisdiction over the classification issues as to the Michigan Reformatory. J.A. # 96-1907 at 381. The court relied upon expert evaluations showing that while Michigan had maintained an acceptable range of overrides[22] in 1993 and 1994, it had fallen out of compliance in March 1995 and had not returned to 949 compliance as of June 1996. The district court *949 expressed concern that Michigan did not maintain steady compliance and was out of compliance at the time of the court's review of the joint motion.
We have already articulated in a prior opinion in this case that the district court is not subject to the parties' stipulation with respect to termination of a consent decree component, but may exercise independent judgment regarding compliance with the decree. See United States v. Michigan, 18 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925, 115 S.Ct. 312, 130 L.Ed.2d 275 (1994). The district court properly adhered to that obligation in determining that the consent decree provision dealing with the implementation of a professionally-based classification plan should remain in effect at the Michigan Reformatory. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over classification issues at the Michigan Reformatory.
B. Evidentiary Record for Resolving Motion to Terminate
Michigan further contends that under the statute a motion for immediate termination of a consent decree must be considered on the record existing at the time the motion was filed, disallowing the district judge to engage in supplemental fact-finding. The state supports its argument by § 3626(b)(3)'s directive that "[p]rospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record" (emphasis added) that relief remains necessary and narrowly drawn. That language, the inmates respond, does not mean simply the existing record at the time the motion was filed. Rather, the statute necessarily enables a district judge to examine current conditions at the prisons which become part of the judicial record, since the very task before the judge is to ascertain the existence of "a current or ongoing violation" of a federal right. As the state would have it, the district court would be forbidden from supplementing the past record in a case to determine whether a current constitutional violation exists. The Second Circuit recently adopted the prisoners' interpretation, finding it the "most sensible" construction of § 3626(b) "[g]iven that the pre-existing record will rarely contain information on the `current' state of affairs." Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 179 (2nd Cir.1997); see also Thompson v. Gomez, 993 F.Supp. 749, 755-56 (N.D.Cal.1997) ("If the existing record is not adequate to determine present circumstances, subsection (3) gives the court the power to supplement the record by taking further evidence."); Ruiz v. Scott, 1996 WL 932104, *8 n. 6 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 25, 1996) ("Th[e] `record' is not necessarily limited to the record that existed prior to the filing of a motion to terminate under Section 3626(b). Rather, ... the record may include supplemental information that is presented to the court."). We note that other courts have also allowed the record to be supplemented with information on current conditions when considering a motion under § 3626(b) (2). See, e.g., Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397, 406-07 (N.D.Ind. 1997) (declining to terminate consent decree until after a hearing is held to determine whether ongoing constitutional violations exist); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727, 733 (D.Vi.1997) (relying on evidence introduced at a hearing following defendants' motion to modify or terminate consent decrees under the PLRA).
We believe this debate is premature at this juncture and should await appellate review of the lower courts' actual rulings on the termination motions. The proper evidentiary methods and materials that a district court may utilize in deciding a § 3626(b)(2) motion is a question more aptly considered when this court has before it a concrete

example of how a district court actually proceeded in ruling upon a motion under § 3626(b)(2). Since we hold the automatic stay provision constitutional in light of the inherent equity powers of the courts to stay the stay if necessary, this debate does not touch upon any issue before this court at this time.
C. Partial Stay of Phases II and III
On September 19, 1996, we issued a partial stay relieving the defendants of their obligation to implement Phases II and III of the Hadix decree pending this appeal. We now lift that partial stay, although we note that the parties 950 may ask Judge Feikens to continue the stay of Phases II and III until the *950 district court issues a ruling on the issues remaining in this litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the 1997 amendments to the automatic stay provision, as properly construed to avoid constitutional infirmity, do not interfere with the traditional inherent powers of the courts. Since the lower courts retain the power to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with the traditional standards governing the granting of preliminary injunctions in equity, we REVERSE the lower court orders holding the pre-1997 automatic stay provision unconstitutional. We also AFFIRM the May 30, 1996 award of attorney fees entered in the Hadix litigation by Judge Feikens, and we AFFIRM Judge Enslen's decision to retain jurisdiction over the security classification system at the Michigan Reformatory. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the decisions of the district courts, which held the pre-1997 automatic stay provision of the PLRA to be unconstitutional, must be reversed because the provision, as amended, "does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary." In my view, however, it is not necessary for us to construe the automatic stay provision to permit courts to "suspend the automatic stay in accordance with general equitable principles," in order to save the amended statute. As I read the statute, a district court may postpone the operation of the automatic stay once for a period of sixty days, provided that it finds good cause to do so. Nothing more is authorized by § 3626(e) and, from a constitutional perspective, nothing more is required.
Before discussing the substance of the automatic stay provision, I feel obliged to touch briefly upon the issue of mootness. Because the amendments to the automatic stay provision significantly alter the inquiry into its constitutionality, I believe that the appropriate response is to remand the matter to the district courts so that they can consider the effect of the amendments on the statute. This is the position taken by both the Justice Department and the prisoner plaintiffs and, as the majority opinion recognizes, this is the preferred procedure in cases where a change in the law fails to extinguish the controversy.
In declining to hold that the case before us is moot, the majority explains that "because this case does not necessitate any findings of fact, the district judges' expertise in evaluating factual matters cannot advance our appellate review of this action." This conclusion ignores the obvious consideration that, since the automatic stay provision directly affects the manner in which district courts handle prison conditions cases, the ideal place to begin an inquiry into the ramifications of the provision would be in these very same courts. As the result of the amendments, for instance, district courts can postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by an additional sixty days. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3). This tripling of the original statute's time period before an automatic stay takes effect represents a significant change, and we ought not to preclude the district courts from their traditional role in helping us to determine in the first instance whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution.
Finally, as the Justice Department points out, while this appeal was pending another panel of this court upheld the constitutionality of § 3626(b), the immediate termination provision of the PLRA. Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.1998). That development certainly alters the legal landscape facing the district courts on remand and we should permit them the opportunity to reassess their initial decisions.

In sum, I agree with the Justice Department and the prisoner plaintiffs that this appeal is moot in light of the 1997 amendments to the automatic stay provision.
Turning to the merits, I fail to see why we need to read an "equitable exception" into the automatic stay provision in order to avoid a separation-of-powers problem. The majority contends that if district courts are limited to a onetime, sixty-day postponement of the automatic stay, the provision "violates the separation-of-powers doctrine 951 because it amounts to a direct legislative suspension of a judicial order." It does nothing of the *951 kind: the suspension is neither immediate nor permanent; at all times the district court retains the authority to avoid (or, alternatively, to lift) a stay by simply complying with certain substantive provisions of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (b).[1] The automatic stay neither mandates a rule of decision in contravention of Klein nor reopens a final judgment in contravention of Plaut. Rather, the provision simply encourages the district court to comply with the PLRA in a timely fashion without divesting the court of the authority to decide the merits of the case.
What are the practical consequences of the automatic stay provision? First, the stay is, by definition, a temporary state that is lifted when the district court makes the factual findings required by the PLRA. While the realities of a crowded court docket coupled with the complexity of litigation related to prison conditions will occasionally make it difficult for district courts to comply with the time constraints imposed by § 3626(e), they do not make it impossible. Courts, after all, do control their own dockets and are free to impose deadlines upon parties and to shift schedules in response to evolving priorities. See Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254, 1255 (6th Cir.1988) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)).
Even in the event that the automatic stay provision were triggered by inaction, the consequences are hardly as dire as the majority would have us believe. In the event that prospective relief is stayed pending the factual findings mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), none of the improvements to prison conditions made by the State over the past decade will be jettisoned nor will prison policies relating to concerns such as health care revert to those in effect before 1985. Rather, the State will be permitted to pause in its implementation of those programs that have not been fully realized.
The automatic stay provision does not represent a way in which the State can evade its obligations. It merely allows the State to request that the status quo be maintained pending a factual finding by the district court that further relief is constitutionally required. Considering the lengthy span of prison litigation,[2] a relatively brief hiatus to review the continued legitimacy of extensive court-ordered relief strikes me as both constitutionally permissible and practically advisable.
Within certain limits, what Congress can create, Congress can take away. The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to establish "inferior Courts" and to determine the jurisdiction of those courts. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Even the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is, after all, subject to regulation under the Exceptions Clause. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868); see Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction, 36 Stan. L.Rev. 895, 908 (1984). Once jurisdiction is conferred, of course, Congress must permit the courts a "meaningful" opportunity to decide the case. In my view, the automatic stay provision does not, as the majority would have it, implicate "the integrity and fairness of judicial decisionmaking." Rather, it merely represents a permissible exercise of Congress' undisputed authority to establish regulations governing the manner in which inferior federal courts operate.
Finally, the majority's invocation of the doctrine of separation-of-powers seems especially ironic, since Congress enacted the PLRA in part due to a perception that federal courts flouted the doctrine by assuming control over prisons. The majority now lectures Congress that it need not have concerned itself with that aspect of the 952 doctrine. *952 Perhaps the lesson to be drawn by Congress is that the only side that matters is our side 0907 that while federal courts may encroach upon the prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches (not to mention those of the States), Congress dare not tinker with ours.
For the reasons just outlined, I concur in the decision to reverse the decisions of the district courts below, but dissent with respect to the reasoning. I also concur in the majority's resolution of the award of attorney fees by Judge Feikens and of Judge Enslen's decision to retain jurisdiction over security classification.

[1] By stipulation the classification issue was referred for resolution in the United States v. Michigan parallel consent decree. See Hadix v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 51 (6th Cir.1991).
[2] Some of Judge Feikens's orders have involved implementing a plan to break up SPSM-CC into five autonomous units. Phase I of the break-up has been implemented. On September 19, 1996, this court issued a partial stay that relieved the defendants of their obligation to implement Phases II and III pending this appeal.
[3] The United States is involved in this appeal as a direct party in the USA suit, as amicus in the health care portions of the Hadix suit in the Western District, and as an intervenor in both the Eastern and Western Districts on the issues regarding the constitutionality of the PLRA automatic stay provision.
[4] Before the 1997 amendments, § 3626(e) provided in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Generally. 0907 The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions.
(2) Automatic stay. 0907 Any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be automatically stayed during the period 0907
(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); ... and
(B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.
[5] The amended version of § 3626(e) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Generally 0907 The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions....
(2) Automatic Stay 0907 Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under [§ 3626(b)] shall operate as a stay during the period 0907
(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed under, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); ... and
(B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.
(3) Postponement of Automatic Stay 0907 The court may postpone the effective date of an automatic stay specified in subsection (e)(2)(A) for not more than 60 days for good cause. No postponement shall be permissible because of general congestion of the court's calendar.
(4) Order Blocking the Automatic Stay 0907 Any order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay described in paragraph (2) (other than an order to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay under paragraph (3)) shall be treated as an order refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction and shall be appealable pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, regardless of how the order is styled or whether the order is termed a preliminary or a final ruling.
[6] Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), "the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions...."
[7] Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, "[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States...."
[8] Both district courts properly rejected non-constitutional grounds for their decisions. Judge Enslen concluded that the automatic stay provision does not directly conflict with either Rule 60(b) or Rule 62(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hadix II, 933 F.Supp. at 1365; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Judge Feikens declined to suspend the effect of the automatic stay provision pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See Hadix I, 933 F.Supp. at 1361.

[9] Judge Feikens issued an order on November 1, 1996 that found the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), (b)(3), unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds and denied the defendants' motion to terminate the consent judgment under § 3626(b)(2) and Rule 60(b). See Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Mich.1996). On November 18, 1996, Judge Enslen entered a similar order for the Hadix and USA decrees pending in his court, but reserved final determination pending this appeal. See Appellants' Reply Br. at 2. Hadix v. Johnson, 965 F.Supp. 996 (W.D.Mich. 1996), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 134 F.3d 371 (Table), 1998 WL 30820 (6th Cir. 1998). Although the inmates had previously suggested that part of this appeal was rendered moot by the district courts' resolution of the underlying motion to terminate the consent decree, this circuit's recent opinion holding the immediate termination provisions constitutional and directing the district court to reconsider the state officials' termination motion forecloses the inmates' mootness argument. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.1998). Moreover, the matter before us is justiciable as an exception to the mootness doctrine as a scenario capable of repetition yet evading review. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (maintaining jurisdiction over "shortterm orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review" that otherwise may forever defeat redressability).
[10] Thus far, courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3626 since passage of the PLRA, including this court, have focused primarily on the immediate termination standards, § 3626(b)(2)-(b)(3), and not on the automatic stay, § 3626(e) (2). These cases have largely concluded that the immediate termination provisions are constitutional. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir.1998) (holding § 3626(b)(2)'s termination provision constitutional); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir.1997) (same); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir.1997) (holding § 3626 constitutional); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir.1997) (interpreting language of the PLRA immediate termination provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), to avoid constitutional problems); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir.1997) (upholding constitutionality of § 3626(b)(2)-(b)(3)); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir.1996) (same), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2460, 138 L.Ed.2d 217 (1997); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397 (N.D.Ind.1997) (same); James v. Lash, 965 F.Supp. 1190 (N.D.Ind.1997) (same); but see Taylor v. Arizona, 972 F.Supp. 1239 (D.Ariz. 1997) (finding § 3626(b) unconstitutional). Though the immediate termination and automatic stay provisions are connected and share similar features, we direct our inquiry in the instant appeal solely to review of the automatic stay provision.
[11] Although the Conference Report accompanying the 1997 bill amending the automatic stay provision does not reveal a clear congressional intent to displace the federal courts' inherent equitable authority, the comments of Senator Spencer Abraham support the state officials' construction of the provision. Speaking on the floor of the Senate, Senator Abraham explained the purpose of the 1997 amendments as follows:
The Department of Justice ... has contended that the stay is not really automatic at all.... The amendments ... clarify that the stay is in fact is automatic by expressly modeling it on the bankruptcy automatic stay, and they state explicitly that any order blocking the automatic stay is appealable, thereby ensuring review of the district court's action.
143 CONG. REC. S12269 (November 9, 1997). Although Senator Abraham's statements indicate his view that Congress sought to confine the courts' discretionary power to suspend the automatic stay to the conditions explicitly stipulated in § 3626(e)(3) (as amended in 1997), we hesitate to find a clear congressional intent to curb traditional equity practice on the basis of only one congressional member's statements.
[12] Prior to the enactment of the 1997 amendments, the prisoners argued 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (1996) violated the separation-of-powers doctrine not only by prescribing a rule of decision without changing the underlying substantive law, but also by directing the reopening of final judgments of courts. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995). Critical to this argument is the issue of whether the consent decrees constitute final judgments not subject to legislative alteration for separation-ofpowers purposes. We recently addressed this issue in Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.1998), in the context of a challenge to the constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3). In Hadix, we agreed with other circuits holding that the consent decrees consist of ongoing prospective relief that is not final for separationof-powers purposes. See Hadix, 133 F.3d at 942-43. Accordingly, the prisoners are foreclosed from challenging the automatic stay provision on the grounds that it unconstitutionally reopens a final judgment.

[13] See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 148 (1986) (defining "automatic" as "having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that performs a required act at a predetermined point in an operation"); RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 140 (2d ed.1993) (defining "automatic" as "having the capability of starting, operating, moving, etc., independently").
[14] We note in passing that Congress did not restrict the PLRA automatic stay to operation solely in the federal courts, as it did with the special masters procedural provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f). Section 3626 applies to civil proceedings initiated in federal or state court arising under federal law with respect to prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). Because the cases we review were brought in federal court, we do not address possible effects of the legislative mandate upon state court processes.
[15] We do not quarrel with Congress's unquestioned authority, which is routinely exercised, to prescribe procedural requirements that regulate federal court practice. Descending from the earliest days of the federal judiciary, it is by now beyond contention that "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts," Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941), and such rules "bind judges and courts in the proper management of the cases before them." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 473, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). Apart from time restrictions on the parties, however, temporal strictures upon actual judicial decisionmaking are scarce. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974 § 101, Pub.L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat.2076 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (setting forth time limits in criminal trials for both pre-trial and trial procedures)). Rarely do such rules and statutes intrude upon the Judiciary's substantive decisional role; where a judicial decision is tied to a temporal stricture, the court usually retains discretion to override the restriction for good cause. See FED. R.Civ.P. 60(b), 65; Speedy Trial Act § 101(h), 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (ends of justice); see also United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir.1982) (dismissing notion that statutes of limitations or Speedy Trial Act sanctions infringe the court's substantive role). It is one thing for Congress to prescribe procedures to be followed in federal court; conferring jurisdiction and then directing that judicial deliberation be exercised in an unduly restrictive manner is quite a different matter.
[16] The inmates also argue that the PLRA's automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, deprives them of their entitlement to relief that has vested by a court judgment in violation of their due process rights. Under the "vested-rights" doctrine, Congress lacks the power to abridge constitutionally-protected property interests that have vested through a final judgment of law. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24, 19 S.Ct. 134, 43 L.Ed. 382 (1898). The inmates, however, do not have vested rights in the prospective relief afforded under these consent decrees. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 n. 3 (6th Cir.1998). While consent decrees in certain respects resemble contracts, they are fundamentally judicial acts that have never been held to be beyond a court's power to modify as equity requires. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (recognizing contractual aspects of consent decrees but holding them "subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees."). To the extent that the decrees and their implementing orders remain subject to modification and continuous court supervision, they cannot confer protected property interests for due process purposes. See System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 649-52, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961) (the plaintiffs had no vested right to have a consent decree enforced after Congress altered the decree's enabling statute since "the parties have no power to require of the court continuing enforcement of rights the [enabling] statute no longer gives"). Accordingly, the prospective relief under a consent decree is not a final judgment for purposes of the vested-rights doctrine. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 176 (2d Cir.1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1090-92 (8th Cir.1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir.1996). Thus the PLRA automatic stay does not dispossess or trammel upon judicially-vested rights.
[17] The Department of Justice suggests that the lower courts may issue an order staying the PLRA's automatic stay where requiring plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing on the merits would be inequitable due to circumstances beyond plaintiffs' control which impair their ability to present adequately their position to the court. Supplemental Br. for the U.S. at 10-11, 15-16. While this position strikes us as reasonable, we believe it premature at this juncture to rule definitively on this matter without the benefit of briefing from all parties in a case that by its factual posture squarely presents the issue to the court.

[18] Section 1997e of Title 42, as amended by the PLRA, provides in relevant part:
(d) Attorney's Fees
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner ... in which attorney's fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that 0907
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under [42 U.S.C. § 1988]; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
[19] Section 1997e of Title 42, as amended by the PLRA, provides in relevant part:
(d) Attorney's Fees ...
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [18 U.S.C. § 3006A], for payment of court-appointed counsel.
[20] As we hold the PLRA's attorney fees provisions inapplicable to the fee award underlying this appeal, we have no occasion to resolve what would be the hourly rate in this case under the PLRA.
[21] On appeal the state officials object to 100 hours for Deborah LaBelle and 17.4 hours for Michael Barnhart. See J.A. # 96-1851 at 287-304 for itemization of hours.
[22] Section D.1 of the consent decree requires the state prison officials to design and implement a professionally-based classification plan. J.A. # 96-1907 at 185. By order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dated July 2, 1991, section D.1 requires the state prison officials to maintain the classification system override rate at a general norm of 20 percent or less. See J.A. # 96-1907 at 381. In other words, defendants may inaccurately classify up to 20 percent of the prisoner population should circumstances require them to do so.
[1] These substantive provisions have been upheld in the face of constitutional challenge by several circuits, including, as mentioned earlier, our own. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir.1997); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir.1997); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir.1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir.1996).
[2] Many consent decrees dealing with prison litigation, including those before us, have been in effect for more than a decade. See, e.g., Dougan, 129 F.3d at 1425 (since 1983); Suffolk County Jail, 129 F.3d at 653 (since 1979); Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 165 (since 1978-79); Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1084 (since 1984); Plyler, 100 F.3d at 369 (since 1986).
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 173 F.3d 958 (1999)
Everett HADIX, et al. (96-2387); Gary Knop, et al. (96-2397), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 96-2387, 96-2397.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued December 9, 1997. Decided April 1, 1999.
959 *959 Patricia A. Streeter (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, Elizabeth R. Alexander, Chief Staff Counsel (argued), National Prison Project, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Michael Barnhart, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellees in docket No. 96-2387.
Susan Przekop-Shaw (argued and briefed), Office of Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before: GUY, NELSON, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
DAUGHTREY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID A. NELSON, J., joined. RALPH B. GUY, JR., J. (pp. 964-66), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.
In these two cases, now consolidated, the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections and other state corrections officials contend that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction and system-wide final injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, a class of inmates at five correctional facilities in Michigan who brought suit alleging that the defendants had violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The district court granted both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in response to the plaintiffs' emergency motion to prevent the defendants from cutting off funding for Prisoners' Legal Services of Michigan. The defendants contend specifically that the district court failed to properly take into account the impact of Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), a recent Supreme Court case, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal law that went into effect in April 1996. We conclude that these cases should be remanded for factual findings and a determination on the merits consistent with this opinion. Because of the necessity of a remand, we leave undisturbed the preliminary injunction ordered by the district court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit began over 15 years ago, in 1982, when the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) 960 threatened to stop funding Prisoners' Legal Services of Michigan (PLSM). PLSM had been established *960 in
1976 by grants from the State Bar of Michigan and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and in 1978 the MDOC began voluntarily funding the office. In 1982, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued a preliminary injunction ordering the MDOC to maintain funding for PLSM until further order of the court, and in 1988 the court found that the plaintiffs' right of access to the courts was being violated and ordered modifications to PLSM. Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988), rev'd, Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir.1992). Hadix required the MDOC to provide attorneys for prisoners as a matter of law. Id. at 293. Prisoners at several facilities not covered by the Hadix lawsuit brought a separate action against prison officials in the Western District of Michigan in which they alleged, among other things, the denial of their right of access to

the courts. The district court granted them relief as well. Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.1987) (finding of liability); 685 F.Supp. 636 (W.D.Mich. 1988) (remedial order), rev'd, Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir.1992).
We reviewed the two district court cases on consolidated appeal and affirmed the courts' conclusion that the defendants' legal access system, while sufficient for prisoners capable of making effective use of legal materials, was constitutionally insufficient for prisoners who "cannot read and write English, or who lack the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent pleadings, or who, because of protracted confinement in administrative or punitive segregation or protective custody, may not be able to identify the books they need." Knop, 977 F.2d at 1005-06. In arriving at the conclusion that "something more was required in the way of paralegal assistance," id. at 1006, we held that "[t]he records contain evidence of a number of specific instances where unassisted inmates suffered individualized harm because of inability to use library resources properly." Id.
Mindful of the "wide discretion" and deference due to state legislatures and prison administrators with regard to the management of prisons, we then vacated portions of both lower courts' remedies as too intrusive and remanded the cases jointly to the Western District of Michigan for development of less intrusive remedies. Based upon this court's decision that a constitutional violation existed, the MDOC agreed to maintain PLSM at the Hadix facility, pending the district court's order. According to the defendants, as soon as a legal-writer program was ready, they planned to discontinue funding for PLSM and remove all attorneys providing legal services from within Hadix facility.
Upon remand, the district court ordered MDOC officials to develop a remedial plan consistent with our decision. The defendants proposed a legal-writer program that would require qualified staff to assess prisoners for their ability to read and write English and for their possession of the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent pleadings. Eight months after the defendants submitted their proposed plan, the plaintiffs filed a response contending that parts of the plan did not comply with this court's rulings and asking the district court to reject the proposed plans. Two weeks after the defendants submitted revised proposed plans in late February 1994, the district court conducted a hearing, as a result of which it found the plans to be incomplete. The day after the hearing, the district court issued its own set of interrogatories requesting further information.
In October 1994, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendants' proposed revised plans and heard from four witnesses about the plans' adequacy. The plaintiffs' two witnesses provided testimony about the reading level below which prisoners would not have the ability to effect meaningful access to the courts on their 961 own; the failure of the program to ensure control, supervision, and accountability; and the inadequacy of *961 the program's curriculum for legal writers in the area of post-conviction relief. The defendants presented two witnesses who testified to the development and the administration of the legal assistance program.
Two months later, in December 1994, the court issued an interim order requiring the defendants to revise the plan in several respects and directing them to implement the plan on a trial basis at one of the facilities subject to the court's jurisdiction. The interim order also required the defendants to monitor and provide an evaluation of the plan and provided for a court monitor. After six months, the court was to evaluate the results and adopt a final plan incorporating "features and approaches that prove to be necessary and effective in practice." Once the final evaluation report was received, "[t]he Court m[ight] then extend the trial implementation for further evaluation, or consider modifications to the plan under trial implementation, expansion of the trial implementation to other sites, and/or adoption of final plans."
In June 1995, the defendants filed their revised plan and proceeded to implement the plan as ordered by the district court. The director of the MDOC appointed a special administrator, Nancy Zang, to oversee the program. The pilot project ran between June and December 1995, and the defendants filed their final evaluation of the project in February 1996, to which the plaintiffs filed objections in March 1996. In late March, the district court issued an order requiring the defendants to submit a final plan and set a hearing to consider its adoption.
On June 3, 1996, the defendants filed their proposed final plan for a legal-writer program, in which prisoner "legal writers" would provide assistance to other prisoners whose reading level was at or below a sixth-grade level. Legal writers would assist these eligible prisoners in preparing "pleadings necessary to initiate the case." The legal writers' work would be monitored "during the first 90 days following implementation of services at each

facility," and the "work product of all new legal writers" was to be reviewed "as deemed necessary." Although this final plan provided the guidelines for eligibility, for legal-writer training, and for the scope of services, the plan was not as detailed as the district court had ordered in December 1994 because, the defendants now argue, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which had gone into effect on April 26, 1996, "limit[ed] federal judicial relief to that which is narrowly drawn and extends no further than necessary to correct a violation of a federal right." The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the defendants' final plan on June 17, 1996.
The district court held another evidentiary hearing about the final plan on June 20, 1996, a few days before the Supreme Court rendered the Lewis v. Casey decision on June 24. After Lewis was issued, the district court ordered the parties to address the impact of the new decision on this case. In response to this order, the defendants submitted a brief arguing that under Lewis, the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek prospective relief because they had failed to demonstrate that they had suffered "actual injury." The defendants asked the district court to vacate the interim orders and dismiss this action as a matter of law.
During this same period of time, the MDOC decided that as a result of the Lewis decision, it no longer needed to continue funding PLSM, and it informed the agency in a letter dated August 16, 1996, that it had until September 30, 1996, to vacate its offices at the Hadix facility and to remove all of its personal property.
On September 25, 1996, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to require that MDOC maintain PLSM at the Hadix facility. The district court held a hearing 962 on this motion five days later, granted the preliminary injunction, and issued a final opinion and order *962 both approving the defendants' final plans with several modifications and also requiring defendants to maintain funding for PLSM until the defendants implemented the legal access plan as modified and approved by the court.
In approving the final plans with modifications, the district court ostensibly considered the plaintiffs' underlying access-to-courts claim in light of both the Lewis decision and the PLRA. The court ruled that our prior holding in this case0907that "the records contain evidence of a number of specific instances where unassisted inmates suffered individualized harm because of inability to use library resources properly" 0907satisfied the plaintiffs' burden of proving "actual injury" as defined and required by Lewis. Knop, 977 F.2d at 1006. The district court also ruled that the relief it ordered was narrowly tailored to the inadequacies that caused the actual injury. Finally, the court granted the preliminary injunction mandating that defendants maintain funding for PLSM until the Legal Access Plan adopted by the district court is implemented.
From these orders, the defendants now appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
We review the defendants' challenge to the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir.1995). "In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." Id. Furthermore, "the district court's weighing and balancing of the equities is overruled only in the rarest of cases." Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir.1997).
In the cases at bar, the district court granted not only the preliminary injunction but also final injunctive relief, because the court found that the plaintiffs had already established the defendants' liability in Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d at 1006. We review de novo the legal determinations underlying the district court's decision to order final relief, and we review the court's factual findings for clear error.
One factor in assessing the appropriateness of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction is the likelihood of success of the underlying lawsuit (in which plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief). Therefore, because our conclusions with regard to the district court's legal basis for ordering final injunctive relief in this case will bear on

our decision regarding the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, we consider the court's decision regarding permanent injunctive relief first.
II. Standing: "Actual Injury" Under Lewis v. Casey
In Knop v. Johnson, the earlier appeal in this case, we determined that "there are at least some Michigan prisoners who have been denied the type of access to the courts required under current Supreme Court doctrine." Knop, 977 F.2d at 999. The underpinning for this conclusion was the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), in which the Court held that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist prisoners in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing them with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
In the intervening opinion in Lewis v. Casey, however, the Supreme Court re-examined Bounds and considerably narrowed its holding. Ruling that Bounds did not create an abstract, free-standing right to access to a law library 963 or to legal assistance, the Court held that to establish *963 standing,[1] an inmate must demonstrate an "actual injury," which, the Court said, cannot be shown "simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense." Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2180. Instead, the Court held, "the inmate ... must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim."
Moreover, when the plaintiffs in a Bounds action are a class of inmates alleging a systemic violation of their right of access to the courts, under Lewis they must show "widespread actual injury." Id. at 2179. The Court made it clear that the "[district] court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury renders its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid."[2]Id. The defendants contend, therefore, that under current Supreme Court doctrine, the injunctive relief granted by the district court should be vacated for failure to establish the degree of actual injury required by Lewis.
Moreover, they argue that under the terms of the PLRA, the action should be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case, conditioned upon the state putting into effect the remedial plan it offered to the court.
The plaintiffs argue, and the district court held, that the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis did not change the law in this circuit, but merely resolved a split among the circuits concerning whether actual injury is required to establish liability in a lawsuit alleging a violation of the right of access to the courts. Lewis arose from the Ninth Circuit, which was among the circuits that had previously held that no proof of actual injury was required in lawsuits involving core aspects of the right of access to the courts. See Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir.1989). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, had held that no constitutional violation exists in any case if "no particular prisoner was actually impeded in his access to the courts." Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir.1985).
In Walker, the plaintiffs claimed that they were not given adequate access to legal materials, and we remanded the case for a determination of whether the denial of access had actually caused any prisoner harm. We explained that "`[i]f appellant [the prisoner] could show that he has somehow been prejudiced in any of his various lawsuits, he might perhaps have a legitimate claim.'" Id. (quoting Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir.1978)). In Knop, we cited the Walker standard with approval. 977 F.2d at 1000. Just before the Lewis opinion was issued, we again confirmed our position that a prisoner who does not show any prejudice fails to state a claim that prison officials denied him access to the courts. Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir.1996) .
The plaintiffs contend that because the Sixth Circuit's "actual injury" requirement is the same as the Lewis v. Casey "actual injury" requirement, we should follow the law of the case and leave undisturbed our finding of actual injury in Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. The district court agreed and held that "[the plaintiffs] have already established the defendants' liability for a constitutional violation." Having found liability, the district court then proceeded to consider the appropriateness of the remedy.

After careful study of these cases, we conclude that the Lewis "actual injury" requirement does differ from the one 964 used *964 by this court in Walker and Knop. In Walker, we held that a prisoner might have a "legitimate claim" if
he could show that he had "somehow been prejudiced in any of his various lawsuits," 771 F.2d at 932, whereas in Lewis the Supreme Court held that only prisoners with non-frivolous underlying claims can have standing to litigate an access-to-courts action. Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2181 & n. 3. By explicitly requiring that plaintiffs show actual prejudice to non-frivolous claims, Lewis did in fact change the "actual injury" requirement as it had previously been applied in this circuit. In cases prior to Lewis, such as Knop and Walker, we did not mention nor make any findings with regard to the validity of the underlying claims that had allegedly been impeded in their presentation by the inadequacies in the prison's legal access program. It is also apparent from the evidence in the present case that no such requirement was imposed by the district court in reviewing the record for actual injury.
Because it is impossible to determine from the record now before us whether the underlying claims were in fact non-frivolous, we conclude that we must remand this case (yet again) for factual findings on this issue. It will be necessary for the district court to determine, first, whether any of the named plaintiffs are still incarcerated and active in the lawsuit and, second, whether they have suffered "actual injury." If the record fails to establish standing under Lewis, the action must be dismissed. If actual injury can be demonstrated, the district court must determine whether that injury is widespread among the class of plaintiffs. If the record fails to establish widespread injury, the district court should dismiss the action as to all but the named plaintiffs who have established actual injury.
III. Remedy
Without a finding of system-wide actual injury, as defined by Lewis, we are not in a position to determine whether the specific remedy adopted by the district court is appropriate. Under Lewis, the remedy must be specifically tailored to address only those inadequacies that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiffs have yet to establish. See Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2184. Moreover, under the PLRA, any relief ordered by the district court must be "narrowly drawn," must "extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation" found under Lewis, and must constitute "the least intrusive means necessary to correct th[at] violation." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Under the same subsection of the Act, the district court must "give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief." Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we hold that the district court's grant of final injunctive relief must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED for a determination of "actual injury" as required by Lewis v. Casey. Because the plaintiffs have not yet established their entitlement to a remedy, we cannot pass on the appropriateness of the specific remedy ordered by the district court, but we AFFIRM the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in order to maintain the status quo until a hearing on the merits can be concluded and a new determination made.
DISSENT
RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 999 (6th Cir.1992), an earlier appeal in this case, we determined that "we are satisfied that there are at least some Michigan prisoners who have been denied the type of access to the courts required under current Supreme Court doctrine." (Emphasis added.) The underpinning for this conclusion was the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977).

965 Recently, the Supreme Court has revisited Bounds and considerably narrowed its *965 holding. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (because Bounds did not create an abstract free-standing right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense).[1]
In recognition of the narrowing of Bounds by Lewis, the court in this appeal concludes that the Lewis "`actual injury' requirement does differ from the one used by this court[.]" Since in Knop we did conclude that entitlement to a remedy had been established, this statement can only mean that Lewis requires us to now repudiate the conclusion reached in Knop. On this point, I am in complete agreement with the court. Where I part company with the majority, however, is in the ordering of a remand to allow the plaintiffs another opportunity to establish "actual injury."
The defendants have advanced a proposal that is designed to provide meaningful access to the courts. In response, the plaintiffs have done exactly what Lewis says they cannot do.
Although Bounds itself made no mention of an actual-injury requirement, it can hardly be thought to have eliminated that constitutional prerequisite. And actual injury is apparent on the face of almost all the opinions in the 35-year line of access-to-courts cases on which Bounds relied. Moreover, the assumption of an actual-injury requirement seems to us implicit in the opinion's statement that "we encourage local experimentation" in various methods of assuring access to the courts. One such experiment, for example, might replace libraries with some minimal access to legal advice and a system of court-provided forms such as those that contained the original complaints in two of the more significant inmate-initiated cases in recent years, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)0907forms that asked the inmates to provide only the facts and not to attempt any legal analysis. We hardly think that what we meant by "experimenting" with such an alternative was simply announcing it, whereupon suit would immediately lie to declare it theoretically inadequate and bring the experiment to a close. We think we envisioned, instead, that the new program would remain in place at least until some inmate could demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.
116 S.Ct. at 2180-81 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the court makes only a passing reference to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 3626. The Act is not factored into the analysis. The PLRA, which was intended to limit judicial involvement in prison administration, limited prospective relief in prison conditions cases to relief that was
no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
966 In my view, when Lewis and the PLRA are read together, they dictate a result *966 different than that reached by the court. I would remand and order a dissolution of the temporary injunction and dismissal of this action, conditioned upon the state putting into effect the remedial plan it offered to the court. After that has been accomplished, if an individual inmate feels he or she can establish a denial of the right to present a non-frivolous claim to a court of competent jurisdiction, a new individual action may be brought.[2] On access to court claims, class actions will generally not be a suitable vehicle for bringing suit due to the highly individualized nature of the proof of an "actual injury."[3]

[1] The requirement of showing actual injury to prove a Bounds violation, the Lewis court emphasized, "derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2179.
[2] In Lewis, the prisoners were able to establish only two instances of actual injury as defined by the Supreme Court. Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2178-79.
[1] Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion: "And though we have not overruled Bounds, we have undoubtedly repudiated its reasoning in our consistent rejection of the proposition that the States must provide counsel beyond the trial and first appeal as of right." 116 S.Ct. at 2195.
[2] As Lewis makes clear, it is not just any alleged denial of access that will trigger a constitutional violation claim:
Finally, we must observe that the injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim. Nearly all of the access-to-courts cases in the Bounds line involved attempts by inmates to pursue direct appeals from the convictions for which they were incarcerated....
116 S.Ct. at 2181.
[3] As Justice Scalia points out in Lewis:
Justice SOUTER suggests that he would waive this actual-injury requirement in cases "involving substantial, systemic deprivation of access to court"0907that is, in cases involving "`a direct, substantial and continuous ... limit on legal materials,'" "total denial of access to a library," or "`[a]n absolute deprivation of access to all legal materials,'" post, at 2204-05, and n. 2. That view rests upon the expansive understanding of Bounds that we have repudiated.
Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2181 n. 4.
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 182 F.3d 400 (1999)
Everett HADIX, et al. (96-2387); Gary Knop, et al. (96-2397), Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 96-2387, 96-2397.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued December 9, 1997. Decided April 1, 1999.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing July 14, 1999.
401 *401 Patricia A. Streeter (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, Elizabeth R. Alexander, Chief Staff Counsel (argued), National Prison Project, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Michael Barnhart, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellees in docket No. 96-2387.
Susan Przekop-Shaw (argued and briefed), Office of Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before: GUY, NELSON, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc July 14, 1999.
DAUGHTREY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID A. NELSON, J., joined. RALPH B. GUY, JR., J. (pp. 406-08), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.
In these two cases, now consolidated, the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections and other state corrections officials contend that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction and system-wide final injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, a class of inmates at five correctional facilities in Michigan who brought suit alleging that the defendants had violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The district court granted both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in response to the plaintiffs' emergency motion to prevent the defendants from cutting off funding for Prisoners' Legal Services of Michigan. The defendants contend specifically that the district court failed to properly take into account the impact of Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), a recent Supreme Court case, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal law that went into effect in April 1996. We conclude that these cases should be remanded for factual findings and a determination on the merits consistent with this opinion. Because of the necessity of a remand, we leave undisturbed the preliminary injunction ordered by the district court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit began over 15 years ago, in 1982, when the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) threatened to stop funding Prisoners' Legal Services of Michigan (PLSM). PLSM had been established in 1976 by grants from the State Bar of Michigan and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and in 1978 the MDOC began voluntarily funding the office. In 1982, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued a preliminary injunction ordering the MDOC to maintain funding for PLSM until further order of the court, and in 402 1988 the court found that the plaintiffs' right of access to *402 the courts was being violated and ordered modifications to PLSM. Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich.1988), rev'd, Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d

996 (6th Cir.1992). Hadix required the MDOC to provide attorneys for prisoners as a matter of law. Id. at 293. Prisoners at several facilities not covered by the Hadix lawsuit brought a separate action against prison officials in the Western District of Michigan in which they alleged, among other things, the denial of their right of access to the courts. The district court granted them relief as well. Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.Mich.1987) (finding of liability); 685 F.Supp. 636 (W.D.Mich. 1988) (remedial order), rev'd, Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir.1992).
We reviewed the two district court cases on consolidated appeal and affirmed the courts' conclusion that the defendants' legal access system, while sufficient for prisoners capable of making effective use of legal materials, was constitutionally insufficient for prisoners who "cannot read and write English, or who lack the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent pleadings, or who, because of protracted confinement in administrative or punitive segregation or protective custody, may not be able to identify the books they need." Knop, 977 F.2d at 1005-06. In arriving at the conclusion that "something more was required in the way of paralegal assistance," id. at 1006, we held that "[t]he records contain evidence of a number of specific instances where unassisted inmates suffered individualized harm because of inability to use library resources properly." Id.
Mindful of the "wide discretion" and deference due to state legislatures and prison administrators with regard to the management of prisons, we then vacated portions of both lower courts' remedies as too intrusive and remanded the cases jointly to the Western District of Michigan for development of less intrusive remedies. Based upon this court's decision that a constitutional violation existed, the MDOC agreed to maintain PLSM at the Hadix facility, pending the district court's order. According to the defendants, as soon as a legal-writer program was ready, they planned to discontinue funding for PLSM and remove all attorneys providing legal services from within Hadix facility.
Upon remand, the district court ordered MDOC officials to develop a remedial plan consistent with our decision. The defendants proposed a legal-writer program that would require qualified staff to assess prisoners for their ability to read and write English and for their possession of the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent pleadings. Eight months after the defendants submitted their proposed plan, the plaintiffs filed a response contending that parts of the plan did not comply with this court's rulings and asking the district court to reject the proposed plans. Two weeks after the defendants submitted revised proposed plans in late February 1994, the district court conducted a hearing, as a result of which it found the plans to be incomplete. The day after the hearing, the district court issued its own set of interrogatories requesting further information.
In October 1994, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendants' proposed revised plans and heard from four witnesses about the plans' adequacy. The plaintiffs' two witnesses provided testimony about the reading level below which prisoners would not have the ability to effect meaningful access to the courts on their own; the failure of the program to ensure control, supervision, and accountability; and the inadequacy of the program's curriculum for legal writers in the area of post-conviction relief. The defendants presented two witnesses who testified to the development and the administration of the legal assistance program.
Two months later, in December 1994, the court issued an interim order requiring the defendants to revise the plan 403 in several respects and directing them to implement the plan on a trial basis at one of the *403 facilities subject to
the court's jurisdiction. The interim order also required the defendants to monitor and provide an evaluation of the plan and provided for a court monitor. After six months, the court was to evaluate the results and adopt a final plan incorporating "features and approaches that prove to be necessary and effective in practice." Once the final evaluation report was received, "[t]he Court m[ight] then extend the trial implementation for further evaluation, or consider modifications to the plan under trial implementation, expansion of the trial implementation to other sites, and/or adoption of final plans."
In June 1995, the defendants filed their revised plan and proceeded to implement the plan as ordered by the district court. The director of the MDOC appointed a special administrator, Nancy Zang, to oversee the program. The pilot project ran between June and December 1995, and the defendants filed their final evaluation of the project in February 1996, to which the plaintiffs filed objections in March 1996. In late March, the district court issued an order requiring the defendants to submit a final plan and set a hearing to consider its adoption.

On June 3, 1996, the defendants filed their proposed final plan for a legal-writer program, in which prisoner "legal writers" would provide assistance to other prisoners whose reading level was at or below a sixth-grade level. Legal writers would assist these eligible prisoners in preparing "pleadings necessary to initiate the case." The legal writers' work would be monitored "during the first 90 days following implementation of services at each facility," and the "work product of all new legal writers" was to be reviewed "as deemed necessary." Although this final plan provided the guidelines for eligibility, for legal-writer training, and for the scope of services, the plan was not as detailed as the district court had ordered in December 1994 because, the defendants now argue, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which had gone into effect on April 26, 1996, "limit[ed] federal judicial relief to that which is narrowly drawn and extends no further than necessary to correct a violation of a federal right." The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the defendants' final plan on June 17, 1996.
The district court held another evidentiary hearing about the final plan on June 20, 1996, a few days before the Supreme Court rendered the Lewis v. Casey decision on June 24. After Lewis was issued, the district court ordered the parties to address the impact of the new decision on this case. In response to this order, the defendants submitted a brief arguing that under Lewis, the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek prospective relief because they had failed to demonstrate that they had suffered "actual injury." The defendants asked the district court to vacate the interim orders and dismiss this action as a matter of law.
During this same period of time, the MDOC decided that as a result of the Lewis decision, it no longer needed to continue funding PLSM, and it informed the agency in a letter dated August 16, 1996, that it had until September 30, 1996, to vacate its offices at the Hadix facility and to remove all of its personal property.
On September 25, 1996, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to require that MDOC maintain PLSM at the Hadix facility. The district court held a hearing on this motion five days later, granted the preliminary injunction, and issued a final opinion and order both approving the defendants' final plans with several modifications and also requiring defendants to maintain funding for PLSM until the defendants implemented the legal access plan as modified and approved by the court.
In approving the final plans with modifications, the district court ostensibly considered the plaintiffs' underlying 404 access-to-courts claim in light of both the Lewis decision and the PLRA. The court ruled *404 that our prior
holding in this case0907that "the records contain evidence of a number of specific instances where unassisted inmates suffered individualized harm because of inability to use library resources properly" 0907satisfied the plaintiffs' burden of proving "actual injury" as defined and required by Lewis. Knop, 977 F.2d at 1006. The district court also ruled that the relief it ordered was narrowly tailored to the inadequacies that caused the actual injury. Finally, the court granted the preliminary injunction mandating that defendants maintain funding for PLSM until the Legal Access Plan adopted by the district court is implemented.
From these orders, the defendants now appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
We review the defendants' challenge to the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir.1995). "In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." Id. Furthermore, "the district court's weighing and balancing of the equities is overruled only in the rarest of cases." Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir.1997).
In the cases at bar, the district court granted not only the preliminary injunction but also final injunctive relief, because the court found that the plaintiffs had already established the defendants' liability in Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d at 1006. We review de novo the legal determinations underlying the district court's decision to order final relief, and we review the court's factual findings for clear error.

One factor in assessing the appropriateness of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction is the likelihood of success of the underlying lawsuit (in which plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief). Therefore, because our conclusions with regard to the district court's legal basis for ordering final injunctive relief in this case will bear on our decision regarding the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, we consider the court's decision regarding permanent injunctive relief first.
II. Standing: "Actual Injury" Under Lewis v. Casey
In Knop v. Johnson, the earlier appeal in this case, we determined that "there are at least some Michigan prisoners who have been denied the type of access to the courts required under current Supreme Court doctrine." Knop, 977 F.2d at 999. The underpinning for this conclusion was the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), in which the Court held that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist prisoners in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing them with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
In the intervening opinion in Lewis v. Casey, however, the Supreme Court re-examined Bounds and considerably narrowed its holding. Ruling that Bounds did not create an abstract, free-standing right to access to a law library or to legal assistance, the Court held that to establish standing,[1] an inmate must demonstrate an "actual injury," which, the Court said, cannot be shown "simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance 405 program is sub-par in some theoretical *405 sense." Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2180. Instead, the Court held, "the inmate . . . must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim."
Moreover, when the plaintiffs in a Bounds action are a class of inmates alleging a systemic violation of their right of access to the courts, under Lewis they must show "widespread actual injury." Id. at 2179. The Court made it clear that the "[district] court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury renders its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid."[2]Id. The defendants contend, therefore, that under current Supreme Court doctrine, the injunctive relief granted by the district court should be vacated for failure to establish the degree of actual injury required by Lewis.
Moreover, they argue that under the terms of the PLRA, the action should be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case, conditioned upon the state putting into effect the remedial plan it offered to the court.
The plaintiffs argue, and the district court held, that the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis did not change the law in this circuit, but merely resolved a split among the circuits concerning whether actual injury is required to establish liability in a lawsuit alleging a violation of the right of access to the courts. Lewis arose from the Ninth Circuit, which was among the circuits that had previously held that no proof of actual injury was required in lawsuits involving core aspects of the right of access to the courts. See Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir.1989). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, had held that no constitutional violation exists in any case if "no particular prisoner was actually impeded in his access to the courts." Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir.1985).
In Walker, the plaintiffs claimed that they were not given adequate access to legal materials, and we remanded the case for a determination of whether the denial of access had actually caused any prisoner harm. We explained that "`[i]f appellant [the prisoner] could show that he has somehow been prejudiced in any of his various lawsuits, he might perhaps have a legitimate claim.'" Id. (quoting Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir.1978)). In Knop, we cited the Walker standard with approval. 977 F.2d at 1000. Just before the Lewis opinion was issued, we again confirmed our position that a prisoner who does not show any prejudice fails to state a claim that prison officials denied him access to the courts. Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir.1996) .

The plaintiffs contend that because the Sixth Circuit's "actual injury" requirement is the same as the Lewis v. Casey "actual injury" requirement, we should follow the law of the case and leave undisturbed our finding of actual injury in Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. The district court agreed and held that "[the plaintiffs] have already established the defendants' liability for a constitutional violation." Having found liability, the district court then proceeded to consider the appropriateness of the remedy.
After careful study of these cases, we conclude that the Lewis "actual injury" requirement does differ from the one used by this court in Walker and Knop. In Walker, we held that a prisoner might have a "legitimate claim" if he could show that he had "somehow been prejudiced in any of his various lawsuits," 771 F.2d at 932, whereas in Lewis the Supreme Court held that only prisoners with non-frivolous underlying claims can have standing to 406 litigate an access-to-courts action. Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2181 & n. 3. By explicitly *406 requiring that plaintiffs show actual prejudice to non-frivolous claims, Lewis did in fact change the "actual injury" requirement as it had previously been applied in this circuit. In cases prior to Lewis, such as Knop and Walker, we did not mention nor make any findings with regard to the validity of the underlying claims that had allegedly been impeded in their presentation by the inadequacies in the prison's legal access program. It is also apparent from the evidence in the present case that no such requirement was imposed by the district court in reviewing the record for actual injury.
Because it is impossible to determine from the record now before us whether the underlying claims were in fact non-frivolous, we conclude that we must remand this case (yet again) for factual findings on this issue. It will be necessary for the district court to determine, first, whether any of the named plaintiffs are still incarcerated and active in the lawsuit and, second, whether they have suffered "actual injury."[3] If the record fails to establish standing under Lewis, the action must be dismissed. If actual injury can be demonstrated, the district court must determine whether that injury is widespread among the class of plaintiffs. If the record fails to establish widespread injury, the district court should dismiss the action as to all but the named plaintiffs who have established actual injury.
III. Remedy
Without a finding of system-wide actual injury, as defined by Lewis, we are not in a position to determine whether the specific remedy adopted by the district court is appropriate. Under Lewis, the remedy must be specifically tailored to address only those inadequacies that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiffs have yet to establish. See Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2184. Moreover, under the PLRA, any relief ordered by the district court must be "narrowly drawn," must "extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation" found under Lewis, and must constitute "the least intrusive means necessary to correct th[at] violation." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Under the same subsection of the Act, the district court must "give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief." Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we hold that the district court's grant of final injunctive relief must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED for a determination of "actual injury" as required by Lewis v. Casey. Because the plaintiffs have not yet established their entitlement to a remedy, we cannot pass on the appropriateness of the specific remedy ordered by the district court, but we AFFIRM the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in order to maintain the status quo until a hearing on the merits can be concluded and a new determination made.
DISSENT
RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting.

407 In Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 999 (6th Cir.1992), an earlier appeal in this *407 case, we determined that "we are satisfied that there are at least some Michigan prisoners who have been denied the type of access to the courts required under current Supreme Court doctrine." (Emphasis added.) The underpinning for this conclusion was the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977).

Recently, the Supreme Court has revisited Bounds and considerably narrowed its holding. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (because Bounds did not create an abstract free-standing right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense).[1]

In recognition of the narrowing of Bounds by Lewis, the court in this appeal concludes that the Lewis "`actual injury' requirement does differ from the one used by this court[.]" Since in Knop we did conclude that entitlement to a remedy had been established, this statement can only mean that Lewis requires us to now repudiate the conclusion reached in Knop. On this point, I am in complete agreement with the court. Where I part company with the majority, however, is in the ordering of a remand to allow the plaintiffs another opportunity to establish "actual injury."

The defendants have advanced a proposal that is designed to provide meaningful access to the courts. In response, the plaintiffs have done exactly what Lewis says they cannot do.

Although Bounds itself made no mention of an actual-injury requirement, it can hardly be thought to have eliminated that constitutional prerequisite. And actual injury is apparent on the face of almost all the opinions in the 35-year line of access-to-courts cases on which Bounds relied. Moreover, the assumption of an actual-injury requirement seems to us implicit in the opinion's statement that "we encourage local experimentation" in various methods of assuring access to the courts. One such experiment, for example, might replace libraries with some minimal access to legal advice and a system of court-provided forms such as those that contained the original complaints in two of the more significant inmate-initiated cases in recent years, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)0907forms that asked the inmates to provide only the facts and not to attempt any legal analysis. We hardly think that what we meant by "experimenting" with such an alternative was simply announcing it, whereupon suit would immediately lie to declare it theoretically inadequate and bring the experiment to a close. We think we envisioned, instead, that the new program would remain in place at least until some inmate could demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.

116 S.Ct. at 2180-81 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

Additionally, the court makes only a passing reference to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 3626. The Act is not factored into the analysis. The PLRA, which was intended to limit judicial involvement in prison administration, limited prospective relief in prison conditions cases to relief that was

no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

408

plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that

*408 such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the

operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

In my view, when Lewis and the PLRA are read together, they dictate a result different than that reached by the court. I would remand and order a dissolution of the temporary injunction and dismissal of this action, conditioned upon the state putting into effect the remedial plan it offered to the court. After that has been accomplished, if an individual inmate feels he or she can establish a denial of the right to present a non-frivolous claim to a court of

competent jurisdiction, a new individual action may be brought.[2] On access to court claims, class actions will generally not be a suitable vehicle for bringing suit due to the highly individualized nature of the proof of an "actual injury."[3]
[1] The requirement of showing actual injury to prove a Bounds violation, the Lewis court emphasized, "derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2179.
[2] In Lewis, the prisoners were able to establish only two instances of actual injury as defined by the Supreme Court. Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2178-79.
[3] If the named plaintiffs are no longer incarcerated within the Michigan Department of Corrections, their claims are now moot. Mootness of the original named plaintiffs' claims, however, does not moot the class action, provided a live controversy remains between the defendants and the plaintiff classes. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404, 445 U.S. 388, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 753, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401-02, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). In the context of an access to courts case under Lewis, named plaintiffs with mooted claims no longer constitute appropriate class representatives under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. To satisfy concerns raised under Rule 23, the appropriate solution would be for the district court to allow for the substitution of class representatives with live claims, asserting actual injury as defined under Lewis.
[1] Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion: "And though we have not overruled Bounds, we have undoubtedly repudiated its reasoning in our consistent rejection of the proposition that the States must provide counsel beyond the trial and first appeal as of right." 116 S.Ct. at 2195.
[2] As Lewis makes clear, it is not just any alleged denial of access that will trigger a constitutional violation claim:
Finally, we must observe that the injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim. Nearly all of the access-to-courts cases in the Bounds line involved attempts by inmates to pursue direct appeals from the convictions for which they were incarcerated. . . .
116 S.Ct. at 2181.
[3] As Justice Scalia points out in Lewis:
Justice SOUTER suggests that he would waive this actual-injury requirement in cases "involving substantial, systemic deprivation of access to court"0907that is, in cases involving "`a direct, substantial and continuous . . . limit on legal materials,'" "total denial of access to a library," or "`[a]n absolute deprivation of access to all legal materials,'" post, at 2204-05, and n. 2. That view rests upon the expansive understanding of Bounds that we have repudiated.
Lewis, 116 S.Ct. at 2181 n. 4.
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 143 F.3d 246 (1998)
Everett HADIX, et al. (96-2567/2568); Mary Glover, et al. (96-2586/2588; 97-1218/1272), Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, Director, et al., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Nos. 96-2567, 96-2568, 96-2586, 96-2588, 97-1218 and 97-1272.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued December 11, 1997. Decided April 17, 1998.
247 *247 Leo H. Friedman (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for Appellants.
Deborah A. LaBelle (argued and briefed), Law Offices of Deborah LaBelle, Jeffrey D. Dillman (argued), Ann Arbor, MI, Michael Barnhart (briefed), Detroit, MI, for Appellees.
Before: KENNEDY, JONES, and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J., joined. JONES, J. (p. 259), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.
These four appeals primarily concern attorney fees in the Michigan prison reform litigation which has been the 248 subject of numerous appeals to our Court for decision. We have consolidated the appeals for decision. *248 One
of these appeals, No. 97-1218, is moot because the order challenged in that case has expired by its terms. The three other appeals present overlapping issues surrounding the propriety of three awards of attorney fees for work performed primarily during the period of January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996.
The major issue before us is whether the attorney fee limitation of section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) applies to work performed after the PLRA's enactment date of April 26, 1996 in a case filed before the enactment date. Section 803(d), among other things, places a cap on the hourly rate attorneys may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in civil rights litigation brought by prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3). Recently, in a separate Glover appeal, we held that section 1997e(d) does not apply to work performed prior to the PLRA's enactment. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (6th Cir.1998). For reasons fully explained below, we conclude that section 1997e(d) is likewise inapplicable to post-enactment work. Neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history permits us to conclude that Congress intended to differentiate between pre-enactment and post-enactment services.
In Glover, defendants also argue for reversal of the fee awards because plaintiffs were not prevailing parties within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in three appellate matters. As explained below, we uphold the awards as to two of the three matters and reverse as to the third because the work was not compensable compliance monitoring and plaintiffs did not prevail on appeal or on their petition for certiorari. On cross-appeal, the Glover plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to increase the hourly rate of a paralegal from the rate last approved by the court. We shall reject this contention as without merit.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION

A. Glover v. Johnson
In 1977, a now-certified class of female inmates incarcerated in the Michigan prison system, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which they alleged violations of certain constitutional rights surrounding the conditions of their confinement. The District Court found that the Glover plaintiffs had been denied the same vocational and educational opportunities provided to male inmates, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the female inmates had been unconstitutionally denied meaningful access to the courts. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Mich.1979) ("Glover I"). After extensive negotiations, the District Court entered an order specifying remedial actions to be undertaken by the defendants to remedy the constitutional violations found and retained jurisdiction until substantial compliance with the remedial order is achieved. Glover v. Johnson, 510 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D.Mich.1981) ("Glover II"). Neither of these orders were appealed by defendants.
On November 12, 1985, the parties stipulated to an order of the District Court, which awarded plaintiffs attorney fees, including fees for monitoring defendants' compliance with the District Court's orders, and established a system providing for plaintiffs' submission of fees and costs on a semi-annual basis and for the lodging of defendants' objections thereto. This 1985 Order, which plaintiffs contend establishes their entitlement to monitoring fees, has never been appealed. It provides in relevant part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and that requests for such fees shall be submitted to opposing counsel every six months. Defendants will have twenty-eight days in which to contest the amount of the fee request.
Thus, since 1985, the parties have followed this procedure and plaintiffs' attorneys have been paid attorney fees at the prevailing market rate, which has increased over the years, to the current rate of $150.00 per hour. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 27, 1989 (the "1989 Order"), the District Court interpreted its 1985 Order as authorizing attorney fees for monitoring compliance with the court's orders in this case in addition 249 to non-monitoring legal work, and as having decided the prevailing *249 party issue. It also held that the prevailing party issue will not be re-decided with each petition for fees, and that the court is therefore not required to await the completion of an appeal before determining whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties on otherwise compensable work. Defendants appealed the 1989 Order, and this Court affirmed the District Court's holdings. Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.1991) ("Glover III").
B. Hadix v. Johnson
In 1980, a class of male prisoners incarcerated in the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex ("SPSM-CC"), brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The parties entered into a comprehensive consent decree, which was approved by and made an order of the District Court on April 4, 1985. The detailed 33-page consent decree addresses sanitation, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, volunteers, access to courts, food service, management, operations and mail at SPSM-CC and called for the submission of more detailed remedial plans to carry out a number of the consent decree mandates. Overall, the consent decree was intended to "assure the constitutionality" of the conditions of confinement at SPSM-CC. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decree until compliance is achieved. Plaintiffs' attorneys have responsibility for monitoring defendants' compliance with the decree, which continues to this day.
On November 19, 1987, the District Court entered an order awarding fees and costs to plaintiffs' attorneys for compliance monitoring. Plaintiffs construe this order as establishing their entitlement to post-judgment monitoring fees. Under the terms of this order, defendants have the right to review and make objections to plaintiffs' fee requests. In the absence of agreement, the District Court will resolve the fee dispute.

II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In Glover and Hadix, each class of plaintiffs filed a fee petition for work performed from January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996 pursuant to established procedure. Appeal Nos. 96-2586/2588 and 96-2567/2568. The Glover plaintiffs filed a second fee petition that covered all outstanding fees and costs related to work on two appeals. Appeal No. 97-1272. Defendants objected on several grounds to all three petitions. The District Court rejected all but one of the objections in three separate orders.
Defendants argued that the attorney fee limitation of the PLRA should be applied to the fee petitions in appeal nos. 96-2586/2588 and 96-2567/2568. In nearly identical opinions, the District Court held the fee provision inapplicable to fees earned before enactment of the PLRA but applied it to those earned thereafter.
Defendants also objected to fees for work on all appellate matters in the Glover fee petitions in appeal nos. 96-2586/2588 and 97-1272, which included work on three appeals, because plaintiffs had not prevailed in these matters. The first involves Case No. 94-1617, a 1996 appeal regarding defendants' obligation to provide legal assistance to plaintiffs for parental rights matters. This case has been decided against plaintiffs and the Supreme Court has denied their petition for certiorari. Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264 (6th Cir.) ("Glover IV"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 67, 136 L.Ed.2d 28 (1996) (hereinafter referred to as the "parental rights appeal"). The second involves appeal nos. 95-1903/95-2037/95-2120/96-1155, consolidated appeals regarding a Compliance Committee established by the District Court (hereinafter referred to as the "Compliance Committee appeals"). These appeals were voluntarily dismissed by stipulation of the parties in March, 1996 upon dissolution of the Committee by the District Court. The third involves appeal no. 95-1521, an appeal regarding the District Court's denial of defendants' motion to terminate the District Court's supervisory jurisdiction because substantial compliance with the Remedial Plan had been achieved (hereinafter referred to as the "termination appeal"). We recently vacated this judgment, retained jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the District Court for a new 250 determination of *250 whether a disparity now exists between female and male inmates in educational and vocational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether female inmates are presently being denied access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (6th Cir.1998) ("Glover V").
In rejecting this challenge, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs were deemed prevailing parties in the 1985 Order, that plaintiffs are not required to establish prevailing party status each time fees are sought but instead need only establish that the legal work was reasonably related to ensuring compliance with the District Court's orders. The District Court went on to conclude that the legal work at issue in all three appeals was related to monitoring compliance with the Remedial Plan and consequent court orders.
The District Court also rejected defendants' objection that the award in No. 96-2586/2588 was otherwise unreasonable as conclusory and unsubstantiated. Finally, the District Court declined to increase the rate of payment for a paralegal to the prevailing market rate because she had been approved at an established lower rate. Defendants and plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal and cross-appeal.[1]
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PLRA TO THESE ACTIONS
A. Statutory Background
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), was signed into law by President Clinton on April 26, 1996.[2] The PLRA, which comprises 10 sections, significantly affects prison litigation by amending several provisions of the United States Code.[3] The Act was intended to curtail what was perceived to be the over involvement of federal courts in managing state prison systems pursuant to remedial orders and consent decrees such as those involved in Glover and Hadix.[4] The second purpose of the Act was to stem the tide of frivolous prisoner suits.[5] Today we focus on section 802, which serves the first purpose

identified above by limiting judicial remedies in prison condition litigation, and section 803, which serves the second statutory purpose enumerated above by amending the Civil Rights Of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq. ("CRIPA").
251 Section 803(d) of the PLRA includes the provision governing the award of attorney *251 fees in prisoner civil rights litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). It provides in relevant part:
§ 1997e. Suits by prisoners
* * * * * *
(d) Attorney's fees
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 2 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C.1988), such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that 0907
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
* * * * * *
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1), (3). In the Eastern District of Michigan, $75 per hour is the maximum amount a courtappointed attorney may be reimbursed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). The established rate of pay for plaintiffs' attorneys in both cases has been $150 per hour since at least 1993. Capping attorney fees at $112.50 (which represents 150% of the $75 maximum) would reduce plaintiffs' attorneys' hourly rate by 25%. Whether or not we apply the fee provision to the attorney fee petitions at issue in these pending cases turns on matters of statutory construction and congressional intent.
B. Judicial Construction Of PLRA Section 803(d)
1. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc.
The analytical framework to be used when determining whether to apply a newly-enacted law to pending cases, or whether such application is impermissible because it would have retroactive effect is set forth by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In step one of the Landgraf analysis, a court determines whether Congress clearly defined the temporal reach of a new law. Id. at 257-63, 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1492-96, 1505. Where Congressional intent is clear, it is controlling. Id. at 264, 114 S.Ct. at 1496. If Congressional intent is ambiguous, a court must proceed with step two, an analysis of retroactivity.
The long-standing presumption against retroactive legislation does not arise every time a statute is applied to a pending case or when its application would upset settled expectations. Id. at 269, 114 S.Ct. at 1499 Rather, a statute operates retroactively when it "attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment" or "impair[s] rights a party possessed when he acted." Id. at 269, 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1499, 1505. The determination of retroactivity is made after assessing "the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event." Id. at 270, 114 S.Ct. at 1499. Judicial inquiries should be guided by "familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and

settled expectations." Id. Retroactive legislation will not be applied in absence of manifestly clear Congressional intent. Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505.
2. Glover V
In Glover V, supra, we analyzed the attorney fee limitation under Landgraf in the context of a petition for fees for work completed before enactment of the PLRA but awarded after enactment. Under step one, we held that 252 Congress had not explicitly prescribed the temporal reach of the provision. 138 F.3d at 249-250. In so doing, we *252 rejected the Fourth Circuit's view that the plain language of the statute providing that fees "shall not be awarded" except as provided, evinces clear congressional intent that all post-enactment fee awards, including those compensating for pre-enactment work, must comply with section 803(d). Id. at 250 (declining to follow Alexander v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 880, 139 L.Ed.2d 869 (1998)). Under step two of Landgraf, we held that application of section 803(d) to a pending fee motion which sought compensation for work completed prior to enactment would be impermissibly retroactive because it would "attach[] significant new legal burdens to the completed work ... [and impair] rights acquired under pre-existing law." Id. at 250. We thus concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to be applied retroactively. We expressly limited our holding to work completed prior to enactment. Id. at 250. Now that we are squarely presented with the issue of post-enactment work in a pending case, we believe that our earlier conclusion regarding retroactivity controls the application of the very same statutory language to post-enactment fees.
Under Landgraf, the Court is to determine the temporal reach Congress intends a new statute to have in the absence of clear congressional intent. In Glover, we determined that the attorney fee provision of section 803(d), as applied to a fee petition for preenactment work, would be impermissibly retroactive. From this conclusion, it followed that the historic presumption against retroactive legislation arose to bar retroactive application of the statute. The presumption is invoked to interpret new statutory language overall, and we do not believe that the resulting statutory interpretation can be limited to specific circumstances. That certain applications of the statute might be permissible does not alter the statutory construction unless it can be said that Congress possessed different intentions with respect to different applications.
In this case, a court would have to find that Congress relied upon the same statutory language to convey an intent that the temporal reach of the statute is dependent upon the timing of the work, i.e., that it intended the fee provision to apply in pending cases for post-enactment fees but did not intend the provision to apply in pending cases for pre-enactment fees. We do not believe the statutory language is capable of such a sophisticated construction; either the fee provision applies in pending cases or not. Our interpretation of section 1997e(d) in Glover V. controls our interpretation of that section here. We therefore hold that the fee limitation is inapplicable to the fee petitions before us, which include work performed both prior to and after the enactment date.
While the Glover court did not rely upon the recent decision in Lindh v. Murphy, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), that decision supports our conclusion regarding retroactivity. As in Lindh, we have the negative inference that section 803(d) is inapplicable to pending cases arising from the fact that Congress made section 802 expressly applicable to pending cases but did not do the same with section 803. We believe that under Lindh, the artificial distinction between pre-enactment and post-enactment work breaks down. In addition, in Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 263, 139 L.Ed.2d 190 (1997), we held that the plain language of the exhaustion requirement of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), evinced Congress' intent that it not be applied to pending cases. Thus, Wright provides additional support for concluding that Congress did not intend to apply the fee provision to pending cases because the attorney fee provision, also part of section 803(d), contains very similar temporal language to that of the exhaustion requirement.
3. Lindh v. Murphy
In Lindh, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which amended the federal habeas statute, applied to an application for habeas corpus pending at the time the new statute was

253 enacted. The Court held that because one section of the AEDPA explicitly applied to pending cases *253 and the other relevant section did not, this evinced clear congressional intent that the latter would not apply to pending cases. Lindh v. Murphy, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. The majority opinion appears to say that when general rules of statutory construction are employed to determine a new statute's temporal reach 0907 the first step of the Landgraf analysis 0907 and a court determines that Congress intended purely prospective application, i.e., no application to pending cases, then the court need not apply the judicial default rules employed in the second step of the Landgraf analysis because there is no risk of retroactive effect. Id. at ___ _ ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2062-63 ("Although Landgraf's default rules would deny application when a retroactive effect would otherwise result, other construction rules may apply to remove even the possibility of retroactivity....").
In its approach, "[t]he Court relies on one canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est esclusio alterius, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2068 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The Court's opinion rests almost entirely on the negative inference that can be drawn from the fact that Congress expressly made Chapter 154, pertaining to capital cases, applicable to pending cases, but did not make the same express provision in regards to Chapter 153." Id. "Chapter 153" refers to sections 2242 and 2253-2255 of Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which are amended by sections 101-106 of the AEDPA. "Chapter 154" was created by section 107 of the AEDPA and refers to new sections 2261-2266 of Title 28. Congress chose to make Chapter 154 explicitly applicable to pending cases. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 107(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1226 (1996) ("EFFECTIVE DATE. 0907 Chapter 154 of title 28 ... shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act.") Congress did not say anything about the effective date of Chapter 153. The Court read section 107(c), which made Chapter 154 explicitly applicable to pending cases, as "indicating implicitly that the amendments to chapter 153 were assumed and meant to apply to the general run of habeas cases only when those cases had been filed after the date of the Act." Lindh v. Murphy, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2063.
The Court distinguished procedural amendments, which it recognized would most likely be applied to pending cases. Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. at 1502)[6]. The Court also suggested that had the legislative history of the two chapters been different, it might have reached a different result. Id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2064. Though the two chapters began in separate bills in separate houses, they were brought together in the same bill before section 107(c) was added. "The insertion of § 107(c) with its different treatments of the two chapters thus illustrates the familiar rule that negative implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the portions of a statute treated differently had already been joined together and were being considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted." Id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2065 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75, 116 S.Ct. 437, 446, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) ("The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger the inference, as applied, for example to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted simultaneously in relevant respects.")).
4. Legislative History of the PLRA
Section 802 of the PLRA contains a provision similar to that found in chapter 154 of the AEDPA making the 254 section applicable to *254 pending cases.[7] On the other hand, section 803 of the PLRA does not contain an
effective date, just like chapter 153 of the AEDPA. The legislative history of sections 802 and 803 of the PLRA is slightly different than that of Chapters 153 and 154 of the AEDPA. The PLRA represents the culmination of efforts to reform two areas of prison litigation. First, the reformers desired to deter federal courts from so closely managing state prison systems in the context of supervising compliance with judicial decrees mandating remedies for unconstitutional prison conditions in litigation that has, in states such as Michigan, spanned decades. Second, the reformers sought to deter the "torrent" of frivolous civil rights lawsuits filed by prisoners.
Congress first proposed reform legislation in Titles II and III of the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995. H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995). Title II 0907 entitled Stop Turning Out Prisoners or STOP 0907 addressed the "judicial remedies" concern. "The purpose of the STOP Act is to keep our Federal courts from taking over State prisons." 141 Cong. Rec. S2648-02, S2649 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchison)[8]. The STOP Act is the forerunner to section 802; both limit judicial remedies in prison condition litigation by amending 18 U.S.C. §

3626. Since, like section 802, the STOP Act was directed at ongoing litigation, it was made expressly applicable to pending cases. Significantly, the STOP Act included a limitation on attorney fees, which like the rest of the STOP provisions, was applicable to pending cases. Title III of H.R. 667 amended CRIPA and addressed the "frivolous lawsuit" concern. Title III is the forerunner to PLRA section 803; both intend to deter frivolous prisoner suits by amending CRIPA. Title III's CRIPA amendments were not given an effective date and, significantly, did not contain a limitation on attorney fees.
As it made its way through the legislative process, the provision limiting attorney fees was moved from the STOP Act to the CRIPA amendments in a bill introduced by Senator Abraham of Michigan. S. 1275, 104th Cong. (1995). S. 1275 continued to expressly apply the STOP Act to pending cases and to refrain from providing an effective date for the CRIPA amendments. Thus, the attorney fee limitation was moved from a section of the statute that was expressly applicable to pending cases to a section that did not contain an effective date. None of the measures in the CRIPA amendments directed at stemming frivolous lawsuits included an effective date. See S. 1275, 104th Cong. §§ 3-4 (1995). S. 1275 contains no reference to H.R. 667 nor any explanation of why the attorney fee limitation was moved from the STOP Act to the CRIPA amendments.
Additional and extensive CRIPA amendments were proposed in S. 866, a bill focused exclusively on stemming frivolous lawsuits. S. 866, 104th Cong. (1996). The provisions of S. 866 went on to become sections 803, 804, 805, 806 and 809 of the PLRA. S. 866 did not contain the STOP Act or any limitation on attorney fees. The sponsors of S. 866 subsequently introduced S. 1279, which incorporated the STOP Act of S. 1275 and the CRIPA amendments of S. 866. The STOP Act was made expressly applicable to pending cases and the CRIPA amendments were not. S. 1279 placed the attorney fee limitation in the CRIPA amendments, which is where it would remain through passage of the PLRA.
In the instant case then, "the language raising the implication" was not inserted after the STOP and CRIPA amendments had been joined in one bill as was the case in Lindh. Lindh v. Murphy, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2065. We believe that any negative inference drawn from Congress' decision to move the attorney fee provision from STOP to CRIPA is weaker than the inference drawn in Lindh. Nonetheless, the identical negative 255 inference that was drawn in Lindh can be drawn when sections 802 *255 and 803 are compared. Furthermore, nothing in the PLRA's legislative history suggests that Congress intended section 803 to apply to pending cases. In fact, we believe that the legislative history suggests otherwise. As discussed above, the STOP Act arose to address the perceived excesses of the federal judiciary in pending litigation such as the instant cases and was logically made expressly applicable to pending cases. In contrast, the CRIPA amendments are forward looking as they are aimed at curtailing the filing of frivolous lawsuits. We have found nothing to suggest that the CRIPA amendments were aimed at pending litigation. This interpretation is also consistent with Wright v. Morris, supra, which held the exhaustion requirement of section 803(d) inapplicable to pending cases.
5. Wright v. Morris
PLRA section 803(d) governs the bringing of civil rights lawsuits by prisoners. Entitled "Suits by Prisoners", the section comprehensively amends section 7 of CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, which was formerly entitled "Exhaustion of Remedies." In addition to the attorney fee limitation, section 803(d) requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies before a prisoner may bring an action under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).[9] In Wright v. Morris, supra, this Court recently held that the plain language of the statute provides that this exhaustion requirement does not apply to pending cases.
§ 1997e. Suits by prisoners
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under ... [42 U.S.C. § 1983] by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis supplied). Issued prior to Lindh, we declined to conclude that section 803 of the PLRA was inapplicable to pending cases based solely on the negative inference drawn from the fact that section 802 is expressly applicable to pending cases. Wright, 111 F.3d at 418. Instead, we relied upon the statutory text alone: "[T]he text of the new requirement plainly states that `no action shall be brought' without exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. We reasoned further:
Thus, it is likely that had Congress intended the new requirement to pertain to pending cases it would have employed the same language as it used in § 802(b)(1) to make that intent clear. This strengthens our conclusion that the text of the PLRA indicates that the new administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to cases filed after the Act's passage.
Id. Even though we declined to rely solely upon the negative inference, we found the fact that section 802 contains a provision expressly applying it to pending cases to be significant.
Our interpretation of section 1997e(a) and reliance upon the negative inference that arises when section 803 is read together with section 802 is equally applicable when analyzing the attorney fee limitation. Section 1997e(d) admonishes that "fees shall not be awarded" in any way inconsistent with the rest of the subsection. This language is not meaningfully distinguishable from the temporal language of section 1997e(a), emphasized above, which provides that no action "shall be brought" prior to exhausting remedies and which we've interpreted as applying prospectively only.
C. Conclusion
In sum, our interpretation of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), under Landgraf in Glover V controls our interpretation of that same section here. Because application of the attorney fee provision would have an impermissible retroactive effect in a pending case involving a petition of attorney fees for pre-enactment work, 256 section 803(d) cannot be *256 applied to pending cases regardless of when the underlying legal work is performed. Further, the fact that Congress chose to move the attorney fee provision from a section of the PLRA made expressly applicable to pending cases to a section without an effective date raises a negative inference under Lindh that Congress intended that the fee provision apply only to cases filed after enactment of the PLRA. Finally, under Wright, the plain language of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), is prospective. For all of these reasons, we hold that the attorney fee provision of the PLRA is inapplicable to cases brought before the statute was enacted whether the underlying work was performed before or after the enactment date of the statute.
IV. THE PREVAILING PARTY STANDARD IN POST-JUDGMENT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION
We next turn to whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties in these various appeals.
A. The Law In The Sixth Circuit
1. Glover v. Johnson (Glover III)
In Glover III, this Court rejected the same "prevailing party" argument that is advanced by defendants here. We held that "plaintiffs may rely on the trial court's 1985 order to establish that they are prevailing parties and, pursuant to that order, plaintiffs have succeeded on a significant issue." Glover III, supra, 934 F.2d at 716. We also held that moving for contempt to compel compliance with earlier District Court orders is a compensable postjudgment monitoring activity. Id. at 715-16. (citing Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980)). In so holding, we rejected defendants' argument that prevailing party status was dependent upon the outcome of their appeal of the District Court's contempt findings. Id. We also upheld the award despite reversing the District Court in part

because it interpreted its remedial order beyond the order's express terms in two areas. Id. at 712 (vocational training), 713 (work pass program). Thus, when plaintiffs seek fees for compliance monitoring, plaintiffs are not required to again establish prevailing party status, nor is the award dependent upon the outcome of an appeal.
2. Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools
Defendants rely heavily, if not exclusively, on our statement in Northcross in their argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees unless they prevail on each post-judgment dispute. There we stated, "[t]he [1977] hearings [which involved plaintiffs' work defending a desegration plan from attack] were collateral to and distinct from the desegregation suit itself, which had been finally terminated in 1974, so had the plaintiffs failed to prevail on the merits the district court would have been justified in denying fees altogether." Northcross, 611 F.2d at 641. We believe that this reliance is misplaced for several reasons. First, because the Northcross plaintiffs prevailed in defending the remedy and because the Court held that plaintiffs are prevailing parties, this statement is dicta. Second, defending a remedy from collateral attack is indistinguishable from affirmatively moving for contempt to enforce compliance with the remedy because both activities share the same purpose of protecting court-ordered relief. See Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir.1997) (compliance monitoring, enforcement of the remedy, and defense of the remedy are generally viewed as "necessary adjuncts to the initial litigation" and compensable). Finally, the Northcross dicta relied upon by defendants is inconsistent with Glover III, which held that compliance monitoring is compensable regardless of the degree of success or the outcome of appeals.
Glover III does not however definitively answer how courts should handle the prevailing party issue when unsuccessful legal work for which fees are requested does not relate to compliance monitoring or otherwise protecting a remedy previously affirmed or not appealed. In such cases, we elect to follow the approach outlined recently by the Eight Circuit.
257 *257 In an ongoing school desegregation case involving the Kansas City School District, the Eighth Circuit had occasion to examine the prevailing party issue when the Supreme Court struck down the use of certain remedial measures employed in the court-approved desegregation plan. Jenkins v. State of Missouri, supra. Because the Supreme Court's decision did not affect the district court's underlying holding that the State of Missouri had committed constitutional violations and was obligated to remedy those violations, the court found that the decision did not "retroactively take away the Jenkins class's status as a prevailing party." Id., 127 F.3d at 714 (discussing Balark v. City of Chicago, 81 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir.1996)) (holding that prospective termination of a 10-year-old consent decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) 0907 as opposed to reversal on direct appeal 0907 did not deprive plaintiffs of prevailing party status, which they enjoyed for 10 years). The Eighth Circuit treated the prevailing party question as a "threshold" issue and went on to examine "whether fees should be awarded for matters on which the plaintiff lost." Id. at 716.
The Jenkins court applied the paradigm of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), a case involving a civil rights plaintiff who had prevailed on some but not all issues, to the prevailing party issue surrounding post-judgment fees in institutional reform cases. Id. (citing Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. Schafer, 83 F.3d 1008, 1010-12, (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 482, 136 L.Ed.2d 376 (1996)). The test asks first whether the issues in the post-judgment litigation are "inextricably intertwined with those on which the plaintiff prevailed in the underlying suit or whether they are distinct." Id. at 717. Compliance monitoring, enforcement of the remedy, and defense of the remedy are generally viewed as "necessary adjuncts to the initial litigation" and compensable. Id. Other activities, such as efforts to expand the scope of the original relief obtained, may amount to the assertion of distinct new claims that cannot rest upon the prevailing party determination in the underlying case. Id. When the issues are intertwined, plaintiffs are entitled to fees, i.e., they maintain their prevailing party status. Id. at 718. If on the other hand, the issues are distinct, plaintiffs are entitled to fees only if they prevail on the separate issue. Id. at 717 (discussing Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir.1994) and Schafer, supra, which denied prevailing party status on strength of underlying litigation under these circumstances). In applying this analysis to the facts before it, the Jenkins court concluded that the issues that went up to the Supreme Court were related to the issues on which the Jenkins class prevailed as the plaintiffs were placed in the position of defending the scope of the district court's remedial authority. Id. at 719.[10]

B. Application of The Glover III/Jenkins Standard
1. The Compliance Committee Appeals
In yet another Glover appeal, appeal no. 96-1852, defendants raised the identical prevailing party issue with respect to the same Compliance Committee fees at issue here, albeit for a different time period. In our recentlyissued decision, we held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties in these appeals by virtue of defendants' voluntary dismissal and that the work was otherwise compensable as post-judgment compliance monitoring. Glover V, supra, at 252. We therefore reject this portion of defendants' challenge.
2. The Termination Appeal
The analysis of the termination appeal fee award is controlled by Glover III. Defendants do not argue that the work was unrelated to ensuring compliance with court orders or that the work was unrelated to the underlying issues on which plaintiffs prevailed. As the District Court found: "[T]he relief sought amounted to a complete 258 termination of the Remedial Plan. Work provided by plaintiffs' counsel on this issue was critically *258 related to monitoring compliance with the judgment."[11] Rather, defendants argue that the prevailing party issue cannot be decided without awaiting the outcome of appeal no. 95-1521. As explained above, this argument was made and rejected once before. Glover III, 934 F.2d at 715-16.
Additionally, we vacated the judgment denying the motion to terminate in appeal no. 95-1521, and, in lieu of assessing whether substantial compliance has been achieved, we retained jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the District Court for a new determination of whether a disparity now exists between female and male inmates in educational and vocational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether female inmates are presently being denied access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment. Glover V, supra, pp. 242-44. Given this outcome, we hold that plaintiffs have prevailed in appeal no. 95-1521. We further hold that this work qualifies as compensable post-judgment compliance monitoring because plaintiffs sought to protect the remedy ordered by the District Court for the equal protection violations and access to court violations it found so many years ago.
3. The Parental Rights Appeal
The remaining issue concerns the fees related to the parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari. This appeal originated when plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief to compel compliance with the District Court's orders regarding court access. Glover v. Johnson, 850 F.Supp. 592 (E.D.Mich.1994). Plaintiffs were prompted by defendants' notice of decision to reduce funding for Prison Legal Services ("PLS"), the agency which provides legal assistance to female inmates, and to wholly eliminate PLS' provision of legal assistance on parental rights matters. The District Court interpreted its earlier orders on court access as having ordered the indefinite continuation of defendants' contract with PLS, which since 1978 had required PLS to provide assistance in the area of parental rights, and held defendants in contempt of those earlier orders. Id. at 594. The District Court also concluded that the elimination of legal assistance in the area of parental rights would violate plaintiffs' newlyenunciated constitutional right to legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 595-601.
The district court proceedings were broader than those on appeal. What is relevant for our purposes here is not what happened below, but instead the issues litigated on appeal. Appeal no. 96-1617 was limited to whether defendants were required by court order or by the Constitution to provide plaintiff inmates with legal assistance in parental rights matters. Plaintiffs lost on both issues. Glover IV, supra, 75 F.3d 264.
In reversing, we first held that the court had abused its discretion in holding defendants in contempt because we found no order requiring the funding of legal assistance in any particular area of law. In the absence of a violated order, the contempt finding could not be sustained. Id. at 267. Next, we held that defendants are not

constitutionally required to provide plaintiffs legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 67, 136 L.Ed.2d 28 (1996).
In awarding fees for appellate work on this matter, the District Court acknowledged this Court's conclusion that defendants had provided legal services for parental rights matters without the support of a direct order but nevertheless concluded that the "work done by plaintiff contesting the termination of services was a postjudgment monitoring activity and is therefore compensable." We disagree with this conclusion. Given the lack of any remedial order, plaintiffs' counsel's efforts might best be characterized as a failed offensive attempt to expand the remedy. In such circumstances courts are less inclined to award fees. See, e.g., Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 259 983, 990 (7th Cir.1988). Plaintiffs' *259 attorneys' efforts do not qualify as post-judgment compliance monitoring and plaintiffs cannot rely upon their status as prevailing parties in the underlying litigation. We therefore reverse this portion of the challenged awards given plaintiffs' lack of success in appeal no. 96-1617 and in the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
C. Conclusion
Defendants' challenges to the award of fees for work on the Compliance Committee appeals and on the termination appeal are rejected because the work is compensable compliance monitoring and because plaintiffs prevailed. Defendants' challenge to the award of fees for the unsuccessful work on the parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari is sustained because this claim went beyond the underlying litigation and plaintiffs did not prevail.
V. OTHER ISSUES ARISING IN GLOVER
A. The District Court's Denial of Defendants' Objections To The Award As Unreasonable Was Not Clearly Erroneous
Defendants objected to 47.4 hours in plaintiffs' fee petition as "frivolous" and "unnecessary"; 48.7 hours as "excessive" and "inappropriate"; and 18.9 hours as "non-Glover" related. The District Court found that "defendants' broad objections and conclusory allegations" were an insufficient basis for denying these fees.
On appeal, defendants make absolutely no effort to add specificity to their objections or to otherwise substantiate their claims. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have filed "unnecessary" and "frivolous" pleadings without identifying those pleadings for this Court or explaining why any such pleadings were unnecessary or frivolous. Defendants' argument that certain fees were "non-Glover related" is just a rehashing of their "prevailing party" argument, which we have rejected on numerous occasions. The District Court was not clearly erroneous in rejecting defendants' objections as an insufficient basis to deny fees which have been carefully documented by plaintiffs' counsel.
B. Whether the District Court Erred in Refusing to Approve An Award of Fees For Paralegals At The Prevailing Market Rate
Despite finding that $80 was well within the prevailing market rate for paralegals, the District Court refused to approve that rate because the rate established for paralegals in its 1990 order was $45 per hour. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in so refusing. Plaintiffs could have submitted a petition for a higher rate before or while the services were being rendered if a higher rate was necessary.
C. Appeal No. 97-1218
The last appeal, No. 97-1218, involves a challenge to the District Court's order of January 31, 1997 enjoining defendants from eliminating funding for provision of legal services to women prisoners at current levels. The

order terminated by its own terms upon a decision in appeal No. 96-1931, which was pending at the time of the court's ruling. Thus, the issues raised in appeal no. 97-1218 became moot upon entry of our opinion in Glover V, supra, which decided, among others, appeal no. 96-1931.
VI. CONCLUSION
We dismiss appeal no. 97-1218 as moot. In appeal nos. 96-2567/2568, 96-2586/2588 and 97-1272, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the cases to the District Court for a recalculation of the fee awards in a manner consistent with this opinion.
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I generally concur in the majority's well drafted opinion. However, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority's reversal of the district court's award of attorney's fees for work in the parental rights appeal, No. 96-1617, and the subsequent petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Although the plaintiffs were not 260 ultimately successful in the appeal. I feel that this work, along with all of the other work *260 plaintiffs' counsel performed in this case, was compensable post-judgment compliance monitoring and related to the underlying equal protection and access to court claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed in their original action. I would therefore affirm all of the fee awards in this case.
[1] Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the constitutional challenges they made to the PLRA's fee provision in Glover, No. 96-2586/2588, which the court denied. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial of its motion. Because we decide that the PLRA fee provision is inapplicable to this case, we need not and do not reach plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.
[2] The Act is found in Title VIII of the omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996 for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies.
[3] The Act amends the following: 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Section 802 0907 Appropriate Remedies For Prison Conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (Section 803 0907 Amendments To Civil Rights Of Institutionalized Persons Act); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Section 804 0907 Proceedings In Forma Pauperis); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (Section 804 0907 Proceedings In Forma Pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Section 806 0907 Federal Tort Claims); and 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (Section 809 0907 Earned Release Credit or Good Time Credit Revocation). The Act also adds provisions, including new sections 1915A (Section 805 0907 Judicial Screening) and 1932 (Section 809 0907 Earned Release Credit or Good Time Credit Revocation) to title 28 of the United States Code.
[4] See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("The legislation I am introducing today [S. 1275] will return sanity and State control to our prison systems by limiting judicial remedies in prison cases [such as those in the State of Michigan]. ..."); 141 Cong. Rec. S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("These guidelines will work to restrain liberal federal judges who see violations on [sic] constitutional rights in every prisoner complaint who have used these complaints to micromanage state and local prisons.").
[5] See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (in addition to problems with "massive judicial interventions in state prison systems," we also have [the problem of] frivolous inmate litigation); 141 Cong. Rec. S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (legislation introduced, S. 1279, will address the "alarming number of frivolous lawsuits" filed by prisoners).
[6] In Landgraf, the Court considered without deciding whether attorney fee provisions are procedural or whether they affect substantive rights. Compare Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277, 114 S.Ct. at 1503 ("[a]ttorney's fee determinations are `collateral to the main cause of action'") (citations omitted), with Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 292, 114 S.Ct. 1522, 1525, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("holding a person liable for attorney's fees affects a `substantive right'"). In Glover V, we rejected the argument that attorney fee provisions can never result in retroactive effect because they may be procedural in nature or are collateral to the main cause of action. Glover V, supra, at 250. "[L]aws regulating litigation conduct [including attorney fee

provisions] often impact the substantive rights of the parties as well ... [and must be scrutinized under the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis]". Id.
[7] Section 802(b)(1) provides that section 802(a), which amends 18 U.S.C. § 3626, "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title."
[8] Senator Hutchison of Texas introduced S. 400 in the Senate, which was identical to Title II of H.R. 667.
[9] Under section 803(d), a court may sua sponte dismiss a civil rights action filed by a prisoner, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); a prisoner may not bring an action for emotional injury without a showing of physical injury, id. § 1997e (e); courts are instructed to conduct hearings by phone to the extent practicable, id. § 1997e(f); and civil rights defendants may waive their right to reply to a complaint without prejudice, id. § 1997e(g).
[10] The Jenkins court went on to examine the reasonableness of the fee award and reduced the fee amount by 50% to reflect plaintiffs' limited success. Id. at 718-20. We express no opinion on this portion of the decision.
[11] The District Court had ruled in an earlier opinion of May 30, 1996, that a decision on fees related to work on No. 95-1521 would be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. However, the District Court must have reconsidered the issue because it granted both fee petitions involved here, which included fees for work in No. 95-1521.
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 230 F.3d 840 (2000)
Everett HADIX, et al. (96-2567/2568); Mary Glover, et al. (96-2586/2588), PlaintiffsAppellees/Cross-Appellants, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, UNITED STATES of America, Intervenor.
Nos. 96-2567, 96-2568, 96-2586, 96-2588.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: June 13, 2000. Decided and Filed: October 4, 2000.
841 *841 Deborah A. LaBelle (argued and briefed), Law office of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, Michigan, Patricia A. Streeter, Detroit, Michigan, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant in 96-2567, 96-2568.
Deborah A. LaBelle (argued and briefed), Law office of Deborah LaBelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for PlaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant in 96-2586, 96-2588.
Leo H. Friedman (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, Michigan, for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Daniel Kaplan (argued and briefed), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.
Todd R. Marti (briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.
Before: KENNEDY, JONES, and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206.
842 *842 KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J., joined. JONES, J. (pp. 847-48), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.
We are presented with the issue of whether the attorney fee cap set forth in § 803(d)(3) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act violates plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the implied Equal Protection Provision of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs seek attorney fees for post-judgment compliance monitoring and argue that by capping the fees they may recover, § 803(d)(3) deprives them of the equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. The district court concluded that § 803(d)(3) does not violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights and plaintiffs appealed. Because plaintiffs have failed to show that § 803(d)(3) is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate legislative purpose we affirm the district court.
I.
These appeals were previously consolidated for oral argument before this Court on the issue of whether the attorney fee limitations set forth in § 803(d)(3) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3), limited attorney fees earned after the Act's passage in cases which preexisted the Act. This Court held that the PLRA's attorney fees provisions were inapplicable to fees earned following the enactment of the PLRA, in cases filed before the Act's passage. See Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1998). Because we

concluded that the fee provisions of the PLRA were inapplicable to plaintiff, we declined to reach plaintiff's argument that § 803(d)(3) was unconstitutional. Id. at 250 n. 1.
Following our decision, defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted defendants' petition and affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that while the fee provisions of the PLRA could not be retroactively applied to services performed prior to the Act's passage, the provisions would apply to any fees earned following the passage of the Act. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999). The Court did not address the constitutionality of § 803(d)(3) and remanded the case to this Court for further proceedings.
II.

We are now squarely confronted with the question of whether § 803(d)(3) of the PLRA results in a deprivation of the Equal Protection guaranteed by the implied equal protection provision of the Fifth Amendment.[1] Section 803
(d) provides in relevant part:

(d) Attorney's fees

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988[FN1] of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that 0907

(B)(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation....

(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an

843

hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section *843 3006A of

Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel.

We review de novo plaintiffs' challenge of the constitutionality of this federal statute. See United States v. Brown, 25 F.3d 307, 308-09 (6th Cir.1994).

A.

Plaintiffs argue that § 803(d)(3) violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution by capping the hourly rate for attorney fees that prisoners may recover, while leaving other civil rights plaintiffs free to recover reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 at the prevailing market rate.[2] We begin our analysis of plaintiff's claimed equal protection violation by determining the level of scrutiny to apply to the classifications Congress made in enacting § 803(d)(3).
Strict scrutiny of an alleged equal protection violation is only employed if the classification at issue discriminates on the basis of a suspect criterion or impinges upon a fundamental right. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-47, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-58, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Prisoners are not a suspect class, see Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980)), and plaintiffs have not alleged that a fundamental right is at issue. Consequently, as plaintiffs appear to concede, in order to establish a violation of equal protection, plaintiffs must show that § 803(d) (3) is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate legislative purpose. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973). Under this standard the statute will be afforded a strong presumption of validity and must be upheld as long as "there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate government purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). The government has no obligation to produce evidence to support the rationality of its statutory classifications and may rely entirely on rational speculation unsupported by any evidence or empirical data. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2098,

124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). The legislature is not even required to articulate any purpose or rationale in support of its legislation. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,15, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). Consequently, plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of "negativ[ing] every conceivable basis which might support [the legislation], ... whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record." Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2643. That being said, rational basis review is not a rubber stamp of all legislative action, as discrimination that can only be viewed as arbitrary and irrational will violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (stating that a law will fail rational basis review if "the varying treatment of different groups of persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the [legislature's] actions were irrational").
B.
Defendants, the United States as intervenor, and the State of Ohio as Amicus Curiae (collectively referred to as the "government" for convenience) contend that different treatment that § 803(d)(3) affords incarcerated civil rights litigants is rationally related to several legitimate legislative purposes. Namely, the government argues that 844 the provisions serve to: *844 deter the filing of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners, reduce trivial or inconsequential suits, reduce judicial intervention into the management of prisons, prevent windfall fee awards, and protect the public fisc.
Plaintiffs agree that the Congress' intent in enacting the PLRA was to reduce the large number of frivolous lawsuits brought by prisoners. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01(daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("We have witnessed an alarming explosion in the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by Stated and Federal prisoners.... Frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the law abiding population"); see also 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (in addition to problems with "massive judicial interventions in state prison systems, we also have [the problem of] frivolous inmate litigation."). However, plaintiffs assert that the attorney fee provisions of the PLRA are unrelated to this goal, since only prevailing parties may collect attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Further, plaintiffs point out that the majority of prisoner lawsuits filed in federal court are pro se, with most frivolous suits being dismissed by the district court prior to appointment of counsel. Finally, plaintiffs argue that under Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966), any intent on the part of Congress to deter frivolous litigation is illegitimate. In Rinaldi, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a statute which singled out imprisoned indigent defendants by requiring them to pay for the cost of transcripts if their appeals were unsuccessful. Indigent defendants who were not incarcerated were not required to bear such costs. The state defended the law on the grounds that it was rationally related to the goal of deterring frivolous appeals. The Supreme Court held otherwise, noting that: "[b]y imposing a financial obligation only upon inmates of institutions, the statute inevitably burdens many whose appeals, though unsuccessful, were not frivolous, and leaves untouched many whose appeals may have been frivolous indeed." Id. at 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497.
The government distinguishes Rinaldi by arguing that there are rational reasons for Congress to single out prisoners by capping the attorney fees they may recover upon prevailing in civil rights litigation due to the peculiar circumstances which influence a prisoner's decision to litigate. Specifically, the government notes that prisoners have substantial quantities of free time, have all their basic needs met, and are provided with free writing materials and often legal assistance. The government also points out that what would normally be thought of as the burdens which attend litigation 0907 such as the large amounts of time spent in depositions, preparing to testify, court appearances and the like 0907 carry few or no opportunity cost to prisoners. Rather, the government contends that for many prisoners time spent in a court room may well be preferable to time spent in jail. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (observing that "a courtroom is certainly a more hospitable place to spend an afternoon than a prison cell" and comparing litigation to a "recreational activity" for many prisoners). Further, the government argues that prisoners may receive unique rewards from litigation, in that it gives litigious prisoners a means of intimidating members of the prison staff.
Plaintiffs argue that the PLRA's attorney fees cap does relatively little to curb truly frivolous lawsuits.[3] However, 845 the *845 cap does appear to be rationally related to the very similar goal of decreasing marginal or trivial lawsuits.

Prior to the fee cap, an attorney would have little disincentive to take prisoner civil rights claims that alleged a technical, but very trivial violation. This could lead attorneys to adopt a "shotgun" approach, filing numerous claims in the hopes that at least a minor violation would likely be found, assuring the recovery of attorneys fees. As the government points out, in lowering the fee recoverable if the claim succeeds, attorneys are likely to demand a more meritorious claim to make the representation worthwhile. This is due to the fact that in deciding to accept any contingent fee arrangement, an attorney must discount the potential amount recoverable by the estimated probability of success. Faced with a smaller potential recovery, a rational attorney would demand a greater likelihood of success before taking a prisoner's case.[4]
Thus, Congress could rationally intend the PLRA's attorney fee cap to provide a counter-balance to a prisoner's numerous incentives to litigate, thereby placing prisoner civil rights plaintiffs more closely in the same decision making position as non-prisoner civil rights plaintiffs. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-21, 28 (1995) ("Th[e] proportionality requirement will discourage burdensome litigation of insubstantial claims where the prisoner can establish a technical violation of a federal right but he suffered no real harm from the violation."); see also Morrison v. Davis, 88 F.Supp.2d 799, 808 (S.D.Oh.2000). There are certainly some prisoners who would continue the litigation of their marginal claims, even without the help of an attorney, however, it is reasonable to conclude that at least some will be dissuaded by the fact that they will have to shoulder the entire workload themselves.
By reducing marginal or frivolous claims, Congress could also rationally be seeking to protect the state and federal treasuries, from which the majority of prisoner civil rights awards are paid. One of the problems that Congress noted was, as observed above, that plaintiffs use a "shotgun approach" to filing prison civil rights claims in the hope of prevailing on at least a minor point. See 141 Cong. Rec. H1042 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hoke) ("[T]his provision eliminates the financial incentive for prisoners [lawyers] to include numerous non-meritorious claims in sweeping institutional reform litigation."). A review of the legislative history makes it clear that Congress believed that the explosion of prisoner civil rights litigation that has occurred since the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 has placed an excessive financial burden on the prison administration, the state treasury, and the federal judiciary. See e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14,626-27 (daily ed. Sep. 29, 1995) (statements of Sens. Hatch, Dole, and Reid). Congress may have reasonably believed that many of these claims involved trivial or frivolous allegations, particularly when compared to the relief sought in civil rights litigation brought on behalf of 846 non-incarcerated plaintiffs. Consequently, *846 Congress could have rationally concluded that such prisoner civil rights litigation leads to attorney fees which are often disproportionate when compared with the result obtained for a similar fee in non-prisoner civil rights litigation.[5]See Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearings on S.3, S.38, S.400, S.866, S.930 and H.R. 667 Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, S. Hrg. 104-573 at 108 (1995), reprinted in Bernard D. Reams and William H. Manz, A Legislative History of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, Document No. 55 (statement of O. Lane McCotter, Director, Utah Dept. of Correction) ("The driving force behind [the] flood of prison litigation" is a "nothing to lose" attitude by prisoners, and lawyers driven by "the prospect of obtaining all of their highly inflated fees and costs if they succeed on some technicality.").[6] Accordingly, while employing imprecise means, Congress did not act irrationally in limiting the attorney fees that lawyers may recover for their representation of prevailing prisoner civil rights litigants.[7]
While plaintiff has raised some well founded criticisms of the methods Congress employed to achieve its purpose, it is not our province to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of Congress's decision to enact the legislation at issue. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 113 S.Ct. at 2642; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2100-2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). The Supreme Court emphasized this point in Heller with an extensive discussion of the issue:
[Rational-basis review] does [not] authorize the judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. For these reasons, a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental

purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these categories need not actually articulate at any

847

time the purpose or rationale supporting its *847 classification. Instead, a classification must be

upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that

could provide a rational basis for the classification.

Id. at 319-20, 113 S.Ct. at 2642 (citations and quotations omitted). Although the means that Congress employed do not tightly fit the ends it sought to achieve, we are compelled to accept Congress' legislative generalizations. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 113 S.Ct. at 2643. Accordingly, because plaintiffs have failed to negate every conceivable rational basis Congress may have had in enacting the PLRA's hourly rate cap for attorney fees, we must conclude that § 803(d)(3) of the PLRA survives rational basis review.[8]

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that § 803(d)(3) of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3), does not violate plaintiff's rights under the implied equal protection provision of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because I believe that § 803(d)(3) is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose, I respectfully dissent. The majority reaches a contrary conclusion primarily by disconnecting the attorneys' fee cap mandated by § 803(d)(3) from the fees otherwise available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. It is only through such a reading of § 803(d)(3) that the majority deems the statute rationally related to the goal of "decreasing marginal or trivial lawsuits." See Ante at 845. As a corollary to the purpose of reducing trivial lawsuits, the majority extrapolates that the statute conserves the resources of the state and federal treasuries out of which the fees are paid. Id. at 845. However, when one assesses the rationality of § 803(d)(3) through the lens of the fees otherwise available under § 1988, it becomes clear that no constitutionally rational basis supports the statute.
Section 1988 authorizes courts to award "reasonable" attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party" in a § 1983 action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); City of Cleveland v. Nation of Islam, No. 96-3291, 1997 WL 469533, at *1 (6th Cir.1997) (unpublished opinion). The plain language of the statute requires "that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). Specifically, a plaintiff does not prevail unless "actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). In assessing the amount of fees to be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff, the primary consideration is the degree of success obtained by the claimant. See id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566. Section 1988's reasonableness requirement therefore mandates a proportionality between the degree of a plaintiff's victory and any fees award. See id. It is thus that the Supreme Court has held that in civil rights suits for compensatory damages, attorneys fees should not be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff that receives only nominal damages. See id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. In this regard, it is clear that § 1988 is not designed "to produce windfalls for attorneys." Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (plurality 848 opinion) (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976) *848 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976 pp. 5908, 5913).
In this context, it is evident that § 1988 does not authorize attorneys' fees for frivolous or trivial lawsuits. See Walker v. Bain, 65 F.Supp.2d 591, 603 (E.D.Mich. 1999) (holding that § 803(d) is not rationally related to goal of deterring frivolous lawsuits). As a predicate to eligibility for fees under § 1988, a plaintiff must not only prevail in a § 1983 action, but must receive substantial relief on the merits of her claim. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 (providing that fees should not be awarded where only nominal damages are awarded). Prevailing claims, by definition, are not frivolous, and claims where a § 1983 plaintiff obtains sufficiently substantial relief to warrant fees under § 1988 are, by definition, not "marginal or trivial." Ante at 845.
Given that § 1988 does not permit a fees award for frivolous or trivial suits, the fees limitation of § 803(d)(3) cannot be rationally related to either of these purposes. Moreover, unless reducing the meritorious, non-trivial claims of prisoners is a legitimate constitutional objective, which has not been averred by any of the parties, the

derivative objectives advanced by the parties 0907 preserving governmental resources, reducing prisoner incentives to file § 1983 actions, and reducing federal oversight of state prisons 0907 are similarly not rationally related to § 803 (d)(3).
Because no rational basis supports § 803(d)(3)'s isolation of prisoners for discriminatory treatment, I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
[1] As the United States recognizes in its brief, only the fee cap provisions are before the panel in this appeal, as the attorney fees at issue arose from post-judgment compliance monitoring. Thus, we need not address the constitutionality of § 803(d)(2), which requires up to 25% of any judgment a prisoner obtains to be applied against any attorney fees awarded under this section.
[2] In the Eastern District of Michigan, $75.00 per hour is the maximum amount that a court appointed attorney may recover under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). Section 803(d)(3) thus caps the attorney fee recoverable at $112.50 per hour (150% of the $75.00 maximum).
[3] The government argues that the reduction in attorney fees goes into a prisoner's decision whether to file a claim. Several courts have agreed with the government's contention. See Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir.1999); Morrison v. Davis, 88 F.Supp.2d 799, 808 (S.D.Oh.2000). However, with respect to truly frivolous claims, it could be plausibly argued that the provision would have at best a very attenuated effect on the litigation decision of a pro se inmate, whose claims must be certified as possessing at least some merit at an early stage in the litigation. Further, the fee cap provisions only apply to cases in which the prisoner has actually prevailed, thereby assuring that at least one claim was meritorious. We need not resolve this issue, however, as other rational bases exist for the law's enactment.
[4] The dissent argues that § 803(d)(3) cannot be rationally related to reducing frivolous lawsuits, because § 1988 already only authorizes courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party." In addition, the dissent argues that the "reasonableness" requirement in § 1988 for the amount of attorneys' fees awarded mandates a proportionality between the degree of plaintiff's victory and any fee awarded, and thus § 803(d)(3) cannot be rationally related to reducing trivial claims either. By reducing the amount of any potential recovery, however, § 803(d)(3) raises the probability of success that such cases must enjoy before an attorney will accept the case. Thus, § 803 is rationally related to reducing frivolous and trivial claims because it will generate a higher required likelihood of success before any given case is taken.
[5] The dissent's allegation that § 803(d)(3) cannot be rationally related to protecting state and federal treasuries unless reducing the number of meritorious, non-trivial claims of prisoners is a legitimate constitutional objective fails to recognize the circumstances specific to prisoners that may increase the number of trivial or frivolous allegations a prisoner may file as compared to a non-prisoner. Congress could have rationally thought that § 803 (d)(3) would eliminate this distinction and thus preserve some governmental resources.
[6] The State of Ohio as Amicus Curiae cites G. Cole, R. Hanson, and J. Gilbert, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Prisoner Grievances: A Reference Manual for Averting Litigation 5-6 (National Institute of Corrections 1984), as observing "Many non-frivolous suits concern small monetary sums, and the time devoted to them by administrators is disproportionate to the amounts involved.").
[7] The government argues that the attorney fee cap provisions may reduce judicial over-involvement in the day to day administration of our nation's prisons. The legislative history of the PLRA also shows that Congress was concerned with this issue. See, e.g., Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearings on S.3, S.38, S.400, S.866, S.930 and H.R. 667 Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, S. Hrg. 104-573 at 3-7, 26-32 (1995), reprinted in Bernard D. Reams and William H. Manz, A Legislative History of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, Document No. 55 (statements of Sen. Spencer Abraham and Former Attorney General William P. Barr). However, because we conclude that the attorney fee cap provision is rationally related to the goal of reducing trivial claims and protecting the public fisc, we need not determine whether Congress's goal of reducing judicial involvement would also provide a rational basis for enacting § 803(d)(3).

[8] We note that the hourly rate chosen by Congress under § 803(d)(3) is also a matter of legislative judgment which we will not overturn unless it is demonstrated that Congress could not have reasonably conceived the rate as appropriate to achieve its legitimate objectives. See, e.g. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110-12, 99 S.Ct. 939, 949-50, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). Plaintiff has made no such showing.
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 322 F.3d 895 (2003)
Everett HADIX et al., Plaintiffs, C. Pepper Moore, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Perry JOHNSON et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-2247.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted: January 30, 2003. Decided and Filed: March 10, 2003.
C. Pepper Moore (briefed), Jackson, MI, pro se.
Leo H. Friedman (briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, for DefendantAppellee.
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
The inmate plaintiff C. Pepper Moore filed a motion for costs and an incentive award for his role as a class 896 representative in the continuing Hadix litigation, a civil *896 rights action brought by Michigan prisoners alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement that was settled by consent decree. The district court judge denied Moore's motion for an incentive award and for costs. We AFFIRM that decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The present appeal focuses on a very narrow issue within the broader Hadix litigation. The Hadix litigation began in 1980, when a group of male prisoners at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex (SPSM-CC) filed suit against the prison, claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated several provisions of the Constitution. The class of plaintiffs was represented by counsel throughout the litigation, and in 1985, the class entered into a consent decree with prison officials that attempted to insure the constitutionality of the conditions at SPSM-CC. The consent decree did not award damages, incentive awards, or costs to any of the individual plaintiffs.
Two years after the consent decree was entered, in November 1987, the district court awarded attorneys' fees to the Hadix plaintiffs for postjudgment monitoring of the defendants' compliance with the decree. The consent decree remained in effect until 2001, when in response to the Prison Reform Litigation Act and a decision of this court, see Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662 (6th Cir.2000), the district court largely terminated the consent decree.
This appeal focuses on the role of C. Pepper Moore, now acting pro se, who claims a right to receive an incentive award and costs. Even though he was represented by counsel during the relevant time periods, Moore personally claims a right to costs and an incentive award for his own efforts in the Hadix litigation. The parties agree that Moore has been extensively involved with the Hadix litigation. Moore became involved with the case in 1983. He was made a named class representative in 1988. According to all accounts, Moore has spent significant amounts of time aiding the Hadix plaintiffs, both in the initial litigation and in the monitoring of the consent decree. Moore claims that he has paid for numerous litigation-related expenses out of his own pocket. His affidavit alleges, for instance, that he has bought several typewriters and paid for their repairs. He claims that he has spent at least $10 per week to copy and distribute to other class members filings of counsel and court orders. He has allegedly

paid for mailing and copying costs, and for footlockers to store his documents. Moore also claims that he gave up his prison job at the Michigan Braille Transcribing Services because of his dedication to the litigation. Moore estimates his expenditures to be approximately $30,955.04, although he has not provided the court with any documentation of these receipts except in a sworn affidavit.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The underlying civil rights action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdiction of the district court over Moore's motion for costs and an incentive award is unimpaired by the fact that the Hadix consent decree is no longer in effect, having been terminated on June 29, 2001. Courts have jurisdiction to hear claims about costs after final judgment. See Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 268, 108 S.Ct. 1130, 99 L.Ed.2d 289 (1988) (noting that a motion for costs under Federal Rule of 897 Civil Procedure 54(d) is a post-judgment motion not appropriate until after judgment); *897 Clarke v. Mindis Metals, Inc., No. 95-5517, 1996 WL 616677, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct.24, 1996) (noting that "Fed R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) provides no time limit regarding motions for costs"). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B. Standards of Review
Although this circuit has never addressed the issue, we agree with the circuit courts that have concluded that a district court's denial of an incentive award should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 399, 408 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1038, 121 S.Ct. 2000, 149 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2001); see also In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir.2000) (applying an abuse-ofdiscretion standard where a district court granted an incentive award to class representatives). We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of costs. See Singleton v. Smith, 241 F.3d 534, 539 (6th Cir. 2001) (using an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a grant of costs, and explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (d) "allows denial of costs at the discretion of the trial court") (citation omitted).
C. Incentive Award
Moore's first claim is that the district court erroneously denied him an incentive award. Incentive awards are typically awards to class representatives for their often extensive involvement with a lawsuit. Numerous courts have authorized incentive awards. See Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir.1998); In re U.S. Bancorp Litig., 291 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 108, 154 L.Ed.2d 32 (2002); In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 463; see also In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 175 F.R.D. 270, 273 & n. 3 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (collecting cases). These courts have stressed that incentive awards are efficacious ways of encouraging members of a class to become class representatives and rewarding individual efforts taken on behalf of the class. Yet applications for incentive awards are scrutinized carefully by courts who sensibly fear that incentive awards may lead named plaintiffs to expect a bounty for bringing suit or to compromise the interest of the class for personal gain. See 2 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newburg on Class Actions § 11.38, at 80-81 (3d ed.1992) (noting that "[t]he propriety of `incentive' awards to named plaintiffs has been rigorously debated"); see also Cohen v. Resolution Trust Corp., 61 F.3d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "`[w]hen a settlement explicitly provides for preferential treatment for the named plaintiffs in a class action, a substantial burden falls upon the proponents of the settlement to demonstrate and document its fairness'") (citation omitted).
This court has never explicitly passed judgment on the appropriateness of incentive awards. See In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 24 Fed. Appx. 520, 526, 2001 WL 1667267, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec.26, 2001) (noting that "[t]his court has not previously been called upon to approve a grant of incentive awards, and we intimate no view as to the 898 propriety of such awards in general") (footnote omitted).[1] We note that *898 some district courts in our circuit, however, have given incentive awards. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F.Supp.2d 907, 913-14 (S.D.Ohio 2001); In re Revco Sec. Litig., No. 1:89CV0593, 1993 WL 497208, at *3 (N.D.Ohio Sept.14, 1993); Enter. Energy

Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240, 251 (S.D.Ohio 1991); In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366, 373-74 (S.D.Ohio 1990).
Although we think there may be circumstances where incentive awards are appropriate, we need not resolve the difficult issue of detailing precisely when they are appropriate 0907 for this case is clearly not a case where an incentive award is proper. As both the district court and the defendants note, incentive awards are usually viewed as extensions of the common-fund doctrine, a doctrine that holds that a litigant who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself is entitled to recover some of his litigation expenses from the fund as a whole. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) (describing the common-fund doctrine); In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 175 F.R.D. 270, 273 & n. 3 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (listing cases where incentive awards have been taken out of a common settlement fund). Thus, when a class-action litigation has created a communal pool of funds to be distributed to the class members, courts have approved incentive awards to be drawn out of that common pool. See Enter. Energy Corp., 137 F.R.D. at 251 (approving incentive awards of $50,000 to each of the class representatives out of a settlement fund of $56.6 million); In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. at 373-74 (approving incentive awards ranging from $35,000 to $55,000 out of a $18 million settlement fund); Brotherton, 141 F.Supp.2d at 913-14 (granting a $50,000 incentive award out of a $5.25 million fund). Without a common fund, however, there is no place from which to draw an incentive award. Unsurprisingly, we are unable to find any case where a claim for an incentive award that is not authorized in a settlement agreement has been granted in the absence of a common fund.
Here there is neither authorization in the consent decree for this incentive award nor a common fund from which it could be drawn. As a result, it is plainly inappropriate to grant an incentive award. We also note that this result comports with our holdings on consent decrees generally. Moore here is essentially asking the defendants to take on the additional burden of an incentive award above and beyond the liabilities they had agreed to in the consent decree settling the lawsuit 0907 for the absence of a common fund here means that Moore would have to obtain the 899 incentive award not from a communal fund belonging to him and his fellow class members, *899 but from the defendants directly. Moore phrases it as merely forcing the defendants to reallocate some of the money from the implementation of the consent decree to his incentive award, but that misses the point. "A consent decree, although in effect a final judgment, is a contract founded on the agreement of the parties." Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827, 113 S.Ct. 86, 121 L.Ed.2d 49 (1992). "`It should [therefore] be construed to preserve the position for which the parties bargained.'" Gonzales v. Galvin, 151 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). Forcing the defendants to pay the incentive award is certainly an additional expenditure, and it is therefore impermissible. See Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1153 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that an increase of one party's "financial obligations under the consent decree beyond [the agreed-upon amount] constitutes an abuse of discretion and cannot stand"), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 2998, 125 L.Ed.2d 691 (1993).
D. Costs
Moore's second claim is that he is entitled to costs. He includes as his "costs" his claims for lost wages, copying costs, word processors and repairs, supplies, storage lockers, and postage in the total amount of $30,955.04. The district court quickly resolved this claim, holding that no statute or case law allows Moore to recover these expenses without explicit authorization in the consent decree.
This decision is correct, but a little explanation is necessary. Prevailing parties are usually entitled to costs. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(d) (noting that "costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs"). Although Rule 54(d) allows a party to be reimbursed for its "costs," this term is given a far narrower interpretation than its vernacular meaning might suggest. See 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666, at 202 (3d ed.1998) (noting that "[a]lthough `costs' has an everyday meaning synonymous with `expenses,' the concept of taxable costs under Rule 54(d) is more limited"). Taxable costs are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 875 (6th Cir.2000) ("Title 28 U.S.C. § 1920 lists the items a court may tax as `costs' to a prevailing party under Rule 54(d)."), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 953, 121 S.Ct. 1428, 149 L.Ed.2d 367 (2001). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1920 lists six items:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
The "costs" that Moore lists do not qualify as costs within the meaning of this statute. Moore does not seek reimbursement for any court fees, docket fees, special interpretation costs, or for compensation of his experts. 900 Moore instead seeks to label his general expenditures as "costs." This, however, is inconsistent *900 with the concept of costs articulated in § 1920. See 10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666, at 204 (3d ed.1998) (stating that "items such as ... investigatory expenses will not qualify either as statutory fees or reimbursable costs" and that "[t]hese expenses must be borne by the litigants"). Moore's lost wages, copying costs, word processors and repairs, supplies, storage lockers, and postage simply are not costs within the meaning of the rule.
III. CONCLUSION
C. Pepper Moore incurred numerous expenses in working to inform his fellow inmates about the Hadix litigation. Nonetheless, for the reasons explained above, the district court properly denied his motion for an incentive award and costs. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
[1] We note that we approved something similar to an incentive award in Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir.1974). In Thornton, the East Texas Motor Freight Company had denied black drivers the opportunity to be promoted from one position to another. This court affirmed a consent decree which gave heightened seniority to black city-drivers who had filed charges with the EEOC, which helped to bring the issue to the Commission's attention. Some district courts in this circuit had construed Thornton as suggesting that incentive awards are proper in some circumstances. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F.Supp.2d 907, 913 (S.D.Ohio 2001); In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 175 F.R.D. 270, 272 (S.D.Ohio 1997). Yet, in an unpublished opinion, a panel of this court explained that Thornton did not involve incentive awards, because the preferential treatment given to the drivers who filed with the EEOC was due to their actions before the litigation began, rather than their actions during the litigation. See In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 24 Fed. Appx. 520, 527 n. 3, 2001 WL 1667267, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec.26, 2001). We note that in Thornton we approved the district court's award of "earlier seniority for those drivers who actively sought an end to the company's ... policy" because they "should benefit more than those who were merely passive" and because they "protest[ed] and help[ed] to bring rights to a group of employees who have been the victims of discrimination." Thornton, 497 F.2d at 420. We need not decide here whether Thornton involved a typical incentive award.
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 Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)
871 F.2d 1087 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., DefendantsAppellants.
No. 88-1144. | March 30, 1989.
E.D.Mich.
AFFIRMED.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
Before DAVID A. NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
*1 This is an interlocutory appeal from a temporary restraining order preventing prison officials at the State Prison of Southern Michigan (“SPSM”) in Jackson, Michigan, from examining files at the Prison Legal Services (“PLS”) office without the presence of a civilian member of the staff.
The underlying case concerns a prisoner class action lawsuit claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to conditions of confinement at the SPSM. In May 1985, the court entered a comprehensive consent decree which addressed most of the issues raised by the plaintiffs. The case then proceeded to a bench trial on issues concerning access to court claims. At the present time, the district court has held that the constitutional right of access to the courts requires the presence of the PLS within the walls of SPSM.
This interlocutory appeal addresses the method by which prison officials may be allowed to search the PLS offices. Appellees do not contest that the prison officials have the

right to search the offices, but appellees worry about the potential for files being taken or read when PLS civilian personnel are not present.
Appellees filed a request for a temporary injunction ex parte, and the court ordered a hearing on the request which was held on November 10, 1987. At the hearing, appellants disputed the extent of the attorney-client privilege in these circumstances and offered to give evidence relating to security reasons for the search procedures. The appellants also suggested that the presence of a shift commander during the search who could then notify PLS of any search would be adequate protection of the attorney-client privilege. The district court rejected the appellants’ arguments and issued a temporary injunction against the appellants, enjoining them from searching the PLS offices without PLS civilian personnel being present unless they give two hours advance notice of the search. Appellants took an interlocutory appeal as of right invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).
I
The appellants contend that the evidence before the district court was not sufficient to grant permanent injunctive relief. This contention results from the confusion concerning whether the district court’s order was in fact permanent injunctive relief or temporary injunctive relief. The appellants claim that there was a permanent order because of the entry on the docket sheet of a “permanent” injunction. However, the original request filed by the appellees only requested temporary injunctive relief, and the appellees maintain that it is their belief that the injunction granted was temporary. Furthermore, the judge never said orally or in writing that the injunction was permanent. Indeed it appears from its post-order memorandum that the district court did not specifically denominate its original order as temporary because it was under the impression that the parties were willing to agree to its final order-an impression first disabused by the notice of appeal.
*2 We adopt the construction urged by the appellees. The district court never notified the appellants of an intention to issue a permanent injunction or provide the proper notice before an issuance of a permanent injunction, and we will assume that the district court would grant the proper procedural notification before the issuance of a permanent injunction. Therefore, we will examine the sufficiency of the district court’s order under the standards for a temporary injunction.1
The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is
1

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir.1982). In determining on appeal whether the district court abused its discretion, “we must consider whether the plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits; whether the plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury; whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and where the public interest lies.” Ibid. (quoting Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319, 323 (6th Cir.1976)).
With regards to likelihood of success on the merits, we need only consider whether the plaintiffs would likely be entitled to the issuance of a permanent injunction in the present case.
Since the district court has held that the presence of the PLS offices within the walls of the prison is necessary to protect the prisoners’ constitutional right of access to the courts, we conclude that an analysis of the permanent injunction regarding the attorney-client privilege, a derivative of this right, should first be considered in relation to a framework of a permanent injunction to remedy a constitutional violation. See Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814 (1974).
Appellants correctly point out that in order to be entitled to permanent injunctive relief for an alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff must establish the fact of the violation, the presence of a continuing irreparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law. Newman v. State of Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083, 103 S.Ct. 1773 (1983).
In U.S. v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir.1979), rev’d on other grounds, 101 S.Ct. 677 (1981), this court concluded that the trust at the heart of the attorney-client privilege is, by its nature, fragile. The trust may be irreparable once broken because there is really no adequate legal remedy for a violation of the privilege. It is true that not all communications between attorney and client are privileged. Fisher v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976). However, it is also true, and appellants do not dispute, that the application of the attorney-client privilege is critical in the areas to which it applies. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1225-1226. Further, prisoners may also assert a client’s right to an attorney-client privilege. Procunier, 94 S.Ct. at 1814.
*3 However, in this case we are not dealing with the world at large, but with the peculiar concerns of a maximum security prison. In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) and Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987), the Supreme Court held that prison officials need only show that a regulation is reasonable to justify its impact on a valid constitutional right. However, the court also noted that if an inmate may

point to an alternative that “fully accomodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penalogical interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. at 2262.
Though given an opportunity by both the district court and this court, the appellants have not shown that a permanent injunction would be more than a de minimis intrusion into a valid penalogical concern. Thus, the probability that unaccompanied searches of the PLS offices would violate a constitutional right without an adequate legal remedy provides support for the probability of the plaintiffs succeeding in a hearing for a permanent injunction in these circumstances. Therefore, appellants have shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
Furthermore, as discussed supra the attorney-client privilege, once broken, is irreparable. This holds true in the context of a preliminary injunction as well as a permanent injunction. Balanced against the great probability of harm to the plaintiff of not issuing the injunction, is the inability of the prison officials to demonstrate any specific harm to them from the issuance of the injunction.
This court gave appellants the opportunity to demonstrate that their searches would be inhibited in any way at all by requiring PLS personnel to be present, and though appellants claim that they had various security concerns, they were unable to articulate any of these at oral argument.2 Prison officials can search the PLS offices any time the office is open. If the office is closed, no imminent security danger has been articulated or even intimated, since the office is completely sealed while waiting for the arrival of PLS civilian personnel. We must agree with the court below that any impact on prison security is de minimis. Therefore, the prison officials have not met even their small burden of justifying a possible violation of the attorney-client privilege.
The overwhelming evidence before the district court at the time the injunction was issued supported the district court’s conclusion that a temporary injunction was appropriate. Furthermore, on the record before us, we conclude that the public interest is in no way disserved by the injunction. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
II
The appellants attempt to convince this court that the proper analysis of this issue should be determined in relation to the law of searches and seizures. Appellants correctly assert that a prisoner has no reasonable
2

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)
expectation of privacy in his cell or other parts of the prison. Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 170 (1st Cir.1986). This analysis, however, completely ignores the attorneyclient privilege. Appellants have pointed to no cases where any court has held that prisoners have no right to an attorney-client privilege, nor have they attempted to show that the attorney-client privilege is based on the Fourth Amendment. Further, PLS has not disputed the right of prison officials to conduct searches. It has only contended that the attorney-client privilege should be protected during those searches. Therefore, Fourth Amendment analysis is inapplicable to the present case.
*4 The temporary injunction of the district court is AFFIRMED.
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
*4 The district court entered its temporary injuction, if that is what it was, after a hearing at which the plaintiffs were not required to present evidence and the defendants were not permitted to. The hearing was held on an application that had not been properly filed and that was not supported, as far as we can tell, by affidavits. It is doubtful whether the defendant prison officials were given adequate notice of the case they would have to meet, and it is clear that they were enjoined from implementing their proposed new prison search procedures without having been allowed to explain from the witness stand what the proposed procedures were and why they were thought to be necessary. I find this, I must say, troubling.
The defendant officials obviously had serious concerns about the security of the prison that they-and not the district court-were responsible for running. Whether those concerns would be frustrated by the conditions the plaintiffs sought to have the court impose is a factual question best answered on the basis of evidence presented by competent witnesses, it seems to me, not argument presented by lawyers who may or may not have been privy to all the facts. Witnesses who presumably had firsthand knowledge of the facts were available to give evidence at the hearing conducted by the district court on November 10, 1987, but the court refused to hear their testimony. We may be able to guess why the court refused to take evidence, but I do not think the refusal is something we can excuse.
Without competent evidence, the district court was in no position to make the findings of fact required of it by Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. (“in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall ... set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action”). And without adequately supported findings of fact, a court of appeals “is unable to meet its obligation to

properly review the district court’s compliance with the criteria ... for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.” Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 284 (1988).
It does not strike me as farfetched to suppose that, as defense counsel argued before the district court, a requirement for advance notice to Prison Legal Services and a wait of up to two hours before the prison office occupied by PLS could be searched during off-hours might tend to reduce the number of off-hour searches that would otherwise be conducted. Surely no court of equityparticulary a federal court that is obligated to give the greatest possible deference to the decisions of state officials vested with direct responsibility for the operation of a state prison-could consider such a reduction anything but undesirable.
It is worth noting, in this connection, that the services provided through the PLS office had not, in the past, been confined to legal services. Defendants’ counsel was prepared to show that James Hadix, one of several prisoner paralegals who worked in the office, had been a participant in a drug smuggling ring that used the PLS office for at least a year. Without the knowledge of the paid professional staff, drugs were apparently brought into the office in reams of xerox paper and were then distributed by Mr. Hadix to the smuggling ring’s customers.
*5 Before Paralegal Hadix was finally caught out, as I gather from statements made by plaintiffs’ counsel at the November 10 hearing, it had been the practice of the prison officials to conduct searches of the PLS office only in the presence of the Director of Prison Legal Services. At some point during the week of November 2, 1987, according to plaintiffs’ counsel, Prisoner Legal Services was advised by memorandum that all keys to the office and to the office file cabinets would henceforth “be turned over to the control center to be kept in a secure area there,” and that searches would henceforth “be conducted at any time, day or night, whether or not the Director of the Office [could] be present....” It seems to be undisputed that a shift commander was to be present to insure the integrity of the files and to make sure that the searches would be confined to looking for contraband, and the district judge himself acknowledged “I’m sure that these people are not going to fiddle around with inmate files.”* It also seems to be undisputed that among the reasons for the change in procedure were the discovery of the drug smuggling operation at the PLS office and the fact that a prison officer had recently been killed at a post directly outside the PLS area.
The announced change in procedure apparently prompted counsel for the class action plaintiffs to prepare a written petition for a temporary restraining order. Whether the petition complied with the requirements of Rule 65(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., we do not know; notwithstanding the filing
3

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)
requirement imposed by Rule 5(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., the petition was never filed with the district court. The joint appendix does not contain a copy of the petition, and this panel has never seen it. The unfiled petition may well have been handed to the district judge, however, because the court’s order starts out with a reference to “Plaintiffs’ Petition for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order dated November 6, 1987....” Whether the defendants were ever favored with a copy of the petition is unclear. The record contains no proof of service, of course.
Upon learning of plaintiffs’ desire for a restraining order, the district judge evidently granted a little irregular ex parte relief. As the judge stated at the November 10 hearing, “I talked to [a] Deputy Warden ... on the phone the other day. * * * [M]y conversation with Deputy Warden Jackson and later confirmed with Warden Jabe was that until I had an opportunity to hear this, there would be no search made outside of Prison Legal Systems’ hours unless [the PLS director] was notified and could be present.”
Unlike ex parte temporary restraining orders, which are supposed to expire by their terms within ten days after they have been entered of record, see Rule 65(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., preliminary injunctions have no specific built-in termination point and are not ordinarily issued without at least five days notice to the adverse party. Rule 65(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that “No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party,” and Rule 6(d) provides that “A written motion ... and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court.” Wright and Miller comment that “[i]n many instances a shorter notice period would compromise the opposing party’s ability to marshal evidence and present his arguments against the issuance of the injunction, which might violate due process standards.” 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949, at 468.
*6 If the plaintiffs’ elusive motion was in fact dated November 6, as the district court said, it seems improbable that either the motion or any notice of hearing could have been served on defendants at least five days before the November 10 hearing date-and there was no court order fixing a shorter period. This is not a mere technicality, in my view. The requirement of adequate written notice is important; it is meant “as a device for securing an opportunity for the non-moving party to muster his best argument, to plan his strategy, and to put his best foot forward. In short, adequate notice helps the court secure a just determination.” Schlesinger Partnership v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir.1982).
We do not know how much time was actually afforded

the defendants to marshal their evidence and muster their arguments prior to the November 10 hearing, just as we do not know what opportunity defense counsel had to review the evidence with his prospective witnesses. Had the witnesses been allowed to testify, to be sure, both the failure to give the requisite five days notice and the failure to file a proper written motion, properly supported by sworn affidavits, might have turned out not to be prejudicial. But because the prospective witnesses were refused permission to testify, the failure to follow the rules becomes much more problematic, to my way of thinking.
The “case” with which defendants’ counsel found himself confronted at the November 10 hearing turned out to consist of an unsworn statement by plaintiffs’ counsel taking up approximately two pages in the transcript. Defense counsel began his own remarks, not surprisingly, “by noting that there’s been no evidence offered or presented by the Plaintiffs to show irreparable harm.” No such evidence was presented at any stage of the proceedings. And the district court showed no interest whatever in defense counsel’s repeated offers to present evidence on the appropriate scope of the injunction that the court was clearly determined to grant.
Where a written application for a preliminary injunction has been properly filed, with appropriate supporting affidavits, the taking of evidence may not be necessary if there is no serious dispute about the facts. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.1968). The application itself is supposed to state the grounds for the injunction “with particularity,” see Rule 7(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., and there may be no need for a hearing if the facts are uncontested. Where the facts are in dispute, however, as Judge Friendly said in Frank, “the inappropriateness of proceeding on affidavits attains its maximum and, even if the plaintiff’s need is great, it will normally be possible for the judge within the allotted time to conduct a hearing that will illuminate the factual issues although probably not settling them.” Id. at 491.
If it is inappropriate to proceed on affidavits in such a case, it is no less inappropriate to proceed solely on the unsworn statements of counsel, without any affidavits at all. The reasonableness of the restraints sought by the plaintiffs in this case obviously involved factual questions, and to foreclose all testimony-particularly when knowledgeable witnesses were in the courthouse, ready, willing, and able to take the stand-strikes me as a patent abuse of discretion. As this court held in SEC v. G. Weeks Securities, 678 F.2d 649, 651, (6th Cir.1982),
*7 “Rule 65 requires a hearing before a preliminary injunction may issue. A hearing implies the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Broth’d of Local F. & E., 357 F.2d 152 (6th Cir.1960). Observance of the Rule’s hearing
4

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)

requirement is particularly important where the facts are disputed....” (Quotation from Carpenter’s Dist. Council v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, 8 (6th Cir.1958), as quoted in Broth’d of Local F. & E., 357 F.2d at 153-154, omitted.)
Compare Medico Security Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek, 680 F.2d 37, 38 (7th Cir.1981), where the trial court was held to have abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction without “the holding of any hearing whatsoever and in the absence of any affidavits or even a verified complaint.”
Whether the order here under review is a “permanent” injunction, which is what the district court’s own docket sheet calls it, or a “temporary” injunction, as it is characterized by this court, seems to me immaterial. Courts are no more free to enter preliminary injunctions without evidentiary support than they are to enter permanent injunctions without evidentiary support. See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir.1987) (“The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of producing evidence ...”).
Every order granting a preliminary injunction, moreover, like every order granting a permanent injunction, is required to “set forth the reasons for its issuance.” Rule 65(d), Fed.R.Civ.P. And the requirement of Rule 52(a) that the trial court find the facts specially is no less applicable to preliminary injunctions than to permanent injunctions. Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir.1988). There was no compliance with these requirements here.

the gaps in the record. The memorandum includes a finding that the injunction’s “effect ... if any, upon the interests of the prison administration is clearly de minimus ” [sic], but in the absence of a proper evidentiary record, I am at a loss to understand the basis for such a finding. The order in the case before us, like the order at issue in Glover v. Johnson, seems to me to represent “excessively intrusive interference in the prerogatives of a state agency that is not supported by evidence of the quality and quantity required for the exercise of such extraordinary federal judicial power.” 855 F.2d at 285. (Emphasis supplied.)
The district judge is an experienced and respected jurist, and I cannot believe that he is unaware of the importance of developing an evidentiary record before issuing injunctions against state agency personnel. What happened here, I suspect, is that as the November 10 hearing progressed, the judge came to think of it as a sort of settlement conference. The transcript of the hearing discloses no agreement between the parties on the twohour notice provision that is being challenged in this appeal, but in his supplemental memorandum the district judge concedes that “[a]t the hearing I concluded that the parties had agreed to the Order.” That erroneous conclusion may explain the otherwise inexplicable issuance of the injunction, but it certainly does not justify it. The injunction, in my opinion, should be vacated forthwith. This court having elected not to follow that course, I respectfully dissent.

On April 1, 1988, after learning that the defendants had appealed the injunction in this case, the district court did file a supplemental memorandum opinion. Although helpful in several respects, the supplemental memorandum does not seem to me adequately to fill in

Parallel Citations
1989 WL 27984 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
	  

Footnotes

1

In its brief, the State made no objection to the procedure afforded them as being inadequate for the granting of a preliminary

injunction. Therefore, we have not addressed the procedural objection raised in the dissent.

2

We do not differ with the dissent that the possibility of drug smuggling is of grave concern; however, the appellants have been

unable to demonstrate or even allege how the search procedures outlined in the preliminary injunction restrain dealing with that

concern.

*

Plaintiffs’ counsel did not offer any reason for supposing it probable that any shift commander would allow officers conducting the

searches to read the contents of the PLS files, as opposed to simply assuring themselves that the files did not contain drugs,

weapons, cell keys, or other contraband. In 1987, it should be noted, PLS did not represent prisoners in lawsuits against officials of

this prison-so unless one is prepared to assume that the officers had a very peculiar taste for legal prose, it is hard to see what

motive they could have had for reading anything.

	  
5

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989) 6

 
 Hadix v. Johnson, 897 F.2d 529 (1990)

897 F.2d 529 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.)
Everett HADIX, et al.,1 Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections, et al.,2 Defendants-
Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 80-73581, Feikeus, D.J.
E.D.Mich.
AFFIRMED.

*1 Defendants-appellants Perry M. Johnson, et al.3 appealed from an interlocutory injunction by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan prohibiting appellants from transferring an inmate, Clarence Moore, from the State Prison of Southern Michigan and adding Moore as a class representative to the plaintiff class. They also appealed from an order denying a motion for recusal of the presiding judge in a class action concerning violation of constitutional rights of prisoners in which action a consent decree has already been entered. Upon review of appellants’ assignments of error, the record in its entirety, the briefs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel, this court concludes that the assignments of error are without merit.
Accordingly, the July 28, 1988 order of the district court is affirmed for the reasons stated in that court’s order.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
No. 88-1905. | March 5, 1990.

Before KEITH, KRUPANSKY and RYAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.

Parallel Citations
1990 WL 19670 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
	  

Footnotes

1

Named plaintiffs-appellees in this class action include Everett Hadix, Richard Mapes, Patrick Somerville, Roosevelt Hudson Jr.,

Brent E. Koster, Lee A. McDonald, Darryl Starges, Robert Flemister, William Lovett, James Covington, Frank Thomas, and James

Hadix.

2

Defendants-appellants are the following, both individually and in the capacities listed: Perry M. Johnson, Director of the Michigan

Department of Corrections, Barry Mintzes, Warden, Charles Andersen, Past Warden, William Daniell Trudell, Deputy Warden,

Duane Sholes, Deputy Warden, John Jobe, Business Manager of the State Prison of Southern Michigan, James Pogats,

Administrative Assistant to the Warden, Roy Rider, Classifications Director of the State Prison, Charles Utess, Resident Services

Director to the State Prison, Dan P. Ludec, Chairman of the Corrections Commission, The Michigan Corrections Commission, and

William G. Milliken, Governor of the State of Michigan.

3

See note 1.

	  

1

 
 Hadix v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 51 (1991)
943 F.2d 51 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Everett HADIX, Richard Mapes, Patrick Somerville, Roosevelt Hudson, Jr., Brent E. Koster, Lee A. McDonald, Darryl Starges, Robert Flemister, William Lovett, James Covington, Frank Thomas, James Hadix, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, Barry Mintzes, Charles Andersen, William Daniell Trudell, Duane Sholes, John Jabe, James Pogats, Roy Rider, Charles Utess, Dan P. Ludec, the Michigan Corrections Commission and William G. Milliken, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 90-1810. | Aug. 29, 1991.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, No. 80-73581; Feikens, J.
E.D.Mich., 740 F.Supp. 433.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Before BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr. and DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
*1 This is an appeal from an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.1 The plaintiffs are a class of inmates in the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson (SPSM) who brought an action against various state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of the conditions under which inmates are confined at SPSM. Most of the issues in the lawsuit were settled with the entry of a consent decree. The consent decree provided, however, that “[t]he parties agree that they will submit the following question[ ] for resolution by the Court after a hearing on the merits: ... Classification.”

The issue of the classification of prisoners at SPSM was not litigated before Judge Feikens, the judge who is presiding over the Hadix case in the Eastern District of Michigan. Instead, the parties agreed that the issue would be decided in the case of United States v. Michigan (hereinafter referred to as “USA ”), over which Judge Enslen presides in the Western District of Michigan. The classification issue was to be determined in USA for a group of Michigan prisons that includes SPSM. The Hadix plaintiffs were permitted to act as amici curiae in the USA case, and in that capacity they presented briefs and some testimony at a three-day hearing before Judge Enslen.
In accordance with a judgment agreed to by the parties in the USA case, the defendants presented a proposed classification plan to the court. Judge Enslen rejected the defendants’ plan and directed them to submit a revised plan incorporating certain compliance procedures and addressing “program needs” that the court found integral to a proper classification system.
In an order entered in the Hadix case in June of 1990, Judge Feikens awarded attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel on the classification issue before Judge Enslen. Judge Feikens relied on an earlier order in which he had found the Hadix plaintiffs to be prevailing parties and a separate order in which he had concluded that the plaintiffs would be entitled to reasonable fees in monitoring the implementation of the decree. See Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980) ( “Services devoted to reasonable monitoring of the court’s decrees, both to insure full compliance and to ensure that the plan is indeed working ... are compensable services”). Judge Feikens concluded that the attorneys’ work with respect to the classification issue was reasonably related to monitoring the Hadix consent decree.
After the attorney fee award had been made in the Hadix case, this court heard an appeal from Judge Enslen’s order regarding classification and other issues in the USA case. With respect to the classification issue, we affirmed the district court’s order in part and reversed it in part, remanding the case for further proceedings. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991).
*2 The work performed in USA by counsel for the Hadix plaintiffs appears to have been more directly concerned with shaping a decree, as far as classification is concerned, than with monitoring implementation of a decree. It is not clear to us, at this point, to what extent the Hadix plaintiffs will prove to have been prevailing parties on the classification issue. Accordingly, we VACATE the fee award and REMAND the case for reconsideration in
1

Hadix v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 51 (1991)

light of whatever disposition is ultimately made of the classification issue in USA.

Parallel Citations
1991 WL 165653 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
	  

Footnotes

1

42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... of this title, ... the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs.”

	  

2

 
 Hadix v. Johnson, 198 F.3d 245 (1999)
198 F.3d 245 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Gary KNOP, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 97-1610, 97-1611. | Nov. 10, 1999.
Before KENNEDY, GUY, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
ORDER
*1 The defendants appeal the district court’s opinion entered upon the plaintiffs’ motions for attorneys’ fees for the time period between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 1996. After the appellate briefing had been completed, these cases were placed into abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin v. Hadix, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (1999). Now these appeals are before the court on a stipulation filed by the defendants-appellants and plaintiffs-appellees. That stipulation states, in whole:
Defendants-Appellants, and Plaintiff-Appellees stipulate to the dismissal of Defendants-Appellants Argument II, in the above captioned appeals, such stipulation conditioned upon a decision by the Sixth Circuit favorable to Defendant with respect to Argument I, of the above captioned appeals consistent with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Hadix, No. 98-262, decided June 21, 1999.
Subsequent to the filing of the stipulation, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to this court requesting “that the Court enter an order modifying the decision of the district court to mandate an hourly rate of $112.50 per hour, consistent with the decision in Martin v.. Hadix, for the period April 27, 1996- December 31, 1996.”
In Martin v. Hadix, the Supreme Court addressed the cap on attorney’s fees created by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). Section 803(d)(3) of the PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) to limit the hourly rate permitted in any action brought by a prisoner in which attorney’s fees are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Pursuant to that amendment, “[n]o award of attorney’s fees ... shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel.” In the instant case, that hourly rate would be $112.50. This section was effective upon the date of enactment, April 26, 1996. The Court held in Martin that “[w]ith respect to postjudgment monitoring performed after the effective date the PLRA fees cap applies to such work.” Martin v. Hadix, 119 S.Ct. at 2008.
In view of Martin v. Hadix, the appropriate hourly rate for attorney work for the period from April 27 to December 31, 1996 is $112.50. The defendants-appellants have withdrawn all other aspects of these appeals.
Therefore, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
1

Hadix v. Johnson, 198 F.3d 245 (1999) Parallel Citations 1999 WL 1045084 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
2

 
 Hadix v. Johnson, 187 F.3d 635 (1999)
187 F.3d 635 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. Everett HADIX, et al. (No. 98-2391), Gary Knop, et al. (No. 99-1007), Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 98-2391, 99-1007. | June 16, 1999.
Before GUY, NELSON, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges. Opinion
ORDER *1 The defendants appeal the November 12, 1998 denial of their motion to terminate remedial injunctive relief granted in these prisoner civil rights class actions. On April 1, 1999, this court entered a decision in Hadix v. Johnson, 173 F.3d 958 (6th Cir.1999), pet. for reh’g and en banc reh’g pending. The April 1 decision reversed the remedial injunctive relief granted by district court that was the subject of the motion to terminate and remanded to the district court for additional findings. The plaintiffs are before the court seeking an order vacating the November 12 district court ruling and remanding for further proceedings consistent with this court’s April 1 decision. Although the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion, they agree that these appeals should be remanded. The plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED; the portion of the November 12, 1998 opinion and order of the district court denying the defendants’ motion to terminate is VACATED; these appeals are REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings.
Parallel Citations 1999 WL 426479 (C.A.6 (Mich.))
1

 
 Hadix v. McGinnis, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)

118 S.Ct. 2368 Supreme Court of the United States
Everett HADIX, et al., petitioners, v.
Kenneth McGINNIS, et al.
No. 97-1693. | June 26, 1998.
Case below, Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1100; 133 F.3d 940.

Opinion Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Parallel Citations 118 S.Ct. 2368 (Mem), 141 L.Ed.2d 737, 66 USLW 3814, 66 USLW 3815
	  

1

 
 Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)

119 S.Ct. 1998 Supreme Court of the United States
Bill MARTIN, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections, et al., Petitioners, v. Everett HADIX, et al.
No. 98–262. | Argued March 30, 1999. | Decided June 21, 1999.

After prevailing in § 1983 suits challenging conditions of their confinement, prisoners filed fee petitions for compliance monitoring. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, John Feikens, J., applied Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to limit fees earned after PLRA’s enactment, but not to limit those earned before. Appeals were taken, and were consolidated. The Court of Appeals, 143 F.3d 246, affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that PLRA’s fee limitation did not apply to cases pending on its enactment date. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor, held that PLRA limits attorney fees for postjudgment monitoring services performed after PLRA’s effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

Justice Scalia filed opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment.

Justice Ginsburg filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Stevens joined.

**1998 *343 Syllabus*

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the

Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of

Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United

States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,

337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

Respondent prisoners filed two federal class actions in 1977 and 1980 against petitioner prison officials challenging the conditions of confinement in the Michigan prison system under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By 1987, the plaintiffs had prevailed in both suits, the District Court for the Eastern District of **1999 Michigan had ruled them entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988 for postjudgment monitoring of the defendants’ compliance with remedial decrees, systems were established for awarding those fees on a semiannual basis, and the District Court had established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the prevailing market rate in both cases was $150 per hour. However, § 803(d)(3) of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3), limits the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits. In the Eastern District, those fees are capped at a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney’s fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA’s effective date, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fee requests next were filed in both cases for services performed between January 1, 1996, and June 30, 1996, a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA’s effective date. In nearly identical orders, the District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion that the PLRA does not limit fees for work performed before April 26, 1996, but concluded that the PLRA cap does limit fees for services performed after that date. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals from these orders, and, as relevant here, affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the PLRA’s fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date. If it did, the court held, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.
Held: Section 803(d)(3) limits attorney’s fees for postjudgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA’s effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date. Pp. 2003–2008.
(a) Whether the PLRA applies to cases pending when it was enacted depends on whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s *344 temporal reach. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229. If not, the Court determines whether the statute’s application to the conduct at issue would result in a retroactive effect. If so, the Court presumes that the statute does not apply to that conduct. E.g., ibid. P. 2003.
(b) Congress has not expressly mandated § 803(d)(3)’s temporal reach. The fundamental problem with petitioners’ arguments that the language of § 803(d)(1)—which provides for attorney’s fees “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner who is confined” (emphasis added)—and of § 803(d)(3)—which relates to fee “award[s]”—clearly expresses a congressional intent that § 803(d) apply to pending cases is that § 803(d) is better read as setting substantive limits on the award of attorney’s fees, and as making no attempt to define the temporal reach of these substantive limitations. Had Congress intended § 803(d)(3) to apply to all fee orders entered after the effective date, it could have used language that unambiguously addresses the section’s temporal reach, such as the language suggested in Landgraf: “[T]he [PLRA] shall apply to all proceedings
1

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
pending on or commenced after the date of enactment.” 511 U.S., at 260, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 2003–2004.
(c) The Court also rejects respondents’ contention that the PLRA’s fee provisions reveal a congressional intent that they apply prospectively only to cases filed after the effective date. According to respondents, a comparison of § 802—which, in addressing “appropriate remedies” in prison litigation, explicitly provides that it applies to pending cases, § 802(b)(1)—with § 803—which is silent on the subject—supports the negative inference that § 803 does not apply to pending cases. This argument is based on an analogy to Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481, in which the Court, in concluding that chapter 153 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was inapplicable to pending cases, relied heavily on the observation that chapter 154 of that Act included explicit language making it applicable to such cases. The “negative inference” argument is inapposite here. In Lindh, the negative inference arose from the fact that the two chapters addressed similar issues, see ibid.; here, **2000 §§ 802 and 803 address wholly distinct subject matters. Finally, respondents’ attempt to bolster their “negative inference” argument with the legislative history—which indicates that § 803’s attorney’s fees limitations were originally part of § 802, along with language making them applicable to pending cases—overstates the inferences that can be drawn from an ambiguous act of legislative drafting. Pp. 2004–2006.
(d) Application of § 803(d)(3) in parts of this case would have retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective. Pp. 2005–2008.
*345 (1) This inquiry demands a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Landgraf, 511 U.S., at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. This judgment should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. Ibid. P. 2006.
(2) For postjudgment monitoring performed before the PLRA’s effective date, the attorney’s fees provisions have a retroactive effect contrary to the usual assumption that statutes are prospective in operation. The attorneys in both cases below had a reasonable expectation that work they performed before the PLRA’s enactment would be compensated at the pre-PLRA rates set by the District Court. The PLRA, as applied to work performed before its effective date, would alter the fee arrangement post hoc by reducing the compensation rate. To give effect to the PLRA’s fees limitations, after the fact, would attach new legal consequences to completed conduct. Landgraf, supra, at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The Court rejects

petitioners’ contention that the application of a new attorney’s fees provision is proper in that fees questions do not change the parties’ substantive obligations because they are collateral to the main cause of action. When determining whether a new statute operates retroactively, it is not enough to attach a label (e.g., “procedural,” “collateral”) to the statute; it must be asked whether the statute operates retroactively, as does the PLRA. Petitioners also misplace their reliance on Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 720–721, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476. Unlike the situation here, the award of statutory attorney’s fees in that case did not upset any reasonable expectations of the parties. See Landgraf, 511 U.S., at 276–279, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Thus, in the absence of an express command by Congress to apply the PLRA retroactively, the Court declines to do so. Id., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Pp. 2006–2007.
(3) With respect to postjudgment monitoring performed after the PLRA’s effective date, by contrast, there is no retroactive effect, and the PLRA fees cap applies to such work. On April 26, 1996, through the PLRA, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were on notice that their hourly rate had been adjusted. From that point forward, they would be paid at a rate consistent with the law’s dictates, and any expectation of compensation at the pre-PLRA rates was unreasonable. The Court rejects respondents’ contention that the PLRA has retroactive effect in this context because it attaches new legal consequences (a lower pay rate) to conduct completed before enactment, the attorney’s initial decision to file suit on behalf of prisoners. That argument is based on the erroneous assumption that the attorney’s initial decision to file a case is irrevocable. Respondents do not seriously contend that the attorneys here were prohibited from withdrawing from the case during the postjudgment monitoring stage. P. 2007.
143 F.3d 246, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
*346 O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined, in which SCALIA, J., joined as to all but Part II–B, and in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–1. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 2008. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 2009.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Thomas L. Casey, for petitioners.
**2001 Deborah A. LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI, for respondents.
2

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)

Opinion
*347 Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*

*

For the reasons stated in his separate opinion, Justice

SCALIA joins Parts I, II–A, and II–C of this opinion.

For the reasons stated in Justice GINSBURG’s separate

opinion, she and Justice STEVENS join Parts I,

II–A–1, and II–B–1 of this opinion.

Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA or Act), 110 Stat. 1321–72, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. III),† places limits on the fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits. We are asked to decide how this section applies to cases that were pending when the PLRA became effective on April 26, 1996. We conclude that § 803(d)(3) limits attorney’s fees with respect to postjudgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA’s effective date but it does not so limit fees for postjudgment monitoring performed before the effective date.

†

Subsection (d) of § 803(d) is the fee provision we

consider today, and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).

Although that provision is technically § 803(d)(d) of

the PLRA, like the parties, we refer to it simply as §

803(d) of the PLRA.

I
The fee disputes before us arose out of two class action lawsuits challenging the conditions of confinement in the Michigan prison system. The first case, which we will call Glover, began in 1977 when a now-certified class of female prisoners filed suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Glover plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prison officials had violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them access to vocational and educational opportunities that were available to male prisoners. They also claimed that the defendants had denied them their right of access to the courts. After a bench trial, the District Court found “[s]ignificant discrimination against the female prison population” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, *348 Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075, 1083 (1979), and concluded that the defendants’ policies had denied the Glover plaintiffs their right of meaningful access to the courts, id., at 1096–1097. In 1981, the District Court

entered a “Final Order” detailing the specific actions to be undertaken by the defendants to remedy the constitutional violations. Glover v. Johnson, 510 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D.Mich.). One year later, the court found that the plaintiffs were “prevailing parties” and thus entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Glover v. Johnson, 531 F.Supp. 1036 (E.D.Mich.1982), App. 103a.
In 1985, the parties agreed to, and the District Court entered, an order providing that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees for postjudgment monitoring of the defendants’ compliance with the court’s remedial decrees. Glover v. Johnson, No. 77–71229 (E.D.Mich., Nov. 12, 1985), App. 125a (Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for System for Submission of Attorney Fee). This order also established the system for awarding monitoring fees that was in place when the present dispute arose. Under this system, the plaintiffs submit their fee requests on a semiannual basis, and the defendants then have 28 days to submit any objections to the requested award. The District Court resolves any disputes. Ibid. In an appeal from a subsequent dispute over the meaning of this order, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees, at the prevailing market rate, for postjudgment monitoring. Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703, 715–716 (1991). The prevailing market rate has been adjusted over the years, but it is currently set at $150 per hour. See Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246, 248 (C.A.6 1998) (describing facts of Glover ).
The second case at issue here, Hadix, began in 1980. At that time, male prisoners at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex (SPSM–CC), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for *349 the Eastern District of Michigan claiming that the conditions of their confinement at SPSM–CC violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Five years later, the Hadix **2002 plaintiffs and the defendant prison officials entered into a consent decree to “ ‘assure the constitutionality’ ” of the conditions of confinement at SPSM–CC. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 930 (C.A.6 1998) (quoting consent decree). The consent decree, which was approved by the District Court, addressed a variety of issues at SPSM–CC, ranging from sanitation and safety to food service, mail, and access to the courts.
In November 1987, the District Court entered an order awarding attorney’s fees to the Hadix plaintiffs for postjudgment monitoring of the defendants’ compliance with the consent decree. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 80–CV–73581 (E.D.Mich., Nov. 19, 1987), App. 79a. Subsequently, the Hadix plaintiffs were awarded attorney’s fees through a procedure similar to the procedure that had been established for the Glover plaintiffs: The plaintiffs submitted semiannual fee
3

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
requests, the defendants filed timely objections to these requests, and the District Court resolved any disputes. The District Court set, and periodically adjusted, a specific market rate for the fee awards; by 1995, that rate was set at $150 per hour for lead counsel. See Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (C.A.6 1995).
Thus, by 1987, Glover and Hadix were on parallel paths. In both cases, the District Court had concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to postjudgment monitoring fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the parties had established a system for awarding those fees on a semiannual basis. Moreover, in both cases, the District Court had established specific market rates for awarding fees. By the time the PLRA was enacted, the prevailing market rate in both cases had been set at $150 per hour.
The fee landscape changed with the passage of the PLRA on April 26, 1996. The PLRA, as its name suggests, contains *350 numerous provisions governing the course of prison litigation in the federal courts. It provides, for example, limits on the availability of certain types of relief in such suits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III), and for the termination of prospective relief orders after a limited time, § 3626(b). The section of the PLRA at issue here, § 803(d)(3), places a cap on the size of attorney’s fees that may be awarded in prison litigation suits:
“(d) Attorney’s fees
“(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent [authorized here].
. . . . .
“(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994 ed. and Supp. III) ], for payment of court-appointed counsel.” § 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III).
Court-appointed attorneys in the Eastern District of Michigan are compensated at a maximum rate of $75 per hour, and thus, under § 803(d)(3), the PLRA fee cap for attorneys working on prison litigation suits translates into a maximum hourly rate of $112.50.
Questions involving the PLRA first arose in both Glover and Hadix with respect to fee requests for postjudgment monitoring performed before the PLRA was enacted. In both cases, in early 1996, the plaintiffs submitted fee requests for work performed during the last half of 1995. These requests were still pending when the PLRA became

effective on April 26, 1996. In both cases, the District Court concluded that the PLRA fee cap did not limit attorney’s fees for services performed in these cases prior to the effective *351 date of the Act. Glover v. Johnson, Civ. Action No. 77–71229 (E.D.Mich., June 3, 1996), App. 148a; Hadix v. Johnson, Civ. Action No. 80–73581 (E.D.Mich., May 30, 1996), App. 91a. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this interpretation of the PLRA on appeal. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 249–251 (1998); Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d, at 946–948.
Fee requests next were filed in both Glover and Hadix for services performed between January 1, 1996, and June 30, 1996, a **2003 time period encompassing work performed both before and after the effective date of the PLRA. As relevant to this case, the defendant state prison officials argued that these fee requests were subject to the fee cap found in § 803(d)(3) of the PLRA, and the District Court accepted this argument in part. In nearly identical orders issued in the two cases, the court reiterated its earlier conclusion that the PLRA does not limit fees for work performed before April 26, 1996, but concluded that the PLRA fee cap does limit fees for services performed after the effective date. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1113 (E.D.Mich.1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a; Glover v. Johnson, Case No. 77–71229 (ED Mich., Dec. 4, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals from these orders, and, as relevant here, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (1998). According to the Court of Appeals, the PLRA’s fee limitation does not apply to fee requests such as those in Hadix and Glover that relate to cases that were pending on the date of enactment. If it were applied to pending cases, the court held, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed. 143 F.3d, at 250–256.
The Court of Appeals’ holding—that the PLRA’s attorney’s fees provisions do not apply to pending cases—is inconsistent with the holdings of other Circuits on these issues. For example, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth *352 Circuits have held that § 803(d) caps all fees that are ordered to be paid after the enactment of the PLRA, even when those fees compensate attorneys for work performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA. Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1385–1388 (C.A.4 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1090, 118 S.Ct. 880, 139 L.Ed.2d 869 (1998); Madrid v. Gomez, 150 F.3d 1030 (C.A.9 1998). See also Blissett v. Casey, 147 F.3d 218 (C.A.2 1998) (PLRA does not necessarily limit fees when work performed before effective date but award rendered after effective date), cert. pending, No. 98–527; Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F.3d 1357, 1360 (C.A.D.C.1998) (holding that PLRA limits fees for work performed after effective date of Act, and suggesting in dicta that it does not apply
4

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
to work performed prior to effective date), cert. pending, No. 98–917. We granted certiorari to resolve these conflicts. 525 U.S. 1000, 119 S.Ct. 508, 142 L.Ed.2d 422 (1998). In this Court, the Hadix and Glover plaintiffs are respondents, and the defendant prison officials from both cases are petitioners.
II
[1] Petitioners contend that the PLRA applies to Glover and Hadix, cases that were pending when the PLRA was enacted. This fact pattern presents a recurring question in the law: When should a new federal statute be applied to pending cases? See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997). To answer this question, we ask first “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). If there is no congressional directive on the temporal reach of a statute, we determine whether the application of the statute to the conduct at issue would result in a retroactive effect. Ibid. If so, then in keeping with our “traditional presumption” against retroactivity, we presume that the statute does not apply to that conduct. Ibid. See also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, supra, at 946, 117 S.Ct. 1871.
*353 A
1
[2] Congress has not expressly mandated the temporal reach of § 803(d)(3). Section 803(d)(1) provides that “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner who is confined [to a correctional facility] ... attorney’s fees ... shall not be awarded, except” as authorized by the statute. Section 803(d)(3) further provides that “[n]o award of attorney’s fees ... shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [18 U.S.C. § 3006A], for payment **2004 of court-appointed counsel.” Petitioners contend that this language—particularly the phrase “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner who is confined,” § 803(d)(1) (emphasis added)—clearly expresses a congressional intent that § 803(d) apply to pending cases. They argue that “any” is a broad, encompassing word, and that its use with “brought,” a past-tense verb, demonstrates congressional intent to apply the fees limitations to all fee awards entered after the PLRA became effective, even when those awards

were for services performed before the PLRA was enacted. They also contend that § 803(d)(3), by its own terms, applies to all “award[s]”—understood as the actual court order directing the payment of fees—entered after the effective date of the PLRA, regardless of when the work was performed.
The fundamental problem with all of petitioners’ statutory arguments is that they stretch the language of § 803(d) to find congressional intent on the temporal scope of that section when we believe that § 803(d) is better read as setting substantive limits on the award of attorney’s fees. Section 803(d)(1), for example, prohibits fee awards unless those fees were “directly and reasonably incurred” in the suit, and unless those fees are “proportionately related” to, or “directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing,” the relief ordered. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III). Similarly, § 803(d)(3) sets substantive limits by prohibiting the award *354 of fees based on hourly rates greater than a specified rate. In other words, these sections define the substantive availability of attorney’s fees; they do not purport to define the temporal reach of these substantive limitations. This language falls short of demonstrating a “clear congressional intent” favoring retroactive application of these fees limitations. Landgraf, 511 U.S., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. It falls short, in other words, of the “unambiguous directive” or “express command” that the statute is to be applied retroactively. Id., at 263, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.
In any event, we note that “brought,” as used in this section, is not a past-tense verb; rather, it is the participle in a participial phrase modifying the noun “action.” And although the word “any” is broad, it stretches the imagination to suggest that Congress intended, through the use of this one word, to make the fee limitations applicable to all fee awards. Finally, we do not believe that the phrase “[n]o award” in § 803(d)(3) demonstrates congressional intent to apply that section to all fee awards (i.e., fee payment orders) entered after the PLRA’s effective date. Had Congress intended § 803(d)(3) to apply to all fee orders entered after the effective date, even when those awards compensate for work performed before the effective date, it could have used language more obviously targeted to addressing the temporal reach of that section. It could have stated, for example, that “No award entered after the effective date of this Act shall be based on an hourly rate greater than the ceiling rate.”
The conclusion that § 803(d) does not clearly express congressional intent that it apply retroactively is strengthened by comparing § 803(d) to the language that we suggested in Landgraf might qualify as a clear statement that a statute was to apply retroactively: “[T]he new provisions shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment.” Id., at 260, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
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Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
provision, unlike the language of the PLRA, unambiguously addresses the temporal reach of the statute. *355 With no such analogous language making explicit reference to the statute’s temporal reach, it cannot be said that Congress has “expressly prescribed” § 803(d)’s temporal reach. Id., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.
2
Respondents agree that § 803(d) of the PLRA lacks an express directive that the statute apply retroactively, but they contend that the PLRA reveals congressional intent that the fees provisions apply prospectively only. That is, respondents insist that the PLRA’s fees provisions demonstrate that they only apply to cases filed after the effective date of the Act. For respondents, this congressional intent is evident from a study of the Act’s structure and legislative history.
According to respondents, a comparison of §§ 802 and 803 of the PLRA leads to the **2005 conclusion that § 803(d) should only apply to cases filed after its enactment. The attorney’s fees provisions are found in § 803 of the PLRA, and, as described above, this section contains no explicit directive that it should apply to pending cases. By contrast, § 802—addressing “appropriate remedies” in prison litigation—explicitly provides that it applies to pending cases: “[This section] shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title.” § 802(b)(1), note following 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 ed., Supp. III). According to respondents, the presence of this express command in § 802, when coupled with § 803’s silence, supports the negative inference that § 803 is not to apply to pending cases. Respondents buttress this “negative inference” argument by reference to the legislative history of the fees provisions. Respondents contend that when the attorney’s fees limitations were originally drafted, they were in the section that became § 802 of the PLRA, which at the time contained language making them applicable to pending cases. Later, the fees provisions were moved to what became *356 803 of the PLRA, a section without language making it applicable to pending cases. Thus, according to respondents, when Congress moved the fees provisions out of § 802, with its explicitly retroactive language, it demonstrated its intent to apply the fees provisions prospectively only. Brief for Respondents 15–18.
Respondents’ “negative inference” argument is based on an analogy to our decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). In Lindh, we considered whether chapter 153 of the newly enacted Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, was applicable to pending cases. In concluding that chapter 153 does not apply to such cases, we relied heavily on the observation that chapter 154 of AEDPA includes explicit language making that chapter applicable to pending cases. We concluded that “[n]othing ... but a different intent explains the different treatment.” 521 U.S., at 329, 117 S.Ct. 2059. This argument carried special weight because both chapters addressed similar issues: Chapter 153 established new standards for review of habeas corpus applications by state prisoners, and chapter 154 created new standards for review of habeas corpus applications by state prisoners under capital sentences. Because both chapters “govern[ed] standards affecting entitlement to relief” in habeas cases, “[i]f ... Congress was reasonably concerned to ensure that chapter 154 be applied to pending cases, it should have been just as concerned about chapter 153.” Ibid.
Because §§ 802 and 803 address wholly distinct subject matters, the same negative inference does not arise from the silence of § 803. Section 802 addresses “[a]ppropriate remedies” in prison litigation, prohibiting, for example, prospective relief unless it is “narrowly drawn” and is “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation.” § 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. III). That section also creates new standards designed to encourage the prompt termination of prospective relief orders, *357 providing, for example, for the “immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” § 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Section 803(d), by contrast, does not address the propriety of various forms of relief and does not provide for the immediate termination of ongoing relief orders. Rather, it governs the award of attorney’s fees. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that if Congress was concerned that § 802 apply to pending cases, it would “have been just as concerned” that § 803 apply to pending cases.
Finally, we note that respondents’ reliance on the legislative history overstates the inferences that can be drawn from an ambiguous act of legislative drafting. Even if respondents are correct about the legislative history, the inference that respondents draw from this history is speculative. It rests on the assumption that the reason the fees provisions were moved was to move them away **2006 from the language applying § 802 to pending cases, when they may have been moved for a variety of other reasons. This weak inference provides a thin reed on which to rest the argument that the fees provisions, by negative implication, were intended to apply prospectively.
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Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
B
[3] Because we conclude that Congress has not “expressly prescribed” the proper reach of § 803(d)(3), Landgraf, 511 U.S., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, we must determine whether application of this section in this case would have retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective. The inquiry into whether a statute operates retroactively demands a commonsense, functional judgment about “whether the new provision attaches new legal *358 consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Id., at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. This judgment should be informed and guided by “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.” Ibid.
1
For postjudgment monitoring performed before the effective date of the PLRA, the PLRA’s attorney’s fees provisions, as construed by respondents, would have a retroactive effect contrary to the usual assumption that congressional statutes are prospective in operation. The attorneys in both Hadix and Glover had a reasonable expectation that work they performed prior to enactment of the PLRA in monitoring petitioners’ compliance with the court orders would be compensated at the pre-PLRA rates as provided in the stipulated order. Long before the PLRA was enacted, the plaintiffs were declared prevailing parties, and the parties agreed to a system for periodically awarding attorney’s fees for postjudgment monitoring. The District Court entered orders establishing that the fees were to be awarded at prevailing market rates, and specifically set those rates, as relevant here, at $150 per hour. Respondents’ counsel performed a specific task—monitoring petitioners’ compliance with the court orders—and they were told that they would be compensated at a rate of $150 per hour. Thus, when the lawyers provided these postjudgment monitoring services before the enactment of the PLRA, they worked in reasonable reliance on this fee schedule. The PLRA, as applied to work performed before its effective date, would alter the fee arrangement post hoc by reducing the rate of compensation. To give effect to the PLRA’s fees limitations, after the fact, would “attac[h] new legal consequences” to completed conduct. Landgraf, supra, at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483.
[4] Petitioners contest this conclusion. They contend that the application of a new attorney’s fees provision is “ ‘unquestionably proper,’ ” Brief for Petitioners 24 (quoting *359 Landgraf, supra, at 273, 114 S.Ct. 1483),

because fees questions “are incidental to, and independent from, the underlying substantive cause of action.” They do not, in other words, change the substantive obligations of the parties because they are “collateral to the main cause of action.” Brief for Petitioners 24–25 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S., at 277, 114 S.Ct. 1483) (internal quotation marks omitted). Attaching the label “collateral” to attorney’s fees questions does not advance the retroactivity inquiry, however. While it may be possible to generalize about types of rules that ordinarily will not raise retroactivity concerns, see, e.g., id., at 273–275, 114 S.Ct. 1483, these generalizations do not end the inquiry. For example, in Landgraf, we acknowledged that procedural rules may often be applied to pending suits with no retroactivity problems, id., at 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483, but we also cautioned that “the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case,” id., at 275, n. 29, 114 S.Ct. 1483. We took pains to dispel the “sugges [tion] that concerns about retroactivity have no application to procedural rules.” Ibid. See also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S., at 327–328, 117 S.Ct. 2059. When determining whether a new statute operates retroactively, it is not enough to attach a label (e.g., “procedural,” “collateral”) to the statute; we must ask whether the statute operates retroactively.
**2007 Moreover, petitioners’ reliance on our decision in Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), to support their argument that attorney’s fees provisions can be applied retroactively is misplaced. In Bradley, the District Court had awarded attorney’s fees, based on general equitable principles, to a group of parents who had prevailed in their suit seeking the desegregation of the Richmond schools. While the case was pending on appeal, Congress passed a statute specifically authorizing the award of attorney’s fees for prevailing parties in school desegregation cases. The Court of Appeals held that the new statute could not authorize fee awards for work performed before the effective date of the new law, but we reversed, holding that the *360 fee award in that case was proper. Because attorney’s fees were available, albeit under different principles, before passage of the statute, and because the District Court had in fact already awarded fees invoking these different principles, there was no manifest injustice in allowing the fee statute to apply in that case. Id., at 720–721, 94 S.Ct. 2006. We held that the award of statutory attorney’s fees did not upset any reasonable expectations of the parties. See also Landgraf, supra, at 276–279, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (distinguishing Bradley on these same grounds). In this case, by contrast, from the beginning of these suits, the parties have proceeded on the assumption that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would govern. The PLRA was not passed until well after respondents had been declared prevailing parties and thus entitled to attorney’s fees. To impose the new standards now, for work performed before the PLRA became effective, would upset the reasonable
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Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
expectations of the parties.
2
With respect to postjudgment monitoring performed after the effective date of the PLRA, by contrast, there is no retroactivity problem. On April 26, 1996, through the PLRA, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were on notice that their hourly rate had been adjusted. From that point forward, they would be paid at a rate consistent with the dictates of the law. After April 26, 1996, any expectation of compensation at the pre-PLRA rates was unreasonable. There is no manifest injustice in telling an attorney performing postjudgment monitoring services that, going forward, she will earn a lower hourly rate than she had earned in the past. If the attorney does not wish to perform services at this new, lower pay rate, she can choose not to work. In other words, as applied to work performed after the effective date of the PLRA, the PLRA has future effect on future work; this does not raise retroactivity concerns.
Respondents contend that the PLRA has retroactive effect in this context because it attaches new legal consequences *361 a lower pay rate) to conduct completed before enactment. The preenactment conduct that respondents contend is affected is the attorney’s initial decision to file suit on behalf of the prisoner clients. Brief for Respondents 29–31. Even assuming, arguendo, that when the attorneys filed these cases in 1977 and 1980, they had a reasonable expectation that they would be compensated for postjudgment monitoring based on a particular fee schedule (i.e., the pre-PLRA, “prevailing market rate” schedule), respondents’ argument that the PLRA affects pre-PLRA conduct fails because it is based on the assumption that the attorney’s initial decision to file a case on behalf of a client is an irrevocable one. In other words, respondents’ argument assumes that once an attorney files suit, she must continue working on that case until the decree is terminated. Respondents provide no support for this assumption, however. They allude to ethical constraints on an attorney’s ability to withdraw from a case midstream, see Brief for Respondents 29 (“And finally, it is at that time that plaintiffs’ counsel commit themselves ethically to continued representation of their clients to ensure that the Constitution is honored, a course of conduct that cannot lightly be altered”), but they do not seriously contend that the attorneys here were prohibited from withdrawing from the case during the postjudgment monitoring stage, see, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 42–43. It cannot be said that the PLRA changes the legal consequences of the attorneys’ pre-PLRA decision to file the case.

**2008 C
In sum, we conclude that the PLRA contains no express command about its temporal scope. Because we find that the PLRA, if applied to postjudgment monitoring services performed before the effective date of the Act, would have a retroactive effect inconsistent with our assumption that statutes are prospective, in the absence of an express command by Congress to apply the Act retroactively, we decline *362 to do so. Landgraf, 511 U.S., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. With respect to postjudgment monitoring performed after the effective date, by contrast, there is no retroactive effect, and the PLRA fees cap applies to such work. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Our task in this case is to determine the temporal application of that provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. III), which prescribes that “[n]o award of attorney’s fees in an action [brought by a prisoner in which attorney’s fees are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 ed., and Supp. III) ] shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994 ed., and Supp. III) ] for payment of court-appointed counsel.”
I agree with the Court that the intended temporal application is not set forth in the text of the statute, and that the outcome must therefore be governed by our interpretive principle that, in absence of contrary indication, a statute will not be construed to have retroactive application, see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). But that leaves open the key question: retroactive in reference to what? The various options in the present case include (1) the alleged violation upon which the fee-imposing suit is based (applying the new fee rule to any case involving an alleged violation that occurred before the PLRA became effective would be giving it “retroactive application”); (2) the lawyer’s undertaking to prosecute the suit for which attorney’s fees were provided (applying the new fee rule to any case in which the lawyer was retained before the PLRA became effective would be giving it “retroactive application”); *363 3) the filing of the suit in which the fees are imposed (applying the new fee rule to any suit brought before the PLRA became effective would be giving it “retroactive application”); (4) the doing of the legal work for which
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Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)

the fees are payable (applying the new fee rule to any work done before the PLRA became effective would be giving it “retroactive application”); and (5) the actual award of fees in a prisoner case (applying the new fee rule to an award rendered before the PLRA became effective would be giving it “retroactive application”).
My disagreement with the Court’s approach is that, in deciding which of the above five reference points for the retroactivity determination ought to be selected, it seems to me not much help to ask which of them would frustrate expectations. In varying degrees, they all would. As I explained in my concurrence in Landgraf, supra, at 286, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (opinion concurring in judgments), I think the decision of which reference point (which “retroactivity event”) to select should turn upon which activity the statute was intended to regulate. If it was intended to affect primary conduct, No. 1 should govern; if it was intended to induce lawyers to undertake representation, No. 2—and so forth.

In my view, the most precisely defined purpose of the provision at issue here was to reduce the previously established incentive for lawyers to work on prisoners’ civil rights cases. If the PLRA is viewed in isolation, of course, its purpose could be regarded as being simply to prevent a judicial award of fees in excess of the referenced amount—in which case the relevant retroactivity event would be the award. In reality, however, the PLRA simply revises the fees provided for by § 1988, and it seems to me that the underlying purpose of that provision must govern its amendment as well—which purpose was to provide an appropriate incentive **2009 for lawyers to work on (among other civil rights cases) prisoner *364 suits.1 That being so, the relevant retroactivity event is the doing of the work for which the incentive was offered.2 All work rendered in reliance upon the fee assurance contained in the former § 1988 will be reimbursed at those rates; all work rendered after the revised fee assurance of the PLRA became effective will be limited to the new rates. The District Court’s announcement that it would permit future work to be billed at a higher rate operated in futuro; it sought to regulate future conduct rather than adjudicate past. It was therefore no less subject to revision by statute than is an injunction. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 436, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1856).

1

Although the fees awarded under § 1988 are payable to

the party rather than to the lawyer, I think it clear that

the purpose of the provision was to enable the civil

rights plaintiffs to offer a rate of compensation that

would attract attorneys.

2

I reject Justice GINSBURG’s contention that the

retroactivity event should be the attorney’s undertaking

to represent the civil rights plaintiff. The fees are intended to induce not merely signing on (no time can be billed for that) but actually doing the legal work. Like the Court, I do not think it true that an attorney who has signed on cannot terminate his representation; he assuredly can if the client says that he will no longer pay the hourly fee agreed upon.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court and join all but Part II–B of its opinion.
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s determination that § 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, (PLRA or Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III), does not “limit fees for postjudgment monitoring performed before the [Act’s] effective date,” ante, at 2001, and with much of the reasoning set out in Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B–1 of the Court’s opinion. I disagree, however, with the holding that § 803(d) “limits attorney’s fees with respect to postjudgment monitoring services performed after ... the effective date.” Ibid. *365 I do not find in the PLRA’s text or history a satisfactory basis for concluding that Congress meant to order a midstream change, placing cases commenced before the PLRA became law under the new regime. I would therefore affirm in full the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held § 803(d) inapplicable to cases brought to court prior to the enactment of the PLRA. To explain my view of the case, I retread some of the factual and analytical ground treated in more detail in the Court’s opinion.
I
On April 26, 1996, President Clinton signed the PLRA into law. Section 803(d) of the Act, governing attorney’s fees, provides:
“(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that—
“(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and
“(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related 9

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
to the court ordered relief for the violation; or
“(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
“(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
“(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater *366 than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18 for payment **2010 of court-appointed counsel.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III).
At issue here is whether § 803(d) governs post-April 26, 1996, fee awards in two lawsuits commenced before that date. In Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Mich.1979), a class of female Michigan inmates filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. III) against various Michigan prison officials (State) in 1977; the Glover plaintiffs alleged principally that they were denied vocational and educational opportunities afforded their male counterparts, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Ruling in plaintiffs’ favor, the District Court entered a remedial order and retained jurisdiction over the case pending defendants’ substantial compliance with that order. See Glover v. Johnson, 510 F.Supp. 1019, 1020 (E.D.Mich.1981). Under a 1985 ruling governing fee awards, plaintiffs’ counsel applied for fees and costs twice yearly. See Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246, 248 (C.A.6 1998).
In Hadix v. Johnson, a class of male Michigan inmates filed a § 1983 action against the State in 1980, alleging that the conditions of their confinement violated the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1985, the parties entered into a consent decree governing sanitation, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, court access, and other aspects of prison life. The District Court retained jurisdiction over the case pending substantial compliance with the decree. Plaintiffs’ attorneys remain responsible for monitoring compliance with the decree. In 1987, the District Court entered an order governing the award of fees and costs to plaintiffs’ counsel for compliance monitoring. See id., at 249.
Counsel for plaintiffs in both cases filed fee applications for compensation at the court-approved market-based level of $150 per hour for work performed between January 1, 1996, and June 30, 1996. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a, 33a. The *367 State objected, arguing that § 803(d) limits all fees awarded after April 26, 1996, in

these litigations to $112.50 per hour. Id., at 34a. In separate but nearly identical opinions, the District Court refused to apply § 803(d)’s fee limitation to work performed before the PLRA’s effective date, see id., at 28a, n. 1; id., at 34a, n. 1, but applied the limitation to all work performed thereafter, see id., at 31a, 41a.
Relying on its recent decision in Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (1998), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s refusal to apply § 803(d) to work completed pre-enactment. See 143 F.3d, at 248. The appeals court reversed the District Court’s judgment, however, to the extent that it applied § 803(d) to work performed postenactment. See id., at 255–256. Unpersuaded that Congress intended the PLRA attorney’s fees provisions to apply retroactively, the panel held that § 803(d) “is inapplicable to cases brought before the statute was enacted whether the underlying work was performed before or after the enactment date of the statute.” Ibid.

II
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), we reaffirmed the Court’s longstanding presumption against retroactive application of the law. “If [a] statute would operate retroactively,” we held, “our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.” Id., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.

Emphasizing that § 803(d) applies to “any action brought by a prisoner who is confined,” the State insists that the statute’s plain terms reveal Congress’ intent to limit fees in pending as well as future cases. See Brief for Petitioners 14–15 (emphases deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court recognizes, however, § 803(d)’s “any action brought” language refers to the provision’s substantive scope, not its temporal reach, see ante, at 2004; “any” appears in the text only in proximity to provisions identifying the *368 law’s substantive dimensions.1 **2011 Had Congress intended that § 803(d) apply retroactively, it might easily have specified, as the Court suggests, that all postenactment awards shall be subject to the limitation, see ante, at 2004, or prescribed that the provision “shall apply in all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act.” Congress instead left unaddressed § 803(d)’s temporal reach.

1

Section 803(d) is thus unlike the unenacted provision

discussed in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S.

244, 260, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994),

which would have made the statute at issue in that case

applicable “ ‘to all proceedings pending on or

commenced after’ ” the effective date. Because this

10

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
language would have linked the word “all” directly to the statute’s temporal scope, we recognized that it might have qualified as a clear statement of retroactive effect. The word “any” is not similarly tied to the temporal scope of the PLRA, however, and so the inference suggested in the Landgraf discussion is not permissible here.
Comparison of § 803(d)’s text with that of a neighboring provision, § 802(b)(1) of the PLRA, is instructive for the retroactivity question we face. Section 802(b)(1), which governs “appropriate remedies” in prison litigation, applies expressly to “all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title.” 110 Stat. 1321–70, note following 18 U.S.C. § 3626. “Congress [thus] saw fit to tell us which part of the Act was to be retroactively applied,” i.e., § 802. Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1203 (C.A.8 1996). While I agree with the Court that the negative implication created by these two provisions is not dispositive, see ante, at 2005–2006, Congress’ silence nevertheless suggests that § 803(d) has no carryback thrust.
Absent an express statutory command respecting retroactivity, Landgraf teaches, the attorney’s fees provision should not be applied to pending cases if doing so would “have retroactive effect.” 511 U.S., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. As the Court recognizes, see ante, at 2007, application of § 803(d) to work performed before the PLRA’s effective date would be impermissibly retroactive. Instead of the court-approved *369 market-based fee that attorneys anticipated for work performed under the old regime, counsel would be limited to the new statutory rate. We long ago recognized the injustice of interpreting a statute to reduce the level of compensation for work already performed. See United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399, 408–409, 2 L.Ed. 479 (1806) (precluding, as impermissibly retroactive, application of a statute reducing customs collectors’ commissions to customs collected before enactment, even when the commission was due after the statute’s effective date).
III
In my view, § 803(d) is most soundly read to cover all, and only, representations undertaken after the PLRA’s effective date. Application of § 803(d) to representations commenced before the PLRA became law would “attac[h] new legal consequences to [an] even[t] completed before [the statute’s] enactment”; hence the application would be retroactive under Landgraf. 511 U.S., at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The critical event effected

before the PLRA’s effective date is the lawyer’s undertaking to prosecute the client’s civil rights claim. Applying § 803(d) to pending matters significantly alters the consequences of the representation on which the lawyer has embarked.2 Notably, attorneys engaged before passage of the PLRA have little leeway to alter their conduct in response to the new legal regime; an attorney who initiated a prisoner’s rights suit before April 26, 1996, remains subject to a professional obligation to see the litigation through to final disposition. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3, and Comment [3] (1999) (“[A] lawyer should carry *370 through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client.”). Counsel’s actions before and after that date are thus “inextricab[ly] part of a course of conduct initiated prior to the law.” Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F.3d 1357, 1362 (C.A.D.C.1998) (Wald, J., dissenting).

2

An attorney’s decision to invest time and energy in a

civil rights suit necessarily involves a complex balance

of factors, including the likelihood of success, the

amount of labor necessary to prosecute the case to

completion, and the potential recovery. Applying §

803(d) to PLRA representations ongoing before April

26, 1996, effectively reduces the value of the lawyer’s

prior investment in the litigation, and disappoints

reasonable reliance on the law in place at the time of

the lawyer’s undertaking.

While the injustice in applying the fee limitations to pending actions may be more readily apparent regarding work performed before the PLRA’s effective date, application **2012 of the statute to work performed thereafter in pending cases also frustrates reasonable reliance on prior law and court-approved market rates. Consider, for example, two attorneys who filed similar prison reform lawsuits at the same time, pre-PLRA. Both attorneys initiated their lawsuits in the expectation that, if they prevailed, they would earn the market rate anticipated by pre-PLRA law. In one case, the lawsuit progressed swiftly, and labor-intensive pretrial discovery was completed before April 26, 1996. In the other, the suit lagged through no fault of plaintiff’s counsel, pending the court’s disposition of threshold motions, and the attorney was unable to pursue discovery until after April 26, 1996.3 Both attorneys have prosecuted their claims with due diligence; both were obliged, having accepted the representations, to perform the work for which they seek compensation. There is scarcely greater injustice in denying pre-PLRA compensation for pretrial discovery in the one case than the other. Nor is there any reason to think that Congress intended these similarly situated attorneys to be treated differently.

3

If counsel’s conduct caused delay or protraction, the

court could properly exercise discretion to deny or

11

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)
reduce the attorney’s fee. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
The Court avoids a conclusion of retroactivity by dismissing as an unsupported assumption the attorneys’ assertion of an obligation to continue their representations through to *371 final disposition. See ante, at 2007. It seems to me, however, that the assertion has secure support.
Like the ABA’s Model Rules, the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (1999), which apply to counsel in both Hadix and Glover, see Rule 83.20(j), provide that absent good cause for terminating a representation, “a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client.” Rule 1.3, Comment. It is true that withdrawal may be permitted where “the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer,” Rule 1.16(b)(5), but explanatory comments suggest that this exception is designed for situations in which “the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees,” Rule 1.16, Comment. Consistent with the Michigan Rules, counsel for petitioners affirmed at oral argument their ethical obligation to continue these representations to a natural conclusion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (“[Continuing the representation] does involve ethical concerns certainly, especially in the[se] circumstance[s].”). There is no reason to think counsel ethically could have abandoned these representations in response to the PLRA fee limitation, nor any basis to believe the trial court would have permitted counsel to withdraw. See Rule 1.16(c) (“When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall

continue representation.”). As I see it, the attorneys’ pre-PLRA pursuit of the civil rights claims thus created an obligation, enduring post-PLRA, to continue to provide effective representation.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Sixth Circuit soundly resisted the “sophisticated construction,” 143 F.3d, at 252, that would split apart, for fee award purposes, a constant course of representation. “[T]he triggering event for retroactivity purposes,” I am persuaded, “is when the lawyer undertakes to litigate the civil rights action on behalf of the client.” Inmates of D.C. Jail, 158 F.3d, at 1362 (Wald, J., dissenting).
*372 * * *
Landgraf’s lesson is that Congress must speak clearly when it wants new rules to govern pending cases. Because § 803(d) contains no clear statement on its temporal reach, and because the provision would operate retroactively as applied to lawsuits pending on the Act’s effective date, I would hold that the fee limitation applies only to cases commenced after April 26, 1996.
Parallel Citations
119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347, 67 USLW 3682, 67 USLW 4500, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4812, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6169, 1999 CJ C.A.R. 3779, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 396
	  

12

 
 McGinnis v. Hadix, 525 U.S. 1000 (1998)
119 S.Ct. 508 Supreme Court of the United States Kenneth L. McGINNIS, et al., petitioners,
v. Everett HADIX, et al. No. 98-262. | Nov. 16, 1998.
Case below, 143 F.3d 246.
Opinion Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted limited to the

following questions: 1. Whether, in litigation pending on the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the attorney fee provision of PLRA Sec. 803(d), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d), applies to fees awarded after the Act’s effective date for services rendered after that date. 2. Whether, in such litigation, this fee provision applies to fees awarded after the Act’s effective date for services rendered before that date.
Parallel Citations
119 S.Ct. 508 (Mem), 142 L.Ed.2d 422, 67 USLW 3331, 67 USLW 3336, 67 USLW 3149, 67 USLW 2183
	  

1

 
 Hadix v. Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2001)

2001 WL 812217 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
No. 80–CV–73581. | June 27, 2001.
Opinion
ORDER OF TERMINATION
FEIKENS, J.
*1 This case is before me based on a Consent Decree (“Decree”) submitted by the parties for approval by this Court on May 13, 1986. The original decree covered a range of conditions within the State Prison of Southern Michigan (“SPSM”), including sanitation, fire protection, overcrowding and protection from harm, access to courts, medical care, mental health care, and facility organization and management. Over the fifteen years following entry of the Decree, I have conducted numerous compliance and related evidentiary hearings, have been involved in extensive negotiations, and have issued orders necessitated by the circumstances faced by the parties.
The remedial measures required pursuant to the original and subsequent agreements of the parties have resulted in substantial improvements. The most important improvement was the reorganization of SPSM, breaking it up into four separate correctional facilities sharing certain support services and facilities. The reorganization involved substantial operational and physical change, resulting in improved access to programs, services, jobs, greater security and accountability for prisoners and staff, and alleviation of dangerous and unhealthy conditions.
During the last five years, the progress achieved under the Consent Decree has resulted in substantial alleviation of many of the conditions that gave rise to the case. Periodically, as substantial compliance with the requirements of the Decree has been achieved, I have issued orders partially terminating jurisdiction. In addition, certain sections of the Consent Decree have been previously transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan (“Western District”), by orders dated June 5, 1992; March 18, 1999; July 12, 2000; and November 15, 2000.

This case has now reached finality. As a result of extended negotiations between the parties, and in order to make it possible to terminate at this time, defendants have agreed to do the following:
1. Make all corrections found necessary by MIOSHA at MSI, and the Director of the Department of Corrections shall request air quality testing by MIOSHA of the textile factory and the welding and painting operations in the metal furniture factory.
2. Adopt the HACCP Program for the Production Kitchen, including the continued use of an outside laboratory for verification, into an operating procedure.
3. Complete the process of identifying all points of cross-connected plumbing and develop and implement a timely corrective program.
4. Direct contact work with asbestos-containing materials is to be done by qualified individuals.
5. Retain the services of an outside contractor to at least semi-annually perform back-to-front sewer cleaning.
6. Continue to meet the standards of the Safe Drinking Water Act, MCLA § 325.1001, et seq.
7. Complete the current administrative segregation painting, clean-up and vermin control program by July 15, 2001. The Director shall direct the responsible staff to promptly complete all necessary repairs to the roof of the building.
*2 8. Make arrangements for plaintiffs’ counsel to meet with central office and field staff that the Director determines are knowledgeable about the ABE/GED program to develop a process that is intended to increase the quality of the ABE/GED programs, such that the students will move more quickly and successfully through the programs.
9. The Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 23, 2000 and filed July 17, 2000, relating to Section IV.H of the Out–of–Cell Activity Plan and identified as Section A on College Programming, remains in full force and effect.
The parties have further agreed that the Due Process Issue (Consent Decree, Introduction, ¶ 6.c) shall be presented to and decided by me.
With the exception of those portions of the Consent Decree transferred to the Western District, with the exception of ¶ 9 above, and with the exception of the Due Process Issue to be decided by this Court, the Court
1

Hadix v. Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2001)
hereby TERMINATES its jurisdiction over all sections of the Consent Decree and implementing orders remaining before this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
	  

2

 
 Hadix v. Johnson
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit August 5, 1998, Filed
96-1907/96-1908/96-1943

Reporter: 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21454 EVERETT HADIX, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants (961908/1943), UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor (96-1908/1943). UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PlaintiffAppellee, v. STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., DefendantsAppellants (96-1907)
Notice: [*1] DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION
Prior History: Original Opinion of May 20, 1998, Reported at: 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10143.
Judges: BEFORE: MARTIN, Chief Judge; NORRIS and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion
ORDER
The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the original panel.
The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

 
 Hadix v. Johnson
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit January 11, 2001, Filed
No. 96-2567/96-2568/96-2586/96-2588

Reporter: 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1311 EVERETT HADIX, ET AL. (96-2567/2568); MARY GLOVER, ET AL. (96-2586/2588), PlaintiffsAppellees/Cross-Appellants, v. PERRY M. JOHNSON, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor.

Notice: [*1] DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION

Prior History: Original Opinion of October 4, 2000, Reported at: 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 24795.

Judges: BEFORE: KENNEDY, SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges.

JONES,

AND

ORDER
The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the original panel.
The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the cases. Accordingly, the petition is denied. Judge Jones would grant rehearing for the reasons stated in his dissent.

Opinion

 
 Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)

871 F.2d 1087 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., DefendantsAppellants.
No. 88-1144. | March 30, 1989.
E.D.Mich.
AFFIRMED.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
Before DAVID A. NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
*1 This is an interlocutory appeal from a temporary restraining order preventing prison officials at the State Prison of Southern Michigan (“SPSM”) in Jackson, Michigan, from examining files at the Prison Legal Services (“PLS”) office without the presence of a civilian member of the staff.
The underlying case concerns a prisoner class action lawsuit claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to conditions of confinement at the SPSM. In May 1985, the court entered a comprehensive consent decree which addressed most of the issues raised by the plaintiffs. The case then proceeded to a bench trial on issues concerning access to court claims. At the present time, the district court has held that the constitutional right of access to the courts requires the presence of the PLS within the walls of SPSM.
This interlocutory appeal addresses the method by which

prison officials may be allowed to search the PLS offices. Appellees do not contest that the prison officials have the right to search the offices, but appellees worry about the potential for files being taken or read when PLS civilian personnel are not present.
Appellees filed a request for a temporary injunction ex parte, and the court ordered a hearing on the request which was held on November 10, 1987. At the hearing, appellants disputed the extent of the attorney-client privilege in these circumstances and offered to give evidence relating to security reasons for the search procedures. The appellants also suggested that the presence of a shift commander during the search who could then notify PLS of any search would be adequate protection of the attorney-client privilege. The district court rejected the appellants’ arguments and issued a temporary injunction against the appellants, enjoining them from searching the PLS offices without PLS civilian personnel being present unless they give two hours advance notice of the search. Appellants took an interlocutory appeal as of right invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).
I
The appellants contend that the evidence before the district court was not sufficient to grant permanent injunctive relief. This contention results from the confusion concerning whether the district court’s order was in fact permanent injunctive relief or temporary injunctive relief. The appellants claim that there was a permanent order because of the entry on the docket sheet of a “permanent” injunction. However, the original request filed by the appellees only requested temporary injunctive relief, and the appellees maintain that it is their belief that the injunction granted was temporary. Furthermore, the judge never said orally or in writing that the injunction was permanent. Indeed it appears from its post-order memorandum that the district court did not specifically denominate its original order as temporary because it was under the impression that the parties were willing to agree to its final order-an impression first disabused by the notice of appeal.
*2 We adopt the construction urged by the appellees. The district court never notified the appellants of an intention to issue a permanent injunction or provide the proper notice before an issuance of a permanent injunction, and we will assume that the district court would grant the proper procedural notification before the issuance of a
1

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)

permanent injunction. Therefore, we will examine the sufficiency of the district court’s order under the standards for a temporary injunction.1

1

In its brief, the State made no objection to the

procedure afforded them as being inadequate for the

granting of a preliminary injunction. Therefore, we

have not addressed the procedural objection raised in

the dissent.

The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir.1982). In determining on appeal whether the district court abused its discretion, “we must consider whether the plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits; whether the plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury; whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and where the public interest lies.” Ibid. (quoting Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319, 323 (6th Cir.1976)).
With regards to likelihood of success on the merits, we need only consider whether the plaintiffs would likely be entitled to the issuance of a permanent injunction in the present case.
Since the district court has held that the presence of the PLS offices within the walls of the prison is necessary to protect the prisoners’ constitutional right of access to the courts, we conclude that an analysis of the permanent injunction regarding the attorney-client privilege, a derivative of this right, should first be considered in relation to a framework of a permanent injunction to remedy a constitutional violation. See Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1814 (1974).
Appellants correctly point out that in order to be entitled to permanent injunctive relief for an alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff must establish the fact of the violation, the presence of a continuing irreparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law. Newman v. State of Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083, 103 S.Ct. 1773 (1983).
In U.S. v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir.1979), rev’d on other grounds, 101 S.Ct. 677 (1981), this court concluded that the trust at the heart of the attorney-client privilege is, by its nature, fragile. The trust may be irreparable once broken because there is really no adequate legal remedy for a violation of the privilege. It is true that not all communications between attorney and

client are privileged. Fisher v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976). However, it is also true, and appellants do not dispute, that the application of the attorney-client privilege is critical in the areas to which it applies. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1225-1226. Further, prisoners may also assert a client’s right to an attorney-client privilege. Procunier, 94 S.Ct. at 1814.
*3 However, in this case we are not dealing with the world at large, but with the peculiar concerns of a maximum security prison. In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) and Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987), the Supreme Court held that prison officials need only show that a regulation is reasonable to justify its impact on a valid constitutional right. However, the court also noted that if an inmate may point to an alternative that “fully accomodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penalogical interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. at 2262.
Though given an opportunity by both the district court and this court, the appellants have not shown that a permanent injunction would be more than a de minimis intrusion into a valid penalogical concern. Thus, the probability that unaccompanied searches of the PLS offices would violate a constitutional right without an adequate legal remedy provides support for the probability of the plaintiffs succeeding in a hearing for a permanent injunction in these circumstances. Therefore, appellants have shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
Furthermore, as discussed supra the attorney-client privilege, once broken, is irreparable. This holds true in the context of a preliminary injunction as well as a permanent injunction. Balanced against the great probability of harm to the plaintiff of not issuing the injunction, is the inability of the prison officials to demonstrate any specific harm to them from the issuance of the injunction.
This court gave appellants the opportunity to demonstrate that their searches would be inhibited in any way at all by requiring PLS personnel to be present, and though appellants claim that they had various security concerns, they were unable to articulate any of these at oral argument.2 Prison officials can search the PLS offices any time the office is open. If the office is closed, no imminent security danger has been articulated or even intimated, since the office is completely sealed while waiting for the arrival of PLS civilian personnel. We must agree with the court below that any impact on prison
2

Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)

security is de minimis. Therefore, the prison officials have not met even their small burden of justifying a possible violation of the attorney-client privilege.

2

We do not differ with the dissent that the possibility of

drug smuggling is of grave concern; however, the

appellants have been unable to demonstrate or even

allege how the search procedures outlined in the

preliminary injunction restrain dealing with that

concern.

The overwhelming evidence before the district court at the time the injunction was issued supported the district court’s conclusion that a temporary injunction was appropriate. Furthermore, on the record before us, we conclude that the public interest is in no way disserved by the injunction. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

II
The appellants attempt to convince this court that the proper analysis of this issue should be determined in relation to the law of searches and seizures. Appellants correctly assert that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell or other parts of the prison. Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 170 (1st Cir.1986). This analysis, however, completely ignores the attorneyclient privilege. Appellants have pointed to no cases where any court has held that prisoners have no right to an attorney-client privilege, nor have they attempted to show that the attorney-client privilege is based on the Fourth Amendment. Further, PLS has not disputed the right of prison officials to conduct searches. It has only contended that the attorney-client privilege should be protected during those searches. Therefore, Fourth Amendment analysis is inapplicable to the present case.
*4 The temporary injunction of the district court is AFFIRMED.
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
*4 The district court entered its temporary injuction, if that is what it was, after a hearing at which the plaintiffs were not required to present evidence and the defendants were not permitted to. The hearing was held on an application that had not been properly filed and that was not supported, as far as we can tell, by affidavits. It is doubtful whether the defendant prison officials were given adequate notice of the case they would have to

meet, and it is clear that they were enjoined from implementing their proposed new prison search procedures without having been allowed to explain from the witness stand what the proposed procedures were and why they were thought to be necessary. I find this, I must say, troubling.
The defendant officials obviously had serious concerns about the security of the prison that they-and not the district court-were responsible for running. Whether those concerns would be frustrated by the conditions the plaintiffs sought to have the court impose is a factual question best answered on the basis of evidence presented by competent witnesses, it seems to me, not argument presented by lawyers who may or may not have been privy to all the facts. Witnesses who presumably had firsthand knowledge of the facts were available to give evidence at the hearing conducted by the district court on November 10, 1987, but the court refused to hear their testimony. We may be able to guess why the court refused to take evidence, but I do not think the refusal is something we can excuse.
Without competent evidence, the district court was in no position to make the findings of fact required of it by Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. (“in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall ... set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action”). And without adequately supported findings of fact, a court of appeals “is unable to meet its obligation to properly review the district court’s compliance with the criteria ... for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.” Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 284 (1988).
It does not strike me as farfetched to suppose that, as defense counsel argued before the district court, a requirement for advance notice to Prison Legal Services and a wait of up to two hours before the prison office occupied by PLS could be searched during off-hours might tend to reduce the number of off-hour searches that would otherwise be conducted. Surely no court of equityparticulary a federal court that is obligated to give the greatest possible deference to the decisions of state officials vested with direct responsibility for the operation of a state prison-could consider such a reduction anything but undesirable.
It is worth noting, in this connection, that the services provided through the PLS office had not, in the past, been confined to legal services. Defendants’ counsel was prepared to show that James Hadix, one of several prisoner paralegals who worked in the office, had been a participant in a drug smuggling ring that used the PLS office for at least a year. Without the knowledge of the
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Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)

paid professional staff, drugs were apparently brought into the office in reams of xerox paper and were then distributed by Mr. Hadix to the smuggling ring’s customers.
*5 Before Paralegal Hadix was finally caught out, as I gather from statements made by plaintiffs’ counsel at the November 10 hearing, it had been the practice of the prison officials to conduct searches of the PLS office only in the presence of the Director of Prison Legal Services. At some point during the week of November 2, 1987, according to plaintiffs’ counsel, Prisoner Legal Services was advised by memorandum that all keys to the office and to the office file cabinets would henceforth “be turned over to the control center to be kept in a secure area there,” and that searches would henceforth “be conducted at any time, day or night, whether or not the Director of the Office [could] be present....” It seems to be undisputed that a shift commander was to be present to insure the integrity of the files and to make sure that the searches would be confined to looking for contraband, and the district judge himself acknowledged “I’m sure that these people are not going to fiddle around with inmate files.”* It also seems to be undisputed that among the reasons for the change in procedure were the discovery of the drug smuggling operation at the PLS office and the fact that a prison officer had recently been killed at a post directly outside the PLS area.

*

Plaintiffs’ counsel did not offer any reason for

supposing it probable that any shift commander would

allow officers conducting the searches to read the

contents of the PLS files, as opposed to simply assuring

themselves that the files did not contain drugs,

weapons, cell keys, or other contraband. In 1987, it

should be noted, PLS did not represent prisoners in

lawsuits against officials of this prison-so unless one is

prepared to assume that the officers had a very peculiar

taste for legal prose, it is hard to see what motive they

could have had for reading anything.

The announced change in procedure apparently prompted counsel for the class action plaintiffs to prepare a written petition for a temporary restraining order. Whether the petition complied with the requirements of Rule 65(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., we do not know; notwithstanding the filing requirement imposed by Rule 5(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., the petition was never filed with the district court. The joint appendix does not contain a copy of the petition, and this panel has never seen it. The unfiled petition may well have been handed to the district judge, however, because the court’s order starts out with a reference to “Plaintiffs’ Petition for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order dated November 6, 1987....” Whether the defendants were ever

favored with a copy of the petition is unclear. The record contains no proof of service, of course.
Upon learning of plaintiffs’ desire for a restraining order, the district judge evidently granted a little irregular ex parte relief. As the judge stated at the November 10 hearing, “I talked to [a] Deputy Warden ... on the phone the other day. * * * [M]y conversation with Deputy Warden Jackson and later confirmed with Warden Jabe was that until I had an opportunity to hear this, there would be no search made outside of Prison Legal Systems’ hours unless [the PLS director] was notified and could be present.”
Unlike ex parte temporary restraining orders, which are supposed to expire by their terms within ten days after they have been entered of record, see Rule 65(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., preliminary injunctions have no specific built-in termination point and are not ordinarily issued without at least five days notice to the adverse party. Rule 65(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that “No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party,” and Rule 6(d) provides that “A written motion ... and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court.” Wright and Miller comment that “[i]n many instances a shorter notice period would compromise the opposing party’s ability to marshal evidence and present his arguments against the issuance of the injunction, which might violate due process standards.” 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949, at 468.
*6 If the plaintiffs’ elusive motion was in fact dated November 6, as the district court said, it seems improbable that either the motion or any notice of hearing could have been served on defendants at least five days before the November 10 hearing date-and there was no court order fixing a shorter period. This is not a mere technicality, in my view. The requirement of adequate written notice is important; it is meant “as a device for securing an opportunity for the non-moving party to muster his best argument, to plan his strategy, and to put his best foot forward. In short, adequate notice helps the court secure a just determination.” Schlesinger Partnership v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir.1982).
We do not know how much time was actually afforded the defendants to marshal their evidence and muster their arguments prior to the November 10 hearing, just as we do not know what opportunity defense counsel had to review the evidence with his prospective witnesses. Had
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Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)
the witnesses been allowed to testify, to be sure, both the failure to give the requisite five days notice and the failure to file a proper written motion, properly supported by sworn affidavits, might have turned out not to be prejudicial. But because the prospective witnesses were refused permission to testify, the failure to follow the rules becomes much more problematic, to my way of thinking.
The “case” with which defendants’ counsel found himself confronted at the November 10 hearing turned out to consist of an unsworn statement by plaintiffs’ counsel taking up approximately two pages in the transcript. Defense counsel began his own remarks, not surprisingly, “by noting that there’s been no evidence offered or presented by the Plaintiffs to show irreparable harm.” No such evidence was presented at any stage of the proceedings. And the district court showed no interest whatever in defense counsel’s repeated offers to present evidence on the appropriate scope of the injunction that the court was clearly determined to grant.
Where a written application for a preliminary injunction has been properly filed, with appropriate supporting affidavits, the taking of evidence may not be necessary if there is no serious dispute about the facts. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.1968). The application itself is supposed to state the grounds for the injunction “with particularity,” see Rule 7(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., and there may be no need for a hearing if the facts are uncontested. Where the facts are in dispute, however, as Judge Friendly said in Frank, “the inappropriateness of proceeding on affidavits attains its maximum and, even if the plaintiff’s need is great, it will normally be possible for the judge within the allotted time to conduct a hearing that will illuminate the factual issues although probably not settling them.” Id. at 491.
If it is inappropriate to proceed on affidavits in such a case, it is no less inappropriate to proceed solely on the unsworn statements of counsel, without any affidavits at all. The reasonableness of the restraints sought by the plaintiffs in this case obviously involved factual questions, and to foreclose all testimony-particularly when knowledgeable witnesses were in the courthouse, ready, willing, and able to take the stand-strikes me as a patent abuse of discretion. As this court held in SEC v. G. Weeks Securities, 678 F.2d 649, 651, (6th Cir.1982),
*7 “Rule 65 requires a hearing before a preliminary injunction may issue. A hearing implies the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Broth’d of Local F. & E., 357 F.2d 152 (6th Cir.1960). Observance of the Rule’s hearing

requirement is particularly important where the facts are disputed....” (Quotation from Carpenter’s Dist. Council v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, 8 (6th Cir.1958), as quoted in Broth’d of Local F. & E., 357 F.2d at 153-154, omitted.)
Compare Medico Security Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek, 680 F.2d 37, 38 (7th Cir.1981), where the trial court was held to have abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction without “the holding of any hearing whatsoever and in the absence of any affidavits or even a verified complaint.”
Whether the order here under review is a “permanent” injunction, which is what the district court’s own docket sheet calls it, or a “temporary” injunction, as it is characterized by this court, seems to me immaterial. Courts are no more free to enter preliminary injunctions without evidentiary support than they are to enter permanent injunctions without evidentiary support. See ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir.1987) (“The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of producing evidence ...”).
Every order granting a preliminary injunction, moreover, like every order granting a permanent injunction, is required to “set forth the reasons for its issuance.” Rule 65(d), Fed.R.Civ.P. And the requirement of Rule 52(a) that the trial court find the facts specially is no less applicable to preliminary injunctions than to permanent injunctions. Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir.1988). There was no compliance with these requirements here.
On April 1, 1988, after learning that the defendants had appealed the injunction in this case, the district court did file a supplemental memorandum opinion. Although helpful in several respects, the supplemental memorandum does not seem to me adequately to fill in the gaps in the record. The memorandum includes a finding that the injunction’s “effect ... if any, upon the interests of the prison administration is clearly de minimus ” [sic], but in the absence of a proper evidentiary record, I am at a loss to understand the basis for such a finding. The order in the case before us, like the order at issue in Glover v. Johnson, seems to me to represent “excessively intrusive interference in the prerogatives of a state agency that is not supported by evidence of the quality and quantity required for the exercise of such extraordinary federal judicial power.” 855 F.2d at 285. (Emphasis supplied.)
The district judge is an experienced and respected jurist, and I cannot believe that he is unaware of the importance of developing an evidentiary record before issuing
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Hadix v. Johnson, 871 F.2d 1087 (1989)
injunctions against state agency personnel. What happened here, I suspect, is that as the November 10 hearing progressed, the judge came to think of it as a sort of settlement conference. The transcript of the hearing discloses no agreement between the parties on the twohour notice provision that is being challenged in this appeal, but in his supplemental memorandum the district judge concedes that “[a]t the hearing I concluded that the parties had agreed to the Order.” That erroneous conclusion may explain the otherwise inexplicable issuance of the injunction, but it certainly does not justify
	  

it. The injunction, in my opinion, should be vacated forthwith. This court having elected not to follow that course, I respectfully dissent.
	  
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