FEB-16-2006 22:35

JUDGE RAKOFF

P.01/01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------- X
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., MARIEME DIONGUE, M.E., P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, and J.z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similar situated,

Plaintiffs,

05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

-v-

ORDER

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,

Defendants.
-~--------~---------------~---------- x
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

Pending before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for a

preliminary inJunction. The Court finds it likely, based on the

voluminous submissions of counsel thus far, that plaintiffs will

prevail against the various legal defenses raised by defendants.

See, ~, Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112 (2d Cir.

2005). Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to any provisional

relief necessary to avoid irreparable harm. See~; cf. Cincotta y.

N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11457 (S.D.N.Y.

2001) (citing cases). A memorandum detailing the reasons for these

determinations will issue following the evidentiary hearing discussed

infra.

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Through the admirable cooperation of counsel, defendants have
voluntarily agreed to undertake certain measures sought by the
plaintiffs. So, essentially on consent, plaintiffs' motion for a
Preliminary Injunction is hereby granted as to the following:
(1) Defendant Verna Eggleston (the ~City Defendant H) is ordered to publish, by March 8, 2006, a revised Policy Bulletin concerning the Human Resource Administration's (~HRAH) responsibility to undertake a Medicaid Disability Review where necessary to establish eligibility for food stamps. Q§§. City Def. Letter Br. dated Feb. 8, 2006 (~City Br.H) at 1; Declaration of Seth Dlamond, dated Jan. 24, 2006 (~Diamond Declo"), at 'IT 4; ~ also General Information System Message 06MA0005, attached to Defs. Doar and Novello's Letter Br. dated Feb. 8, 2006 (~State Br.").
(2) City Defendant is ordered to modify, by April 28, 2006, HRA's benefits administration computer system (~POS") to recognize through a "code" the category of battered aliens who hold an 1-130 petition and present proof of domestic violence. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at , 3.
(3) City Defendant is ordered to publish, by February 28, 2006, an interim Policy Bulletin directing workers to refer all applications by battered qualified aliens (and PRUCOL aliens, ~ Diamond Decl. at 'IT 2), to the Job Center's deSignated subject matter experts for handling, and to train staff, in March 2006, to comply with this interim Policy Bulletin. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at ~ 2.
(4) City Defendant is ordered to publish, by February 28, 2006, an interim Policy Bulletin that provides instructions on opening the cases of those battered qualified aliens to whom the United States Custom and Immigration Service (USCIS) will not issue Alien Registration numbers, and to train staff, in March 2006, to comply with this interim Policy Bulletin. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at ~ 2.
(5) City Defendant is ordered to publish, within four weeks of the implementation of the modification to the POS system described in (2), a revised policy Bulletin concerning the handling of battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens, and, to train staff, during the month following its publication, to comply with the revised Policy Directive. See City Br. 3; Diamond Decl. at ~ 5.
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(6) City Defendant is ordered to establish, by February 28, 2006, an informal relief system for non-citizen applications, if such applications are not already covered by other informal relief systems implemented in connection with other litigation, through which Plaintiffs' counsel may contact a designee of City Defendant on behalf of plaintiffs or members of the proposed class whose eligibility has been erroneously assessed. See City Br. at 4.
(7) State Defendants are ordered to remove. by April I, 2006, the requirement that an alien registration number be inputted when entering the "B code." See State Br. at 1.
(8) State Defendants are ordered to revise, by March 8. 2006, the language of the notice denying benefits to include battered qualified aliens among the list of immigration statuses that may qualify immigrants for public benefits. See id.
(9) State Defendants are ordered to release, by March 22, 2006, an issuance regarding eligibility requirements for aliens who are victims of domestic violence and to attach an updated version of its document "LDSS-4579: Alien Eligibility Desk Aid." ~..i.!;L.. at 2.
In addition, plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order
directing defendants to undertake immediately certain further
relief,' their entitlement to which they claim is uncontested, and

'Specifically, plaintiffs ask the Court to order defendants to (1) change, by April 28, 2006, the question in POS that asks if a battered qualified alien has a petition that "sets forth a 'Prima Facie Case,'" ggg Pls.' Letter Br. dated Feb. 13, 2006, at 2, ~ 2; (2) investigate why POS caused many of plaintiffs' and declarants' cases to "error out," see id. at 2, ~ 3; (3) change, by April 28, 2006, the Ilst of documents from which workers must choose to open a case for a person who is PRUCOL to reflect the updated list of documents contained in a recent State DOH policy memorandum. see id. at 2, ~ 4; (4) publish, by February 28, 2006, a Policy Bulletin explaining the proper procedures for referring an immigrant to the Social Security Administration and explaining that a Social Security number is not required for the receipt of fully State and locally funded benefits, and train workers on this new Policy Bulletin, see id. at 3, ~ 5; (5) issue written notices when (a) one or more family members are accepted for benefits and one or more are denied due to immigration status; and (b) a proposed class member asks to be added to an open case; publish. by February 28. 2006. a Policy Bulletin on these issues;
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advise the Court that they continue to seek all the relief set forth in their Notice of Motion (except the relief requested in II.B and III.A of the Notice of Motion, which plaintiffs no longer seek on a preliminary basis). See PIs.' Letter Br. dated Feb. 13, 2006, at 3-4. The Court defers ruling on all these further requests for relief until after the evidentiary hearing, which will be held at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, March 1, 2006. Counsel are directed to call Chambers on Friday, February 17, 2006, to discuss what additional discovery, if any, will be permitted in advance of the evidentiary hearing.
SO ORDERED.
~~'S.D'J.
Dated: New York, New York February 16, 2006

and train staff, in March 2006, concerning the policy Bulletin, see id. at 3, ~ 6.
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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. NO. 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR) (ECF CASE).
May 19, 2006.
Plaintiffs' Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
POINT I LIABILITY OF THE CITY DEFENDANT UNDER MONELL HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ... 1
A. HRA Had Ample Notice Of The Need For Corrective Action ... 2
B. HRA Was Deliberately Indifferent To The Need For Additional Training ... 4
C. The City Is Not Absolved Of Liability Because It Acted At The Direction Of The State ... 8
POINT II LIABILITY OF THE STATE DEFENDANT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ... 10
A. Erroneous Training Materials ... 11
B. The “Second Date” Problem In WMS ... 12
C. Multi-Suffix Cases ... 14
D. The Court's February 16, 2006 Order Against the State Should Not Be Vacated ... 15
1. The State's corrective actions were in no realistic sense “voluntary.” ... 15
2. Unilateral actions by a party to comply with an order or judgment do not war-
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rant vacatur of the order or judgment ... 16 POINT III THE COURT SHOULD ORDER ADDITIONAL RELIEF AGAINST THE CITY AND STATE DEFENDANTS ... 18
A. Additional Relief Is Warranted Against the State Defendants ... 19 1. Single-date problem in WMS/green card holders of less than five years ... 19 2. Instructions on opening cases in WMS, particularly multi-suffix cases ... 20 3. Social Security numbers for applicants for federal benefits ... 21 4. Training on federal Medicaid ... 22
B. Additional Relief Is Warranted Against the City Defendant ... 22 1. Social Security number requirements ... 22 2. Eligibility for benefits of battered qualified aliens and persons who are
PRUCOL ... 24 3. Green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years ...
24 4. Training on opening cases for alien in WMS ... 25 5. Issuance of notices ... 25 6. Cases not handled by liaisons ... 26 7. POS revisions ... 27
POINT IV GALINA RYBALKO'S APPLICATION TO INTERVENE SHOULD BE GRANTED ... 27 POINT V THE PROPOSED PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED ... 29 CONCLUS ... 31
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 6 Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989) ... 18 Brownley v. Doar, 11 Misc. 3d 615, 811 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2006) ... 14 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) ... 5 Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) ... 14

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D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. Civ-03-2489, 2004 WL 633222 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) ... 30 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ... 16 Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979) ... 9 German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y.1995), clarified 896 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ... 29, 30 Haley v. Pataki, 60 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 17 Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 10 Housing Works, Inc. v. City of New York, 203 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2000) ... 17 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27 (1993) ... 18 Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) ... 5 Jiggetts v. Dowling, 261 A.D.2d 144, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1st Dep't 1999) ... 13 Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005) ... 10 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ... 10 McNeill v. New York City Housing Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y.1989) ... 30 McVay v Wing, 303 A.D.2d 727, 758 N.Y.S.2d 88 (2d Dep't 2003) ... 14 Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993) ... 18 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ... 1, 9 Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ... 30 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) ... 5 Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027 (1986) ... 8, 9 Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993) ... 28, 30 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) ... 16 Shubrick v. Wing, 303 A.D.2d 744, 757 N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d Dep't 2003) ... 14 Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) ... 8, 9 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) ... 16, 17, 18

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United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005) ... 17, 18
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. 18 § 370.4(b)(2)(i) (2006) ... 13
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 158(1)(g) ... 13
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 159(5) ... 13
MISCELLANEOUS
Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) ... 8, 9
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiffs submit this memorandum of law in reply to the City and State defendants' May 5, 2006 post-trial memoranda, and in further support of the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief and class certification.
Point I of this brief demonstrates that the City's liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) has been established because (1) HRA had ample notice of the need to take corrective action; (2) HRA was deliberately indifferent to the need for additional training; and (3) HRA is liable for actions taken at the direction of the State.
Point II demonstrates that the State's actions and omissions caused the violation of plaintiffs' federal rights under the food stamp and Medicaid acts, and that the February 16, 2006 injunction against the State should not be vacated.
Point III of this brief details the specific additional injunctive relief plaintiffs seek against the City and the State defendants. Point IV responds to the defendants' arguments regarding Galina Rybalko and explains why her motion to intervene should be granted. Lastly, Point V responds to the City's erroneous argument that the proposed class should not be certified because (1) the class is not sufficiently numerous; and (2) the class definition is overbroad.
POINT I
LIABILITY OF THE CITY DEFENDANT UNDER MONELL HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.
The City defendant advances three arguments why liability has not been demonstrated under Monell. It claims (1) that HRA did not have sufficient notice of the need to take corrective action (City Post-Hr'g Mem. of Law (City Mem.) 13-14); (2) that HRA was not “deliberately indifferent” to the need for additional or corrective training (City Mem. 15-21); and (3) with regard to certain violations, the City should not be held responsible because the State is at fault (City Mem. 22-27). The first two arguments are wrong as a matter of fact; the third is wrong as a matter of law.
A. HRA Had Ample Notice Of The Need For Corrective Action.
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The evidence demonstrated that HRA policy makers Elaine Witty, Ivelia Sisco, Cecile Noel, and Jane Corbett had ample notice of systemic problems with the delivery of public benefits to immigrant class members. All four senior policy-makers have substantial authority and responsibility within HRA. (Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 390-94.) Jane Corbett is Executive Deputy Commissioner of the Office of Policy and Program Development. (Tr. 925:23-926:6.) Ivelia Sisco is the director of procedures for public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps (Tr. 967:1-13) and is the person at HRA who has had primary responsibility for developing procedures relating to immigrant eligibility for public benefits. (Tr. 968:10-14.) Cecile Noel is HRA's Deputy Commissioner for Domestic Violence Emergency Services. (Tr. 478:21-23.) Elaine Witty is Executive Director of the Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs (ORIA) at HRA. (Tr. 909:7-11.)
On more than one occasion during the last two years, Ms. Witty told Ms. Sisco that immigrants were being denied public benefits because workers do not understand the eligibility rules. (Tr. 971:4-14) Ms. Sisco shared this information with the participants in HRA's weekly Office of Procedures and Training managers' meeting. (Tr. 971:15-18; FOF ¶ 395.) Ms. Witty was also aware that workers were having trouble identifying immigration documents (Tr. 921:18-21) and that immigrant victims of domestic violence were experiencing difficulty in having benefits issued to them (Tr. 925:16-22). She informed both Ms. Corbett and Ms. Sisco of this problem (Tr. 925:23-926:9; FOF ¶¶ 396-97).
Likewise, Ms. Witty was aware that HRA employees had trouble applying the eligibility rules pertaining to persons with filed or approved I-130 petitions and proof of abuse (Tr. 927:7-11, 928:5-11); that HRA workers sometimes had difficulty with the eligibility rules regarding PRUCOL individuals (Tr. 932:6-8); and that workers were having difficulty handling mixed status households (Tr. 934:23-935:3; 980:19-22). She advised Ms. Sisco of all three of these problems (Tr. 981:20-24; 932:16-21; 934:23-935:3; 980:19-22), and informed Ms. Corbett about the problem concerning I130 petitions. (Tr. 928:19-929:10; FOF ¶¶ 398-400.) Ms. Witty also knew that workers were having difficulty opening cases in the WMS computer system for people who did not have Social Security numbers. (Tr. 918:13-16; FOF ¶ 401.)
In addition, in July 2004, Reena Ganju informed Deputy Commissioner Noel of her belief that HRA's ADVENT workers - who deal exclusively with domestic violence victims - required additional training. (Tr. 479:16-20, 482:21-483:1.) She presented Ms. Noel with a letter requesting additional and comprehensive training for ADVENT staff (Pl. Ex. 778), sent a copy to Elaine Witty (Tr. 512:13-16), and followed up on those communications by providing training materials to Ms. Noel and Ms. Witty that HRA might use (Tr. 483:5-18; FOF ¶¶ 403-04).
In contending that it lacked sufficient notice of the need for corrective action, HRA ignores the fact that Executive Deputy Commissioner Corbett and the Director of Procedures, Ms. Sisco, both had notice of substantial problems. Also lacking in merit are HRA's assertions that notice to Ms. Witty was insufficient because her office “is not responsible for making eligibility determinations,” and that notice to Ms. Noel was not good enough because her workers “[do] not deal with FIA job center ap-

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plicants for eligibility.” (City Mem. 14.) Ms. Witty repeatedly intervened in correcting erroneous eligibility determinations. Ms. Ganju, for example, testified that Ms. Witty was “the person behind” the eligibility determinations in approximately 10-20 cases on which she had sought Ms. Wittty's assistance. (Tr. 513:14-20.) Indeed, Ms. Witty had established a so-called “pilot advocacy program” for that very purpose. (Tr. 911:18-912:4.) One of her duties and responsibilities is to provide “expertise and guidance on alien eligibility for food stamps, medical assistance and cash assistance.” (Pl Ex. 889 at MKB 11776.) And while Ms. Noel's workers do not make initial eligibility determinations, they are responsible for making subsequent eligibility determinations on recertification, and indeed had done so on several cases about which Ms. Ganju testified. (Tr. 519:19-520:16; see also Tr. 1001:14-1003:6, 1007:21-1008:24; Pl. Ex. 663.)[FN1]
FN1. The City's objection that notice from Ms. Ganju was insufficient because “such notice would only be ‘that a particular advocacy group was taking a particular position,’ ” (City Mem. 14), is wholly without merit. The City cites no authority for the proposition that notice of the need for additional training is insufficient as a matter of law if it comes from a legal advocate outside of HRA. B. HRA Was Deliberately Indifferent To The Need For Additional Training.
Plaintiffs' claims regarding training are independent and distinct from their claims regarding HRA's policies, customs and usages. As argued more fully in plaintiffs' December 13, 2005 memorandum of law, at 35-37, a § 1983 violation may be established in three different ways that are relevant here. (1) The City may have “formal rules or understandings - often but not always committed to writing - that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986). (2) The City may have a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity.” Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000). (3) The City may have provided inadequate training when the need for more or different training was evident. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
A showing of “deliberate indifference” to the need for additional or improved training is pertinent only to the third of these theories, and not to claims regarding HRA's policies, customs, and usages. In this case, liability has been established under all three theories.
HRA's assertion that plaintiffs purportedly offered “no evidence of a faulty training program on the part of the City defendant” (City Mem. 13), flies in the face of massive evidence to the contrary. As explained in plaintiffs' post-hearing memorandum of law (Pl. Mem. 6-7, 21) and proposed findings of fact (FOF ¶¶253-58, 322-26), there was substantial evidence that HRA had a flawed training program. HRA relies on a system of “training the trainers.” (Tr. 1194:9-19.) The evidence established that HRA used flawed training materials to train those trainers. In HRA's April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Instructor's Guide,” a battered qualified alien was

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defined solely as a person with a “prima facie” notice. No other battered qualified aliens were mentioned. (Pl. Ex. 469 at MKB01171-72.) HRA's “April 2005 Training Release” made the same mistake. (Pl. Ex. 464 at C12928-29.) Similarly, HRA's April and June 2005 “Trainer's Manual” for its new hires training referred only to battered aliens with approved I-360s and those with a “prima facie case.” (Pl. Ex. 468 at MKB01166-67.) Battered qualified aliens with I-130 family-based petitions, K, or V visas are not mentioned. (FOF ¶¶ 255-58.) The same flaw repeatedly appeared in faulty HRA policy directives, which omitted mention of the I-130 group entirely. (Pl. Ex. 507 at MKB 01067; Pl. Ex. 526 at MKB 01242; FOF ¶¶ 289-90.)
As a consequence, HRA's own trainers did not understand that immigrants who have proof of abuse and are beneficiaries of pending or approved I-130 petitions may be eligible for public benefits. As explained in plaintiffs' post-hearing memorandum of law, this failing was clearly evident during the testimony of Reena Ganju, who testified that the trainer for the Waverly Job Center erroneously advised the Center Director's office that clients in the I-130 category are not eligible for benefits. (Tr. 454:20-455:5.)
Citing Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2004), the City claims that plaintiffs failed to establish that faulty training is “closely related to the ultimate injury.” (City Mem. 13.) But in fact, the evidence of a causal link is very strong. HRA's trainers received training materials wrongly stating that a “prima facie” notice is necessary to establish eligibility. Immigrants in the so-called I-130 group do not have a “prima facie” notice. One of those trainers wrongly informed Job Center staff at the Waverly Center that I-130 clients are not eligible because “the client needs to have a prime [sic] facie notice in order to be eligible for benefits.” (Tr. 454:20-455:5.) That erroneous instruction, in turn, led to the wrongful denial of benefits to Ms. Ganju's client C.W.S., who was in the I-130 category. (Id.; see also FOF ¶ 301 (M.E.); 304 (M.A.).) In short, faulty training materials led to erroneous information provided by trainers to Job Center staff, which led to incorrect denials of public benefits.[FN2]
FN2. HRA's training materials regarding PRUCOL clients were also badly flawed. As noted in plaintiffs' post-hearing memorandum of law (Pl. Mem. 21) and proposed findings of fact (FOF ¶¶ 322-26), HRA's training materials failed to indicate that PRUCOL clients can be eligible for Safety Net Assistance. (Pl. Ex. 469 at MKB01175-76; Pl. Ex. 464 at C12932.) These failings pertain to plaintiffs' claims against HRA under State law, which the Court may entertain under its supplemental jurisdiction.
The City relies heavily on the fact that it conducted periodic trainings for its staff. (City Mem. 17-19.) But HRA's training materials, and the policy directives they purported to explain, had significant errors. A clear illustration is provided by the City's faulty guidance regarding Social Security numbers. The City candidly admits that the “state regulations governing the requirements for social security numbers for immigrants are contradictory and appear irreconcilable.” (City Mem. 23.) As a result, the City's policy directives - which stated that furnishing a SSN is a condition of eligibility for public benefits (Pl. Ex. 636 at MKB-OTDA 10207) - were

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incorrect. (Tr. 683:5-12.) However, even after the State (through Paul Dichian) orally advised the City to correct its policy directives, the City issued a new directive that was also incorrect and that Mr. Dichian would not have approved had he seen it. (Tr. 690:11-14.)
In short, the City may have conducted various trainings related to alien eligibility issues; but those trainings and the directives on which they were based contained errors that led to the systemic denial of benefits.
C. The City Is Not Absolved Of Liability Because It Acted At The Direction Of The State.
The City's final attempt to evade liability for unlawful practices is to shift blame for those practices to the State. The City argues that four of its policies and practices - those regarding Social Security numbers, PRUCOL status, multi-suffix cases, and Alien Registration numbers - were taken at the direction of the State, and therefore were exclusively the fault of the State. (City Mem. 22-27.) Notably absent from the City's argument, however, is any legal authority for the view that a municipal government that engages in a systemic violation of federal law at the direction of its principal, the State, bears no legal responsibility for that wrongful conduct. Indeed, the law is otherwise.
In § 1983 cases challenging actions by an agent taken at the direction of a principal, courts have adopted common law principles set forth in the Restatement of Agency. See, e.g., Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027 (1986); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). It is a basic principle at common law that an agent that acts unlawfully at the direction of a principal is jointly and severally liable with the principal. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343 (1958) provides: “An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the principal ...” Sections 359C(1) and 217B(1) of the Restatement both provide as follows: “Principal and agent can be joined in an action for a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent or that of agent and principal, and a judgment can be rendered against each.”
In Raysor, the Second Circuit applied Restatement § 343 to determine the liability of agents in actions brought pursuant to § 1983. 768 F.2d at 38. There, a Port Authority police officer made an arrest at the command of his superior officer. Id. at 36. Suing under § 1983 and state law, the plaintiff alleged that the arresting officer had done so without a good faith belief that the order to him had been imparted lawfully. Id. Reversing the district court's dismissal of the state law claim, and holding that both claims should go forward, the Second Circuit held that the district court “ignored the general tort rule that an agent is not relieved of liability merely because he acted at the command of the principal, see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343 comments b, d (1958).” 768 F.2d at 38.
Likewise, in Thaddeus-X, the plaintiff, a prisoner, alleged that prison officials retaliated against him for providing legal advice to another prisoner. 175 F.3d 378.
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The district court dismissed the claims against three guards, believing they were absolved from liability because they were “merely executing their superior's orders.” Id. at 393. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “[r]eliance on a superior's orders does not in itself dissipate all liability,” and noting that the result “accords with longstanding general and specific tort principles.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343 cmt. d). The court emphasized that its holding was consistent with cases like Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1979), which rejected an argument that FBI agents could not be held liable for wrongful conduct because “they were merely following the orders of their superior and should not be put to the test of either disobeying authority or being subject to liability.” Id.
For these reasons, the City is not excused from liability under Monell on the ground that certain of its actions were taken at the direction of the State defendants.
POINT II
LIABILITY OF THE STATE DEFENDANT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.
The State defendants erroneously claim that the evidence admitted at trial did not demonstrate that State actions and omissions “actually caused the violation of plaintiffs' federal rights under the food stamp or Medicaid acts.” (State Post-Hr'g Mem. of Law (State Mem.) 10.) The State makes this contention in relation to three areas: (1) erroneous training materials (State Mem. 10-12); (2) the WMS “second date” problem (State Mem. 13-14); and (3) difficulties opening “multi-suffix” cases in WMS (State Mem. 14-15). These assertions are wrong as a matter of fact.[FN3] (See Points II.A. through II.C. infra.)
FN3. In a legal argument it relegated to a footnote (State Mem. 12, n.6), the State also contends there was no evidence that its misleading CNS notices “deterred applicants from continuing to seek benefits.” This argument is wholly lacking in merit. In the example the State discusses, declarant W.J.'s benefits were not discontinued solely because of the assistance of counsel. (W.J. Decl. ¶¶ 25-26.) The fact that counsel intervened to ensure that W.J.'s benefits would continue has no bearing on whether the notice itself violated due process. In evaluating the constitutional adequacy of the State's CNS notices, the question is whether they provided sufficient information to enable recipients to understand the basis for the agency's action and whether a challenge to the action is warranted. See Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005). The “specific type of notice required will vary depending on the circumstances of each given case,” id. at 124, and must be determined by “taking into account the private interests affected by the city's action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests through the procedures used, and the administrative burden placed on the city.” Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1986); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In this case, the State's CNS notices provided an incomplete list of immigrants who are eligible for benefits, omitting battered qualified aliens entirely. (FOF ¶¶ 380-85.) That omission left battered immigrants with the false impres-

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sion that they were ineligible for benefits and that an appeal could not succeed. In light of the risk of an erroneous deprivation of benefits created by the notice, the substantial private interests at stake, and the minimal cost of modifying the notice, the State's misleading CNS notice violated due process.
Additionally, the State's assertion that the Court's February 16, 2005 order should be vacated is contrary to the law and should be rejected. (See Point II.D. infra.)
A. Erroneous Training Materials.
The State does not even attempt to defend the accuracy of its training materials, which it assumes “arguendo” contain “certain omissions.” (State Mem. 9-10.) Those “certain omissions” include the complete failure to mention the eligibility of battered qualified immigrants in the State's food stamp and Medicaid training materials. (FOF ¶¶ 260-63.) Additionally, the State's food stamp training materials contained many other serious errors that were acknowledged during Steven Ptak's testimony. (Tr. 1160:7-1162:12.)
Instead of defending the accuracy of its training materials, the State contends there was no evidence that their use had an impact at the City's Job Centers. But this contention is wrong. Mr. Ptak admitted that the training materials he attached to his affidavit were intended for use in Job Centers after comments from so-called “dry run training[s]” were incorporated. (Tr. 1153:19-25.) Although counsel for the State objected to further questioning about these training materials because, he claimed, “it's clear they're not about job centers” (Tr. 1155:3-6), he withdrew the objection after it was pointed out that Mr. Ptak had himself attached these training materials to his affidavit as evidence of trainings performed at Job Centers. (Tr. 1155:7-11.)
Ironically, the State also seeks to excuse its faulty training materials on the ground that “HRA workers are regularly trained on HRA materials” and that HRA's alien eligibility desk aids “include battered qualified aliens as potentially eligible for cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid.” (State Mem. 11.) But the city desk aids had and still have various flaws. For example, as noted in plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact (FOF ¶ 266), even now the “Description of Status” in the current city desk aid refers only to those with a “prima facie.” (Pl. Ex. 515 at MKB01127.) The description does not reference those with pending or approved I-130 petitions or those with approved I-360 VAWA self-petitions. Michelle Shepard, head of HRA's POS design team, testified that even she found this description confusing because it refers only to those with a “prima facie case.” (Tr. 776:7-25, 777:21-25.)
B. The “Second Date” Problem In WMS.
The State cannot and does not dispute that the design of WMS was flawed because it allowed data in the date field associated with the Alien Citizenship Indicator (ACI) to be overwritten by a later date. A State witness, David Spielman, admitted that “workers were changing the date on the system which was making these people ineligible.” (Tr. 1334:20-22.) In response to this litigation, the State took steps to
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correct this problem by “locking down” the date field so that a more recent date cannot overwrite an earlier date.
As plaintiffs explained in their post-hearing memorandum of law (Pl. Mem. 12-14), this correction solves only part of the problem. Because WMS contains only a single date field associated with the ACI, it is impossible to track both the date of entry into the United States and the number of years of qualified alien status. The former is necessary to determine whether certain qualified aliens are eligible for federal public assistance and federal Medicaid; the latter is necessary to determine whether they are eligible for federal food stamps.
Astonishingly, rather than simply fixing the problem, the State responds that it will instead provide State-funded Medicaid and State-funded Safety Net Assistance to immigrants who are actually eligible for federal Medicaid and federal TANF benefits. (State Mem. 13.) Since the funding source is not evident to the benefit recipient (id.), according to the State's reasoning, the only losers in this arrangement are the taxpayers of New York, who are paying for the federal government's share of Medicaid and public assistance for these immigrants.
This response is flawed for two reasons. First, there is an important practical reason why such cases should be correctly opened under the federal assistance programs: no multi-suffix case problems will arise if all household members are receiving federal benefits. But if the cases are erroneously opened under the state programs for immigrant household members, and other household members are receiving federal benefits, then the multi-suffix case problems discussed at length during the hearing will arise.
Second, while the dollar value of cash assistance is the same under the federal and State programs, in other respects the rights of federal and State welfare recipients differ significantly. For example, after two years, certain statutory restrictions apply to State-funded Safety Net Assistance but do not apply to recipients of federal welfare benefits.[FN4] Further, recipients of federal welfare benefits are entitled to supplemental rental allowances if they are facing eviction because their “shelter allowance” is inadequate to pay the rent. Jiggetts v. Dowling, 261 A.D.2d 144, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1st Dep't 1999). But the State disputes that Safety Net Assistance recipients are statutorily entitled to such allowances, see Brownley v. Doar, 11 Misc. 3d 615, 626, 811 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2006)(appeal pending), and some state courts have held that they are not. See McVay v Wing, 303 A.D.2d 727, 727, 758 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88 (2d Dep't 2003); Shubrick v. Wing, 303 A.D.2d 744, 745, 757 N.Y.S.2d 450, 450 (2d Dep't 2003). Indeed, it is unseemly that the State is maintaining in this court that there is no difference between recipients assisted under the federal and State categories, while in other courts it is taking exactly the opposite position.
FN4. Immigrants who are eligible for Safety Net Assistance under Soc. Serv. Law § 158(1)(g) “but have received cash assistance for two years or more shall receive assistance only in the form of non-cash assistance.” N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 159(5) (McKinney 2006); see N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. 18 § 370.4(b)(2)(i)

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(2006).
Accordingly, there are both legal and practical differences between receiving assistance under the federal and State categories. Since the federal courts are vested with a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them, Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-818 (1976), and since clear evidence has been presented that the plaintiffs' federal rights have been violated, the Court should issue injunctive relief designed to redress the denial of those federal rights. In this case, that means directing the State to correct the “second date” problem.
C. Multi-Suffix Cases.
The State claims that no causal relationship was established between difficulties opening multi-suffix cases in WMS and the wrongful denial of benefits. This assertion is clearly refuted by the evidence, which demonstrated that the State issued inadequate instructions and provided inadequate training on how to open multi-suffix cases for immigrants, and that many of the plaintiffs' and declarants' cases had “errored out” for this reason. (FOF ¶¶ 225-45.) Even the City admits that the record “is clear that it is difficult to open such a case and that unless and until the State defendant issues clear instructions, the task for opening such a case will continue to pose challenges to job center workers.” (City Mem. 27.)
D. The Court's February 16, 2006 Order Against the State Should Not Be Vacated.
The Court's February 16, 2006 order against the State should not be vacated for two reasons. First, in no reasonable sense of the word were the few corrective actions that the State took “voluntary.” Second, even if they were “voluntary,” unilateral actions by a party to comply with a court order or judgment do not provide a basis for vacating the order or judgment.
1. The State's corrective actions were in no realistic sense “voluntary.”
The State's notion that it “voluntarily” undertook certain actions, and that the Court “memorialized the defendants' promises” in the February 16, 2006 order (State Mem. 2), seriously mischaracterizes the history of this action. Initially, the State vigorously disputed the need for any relief in this action. For example, in papers submitted on January 25, 2006, the State claimed: “The major alleged flaws of WMS simply do not exist.” (State Mem. of Law in Opp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and Class Cert. at 30.)
The State offered to undertake certain corrective measures only after the Court stated as follows during oral argument on the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion: [W]e are only focusing on one aspect of this right now and I am not at all sure whether the plaintiffs are not entitled in any event to some sort of court order. But what I do know is that if they are not entitled to a court order it is because the city and state have come forward and said, Judge, we are fixing this problem and we are fixing it by date X, and if we don't fix it by date X, you know, impose your

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order and do whatever else the law requires, but we are going to work our damnedest to have it done by date X.
(Tr. of Oral Arg., Feb. 2, 2006, 11:1-10.)
It was only in response to this statement by the Court, which effectively rejected the State's contention that no corrective steps were necessary, that the State agreed to correct one (and only one) of the WMS problems (that it had previously denied even existed), along with three other specific corrective actions. It tortures the English language to say that these corrective actions were undertaken “voluntarily.”
2. Unilateral actions by a party to comply with an order or judgment do not warrant vacatur of the order or judgment.
Even if the State's actions were understood to be “voluntary,” the State misstates the law with regard to such “voluntary” actions by the party seeking relief from an order or judgment. Vacatur of an order is improper when the party seeking relief from the order “caused the mootness by voluntary action.” U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994). As the Supreme Court explained in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., by agreeing to comply with the order, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice. The denial of vacatur is merely one application of the principle that “a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks.”
Id. at 25 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963); citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)).
This rule applies regardless of whether mootness results from a formal settlement (as in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.), or from unilateral compliance by the losing party with the district court's order. In Housing Works, Inc. v. City of New York, 203 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam), for example, the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the City to “re-rank” the plaintiff's applications for funding for two housing projects. The City complied with the court's order after its motions for a stay pending appeal were denied. Id. When the Second Circuit heard the appeal, the issue had become moot; the sole question on appeal was whether the Second Circuit should vacate the district court's preliminary injunction because the City had complied with the order. Id. at 178. This action the Court declined to do, noting that the “general practice” is to leave the injunction in place.[FN5] Id. at 178; see also United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 399 F.3d 527, 529 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (“in the civil context, vacatur of a previously issued decision of a court of appeals is not constitutionally mandated, and indeed is typically inappropriate, when the appeal is subsequently mooted due to settlement between the parties or the losing party's unilateral actions”)(emphasis added) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1989) (“we find no basis for allowing a plaintiff who lost in a lower court to vacate the
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adverse judgment simply by deciding that he no longer wishes to pursue the claim” (emphasis in original)).
FN5. Haley v. Pataki, 60 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995), on which the State relies (State Mem. 4), is not to the contrary. In Haley, the Court found that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, vacatur of the injunction is proper.” Id. at 142. The unique circumstances in Haley were quite different from this case, however. There, the Governor prevented the payment of salaries of employees of the State Legislature unless and until the Legislature enacted a State budget. Finding a probability of success that the Governor's actions violated the rights of the plaintiffs under the Contract Clause, the district court issued an injunction requiring “that insofar as the Governor undertakes to send future appropriations bills and messages of necessity to the legislature for the payment of state workers, he may not exclude payment to legislative employees from such bills.” Id. at 140. The Governor appealed and sought a stay of the order, which was denied. The Governor then complied with the injunction while budget negotiations continued. In June, after adoption of a State budget, the appeal became moot. The Second Circuit vacated the injunction because the constitutional issue “is best addressed not on interlocutory appeal but at trial after full discovery.” Id. at 142. Since the dispute had been resolved for the current budget year; and since discovery and a trial on the merits were to go forward before the next budget year, it was only logical to vacate the preliminary injunction and await a final ruling on the merits. Here, in contrast, there is no reason to vacate the order pending a trial on the merits. The preliminary injunction hearing in this case provides ample support for the Court's order.
Further, the public interest is not served by vacating an injunction after the losing party complies with it. As Justice Stevens has written, “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993)(Stevens, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted); see Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1993). No public purpose would be served by vacating the court's preliminary injunction; indeed, no logical reason of any kind has even been posited for vacating the injunction.
For these reasons, the fact that the State has complied with this Court's order of February 16, 2006, is not a reason for vacating it. The order should remain in place as a precedent.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER ADDITIONAL RELIEF AGAINST THE CITY AND STATE DEFENDANTS.
Since the preliminary injunction hearing, the defendants have taken some additional steps in response to the claims raised in this lawsuit. A number of additional actions are needed, however, in order to prevent the proposed plaintiff class from
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suffering irreparable harm due to the systemic denial of public benefits. These actions are addressed individually below.
A. Additional Relief Is Warranted Against the State Defendants.
1. Single-date problem in WMS/green card holders of less than five years.
In response to an inquiry from the City seeking clarification of the policy of what constituted five years in qualified alien status, the State wrote a letter to David Lock at HRA's Office of Legal Affair, subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, explaining that the time an immigrant has been a lawful permanent resident should be added to the time an immigrant spent in another qualified alien status in order to determine eligibility for food stamps. (Post-Hr'g Supp. Decl. of David Lock, dated May 4, 2006 (Lock Supp. Decl.) Exhibit A (dated March 28, 2006).) This letter resolved the individual situation of Ms. Rybalko, but it does not ensure that other lawful permanent residents who have been qualified aliens for five years, but who have not been lawful permanent residents for five years, are provided federal food stamps. The State has not issued a policy bulletin or directive and has not performed training or otherwise instructed HRA workers regarding the clarification of the policy outlined in the letter to David Lock.
The change made to WMS to ensure that a date entered into the computer cannot be subsequently changed to a later date (Post-Hr'g Supp. Aff. of David Spielman, dated May 5, 2006 (Spielman Supp. Aff.)) also does not ensure that lawful permanent residents will receive the food stamps to which they are entitled. Two problems remain. First, as explained previously (Point II.B. supra; Pl. Mem. 12-14), the State should be ordered to add a second date field to WMS so that both the date an immigrant became a qualified alien and the date the immigrant entered the country can be recorded. Otherwise, some immigrants will be granted benefits erroneously under the State program rather than the federal program.
Second, the State's “date lock” solution will only help those immigrants who become lawful permanent residents while receiving public benefits. In those cases, the earlier date upon which they first became qualified aliens will already have been entered into WMS; and the later date on which they became lawful permanent residents will not overwrite it. But the “date lock” will do nothing to ensure that workers will initially enter the correct date if a person is already a lawful permanent resident at the time he or she first applies for benefits. To prevent continued erroneous denials of food stamps, the State should be ordered to issue a formal instruction, in the form of a policy bulletin or directive, explaining (1) which date to enter, and (2) that time in different qualified alien statuses should be added together to determine eligibility for federal food stamps.
2. Instructions on opening cases in WMS, particularly multi-suffix cases.
As discussed in detail previously (Pl. FOF ¶¶ 225-245; Pl. Mem. 34-36), due to inadequate instructional material and training, HRA workers have great difficulty opening cases for aliens directly in WMS, particularly when those cases require two suffixes. The City candidly admits the significant problems HRA workers have opening
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these cases because the State has not issued clear instructions (City Mem. 27) and explicitly “requests that the State defendant issue specific direction on opening cases on aliens in WMS” (City Mem. 32).
The plaintiffs join this request and respectfully ask the Court to order the State to prepare clear and comprehensive instructions on how to open cases for aliens directly in WMS, focusing particularly on multi-suffix cases.
3. Social Security numbers for applicants for federal benefits.
By approving the City's revised policy directives on Social Security numbers, the State has implicitly conceded that its policy directives - including the form letter provided to applicants for Social Security numbers - are incorrect. But inexplicably the State has failed to revise its own policy directives. The conflict between the State and City directives is likely to cause confusion. Furthermore, the State form letter and directives are manifestly incorrect and must be revised to conform to federal law. This Court should not acquiesce in the view ascribed by Mr. Dichian to “management” at OTDA, which was that the Social Security number problems at issue here are somehow unique to New York City.[FN6] To prevent the continued erroneous denial of federal food stamps and federal Medicaid, the State should be ordered to correct its policy directives on Social Security numbers. (Pl. Mem. 8-11; Pl. FOF ¶¶ 273-76.)
FN6. At trial, Mr. Dichian testified that “management” directed HRA to correct City policy bulletins instead of correcting the State's own faulty directives. (Tr. 663:25-664:23.) In response, the Court asked: “Well, I am missing something. The state has the ultimate authority on this kind of stuff, right? ... [W]hy did they leave it to HRA?” Mr. Dichian responded: “As I recall, they saw it as an HRA, a city problem and that HRA should issue the directive.” (Tr. 664:24-665:16.) The Court responded: “Why did they see it as a city problem? It directly related to the interpretation of state regulations, yes?” (Tr. 665:17-19.) Later the Court asked: “It is not the view of the two persons you mentioned that spousal and child abuse is limited to New York City, correct?” (Tr. 667:6-8.)
4. Training on federal Medicaid.
As requested by the plaintiffs, the State has revised its training materials regarding eligibility for federal food stamps. (Post-Hr'g Supp. Aff. of Steven Ptak (Ptak Supp. Aff.) ¶ 6.) The State has not, however, revised its training materials regarding eligibility for federal Medicaid.[FN7] The State's most recent training materials on eligibility for federal Medicaid leave battered qualified aliens off the list of those eligible. (Pl. FOF ¶ 261; Pl. Ex. 536 at MKB01355-57.)
FN7. The State's revised training materials do mention emergency Medicaid, Medicaid for pregnant individuals, and Child Health Plus B, a form of Medicaid for children. (Post-Hr'g Supp. Aff. of Robert L. Sharkey, dated May 5, 2005 (Sharkey Supp. Aff.) Ex. E at 5.) These programs, which are not at issue in this case, are open to persons regardless of immigration status. At no point do the State's training materials explain who is eligible for federal Medicaid
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(or State Medicaid).
The State therefore should be ordered to revise its training materials, including those prepared and used by contractors, so that they accurately and comprehensively explain which immigrants are eligible for federal Medicaid.
B. Additional Relief Is Warranted Against the City Defendant.
1. Social Security number requirements.
In response to the allegations in this case, the City has issued revised policy directives regarding Social Security numbers. While these policy directives are an improvement, they still contain significant errors. For example, the form letter given to applicants for Social Security numbers still erroneously states that all applicants “must provide a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility for receipt of Temporary Assistance.” (HRA Policy Directive 06-15, Attachment A, attached to Post-Hr'g Supp. Decl. of James Whelan, dated May 5, 2006 (Whelan Supp Decl.) as Ex. D.) This statement, which is incorrect when applied to those applying for State benefits who cannot receive a Social Security number due to their immigration status, is likely to confuse HRA workers and applicants. The City should be ordered to correct this and other errors.[FN8]
FN8. Attachment A to PD 06-10 states that if the reason an applicant is denied a Social Security number cannot be resolved, then the worker should “re-evaluate the individual's eligibility for PA, MA, and/or FS.” (Whelan Supp. Decl. Ex. B.) This statement may lead a worker to erroneously conclude that an individual is ineligible for benefits if they are denied a Social Security number. Workers may also be confused because the revised policy directives (for example, PB 06-63, attached as Ex. C to Whelan Supp. Decl.) reference PD 06-09, which was withdrawn on May 5, 2006, a week after it was issued, presumably because in the introductory policy statement it erroneously stated: “Furnishing a Social Security Number (SSN) is a condition of eligibility for public assistance (PA), food stamps (FS) and medical assistance (MA).” (Whelan Supp. Decl. Ex. A.)
To prevent the continued erroneous denial of benefits, the City should also be ordered to conduct comprehensive training on these policy directives for all workers involved in eligibility determinations. (Pl. FOF ¶¶ 273-287; Pl. Mem. 8-12, 16-20.). That is, the City should train not only workers who make initial eligibility determinations, but also workers who (a) process requests to be added to a case, (b) process recertifications, (c) make decisions to take adverse case actions, (d) process fair hearings, or (e) review any of the above determinations.[FN9]
FN9. In its brief, the City asserts that its staff “has provided training on these [revised Social Security number] P.D.'s.” (City Mem. 31 (emphasis added)). This assertion is not supported by anything in evidence, and is improbable given that one of the directives was issued the day the brief was filed and the others the week before. (Whelan Supp. Decl. Exs. A, B and C (issued April 27, 2006); Whelan Supp. Decl. Ex. D (issued May 5, 2006).)
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2. Eligibility for benefits of battered qualified aliens and persons who are PRUCOL.
The City states that it has developed a proposed policy directive on the eligibility of applicants who are battered or PRUCOL. (Whelan Supp. Decl. ¶ 8.) According to the Court's February 16, 2006 order, this directive must be published this month (specifically within four weeks of April 28, 2006) and trained on in the following month. Since the proposed policy directive has not been shared with the Court or the plaintiffs, it is impossible to know whether it will correctly describe the eligibility of battered qualified aliens and persons who are PRUCOL. Even assuming it does, the plaintiffs are also requesting that the Court order the City to correct other policy directives that omit reference to the eligibility of the I-130 group of immigrants (such as 03-65-ELI, which is Pl. Ex. 507). (Pl. FOF ¶¶ 264-290.) Furthermore, the plaintiffs are requesting an order specifying that the training on the proposed policy directive, as well as the other corrected policy directives, should be of all staff involved in eligibility determinations (as defined in Point III.B.2. supra). Even if these eligibility determinations are not made by frontline workers because the cases are handled by the immigrant liaisons, frontline workers should still be trained on how to correctly identify battered qualified aliens and persons who are PRUCOL so that they can make the appropriate referral.
3. Green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years.
As discussed above, the recent changes made by the City and State do not ensure that lawful permanent residents who have had that status for less than five years are not erroneously denied food stamps. The City should be ordered to issue a policy directive or bulletin and refer all of these cases to the immigrant liaisons, or in the alternative to train all workers involved in eligibility determinations (as defined in Point III.B.2. supra) on how to determine the number of years that an alien has been a qualified alien. The City should also be ordered to train workers on which dates must be entered into POS and WMS.
4. Training on opening cases for alien in WMS.
As discussed above, the City admits that additional training is needed on opening cases for aliens in WMS. (City Mem. 27, 32.) The City claims, however, that it “has no control” over the situation and cannot do anything without the direction of the State. (City Mem. 27.) While the City cannot make changes to WMS, it does have control over the training provided on WMS. Whether or not the State is ordered to provide instructional material, the City should be ordered to conduct training of all staff who are involved in opening cases for aliens directly in WMS.
5. Issuance of notices.
The City fails to provide written notice of the denial of public benefits (a) when an immigrant household initially applies for public benefits and the case is accepted for the citizen children and denied for the immigrant family members; and (b) when a request to add immigrant household members to the existing public benefits case of an immigrant child is denied. (Pl. Mem. 14-16; Pl. FOF ¶¶ 365-379.) The recent changes to the CNS and POS notice systems (City Mem. 32-33) do little to ad-
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dress the former situation and nothing to address the latter situation.
The change to the CNS notice system so that it issues notices when cases are denied does not address either of these situations because a CNS notice is not issued when one family member is accepted or has an open case and another family member is denied. (Tr. 1294:2-5.)
The POS modification may result in the more frequent issuance of notice when a citizen child is accepted and an immigrant family member is initially denied. Effective March 20, 2006, notices generated by POS will list the names of the persons denied benefits and the names of the persons accepted for benefits. (Post-Hr'g Supp. Decl. of Michele Shepard (Shepard Supp. Decl.) Ex. D at 6.) POS, however, will not generate notices for multi-suffix cases (Shepard Supp. Decl. ¶ 6) and it does not appear that POS will generate notices when individuals ask to be added to an open case. Furthermore, even when POS does generate a notice, in some cases workers will still need to enter the denial reason themselves. (Shepard Supp. Decl. Ex. D at 6.)
Because notices still often are not completely computer generated, the City should be ordered to issue a policy directive and conduct training on the necessity of providing notices when individuals ask to be added to an existing case, and the need to complete and issue notices listing the individuals accepted, those denied public benefits, and the reason for the denial, whenever one or more members of a household is accepted and one or more is denied due to immigration status.
6. Cases not handled by liaisons.
The City still has not clarified whether the immigrant liaisons will handle any eligibility determinations outside the context of initial applications. (Pl. Mem. 45; Pl. FOF ¶ 412; Tr. 1232:15-1233:22.) As discussed in more detail previously (Pl. Mem. 45), the plaintiffs are therefore requesting that if the City does not refer to the immigrant liaisons all issues regarding immigrant eligibility or Social Security or Alien numbers, that all staff who handle any eligibility determinations (as defined in Point III.B.2. supra) for proposed class members be provided with the same training that the immigrant liaisons receive.
7. POS revisions.
The changes to POS described by Michele Shepard in her supplemental declaration appear adequately to address the primary concerns of the plaintiffs. If these changes are implemented by June 5, 2006, as expected by Ms. Shepard (Shepard Supp. Decl. ¶ 5), then the plaintiffs' request no further preliminary relief related to POS. If these changes are not implemented as promised, the plaintiffs reserve the right to request such preliminary relief.[FN10]
FN10. The plaintiffs note that the City has already failed to meet one deadline set by this Court. In its February 16, 2006 order, the Court ordered the City by April 27, 2006, to modify POS to recognize those with I-130 petitions and proof of abuse. The City now without explanation states that it will not make this revision until June 5, 2006. (City Mem. 30 (“The modifications to

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POS directed by the court in its February 16th Order are included in the POS revisions discussed in the Shepard Supp. Decl and will be completed by June 5, 2006.”).)
POINT IV
GALINA RYBALKO'S APPLICATION TO INTERVENE SHOULD BE GRANTED.
The proposed class definition includes lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years but who have been in a qualifying status for at least five years and who were wrongfully denied food stamps. Galina Rybalko's application to intervene as a named plaintiff should be granted, as she is an appropriate representative of class members in that circumstance, her request for intervention was timely, and her claim shares a common question of law and fact with the other plaintiffs. As explained more fully in plaintiffs' post-hearing memorandum of law (Pl. Mem. 46-47), Ms. Rybalko was denied public benefits to which she was legally entitled for the same reasons other plaintiffs were denied: the lack of adequate training and resulting confusion of City defendant employees.
City defendant's contention that Ms. Rybalko should not be permitted to intervene because “there is no case or controversy affecting Ms. Rybalko” is contrary to the case law on this subject. While Ms. Rybalko currently receives food stamps, at the time of her motion to intervene,[FN11] Ms. Rybalko had a justiciable claim. In Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit rejected City defendant's precise argument and held that “each intervenor at the time of her motion to intervene was suffering from a delay beyond the period provided by federal law for the processing of her application for food stamp or ANFC benefits. Thus, at the material time, each plaintiff was suffering injury capable of being redressed by declaratory or injunctive relief.” 987 F.2d at 938.
FN11. On March 24, 2006, this Court deemed plaintiffs' oral application to add Ms. Rybalko as a named plaintiff to be a motion for that relief. (Tr. 1409:6-12.)
The Second Circuit also noted in Robidoux that the “[a]ppellants' claims [we]re inherently transitory since the Department will almost always be able to process a delayed application before a plaintiff can obtain relief through litigation.” Id. So too with the benefits at bar, where it is very likely that every time a potential plaintiff moves to intervene to represent this group, the intervener's personal application will soon after be correctly determined and her individual claim will become “moot.” While beneficial to those individuals, such resolution will never address the rights of the unidentified class members.
No more convincing is City defendant's allegation that because Ms. Rybalko's application has finally been correctly adjudicated, “there is no subclass facing potential damage to be represented” (City Mem. 46). Common sense dictates that Ms. Rybalko is not the only lawful permanent resident in her circumstance. In fact, the defendants' policy statements on the issue are so lacking, that even after Ms. Rybalko's wrongful denial was brought to City defendant's counsel's attention, City defendant's counsel did not comprehend the scheme and as of the close of the hearing, Ms. Ry-
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balko still was not receiving food stamps. Such incomprehension at such senior levels of City defendant demonstrates the need for this group to be represented as part of the class. Ms. Rybalko should be permitted to intervene.
POINT V
THE PROPOSED PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED.
City defendant's post-hearing memorandum of law largely repeats arguments already briefed in full by both parties or recycles issues that have already been disposed of by this Court. Plaintiffs limit their response accordingly, and respectfully refer this Court to the plaintiffs' prior filings. Plaintiffs will address only the few new objections raised in City defendants' opposition papers.
First, City defendant's assertion that Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement is not met because City defendant does not believe that “there are numbers beyond the group Ms. Ganju identified” defies logic and common sense. Obviously Ms. Ganju, a single attorney, did not know every single immigrant class member who has been wrongfully denied public benefits in the whole of the City of New York. As courts are empowered to “make common sense assumptions to support a finding of numerosity,” this Court should use its own common sense to disregard any argument that presumes Ms. Ganju could have represented, or even known, every potential class member. See German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537, 552 (S.D.N.Y.1995), clarified, 896 F.Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Further, as this court noted in McNeill v. New York City Housing Auth., 719 F.Supp. 233, 252 (S.D.N.Y.1989), “[i]t is permissible for the plaintiffs to rely on reasonable inferences drawn from the available facts.” As the available facts demonstrate that Ms. Ganju, one attorney, has identified between 50 and 60 affected individuals, a reasonable inference would be that many more affected individuals exist, and are either represented by other attorneys, or not represented at all. (Tr. 474:16-475:2.)
Next, City defendant's allegation that the class definition is overbroad because it “seek[s] to have future applicants included within the class without any cut off for inclusion” is contrary to the body of Second Circuit case law on class certification. Courts routinely certify classes whose class definitions allow for the inclusion of future applicants. See, e.g., Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 939 (remanding to certify a class comprising at least “all current and future Vermont applicants for assistance from the Food Stamp and ANFC programs”); Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F.Supp. 622, 632-634 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (certifying a class consisting of “[a]ll residents of New York City who have received or will receive AFDC, Food Stamp or Home Relief benefits who have requested, are requesting, or will request a fair hearing in response to an action by the City agency to discontinue, suspend, reduce, or restrict benefits and are entitled to aid continuing”); D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. Civ-03-2489, 2004 WL 633222, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (certifying a class consisting of “[a]ll present and future New York City preschool children with [Individualized Education Programs] who have not or will not timely receive all of the services required by their IEPs”).
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City defendant's allegations regarding the inadequacy of class counsel have already been disposed of by this court in its memorandum order denying defendants' motion for disqualification and merit no further discussion in this brief.
For all of these reasons, and all reasons previously argued, the class should be certified.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should (1) issue a preliminary injunction granting the relief set forth in Point III supra; (2) grant the motion to intervene by Galina Rybalko; and (3) certify a class as defined in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, along with such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2006 WL 1793015 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W. M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York Human Resources Administration, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State Department
of Health, Defendants. No. 05 Civ 10446 (JSR).
May 5, 2006.
City Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Attorney for Defendants, 100 Church Street, New York, N.Y. 10007.Of Counsel: Jane Tobey Momo, Tel: (212) 788-1281, Nyclis No. 05GL00264.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ... 2
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY TO ENJOIN GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THEIR MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION INCLUDING THE ADDITIONAL RELIEF REQUESTED POST HEARING FROM THIS COURT SHOULD BE DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY ... 2
A. The Plaintiffs Must Meet a Heightened Standard In Order to Obtain Mandatory Injunctive Relief Against the City Defendant ... 2
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Prove That They Will Suffer Extreme Or Very Serious Damage If Denied Preliminary Relief ... 6
C. Plaintiffs' Have Not Demonstrated a Clear Or Substantial Likelihood of Success On The Merits ... 8
1. The Plaintiffs And Will Not Be Able To Establish Monell Liability ... 9
D. Injunctive Relief Is Not Warranted If The Defendant Has Initiated Efforts To
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Substantially Comply With Statutory Mandates ... 28 POINT II THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.
RULE 23 ... 34 A. Plaintiffs Have Not Demonstrated That They Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(a)
... 34 A. Plaintiffs Have Not Established that Joinder of all Members is Impracticable
... 36 B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Commonality and Typicality ... 37 C. Plaintiffs Fail to Satisfy the “Adequacy of Representation” Requirement of Rule
23(a)(4) ... 41 D. Plaintiffs' Definition Of The Class Is Overbroad And Encompasses Members Of The
Proposed Class Who are Members of the Class Certified in Reynolds v. Giuliani ... 43 POINT III GALINA RYBALKOV'S APPLICATION TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE DENIED ... 45
CONCLUSION ... 46 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Abdul Wali v. Coughlin,, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985) ... 3, 10, 30 Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 13, 14 Beaudoin v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 343, 408 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1978) ... 23 Bishop, et al., v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preservation and Development, et al., 141 F.R.D. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ... 36 Board of County Comm'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) ... 11 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) ... 11 D.D. v. N.Y.C. Board of Education, 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5189 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004) ... 4 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) ... 43 General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) ... 36 General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) ... 39

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Goodwin, et al. v. Louis LaPolla, et al., 589 F. Supp. 1423 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ... 43 Irene S. Lo Re, et al., v. The Chase Manhattan Corporation, et al., 431 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ... 43 Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) ... 3, 10, 30 Mastrovincenzo v. The City of New York, 435 F.2d 78 ... 2, 3, 10, 29 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ... 11 Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 12 In re: Prudential Securities Incorporated Limited Partnerships Litigation, 163 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ... 39 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y.) ... 46 Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1991) ... 13 Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 36 Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., et al., 103 F.R.D. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 839 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988) ... 40 In re: The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 39 In Re: The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., et al., 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 42 Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't., Inc., 60 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 3 Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 3, 29 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 13 Wright, et al. v. Giuliani, et al., No. 99 Civ. 10091, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8322 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 230 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 2000); ... 44 Statutes 8 U.S.C. §1641 (c) ... 36 42 U.S.C. §1983 ... 10 Fed R. Civ. P. 23 (a) ... 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) ... 42 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 ... 35 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) ... 35
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Federal Practice and Procedure § 1759-61 (2d ed. 1986) ... 45
§ 3-47 (3d Ed. 1992) ... 38
§ 3-84 (3d Ed. 1992) ... 40
§ 3-84 ... 40
Moore's Federal Practice § 23.24 [4] (3d Ed. 1997) ... 39
Moore's Federal Practice § 23.21 [3] (1999) ... 44, 45
§ 1983 ... 12
18 NYCRR §351.2 ... 24
18 NYCRR §369.2 ... 24
18 NYCRR §351.2 ... 24
18 NYCRR §369.2 ... 24
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23 ... 2
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendant Verna Eggleston, as Commissioner of the Human Resources Administration (“HRA”), (the “City Defendant”), submits the within Post Hearing Memorandum of Law in further opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and Class Certification. The Court is also respectfully referred to the accompanying Supplemental Declarations: the Supplemental Declaration of James Whelan, dated May 5, 2006 (“Supp. Whelan Dec.”); the Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard, dated May 5, 2006; (“Supp. Shepard Decl.”); the Supplemental Declaration of Elaine Whitty, dated May 5, 2006 (“Supp. Whitty Decl.”); and the Supplemental Declaration of David Lock, dated May 5, 2006 (“Supp. Lock Dec.”) which address certain developments since the close of the hearing, and are offered to supplement the record.
The record establishes that plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction should be denied as they have not met the heightened standard for a mandatory preliminary injunction. Additionally, the application for class certification should be denied as plaintiffs have not established that they meet the requirements for class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are fully set forth in the testimony of the hearing on the preliminary injunction before this Court on March 14, 2006 - March 24, 2006 and the City defendants' declarations and supplemental declaration filed in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the supplemental declarations of Michele Shepard, James Whelan, Elaine Witty and David Lock which accompany this post hearing Memorandum of Law.

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POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY TO ENJOIN GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THEIR MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION INCLUDING THE ADDITIONAL RELIEF REQUESTED POST HEARING FROM THIS COURT SHOULD BE DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
A. The Plaintiffs Must Meet a Heightened Standard In Order to Obtain Mandatory Injunctive Relief Against the City Defendant
Plaintiffs are seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction against the City defendant but have not established that they have met the extraordinarily high standard for the issuance of such an injunction. See Mastrovincenzo v. The City of New York, 435 F.3d. 78 (2d Cir. 2006). By asking the Court to compel government action by directing the City defendant to perform the tasks that are listed in their post hearing brief and in the complaint, the plaintiffs are seeking mandatory injunctive relief, as defined by the Second Circuit. “A mandatory injunction, in contrast [to a prohibitory injunction] is said to alter the status quo by commanding some positive act ...” A prohibitory injunction seeks to maintain the status quo pending a trial on the merits. Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d 78, 90.
“A district court may enter a prohibitory preliminary injunction staying ‘government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme’ only when the moving party has demonstrated that (1) absent injunctive relief, he will suffer ‘irreparable injury,’ and (2) there is ‘a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his claim’ ” “ ‘[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted as a routine matter.’ J.S.G. Trading Corp. v. Tray Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1990). To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits or (b) ‘sufficiently serious questions' on the merits and a balance of hardships ‘tipping decidedly’ in the movant's favor. Brooks v. Giuliani, 84 F. 3d 1454, 1462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 519 U.S. 992 (1996) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979).
However, a party moving for a mandatory injunction which alters the status quo by commanding some positive act must meet a higher standard. Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-35 (2d Cir. 1995). To obtain a mandatory injunction, the moving party must demonstrate “a greater likelihood of success on the merits,” or that it will suffer extreme or very serious damage if denied preliminary relief. Mastrovincenzo v. The City of New York, 435 F. 3d 78 at 89, citing Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F. 3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); D.D. v. N.Y.C. Board of Education, 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5189, *72-73, (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004). The Court is also respectfully referred to “City Defendant's Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For a Preliminary Injunction And Class Certification,” dated January 25, 2006 (“City Def. Op. Mem.”), at Point I.

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“A heightened “substantial likelihood” standard may also be required when the requested injunction (1) would provide the plaintiff with “all the relief that is sought and (2) could not be undone by a judgment favorable to defendants on the merits at trial. Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 90.” Additionally, injunctive relief is not warranted if the defendant has initiated efforts to substantially comply with statutory mandates, and the Court may consider extrinsic factors and the defendants' activities and efforts in determining that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a clear or substantial likelihood of success. See D.D. v. N.Y.C. Board of Education, 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5189 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004)
All of the preliminary relief sought by the plaintiffs is mandatory in nature. In the original motion for a preliminary injunction they sought the following mandatory relief, in sum: (1) the establishment of a procedure for plaintiffs counsel to contact a liaison to handle erroneous assessments of immigrant eligibility(¶A); (2) a process to address the entry of the correct ACI indicator in POS for all class members who apply for public benefits and maintain immigration documentation submitted by class members (¶B); (3) development of a plan to identify POS problems and a method and timeline to fix them; (4) issuance of certain notices (5) make certain referrals for disability Medicaid determinations; (6) assist class members applying for federal food stamps in applications for social security benefits.[FN1]
FN1. In their complaint Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue “a preliminary injunction as requested in plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause submitted in conjunction with [their] complaint.” Class Action Complaint at p.95 ¶3. This Court refused to sign plaintiffs' proposed Order to Show Cause, and plaintiffs proceeded instead by Notice of Motion.
Plaintiffs' post hearing demand for relief contains additional requests which are explicitly mandatory in nature. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to direct the City to: 1. issue a correct and comprehensive policy directive bulletin regarding the need for Social Security numbers for federal and State public benefits programs for all categories of immigrants affected by this case. 2. correct all policy directives that relate to immigrant eligibility for benefits and that omit reference to the eligibility of the I-130 group of immigrants; 3. issue a policy bulletin on PRUCOL eligibility for benefits and train; 4. include the cases concerning eligibility of green card holders who have had their green cards for less than 5 years to the immigrant liaisons, or in the alternative to conduct trainings regarding the eligibility of immigrants in this category and the number of years of qualified status they have accrued; 5. conduct trainings on how to open cases for aliens directly in WMS, focusing on multi-suffix cases; 6. issue a policy directive or bulletin and conduct training regarding the issuance of a notice of acceptance or denial to mixed immigrant/citizen households where only some household members may be entitled to benefits; 7. refer certain cases to immigrant liaisons or alternatively conduct training; 8. revise POS to add information to POS in the initial menu on immigrant statuses; eliminate a question in POS regarding prima facie notices; revise list of PRUCOL documentation; address the issue of the number of years a green card holder in qual-
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ified status has accrued.
Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum of Law In Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification (“Pl. Post Hearing Mem.”) at pp. 42-46.
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Prove That They Will Suffer Extreme Or Very Serious Damage If Denied Preliminary Relief
Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief beyond that which the City has implemented voluntarily and is continuing to implement. The City has or is in the process of voluntarily providing plaintiffs with essentially all of the relief they have sought. (See the discuss infra at Subparagraph D. As noted in the Court's Memorandum Order dated February 16, 2006, granting “provisional relief necessary to avoid irreparable harm,” the relief granted was “essentially on consent.” Thereafter the City implemented, and is in the process of implementing, additional improvements to its computer system (POS), new policy directives and bulletins clarifying the procedures required to timely and accurately process immigrants' claims for public benefits, training of all personnel involved in making determinations of immigrants' eligibility for benefits, creation of a special immigrant liaison to serve as a specialist in immigrant eligibility issues, and creation of an immigrant eligibility help desk within the HRA Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs (“ORIA”).
Moreover, with respect to those processes and procedures which it could not implement without clarification or instructions from the State, it has sought and continues to seek such “clearances” so that it can implement the improvements to facilitate the delivery of benefits to the putative class.
The evidence at the hearing before this Court does not disclose a single instance in which any HRA employee sought to deny benefits to an eligible applicant. Moreover, the plaintiffs actually complained that many HRA employees used “work arounds” to bypass roadblocks in the State's mainframe computer system “WMS” in order to allow benefits to be delivered. To the extent that these ad hoc measures were required, they do not constitute evidence of deliberate indifference to the rights of immigrant applicants; rather, they demonstrate a positive desire to deliver the benefits.
All of the evidence presented by plaintiffs was anecdotal, and at most, demonstrated that inherently complex alien eligibility rules and regulations were beyond the capacity of individual job center workers. On the other hand, more sophisticated workers, such as Sara Mathew, were able to obtain benefits for clients with the most factually complex cases, and in the face of inherent limitations in WMS. Moreover, although plaintiffs' counsel started working on this “impact litigation” in September, 2004, and solicited clients through advocacy groups, the universe of applicants who actually suffered denial or delay in receipt of benefits is exceedingly small, and each named plaintiff or declarant, as well as subsequent introduced informal intervenors, has received the benefits to which she is entitled.
The actual and proposed allocation of resources by HRA to the concerns raised by counsel is more than adequate to provide relief for eligible immigrants who seek benefits, without further intervention of the Court. Although the City does not con-
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cede that it is required to provide the additional relief sought by plaintiffs in their post hearing memorandum, it is, in fact, doing just that. The evidence at the hearing demonstrates that HRA issues policy directives (“P.D.'s)” and policy bulletins (“P.B.'s”), trains on them, and continues to train as issues come up, does “back to basics” training as refresher courses for all Job Center workers, and trains on updates and improvements to POS and to WMS.
POS is regularly updated across the board and where appropriate special updates are created. When plaintiffs' counsel raised legitimate issue with regard to POS and the policy directives underlying the POS instructions and procedures (only in the context of this litigation although they had been gathering their “evidence” for 14 months), Michele Shepard, POS chief designer, immediately set out to make corrections and updates to enable the Job Center workers to more accurately process immigrants' applications.
The picture of POS that emerged after the hearing was of a City designed “front end” application that delivers information to the State WMS system. For the most part it works well, and is compatible with the archaic State mainframe. There are instances where POS doesn't work or WMS doesn't work (such as multi suffix cases). In that case the workarounds are used to obtain benefits for applicants. These are not uncommon in the arcane world of immigrant eligibility. Those fixes that can be implemented are and will be implemented.
It should be noted that the parade of horribles that were presented to the Court were for the most part contained in declarations of plaintiffs' attorneys and their employees and that no true “emergency” existed which required such submissions after 14 months of preparation.. (Moreover, these attorney declarations which attest to the so called “facts” should be stricken from the record as improper advocate/witness testimony.) It is clear from the testimony that plaintiffs' counsels' interaction with HRA employees was designed more to “set up” this action than to obtain benefits for their clients. The evidence at the hearing, however, showed overall success on the part of HRA in delivering services to immigrants, as demonstrated by the small universe of aggrieved parties.
C. Plaintiffs' Have Not Demonstrated a Clear Or Substantial Likelihood of Success On The Merits
Plaintiffs' have not met their burden to show a heightened substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing established that the City does not have a custom, policy or practice in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights as demonstrated in below and previously argued in the City Def. Op. Mem. filed in advance of the hearing. Additionally, plaintiffs do not have a clearly enforceable right to enforce the Food Stamp Act and regulations and Medicaid Act and regulations upon which they rely. The Court is respectfully referred to the discussion in the City Def. Op. Mem. in addition to the testimony discussed herein.
1. The Plaintiffs And Will Not be Able to Establish Monell Liability

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Plaintiffs' have not met their burden to show a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits, or that they will suffer extreme or very serious damage if denied preliminary relief. Matrovicenzo v. City of New York, 435 F. 3d 78; Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).' ” D.D. v. N.Y.C. Board of Education, 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5189, *72-73, (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004).
Plaintiffs have not established liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 by demonstrating that the City has a custom policy or practice which has caused plaintiffs' alleged injuries and that City defendant is deliberately indifferent to the constitutional or statutory rights of the putative plaintiff class. Instead, the record establishes that the City defendant: • has issued and implemented policies and procedures including alien eligibility requirements for public benefits, consistent with the policy of the State defendants and with their approval; • has an established policy and practice of regularly training its FIA Job Center workers each month on its policies and procedures which include alien eligibility requirements for public benefits; • has developed and implemented a computerized software system (the “Paperless Office System” or POS) which is regularly utilized in the Job Centers as a front end application to the State WMS computer system, and which represents a significant improvement in processing applications; • has established an Office of Immigrant Affairs which regularly provides information, guidance and training to FIA staff on issues concerning immigrant eligibility for public benefits and acts as an internal advocate in individual cases concerning immigrant eligibility for public benefits; • has a variety of resources which are made available and are utilized by its FIA staff in dealing with questions including questions regarding alien eligibility for public benefits.
“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents” under a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) “[I]nstead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.. Plaintiffs must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused their injuries,” Board of County Comm'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); “It is only when the ‘execution of the government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under §1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
A claim of “policy” involves a “deprivation[] resulting from the decisions of [the municipality's] duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality,” whereas a “ ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Brown, 520 U.S.at 403-404 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
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690-691, 694). A § 1983 plaintiff must not merely “identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality”; the plaintiff “must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. Moreover, suing a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of suing the government entity itself, so that the City defendant, Commissioner Verna Eggleston, may not be held liable in her official capacity without proof of an official policy or custom, as in Monell. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).
There are only “limited circumstances” in which allegations of a failure to train or supervise can be the basis of liability under §1983. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. These “limited circumstances” occur only where the municipality inadequately trains or supervises its employees, this failure to train or supervise is a city policy, and that city policy causes the employees to violate a citizens constitutional or statutory rights. Id. at 389-91; Brown, 520 U.S. 397. Plaintiffs' may prove a city policy or custom, as the Supreme Court has explained in City of Canton, by showing that the municipality's failure to train evidenced a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of plaintiffs as follows: “We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for §1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to the deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. This rule is consistent with our admonition that a municipality can be liable under §1983 only where its policies are the ‘moving force’ [behind] the constitutional violation.” Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under §1983... “Municipal liability under §1983 attaches where -- and only where -a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives” by city policymakers. Only where a failure to train reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality -- a “policy” as defined by our prior cases -- can a city be liable for such a failure under §1983.
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89 (internal citations omitted).
Thus, the City defendant is not automatically liable under §1983 even if it inadequately trained or supervised its employees and those employees violated plaintiffs' statutory or constitutional rights. To establish a “deliberate or conscious choice” or such “deliberate indifference,” plaintiffs must prove that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action. See Brown, 520 U.S. 39. As the Supreme Court explained in City of Canton: To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under §1983. In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a §1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city “could have” done to prevent the unfortunate incident. Thus, permitting cases against cities for their “failure to train” employees to go forward under §1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities....
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City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391-92;
In Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit held that a municipal policy may be inferred from “evidence that the municipality had notice of but repeatedly failed to make any meaningful investigation into charges that police officers had used excessive force in violation of the complainants' civil rights.” In Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) the plaintiff alleged that the police chief failed to supervise officers to prevent use of excessive force, and claimed that a failure to train officers in not using excessive force in making arrest constituted deliberate indifference within the meaning of City of Canton and Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs' while relying upon the three pronged test in Walker for demonstrating deliberate indifference in the context of a failure to train claim, don't discuss or even mention the Second Circuit's later decision in Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113. In Amnesty Am. the Second Court required a plaintiff to prove that “a policymaking official had notice of a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct, such that the need for corrective action or supervision was ‘obvious,’ ” and that “the policymaker's failure to investigate or rectify the situation evidences deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence or bureaucratic inaction.” The Court held that in establishing deliberate indifference in the context of a failure to train claim, plaintiff's failure to offer any evidence as to the purported inadequacies of the Town's training program and the causal relationship between those inadequacies and the alleged constitutional violation was a basis for affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment. The Court stated: City of Canton requires that plaintiffs establish not only that the officials' purported failure to train occurred under circumstances that could constitute deliberate indifference, but also that plaintiffs identify a specific deficiency in the city's training program and establish that that deficiency is ‘closely related to the ultimate injury, ‘such that it ‘actually caused’ the constitutional deprivation. [citation omitted]... Thus the Supreme Court emphasized in City of Canton that plaintiffs must establish that ‘the officer's shortcomings resulted from ... a faulty training program’ rather than from the negligent administration of a sound program or other unrelated circumstances.''
Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 129 - 130. The Court noted that its holding in Walker v. City of New York is not to the contrary, given that Walker case was dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage.. Id. at 130, n.10. Plaintiffs, here offer no evidence of a faulty training program on the part of the City defendant, and the evidence as to the City's training establishes the contrary proposition.
(a) Notice
There is not a shred of evidence that the plaintiffs' provided Commissioner Eggleston, herself, with notice of a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct, such that the need for corrective action or supervision was ‘obvious,’ ” and that “the policymaker's failure to investigate or rectify the situation evidences deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence or bureaucratic inaction.”

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Plaintiffs' base their argument on notice on the testimony regarding Reena Ganju's opinion that such notice was necessary. Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Ganju, an advocate attorney, placed the City defendant on notice of “the need for additional training regarding immigrant eligibility issues” because Ms Ganju, expressed her personal opinion and belief that additional training of so-called ADVENT workers was necessary on issues of immigrant eligibility for benefits in a letter to HRA's Deputy Commissioner for Domestic Violence Emergency Services, Cecile Noel which she also copied to Elaine Witty, the Director of HRA's Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs (“ORIA”). See Pl. Post Hearing Op. Mem. at p. 29.. However, the Court recognized during the hearing that such testimony is irrelevant (in the context of plaintiffs trying to elicit that senior staff at HRA would have been on notice of the need for additional training). During plaintiffs' counsel questioning of the City's Deputy Commissioner of the Family Independence Administration Office of Policy Procedures and Training, James Whelan, the Court noted that such notice would only be “that a particular advocacy group was taking a particular position.” (Tr. 1223 - 1225:19.) Further, even if Ms. Noel and Ms. Witty received such a letter from Ms. Ganju, according to Mr. Whelan's testimony, Ms. Noel does not deal with FIA job center applicants for eligibility but is “over domestic violence” advent workers who are not part of FIA and who report to Cecile Noel and are trained by her staff. (Tr. 1223:25 - 1224:16.) Ms. Witty also testified that her office does not, and is not responsible for making eligibility determinations.
(b) Deliberate Indifference
The evidence does not show that the City defendant is deliberately indifferent to any rights of the plaintiffs by failing to train or that its policies are the “moving force” [behind] any alleged constitutional or statutory violation. Instead, the evidence establishes that the City has an ongoing training program which includes training on immigrant eligibility issues in new hire training, on the job training, monthly training, and specialized training. Further, the City has issued policy directives (“PD”) and policy bulletins (“PB”) in accordance with and pursuant to the policies and procedures of the State defendants and has provided training on each of these.
The testimony of the Deputy Commissioner of the Family Independence Administration (“FIA”) Office of Policies and Procedures, James Whelan, established that the City has a custom, policy and practice of regular and ongoing training of its Job Center workers and supervisors and other staff (including its immigrant eligibility specialists) on various topics which include immigrant eligibility benefits and the issues raised in this litigation. Mr. Whelan also testified to the process that FIA utilizes to issue policies and procedures in accordance with and based upon the policies and procedures set forth by the New York State defendants in their Informational, GIS document or an ADM.
The FIA Office of Policy and Procedures consists of several divisions - the Office of Procedures, the Office of Training, the Office of Policy and Research and the Office of Logistical Support that report to Deputy Commissioner Whelan. (Tr. 1185: 18 - 24.)

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Policies and procedures are developed by the New York State defendants and issued to the City defendant in the form of a State Informational (“INF”), ADM and/or GIS document. After an ADM, INF or GIS is issued, the FIA Office of Procedures will develop a policy bulletin (“PB”) or policy directive (PD) based on the State document which will nearly mirror the State INF, ADM or GIS. For example, when the State defendant OTDA issued its alien eligibility desk guide, in the past, the City issued its equivalent of the state desk guide. Similarly when the State OTDA issued its INF on battered aliens' eligibility for benefits, in March 2006, and the State alien eligibility desk guide (State defs. Exhs. WW and XX) Mr. Whelan testified that in response his office would issue a policy directive incorporating the information contained in the informational letter. Based on the alien eligibility desk guide, the City would issue its alien eligibility desk aid and when the procedure is completed train all job center staff on the completed policy directive. (Tr. 11:22 - 12:13; 12:23 - 13:13.)
Policy directives are comprehensive documents that could cover a variety of policy matters relating usually to one issue. A policy bulletin is generally a shorter document than a policy directive and less comprehensive. The Office of Training is responsible for developing curricula for training around each PD or PB and conducting the training. (Tr. 1188:6 - 20; Tr. 1192:16 - 22;)
James Whelan testified to a system whereby over 4,000 workers were trained each month. Trainers from a centralized training unit train center based trainers, who are stationed in job centers. Center based trainers then train all job center workers, each month. (Tr. 1194:6 - 1195:18; 1204:3-10; 1247: 2 - 1248:7; City Def. Exh. HHHH at C15784 - C15787.) Sara Mathews, Administrative Assistant to the Director of the Bay Ridge Job Center (a center which services a large immigrant population) testified regarding the extensive training which is given each month to Job Center personnel who are required to attend, and the resources available to job center workers. (Tr. 3/24/06 1306:13 - 23; 1308:5 - 1311:7.)
Every month in a job center in addition to training on the new policy bulletins and policy directives a topic is selected which will be reinforced with staff through training known as “Back to Basics.” (Tr. 1279:19 - 24.) The topics for back to basics training are determined in a variety of ways. As James Whelan testified:
Q. How are those topics chosen?
A. In a variety of ways. They could be something that either a Pert audit, or FIA office of operations have determined this is something they would like to see retrained or that they think there is a weakness or staff needs a refresher. There is no formal path or something to be chosen as back to basic. It could be a request met by FIA operations or requests from another part of FIA or could be based on Pert audit or something Trainings has decided it would be good to retrain staff on.
(Tr. 1279:25 - 1280:9.)
In addition to the monthly training and back to basics training for FIA staff, HRA conducts new hires training. (Tr. 1279:14 - 18.) Outside of the training sessions
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there are a number of additional resources which FIA staff members utilize in order to have their questions answered. Such resources include the FIA call center, the HRA intranet (where policy bulletins, policy directives, FIA forms, state forms, policy manuals are all posted on the web) and a message board which is accessed primarily by trainers for clarification of policy. (Tr. 1280:10 - 1281:4; 1282:11 15; Tr. 3/24/06 1308:5 - 1311:7; City Def. Exhs. HHHH; NNN; AAAA.)
Training has been conducted on a number of specific issues related to this litigation both as part of the monthly training, back to basics, new hires training and specialty trainings. Such trainings include alien eligibility for public benefits, PRUCOL, Social Security Numbers for Aliens, the New York State Welfare Management System (“WMS”), the City's Paperless Office System (“POS”), FIA's informational resources for Job Center staff including the FIA Intranet, message board, and call center, notice to clients, and lost or expired documentation.
Alien eligibility trainings have been conducted at various times in the past particularly after changes in legislation regarding immigrants' eligibility (or ineligibility) for food stamps. (Tr. 1220:6 - 1221:17.) The City has also issued policy directives and trained its FIA workers on food stamp eligibility for aliens, in accordance with and pursuant to State defendant OTDA's policy and procedures. (Tr. 1278:6 - 1279: 13; City Def. Exhs. QQQ, YYY, RRR and ZZZ.) Staff has been trained and retrained on these and other issues. (Tr. 1223:17.)
According to James Whelan, additional training on PRUCOL's is planned and will be conducted after the implementation of the changes in POS that were the subject of Michele Shepard's testimony during the hearing. (Tr. 1234 15-20.)
As of the date of James Whelan's testimony a revised policy directive on Social Security numbers was in process and retraining on Social Security numbers for immigrants was planned for all of the 4000 workers at FIA job centers. (Tr. 1246:16-1247:4.) Since the conclusion of the hearing, a revised policy directive on social security was issued and training. will be conducted in accordance with the HRA's policy to train on all PD's. (See Supp. Whelan Decl.). Workers have been trained on the Social Security Administration's requirements for Social Security numbers or the necessity or not of a Social Security number for benefits, in accordance with State defendants' policies and procedures as they have evolved. (Tr. 1245:21 - 1246:10; 1273:2 - 12; 1273:16 - 1276:21; 1277:18 - 1278:5; City Def. Exhs. BBBB; CCCC; NNN; DDDD.)
The WMS software has been the subject of policy directives and is trained periodically and in particular as it relates to Food Stamp eligibility and Public Assistance. (Tr. 1281:5 - 6.; City Def. Exhs. GGGG, IIII..) The City also provides training on turn-around documents (“TAD”). (City Def. Exh. FFFF.)
Disability Medicaid determinations were recently addressed in Policy Bulletin #06-33-ELI dated March 8, 2006 in order to provide Job Center staff with information regarding the circumstances under which a Disability Medicaid review is to be performed. (City Def. Exh. MMMM..

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Policy Directive 03-66-ELI revision to lost and expired documentation was issued by FIA based upon State OTDA defendant's Informational Letter 03 INF 19, and also trained to FIA staff. (Tr. 1784:17-20; 1285:1-9; City Def. Exhs. VVV; WWW.) James Whelan described the relationship between a policy directive such as City Def. Exh. VVV and the State Informational upon which the particular policy directive is based, such as 03-Inf-19 (City Def. Exh. WWW) as one in which the FIA policy directive tracks and mirrors the State informational. (Tr. 1286: 15 - 18.)
The record of the hearing is replete with testimony of the extensive policies and procedures issued in regard to every issue in this litigation. Additionally, the record establishes the custom, policy and practice of HRA to engage in regular, monthly training of all its FIA staff, and to provide training to new hires, training on special topics, and back to basics training as well. Additionally, Deputy Commissioner Whelan has described efforts at quality control, and review and a system whereby topics that require further attention are discussed among staff, brought to the attention of HRA's Office of Policy and Procedures and are the subject of further training and retraining.
The largely anecdotal evidence that the plaintiffs' have presented of their perceptions that workers did not understand immigrant eligibility rules, oftentimes based upon observations reported to an individual who testified (such as Reena Ganju) does not negate or undercut in any way the extensive policy and procedures of the City defendant and its extensive training of FIA workers.
Plaintiffs' hearsay accounts are belied by the testimony of Sarah Mathews, a supervisor at a busy Brooklyn Job Center with a large immigrant clientele. Ms. Mathews is knowledgeable of the alien eligibility requirements for benefits and has been trained repeatedly on them. She also has been appointed one of the Immigrant Liaisons and is one of the so-called Job Center immigrant eligibility experts who will handle certain immigrant cases and will be a resource for other job center personnel in handling their cases. (Tr. 3/24/06 1311:19- 24.) Significantly, Ms. Mathews had a number of contacts with plaintiffs' counsel prior to the inception of the lawsuit, and in connection with their immigrant clients. (Tr. 3/14/06 1306:13 - 1307:6.) It is significant to note that after plaintiffs took Ms. Mathew's deposition but they did not call her as a witness for the hearing. And after listening to her testimony, we conclude that plaintiffs selectively presented workers testimony.
They called Mr. Sosa, who does not handle initial applications for immigrant eligibility at FIA. Rather, he is an ADVENT worker who does recertifications for individuals whose eligibility had previously been determined Similarly, Ms. Pierre, is involved with supervising a control unit that does data entry, and is not a supervisor of front line job center workers who are responsible for taking immigrant applications for benefits. The testimony from the plaintiffs as to particular job center workers not understanding the rules for immigrant eligibility are just observations reported by individual litigants who are themselves not trained in any way on the requirements and are based largely in part on what they have been told by their counsel. Also, the testimony of plaintiffs that to the extent it suggested that an applicant was not being handled correctly, is meaningless in the absence of a clear

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statement of the documentation that was actually provided to the job center at the time of the initial application (both at the initial meeting and subsequent requests made of the applicant for original documentation (such as an I-130 receipt or I-360 prima facie notice or notice of approval) over the 45 days period during which the documentation is submitted and reviewed and the determination of eligibility for benefits is made. Additionally, as we know from the testimony of the POS director, Michele Shepard, given the specific menus in POS, isolated comments of individual workers as to a clients potential eligibility are meaningless to the suggested determinations made in POS and finally made in the State WMS computer system. A worker's comments have no effect on the information that is entered into POS through the applicant's responses to the specific questions set forth in the POS modules. (Tr. 805:13-19.)
Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under §1983... “Municipal liability under §1983 attaches where -- and only where -a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives” by city policymakers. Only where a failure to train reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality and such conduct is the moving force behind the statutory or constitutional violation sought to be enforced under Section 1983, and the record establishes defects in the training may this court find Monell liability. This record establishes that the plaintiffs' have not proven deliberate indifference on the part of the City defendant and do not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Monell claims. Plaintiffs have not proven that they have a clear and substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their failure to train claims, and a preliminary injunction should not be issued applying the rigorous standard for issuance of a mandatory injunction.
(c) The City Defendant, as the Agent of the State Is Not The Moving Force Behind The Injury, if any to Plaintiffs or the Purported Plaintiff Class
As the plaintiffs state “[a]s a matter of law and fact, HRA serves as the agent of State OTDA with regard to the food stamp and public assistance programs, and the agent of State DOH with regard to the Medicaid program.” Pl. Post Hearing Mem. pp. 30 - 31. Plaintiffs have argued to the Court that “Inasmuch as the local commissioners are agents of the State department they may not substitute their interpretations of the regulations of the State department for those of the State department or the State commissioner” citing the New York State Court of Appeals language in Beaudoin v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 343, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (1978). Pl. Post Hearing Mem. at 31. Moreover, the testimony of the State witness, Paul Dichian, which plaintiffs quote to the Court, more than established that as to the entitlement to public benefits HRA was not free to implement or establish policy:
Q. [D]oes HRA have the authority to issue policy directives and bulletins without the approval of OTDA?
A. No.

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Q. And if OTDA sets the parameters for inclusion within a specific class of persons entitled to benefits, does HRA have the authority to expand that category?
A. No.
(Tr. 728:7-13.)
To the extent that the injuries, if any, are caused by the State defendant's own policies and procedures, the City defendant may not be held liable for the implementation or interpretation of policies of the State which, by law, the City defendant must implement.. Accordingly, the City is bound to follow the requirements set forth by the State for administering public benefits to the plaintiffs and the purported plaintiff class and implement the policies of the State in accordance with the State defendants' own mandates to the City and the State defendants' interpretations of applicable law. The City defendant is not the moving force behind the injuries, if any to plaintiffs or the purported class, which have been caused by the State defendants' own policies and practices in the following areas, discussed below, over which the City has no control.
(i) Social Security Number Requirements for Aliens
Allegations that the State defendants policies and practices with regard to the requirements for Social Security numbers in connection with an application by an alien for public benefits do not comport with federal and/or state law are simply beyond the control of the City defendant who may not change these policies or implement different ones unilaterally. There is no question that the state regulations governing the requirements for social security numbers for immigrants are contradictory and appear irreconcilable. Paul Dichian testified as to the contradiction found in two state regulations: 18 NYCRR §351.2 and 18 NYCRR §369.2. The State defendants have not issued an updated INF, ADM, or GIS to address the issues concerning the requirements for a Social Security Number for aliens who are seeking public benefits. While Mr. Dichian testified that he had sent an e-mail and thereby informally communicated to FIA's Ivelia Cisco, a statement that an alien who would not be entitled to a Social Security Number through no fault of her own (based on her immigrant status) should not be denied public benefits, the regulations of the State OTDA belie Mr. Dichian's informal conclusion and expose the City defendant to potential liability for payment of benefits in contravention of the state regulations. (City Def. Exh. W; 18 NYCRR §351.2 and 18 NYCRR §369.2.) In fact, in the instance of M.E., the state defendant directed that the benefits to M.E. be terminated because she did not obtain a social security number. While the cross-examination of M.E. showed that she did not cooperate with the City's repeated requests for her to apply for a social security number and provide evidence that she had applied for one, the City did not require M.E. to obtain a social security number in order to begin the issuance of benefits to her. (City def. Exhs. E, F, G, I, K.)
After the hearing, the FIA developed the following Policy Directives which address the need for Social Security Numbers:
Policy Directive (“PD”) #06-09, Social Security Numbers for Non-Citizens, dated ex-
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plains that “Furnishing a Social Security number (SSN) is a condition of eligibility for public assistance (PA), food stamps (FS) and medical assistance (MA). (PD#06-09 is annexed to the Supp. Whelan Decl. as Exhibit A.) Each member of a household who is applying for any of these programs must furnish, or apply for, an SSN.” This PD indicates that “when a lawfully admitted non-citizen applies for PA/NPA/FS but does not have an SSN, it must be determined whether or not the applicant is otherwise eligible before addressing the SSN issue.” The PD goes on further to give specific instructions on how to direct otherwise eligible applicants to apply for an SSN. See Supp. Whelan Decl. at Exh. A at pp. 1-2. The PD also indicates that “if the noncitizen is denied an SSN for this reason (non-citizen is without lawful immigration status or work authorization), do not request that s/he apply again until s/he has obtained lawful immigration status and or/or work authorization. Id at p. 4
Importance of Accurate Social Security Numbers in the Welfare Management System (WMS) was addressed in P.D. #06-10. (P.D. #06-10 is annexed to the Supp. Whelan Decl. as Exhibit B.) The P.D. states that “[a]s a condition of eligibility for public assistance (PA) and food stamps (FS) benefits, the applicant/participant and all members of the PA and/or FS household must have a valid SSN or show proof of having applied for one.” See Supp. Whelan Decl. Exh. B, p.1. This extensive P.D. addresses the required actions by Job/Model Centers/Non-Public Assistance Food Stamp Offices and their staff towards ensuring that all SSN discrepancies are appropriately addressed. In cases of non-citizens coded “B” (Certain Battered Aliens) and “O” (PRUCOL) where the SSN indicator is 3(Closed, Denied, or Suspended), staff is directed to review the case to determine the circumstances of denial. The P.D. further explains the necessary actions for the varying reasons for a denial. See Supp. Whelan Dec. at Exh. B, p. 6.
P.D. #06-09 is accompanied by Policy Bulletin (P.B.) #06-63, Denial of Social Security Numbers for Non-Citizens. P.B. #06-63 is annexed to the Supp. Whelan Decl. as Exhibit C. This P.B. provides staff with a clearance regarding applications for Social Security Numbers for non-citizens who have been deemed eligible for public assistance (PA) and/or food stamps (FS). The P.B. specifically addresses the many ways a non-citizen could be a qualified alien under the “B” and “O” categories. It further explains that the only responsibility for applicants in this category is to apply for an SSN. See Whelan Supp. Decl. Exh. C, p. 2.
(ii) PRUCOL Status
The Office of Procedures developed the proposed P.D., Project #1576, entitled Determining Qualified Alien Status for Battered/Abused Non-citizens and PRUCOL Eligibility. Project #1576 provides for guidance for those instances in which a noncitizen who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent, who is either a U.S. citizen or a Lawfully Permanent Resident (LPR may be considered a “qualified alien” for purposes of receiving public benefits. Noncitizens, who do not meet the “qualified alien” criteria may be eligible for public benefits if they are permanently residing under the color of law (PRUCOL). While plaintiffs have raised on numerous occasions the differing definitions by the State defendants on who is a PRUCOL as a basis for their claims that individual purported class members were not

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properly classified as PRUCOL, the City defendant does not define who is or is not a PRUCOL and may not alter or conform the State defendant's differing PRUCOL definitions. Project #1576 is currently awaiting state approval.
(iii) Multi Suffix cases, Alien Registration Numbers
On February 28, 2006 The Office of Procedures published P.B. #06-31, Battered Immigrants and Immigrants who are Permanently Residing in the U.S. under Color of Law (PRUCOL). P.B. # 06-31 is annexed to the Supp. Whelan Decl. as Exh. E. This P.B. was released in an effort to “provide the Job Center staff with information regarding a new initiative to better serve immigrant applicants applying for Public Assistance (PA), Medicaid (MA) and/or Food Stamps (FS).” This P.B. describes the role of the immigrant liaison and when staff members should seek their help. It also notified staff of the deletion in WMS of the requirement to enter an alien registration number.
The testimony clearly delineated the State WMS computer system from the City defendant's POS system. The City defendant has no control over the State WMS system, unlike the control that it may exercise over its own POS system. The City was powerless to delete the requirement for an alien registration number from WMS. However, according to P.B. #06-31, the FIA staff was alerted that “effective April 1, 2006, the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance will remove from the Welfare Management System (WMS) the requirement for entering an Alien Registration Number in Element 381 of the Turn-Around Document (TAD) for children of applicants/participants with Alien/Citizenship Indicator (ACI) “B.”
Much of the testimony of Rochelle Eisenstein centered on flaws in the State's WMS system whereby cases would “error out” or not pass edits in the State's computer system thereby delaying or in some instances preventing the opening of plaintiffs' cases or their addition to ongoing cases. The evidence showed that although some instructions were contained in the State's authorization of grants manual there were no explicit instructions on how to open a case in which there was a mixed household (one person entitled to benefits as an immigrant and the other entitled to different benefits as a citizen). Such cases proved unwieldy at best and could not be opened in the POS system. Additionally, when asked how to open such a case, the instructions from Rochelle Eisenstein differed from the instructions to which Michele Shepard testified. The record however, is clear that it is difficult to open such a case and that unless and until the State defendant issues clear instructions, the task for opening such a case will continue to pose challenges to job center workers. This is an issue over which the City defendant has no control as it is not the City's system that is at fault. (See, e.g. Tr. 3/24/06 7:3 - 15.). However, it should be noted that multi suffix cases are not limited to immigrant applicants only, and the total number of such cases in the system is approximately 1100.
Even if opening multi-suffix cases is challenging, Sara Mathews testified: that as she has become familiar with multi-suffix cases through training and through seeing more of those types of cases, she will be able to resolve them quickly and would be able to do so in her capacity as an immigrant specialist. (Tr. 3/24/06 1318:21 -

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1319:5.)
(iv) Disability Medicaid Determinations
Disability Medicaid determinations were recently addressed in Policy Bulletin #06-33-ELI dated March 8, 2006 in order to provide Job Center staff with information regarding the circumstances under which a Medicaid disability review is to be performed. (City Def. Exh. MMMM.) The City defendant is here implementing existing State policy. Plaintiffs' however are urging the Court to change the policy of the State in regard to when a disability Medicaid referral will be made. The City defendant may not alter or change the State's policy and P.B. #06-33-ELI is based upon the State's existing policy in regard to Disability Related Medicaid determinations.
D. Injunctive Relief Is Not Warranted If The Defendant Has Initiated Efforts To Substantially Comply With Statutory Mandates
“A heightened “substantial likelihood” standard may also be required when the requested injunction (1) would provide the plaintiff with “all the relief that is sought and (2) could not be undone by a judgment favorable to defendants on the merits at trial. Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 90.” Injunctive relief is not warranted if the defendant has initiated efforts to substantially comply with statutory mandates, and the Court may consider extrinsic factors and the defendants' activities and efforts in determining that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a clear or substantial likelihood of success. See D.D. v. N.Y.C. Board of Education, 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5189 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004). As discussed below, given the substantial efforts and measures which the City Defendants have in place, or are in the process of implementing, plaintiffs' cannot demonstrate that they meet the heightened standard for clear and substantial likelihood of success.
Moreover, given the measures that have been implemented and that are in process, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer extreme or very serious damage if denied preliminary relief. As discussed below: (1) the City voluntarily has undertaken measures prior to the preliminary hearing; (2) the City has complied with its obligations as further directed in a Memorandum Order of this Court, dated February 16, 2006, (3) the City has voluntarily undertaken and has implemented or is in the process of implementing measures that are fully responsive to the requests plaintiffs now make for additional preliminary relief. Accordingly, plaintiffs will not suffer extreme or very serious damage if denied preliminary relief. Mastrovincenzo v. The City of New York, 435 F. 2d 78 at 89, citing Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F. 3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995.) In the absence of such a showing, they have not met their burden for the issuance of mandatory injunctive relief. Id.; Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
The City defendants have voluntarily undertaken a number of measures since the inception of this litigation which would obviate the need, if any, for preliminary injunctive relief. As set forth in the Declaration of Seth Diamond, dated January 24, 2006, filed prior to the hearing in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification, HRA voluntarily undertook to:
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• Establish immigrant liaisons at each job center; • To upgrade POS; • To communicate with the State Defendants to clarify the City's authority to make eligibility determinations for disability related Medicaid where necessary to establish eligibility for Food Stamps; • To issue a revised procedure on battered aliens and PRUCOLS and to conduct additional training on these two categories.
HRA has established immigrant liaisons at each job center and has conducted training for them. As set forth in the testimony of Michele Shepard at the hearing and in the Supp. Shepard Decl. substantial changes to POS are in process and will be completed by June 5, 2006. HRA, based on a communication with State defendants regarding disability related Medicaid has issued P.D. #06-33-ELI dated March 8, 2006 (City Def. Exh. MMMM.) consistent with that authority. As discussed above, and in the Supp. Whelan Decl., the Office of Procedures developed the proposed P.D., Project #1576, entitled Determining Qualified Alien Status for Battered/Abused Non-citizens and PRUCOL Eligibility, for which it is awaiting State defendant OTDA's approval. Once approved, and the P.D. then issued, it will be trained to all FIA Job Center staff.
By Memorandum Order of this Court, dated February 16, 2006, the City was ordered additionally to publish a revised Policy Bulletin on Disability Medicaid by March 8, 2006. The City complied fully in its issuance of PD #06-33-ELI dated March 8, 2006 (City Def. Exh. MMMM.) The modifications to POS directed by the Court in its Feb. 16th Order are included in the POS revisions discussed in the Supp. Shepard Decl and will be completed by June 5, 2006. Following the issuance of the POS revisions, the City defendant will conduct training on the revisions.
On February 28, 2006 the City defendant published P.B.#06-31, which not only describes the role of the new immigrant liaison and when staff should seek their help, but also informs staff of a change in the WMS requirement to enter alien registration numbers for certain immigrants. (City def. Exh. LLL; Supp. Whelan Decl.)
As discussed above, and in the Supp. Whelan Decl., the Office of Procedures developed the proposed P.D., Project #1576, entitled Determining Qualified Alien Status for Battered/Abused Non-citizens and PRUCOL Eligibility, for which it is awaiting State defendant OTDA's approval. Once approved, and the P.D. then issued, it will be trained to all FIA Job Center staff.
In response to item number 6 of the Court's February 16th Order, the City defendants have established an informal relief system in that HRA counsel has designated an Assistant Agency Counsel as an individual who may be contacted on behalf of plaintiffs or members of the proposed class whose eligibility has been erroneously assessed. The City defendant is in full compliance with the Court's February 16th Order.
In response to the Court's direction to the plaintiffs to identify what, if any additional relief they would like having heard the testimony of the City's witnesses including James Whelan and Michele Shepard as well as the other City witnesses, plaintiffs identified a limited list of additional items (see Pl. Post Hearing Mem. at pp. 42 - 46), most of which have been completed or are in process of being com-
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pleted as follows:
1. Social Security number requirements: Specifically, the City has issued the policy directives as to Social security which are described above and in the Supp. Whelan Decl. and in accordance with its ongoing training of FIA staff has provided training on these P.D.'s.
2. Eligibility for benefits of battered qualified immigrants and PRUCOL immigrants: The battered alien and PRUCOL P.D. has already been submitted to the State defendant and is awaiting approval by OTDA. (Supp. Whelan Decl..) Once approved, it will be trained consistent with the process for FIA training which was described to the Court by James Whelan in his testimony.
3. Green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years: The issue concerning Galina Rybalkov (a proposed intervenor) has been resolved through correspondence issued by the State defendant OTDA.. By letter dated March 28, 2006, from John. D. DiBari, Associate Attorney for OTDA to Deputy General Counsel for HRA, David Lock, HRA was informed that the issue concerning Galina Ryblakov should be resolved by adding the applicant's time as a parolee to the applicant's time as a legal permanent resident to determine the time in which Ryblakov has been a “qualified” alien. As the Court noted, Ms. Rybalkov “is the only one who fit [the] category” of plaintiffs' proposed class category of “green card holders who have had that status for less than five years.” (Tr. 3/24/06 1231:12 - 22.) However, the March 28th letter to HRA addressed the issue also as a general matter, whereby the State defendant advised that “the date that the applicant first obtains ‘qualified’ status (assuming the applicant continuously remains in a ‘qualified’ status) is the date that must be used for purposes of determining whether an applicant has met the food stamp alien eligibility requirement of five years in ‘qualified’ status. (A copy of the March 28, 2006 correspondence is annexed to the Supp. Lock Decl. as Exhibit A.)
As set forth in the accompanying declaration of Michele Shepard, changes have been made to the WMS system in order to preserve the earlier date of qualified status, workers will be trained on that change and the earlier date of qualified status will continue to be preserved in the POS system. (Supp. Shepard Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 and Exhs. E; F thereto.)
4. Training on opening cases on aliens in WMS: The City defendant requests that the State defendant issue specific direction on opening cases on aliens in WMS. The record supports the request in that the State defendants' authorization of grants manual [INSERT EXHIBIT NO.] admittedly does not contain specific directions on opening multi-suffix cases in WMS for aliens. HRA conducts periodic training on WMS and will include a segment on training on opening cases on aliens in WMS after issuance of the State directions as requested above. In the interim, the immigrant liaisons in each center have been trained and are one of the appropriate resources for questions (in addition to other HRA resources) including the help desk (both HRA and State), job center trainers, ORIA and OPPD and the HRA intranet. (Tr. 3/24/06 1319: 9 - 1319:5); Tr. 3/23/06 1205: 6 - 1207:1; Tr. 3/24/06 1228:16 - 1229:13; Tr. 03/23/06 1132:17 - 23.)

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5. Issuance of Notices: The City has undertaken to reinforce the requirements to issue notice(s) of acceptance and/or denial of benefits and to amend POS to generate such notice. The record establishes that the City has issued and conducted training on P.D. #05-41-SYS, dated November 28, 2005, informing staff that the CNS system has been modified, effective November 21, 2005 so that “CNS will generate notices for case level denials for PA/FS [Public Assistance/Food Stamp] cases when both PA and FS are denied at the same time (the case status must be AP [applying] for both PA and FS) and on PA-only cases when PA is denied. (City Def. Exh. IIII at p. 7, Bates No. C15795; Tr.-3/24/06, 17:21 - 18: 21;.) Additionally, HRA issued and provided training on P.B.06-08-ELI/Registering all members of the mandatory filing unit in WMS, dated January 31, 2006, provided: The purpose of this policy bulletin is to remind all staff that when an applicant applies for Public Assistance (PA), all members of the mandated filing unit must be placed in applying (AP) status for all three programs (PA, Medical Assistance (MA) and Food Stamps (FS)) in the Welfare Management System (WMS). This must be done even in instances where there is a clear indication that one or more members of the applying household (h/h) will not be eligible for any of the programs.
(City Def. Exh. KKK, at Bates No. C15662.) The effect of placing all members in applying status is that POS will now generate case level notices which will list applicants and the disposition of their applications (acceptance/denial) separately. (See Supp. Shepard Decl. at ¶¶ and Exh.[3/20/06 pd INSERT], thereto.)
6. Cases Not Handled by Immigrant Liaisons: The City defendant will provide training to all staff on battered qualified immigrants and PRUCOL immigrants after the State has approved the PD discussed in item 2 above. See item No. 1 above with regard to Social Security and Alien registration numbers noting that the City has provided training on Social Security and Alien Registration No. P.D.'s in accordance with its regularly scheduled training program for all FIA staff. Cases involving fair hearing compliance are handled by the fair hearing group, as described in the testimony of Sara Mathews, who provides supervision on fair hearing complaints and resolves each complaint through follow-up. (Tr. 3/23/06 1307:14 - 1308:4.)
7. POS revisions: The Court is respectfully referred to the changes to POS are described, in detail in the Supp. Sheppard Decl. submitted herewith. In sum, the changes that are requested by the plaintiffs are incorporated in the revisions to POS that Ms. Shepard describes in her supplemental declaration and in her testimony during the hearing.
POINT II
THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. RULE 23
Plaintiffs are seeking class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) and (b)(2) and (b)(3). The City defendant respectfully refers the Court to its discussion at Point II of the “City Defendant's Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification.,” dated January 25, 2006, on file with the Court. In addition, plaintiffs have not demon-
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strated that they meet the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a) and the definition of the class is overbroad.
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Demonstrated That They Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(a)
Fed R. Civ. P. 23 (a) sets forth four prerequisites for class certification. Specifically, the rule provides that: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 (a).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that a class action may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The party seeking certification as a class bears the burden of demonstrating that all of the criteria of Rule 23(a) have been met; in the wake of Falcon, courts have been generally strict in the application of Rule 23(a) criteria. Bishop, et al., v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preservation and Development, et al., 141 F.R.D. 229, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), citing Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F. 2d 590, 597 (2d Cir. 1986).
Plaintiffs define the proposed class as: All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for State or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, and/or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have public benefits discontinued or reduced; (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying for public benefits; and (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application for public benefits by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1641 (c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1641 (c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
Complaint, Request for Relief, ¶ 1, pp. 90-91.
As set forth below, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the proposed class meets all of the requirements of Rule 23 for certification.
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Established that Joinder of all Members is Impracticable

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Under Rule 23(a)(1), “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable ....” The determination of whether plaintiffs' meet their burden to show impracticability of joinder is a practical one which is not based merely on numbers and must be determined in the context of the particular litigation. “By its express language, Rule 23(a)(1) is not a numerosity requirement in isolation. The words of this test, ‘the class is so numerous,’ are immediately followed by the limiting phrase ‘that joinder of all members is impracticable.’ ... The practicability of joinder must be evaluated in light of the circumstances of the particular litigation.” Conte and Newberg, Newberg On Class Actions, §3:3, p. 218 (2002).
Plaintiffs' rely heavily on the testimony of Reena Ganju to attempt to establish numerosity. They argue in their post hearing brief “that she represented 50 to 60 battered immigrant clients” applying to HRA for public benefits during her tenure at Sanctuary for Families which Ms. Ganju testified was “one of the largest immigration projects in the city that provide legal services to indigent battered women.” (Tr. 474:21 - 475:2.) Despite the size of the Sanctuary immigration project, the 50-60 cases included referrals from domestic violence shelters and community based organizations that dealt with domestic violence populations, as well, and thereby represented a segment of the population which went beyond that of the Sanctuary immigration project. (Tr 475:3 - 14.) According to Ms. Ganju's testimony, not all of the 50 or 60 battered immigrants are members of the proposed class. Of the 50 to 60 battered immigrant clients that Ms. Ganju represented, she testified that “[t]here was one section of the population [she] served who had been previously denied [public benefits] or told they were ineligible and deterred from applying.” The other section were people who “may well have fully known how to apply on their own.” (Tr.:475:15 - 476:1.) Of the subset previously denied benefits, Ms. Ganju testified that “[a]l of them with [her] assistance ended up receiving benefits.”
Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence that joinder of the individuals is impracticable, and to the extent that they suggest that there are numbers beyond the group Ms. Ganju identified is simply speculative.[FN2] Certainly all of the individuals identified as being part of the section of 50-60 individuals who may be members of the proposed class are known to the plaintiffs counsel, as are the “24 class members” referenced by counsel in their brief. Moreover, in evaluating whether joinder is impracticable in the circumstances of this litigation, the Court should take note that plaintiffs' counsel solicited clients for this lawsuit beginning in September 2004 and still only came up with the segment that Ms. Ganju referenced in her testimony. Plaintiffs presume, without any evidence that future class members would be similarly situated to the named plaintiffs. This simply is not the case, given the facts of this litigation to date and the steps initiated by the City defendants to ameliorate any alleged problems. Moreover, the resources that currently exist to deal with immigrant eligibility issues appear to be adequate to the needs of this group, as Ms. Ganju testified that all of her individual clients received their benefits.
FN2. Plaintiffs argument that defendants are bound to proffer additional evid-
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ence on numerosity when plaintiffs' have failed to meet their burden to establish numerosity is illogical and would improperly shift the burden from the movant for class certification. Additionally any suggestion that the City defendant considers the matters at issue to be anything more than isolated cases readily capable of resolution within the existing parameters of relief available to individual claimants is simple wishful thinking on the part of plaintiffs' counsel.
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Commonality and Typicality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the class. The commonality prerequisite and the impracticability of joinder requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) are interdependent. 1 Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3-47 (3d Ed. 1992). “Consideration of the common questions issue requires an answer to the question: ‘Common to whom?’ Correspondingly, when one considers the impracticability of joinder, one necessarily perceives this issue with respect to the common questions raised for adjudication.” Id. In other words, the “commonality” requirement “requires that a plaintiff show the existence of an aggrieved class of plaintiffs by showing that there are questions of law and fact common to the class.” Bishop, 141 F.R.D. at 236. As the Supreme Court noted in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982): Conceptually there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual such that the individual's claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim will be typical of the class claims. For [the plaintiff] to bridge that gap, he must prove much more than the validity of his own claim.
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, n. 13; see also Bishop, 141 F.R.D. at 229.
A named representative plaintiff's claim is typical within the meaning of Rule 23(a)(3) if it arises from the same event, practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and is based on the same legal theory. In re: Prudential Securities Incorporated Limited Partnerships Litigation, 163 F.R.D. 200, 208-209 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), citing, inter alia, In re: The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992). However, “if a court must make highly fact-specific or individualized determinations in order to establish a defendant's liability to each class member, typicality will not be met...” 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.24 [4] (3d Ed. 1997). “[W]here there are particularly unique fact patterns, employment circumstances, or defenses with respect to a named plaintiff, the claims of that plaintiff may not be typical of the class, and he or she may be an inappropriate class representative.” Bishop, 141 F.R.D. at 238; Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., et al., 103 F.R.D. 641, 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 839 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
Moreover, the “satisfaction of this requirement may not be based on any conclusory assumption that the litigation involves inherent class claims...” 1 Herbert Newberg,

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Newberg on Class Actions § 3-84 (3d Ed. 1992). Courts have noted that there is a wide gap between an individual who alleges a violation of his rights pursuant to an alleged policy of defendants to deny those rights, and the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury. See id. at § 3-84 and nn. 216, 217.
Plaintiffs have simply failed to bridge the gap. The legal and factual issues that are relevant to a determination of whether an individual alien is entitled to public benefits abound are numerous and particular to the individual. To suggest that they are common to the class is merely to say that the same law and policy (which plaintiffs do not challenge as unconstitutional) is applied to each purported member of the class.. The crux of plaintiffs' argument is that the law is applied incorrectly (because there are instances when alien eligibility determinations are made incorrectly, in their view), and that in certain respects state policy, in their opinion, should be changed.
There is no issue that city defendant does not establish state policy and is bound to apply applicable federal and state law. Issues concerning the WMS system, or State Defendants' policies regarding the need for social security numbers for federal and state benefits, the definition of who is a PRUCOL, who should be referred for a disability Medicaid determination all concern State policies that are not within the purview of the City defendant to change.
The factual issues that arise in the context of each application for public benefits are unique to each application. Eligibility for public benefits depends in large part on the documentation an applicant provides (or fails to provide); the information an applicant provides (or fails to provide; when documentation or information is furnished by the applicant (and whether it is provided timely and at relevant times during the application process); the nature of the benefit sought, and compliance with all of the multitude of application requirements that may be wholly unrelated to an immigrant's status.
As the Court may appreciate from the testimony of each plaintiff, and the Job Center workers, the determination of whether an immigrant is eligible for benefits varies radically from applicant to applicant and is dependent on numerous factors that are not at issue in the litigation. The determination may turn on whether the applicant has cooperated in providing the requested information in a timely way; whether the applicant has submitted original documentation; whether an applicant has kept mandatory appointments (such as those for Child Support Enforcement); whether the individual has been truthful in representations to the agency in connection with an application for benefits.
In addition there are numerous individual circumstances in connection with issues raised in the litigation which would require minihearings even if one could categorize immigrants in a particular status. The testimony in regard to M.E.'s failure to cooperate in applying for a social security number and presenting proof that she had applied for one is one such example. Therefore in order to determine who would be a member of the class, the Court would have to conduct a minihearing to ascertain the precise reasons why a decision was made at the relevant time that the applicant

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would be denied benefits, before any conclusion could be drawn that an individual would be a member of the proposed class -- an individual who had been or will be denied benefits in whole or in part because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
As this Court noted, under circumstances such as these, denial of a motion for class certification is “obvious: the rights of the individual[s] ... vary radically and often require resort to complicated and hoary documents to make any kind of determination. Thus, ‘each of the Claimants' claims is based on facts specific to that Claimant’ and the ‘facts and legal and legal arguments are separate and distinct from one another.” See In re Worldcom, Inc., M-47 (JSR) 2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9695, (S.D.N.Y.)
C. Plaintiffs Fail to Satisfy the “Adequacy of Representation” Requirement of Rule 23(a)(4)
Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Of the four elements of Rule 23(a), it is widely agreed that adequacy of representation is the most important factor to be considered. See In re: LILCO Securities Litigation, 111 F.R.D. 663, 672 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted). The Court's obligation to examine a proposed class representative's adequacy is even more significant in light of the constitutional defect that attaches to the choice of an inadequate class representative. See id.
The inquiry into adequacy of representation examines both the plaintiff representatives and their counsel. As to the plaintiffs themselves, it is necessary to eliminate as far as possible the likelihood that the representative plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the remainder of the class. See id.; see also In Re: The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., et al., 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); Irene S. Lo Re, et al., v. The Chase Manhattan Corporation, et al., 431 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Goodwin, et al. v. Louis LaPolla, et al., 589 F. Supp. 1423 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying class certification where, among other defects, as to the issue of adequacy of representation, plaintiffs did not show an absence of potential conflicts of interest between the class members, nor did they show that their counsel was capable of representing the interests of the class). With respect to counsel, courts consider whether or not plaintiffs' attorneys are qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
Here, both the representative plaintiffs and their counsel fail to meet the adequacy of representation requirement. To the extent that individual plaintiffs are active recipients of public benefits, their willingness to continue in a representative capacity has not been shown. Nor does the record contain adequate evidence that plaintiffs' understand the nature of the litigation and their duties as class representatives.
As to plaintiffs counsels' request to be class counsel, the City defendant incorpor-
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ates by reference and renews its arguments in support of its motion to disqualify counsel in opposition to this class certification motion. The trial testimony of Reena Ganju demonstrated that this litigation was set up by counsel who advertised for clients through solicitations to advocacy groups and on the internet, long before the litigation was commenced. While seeking clients for the lawsuit, counsel for the plaintiffs engaged in repeated contacts with HRA staff, in a blatant effort to “set up” the facts that they would later argue to the Court, through their written attorney declarations filed in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Their lack of candor to the Court about when and how they came to represent the individual plaintiffs' is certainly a factor which should weigh heavily in this Court's determination of whether they would be adequate counsel for a class, in the event one were to be certified. Despite specific and repeated questioning by the Court, only days before Ms. Ganju testified at the preliminary injunction hearing did counsel for the City defendants learn that she continued to represent the first named plaintiff, M.K.B. after this action was commenced. While Ms. Saylor represented to the Court that Ms. Ganju was not employed by any of defendants' counsel, only on the date Ms. Ganju testified at the hearing did plaintiffs' counsel produce the retainer agreement between the New York Legal Assistance Group (“NYLAG”) (one of the counsel representing plaintiffs in this lawsuit), and M.K.B. which was signed by Reena Ganju on behalf of NYLAG. For the Court to reward this marginal behavior by finding plaintiffs' counsel adequate under Rule 23 and granting counsels' request to be named class counsel would be inappropriate on the record before the Court.
D. Plaintiffs' Definition Of The Class Is Overbroad And Encompasses Members Of The Proposed Class Who are Members of the Class Certified in Reynolds v. Giuliani
“The definition of the class is of primary importance, since it ‘enables courts to accurately determine whether the proposed class satisfied the other requirements of Rule 23.’ ” Wright, et al. v. Giuliani, et al., No. 99 Civ. 10091, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8322, at *28-29 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2000) (quoting 5 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.21 [3] (1999)), aff'd on other grounds, 230 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 7A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1759-61 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that the court must determine whether the definition of a class is workable prior to beginning its analysis under Rule 23). “In addition, defining the class identifies the persons who would be (1) entitled to relief, (2) bound by the judgment and (3) entitled to notice [if applicable].” 5 James Wm. Moore, et al. Moore's Federal Practice §23.21 [3] (1999). (A copy of the Wright v. Giuliani decision is annexed as Appendix A.)
The putative class should not be certified because the definition of the class is overbroad.
Plaintiffs' definition of the class includes within it members of the class certified in Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 293 (S.D.N.Y.). The Reynolds class is defined as a class consisting of “all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center.” To the extent that the two classes are overlapping, the

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Court would run the risk that the relief sought in this action would or may be in direct contravention of the permanent injunction, monitoring, and notice afforded the class in Reynolds. (See the Declaration of David Lock, dated January 24, 2006, and Exhibit C, thereto, which City defendant submitted in the instant. action in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification, and discussion in the City Defendant's Op. Mem. at pp. 11 - 15.) Additionally, plaintiffs seek to have future applicants included within the class without any cut-off for inclusion whatsoever. There would be no way to determine, who would be bound by the judgment.
Because plaintiffs have utterly failed to demonstrate the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation required under 23(a), they cannot meet the requirements of 23(b)(2). Where the class itself cannot be defined; where the members cannot be shown to be sufficiently numerous, where they do not share common issues of law or fact, plaintiffs cannot show that defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class they have defined.
POINT III
GALINA RYBALKOV'S APPLICATION TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE DENIED
Plaintiffs seek to add Ms. Rybalkov as a plaintiff in this case, purportedly to represent a subclass consisting of lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years. The issue raised at the hearing with respect to Ms. Rybalkov was the failure to add together the time she had the immigration status as a parolee with the time she has been a lawful permanent resident. The import of the claim is that the combination of the two time periods will enable Ms. Rybalkov to obtain additional public benefits.
The issue concerning Galina Rybalkov has been resolved through correspondence issued by the State defendant OTDA.. By letter dated March 28, 2006, from John. D. DiBari, Associate Attorney for OTDA to Deputy General Counsel for HRA, David Lock, HRA was informed that the issue concerning Galina Ryblakov should be resolved by adding the applicant's time as a parolee to the applicant's time as a legal permanent resident to determine the time in which Ryblakov has been a “qualified” alien. As the Court noted, Ms. Rybalkov “is the only one who fit [the] category” of plaintiffs' proposed class category of “green card holders who have had that status for less than five years.” (Tr. 3/24/06 1231:12 - 22.) The March 28th letter to HRA addressed the issue also as a general matter, whereby the State defendant advised that “the date that the applicant first obtains ‘qualified’ status (assuming the applicant continuously remains in a ‘qualified’ status) is the date that must be used for purposes of determining whether an applicant has met the food stamp alien eligibility requirement of five years in ‘qualified’ status. (Supp. Lock Decl; and Exh. A, thereto.)
As set forth in Exh. E to the Suppl. Shepard Decl., changes have been made to the WMS system in order to preserve the earlier date of qualified status, workers will be trained on that change and the earlier date of qualified status will continue to be preserved in the POS system.

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Accordingly, not only is there no case or controversy affecting, Ms. Rybalkov, there is no subclass facing potential damage to be represented. Ms. Rybalkov's application to intervene should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification in its entirety.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W. M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York Human Resources Administration, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2006 WL 1793013 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. No. 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). April 14, 2006.
Plaintiffs' Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... v
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
POINT I LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE CITY DEFENDANT ... 2
A. Customs and Usages In Violation of Due Process and Federal Statutes ... 2
1. The City has a custom and usage of denying federal and State public benefits to eligible battered qualified immigrants ... 4
a. Computer-related problems ... 4
b. Misplaced focus on those with “prima facie” notices ... 6
2. The City has a custom and usage of denying federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to eligible immigrants because the City provides them with improper documentation ... 8
3. The City has a custom and usage of denying federal food stamps to eligible lawful permanent residents who have five years of qualified alien status, but who have had their green cards for less than five years ... 12
4. HRA has a custom and usage of failing to provide adequate written notice of the denial of public benefits in three circumstances ... 14

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a. Cases accepted for citizen children and denied for immigrant household members ... 14
b. Cases in which a request to add an immigrant parent to a child's case is denied ... 15
c. Inadequate and misleading computerized notices ... 16 5. The City has a custom and usage of denying State public benefits to eligible immigrants who cannot obtain a Social Security number from SSA through no fault of their own ... 16 6. The City has a custom and usage of denying State public benefits to certain eligible immigrants who are PRUCOL ... 20 B. Failure to Train ... 25 1. The City knows to a moral certainty that immigrants who are class members in this case will apply for public benefits ... 26 2. Eligibility decisions regarding class members in this case present City employees with difficult choices of the sort that training and supervision will make less difficult ... 26 3. City employees have a history of mishandling decisions regarding the eligibility of immigrant class members in this case ... 27 4. Erroneous decisions by City employees frequently cause the loss of public benefits to which immigrant class members are eligible ... 29 5. The City was on notice of the need for additional training ... 29 POINT II LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS ... 30 A. Evidence Received Against the City Defendant Is Admissible Against the State Defendant ... 30 B. The State Defendants' Liability for Violations of Federal Law Has Been Established ... 33 1. The State caused or contributed to the cause of violations ... 33
a. Single date field for Alien/Citizenship Indicator ... 34 b. Opening cases for immigrants directly in WMS ... 34 c. Social Security numbers for immigrants applying for federal benefits ... 36 d. Flawed State training materials ... 36 e. Alien numbers ... 37
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f. State Alien Eligibility Desk Aid and State Policy Memoranda ... 38 g. Inadequate and misleading State CNS Notices ... 39 2. The State is jointly responsible for the City's systemic violations of federal law ... 39 POINT III THE COURT SHOULD ORDER ADDITIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE CITY AND STATE DEFENDANTS ... 41 A. Additional Relief Warranted Against the State Defendants ... 41 1. Adequately correct the single-date problem in WMS ... 41 2. Training and improved instructions regarding multi-suffix cases ... 42 3. Social Security numbers for applicants for federal benefits ... 4 2 4. Training materials regarding federal Medicaid and food stamps ... 42 B. Additional relief warranted against the City defendant ... 42 1. Social Security number requirements ... 43 2. Eligibility for benefits of battered qualified immigrants and persons who are PRUCOL immigrants ... 43 3. Green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years ... 44 4. Training on opening cases on aliens in WMS ... 44 5. Issuance of notices ... 45 6. Cases not handled by immigrant liaisons ... 45 7. POS revisions ... 45 POINT IV PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO INTERVENE MS. RYBALKO SHOULD BE GRANTED ... 46 A. Facts Concerning Ms. Rybalko ... 46 B. Ms. Rybalko's Motion to Intervene Should Be Granted ... 47 POINT V THE PROPOSED CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED ... 49 A. Plaintiffs have demonstrated numerosity ... 50 B. Class members share common issues of law and fact ... 50 C. Named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class ... 51 D. Named class members and counsel provide adequate representation ... 52

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E. The Class Satisfies The Requirements of Rules 23(b)(2) and (3) ... 52 1. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(2) ... 52 2. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(3) ... 53
CONCLUSION ... 54 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2001) ... 21 Matter of Barbaro v Wyman, 32 A.D.2d 647 ... 31 Beaudoin v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 343, 408 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1978) ... 31 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) ... 2 Matter of Bonfanti v Kirby, 54 A.D.2d 714 ... 31 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) ... 25 Dajour B. v. City of New York, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001) ... 39, 40 Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 147 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ... 47 Eckert v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 227 F.R.D. 60 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ... 47 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) ... 2 Hillburn v. Maher, 795 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 32 Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997) ... 51 McCoy v. Ithaca Hous. Auth., 559 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) ... 51 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ... 2 Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 29, 30 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ... 32, 40, 51, 52 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2743 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) ... 32 Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992) ... 40 Matter of Samuels v Berger, 55 A.D.2d 913 ... 31 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 26, 26

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Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1984) ... 40 STATUTES AND RULES 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 ... 9 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 (a) ... 9 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 (b) ... 9 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 (d) ... 9 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(3)(i) ... 10 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(3)(ii) ... 10 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 ... 32 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(a) ... 9 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e) ... 9 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) ... 32, 39 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J) ... 11 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(L) ... 12, 46 8 U.S.C. §1613(a) ... 12 8 U.S.C. §1613(b) ... 12 8 U.S.C. §1613(c) ... 12 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(4) ... 46 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) ... 49 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ... 1, 3 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) ... 32, 40 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... passim Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ... 49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) ... 52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) ... 52, 53 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (2003) ... 53 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B) ... 53

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) ... 47
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) ... 47
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) ... 30, 32
N.Y. Const., art XVII, § 1 ... 31
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 2(1) ... 31
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 17 ... 31
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 20 ... 31
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 34 ... 31
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 65(3) ... 31
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 122 ... 21
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 158(1)(g) ... 20
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.2(c) ... 17
MISCELLANEOUS
A. Conte & H. Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 16:8, at 166-68 (2002) ... 47
Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, 1997 Laws of N.Y. ch. 436, § 122(f) ... 31
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiffs submit this post-hearing memorandum of law in support of their request for additional preliminary injunctive relief beyond that ordered by the Court in its order of February 16, 2006 and in support of their contention that the February 16, 2006 order is valid and its current provisions must remain in effect.
In Point I, we demonstrate that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been established against defendant Eggleston (hereafter City defendant or HRA). In this section, we show that plaintiffs established at trial the elements necessary to prove a claim against a municipality under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), consisting of(1) an unlawful custom and usage and (2) a failure to train. We also demonstrate that certain pendent state claims that the Court may hear under its supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, have been established against the City defendant.
In Point II, we demonstrate that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been established against the State defendants. As part of that discussion, we establish that all admissions received against the City defendant are admissible against the State defendants because the City defendant functions in law and in fact as the State's agent with regard to all the matters at issue here.
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In Point III, we detail the specific additional remedies plaintiffs seek against the City and State defendants in their preliminary injunction motion beyond those set forth in the Court's order of February 16, 2006.
In Point IV, we address a question left open at the end of trial concerning whether the pending motion to intervene by Galina Rybalko should be granted. Ms. Rybalko's motion to intervene should be granted so that she may represent a group of green card holders for whom relief is being sought, and concerning whom future disputes may arise.
In Point V, we supplement arguments set forth in plaintiffs' original memorandum of law in support of class certification, based on facts established at trial.
POINT I
LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE CITY DEFENDANT.
Plaintiffs are not re-briefing arguments that were fully addressed in the parties' moving papers on the preliminary injunction motion, and resolved by the Court in its order of February 16, 2006. For example, in their original moving papers, the parties fully briefed whether the federal statutes under which plaintiffs have sued create rights that are enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). In its order of February 16, 2006, the Court found “it likely, based on the voluminous submissions of counsel thus far, that plaintiffs will prevail against the various legal defenses raised by defendants.” (Order of Feb. 16, 2006 at 1.) The only remaining question is whether the plaintiffs proved at trial the existence of a policy, custom, or usage that violates due process and/or the federal statutes at issue here. That is the issue addressed in this memo of law. Whether those statutes create enforceable rights has already been fully briefed and decided.
In their original moving papers, plaintiffs also set forth the principles according to which custom or usage can be the basis of a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiffs have established liability against the City defendant under the custom/usage and training/ supervision theories.
A. Customs and Usages In Violation of Due Process and Federal Statutes
At trial, the plaintiffs proved the existence of four customs and usages by the City defendant that violate due process and/or federal statutes that create enforceable rights under § 1983. They are:
(1) a City custom and usage of denying federal public benefits to eligible battered qualified immigrants;
(2) a City custom and usage of denying federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to immigrants without a Social Security number who cannot obtain one because the City provides them with improper documentation;

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(3) a City custom and usage of denying federal public benefits to eligible immigrants who are green card holders, who have had their green cards for less than five years, and who have five years of qualified alien status; and
(4) a City custom and usage of (a) failing to provide written notice of the denial of public benefits when an immigrant household applies for public benefits and the case is accepted for the citizen children and denied for the immigrant parents; (b) failing to provide written notice when a request to add immigrant household members to the existing public benefits case of a citizen child is denied; and (c) issuing computerized notices that are misleading because they leave battered qualified aliens off the list of eligible immigrants.
These four practices violate due process and/or federal statutes, for which a cause of action is created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In addition to these practices, three municipal customs and usages have been shown to violate state law and are cognizable under the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The plaintiffs demonstrated:
(5) a City custom and usage of denying State public benefits to eligible battered qualified immigrants;
(6) a City custom and usage of denying State public benefits to immigrants who are not eligible to obtain a Social Security number from the Social Security Administration, through no fault of their own, on account of their immigration status but who are nonetheless eligible for public benefits; and
(7) a City custom and usage of denying State public benefits to certain eligible immigrants who are PRUCOL.
1. The City has a custom and usage of denying federal and State public benefits to eligible battered qualified immigrants.
The City has a custom and usage of denying federal and State public benefits to eligible battered qualified immigrants.[FN1] The voluminous evidence demonstrating the existence of this custom and usage is set forth in plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 193-318. Without attempting to summarize all that evidence here, we draw the Court's attention to some of the more salient facts from which the Court can and should infer that this practice is systemic in nature.
FN1. The evidence regarding categories (1) and (5) above is discussed together in this section, since the causes of these practices pertain equally to immigrants eligible for federal and State benefits. These categories are separated analytically only to ensure clarity about which claims give rise to § 1983 violations, and which give rise to pendent state claims.
a. Computer-related problems
The City's Paperless Office System (POS) computer system has made it all but impossible to open a public benefits case correctly for a battered qualified immigrant. Workers who wish to open a case for a battered qualified immigrant must access
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a particular screen in the POS computer system. Before November 2005, that screen could not be accessed unless the worker selected one of three specific immigration categories for the immigrant, none of which is applicable to a battered qualified immigrant (“parolee for at least one year,” “legal permanent resident” or “conditional entrant”). (See FOF ¶¶ 203-204.) After revisions to POS in November 2005, the worker still must access the screen by selecting one of several immigration categories that are not applicable to battered qualified aliens. The only change is that workers may now choose two additional inapplicable categories: “undocumented” or “PRUCOL”. (See FOF ¶¶ 218-221.) Ms. Shepard, the head of the POS design team, admitted that POS does not readily accommodate the entry of information for battered qualified aliens. (Tr. 787:13-17.)
Ample testimony corroborated the fact that the lack of a clear and simple way to access the battered qualified alien screen in POS makes it difficult or impossible to open cases correctly for such individuals. Mr. Gladly, a caseworker at HRA's Immigrant and Refugee Center No. 47, told Reena Ganju, an attorney working for Sanctuary for Families, that although he recognized a client was eligible based on an approved VAWA self-petition, he “did not know and could not input her proper immigration status into the computer.” (Tr. 393:11-14.) Mr. Gladly described the various attempts he made to open the case, including discussions with other caseworkers and with supervisors, in order to find where under the PRUCOL heading there was a VAWA self-petition category that he could select. (Tr. 393:22-25.) None of the choices would work, however, because the space for alien number was “grayed out” such that it would not accept numbers. (Tr. 393:22-394:20.) Another worker at the Immigrant and Refugee Center, Ms. Morales, described the same predicament. (Tr. 395:13-23.)
Indeed, this computer problem has been so intractable that some workers have purposefully “miscoded” a battered qualified immigrant's case as that of a citizen or green card holder in order to facilitate opening the case. As Ms. Ganju testified, Mr. Gladly said “that basically caseworkers would fake it, meaning they would miscode immigration statuses in order to facilitate their entry into the computer system.” (Tr. 396:4-7.) Ms. Ganju identified at least three clients whose cases had been miscoded in this fashion. (See FOF ¶¶ 210-217). This miscoding practice had a serious negative consequence, however, because it would subject the client to discontinuance at a later date because she would not be able to verify that she had the immigration status that was actually entered into the computer. (Tr. 396:9-13.)
Other problems related to the State's WMS computer system also cause the denial of public benefits to eligible battered qualified aliens. (See FOF ¶¶ 225-252.) Because these problems are primarily attributable to the State, they are discussed in Point II B 1 infra.
b. Misplaced focus on those with “prima facie” notices
Problems related to policies and training also lead to the wrongful denial of benefits to eligible battered qualified immigrants. (See FOF ¶¶ 253-258.) One of the most serious problems is a systemic misunderstanding by HRA workers about the eligibility of battered immigrants who are the beneficiary of a pending or approved I-

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130 petition by a citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse (the so-called “I-130 group”). For years, no City and State policy documents made any mention of the eligibility of immigrants in the I-130 group, and important policy documents still in use do not mention I-130 holders. (See FOF ¶¶ 265-266.) HRA employees therefore simply do not understand that immigrants in the I-130 group with proof of domestic violence could be eligible for benefits. (See FOF ¶¶ 266-267.)
Some of the most telling evidence that this error is pervasive and systemic is HRA's own defective training material. (See FOF ¶¶ 270-272.) HRA's Deputy Commissioner in charge of training, James Whelan, testified that HRA relies on a system of “training the trainers.” (Tr. 1194:9-19.) Senior trainers develop curricula and use it to train “center based trainers.” Those center-based trainers, in turn, are stationed at job centers and train the staff at those centers. (Tr. 1195:4-18.) The materials those trainers have used to train job center staff are clearly and seriously defective. For example, HRA's “April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Instructor's Guide” defines a battered qualified alien solely as a person with a “prima facie” notice. No other battered qualified aliens are mentioned. (Pl. Ex. 469 at MKB01171-2.) Likewise, HRA's “April 2005 Training Release” defines a battered alien solely as a person with a “prima facie” notice. (Pl. Ex. 464 at C 12928-29.) No other battered qualified aliens are mentioned. (Pl. Ex. 464 at C12928-41.) Similarly, HRA's April and June 2005 “Trainer's Manual” for its new hires training refers only to battered aliens with approved I-360s and those with a “prima facie case.” (Ex. 468 at MKB01166-7.) Battered aliens with I-130 family-based petitions, K or V visas, are not mentioned.[FN2] (Id.)
FN2. State training materials prepared for use by HRA are even more deeply flawed. (E.g., Pl. Ex. 536 at MKB01355.) Those materials fail to mention any categories of battered qualified immigrants who are eligible for federal benefits. (See FOF ¶ 259.)
That the trainers themselves are seriously misinformed about I-130 petitions surfaced during a telling moment in Ms. Ganju's testimony. Ms. Ganju spoke to the Assistant to the Director of the Waverly Job Center in Manhattan about her client C.W.S., who was in the I-130 category. The Assistant to the Director, she said, “had spoken with the trainer at the welfare center, a woman by the name of Ms. Adeno and Ms. Adeno had stated that the client needs to have a prime [sic] facie notice in order to be eligible for benefits.” (Tr. 454:20-455:5.)
The significance of this admission is not just that it is wrong - although it certainly is wrong. Immigrants in the I-130 group do not have “prima facie” notices, but may nonetheless be eligible for benefits if they have proof of domestic abuse. Rather, the significance is that it was said by the person responsible for training the entire staff of the Waverly Job Center. And she, according to Mr. Whelan, was trained by HRA's senior training staff at HRA. Other senior HRA staff have expressed similar confusion on this issue. As late as the summer or fall of 2004, Ive Sisco, who is in charge of writing immigrant eligibility polices for HRA, (see FOF ¶ 285), told Paul Dichian that even she did not know whether the I-130 group of immigrants could be eligible for public benefits (Tr. 700:16-702:4).

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From HRA's own defective training materials, and from statements by the trainers like Ms. Adeno, and by senior staff such as Ms. Sisco, the Court can fairly infer that the senior staff of HRA itself does not understand the eligibility of immigrants in the I-130 group. And since the senior trainers and the principal policy writer do not understand it, it is impossible for the rest of HRA's staff to understand it. This is powerful evidence indeed that misinformation about the I-130 group is systemic.
2. The City has a custom and usage of denying federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to eligible immigrants because the City provides them with improper documenta-
tion.
The plaintiffs demonstrated at trial that the standard form letters prescribed by the State, and used by the City, for obtaining a Social Security number for an immigrant applying for a federal benefit program (federal food stamps and federal Medicaid) are defective. These letters virtually ensure that an immigrant who lacks work authorization will be erroneously denied a Social Security number. Since furnishing a Social Security number is a condition of eligibility for those federal benefit programs, this causes immigrants who lack work authorization to be systematically and erroneously denied federal food stamps and federal Medicaid.
Federal law requires applicants for federal Medicaid[FN3] and federal food stamps[FN4] to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility. If an applicant for one of those federal benefits does not have a Social Security number, the agency administering the program must assist the applicant in applying for one. 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(b) (food stamps); 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e) (Medicaid).
FN3. 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(a) (“The agency must require, as a condition of eligibility, that each individual (including children) requesting Medicaid services furnish each of his or her social security numbers (SSNs)”).
FN4. 7 C.F.R. § 273.6. This regulation arguably contains an ambiguity regarding whether food stamps must be denied if SSA declines to issue a Social Security number after an application for one is made. Section 273.6(a) provides: “The State agency shall explain to applicants and participants that refusal or failure without good cause to provide an SSN will result in disqualification of the individual for whom an SSN is not obtained.” The question is whether SSA's denial of a Social Security number could constitute “good cause.” “Good cause” is defined in § 273.6(d), which states: “Once an application has been filed, the State agency shall permit the member to continue to participate pending notification of the State agency of the household member's SSN” (emphasis added). The consensus by witnesses who testified for the City and State was that a Social Security number is required for food stamp participation. Asked by counsel for the State about this requirement, Ivelia Sisco, HRA's Director of Procedures for eligibility, testified: “You're required to have a Social Security number at some point.” (Tr. 997:15-16.) Steve Ptak, the Food Assistance Director with the OTDA Division of Employment and Transitional Supports, testified that it was his “general understanding” that an

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immigrant without a Social Security number “would not be eligible for food stamps,” and indicated that “We have asked USDA for clarification regarding that.” (Tr. 1180:1-3.) He also testified that a USDA official “gave a tentative answer that he believed that those individuals would not - would not be eligible and would have to be closed or denied, but that he needed to check with USDA counsel.” (Tr. 1180:4-1181:2.)
In the case of applicants for a federal benefit (like federal food stamps and federal Medicaid), the Social Security Administration (SSA) will issue a Social Security number to immigrants who are not authorized to work when they need one “to satisfy a Federal statute or regulation that requires you to have a social security number in order to receive a Federally-funded benefit to which you have otherwise established entitlement ....” 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(3)(i)(emphasis added).
It must be emphasized that SSA will issue a Social Security number to immigrants for a federal benefit who lack work authorization only if a federal statute or regulation requires a Social Security number in order to receive the benefit. The procedure for doing so is set forth in the SSA Program Operations Management System (POMS) RM 00203.510 (available online at https:// s044a90.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0100203510). The only acceptable documentation for this purpose is a letter from a government entity, dated and on letterhead stationery, specifically identifying the alien, the non-work reason for which a Social Security number is required, the relevant statute or regulations requiring the Social Security number as a condition to receive the benefit or service, and the name and telephone number of an official to contact so that the information provided may be verified. Id.
SSA's policy is different in the case of applicants for a state benefit. Even when a state law requires furnishing a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility, SSA will issue a Social Security number to an immigrant applying for a state benefit only if the immigrant has work authorization. (Tr. 647:16-25.) This is because federal regulations specify that SSA will issue a non-work Social Security number to an immigrant who is eligible for state public benefits only if the immigrant is “legally in the United States.” 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(3)(ii); see also POMS RM 00203.510, a phrase SSA construes as meaning that the immigrant must have work authorization.
This means that for immigrants who lack work authorization, the letter from a government entity must specify the federal program for which a Social Security number is required (i.e., federal Medicaid or federal food stamps) and the federal regulation that requires the Social Security number. If only a state program or state regulation is specified, SSA will not issue a Social Security number to an immigrant who lacks work authorization.
The letter prescribed by the State for this purpose, and used by the City, does not satisfy this requirement. The State letter, Pl. Ex. 631 (02 INF 40, Attachment), states: “____(Alien's Name)_____is an applicant for public assistance .... In New York State public assistance is known as temporary assistance ....” (The identical

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City letter is in evidence at Pl. Ex. 504 at MKB01505.) Temporary Assistance is a State public assistance program. The letter also cites only to a state regulation, not a federal statute, as required by SSA's rules. (Pl. Exs. 631, 504 at MKB01505.) On its face, this letter does not suffice to cause SSA to issue a non-work Social Security number to an immigrant who lacks work authorization because it refers only to a state program.
This defect causes denial of federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to battered qualified immigrants who lack work authorization. Plaintiff M.E.'s daughter, E.R., represents a typical example of this problem. As the minor child of a battered qualified immigrant, E.R. is eligible for federal food stamps. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J). As HRA instructed, M.E. applied for a Social Security number on behalf of herself and E.R. (Tr. 153:19-23); on November 10, 2005, SSA denied both requests, stating “You have not given us document(s) we need to show U.S. citizenship or lawful alien status.” (Pl. Exs. 204, 204-A; Tr. 153:24-155:8.)
This problem is systemic by nature, since the defective letter is in use by HRA in all cases in New York City, and indeed is in use throughout New York State.
3. The City has a custom and usage of denying federal food stamps to eligible lawful permanent residents who have five years of qualified alien status, but who have had
their green cards for less than five years.
The evidence demonstrates a custom and usage of denying food stamps to lawful permanent residents who have five years of qualified alien status, but who have had their green cards for less than five years. This problem is related to a deficiency in the design of the State WMS computer system, which contains a single date field related to immigration status. Although State OTDA has announced a purported fix to this problem, the fix does not correct it. (See FOF ¶¶ 362-64.)
Two dates are relevant to determining an immigrant's eligibility for federal food stamps, Medicaid, and federal public assistance. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(L), a Qualified Alien is eligible for food stamps if she has resided in the United States in a Qualified Alien status for five or more years, regardless of the date of entry into the United States. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(b)(1) and 1613(a)(b) & (c), an immigrant is eligible for federal Medicaid and federal public assistance if she entered the United States before August 22, 1996 or, if she entered after that date, if she has been in a Qualified Alien status for five or more years.
WMS contains only one data element for recording a date related to a client's immigration status. (Tr. 871:24-872:17.) For an immigrant who does not yet have a green card, the date recorded here is either the date she arrived in the United States or the date on which she became a Qualified Alien. If and when she later obtains a green card, that date would be entered in WMS, overwriting the earlier date (Tr. 1335:20-22) and causing WMS to conclude that she had fewer than five years of Qualified Alien status.
Elaine Witty admitted that the single date field causes problems for persons who at-
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tain Qualified Alien status prior to attaining lawful permanent resident. She explained at trial: Q. Isn't it true that some time in 2004, you learned that WMS cannot maintain a record of both the date someone became a qualified alien and the date that person became a lawful permanent resident? A. Yes. Q. And did this feature of WMS cause you concern? A. Yes. Q. And why did it cause you concern? A. I was concerned that the LPR date would override the date of becoming a battered qualified alien. Q. And why did that cause you concern? A. I was concerned that by losing the date a person becomes a battered qualified alien, it would affect their eligibility for public benefits.
(Tr. 945:19-946:7.)
In his testimony, David Spielman, one of State OTDA's computer witnesses, confirmed that Ms. Witty was correct to be concerned: “[W]orkers were changing the date on the system which was making these people ineligible.” (Tr. 1334:20-22.)
At the close of trial, Mr. Spielman testified that State OTDA agreed “in principle” to a modification of WMS to address this problem by adding an “edit” (or rule) that prevents a date previously entered in the date field from being changed to a more recent date. (Tr. 1333:9-22, 1339:21-1340:4.) This modification, however, does not fully address the problem.
First, the override fix is not an adequate workaround because WMS must have two date fields in order to record both the date of entry and the date an immigrant obtained qualified status. It is possible for an immigrant to have entered the United States before August 22, 1996, but not to have more than five years of qualified status. This would be typical of an immigrant in the I-130 group who does not have proof that she began suffering domestic violence until some years after her entry. (Plaintiff M.E. is illustrative.) Such an immigrant can be eligible for federal Medicaid and federal public assistance benefits by virtue of her pre-1996 entry into the United States, but would not be eligible for federal food stamps until she has been in a qualified status for five years. It is necessary to track both dates in order to determine when she becomes eligible for federal food stamps.
Second, without clear instructions on the relevant dates that workers should enter, immigrants will continue to be unlawfully denied food stamps.
4. HRA has a custom and usage of failing to provide adequate written notice of the denial of public benefits in three circumstances.
The plaintiffs demonstrated a City custom and usage of failing to provide adequate written notices. Specifically, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the City systemically (a) fails to provide written notice of the denial of public benefits when an immigrant household applies for public benefits and the case is accepted for the
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citizen children and denied for the immigrant parents; (b) fails to provide written notice when a request to add immigrant household members to the existing public benefits case of a citizen child is denied; and (c) issues computerized notices that leave battered qualified aliens off the list of eligible alien and therefore mislead battered qualified aliens to think that benefits were correctly denied or discontinued.
a. Cases accepted for citizen children and denied for immigrant household members
Some form notices used in accepting public benefits cases have no space for identifying members of the household whose application has been denied. (See FOF ¶ 372.) These notices are facially defective and do not give adequate notice when a case is accepted for citizen children but assistance for one or more immigrant household members is denied.
Other notices include a space on which the names of household members who were denied assistance could be indicated. (See FOF ¶ 373.) However, in completing those notices, the City's practice is to check the boxes indicating the case has been accepted, and to leave blank the areas for household members who are denied assistance. (See FOF ¶¶ 373-379.) Representative notices of this kind are in evidence for plaintiffs Miriam Diongue (Pl. Ex. 45) and M.K.B. (Pl. Ex. 765), and are before the Court in the declaration of W.S. (W.S. Decl., Ex. F.)[FN5]
FN5. The inaccuracy of the W.S. notice, as described in her declaration, is corroborated by the testimony of Reena Ganju. (Tr. 405:2-24; Tr. 424:23-425:10.) The City did not object to Ms. Ganju's testimony regarding the inaccuracy of W.S.'s notice because the notice and her declaration were before the Court. (Tr. 425:15-19.)
During colloquy at trial, counsel for the City alleged it would show that in these kinds of situations, the City's practice was to fill out the notice forms, including any denials. (Tr. 427:23-428:3.) But the City never introduced into evidence an example of any notice indicating that any case was accepted for some household members and denied for others. If, as the City alleged, its practice was to complete these notices correctly and include denial information, then it should have been a trivial matter to identify at least one example of such a notice, if not dozens. Not a single example of such a notice is in evidence.
b. Cases in which a request to add an immigrant parent to a child's case is denied
Numerous clients testified or attested to the failure to give a written notice of denial when an immigrant parent's request to be added to the open case of a citizen child is denied. (See FOF ¶¶ 373-379.) In July 2004, and on seven or eight additional occasions after that, A.I. asked Ms. Walker at the Jamaica Job Center if she and W.A. could be added to S.A.'s public assistance case. (Tr. 105:17-106:13.) Each time, she was told orally, not in writing, that she could not receive benefits because she did not have a green card. (Tr. 106:16-19.) On July 14, 2005, M.A. went to HRA Job Center #46 and asked to be added to her child's public assistance case. (Pl. Ex. 91; Tr. 204:8-19.) M.A. received no written notice in response to her request to
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be added. (Tr. 250:19-20.) Nicole Prince asked to be added to her child's case on February 22, 2005 (Pl. Ex. 803) and in March 2005 (Pl. Ex. 805). She did not receive a notice in response to either of these requests to be added. (Prince Decl. ¶ 22.) Likewise, L.A.M., M.H., K.T., and Angelica Higinio all did not receive a notice in response to their requests to be added to their children's public assistance case. (L.A.M. Decl. ¶ 25; Higinio Decl. ¶¶ 18-19, 21, 22; M.H. Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; K.T. Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9.)
Again, the City never introduced in evidence a single example of a notice denying an immigrant parent's request to be added to a child's open public assistance case.
c. Inadequate and misleading computerized notices
The City issues computerized notices that erroneously fail to list battered qualified aliens as one of the categories of immigrants eligible for public benefits. (See FOF ¶ 380.) Because the language in these notices is prescribed by the State, these issues are discussed in Point II(B)(1)(g) infra.
5. The City has a custom and usage of denying State public benefits to eligible immigrants who cannot obtain a Social Security number from SSA through no fault of their own.
The City has a custom and usage of denying State public benefits to eligible immigrants who cannot obtain a Social Security number from SSA, through no fault of their own, on account of their immigration status. (See FOF ¶¶ 277-318.) The City's (erroneous) belief that furnishing a Social Security number is a condition of receiving State public benefits was manifest throughout the trial. Perhaps the most striking proof of this fact was the testimony of Ivelia Sisco, HRA's Director of Procedures for eligibility, in response to questioning by counsel for the State. Mr. Kraft asked Ms. Sisco: Q. Is the receipt - is the possession of a Social Security number a requirement to receive state funded safety net assistance? A. Yes. Q. You're sure about that? A. It is a requirement at least at some point.
(Tr. 997:24-998:4.) Likewise, Josephine Pierre, a supervisor at the Linden Job Center who reports to the Center Director, testified: Q. What instructions have you received concerning whether a client can have an active public assistance case if she does not have a Social Security number? A. As far as I know a Social Security number is required.
(Tr. 1130:15-18.) Similarly, Ms. Ganju testified that Mr. Flaum, who is an HRA official above the level of Center Director, and who works in the HRA Regional Manager's Office overseeing the Homeless Region, stated that “he did not believe that those who did not have Social Security numbers were eligible for benefits.” (Tr. 462:9-463:6.) Likewise, Ms. Wright at the Euclid Job Center said that Social Security numbers are required in order to receive benefits. (Tr. 503:21-504:2.)

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There was ample evidence that this misunderstanding was widespread among HRA workers. Ms. Ganju, for example, testified that in four of her cases, HRA workers personally informed her that her clients were being denied benefits because they lacked a Social Security number. (Tr. 444:21-445:3.) In one case (H.G.), she contacted Paul Dichian at State OTDA, who persuaded the HRA worker (Mr. Flaum) to reverse his position. (Tr. 445:12-15.) In the other three cases, the HRA workers adhered to their positions even after Ms. Ganju remonstrated that a Social Security number was not necessary. (Tr. 445:4-21.)
The City's practice of requiring a Social Security number as a condition of receiving State public assistance benefits is scarcely surprising in light of the State's regulations and instructions to the City. A State regulation, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.2(c), flatly says that each member of the household “must furnish a social security number as a condition of the household's eligibility for public assistance.” (Pl. Ex. 634.) State Informational Letter 02 INF 40 instructs that “Districts should advise aliens as early as possible of the requirement to furnish” a Social Security number. (Pl. Ex. 631, at 2.) The letter prescribed by the State for use by clients in applying for a Social Security number refers to § 351.2 of the State regulations and states unconditionally: “[A]ll applicants and legally responsible relatives must provide a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility for receipt of temporary assistance.” (Pl. Ex. 631, Attachment.)
These instructions, and HRA's adherence to them, put battered immigrants who lack work authorization in what the Court several times called a “Catch 22.” (Tr. 662:15-17, 666:7-14.) Through “no fault of their own” (Tr. 662:7), VAWA selfpetitioners are unable to obtain a Social Security number until their self-petition is approved and they can obtain work authorization. (Tr. 661:23-662:8.) HRA's insistence that immigrants furnish a Social Security number when they are simply unable, through no fault of their own, to do so, makes it impossible for VAWA selfpetitioners to obtain public benefits for 14 to 18 months after they became eligible. (Tr. 646:14-16.)
Despite all these State instructions, however, the State's rule regarding Social Security numbers is actually something quite different. Mr. Dichian testified that “we have conflicting regulations” (Tr. 656:20-21), and that he “rel[ies] on a different regulation, which is in 369.2,” requiring that people need only furnish or apply for a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility. (Tr. 657:7-10.) In open court, counsel for the State represented unequivocally that “it [is] the state's position right now that VAWA self petitioners who have been denied Social Security numbers because they can't qualify for Social Security numbers until the VAWA self petition is approved should receive public assistance.” (Tr. 668:13-18.)
Mr. Dichian met with his superiors at State OTDA to discuss this problem. At that meeting, “[t]hey agreed to say that the domestic violence victims should receive benefits and that HRA should stop denying benefits because of their inability to obtain Social Security numbers and they should write a directive to their centers instructing them.” (Tr. 664-17:21.) He testified that “they agreed with me that it was an inappropriate denial of benefits and that the controlling regulation was not

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351.2 but really should be 369.2.” (Tr. 666:19-22.)
Rather than issuing their own instructions to correct this systemic problem, State officials orally instructed HRA to issue its own directive, reasoning that this is “a City problem.” (Tr. 665:15-16.). HRA, in turn, did issue such a policy bulletin, PB #04-171-ELI, which is in evidence as Pl. Ex. 639. But that bulletin did not fully address the systemic problem. Indeed, Mr. Dichian testified that the City directive was seriously flawed and that he would not have approved it if he had seen it. (Tr. 690:11-14.) He testified that “It is just not correct. It is not detailed enough.” The directive “needs to address, as you say, explain more fully the pending or approved I-130 petitions.” Nor would Mr. Dichian have approved the title or the first paragraph, both of which refer only to “approved prima facie determinations.” (Tr. 690:20-691:7.)
Moreover, although an early draft of the Policy Bulletin would have covered PRUCOL immigrants, the final version of the Policy Bulletin did not. (Tr. 687:19-24.) Despite that omission, Mr. Dichian acknowledged that it would be incorrect to exclude PRUCOLs (Tr. 685:21-686:22); that he knew of no policy reason for distinguishing between PRUCOLs and battered qualified immigrants in this regard (Tr. 688:6-10), and that he knew of at least one PRUCOL immigrant (H.G.) who had been affected by this problem. (Tr. 687:25-688:2.) He further testified that no instructions had been given to HRA to clarify that PRUCOLs were covered by the directive: Q. To your knowledge, did OTDA ever instruct HRA to make clear that PRUCOLs were covered by this policy directive? A. No. Q. Is there any state policy directive or any other state instruction that makes that clear? A. No. Q. To your knowledge did OTDA ever issue any training instructions or training manuals that made that clear? A. No.
(Tr. 688:17-25.)
In sum, a systemic practice existed regarding HRA's denial of State public benefits to eligible immigrants because of the Social Security number problem. (See FOF ¶¶ 327-330.) HRA's issuance of PB #04-171-ELI did not fully cure that problem. Further relief necessary to correct the problem is discussed in Point III infra.
6. The City has a custom and usage of denying State public benefits to certain eligible immigrants who are PRUCOL.
The City has a custom and usage of denying State public benefits to certain eligible immigrants who are PRUCOL, and therefore eligible for State public assistance (called Safety Net Assistance) and State Medicaid.[FN6] This practice exists because of poor training on PRUCOL issues, coupled with confusing and incomplete policy instructions by State OTDA and HRA. Other causes of this practice include the Social Security number problem discussed in Point I(A)(5) supra, and the difficulty of opening a case directly in WMS for aliens (particularly affecting multi-suffix
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cases) discussed in Point II(B)(1)(b) infra.
FN6. “PRUCOL” is an acronym for “Permanently Residing Under Color Of Law.” State OTDA provides State-funded Safety Net Assistance to immigrants who are PRUCOL because N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 158(1)(g) provides that “a person is eligible for safety net assistance who is ... (g) ... an alien who is permanently residing under color of law but is not a qualified alien.” State DOH provides State-funded Medicaid to immigrants who are PRUCOL because, on June 5, 2001, the New York State Court of Appeals held, in Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2001), that § 122 of the Social Services Law is unconstitutional to the extent that it denies State-funded Medicaid to persons who are PRUCOL.
The City and State are both responsible for faulty training regarding PRUCOL issues. (See FOF ¶¶ 322-326.) For example, in April 2005, HRA conducted a “Back to Basics” training on immigrant eligibility for public benefits. (Pl. Ex. 469.) After reviewing various definitions, the trainers discussed “categories of assistance that may be available to our alien population.” (Pl. Ex. 469 at MKB01175.) In the discussion of Safety Net Assistance - the only form of public assistance for which PRUCOL aliens are eligible - PRUCOL is not mentioned at all. The trainers taught only that Qualified Aliens who enter the United States after August 22, 1996, and who have been in that status for less than five years, are eligible for Safety Net Assistance. (Pl. Ex. 469 at MKB01176.)
HRA made the same error in a separate April 2005 training release. This training also taught that the only aliens who are eligible for Safety Net Assistance are Qualified Aliens who entered the United States after August 22, 1996, and who have been in that status for less than five years. (See Pl. Ex. 464 at C12932.)
State OTDA is also responsible for faulty training materials on PRUCOL eligibility. The Professional Development Program at Rockefeller College, University of Albany, prepares training materials under contract with State OTDA. (Tr. 1163:25-1164:1.) An August 3, 2004 training by the Rockefeller College program contained a component on “Citizenship Requirements for Participation.” (Pl. Ex. 536.) That training module made no mention at all of PRUCOL eligibility for Safety Net Assistance. It taught only that lawful permanent residents could receive Safety Net Assistance if they have not been in that status for five years. (Pl. Ex. 536 at MKB-01357.)
Flaws in the State OTDA and City alien eligibility desk aids compound these egregious training errors. The State OTDA desk aid has never explained, in any fashion comprehensible to an ordinary caseworker, who is and who is not PRUCOL. (See FOF ¶ 337.) In the State desk aid that was in effect when the hearing in this case began (Pl. Ex. 640; Tr. 695:1-4), OTDA did not list the categories of immigrants who are PRUCOL or the documents they would need to prove it. Instead, the desk aid included opaque cross-references to other documents (see Tr. 71221-25), which the Court compared unfavorably with the Marx Brothers movie, “A Day at the Races” (Tr. 713:1-14). The two documents cross-referenced (Pl. Exs. 641, 642) are publications from 1988 and 1999 that are outdated, incomplete, extremely difficult to obtain,[FN7] and de-

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scribed by Mr. Dichian himself as “partially obsolete.” (Tr. 720:19-21; see Pl. Ex. 643.) “[E]ven if a person were to get hold of Exhibit 641 or 642 and looked up the categories, there would be still be three categories of PRUCOL persons who were not listed.” (Tr. 719:1-5.)
FN7. Neither document is distributed to welfare workers, nor is either document available on the OTDA web site. (Tr. 716:24-717:24.) Pl. Ex. 642 is so obscure that State OTDA received an e-mail (Pl. Ex. 643) from HRA's Office of Legal Affairs asking State OTDA to supply HRA with a copy of Pl. Ex. 642 because HRA did not have a copy in its own library. (Tr. 717:25-718:3.)
State OTDA's most current public definition of PRUCOL is instead contained in the Temporary Assistance Source Book. (Pl. Ex. 630.) But Mr. Dichian admitted that even this document contains an incomplete list of PRUCOL individuals because it omits four categories of individuals who are PRUCOL.[FN8] (Tr. 723:11-13.) When asked the question, “How would a diligent and enterprising person who is endeavoring to learn what immigrants the state considered PRUCOL be able to ascertain what all the categories are?,” Mr. Dichian answered: “I don't know.” (Tr. 723:14-24.)
FN8. The four categories are V, K, S , and U visa applicants. (Tr. 721:6-16.) State OTDA's counsel's office stated, and Mr. Dichian agreed, that “[s]ince they are known to [BCIS], are in the country permissibly for an indefinite, lengthy period, likely to be permanent, I can think of no reason why they would not be PRUCOL.” (Tr. 722:22-723:5; Pl. Ex. 646.)
Until 2003, the situation was no better on HRA's side of the fence. HRA issued two versions of its own alien eligibility desk aid in 2002. (Pl. Exs. 500, 502.) Both versions merely parroted the State desk aid's obscure references to obsolete publications that do not contain correct definitions of PRUCOL. (Pl. Exs. 500 at MKB01221, 502 at MKB01489.) No HRA caseworker could reasonably have understood who was, and was not, PRUCOL from these obscure references.
The situation was so dire that, in February 2003, an employee in HRA's Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs sent an e-mail to various City and State officials, including Paul Dichian, urging “that the centers/workers need more specific guidance on PRUCOL eligibility .... This office has received a lot of inquiries from the centers and other program areas on the documentation necessary to establish PRUCOL status and eligibility for Safety Net Assistance. We have been unable to find any policy guidance on the required documentation to establish PRUCOL in the context of eligibility for Safety Net Assistance ....” (City Ex. MM. at MKB-OTDA 10236.)
Mr. Dichian responded in an e-mail by providing a list of immigrants that OTDA considers PRUCOL. (Id. at MKB-OTDA 10234-35.) In August 2003, HRA issued for the first time a desk aid that contained a comprehensible description of who is and is not PRUCOL. (Pl. Ex. 506.) However, HRA did so in a way that was not designed to inform any caseworker that changes in the description of the PRUCOL category had been made. The policy bulletin transmitting the desk aid recites that the desk aid has been revised to reflect changes concerning “sponsor deeming requirements when determining Food Stamp eligibility and benefits for children who are under the age of 18.” (Pl.
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Ex. 506 at MKB01526.) Since PRUCOL immigrants are not eligible for food stamps, no caseworker could reasonably have been alerted to changes affecting the PRUCOL categories. A revision to the City guide issued in May 2004 also made no mention of changes to the PRUCOL categories. (Pl. Ex. 509.)
In October 2004, State DOH published a different description of immigrants who are PRUCOL for purposes of the Medicaid program.[FN9] (Pl. Ex. 539.) Although City job centers are required to use this definition for Medicaid purposes, no City desk aid or policy directive or bulletin to job centers has alerted HRA employees of those aspects of State DOH's definition of PRUCOL that differ from State OTDA's definition. (See FOF ¶ 335.) The City's POS computer system also fails to include many common immigration documents that demonstrate that an immigrant is eligible for State Medicaid. (See FOF ¶ 336.)
FN9. Despite what would seem to be the self-evident proposition that the term PRUCOL, as used by the New York Court of Appeals and the Social Services Law, ought to have a single, well-defined meaning, the two agencies that administer benefits to immigrants who are PRUCOL have adopted disparate and, in part, conflicting interpretations of what that term means. (See Tr. 712:12-13) (“different state agencies have different interpretations of PRUCOL”)
B. Failure to Train
A municipality may be held liable for failing to train and adequately supervise its employees. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme Court addressed the scope of municipal liability for failure to train or supervise. There the Court held: It may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train its employees. But it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.
489 U.S. at 390. Elaborating on this language in Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit set forth three elements that must be established to sustain an allegation of failure to adequately train and supervise municipal employees: From these examples, we discern three requirements that must be met before a municipality's failure to train or supervise constitutes deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens. First, the plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows “to a moral certainty” that her employees will confront a given situation. Id. Thus, a policymaker does not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to train employees for rare or unforeseen events. Second, the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult

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or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation.... Finally, the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights ....
Walker, 974 F.2d at 297-98.
A claim of inadequate training and supervision under § 1983 does not require a showing of “ill will” or bad motive by the defendant. As described by the Second Circuit in Walker, the test is an objective one. Plaintiffs established at trial that they meet the criteria set forth in Walker.
1. The City knows to a moral certainty that immigrants who are class members in this case will apply for public benefits.
The City knows to a moral certainty that significant numbers of immigrants who are members of the proposed class in this case will apply for public benefits at Job Centers. Ms. Ganju testified that she alone represented 50 to 60 battered immigrant clients applying to HRA for public benefits during her 28 months at Sanctuary for Families (Tr. 474:16-475:2), and many additional cases were discussed by other witnesses at trial. While the exact number of cases is known only to the defendants, the numbers are obviously significant.
Furthermore, the Court invited the defendants to introduce evidence at trial of the total number of such cases, and indeed said that it was assuming the defendants would do so. (Tr. 467:10-14.) Yet, although the information is solely within their control, the defendants have never suggested, much less proffered, any evidence indicating that the number of cases is small or insignificant.
2. Eligibility decisions regarding class members in this case present City employees with difficult choices of the sort that training and supervision will make less dif-
ficult.
Eligibility decisions regarding immigrant class members in this case present City employees with difficult decisions of the sort that training and supervision will make less difficult. Ms. Shepard acknowledged this in response to questions by the Court regarding the POS computer system, which is supposed to guide workers through what is otherwise a very complex situation and lead them to correct decisions regarding eligibility: THE COURT: ... This system, as I understand it, this POS system, is supposed to operate so that if someone comes into a job center seeking either benefits they don't previously have or enhanced benefits or anything to do with benefits, the person there who is on the recipient end starts entering - starts making use of this computer programming to take them through what is otherwise a very complicated situation to make sure that the person is eligible or to determine if a person is not eligible. Do I have that part right? THE WITNESS: Yes.
(Tr. 761:19-762:4) (emphasis added). The POS computer system is designed with the idea that decisions regarding eligibility for public benefits - even those not in-

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volving alien eligibility - are inherently complex. The complex statutory scheme governing immigrant eligibility for benefits makes that all the more true with regard to alien eligibility decisions.
HRA itself recognizes that a regular regime of training is essential to ensure that workers make correct eligibility decisions. Mr. Whelan testified that HRA attempts to implement such training on a monthly basis using a “train-the-trainer” methodology. (Tr. 1194:6-1195:18.) The issue here is not whether such trainings are important and should be conducted; that is conceded. Indeed, HRA has established an Office of Training under Mr. Whelan's jurisdiction. (Tr. 1186:21-22.) Instead, the question is whether the trainings HRA conducted were accurate, comprehensive, and sufficiently frequent to ensure that workers are properly trained and supervised. As we demonstrate below, the evidence shows they are not.
3. City employees have a history of mishandling decisions regarding the eligibility of immigrant class members in this case.
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, overwhelming evidence demonstrated that City employees have a history of mishandling decisions regarding the eligibility of immigrant class members in this case. (See FOF ¶¶ 291, 318, 342-355.) Repeated, common errors by City workers, causing erroneous eligibility determinations, are directly attributable to flawed training materials prepared by the defendants. As was demonstrated earlier, the lack of awareness by HRA caseworkers of the eligibility of immigrants in the I-130 group and of PRUCOL immigrants is attributable in part to defective training materials used by the City to train those workers as well as to corresponding defects in the POS computer system that they utilize on a daily basis. (See pp. 4-8 supra.)
Other evidence demonstrated that workers who needed additional training in the area of immigrant eligibility for public benefits were not receiving it. For example, Josephine Pierre, a supervisor in the Linden Job Center who worked for the Center Director, testified that she could not remember the last time she attended a training regarding the eligibility of asylum applicants (Tr. 1130:19-25). Until she attended a training shortly before she testified, Ms. Pierre could not recall attending any trainings regarding immigrant eligibility for benefits for at least three years. (Tr. 1131:1-16.)
Likewise, when the Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs reached out in an e-mail to senior State and City officials and indicated that “centers/workers need more specific guidance on PRUCOL eligibility,” and that “[w]e have been unable to find any policy guidance on the required documentation to establish PRUCOL” (City Ex. MM), it was evident that workers at job centers were not receiving sufficient training on that important topic.
In short, the evidence demonstrates not only a history of errors, but a history of errors that flowed from either inadequate training or the use of faulty training materials, and that was reinforced by similar flaws in the City's computer system.
4. Erroneous decisions by City employees frequently cause the loss of public bene-
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fits to which immigrant class members are eligible.
Plaintiffs also demonstrated that erroneous decisions by City workers frequently cause immigrant class members to lose public benefits to which they are legally entitled. The record is replete with examples of benefits being denied erroneously or discontinued. (See FOF ¶¶ 291-318, 342-355, 356-361.) Even when decisions were later rectified - for example, after fair hearings, or as the result of persistent and extended advocacy by advocates like Ms. Ganju - benefits were still lost for significant periods of time, causing severe and irreparable injury. In response to questioning by the Court, Ms. Ganju testified that the duration of delays in the receipt of benefits varied greatly, but she indicated that in some cases the delays could amount to months in duration. (Tr. 477:22-478:13.)
5. The City was on notice of the need for additional training.
The City had ample notice of the need for additional training regarding immigrant eligibility issues. (See FOF ¶¶ 390-405.) In July 2004, Ms. Ganju and other advocates attended a meeting with HRA's Deputy Commissioner for Domestic Violence Emergency Services, Cecile Noel. During that meeting, Ms. Ganju discussed her belief that additional training of “ADVENT program” workers was necessary on issues of immigrant eligibility for benefits. (Tr. 479:10-20.) The ADVENT program consists of units within job centers that deal exclusively with domestic violence victims. (Tr. 479:1-4.) Although ADVENT workers are not involved in “initial applications,” they are involved at subsequent stages after the initial application has been completed. (Tr. 512:1-5.) At that meeting, Ms. Ganju expressed her belief that ADVENT workers “did not know the alien eligibility rules,” and that it was important that they do so because they were dealing with battered qualified immigrants frequently. (Tr. 479:16-20, 482:21-483:1.) She also presented Ms. Noel with a letter requesting additional and comprehensive training for ADVENT staff on battered immigrant eligibility for public benefits (Pl. Ex. 778), and sent a copy of that letter to Elaine Witty, Director of HRA's Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs. (Tr. 512:13-16.) In October 2004, Ms. Ganju followed up on her initial conversation and provided training materials to Ms. Noel and Ms. Witty on immigrant eligibility issues. (Tr. 483:5-18.)
In conclusion, all the elements of a claim for inadequate training and supervision against the City defendant have been established here.
POINT II
LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS
A. Evidence Received Against the City Defendant Is Admissible Against the State Defendant.
All evidence received against the City defendant as an admission by a party opponent is admissible against the State defendants under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Rule 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is “a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within

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the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” “A sufficient foundation to support the introduction of vicarious admissions therefore requires only that a party establish (1) the existence of the agency relationship, (2) that the statement was made during the course of the relationship, and (3) that it relates to a matter within the scope of the agency.” Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1992). “The authority granted in the agency relationship need not include authority to make damaging statements, but simply the authority to take action about which the statements relate.” Id. at 538.
As a matter of law and fact, HRA serves as the agent of State OTDA with regard to the food stamp and public assistance programs, and the agent of State DOH with regard to the Medicaid program. Section 65(3) of the Social Services Law provides: “The county commissioner shall act as the agent of the department in all matters relating to assistance and care administered or authorized by the town public welfare officers.” N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 65(3) (emphasis added).[FN10] Construing this language in Beaudoin v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 343, 408 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1978), the New York Court of Appeals made this agency relationship crystal clear:
FN10. The term “department” is defined in N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 2(1): “Department means the state department of social services, provided however that for purposes of titles eleven ... of article five of this chapter [Medicaid], department means the state department of health....” The “department of social services” has since been renamed the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, 1997 Laws of N.Y. ch. 436, § 122(f).
In New York State, the social services program is a State program, administered through the 58 local social services districts under the general supervision of the State Department of Social Services and the State Commissioner of Social Services. (NY Const, art XVII, § 1; Social Services Law, §§ 17, 20, 34.) The county commissioners are denominated by statute “agents” of the State department (Social Services Law, § 65, subd 3) .... [T]he local commissioners act on behalf of and as agents for the State. Each is a part of and the local arm of the single State administrative agency .... Inasmuch as the local commissioners are agents of the State department they may not substitute their interpretations of the regulations of the State department for those of the State department or the State commissioner (Matter of Samuels v Berger, 55 AD2d 913; Matter of Bonfanti v Kirby, 54 AD2d 714; Matter of Barbaro v Wyman, 32 AD2d 647). To recognize any such right would be to undermine the supervisory authority of the State commissioner and to invite administrative chaos.
Beaudoin, 45 N.Y.2d at 347-48, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
In addition to their statutory role as “agents” under state law, the local districts serve as agents under federal law with regard to the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs. The Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts both require participating states to designate a single state agency to be responsible for administering and supervising the programs. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5), 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid). As Judge Pauley found last year in Reynolds v. Gi-

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uliani, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2743, at *61-62 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005), these federal mandates require HRA to serve as the State's agent for purposes of the Medicaid and food stamp programs: For administration of these public welfare programs, local social services districts, including the City of New York, are considered “agents of the state.” See Reynolds III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The Food Stamp Act expressly defines the term “State agency” as “the agency of State government, including the local offices thereof, which has the responsibility for the administration of the federally aided public assistance programs within such State ....” 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n). Similarly, states bear the ultimate responsibility for supervising compliance with the Medicaid Act and state cash assistance programs. See Hillburn v. Maher, 795 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 1986) (“single State agency” required to administer Medicaid to avoid lack of accountability); Beaudoin, 45 N.Y.2d at 347-48 (“In the administration of public assistance funds, whether they come from Federal, State or local sources... the local commissions act on behalf of and as agents for the State.”).
Accordingly, HRA is the agent of State OTDA (and, for the Medicaid program, State DOH) for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Since there is no doubt that any statements by HRA pertaining to this case were made during the course of the agency relationship, and relate to matters within the scope of that agency, these statements are admissible against the State agencies.
Finally, at trial, the State and City defendants conceded the existence of this agency relationship. For example, when counsel for the State asserted that only the City, and not the State, makes determinations of eligibility for public assistance unless the matter is brought to a fair hearing (Tr. 1371:12-21), the following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: I see. So in other words, the state has delegated to the city as its agents this important function. MR. KRAFT: That's right. It's exactly how the social services law is laid out. THE COURT: You are making a very good case for Mr. Rosenberg's last argument. But in any event, for the moment the question will be limited to the city.
(Tr. 1371:22-1372:3.)
Likewise, counsel for the City asked Mr. Dichian: Q. [D]oes HRA have the authority to issue policy directives and bulletins without the approval of OTDA? A. No. Q. And if OTDA sets the parameters for inclusion within a specific class of persons entitled to benefits, does HRA have the authority to expand that category? A. No.
(Tr. 728:7-13.) HRA's authority is limited in this fashion because, by statute, HRA serves as the agent of the State.
For all these reasons, admissions by HRA personnel received in evidence against the City are admissible against State OTDA (with regard to public assistance and food stamps) and against State DOH (with regard to Medicaid) as well.
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B. The State Defendants' Liability for Violations of Federal Law Has Been Established.
The State's liability in this action has been demonstrated for two independent reasons. First, as a factual matter, the State either caused or contributed to the cause of many of the violations committed by the City defendants' employees. Second, as a legal matter, the State is jointly responsible with the City defendant for the City's violation of federal law.
1. The State caused or contributed to the cause of violations.
The plaintiffs demonstrated that the State caused or contributed to the cause of federal violations by the City defendant in the following seven respects. The first four categories involve issues on which further relief from this Court is necessary. The last three categories involve issues that were rectified by the State in response to this Court's order of February 16, 2006. Although no further relief is needed regarding those last three items, mention is made of them here to make clear that the Court's order of February 16 on these aspects of relief was fully warranted.
a. Single date field for Alien/Citizenship Indicator
As noted previously, see Point I supra, the WMS computer system has a single date field for recording the date on which an immigrant entered the country or became a qualified alien. Until changes ordered by this Court are implemented, information entered into that field can be erased when a subsequent relevant event occurs (such as when the immigrant obtains a green card), and a new date is entered in that field. This problem, which Mr. Spielman conceded caused the wrongful denial of benefits (Tr. 1334:20-22.), will be partially rectified by an edit that will prevent a later date from overwriting an earlier date. While an improvement, this change does not fully solve the problem. See Point III infra.
b. Opening cases for immigrants directly in WMS
A case must have two suffixes if one person in the family is eligible for State public benefits and another is eligible for federal public benefits. (Tr. 791:20-792:10, 856:25-857:3.) Two suffix cases cannot be opened in POS and must be opened in WMS. (Tr. 792:14-16.)
Evidence presented at trial established that the design of the WMS computer system makes it difficult to open a case directly for an alien in WMS generally, but particularly difficult if a case is multi-suffix. (See FOF ¶¶ 225-245.) The problem lies in certain rules built into WMS, known as “edits” and “cross-edits”[FN11] that are designed to ensure the compatibility and integrity of data in various fields. In order to open a case successfully for an immigrant, the alien status or ACI indicator (element 382), alien number (element 381), and date of entry (element 389) must be compatible with several data elements related to whether someone was eligible for state or federal benefits (elements 307, 325, 376, 377, and 343). (Tr. 1364:19-1365:24.) Most of the plaintiffs' and declarants' cases errored out in WMS

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because of errors related to these cross-edits. (Tr. 1370:7-14, 1376:19-1377:1.)
FN11. An “edit” is a rule requiring that data entered into a data element in WMS must conform to a value that WMS recognizes. If a case fails an edit in WMS, then it errors out. (Tr. 846:6-847:11.) A “cross-edit” is a rule requiring that data entered into a data element in WMS must be compatible with information entered in other data elements in WMS. If data in one data element is not compatible with data in another, the case will error out and will not process successfully. (Tr. 1364:1-15, 809:11-20, 849:3-9.)
These problems are acute when a family member seeking addition to an existing case is eligible for state benefits has a case in a rejected (“RJ”) status and the household member with an active case is receiving federal benefits. In that situation which applied to, and caused errors in, a number of the plaintiffs' cases (Tr. 1377:7-13) - the steps that must be taken to open such a multi-suffix case in WMS are very complex and must be taken over a series of days. (Tr. 796:16-22, 1343:18-20; FOF ¶¶ 234-237.)[FN12]
FN12. On the first day, the worker must change the entire family to Safety Net Assistance. On the second day, the worker must put the immigrants into applying (or AP) status. Then the worker must activate the lines. Finally, the worker must split the suffix into two so that those family members eligible for federal public benefits are on a separate line from those eligible for state public benefits. (Tr. 1354:18-1356:6.) If a worker attempts to add such persons to a case through POS, the case will error out. POS does not, however, prompt workers to inform them that the case must be processed through WMS. (Tr. 1359:16-1360:18; see also Tr. 1094:3-19.)
The root of the problem - and the basis for the relief plaintiffs are seeking on this score, see Point III infra is that instructional materials and training on these matters are inadequate. (See FOF ¶¶ 238-243.) This full process for opening such cases is not explained in State OTDA's Authorization of Grants Manual (State Exhibit QQ). (Tr. 1356:9-12, 880:25-881:4; see also Tr. 1346:24-1347: 1.) Indeed, there is no example in the Authorization of Grants Manual regarding how to open a multi-suffix case involving a family with immigrants. (Tr. 877:8-12.) HRA workers do not receive training on when a case needs to have two suffixes (Tr. 1097:1-6.), and State OTDA does not provide trainings to HRA employees on how to open multisuffix cases. (Tr. 883:21-884:13.) Even some “error correction specialists” do not know how to open cases of this type. (Tr. 1095:10-18.)
Although multi-suffix errors may eventually be corrected, they cause significant delays in clients receiving benefits for which they are eligible. Even after the defendants represented to the Court that benefits would be provided to the named plaintiffs, some of their cases continued to error out multiple times. (Pl. Exs. 30A at 2, 30B, 30C.) In the case of Ms. Ganju's client, S.M., the case errored out no fewer than six or seven times before it was finally opened. (Tr. 403:22-404:5.)
c. Social Security numbers for immigrants applying for federal benefits

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As noted previously, the City provides a flawed letter to immigrants to use in applying for a Social Security number. That letter is on a form prescribed by the State. In Point III infra, the plaintiffs seek relief against State OTDA regarding this problem to the extent that it results in the denial of federal benefits.
d. Flawed State training materials
State training materials are seriously flawed. (See FOF ¶¶ 253-243.) A number of flawed State training materials have already been noted. For example, the training materials prepared for State OTDA by Rockefeller College in 2004 are rife with errors concerning the eligibility of immigrants for public assistance. (Pl. Ex. 536.) In the list of immigrants who may be eligible for federal public assistance, federal food stamps, and federal Medicaid, battered qualified aliens are not even on the list. (Pl. Ex. 536 at MKB01355-57.) In the description of who may be eligible for Safety Net Assistance, PRUCOL immigrants are not even mentioned. (Id. at MKB01357.)
The Rockefeller College training materials prepared in November 2005 on food stamp eligibility (Pl. Ex. 677), discussed at some length during Mr. Ptak's examination at trial (Tr. 1152:10-1162:12), are also grievously flawed. Those materials are the State's most recent final set of training materials on food stamp eligibility (Tr. 1154:1-4), and were used as recently as November and December 2005 to train HRA workers. (Tr. 1154:5-13.) They completely omit any mention of battered qualified aliens from the list of immigrants who are eligible for federal food stamps. (Pl. Ex. 677 at MKB-OTDA 10437; see Tr. 1156:15-1158:18.) Moreover, they are seriously flawed in many other ways as well (Tr. 1160:7-1162:12), demonstrating a stunning lack of attention to detail and accuracy. Indeed, Mr. Ptak admitted that the training materials he had attached to his own affidavit did not include mention of any of the categories of immigrants whose eligibility for food stamp benefits was restored by the Food Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2002, Title IV of Public Law 107-171, which he discussed in paragraph six of his affidavit. (Tr. 1174:20-1178:4.)
e. Alien numbers
Some battered qualified immigrants do not have an Alien number. (Tr. 1389:13-14, 863:15-864:15, 866:15-867:2.) Nonetheless, until this Court ordered that corrective action be taken concerning this problem, WMS and POS required the entry of an Alien number in order to open a case for a battered qualified immigrant. (Tr. 1389:9-12.) If an Alien number was not entered, the case would error out. (Tr. 865:4-11; see also FOF ¶¶ 246-252.)
A number of battered qualified immigrant cases either could not be opened or “errored out” because of this problem. For example, in January 2006, one of the plaintiffs' or declarants' cases errored out because that individual did not have an Alien number. (Tr. 868:11-25, 871:2-10.) Additionally, two of Ms. Ganju's clients were denied public benefits, or had their receipt of public benefits delayed, because they did not have an Alien number or because the number could not be located. (Tr. 472:9-474:15.) In the case of R.K., this caused a delay in the receipt of benefits of one month. (Tr. 473:20-474:10.)

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Corrections to WMS regarding Alien numbers were not made until March 2006, in response to this Court's order of February 16, 2006. (Tr. 865:12-16, 1389:9-12.)
f. State Alien Eligibility Desk Aid and State Policy Memoranda
Until the fall of 2004, the State alien eligibility desk aid (Pl. Ex. 640), and State informational materials (Pl. Exs. 647, 648) made no mention of the eligibility of the I-130 group of immigrants. (Tr. 695:8-697:13.) The State has admitted that the desk aid was not clear enough regarding I-130 petitions. (Tr. 700:1-15.) Moreover, apart from the desk aid, as of the summer of 2004, no other State OTDA policy statements or training materials addressed the I-130 group of immigrants. (Tr. 702:8-11.) Even after mention of this group was added, see Pl. Ex. 640 at MKBOTDA 10535, it was done in a very misleading and incomplete manner. (See FOF ¶¶ 337-341.) The applicable row of the chart that addresses battered immigrants refers only to immigrants who obtain a prima facie notice (which does not apply to the I130 group). Not until the end of trial did the State issue a new desk aid making corrections in this respect. (See FOF ¶ 341.)
g. Inadequate and misleading State CNS Notices
A substantial amount of evidence was received regarding Client Notice System (CNS) notices that are inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading because they fail to include any reference to battered qualified immigrants. (E.g., see Pl. Ex. 882; 1164, ninth unnumbered page (notice to Natasha Dmitro); Tr. 703:3-704:10, 1167:3-11687; FOF ¶¶ 380-386.) In response to this Court's order, this problem appears to have been rectified. (State Ex. UU.)
2. The State is jointly responsible for the City's systemic violations of federal law.
Because the State caused, or contributed to the cause of, numerous systemic violations of federal law by the City defendant, injunctive relief against the State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is fully warranted. Accordingly, this Court need not reach the question whether the State would also be liable for such systemic violations by the City under § 1983 even if the State were not, in fact, responsible for causing the problem in whole or in part.
That said, the law is clear that the State is jointly liable with the City, as a matter of law, for the City's systemic violations of the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid Acts, regardless of whether the State factually caused or contributed to those violations. As noted earlier, the federal Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts impose on the State the responsibility for administering and supervising the programs. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5). Although the State may delegate those responsibilities to its agents, the local social services districts, ultimate responsibility for administration of the program rests on the shoulders of the State. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Judge Koeltl's discussion of the State's liability under these provisions in Dajour B. v. City of New York, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001), is

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fully applicable here. As Judge Koeltl held: DOH next argues it is not liable for the City's alleged deficiencies in providing EPSDT services. DOH essentially asserts that its delegation of the administration of the state's Medicaid plan to the local social services districts, including the City's HRA, relieves it of its responsibility to ensure that the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act are enforced. This argument is without merit. While a participating state may delegate certain administrative responsibilities to political subdivisions, including the administration of EPSDT services, Congress has placed the ultimate responsibility to administer the Medicaid Act on the State, and that duty is non-delegable. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a); Reynolds II, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 385-86 (concluding that a state that chooses to delegate administration of the Medicaid program retains duty to ensure compliance with the Medicaid Act's requirements); cf. Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding state responsible for ensuring local agencies compliance with the Food Stamp Act where the state chose to delegate administrative responsibilities of its food stamp program to local agencies); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984) (“While the state may choose to delegate some administrative responsibilities, the ultimate responsibility for operation of the food stamp plan remain[s] with the state.”) (quotation omitted). Thus, although 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) does not provide the plaintiffs with an enforceable right under Section 1983, the DOH, as the agency responsible for New York State's Medicaid program is accountable for violations of the substantive EPSDT provisions, which do create enforceable rights
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251, at *42-43.
During the oral argument on February 2, 2006, the Court was well-aware of Judge Koeltl's holding in Dajour B., and asked counsel for the State to address how, if at all, Dajour B. could be distinguished. (Tr. of Oral Arg., February 2, 2006, at 27.) At that time, Mr. Kraft sought to limit the reasoning of Dajour to cases in which individual problems could not be addressed in fair hearings. (Id. at 27-28.) This distinction lacks merit. Apart from the fact that other courts have reached the same conclusion even when issues could be raised in fair hearings, e.g., Reynolds v. Giuliani, supra, the distinction misses a critical point.
The issues in this case are actionable under § 1983 precisely because they involve systemic violations. Systemic violations cannot, by definition, be cured in individual fair hearings. Consider, for example, the design flaws in the POS computer system that made it difficult or impossible for HRA workers to open cases for battered qualified immigrants. No State Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) could do more than order that benefits be provided or restored to a particular appellant affected by that problem. Certainly an ALJ could not, in the context of a single fair hearing, order the City to redesign its computer system. And even if such an extraordinary order were ever issued by an ALJ, the City would certainly refuse to comply with it because it ordered relief beyond the circumstances of the individual client whose case was heard in the fair hearing.
In short, the essence of the State's position here is that it has no legal responsibility to take steps to rectify any systemic violations of the federal Food Stamp

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and Medicaid Acts. Its ALJs may not order such corrections; and - the State claims no court may hold the State responsible for such violations either. This is an extraordinary legal position with no support in the food stamp or Medicaid Acts or in the case law. Those statutes make the State the single agency responsible for administration of the systemic aspects of the benefit programs. The State's position, in contrast, would absolve the State of any such responsibility. This position is wholly without merit and must be rejected.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER ADDITIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE CITY AND STATE DEFENDANTS.
A. Additional Relief Warranted Against the State Defendants
For the reasons set forth in Points I and II of this brief, the evidence demonstrates that the following additional relief should be ordered against the State defendants:
1. Adequately correct the single-date problem in WMS
As discussed in Point I(A)(3) supra, the fact that WMS has only one date field related to alien status results in the unlawful denial of food stamps to lawful permanent residents who have been green card holders for less than five years but who have been in a qualified status for five or more years. To prevent these erroneous denials, State OTDA should be ordered to add a second date field to WMS and provide proper instructions on which dates should be entered into those fields.
2. Training and improved instructions regarding multi-suffix cases
For reasons explained earlier, instructional materials and training on how to open multi-suffix cases for immigrants are grossly inadequate. The State should be ordered to prepare clear and comprehensive instructions on how to enter such cases into WMS for all the categories of immigrants affected by this litigation. (See ¶¶ 33-35 supra.)
3. Social Security numbers for applicants for federal benefits
The State should be ordered to revise 02 INF 40 (Pl. Ex. 631) so that it correctly states the current practice of the SSA with regard to the issuance of non-work Social Security numbers for immigrants applying for public benefits. The letter provided to those who do not have Social Security numbers but are otherwise eligible for federal benefits should be revised to make clear that the local social services district must designate the federal benefits program, if any, for which the immigrant is applying for benefits, and the provision of federal law that requires a Social Security number in order to receive those benefits. (See ¶¶ 8-11 supra.)
4. Training materials regarding federal Medicaid and food stamps

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The State should be ordered to revise all State training materials, including those prepared and used by contractors, so that they accurately and comprehensively recite the immigrant eligibility rules for federal Medicaid and federal food stamps.
B. Additional relief warranted against the City defendant
For the reasons set forth in Point I of this brief, the evidence demonstrates that the following additional relief should be ordered against the City defendant:
1. Social Security number requirements
The Court should direct the City to issue a correct and comprehensive policy directive or bulletin regarding when Social Security numbers are, and are not, required for federal and State public benefits programs for all categories of immigrants affected by this case. This issuance must include a sample letter that complies with SSA's requirements. Upon issuance, the City should conduct trainings for all staff who are involved in determining or reviewing the eligibility of immigrants for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance at Job Centers, including the new immigrant liaisons; all supervisory personnel in the Center Director and Regional Manager offices; ADVENT staff; fair hearing compliance workers; and all other personnel who are involved in accepting, denying, or discontinuing public benefits.
2. Eligibility for benefits of battered qualified immigrants and persons who are PRUCOL immigrants
The Court should direct the City to correct all policy directives that relate to immigrant eligibility for benefits and that omit reference to the eligibility of the I-130 group of immigrants (such as 03-65-ELI, which is Pl. Ex. 507)). (See FOF ¶¶ 264-290.) The Court should also direct the City to issue a policy directive or bulletin on PRUCOL eligibility for benefits, which should include a clear description of PRUCOL eligibility for both public assistance and Medicaid and the differences, if any, between them. Upon issuance, the City should conduct trainings for all staff who are involved in determining or reviewing the eligibility of battered qualified immigrants and PRUCOL immigrants for Medicaid, public assistance, and/or food stamps at job centers, as described above. (See FOF ¶¶ 327-341.) A separate training should be conducted for frontline workers designed to ensure that they correctly recognize a client who may be a battered qualified immigrant or a PRUCOL immigrant, and make a proper referral to the immigrant liaison. (See FOF ¶¶ 342-355.)
3. Green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years
As was evident with the case of Galina Rybalko, see Point IV infra, there can be substantial confusion over the eligibility of green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years. In particular, as occurred in the case of Ms. Rybalko, questions arise concerning how to determine the number of years of Qualified Alien status. To ensure that eligibility decisions in these cases are made by properly trained workers, the Court should direct the City to include such cases among those that are referred to the immigrant liaisons. The liaisons should receive training regarding the so-called Rybalko issue (how to determine the number of years

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of Qualified Alien status). In the alternative, the Court should direct the City to conduct trainings for all front-line eligibility workers and supervisor staff regarding the eligibility of immigrants in this category and the number of years of qualified status they have accrued.
The Court should also direct the City to train its workers to know which dates must be entered into the computer systems in order to determine eligibility for food stamps (the date qualified status is achieved) and in order to determine eligibility for federal Medicaid and federally-funded public assistance (date of entry into the country).
4. Training on opening cases on aliens in WMS
The Court should direct the City, in coordination with the State, to conduct trainings on how to open cases for aliens directly in WMS, focusing particularly on multi-suffix cases. This training should be for all staff who are involved in opening such cases for battered qualified immigrants for Medicaid, public assistance, and/or food stamps at job centers.
5. Issuance of notices
The Court should direct the City to issue a policy directive or bulletin regarding the issuance of a notice of acceptance or denial to households (a) when an immigrant household applies for public benefits and the case is accepted for the citizen children and denied for immigrant household members; and (b) when a request to add immigrant household members to the existing public benefits case of a citizen child is denied. Upon issuance, the City should conduct training for all staff who are involved in issuing such notices.
6. Cases not handled by immigrant liaisons
The testimony of Mr. Whelan was rather unclear regarding how many and what types of cases the immigrant liaisons would handle. (E.g., Tr. 1232:15-1233:2.) This was particularly so with regard to cases involving battered qualified immigrants and PRUCOL immigrants outside of the context of initial eligibility, including cases (a) coming up for recertification, (b) involving a proposed adverse action to be taken related to immigration status or a Social Security or Alien number issue, and (c) involving fair hearing compliance related to immigration status or a Social Security number or Alien number issue.
The plaintiffs believe it would be preferable if the immigrant liaison staff were to handle all cases in categories (a), (b), and (c). However, caseload limitations may make that proposal impractical at this time. Therefore, the Court should order that if, and to the extent that, the City defendants do not refer cases in categories (a), (b), and (c) to the immigrant liaisons, then staff who handle such cases will be provided the same training that immigrant liaison workers receive with regard to immigrant eligibility for benefits.
7. POS revisions

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The record is somewhat unclear concerning precisely what changes to POS will be made in the upcoming POS release. In the upcoming release, POS should add a category for battered qualified immigrants in the initial menu. POS should eliminate any question that requires a worker to answer “yes” to whether such an immigrant has a “prima facie” notice in order to open such a case. Revisions to POS should include references to documents that render an immigrant eligible for PRUCOL for Medicaid purposes (to the extent different than for public assistance). POS should also make clear that in determining five years of qualified status, periods of qualified status accrued under different immigration status may be added together, so that the eligibility of clients like Ms. Rybalko will be handled correctly. (See Tr. 1372:22-1373:15.)
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO INTERVENE MS. RYBALKO SHOULD BE GRANTED
A. Facts Concerning Ms. Rybalko
Galina Rybalko was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period in April 2000. (Pl. Ex. 173). She therefore entered the United States as a Qualified Alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(4). A Qualified Alien is eligible for food stamps if she has resided in the United States in a qualified status for five or more years. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(2)(L). Thus, Ms. Rybalko became eligible for federal food stamps in April 2005.
Ms. Rybalko received her green card in June 2003. (Pl. Ex. 173.) She applied for food stamps at the Coney Island Job Center in April 2005, shortly after the fiveyear anniversary of the date she became a Qualified Alien. (Tr. 323:5-9.) HRA initially denied Ms. Rybalko's application. Later HRA granted her benefits, but then discontinued them after finding they were erroneously granted. When benefits were denied and later discontinued, HRA workers at the Coney Island center repeatedly stated that Ms. Rybalko is ineligible because she has not had her green card for five years. (Tr. 325:20-326:17, 329:13-330:8; see also FOF ¶¶ 64-77.)
Ms. Rybalko requested two fair hearings challenging the denial and discontinuance of her food stamps. In two fair hearing compliance statements, HRA stated that Ms. Rybalko is not eligible to receive food stamps on account of her immigration status. (Pl. Ex. 170, 172.) In one of those statements, HRA explicitly indicates that Ms. Rybalko must have a green card for five years in order to be eligible for food stamps. (Pl. Ex. 70.)
Even after Ms. Rybalko testified in this case, there was considerable confusion at the City and State levels regarding whether she had five years of qualified alien status. (See Tr. 1217:16-20 (indicating that the City was waiting for a “clearance from the State” before it could report back to the plaintiffs), 1372:22-1373:15 (discussing the number of years of qualified status).) As of the close of trial, Ms. Rybalko had not received the benefits she was seeking. (Tr. 1405:2-6.)

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For purposes of the proposed findings of fact, the Court directed the parties to assume Ms. Rybalko had been intervened, and indicated that if intervention is granted, she will be added nunc pro tunc as of March 24, 2006. The Court deemed plaintiffs' oral application to add Ms. Rybalko as a named plaintiff to be a motion for that relief. (Tr. 1409:6-12.)
B. Ms. Rybalko's Motion to Intervene Should Be Granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) permits class members to intervene in a pending class action. Eckert v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 227 F.R.D. 60, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 147 F.R.D. 60, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) authorizes permissive intervention upon timely application “when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” Courts are “particularly amenable to permissive intervention” when no additional issues are presented and when intervention would strengthen the adequacy of the representation. A. Conte & H. Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 16:8, at 166-68 (2002).
In this case, Ms. Rybalko shares a question of law and fact with the class. The class is comprised of “Affected Immigrants” who are eligible for, inter alia, federal food stamps and who have either been denied those benefits or had them discontinued or reduced, because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. The term “Affected Immigrants” includes four groups of immigrants. The third of those groups consists of “lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years.” (Complaint ¶ 30.) Ms. Rybalko is eligible for federal food stamps; she has had those benefits both denied and discontinued because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules; and she is in the third category of Affected Immigrants. She therefore shares a question of law and fact with the class. Currently, she is the only representative of the third category of Affected Immigrants.
Ms. Rybalko's motion to intervene should be granted for several reasons. First, and most importantly, the City has proposed a plan in which immigrant liaisons will review and act on applications for benefits by certain immigrants. Those immigrants include battered qualified immigrants and persons who are PRUCOL (the first, second, and fourth groups of Affected Immigrants in the class). However, they do not include green card holders (the third group represented by Ms. Rybalko). (See FOF ¶¶ 409-410.) As indicated in Point III supra, the plaintiffs are requesting certain relief regarding immigrants in Ms. Rybalko's category, including referrals to the immigrant liaisons and training concerning immigrant eligibility. Ms. Rybalko's motion to intervene should be granted so she may represent that group of immigrants for whom this relief is sought.
Second, even if the Court were to deny this branch of the relief plaintiffs seek, Ms. Rybalko should be permitted to intervene because disputes may arise in the future regarding other immigrants like her who are seeking public benefits. Indeed, if the “Rybalko cases” are not referred to the liaisons, then such disputes may be more likely to arise because of potential confusion regarding their eligibility and because their cases will not be handled by specialists. A class representative of

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those immigrants should be made a party to the action in case further relief regarding this group is sought.
Ms. Rybalko's motion to intervene is timely. Additionally, there would be no conceivable prejudice to the defendants if she were made a party to the action. Accordingly, her motion to intervene should be granted.
POINT V
THE PROPOSED CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED
Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and a class defined as: All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
The standards for class certification are set forth in plaintiffs' opening memorandum of law. At the hearing, plaintiffs have proved all of the requisite elements.
A. Plaintiffs have demonstrated numerosity.
Plaintiffs have provided direct evidence in this proceeding of the erroneous denial and discontinuance of the applications of a large number of Affected Immigrants. (See FOF ¶¶ 1-189 (discussing 24 class members); Tr. 474:16-475:2 (testimony of Ms. Ganju that she represented 50 to 60 battered immigrant clients applying to HRA for public benefits during her 28 months at Sanctuary).) This evidence demonstrates that a large number of Affected Immigrants have faced the problems alleged in the Complaint and that there are system-wide problems that would affect any member of the class, when viewed in light of the common sense assumption that the advocates involved in this case could not possibly have brought before the Court every instance of erroneous denial that exists throughout the proposed class. It is further evident, from the fact that defendants have portions of their computer systems and published policies specifically dealing with the issues of the proposed class members, that the defendants themselves consider the matters at issue to involve classes of applicants within the City and not mere isolated cases. Moreover, although invited by the Court to do so (Tr. 467:10-14), defendants never proffered any evidence to dispute the numerosity of the proposed class.

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This evidence readily satisfies the numerosity requirement for a class action.
B. Class members share common issues of law and fact.
Plaintiffs allege, and have submitted extensive proof, that the alleged deprivations on the part of defendants are widespread and systematic. These problems, involving flawed computer systems, policies and training, broadly affect qualified immigrants. (See FOF ¶¶ 197-252 (computer problems); ¶¶ 264-290, 331-341 (flawed policy directives); ¶¶ 253-263, 390-405 (faulty training)).
The evidence shows that all class members share common issues of law and fact: defendants erroneously and systemically fail to provide public benefits to members of the class as a result of, for example, maintaining computer systems that wrongly omit significant categories of eligible immigrants, failing to provide instructions and training on the proper use of those computer systems to handle issues typical of the members of the proposed class, providing policy directives and guidelines that do not conform to applicable law, and not properly training workers charged with assessing eligibility.
The common questions resulting from the systemic failures on the part of the defendants which have been demonstrated in this case are sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement. See Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[t]he commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs' grievances share a common question of law or fact.”) (emphasis added); McCoy v. Ithaca Hous. Auth., 559 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (even a single common question establishes commonality).
C. Named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class.
Plaintiffs have shown that the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the rest of the class because each plaintiff, like all members of the class, is an immigrant eligible for public benefits who was denied or delayed in receiving those benefits as a result of defendants' pattern and practice of misapplying the laws governing eligibility of immigrants.
In Reynolds, this Court certified a class of public benefits applicants similar to that in this case. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements because “the named plaintiffs' claims arise from the same course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of all the class members and are based on the same legal theories.” Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
Where computer systems are programmed to omit large portions of a class, policies are promulgated that erroneously direct that benefits be withheld from substantial groups within the class, and workers are not trained so as to deal effectively with issues that typify membership in the class, the typicality requirements for a class action are satisfied.
D. Named class members and counsel provide adequate representation.
Counsel has demonstrated its ability to prosecute this case vigorously, and this
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Court has denied defendants' motion seeking disqualification. The named plaintiffs have and will continue to fairly represent the class. The interests of the named plaintiffs are identical to those of the proposed class because the named plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to assure that defendants conform their computer systems, policy directives, and worker training to the statutes and regulations governing immigrant eligibility so that class members will receive the benefits for which they are eligible. Such relief will have no detrimental effect on any of the other class members, but will serve to assist them in obtaining benefits to which they are entitled. Further, the named plaintiffs have participated fully in this litigation, having depositions taken, submitting requested documents, and testifying at the evidentiary hearing. Thus, the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).
E. The Class Satisfies The Requirements of Rules 23(b)(2) and (3).
1. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(2).
The proposed class meets the criterion for certification set forth in Rule 23(b)(2), which provides that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”
The defendants routinely violate the statutes and regulations governing immigrant eligibility for public benefits, thus denying public benefits to eligible immigrant class members. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is therefore appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2). See Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91 (certifying class under 23(b)(2) where City defendants' improper deterrence of individuals from applying for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance, and failure to timely process applications, as well as State defendants' failure to oversee the City defendants' compliance with welfare laws, constituted actions generally applicable to the class making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a whole).
2. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(3).
The proposed class also meets the criteria for certification set forth in Rule 23(b)(3) because “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any question affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs do not merely seek to receive the benefits to which they personally are entitled, but rather they are addressing class-wide problems that commonly bear on Affected Immigrants.
Plaintiffs also fulfill the second requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), “that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (2003). The Rule lists the following four factors to consider under the second requirement: (A) the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against the members of the class;
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(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
As for the first factor, class members share the same interest: ensuring that Affected Immigrants receive the benefits to which they are entitled. Regarding the second factor, named plaintiffs are unaware of “any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against the members of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). Additionally, it is clearly desirable to concentrate this litigation in New York City because all of the class members are New York City residents and have been negatively affected by the actions of the New York City government and the New York State government in New York City. Finally, class counsel has already demonstrated that it is capable of managing the case by filing the complaint and bringing this case through a two-week hearing over the short span of less than four months.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should (1) issue a preliminary injunction granting the relief set forth in Point III supra; (2) certify a class as defined in paragraph 30 of the Complaint; and (3) grant the motion to intervene by Galina Rybalko.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2006 WL 1444044 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. No. 05 CV 10446 (JSR). January 30, 2006.
State Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction And Class Certification.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Attorney for State defendants, 120 Broadway, 24th Floor, New York, New York 10271, (212) 416-8632.Robert L. Kraft, Assistant Attorney General of Counsel.
Table of Contents
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ... 2
A. NEW YORK STATE PARTICIPATES IN FEDERALLY FUNDED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND MUST COMPLY WITH ELIGIBILITY LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN FEDERAL LAW ... 2
1. PROVIDING A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS A CONDITION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERALLY FUNDED BENEFIT PROGRAMS ... 3
2. ALIEN STATUS AFFECTS ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS THROUGH FEDERALLY FUNDED PROGRAMS ... 4
B. NEW YORK'S STATE-FUNDED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MEET THE NEEDS OF SOME PERSONS INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE FEDERALLY FUNDED BENEFITS BUT HAVE THEIR OWN ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS ... 8
C. STATE DEFENDANTS SUPERVISE THE ADMINISTRATION OF BENEFIT PROGRAMS BY LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICTS ... 10
1. GENERAL SUPERVISION THROUGH STATE REGULATIONS AND OTHER STATEWIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL DISTRICTS ... 12
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2. REVIEW OF SPECIFIC CASES THROUGH FAIR HEARINGS ... 12
3. THE OTDA OPERATES A COMPUTER SYSTEM THAT LOCAL SOCIALSERVICES DISTRICTS USE TO ADMINISTER PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ... 18
D. THE PLAINTIFFS' FAIR HEARINGS ... 19
E. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT ... 23
ARGUMENT ... 25
POINT I THE PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE DENIED ... 25
A. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT THE INJUNCTION ... 26
B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING CLEAR OR SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ... 31
1. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS WHICH SEEK RETROSPECTIVE RELIEF FOR ALLEGED past VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW AND WHICH ALLEGE VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW ... 32
2. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO FEDERAL FOOD STAMPS BECAUSE THEY ARE ELIGIBLE FOR DISABILITY-RELATED MEDICAID IS LIKELY TO BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE FOOD STAMP STATUTE EXPRESSLY HINGES SUCH ELIGIBILITY UPON RECEIPT OF DISABILITY-RELATED FEDERAL MEDICAID, NOT STATE MEDICAID ... 34
3. PLAINTIFFS' SUPERVISORY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN THESE CLAIMS since PLAINTIFFS EITHER OBTAINED FAVORABLE FAIR HEARING DECISIONS FROM STATE DEFENDANTS AND, IF DISSATISFIED WITH THOSE DECISIONS, FAILED TO SEEK AVAILABLE STATE COURT REVIEW, OR FAILED TO REQUEST FAIR HEARINGS FROM STATE DEFENDANTS ... 36
4.PLAINTIFFS SUPERVISORY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE FOOD STAMP ACT OR THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT TO PRESCRIBE THE MANNER BY WHICH STATE DEFENDANTS MUST SUPERVISE THE ISSUES HEREIN, IN PARTICULAR AS PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT STATE DEFENDANTS' FAIR HEARING REVIEW OF THEIR CASES VIOLATED THE FEDERAL FOOD STAMPS OR MEDICAID STATUTES OR REGULATIONS ... 42
POINT II PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF A PROPOSED CLASS SHOULD BE DENIED ... 49
CONCLUSION ... 53
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) ... 32

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Alexandre v. Cortes, 140 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 1998) ... 41 Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001) ... 10 Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1996) ... 33 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) reh. denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984) ... 37 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) ... 46, 47, 48 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) ... 50, 51 Cokely v. NYCCOC, 2003 WL. 1751738 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) ... 52 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ... 33 Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ... 49 Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) ... 33 Hegarty v. Perales, 168 A.D.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1990) ... 42 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2001) ... 52 Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) ... 31 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 ... 33 Latino Officers Ass'n v. City of New York, 196 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 1999) ... 32 Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988) ... 40 New York State National Organization for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156 (2dCir. 2001) ... 40, 41 Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1984) ... 33 Patterson v. Blum, 86 A.D.2d 893 (2d Dep't 1982) ... 42 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) ... 32, 33 Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) ... 33 Ouern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) ... 32 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ... 51 Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F. Supp. 2d316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ... 32 Rivera v. Bane, Supreme Court, new York County, Index No. 45305/92 (Soto, J) ... 14, 20, 23, 39

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Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) ... 38 Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227 (2nd Cir.1999), cert den., 531 U.S. 864 (2000) ... 20, 25, 26 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) ... 38 Teytelman v. Wing, P.E. Tr. 17-18 ... 22 Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 557 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977) ... 32 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ... 32, 37, 38, 47 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) ... 32 Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) ... 46 United States Constitution Article III ... 37, 38 Eleventh Amendment ... passim Federal Statutes 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq ... 3 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) ... 43, 48 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n)(1) ... 10, 24, 36, 43, 48 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r) ... 36 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r)(2)(B) ... 36 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) ... 12 7 U.S.C. § 2020 ... 3, 13, 43, 44, 45 7 U.S.C. § 2020(b) ... 44 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d) ... 43, 44 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) ... 13, 44 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) ... 45 8 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq ... 4 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2) ... 4, 5 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1) ... 7

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8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2) ... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J) ... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(L) ... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B)(C) ... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3) ... 6, 7, 8, 36 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3)(B) ... 6 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3)(F(ii) ... 7, 36 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) ... 8 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2) ... 8 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3)(A) and (C) ... 7 8 U.S.C. § 1641 ... 5, 6, 50 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) ... 5 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) ... 5, 6 8 U.S.C. § 1641 ... 5, 6, 50 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq ... 2 42 U.S.C. § 602 ... 3 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) ... 10 42 U.S.C. § 654a ... 47 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(a)(1) ... 4 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq ... 2, 36 42 U.S.C. § 1396a ... 3 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) ... 45 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) ... 13, 45 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) ... 10, 24, 45, 48 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) ... 34 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) ... 34 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) ... 34

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2006 WL 548605 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cite as: 2006 WL 548605)
42 U.S.C. § 1396c ... 46 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... 32, 40 Federal Regulations 7 C.F.R. § 271.6(a)(1) ... 44 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(a) ... 4 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(b)(2) ... 4 42 C.F.R. §431.10 (Medicaid) ... 24, 48, 49 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(a) ... 4 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e) ... 4 45 C.F.R. § 307.10 (1995) ... 47 Federal Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ... 51 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a) ... 49 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(1) ... 49, 50 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(1)(A) ... 50 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(1)(B) ... 50 Fed. R. Evid. 802 ... 52 State Statutes N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules
Article 78 ... 17, 40 N.Y. SSL §§ 2(1) ... 11 N.Y. SSL §§ 2(1)(6) ... 11 N.Y. SSL §§ 17 ... 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 20 ... 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 21-a ... 11 N.Y. SSL §§ 21(1) ... 18, 19 N.Y. SSL §§ 21(5) ... 18

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2006 WL 548605 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cite as: 2006 WL 548605)
N.Y. SSL § 22 ...13, 37 N.Y. SSL § 22(3) ... 13 N.Y. SSL §§ 22(5) ... 13 N.Y. SSL §§ 34 ... 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 56 ... 10 N.Y. SSL § 61 ... 10, 37 N.Y. SSL §§ 62 ... 11 N.Y. SSL §§ 95 ... 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 95(1) ... 11 N.Y. SSL §§ 95(10) ... 10 N.Y. SSL §§ 95(10(K) ... 10 N.Y. SSL §§ 122 ... 9 N.Y. SSL §§ 131-a ... 8, 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 158(1) ... 8 N.Y. SSL §§ 158(1)(a), (B) ... 9 N.Y. SSL §§ 158(1)(g) ... 9 N.Y. SSL §§ 158(2) ... 9 N.Y. SSL § 336 ... 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 358 ... 11 N.Y. SSL § 363-a ... 11 N.Y. SSL § 363-a(2) ... 12 N.Y. SSL §§ 365(1) ... 11 N.Y. SSL § 366(1)(a)(1) ... 9, 12 Session Laws of New York L. 1996 C. 474 § 233 ... 11 L. 1997 C. 436 Part B § 122 ... 11 State Rules and Regulations

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18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-3.4 ... 14, 15, 16
18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358-3.7 ... 14
18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358-4.2(c) ... 14
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.2 ... 21
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.6 ... 13
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.6 ... 15, 16
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.9 ... 15
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.9(a) ... 15
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.9(b) ... 16
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-6.4(c) ... 17, 41
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360-2.9 ... 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 41
18 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 358 ... 13
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This memorandum of law is respectfully submitted on behalf of defendants ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“State OTDA”), and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health (“State DOH” collectively “State defendants”), in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for A preliminary injunction against the State defendants and for class certification. The Court should deny plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction against State defendants because, as discussed in Point I below, plaintiffs' claims against the State defendants would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment and various jurisdictional grounds, and thus plaintiffs would not likely even succeed in ultimately obtaining a similar permanent injunction against State defendants. Also, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that, in the absence of the sought-after preliminary injunction against the State defendants, plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm. Similarly, the Court should decline to grant plaintiffs' request that it certify a class since, as discussed in Point II below, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the prerequisites for certification of the proposed class, in particular against the State defendants.
Submitted herewith are the Declaration of Robert L. Kraft dated January 25, 2006 (“Kraft Dec.”) with exhibits; the Affidavit of Linda LeClair sworn to January 24, 2006 (LeClair Aff.”) with exhibits; the Affidavit of Rochelle Eisenstein sworn to January 25, 2006 (Eisenstein Aff.”) with exhibits; the affidavit of Stephen Ptak (“Ptak Aff.”) sworn to January 25, 2006, with exhibits; and the affidavit of Pamela F. Hopkins sworn to on January 25, 2006 (“Hopkins Aff.”) with exhibits.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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A. NEW YORK STATE PARTICIPATES IN FEDERALLY FUNDED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND MUST COMPLY WITH ELIGIBILITY LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN FEDERAL LAW
New York State participates in three programs that are wholly or partially federally funded: the Medical Assistance program codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (“Federal Medicaid”), the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (“Family Assistance”), and the Food Stamp program codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (“Food Stamps”). As their names suggest, these three federally funded programs address the need of individuals and families with low incomes and limited resources for medical assistance, cash assistance, and food stamp assistance. These federal programs require participating states to operate the programs in accordance with requirements found in federal statutes and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, 42 U.S.C. § 602, and 7 U.S.C. § 2020.
The Family Assistance program, the Medicaid program and the Food Stamp program each set forth certain requirements that an applicant must meet to be eligible for benefits under the respective federal program. The eligibility requirements include financial (income and resources) and non-financial (such as work rules) requirements. The application process for an applicant applying for Family Assistance, Medicaid Assistance and Food Stamps at a New York City Job Center is a joint process whereby a single interview is conducted for all three programs. However, as certain eligibility requirements are unique to each program, separate eligibility determinations must be made for each program.[FN1]
FN1. It is possible to apply for Federal Medicaid only, or for Food Stamps only. However, this lawsuit “does not challenge the policies or procedures at Medicaid-only and food stamp-only centers.” Declaration of Elizabeth S. Saylor dated December 12, 2005 „ 4. 1. PROVIDING A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS A CONDITION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERALLY FUNDED BENEFIT PROGRAMS
States “shall require, as a condition of eligibility for benefits under [Federal Medicaid, Family Assistance and Food Stamps], that each applicant for or recipient of benefits under that program furnish to the State his social security account number (or numbers, if he has more than one such number), and the State shall utilize such account numbers in the administration of that program so as to enable the association of the records pertaining to the applicant or recipient with his account number.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(a)(1), (b)1), (2), (4).[FN2]
FN2. Federal regulations applicable to the Federal Medicaid program provide that “[t]he agency must require, as a condition of eligibility, that each individual (including children) requesting Medicaid services furnish each of his or her social security numbers (SSNs).” 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(a). “If an applicant cannot recall his SSN or SSNs or has not been issued a SSN the agency must- (1) Assist the applicant in completing an application for a SSN; (2) Obtain evidence required under SSA regulations to establish the age, the citizenship or alien status, and the true identity of the applicant; and (3) Either send the application to SSA or, if there is evidence that the applicant

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has previously been issued a SSN, request SSA to furnish the number.” 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e). Federal regulations applicable to the Food Stamp program provide that “[t]he State agency shall require that a household participating or applying for participation in the Food Stamp Program provide the State agency with the social security number (SSN) of each household member or apply for one before certification.” 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(a). “For those individuals who do not have an SSN, ... an individual must apply at the SSA, and the State agency shall arrange with SSA to be notified directly of the SSN when it is issued. The State agency shall inform the household where to apply and what information will be needed, including any which may be needed for SSA to notify the State agency of the SSN. The State agency shall advise the household member that proof of application from SSA will be required prior to certification.” 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(b)(2). 2. ALIEN STATUS AFFECTS ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE BENEFITS THROUGH FEDERALLY FUNDED PROGRAMS
Aside from the foregoing eligibility requirements that are applicable to citizens and aliens alike, Congress has enacted additional eligibility restrictions only applicable to aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. When enacting these provisions Congress provided that “[i]t continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that-- (A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and (B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2). New York State must apply these eligibility restrictions to alien applicants requesting Federal Medicaid, Family Assistance, or Food Stamps.
The first step when applying the federal alien eligibility restrictions is to determine whether the applicant is a “qualified alien” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641. The term “qualified alien” means an alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives, or attempts to receive a Federal public benefit, is in one of two distinct groups. The first group consists of aliens who either entered the United States pursuant to certain provisions of law or remain in the United States pursuant to certain provisions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b).[FN3] A second group of “qualified aliens” consists of certain battered aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c).[FN4]
FN3. (1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence ..., (2) an alien who is granted asylum ..., (3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States ..., (4) an alien who is paroled into the United States ... for a period of at least 1 year, (5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld ..., (6) an alien who is granted conditional entry ...; or (7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant .... 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b), citations to other provisions of the Immigration Act omitted.
FN4. (c) Treatment of certain battered aliens as qualified aliens For purposes

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of this chapter, the term “qualified alien” includes-(1) an alien who-(A) has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by a spouse or a parent, or by a member of the spouse or parent's family residing in the same household as the alien and the spouse or parent consented to, or acquiesced in, such battery or cruelty, but only if (in the opinion of the agency providing such benefits) there is a substantial connection between such battery or cruelty and the need for the benefits to be provided; and (B) has been approved or has a petition pending which sets forth a prima facie case for-(i) status as a spouse or a child of a United States citizen pursuant to clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of section 204(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (ii) classification pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii) of section 204(a)(1)(B) of the Act, (iii) suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996). (iv) status as a spouse or child of a United States citizen pursuant to clause (i) of section 204(a)(1)(A) of such Act, or classification pursuant to clause (i) of section 204(a)(1)(B) of such Act; (v) cancellation of removal pursuant to section 1229b(b)(2) of this title; (2) an alien-(A) whose child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by a spouse or a parent of the alien (without the active participation of the alien in the battery or cruelty), or by a member of the spouse or parent's family residing in the same household as the alien and the spouse or parent consented or acquiesced to such battery or cruelty, and the alien did not actively participate in such battery or cruelty, but only if (in the opinion of the agency providing such benefits) there is a substantial connection between such battery or cruelty and the need for the benefits to be provided; and (B) who meets the requirement of subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1); or (3) an alien child who-(A) resides in the same household as a parent who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by that parent's spouse or by a member of the spouse's family residing in the same household as the parent and the spouse consented or acquiesced to such battery or cruelty, but only if (in the opinion of the agency providing such benefits) there is a substantial connection between such battery or cruelty and the need for the benefits to be provided; and (B) who meets the requirement of subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1). This subsection shall not apply to an alien during any period in which the individual responsible for such battery or cruelty resides in the same household or family eligibility unit as the individual subjected to such battery or cruelty. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c), parallel citations omitted.

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Being a qualified alien does not, in and of itself, automatically permit him or her to receive Federal Medicaid, Family Assistance, or Food Stamps. Because Congress has defined the Food Stamp program as a “specified federal program,” 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3)(B), the eligibility restrictions based on alienage contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1) and the exceptions contained in § 1612(a)(2) are applicable to applicants for Food Stamps. That is, paragraph 1612(a)(1) provides that qualified aliens are not eligible to receive Food Stamps unless they are covered by one of the exceptions listed in paragraph 1612(a)(2). Three of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting qualified aliens from receiving food stamps are raised in this case. The eligibility restrictions based on alienage contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1) “shall not apply to any qualified alien who has resided in the United States with a status within the meaning of the term ‘qualified alien’ for a period of 5 years or more beginning on the date of the alien's entry into the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(L) The eligibility restrictions based on alienage contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1) do not apply to applicants for Food Stamps who are under 18 years of age. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J). The provisions described in the preceding two sentences lead to the result that there are households where some members (qualified alien children) are eligible for Food Stamp benefits and other members (qualified alien parents who have not had five years in qualified status) are not. In addition, a qualified alien may receive Food Stamps if he or she “is receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability (within the meaning of section 2012(r) of Title 7).” See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(ii).[FN5]
FN5. Certain qualified aliens may receive Food Stamps only during the first seven years after they enter the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A). Qualified aliens who are lawful permanent residents or veterans, or members of veterans' families, may receive food stamps without either a five year waiting period or a seven year limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B), (C). Because Congress has defined Family Assistance and Federal Medicaid as “designated federal programs,” 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(3)(A) and (C), the general rule of alien eligibility contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) and the prohibitions contained in § 1612(b)(2) are applicable to applicants for Family Assistance and Federal Medicaid. That is, states are permitted to determine qualified aliens eligible for Federal Medicaid and Family Assistance but only if those qualified aliens are not covered by the prohibitions in paragraph 1612(b)(2) or the general prohibition in 8 U.S.C. § 1613, which provides that qualified aliens may not receive federally funded means tested public benefits for a five year period after being in a qualified status.
B. NEW YORK'S STATE-FUNDED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MEET THE NEEDS OF SOME PERSONS INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE FEDERALLY FUNDED BENEFITS BUT HAVE THEIR OWN ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
New York State has established two programs-Safety Net Assistance and State Medicaid- that are completely state and locally funded to meet the needs of persons not eligible to receive federally funded benefits. The Safety Net Assistance program (“SNA”) provides cash public assistance to individuals and households ineligible to receive federally funded Family Assistance.[FN6] See New York Social Services Law (“NY SSL”)§ 158(1). The SNA program applies the same standard of need, the same in-
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come and resource disregards and the same exemptions as the Family Assistance program, and provides SNA recipients the same grant levels and types of grants available through the Family Assistance program. NY SSL § 131-a. Examples of persons who are not eligible to receive Family Assistance and are eligible to receive SNA are adults with children in the household who have exhausted the adult's five year time limit on Family Assistance and adults living in households that do not include children. See NY SSL § 158(1)(a), (B).
FN6. Effective August 20, 1997, New York State changed the names of its two cash public assistance programs from Aid to Dependent Children and Home Relief to Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance, respectively. Except when the context and purpose indicates otherwise, references in any chapter of law or in any regulation of a state agency or in any state agency form or contract to “home relief” shall refer to the safety net assistance program and references to “aid to dependent children” or “aid to families with dependent children” shall refer to the family assistance program. See L. 1997 C. 436 Part B § 141. If otherwise eligible, a person who is a qualified alien who is ineligible to receive Family Assistance solely because of the Federal restrictions based on alienage, or who is an alien who is permanently residing under color of law but is not a qualified alien, is eligible to receive SNA. See NY SSL § 158(1)(g).
A person who is eligible for Family Assistance shall be granted family assistance and while receiving such aid shall not be eligible for safety net assistance. See NY SSL § 158(2). The preceding sentence leads to the result that a household consisting of a citizen child (who is eligible to receive Family Assistance) and qualified parent and qualified alien children who are not eligible to receive Family Assistance, will receive cash public assistance through both the federally funded Family Assistance and the state funded SNA programs.
The State Medicaid program (“State medicaid”) expands the coverage of the federal Medicaid program to cover categories of persons who are not eligible to receive federal Medicaid. See e.g., NY SSL § 366(1)(a)(1) (SNA recipients).
New York State does not apply the federal eligibility restrictions based on alienage to the SNA and State Medicaid programs. The New York State legislature adopted Social Services Law § 122 to set forth the rights of aliens in New York State to receive various benefits. Although Social Services Law § 122, as written, restricts eligibility for State Medicaid to certain aliens, that restriction was declared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001). Since 2001, an alien who is a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) or who is permanently residing under color of law (“PRUCOL”)[FN7] if financially and/or medically eligible, receive State Medicaid. State DOH, in compliance with the final order in Aliessa, (“Aliessa Order”) has provided written instructions and training materials to local social services districts and has directed local social services districts not to use an alien's LPR or PRUCOL status as a reason for denying State Medicaid. See Aliessa Order, a copy of which is annexed to the Kraft Decl. See also LeClair Aff. „„ 11-24.

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FN7. “As distinguished from illegal aliens subject to deportation, this designation [PRUCOL] is used to classify aliens of whom the INS [now U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Service] is aware, but has no plans to deport.” Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d at 422 n. 2. In addition to these two state programs, New York had in effect a Food Assistance Program (“FAP”) that provided State-funded Food Stamp benefits to certain aliens not eligible to receive federally funded Food Stamps. NY SSL § 95(10). The FAP program expired on September 30, 2005. NY SSL § 95(10(k).
C. STATE DEFENDANTS SUPERVISE THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS BY LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICTS
States are given the option of administering Federal Medicaid, Family Assistance, and Food Stamps through state agencies or having State agencies supervise the administration of these programs by agencies of local government. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4), and 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n)(1). New York State has adopted the latter option. New York State is divided into 58 local social services districts, with the City of New York constituting one district. See NY SSL §§ 56 and 61. The New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA” or “City defendant”) administers public assistance programs for residents of New York City. State DOH supervises the provision of Federal Medicaid and State Medicaid in New York State. See NY SSL § 363-a; LeClair Aff. State OTDA inter alia, supervises the administration of the Family Assistance, SNA and Food Stamp programs in New York State. See NY SSL §§ 358, 95(1).[FN8] See also, Ptak
FN8. Prior to 1996, the New York State Department of Social Services and its Commissioner supervised administration of all public assistance programs in New York State. In 1996, the Legislature transferred supervision of administration of the Medicaid program to the Commissioner of the Department of Health. See L. 1996 C. 474 § 233. In 1997 the Legislature renamed the portion of the Department of Social Services responsible for administering cash public assistance programs the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. See L. 1997 C. 436 Part B § 122. Because of these legislative changes, the definitions of the words “department” and “Commissioner” in the Social Services Law vary depending on their location. See NY SSL § 2(1) and (6). Local social services districts determine whether individuals who apply for these forms of public assistance are eligible to receive them. See NY SSL §§ 365(1), (Federal and State Medicaid) 344 (Family Assistance) and 95(3) (Food Stamps). In addition to making eligibility determinations, local social services districts furnish ongoing public assistance to eligible recipients by providing benefits through electronic cards that can be swiped at machines in provider facilities or grocery stores, through direct vendor payments to landlords, and otherwise as appropriate. See NY SSL §§ 62, 21-a.
When a local social services district determines whether a household is eligible to receive benefits, the district (1) identifies who is applying for benefits as part of the household, and (2) determines whether the combined income and resources of household members are below the standards of need set in law. See NY SSL § 366

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(Medicaid), 131-a (Family Assistance and SNA) and 95 (FS).[FN9]
FN9. But See footnote 1 Supra. For purposes of this law suit, the local districts are determining which applicants are eligible to receive cash public assistance, either Family Assistance or SNA, which will lead to eligibility for Medicaid and Food Stamps unless the federal alienage restrictions interfere. Applicants who are financially eligible to receive SNA are also financially eligible to receive Food Stamps and Medicaid, so separate eligibility determinations regarding Food Stamps and Medicaid are not made when SNA financial eligibility is ascertained. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a); NY SSL § 366(1)(a)(1).
1. GENERAL SUPERVISION THROUGH STATE REGULATIONS AND OTHER STATEWIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL DISTRICTS
State DOH provides general supervision of the administration of the Federal and State Medicaid programs by issuing regulations and otherwise notifying the local districts of statewide policies applicable to local social services districts administering the Federal and State Medicaid programs. See NY SSL § 363-a(2); LeClair Aff. „ 14. Similarly, State OTDA provides general supervision of the administration of the Family Assistance, SNA, and Food Stamp programs by issuing regulations and otherwise notifying local social services districts of statewide policies applicable to local social services districts administering those programs. See NY SSL §§ 17, 20, 34; Ptak Aff.
2. REVIEW OF SPECIFIC CASES THROUGH FAIR HEARINGS
The Food Stamp Act provides that the State plan shall provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency ...” See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). The Social Security Act provides that the State Medicaid plan must “provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness ...” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3).
To implement these Federal mandates, State DOH and State OTDA review cases where applicants for or recipients of public assistance are dissatisfied with local agency actions or failure to act and seek fair hearing review. See NY SSL § 22; 18 New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (“N.Y.C.R.R.”) Part 358.
Through the State fair hearing process provided for by federal and state statute, the State OTDA oversees local social services districts' administration of individual Food Stamp, Family Assistance and SNA cases. See Social Services Law § 22. The State DOH also utilizes the State OTDA's fair hearing office to oversee the local districts' administration of the Medicaid program. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360-2.9.
Fair hearings are available to applicants for or recipients of Food Stamps, Medicaid and public assistance. NY SSL § 22(3). A person may challenge a local district's denial of an application, failure to act upon any application, inadequacy in the

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amount of assistance, or full or partial discontinuance of assistance. NY SSL § 22(5).
The party for whom the fair hearing is requested is the “appellant.” 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.6. An appellant may examine his or her case record before the fair hearing and, if requested, must receive before the hearing, at no charge, copies of all documents which the local social services district will present at the hearing. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358-3.7, 358-4.2(c). In the City of New York, implementation of these regulations is governed by a Stipulation of Settlement in Rivera v. Bane, Supreme Court, new York County, Index No. 45305/92 (Soto, J). A copy of the Stipulation is annexed to the Kraft Decl. as Exhibit 2.
The appellant's rights in the fair hearing process are set forth at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-3.4.[FN10] The parties' respective burdens of proof at the fair hearing are set forth at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.9. The burden of proof to establish eligibility for a benefit, or for a higher benefit amount than that provided by the local agency, is upon the appellant. In contrast, the burden of proof to establish that the discontinuation or reduction of a benefit is correct is upon the local agency. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.9(a). The hearing officer who conducts the fair hearing is not a representative of either the appellant or the local social services district.[FN11] The decision after fair hearing must be supported by substantial evidence. 18 No.Y.C.R.R § 358-5.9(b)
FN10. As an appellant you have the right: (a) to the continuation or reinstatement of your public assistance, medical assistance authorization, food stamp benefits or services until the issuance of a decision in your fair hearing, ... You have the right to request that your assistance, benefits or services not be continued or reinstated until the fair hearing decision is issued; (b) to examine your case record and to receive copies of documents in your case record which you need to prepare for the fair hearing, upon your request, ....; (c) to examine and receive copies of all documents and records which will be submitted into evidence at the fair hearing by a social services agency,...; (d) to the rescheduling (adjournment) of your hearing, ...; (e) to be represented by an attorney or other representative at any conference and hearing, or to represent yourself; (f) to have an interpreter at any fair hearing, at no charge to you, if you do not speak English or if you are deaf. You should advise OAH prior to the date of the fair hearing if you will need an interpreter; (g) to appear and participate at your conference and fair hearing, to explain your situation, to offer documents, to ask questions of witnesses, to offer evidence in opposition to the evidence presented by the social services agency and to examine any documents offered by the social services agency; (h) to bring witnesses to present written and oral evidence at any conference or fair hearing; (i) at your request to the social services agency, to receive necessary transportation or transportation expenses to and from the fair hearing for yourself
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and your representatives and witnesses and to receive payment for your necessary child care costs and for any other necessary costs and expenditures related to your fair hearing; (j) to have the fair hearing held at a time and place convenient to you as far as practicable, taking into account circumstances such as your physical inability to travel to the regular hearing location; (k) to request removal of a hearing officer in accordance with section 358-5.6 of this Part; and (1) to seek review by a court if the decision is not in your favor. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-3.4.
FN11. (b) To ensure a complete record at the hearing, the hearing officer must: (1) preside over the fair hearing and regulate the conduct and course of the fair hearing, including at the hearing officer's discretion, requiring sworn testimony, and administering the necessary oaths; (2) make an opening statement explaining the nature of the proceeding, the issues to be heard and the manner in which the fair hearing will be conducted; (3) elicit documents and testimony, including questioning the parties and witnesses, if necessary, particularly where the appellant demonstrates difficulty or inability to question a witness; however, the hearing officer will not act as a party's representative; (4) where the hearing officer considers independent medical assessment necessary, require that an independent medical assessment be made part of the record when the fair hearing involves medical issues such as a diagnosis, an examining physician's report, or a medical review team's decision; (5) adjourn the fair hearing to another time on the hearing officer's own motion or on the request of either party, ...; (6) adjourn the fair hearing when in the judgment of the hearing officer it would be prejudicial to the due process rights of the parties to go forward with the hearing on the scheduled hearing date; (7) review and evaluate the evidence, rule on the admissibility of evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, make findings of fact relevant to the issues of the hearing which will be binding upon the commissioner unless such person has read a complete transcript of the hearing or has listened to the electronic recording of the fair hearing; (8) at the hearing officer's discretion, where necessary to develop a complete evidentiary record, issue subpoenas, and/or require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and records; and (9) prepare an official report containing the substance of what transpired at the fair hearing and including a recommended decision to the commissioner or the commissioner's designee. (c) A party to a hearing may make a request to a hearing officer that the hearing officer remove himself or herself from presiding at the hearing. ... 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-5.6. When the decision after fair hearing is adverse to the local district, the local district must comply with the decision. NY SSL § 22(9)(a).

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It is not uncommon for a decision after fair hearing to remand the matter back to the local district, such as to render an eligibility determination where the public assistance application has not been timely processed or where the fair hearing decision annuls the local social services district's denial of an application for benefits on a particular criterion without reaching other eligibility criteria. Such a decision after fair hearing provides that the determination of the local social services district is not correct and is reversed, and is considered favorable to the appellant. If a fair hearing appellant who received a favorable decision after fair hearing-either a decision on the merits or a remand for further local district action- believes that the local district has failed to comply and wishes the State to secure the local district's compliance, State regulations provide for the appellant to submit a complaint to State OTDA's Office of Administrative Hearings Compliance Unit. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-6.4(c). The Compliance Unit will thereafter “secure compliance by whatever means is deemed necessary and appropriate under the circumstances of the case.” 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-6.4(c).
A decision after fair hearing that is adverse to the appellant may be challenged by commencing a proceeding in State Supreme Court pursuant to N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules article 78. See NY SSL § 22(9)(b). Also, upon request to the Commissioner, a fair hearing decision may be corrected for any error of law or fact. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-6.6(a)(3).
3. STATE OTDA OPERATES A COMPUTER SYSTEM THAT LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICTS USE TO ADMINISTER PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
State OTDA has designed and implemented a computerized welfare management system (“WMS”) which is capable of receiving, maintaining and processing information relating to persons who have applied for or been determined eligible for benefits under any program for which State OTDA has supervisory responsibilities. The WMS provides individual and aggregate data to local social services districts to assist them in making eligibility determinations and basic management decisions, and provides data to State OTDA to assist it in supervising the local administration of such programs. See NY SSL § 21(1). State DOH uses WMS to supervise the administration of the Medicaid program. See NY SSL § 21(5). The Legislature intended the WMS to limit fraud and mismanagement and to achieve compliance with Federal law, and to maximize utilization of Federal funds. See NY SSL § 21(1).[FN12]
FN12. Such system shall be designed so as to assist local districts and the state in achieving the following goals: a. reducing mismanagement in the administration of such program, detecting fraudulent practices, and helping identify policies or conditions that will reduce or deter fraud; b. promoting efficiency in local district determinations of eligibility for public assistance and care and other programs supervised by the department, to expedite such determinations and to reduce unauthorized or excessive payments; c. achieving compliance with federal laws and regulations and maximizing utilization of federal funds; d. improving data collection and retention techniques and developing uniform

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reporting forms and procedures; f. being developed and implemented in each social services district, to the extent possible consistent with statewide uniformity, in a manner compatible with maximum utilization of existing data processing systems and capabilities of such district and with minimum local participation by such district in administrative expenditures directly attributable to the design and implementation of such system; and g. achieving such other goals consistent with this chapter and other laws as are desirable for improving the administration of such programs. NY SSL § 21(1). Workers in local social services districts ensure that the data they collect when processing initial applications and ongoing cases is entered into the WMS.
D. THE PLAINTIFFS' FAIR HEARINGS
Plaintiffs M.K.B., A.I. and L.A.M. allege no fair hearing requests. Plaintiffs Denise Thomas and J.Z. obtained stipulated resolutions of their fair hearing requests. Complete copies of the administrative records for the remaining plaintiffs which records include a transcript, copies of the evidence submitted by both parties, and the Decision After Fair Hearing (“DAFH”) are annexed as exhibits to the Hopkins Aff.
Plaintiff O.P.
The issue at the fair hearing of O.P. (who alleges she is PRUCOL, Complaint at „ 163) was whether the HRA correctly denied her application for public assistance, Medicaid and Food Stamps due to her alien status. O.P. hearing transcript (“Tr.”) at 2 & 13. At the hearing, O.P.'s attorney, inter alia, objected that he did not have the HRA's evidence packet. O.P. Tr. at 8. The HRA's representative stated that due to the emergency scheduling of this hearing “we have nothing to present” and asked for a recess. O.P. Tr. at 11-12. The ALJ denied the request for a recess. O.P. Tr. at 12. The HRA representative left the hearing room to consult with her supervisor after the ALJ told her that he would proceed with the hearing without her presence. O.P. Tr. at 12 & 14. The hearing continued with O.P.'s attorney submitting documents regarding O.P.'s immigration status.
O.P.'s DAFH, dated August 11, 2005, held that the HRA's failure to produce its evidence package violated the Rivera stipulation and, in compliance with the Rivera stipulation, annulled the HRA's denial of O.P.'s application for public assistance, Medicaid and Food Stamps and directed the HRA, inter alia, to re-process O.P.'s application and to advise appellant what further documents are necessary, if any. O.P. DAFH at 3.
Plaintiff L.W.
The issue at L.W.'s fair hearing was whether the HRA correctly denied her application for Food Stamps due to her alien status and failed to process her application for public assistance. L.W. Tr. at 12-14. At the hearing, L.W.'s attorney raised Rivera and Rodriguez objections on the ground that the HRA did not produce certain documents for the fair hearing. L.W. Tr. at 24-25. L.W.'s attorney also asked for a
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Medicaid disability review referral in order to obtain federal food stamps and also asserted, in the alternative, that L.W. was eligible for State Food Stamps. L.W. Tr. at 27-28.
L.W.'s DAFH, dated July 29, 2005, held that the HRA's failure to produce documents for the hearing violated the Rivera stipulation, annulled the HRA's denial of her application for Food Stamps, held that the HRA's failure to act on her application for public assistance was incorrect, and directed the HRA, inter alia, to process O.P.'s application for both and to advise appellant what further documents are necessary, if any. L.W. DAFH at 4-5.
Plaintiff M.A.
The issue at M.A.'s fair hearing was whether the HRA failed to act on M.A.'s request to add her to her daughter's public assistance, Medicaid and food stamps case. M.A. Tr. at 3, 11-12. At the hearing, M.A.'s attorney stated that M.A. is “not eligible for Federal Food Stamp Benefits ... [b]ut she is eligible for FAP [State Food Assistance Program].” M.A. Tr. at 19. At the hearing, M.A. and her attorney submitted documents relating to M.A.'s immigration status and her application, as to which the HRA had not yet submitted a written decision. M.A. Tr. at 13-21.
M.A.'s DAFH, dated October 21, 2005, held that the HRA incorrectly failed to act on M.A.'s request to add her to her daughter's public assistance, Medicaid and food stamps case, and directed the HRA, inter alia, to process her application taking into account her approved I130 form and to advise her what further documents are necessary, if any. M.A. DAFH at 6-7.
Plaintiff Marieme Diongue
The issue at the fair hearing of Marieme Diongue (who alleges she is PRUCOL, Complaint at „ 209) was whether the HRA's Notice of Action correctly omitted her from her child's public assistance and Medicaid case. Diongue Tr. at 6 & 14. At the hearing, Diongue's attorney submitted, inter alia, a copy of a letter to the HRA “showing that she applied for both” herself and her child. Diongue Tr. at 20).
Diongue's DAFH, dated October 5, 2005, set forth the “adequate notice” requirement of 18 N.Y.C.R.R § 358-2.2, and held that the HRA's “notice improperly did not give a reason for the Agency's determination not to include the needs of the Appellant in the Public Assistance and Medical Assistance” household. Diongue DAFH at 5-10.
Plaintiff M.E.
The issue at M.E.'s fair hearing was whether the HRA correctly discontinued her Public Assistance, Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits for her alleged failure to submit documents for her recertification of these benefits. M.E. Tr. at 11-13, 17-18. At the hearing, M.E. testified about, and produced copies of, the documents she presented at her recertification to support her immigration eligibility status. M.E. Tr. 35-38).
M.E.'s DAFH, dated September 27, 2005, found that M.E. “timely submitted all re-
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quired documentation to the HRA,” annulled the HRA's determination to discontinue her Public Assistance, Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits and directed the HRA, inter alia, to restore any such lost benefits retroactive to the date of the discontinuance. M.E. DAFH at 3.
Plaintiff P.E.
The issue at P.E.'s fair hearing was whether the HRA correctly reduced her Public Assistance and Food Stamps. P.E. Tr. at 2-3. At the hearing, P.E.'s counsel raised a Rivera objection n on the ground that the HRA did not produce certain documents for the fair hearing. P.E. Tr. at 4-5. P.E.'s counsel also asserted that the HRA's notice was inadequate for not stating a reason and that P.E. is eligible for State Food Stamps pursuant to the State court decision in Teytelman v. Wing. P.E. Tr. 17-18.
P.E.'s DAFH, dated December 14, 2005, held that the HRA's failure to produce documents for the hearing violated the Rivera stipulation, annulled the HRA's notice and directed the HRA, inter alia, to restore any lost benefits retroactive to the date of the action. P.E. DAFH at 4-5.
Plaintiff Anna Fedosenko
The issue at Anna Fedosenko's fair hearing was whether the HRA correctly discontinued her Food Stamps. Fedosenko Tr. at 2-3. At the hearing, Fedosenko's counsel asserted that the HRA had discontinued Fedosenko's Food Stamps without notice. Fedosenko Tr. 4-5. Fedosenko's counsel also asserted that Fedosenko should nonetheless be eligible for federal food stamps due to her disability. Fedosenko Tr. 8.
Fedosenko's DAFH, dated August 29, 2005, discussed the regulatory notice requirements for discontinuing benefits, and held that the HRA's discontinuation of Fedosenko's Food Stamps without notice was incorrect, and directed the HRA to restore her food stamps retroactive to the date of the discontinuance. Fedosenko DAFH at 2.
E. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT In the Class Action Complaint dated December 13, 2005, thirteen plaintiffs[FN13] seek to represent a class. Plaintiffs demonstrate three common facts. First, they all applied to receive public assistance at offices known as Job Centers run by the HRA. Second, plaintiffs are not United States citizens, though their immigration statuses, and the documentation they have to demonstrate those statuses, differ. And third, the HRA failed to provide plaintiffs with the full relief requested. See Complaint „„ 149-348.
FN13. Plaintiff L.M. has voluntarily dismissed her claim. Plaintiffs' claims against the State defendants, found in the seventh claim for relief,[FN14] are all supervisory in nature. Plaintiffs would have this Court find the State defendants supervisorily liable for the City defendant's conduct.
FN14. 359. Actions and omissions by State OTDA and State DOH have caused and/ or contributed to the policies, customs, and usages of HRA described above.
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Because HRA functions as a matter of law as the agent of State OTDA (with regard to federal food stamps) and State DOH (with regard to federal Medicaid), State OTDA and State DOH are jointly and severally liable for HRA's violations of federal law. 360. Through their actions and omissions that have caused and/or contributed to the policies, customs, and usages of HRA described above, State OTDA, and State DOH have violated their responsibilities under federal law as the single state agencies responsible for administering and supervising the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs, respectively, in New York State, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Medicaid), and 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid). 361. State OTDA and State DOH have been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees who administer federal food stamps and federal Medicaid at job centers. Their deliberate indifference to the federal rights of class members has caused and/or contributed to the policies, customs, and usages of HRA described above; and has resulted in the widespread and systematic denial of the rights under federal law of eligible class members to receive federal food stamps and federal Medicaid.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE DENIED
“When seeking a preliminary injunction that will affect government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the moving party must show: (1) it will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction and (2) a likelihood of success on the merits. However, where the injunction sought will alter rather than maintain the status quo, the movant must show clear or substantial likelihood of success. As a final consideration, whenever a request for a preliminary injunction implicates public interests, a court should give some consideration to the balance of such interests in deciding whether a plaintiffs threatened irreparable injury and probability of success on the merits warrants injunctive relief.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 233 (2nd Cir.1999) (citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), cert den., 531 U.S. 864 (2000).
Plaintiffs request an order Granting a Preliminary Injunction directing the State Defendants: “A. within two weeks after entry of said Order, to establish and maintain, for the pendency of this litigation, a record of all fair hearings requested and held involving issues of immigrant eligibility, and of all fair hearing decisions resulting from these hearings; B. to supervise and oversee City defendant's compliance with the notice requirements of paragraph II [of the Notice of Motion] and all other requirements of paragraph II as they relate to federal food stamps and federal Medicaid; and C. within ninety days of entry of said Order, to submit a plan to the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel, identifying in the computer system(s) that the State defendants operate, all problems that cause or contribute to the erroneous

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denial of federal food stamps and federal Medicaid, and specifying a method and a time line for fixing them forthwith.” Notice of Motion dated January 11, 2006.
A. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT THE INJUNCTION
“Irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the moving party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the issuance of an injunction will be considered. The movant must demonstrate an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages. In the absence of a showing of irreparable harm, a motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.” Id. at 233-4 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs have not stated the harm, let alone irreparable harm, that will befall them if the State defendants do not “establish and maintain, for the pendency of this litigation, a record of all fair hearings requested and held involving issues of immigrant eligibility, and of all fair hearing decisions resulting from these hearings.” This piece of injunctive relief seems most like an overbroad discovery request that would cover fair hearings beyond the cases of class members and include fair hearings on State benefits, which, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, are beyond the purview of this Court. Furthermore, as discussed in subpoint (B)(3) below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review State fair hearing decisions on Federal benefits, which, instead, are subject to State judicial review.
A separate flaw with this prayer for injunctive relief is that, if read to the fullest extent, it requires State defendants to review every fair hearing transcript to ascertain what issues were discussed at the hearing so as to keep “a record of hearings requested and held involving issues of immigrant eligibility.” However, as alleged by plaintiffs, this issue is not reached in a number of fair hearings involving aliens, since those aliens or their representatives, raise procedural notice-related issues that have nothing to do with immigration status.
Similarly, plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order directing State defendants “to supervise and oversee City defendant's compliance with the notice requirements of paragraph II and all other requirements of paragraph II as they relate to federal food stamps and federal Medicaid.”[FN15]
FN15. II. Granting a preliminary injunction directing Defendant Verna Eggleston (hereinafter the “City Defendant”): A. within two weeks of entry of said Order, to establish a procedure by which Plaintiffs' counsel may contact a designee of City Defendant on behalf of individual class members whose eligibility has been erroneously assessed, and which ensures that such individual class members have their eligibility assessed correctly and their public assistance, Medicaid and/or food stamps (collectively public benefits) issued within the time frames established by law during the pendency of the litigation; B. within two weeks of entry of said Order, to ensure that all HRA workers
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correctly enter the code(s) in the computer system(s) designating the immigration status of all class members who apply for public benefits or apply to be added to a household member's public benefits case; and to maintain electronic or paper copies of all immigration documentation that such class members submit; C. within ninety days of entry of said Order, to submit a plan to the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel, identifying in the computer system(s) that HRA operates, all problems that cause or contribute to the erroneous denial of public benefits to class members, and specifying a method and a time line for fixing them forthwith. D. Immediately after entry of said Order, (i) to refrain from unlawfully denying, discontinuing, and/or reducing class members' federal food stamps on account of immigration status; (ii) to refrain from unlawfully denying, discontinuing, and/or reducing the public assistance and/or Medicaid benefits of class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status; (iii) to refrain from turning away, deterring, or discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these benefits, on account of immigration status; (iv) to refrain from turning away, deterring, or discouraging class members who are not lawful permanent residents from applying for Medicaid and public assistance benefits or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these public benefits, on account of immigration status; (v) to provide class members with timely and adequate written notice of the denial of food stamps, Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits (1) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; and (2) when class members apply to be added to an existing benefits case and are denied; (vi) to refrain from issuing misleading notices to class members that make it difficult or impossible for class members to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied, discontinued, or reduced; or whether they were granted in the proper amount and whether to appeal such denial, discontinuance, or reduction; (vii) to ensure that all disabled Qualified Alien class members are referred for Medicaid disability determinations if there is an indication that they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid, and that those determined to be disabled receive the food stamps to which they are legally entitled; (viii) to assist class members who are applying for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid in completing an application for a Social Security number and to provide them with the proper documentation that complies with the Social Security Administration's requirements. (ix) to refrain from enforcing State regulations, State directives, and City directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security number is impossible to obtain.
State defendants already supervise City defendant's administration of the Medicaid

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and Food Stamp programs. State defendants' supervision includes the matters raised in this lawsuit, and plaintiffs have not demonstrated that State defendants' supervision of their particular cases through the fair hearing process is legally flawed so as to entitle plaintiffs to the sought after supervisory injunction. In particular, there is no basis for issuing a preliminary injunction against State defendants to supervise the City defendant's compliance with “adequate notice” requirements, as State defendants already supervise this issue through the fair hearing process, as illustrated by Diongue's fair hearing decision which vacated the City's notice as inadequate.
Plaintiffs, apparently aware that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits this Court from directing State defendants to enforce state law, would limit the State defendants' supervision of City defendant to issues of federal law. Yet, most of the named plaintiffs, and presumably the class they would represent if they are representative, are eligible to receive only State law benefits, SNA and State Medicaid. See LeClair Aff. „„ 27-40. If the majority of plaintiffs who are only eligible for State law benefits are not harmed without an injunction compelling the State defendant to supervise the City defendant's administration of State law, there is no harm, let alone no irreparable harm, in the absence of an order requiring the State defendants to supervise the City defendant's administration of Federal law more than it already does.
Furthermore, many of the provisions that the plaintiffs would have this Court apply to City defendant are not specifically required by Federal law. For example: the provision in subparagraph A. establishing a liaison for immigration-related complaints from plaintiffs' counsel; the provision in subparagraph C. requiring the City defendant to submit a plan to the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel, within ninety days of entry of said Order, identifying in the computer system(s) that HRA operates, all problems that cause or contribute to the erroneous denial of public benefits to class members, and specifying a method and a time line for fixing them forthwith; and the provision in clause D(vii) to ensure that all disabled Qualified Alien class members are referred for Medicaid disability determinations if there is an indication that they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid, and that those determined to be disabled receive the food stamps to which they are legally entitled.
Finally, plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order requiring the State defendants, “within ninety days of entry of said Order, to submit a plan to the Court and Plaintiffs' counsel, identifying in the computer system(s) that the State defendants operate, all problems that cause or contribute to the erroneous denial of federal food stamps and federal Medicaid, and specifying a method and a time line for fixing them forthwith.” In fact, the experience with the named plaintiffs demonstrates that, with proper attention to the cases paid by the City defendant's employees, the plaintiffs eligible for federal benefits could be recorded on the State's computer system as eligible to receive the Federal benefits sought. See LeClair Affidavit „„ 27-29.
The plaintiffs incorrectly allege that the WMS system is rife with substantial

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flaws. From this inaccurate statement, the plaintiffs imply that its operation in granting benefits contributes to a violation of federal rights which is undefined in their papers. Moreover, the problems which plaintiffs point to are mainly those of the City's computer system, the Paperless Office System (“POS”), not the state computer system, WMS.
The plaintiffs have limited this case to the granting of benefits in the job centers operated by the City of New York. There is a WMS devoted to processing and managing benefits in New York City, separate from the remainder of the state. Eisenstein Aff. „ 3.[FN16] The major alleged flaws of WMS simply do not exist. Id. „ 10.
FN16. Affidavit of Rochelle Eisenstein, sworn to January 24, 2006 hereafter “Eisenstein Aff.”. Ms Eisenstein is the Director of the New York City Welfare Management Systems Group of OTDA.
The handling of benefits for what plaintiffs label as “mixed households” has been accomplished successfully by WMS for 25 years. Id. „ 4. Instructions for doing so are set forth in Exhibit 1 to the Eisenstein affidavit at page 45. The fact that, assuming arguendo, plaintiffs are correct, HRA workers have difficulty in following the instruction does not demonstrate a flawed computer system.
The other problems plaintiffs claim also are non-existent. WMS does allow benefits to be granted to individuals who do not have Social Security Numbers. Eisenstein Aff. „ 5. Nor does WMS always require an individual have an alien number. Id. „ 6. Electronic benefit cards have worked properly with two suffix[FN17] cases for years. Id. „ 8. Nor is WMS unable to issue federal food stamps through disability-based Medicaid as plaintiffs incorrectly allege. Id. „ 9.
FN17. In a situation where some members of the household receive federal benefits and others receive state and locally funded benefits, there is a single case number for the family and different “suffix”es are utilized to issue benefits. B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING CLEAR OR SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD
OF SUCCESS
“The moving party must make a clear or substantial showing of a likelihood of success where (1) the injunction sought will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo--i.e., is properly characterized as a mandatory rather than prohibitory injunction; or (2) the injunction sought will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought, and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “when the moving party seeks a preliminary injunction to stay government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, a preliminary injunction should only be granted if the movant meets the more rigorous likelihood of success standard.” Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F.Supp.2d 316, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Latino Officers Ass'n v. City of New York, 196 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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1. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS WHICH SEEK RETROSPECTIVE RELIEF FOR ALLEGED PAST VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW AND WHICH ALLEGE VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW
Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint „ 1. However, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars a federal suit by a citizen against a state, or one of its agencies, absent its consent to such a suit or an express statutory waiver of immunity. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). It is well settled that the State of New York has not consented to suit in federal court, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977), and that the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were not intended to override a state's immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979). Similarly, neither a State nor a State agency is a “person” subject to suit under section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Will applies to “State or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Id. 491 U.S. at 70.
To the extent plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment relief regarding past violations of federal law by the State defendants, those claims must also be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment “does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985)).
Furthermore, it is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from granting relief against state officials for alleged violations of state law. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 103; Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1996); Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1984). In this regard, the Supreme Court has stated: A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106. Accordingly, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), this Court's jurisdiction over the State defendants is limited to potentially redressing, on a prospective basis, ongoing violations of federal law. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14.
In this action, most of the plaintiffs allege grievances tied to the City defendants' administration of various State benefits conferred by New York State law, i.e., the State's Food Assistance Program (now expired), the State's Safety Net Assistance program (the State's primary public assistance program for citizens and aliens who are not eligible for federal benefits), and the State Medicaid program (the State's Medical Assistance program for persons who are not eligible for Federal

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Medicaid). The plaintiffs who receive these State benefits allege PRUCOL status (O.P.,Complaint at „ 163; Diongue, id. at „ 209; L.A.M., id. at „ 282), which is not a “qualified alien” status for federal benefit purposes. See also, LeClair Affidavit, „„ 30-40.
Since this Court, applying the Eleventh Amendment, is likely to dismiss all claims against the State defendants which allege that the State defendants, either directly or through their supervisory capacity over the City defendant, violated State law in the operation of the State's Food Assistance Program, Safety Net Assistance program, and the State Medicaid program, the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction must be similarly denied.
2. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO FEDERAL FOOD STAMPS BECAUSE THEY ARE ELIGIBLE FOR DISABILITY-RELATED MEDICAID IS LIKELY TO BE DISMISSED, BECAUSE THE FOOD
STAMP STATUTE EXPRESSLY HINGES SUCH ELIGIBILITY UPON RECEIPT OF DISABILITY-RELATED FEDERAL MEDICAID, NOT STATE MEDICAID
A disabled applicant may be found eligible to receive Federal Medicaid as “categorically needy” or “medically needy.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10(A) and 1396a(a)(10(C) respectively. If a certified disabled individual is receiving federal Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) cash assistance because his or her income and resources do not exceed SSI levels, he or she is “categorically needy” and is automatically eligible for Federal Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). States that participate in Federal Medicaid must cover these categorically needy individuals and other categorically needy individuals as described in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). A separate group of recipients of federal Medicaid are the “medically needy.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C). This is an optional group that states may include in their Medicaid programs but are not required to do so. New York includes the medically needy in its Medicaid program. The medically needy include disabled individuals who would be “categorically needy” (i.e. would be eligible to receive SSI cash assistance) except that they have slightly higher income and resources that disqualify them from receiving SSI cash assistance. To be eligible for Federal Medicaid as an SSI-related medically needy recipient, an applicant must be aged, blind or certified disabled and have income and resources that, although exceeding SSI eligibility levels, are below standards applicable to the medically needy. If found eligible, such a medically needy recipient spends down a portion of his or her income monthly on medical care before Medicaid pays the remainder of his medical bills. See NY SSL § 366(1)(a)(5). These same principles are part of the State Medicaid program. See LeClair Aff. „ 43.
Both Fedosenko (Complaint „„ 253, 257) and L.W. (Complaint „ 180, 190) allege that they are disabled. They both receive State Medicaid as categorical eligibles based on their low incomes and resource levels. Fedosenko acknowledges that she has been receiving SNA and State Medicaid. Complaint „ 254. L.W. acknowledges that she has received Medicaid through a Medicaid- only center for all times relevant to the Complaint. Complaint „ 185. Although she does not specify whether it was State or Federal Medicaid, because she entered the United States in October, 2003, (Complaint „ 182), she is receiving State Medicaid since she cannot receive Federal Medicaid due

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to the five year waiting period. Likewise, since Fedosenko entered the United States on September 27, 2002, she is not eligible to receive Federal Medicaid.
Fedosenko and L.W. claim that they are eligible to receive federal Food Stamps even though they are both in their five year ban period prohibiting their receipt of Food Stamps. Plaintiffs' claim is best summarized in a paragraph regarding Fedosenko that erroneously states that “[b]ecause she is disabled, she would be eligible for federal food stamps if HRA had complied with its legal obligation to refer her for a Medicaid disability determination.” Complaint „ 254. The just stated legal conclusion is erroneous because those qualified aliens eligible to receive federal Food Stamps without a five year waiting period must be “receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability (within the meaning of section 2012(r) of Title 7).” See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(ii). Meanwhile, section 2012(r) of Title 7, defines the phrase “elderly or disabled member,” in pertinent part, as “a member of a household who- ... receives disability-related medical assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.).” See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Fedosenko and L.W. are not eligible to receive federal disability-related medical assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act because they have not been in the United States for five years in a qualified status. They are eligible to receive, and do receive, State Medicaid, but State Medicaid is not provided “under title XIX of the Social Security Act.”
Even if, arguendo, State Medicaid was found to be “under title XIX of the Social Security Act,” State DOH does not pay State Medicaid dollars to have a doctor determine that someone who already receives State Medicaid due to low income is disabled and, therefore, could be receiving State Medicaid due to disability. Low income alien Medicaid recipients like Fedosenko and L.W. receive State Medicaid because of their financial status, not because of their disability. See LeClair Aff. „ 41-46. There is no federal requirement that they be referred for a disability determination when they still would not qualify for Federal Medicaid due to their alien status.
3. PLAINTIFFS' SUPERVISORY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN THESE CLAIMS since PLAINTIFFS
EITHER OBTAINED FAVORABLE FAIR HEARING DECISIONS FROM STATE DEFENDANTS AND, IF DISSATISFIED WITH THOSE DECISIONS, FAILED TO SEEK AVAILABLE STATE COURT REVIEW, OR FAILED TO REQUEST FAIR HEARINGS FROM STATE DEFENDANTS
As set out above, New York has adopted the federally approved option whereby local social services districts such as the HRA determine whether applicants for public assistance are eligible to receive the benefits applied for, and whether recipients are entitled to changed levels of benefits (NY SSL § 61), with the State defendants reviewing those determinations when requested to do so by individuals who feel aggrieved by local social services districts determinations (NY SSL § 22). The State defendants have no direct obligation to make determinations regarding the eligibility of any applicant for the types of benefits at issue in this case. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against the State defendants are all of a supervisory nature.

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Plaintiffs' claims against the State defendants are likely to be dismissed because all of the named plaintiffs either invoked State defendant's supervisory review through their fair hearing requests and obtained favorable decisions after fair hearing, or did not request a fair hearing and, therefore, failed to seek the State defendant's supervisory review. Thus, plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim for supervisory relief against the State defendants as well as fail to demonstrate standing to assert that State defendants' fair hearing supervision of their cases has caused them legal injury.
The“case or controversy” clause of Article III of the Constitution makes standing a threshold issue when considering the viability of a case in the Federal Courts. That is, a “plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), reh. denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984), citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Such lack of a causative link against a supervisory defendant was the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), that class action plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement for a permanent injunction against the Police Commissioner which was aimed at curtailing alleged unconstitutional misconduct by the Commissioner's police officers: As the facts developed, there was no affirmative link between the occurrences of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners -- express or otherwise -- showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection found by the District Court between petitioners and the individual respondents was that in the absence of a change in police disciplinary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not with respect to them but as to the members of the classes they represented.
423 U.S. at 371. See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976) (indigent plaintiffs alleging that non-profit hospitals failed to provide them with medical treatment did not satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement against the Internal Revenue Service, observing that “it does not follow ... that the denial of access to hospital services in fact results from the IRS's Revenue Ruling allowing favorable tax treatment to such hospitals that offered only emergency-room services to indigents, rather than full hospital services”).
Of the twelve remaining named plaintiffs, nine of them requested fair hearings. Seven of them obtained favorable decisions, and the other two, Denise Thomas and J.Z., obtained stipulated resolutions to their fair hearing requests. Plaintiffs M.K.B., A.I. and L.A.M. allege no fair hearing requests.
As to the seven plaintiffs who obtained favorable decisions, their alien eligibility status was not reached in these fair hearing decisions, as these seven fair hearings were decided against the City on procedural grounds raised at the hearing. To illustrate, O.P. and L.W. both obtained favorable decisions annulling the City's denial of their respective food stamp applications pursuant to the Rivera stipulation. P.E. similarly obtained a favorable decision annulling the City's reduction of her public

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assistance and food stamps pursuant to the Rivera stipulation. M.E. obtained a favorable decision annulling the City's discontinuation of her public assistance, food stamps and Medicaid for her alleged failure to submit documents upon recertification, upon a finding that she complied with the City's recertification request for documents. Fedosenko obtained a favorable decision annulling the City's discontinuation of her food stamps, due to the absence of notice. M.A., who challenged the City's failure to add her to her daughter's case, obtained a favorable decision after fair hearing directing the City to process her application. Marieme Diongue obtained a favorable decision annulling the City's determination which omitted her from her daughter's case, as providing inadequate notice, and directing the City to make a retroactive determination of her eligibility.
Thus, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that State defendants' fair hearing review of their particular cases is legally flawed, let alone so as to subject State defendants to a supervisory injunction enjoining State OTDA and State DOH to employ an alternative method of supervising alien eligibility issues. While plaintiffs complain in this action that their fair hearing decisions should have reached their substantive immigration eligibility status, as set out above, they prevailed on other grounds at their fair hearings, such as procedural defenses, which obviated reaching those issues. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a Constitutional or statutory mandate for hearing officers to always reach and decide an appellant's substantive eligibility for benefits, especially when the appellant's challenge to the local social services district's determination can be resolved in the appellant's favor on other grounds. It is also questionable whether plaintiffs' fair hearing records were such as to prove (or disprove) their eligibility - let alone demonstrate that a remand was unlawful.
In any event, if plaintiffs, most of whom were represented by counsel at their fair hearings, wished to judicially challenge their fair hearing decisions, they had available to them, and did not avail themselves of, State judicial review pursuant to N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78, and thus they cannot seek to somehow challenge their respective fair hearing decisions in this Court. See Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988)(affirming dismissal of § 1983 suit by discharged city employee who claimed ALJ made evidentiary error at administrative hearing since employee had available State court remedies pursuant to CPLR Article 78). Also, in New York State National Organization for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (“N.O.W.”), the Second Circuit reversed the district court's award of injunctive and declaratory relief to class action plaintiffs who alleged undue delay in a state agency's handling of their claims. The Second Circuit stated that “the district court failed to consider the availability of other procedures that could have prevented the claimants from suffering prejudicial delay. More precisely, the district court erred in not considering Article 78 proceedings and how (if utilized by the claimants) these proceedings could have reduced claimants' risk of experiencing prejudicial delay.” 261 F.3d at 168. The Second Circuit in N.O.W. went on to state that “[g]iven the availability of Article 78 procedures, which can be invoked before actual prejudice arises (unlike a § 1983 damage claim, which presumably would arise only after actual prejudice had occurred), we find that the second Matthews factor weighs dispositively in favor of the government.” Id. at 168. The Circuit further
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went on to state that “[b]ecause we hold that Article 78 proceedings provide a meaningful pre-deprivation remedy, we need not decide whether the ‘alleged deprivations'-- i.e., processing delay followed by actual prejudice--are ‘random and unauthorized,’ or instead are based in established state procedures.” Id. at 169 n. 3 (emphasis added), citing Alexandre v. Cortes, 140 F.3d 406, 411 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the existence of independent state post-deprivation remedies are a defense only when the deprivation at issue was “random and unauthorized”).
Some of the plaintiffs allege that although they obtained favorable fair hearing decisions, the City nonetheless did not comply with those decisions. See, e.g., L.W., Complaint at „ 190; M.A., id. at „ 205; J.Z., id. at „ 344). However, these plaintiffs do not allege that they informed State defendants' Compliance Unit of this non-compliance by making non-compliance complaints pursuant to 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-6.4(c). Insofar as these plaintiffs have not exhausted their available supervisory remedies with State defendants, they lack standing, as well as a legal basis, for contending that State defendant's supervision of their particular cases is legally inadequate.[FN18]
FN18. O.P. (who is PRUCOL) made a compliance complaint, which resulted in the City submitting a Fair Hearing Compliance Statement (exhibit K to O.P's declaration dated November 22, 2005), stating, inter alia: We have been unable to determine if you are eligible for the benefits that were the subject of your Fair Hearing. We mailed you a letter on 8/16/05, asking you to bring the following [documents] to the Job Center by 8/24/05 ... Because you failed to respond to our letter, we cannot complete any compliance action until you supply the requested information. If you bring the information to the Job Center within ten days from the date of this notice, we will consider the information in accordance with the Fair Hearing decision.
Furthermore, the allegation of HRA's non-compliance with a fair hearing decision does not support the request for a preliminary injunction against State OTDA. For example, in Hegarty v. Perales, 168 A.D.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1990), the petitioner sued the State and local social services commissioner to compel compliance with the State commissioner's decision after fair hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal of the petition as against the State commissioner and affirmed Supreme Court's denial of the petition as against the local commissioner “except to the extent of directing his compliance with the ‘Decision After Fair Hearing’.” 168 A.D.2d at 561. Similarly, in Patterson v. Blum, 86 A.D.2d 893 (2d Dep't 1982), the petitioner sued the State and local commissioners of social services to compel the local commissioner to comply with the State commissioner's decision after fair hearing. There, again, the Appellate Division dismissed the petition as against the State commissioner, and only granted the petition “to the extent that the matter is remitted to the Nassau County Department of Social Services with directions to proceed in accordance with the directives set forth in the decision after fair hearing.” 86 A.D.2d at 894.
4. PLAINTIFFS SUPERVISORY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE FOOD STAMP ACT OR

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THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT TO PRESCRIBE THE MANNER BY WHICH STATE DEFENDANTS MUST SUPERVISE THE ISSUES HEREIN, IN PARTICULAR AS PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT
STATE DEFENDANTS' FAIR HEARING REVIEW OF THEIR CASES VIOLATED THE FEDERAL FOOD STAMPS OR MEDICAID STATUTES OR REGULATIONS
Plaintiffs seek an injunction against the State defendants to “supervise” the City defendants in some manner which plaintiffs do not specify other than to contend that “the State fair hearing system ... is wholly inadequate and ineffective in rectifying widespread and persistent errors by HRA in the delivery of public benefits to class members.” Plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of motion for preliminary injunction and class certification, at 28. However, as discussed above, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their respective fair hearing decisions, all of which were favorable, somehow legally harmed them - let alone, violated the federal food stamp or Medicaid statutes and regulations, which expressly provide for supervisory review through the fair hearing process. To the extent the State's WMS is considered a form of supervision, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the State computerized welfare management system contains any error that systemically deprives eligible aliens of federal benefits.
The Food Stamp Act provides that the State agency participating in the food stamp program “shall submit for approval a plan of operation specifying the manner in which such program will be conducted within the State in every political subdivision.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d).[FN19] The“Secretary [of the United States Department of Agriculture] may not, as a part of the approval process for a plan of operation, require a State to submit for prior approval by the Secretary the State agency instructions to staff, interpretations of existing policy, State agency methods of administration, forms used by the State agency, or any materials, documents, memoranda, bulletins, or other matter, unless the State determines that the materials, documents, memoranda, bulletins, or other matter alter or amend the State plan of operation or conflict with the rights and levels of benefits to which a household is entitled.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d).
FN19. Under the Food Stamps statute, “State agency” means “the agency of State government, including the local offices thereof, which has the responsibility for the administration of the federally aided public assistance programs within such State, and in those States where such assistance programs are operated on a decentralized basis, the term shall include the counterpart local agencies administering such programs ...” 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n).
The Food Stamp Act further provides that the State plan shall provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency ...” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Implementing regulations provide that the “State agency shall maintain a system of its choosing for handling program complaints filed by participants, potential participants, or other concerned individuals or groups.” 7 C.F.R. § 271.6(a)(1) (emphasis added). This regulation further provides that “[c]omplaints regarding such areas as processing standards and service to participants and potential participants would generally be handled under this complaint procedure.” 7 C.F.R. § 271.6(a)(1).

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In addition, the Food Stamp Act provides that “[w]hen a State agency learns, through its own reviews under section 2025 of this title or other reviews, or through other sources, that it has improperly denied, terminated or underissued benefits to an eligible household, the State agency shall promptly restore any improperly denied benefits ..., and shall take other steps to prevent a recurrence of such errors where such error was caused by the application of State agency practices, rules or procedures inconsistent with the requirements of this chapter or with regulations or policies of the Secretary issued under the authority of this chapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(b).
Finally, the Food Stamp Act provides that “[i]f the Secretary determines, upon information received by the Secretary, or investigation that the Secretary shall initiate upon receiving sufficient information evidencing a pattern of lack of compliance by a State agency of a type specified in this subsection, that in the administration of the food stamp program there is a failure by a State agency without good cause to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter, ... the Secretary shall immediately inform such State agency of such failure and shall allow the State agency a specified period of time for the correction of such failure.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g)(emphasis added). “If the State agency does not correct such failure within that specified period, the Secretary may refer the matter to the Attorney General with a request that injunctive relief be sought to require compliance forthwith by the State agency ...” Id.
The Medicaid program is administered by the states in accordance with a plan approved by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The Social Security Act provides that the State Medicaid plan, inter alia: ... provide for the establishment or designation of a single state agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan, except that the determination of eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be made by the State or local agency administering the State plan approved under subchapter I or XVI of this chapter (insofar as it relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (emphasis added). The state's Federal Medicaid plan must “be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1). The state's Federal Medicaid plan must “provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness ...” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3).
With respect to State agency compliance, the Social Security Act provides: If the Secretary, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan ... finds ... that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to comply substantially with any such provision... the Secretary shall notify such State agency that further payments will not be made to the State ... until the Secretary is satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure to comply.

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42 U.S.C. § 1396c (emphasis added).
As the food stamp Act and Social Security Act and implementing regulations expressly provide for supervisory review through the fair hearing process, even though the plaintiffs are aliens, they lack a private right of action to mandate some other manner by which State defendants must supervise the alien eligibility issues involved here. In Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that individuals do not have a private right of action under section 1983 to enforce a “substantial compliance” provision of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court followed its traditional three-prong test for determining whether a federal statutory provision confers a federal private right of action: (1) Congress must have intended that the provision benefit the plaintiff, (2) “plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence”, and (3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. 520 U.S. at 341, citing, Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 430-32 (1987).
In Blessing, the Supreme Court determined that “the requirement that a State operate its child support program in ‘substantial compliance’ with Title IV-D [of the Social Security Act] was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right.” 520 U.S. at 343. The Court found that “[f]ar from creating an individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State's Title IV-D program.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court further stated that “the Secretary must look to the aggregate services provided by the State, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied.”Id. (emphasis added). The Court also observed that “many provisions, like the ‘substantial compliance’ standard, are designed only to guide the State in structuring its systemwide efforts at enforcing support obligations.” 520 U.S. at 344 and opined as follows: The Court of Appeals erred not only in finding that individuals have an enforceable right to substantial compliance, but also in taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV-D creates rights. It is readily apparent that many other provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme do not fit our traditional three criteria for identifying statutory rights. To begin with, many provisions, like the “substantial compliance” standard, are designed only to guide the State in structuring its systemwide efforts at enforcing support obligations. These provisions may ultimately benefit individuals who are eligible for Title IV-D services, but only indirectly. For example, Title IV-D lays out detailed requirements for the State's data processing system. Among other things, this system must sort information into standardized data elements specified by the Secretary; transmit information electronically to the State's AFDC system to monitor family eligibility for financial assistance; maintain the data necessary to meet federal reporting requirements; and provide for the electronic transfer of funds for purposes of income withholding and interstate collections. 42 U.S.C. § 654a (1994 ed., Supp. II); 45 C.F.R. § 307.10 (1995). Obviously, these complex standards do not give rise to individualized rights to computer services. They are simply intended to improve the overall efficiency of the States' child support enforcement scheme.
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520 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further stated that it is impermissible for plaintiffs simply to cite to an entire federal program statute (in that case child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act), and then claim they have a legally enforceable federal right to sue the State to compel compliance with the program in all respects. The Court stated that such an approach: paints with too broad a brush. It was incumbent upon [plaintiffs] to identify with particularity the rights they claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether Title IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined “rights.”
520 U.S. at 342.[FN20]
FN20. The Supreme Court consequently reversed and remanded to the lower court “to determine exactly what rights, considered in their most concrete specific form” were being asserted and “whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right.” 117 S.Ct. at 1362.
Here too, plaintiffs' supervisory claim against the State defendants “paints with too broad a brush” in alleging that State defendants' supervision of plaintiffs' cases violates the federal food stamps statutory provision, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n), and the Federal Medicaid statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) and regulation, 42 C.F.R. §431.10. (Complaint at para. 360). However, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) is merely a definitional section, and states that “State agency” means “the agency of State government, including the local offices thereof, which has the responsibility for the administration of the federally aided public assistance programs within such State, and in those States where such assistance programs are operated on a decentralized basis, the term shall include the counterpart local agencies administering such programs ...” 7 U.S.C. § 2012(n). Meanwhile, plaintiffs' citation to the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5), is unavailing to confer upon them an enforceable right against the State DOH since this statute merely requires that the State Medicaid plan, inter alia: ... provide for the establishment or designation of a single state agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan, except that the determination of eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be made by the State or local agency administering the State plan approved under subchapter I or XVI of this chapter ...
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5). While 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 sets forth certain provisions for the Medicaid supervising agency, these provisions, and those cited above, do not confer private rights enforceable pursuant to Blessing. These provisions are not intended to provide a benefit to individuals with respect to State supervision. Furthermore, the provisions do not confer a concrete benefit specific enough for the judiciary to enforce. Congress created more restrictive criteria for aliens, adding alienage-related conditions which also embroil the welfare eligibility process with other federal agencies involved in immigration matters, i.e., the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Social Security Administration. Thus, plaintiffs lack the private right of action to enjoin the State defendants to supervise the alien eligibility issues here in some manner beyond the Congressionally mandated fair hearing process, as to which, again, plaintiffs have not demonstrated

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that their fair hearings violated the federal food stamps or Medicaid statutes or regulations. Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F.Supp.2d 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (no private right of action is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) and 42 C.F.R. § 431.10, on which certain of the claims against the State DOH are premised).
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF A PROPOSED CLASS SHOULD BE DENIED
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) Rule 23(a). When a person sues as a representative of a class, the court must-at an early practicable time-- determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(1)(A). An order certifying a class action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(1)(B). Plaintiffs ask this Court to certify a broad class with a complex definition as follows: All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for State or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, and/or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have public benefits discontinued or reduced; (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying for public benefits; and/or (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application for public benefits, by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
Notice of Motion dated January 11, 2006. The phrase “Affected Immigrants” is overbroad in including people who are not “qualified aliens” under federal law, and in including qualified alien categories which are not represented by the named plaintiffs. The only “qualified alien” category which plaintiffs represent appears to be the “battered alien” category. Because the proposed class is completely subsumed in the definition of a certified class that provides for permanent injunctive relief for those who apply for benefits at Job Centers, and because the proposed definition is overly broad and includes references to state law claims that this court may not enforce against State defendants, the Court should deny the instant motion for class certification.
It is well-settled that a class action is “an exception to the usual rule that lit-

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igation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979). Accordingly, as a prerequisite under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for maintaining a class action, it must appear that a plaintiff presents a claim or an issue for adjudication that is typical of a class of claims or issues which could be raised by an ascertainable class of persons who are not before the court. “[T]he class-action device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.” Califano, id., at 701 (emphasis added). Otherwise class actions could result in the litigation of abstract questions which are not generated by the parties before the court. The very rationale for employing Rule 23 thus involves a threshold determination by the trial court that the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court possesses claims which are representative of the class.
In Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F.Supp.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) the Court certified a class defined as “all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center.” Id. at 392. The Court recently signed a final judgment directing permanent injunction against State DOH, STATE OTDA and City defendant. See 2005 WL 3428213. Some of the lawyers who are proposed class counsel in the instant action are class counsel in Reynolds. Clearly plaintiffs in the instant action are members of the Reynolds class. Relief is best sought for them through the Reynolds litigation, especially since the provision of relief to them might interfere with plans to provide relief to other Reynolds class members.
In the instant action, most of the plaintiffs have demonstrated that, if they are eligible to receive any kind of public benefit, they are eligible to receive SNA and State Medicaid.[FN21] These are claims arising out of State law, and this court is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment from adjudicating how the State defendants enforce state law. For this reason alone, certification of the proposed class that includes references to state law benefits is improper.
FN21. The plaintiffs rely on „„ 3-16 of the declaration of Camille Carey, Esq., one of the attorney/witnesses representing the plaintiffs, to argue that they satisfy the numerosity criterion of Rule 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law at 52. Examination of the declaration demonstrates that Ms. Carey transmits estimated information she heard from others to arrive at the total of persons she claims might be members of the class. This is hearsay and is not admissible into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 802. “The evidence supplied by plaintiffs for use by the court in its analysis must be such that it could be received into evidence.” Cokely v. NYCCOC, 2003 WL 1751738 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003)(Motley, J.)citing In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2001). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' argument must fail. Ms. Carey makes no effort to demonstrate how many of the cases she improperly reports actually suffered harm, that is a benefits application problem due to their immigration status.
Note: Page 52 missing in original document

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the State defendants and class certification should be denied.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2006 WL 548605 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. No. 05 CV 10446 (JSR). December 13, 2005.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ... 3
A. Immigrant Eligibility for Public Benefits ... 3
B. Facts Concerning Four Representative Named Plaintiffs ... 6
1. M.K.B. ... 7
2. O.P ... 9
3. L.W ... 12
4. M.A. ... 14
C. Class-Wide Facts ... 15
1. Systemic errors by HRA caseworkers and supervisors ... 16
2. Flaws in the defendants' computer systems ... 19
a. Flaws regarding eligible immigrants and documents ... 20
b. Mixed federal and State public benefits cases ... 22
c. Adding parents to their children's open cases ... 23

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d. Other computer programming flaws ... 24
3. Systemic denials of adequate notice ... 25
4. The State fair hearing process does not cure the problems ... 28
ARGUMENT ... 30
POINT I PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE GRANTED ... 30
A. Class Members Have Suffered And Will Continue To Suffer Irreparable Harm Unless Defendants Are Enjoined To Provide Class Members With The Public Benefits For Which They Are Eligible ... 30
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed On The Merits ... 33
1. Plaintiffs are asserting violations of clearly established federal rights ... 34
2. Defendants have a policy, custom, and usage of denying public benefits to eligible immigrants ... 35
a. City and State policy directives contain material misstatements and omissions regarding immigrant eligibility for public benefits ... 37
(i) Battered qualified immigrants ... 38
(ii) Disabled Qualified Aliens ... 39
(iii) Social Security numbers ... 40
b. HRA has a custom and usage of denying public benefits to eligible immigrants ... 45
c. Defendants have failed to train and supervise ... 47
3. The City defendant's failure to provide timely and adequate written notice of public benefits denials or discontinuances violates federal and State statutes and regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution ... 49
POINT II THE PROPOSED PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED ... 5 ... 51
A. The Class Satisfies Rule 23(a) ... 52
1. The proposed class is so numerous as to warrant class certification ... 52
2. Class members share common issues of law and fact and named plaintiffs' claims are typical of claims of the class ... 54
3. The named class members and class counsel will provide adequate representation for members of the class ... 55

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B. The Class Satisfies The Requirements Of Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) ... 56 1. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(2) ... 56 2. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(3) ... 57
CONCLUSION ... 58 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES In re Alcoholic Beverages Litig., 95 F.R.D. 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ... 53 Alexander A. v. Novello, 210 F.R.D. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ... 35 Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001) ... 6 Amnesty America v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 37 Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ... 30 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) ... 33, 34 Board of the Co. Comm'rs of Bryan Co. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) ... 36 Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ... 52 Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002) ... 35 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) ... 37 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 52 Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998) ... 35 Doston v. Duffy, 732 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ... 51 Folsom v. Blum, 87 F.R.D. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ... 54 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ... passim Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) ... 34 Green Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 30 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (199 1) ... 33 Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 49 Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1977) ... 30

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Jane B. v. New York City Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 117 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ... 53, 54 Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) ... 36, 37 Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) ... 36 Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005) ... 49, 50 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) ... 42 Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997) ... 54, 55 Mayhew v. Cohen, 604 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ... 51 McCoy v. Ithaca Hous. Auth., 559 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) ... 55 Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ... 33, 34 Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ... 30, 52 Mullane v. C. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ... 49 Nat. Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of E. Haven, 70 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 30 Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999) ... 36, 37 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) ... 36 Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 35 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ... passim Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ... passim Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877 (WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) ... passim Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 10900 (DLC), 2000 WL 760300 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2000) ... 35 Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993) ... 52, 53, 54 Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004) ... 35 Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't., 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 35, 36 Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 100 (1975) ... 49 Wahhab v. City of New York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ... 36, 37
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Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 47 Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ... 35 STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(3)(ii) ... 35 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) ... 35 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2) ... 6, 18 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 13 (b) ... 6 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 13 (d) ... 6 8 U.S.C. § 1 62 1 (d) ... 6 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) ... 4 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c) ... 4, 5 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) ... 34 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(k) ... 17 Immigration and Nationality Act § 105(a)(15)(v) ... 17 Medicaid Act § 1396r-6(a)(1) ... 35 Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, Subtitle G, 108 Stat. 1902, 1953 (1994) ... 4 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a) ... 35 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(g)(1) ... 35 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 ... 40, 41 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g) ... 50 8 C.F.R. § 2 1 4.15 ... 17 8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2 ... 17 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a) ... 41 42 C.F.R. § 435.910 ... 40, 41 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 ... 50 42 C.F.R. § 435.912 ... 50

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F ed. R. Civ. P. 2 3(a) ... 52, 54
F ed. R. Civ. P. 2 3(b) ... 56, 57
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 122 ... 6, 42
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 349.3(b) ... 6
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.2(c) ... 43
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.2 ... 50
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-3.3 ... 50
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360-1.2 ... 42, 43
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 369.2(b) ... 42
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 370.2(c) ... 42
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Immigrants who reside in New York State legally and permanently, and who are impoverished because they are disabled or unemployed, are legally entitled to receive certain forms of subsistence-level public benefits they need to survive. In New York City, the local agency responsible for determining eligibility for and delivering those benefits is the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA). The State agencies responsible for ensuring that HRA administers benefits lawfully, and on whose behalf HRA acts as an agent, are the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (State OTDA) and the New York State Department of Health (State DOH).
Because of deep-seated flaws in their policy statements, computer programming, training, supervision, and other deficiencies described in this memorandum of law, HRA, State OTDA, and State DOH systemically and routinely fail to deliver State and federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps (collectively public benefits[FN1]) at New York City job centers[FN2] to many categories of immigrants who are legally eligible for assistance. The immigrants who are most frequently victimized by these failings, and on whose behalf this action is brought,[FN3] are:
FN1. “Public benefits,” as defined here, includes federal food stamps, federal and State Medicaid, federally and State-funded public assistance and, for periods before October 1, 2005, State food stamps through the Food Assistance Program.
FN2. Since 1998, New York City has used the term “job center” to refer to the HRA offices responsible for administering joint public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid cases. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
FN3. For a detailed statement of the class definition, see Compl. „ 39.
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(i) Battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are, for that reason, Qualified Aliens;[FN4]
FN4. For the statutory definition of the term “Qualified Alien,” see infra note 6, and Compl. „ 42. (ii) Their immigrant children or, in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens;
(iii) Lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and
(iv) Persons who are Permanently Residing in the United States under Color of Law (PRUCOL).[FN5]
FN5. The term “PRUCOL,” an acronym for “Permanently Residing Under Color of Law,” refers to immigrants living in the United States with the knowledge and permission or acquiescence of the federal immigration authority and whose departure the federal immigration authority does not contemplate enforcing. For a complete definition of the term PRUCOL, see N.Y. State Department of Health, Admin. Dir. 04 OMM/ADM-07, at 19-22; Compl. „ 70. For simplicity, immigrants in (i) and (ii) above will be described in this memorandum as “battered qualified immigrants” - a term that includes Qualified Aliens who are themselves battered as well as their children and parents.
All class members are either Qualified Aliens or PRUCOL. All of them are eligible for both Medicaid and public assistance. In addition, class members who are Qualified Aliens and who are either children, disabled, or in certain other categories, are also eligible for federal food stamps. The impact of the defendants' systemic failure to deliver Medicaid, public assistance, and food stamps to eligible class members at New York City job centers is irreparable and utterly devastating. Many class members are battered qualified immigrants who require public benefits not only to survive, but to escape the victimization they have suffered at the hands of their batterers.
This action seeks to compel HRA, State OTDA, and State DOH to develop the plans and improvements necessary to rectify systemic flaws in the delivery of Medicaid, public assistance, and food stamps to class members at New York City job centers. Ultimately, plaintiffs seek an order ensuring that all class members receive the public benefits to which they are legally entitled.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Immigrant Eligibility for Public Benefits
The rules governing the eligibility of immigrants for public benefits are admittedly complex. But complexity is no excuse for failing to apply the law uniformly and correctly at all HRA job centers. For convenience, the most important rules are summarized below. For a full statement of the relevant rules concerning immigrant eligibility for public benefits, see the Compl. „„ 40-83.

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Qualified and PRUCOL Aliens. The first step in determining whether an immigrant is eligible for public benefits in New York State is to determine whether the immigrant is either a Qualified Alien or PRUCOL. The term “Qualified Alien” is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) and, for convenience, is summarized in the footnote below.[FN6] The term “PRUCOL” includes all persons who are permanently residing in the United States with either the knowledge and permission of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), or the knowledge and acquiescence of the USCIS.[FN7]
FN6. A Qualified Alien is an alien who (a) is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or (b) has been granted asylum under § 208 of the INA, or (c) was admitted as a refugee under § 207 of the INA, or (d) has been paroled into the United States for at least one year under § 212(d)(5) of the INA, or (e) has been granted withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the INA (as in effect before April 1, 1997), or § 241(b)(3) of the INA, or (f) has been granted conditional entry under § 203(a)(7) of the INA (as in effect before April 1, 1980), or (g) is a Cuban or Haitian entrant, as defined in § 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, or (h) has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States (referred to herein as battered qualified immigrants). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1641(b), (c).
FN7. See supra note 5. Of particular importance here are two groups of battered immigrants and their children and/or parents who are Qualified Aliens because of the abuse they have suffered. One group of battered qualified immigrants, known as “VAWA self-petitioners,” includes immigrants who have filed a petition for classification as a battered spouse or child of a U.S. citizen, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(i), or of a lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(ii), under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, Subtitle G, 108 Stat. 1902, 1953 (1994). Two subgroups of VAWA self-petitioners are important here: those who have received a notice stating they have set forth a “prima facie case” under VAWA; and those whose self-petitions under VAWA have been approved. The statute defines both subgroups as Qualified Aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B) (referring to an alien who “has been approved or has a petition pending which sets forth a prima facie case...”).
A second group of battered qualified immigrants includes immigrants who are not “self-petitioners,” but who present proof of abuse and proof that a petition has been filed on their behalf by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident parent or spouse for classification of the alien as a spouse or child of the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident petitioner. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(iv). Because the form for filing such a petition is known as an 1-130, this second group will be referred to as the I-130 group of battered qualified immigrants throughout this memorandum. Some kinds of visas, such as certain K or V visas, suffice as proof that an I-130 petition has been filed because the filing of the I-130 petition is a condition of obtaining the visa.
Prominent among immigrants in the PRUCOL group are those who have been granted de-

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ferred action status by USCIS, and asylum applicants who have been authorized to work in the United States. See State DOH, 04 OMM/ADM-07, §§ IV(F)(i), (1), at 19-20 (attached as Ex. 45 to the accompanying Declaration of Jennifer Baum dated Dec. 12, 2005 (Baum Decl.)). An important group of immigrants granted deferred action are those who have submitted U visa applications to USCIS. U visas are available to victims of certain crimes, including domestic violence, who have suffered substantial harm because of these crimes and who have been helpful with the criminal investigation or prosecution of these crimes.
Medicaid and public assistance. All Qualified and PRUCOL Aliens have immigration statuses that render them eligible for Medicaid and public assistance. Those who entered the United States before August 22, 1996 or have been a Qualified Alien for five years (the “five-year bar”), or are exempt from the five-year bar,[FN8] are eligible for federally funded Medicaid and federally funded public assistance, known as Family Assistance in New York State. Otherwise, they are eligible for fully State-funded Medicaid (State Medicaid), Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 426-27 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 122(1)(c), and State-funded public assistance, known as Safety Net Assistance in New York State, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 122(1)(c); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 349.3(b)(1)(iv).
FN8. Immigrants who are exempt from the five-year bar for federal Medicaid include (1) persons admitted as refugees under § 207 of the INA; (2) persons granted asylum under § 208 of the INA; (3) persons granted withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the INA (as in effect before April 1, 1997) or § 241(b)(3) of the INA; (4) Cuban or Haitian entrants, as defined in § 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980; (5) Amerasians; (6) lawfully residing veterans or individuals on active duty and their lawfully residing dependents; or (7) American Indians born in Canada or members of a federally recognized Indian tribe. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1613(b), (d). Immigrants who are exempt from the five-year bar for federally reimbursed Family Assistance are the same as those who are exempt from the five-year bar for federal Medicaid, except that American Indians born in Canada or members of a federally recognized Indian tribe are not included. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(b). Food Stamps. A Qualified Alien has an immigration status that renders her eligible for federal food stamps if she is (1) a lawful permanent resident who has worked 40 qualifying quarters as defined under the Social Security Act; or (2) is receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability within the meaning of the Food Stamps Act; or (3) was lawfully residing in the United States and was 65 years of age or older on August 22, 1996; or (4) is under 18 years of age; or (5) has resided in the United States in a Qualified Alien status for five or more years; or (6) is in one of several other immigration categories.[FN9] 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B), (F)(ii), (I), (J), (L).
FN9. These categories are identical to the categories of immigrants who are exempt from the five-year bar for federal Medicaid, see supra note 8, with one addition: Members of a Hmong or Highland Laotian tribe who rendered assistance to the United States military during the Vietnam era are included. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(2)(C), (G), (K). As discussed in supra note 1, the State-funded food
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stamp program expired on September 30, 2005. B. Facts Concerning Four Representative Named Plaintiffs
This case is brought by 13 named plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated lawfully residing immigrants. The facts regarding four representative named plaintiffs are summarized below. For a brief summary of all the plaintiffs' experiences, see „„ 24 - 37 of the Declaration of Elizabeth S. Saylor submitted in support of the Order to Show Cause.[FN10]
FN10. The plaintiffs' experiences are all set out in more detail in the Compl. at „„ 149-348. Many of the plaintiffs and declarants in this matter are proceeding anonymously because they fear that using their names would endanger them and their children by creating a risk that their abusers could find them. 1. M.K.B.
M.K.B. is a 33-year-old woman from Jamaica who lives in a homeless shelter in Manhattan with her three children, M.A.B., age 9; S.B., age 7; and, N.B., age 2 months. In May 2004, M.K.B. and her two older children arrived in New York to be reunited with her husband and the children's father. M.K.B. entered the United States on a V-1 visa and her children entered on V-3 visas. They received these visas because M.K.B.'s husband, a lawful permanent resident, filed an I-130 family-based petition on their behalf. (Declaration of M.K.B., dated Dec. 1, 2005 (M.K.B. Decl.) „„ 1, 3-4, 8.)
Unfortunately, soon after their arrival, M.K.B.'s husband became abusive. He tormented the children, for example, by leaving a large kitchen knife under M.A.B.'s pillow. The worst incident occurred in September 2005, when M.K.B. was eight months pregnant. M.K.B.'s husband came at her with an ice pick, threatened to kill her, and threw a bucket at her, just missing her stomach that held their unborn child. He also showed her rat poison and threatened to feed it to the children. Fearing for her safety and the well-being of her two children and unborn son, M.K.B. called the police and fled with her children that night. Since then, she has lived in a homeless shelter with her children. M.K.B. subsequently received a temporary order of protection from New York County Family Court. (Id. „„ 5-7.)
As immigrants with approved I-130s plus proof of domestic violence, M.K.B. and her two immigrant children are Qualified Aliens and therefore eligible for State Medicaid and State public assistance. As Qualified Aliens under the age of 18, M.A.B. and S.B. are also eligible for federal food stamps. N.B., who was born in XXXXXX, is eligible for all federal public benefits because he is a citizen. (Id. „„ 1, 3, 8.)
On September 30, 2005, M.K.B. applied for public benefits for herself and her three children at the Riverview Job Center. M.K.B. told Mr. Sonde, her HRA caseworker that she was a domestic violence victim. She showed him police reports, her and her children's passports (which contain the V visas), her work permit, and her Social Security card. Mr. Sonde told her that her immigrant children were not eligible because they did not have Social Security numbers. (Id. „„ 9-10.)
M.K.B. later received notices stating that public assistance, Medicaid, and food
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stamps cases had been accepted and that she would receive $68.50 semi-monthly in public assistance and $119 per month in food stamps. The notices did not state who in the family had been accepted. M.K.B. assumed these benefits were for her because she had not yet brought in her newborn's Social Security card. M.K.B. never received a notice stating that her or her children's application for public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid had been denied. (Id. „ 11.)
Because M.K.B. did not know who in her family was accepted, her attorney called the Riverview Job Center. Ms. Medina, a HRA caseworker, stated that the case was open only for the citizen baby and that the rest of the family had been rejected due to their immigration status. (Declaration of Reena Ganju dated Dec. 12, 2005 (Ganju Decl.) „ 104.)
Since M.K.B. fled her husband, she has struggled to provide for her family. M.K.B. uses almost all of the public assistance grant to purchase baby wipes and diapers for her newborn son. Even so, she often runs out of diapers. Once when she ran out of diapers, several children of other shelter residents each gave her dollar bills they had just received at a church dinner so that she could buy diapers. The other shelter residents have also given her soap, toothpaste, sanitary pads, and shampoo. M.K.B. fears their kindness will end soon, leaving her and her children with almost nothing. (M.K.B. Decl. „ 18.)
M.K.B. also does not have enough money to feed herself and her three children. She cannot afford to purchase nutritious foods, such as dairy products, fruits, and vegetables. Her family survives on cereal and milk, hot dogs, frozen dinners, and fast food because these are the only foods they can afford with the benefits she receives for her newborn son. As a result of not eating enough, she and her children have lost weight and often lack energy. M.K.B. frequently feels weak and suffers from headaches because she is not eating enough and is breastfeeding. (Id. „„ 14-15.)
When she fled her home in September, M.K.B. could only bring a few items of clothing with her. Now she is unable to afford more clothing for herself and her children. They rely on clothing donations from the shelter, but there have not been enough winter clothing donations to clothe her and her family. Her son S.B. does not have a warm winter coat and M.K.B. and the children all need winter sweaters, shoes, and pants. (Id. „ 19.)
Because she does not have Medicaid, M.K.B. has been unable to obtain the medical care she needs to treat painful eye cysts and two sexually transmitted diseases she contracted from her abusive husband. Also, S.B. has been unable to see a dentist for chipped front teeth even though he is in pain. (Id. „ 17.)
M.K.B. and her children will not be able to afford to move out of the shelter until they are receiving benefits for the entire family. (Id. „ 23.)
2. O.P.
O.P. is a 39-year-old immigrant victim of domestic violence from Peru. She has two children, ages 5 and 13, both of whom live with her in a homeless shelter in New

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York City. O.P. was granted deferred action by the USCIS in January 2005 based on a U visa application. She is eligible for a U visa because she assisted the District Attorney's Office in the prosecution of the father of her younger child, who abused her for several years. O.P.'s immigration status makes her PRUCOL, and therefore eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. (Declaration of O.P. dated Nov. 22, 2005 (O.P. Decl.) „„ 1, 4, 7-12.)
In March 2005, O.P. moved into a domestic violence shelter. She first applied for public assistance and Medicaid at the Hamilton Job Center shortly thereafter. She submitted copies of all of her immigration documents, including her deferred action notice; her passport and Social Security card; and a letter from an attorney explaining the basis for her PRUCOL status and the public benefits for which she is therefore eligible. The caseworker processing her application told O.P. that her application for public benefits would be denied because she “did not have a green card.” (Id. „„ 18-19.) O.P. later received a notice dated June 14, 2005, denying her application for public assistance because she did not present “verification that [she is] a citizen or that [she is] a lawful permanent resident.”[FN11] (Id. „ 20, Ex. H.) O.P. never received a notice regarding her Medicaid application. (Id. „ 20.)
FN11. This quotation has been translated from Spanish to English. On July 7, 2005, O.P. attended an administrative fair hearing conducted by State OTDA regarding the denial of her public benefits application. The decision issued after the hearing, dated August 11, 2005, did not state O.P.'s immigration status, nor did it state the public benefits for which she is eligible or explain the immigrant eligibility rules. It merely instructed the center to withdraw the denial notice and to continue to process her public benefits application. (Id. „„ 21-22, Ex. I.)
On August 5, 2005, O.P. and her children were forced to move out of the domestic violence shelter and into a regular homeless shelter because they had reached the State-mandated time limit for stays in emergency domestic violence shelters. After moving into the homeless shelter, she reapplied for public benefits twice more - in August and October at the Riverview Job Center. Both times she was erroneously denied due to her immigration status. (Id. „„ 23, 31, 41.)
She still has not received any benefits, even though the Administrative Assistant (AA) to the Director[FN12] of the Riverview Job Center, Mr. Oni, told her and her attorney on September 23, 2005 that he would look into the case. (Declaration of Kevin Kenneally, dated Dec. 8, 2005 (Kenneally Decl.) „„ 11-14.)
FN12. The AA to the Director is the person in the Director's office who generally handles advocates' requests for assistance with problem cases. (Ganju Decl. „ 20.) O.P. and her children are suffering great hardship every day because of the erroneous denials of her three public benefits applications. O.P. has no money and is receiving no other form of assistance. She feeds herself and her two children by going to food pantries, where she is able to get some canned food and sometimes a box of cereal or a little bag of rice. She is unable to afford nutritious fresh food for

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herself and her two children. Sometimes she goes without food in order to feed her children. (O.P. Decl. „„ 45-46.)
O.P.'s application for Housing Stability Plus, a housing subsidy for those living in shelters, was denied solely because she was not receiving public assistance. This subsidy would have enabled O.P. and her two children to move out of the shelter system and into permanent housing of their own. (Id. „ 24.)
O.P. is unable to visit a doctor because she does not have Medicaid. O.P. frequently suffers debilitating pain in her ovaries. In September 2005, she underwent a colonoscopy. The doctor who performed that procedure referred her to a gynecologist for further treatment regarding the pain in her ovaries. She has not, however, been able to see a gynecologist or receive any treatment for this problem because she is unable to afford the fee.
Recently, she fainted in the kitchen at her homeless shelter. Her son discovered her collapsed and unconscious on the floor. She does not know why she lost consciousness or for how long, and she is unable to afford medical treatment to learn why or how to prevent a reoccurrence. (Id. „„ 36-40.)
Because she has been denied public assistance, she is also denied child care assistance and cannot search for or obtain a job. (Id. „„ 15, 48.)
3. L.W.
L.W. is a 62-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica who is staying temporarily with a friend in Brooklyn. She suffers from multiple severe medical problems, including heart disease, kidney stones, a hernia, and high blood pressure. L.W. entered the United States in 2003 on a K-3 visa as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. (Declaration of L.W., dated Oct. 21, 2005 (L.W. Decl.) „„ 1, 3, 5; Declaration of Jennifer Rolnick, dated Dec. 12, 2005 (Rolnick Decl.) „ 29.)
As a domestic violence victim with an approved I-130 family-based petition, L.W. is a Qualified Alien and is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. As a disabled Qualified Alien, she is also eligible for federal food stamps. L.W. did not, however, receive public assistance until four months after she originally applied, and she is still not receiving federal food stamps seven months after applying. (L.W. Decl. „„ 2, 11, 27.) She is receiving Medicaid, but not disability-related Medicaid, despite her serious medical problems, because HRA has failed to make a determination of disability, which State procedures require HRA to do. HRA's failure to make a Medicaid disability determination for L.W. is critical because she can receive food stamps only after being found disabled pursuant to such a determination. (Rolnick Decl. „„ 9, 22.)
L.W. first applied for public assistance and food stamps on or about March 17, 2005. A caseworker told her that HRA would deny her application, but she never received a notice stating this. L.W. applied for public assistance and food stamps a second time on or about May 31, 2005. That same day, HRA denied her food stamps application due to her immigration status, this time by issuing a written notice of determina-

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tion. On June 7, 2005, a worker told L.W. that HRA had denied her public assistance application. HRA provided no written notice of that decision. (L.W. Decl. „„ 11-15.)
After continuous advocacy by L.W.'s attorneys, HRA finally approved her application for public assistance on July 14, 2005. On June 29, a State OTDA hearing decision directed HRA to re-evaluate L.W.'s May 31 application for food stamps. Despite that directive and numerous calls to the center by her attorneys, HRA has taken no further action on her food stamps application. (Id. „„ 19-23; Rolnick Decl. „„ 7-11, 21, 26; Declaration of Elizabeth Saylor dated Dec. 12, 2005 (Saylor Decl.) „„ 153-157; Declaration of Angela Migally, dated Oct. 14, 2005 (Migally Decl.) at „„ 5, 8-14.)
L.W. does not have the resources to provide herself with a sufficient diet. She lived in a domestic violence shelter until about two weeks ago, but she had to move out because she had exceeded the State-mandated time limit and the shelter could no longer afford to house her without payment. When she lived in the shelter, she had to rely on other residents for hand-outs in order to eat. Now she has to rely on charity. Sometimes no one has food to give her and she has to go without food. She worries that not eating will cause her health to deteriorate further. She already suffers from stomach and chest pain almost every day. (L.W. Decl. „ 27; Rolnick Decl. „ 29.)
4. M.A.
M.A. is a 36-year-old battered qualified immigrant from the Dominican Republic who lives in a homeless shelter in the Bronx, New York with her 3-year-old daughter. M.A. arrived in the United States in September 1999 to be reunited with her husband, who is a lawful permanent resident. In October 2003, her husband filed an I-130 family-based petition on her behalf, which USCIS approved in February 2004. Although she is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance, she has not received the benefits for which she is eligible. (Declaration of M.A., dated December 3, 2005 (M.A. Decl.) „„ 1-5, 20.)
M.A.'s husband frequently beat her, threatened her with weapons, and said he would kill her. During the summer of 2004, the abuse became unbearable and M.A. fled to a domestic violence shelter in Brooklyn with her daughter. Because her husband continued to threaten her, she obtained an order of protection from Family Court. On or around February 2005, their allowed time at the shelter expired and they moved to a homeless shelter in the Bronx, where M.A. and her daughter currently live. (Id. „„ 6-9.)
M.A. first applied for public assistance and Medicaid for her daughter, a U.S. citizen, on or around September 9, 2003. On behalf of her daughter alone, she currently receives $68.50 in public assistance semi-monthly and $116 per month in food stamps. This is her family's only source of income. (Id. „ 10.)
M.A. has gone to the Crotona Job Center and asked to be added to her daughter's public benefits case four times - on July 14 and 21, 2005 and on November 15 and 18, 2005. Each time, she gave the HRA workers a copy of her I-130 notice and proof of
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abuse. Each time, she was told that she was ineligible due to her immigration status. She was told, for example, that she was not eligible because she was not a lawful permanent resident and did not have a “prima facie.” She never received a written notice in response to any of these applications. (Id. „„ 10-20.)
On September 30, 2005, she attended a fair hearing to challenge the failure of the center to add her to her daughter's case. The decision, dated October 21, 2005, directed the center to continue processing her application, taking into account her approved I-130 status. The decision, however, contains no discussion of the law on immigrant eligibility for benefits and does not state whether M.A. is eligible for benefits. To date, no one has contacted M.A. regarding the fair hearing decision. (Id. „„ 16-18, Ex. D; Declaration of Russell Jacobs, dated Dec. 12, 2005 (Jacobs Decl.) „„ 10-12.)
M.A. cannot afford to buy enough food for her daughter and herself. She also cannot afford to buy her daughter winter clothes. And it is extremely difficult for her to find housing outside of the shelter system until her application for benefits is accepted because only then will she qualify for an adequate housing subsidy. (M.A. Decl. „„ 21-22.)
Because she does not have Medicaid, M.A. is unable to receive all of the medical treatment she needs. A clinic doctor recommended that she see a psychologist for depression resulting from the domestic violence, but she does not have money to pay for counseling. She has been unable to go to the dentist, although she has pain in her teeth. She worries that if she becomes seriously ill that no one will be able to care for her daughter. (Id. „ 23.)
C. Class-Wide Facts
HRA systemically and routinely erroneously denies applications by class members for Medicaid, food stamps, and public assistance at HRA job centers because of misapplications of immigrant eligibility rules, and systemically and routinely deters and discourages class members from applying for these benefits. HRA also systemically and routinely fails to give adequate and timely notice to immigrants who have been denied benefits at job centers. These systemic violations of law are directly attributable to material misstatements and omissions in defendants' policies and instructions; errors in design of the defendants' computer systems; and defects in the notices defendants use (or fail to use) to notify immigrants of the denial of an application for benefits. The State fair hearing system, which is supposed to rectify erroneous denials of Medicaid, public assistance, and food stamps, is wholly inadequate and ineffective in rectifying widespread and persistent denials of public benefits by HRA to eligible immigrants.
1. Systemic errors by HRA caseworkers and supervisors
HRA workers have repeatedly told eligible immigrants that they are ineligible for benefits because they or their spouses are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents,[FN13] or because they have not resided in the United States for five years,[FN14] or because they do not have work authorization,[FN15] or because an Im-
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migration Judge has not yet ruled on an asylum application,[FN16] or because they lack a Social Security number.[FN17]
FN13. See Declaration of L.A.M. dated Nov. 29, 2005 (L.A.M. Decl.) „„ 17, 23; Declaration of P.S. dated Nov. 17, 2005 (P.S. Decl.) „ 13; Declaration of Marieme Diongue (Diongue Decl.) „ 14; M.A. Decl. „ 20; Declaration of K.T. dated Oct. 12, 2005 (K.T. Decl.) „ 7; Declaration of Nicole Prince dated Dec. 8, 2005 (Prince Decl.) „ 17; O.P. Decl. „„ 19, 42; Declaration of R.R. dated Sept. 29, 2005 (R.R. Decl.) „ 12; Declaration of P.E. dated Nov. 10, 2005 (P.E. Decl.) „„ 10, 37, 49; Declaration of Violeta Petrova dated Sept. 1, 2005 (Petrova Decl.) „„ 16, 18; Declaration of N.E. dated Aug. 25, 2005 (N.E. Decl.) „ 17; Declaration of W.J. dated Sept. 30, 2005 (W.J. Decl.) „„ 13, 21, 24; Declaration of M.T. dated Sept. 22, 2005 (M.T. Decl.) „ 24; Declaration of Angelica Higinio dated Dec. 3, 2005 (Higinio Decl.) „ 18; Decl. of Denise Thomas dated Dec. 11, 2005 (Thomas Decl.) „„ 18-19, Jacobs Decl. „ 79; Saylor Decl. „ 111.
FN14. See Declaration of Anna Fedosenko dated Nov. 21, 2005 (Fedosenko Decl.) „„ 8, 14; K.T. Decl. „ 5; Prince Decl. „ 25; R.R. Decl. „ 12; Declaration of W.S. dated Nov. 22, 2005 (W.S. Decl.) „ 5; Thomas Decl. „ 19; Jacobs Decl. „ 79.
FN15. See P.E. Decl. „ 30; Petrova Decl. „ 10.
FN16. See Fofana Decl. „ 11; Declaration of Carrie Wollmershauser dated Sept. 14, 2005 (Wollmershauser Decl.) „ 3.
FN17. See M.K.B. Decl. „ 10; P.S. Decl. „ 13; P.E. Decl. „„ 26-27, 34, 37, 44, 49; Declaration of M.E. dated Nov. 8, 2005 (M.E. Decl.) „ 9; Ganju Decl. „„ 32-34, 103, Ex. 32; Prince Decl. „ 22; W.J. Decl. „ 16; Thomas Decl. „ 18; Saylor Decl. „ 178. The systems employed by defendants to deliver public benefits to class members are rife with error. Workers' errors are especially prevalent with respect to battered immigrants. Some HRA workers understand that a VAWA “prima facie” notice is sufficient to prove that an immigrant is a Qualified Alien - although many workers get even that wrong. (For example, a worker at the Linden Job Center told Nicole Prince that she had never heard of a “prima facie” notice) (Prince Decl. „ 12; see also M.H. Decl. „„ 7, 9; L.A.M. Decl. „ 17; P.S. Decl. „„ 13-14; Thomas Decl. „„ 18-19, 22; Ganju Decl. „„ 14, 47, 23-24, 65, 67.) Most HRA workers are unaware that immigrants with I-130 petitions and proof of abuse are eligible for benefits. (M.A. Decl. „„ 12, 14, 19, 20; P.E. Decl. „„ 10, 13; Declaration of J.Z. dated Dec. 9, 2005 (J.Z. Decl.) „„ 16, 19; M.E. Decl. „„ 22, 25; Declaration of Anya Emerson (Emerson Decl.) „ 10; Ganju Decl. „„ 15, 20, 96, 97; W.J. Decl. „„ 7-8, 13; Saylor Decl. „ 216.) Workers who may have heard of an I-130 petition are generally unaware that proof of an I-130 filing may be shown by other documentation, including documents indicating that an immigrant has or is eligible for a V-1, V-2, or V-3 visa[FN18] or has a K-3 or K-4 visa.[FN19] (M.K.B. Decl. „ 10; Declaration of A.I. dated Dec. 1, 2005 (A.I. Decl.) „„ 17, 24-27; L.W. Decl. „„ 5, 13.)

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FN18. V visas, issued pursuant to INA § 101(a)(15)(v), are issued to the spouse (V-1) or unmarried child (V-2 or V-3) of a lawful permanent resident who is the beneficiary of Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed on or before December 21, 2000 so that they may enter the United States. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.15(a) and (c).
FN19. K visas, issued pursuant to INA § 101(a)(15)(k), are issued to those with filed I-130 petitions for the purpose of allowing reunification of families of U.S. citizens by allowing the spouse (K-3) and her children (K-4) to enter the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(K)(7). Likewise, workers who may have heard of a VAWA prima facie notice are often unaware that a VAWA approval notice also suffices to prove eligibility. When N.E. showed a job center worker the approval notice on her VAWA self-petition, her worker told her that the approval notice was insufficient and that only a prima facie notice would suffice. (N.E. Decl. „ 24; see also M.A. Decl. „ 19; Petrova Decl. „„ 8, 12, 19.) When M.T. presented a VAWA approval notice, the job center worker threatened to remove her from the case because she did not have a green card. (M.T. Decl. „ 24; see also Petrova Decl. „„ 20-21; W.J. Decl. „ 24.)
Similarly, most HRA workers are unaware that certain battered immigrants may be PRUCOL and therefore eligible for public assistance and Medicaid. For example, most workers do not know that U visa applicants who have been granted deferred action status are PRUCOL and therefore eligible for benefits. (L.A.M. Decl. „„ 17, 23; Diongue Decl. „„ 14-15; O.P. Decl. „„ 18-19, 31, 33; Higinio Decl. „„ 18-19, 22; R.R. Decl. „„ 10, 12, 14; Ganju Decl. „„ 12, 19, 45; Declaration of Diane Gonzalez dated Sept. 7, 2005 (Gonzalez Decl.) „„ 15, 23.) Indeed, many workers are unaware of what the term PRUCOL even means. (See Declaration of Nicole Sara Price (Price Decl.) „„ 4-9; Jacobs Decl. „ 55; Saylor Decl. „ 215.)
Several systemic errors affect immigrants who are eligible for federal food stamps. All Qualified Aliens are eligible for federal food stamps if they are in receipt of benefits or assistance for blindness or disability. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(ii). State OTDA has instructed local social services districts that if a person applying for federal food stamps is also applying for or receiving Medicaid, and there is any indication that the person may be disabled, then the person must be referred for a Medicaid disability determination. If the determination establishes that the person is disabled, then he or she is eligible for federal food stamps. (Baum Decl. „ 39.)
Despite that State directive, HRA job centers routinely do not make, and indeed do not know how to make, the required referrals. For example, the Administrative Assistants (AA) to the Directors at the Linden and Brooklyn Immigrant and Refugee Job Centers stated they could not make the required referrals, as did a supervisor at Dekalb and a Deputy Director at the Senior Works Center. (Declaration of Gella Pyetranker (Pyetranker Decl.) „ 7; Declaration of Polina Benyminov dated Aug. 25, 2005 (Benyminov Decl.) „„ 12, 13; Rolnick Decl. „„ 8-12, 21-23; Lourdes-Merilien Decl. „ 15; Declaration of Caroline Hickey (Hickey Decl.) „ 11.) As a result, many disabled Qualified Aliens, including Plaintiffs Anna Fedosenko and L.W., do not receive the food stamps they desperately need. (Fedosenko Decl. „„ 7-9 (without food stamps for

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fourteen months); Hickey Decl. „„ 11, 15; L.W. Decl. „„ 14, 27 (without food stamps for eight months); Rolnick Decl. „„ 7-10, 17, 22-23. See also Benyminov Decl. „„ 12-13, 17 (denied food stamps for nine months); Lourdes-Merilien Decl. „„ 15, 17 (denied food stamps for sixteen months); Saylor Decl. „„ 120-157.)
Additionally, lawful permanent residents with 40 quarters of work history as defined by the Social Security Act are eligible for federal food stamps regardless of their age, how long they have had their status, or whether they are disabled. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B). HRA workers routinely deny food stamps to immigrants who have been lawful permanent residents for fewer than five years, even if they have more than 40 quarters of work history. Indeed, HRA routinely fails to determine or inquire about how long a lawful permanent resident who is applying for food stamps has worked. (Declaration of L.M. dated Nov. 15, 2005 (L.M. Decl.) „ 11.)
2. Flaws in the defendants' computer systems
Various flaws in the computer systems used by the defendants to process applications for public benefits are partly responsible for the systemic and erroneous denial of benefits to eligible class members. Two computer systems are relevant here. The Welfare Management System (WMS), which is designed and maintained by State OTDA, is the computer system primarily responsible for issuing benefits to public assistance recipients in New York State. HRA has developed a “front end” to WMS called the Paperless Office System (POS), which is used in all but one job center in New York City to take actions in WMS. POS and WMS contain numerous programming errors that make it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to provide public benefits to class members.
a. Flaws regarding eligible immigrants and documents
POS has been programmed to prompt HRA caseworkers to enter an applicant's immigration status from a drop-down menu. VAWA self-petitioners, however, and the I-130 group of battered qualified immigrants, are not included as an option in this dropdown menu. Nor do these immigration statuses fit into any of the other choices on the menu. (Ganju Decl. „„ 56-57; Petrova Decl. „ 23, Ex. D.) Caseworkers routinely misinterpret these omissions as evidence that an applicant is ineligible. For example, P.S. and A.M. were erroneously denied public benefits because their workers could not select VAWA from the POS pull down menus, or otherwise enter a VAWA immigration status in the computer system. As a result, their caseworkers believed that both immigrants were ineligible for benefits. (P.S. Decl. „ 14; see also Petrova Decl. „ 29; Declaration of Megan Dorton (Dorton Decl.) „„ 6-9, 11.)
Nor does POS have fields for certain PRUCOL categories, such as asylum applicants. When Khady Fofana, an asylum applicant with employment authorization, applied for benefits at HRA's specialized Manhattan Immigrant and Refugee Job Center, a worker acknowledged “that the computer system did not list the code on [Ms. Fofana's] employment authorization card as a valid code for PRUCOL or to receive benefits.” (Declaration of Khady Fofana dated Dec. 6, 2005 (Khady Decl.) „ 23.) After explaining a computer “work-around” needed to open the case, he “stated that most workers ... probably do not know that [Ms. Fofana is] eligible for public benefits or how to input [her] application into the computer so that it would be properly accepted.”
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Id.; see also Declaration of Jami Johnson dated Dec. 12, 2005 (Johnson Decl.) „ 31; Wollmershauser Decl. „ 4.) While it appears to be possible to bypass these flaws by working around POS and opening a case directly in WMS, most workers do not know how or fail to take this step. (Saylor Decl. „ 80; Ganju Decl. „„ 51-60.)
The POS drop-down menus for entering class members' documents are also incomplete. POS contains a drop-down list of documents that may be used to establish a client's eligibility for public benefits. However, POS does not permit the worker to enter certain documents that are crucial to establishing the eligibility of some immigrants for public benefits. For example, the drop-down list does not contain a notice of approval of an I-130 petition, although this document can be crucial to establishing a battered immigrant's eligibility for public benefits. When A.B.'s advocate asked her worker to enter her approved I-130 notice in the computer system, the worker could neither select this document from the drop-down list nor type it in. (Emerson Decl. „ 14.)
To work around these limitations, some HRA caseworkers intentionally miscode an applicant's immigration status in the computer as citizen or lawful permanent resident. For example, R.J. and M.E. were intentionally miscoded in the computer as citizens, and N.P. was deliberately miscoded as a lawful permanent resident, in order to open their cases. (Ganju Decl. „„ 52-53, 55-56, 92.) In N.P.'s case, Mr. Gladley, an HRA caseworker at the Manhattan Immigrant and Refugee Center, said that while he recognized that the client was eligible for benefits, “he could not figure out how to enter her into the computer ... Mr. Gladley said that he called a supervisor and others, but no one could tell him how to enter in a VAWA self-petitioner into the system.” (Id. „„ 54, 58.) When asked why the original entry had been made incorrectly, “[h]e stated that people may be eligible but the computer system makes it impossible to enter their immigration information accurately. He stated that ... this is why the caseworker had ‘faked it’ by entering her in as a permanent resident.” (Id. „ 60.)
While these actions may be well-intentioned, they can result in subsequent erroneous case closings. In N.P.'s case, for example, the central HRA office ordered a case review because the facts on record were inconsistent with the client's classification as a lawful permanent resident. (Id. „ 55; see also Id. „ 53; M.E. Decl. „ 20.)
Shortcomings in State OTDA's computer systems contribute to the erroneous denial of public benefits without adequate notice to eligible immigrants. For example, State OTDA's Computer Notice System (CNS) is programmed with inaccurate and misleading information regarding immigrant eligibility for benefits. (Saylor Decl. 199-208; W.J. Decl. Ex. 13; J.Z. Decl. „ 24, Ex. K, Ganju Decl. Decl. „ 29, Ex. 7.) Specifically, State OTDA's WMS computer system lacks the capabilities to issue federal food stamps to Qualified Aliens based on the receipt of disability-based Medicaid. (Saylor Decl. „„ 131-33.)
b. Mixed federal and State public benefits cases
The defendants' computer systems are not adequately programmed to handle situations in which one or more family members are eligible for state public benefits, and one
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or more other family members are eligible for federal public benefits. In these “mixed family” situations, the computer system must create two separate but joined cases so that the federal government subsidizes the payment of public benefits only to those family members who are eligible for federal benefits. HRA handles this “mixed family” situation by utilizing one case number for the entire family but creating two “suffixes,” one for the family members eligible for federal benefits and another for the family members eligible for state benefits. (Saylor Decl. „ 84.)
When an HRA worker tries to open a case for a “mixed family” in the POS system, the case “errors out.” (City workers use the term “error out” to describe situations when the computer is rejecting the case not because the applicant is ineligible for public benefits, but because the computer is unable to open the case due to errors in processing the case.) (Saylor Decl. „ 85; Ganju Decl. „„ 46-47.) Recognizing that the POS computer system cannot handle these multi-suffix cases, a City policy directive instructs workers to process them through the WMS system. (Saylor Decl. „ 85.) In order to do so, the information must be written out on a form and given to the technology department to be entered directly into WMS. (Id. at „ 86.) Most HRA caseworkers do not know how to refer these cases properly to the technology department. And even the technology department has great difficulty getting these “mixed family” cases open. (Id. at „„86-87.) As a result, most “mixed families” do not receive all the public benefits to which they are entitled or receive them only after a long delay and extensive advocacy. (Ganju Decl. „„ 48-50; Emerson Decl. „ 13; Saylor Decl. „„ 89, 162-165.) L.A.M. and A.I., for example, are not receiving benefits - even though their job centers agree with their legal advocates that they are eligible - because their cases continue to error out in the computer system. (L.A.M. Decl. „„ 26, 28-34; A.I. Decl. „„ 28, 30-32; Saylor Decl. „ 90.)
c. Adding parents to their children's open cases
The computer systems make it very difficult to add immigrant parents to public benefits cases that are already open for one or more of their minor children. When HRA opens a case for a minor child only, the child's custodian's name appears on the case as the payee, since benefits cannot be issued directly to a minor. If a caseworker later attempts to add that custodian to the case - either because the custodian recently became an eligible immigrant or because the custodian was initially wrongly denied - the case will be rejected by the computer system as a duplicate case. (Saylor Decl. „ 91.) The custodian can be added to the child's case only if the child's case is closed and then a new case is opened for the child and custodian. (Id.) Many caseworkers do not know how to or do not attempt to do this. If they do try, sometimes the child's case remains closed because the caseworker is unable to open a new case including the immigrant parent due to other problems with the computer system. (Saylor Decl. „ 90; Ganju Decl. „„ 48-49.)
d. Other computer programming flaws
Class members who do not have Social Security numbers are often incorrectly denied public benefits because the City's computer system makes it difficult to open a case without entering a Social Security number for each applicant. If a Social Security

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number is not entered for an applicant, a message appears on the screen prompting the caseworker to enter a Social Security number. (Saylor Decl. „ 97.) The case cannot be opened until the caseworker makes an entry. (Id.) While there is a way to open a case for a person without entering a Social Security number, most caseworkers do not know the code that must be entered and the message on the screen leads them mistakenly to believe that a Social Security number is required in order to be eligible for public benefits. (Id.) As a result, class members without Social Security numbers are frequently wrongly denied public benefits. Nicole Prince, for example, attests that her caseworker “said that she could not add me to the case because I did not have a Social Security number. She said that when she tried to enter me into the computer, the computer would not accept my case without it.” (Prince Decl. „„ 12, 22; Saylor Decl. „ 98.)
Similarly, the computer system requires the entry of an Alien number (A number), which is a number given to some immigrants by USCIS, for each immigrant with an active public benefits case. (Ganju Decl. „ 37; Saylor Decl. „„ 100-101, 194.) Some immigrants who are eligible for public benefits, including immigrant children who are derivatives on their parents' VAWA self-petitions, do not have their own A numbers. As a result, they are incorrectly denied public benefits they are eligible to receive. (Saylor Decl. „ 102; Ganju Decl. „„ 38-39.)
POS also lacks a field in which to enter the often-critical date when the immigrant became a Qualified Alien if the immigrant is now a lawful permanent resident, even though eligibility for federal public assistance, federal Medicaid, and federal food stamps all may depend upon whether the immigrant has been a Qualified Alien for five years. (Petrova Decl. Ex. D; Saylor Decl. „ 103.) As a consequence, immigrants who have been Qualified Aliens for more than five years, but who only recently became lawful permanent residents, are denied the public benefits to which they are entitled. This particularly affects battered qualified immigrants because they are often Qualified Aliens for many years before they become lawful permanent residents. (Id. at 104.)
3. Systemic denials of adequate notice
In three circumstances, class members are denied public benefits without any written notice of the denial or the reasons for it. First, HRA invariably fails to provide a notice of denial when assistance is granted to some family members but denied to others because of immigration status. M.K.B.'s experience in this regard is typical. Although she and her immigrant children had been denied public assistance and Medicaid, she received a notice stating that a public assistance and Medicaid case were accepted and that she would receive $68.50. She had no idea which members of her family had been found eligible for public assistance and Medicaid because the letter did not have any names on it. Likewise, although her immigrant children had been denied food stamps, she received a notice stating that she would receive $119 in food stamps every month. Once again, she did not know which family members had been found eligible for food stamps because the notice did not specify. (M.K.B. Decl. „ 11; see also P.E. Decl. „„ 13-15; K.T. Decl. „ 5; W.J. Decl. „ 15; W.S. Decl. „ 23; M.T. Decl. „ 12; Ganju Decl. „„ 14, 13, 20; Saylor Decl. „ 168.)

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Second, HRA fails to provide a written notice of denial when an immigrant whom a worker deems to be ineligible asks to be added to an existing public benefits case. (See, e.g., A.I. Decl. „„ 25, 27; J.Z. Decl. „ 16, 19; M.H. Decl. „ 9, 12; K.T.Decl. „„ 7, 9; M.A. Decl. „„ 12, 14-15, 19, 20; Ganju Decl. „„ 12, 20, 28, 40-45; Thomas Decl. „„ 18-19, 22.) Angelica Higinio's experience is typical. In the course of making repeated attempts to be added to her son's active public benefits case, Ms. Higinio tried to give an HRA supervisor her immigration documents and to request benefits for herself, but “she refused to look at the papers and just told me I was ineligible.” (Higinio Decl. „ 19.) Ms. Higinio attests that “[e]ven though I had gone to Melrose many times, I never received anything in writing stating that I was ineligible for benefits. I was never even allowed to apply, since the workers there just verbally told me I was ineligible for benefits.” (Id. 21.)
Finally, many immigrants fail to receive notice of the denial of their application because HRA refuses to permit them to apply. P.S.'s worker “would not allow [her] to submit an application” because she is “not a U.S. resident and do[es] not have a social security number.” (P.S. Decl. „ 13.) R.R.'s worker told her she “was ineligible for benefits based on [her] immigration status and she refused to let [her] apply.” (R.R. Decl. „ 10.) When R.R. returned a month later and insisted on reapplying, “[t]he worker advised me she did not know why I was there because I was not eligible for benefits. I saw her pick up my application from the desk and drop it in the garbage can.” (R.R. Decl. „ 12.) The same thing happened to her the next month. (R.R. Decl. „ 14; see also Diongue Decl. „ 14; P.E. Decl. „„ 10, 11; Ganju Decl. „„ 15, 19.)
When HRA does issue notices, the notices often contain misleading statements of the immigrant eligibility rules. As a result, it is difficult or impossible for class members who receive these notices to determine whether the denial of assistance or the amount of benefits granted was proper, or to make informed decisions about whether to appeal the denials of their applications or discontinuances of their benefits.
The computer-generated notices issued by HRA to some class members omit many qualifying immigration statuses. For example, W.J. received a discontinuance notice that purported to list the immigration statuses that qualify needy immigrants for public benefits, but the notice failed to include battered Qualified Aliens on that list. (Saylor Decl. „„ 199-208; W.J. Decl. „ 20, Ex. 13.) Since W.J.'s eligibility for benefits was based on her status as a battered Qualified Alien, the omission of that status from the list of qualifying statuses made it appear that the determination that she was ineligible was correct and that requesting a fair hearing to challenge the determination would be futile. Other computerized notices contain the same errors because they utilize the same stock incorrect eligibility language from defendants' computer systems. (J.Z. Decl. „ 24, Ex. K; Ganju „ 29, Ex. 7; Jacobs Decl. „ 48, 59; Saylor Decl. „ 200.)
Handwritten or individually typed notices also routinely contain misleading information. For example, the notice discontinuing M.E. and her daughter E.R.'s public benefits stated that the reason they were being discontinued was that they did not

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“apply for a prima facie,” even though applying for a “prima facie” is not an eligibility requirement. Like the computer-generated notices, notices such as the one sent to M.E. create the misleading impression that a fair hearing would be futile. (M.E. Decl. „ 22, Ex. K; see also O.P. Decl. „ 20, Ex. H; Ganju Decl. „ 28, Ex. 12, 6; Fedosenko Decl. „ 14, Ex. G; Jacobs Decl. „ 49, Ex. 10.)
Without adequate notice of a denial and the reason for it, many class members are unable to effectively challenge erroneous denials in a State fair hearing. Those who are not permitted to apply lack any denial from which to appeal. Those who receive notices are routinely given misleading information about immigration eligibility rules that makes it difficult or impossible for them to know whether they could successfully challenge the denial. Many plaintiffs and declarants went for many months without public benefits for these reasons. (L.M. Decl. „„ 13, 19-20; Saylor Decl. „„ 166-183; J.Z. Decl. „„ 16, 19, 25; K.T. Decl. „„ 5, 7, 9; Lourdes-Merilien Decl. „„ 8, 12; M.H. Decl. „„ 9, 12, 17; Prince Decl. „„ 12, 29; P.E. Decl. „„ 10, 14, 24; W.J. Decl. „„ 15, 22; M.T. Decl. „„ 12, 16; Thomas Decl. „„ 6, 18-19, 22.)
4. The State fair hearing process does not cure the problems.
State OTDA and State DOH are required by law to ensure that HRA accurately and timely delivers public benefits to eligible class members. The only mechanism by which the State defendants attempt to do so is the State fair hearing system. That system is wholly inadequate and ineffective in rectifying widespread and persistent errors by HRA in the delivery of public benefits to class members.
Fair hearing decisions on the issue of immigrant eligibility usually do not direct a job center to take any action other than to “process” the application or to “review” the case. An instruction of this kind leaves the application in the same status as it was prior to the fair hearing. Immigrants commonly receive decisions that merely direct the job center to continue to process the application. (See, e.g., M.A. Decl. „ 17, Ex. D; Diongue Decl. „ 19, Ex. G; Declaration of Maryanne Sexton (Sexton Decl.) „ 10; Saylor Decl. „ 174, 182, 217; O.P Decl. Ex. D; L.W. Decl. „ 21, Ex. G; L.M. Decl. „ 18, Ex. F; Ganju Decl. „„ 63, 65, 69, 73, Ex. 15-18; Higinio Decl. „ 24, Ex. H; M.H. Decl. Ex. F; Fofana Decl. „ 14, Exs. G, J; Prince Decl. „ 26, Ex. F; R.R. Decl. „ 16, Ex. D; W.S. Decl. „ 24, Ex. G; Jacobs Decl. „„ 11, 17, 37, 43, 51, 57, 66, 84.) A general command of this kind provides no guidance to the worker and, thus, no remedy to the appellant. (See, e.g., Sexton Decl. „„ 10, 11 (decision directed HRA to process application but failed to determine eligibility, and HRA responded to the decision by denying the application again); W.S. Decl. „„ 24-25, Ex. H, I; Fofana Decl. „„ 14-15, 27.)
When immigrants return to their job centers after receiving fair hearing decisions, the centers rarely correct their errors or grant the appropriate level of benefits. (See, e.g., Diongue Decl. „ 19, Ex. G; Sexton Decl. „„ 10-12; Fedosenko Decl. „„ 13-14; L.M. Decl. „„ 18, 20); L.W. Decl. „„ 21, 27; Eiley Decl. „ 29; Fofana Decl. „„ 15, 27; M.F. Decl. „ 20; Prince Decl. „ 27; O.P Decl. „„ 3, 22, 28-30; R.R. Decl. „„ 16, 20; Ganju Decl. „„ 45, 66, 70, 73, 74; W.S. Decl. „„ 26-28.) Indeed, it is common for HRA workers to refuse to comply with or even read fair hearing decisions.

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(See, e.g., Saylor Decl. „ 192; R.R. Decl. „ 18; Wollmershauser Decl. „ 4; Fofana Decl. „ 15; Johnson Decl. „ 12; J.Z. Decl. „ 32; W.S. Decl. „„ 25, 27; W.J. Decl. „ 21; Hickey Decl. „ 13; Jacobs Decl. „ 20.)
Adding to the problem, most immigrants receive fair hearing decisions that fail to cite or that misstate the applicable law. (See, e.g., Ganju Decl. „„ 79-80, Ex. 19, 20; Saylor Decl. „„ 182, 190, 217; Diongue Decl. Ex. G; M.E. Decl. Ex. O; Jacobs Decl. „„ 11, 18, 37, 43, 51, 57, 66, 80, 82, Ex. 27; W.J. Decl. Ex. 13; O.P. Decl. Ex. I; L.W. Decl. Ex. G; L.M. Decl. Ex. F; M.T. Decl. Ex. I.; K.T. Decl. Ex. C.; Prince Decl. Ex. F). In a response to a Freedom of Information Law request by plaintiffs' counsel, the State OTDA identified 42 fair hearing decisions from 2004 and 2005 that included an issue of immigrant eligibility, and out of those 42 decisions, 35 failed to discuss laws or guidelines relating to that very issue. (McEnnis Decl. „ 5.) The seven remaining decisions incorrectly or incompletely state the law. (Id., passim.) Most of those decisions do not even identify the applicant's immigration status. (Id. „ 4.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE GRANTED.
“To obtain a preliminary injunction the moving party must show, first, irreparable injury, and, second, either (a) likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly tipped in the movant's favor.” Green Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2004). Preliminary relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy in cases involving the deprivation of a right secured by the laws of the United States, including claims that individuals have been deprived of public benefits to which they are entitled. See, e.g., Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (issuing a preliminary injunction to prevent the improper denial of food stamp, Medicaid, and public assistance applications).
A. Class Members Have Suffered And Will Continue To Suffer Irreparable Harm Unless Defendants Are Enjoined to Provide Class Members With the Benefits For Which They
Are Eligible.
The Second Circuit considers “a showing of irreparable harm to be the most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Town of E. Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1995). Accord Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 339. This Court has repeatedly held that the erroneous denial of public benefits results in “extreme and very serious damage” that constitutes irreparable harm. Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (internal quotations omitted), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1977); Reynolds, 35 F. Supp.2d at 339 (“To indigent persons, the loss of even a portion of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable injury” (quoting Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324, 336 (S.D.N.Y.

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1977) (issuing a preliminary injunction to prevent reductions in Medicaid benefits).
Food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance are essential subsistence benefits that enable class members to survive day to day. Every day that class members live without their full public benefits is a day of “brutal need,” causing physical and emotional injury that cannot be compensated with later payments or other monetary awards. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-65 (1970). In Goldberg, the Supreme Court observed that denying public benefits “may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live.” Id. at 264 (emphasis in original). This wrongful deprivation constitutes irreparable injury.
Class members suffer irreparable injury in many different ways. Many class members and their children suffer from hunger and poor nutrition because they do not have enough money for food. For example, although she is breastfeeding, M.K.B regularly does not eat enough because she does not have enough money. (M.K.B. Decl. „„ 14-15.) L.M., who was hospitalized for dehydration and low potassium, is forced to skip meals, and often has headaches or is dizzy. (L.M. Decl. „„ 14, 21.) L.W., who is recovering from kidney surgery and suffers from stomach pain, cannot get enough to eat unless others share food with her. (L.W. „„ 22, 27.) Anna Fedosenko is suffering from anemia and is unable to eat food rich in iron as recommended by her doctor. (Fedosenko Decl. „„ 9-10.) Denied public assistance for six months, Khady Fofana went for days at a time without food, and depended on friends and free social services for the food she got. (Fofana Decl. „„ 1, 27; see also L.A.M. Decl. „„ 36, 40, 45; M.A. Decl. „ 21; O.P. Decl. „„ 45-46; Diongue Decl. „ 24; A.I. Decl. „ 38; R.R. Decl. „ 20; P.E. Decl. „„ 19-20; W.S. Decl. „„ 3, 31-32; J.Z. Decl. „„ 48-50; P.S. Decl. „ 18; M.T. Decl. „ 13; N.P. Decl. „ 23; Higinio Decl. „ 27; M.E. Decl. „ 28; Benyminov Decl. „ 11.)
Class members also lack the income they need to buy the barest necessities for their families. Denied public assistance since June 2005, L.A.M. frequently runs out of diapers, as well as toilet paper, laundry detergent, soap, and shampoo. (L.A.M. Decl. „ 37.) Sometimes charities give her these items, but she often has to go without them. (Id.) Last month, her son's daycare had to take diapers from the other children in order to put diapers on her son. At night, she sometimes puts a plastic bag on the bed instead of putting a diaper on her son so that only the bag - not the bed - gets wet. (Id. „„ 37, 41.) She is also worried because her son does not have a winter coat, winter boots, or enough other warm clothes. (Id. „ 43.) M.A., M.K.B., A.I., and many other class members also cannot afford to buy their young children winter clothes or other basic necessities. (M.A. Decl. „ 21; M.K.B. Decl. „„ 18-22; A.I. Decl. „„ 33-41; M.H. Decl. „ 17; Diongue Decl. „„ 22-24; P.E. Decl. „„ 42, 44, 51-52; N.E. Decl. „ 20; Lourdes-Merilien Decl. „ 7; Prince Decl. „ 23; Higinio Decl. „„ 29-30; M.E. Decl. „ 25; W.S. Decl. „ 33; L.W. Decl. „ 25; Thomas Decl. „„ 30-31.)
Class members who have been denied Medicaid are unable to obtain routine health care, treat serious medical conditions, and obtain essential prescription medicines. Denied Medicaid for eight months, O.P. has been unable to see a gynecologist to get treatment for the debilitating pain in her ovaries she frequently suffers. (O.P. Decl. „„ 36-40.) P.E. did not go to a doctor when she was in excruciating pain, and is

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still harassed by collection agencies because Medicaid refuses to pay the over $5000 in bills for her gallbladder removal surgery. (P.E. Decl. „„ 20, 53.) M.K.B. is unable to obtain treatment for serious medical conditions. (M.K.B. Decl. „ 17; see also M.A. Decl. „ 23; P.S. Decl. „„ 3,19; J.Z. Decl. „ 52; N.E. Decl. „ 20; M.E. Decl. „„ 25, 37, Ex. L; Fofana Decl. „ 27).
Many class members have become homeless, or have been faced with the imminent threat of homelessness, because they lack the income they need to pay for housing. P.E. was forced to move into a homeless shelter with her children. (P.E. Decl. „„ 18, 50.) Wrongfully denied the correct amount of assistance, N.E. was threatened with eviction and forced to move because she was behind in rent. (N.E. Decl. „„ 20, 31; see also Lourdes-Merilien Decl. „„ 11-12; Diongue Decl. „ 21; Fofana Decl. at „„ 6, 27.)
Finally, class members who live in shelters are unable to qualify for housing or housing assistance because they have been wrongly found ineligible for public assistance. M.A. is not eligible for a housing subsidy that will allow her and her two-year-old daughter to move out of a homeless shelter only because the Crotona Job Center refuses to add her to her daughter's public assistance case. (M.A. Decl. „ 22; see also O.P. Decl. „ 24 (O.P. and her children are forced to live in a shelter.); M.K.B. Decl. „ 23 (same); L.A.M. Decl. „ 46; Prince Decl. „ 14; J.Z. Decl. „ 48; L.W. Decl. „„ 25, 26; P.E. Decl. „ 29 (denied public housing).
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed On The Merits.
Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory,” deprives another person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and state officials sued in their individual capacities are “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (municipalities); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23 (1991) (state officials). A plaintiff asserting claims under § 1983 “must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely the violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). In actions against municipal and state officials, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions challenged were taken pursuant to a governmental policy or, if not authorized by “written law,” by government practices that are “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (internal citations omitted).
These elements are fully satisfied here. Plaintiffs are suing for violations of federal rights unambiguously established by the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The actions they challenge are taken pursuant to formal government policies or, when they are contrary to policy, are so pervasive and well-established as to constitute a “custom or usage” with the force of law.
1. Plaintiffs are asserting violations of clearly established federal rights
Plaintiffs seek to enforce clearly established rights under the federal Food Stamp
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and Medicaid Acts. In determining whether a statute creates a federal right for purposes of § 1983, three factors are relevant: Congress must have “intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff”; the asserted right must not be “so ‘vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and it “must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted). Clarifying the third element in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002), the Supreme Court held that a federal right must be ‘unambiguously conferred’ to support a cause of action under § 1983. Id.
The claims asserted herein satisfy these standards. The Medicaid Act unambiguously provides that “all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the [Medicaid] plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). Although the Second Circuit has not yet addressed this language directly,[FN20] three other Circuits and several district courts in this Circuit have held that this language creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189-93 (3d Cir. 2004); Bryson v. ??, 308 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2002); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714-19 (11th Cir. 1998); Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877 (WHP), 2005 WL 342106, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005); Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 341; Alexander A. v. Novello, 210 F.R.D. 27, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Likewise, the Food Stamp Act unequivocally mandates that applicants must be permitted “to apply to participate in the program on the same day that the household first contacts a food stamp office in person during office hours.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(3)(iii). Eligible applicants must be provided food stamps no later than 30 days after application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(a), (g)(1). As numerous district courts in this Circuit have held, this language creates rights enforceable under § 1983. Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561, 574-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 10900 (DLC), 2000 WL 760300, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jun 12, 2000); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2005 WL 342106; see Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
FN20. The Second Circuit has, however, held that similar language in another section of the Medicaid Act creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983. Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2004) (Section 1396r-6 of the Medicaid Act creates rights enforceable under § 1983). Section 1396r-6(a)(1) provides that families who were receiving public assistance “in at least 3 of the 6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid, because of... income from, employment ... shall... remain eligible for assistance ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period.” 2. Defendants have a policy, custom, and usage of denying public benefits to eli-
gible immigrants
Liability may be imposed under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to formal governmental policies, as well as for actions taken under color of any “custom or usage” of a state. “The policy or custom used to anchor liability need not be contained in an explicitly adopted rule or regulation,” Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1992), and need not have “received formal approval
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through the body's official decisionmaking channels.” Id. A custom or usage “that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Board of the Co. Comm'rs of Bryan Co. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
A policy, custom, or usage under § 1983 may be established in several different ways. See Wahhab v. City of New York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). First, policies include “formal rules or understandings - often but not always committed to writing - that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986). For example, the Court explained in Pembaur that the written rule in Monell requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were medically necessary was a policy for purposes of § 1983. Id. at 481. Thus, formal policy directives, bulletins, and instructions issued by State OTDA, State DOH, and HRA constitute policies under § 1983.
Second, a custom and usage may be established by showing that subordinates who, although not themselves “authorized decisionmakers,” nonetheless engaged in a practice “that was so permanent and well settled as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Liability is established on this basis by showing a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity.” Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)); see Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 870-71 (“So long as the discriminatory practices of city officials are persistent and widespread, they ‘could be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” ').
Finally, a government entity's failure to train and/or supervise subordinate employees may give rise to liability under § 1983. As the Supreme Court explained in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989): [I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.
Id. at 390; see also Amnesty America v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 61-62; Pangburn, 200 F.3d at 71-72; Wahhab, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
In this case, § 1983 liability is established on all three of these theories: City and State officials have issued formal written directives and instructions that are contrary to law, and/or have material misstatements and omissions concerning immig-

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rant eligibility for public benefits. Authorized decision-makers have acquiesced in a longstanding custom and practice by their subordinates of denying public benefits to eligible immigrants. Finally, City and State policy-makers have been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to subordinate employees.
a. City and State policy directives contain material misstatements and omissions regarding immigrant eligibility for public benefits.
City and State directives and instructions contain material misstatements and omissions that are contrary to law in a number of different areas including: (1) eligibility of battered qualified immigrants for public assistance and Medicaid; (2) eligibility of disabled immigrants for food stamps; and (3) the use of federal Social Security numbers. (See Baum Decl.,passim.)
(i) Battered qualified immigrants
Over the years, State OTDA and city policy directives have made many serious errors with regard to the eligibility of battered qualified immigrants for public benefits. Those errors have led to a generation of HRA caseworkers and supervisors who misunderstand and misapply the law. Although some corrections have been made recently, State OTDA and City directives still retain significant errors.
For example, the City's most comprehensive and widely available set of instructions on handling domestic violence cases contains a serious omission. It states that a domestic violence victim is eligible for benefits if she receives a “Notice of Prima Facie Case.” No other battered qualified immigrants are mentioned. HRA, PD 03-65-ELI, at 17 (Nov. 25, 2003) (attached as an Ex. 10 to Baum Decl.). (See also Baum Decl. „ 28.)
HRA and State OTDA have also published “Alien Eligibility Desk Aids” that summarize the eligibility of immigrants for public benefits. From 1998 until 2003, all of the City and State desk aids omitted any reference to the entire I-130 group of battered qualified immigrants who have been sponsored for immigration status by their citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse through I-130 family-based petitions. Although the current desk aids refer to the I-130 group, they discuss it under a large-print heading concerning immigrants with a “prima facie” case, erroneously making it appear that the corrections pertain to VAWA self-petitioners only. (Id. „ 18.) The current City and State desk aids are still not fully correct with regard to battered qualified immigrants. For example, they omit reference to V-3 visa holders like M.K.B. and A.I.'s children.[FN21] (Id. „ 23.)
FN21. The desk aids also fail to indicate that the following are Qualified Aliens: conditional permanent residents (green card holders who apply for a green card within two years of marriage) with proof of abuse; and immigrants with a notice of establishing that a “battered spouse waiver” (I-751) has been filed. (Baum Decl. „ 23.)
These omissions, and others in State and City policy directives (see Baum Decl. „„

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9-24), have erroneously led caseworkers to conclude that a Prima Facie Notice under VAWA is the exclusive means for establishing a battered immigrant's eligibility for public assistance and Medicaid. (See supra at 18-19.) So great is the confusion generated by this failing that many HRA workers believe that battered immigrants who receive an approval of their VAWA self-petition are no longer eligible because they no longer have a current Prima Facie Notice.[FN22] (See supra at 18.)
FN22. The initial VAWA prima facie notices expire after 180 days. Federal immigration authorities will issue extensions of these notices until the petition is approved. Once the petition is approved, however, they will not issue a new prima facie notice.
(ii) Disabled Qualified Aliens
Qualified Aliens are entitled to federal food stamps if, inter alia, they are in receipt of disability-related benefits, including disability-based Medicaid. HRA has failed to follow State directives that implement this federal statutory entitlement. State OTDA has issued a directive that correctly provides that persons applying for food stamps who are also applying for or receiving Medicaid “must have a Medicaid disability determination if there is an indication that they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid.” State OTDA, 03 Information Letter (INF) 14, at 5 (April 2, 2003) (attached as Ex. 34 to the Baum Decl.). If the determination establishes that the person is disabled, then he or she is “in receipt of disability-related benefits” for federal food stamp purposes. (Id. at 4-5.) State DOH's Medicaid Reference Guide (MRG) requires this disability evaluation for the Medicaid program. (Baum Decl. „ 40, Ex. 34.)
Several City policy directives mention that Qualified Aliens in receipt of disability-based Medicaid are eligible for food stamps. (Baum Decl. „ 42.) But they fail to implement the State's instruction that persons applying for food stamps who are also applying for or receiving Medicaid “must have a Medicaid disability determination” if there is an indication they may be disabled. (See, e.g., State OTDA, 03 INF 14, at 5 (April 2, 2003) (emphasis added) (attached as Ex. to Baum Decl.) Nor has the City created any mechanism for performing such determinations. (Baum Decl. „ 43.)
Recognizing that HRA lacked a policy directive requiring such referrals, Elizabeth Saylor, a Legal Aid Society attorney, made repeated requests to personnel at the highest levels of HRA, State OTDA, and State DOH asking those agencies to establish the required referral procedures. Despite those requests, HRA and State OTDA have failed to do so. (Saylor Decl. „„ 123- 148.)[FN23] As a result, many disabled Qualified Aliens, including plaintiffs Anna Fedosenko and L.W., still do not receive the food stamps they desperately need. (See infra at 19.)
FN23. In response to Ms. Saylor's requests, HRA issued a policy directive which explains that instructions in a prior policy directive for entering applicants in this category in the WMS computer system have been revised to correct a computer glitch affecting these cases. This new directive did not, however, resolve the underlying problem that there is still no procedure for referring welfare recipients for Medicaid disability determinations. (Saylor

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Decl. „ 40, 46.)

(iii) Social Security numbers

Errors regarding the use of Social Security numbers (SSN) arise in two different contexts: cases in which federal law requires furnishing a SSN as a condition of eligibility; and cases in which federal law is inapplicable and a state statute specifically defines as eligible certain immigrants to whom the Social Security Administration (SSA) will not issue SSNs.

SSNs required by federal law. Federal law requires that all applicants for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid provide a SSN or apply for one before certification. 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(a) (food stamps); 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(a) (Medicaid). If otherwise eligible applicants for these programs do not have a SSN, the agency administering the food stamp or Medicaid program must assist the applicants in completing an application for a SSN and send them to apply at the local SSA office. 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(b)(2) (food stamps); 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e) (Medicaid).

SSA will issue a SSN to immigrants not authorized to work by USCIS (non-work SSN) when they need one to obtain federal food stamps or federal Medicaid if they are otherwise eligible for those programs. 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(3)(i). To obtain such a non-work SSN, the local benefits agency must follow the procedure set forth in SSA's Program Operations Manual System (POMS), which requires that a local benefits agency must provide an applicant with a letter meeting certain specific requirements. The letter must not be a form letter; must be dated; must specifically identify “the nonwork reason for which an SSN is required, the relevant statute or regulations requiring the SSN as a condition to receive the benefit or service, and the name and telephone number of an official to contact so that the information provided may be verified.” SSA, POMS, Alien without Work Authorization - Nonwork Need for an SSN, Records Maintenance (RM) 00203.510, at 2 (2002) (attached to Ex. 48 to Baum Decl. and available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/).

State and City policy directives virtually guarantee that immigrants who require a non-work SSN as a condition of obtaining federal food stamps and federal Medicaid will not obtain one. This is because State and City policy directives instruct HRA workers to refer applicants to SSA with letters that do not meet SSA's requirements. (Baum Decl. „ 59.) The letter prescribed by State OTDA is a form letter, has no space for a date, does not cite the specific federal benefit program for which the applicant is eligible, and does not indicate the statute or regulation requiring an SSN as a condition of receiving the benefit. (Id.) Likewise, HRA's instructions attach a draft letter to SSA that fails to specify whether the applicant is eligible for federal or state benefits. (Id. Ex. 7.) SSA will not issue SSNs in response to such letters. (Ganju Decl. „ 35-36, Ex. 10; M.E. Decl.„„ 29, 31 Exs. N, P, Q; M.T. Decl.„„ 20, 21.)

Immigrants who are eligible for benefits under State law and who cannot obtain SSNs. SSA will only provide a SSN to an immigrant for the purpose of obtaining a state or local public benefit only if the immigrant has work authorization. (Ganju Decl. „ 36, Ex. 10.) New York State Social Services Law § 122, however, makes eligible for

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public assistance and State Medicaid certain immigrants who cannot obtain work authorization and who therefore cannot obtain SSNs, such as battered qualified immigrants and certain PRUCOL immigrants. Nevertheless, one state regulation purports to require applicants for public assistance to furnish a SSN, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.2(c), while other regulations merely require applicants who do not have a SSN to apply for one. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 370.2(c)(3)(1); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 369.2(b)(1)(i). State Medicaid regulations make all three of these inconsistent provisions applicable to the Medicaid program. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360-1.2 (with exceptions not relevant here, “All departmental regulations relating to public assistance and care apply to medical assistance ....”). To the extent that State regulations purport to require applicants, as a condition of obtaining benefits for which they are eligible under State statutes, to furnish a SSN that is impossible to obtain those regulations are unlawful. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
Not surprisingly, State policy directives and instructions that address the obligation to furnish a SSN as a condition of eligibility for State Medicaid and public assistance are internally inconsistent and ambiguous. State OTDA's instructions concerning public assistance say several times that “Furnishing an SSN is a condition of temporary assistance eligibility.” (State OTDA, 02 INF 40, at 2 (Nov. 27, 2002) (emphasis added) (attached as Ex. 33 to Baum Decl.). Yet in numerous other places they refer to an obligation to “furnish or apply for an SSN.” (Id.)
Likewise, a 2004 State DOH directive applicable to Medicaid recites that “New York State's laws and regulations require a Social Security Number for public benefits, including Medicaid.” (State DOH, 04 OMM/ADM-7, at 28 (Oct. 26, 2004) (citing, inter alia, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.2(c), 360-1.2.) (attached as an Ex. to Baum Decl.) Despite that statement, the directive continues: “All applicants for Medicaid thus must provide a Social Security Number or proof that they have applied for one or tried to apply for one.” Id. (emphasis added). The directive makes an exception even to this requirement for, inter alia, “certain battered women immigrants who prove their status under the Violence Against Women ACT (VAWA), as set forth in the section titled ‘Battered Immigrant’ of this directive.” Id. (See also Baum Decl. „ 71.)
State OTDA's instructions fail to make an exception for cases in which an immigrant lacks work authorization, and therefore cannot obtain a SSN. Although State OTDA acknowledges that “SSA no longer assigns SSNs to lawfully admitted aliens (legal aliens) who do not have work authorization,” the agency's directive asserts incorrectly: “However, SSA will issue SSNs to aliens who are otherwise eligible for temporary assistance if State Law requires an SSN as a condition of eligibility for temporary assistance.” State OTDA, 02-INF-40, at 2 (attached as Ex. 33 to the Baum Decl.)
These faulty and confusing instructions led high-level decision-makers at HRA to conclude that furnishing a SSN is required as a condition of eligibility for public assistance and State Medicaid, even when it is impossible to obtain one. For example, Elaine Witty is Executive Director of HRA's central Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, an office that is supposed to have specialized expertise regarding immigrant eligibility for benefits. In a conversation with Reena Ganju, an attorney

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with Sanctuary for Families, on or around June 20, 2004, Ms. Witty told Ms. Ganju that “where a public benefits recipient has been denied a Social Security number, her case should be closed because a number is required to receive benefits. She stated that she was doing me a favor by keeping cases of battered immigrants open where they had been denied Social Security numbers.” (Ganju Decl. „ 35.)
Consistent with Ms. Witty's understanding, HRA's February 2003 policy directive on SSN rules required applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to furnish a SSN, even when SSA will not supply one. In a correction belatedly issued in September 2004, HRA acknowledged that public benefits may be issued to battered immigrants with I-130 family based petitions or VAWA self-petitions even if they are denied a Social Security number by SSA, as long as they provide proof of the denial. (Baum Decl. „ 44.) Unfortunately, this directive says nothing about other categories of immigrants who are eligible for public benefits but who may not have a SSN because they lack work authorization. They include persons who are not eligible for work authorization (because, for example, they are PRUCOL), and persons who are eligible for work authorization but have not obtained it (because, for example, they lack the ability to pay for it, or because they are disabled or are minor children). Since the directive says nothing about those other categories, and since the 2003 directive was never withdrawn, workers continue to infer that Social Security numbers are required in those circumstances. (Id. „ 65.)
Adding further confusion, HRA issued yet another Policy Directive stating that if the reason for SSA's denial of an SSN cannot be resolved, the applicant's eligibility for benefits must be “re-evaluate[d].” (Baum Decl. „ 80.) As applied to immigrants with approved prima facie determinations, this directive contradicts the prior one that states that benefits should be issued when the applicant demonstrates that SSA denied her request for an SSN. It also leaves the faulty impression that SSA will issue SSNs for these applicants when, in fact, it will not. (Id. at 81.)
b. HRA has a custom and usage of denying public benefits to eligible immigrants
City and State policy-makers have acquiesced in a longstanding custom and practice by their subordinates of denying public benefits to eligible immigrants. For at least four reasons, it is clear that errors by City personnel are part of a persistent and widespread custom and practice, and not merely random, sporadic, and isolated mistakes by individuals.
First, the computer systems used by the City and State defendants are plagued with flaws that cause systemic errors in public benefits cases involving immigrants. Many of these flaws are traceable to POS, the graphical “front end” that HRA developed to the State's aging WMS computer system. POS is used in all but one of HRA's job centers. POS reflects a flawed implementation of many rules and regulations that relate to immigrant eligibility for benefits. These flaws are built into the fields and menu choices within POS itself. Since POS is used in almost all job centers, these short-comings cause systemic errors. (See supra at 20.)
Second, as discussed at length in the accompanying Baum Declaration, State and City policy directives and instructions have been seriously flawed for years, and are
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still flawed in many important respects. Most caseworkers and supervisors employed by HRA were trained using these flawed directives and are unaware they are inconsistent with federal and state statutes and regulations.
Third, many HRA personnel have candidly admitted that HRA workers are ignorant of the correct immigrant eligibility rules and procedures. For example, in March 2005, the Deputy Director of the Euclid Job Center acknowledged to Elizabeth Saylor that workers at the Euclid center do not know rules regarding immigrant eligibility for public benefits, and that workers at that center “do not know what a prima facie notice is.” (Saylor Decl. „ 225, see also id. at 114.) In September 2005, the Administrative Assistant (AA) to the Director at the Bay Ridge Job Center admitted that because of flaws in the computer system, multi-suffix cases must be manually processed. “She stated that only one person at her center knows how to properly open these cases and that when he is out then they have to ask someone from another center to open the case.” (Id. „ 17.) On December 5, 2005, a worker at the specialized Manhattan Immigrant and Refugee Job Center admitted that most workers “probably do not know” that asylum applicants with work authorization are eligible for public benefits, or how to enter their applications into the computer system. (Fofana Decl. „ 23.)
Indeed, the declarations submitted in support of this motion are filled with instances of supervisory personnel demonstrating their ignorance of immigrant eligibility rules. For example, on December 5, 2005, the AA to the Director of the Euclid Job Center discontinued M.E. and E.R.'s benefits, stating that they were ineligible because they had been denied a SSN by SSA (Ganju Decl. „ 102.) In July 2005, a supervisor at the Hamilton Center told M.E. that immigrants with an approved I-130 and proof of domestic abuse are not eligible for benefits. (M.E. Decl. „ 28, 29.) The same thing happened to J.Z. at the Colgate Job Center in September 2004. (J.Z. Decl. „ 19.) At the Fordham Job Center in June 2005, a supervisor refused to accept Ms. Higinio's application, telling her she was ineligible. When Ms. Higinio protested that “my immigration attorneys said I was eligible for benefits, [the caseworkers] told me that immigration lawyers know the immigration laws, but that they, the caseworkers, knew the welfare laws, and I was just not eligible.” (Higinio Decl. „„ 19, 25.) In July 2005, an AA to the Director at the Linden Center said P.E. was ineligible for public benefits because she did not have work authorization. (Petrova Decl. „ 8.) In March 2005, a supervisor at the Queens Job Center denied public benefits to two domestic violence victims after stating that individuals with deferred action notices are not eligible. (Gonzalez Decl. „„ 15, 23; see also Price Decl. „„ 5-9.) As set forth above, the job center directors' offices do not know how to refer immigrants for Medicaid disability determinations. (See infra. at 41.)
When supervisory personnel misunderstand and misapply the rules, there is a strong likelihood that errors by the line workers they supervise are systemic and not isolated.
Finally, the sheer breadth, scope, and frequency of the errors described in the accompanying declarations are indicative of the systemic nature of the problem. Ms. Ganju describes approximately 55 cases she has handled between September 2003 and

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March 2005 involving erroneous immigrant eligibility determinations. (Ganju Decl. „„ 1-117.) In the last year alone, Ms. Saylor has represented, supervised the representation of, or provided advice to approximately 50 cases of the same kind. (Saylor Decl. „„ 107-226.) These two attorneys can see only a small percentage of immigrants who are denied assistance.
c. Defendants have failed to train and supervise
These systemic errors are evidence of a gross and alarming failure by policy-making personnel to train and supervise their subordinates. The Second Circuit has outlined three elements necessary to establish a claim for failure to train. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992). The plaintiff must demonstrate “that a policymaker knows ‘to a moral certainty’ that her employees will confront a given situation.” Additionally, the plaintiff must show “that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation.” Finally, the plaintiff must establish “that the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights.” Id.
These elements are plainly satisfied here. None of the categories of immigrants discussed in this memorandum is rare or unusual. The State and City defendants know “to a moral certainty” that immigrants in these various eligibility categories will apply for public benefits at City welfare offices. Nor can there be any doubt that training and supervision will make eligibility decisions concerning these immigrants “less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation.” Id.
Finally, for the reasons outlined above, the evidence is overwhelming that wrong choices by City employees will “frequently cause the deprivation” of the plaintiffs' rights to public benefits. Indeed, not only have defendants' failure to train frequently caused the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights, but in those limited instances when defendants have attempted to provide training, they have done so with deeply flawed training materials.
For example, training materials prepared for State OTDA by the University of Albany fail to indicate that battered qualified immigrants are eligible for public benefits at all in one lesson. Moreover, another lesson in these training materials that includes a discussion of immigrant eligibility for federal food stamps also fails to include any domestic violence survivors in the explanation of Qualified Alien status. (Baum Decl. „ 32.) Likewise, State training materials erroneously state that lawful permanent residents are the only immigrants who are eligible for State funded public assistance or State funded Medicaid. Not once do these training materials mention PRUCOL immigrants, much less explain who falls within this class of immigrants, even though the title of the Lesson section is “Citizenship Requirements for Participation.” (Id. „ 48; see also id. „„ 31-36, 52, 83, 84, 93.)
HRA training materials reinforce various mistakes in HRA's and State OTDA's policy directives. For example, in a December 5, 2001 training manual subtitled “Food
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Stamps for Aliens,” HRA defines a battered Qualified Alien as someone who “has been granted or has a petition pending with INS that sets forth a prima facie case.” HRA, Training Workbook, Food Stamps for Aliens, at 20 (2001) (attached as Ex. 19 to the Baum Decl.). No mention is made of battered qualified immigrants who have approved I-130's or other documents showing that they are battered qualified immigrants. (Baum Decl. „ 34.) Likewise, the City's “April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Instructor's Guide” defines a battered alien solely as someone with a prima facie notice. FIA, Office of Training Operations, April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Insturctor's Guide, at 13-14. No other battered immigrants are mentioned. Id. 35.
3. The City defendant's failure to provide timely and adequate written notice of public benefits denials or discontinuances violates federal and State statutes and
regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
Adequate notice is one of the most basic and fundamental requirements of due process. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254; accord Mullane v. C. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “In order to be constitutionally adequate, notice of benefits determinations must provide claimants with enough information to understand the reasons for the agency's actions.” Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 123 (2d Cir. 2005). As the Second Circuit held in Kapps, “Claimants cannot know whether a challenge to an agency's action is warranted, much less formulate an effective challenge, if they are not provided with sufficient information to understand the basis for the agency's action.” Id. at 124; see Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1986) (“the recipient must be given information sufficient to put him in a position to defend the impending termination of benefits”); Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 100 (1975). “[I]n the absence of effective notice, the other due process rights afforded a benefits claimant - such as the right to a timely hearing - are rendered fundamentally hollow.” Kapps, 404 F.3d at 124.
Federal and State regulations that implement these due process rights also require timely and adequate notice of any denial or termination of benefits. Notices must indicate the action taken by the agency, the reason for any denial or the amount of the benefit granted, the laws and regulations on which that action was based, and the effective date of the action. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911, 435.912 (federal Medicaid); 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g)(2) (federal food stamps); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358-3.3, 358-2.2 (public assistance).
In flagrant violation of these mandates, HRA fails to provide any written notice of denial in three circumstances: (1) when assistance is granted to some family members in a “mixed family” but denied to others because of immigration status; (2) when an immigrant whom a worker deems to be ineligible asks to be added to an existing public assistance case; and (3) when HRA informs an immigrant orally that she is ineligible and refuses to permit her to apply. (See supra at 26.) HRA's failure to provide a written notice of denial in these circumstances plainly violates due process, Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68, and federal and state regulations.
HRA's practice with regard to “mixed families” is particularly egregious because it is affirmatively misleading. When an immigrant in a “mixed family” applies for bene-

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fits, HRA issues a notice stating that benefits have been granted - even though benefits have actually been denied for some immigrant family members. Immigrants in “mixed families” have no way of knowing that benefits have been denied for some household members, since the notices do not indicate for whom benefits have been granted. (See supra at 22.) False and misleading notices like these clearly violate due process. See, e.g., Reynolds, 35 F.Supp. at 341 (“Plaintiffs' allegations concerning various practices at job centers such as providing false or misleading information to applicants about their eligibility, ... state[s] a viable due process claim.”); Mayhew v. Cohen, 604 F. Supp. 850, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (“Constitutionally adequate notice must not only contain the necessary minimum amount of relevant data, it must also not mislead its recipient about that data's significance.”); Doston v. Duffy, 732 F. Supp. 857, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“The due process clause prohibits unintelligible, confusing, or misleading notices.”).
Additionally, when HRA issues written notices, those notices give misleading or erroneous information regarding the basis for a denial of benefits. (See supra at 27-29.) HRA's computer-generated and handwritten notices routinely misstate the law regarding immigrant eligibility for benefits and leave out references to eligible categories of immigrants. See supra at 28-29. These notices mislead immigrants into believing they are not eligible - and therefore have no basis to appeal - when in fact they are eligible. Accordingly, they violate due process. As the Supreme Court held in Goldberg, notice to a public assistance recipient must “detail[] the reasons for the proposed termination” so a recipient is able to determine whether the intended action “rest[s] on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of the particular case.” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68. A notice that states false or misleading information about eligibility rules does not comply with this mandate. Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
POINT II
THE PROPOSED PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED.
Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and a class defined as: All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).

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Because class members satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and of 23(b)(2) and (b) (3), and because class certification is essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of this case, plaintiffs' motion for class certification should be granted. Courts have frequently certified classes of applicants and recipients of public benefits seeking to challenge a policy or custom of denials of public benefits. See e.g., Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 392; Morel, 927 F. Supp. at 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
A. The Class Satisfies Rule 23(a)
1. The proposed class is so numerous as to warrant class certification.
Rule 23(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Impracticable does not mean impossible, but simply difficult or inconvenient. Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit has presumed numerosity “at a level of 40 members.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995).
The facts in this case support a finding of numerosity. A portion of the proposed class consists of indigent battered immigrants who have filed either VAWA selfpetitions, petitions for a battered spouse waiver (I-751), or applications for U visa-related interim relief. A survey of organizations in New York City that assist indigent battered immigrants with filing these applications indicates that at least 488 VAWA self-petition cases with 338 and 363 derivatives, 58 battered spouse waiver cases, and 157 applications for U visa interim relief are filed annually on behalf of indigent battered immigrants in New York City. (Declaration of Camille Carey dated Dec. 6, 2005 (Carey Decl). „„ 3-16.) Over 90 percent of these applications were submitted with fee waiver requests, demonstrating that the immigrants were impoverished and likely to be class members in this case. (Id. „ 16.) It is apparent from these figures alone that the number of proposed class members far exceeds the number of persons who could practically be joined in this action. (Id. „ 2.)
Moreover, the class size is substantially larger than these figures indicate. First, the number of class members with pending VAWA self-petitions, I-751 battered spouse waiver cases, and applications for U visa-related interim relief are much larger than the number of annual cases filed because of the length of time it takes for USCIS to adjudicate these matters. (Id. „„ 17-19.) Second, the proposed class includes individuals in other immigration categories, such as class members who have approved or filed I-130 family-based petitions and proof of abuse, class members who have been lawful permanent residents for less than five years, and others. (Id. „ 6.) Third, the survey did not include all providers of domestic violence-related immigration services in New York City, and indeed it would have been impractical to contact all such providers. (Id.)
The fact that the size of the proposed class has not been precisely determined “is not a fatal defect in the motion; a class action may proceed upon estimates as to the size of the proposed class.” Jane B. v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 117 F.R.D. 64, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting In re Alcoholic Beverages Litig., 95 F.R.D. 321, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)); see also Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 935. In Reynolds,
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the court found the numerosity requirement satisfied where plaintiffs contended “thousands of families and individuals apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance from City defendants each month. Because City defendants deter, discourage, and prevent many of those who seek to file applications ... from filing applications, the identity of many plaintiff class members is unknown to plaintiffs and, therefore, joinder is impracticable.” 118 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
The requirement that joinder be impracticable is not solely dependent upon numbers, but on the totality of the circumstances of a case. Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936. Joinder is also impracticable here because of the fluid nature of the class. See Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 388. The composition of the class will change constantly as some members of the class go to work and become ineligible for benefits and other class members' applications are denied. Cf. Folsom v. Blum, 87 F.R.D. 443, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[c]lass... will change constantly as existing AFDC, Social Security and SSI benefits are discontinued, and new applications are granted ... [t]herefore, joinder of all class members is impracticable”); see also Jane B., 117 F.R.D. at 70 (“In view of the fluid composition of the [class], joinder. .. is impracticable.”).
2. Class members share common issues of law and fact and named plaintiffs' claims are typical of claims of the class.
The commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) is satisfied when class members share a question of law or fact and the requirement of typicality of Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) & (3).[FN24] Here, all class members share common issues of law and fact, e.g., whether defendants erroneously and systemically fail to provide public benefits to members of the class as a result of various practices including, but not limited to, maintaining a computer system that wrongly omits significant categories of eligible immigrants; providing inaccurate training and policy guidelines for employees charged with assessing eligibility; and providing fair hearings that more often than not result only in remands that re-start the flawed process.
FN24. Courts will often consider commonality and typicality together because “[t]he crux of both requirements is to ensure that ‘maintenance of a class action is economical and that the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” ’ Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (quoting Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997).
This common question is sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement. See Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[t]he commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs' grievances share a common question of law or fact.”) (emphasis added); McCoy v. Ithaca Hous. Auth., 559 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (even a single common question establishes commonality).
To establish typicality, the class members must show that “each class member's claim
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arises from the same course of events.” Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (internal citations omitted). The named plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the rest of the class because each plaintiff, like all members of the class, is an immigrant eligible for public benefits who was denied or delayed in receiving those benefits as a result of defendants' pattern and practice of misapplying the laws governing eligibility of immigrants. In Reynolds, this Court certified a class of public benefits applicants similar to that in this case. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements because “the named plaintiffs' claims arise from the same course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of all the class members and are based on the same legal theories.” Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 389.
3. The named class members and class counsel will provide adequate representation for members of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, measured by two factors: (1) class counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation, and (2) the interests of the named plaintiffs cannot be antagonistic to those of the remainder of the class. See Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 390. Both factors are met in this case.
Counsel are experienced in class action litigation in federal and state courts, including matters relating to public benefits, and will prosecute this action vigorously and competently. The named plaintiffs are able to fairly represent the class. The interests of the named plaintiffs are identical to those of the proposed class because the named plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to assure that defendants conform their computer systems, policy directives, and worker training to the statutes and regulations governing immigrant eligibility so that class members will receive the benefits for which they are eligible. Such relief will have no detrimental effect on any of the other class members, but will only benefit them as it will increase their chances of obtaining benefits to which they are entitled. Thus, the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).
B. The Class Satisfies The Requirements of Rules 23(b)(2) and (3).
1. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(2).
The proposed class meets the criterion for certification set forth in Rule 23(b)(2), which provides that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”
The defendants routinely violate the statutes and regulations governing immigrant eligibility for public benefits, thus denying public benefits to eligible immigrant class members. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is therefore appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2). See Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91 (certifying class under 23(b)(2) where City defendants' improper deterrence of individuals from applying for
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food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance, and failure to timely process applications, as well as State defendants' failure to oversee the City defendants' compliance with welfare laws, constituted actions generally applicable to the class making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a whole).
2. The class meets the standard of Rule 23(b)(3)
The proposed class also meets the criteria for certification set forth in Rule 23(b)(3) because “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any question affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs seek to prevent the defendants from engaging in a persistent course of conduct that deprives eligible immigrants of public benefits.
Plaintiffs also fulfill the second requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), “that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (2003). The Rule lists the following four factors to consider under the second requirement: (A)the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against the members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Members of the class have no interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions because all plaintiffs are seeking the same relief, i.e. reform of the defendants' practices to bring them into compliance with the law. Named plaintiffs are unaware of “any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against the members of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). This is clearly the appropriate forum as all of the class members are New York City residents and have been negatively affected by the actions of the New York City government and the New York State government in New York City. Case management of the proposed class action would not be difficult. There are no individualized questions of fact or law that would cause delays or present the need for numerous individual determinations.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the class should be certified.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2005 WL 3832238 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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LEXSEE 2005 U.S. DIST. CT. MOTIONS 10446
Go To U.S. District Court Opinion
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, - against - VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants.
05 Civ. 10446 (JSR) (ECF CASE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 10446; 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 20888
September 20, 2006
Motion for Reconsideration
COUNSEL: [**1] Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief (SB0987), THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, Adriene L. Holder (ALH1872), Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Practice Area, Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR5579), Attorney-in-Charge, Law Reform, Christopher D. Lamb (CDL8145), Attorney-in-Charge, Staten Island Neighborhood Office, Jennifer Baum, of Counsel (JB4030), Camille Carey, of Counsel (CC1435), 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor, New York, New York 10038, 212-577-3325.
Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (YS3107), NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP, Jane G. Stevens, of Counsel (JS4790), Caroline Hickey, of Counsel (CH1410), Deborah Berkman, of Counsel, 450 West 33rd Street, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10001, 212-613-5000.
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP, Ronald Abramson (RA0979), Russell Jacobs, of Counsel (RJ3657), One Battery Park Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10004 1482, 212-837 6000, Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR5579), Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class.
Of Counsel: THE EMPIRE JUSTICE CENTER, Barbara Weiner, 119 Washington Ave., Albany, N.Y. 12210, 518-462-6831.
TITLE: PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
TEXT: [*1] PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiffs submit this memorandum of law in opposition to the State defendants' motion for reconsideration of a portion of this Court's decision and order granting class certification. Because no issue of fact or law was presented to and overlooked by the Court, the motion should be denied in its entirety.
ARGUMENT

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THE STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE DENIED
A. Standards Governing Motions for Reconsideration
"The standard [**5] for granting such a motion [for reconsideration] is strict." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). "[R]econsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked -- matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Id. A motion for reconsideration "is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple.'" Sequa Corp. v. Gbj Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). A "party who realizes, with the acuity of hindsight, that he failed to present his strongest case at trial, is not entitled to a second opportunity by moving to amend a finding of fact or a conclusion of law." United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 831 F. Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In short, a "motion for reconsideration may not be used to advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court, nor may it be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues already [**6] decided by the Court." Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
[*2] Moreover, a motion for reconsideration "is not a substitute for appeal and 'may be granted only where the Court has overlooked matters or controlling decisions which might have materially influenced the earlier decision.'" Morales v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In determining whether a motion for reconsideration should be granted, Local Rule 6.3 should "be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Wechsler v. Hunt Health Systems, Ltd., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19757, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004).
B. The Motion to Remove from the Class Lawful Permanent Residents Who Have Had Their Green Cards for Less than Five Years Should Be Denied
The State's motion to remove from the class definition lawful permanent residents ("LPRs") who had their green cards for less than five years should be denied. The State's suggestion that the plaintiffs presented "no evidence" that LPRs in this situation [**7] were systematically being denied benefits, and that "the Court's decision found none" (State Mem. at 3), is wholly incorrect. Indeed, the Court made numerous factual findings on just this point, including an explicit finding that the violations were systemic. The State's assertion that the claim of one such class member, Galina Rybalko, has become moot is contrary to the law in this Circuit, which holds that for mootness purposes, the claim relates back to the date of her intervention motion. Finally, because of misstatements about the law, the State's analysis of what it describes as four categories of LPRs is flawed. Actually, there is only one relevant group of LPRs: those who have been in that status for less than five years. Ms. Rybalko is an adequate class representative for these class members. Whether these class members entered the United States as LPRs; switched to that status before applying for benefits; or switched to that status after [*3] applying for benefits is immaterial.
1. The Court received substantial evidence that defendants wrongly denied public benefits to immigrants who were lawful permanent residents for less than five years
Substantial [**8] evidence was presented to the Court that City workers erroneously denied public benefits to class members because they erroneously believed that being a lawful permanent resident for five years is a condition of eligibility, or because the defendants' computer systems "errored out" when eligible applicants did not have five years of lawful permanent resident status.
For example, declarant K.T. and her minor daughter were LPRs with less than five years in that status when they applied for public assistance, Medicaid, and Food Stamps in December 2004. (Declaration of K.T., dated Oct. 12, 2005, PP 3, 5.) As an LPR, K.T., a victim of domestic violence, was eligible for public assistance and Medicaid. Her daughter, as an LPR under the age of 18, was eligible not only for public assistance and Medicaid, but also for federal food stamps. The worker at the Linden Center told K.T. that they were ineligible for any benefits because they were not

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LPRs for five years. Only her citizen son's application was processed. (Id. P 5.)
Later, K.T. made additional efforts to be added to her citizen son's public benefits case. In March 2005, she went to the Bushwick Job Center, where her son's case [**9] had been transferred. Her caseworker, Ms. Reyes, "said that my daughter and I were ineligible for Public Assistance, Medicaid, and Food Stamps because we were lawful permanent residents for less than five years." (Id. P 9.) Ms. Reyes denied all benefits to K.T. and her minor daughter for that reason.
Likewise, declarant Polina Benyminov had been an LPR for several months when she [*4] applied for public assistance and Medicaid at the Bay Ridge Job Center in December 2003. Although as an LPR she was eligible for both benefits, she was denied all benefits on account of her immigration status. (Declaration of Polina Benyminov, dated Aug. 25, 2005, P 6.) In January 2004 she attempted to reapply at the Linden Job Center. There the worker told her orally that she was ineligible. (Id. P 8.)
Further, the record is replete with evidence that City and State workers erroneously told applicants that they had to be an LPR for at least five years in order to receive benefits. For example, on May 17, 2005, declarant R.R. applied for cash assistance at Dyckman Job Center. As the Court noted in its factual findings, "In May 2005, one of those employees wrongly told R.R. that she was [**10] ineligible for benefits because she did not have a green card and had not been a green card holder for five years." M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006). R.R. explained that the worker "could not help me and would not enter my information into the computer system." (Declaration of R.R., dated Sept. 29, 2005, P 12.) Similarly, on February 2, 2005, Ms. Matias at the Hamilton Job Center told declarant W.S. that she was not eligible for food stamps because W.S. had not had her green card for five years. (Declaration of W.S., dated Nov. 22, 2005, PP 14-15.)
Likewise, the Court heard the testimony of Galina Rybalko, whose motion to intervene in this action was granted for the purpose of representing those class members who are green card holders for less than five years. (Tr. 1401:5-8.) City workers at the Coney Island Job Center repeatedly stated erroneously that Ms. Rybalko is ineligible for food stamps because she has not had her green card for five years. (Tr. 325:20-326:17; 329:13-330:8.) In response to Ms. Rybalko's request for a fair hearing, the City prepared a statement asserting that Ms. Rybalko [*5] must have [**11] a green card for five years in order to be eligible for food stamps. (Pl. Ex. 70.) In its Opinion and Order, the Court found that Ms. Rybalko had wrongly been denied benefits because the City failed to add the time she had been a parolee to the time she had been a lawful permanent resident, which together were more than five years. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, at *54.
Additionally, in September 2004, a worker at the Senior Works center told plaintiff Anna Fedosenko's granddaughter that Ms. Fedosenko was ineligible for food stamps until she had had her green card for more than five years. (Declaration of Anna Fedosenko, dated Nov. 21, 2005, P 8.) On September 7, 2005, at M.L.'s fair hearing challenging the denial of her application for food stamps for herself, the State's Administration Law Judge told her that "the only person eligible for food stamps, I don't know about the work permit ones, but you have to have a green card for at least 5 years." (Transcript of M.L. fair hearing dated September 7, 2005, attached as Exh. 17 to Declaration of Russell W. Jacobs, dated Dec. 12, 2005, at 15.)
Indeed, counsel for the City continued to make erroneous [**12] statements regarding the eligibility of such lawful permanent residents throughout this case. Jesse Levine, counsel for the City, said at the hearing that Ms. Rybalko was ineligible for benefits "because she cannot combine two statuses into five years." (Tr. 1209:2-8.) David Lock, Deputy General Counsel of Human Resources Administration wrote that Ms. Rybalko "is not entitled to Food stamp benefits since she is a lawful permanent resident and does not have 40 qualifying quarters of work." (Pl. Ex. 1170.)
Further, the State acknowledged that its training materials were erroneous with respect to LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years. The State's December 2005 training [*6] materials state that "Alien eligibility for FS is limited to: . . . Permanent resident aliens who have resided in the U.S. for at least 5 years." (Ex. 677 at 10437.)

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Stephen Ptak testified that this statement in the training materials was incorrect and that instead of "permanent resident aliens who have resided in the United States for at least five years," it should have said permanent resident aliens "who have qualifying status for five years." (Tr. 1160:7-11.)
Finally, computer design [**13] errors caused LPRs who had been in that status for less than five years to be denied benefits erroneously. The problem was described during the testimony of Reena Ganju, who recounted her conversation with a City worker at the Seaport Job Center, Ms. Harris, concerning one of Ms. Ganju's clients, W.S. W.S. had applied for the former State Food Assistance Program (FAP). The worker said that "because she was putting in a date of entry as the date that she, the client, had gotten a green card and that was less than five years of having a green card, the case was erroring out," (Tr. 405:13-18.), a fact the Court explicitly noted in its decision. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, at *68-*69.
After receiving all this evidence, the Court found that "the City had a policy, custom, and usage of denying benefits to . . . lawful permanent residents who had been in that status for less than five years." M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, at *94 (emphasis added). The Court expressly found that these instances were not "simply 'isolated unconstitutional acts of . . . employees.'" Id. Rather, the Court found, the plaintiffs "have [**14] made a very substantial showing that the mistaken determinations were the direct results of the flawed design of the City's computer system ('POS'), the pervasive errors in the City's training materials and policy directives, and the widespread worker ignorance resulting from the inadequate training of the City employees." Id. Thus, the State's assertion that the Court made no finding that this practice [*7] was systemic is directly contradicted the Court's decision. Further, substantial evidence supported the Court's finding that the practice was systemic, including the sheer number of different Job Centers involved, the fact that training materials and the City and State computer systems were partly at fault, and that fact that supervisors and other senior officials were under a mistaken understanding of the law.
2. Galyna Rybalko is an adequate class representative of all LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years
In certifying a class action, it is not necessary to have a class representative for each and every factual variation among members of the class. "When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both [**15] the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of minor variations in the fact patterns underlying individual claims." Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936-37 (2d Cir. 1993). Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986), which the Court cited in its decision, illustrates this principle. There, the Court of Appeals reversed a decision decertifying a class in an employment discrimination case in which the class representative alleged she was a victim of discriminatory denial of transfers. The class she sought to represent included women who suffered discrimination in advancement generally, including denials of transfer, fewer training opportunities, and lack of promotions. "Evidence indicating that the employer discriminated in the same general fashion against the class representatives and against other members of the class was held sufficient to satisfy the typicality requirement." Robidoux, 798 F.2d at 937.
Here, as in Robidoux and Rossini, there are minor variations in the factual circumstances of individual LPR class members. Some, like [**16] K.T. and Polina Benyminov, entered this country [*8] as LPRs. Others, like Galina Rybalko, switched to LPR status from another immigration status. These differences are immaterial. The point is that, as the Court found, City workers systematically and erroneously denied benefits to LPRs who had their green cards for less than five years.
Galina Rybalko is an adequate class representative for all these LPRs. She was eligible for a public benefit -federal food stamps -- because she had a qualified alien status for five years. Despite her eligibility, she was denied food stamps because City workers wrongly believed she needed to have a green card for five years. That situation is typical of all the LPRs who were wrongly denied assistance for various public benefits because City workers wrongly believed they needed a green card for five years, or were unable to enter their cases in the computer for that reason. It is not necessary to have a separate class representative for every public benefit category, or for every immigration status in

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which an immigrant began before becoming an LPR.
The State's assertion that Ms. Rybalko is not an adequate class representative because her [**17] claim has become "moot" lacks merit. The law in this Circuit is directly to the contrary. As the Second Circuit held in Robidoux:
Where class claims are inherently transitory, "the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1975). Even where the class is not certified until after the claims of the individual class representatives have become moot, certification may be deemed to relate back to the filing of the complaint in order to avoid mooting the entire controversy.
Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d at 938-39; see also Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 70 n.34 (2d Cir. 2002); Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1994); Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
[*9] As in Robidoux, the claims in this case are "inherently transitory." Ms. Rybalko moved to intervene in this action. The event analogous to the filing of her complaint is her motion to intervene. That motion was made [**18] on March 24, 2006. (Tr. 1409:6-12.) As of that date, Ms. Rybalko had still not received the benefits to which she was entitled (Tr. 1405:2-6), and her claim was therefore not moot. Under the law of this Circuit, Ms. Rybalko does not become an inadequate class representative merely because, after she moved to intervene, the defendants paid the benefits she was owed. Indeed, all the plaintiff class representatives have now received the benefits they were owed; they do not thereby become inadequate class representatives. n1
n1 The State erroneously suggests that Ms. Rybalko's claim is also moot because the State introduced a "lock" on the date field in WMS. First, the State has been ordered to add a second date field because the "lock" does not entirely cure the problem. That second date field has not yet been added. Second, Ms. Rybalko is representing all LPRs who have had their green cards for less than five years, not merely those who were foiled by the lack of a "lock" on the WMS date field.

3. [**19] The State's analysis of the groups of LPRs is flawed
In its brief, the State purports to divide the class of LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years into four groups. Because of misstatements about the law, the State's analysis of these four groups is seriously flawed. Actually, there is only one relevant group of LPRs. That some of this group entered the United States as LPRs, some switched to that status before applying for benefits, and others attained that status while on benefits is not material.
As defined by the State, the first group (Group 1) consists of LPRs who entered the United States in LPR status or who attained that status after being in a non-qualified status. n2 As [*10] noted, the court heard evidence about various immigrants in this category, including plaintiff Anna Fedesenko and declarants K.T. and Polina Benyminov. The second category (Group 2) consists of immigrants who entered the United States in a qualified status, such as Galyna Rybalko, and later changed to LPR status. Although the State distinguishes analytically between Groups 1 and 2, there is no distinction between them as far as the evidence was concerned. As noted, [**20] substantial evidence showed that immigrants in both groups were wrongly denied benefits unless they were in an LPR status for five years. Neither City nor State workers made any distinction between whether an immigrant was initially in an LPR status when she arrived in the United States, or alternatively, whether she started in a non-qualified status, or a qualified status other than LPR, and later switched to LPR status by the time she applied for benefits.
n2 The State erroneously asserts that immigrants in Group 1 are not eligible to receive federal benefits "until

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they have been five years in LPR status." (State Mem. at 4.) LPRs who entered the United States before August 22, 1996, are eligible to receive federal Medicaid and TANF assistance without five years of LPR status. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a).
The third group defined by the State (Group 3) includes LPRs who were initially in a so-called "specially qualified" alien status. n3 The State claims that this group is eligible to receive food [**21] stamps and Medicaid for seven years, and thereafter if they become LPRs. This assertion is simply wrong. As noted in P 55(b) of the Complaint, all the so-called "specially qualified" aliens are eligible to receive food stamps without regard to time limitation, and without regard to [*11] whether they achieve LPR status. Immigrants listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A) are eligible for federal food stamps for seven years; therefore they remain eligible for federal food stamps under § 1612(a)(2)(L) because they are "Qualified Aliens" who have been in a qualified status for more than five years. The other categories of "specially qualified" aliens are also eligible without time limitation. Therefore, as far as food stamps are concerned, it is of no importance whether any of these immigrants attains LPR status after seven years or otherwise. n4 The same is true for Medicaid and public assistance. As noted in P 65 of the Complaint, all the "specially qualified" aliens are eligible for both programs. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(b). As far as Medicaid and public assistance are concerned, it is of no importance whether they achieve LPR status. Thus, the [**22] third group is completely irrelevant to the State's motion.
n3 The term "specially qualified" alien does not appear in federal law. OTDA has defined the term to refer generally to the groups of immigrants who are listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2) as exempt from the seven-year bar on federal food stamps, and/or who are listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1613(b) as exempt from the five-year bar on federal means-tested public benefits (including federal Medicaid). See http://www.otda.state.ny.us/otda/ta/ta_sourcebook.htm, ch. 24, § B (Feb. 2005). As OTDA defines it, the term "specially qualified" alien partially overlaps with "Qualified Alien" as defined under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) and (c). Both groups include refugees, persons granted asylum, granted withholding of deportation, and Cuban and Haitian entrants. The term "specially qualified" alien also includes several groups of immigrants who are not designated as "Qualified Aliens," including Amerasians and certain veterans who are "lawfully residing in any State." As explained in footnote 4 infra, OTDA's definition of "specially qualified alien," as posted on its external web site, does not reflect revisions to the definition made since the preliminary injunction hearing in this case. [**23]

n4 In the version of the Temporary Assistance Source Book posted on its external web site, for those categories of "specially qualified aliens" who are also "Qualified Aliens," OTDA's definition provides that the alien is a "specially qualified alien" "for a period of seven years." See http://www.otda.state.ny.us/otda/ta/ta_sourcebook.htm, ch. 24, § B (Feb. 2005). After the preliminary injunction hearing in this case, however, and consistent with the argument made here that it is not relevant, for purposes of federal benefits eligibility, whether these immigrants attain LPR status within seven years, OTDA revised this page of the Source Book to delete the references to seven years. (Bates Stamp No. MKB-OTDA 11610.) Those changes have not been posted to the external OTDA web site.
The last group (Group 4) of LPRs is said to consist of three subcategories: (1) children under 18 years of age who are eligible for food stamps under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J); (2) persons receiving benefits for blindness or disability, who are eligible for food stamps under 8 U.S.C. § 1612 [**24] (a)(2)(F)(2); and (3) persons who have worked 40 qualifying quarters under the Social Security Act, who are eligible for food stamps under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B). However, the State has badly mangled its description of the law. The first two subcategories do not consist [*12] of LPRs, but Qualified Aliens. n5 The State has tripped over the same distinction that befuddled the City's workers in so

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many cases discussed at trial. The immigrants who are eligible for food stamps under §§ 1612(a)(2)(J) and (F)(2) are eligible by reason of being Qualified Aliens, not LPRs. There are various plaintiffs in this category, including the older children of M.K.B., see Complaint P 149; the daughter of M.E., see P 223; P.E.'s older son, see P 239, and A.I.'s older daughter, see P 264. They are wholly irrelevant to any issue concerning LPRs.
n5 The term Qualified Alien, which is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) and (c), is broader than the term LPR. As noted in the Complaint, P 42, Qualified Aliens include LPRs, as well as persons granted asylum, admitted as a refugee, paroled into the United States for at least one year, granted withholding of deportation or conditional entry, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and, importantly for this case, battered and subject to extreme cruelty. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b), (c).
[**25]
The third subcategory of Group 4 -- LPRs who have worked 40 qualifying quarters -- is indeed a category specific to LPRs, and not all Qualified Aliens. However, as far as the evidence in this case is concerned, it is analytically the same as Groups 1 and 2 above. These are LPRs who either started out as LPRs, or who later switched to LPR status, and who were wrongly denied food stamps.
In summary, although the State posits four groups of LPRs and purports to dissect them, actually there is only one relevant group to consider. That group is comprised of LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years, regardless of the status in which they began before they became LPRs. As explained above, substantial evidence demonstrated that City workers wrongly denied benefits to these immigrants, and that the practice of doing so was systemic and not isolated. Galina Rybalko is adequate to serve as their class representative. Accordingly, there is no basis for removing them from the class.
Finally, the Court has already considered and rejected substantially the same argument [*13] that the State is now advancing. As the Court held, "[a]lthough defendants argue that each member [**26] of the class was denied benefits for slightly different reasons and under slightly different circumstances, the Court of Appeals, in strikingly similar circumstances, has found that the commonality and typicality requirements are met." M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, at *116 (citing Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam)). A motion for reconsideration is not an occasion for relitigating issues already decided by the Court. Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
For all these reasons, the State's motion to remove LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years should be denied.
C. The Motion to Remove PRUCOLs From the Class Should be Denied
The State's request to remove PRUCOLs from the class because relief regarding PRUCOLs would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment should be denied. The State's position has been squarely rejected by the Second Circuit and by district courts in this Circuit. Moreover, this issue was previously presented to the Court and rejected in footnote 20 of the Court's decision. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, [**27] at *111 n.20.
The leading case on point is the Second Circuit's decision in Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979). In Holley, the plaintiff, an immigrant, sought public assistance on the ground that she was PRUCOL. She brought an action in federal court against the State and the local county welfare commissioner, alleging both an Equal Protection claim and a pendent claim. n6 [*14] Ruling in her favor on the pendent claim, the district court directed the county defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for public assistance wrongfully denied, but denied, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, similar relief against the State defendant. On appeal, the county defendant argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred any relief against the county because the State controls the policies of the county department. The

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Second Circuit squarely rejected this argument:
That the State controls the policies of the County Department of Social Services is not decisive on the Eleventh Amendment issue. In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the Court noted that it has "consistently refused to construe the Amendment [**28] to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a 'slice of state power.'" Of much greater significance is the entity upon whom rests the primary obligation to make payments to the AFDC recipient, and as discussed below, that entity appears to be the County.
Holley, 605 F.2d at 643-44 (emphasis added).
n6 At the time, Holly's constitutional claim could be considered only by a three-judge court. See former 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed Aug. 12, 1976). Her pendent claim, in contrast, could be heard by a district court judge sitting alone. In an earlier phase of the litigation, the Second Circuit had held that the constitutional claim was sufficiently substantial to support pendent jurisdiction. The Court held that, "since pendent jurisdiction exists over them, the district judge, sitting alone, may well want to consider and rule upon these claims before convening the three-judge court." Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294, 1295-96 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976).
[**29]
Central to the Second Circuit's reasoning is that under State law, the counties bear "'ultimate responsibility' for public assistance payments." Id. at 644 (quoting Toia v. Regan, 54 A.D.2d 46, 50 (4th Dept.), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 837 (1976), app. dismissed, 429 U.S. 1082 (1977)). n7 "Moreover, 'the county's duty to provide assistance is not dependent upon the receipt of [*15] equivalent money from the State and the cases have so held.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 55 (1975)).
n7 The Court noted "that legislature has seen fit to create local social service districts, which are required by law to provide for the 'assistance and care of any person . . . who is in need of public assistance and care which he is unable to provide for himself.' N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 62(1). Moreover, section 88 of the New York Social Services Law makes it 'the duty of the board of supervisors of a county, the town board of a town and the appropriating body of a city to make adequate appropriations and to take such action as may be necessary to provide the public assistance and care required by this chapter.'" Holley, 605 F.2d at 643.
[**30]
Since Holley, a number of district courts have held that they have power, under the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, to direct the City to provide State public benefits to public assistance recipients, notwithstanding the State's supervisory control over the City defendant. For example, in Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2743 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005), Judge Pauley recently rejected the same argument advanced here by the State defendants. Citing Holley, 605 F.2d at 644, Judge Pauley held: "Local social services districts do not enjoy sovereign immunity against plaintiffs' Social Services Law claim because they have a duty to administer public assistance under New York law. Thus, the City can be held liable for failing to comply with the strictures of [State law]." 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2743, at *57.
Likewise, in Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004), the district court found that the City had violated various State laws requiring the provision of State-funded benefits [**31] to public assistance recipients, and ordered the City to comply with those

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provisions. 119 F. Supp. 2d at 217-21. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the State defendants are required by law to supervise the delivery of public benefits by the City defendant. 331 F.3d at 286-87. Notwithstanding the State's supervisory obligations and control over the City defendant, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's injunction directing the City to deliver State-funded benefits in compliance with State law. The district court "properly exercised pendent jurisdiction over the state claims given that the underlying factual issues were identical, and efficiency was therefore obviously served by simultaneous adjudication of the state law issues." Id. at 291.
[*16] Today, New York law mandates that all local social services districts, including HRA, must provide State Medicaid and State-funded public assistance to PRUCOL immigrants. n8 Under Holley, local departments of social services, including HRA, have the ultimate responsibility for delivering these benefits -- regardless of whether they receive State reimbursement, and [**32] regardless of whether policies of the local districts are subject to approval or control by the State. Thus, even assuming arguendo (as does the State, see State Mem. at 9), that the State might not approve a City policy directive concerning PRUCOLs, that failure would not affect this Court's power to require the City defendant to comply with State law under the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.
n8 Section 122(1)(c) of the State Social Services Law provides that persons shall be eligible for Safety Net Assistance and medical assistance (Medicaid) if they are "permanently residing in the United States under color of law." Although the statute delineates certain limitations on PRUCOL eligibility for purposes of Medicaid, those limitations were declared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001).
Finally, as noted, this issue was already presented to the Court and rejected. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347, [**33] at *111 n.20. A motion for reconsideration may not be used "as a vehicle for relitigating issues already decided by the Court," Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 461, and "is not a substitute for appeal." Morales v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 372. Accordingly, there is no basis for modifying the class definition regarding PRUCOLs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, the State defendants' motion for reconsideration should be denied in its entirety.
[*17] Dated: New York, New York September 20, 2006
Respectfully submitted,
Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief (SB0987)
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
Adriene L. Holder (ALH1872)
Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Practice Area
Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR5579)
Attorney-in-Charge, Law Reform
Christopher D. Lamb (CDL8145)
Attorney-in-Charge, Staten Island Neighborhood Office

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Jennifer Baum, of Counsel (JB4030) Camille Carey, of Counsel (CC1435) 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 10038 212-577-3325 Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (YS3107) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Jane G. Stevens, of Counsel (JS4790) Caroline Hickey, of Counsel (CH1410) Deborah [**34] Berkman, of Counsel 450 West 33rd Street, 11th Floor New York, NY 10001 212-613-5000 HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson (RA0979) Russell Jacobs, of Counsel (RJ3657) One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004 1482 212-837 6000 Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR5579) Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class
[*18] Of Counsel: THE EMPIRE JUSTICE CENTER Barbara Weiner 119 Washington Ave. Albany, N.Y. 12210 518-462-6831

 
 Page 1
LEXSEE 2005 U.S. DIST. CT. MOTIONS 10446
Go To U.S. District Court Opinion
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., MARIEME DIONGUE, M.E., P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of
their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, - against - VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources
Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner
of the New York State Department of Health, Defendants.
05 CV 10446 (JSR) (ECF CASE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 10446; 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 20887
September 13, 2006
Motion for Reconsideration
COUNSEL: [**1] ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York, Attorney for State defendants, 120 Broadway, 24th Floor, New York, New York 10271, (212) 416-8632.
ROBERT L. KRAFT, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
TITLE: STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER
TEXT: PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This Memorandum of Law is respectfully submitted in support of the motion of defendants ROBERT DOAR, as
Commissioner of the New [**2] York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health (collectively "State defendants"), pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 6.3 for reconsideration of so much of this Court's Opinion and Order entered August 29, 2006 ("Opinion and Order"), as certified a class including "(3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently [*2] Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL)." Opinion and Order, at 78-79. n1 As relief, the State defendants request an order striking the above-quoted language from the definition of the class.
n1 Page references are to the copy of the Opinion and Order filed as Document 150.
This Court accurately described most of the claims made and evidence adduced in this litigation in the opening sentence of the Opinion and Order as follows:
It is not the policy of the United States, nor of the State of New York, to leave destitute [**3] the

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battered immigrant wives and children of lawful U.S. residents just because their abusive husbands are no longer supporting them or providing them with a basis for obtaining aid.
id. at 1. Because the challenged portions of the definition of the certified class are not encompassed in this description, and for the reasons set out below, they should be struck from the definition of the certified class.
ARGUMENT
A motion to reconsider should be granted when the movant demonstrates that the court overlooked factual matters or controlling authority that had been presented to it in the proceedings on the underlying motion. Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 624 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Beatty v. United States, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6895 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
[*3] POINT I
LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THAT STATUS FOR LESS THAN FIVE YEARS ARE NOT PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE CERTIFIED CLASS SINCE NO CLASS REPRESENTATIVES DEMONSTRATE THE VARIOUS CLAIMS SUCH PERSONS MAY HAVE
The class action device was designed as "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and [**4] on behalf of the individual named parties only." General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). It is appropriate where the "issues involved are common to the class as a whole" and when they "turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class." Id. (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 701). Given the limited circumstances in which class actions are appropriate, "actual, not presumed conformance" with the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23 is "indispensable." 457 U.S. at 160; see also Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). Thus, a class action may be certified only if the trial court is satisfied, "after a rigorous analysis," that those prerequisites have been satisfied. 457 U.S. at 161; see, e.g., Bishop v. New York City Dep't of Housing Preservation and Development, 141 F.R.D. 229, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
While the Court's decision found that defendants' acts or omissions adversely affected battered immigrants and PRUCOLs, [**5] there was no evidence presented by plaintiffs-- and the Court's decision found none-- that lawful permanent residents ("LPRs") who have been in that status for less than five years were being systemically denied benefits by the practices which affected the two other immigrant groups. Indeed, there is only one plaintiff with the immigration status of LPR, i.e., Anna Fedosenko ("Fedosenko"), and she did not testify at the hearing nor [*4] prosecute her claim that she is entitled to federal food stamps by reason of her State Medicaid eligibility. Plaintiffs presented at the hearing a proposed LPR intervenor, Galina Rybalko ("Rybalko"), whose claim did not support Fedosenko's claim.
LPRs who have been in that immigration status for less than five years are not properly certified as part of a class in this litigation, which is concerned with whether the defendants properly applied 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612 and 1641(c) to battered aliens, because the benefits LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years may receive depend on the manner in which they became LPRs. There are various types of LPR categories for which no claims--let alone--claims supported by [**6] evidence of numerosity-- were presented herein but which are, nonetheless, potentially covered by the Court's overbroad definition. The difference in treatment, and in possible relief necessary to insure proper treatment, goes to the lack of commonality and typicality of class claims.
One group of LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years includes aliens who entered the United States in LPR status and aliens who obtain LPR status after being in a non-qualified alien status. n2 Such aliens are not eligible to receive Federal benefits until they have been five years in LPR status. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a). They may only

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receive State benefits, Safety Net Assistance and State Medicaid. New York Social Services Law ("NY SSL §§ 158, 366; Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1, (2001). Plaintiff [*5] Fedosenko is in this category, but she does not raise a claim of non-receipt of these benefits since she received Safety Net Assistance and State Medicaid after she applied for benefits. Her claim is that some law requires the defendants to refer her for a disability Medicaid determination and that, after this [**7] is done, she is eligible to receive Food Stamps due to her disability. This claim was not pursued by plaintiffs at the fact-finding hearing and is not related to her LPR status. Therefore, she is not a valid class representative with standing to assert a claim that she was denied State benefits during her first five years in LPR status when she is, indisputably, not entitled to receive Federal Medicaid.
n2 This group also includes aliens who are the beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, who gain LPR status as a result. Although many plaintiffs had I-130 petitions on their behalf, Plaintiffs do not have a representative of this group of lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years. This group also includes beneficiaries of I-140 petitions (by employers), and aliens who are beneficiaries of the diversity lottery visa, none of whom were represented in the litigation but are all covered by the proposed class definition.
A second group of LPRs who have been in that status for less than [**8] five years includes aliens who entered the United States in a qualified alien status, such as a parolee, and changed to LPR status thereafter. Proper treatment of such aliens is to add the time in the other qualified status to the time in LPR status, and if the sum of these time periods exceeds five years, such aliens, if otherwise eligible, may receive Federal benefits. Intervenor Rybalko is such a person. Rybalko was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period on April 5, 2000 (Pl. Ex. 173), and became a lawful permanent resident on June 13, 2003 (Pl. Ex. 173). Rybalko received State benefits in the form of Safety Net Assistance since September 2004 and State Medicaid since in or about 2002 (Tr. 322:11-22). To have received the State Medicaid, Rybalko's date of parole was entered into the Welfare Management System ("WMS") since she had not yet attained LPR status. Thus far, Rybalko, like Fedosenko, was not adversely affected by being a lawful permanent resident who has been in that status for less than five years.
Rybalko's claim is that, when she first applied for food stamp benefits in the beginning of April 2005, five years after she was paroled into the United States, [**9] (Tr. 323:3-9), she was denied [*6] food stamps because a City worker relied on the LPR date and did not include the time in qualified status as a parolee. However, as this Court noted at page 48 of the Opinion and Order, State defendants made a change to the WMS, referred to as the "lock," that resolves the problem demonstrated by Rybalko. The lock ensures that, once a qualified status such as a date of parole is entered into the WMS, it cannot be updated. This solution of the problem affects not only Rybalko but also affects others similarly situated to her. To the extent the Court based this portion of the class definition on Rybalko's now moot claim, the court has identified a class that has no members at all. The claim of the single named plaintiff has become moot. In fashioning this portion of the class definition, the Court improperly adopts plaintiffs' assumption that other similarly situated individuals exist. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61 (without "reasonable specificity" by plaintiff, court cannot define a class and defendant does not know how to defend).
A third group of LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years includes aliens who [**10] entered the country in what is known as a "specially qualified" status. These aliens, who include refugees, asylees, aliens whose deportation is withheld, Cuban or Haitian entrants and Amerasians, 8 U.S.C. § 1613(b)(1), are eligible to receive Food Stamps and Medicaid for a period of seven years from the date they enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A). If such aliens become LPRs during that seven year period, they continue to receive Food Stamps because of their initial specially qualified status. Plaintiffs did not present a class representative of this type, although this type of alien is clearly within this portion of the certified class definition.
A fourth group of LPRs who have been in that status for less than five years includes aliens who are children under eighteen years of age, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J), aliens who receive [*7] certain disability payments, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F), and aliens who have worked or can be credited with forty qualifying quarters of coverage as defined

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under Title II of the Social Security Act 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B). [**11] Persons in this group are eligible for Food Stamp benefits regardless of what their prior immigration status was before becoming an LPR. Plaintiffs did not present class representatives of this type, although these types of alien are clearly within this portion of the certified class definition.
For the foregoing reasons, State defendants respectfully request the Court to strike lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years from the definition of the certified class.
POINT II
PERSONS WHO ARE PERMANENTLY RESIDING UNDER COLOR OF LAW ARE NOT PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE CERTIFIED CLASS SINCE THE PROVISION OF RELIEF WILL UNAVOIDABLY REQUIRE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAW AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS IN VIOLATION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Court's Opinion and Order acknowledges, as plaintiffs do, that Persons who are permanently residing under color of law ("PRUCOL") are not eligible for Federal benefits but may be eligible for State benefits under State law in pertinent part as follows:
While some non-qualified aliens are not eligible for any benefits, one exception is the group known as "PRUCOL [**12] aliens," i.e., aliens living in the United States with the knowledge and permission or acquiescence of the federal immigration authorities and whose departure the federal immigration authorities do not contemplate enforcing. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 571-72 (2d Cir. 2001). For example, PRUCOL status is frequently accorded to applicants for so-called "V" [sic] visas, which are available to victims of crimes including crimes of domestic violence who have cooperated in the investigation or prosecution of those crimes. PRUCOL aliens, although ineligible for many federal benefits, see 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a), may [*8] nonetheless qualify in New York for state-funded Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance, see N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 158(1)(g), 122(c), 366(1)(a).
Id. at 5. The Opinion and Order made further findings about the relationship between the State defendants, the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA"), and the New York State Department of Health ("DOH"), and the City defendant ("HRA") in pertinent part as follows:
New York State has elected to delegate the administration of [**13] public benefits program [sic] to agencies of local government under the supervision of state agencies. New York is divided into 58 local social services district, [sic] with the City of New York constituting one such district. Tr. 643: 6-16; see also N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 56, 61. HRA is the agency responsible for administering these public assistance programs for residents of New York City.
In New York State, DOH supervises the provision of federal and state Medicaid, and OTDA supervises the administration of the Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, and Food Stamp programs. The State Defendants' supervision of the City Defendant consists, in relevant part, of OTDA's policy directives and instructions issued to HRA, OTDA's regular meetings and communications with HRA staff (including availability for on-call assistance), the State's conduct of the "fair hearing" system of appeals from HRA determinations, the State Defendants' computerized Welfare Management System ("WMS"), and the State's occasional training of HRA staff. Also, HRA may not issue policy directives or policy bulletins without the approval of OTDA. Tr. 728:7-10.
id. at 7. The Opinion and Order [**14] notes that "OTDA and DOH have different interpretations of who is and is not

2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 10446, *8; 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 20887, **14

Page 5

PRUCOL," Id. at 32, and anticipates the future course of providing relief regarding this issue as follows:
After the evidentiary hearing in this case, the City, upon receiving approval from OTDA, issued Policy Directive PD 06-24-ELI, titled "Determining Qualified Alien Status for Battered/Abuse Noncitizens and PRUCOL Eligibility." By letter dated August 1, 2006, however, plaintiffs lodged various objections concerning the discussion of PRUCOL eligibility in PD 06-24-ELI, such as that the revised Policy Directive fails to explain DOH and OTDA's different definitions of PRUCOL. To the extent these objections are not mooted by what follows below, they will be considered by the Court as part of the further proceedings in this case.
[*9] id. at footnote 6 (emphasis added). This language overlooks the fact that review of plaintiffs' objections concerning the discussion of PRUCOL eligibility places this Court in the shoes of OTDA and DOH as an interpreter of state law, and in conflict with the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. If, arguendo, HRA seeks approval [**15] of a revised policy directive from OTDA or DOH and does not receive it, for whatever reason, HRA may not issue the proposed revised document and this Court is unable to compel action by either State defendant. For that reason, it is improvident for the Court to certify a class that includes PRUCOL aliens. Doing so does not leave these aliens without a remedy. Their complaints about PRUCOL eligibility should be brought in State Court. See, Aliessa v. Novello Supra.
The Opinion and Order refers to Lewis v. Thompson, when describing the concept of PRUCOL. But in doing so, the Court has overlooked the fact that the statutory history explained at length in Lewis indicates that Congress has abandoned the concept of PRUCOL aliens, replacing it with the concept of qualified aliens found in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612, 1613, and 1641(c). In fact, a number of the federal regulations referred to in Lewis have been repealed in the last six years. This matter of State law should be left to State Courts for resolution.
PRUCOLs are not properly included in the certified class in this litigation because federal law does not apply to these persons, and to the extent this [**16] Court directs the City defendant, the State defendants' purported agent to take actions, while at the same time finding that City defendant cannot act without approval from the State defendants, the Court is violating the Eleventh Amendment's ban on enforcement of state law against a State agency. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
[*10] Since the proposed class members cannot receive relief from the State defendants, the Court should reconsider its determination to include them as part of the certified class and upon reconsideration should remove them from the definition of the certified class.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State defendants respectfully request this Court to grant their motion for reconsideration of that portion of its Opinion and Order including lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years and persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law as part of the definition of the certified class, and, upon reconsideration, enter an order striking that portion of the definition of the certified [**17] class.
Dated: New York, New York September 13, 2006
Respectfully submitted,
ELIOT SPITZER
Attorney General of the State of New York

2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 10446, *10; 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 20887, **17

Page 6

Attorney for State Defendant ROBERT L. KRAFT (RK5418) Assistant Attorney General 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271 (212) 416-8632

 
 JUDGE RAKOfr 05 CV 10446

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M.K.R, O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

- against-

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner ofthe

New York City Human Resources

Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as

Commissioner of the New York State Office of

Temporary and Disability Assistance; and

\ i ,;

.".\

ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--'=D"'e=fendants.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

':
\

I. Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.s.C. § 1983 on behalf of themselves and a

~)

class of similarly situated immigrant families and individuals in New York City who are, have

been, or will be erroneously denied desperately-needed food stamps, Medicaid, and/or public

assistance benefits (collectively public benefits).

2. Plaintiffs challenge the policies and practices of defendant EGGLESTON

(hereinafter City defendant or HRA) and defendants DOAR and NOVELLO (hereinafter

collectively State defendants and individually State OTDA and State DOH) that systemically and

erroneously deny class members' applications for public benefits; deny requests by class

members to be added to a public benefits case; and discontinue or reduce public benefits

Page 2

received by class members, because ofthe systemic misapplication of rules concerning

immigrant eligibility for public benefits.

3. Plaintiffs also challenge the policies and practices of the City and State defendants

that systemically deter and discourage class members from applying for public benefits, and/or

pressure them to withdraw applications for public benefits, on account of immigration status.

I

4. Plaintiffs further chaJlenge City and State defendants' policy and practice of failing

to provide timely and adequate notice of the denial of benefits to class members: (1) when

public benefits are granted to some household members but denied to others; (2) when class

members apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when class

members are discouraged or prohibited from applying for public benefits, based on immigration

status.

5. Plaintiffs further challenge City and State defendants' policy and practice of issuing

i

misleading notices to class members that make it difficult ifnot impossible to determine whether

,

public benefits were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and whether to appeal

such denial, discontinuance, or reduction.

6. Plaintiffs challenge the policy and practice of State defendants of failing to

supervise, train, institute adequate quality assurance measures, and otherwise ensure the correct

application by City defendant of immigrant eligibility rules for the federally funded food stamp

and federally funded Medicaid programs, and offailing to ensure the provision of timely and

adequate notice when federal and/or State public benefits are denied in whole or in part,

discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status.

7. Plaintiffs allege that City defendant systemically misapplies immigrant eligibility

rules because of faulty policy directives and instructions issued over the course of many years by

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 3

the State and City defendants; because of computer-related problems attributable to the State and

City defendants that make it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to provide class members with

public benefits; and because of poor training and supervision over many years by the City and

State defendants.

8. Plaintiffs seek an injunction enjoining the City defendant in her capacity as

Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA):

(a) to refrain from unlawfully denying, discontinuing, andlor reducing class members

public benefits on account ofimmigration status;

(b) to refrain from deterring or discouraging class members from applying for public

benefits, or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these benefits, on

account of immigration status;

(c) to provide timely and adequate written notice of the denial of public benefits to

i

class members (1) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; and (2) when class members apply

I

to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied;

(d) to refrain from issuing misleading notices to class members that make it difficult

ifnot impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or

provided in the proper amount andlor whether to appeal;

(e) to ensure that all disabled Qualified Alien class members are referred for

Medicaid disability determinations ifthere is an indication that they may qualify

for disability-related Medicaid, and that those determined to be disabled receive

the food stamps to which they are legally entitled;

NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 4 ,
(I) to assist class members who are applying for federal food stamps and federal

Medicaid in completing an application for a Social Security number and to

provide them with proper documentation that complies with Social Security

Administration Program Operations Manual System (POMS) Records

Maintenance (RM) 00203.510 Alien without Work Authorization- Non-work

Need for an SSN (2002) (available at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsfi').

(g) to refrain from enforcing State regulations, State directives and City directives

and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State

Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a

Social Security number is impossible to obtain.

9. Plaintiffs further seek an order enjoining State defendants to supervise and oversee

the conduct and actions of City defendant to ensure that the City defendant complies with all

I

federal mandates regarding immigrant eligibility for federal Medicaid and federal food stamps, and to ensure that timely and adequate notice is provided when State and/or federal public

,

't

benefits are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. This action is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as an action seeking redress of the

deprivation of statutory and constitutional rights under color of law.

:,;
'oj

II. Jurisdiction over this action is conferred upon the Court by: (a) 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

which provides for jurisdiction in the United States district courts of civil actions arising under

the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States; (b) 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), which provides

for jurisdiction in the United States district courts of civil actions to redress deprivation of rights

Page 5

secured by the Constitution of the United States; and (c) for claims against the City defendant

arising under State law, 28 U.s.C. § 1367. 12. Venue properly lies with this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

PARTIES

Plaintiffs 13. Many of the named plaintiffclass representatives are using their initials because

they are victims of domestic violence who fear that their abusers will find and hurt them.

14. PlaintiffM.K.B. is a 33-year-old battered qualified immigrant (for a definition of

battered qualified immigrant, see ~ 42(h) - 44 below) from Jamaica who lives in a homeless

shelter in Manhattan with her three children, M.A.B., age 9, S.B., age 7, and, N.B., age 2 months.

15. PlaintiffO.P. is a 39-year-old battered immigrant from Peru who is Permanently

I

Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL) (for a definition ofPRUCOL, see U 69,70 below)
because the USCIS granted her deferred action, who lives in a domestic violence shelter with her

two children, ages 5 and 13.
f
l
16. PlaintiffL.W. is a 62-year-old disabled battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica

who is temporarily living with a friend in Brooklyn.

17. PlaintiffM.A. is a 36-year-old battered qualified immigrant from the Dominican

Republic who lives in a homeless shelter in the Bronx with her 3-year-old daughter.

I
',1

18. Plaintiff Marieme Diongue is a 29-year-old immigrant from Senegal who is

I

j

!

PRUCOL because she was granted deferred action and who lives in the Bronx with her 10-

month old daughter.

19. PlaintiffM.E. is a 37-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Mexico who lives

in New York City with her three children, ages 12,7, and 9.

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 6

20. PlaintiffP.E. is a 31-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica who lives

in New York City with her two sons, ages 12 and 2.

21. Plaintiff Anna Fedosenko is an 88-year-old disabled lawful permanent resident

from the Ukraine who lives in Brooklyn with her daughter.

22. Plaintiff A.I. is a 32-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Bangladesh who

lives in Brooklyn, New York with her two children, SA, age 2, and W.A., age 6.

23. PlaintiffL.A.M. is a 34-year-old immigrant from Trinidad who is PRUCOL

because the USCIS granted her deferred action. She lives in a domestic violence shelter with her

2-year-old son.

24. PlaintiffL.M. is a 42-year-old lawful permanent resident from Haiti with 40

qualifYing work quarters as defined in the Social Security Act who lives with her two children,

,

I

ages 2 and 16, in a domestic violence shelter in New York City.

I

25. PlaintiffDenise Thomas is a 26-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Saint Lucia who lives in Brooklyn with her mother, sister, 3-year-old daughter, and 9-month-old son.

26. Plaintiff J.z. is a 28-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Mexico who lives

in the Bronx, New York with her 8-year-old son and her 4-year-old daughter.

Defendants

27. Defendant Verna Eggleston is the Commissioner of the City ofNew York Human

Resources Administration (HRA), which is the local social services agency responsible for the

delivery of food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance for residents of New York City. She is

responsible for, inter alia, the overall operation and administration of federal and state public

benefits programs in New York City, and for ensuring that all agency personnel comply with

,

federal and state law and regulations relating to those programs.

!,

NY JOO8585JDOC

Page 7

28. Defendant Robert Doar is the Commissioner of the State of New York Office of

I

Temporary and Disability Assistance (State OTDA). He is responsible for, inter alia: (a)

I

administration of the food stamp program throughout New York State; and (b) supervision of the

administration of the food stamp and public assistance programs by all ofthe State's local social

services districts, including New York City.

29. Defendant Antonia C. Novello is the Commissioner ofthe State of New York

Department of Health (State DOH). She is responsible for, inter alia: (a) the administration of

New York State's federal and State Medicaid programs throughout New York State; and (b)

supervision of the administration of the federal and State Medicaid programs by all of the State's

local social services districts, including New York City.

I

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

I

30. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)

i

on behalf of themselves, on behalf of their minor children and a class defined as:

I
!

All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for State or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, andlor food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will

have public benefits discontinued or reduced; (c) have been or will be discouraged

or prevented from applying for public benefits; andlor (d) have been or will be

encouraged to withdraw an application for public benefits, by a New York City

job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.

For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term "Affected Immigrants" means (1) battered spouses and battered children ofV.s. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case ofbatlered children, their immigrant parents,
provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3)
lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).

31. Since 1998, New York City has used the term 'Job center" to refer to the HRA

offices responsible for administering joint public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid cases.

Page 8

32. This class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Every year,

at least hundreds of class members apply, or attempt to apply, for public benefits at New York

City job centers. Upon information and belief, hundreds of class members are either denied

public benefits in whole or in part, have public benefits discontinued or reduced, are discouraged

from applying, or are pressured to withdraw an application, because of a systemic misapplication

ofimmigrant eligibility rules.

33. Joinder of all class members is also impracticable because City Defendant often

fails to record accurately the reason for the denial ofpublic benefits to immigrants; because City

Defendant often fails to record the immigration status of persons whom they find ineligible and

because City Defendant does not record the names ofpersons who are discouraged or prevented

from applying for public benefits or pressured to withdraw applications because of immigration

status.

I

34. There are questions of fact and law common to the class. At issue are City Defendant's policies and practices at New York City job centers of:

I

(a) systemically and erroneously denying applications for public benefits by class

members; denying requests by class members to be added to a public benefits case; and discon-

tinuing or reducing benefits received by class members, because of the systemic misapplication

,

of rules concerning immigrant eligibility for benefits;

" l

1

(b) systemically deterring and discouraging class members from applying for public

benefits, andlor pressuring them to withdraw applications for public benefits, on account of

immigration status;

(c) failing to provide adequate and timely written notice of the denial ofpublic

benefits to class members: (1) when public benefits are granted to some household members but

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 9

denied to others; (2) when class members apply to be added to an existing public benefits case

and are denied; and (3) when class members are discouraged or prohibited from applying for

public benefits, on account of immigration status;

(d) systemically and erroneously issuing misleading notices to class members that

make it difficult if not impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or

I

provided in the proper amount and whether to appeal the denial, discontinuance or reduction of such benefits;

(e) systemically and erroneously failing to refer aU disabled qualified alien class

members for Medicaid disability determinations and failing to provide federal food stamps to

such disabled class members;

I

(f) systemically and erroneously failing to assist class members who are applying for

I

federal food stamps and federal Medicaid with their Social Security number applications, as required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(b) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e);

I

(g) to refrain from enforcing State regulations, State directives and City directives

!

and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to

furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security number is

impossible to obtain.

35. Also at issue are State defendants' policies and practices offailing to supervise,

train, institute adequate quality assurance measures, and otherwise ensure the correct application

by the City defendant of immigrant eligibility rules for the federal food stamp and federal

Medicaid programs, and offailing to ensure the provision oftimely and adequate notice when

public benefits are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration

status.

NY lOO8585JOOC

Page 10
36. The individual plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class. All the named plaintiff class representatives are immigrants who have sought to apply or have applied for public benefits at New York City job centers and whose public benefits application have been denied or whose public benefits have been discontinued; and/or have been deterred, discouraged, and prevented from applying for public benefits due to their immigration status; and/or have not received timely and adequate notice regarding their eligibility for those benefits; and/or have received misleading notices that made it difficult if not impossible to determine whether their public benefits were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal that denial or reduction.
37. Declaratory and injunctive relief are appropriate with respect to the class as a whole because defendants have acted on grounds app licab Ie to the class.
38. The named plaintiffs and the proposed class are represented by The Legal Aid Society, New York Legal Assistance Group, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, and The Empire Justice Center, whose attorneys are experienced in class action litigation and will adequately represent the class.
39. A class action is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this matter in that the prosecution ofseparate actions by individual class members would unduly burden the Court and create the possibility of conflicting decisions.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEME 40. For purposes of this complaint, the term "public benefits" includes federal food stamp benefits, public assistance (Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance), federal Medicaid, and State Medicaid. When used in reference to the period prior to September 30,

Page 11

2005, the term public benefits also refers to State food stamps provided through the Food

Assistance Program (State food stamps or FAP benefits), which expired on September 30, 2005.

41. In Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

of 1996 ("PRWORA"), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2260 (1996), Congress imposed

:~

limitations on the eligibility of immigrants for federally funded public benefits, including

l

'~j.

federally funded public assistance, federal Medicaid, and federal food stamps (collectively

federal public benefits).

42. With certain exceptions, the PRWORA restricts eligibility for federal public

benefits to Qualified Aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a). As described at greater length below, § 402 of

the PRWORA further limits eligibility for federal means-tested public benefits, including federal

I

food stamps, federal Medicaid, and federal public assistance to certain subcategories of Qualified

I

Aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1612. The term "Qualified Alien" is defined as an alien who:

(a) is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.; or

(b) has been granted asylum under § 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; or

(c) was admitted as a refugee under § 207 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1157; or

(d) has been paroled into the United States for at least one year under § 212(d)(5) of

the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1I 82(d)(5); or

(e) has been granted withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1253(h) (as in effect before April I, 1997), or § 241(bX3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 125J(b)(3);

or

(f) has been granted conditional entry under § 203(a)(7) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ I 253(a)(7) (as in effect before April 1, 1980); or

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 12

(g) is a Cuban or Haitian entrant, as defined in § SO I(e) of the Refugee Education

Assistance Act of 1980; or

I

(h) has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States and meets

I

the criteria set forth in '11'1143-44 below ("battered qualified immigrants").

I

8 U.S.C. § 1641(b), (c).

43. "Battered qualified immigrants" as used in 'II 42(h) above include persons who fall

into one of the categories in '1144 below, and who are either (I) Qualified Aliens who are

themselves battered, 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (c)(l); (2) Qualified Alien parents ofa child who has been

battered, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(2); or (3) Qualified Alien children ofa parent who has been

battered, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(3).

44. To establish status as a Qualified Alien pursuant to 8 U.S.C.§ 1641(c), the alien

must provide evidence that her petition, or a petition filed on her behalfby her U.s. citizen or

lawful permanent resident spouse or parent, under one ofthe immigration provisions listed below

has been approved or has been found to set forth a prima facie case:

(a) the alien's petition for classification as a battered spouse or child ofa U.S. citizen

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § IIS4(a)(I)(A)(ii), (iii) or (iv) [see 8 U.S.C. § 164I(c)(1)(B)(i)], or ofa

lawful permanent resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § l1S4(a)(l)(B)(ii) or (iii) [see 8 U.S.C.

§1641(c)(l)(B)(ii)]; or

(b) a petition filed by the alien's U.S. citizen spouse or parent under 8 U.s.C.

§ IlS4(a)(I)(A)(i) for classification ofthe alien as a spouse or child ofa U.s. citizen, or a

petition filed by the alien's lawful permanent resident spouse or parent under 8 U.S.c.

§ IIS4(a)(1)(B)(i) for classification of the alien as the spouse or child of a lawful permanent

resident [see 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(iv)]; or

Page 13
(c) an application for suspension of deportation [see 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(iii)]; or (d) an application for cancellation of removal [see 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(v)].
I
45. A battered qualified immigrant as defined in ~ 44(a) is commonly known as a "VAWA self-petitioner" because the petition for her classification as a spouse or child of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident has been filed by her on her own behalf (and, where applicable in the case of a battered alien parent, on behalf ofher alien child) under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, Subtitle G, 108 Stat. 1902,1953 (1994). The form for filing such a petition is an 1-360. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(3).
46. A battered immigrant as defined in ~ 44(b) is not a "self-petitioner." Rather, she is an alien on whose behalf a petition has been filed by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident parent or spouse for classification of the alien as a spouse or child of the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident petitioner. The form for filing such a petition is known as an 1-130. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1).
47. One nuance concerning 1-130 petitions should be noted. An unmarried child of the spouse ofa U.S. citizen must be the beneficiary of a separate petition filed by the U.S. citizen stepparent or parent. Therefore, a separate 1-130 petition must be filed for each child of the spouse ofa U.S. citizen. However, an unmarried child of the spouse ofa lawful permanent resident can be a derivative beneficiary on the parent's 1-130 petition. Therefore, a separate 1130 petition does not need to be filed for a child ofthe spouse ofa lawful permanent resident, as the child is a derivative on the parent's 1-130 petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4).
48. A child of a VAWA self-petitioning spouse can be a derivative beneficiary on the self-petitioner's 1-360 petition regardless of whether the self-petitioner's spouse is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 C.F .R. § 204.2(c)(4); see also Preamble to Interim Regulations,
NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 14
61 Fed. Reg. at 13068-69 (March 26, 1996). A child of a VAWA self-petitioning child cannot be a derivative beneficiary on the self-petitioner's 1-360 petition, and a separate petition must be filed for the child. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(e)(4).
49. In the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. 1. No. 106-386, § 107(b)(1 )(.A), 114 Stat. 1464, 1475 (2000), Congress provided that, notwithstanding Title N of the PRWORA, "an alien who is a victim ofa severe form of trafficking in persons shall be eligible for benefits and services ... to the same extent as an alien who is admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 207 ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act." Although trafficking victims are not included in the statutory definition of Qualified Alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (b), they are eligible under § 107(b)(1 )(A) for public benefits to the same extent as refugees. A visa called the T visa has been created for victims of human trafficking. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(T).
50. As discussed below, New York State law provides public benefits to many immigrants who are not eligible for federal public benefits.
A. Federal Food Stamps 51. Congress established the federally funded, state-administered food stamp program in 1964 in order to "safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." 7 U.S.C. § 2011; 7 C.F.R. § 271.1. 52. To be financially eligible for federal food stamps, a household's net income must be at or below the federal poverty line. The resources available to the household may not exceed $2,000 (or, where a household includes a member who is disabled or 60 years of age or older, $3,000). 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(c), (g).
NY J008585JOOC

Page 15

53. Applicants must be permitted "to apply to participate in the program on the same

day that the household first contacts a food stamp office in person during office hours." 7 U.S.C.

§ (e)(2)(B)(iii). Eligible applicants must be provided federal food stamps no later than 30 days

I

after application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a), (g)(l). Under federal law, expedited federal food stamps must be provided to certain particularly needy households within

seven days. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9). New York law requires that certain particularly needy

households must receive expedited federal food stamps within five days. 18 N.Y.C.R.R.

§ 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a).

54. The social services district must notify every applicant in writing of its decision to

accept or deny a federal food stamp application. All notices must include the action taken by the

agency, the specific reason for any denial or the amount of the benefit granted, the laws and

regulations on which that action was based, the effective date of the action, and the certification

period. 7 C.F.R. § 273.lO(g)(I).

I

55. To be eligible for federal food stamps, an immigrant must be either:

(a) a Qualified Alien who:

(1) is a lawful permanent resident who has worked 40 qualifying quarters of

coverage as defined under the Social Security Act, or who can be credited with such quarters, as

set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1645, see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B); or

(2) is receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability within the

meaning of the Food Stamp Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(ii); or

(3) was lawfully residing in the United States and was 65 years of age or older

on August 22, 1996,8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(I); or

(4) is under 18 years of age, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J); or

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 16

(5) has resided in the United States in a Qualified Alien status for five or more

years, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(L); or

(b) is a (I) refugee (or T visa holder. see' 49 above), (2) asylee, (3) person whose

deportation has been withheld. (4) CubanlHaitian entrant, (5) Amerasian. (6) American Indian

born in Canada or a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, (7) member of a Hmong or

Highland Laotian tribe who rendered assistance to the U.S. military during the Vietnam era, or

(8) lawfully residing active duty service member or honorably discharged veteran or a spouse or

unmarried dependent child of such individual. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A), (C), (G). (K).

finmigrants in these eight categories are eligible for federal food stamps without any time

limitation. (Under 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A), immigrants in the first five categories are eligible

for federal food stamps for seven years; thereafter. they remain eligible for federal food stamps

under 8 U.S.c. § 1612(a)(2)(L) because they have been in a Qualified Alien status for five or

more years.)

56. Qualified Aliens who are in receipt of disability-related Medicaid benefits are

receiving "benefits or assistance for blindness or disability" (, 55(a)(2) above) for the purposes

of8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(ii). See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(r)(2)(B). An applicant for or recipient of

Medicaid must be referred for a Medicaid disability determination if there is an indication that

!

they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid. State DOH. Medicaid Reference Guide

I

(MRG). at 27 (February 2005). State OTDA has advised local districts of this requirement.

I

i
I

State OTDA. Informational Letter (INF) 03 INF 14. at 5 (April 2. 2003). lfthe Medicaid

disability determination established that the individual is disabled. then he or she is eligible for

federal food stamps. [d.

NY JOO8585JDOC

Page 17

B. New York State Food Assistance Program

57. In 1997, New York established a state and locally funded food stamp program

called the Food Assistance Program (FAP) for certain Qualified Aliens who were ineligible for

!

federal food stamps because of their immigration status. Welfare Reform Act of 1997, N.Y.

I

Laws ofl997, ch. 436, Part B § 14S-b (1997). Participation in FAP by local social services

!

districts was optional. N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 95(10)(2). New York City participated in FAP

until the Legislature allowed the program to expire on September 30, 2005.

58. Initially, eligibility for FAP was limited to certain Qualified Aliens who, on August

22, 1996, resided in the local social services district in which they were applying for benefits,

were ineligible for federal food stamps due to their immigration status, and were: (I) under

eighteen years of age, (2) elderly, or (3) disabled. Welfare Reform Act ofl997, N.Y. Laws of

1997, ch. 436, Part B § 14S-b (1997). In 2001, domestic violence victims were added to the list

ofvuInerable inunigrants eligible for FAP. 2001 N.Y. Laws, ch. 232.

59. In 2002, Congress expanded eligibility for federal food stamps to Qualified Aliens

who are under 18 or disabled. 8 U.S.C. § 16 I2(a)(2)(F) & (1). Because they were restored to

the federal program, Qualified Aliens who were under IS or disabled were no longer eligible for

FAP benefits. Those who remained eligible for FAP were Qualified Aliens who had been

residing in the United States on August 22, 1996 and were victims of domestic violence or

elderly (60 years of age or older), but who were ineligible for federal food stamps because they

had not been in a qualified status for at least five years after entry.

N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 95(lO)(b).

60. As set forth below, HRA failed to instruct adequately workers about FAP and to

direct workers to provide FAP to eligible immigrants. As a result, workers consistently failed to

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 18
provide FAP benefits to immigrants who applied for assistance and who would have been eligible for FAP. Likewise, for most offAP's existence, State aIDA consistently failed to include reference to FAP in its alien desk aid, which otherwise listed all the public benefits programs for which immigrants might be eligible. Because ofthese omissions, many class members who should have received FAP benefits did not do so. In September 2005, the New York State Legislature allowed the FAP program to expire without renewal. Upon information and belief, at that time there were five or fewer immigrants enrolled in FAP in New York State.
C. Federal and State Medicaid 61. Congress created the federal Medicaid program in 1965 to provide medical benefits to families with children, pregnant women, the elderly, the disabled, and the blind "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.c. § 1396; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(IO). The costs of providing medical benefits under the federal Medicaid program are shared among the states and the federal government. 62. The federal Medicaid Act provides that "all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the [Medicaid) plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)(8). Federal Medicaid regu1ations mandate that "[t)he agency must afford an individual wishing to do so the opportunity to apply for Medicaid without delay." 42 C.F.R. § 435.906. Federal Medicaid applications must be processed within 45 days, except in circumstances where the applicant claims to be eligible for Medicaid because of a disability, in which case the application must be processed within 90 days. 42 C.F.R. § 43S.911(a)(I)-(2). 63. Federal law requires that the social services district notifY every applicant in writing of any decision accepting or denying a Medicaid application. All notices must include the action
NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 19
taken by the agency, the reason for any denial ifthe application is denied, the laws and regulations on which that action was based, the effective date of the action if it not a denial, and the certification period. 42 C.F.R. § 435.912; see also 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358-3.3, 358-2.2
64. Only Qualified Aliens are eligible for federal Medicaid. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1). In Section 403 ofPRWORA, Congress enacted a five-year bar on the eligibility of certain Qualified Aliens who entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996 for federal means-tested public benefits, including federal Medicaid. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a). Nevertheless, as described below in ~ 65, certain categories of immigrants are exempt from the five-year bar. Innnigrants who are eligible for federal Medicaid benefits therefore include:
(a) Qualified Aliens who entered the United States before August 22, 1996 (regardless of the status in which they entered);
(b) Qualified Aliens who entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996, and who have been in a qualified status for five years; and
(c) Qualified Aliens who are exempt from the five-year bar. 65. Qualified Aliens who are exempt from the five-year bar on federal Medicaid benefits include (1) refugees (and T visa holders, see ~ 49 above), (2) asylees, (3) persons granted withholding of deportation, (4) Cuban and Haitian entrants, (5) Amerasians; (6) lawfully residing veterans or individuals on active duty and their lawfully residing dependents; or (7) American Indians born in Canada or members of a federally recognized Indian tribe. 8 U.S.c. §§ 16l3(b), (d). 66. New York State provides State Medicaid to several categories of individuals who are not eligible for federal Medicaid. N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 366(l)(a), 158(1)(b), 369-ee(2); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 360-3.3(a)(I), (b)(7).
NY IOO8585JOOC

Page 20
67. Under State law, "[a]ny person requesting medical assistance may make an application therefor in person, through another in his behalf or by mail. . . ."
N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(l). Medical assistance "shall be given" to all eligible applicants.
N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 366(1)(a). 68. In 1997, the New York State Legislature adopted the same inunigration eligibility
restrictions in its State Medicaid program as Congress had imposed in 1996 on the federal Medicaid program with the exception that the Legislature chose to provide State Medicaid to those otherwise eligible persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL) who, as of August 4, 1997, were residing in certain licensed residential health facilities or were
diagnosed with AIDS. N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 122(1)(c).
69. The term PRUCOL, an acronym for "Permanently Residing Under Color of Law," is not an official immigration status. Rather, it is a public benefits category referring to .immigrants who are permanently residing in the United States with knowledge and either the permission or the acquiescence of the USCIS. See State DOH, Administrative Directive (ADM) 04 OMMlADM-07, at 19-22 (Oct. 24, 2004).
70. State DOH has determined that the following statuses are considered PRUCOL: (a) Persons paroled into the United States pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the INA showing status for less than one year, except Cuban/Haitian entrants; (b) Persons residing in the United States pursuant to an Order of Supervision; (c) Persons residing in the United States pursuant to an indefinite stay of deportation; (d) Persons residing in the United States pursuant to an indefinite voluntary departure;
NV IOO8585.J,DOC

Page 21

(e) Persons on whose behalf an immediate relative petition has been approved and

their families covered by the petition, who are entitled to voluntary departure, but whose

departure the USCIS does not contemplate enforcing;

(f) Persons who have filed applications for adjustment of status pursuant to Section

245 of the INA that USCIS consider "properly filed" or granted and whose departure the USCIS

does not contemplate enforcing;

(g) Persons granted stays of deportation by court order, statute, or regulation, or

individual determination by USCIS pursuant to Section 243 of the INA and whose departure the

USCIS does not contemplate enforcing;

(h) Persons granted voluntary departure pursuant to Section 242(b) of the INA;

uscrs (i) Persons granted deferred action status pursuant to

operating instructions;

U) Persons who entered and have continuously resided in the U.S. since before

1101172;

(k) Persons granted suspension of deportation pursuant to Section 244 ofthe INA;

and

(I) Other persons living in the United States with the knowledge and permission or

acquiescence ofthe USCIS and whose departure the USCIS does not contemplate enforcing.

Examples include but are not limited to, the following:

•

Pennanent non-immigrants pursuant to Public Law 99-239 (applicable to Citizens

of the Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands);

•

Applicants for adjustment ofstatus, asylum, suspension ofdeportation or

cancellation of removal, or deferred action;

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 22

I

• Persons granted extended voluntary departure, or Deferred Enforced Departure

(DED) for a specified time due to conditions in their home country;

• Persons granted Temporary Protected Status; and

• Persons having a "K", "V", "8" or "U" visa.

State DOH, 04 OMMlADM-07, at 19-Z0.

71. In 2001, the New York Court of Appeals held on State and federal constitutional

grounds that New York State may not deny State Medicaid benefits to legal immigrants based on

their immigration status. Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.Zd 418,421-22 (2001). As a result ofthe

ruling in Aliessa, all Qualified Aliens and PRUCOL individuals who are ineligible for federal

I

I

Medicaid due to immigrant eligibility restrictions are eligible for State Medicaid. D. Federal and State Public Assistance

I

72. Under the New York State Constitution and the State Social Services Law, social

services officials are under a duty to provide adequately for those individuals and families who

do not have sufficient funds to support themselves and to provide such services as far as possible

to ensure that families be kept together and not be separated for reasons of poverty alone. N.Y.

Const. Art. XVII; N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 131(1) & (3).

73. The federal government provides block grants to States for temporary assistance to

needy families (TANF) under Part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 el

seq.

74. New York has established two public assistance programs for indigent New

Yorkers to comply with this duty. The first of those programs, Family Assistance, is funded in

part by the federal TANF block grant. Family Assistance is available in general to families with

a child under 18 and to pregnant women.

NY lOOSS8SJDOC

Page 23

75. The second of those programs, Safety Net Assistance, receives no federal TANF

funds. Safety Net Assistance is available generally to childless adults, those ineligible for

Family Assistance due to the federal immigrant eligibility restrictions, and those who have

reached the federal time limit for receipt of federal public assistance.

N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 158 & 349.

76. Under New York State regulations, "[a]ny person has the right to make application

for that form of public assistance or care that he or she believes will meet his or her needs. The

applicant or any adult member of the applicants' family has the right to make application for

such assistance or care." 18 N. Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(a)(1). "While documentation is required for the

determination of eligibility, it shall not be a prerequisite to filing an application."

18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(b).

77. All applications for public assistance "shall be processed promptly."

I

18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(b). A personal interview to establish eligibility for public assistance must be scheduled within seven working days from the date of filing, except where there is an

indication of emergency need, in which case the interview must be held immediately.

18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(c). The decision to accept or deny the application for public assistance

must be made within 30 days from the date of application for Family Assistance and within 45

days from the date of application for Safety Net Assistance, except for specified, acceptable

reasons for delay. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.8(b).

78. Individuals determined by the social services district to be in immediate need of

assistance have a right to an emergency or predetermination grant of assistance, even when

ongoing eligibility has not yet been established. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.8(c)(4).

I

Page 24

I

79. The social services district must notify every applicant in writing of its decision to

accept or deny an application for public assistance. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.8(b). All notices must

include the action taken by the agency, the specific reason for any denial or the amount of

benefits granted, the laws and regulations on which the action is based, and for acceptances the

effective date of the action. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358-3.3, 358-2.2. When an application for public

assistance is withdrawn, the social services district must record the reasons therefor in the case

record. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 355.3(a)(3).

80. Because Family Assistance is funded in part by the federal TANF block grant,

immigrant eligibility restrictions on the use ofTANF funds apply to eligibility for Family

'j

Assistance. With one exception (concerning eligibility of American Indians born in Canada or

I

members of a federally recognized Indian tribe), these restrictions are the same as those applicable to the federal Medicaid program.

!

I

81. As is the case for federal Medicaid, only Qualified Aliens are eligible for Family Assistance. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(l). The five-year bar in § 403 ofPRWORA on the eligibility of

't

certain Qualified Aliens who entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996 for federal

means-tested public benefits applies to Family Assistance. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a). The exceptions

to the five-year bar are also applicable to Family Assistance. (See' 82 below.) As a

consequence, immigrants who are eligible for Family Assistance include:

(a) Qualified Aliens who entered the United States before August 22, 1996,
,

J
j

regardless of the status in which they entered;

(b) Qualified Aliens who entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996 and

who have been in a qualified status for five years; and

(c) Qualified Aliens who are exempt from the five-year bar.

Page 25
82, Qualified Aliens who are exempt from the five-year bar on Family Assistance
include (1) refugees (and T visa holders, see' 49 above), (2) asylees, (3) persons granted
withholding of deportation, (4) Cuban and Haitian entrants, (5) Amerasians; and (6) lawfully residing veterans or individuals on active duty and their lawfully residing dependents. 8 U.S.c. §§ 1613(b). (The exception concerning eligibility of American Indians born in Canada or members ofa federally recognized Indian tribe, 8 U's.C. § 16!3(d), applies to the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs but not to Family Assistance.)
83. To be eligible for Safety Net Assistance, an immigrant must be: (1) a Qualified Alien, including an alien who entered the United States after August 22, 1996, who is not exempt from the five-year bar, and who has been in a qualified status for less than five years; or (2) a person who is not a Qualified Alien but who is otherwise Permanently Residing in the United
States Under Color of Law (PRUCOL), N, Y. Soc. Servo Law § 122(1)(c). E. Requiremeuts Regardiug Social Security Numbers 1. Federal food stamps and federal Medicaid
84. All applicants for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid must provide Social Security numbers (SSN). 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(a) (food stamps); 42 C.P.R. § 435.910(a) (Medicaid). If an otherwise eligible applicant does not have a SSN, the agency administering the food stamp or Medicaid program must assist the applicant in completing an application for a SSN and send the applicant to apply for a SSN at the local Social Security Administration (SSA) office. 7 C.P.R. § 273.6(b) (food stamps); 42 C.P.R. § 435.9!O(e) (Medicaid).
85. The Medicaid "agency must not deny or delay services to an otherwise eligible applicant pending issuance or verification of the individual's SSN by SSA." 42 c.P.R. § 435.910(f).
,>.

Page 26

86. An applicant for or recipient of federal food stamps who "has refused or failed

without good cause to provide or apply for an SSN ... shall be ineligible to participate in the

Food Stamp Program." 7 C.F.R. § 273.6(c).
87. SSA will issue a SSN to immigrants not authorized to work by uscrs (non-work

SSN) when they need one to "to satisfy a Federal statute or regulation that requires you to have a

social security number in order to receive a Federally-funded benefit to which you have

otherwise established entitlement ...." 20 C.F.R. § 422.I04{a)(3)(i).

88. The procedure for obtaining a SSN in this circumstance is set forth in SSA's

Program Operations Manual System (POMS), which requires that a local benefit agency provide

an applicant with a letter meeting certain specific requirements. The letter must not be a form

i
I

letter; must be dated; must specifically identify ''the non-work reason for which an SSN is required, the relevant statute or regulations requiring the SSN as a condition to receive the

I

benefit or service, and the name and telephone number of an official to contact so that the information provided may be verified." SSA, POMS 00203.510, at 2 (2002) .

•

2. Public assistance and State Medicaid

89. No federal statute or federal regulation requires applicants for or recipients of

public assistance (whether federally or state funded) or state Medicaid to furnish a SSN as a

condition of eligibility.

90. No New York State statute requires applicants for or recipients of public assistance

(whether federally or state funded) or State Medicaid to furnish a SSN as a condition of

eligibility. The State Social Services Law requires that an applicant for public assistance "shall,

as a condition ofreceiving such aid, present proof of his identity to the social services official as

the department may by regulation require." N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 134-a(2). With regard to

NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 27
Medicaid, the Social Services Law provides that, "[i]n accordance with the regulations of the department of health, it shall be the responsibility of the applicant to provide infonnation and documentation necessary for the detennination of initial and ongoing eligibility for medical assistance." N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(2)(a).
91. State regulations impose contradictory requirements regarding the need to furnish a SSN as a condition of eligibility for public assistance and State Medicaid. Two State regulations governing public assistance programs provide that applicants and recipients must furnish or applyfor a SSN as a condition of eligibility. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 370.2(c)(3)(i) ("Any applicant for or recipient of safety net assistance ... must furnish or apply for a social security number as a condition of eligibility"); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 369.2(b)(I)(i)("when a social security number cannot be furnished, the applicant or recipient shall apply for such number, submit verification ofsuch application, and provide the number upon its receipt").
92. On the other hand, one State regulation for public assistance programs purports to require furnishing a SSN as a condition of eligibility. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.2(c) ("each member of the household for whom an application for assistance is made ... must apply for and must furnish a social security number as a condition of the household's eligibility for public assistance.").
93. State Medicaid regulations make these inconsistent provisions applicable to the Medicaid program. 18 N.Y.C.R.R.R § 360-1.2 (with exceptions not relevant here, "All departmental regulations relating to public assistance and care apply to medical assistance....").
94. When a state or local law (as opposed to a federal law) requires furnishing a SSN as a condition of eligibility for a public benefit, SSA will issue a SSN only ifthe inunigrant has work authorization. Federal regulations provide that a non-work SSN will be provided to an

Page 28
immigrant who is eligible for a state or local public benefit that requires the furnishing of aSSN,
but only if the immigrant is "legally in the United States." 20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a)(3)(ii). SSA
has stated that the phrase "legally in the United States" means that the immigrant must have work authorization. An immigrant who lacks work authorization is not able to obtain aSSN from SSA for the purpose ofobtaining public assistance benefits (Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance) or State Medicaid.
95. Many immigrants are eligible for State-funded benefits but lack work authorization. For example, battered qualified immigrants who are in the process of self-petitioning under VAWA but whose self-petition has not yet been approved, and those with an approved family petition (I-130) but who have no application for permanent residence pending, are not authorized to work. They may be eligible for public benefits for months, and often for a year or more, before they receive employment authorization and are able to get aSSN.
96. State OTDA and City Defendants' policy directives and instructions incorrectly assert that SSA will furnish a SSN to all immigrants who apply and are eligIble for federal public assistance or a state public benefit, when in practice, those who lack work authorization will not be issued a SSN by SSA. For example, a 2002 policy directive issued by State OIDA incorrectly states "SSA will issue SSNs to aliens who are otherwise eligible for temporary
assistance if State Law requires an SSN." State OTDA, 02 INF-40 at 2 (Nov. 27, 2002). See also
HRA, Policy Dir. (PD) PD 03-1 I-ELI, at I (February 28,2003) ("SSA will also issue SSNs to aliens who are otherwise eligible for public benefits ifthe state law requires an SSN as a condition of eligibility for assistance"). These directives and instructions are incorrect and misleading because SSA will not issue a SSN to an immigrant who is eligible only for public assistance, State Medicaid and State food stamps and who lacks employment authorization.

Page 29

97. State policy directives and instructions that address the obligation to furnish aSSN

as a condition of eligibility for public assistance, State Medicaid, and State food stamps are

contradictory, internally inconsistent, and ambiguous. A 2004 State DOH directive entitled

"Citizenship and Alien Status Requirements for the Medicaid Program" recites: "New York

i

State's laws and regulations require a Social Security Number for public benefits, including

Medicaid," State DOH, 04 OMMIADM-7, at 28 (citing, inter alia, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 3S1.2(c),

360-1.2). Despite that statement, the directive continues: "All applicants for Medicaid thus must

provide a Social Security Number or proofthat they have appliedfor one or tried to apply for

one" (emphasis added). Jd. The directive makes an exception even to this requirement for, inter

alia, "certain battered women immigrants who prove their status under the Violence Against

Women ACT (VAWA), as set forth in the section titled 'Battered Immigrant' of this directive."

Jd.

I

98. With regard to public assistance, a 2004 Informational Letter issued by State OTDA states, "Furnishing an SSN is a condition oftemporary assistance eligibility." State OTDA, 02

I'I

INF-40 at 2. It explains that the applicant or recipient "initially complies with this requirement

by applying for an SSN . . .. The applicant or recipient fully complies with this requirement by

furnishing the SSN when the Social Security card is received." Jd. In preparing letters to SSA,

local social services districts are directed to "[clite New York State law that requires an SSN as a

condition of eligibility for temporary assistance." Jd. Local districts are directed to "advise

aliens as early as possible of the requirement to furnish an SSN ...." Jd.

99. Notwithstanding these statements about the applicant's obligation to furnish aSSN,

this directive refers on five other occasions to an obligation to "furnish or apply for an SSN."

For example, the State OIDA policy directive states "Each member of a household that is

_'>f;

Page 30

applying for temporary assistance must furnish or apply for an SSN" (emphasis added). ld. The

"failure of an applying alien parent/caretaker relative to fornish or applyfor an SSN will result in

an incremental non-durational sanction" (emphasis added). ld. If a non-applying household

member whose needs are considered "fails to fornish or applyfor an SSN, the entire household

is ineligible for assistance." ld. at 3.

F. State Supervision

toO. The Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts both require participating states to designate a

single state agency to be responsible for administering and supervising the programs.

7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5), 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid).

While states may delegate administrative responsibility for the day-to-day oversight of these

programs, ultimate responsibility for compliance with statutory requirements remains at the state

level.

I

101. Under State law, the New York State Department of Health is the single state agency responsible for supervising administration of the Medicaid program in New York State.

See, e.g.. N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 365(1) (local social services districts furnish medical assistance

"subject to supervision by the department").

102. Under State law, the State Office of Temporary and Disability Allowance (State

OTDA) is the single state agency responsible for supervising administration of the food stamp

and public assistance programs in New York State. See 1997 Laws of N.Y. ch. 436, § 122(1)

(transferring all responsibilities concerning administration of financial support services and food

stamps to State OTDA).

103. HRA and each of the 58 social services districts in New York State serve as

"agents" of the State Commissioner of Health with regard to Medicaid, and the State

Page 31

Conunissioner of OIDA with regard to federal food stamps and public assistance.

N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 65(3) ("The county conunissioner shall act as the agent of the department

I

...."); § 2(1) ("Department" means "state department of social services" (now State OTDA,

I

1997 Laws of N.Y. ch. 436, § 122(f), except that for purposes of title II (Medicaid),

I

"department means the state department of health").

104. Under State law, State aTDA is the agency responsible for administering the

system of administrative fair hearings in which applicants for an<! recipients of public benefits

may appeal from an adverse determination by a local social services district. N.Y. Soc. Servo

Law § 22.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO THE CLASS

I

105. All plaintiffs and plaintiff class members are inunigrants who are, have been, or

I

will be eligible for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits who did not receive,

I

are not receiving, or will not receive one or more ofthese public benefits because of a systematic misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.

!

106. All plaintiffs and plaintiff class members are indigent and needy. Those seeking

public assistance and federal food stamps live at or below the federal poverty level. Those

seeking Medicaid lack sufficient income to meet their medical needs.

107. All plaintiffs and plaintiff class members have suffered, are suffering, and/or will

continue to suffer severe and irreparable harm as a direct consequence of the defendants' actions
j
and failures to act challenged in this case. They face imminent, and in many cases, life

threatening harm because they are being denied or delayed access to food, shelter, medical care,

and other basic necessities.

NY lOO8585JDOC

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A. Policies. Customs, and Usages Challenged in this Action 108. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage of incorrectly denying battered qualified immigrants and PRUCOL immigrants' applications for public assistance and Medicaid; of erroneously discontinuing and reducing tbese public benefits to such class members; of falsely infonning such class members tbat they are not eligible for tbese benefits; of deterring and discouraging such class members from applying for tbese benefits; of pressuring such class members to witbdraw tbeir applications for these benefits; and of refusing to allow such class members to apply for these benefits, on account of immigration status. 109. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage of incorrectly denying class members' applications for food stamps; of erroneously discontinuing and reducing class members' food stamps; of falsely informing class members tbat tbey are not eligible for food stamps; of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for food stamps; ofpressuring class members to withdraw their applications for food stamps; and of refusing to allow class members to apply for food stamps, on account of immigration status. 110. For example, HRA workers systematically falsely infonn class members that they or their family members are not eligible for public benefits because they are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, or because they have not resided in tbe United States for five years, or because tbey lack a particular immigration document when another document suffices to prove eligibility, or because they lack a Social Security number when none is required. Ill. So too, HRA systematically finds battered qualified immigrants on whose behalfa pending or approved I-I30 family based petition was filed by their citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent batterer, and who submit proof of abuse (the group discussed in

Page 33

mI 44(b) and 46 above), to be ineligible for public assistance and Medicaid, when in fact they are

eligible for those benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 164I(c)(l)(B)(iv).

112. Likewise, HRA systematically finds VAWA self-petitioners (the group discussed in

'If'lf 44(a) and 45) whose petitions have been approved to be ineligible for public benefits, and

systematically discontinues their active cases, because their original or extension "prima facie"

notice has expired - even though they have an approval notice. The statute defmes as a

Qualified Alien a battered inunigrant whose petition "has been approved" as well as a battered

immigrant whose petition "has been found to set forth a prima facie case."

8 U.s.C. § 1641(c)(l)(B).

113. Likewise, HRA systematically finds inunigrants who have applied for a U visa, and

I

who have been granted deferred action stains on that basis, to be ineligible for public assistance

I

and Medicaid, when in fact they are eligible for those benefits because they are PRUCOL. (See
'If 70(i) above.)

114. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage of denying applications by class members to

be added to a household member's public benefits case on account of their immigration stains

when, in fact, the class members are eligible to be added to the household member's case.

115. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage offalsely infonning class members who are

eligible for public assistance or State Medicaid, and who lack employment authorization, that

SSA will issue a Social Security Number to them when SSA will not in fact do so; and of

denying, terminating, or reducing public benefits when those class members are denied a Social

Security number by SSA.

116. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage ofreferring applicants for federal food stamps

and federal Medicaid to SSA with documentation that fails to comply with SSA's requirements,

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thereby making it likely or certain that SSA will not issue them a Social Security number, and of

denying, terminating, or reducing public benefits when those class members are denied a Social

Security number.

117. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage of failing to provide timely and adequate

written notice of the denial of public benefits to immigrants: (1) when assistance is granted to

some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants

apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants

are discouraged or prohibited from applying for public benefits.

118. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it

difficult if not impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided

in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal such denial, discontinuance or reduction.

119. HRA has a policy, custom, and usage of failing to refer Qualified Aliens for

I

Medicaid disability determinations when there is an indication that they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid, as required by State law, State OTDA, 03 INF 14, at 5; State DOH,

!

Medicaid Reference Guide (MRG), at 27 (Feb. 2005) and offailing to provide food stamps to

those who would be found disabled;

120. State OTDA and State DOH are responsible in part for these systemic errors by

HRA because, as set forth below, those State agencies have issued erroneous policies, directives,

instructions, and in the case of Social Security number requirements, contradictory and

inconsistent regulations; because corrective instructions have been belated and inadequate;

because the State computer system is responsible in part for systemic errors regarding immigrant

eligibility for benefits; because the State fair hearing system has been and remains inadequate to

redress these systemic failings; and because both agencies have failed to supervise and

Page 35

implement adequate quality assurance measures necessary to prevent systematic errors by BRA

personnel.

121. State OTDA, State DOH, and BRA have been deliberately indifferent to the need to

provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees at job centers. All three agencies

know to a moral certainty that large numbers of class members have applied, and will continue to

apply, to HRA for public benefits at job centers. All three agencies have been on notice that

subordinate employees of BRA at job centers are making systematic errors regarding immigrant

eligibility for public benefits and have taken no effective action to rectify those systemic errors.

B. Causes of Systemic Errors

122. The systematic errors described above are the consequence of: (1) State OTDA,

State DOH, and HRA having issued erroneous, incomplete, and inconsistent policy directives

and instructions, and having made belated and inadequate corrections to prior erroneous,

i

incomplete, and inconsistent directives; (2) flaws in the City and State computer systems that are used to administer public benefits programs in New York City; and (3) grossly inadequate

"

l

training and supervision of employees at all levels ofHRA, and (4) grossly inadequate training

and supervision ofHRA by State OTDA and State DOH.

1. Policy directives

123. Since at least 1998, various State and City policy directives and instructions have

contained incorrect, materially misleading, andlor confusing information about the categories of

immigrants who are eligible for public benefits and the documents they need to provide in order

to prove eligibility. Although corrections have been issued sporadically, in many instances the

same mistakes and omissions have persisted from one version to the next, year after year. When

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corrections have been made, those corrections have often been made in ways that are not calculated to come to the attention of front-line workers and supervisors.
124. State and City policy directives and instructions have been and remain flawed in several respects:
(a) HRA's directives have been flawed regarding the eligibility of battered immigrants for public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps;
(b) HRA's directives have failed to comply with State instructions to refer immigrants for Medicaid disability determinations necessary for federal food stamp eligibility if there is an indication that they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid;
(c) State OTDA's directives have been flawed regarding the eligibility of battered immigrants for public assistance and food stamps;
(d) State OTDA's and HRA's policy directives contain erroneous information regarding when SSA will issue a Social Security number;
(e) State OIDA, State DOH, and HRA's policy directives contain erroneous and/or confusing information regarding when furnishing a Social Security number is required as a condition of eligibility for public benefits;
(f) State orDA and HRA's policy directives addressing PRUCOL immigrants are incomplete, either failing to include PRUCOL in relevant sections and/or failing to define or explain it.
125. For the entire duration ofthe former State Food Assistance Program (FAP), State OIDA's and HRA's policies, directives, and instructions regarding battered immigrants made almost no reference to FAP. Because of these omissions, FAP was grossly underutilized by battered immigrants until the program expired on September 30, 2005.

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2. Computer systems
126. Two computer systems are ofprimary importance here. The Welfare Management System (WMS), which is designed and maintained by State OTDA, is the computer system primarily responsible for the delivery of public benefits to recipients in New York State. HRA has developed a "front end" to WMS called the Paperless Office System (POS). POS is used in all job centers in New York City except one to take actions in WMS.
127. As set forth below, POS and WMS contain numerous programming errors that make it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to provide public benefits to class members.
128. POS has been programmed to prompt caseworkers to enter an applicant's immigration status, and the documentation that supports that status, by choosing from a limited list of options on various drop-down menus. The fields that have been built into POS, and the drop-down menus within those fields, are incomplete and do not correspond correctly to the law.
129. When a class member applies for public benefits, and her status and/or documentation do not correspond to the fields and menus options offered by POS, HRA workers are almost invariably unable to open the case properly.
130. For example, VAWA self-petitioners, and other battered qualified immigrants who are Qualified Aliens because of abuse against them or a family member (such as victims of abuse whose husbands filed I-130 family-based petitions), are not included as an option in the pertinent POS drop-down menus. Nor do these immigration statuses fit into any of the other choices on the menu.
131. HRA workers respond to these shortcomings in POS in ways that result in the wrongful denial of benefits to class members. Some workers misinform eligible applicants that they are ineligible for benefits because their immigration status is not included in POS as an

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option. Other workers attempt but are unable to open the case in POS because the case "errors

out." Other workers attempt to work around POS's limitations by entering false information

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about the applicant's immigration status into POS. This stratagem allows the case to be opened,

I

but benefits are later discontinued or terminated because the immigrant does not actually have

I
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the immigration status indicated in POS. This may also result in the immigrant not receiving the correct amount or type of public benefits.

132. The computer systems are not adequately programmed to handle situations in which

one or more family members are eligible for State public benefits, and one or more other family

members are eligible for federal public benefits. These "mixed family" situations are common in

cases with immigrant family members. "Mixed family" cases are handled by utilizing one case

~
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number for the entire family but creating two "suffixes," one for the family members eligible for federal benefits and another for the family members eligible for State benefits.

I

133. The POS computer system cannot handle these multi-suffix cases. HRA therefore instructs workers to process them through the WMS system. To do so, the information must be

:.1

written out on a form and given to the technology department to be entered manually. Most

HRA caseworkers do not know how to refer these cases properly to the technology department,

and the technology department often has great difficulty getting these "mixed family" cases

open.

134. The computer systems are not adequately programmed to handle situations in which

a caseworker is attempting to add immigrant parents to a public benefits case that is already open

,

for one or more of their minor children. When HRA opens a case for a minor child only, the

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child's custodian's name appears on the case as the payee since public benefits cannot be issued

directly to a minor. If a caseworker later attempts to add that custodian to the case - for

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example, because the custodian recently became an eligible immigrant - the case will be rejected

by the computer system as a duplicate case. The custodian can be added to the child's case only

if the child's case is closed and then a new case is opened for the child and custodian. Many

caseworkers do not know how to or do not attempt to do this. If they do try, sometimes the

child's case remains closed because the caseworker is unable to open a new case including the

immigrant parent due to other programming errors in the computer system.

135. The computer systems do not correctly handle cases in which class members do not

have Social Security numbers. If a Social Security number is not entered for an applicant, a

message appears on the screen prompting the caseworker to enter a Social Security number. The

case cannot be opened until the caseworker makes an entry. While there is a way to open a case

without entering a Social Security number, by entering a specific code in lieu of the Social

Security number, most caseworkers do not know that a code that must be entered and the

message on the screen leads them mistakenly to believe that a Social Security number is required

I

in order to be eligible for public benefits.

1

136. Even though many eligible immigrants do not have an Alien number (A number),

the computer system requires the entry of an A number for each immigrant with an active public

benefits case. This flaw particularly affects immigrant children of VAWA self-petitioners who

are derivatives on the petitions of their parents. These derivative beneficiaries do not receive

their own A number until after the VAWA self-petition cases are approved, often a year or more

after they are filed.

3. Inadequate snpervision and training

137. Applicants in New York City who apply for Medicaid together with public

assistance and/or food stamps submit such applications at job centers operated by HRA. The

NY 1008585JOOC

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State Department of Health is the single State agency responsible for supervising the Medicaid

functions at job centers. The State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance is the single

State agency responsible for supervising the food stamp and public assistance functions at job

centers. (See" 101-103 above.)

138. State DOH and lIRA have failed to implement quality assurance mechanisms

sufficient to detect and redress the widespread and systemic denial of Medicaid benefits to class

members at job centers in New Yotk City.

139. State OTDA and HRA have failed to implement quality assurance mechanisms

sufficient to detect and redress the widespread and systemic denial of food stamp and public

assistance benefits to class members at job centers in New York City.

I

140. State OTDA and lIRA training materials contain numerous errors that lead to the denial ofpublic benefits to battered qualified innnigrants.

!

141. Examples of these errors are contained in training materials prepared for State

OTDA by the University of Albany. University of Albany, Institute for Temporary Assistance

Programs, The Professional Development Program at Rockefeller College, Assistance Programs

and Participation Requirements (2004) (hereinafter"Assistance Programs and Participation

Requirements").

142. These training materials fail to indicate that battered qualified immigrants are

I

eligible for public benefits at all. ld. at Lesson I: Introduction to Assistance Programs,

f

Citizenship Requirements for Participants, 9-15. A separate lesson of these training materials

1
1

that includes a discussion of immigrant eligibility for federal food stamps also fails to include

any domestic violence survivors in the explanation of Qualified Alien status. ld. at Lesson 4:

Food Stamps Household Composition, 22.

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143. Current State training materials erroneously state that the only immigrants who are eligible for State public assistance or State Medicaid are lawful permanent residents. Id. at

Lesson I, at 10-11. Not once do these training materials mention immigrants who are PRUCOL,

much less explain who falls within this class of immigrants, even though the title of the Lesson

section is "Citizenship Requirements for Participation." Id. at 10-16.

144. State OIDA's alien eligibility desk aids do mention that an immigrant may be

PRUCOL, but the term is not defined except for an explanation of what the letters stand for.

State OIDA, 04-ADM-08, attachment LDSS-4579, at 5. Nor does it list the common documents

that PRUCOL immigrants might have. Nor do they provide a definition of PRUCOL, though

they do state in a footnote that "PRUCOL refers to aliens who are permanently residing in the

US under Color of Law." Id. at 5, n. 2. The footnote instructs workers to look in a 1988 policy

directive or in the Temporary Assistance Source Book for a definition ofPRUCOL for purposes

of public assistance eligibility and in a 2003 policy directive for purposes of Medicaid eligibility.

Id. at 5. Caseworkers are unlikely to look up what immigration documents make an immigrant

PRUCOL, particularly given that the desk aids do not provide a definition ofPRUCOL, only an

explanation of what the letters in the acronym stand for.

145. HRA training materials reinforce various mistakes in HRA's and State OTDA's

policy directives. For example, in a December 5, 2001 training manual subtitled "Food Stamps

for Aliens," HRA defmes a battered Qualified Alien as someone who "has been granted or has a

petition pending with INS that sets forth a prima facie case." HRA, Training Workbook, Food

Stamps for Aliens, at 20-21 (2001). No mention is made of battered qualified immigrants who

have approved I-130s or 1-3605 or other documents showing that they are battered qualified

immigrants. Id. Likewise, the City's "April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Instructor's Guide"

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defines a battered alien solely as someone with a prima facie notice. No other battered

immigrants are mentioned. HRA, Office of Training Operations, April 2005 Monthly Staff

Meeting Instructors Guide, at 13-15 (April 2005).

146. The State administrative fair hearing system administered by State OTDA is wholly

inadequate and ineffective in rectifying widespread and persistent errors by HRA. Fair hearing

decisions usually fail to direct the job center to take any action other than "process" the

application or to "review" the case. Immigrants commonly receive decisions that merely direct

the job center to continue to process the application. A general command to process the

application or review the case provides no guidance to the worker, and thus no remedy to the

appellant.

147. When immigrants return to their job centers after receiving such fair hearing

decisions, job centers rarely correct their errors or grant the appropriate level of benefits.

Frequently, job centers will refuse to comply with the fair hearing decisions because they

f

mistakenly believe that the individual is not eligible for public benefits due to immigration

status.

148. Most immigrants receive fair hearing decisions that fail to cite or misstate the

applicable law.

FACTS OF INDIVIDUAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiff M.K.B.

149. M.K.B. is a 33-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica who lives in a

homeless shelter in Manhattan with her three children, M.A.B., age 9, S.B., age 7, and, N.B., age

2 months. M.K.B. and her two older children are battered qualified immigrants because the

USCIS has approved an 1-130 petition filed by M.K.B.'s abusive husband on M.K.B. and her

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two immigrant children's behalf. Because they have an approved 1-130 and proof of abuse, they are Qualified Aliens. Because they arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996, they are eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. M.A.B. and S.B. are also eligible for federal food stamps because they are Qualified Alien children. N.B., who is a U.S. citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits, is the only one in the family who is receiving public benefits.
150. M.K.B. and her two immigrant children have been denied all benefits since September 2005 because workers at the Riverview job center do not know that immigrants with 1-130 family-based petitions (as evidenced by V-I and V-3 visas) are eligible for public benefits.
151. M.K.B. moved to the United States in May 2004 with her two immigrant children to reunite with her husband and the children's father. M.K.B. came on a V-I visa, and the two children came on V-3 visas. They received these visas because M.K.B.' s husband, a lawful permanent resident, had filed an 1-130 petition on their behalf. (V-I and V-3 visas are only available to the beneficiaries ofI-130 petitions filed before December 21,2000.)
152. Shortly after their arrival, M.K.B.'s husband became physically, verbally, and economically abusive towards them. The worst incident occurred on September 7,2005, when M.K.B. was eight months pregnant. Her husband came at her with an ice pick, threatened to kill her, and threw a bucket at her. He then showed her rat poison and threatened to feed it to the children. He also said he was going to cut up the children's bed with a knife.
153. Fearing for her and her children's lives, M.K.B. called the police and fled with her children that night. Since then, she has lived in a homeless shelter in Manhattan with her children. On September 23, 2005, she gave birth to N.B.

Page 44
154. As a result of the abuse, M.K.B. received a temporary order ofprotection from Manhattan Family Court ordering that her husband stay away from her and their three children.
155. On September 30, 2005, M.K.B. applied for public benefits at the Riverview Job Center for herself and her three children. M.K.B. told Mr. Sonde, her HRA worker, that she was a domestic violence victim. She showed him her police reports, her and her children's passports (which contain the V visas), her work permit, and her Social Security card. Mr. Sonde told her that her immigrant children were not eligible for benefits because they do not have Social Security numbers.
156. At the end of October, M.K.B. received a notice stating that her public assistance and Medicaid case was accepted and that she would receive $68.50 semi-monthly, which is the amount a family of one usually receives in cash. She subsequently received another notice stating that her family would receive $119 in food stamps per month, which is the amount a family of one often receives. The notices did not state who in the family had been accepted. M.K.B. never received a notice denying her or her children's application.
157. Because M.K.B. did not know who in her family was accepted, her attorney called the Riverview Job Center. Ms. Medina, a worker at that center, stated that the case was open only for the citizen baby and that the rest of the family had been rejected due to immigration status.
158. Since M.K.B. fled her husband, she has struggled to support her family. She often does not have enough food and cannot afford to buy nutritious foods, such as dairy products, fruits, and vegetables. As a result, she and her children have lost weight and often lack energy because they are not eating enough. M.K.B. also often feels weak and suffers from headaches because she is not eating enough and is breastfeeding.
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159. M.K.B. uses most of her public assistance grant to buy baby wipes and diapers for

her newborn son, but still she often runs out of diapers. Once when she ran out of diapers, the

I

shelter residents' children each gave her one dollar, charity they received at a church dinner, so that she could buy diapers. The other shelter residents also have given her soap, toothpaste,

sanitary pads, and shampoo. M.K.B. fears their kindness will soon end, leaving her and her

children with almost nothing at all. 160. Despite donations from charity, M.K.B. and her children do not have enough winter

clothing. M.K.B. also often cannot afford to buy a Metrocard and is forced to miss important

appointments.

161. Because she was denied Medicaid, M.K.B. has been unable to get treatment for

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reoccurring eye cysts or the sexually transmitted diseases her husband gave her. S.M., who chipped his two front teeth, also suffers in pain because M.K.B. cannot afford to take him to a

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dentist. 162. M.K.B. and her children will not be able to afford to move out of the shelter until

they are receiving public assistance for the entire family.

Plaintiff o.P.

163. O.P. is a 39-year-old immigrant from Peru who is PRUCOL because the uscrs

granted her deferred action. As a PRUCOL immigrant, she is eligible for State Medicaid and

Safety Net Assistance. O.P. lives in a homeless shelter in New York City with her two children,

ages 5 and 13. Due to their immigration status, her children are only eligible for Child Health

Plus B, a low-cost health insurance program for children for which there are no immigration

requirements.

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164. Since March 2005, O.P. has been repeatedly denied all public benefits because

workers at the Hamilton and Riverview Job Centers mistakenly think that only citizens and

lawful permanent residents are eligible for benefits.

165. O.P. was granted deferred action in January 2005 because she has a pending U visa

application. She is eligible for a U visa because she assisted the District Attorney's Office in the

prosecution of the father of her younger child, who abused her for several years. The last

incident occurred in July 2004, when he held her down and repeatedly punched her in the head,

grabbed her hair, and yelled at her. In March 2005, O.P. fled to a domestic violence shelter with

her children because she was afraid of her husband.

166. O.P. is unable to work because she cannot afford childcare.

167. O.P. first applied for public assistance and Medicaid at the Hamilton Job Center in

March 2005, shortly after moving into an emergency domestic violence shelter. She submitted

copies of her deferred action notice, Social Security card, and a letter from her attorney that

explained that she was eligible for benefits as a PRUCOL individual.

168. The caseworker processing O.P.'s application told her she was ineligible because

she did not have a green card. O.P. later received a notice stating that her public assistance

application was denied because she did not present verification of citizenship or proof oflawful

permanent resident status. The notice did not state whether she was denied Medicaid. O.P.

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never received a notice regarding her Medicaid application.

:l

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169. O.P. requested a fair hearing, which was held July 7, 2005, to challenge the denial

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ofher public benefits application. The fair hearing decision, issued August 11,2005, instructed

the center to withdraw the denial notice and to continue to process her public benefits

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application. The decision did not mention her immigration status or state whether she is eligible

for benefits. 170. On August 5, 2005, O.P. and her children were forced to move to a homeless shelter

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because they had reached the state mandated time limit in an emergency domestic violence shelter and had no other housing options.

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171. Several weeks later, O.P. received a notice that had been mailed to her old domestic

violence shelter, even though she had notified the center of her new address at the homeless

shelter. She was unable to read the notice because it was written in English.

172. The day she received the notice, she went to the Hamilton Job Center and her

caseworker explained that the notice asked her to bring in some documents. O.P. offered to

bring in the requested documents the next day, but the caseworker told her that it was too late.

173. O.P. later learned that the letter requested only two things that she had not already

submitted when she first applied. One was a letter from her homeless shelter, but she was not

,

living in the homeless shelter when she applied. In any event, HRA was aware she was living in

a homeless shelter as HRA is paying for her stay there. The other requested items were "alien

cards." There is no such thing as an "alien card." Most likely, HRA was requesting her green

card. O.P. does not have a green card but is eligible for public benefits because she has deferred

action.

174. On August 8, 2005, O.P. reapplied for public assistance at the Riverview Job

Center, which specializes in handling the public benefits cases of individuals living in homeless

shelters. O.P. once again submitted all of her documents, including her deferred action notice

and the letter from her attorney explaining that she is eligible as a PRUCOL individual. Mr.

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Peralta, the caseworker she met with, told her that she was not eligible because of her

immigration status.

175. a.p. never received any notice regarding this application, but she later learned that

the center denied her application on August 9, 2005 because of her immigration status. a.p. still

has not received any benefits, even though the Director of the Riverview Center told her and her

attorney on September 23,2005, that he would look into the case.

176. a.p. reapplied yet again in October 2005 at the Riverview Job Center. Mr.

Lorenzo, an HRA worker, told her that she was not eligible for public assistance because she did

not have a green card but that she might be eligible for Medicaid. She never received a notice

regarding this application or any benefits.

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177. O.P. and her two children have suffered great hardship for nine months due to the

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erroneous denial of a.p.'s applications. a.p. has no money and relies on food pantries to feed

herself and her two children. Her family eats mostly canned food, cereal, and rice. They cannot

t

afford nutritious fresh food, and sometimes O.P. goes without food in order to feed her children.

j

178. a.p. also has not been able to receive necessary medical care because she has been

denied Medicaid. a.p. last saw a doctor on March 2005 during a free physical exam at the

domestic violence shelter. The doctor referred her to a gynecologist because he found problems
with her ovaries and thought she was at risk for cancer. But a.p. cannot afford to see a gynecologist. a.p. frequently suffers debilitating pain in her ovaries. Recently, she fainted in

the kitchen at her homeless shelter. Her son discovered her collapsed and unconscious on the

floor. She does not know why she lost consciousness or for how long.

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179. O.P. is currently learning English. She hopes that, if she receives public assistance,

she will get childcare assistance and will be able to find employment and support and feed her

family.

PlaintiffL.W.

180. L.W. is a 62 year-old battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica living temporarily

with a friend in an apartment in Brooklyn, New York. Because L.W. has an approved I-DO

petition and proof of abuse, she is a Qualified Alien. Because she arrived in the United States

after August 22, 1996, she is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. L.W. is

disabled and would be in receipt of disability-based Medicaid ifHRA had complied with its legal

obligation to refer her for a Medicaid disability determination. Had HRA done so, L.W. would

I

be eligible for federal food stamps. 181. L.W. was denied public assistance for five months because workers at the Linden

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and Dekalb Job Centers did not know that immigrants with 1-130 petitions (as evidenced by K-3 visa) are eligible. She received public assistance only after extensive advocacy ofher attorneys.

Despite this advocacy, however, she still has not received food stamps.

182. L.W. came to the United States on a K-3 visa in October 2003 to be reunited with

her husband, who is a U.S. citizen. L. W. was eligible for the K-3 visa because husband filed an

1-130 petition on her behalf.

183. Several months after she arrived, L.W's husband became physically abusive. He

would demand certain sexual behaviors that she was not comfortable with and threatened to hurt

her if she did not engage in them. For example, in January 2005, when she refused to have sex

with him, he threatened her, slapped her across the face, and ripped her clothes from her body.

He then choked her, threw her onto the bed, and raped her.

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184. Shortly after that incident, L.W. moved into a domestic violence shelter in

Brooklyn, New York. She lived in this shelter until the shelter could no longer afford to keep

her, because she had long exceeded the State mandated time limits for remaining in a domestic

violence shelter. On November 14, 2004, she moved in with a friend. She can only stay with

this friend temporarily and she does not know where she will go next.

I

185. L.W. applied twice for public assistance and food stamps: once at the Linden Job

Center (first application) on or about March 17,2005, and once at the Dekalb Job Center (second

application) on or about May 31,2005. She was denied both times. She was already receiving

Medicaid through a Medicaid-only center for all times relevant to this Complaint.

186. On the first application, a caseworker told her orally that the application was

denied; she never received any further indication of the status of the first application. On the

second application, L.W. received a notice stating that she was denied food stamps because of

her immigration status. She was later told by a caseworker that she was also denied public

assistance, although she was not told the reason for the denial. The Administrative Assistant

(AA) to the Director at the Dekalb Job Center later told L. W. 's attorney that the denial was due

to immigration status.

187. On or about June 29, 2005, L.W. attended a fair hearing on the denial of her request

1

for public benefits. At the fair hearing, the representative of the Dekalb Job Center testified that

I

l

the center denied L.W. benefits because personnel at the regular job centers do not know

"

i
I

inunigrant eligibility law. The representative testified that, as an immigrant, L.W. should have applied for benefits at the "refugee center," where the caseworkers actually understand the law.

NY lOO8585JOOC

Page 51

188. State OTDA issued a decision on that fair hearing dated July 29, 2005. The

decision directed the center to process L.W. 's public assistance and food stamps applications.

The center has failed to fully comply with the decision.

I

189. L.W. began receiving public assistance in September 2005 as a result of the

extensive advocacy of her attorneys who repeatedly called and faxed the Dekalb Job Center and

I

personnel in HRA's Brooklyn Regional Manager's office.

190. Despite this advocacy, L.W. bas never received food stamps. The caseworkers at

the Dekalb Job Center have refused to refer L.W. for a Medicaid disability determination so that

she can receive food stamps. Ifshe was referred, there is no doubt that she would be found

disabled. L.W. suffers from several severe medical ailments, including kidney stones, a hernia,

and high blood pressure. Earlier this year, she had a heart attack and had surgery for kidney

stones. She recently had mUltiple surgeries and is scheduled to have another surgery later this

month.

191. L.W. has suffered greatly as a result of the denials of her applications. For five

months, until she received public assistance, she received only $20 food vouchers per week from

the shelter and had to rely on other shelter residents to share food with her. Because she still

does not have food stamps, she still does not have enough food. When she has spent her small

public assistance grant and no one has food to give her, she has to go without food. She worries

that not eating well will cause her health to deteriorate further. She already suffers from stomach

and chest pain almost every day.

192. Because she was denied public assistance for five months, she was unable to apply

for a housing subsidy until recently. She was not able to find subsidized housing before she was

asked to leave the domestic violence shelter because she had long exceeded the allowable time.

Page 52

She is staying with a friend temporarily, but she cannot stay there long. She does not know

where she will go. She is afraid to go to a shelter for single adults because those shelters are

very dirty; she would have to sleep on a cot in a room with many other women, most ofthem

much younger than she. She does not think she would be able to recover from her scheduled

surgery if she were forced to live in a dirty shelter.

Plaintiff M.A.

193. M.A. is a 36-year-old battered qualified immigrant from the Dominican Republic

who lives in a homeless shelter in the Bronx, New York with her 3-year-old daughter. USCIS

has approved an 1-130 petition filed on MA's behalf. Because she has an approved 1-130

petition and proofof abuse, she is a Qualified Alien. Because she arrived in the United States

after August 22,1996, she is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. Her

daughter, a U.S. citizen, is eligible for all federal public benefits.

194. M.A, has been wrongly denied public assistance and Medicaid since July 2005,

195. M.A. moved to the United States in September 1999 in order to be reunited with her

husband, who is a U.S. citizen. On or about October 2003, M.A.'s husband filed an 1-130

uscrs family-based petition on her behalf.

approved the 1-130 petition on February 5, 2004,

196. After she came to the United States, M.A. 's husband became inexplicably angry

and violent. He threatened her with weapons and said he would kill her. He also often hit her

1

!

head and body with his hands. The abuse soon became unbearable and, in the summer of2004,

1

M,A. fled to a domestic violence shelter with their then two-year-old daughter. They lived there

1

until February 2005, when their allowed time at the shelter expired. Since then, they have lived

in a homeless shelter in the Bronx,

NY JOO8S8SJDOC i" L

Page 53

197. After M.A. left the domestic violence shelter, her husband continued to threaten

her. On February 16, 2005, she obtained an order of protection against her husband.

198. On July 14, 2005, M.A. went to the Crotona Job Center in the Bronx to ask to be

added to her daughter's open public assistance case. She spoke with a Ms. Bonilla and gave her

a copy of her 1-130 receipt notice and the order of protection. Ms. Bonilla told her that she

needed a copy ofthe 1-130 approval notice and that M.A. was ineligible unless she had the

original approval notice.

199. On July 21,2005, M.A. went back to the Crotona Job Center with a printout from

the USCIS website indicating that her 1-130 petition had been approved. M.A. first was directed

to Mr. Perreira, an HRA caseworker, but he refused to meet with her and would not look at the
usels printout. He told her she was not eligible due to her immigration status. M.A. gave the

printout to another worker who told M.A. that she would receive a decision in writing.

200. M.A. did not receive any correspondence from the Crotona Job Center after her July

21,2005 visit. On September 30, 2005, she attended a fair hearing to challenge the failure of the

Crotona Job Center to add her to her daughter's case. At the hearing, her attorney gave the judge

uscrs copies of her order ofprotection, the 1-130 receipt notice, and the

printout showing the

petition was approved.

201. M.A. received a decision on her fair hearing dated October 21,2005. The decision

directed the center to continue processing her application, taking into account her approved 1-130

status. The decision did not state whether she was an eligible immigrant or explain which

immigrants are eligible.

202. M.A. returned to the Crotona Job Center on or about November 15, 2005 and again

asked Ms. Bonilla to add her to her daughter'S case. She showed Ms. Bonilla all of the papers

Page 54

she had shown her the first time she came into the center, as well as a copy of the computer

printout showing that the 1-130 was approved.

203. Ms. Bonilla told M.A. that she was not eligible due to her immigration status. She

said that M.A. needed a "prima facie." Ms. Bonilla told M.A. to return to the center on

November 18, 2005 to meet with someone else to discuss her eligibility.

204. On November 18,2005, M.A. returned to the Crotona Job Center and gave her

papers to a woman named Delone. Delone said that she is not eligible for public benefits

because she is not a lawful permanent resident.

205. M.A. has never received a notice regarding any of her requests to be added to her

I

daugbter's case and still has not received public assistance or Medicaid. 206. As a result, M.A. cannot afford to buy enougb food for her daugbter and herself.

Usually she buys only milk, cheese, and bread. She also cannot afford to buy her daugbter

winter clothes, and is concerned that her daugbter will freeze without warmer clothes.

207. M.A. has been unable to find housing outside of the shelter because her application

for public assistance was denied.

208. Because she does not have Medicaid, M.A. is unable to receive all of the medical

treatment she needs. She suffers from depression as a result ofthe abuse, but does not have

money to pay for counseling. She has also been unable to go to the dentist and suffers daily from

pain in her teeth. She also fears that if she gets sick, she will not be able to pay for medical

treatment or care for her daugbter.

Plaintiff Marieme Diongue

209. Marieme Diongue is 29-year-old immigrant from Senegal who is PRUCOL because

the USeIS granted her deferred action. She lives in a one-bedroom apartment in the Bronx, New

NY lOO8585JDOC

Page 55

York, with her eleven-month-old daughter Mouslymadou. Because she is PRVCOL, Ms.

Diongue is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. Her daughter, who is a V.S.

citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits, is the only one in the family

receiving any benefits.

210. Ms. Diongue has been wrongly denied public assistance and Medicaid since March

2005 because workers at the Melrose Job Center think she is ineligible until she receives a green

card.

211. Ms. Diongue was granted deferred action on April 12, 2004 because she has a

pending V visa application. She is eligible for a V-visa because she assisted in the prosecution

of her sister's murderer, who was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.

212. In June 2000 when Ms. Diongue returned to the apartment she shared with her

sister, her sister's boyfriend was hiding inside the door. He tortured her for five hours. He

, f

pushed her onto a bed and tried to strangle her. He theo left her naked with her hands bound

behind her back. Because he heard Ms. Diongue's friends outside of the apartment, he panicked

.\

i

and ran away. When he left, she went to her sister's bedroom and found her dead on the floor.

11,

He had strangled and murdered her sister.

213. In March of2004, Ms. Diongue became pregnant and was no longer able to work

because of constant illness. Forced to quit her job, she moved in with her brother. Her daughter

Mouslymadou was born in December of 2004.

214. In March of2005, Ms. Diongue applied for public benefits at the Melrose Job

Center because she could not afford basic necessities and did not have enough money to pay the

reot she owed her brother. She gave Ms. Swaby, a caseworker at the center, her work permit,

Social Security card, deferred action notice, and a letter outlining the benefits for which her

NY IOO8585JOOC

Page 56

daughter and Ms. Diongue were entitled. Ms. Swaby told her that she was not eligible because

she did not have a green card.

215. In April of 2005, Ms. Diongue received a notice stating that one person in her

family would receive pubic benefits. The notice did not state who was accepted, and Ms.

Diongue never received a denial notice for herself.

216. On July 5, 2005, Ms. Diongue attended a fair hearing to challenge HRA's decision

to deny her benefits. At the hearing, HRA's representative stated that Ms. Diongue was denied

due to her inunigration status. The fair hearing decision, dated October 5, 2005, states that the

HRA's determination concerning Ms. Diongue's request for public benefits was not correct and

should be reversed. The decision does not, however, state whether she is an eligible inunigrant

I

or explain which immigrants are eligible. 217. On October 20, 2005, Ms. Diongue received a Fair Hearing Compliance Action

I

Letter from the Melrose Job Center stating, "you are not eligible for assistance due to your alien status which is only temporary and work only."

218. Ms. Diongue is still not receiving any benefits.

219. As a result ofbeing denied public benefits for nine months, Ms. Diongue and her

daughter have suffered greatly. Ms. Diongue often does not have enough money for basic

necessities like soap, clothing, diapers, toys, or a crib. Because she cannot afford to buy a crib,

she sleeps with her baby on a used old mattress placed on the living room floor. She also often

runs out of food and has to rely on food pantries.

220. Even though Ms. Diongue recently got a job as a bathroom attendant, the job does

not pay much and she still has trouble buying food and other basic necessities.

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 57
Plaintiff M.E. 221. M.E. is a 37-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Mexico who lives in New
York City with her 12-year-old daughter, E.R., who is also a battered qualified immigrant, and her two citizen children, D.E., age 10, and J.E., age 7.
222. In October 1994, M.E. and E.R. joined M.E.'s husband, a lawful permanent resident, in Texas. In 1997, M.E.'s husband filed 1-130 family-based petitions for M.E. and E.R. M.E.'s 1-130 petition was approved in December 1998 and E.R.'s was approved in February 2000.
223. Because they have approved I-130s and proof of domestic violence, M.E. and E.R. are Qualified Aliens. As Qualified Aliens who arrived in the country before August 22, 1996, M.E. and E.R are eligible for federal Medicaid and Family Assistance. As a Qualified Alien under the age of eighteen, E.R. is also eligible for federal food stamps. D.E. and J.E., the citizen household members, are the only family members currently receiving public benefits.
224. During M.E.'s relationship with her husband, he physically abused her. On one
occasion, he punched M.E. in the face, threw a television at her feet, threw her against a wall, and began to choke her. M.E. later learned that her husband had sexually abused E.R., hit her, and threatened that he would hurt her if she told M.E. what he was doing. In July 2000, M.E. and her children left her husband. In September 2000, while drunk, her husband arrived at her sister's house, got into an argument, pulled out a gun, and shot her brother-in-law in the leg. Fearing for her safety, she left Texas and took the children to New York, moving in with one of her brothers and his family.
225. After seven months, M.E.'s husband came to New York looking for her. They reconciled for a short period. In July 2002, however, he punched M.E. in the face so hard that he
NY \008585_,.WC

Page 58
split her lip. In order to get away from him, she moved with her three children to live with another one of her brothers.
226. Left with no means to provide for her children, M.E. applied for public benefits in July 2002. At the time, she applied only for her two younger U.S. citizen children because she assumed she and E.R. were not eligible for benefits because of their immigration status. Her two citizen children' applications for public benefits were approved.
227. In May 2004, M.E.'s husband found her again. He came to the apartment drunk, pushed her, and threatened to kill her. After that incident, M.E. obtained an order of protection from family court prohibiting her husband from contacting her and their children. On May 19, 2004, M.E. and the children entered a domestic violence shelter. In July 2004, she returned to court and obtained a final two-year order ofprotection.
228. At about this time, a social worker referred M.E. to Sanctuary for Families, where an attorney advised her that she and E.R. were eligible for public benefits based on the approved 1-130 petitions and the domestic violence they had suffered. In June 2004, her attorney asked that M.E. be added to her children's public benefits case. In response, HRA asked M.E. to apply for a Social Security number. She did so as requested and was denied around July 1,2004. After staff at Sanctuary for Families spoke with several workers at the Family Service Call-in Center (#17), M.E. was added to her children's public benefits case.
229; In Augost 2004, staff at Sanctuary for Families requested that E.R. be added to M.E.'s case as well. M.E. received a Medicaid card for E.R. in September 2004, and a notice dated October 14, 2004 listing E.R. on the case.
230. In November 2004, the Hamilton Job Center advised a counselor at the domestic violence shelter that the Center had made a mistake, that M.E. and E.R.'s case had been
NY 1008585JDOC

Page 59
miscoded in the computer system, and that their benefits would be discontinued. Because of advocacy by M.E.'s attorney at Sanctuary for Families, the Center did not close M.E. and E.R's case at that time.
231. On June 9, 2005, M.E. went to the Hamilton Job Center for a recertification appointment. The caseworker told her that she needed a new "prima facie notice" in order to keep her public benefits case open. M.E. tried to explain that the immigration document the worker was reading was not a prima facie notice, but the worker did not understand. A month later, M.E. received a notice removing herself and E.R. from their public benefits case. M.E.'s attorney requested a fair hearing on her behalf to challenge these actions.
232. On July 18, 2005, M.E. went to an appointment at the Hamilton Job Center to discuss why she had requested a fair hearing. A supervisor, Mr. Hane, informed her that she needed to bring in a "prima facie notice" or a form 1-797.
233. On August 18,2005, M.E.'s case was transferred to the Bushwick Job Center. On August 25, she met with Ms. Baptiste, who asked for M.E. 's Social Security number. When M.E. told her she did not have one, Ms. Baptiste responded that she was not eligible for benefits if she did not have a Social Security number.
234. On September 27, 2005, a fair hearing decision was issued in M.E. 's favor fmding that she was entitled to continued assistance.
235. At the end of September, M.E. 's case was transferred to the Euclid Job Center. On October 31, she was given forms to use to apply for and verify a Social Security number. After some effort, M.E. was able to secure Social Security number denials for herself and her daughter from the Social Security Administration. She provided copies of these denials to the Euclid Job Center on November 15,2005.
NY JOO8585JDOC

Page 60
236. On or about November 30, 2005, M.E. learned that benefits for herself and E.R. had been discontinued without notice because they had been denied Social Security numbers. Ms. Wright, who took the action, stated that ifM.E. could not show the SSA a prima facie notice in order to obtain a Social Security number, then she did not have an immigration status that makes her eligible for public benefits. Ms. Wright stated that M.E. needed a Social Security number to get benefits.
237. E.R. attends counseling several times a week and takes prescription medication to address the emotional and psychological effects of enduring and observing years of abuse at the hands ofher stepfather. She suffers from depression, anxiety, and has expressed suicidal thoughts. M.E. fears that E.R. will imminently lose her therapy and prescription drugs because her Medicaid has been discontinued. If she loses these, M.E. worries that E.R. may hurt herself, and will not be able to concentrate, sleep at night, and will have behavioral problems in school as she did before she received counseling and medication.
238. Due to the food stamp and public assistance reduction, M.E. will be unable to feed her children enough nutritious food. This will severely impact E.R. who needs to eat nutritious food to prevent adverse side effects of her medication. Also, M.E. will not be able to buycIothes for her three growing children nor pay to use a laundry machine. M.E. will have to wash clothes less frequently and sometimes by hand. She will also not be able to provide her children with needed school supplies, such as their gym uniforms and money for class trips, because HRA has erroneously denied her and E.R. the benefit for which they are eligible. Plaintiff P.E.
239. P.E. is a 32-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica who lives with her two sons, ages 12 and 2. P.E. and her older son, E.E. have been Qualified Aliens since June
NY IOO8585JOOC tJ
~i

Page 61

2003 when they first applied for benefits because they had proof of abuse and were covered by 1-

130 family-based petitions filed by P.E. 's abusive husband. They now have an approved VAWA

i,Il

self-petition. Because P.E. and her older son arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996,

1~ 1

they are eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. P.E.'s older son is also eligible

~.(.~

!'\ !

for federal food stamps as a Qualified Alien child, and P.E. was eligible for state food stamps

until the program was discontinued in September 2005. Because P.E.'s younger son is a United

States citizen, he is eligible for all federal public benefits.

240. For over two years, P.E. and her son E.E. have been attempting to obtain the public

benefits they are entitled to from the Euclid, Riverview, and Linden Job Centers. They are now

receiving ongoing benefits only due to constant advocacy of their attorneys and a directive from

State OTDA that their benefits should remain the same pending a fair hearing decision regarding

the discontinuance of their benefits in April 2005. They are also still owed over $2000 in

retroactive public assistance benefits and have over $5000 in unpaid medical bills because of

I

HRA's delay in accepting her Medicaid application.

I

241. P.E. fled from her husband in 2001 because ofhis physical abuse. Earlier in 2001,

her husband had choked her, smothered her with a pillow, and almost suffocated her. When she

fled to her mother's home, he found and raped her. Her youngest son is a product of that rape.

242. P.E.'s husband provided no support and she needed milk to feed her baby. As a

result, she applied for public benefits for herself and two children in June 2003. An HRA worker

told her she was not eligible for public benefits because she was married to a green card holder.

She and her son were son denied, in part, due to her immigration status.

243. Desperate and unable to provide for her family, P.E. applied again in early

November 2003. HRA accepted only her citizen son's application. P.E. and her older son were

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wrongly denied assistance, although HRA never provided her with a notice of denial. The notice

she did receive failed to apprise her that only her citizen son would receive any benefits.

244. In November 2004, P.E. received a prima facie notice on her VAWA self-petition,

on which E.B. is a derivative beneficiary. She returned to HRA and asked that she and her

immigrant son be added to her citizen son's case. Due to her attorney's extensive advocacy,

HRA granted the request, providing her and her immigrant son public assistance and Medicaid,

and also issuing her immigrant son food stamps.

245. However, starting January 2005, every time P.E. went to an appointment HRA

workers said she and her immigrant son were receiving benefits by mistake, either because she is

not a citizen or because she has no Social Security number or work authorization. She only

remained on benefits because her attorney called the center each time HRA threatened to close

her case.

!

246. On April 19, 2005, P.E. received notice that her family's public assistance and food

stamps benefits were being reduced to the amounts payable for one person. The notice did not

explain why she and her immigrant son were being removed from the case.

247. On June 21, 2005, P.E. attended a fair hearing challenging HRA's decision to take

P.E. and her immigrant son offof the family's case. No decision has been issued on this hearing.

248. On August 19, 2005, P.E. attended a second fair hearing, this one challenging

HRA's refusal to add her and her immigrant son to the case until November 2004. The decision

on that fair hearing, issued on September 20 2005, found that HRA wrongly denied P.E. and her

immigrant son public benefits in June 2003 and again in November 2003 due to a misapplication

of the immigrant eligibility rules. The decision directed HRA to provide the missing retroactive

public benefits back to July 2003. HRA has only partially implemented that decision: P.E.

;
1.,

Page 63

received all the retroactive food stamps that her family was owed, but she is still owed $2,233 in

public assistance and her medical bills are still unpaid.

249. While P.E. has been waiting for her fair hearing decisions, numerous different HRA

workers have repeatedly threatened to discontinue her benefits. For example, on June 29, 2005,

Ms. Wright, an HRA caseworker, said that she was going to close P.E. 's case because P.E. did

not have a green card or Social Security number.

250. Several other workers have told her that she and E.E. are not eligible because their

VAWA prima facie notice has expired. They do not realize that a VAWA approval notice

supersedes a prima facie notice and entitles them to benefits. A different worker said they were

not eligible because they did not have employment authorization. Recently, several HRA

I

workers have threatened to close their cases because they do not have Social Security numbers or

I

green cards.

!

251. P.E. has been harmed in several ways because ofHRA's inability to apply

I

immigrant eligibility rules correctly. She was unable to pay rent in 2003 and was forced to move into a homeless shelter in March 2004. She did not have enough money for food from March

2004 until November 2004 and had to skip meals or eat only noodles for days. In the fall of

2004, she suffered from excruciating pain for weeks but did not go to a doctor because she had

been denied Medicaid and could not afford to pay a doctor. In October 2004, she was rushed to

the hospital by ambulance and had her gallbladder removed. P.E. is still harassed by collection

agencies because she has over $5,000 in unpaid medical bills from the gallbladder surgery that

should have been covered by Medicaid. She was also unable to attend school until October 2005

because HRA refused to provide her with childcare assistance until she received a Social

Security number.

NY 1008585JDOC

Page 64
252. P.E. desperately needs the $2,233 in retroactive public assistance benefits that she is owed so that she can buy furniture for her apartment, as well as warm coats, clothes, and shoes for her children. She constantly fears that her benefits will be cut off because every time she goes to her job center for an appointment, the caseworkers tell her that she should be removed from the case. Plaintiff Anna Fedosenko
253. Anna Fedosenko is an 88-year-old disabled lawful permanent resident from the Ukraine who speaks only Russian. She lives in an apartment in Brooklyn with her disabled daughter.
254. Ms. Fedosenko has been a lawful permanent resident since September 27,2002. Because she came to the United States after August 22, 1996, she is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. Because she is disabled, she would be eligible for federal food stamps if HRA had complied with its legal obligation to refer her for a Medicaid disability determination.
255. Ms. Fedosenko received public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps until September 2004 when her food stamps were discontinued without notice. Despite a favorable fair hearing decision, she has not received food stamps since then. She has continued to receive public assistance and Medicaid, however.
256. On June 27, 2005, Ms. Fedosenko's attorney spoke to Ms. Williams, the Deputy Director of the Senior Works Center, who said that Ms. Fedosenko is not eligible for food stamps because she has not had her green card for five years. During that conversation and in subsequent ones, Ms. Fedosenko's attorney explained that she is eligible for food stamps if
NY 1008585JDOC

Page 65

Medicaid finds her disabled. Her attorney asked Ms. Williams to refer Ms. Fedosenko for the

necessary disability determination. Ms. Williams did not know how to make the referral.

257. If properly referred, Ms. Fedosenko would undoubtedly be found disabled. She is

88 years old. She is legally blind and suffers from age-related macular degeneration, severe

arthritis, anemia, depression, and has extremely limited mobility that prevents her from taking

public transportation or walking more than a short distance.

I

258. On July 21,2005, an attorney represented Ms. Fedosenko at a fair hearing

challenging the discontinuance of her food stamps without notice.

259. The decision after the fair hearing, issued on August 29, 2005, found that HRA's

determination to discontinue her food stamps without notice was incorrect and was reversed.

The decision directed the Senior Works Center to immediately restore her food stamp benefits

retroactive to August 31, 2004 based on the lack of notice.

260. On September 7, 2005, the Senior Works Center issued a Fair Hearing Compliance

Statement stating that the Center would not comply with the fair hearing decision because "in

order to receive food stamps, you must lawfully reside in the United States for five years."

261. On November 18,2005, Ms. Fedosenko's attorney faxed Ms. Williams, the Deputy

Director of the Senior Works Center, a copy ofa Medicaid disability determination form that had

been completed by Ms. Fedosenko's doctors and requested that Ms. Fedosenko be referred for a

Medicaid disability determination. This fax also requested that the center comply with the fair

hearing decision and issue Ms. Fedosenko's food stamps retroactive to August 31, 2004. There

has been no response from the Center and Ms. Fedosenko is still not receiving food stamps.

262. The discontinuance of Ms. Fedosenko's food stamps has caused and is continuing

to cause Ms. Fedosenko irreparable harm. Ms. Fedosenko has anemia so it is vitally important

NY 1008585JDOC

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that her diet contains lots of fresh food that is rich in iron. The food stamps that her disabled

daughter receives cannot be stretched to feed them both. Ms. Fedosenko frequently goes without

these foods because she cannot afford them, even though her doctor has advised her of the

importance of these foods in her diet and the dangers of not treating her anemia in this way.

263. Because Ms. Fedosenko must use her $68.50 semi-monthly public assistance grant

to purchase food, she has difficulty pay for other basic necessities, such as laundry, clothing, and

travel.

Plaintiff A.I.

264. A.I. is a 32-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Bangladesh who lives in an

apartment in Brooklyn, New York with her two children, S.A., who is 2 years old, and W.A.,

who is 6 years old. USCIS has approved an 1-130 petition filed on A.I. and W.A.'s behalf.

I

Because they have an approved 1-130 and proof of abuse, they are Qualified Aliens. Because they arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996, they are eligible for State Medicaid and

I

Safety Net Assistance. W.A. is also eligible for federal food stamps because she is a child. S.A.,

who is a citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits, is the only one in the family

who is receiving public benefits.

265. A.I. and W.A. have not received any of the benefits for which they are eligible even

though they have applied repeatedly since March 2004.

266. A.I. and W.A. came to the United States in September 2002 on V-I and V-3 visas,

respectively. They received these visas because A.I.'s husband, who is a lawful permanent

resident, had filed an 1-\30 family petition on her and their daughter's behalf.

267. A.I.'s life in the United States has been very difficult. Her husband, who has been

hospitalized repeatedly for mental illness, controlled her every move until she fled to a domestic

Page 67

violence shelter. About a month or two after she arrived, while she was pregnant with their

second daughter, he kicked her in the stomach repeatedly, threatened to kill her, and choked her.

The abuse continued on a regular basis.

268. After their daughter was born in June 2003, A.I. got a job because her husband was

not working and they were barely making ends meet. But this made her husband furious. He

, .

accused her of sleeping with other men while she was at work and would beat her or lock the

door so that she could not go to work. He cut up all her clothes so that she could not go out.

269. In February 2004, the abuse became unbearable. During an argument about money,

AI. 's husband hit her in the face and threatened to kill her with a knife. He then threw her and

their older daughter W.A out of the house. He would not let her take their baby daughter

though. As a result, the police arrested him and took him to a mental hospital for observation.

AI. then received an order of protection from family court that said that her husband must stay

away from and refrain from contacting her and the children.

270. Soon after this incident, A.I. and her children fled to a domestic violence shelter in

Brooklyn. They lived in the domestic violence shelter until September 2004 when they moved

into the apartment where they now live.

271. While living in the shelter, on March 12, 2004, A.I. applied for public benefits for

herself and her two children at the Jamaica Job Center. She showed her HRA worker, an Asian-

1

!

American woman, copies of her and her daughter's V visas, employment authorization cards,

'1

and Social Security cards. The V visas and the code on her employment authorization card

indicate that AI.'s husband filed 1-130 family-based petitions for her and W.A. Despite this, the

caseworker told her that only her citizen daughter was eligible.

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Page 68

272. In April 2004, her citizen daughter started receiving public assistance, food stamps,

and Medicaid. A.I. never received a notice stating that she and her immigrant daughter were

I

denied, or that her citizen daughter was accepted. Although A.I. and her immigrant daughter were denied Medicaid at this time, they started receiving Medicaid in June 2004 and October

I

2004, respectively, when they applied at a local hospital. 273. Starting in July 2004, A.I. repeatedly asked her caseworker Ms. Walker to add her

and her immigrant daughter to the case. Each time, she showed Ms. Walker all of her and her

daughter's immigration papers. She also gave Ms. Walker a copy of her order of protection and

a letter stating that she lived in a domestic violence shelter. Ms. Walker always told A.I. that she

could only receive benefits for her citizen daughter because she and her immigrant daughter only

have work permits.

274. In the summer of2005, her citizen daughter's case was transferred to the

Greenwood Job Center. A.I. asked her new worker, Mr. Conley, to add her and her immigrant

daughter to the case. After looking at her immigration papers and checking in the computer, he

too told her that only her citizen daughter is eligible for benefits.

275. On November 14, 2005, A.I. again asked Mr. Conley to add her and her immigrant

daughter to the case. This time she took with her a letter from her attorney explaining their

eligibility. Attached to the letter was a copy of their V visas, employment authorization cards, 1-

130 approval notice, and proof of abuse in the form of an order ofprotection and letter from the

domestic violence shelter.

276. After reviewing the letter, Mr. Conley agreed to add her and her immigrant

daughter to the case and entered their information into the computer system.

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277. But, due to computer problems related to their immigration status, A.I. and her immigrant daughter still have not received public assistance. The case has repeatedly "errored out" of the system. The Deputy Director of the center, Ms. Wallace, and Mr. Conley have both tried on numerous occasions to open the case. But they cannot figure out how to do so.
278. A.I. has never received a notice in response to her multiple requests for her and her immigrant daughter to be added to the case.
279. AI. and her two children have struggled to survive on the limited public assistance and food stamps they receive.
280. A.I. and her children can barely afford the basics. They survive on good will and charity. Organizations frequently provide food, diapers, Metrocards, and toiletries, and AI.'s family assists when they visit from Bangladesh. However, this assistance is not enough, and they often go without necessities. AI. must sometimes subsist on beans and cereal alone. She does not have enough wann clothes for herself or the children. For eight months, she had no phone.
281. AI. wants ajob so that she will no longer depend on public benefits to survive, but her work authorization expired in September 2004. Her immigration attorney filed for renewal and is planning to file Violence Against Women Act petitions and applications to adjust so that AI. and W.A can become lawful permanent residents. Until she receives work authorization, AI. and her children must rely on charity and public benefits. Plaintiff L.A.M.
282. L.A.M. is a 34-year-old immigrant from Trinidad who is PRUCOL because the USCIS granted her deferred action on June 3, 2005. She lives in a domestic violence shelter with her two-year-old son. Because L.AM. is PRUCOL, she is eligible for Safety Net
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Page 70
Assistance and State Medicaid. Her SOil, who is a citizen, is eligible for all federal public benefits.
283. L.A.M. has been wrongly denied public assistance since June 2005 because the workers at the Linden Job Center mistakenly think she is ineligible because she does not have a green card. In October 2005, L.A.M.'s attorney convinced the Administrative Assistant to the Director of Linden to add L.A.M. to her son's case. But due to computer problems related to her immigration status, L.A.M. is still not receiving public assistance.
284. While visiting the United States on vacation, L.A.M. met her abuser, who is a U.S. citizen. After they had been dating for a while, he promised to marry her and file papers so that she could stay in the country and become a lawful permanent resident. In May of2002, when she found out that she was pregnant, he again promised to marry her, but he kept pushing back the date.
285. In January 2003, L.A.M. moved in with him and his mother. After that, he became abusive. At first the abuse was emotional and financial. But after their baby was born, he became physically abusive too. The worst incident occurred in January 2004 when she told him that she was going to leave him. When she was taking ber son's clothes out of the drawers to pack them, be slammed the drawer closed, almost smashing her fingers. He then started punching her repeatedly in the head. Blood dripped from her head all over the floor and her clothes. As a result ofthe punches, her face swelled, and she got a black eye, bruised lips, and cuts on her nose, eye, tongue, and ear. She bad severe head pain and her ear kept bleeding for days. She could not eat, and had to sleep sitting up because it hurt to lie on her ear.
286. The abuser was arrested for tbis abuse. Sbe helped tbe District Attorney prosecute bim, and he was sentenced to jail until September 2005. Because she assisted in the prosecution

Page 71

of a violent crime, she was eligible to apply for a U visa. She applied and was granted deferred

action on June 3, 2005. She also received employment authorization.

287. While her abuser was in jail, she lived in a small room in an office building with her

son. At first she was able to support herself with odd jobs like babysitting and cleaning. But in

July 2004, however, she could not fmd another job. She was desperate and applied for public

benefits at the Linden Job Center. Her son began to receive public benefits.

288. In early or mid June 2005, after she received the deferred action notice and

employment authorization, she went to her caseworker Ms. Kirkendall and asked to be added to

her son's public assistance case. (L.A.M. already had Medicaid through a Medicaid-only

center.) She told Ms. Kirkendall that she was a victim of domestic violence and showed her the

employment authorization, which has a code CI4 on it that indicates that she have been granted

deferred action.

289. Ms. Kirkendall told her that she needed a green card and that the employment

I

authorization was not enough. When L.A.M. insisted that her attorney told her that she was

eligible, Ms. Kirkendall went to speak with a supervisor. When she came back she said that her

boss said L.A.M. was not eligible because the domestic violence occurred in this country (not in

her home country), because she did not have a "prima facie," and because she was not a citizen

or green card holder. She continued to receive benefits only for her son.

290. When her abuser's parole officer warned her that he wouJd be getting out ofjail in

September 2005, L.A.M. and her son fled to a domestic violence shelter. They have lived in that

shelter since August 5, 2005.

291. On October 4, 2005, L.A.M. again applied to be added to her son's public

assistance case once more. When she got to the Linden Job Center, she went to the customer

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service counter and asked to apply for public assistance. She presented her work authorization,

Social Security card, and a letter from her immigration advocate that explained that she was an

eligible immigrant. Attached to the letter was HRA's Alien Eligibility Desk Aid, which states

that those with deferred action are eligible for public assistance. She was told that she was not

eligible because she was did not have a green card.

292. L.A.M. never received a notice in response to any of her requests to be added to her

son's case.

293. October 11, 2005, L.A.M.'s attorney faxed a letter to the Administrative Assistant

(AA) to the Director of the Linden Job Center, Ms. Bedford, asking her to add L.AM. to her

son's case retroactive to July 2005. Along with the cover note, L.AM.'s attorney sent a copy of

L.A.M.'s deferred action notice, employment authorization card, Social Security card, the letter

from her immigration advocate that she had taken into the center, and the page from HRA's

Desk Aid that says that she is eligible. Her attorney then followed up with multiple phone calls.

294. Due to this advocacy, L.AM. was added to her son's case on October 14, 2005.

L.AM., however, has not received any benefits, not even for her son, since October 13, 2005.

She went into the center on multiple occasions to ask why she and her son were not receiving

benefits. On November 15, her attorney called the center Linden Job Center's Director's office.

She spoke to Ms. Jefferson who said that the case is open for L.AM. and her son and that $54.50

in public assistance and approximately $150 in food stamps were issued on the card the day

before. When asked why L.A.M. was receiving only $54.50 semi-monthly, when families of two

usually get twice that amount, Ms. Jefferson said that it must be because L.A.M.'s case has two

suffixes - one suffix so that her son can receive state benefits and one so that she can receive

:\

')

federal benefits. Ms. Jefferson said L.AM. should go to the center to get a new card because

NV IOO8585JDOC

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sometimes the cards stop working when a new suffix is created. Ms. Jefferson also promised to leave a message for the AA, Ms. Bedford, so that the other $54.50 could be issued.
295. L.A.M. went to the center and received a new benefits card. But the new card, as well as the old cards, has no benefits on it. L.A.M. has called the number on the back of the card repeatedly, but the people who answer the line say there are no benefits on the cards and that they cannot help her. Her attorney also left repeated messages for the AA, as well as Ms. McCall, the Deputy Director. But no one returned her calls.
296. L.A.M. and her son and have not received any public assistance or food stamps since October 13, 2005 due to computer problems related to L.A.M.'s immigration status.
297. L.A.M. has suffered extreme hardship because she has been denied public benefits for almost six months. She often does not have enough food and has to rely on food pantries and other charities. Even so, she sometimes has to skip meals and does not always have enough milk for her son. She rarely is able to buy the fresh fruit and vegetables her doctor told her to eat to prevent her acid reflux from reoccuning. As a result, she often got stomach pains and headaches.
298. She also frequently runs out of diapers, as well as toilet paper, laundry detergent, shampoo, and other basic necessities. When she is low on diapers, she is forced to stay home with her son so that she does not have to put a diaper on him. She lets him run around without a diaper and tries to get him to go in the toilet. But often he has accidents. At night, instead of putting a diaper on him, she puts a plastic bag on the bed so that only the bag - not the bed - gets soiled ifhe had an accident. Recently her son's daycare had to take diapers from other children in order to put diapers on her son.
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299. She also does not have sufficient winter clothes for her son. She cannot afford to pay for a cellphone. It is very hard for her doctors, lawyers, counselors, potential landlords, and potential employers to get in touch with her.
300. Because the Linden Job Center did not open her case until mid-October 2005, she was certified for a housing voucher for only $765 per month. She looked but could not find an apartment for that amount. Now that she is on the public benefits case (though not receiving benefits), she has been certified for $850. But she has lost a month oftime and is having trouble finding apartments because her phone is dead and she does not have money for the subway.
301. If L.A.M. and her son do not receive benefits soon, they will run completely out of food and other basic necessities. Charities and food pantries can only give her a limited amount. Plaintiff L.M.
302. L.M. is a 42-year-old lawful permanent resident from Haiti who lives with her two children, ages 2 and 16, in a domestic violence shelter in New York City. Because she is a Qualified Alien who entered the country prior to August 22, 1996, L.M. is eligible for federal Medicaid and Family Assistance. Because she has worked 40 qualifying quarters (10 years) in the United States as defined under the Social Security Act, she is eligible for federal food stamps. L.M.'s older son entered the country after 1996 and has been a lawful permanent resident since 2003. As a Qualified Alien child who entered after 1996, he is eligible for State Medicaid, Safety Net Assistance, and federal food stamps. L.M.' s younger son is a citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits.
303. L.M. has been denied the food stamps she is entitled to since at least June 2004 because the workers at the Melrose Job Center never inquired into whether she had 40 qualifying
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Page 75

work quarters. Her two children receive food stamps and all three of them receive public

assistance and Medicaid. 304. L.M. moved to the United States in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident

in 2001. As a result of abuse, L.M. suffers from depression as well as memory loss. She is no

longer able to work because of severe carpal tunnel syndrome and must rely on public benefits to

support her family. 305. Because she never received a notice stating she was denied food stamps, L.M. did

not realize that she was not on her children's food stamp case until her attorney told her that

HRA's computer records show that she was denied food stamps due to her immigration status. L.M. had never been asked if she worked 40 quarters, and the application that she completed did

J

not ask if she had worked 10 years or 40 quarters.

i

306. On May 9, 2005, L.M. attended a fair hearing to appeal the denial of her food

stamps application. At the hearing, L.M. 's attorneys submitted copies of her green card and

Social Security Statement, which shows that she has over 40 quarters of work history. L.M.' s

attorneys also submitted City and State policy directives showing that lawful permanent residents with 40 work quarters are eligible for food stamps. While the hearing had been requested to

contest the denial of food stamps since June 2004, the AU would only let L.M. discuss the

period from August 25, 2005 forward.

307. On July 14, 2005, L.M. attended a fair hearing to challenge the denial offood

stamps from June 2004 forward. L.M. and her attorney again presented the same documents: her

green card, Social Security Statement, and the relevant City and State policy directives

explaining that she is eligible.

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308. A decision on the first hearing issued on August 5, 2005. That decision found that HRA's denial ofL.M.'s food stamp application was incorrect. The decision directed HRA to continue processing her application for benefits and to provide her with benefits retroactive to August 25, 2005 if she is foood eligible for food stamps. The decision does not mention L.M.' s immigration status, nor does it explain the immigrant eligibility rules.
309. A decision on the second fair hearing issued on November 2,2005. That decision stated that the City's denial of L.M.'s Jooe 2004 application for food stamps was incorrect and that her food stamp benefits must be recomputed to include her needs retroactive to that date. The decision explained that lawful permanent residents with 40 qualifying quarters, like L.M., are eligible for food stamps and that HRA had "failed to present any evidence that it properly investigated and determined that issue."
310. Despite these two fair hearing decisions, L.M. is still not on her children's food stamps case. This wrongful denial of food stamps for almost a year and a half has caused great hardship for L.M. and her family.
311. L.M. struggles to pay for food and usually runs out of food half way through the month. She is forced to rely on food pantries to feed her children. Sometimes she also is able to borrow money from friends. But despite this help from charity and friends, she has to skip meals. When she does, she gets headaches and feels dizzy. In April 2005, she had to go to the emergency room twice for dizziness and dehydration because she was not eating enough and was stressed over her living situation and the problems with her benefits. Plaintiff Denise Thomas
312. Denise Thomas is a 26-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Saint Lucia. She lives in her mother's Brooklyn apartment with her sister, 3-year-old-daughter and her 9-month-

Page 77

old son. Ms. Thomas has been a Qualified Alien since July 2004, when she received a prima

facie notice on her VAWA self-petition. Because she is a Qualified Alien who entered the

I

United States prior to 1996, she is eligible for Family Assistance and federal Medicaid. Until the

, i

program was discontinued in September 2005, she was also eligible for state food stamps. Both

her children are U.S. citizens and are receiving all the public benefits for which they are eligible.

313. Ms. Thomas was denied public benefits for eleven months because workers at the

Greenwood Job Center do not know that VAWA self-petitioners are eligible. Due to efforts of

her advocates, she now receives ongoing benefits. But she is still owed almost a year of

retroactive public assistance benefits.

314. Ms. Thomas came to the United States from Saint Lucia in 1995 when she was 15

years old. She has not left the country since then, and she is willing to apply for citizenship

once she is eligible to do so.

I

315. Ms. Thomas met her husband at church and they married in January 2002. During the course of their relationship, Ms. Thomas's husband regularly abused her. He even assaulted

her while she was pregnant with their first child. After one incident where her husband hit her

sister'S face, Ms. Thomas filed a police report against him. When he pushed her down the stairs,

Ms. Thomas again called the police and obtained a full order ofprotection against him. In

August of2003, Ms. Thomas took her husband's keys and forced him to move out.

316. Soon thereafter, in August 2003, prior to filing a VAWA self-petition, Ms. Thomas

applied for public assistance benefits for herself and her daughter. Her daughter's application

was approved.

317. In September 2004, after she had received a prima facie notice on her VAWA self-

petition, Ms. Thomas asked to be added to her daughter's public benefits case. Ms. Calendar, a

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Page 78
caseworker at the Greenwood Job Center worker, told Ms. Thomas that she needed either a Social Security number or a green card to obtain benefits and that the prima facie notice was insufficient.
318. In January 2005, Ms. Thomas again asked to be added to her children's public assistance case. Ms. S. Thomas, a Greenwood caseworker, told her that she had to be a citizen for five years to receive benefits.
319. In February 2005, Ms. Thomas's VAWA self-petition was approved. 320. In March 2005, Ms. Thomas's son was born. In June 2005, Ms. Thomas applied for benefits for her newborn and again requested to be added to his case. Her son began receiving benefits, but Ms. Thomas did not. Ms. Thomas requested a fair hearing on the denial of her request to be added to her children's case. 321. Ms. Thomas's advocate sent numerous letters to and persistently called the Greenwood Job Center and the Deputy Regional Manager Regional Manager explaining Ms. Thomas's eligibility. As a result of his advocacy, Ms. Thomas began receiving public assistance and Medicaid in July 2005. She still has not, however, received any of the benefits to which she was entitled for the year she was wrongfully denied benefits. She attended a fair hearing on December 1,2005 to seek these retroactive benefits. No decision has been issued on the fair hearing. 322. Because Ms. Thomas was wrongfully denied benefits, she had to borrow money from her mother to support her children. She relied on leftover food from charitable organizations and friends to feed her children. She often could not afford soap or detergent. Her children suffered from eczema and Ms. Thomas was sometimes unable to buy the lotion to treat them.
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323. She desperately needs the retroactive benefits that she is owed because her mother's

landlord has told them that they must move. She could use the retroactive benefits to pay

I ,

moving expenses, such as the security deposit and first month's rent.

Plaintiff J .z.

324. lZ. is a 28-year-old battered qualified inunigrant from Mexico who lives in an

apartment in the Bronx, New York with her 8-year-old son and her 3-year-old daughter. J.z. has

been a Qualified Alien since July 2004 when she first applied for public benefits. She was a

Qualified Alien initially because she had proof of abuse and her husband had filed an 1-130

family-based petition on her behalf. She now is a Qualified Alien because she has an approved

VAWA self-petition. Because she arrived in the United States before August 22, 1996, J.Z. is

eligible for federal Medicaid and Family Assistance. Until the program was discontinued in

September 2005, J.z. was also eligible for state food stamps. Her children are U.S. citizens and

therefore eligible for all federal public benefits.

I

325. lZ. was denied all public benefits by the Colgate, Crotona, and Greenwood Job

Centers for eight months because the workers at these centers wrongly thought she was an

ineligible immigrant. Then in June 2005, just three months after she was finally added to her

children's case, her case was again closed because workers at the Hamilton Job Center, where

the case had been transferred, thought she was no longer eligible because her VAWA prima facie

notice had expired. These workers did not realize that a VAWA approval notice supersedes the

prima facie notice and is sufficient to make her eligible for benefits. J.Z.'s benefits were restored

five weeks later due to advocacy of her attorney, but she still has unpaid medical bills and is

owed retroactive public assistance and food stamps.

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326. J.2. arrived in the United States in 1984 or 1985, when she was 7 or 8 years old.

J.Z. has not left the United States since she arrived, and she is willing to apply for citizenship

once she is eligible.

327. J.Z. met her husband in high school, and they got married in the Bronx in 1996.

They have two children.

328. In April 2001, J.Z.'s husband, a lawful permanent resident, filed an 1-130 family-

based petition for her. USCIS approved the 1-130 petition on September 30, 2004.

329. In March of 2004, J.Z. called the police when her husband threatened to kill her and

tried to throw her out of their apartment. A few months later, in July 2004, J.Z. called the police

three more times when her husband punched her in the head, pushed her into the bed, and choked

her. J.2. had to go to the hospital to treat her injuries, bruises, and the pain she suffered as a

result of his attacks. J.Z. was very scared and did not want him around her or the children.

330. After the incidents in July 2004, her husband left their home.

331. In July 2004, lZ. was unemployed. At that time, her husband was receiving food

i
i

stamps, public assistance, and Medicaid for himself and their children and they supported

themselves with those benefits. J.Z. was not on the family's public benefits budget and at that

time had never received public benefits herself.

332. In July 2004, after her husband left their apartment, J.Z. went to Colgate Job Center

I

to recertify her children's public benefits case. J.Z. asked Mr. Gonzalez, the caseworker she met

,:~

with, to add her to the case and showed him police reports concerning her husband's abuse, her

1

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I

marriage certificate, the children's birth certificates, and the receipt notice on her 1-130 petition.

I

Mr. Gonzalez re-certified the children, but told J.Z. that she was ineligible for benefits based on

l

her immigration status.

NY lOO8585JDOC

Page 81 333. On or about September 13, 2004, J.Z. moved into a domestic violence shelter with the children because her husband had been calling her and threatening to hurt her and take away the children. She also obtained an order of protection against her husband. 334. On or about September 17, 2004, J.Z. returned to the Colgate Job Center and spoke with Ms. White, Mr. Gonzalez's supervisor. J.Z. again asked to be added to the children's case and J.Z. showed Ms. White a letter from the domestic violence shelter where J.z. was staying and the 1-130 approval notice J.Z. had recently received. Ms. White told her she was ineligible due to her immigration status. 335. On December 20,2004, J.Z. received a VAWA prima facie notice from USCIS. 336. Meanwhile, her children's public benefits case was transferred to the Crotona Job Center. On or about January 24, 2005, J.Z. went to the Crotona Job Center and asked Ms. Martinez, an HRA caseworker, to add her to the case and showed him her VAWA prima facie notice, her 1-130 approval notice, a letter from her shelter, and the evidence of domestic violence J.Z. had turned in at the Colgate Center. 337. J.Z. did not receive any notice in response to her requests to be added to her children's case until early March 2005. On March 8, 2005, she received a notice stating that she would be added to her children's public assistance and Medicaid case. Even though she was eligible for state food stamps, the notice incorrectly stated that J.Z. would not receive food stamps because J.Z. was an ineligible non-citizen. 338. In or about March 2005, J.Z. and her children had to move into a homeless shelter because they had stayed for the maximum period oftime allowed in an emergency domestic violence shelter.
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339. On May 20, 2005, J.Z. attended a fair hearing to challenge the fact that she was denied food stamps. The decision, issued June 8, 2005, stated that HRA was incorrect in denying her food stamps and ordered HRA to continue to provide her with ongoing and retroactive food stamps. J.Z. has never received ongoing or retroactive food stamps.
340. Meanwhile, their case was transferred to the Hamilton Job Center. On or about June 14,2005, J.z. showed the fair hearing decision to Ms. ScantJebury, her caseworker, and her supervisor, Mr. Sosa. The HRA workers stated that the fair hearing decision did not require them to add her to the food stamp budget and that J.Z. was ineligible for food stamps because of her immigrant status.
341. Further, Ms. ScantJebury and Mr. Sosa stated that even if J.z. had been eligible for
public benefits in the past J.Z. would no longer be eligible for any public benefits because her prima facie notice was expiring on June 18,2005. J.Z. showed them the approval notice for her self-petition, but they told her that the approval notice did not establish eligibility and that J.Z. would need another prima facie notice. Even though J.Z. explained that the approval notice meant her immigration case was approved and that it was better evidence oflawful immigration status than her prima facie notice, the workers told her that they were going to take her off of the case. That is exactly what happened.
342. J .Z. never received a written notice that she would be removed from the case, but on June 29,2005, she was taken off the public assistance and Medicaid case. As a result, her housing voucher was reduced from $925 to $820 and J.Z. was unable to find an apartment that she could rent for $820 a month.
343. On or about August 4,2005, J.Z. attended a fair hearing on HRA's decision to drop her from the case in June 2005 and its failure to grant her public assistance and Medicaid
NY lOO8585JDOC

Page 83 benefits retroactive to July 2004. At the fair hearing, the center representative agreed to review her case retroactive to July 2004 and to detennine whether to include her in the current budget. State OTDA issued a decision dated September 20, 2005 reflecting the stipulation.
344. Although J.Z. is currently on the budget because her attorney advocated for her to receive benefits pending a fair hearing decision, she still has not received the retroactive public assistance she is entitled to and HRA has not paid her old medical bills.
345. In October 2005, J.Z. moved into an apartment with her children. 346. When she was not on the case, J.Z. was unable to pay for food for herself and her children. Even though friends gave her food and she borrowed money, she sometimes had to go without food so that her children could eat. 347. J.Z. developed an ulcer as a result of the stress caused by the uncertainty of her public benefits, the instability of her housing situation, and her poor nutrition. Because J.Z. was denied Medicaid for so long, she was unable to get medical treatment for her ulcer and the other medical conditions she was suffering. In June and July 2005, J.Z. was unable to afford to get her prescription for Nexium filled. Further, J.z. has over $1,000 in unpaid bills for medical treatment from her husband's abuse in July 2004. 348. J.Z.'s daughter's health also suffered greatly after they moved into the homeless shelter. Her poor nutrition has caused great fluctuations in her weight. i
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STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant) Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying Federal Food Stamp Benefits to Eligible Class Members 349. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal food stamp benefits to eligible class members on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal food stamp benefits to these class members on account of immigration status, violates 7 U.S.C. § 2020(eX3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a), (g)(J). SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant) Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying Federal Medicaid Benefits to Certain Eligible Class Members 350. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal Medicaid benefits to eligible class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal Medicaid benefits to these class members on account of immigration status, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant) Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Class Members from Applying for Federal Food Stamps 351. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps; refusing to permit class members to apply for federal food stamps; and/or discouraging or refusing to permit class members seeking to apply for
NY lOO8585JDOC

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federal food stamps to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member,

violate 7 U.S.C. § ZOZO(e)(2)(B)(iii).

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against the City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Certain Class Members from Applying for Federal Medicaid

35Z. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members who

are not lawful permanent residents from applying for federal Medicaid benefits; refusing to

permit these class members to apply for those federal Medicaid; and/or discouraging or refusing

to permit these class members seeking to apply for federal Medicaid to be added to the existing

public benefits case of a household member, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX8) and 42 C.F.R.

§ 435.906 (Medicaid).

I

FIFfH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant)

J

Unlawful POlicy and ClMtom of Failing to Provide Adequate and

Timely Notice of the Denial, Discontinuance, or Reduction of Benefits

353. HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide notice of the denial of

federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to class members: (1) when assistance is granted to

some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants

apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants

are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violate 7 C.F.R. § Z73.1O(g)(I) (food

stamps), and 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid).

354. HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide notice ofthe denial of public

benefits to class members: (1) when assistance is granted to some household members but

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denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants are discouraged or prohibited from applying for public benefits, violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
355. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if not impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal, violate 7 C.F.R. § 273.IO(g)(I) (food stamps), and 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid).
356. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices to class members that make it impossible for them to make informed decisions about whether, and to appeal effectively from the denial, when public benefits are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against tbe City Defendant) Unlawful Failure to Admiuister, Supervise, and Train 357. HRA has been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees at job centers. HRA's deliberate indifference to the federal rights of class members has caused and/or contributed to the policies, customs, and usages described above; and has resulted in the widespread and systematic denial of the rights under federal law of eligible class members to receive federal food stamps and federal Medicaid. 358. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of referring applicants for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to SSA with documentation that fails to comply with SSA's requirements,
NY lOO8585JDOC

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thereby making it likely or certain that SSA will not issue them a Social Security number, violates 7 C.F.R. ~ 273.6(b) (food stamps) and 42 C.F.R. § 43S.910(e)(Medicaid).
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the State Defendants)
Unlawful Failure to Administer, Supervise and Train 359. Actions and omissions by State OTDA and State DOH have caused andlor contributed to the policies, customs, and usages ofHRA described above. Because HRA functions as a matter of law as the agent of State OrDA (with regard to federal food stamps) and State DOH (with regard to federal Medicaid), State OrDA and State DOH are jointly and severally liable for HRA's violations offederaI law. 360. Through their actions and omissions that have caused andlor contributed to the policies, customs, and usages ofHRA described above, State OTDA, and State DOH have violated their responsibilities under federal law as the single state agencies responsible for administering and supervising the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs, respectively, in New York State, in violation of7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Medicaid), and 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid). 361. State OTDA and State DOH have been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees who administer federal food stamps and federal Medicaid at job centers. Their deliberate indifference to the federal rights of class members has caused andlor contributed to the policies, customs, and usages ofHRA described above; and has resulted in the widespread and systematic denial of the rights under federal law of eligible class members to receive federal food stamps and federal Medicaid.
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STATE LAW CLAIMS

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against tbe City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying Public Assistance And State Medicaid to Certain Eligible Class Members

362. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying public assistance and State Medicaid

to eligible class members who are not lawful pennanent residents on account of immigration

I

status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing public assistance and State Medicaid benefits to

these class members on account of immigration status, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122,

131(1) & (3) (public assistance), 366(1)(a) (State Medicaid), and 18 N'y.C.R.R. §§ 349, et seq.

(public assistance).

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against tbe City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying State Food Stamps to Eligible Class Members

363. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying State food stamp benefits to eligible

class members on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing class

members' State food stamps on account of immigration status, violated N.Y. Soc. Servo Law

§ 95(1O)(b) (State Food Assistance Program).

TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against tbe City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Certain Class Members From Applying for Public Assistance and State Medicaid

364. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members who

are not lawful pennanent residents from applying for public assistance and State Medicaid;

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refusing to pennit these class members to submit applications for those benefits; and/or discouraging or refusing to pennit class members seeking to apply for those benefits to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366a(l) (State Medicaid) 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(a) and (b) (public assistance).
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant)
Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Class Members From Applying for State Food Stamps
365. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for State food stamps; refusing to permit class members to submit applications for those benefits; and/or discouraging or refusing to permit class members seeking to apply for those benefits to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violated N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 95(10)(b) (State Food Assistance Program).
TWELTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant)
Unlawful Policy and Custom of Failing to Provide Adequate and Timely Notice of the Denial, Discontinnance, or Reduction of State Benefits 366. HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide notice of the denial ofpubJic benefits to immigrants: (I) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violates 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.8(b) and 358-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(3)(b) (Medicaid).
NY IOO8585JOOC

I

Page 90

I

367. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it

difficult if not impossible to determine whether public assistance and State Medicaid were

correctly denied or provided in the proper amount andlor whether to appeal when such benefits

are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violates

18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 35J.8(b) and 358.2-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-

a(3)(b) (Medicaid).

THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against the City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy aud Custom of Requiring Applicants for Public Assistance and State Medicaid Who Cannot Obtain Social Security Numbers to Furnish Social Security Numbers

368. No provision of the New York State Social Services Law requires applicants for

public assistance or State Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of

eligibility.

369. To the extent that HRA acts to enforce State regulations, State directives, and City

directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State

Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security

number is impossible to obtain, those actions violate N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122, 134-a(2) and

366-a(2)(a).

REOUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter a judgment in their

favor as follows:

I. CertifY this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)

with a plaintiff class defined as:

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Page 91
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for State or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, and/or food stamps, and wbo either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have public benefits discontinued or reduced; (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying for public benefits; and/or (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application for public benefits, by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term "Affected Immigrants" means (I) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case ofbattered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in tbat status for less than five years; and (4) persons wbo are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
2. Issue a declaratory judgment declaring: (a) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal food stamps to eligible class members on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal food stamps on account of immigration status, violates 7 U.S.C. § 2020{e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2{a), (g){l) (food stamps);
(b) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal Medicaid benefits to eligible class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal Medicaid benefits to these class members on account ofimrnigration status, violates 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (Medicaid);
(c) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps; refusing to permit class members to apply for federal
food stamps; andlor discouraging or refusing to permit class members seeking to apply for federal food stamps to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violates 7 U.S.c. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iii);
NY 1008585JDOC

I.
Page 92

(d) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from

applying for federal Medicaid; refusing to permit class members who are not lawful

permanent residents to apply for federal Medicaid; andlor discouraging or refusing to

permit class members seeking to apply for federal Medicaid to be added to the existing

public benefits case ofahousehold member, violates 42 C.F.R. § 435.906 (Medicaid);

(e) HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide timely and adequate notice of the

denial offederal food stamps and federal Medicaid to class members: (I) when

assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on

immigration status; (2) when class members apply to be added to an existing public

benefits case and are denied; and (3) when class members are discouraged or prohibited

from applying for assistance, violates 7 C.F.R. § 273.l0(g)(1) (food stamps), and 42

C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid);

I

(f) HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide timely and adequate notice of the denial of public benefits to immigrants: (I) when assistance is granted to some

household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when class

members apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3)

when class members are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violates

the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution;

(g) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if

not impossible to determine whether federal food stamps or federal Medicaid were

correctly denied or provided in the proper amount andlor whether to appeal when federal

food stamps and federal Medicaid are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced

Page 93

)

because of immigration status, violates 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g)(l) (food stamps), and 42

I

C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid);

I

(h) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if

not impossible to detennine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided in

the proper amount and/or whether to appeal when such benefits are denied in whole or in

part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violates the due process

clause of the U.S Constitution;

(i) HRA has been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and

supervision to HRA employees at job centers;

(j) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of referring applicants for federal food stamps and

federal Medicaid to SSA with docwnentation that fails to comply with SSA's

requirements, thereby making it likely or certain that SSA will not issue them a Social
Security nwnber, violates 7 C.F.R. 1 273.6(b)(food stamps) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e)

(Medicaid);

(k) actions and omissions by State OTDA and State DOH have caused and/or contributed to

the violations of federal law by HRA challenged in this action, for which State OTDA

and State DOH are jointly and severally liable;

(I) through their actions and omissions that have caused and/or contributed to the federal

violations by HRA challenged in this action, State OTDA and State DOH have violated

their responsibilities under federal law as the single state agencies responsible for

administering and supervising the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs,

respectively, in New York State, in violation of7 U.S.C. § 20l2(n) (food stamps); 42

U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Medicaid), and 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid);

NY lOO8585_3.DOC

Page 94
(m) State OTDA and State DOH have been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees who administer federal food stamps and federal Medicaid at job centers;
(n) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying public assistance and State Medicaid benefits to eligible class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing public assistance and State Medicaid benefits to these class members on account of immigration status, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122, 131(1) & (3) (public assistance), 366(J)(a) (State Medicaid), and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 349, et seq. (public assistance);
(0) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members who are not lawful permanent residents from applying for public assistance and State Medicaid; refusing to permit these class members to submit applications for those benefits; and/or discouraging or refusing to permit these class members seeking to apply for those benefits to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(l) (State Medicaid) and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(a) and (b) (public assistance);
(P) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of failing to provide timely an adequate notice of the denial ofpublic assistance and State Medicaid to immigrants; (1) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violates 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.8(b) and 358-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(3)(b) (Medicaid);
NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 95
(q) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if not impossible to determine whether public assistance and State Medicaid were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal when public assistance and State Medicaid are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violates 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.8(b) and 358-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(3)(b) (Medicaid); and
(r) to the extent that HRA acts to enforce State regulations, State directives, and City directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security number is impossible to obtain, those actions violate N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122, 134-a(2) and 366-a(2)(a);
3. Issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as requested in plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause submitted in conjunction with this complaint.
4. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining the City defendant: (a) to refrain from unlawfully denying, discontinuing, and/or reducing federal food stamps at job centers on account of immigration status to class members who are eligible for those benefits; (b) to refrain from denying, discontinuing, and/or reducing Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits at job centers on account of immigration status to class members who are not lawful permanent residents and who are eligible for those benefits; (c) to refrain from turning away, deterring, or discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps, at job centers, or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these benefits, on account ofimmigration status;

Page 96
(d) to refrain from turning away, deterring, or discouraging class members who are not lawful permanent residents from applying for Medicaid and public assistance benefits at job centers, or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these benefits, on account of immigration status;
(e) to permit all plaintiff class members to submit an application to HRA for federal food stamps at job centers regardless oftheir immigration status;
(f) to permit all plaintiff class members who are not lawful permanent residents to submit an application to HRA for Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits at job centers regardless of their immigration status;
(g) to provide timely and adequate notice of the denial offood stamps, Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits at job centers to class members (I) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; and (2) when class members apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied;
(h) to refrain from issuing misleading notices that make it difficult or impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal when such benefits are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status;
(i) to ensure that all disabled Qualified Alien class members are referred for Medicaid disability determinations ifthere is an indication that they may qualify for disabilityrelated Medicaid, and that those determined to be disabled receive the food stamps to which they are legally entitled;
(j) to refrain from enforcing State regulations, State directives, and City directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to
NY 1008585JDOC

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apply for and furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security number is impossible to obtain; (k) to provide class members who do not have Social Security numbers and who apply for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid with the necessary documentation so that they can obtain a Social Security number from SSA; (I) to provide retroactive State food stamps to those eligible class members who were wrongly denied them due to their immigration status; and (m)to develop and implement a plan of correction that will: (i) correct all policy memoranda and other instructional material that misstate immigrant
eligibility rules for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance, or the requirement that applicants and recipients furnish or apply for a Social Security number; (ii) reconfigure their computer systems so that class members' food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance cases can be properly entered into those computer systems and opened; (iii) retrain their employees on the correct immigrant eligibility rules for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance benefits and Social Security number requirements; and (iv) implement a plan for regular monitoring and reporting on applications for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance by class members so that corrective action may be taken if noncompliance with immigrant eligibility rules for public benefits is found. 5. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining the State defendants:

I Page 98

(a) to supervise and oversee the conduct and actions of the City defendant to ensure that the

City defendant complies with all federal mandates regarding immigrant eligibility for

federal food stamps and federal Medicaid, and to ensure that timely and adequate notice

is provided when food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance benefits are denied in

whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status; and

(b) to develop and implement a plan of correction that will:

(i) correct all policy memoranda and other instructional material that misstate immigrant

eligibility rules for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid benefits;

(ii) reconfigure the computer systems for which State defendants are responsible to the

extent necessary so that class members' federal food stamps and federal Medicaid

cases can be proper!y entered into those computer systems and opened;

(iii) retrain their employees on the correct immigrant eligibility rules for federal food

stamps and federal Medicaid benefits;

(iv) implement a plan for regular monitoring and reporting on applications for federal

, I

food stamps and federal Medicaid benefits by class members so that corrective action

may be taken if noncompliance with immigrant eligibility rules for public benefits is

found.

6. award reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

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7. order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York December 13, 2005

Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief (SB0987) THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Adriene L. Holder (ALHI872) Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Practice Area Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR5579) Director of Litigation, Civil Practice Area ChristopherD. Lamb (CDLS145) Attorney-in-Charge, Staten Island Neighborhood Office Elizabeth Sykes Saylor, of Counsel (ESS809J) Jennifer Baum, of Counsel (JB4030) 199 Water Street, 3m Floor NewYork,NewYork 10038 Phone: (718) 422-2871

Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (YS31 07) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Jane G. Stevens, of Counsel (JS4790) Caroline Hickey, of Counsel (CHI41O)
Kevin KenneaJly, of Counsel (KK0710) 450 West 33Td Street, 11th Floor New York, NY 10001 Phone: (212) 613-5000

HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson (RA0979) Russell Jacobs, of Counsel (RJ3657) One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004-1482 Phone: (212) 837-6000

Of Counsel:
THE EMPIRE JUSTICE PROJECT Barbara Weiner 119 Washington Ave. Albany, N.Y. 12210 Phone: 518-462-6831

BY::~fL~~~~~~~<Z~~~'~'~<~~'~_______
I/)--Y'
ffs and the Plaintiff Class

 
 Page 51

188. State OTDA issued a decision on that fair hearing dated July 29, 2005. The

decision directed the center to process L.W. 's public assistance and food stamps applications.

The center has failed to fully comply with the decision.

I

189. L.W. began receiving public assistance in September 2005 as a result of the

extensive advocacy of her attorneys who repeatedly called and faxed the Dekalb Job Center and

I

personnel in HRA's Brooklyn Regional Manager's office.

190. Despite this advocacy, L.W. bas never received food stamps. The caseworkers at

the Dekalb Job Center have refused to refer L.W. for a Medicaid disability determination so that

she can receive food stamps. Ifshe was referred, there is no doubt that she would be found

disabled. L.W. suffers from several severe medical ailments, including kidney stones, a hernia,

and high blood pressure. Earlier this year, she had a heart attack and had surgery for kidney

stones. She recently had mUltiple surgeries and is scheduled to have another surgery later this

month.

191. L.W. has suffered greatly as a result of the denials of her applications. For five

months, until she received public assistance, she received only $20 food vouchers per week from

the shelter and had to rely on other shelter residents to share food with her. Because she still

does not have food stamps, she still does not have enough food. When she has spent her small

public assistance grant and no one has food to give her, she has to go without food. She worries

that not eating well will cause her health to deteriorate further. She already suffers from stomach

and chest pain almost every day.

192. Because she was denied public assistance for five months, she was unable to apply

for a housing subsidy until recently. She was not able to find subsidized housing before she was

asked to leave the domestic violence shelter because she had long exceeded the allowable time.

Page 52

She is staying with a friend temporarily, but she cannot stay there long. She does not know

where she will go. She is afraid to go to a shelter for single adults because those shelters are

very dirty; she would have to sleep on a cot in a room with many other women, most ofthem

much younger than she. She does not think she would be able to recover from her scheduled

surgery if she were forced to live in a dirty shelter.

Plaintiff M.A.

193. M.A. is a 36-year-old battered qualified immigrant from the Dominican Republic

who lives in a homeless shelter in the Bronx, New York with her 3-year-old daughter. USCIS

has approved an 1-130 petition filed on MA's behalf. Because she has an approved 1-130

petition and proofof abuse, she is a Qualified Alien. Because she arrived in the United States

after August 22,1996, she is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. Her

daughter, a U.S. citizen, is eligible for all federal public benefits.

194. M.A, has been wrongly denied public assistance and Medicaid since July 2005,

195. M.A. moved to the United States in September 1999 in order to be reunited with her

husband, who is a U.S. citizen. On or about October 2003, M.A.'s husband filed an 1-130

uscrs family-based petition on her behalf.

approved the 1-130 petition on February 5, 2004,

196. After she came to the United States, M.A. 's husband became inexplicably angry

and violent. He threatened her with weapons and said he would kill her. He also often hit her

1

!

head and body with his hands. The abuse soon became unbearable and, in the summer of2004,

1

M,A. fled to a domestic violence shelter with their then two-year-old daughter. They lived there

1

until February 2005, when their allowed time at the shelter expired. Since then, they have lived

in a homeless shelter in the Bronx,

NY JOO8S8SJDOC i" L

Page 53

197. After M.A. left the domestic violence shelter, her husband continued to threaten

her. On February 16, 2005, she obtained an order of protection against her husband.

198. On July 14, 2005, M.A. went to the Crotona Job Center in the Bronx to ask to be

added to her daughter's open public assistance case. She spoke with a Ms. Bonilla and gave her

a copy of her 1-130 receipt notice and the order of protection. Ms. Bonilla told her that she

needed a copy ofthe 1-130 approval notice and that M.A. was ineligible unless she had the

original approval notice.

199. On July 21,2005, M.A. went back to the Crotona Job Center with a printout from

the USCIS website indicating that her 1-130 petition had been approved. M.A. first was directed

to Mr. Perreira, an HRA caseworker, but he refused to meet with her and would not look at the
usels printout. He told her she was not eligible due to her immigration status. M.A. gave the

printout to another worker who told M.A. that she would receive a decision in writing.

200. M.A. did not receive any correspondence from the Crotona Job Center after her July

21,2005 visit. On September 30, 2005, she attended a fair hearing to challenge the failure of the

Crotona Job Center to add her to her daughter's case. At the hearing, her attorney gave the judge

uscrs copies of her order ofprotection, the 1-130 receipt notice, and the

printout showing the

petition was approved.

201. M.A. received a decision on her fair hearing dated October 21,2005. The decision

directed the center to continue processing her application, taking into account her approved 1-130

status. The decision did not state whether she was an eligible immigrant or explain which

immigrants are eligible.

202. M.A. returned to the Crotona Job Center on or about November 15, 2005 and again

asked Ms. Bonilla to add her to her daughter'S case. She showed Ms. Bonilla all of the papers

Page 54

she had shown her the first time she came into the center, as well as a copy of the computer

printout showing that the 1-130 was approved.

203. Ms. Bonilla told M.A. that she was not eligible due to her immigration status. She

said that M.A. needed a "prima facie." Ms. Bonilla told M.A. to return to the center on

November 18, 2005 to meet with someone else to discuss her eligibility.

204. On November 18,2005, M.A. returned to the Crotona Job Center and gave her

papers to a woman named Delone. Delone said that she is not eligible for public benefits

because she is not a lawful permanent resident.

205. M.A. has never received a notice regarding any of her requests to be added to her

I

daugbter's case and still has not received public assistance or Medicaid. 206. As a result, M.A. cannot afford to buy enougb food for her daugbter and herself.

Usually she buys only milk, cheese, and bread. She also cannot afford to buy her daugbter

winter clothes, and is concerned that her daugbter will freeze without warmer clothes.

207. M.A. has been unable to find housing outside of the shelter because her application

for public assistance was denied.

208. Because she does not have Medicaid, M.A. is unable to receive all of the medical

treatment she needs. She suffers from depression as a result ofthe abuse, but does not have

money to pay for counseling. She has also been unable to go to the dentist and suffers daily from

pain in her teeth. She also fears that if she gets sick, she will not be able to pay for medical

treatment or care for her daugbter.

Plaintiff Marieme Diongue

209. Marieme Diongue is 29-year-old immigrant from Senegal who is PRUCOL because

the USeIS granted her deferred action. She lives in a one-bedroom apartment in the Bronx, New

NY lOO8585JDOC

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York, with her eleven-month-old daughter Mouslymadou. Because she is PRVCOL, Ms.

Diongue is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. Her daughter, who is a V.S.

citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits, is the only one in the family

receiving any benefits.

210. Ms. Diongue has been wrongly denied public assistance and Medicaid since March

2005 because workers at the Melrose Job Center think she is ineligible until she receives a green

card.

211. Ms. Diongue was granted deferred action on April 12, 2004 because she has a

pending V visa application. She is eligible for a V-visa because she assisted in the prosecution

of her sister's murderer, who was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.

212. In June 2000 when Ms. Diongue returned to the apartment she shared with her

sister, her sister's boyfriend was hiding inside the door. He tortured her for five hours. He

, f

pushed her onto a bed and tried to strangle her. He theo left her naked with her hands bound

behind her back. Because he heard Ms. Diongue's friends outside of the apartment, he panicked

.\

i

and ran away. When he left, she went to her sister's bedroom and found her dead on the floor.

11,

He had strangled and murdered her sister.

213. In March of2004, Ms. Diongue became pregnant and was no longer able to work

because of constant illness. Forced to quit her job, she moved in with her brother. Her daughter

Mouslymadou was born in December of 2004.

214. In March of2005, Ms. Diongue applied for public benefits at the Melrose Job

Center because she could not afford basic necessities and did not have enough money to pay the

reot she owed her brother. She gave Ms. Swaby, a caseworker at the center, her work permit,

Social Security card, deferred action notice, and a letter outlining the benefits for which her

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daughter and Ms. Diongue were entitled. Ms. Swaby told her that she was not eligible because

she did not have a green card.

215. In April of 2005, Ms. Diongue received a notice stating that one person in her

family would receive pubic benefits. The notice did not state who was accepted, and Ms.

Diongue never received a denial notice for herself.

216. On July 5, 2005, Ms. Diongue attended a fair hearing to challenge HRA's decision

to deny her benefits. At the hearing, HRA's representative stated that Ms. Diongue was denied

due to her inunigration status. The fair hearing decision, dated October 5, 2005, states that the

HRA's determination concerning Ms. Diongue's request for public benefits was not correct and

should be reversed. The decision does not, however, state whether she is an eligible inunigrant

I

or explain which immigrants are eligible. 217. On October 20, 2005, Ms. Diongue received a Fair Hearing Compliance Action

I

Letter from the Melrose Job Center stating, "you are not eligible for assistance due to your alien status which is only temporary and work only."

218. Ms. Diongue is still not receiving any benefits.

219. As a result ofbeing denied public benefits for nine months, Ms. Diongue and her

daughter have suffered greatly. Ms. Diongue often does not have enough money for basic

necessities like soap, clothing, diapers, toys, or a crib. Because she cannot afford to buy a crib,

she sleeps with her baby on a used old mattress placed on the living room floor. She also often

runs out of food and has to rely on food pantries.

220. Even though Ms. Diongue recently got a job as a bathroom attendant, the job does

not pay much and she still has trouble buying food and other basic necessities.

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Plaintiff M.E. 221. M.E. is a 37-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Mexico who lives in New
York City with her 12-year-old daughter, E.R., who is also a battered qualified immigrant, and her two citizen children, D.E., age 10, and J.E., age 7.
222. In October 1994, M.E. and E.R. joined M.E.'s husband, a lawful permanent resident, in Texas. In 1997, M.E.'s husband filed 1-130 family-based petitions for M.E. and E.R. M.E.'s 1-130 petition was approved in December 1998 and E.R.'s was approved in February 2000.
223. Because they have approved I-130s and proof of domestic violence, M.E. and E.R. are Qualified Aliens. As Qualified Aliens who arrived in the country before August 22, 1996, M.E. and E.R are eligible for federal Medicaid and Family Assistance. As a Qualified Alien under the age of eighteen, E.R. is also eligible for federal food stamps. D.E. and J.E., the citizen household members, are the only family members currently receiving public benefits.
224. During M.E.'s relationship with her husband, he physically abused her. On one
occasion, he punched M.E. in the face, threw a television at her feet, threw her against a wall, and began to choke her. M.E. later learned that her husband had sexually abused E.R., hit her, and threatened that he would hurt her if she told M.E. what he was doing. In July 2000, M.E. and her children left her husband. In September 2000, while drunk, her husband arrived at her sister's house, got into an argument, pulled out a gun, and shot her brother-in-law in the leg. Fearing for her safety, she left Texas and took the children to New York, moving in with one of her brothers and his family.
225. After seven months, M.E.'s husband came to New York looking for her. They reconciled for a short period. In July 2002, however, he punched M.E. in the face so hard that he
NY \008585_,.WC

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split her lip. In order to get away from him, she moved with her three children to live with another one of her brothers.
226. Left with no means to provide for her children, M.E. applied for public benefits in July 2002. At the time, she applied only for her two younger U.S. citizen children because she assumed she and E.R. were not eligible for benefits because of their immigration status. Her two citizen children' applications for public benefits were approved.
227. In May 2004, M.E.'s husband found her again. He came to the apartment drunk, pushed her, and threatened to kill her. After that incident, M.E. obtained an order of protection from family court prohibiting her husband from contacting her and their children. On May 19, 2004, M.E. and the children entered a domestic violence shelter. In July 2004, she returned to court and obtained a final two-year order ofprotection.
228. At about this time, a social worker referred M.E. to Sanctuary for Families, where an attorney advised her that she and E.R. were eligible for public benefits based on the approved 1-130 petitions and the domestic violence they had suffered. In June 2004, her attorney asked that M.E. be added to her children's public benefits case. In response, HRA asked M.E. to apply for a Social Security number. She did so as requested and was denied around July 1,2004. After staff at Sanctuary for Families spoke with several workers at the Family Service Call-in Center (#17), M.E. was added to her children's public benefits case.
229; In Augost 2004, staff at Sanctuary for Families requested that E.R. be added to M.E.'s case as well. M.E. received a Medicaid card for E.R. in September 2004, and a notice dated October 14, 2004 listing E.R. on the case.
230. In November 2004, the Hamilton Job Center advised a counselor at the domestic violence shelter that the Center had made a mistake, that M.E. and E.R.'s case had been
NY 1008585JDOC

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miscoded in the computer system, and that their benefits would be discontinued. Because of advocacy by M.E.'s attorney at Sanctuary for Families, the Center did not close M.E. and E.R's case at that time.
231. On June 9, 2005, M.E. went to the Hamilton Job Center for a recertification appointment. The caseworker told her that she needed a new "prima facie notice" in order to keep her public benefits case open. M.E. tried to explain that the immigration document the worker was reading was not a prima facie notice, but the worker did not understand. A month later, M.E. received a notice removing herself and E.R. from their public benefits case. M.E.'s attorney requested a fair hearing on her behalf to challenge these actions.
232. On July 18, 2005, M.E. went to an appointment at the Hamilton Job Center to discuss why she had requested a fair hearing. A supervisor, Mr. Hane, informed her that she needed to bring in a "prima facie notice" or a form 1-797.
233. On August 18,2005, M.E.'s case was transferred to the Bushwick Job Center. On August 25, she met with Ms. Baptiste, who asked for M.E. 's Social Security number. When M.E. told her she did not have one, Ms. Baptiste responded that she was not eligible for benefits if she did not have a Social Security number.
234. On September 27, 2005, a fair hearing decision was issued in M.E. 's favor fmding that she was entitled to continued assistance.
235. At the end of September, M.E. 's case was transferred to the Euclid Job Center. On October 31, she was given forms to use to apply for and verify a Social Security number. After some effort, M.E. was able to secure Social Security number denials for herself and her daughter from the Social Security Administration. She provided copies of these denials to the Euclid Job Center on November 15,2005.
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236. On or about November 30, 2005, M.E. learned that benefits for herself and E.R. had been discontinued without notice because they had been denied Social Security numbers. Ms. Wright, who took the action, stated that ifM.E. could not show the SSA a prima facie notice in order to obtain a Social Security number, then she did not have an immigration status that makes her eligible for public benefits. Ms. Wright stated that M.E. needed a Social Security number to get benefits.
237. E.R. attends counseling several times a week and takes prescription medication to address the emotional and psychological effects of enduring and observing years of abuse at the hands ofher stepfather. She suffers from depression, anxiety, and has expressed suicidal thoughts. M.E. fears that E.R. will imminently lose her therapy and prescription drugs because her Medicaid has been discontinued. If she loses these, M.E. worries that E.R. may hurt herself, and will not be able to concentrate, sleep at night, and will have behavioral problems in school as she did before she received counseling and medication.
238. Due to the food stamp and public assistance reduction, M.E. will be unable to feed her children enough nutritious food. This will severely impact E.R. who needs to eat nutritious food to prevent adverse side effects of her medication. Also, M.E. will not be able to buycIothes for her three growing children nor pay to use a laundry machine. M.E. will have to wash clothes less frequently and sometimes by hand. She will also not be able to provide her children with needed school supplies, such as their gym uniforms and money for class trips, because HRA has erroneously denied her and E.R. the benefit for which they are eligible. Plaintiff P.E.
239. P.E. is a 32-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Jamaica who lives with her two sons, ages 12 and 2. P.E. and her older son, E.E. have been Qualified Aliens since June
NY IOO8585JOOC tJ
~i

Page 61

2003 when they first applied for benefits because they had proof of abuse and were covered by 1-

130 family-based petitions filed by P.E. 's abusive husband. They now have an approved VAWA

i,Il

self-petition. Because P.E. and her older son arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996,

1~ 1

they are eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. P.E.'s older son is also eligible

~.(.~

!'\ !

for federal food stamps as a Qualified Alien child, and P.E. was eligible for state food stamps

until the program was discontinued in September 2005. Because P.E.'s younger son is a United

States citizen, he is eligible for all federal public benefits.

240. For over two years, P.E. and her son E.E. have been attempting to obtain the public

benefits they are entitled to from the Euclid, Riverview, and Linden Job Centers. They are now

receiving ongoing benefits only due to constant advocacy of their attorneys and a directive from

State OTDA that their benefits should remain the same pending a fair hearing decision regarding

the discontinuance of their benefits in April 2005. They are also still owed over $2000 in

retroactive public assistance benefits and have over $5000 in unpaid medical bills because of

I

HRA's delay in accepting her Medicaid application.

I

241. P.E. fled from her husband in 2001 because ofhis physical abuse. Earlier in 2001,

her husband had choked her, smothered her with a pillow, and almost suffocated her. When she

fled to her mother's home, he found and raped her. Her youngest son is a product of that rape.

242. P.E.'s husband provided no support and she needed milk to feed her baby. As a

result, she applied for public benefits for herself and two children in June 2003. An HRA worker

told her she was not eligible for public benefits because she was married to a green card holder.

She and her son were son denied, in part, due to her immigration status.

243. Desperate and unable to provide for her family, P.E. applied again in early

November 2003. HRA accepted only her citizen son's application. P.E. and her older son were

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wrongly denied assistance, although HRA never provided her with a notice of denial. The notice

she did receive failed to apprise her that only her citizen son would receive any benefits.

244. In November 2004, P.E. received a prima facie notice on her VAWA self-petition,

on which E.B. is a derivative beneficiary. She returned to HRA and asked that she and her

immigrant son be added to her citizen son's case. Due to her attorney's extensive advocacy,

HRA granted the request, providing her and her immigrant son public assistance and Medicaid,

and also issuing her immigrant son food stamps.

245. However, starting January 2005, every time P.E. went to an appointment HRA

workers said she and her immigrant son were receiving benefits by mistake, either because she is

not a citizen or because she has no Social Security number or work authorization. She only

remained on benefits because her attorney called the center each time HRA threatened to close

her case.

!

246. On April 19, 2005, P.E. received notice that her family's public assistance and food

stamps benefits were being reduced to the amounts payable for one person. The notice did not

explain why she and her immigrant son were being removed from the case.

247. On June 21, 2005, P.E. attended a fair hearing challenging HRA's decision to take

P.E. and her immigrant son offof the family's case. No decision has been issued on this hearing.

248. On August 19, 2005, P.E. attended a second fair hearing, this one challenging

HRA's refusal to add her and her immigrant son to the case until November 2004. The decision

on that fair hearing, issued on September 20 2005, found that HRA wrongly denied P.E. and her

immigrant son public benefits in June 2003 and again in November 2003 due to a misapplication

of the immigrant eligibility rules. The decision directed HRA to provide the missing retroactive

public benefits back to July 2003. HRA has only partially implemented that decision: P.E.

;
1.,

Page 63

received all the retroactive food stamps that her family was owed, but she is still owed $2,233 in

public assistance and her medical bills are still unpaid.

249. While P.E. has been waiting for her fair hearing decisions, numerous different HRA

workers have repeatedly threatened to discontinue her benefits. For example, on June 29, 2005,

Ms. Wright, an HRA caseworker, said that she was going to close P.E. 's case because P.E. did

not have a green card or Social Security number.

250. Several other workers have told her that she and E.E. are not eligible because their

VAWA prima facie notice has expired. They do not realize that a VAWA approval notice

supersedes a prima facie notice and entitles them to benefits. A different worker said they were

not eligible because they did not have employment authorization. Recently, several HRA

I

workers have threatened to close their cases because they do not have Social Security numbers or

I

green cards.

!

251. P.E. has been harmed in several ways because ofHRA's inability to apply

I

immigrant eligibility rules correctly. She was unable to pay rent in 2003 and was forced to move into a homeless shelter in March 2004. She did not have enough money for food from March

2004 until November 2004 and had to skip meals or eat only noodles for days. In the fall of

2004, she suffered from excruciating pain for weeks but did not go to a doctor because she had

been denied Medicaid and could not afford to pay a doctor. In October 2004, she was rushed to

the hospital by ambulance and had her gallbladder removed. P.E. is still harassed by collection

agencies because she has over $5,000 in unpaid medical bills from the gallbladder surgery that

should have been covered by Medicaid. She was also unable to attend school until October 2005

because HRA refused to provide her with childcare assistance until she received a Social

Security number.

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252. P.E. desperately needs the $2,233 in retroactive public assistance benefits that she is owed so that she can buy furniture for her apartment, as well as warm coats, clothes, and shoes for her children. She constantly fears that her benefits will be cut off because every time she goes to her job center for an appointment, the caseworkers tell her that she should be removed from the case. Plaintiff Anna Fedosenko
253. Anna Fedosenko is an 88-year-old disabled lawful permanent resident from the Ukraine who speaks only Russian. She lives in an apartment in Brooklyn with her disabled daughter.
254. Ms. Fedosenko has been a lawful permanent resident since September 27,2002. Because she came to the United States after August 22, 1996, she is eligible for State Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. Because she is disabled, she would be eligible for federal food stamps if HRA had complied with its legal obligation to refer her for a Medicaid disability determination.
255. Ms. Fedosenko received public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps until September 2004 when her food stamps were discontinued without notice. Despite a favorable fair hearing decision, she has not received food stamps since then. She has continued to receive public assistance and Medicaid, however.
256. On June 27, 2005, Ms. Fedosenko's attorney spoke to Ms. Williams, the Deputy Director of the Senior Works Center, who said that Ms. Fedosenko is not eligible for food stamps because she has not had her green card for five years. During that conversation and in subsequent ones, Ms. Fedosenko's attorney explained that she is eligible for food stamps if
NY 1008585JDOC

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Medicaid finds her disabled. Her attorney asked Ms. Williams to refer Ms. Fedosenko for the

necessary disability determination. Ms. Williams did not know how to make the referral.

257. If properly referred, Ms. Fedosenko would undoubtedly be found disabled. She is

88 years old. She is legally blind and suffers from age-related macular degeneration, severe

arthritis, anemia, depression, and has extremely limited mobility that prevents her from taking

public transportation or walking more than a short distance.

I

258. On July 21,2005, an attorney represented Ms. Fedosenko at a fair hearing

challenging the discontinuance of her food stamps without notice.

259. The decision after the fair hearing, issued on August 29, 2005, found that HRA's

determination to discontinue her food stamps without notice was incorrect and was reversed.

The decision directed the Senior Works Center to immediately restore her food stamp benefits

retroactive to August 31, 2004 based on the lack of notice.

260. On September 7, 2005, the Senior Works Center issued a Fair Hearing Compliance

Statement stating that the Center would not comply with the fair hearing decision because "in

order to receive food stamps, you must lawfully reside in the United States for five years."

261. On November 18,2005, Ms. Fedosenko's attorney faxed Ms. Williams, the Deputy

Director of the Senior Works Center, a copy ofa Medicaid disability determination form that had

been completed by Ms. Fedosenko's doctors and requested that Ms. Fedosenko be referred for a

Medicaid disability determination. This fax also requested that the center comply with the fair

hearing decision and issue Ms. Fedosenko's food stamps retroactive to August 31, 2004. There

has been no response from the Center and Ms. Fedosenko is still not receiving food stamps.

262. The discontinuance of Ms. Fedosenko's food stamps has caused and is continuing

to cause Ms. Fedosenko irreparable harm. Ms. Fedosenko has anemia so it is vitally important

NY 1008585JDOC

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that her diet contains lots of fresh food that is rich in iron. The food stamps that her disabled

daughter receives cannot be stretched to feed them both. Ms. Fedosenko frequently goes without

these foods because she cannot afford them, even though her doctor has advised her of the

importance of these foods in her diet and the dangers of not treating her anemia in this way.

263. Because Ms. Fedosenko must use her $68.50 semi-monthly public assistance grant

to purchase food, she has difficulty pay for other basic necessities, such as laundry, clothing, and

travel.

Plaintiff A.I.

264. A.I. is a 32-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Bangladesh who lives in an

apartment in Brooklyn, New York with her two children, S.A., who is 2 years old, and W.A.,

who is 6 years old. USCIS has approved an 1-130 petition filed on A.I. and W.A.'s behalf.

I

Because they have an approved 1-130 and proof of abuse, they are Qualified Aliens. Because they arrived in the United States after August 22, 1996, they are eligible for State Medicaid and

I

Safety Net Assistance. W.A. is also eligible for federal food stamps because she is a child. S.A.,

who is a citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits, is the only one in the family

who is receiving public benefits.

265. A.I. and W.A. have not received any of the benefits for which they are eligible even

though they have applied repeatedly since March 2004.

266. A.I. and W.A. came to the United States in September 2002 on V-I and V-3 visas,

respectively. They received these visas because A.I.'s husband, who is a lawful permanent

resident, had filed an 1-\30 family petition on her and their daughter's behalf.

267. A.I.'s life in the United States has been very difficult. Her husband, who has been

hospitalized repeatedly for mental illness, controlled her every move until she fled to a domestic

Page 67

violence shelter. About a month or two after she arrived, while she was pregnant with their

second daughter, he kicked her in the stomach repeatedly, threatened to kill her, and choked her.

The abuse continued on a regular basis.

268. After their daughter was born in June 2003, A.I. got a job because her husband was

not working and they were barely making ends meet. But this made her husband furious. He

, .

accused her of sleeping with other men while she was at work and would beat her or lock the

door so that she could not go to work. He cut up all her clothes so that she could not go out.

269. In February 2004, the abuse became unbearable. During an argument about money,

AI. 's husband hit her in the face and threatened to kill her with a knife. He then threw her and

their older daughter W.A out of the house. He would not let her take their baby daughter

though. As a result, the police arrested him and took him to a mental hospital for observation.

AI. then received an order of protection from family court that said that her husband must stay

away from and refrain from contacting her and the children.

270. Soon after this incident, A.I. and her children fled to a domestic violence shelter in

Brooklyn. They lived in the domestic violence shelter until September 2004 when they moved

into the apartment where they now live.

271. While living in the shelter, on March 12, 2004, A.I. applied for public benefits for

herself and her two children at the Jamaica Job Center. She showed her HRA worker, an Asian-

1

!

American woman, copies of her and her daughter's V visas, employment authorization cards,

'1

and Social Security cards. The V visas and the code on her employment authorization card

indicate that AI.'s husband filed 1-130 family-based petitions for her and W.A. Despite this, the

caseworker told her that only her citizen daughter was eligible.

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272. In April 2004, her citizen daughter started receiving public assistance, food stamps,

and Medicaid. A.I. never received a notice stating that she and her immigrant daughter were

I

denied, or that her citizen daughter was accepted. Although A.I. and her immigrant daughter were denied Medicaid at this time, they started receiving Medicaid in June 2004 and October

I

2004, respectively, when they applied at a local hospital. 273. Starting in July 2004, A.I. repeatedly asked her caseworker Ms. Walker to add her

and her immigrant daughter to the case. Each time, she showed Ms. Walker all of her and her

daughter's immigration papers. She also gave Ms. Walker a copy of her order of protection and

a letter stating that she lived in a domestic violence shelter. Ms. Walker always told A.I. that she

could only receive benefits for her citizen daughter because she and her immigrant daughter only

have work permits.

274. In the summer of2005, her citizen daughter's case was transferred to the

Greenwood Job Center. A.I. asked her new worker, Mr. Conley, to add her and her immigrant

daughter to the case. After looking at her immigration papers and checking in the computer, he

too told her that only her citizen daughter is eligible for benefits.

275. On November 14, 2005, A.I. again asked Mr. Conley to add her and her immigrant

daughter to the case. This time she took with her a letter from her attorney explaining their

eligibility. Attached to the letter was a copy of their V visas, employment authorization cards, 1-

130 approval notice, and proof of abuse in the form of an order ofprotection and letter from the

domestic violence shelter.

276. After reviewing the letter, Mr. Conley agreed to add her and her immigrant

daughter to the case and entered their information into the computer system.

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277. But, due to computer problems related to their immigration status, A.I. and her immigrant daughter still have not received public assistance. The case has repeatedly "errored out" of the system. The Deputy Director of the center, Ms. Wallace, and Mr. Conley have both tried on numerous occasions to open the case. But they cannot figure out how to do so.
278. A.I. has never received a notice in response to her multiple requests for her and her immigrant daughter to be added to the case.
279. AI. and her two children have struggled to survive on the limited public assistance and food stamps they receive.
280. A.I. and her children can barely afford the basics. They survive on good will and charity. Organizations frequently provide food, diapers, Metrocards, and toiletries, and AI.'s family assists when they visit from Bangladesh. However, this assistance is not enough, and they often go without necessities. AI. must sometimes subsist on beans and cereal alone. She does not have enough wann clothes for herself or the children. For eight months, she had no phone.
281. AI. wants ajob so that she will no longer depend on public benefits to survive, but her work authorization expired in September 2004. Her immigration attorney filed for renewal and is planning to file Violence Against Women Act petitions and applications to adjust so that AI. and W.A can become lawful permanent residents. Until she receives work authorization, AI. and her children must rely on charity and public benefits. Plaintiff L.A.M.
282. L.A.M. is a 34-year-old immigrant from Trinidad who is PRUCOL because the USCIS granted her deferred action on June 3, 2005. She lives in a domestic violence shelter with her two-year-old son. Because L.AM. is PRUCOL, she is eligible for Safety Net
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Assistance and State Medicaid. Her SOil, who is a citizen, is eligible for all federal public benefits.
283. L.A.M. has been wrongly denied public assistance since June 2005 because the workers at the Linden Job Center mistakenly think she is ineligible because she does not have a green card. In October 2005, L.A.M.'s attorney convinced the Administrative Assistant to the Director of Linden to add L.A.M. to her son's case. But due to computer problems related to her immigration status, L.A.M. is still not receiving public assistance.
284. While visiting the United States on vacation, L.A.M. met her abuser, who is a U.S. citizen. After they had been dating for a while, he promised to marry her and file papers so that she could stay in the country and become a lawful permanent resident. In May of2002, when she found out that she was pregnant, he again promised to marry her, but he kept pushing back the date.
285. In January 2003, L.A.M. moved in with him and his mother. After that, he became abusive. At first the abuse was emotional and financial. But after their baby was born, he became physically abusive too. The worst incident occurred in January 2004 when she told him that she was going to leave him. When she was taking ber son's clothes out of the drawers to pack them, be slammed the drawer closed, almost smashing her fingers. He then started punching her repeatedly in the head. Blood dripped from her head all over the floor and her clothes. As a result ofthe punches, her face swelled, and she got a black eye, bruised lips, and cuts on her nose, eye, tongue, and ear. She bad severe head pain and her ear kept bleeding for days. She could not eat, and had to sleep sitting up because it hurt to lie on her ear.
286. The abuser was arrested for tbis abuse. Sbe helped tbe District Attorney prosecute bim, and he was sentenced to jail until September 2005. Because she assisted in the prosecution

Page 71

of a violent crime, she was eligible to apply for a U visa. She applied and was granted deferred

action on June 3, 2005. She also received employment authorization.

287. While her abuser was in jail, she lived in a small room in an office building with her

son. At first she was able to support herself with odd jobs like babysitting and cleaning. But in

July 2004, however, she could not fmd another job. She was desperate and applied for public

benefits at the Linden Job Center. Her son began to receive public benefits.

288. In early or mid June 2005, after she received the deferred action notice and

employment authorization, she went to her caseworker Ms. Kirkendall and asked to be added to

her son's public assistance case. (L.A.M. already had Medicaid through a Medicaid-only

center.) She told Ms. Kirkendall that she was a victim of domestic violence and showed her the

employment authorization, which has a code CI4 on it that indicates that she have been granted

deferred action.

289. Ms. Kirkendall told her that she needed a green card and that the employment

I

authorization was not enough. When L.A.M. insisted that her attorney told her that she was

eligible, Ms. Kirkendall went to speak with a supervisor. When she came back she said that her

boss said L.A.M. was not eligible because the domestic violence occurred in this country (not in

her home country), because she did not have a "prima facie," and because she was not a citizen

or green card holder. She continued to receive benefits only for her son.

290. When her abuser's parole officer warned her that he wouJd be getting out ofjail in

September 2005, L.A.M. and her son fled to a domestic violence shelter. They have lived in that

shelter since August 5, 2005.

291. On October 4, 2005, L.A.M. again applied to be added to her son's public

assistance case once more. When she got to the Linden Job Center, she went to the customer

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service counter and asked to apply for public assistance. She presented her work authorization,

Social Security card, and a letter from her immigration advocate that explained that she was an

eligible immigrant. Attached to the letter was HRA's Alien Eligibility Desk Aid, which states

that those with deferred action are eligible for public assistance. She was told that she was not

eligible because she was did not have a green card.

292. L.A.M. never received a notice in response to any of her requests to be added to her

son's case.

293. October 11, 2005, L.A.M.'s attorney faxed a letter to the Administrative Assistant

(AA) to the Director of the Linden Job Center, Ms. Bedford, asking her to add L.AM. to her

son's case retroactive to July 2005. Along with the cover note, L.AM.'s attorney sent a copy of

L.A.M.'s deferred action notice, employment authorization card, Social Security card, the letter

from her immigration advocate that she had taken into the center, and the page from HRA's

Desk Aid that says that she is eligible. Her attorney then followed up with multiple phone calls.

294. Due to this advocacy, L.AM. was added to her son's case on October 14, 2005.

L.AM., however, has not received any benefits, not even for her son, since October 13, 2005.

She went into the center on multiple occasions to ask why she and her son were not receiving

benefits. On November 15, her attorney called the center Linden Job Center's Director's office.

She spoke to Ms. Jefferson who said that the case is open for L.AM. and her son and that $54.50

in public assistance and approximately $150 in food stamps were issued on the card the day

before. When asked why L.A.M. was receiving only $54.50 semi-monthly, when families of two

usually get twice that amount, Ms. Jefferson said that it must be because L.A.M.'s case has two

suffixes - one suffix so that her son can receive state benefits and one so that she can receive

:\

')

federal benefits. Ms. Jefferson said L.AM. should go to the center to get a new card because

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sometimes the cards stop working when a new suffix is created. Ms. Jefferson also promised to leave a message for the AA, Ms. Bedford, so that the other $54.50 could be issued.
295. L.A.M. went to the center and received a new benefits card. But the new card, as well as the old cards, has no benefits on it. L.A.M. has called the number on the back of the card repeatedly, but the people who answer the line say there are no benefits on the cards and that they cannot help her. Her attorney also left repeated messages for the AA, as well as Ms. McCall, the Deputy Director. But no one returned her calls.
296. L.A.M. and her son and have not received any public assistance or food stamps since October 13, 2005 due to computer problems related to L.A.M.'s immigration status.
297. L.A.M. has suffered extreme hardship because she has been denied public benefits for almost six months. She often does not have enough food and has to rely on food pantries and other charities. Even so, she sometimes has to skip meals and does not always have enough milk for her son. She rarely is able to buy the fresh fruit and vegetables her doctor told her to eat to prevent her acid reflux from reoccuning. As a result, she often got stomach pains and headaches.
298. She also frequently runs out of diapers, as well as toilet paper, laundry detergent, shampoo, and other basic necessities. When she is low on diapers, she is forced to stay home with her son so that she does not have to put a diaper on him. She lets him run around without a diaper and tries to get him to go in the toilet. But often he has accidents. At night, instead of putting a diaper on him, she puts a plastic bag on the bed so that only the bag - not the bed - gets soiled ifhe had an accident. Recently her son's daycare had to take diapers from other children in order to put diapers on her son.
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299. She also does not have sufficient winter clothes for her son. She cannot afford to pay for a cellphone. It is very hard for her doctors, lawyers, counselors, potential landlords, and potential employers to get in touch with her.
300. Because the Linden Job Center did not open her case until mid-October 2005, she was certified for a housing voucher for only $765 per month. She looked but could not find an apartment for that amount. Now that she is on the public benefits case (though not receiving benefits), she has been certified for $850. But she has lost a month oftime and is having trouble finding apartments because her phone is dead and she does not have money for the subway.
301. If L.A.M. and her son do not receive benefits soon, they will run completely out of food and other basic necessities. Charities and food pantries can only give her a limited amount. Plaintiff L.M.
302. L.M. is a 42-year-old lawful permanent resident from Haiti who lives with her two children, ages 2 and 16, in a domestic violence shelter in New York City. Because she is a Qualified Alien who entered the country prior to August 22, 1996, L.M. is eligible for federal Medicaid and Family Assistance. Because she has worked 40 qualifying quarters (10 years) in the United States as defined under the Social Security Act, she is eligible for federal food stamps. L.M.'s older son entered the country after 1996 and has been a lawful permanent resident since 2003. As a Qualified Alien child who entered after 1996, he is eligible for State Medicaid, Safety Net Assistance, and federal food stamps. L.M.' s younger son is a citizen and therefore eligible for all federal public benefits.
303. L.M. has been denied the food stamps she is entitled to since at least June 2004 because the workers at the Melrose Job Center never inquired into whether she had 40 qualifying
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Page 75

work quarters. Her two children receive food stamps and all three of them receive public

assistance and Medicaid. 304. L.M. moved to the United States in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident

in 2001. As a result of abuse, L.M. suffers from depression as well as memory loss. She is no

longer able to work because of severe carpal tunnel syndrome and must rely on public benefits to

support her family. 305. Because she never received a notice stating she was denied food stamps, L.M. did

not realize that she was not on her children's food stamp case until her attorney told her that

HRA's computer records show that she was denied food stamps due to her immigration status. L.M. had never been asked if she worked 40 quarters, and the application that she completed did

J

not ask if she had worked 10 years or 40 quarters.

i

306. On May 9, 2005, L.M. attended a fair hearing to appeal the denial of her food

stamps application. At the hearing, L.M. 's attorneys submitted copies of her green card and

Social Security Statement, which shows that she has over 40 quarters of work history. L.M.' s

attorneys also submitted City and State policy directives showing that lawful permanent residents with 40 work quarters are eligible for food stamps. While the hearing had been requested to

contest the denial of food stamps since June 2004, the AU would only let L.M. discuss the

period from August 25, 2005 forward.

307. On July 14, 2005, L.M. attended a fair hearing to challenge the denial offood

stamps from June 2004 forward. L.M. and her attorney again presented the same documents: her

green card, Social Security Statement, and the relevant City and State policy directives

explaining that she is eligible.

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308. A decision on the first hearing issued on August 5, 2005. That decision found that HRA's denial ofL.M.'s food stamp application was incorrect. The decision directed HRA to continue processing her application for benefits and to provide her with benefits retroactive to August 25, 2005 if she is foood eligible for food stamps. The decision does not mention L.M.' s immigration status, nor does it explain the immigrant eligibility rules.
309. A decision on the second fair hearing issued on November 2,2005. That decision stated that the City's denial of L.M.'s Jooe 2004 application for food stamps was incorrect and that her food stamp benefits must be recomputed to include her needs retroactive to that date. The decision explained that lawful permanent residents with 40 qualifying quarters, like L.M., are eligible for food stamps and that HRA had "failed to present any evidence that it properly investigated and determined that issue."
310. Despite these two fair hearing decisions, L.M. is still not on her children's food stamps case. This wrongful denial of food stamps for almost a year and a half has caused great hardship for L.M. and her family.
311. L.M. struggles to pay for food and usually runs out of food half way through the month. She is forced to rely on food pantries to feed her children. Sometimes she also is able to borrow money from friends. But despite this help from charity and friends, she has to skip meals. When she does, she gets headaches and feels dizzy. In April 2005, she had to go to the emergency room twice for dizziness and dehydration because she was not eating enough and was stressed over her living situation and the problems with her benefits. Plaintiff Denise Thomas
312. Denise Thomas is a 26-year-old battered qualified immigrant from Saint Lucia. She lives in her mother's Brooklyn apartment with her sister, 3-year-old-daughter and her 9-month-

Page 77

old son. Ms. Thomas has been a Qualified Alien since July 2004, when she received a prima

facie notice on her VAWA self-petition. Because she is a Qualified Alien who entered the

I

United States prior to 1996, she is eligible for Family Assistance and federal Medicaid. Until the

, i

program was discontinued in September 2005, she was also eligible for state food stamps. Both

her children are U.S. citizens and are receiving all the public benefits for which they are eligible.

313. Ms. Thomas was denied public benefits for eleven months because workers at the

Greenwood Job Center do not know that VAWA self-petitioners are eligible. Due to efforts of

her advocates, she now receives ongoing benefits. But she is still owed almost a year of

retroactive public assistance benefits.

314. Ms. Thomas came to the United States from Saint Lucia in 1995 when she was 15

years old. She has not left the country since then, and she is willing to apply for citizenship

once she is eligible to do so.

I

315. Ms. Thomas met her husband at church and they married in January 2002. During the course of their relationship, Ms. Thomas's husband regularly abused her. He even assaulted

her while she was pregnant with their first child. After one incident where her husband hit her

sister'S face, Ms. Thomas filed a police report against him. When he pushed her down the stairs,

Ms. Thomas again called the police and obtained a full order ofprotection against him. In

August of2003, Ms. Thomas took her husband's keys and forced him to move out.

316. Soon thereafter, in August 2003, prior to filing a VAWA self-petition, Ms. Thomas

applied for public assistance benefits for herself and her daughter. Her daughter's application

was approved.

317. In September 2004, after she had received a prima facie notice on her VAWA self-

petition, Ms. Thomas asked to be added to her daughter's public benefits case. Ms. Calendar, a

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Page 78
caseworker at the Greenwood Job Center worker, told Ms. Thomas that she needed either a Social Security number or a green card to obtain benefits and that the prima facie notice was insufficient.
318. In January 2005, Ms. Thomas again asked to be added to her children's public assistance case. Ms. S. Thomas, a Greenwood caseworker, told her that she had to be a citizen for five years to receive benefits.
319. In February 2005, Ms. Thomas's VAWA self-petition was approved. 320. In March 2005, Ms. Thomas's son was born. In June 2005, Ms. Thomas applied for benefits for her newborn and again requested to be added to his case. Her son began receiving benefits, but Ms. Thomas did not. Ms. Thomas requested a fair hearing on the denial of her request to be added to her children's case. 321. Ms. Thomas's advocate sent numerous letters to and persistently called the Greenwood Job Center and the Deputy Regional Manager Regional Manager explaining Ms. Thomas's eligibility. As a result of his advocacy, Ms. Thomas began receiving public assistance and Medicaid in July 2005. She still has not, however, received any of the benefits to which she was entitled for the year she was wrongfully denied benefits. She attended a fair hearing on December 1,2005 to seek these retroactive benefits. No decision has been issued on the fair hearing. 322. Because Ms. Thomas was wrongfully denied benefits, she had to borrow money from her mother to support her children. She relied on leftover food from charitable organizations and friends to feed her children. She often could not afford soap or detergent. Her children suffered from eczema and Ms. Thomas was sometimes unable to buy the lotion to treat them.
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323. She desperately needs the retroactive benefits that she is owed because her mother's

landlord has told them that they must move. She could use the retroactive benefits to pay

I ,

moving expenses, such as the security deposit and first month's rent.

Plaintiff J .z.

324. lZ. is a 28-year-old battered qualified inunigrant from Mexico who lives in an

apartment in the Bronx, New York with her 8-year-old son and her 3-year-old daughter. J.z. has

been a Qualified Alien since July 2004 when she first applied for public benefits. She was a

Qualified Alien initially because she had proof of abuse and her husband had filed an 1-130

family-based petition on her behalf. She now is a Qualified Alien because she has an approved

VAWA self-petition. Because she arrived in the United States before August 22, 1996, J.Z. is

eligible for federal Medicaid and Family Assistance. Until the program was discontinued in

September 2005, J.z. was also eligible for state food stamps. Her children are U.S. citizens and

therefore eligible for all federal public benefits.

I

325. lZ. was denied all public benefits by the Colgate, Crotona, and Greenwood Job

Centers for eight months because the workers at these centers wrongly thought she was an

ineligible immigrant. Then in June 2005, just three months after she was finally added to her

children's case, her case was again closed because workers at the Hamilton Job Center, where

the case had been transferred, thought she was no longer eligible because her VAWA prima facie

notice had expired. These workers did not realize that a VAWA approval notice supersedes the

prima facie notice and is sufficient to make her eligible for benefits. J.Z.'s benefits were restored

five weeks later due to advocacy of her attorney, but she still has unpaid medical bills and is

owed retroactive public assistance and food stamps.

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326. J.2. arrived in the United States in 1984 or 1985, when she was 7 or 8 years old.

J.Z. has not left the United States since she arrived, and she is willing to apply for citizenship

once she is eligible.

327. J.Z. met her husband in high school, and they got married in the Bronx in 1996.

They have two children.

328. In April 2001, J.Z.'s husband, a lawful permanent resident, filed an 1-130 family-

based petition for her. USCIS approved the 1-130 petition on September 30, 2004.

329. In March of 2004, J.Z. called the police when her husband threatened to kill her and

tried to throw her out of their apartment. A few months later, in July 2004, J.Z. called the police

three more times when her husband punched her in the head, pushed her into the bed, and choked

her. J.2. had to go to the hospital to treat her injuries, bruises, and the pain she suffered as a

result of his attacks. J.Z. was very scared and did not want him around her or the children.

330. After the incidents in July 2004, her husband left their home.

331. In July 2004, lZ. was unemployed. At that time, her husband was receiving food

i
i

stamps, public assistance, and Medicaid for himself and their children and they supported

themselves with those benefits. J.Z. was not on the family's public benefits budget and at that

time had never received public benefits herself.

332. In July 2004, after her husband left their apartment, J.Z. went to Colgate Job Center

I

to recertify her children's public benefits case. J.Z. asked Mr. Gonzalez, the caseworker she met

,:~

with, to add her to the case and showed him police reports concerning her husband's abuse, her

1

I
I

marriage certificate, the children's birth certificates, and the receipt notice on her 1-130 petition.

I

Mr. Gonzalez re-certified the children, but told J.Z. that she was ineligible for benefits based on

l

her immigration status.

NY lOO8585JDOC

Page 81 333. On or about September 13, 2004, J.Z. moved into a domestic violence shelter with the children because her husband had been calling her and threatening to hurt her and take away the children. She also obtained an order of protection against her husband. 334. On or about September 17, 2004, J.Z. returned to the Colgate Job Center and spoke with Ms. White, Mr. Gonzalez's supervisor. J.Z. again asked to be added to the children's case and J.Z. showed Ms. White a letter from the domestic violence shelter where J.z. was staying and the 1-130 approval notice J.Z. had recently received. Ms. White told her she was ineligible due to her immigration status. 335. On December 20,2004, J.Z. received a VAWA prima facie notice from USCIS. 336. Meanwhile, her children's public benefits case was transferred to the Crotona Job Center. On or about January 24, 2005, J.Z. went to the Crotona Job Center and asked Ms. Martinez, an HRA caseworker, to add her to the case and showed him her VAWA prima facie notice, her 1-130 approval notice, a letter from her shelter, and the evidence of domestic violence J.Z. had turned in at the Colgate Center. 337. J.Z. did not receive any notice in response to her requests to be added to her children's case until early March 2005. On March 8, 2005, she received a notice stating that she would be added to her children's public assistance and Medicaid case. Even though she was eligible for state food stamps, the notice incorrectly stated that J.Z. would not receive food stamps because J.Z. was an ineligible non-citizen. 338. In or about March 2005, J.Z. and her children had to move into a homeless shelter because they had stayed for the maximum period oftime allowed in an emergency domestic violence shelter.
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339. On May 20, 2005, J.Z. attended a fair hearing to challenge the fact that she was denied food stamps. The decision, issued June 8, 2005, stated that HRA was incorrect in denying her food stamps and ordered HRA to continue to provide her with ongoing and retroactive food stamps. J.Z. has never received ongoing or retroactive food stamps.
340. Meanwhile, their case was transferred to the Hamilton Job Center. On or about June 14,2005, J.z. showed the fair hearing decision to Ms. ScantJebury, her caseworker, and her supervisor, Mr. Sosa. The HRA workers stated that the fair hearing decision did not require them to add her to the food stamp budget and that J.Z. was ineligible for food stamps because of her immigrant status.
341. Further, Ms. ScantJebury and Mr. Sosa stated that even if J.z. had been eligible for
public benefits in the past J.Z. would no longer be eligible for any public benefits because her prima facie notice was expiring on June 18,2005. J.Z. showed them the approval notice for her self-petition, but they told her that the approval notice did not establish eligibility and that J.Z. would need another prima facie notice. Even though J.Z. explained that the approval notice meant her immigration case was approved and that it was better evidence oflawful immigration status than her prima facie notice, the workers told her that they were going to take her off of the case. That is exactly what happened.
342. J .Z. never received a written notice that she would be removed from the case, but on June 29,2005, she was taken off the public assistance and Medicaid case. As a result, her housing voucher was reduced from $925 to $820 and J.Z. was unable to find an apartment that she could rent for $820 a month.
343. On or about August 4,2005, J.Z. attended a fair hearing on HRA's decision to drop her from the case in June 2005 and its failure to grant her public assistance and Medicaid
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Page 83 benefits retroactive to July 2004. At the fair hearing, the center representative agreed to review her case retroactive to July 2004 and to detennine whether to include her in the current budget. State OTDA issued a decision dated September 20, 2005 reflecting the stipulation.
344. Although J.Z. is currently on the budget because her attorney advocated for her to receive benefits pending a fair hearing decision, she still has not received the retroactive public assistance she is entitled to and HRA has not paid her old medical bills.
345. In October 2005, J.Z. moved into an apartment with her children. 346. When she was not on the case, J.Z. was unable to pay for food for herself and her children. Even though friends gave her food and she borrowed money, she sometimes had to go without food so that her children could eat. 347. J.Z. developed an ulcer as a result of the stress caused by the uncertainty of her public benefits, the instability of her housing situation, and her poor nutrition. Because J.Z. was denied Medicaid for so long, she was unable to get medical treatment for her ulcer and the other medical conditions she was suffering. In June and July 2005, J.Z. was unable to afford to get her prescription for Nexium filled. Further, J.z. has over $1,000 in unpaid bills for medical treatment from her husband's abuse in July 2004. 348. J.Z.'s daughter's health also suffered greatly after they moved into the homeless shelter. Her poor nutrition has caused great fluctuations in her weight. i
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STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant) Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying Federal Food Stamp Benefits to Eligible Class Members 349. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal food stamp benefits to eligible class members on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal food stamp benefits to these class members on account of immigration status, violates 7 U.S.C. § 2020(eX3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a), (g)(J). SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant) Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying Federal Medicaid Benefits to Certain Eligible Class Members 350. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal Medicaid benefits to eligible class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal Medicaid benefits to these class members on account of immigration status, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant) Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Class Members from Applying for Federal Food Stamps 351. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps; refusing to permit class members to apply for federal food stamps; and/or discouraging or refusing to permit class members seeking to apply for
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federal food stamps to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member,

violate 7 U.S.C. § ZOZO(e)(2)(B)(iii).

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against the City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Certain Class Members from Applying for Federal Medicaid

35Z. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members who

are not lawful permanent residents from applying for federal Medicaid benefits; refusing to

permit these class members to apply for those federal Medicaid; and/or discouraging or refusing

to permit these class members seeking to apply for federal Medicaid to be added to the existing

public benefits case of a household member, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX8) and 42 C.F.R.

§ 435.906 (Medicaid).

I

FIFfH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant)

J

Unlawful POlicy and ClMtom of Failing to Provide Adequate and

Timely Notice of the Denial, Discontinuance, or Reduction of Benefits

353. HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide notice of the denial of

federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to class members: (1) when assistance is granted to

some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants

apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants

are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violate 7 C.F.R. § Z73.1O(g)(I) (food

stamps), and 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid).

354. HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide notice ofthe denial of public

benefits to class members: (1) when assistance is granted to some household members but

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denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants are discouraged or prohibited from applying for public benefits, violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
355. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if not impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal, violate 7 C.F.R. § 273.IO(g)(I) (food stamps), and 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid).
356. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices to class members that make it impossible for them to make informed decisions about whether, and to appeal effectively from the denial, when public benefits are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against tbe City Defendant) Unlawful Failure to Admiuister, Supervise, and Train 357. HRA has been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees at job centers. HRA's deliberate indifference to the federal rights of class members has caused and/or contributed to the policies, customs, and usages described above; and has resulted in the widespread and systematic denial of the rights under federal law of eligible class members to receive federal food stamps and federal Medicaid. 358. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of referring applicants for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid to SSA with documentation that fails to comply with SSA's requirements,
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thereby making it likely or certain that SSA will not issue them a Social Security number, violates 7 C.F.R. ~ 273.6(b) (food stamps) and 42 C.F.R. § 43S.910(e)(Medicaid).
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the State Defendants)
Unlawful Failure to Administer, Supervise and Train 359. Actions and omissions by State OTDA and State DOH have caused andlor contributed to the policies, customs, and usages ofHRA described above. Because HRA functions as a matter of law as the agent of State OrDA (with regard to federal food stamps) and State DOH (with regard to federal Medicaid), State OrDA and State DOH are jointly and severally liable for HRA's violations offederaI law. 360. Through their actions and omissions that have caused andlor contributed to the policies, customs, and usages ofHRA described above, State OTDA, and State DOH have violated their responsibilities under federal law as the single state agencies responsible for administering and supervising the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs, respectively, in New York State, in violation of7 U.S.C. § 2012(n) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Medicaid), and 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid). 361. State OTDA and State DOH have been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees who administer federal food stamps and federal Medicaid at job centers. Their deliberate indifference to the federal rights of class members has caused andlor contributed to the policies, customs, and usages ofHRA described above; and has resulted in the widespread and systematic denial of the rights under federal law of eligible class members to receive federal food stamps and federal Medicaid.
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STATE LAW CLAIMS

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against tbe City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying Public Assistance And State Medicaid to Certain Eligible Class Members

362. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying public assistance and State Medicaid

to eligible class members who are not lawful pennanent residents on account of immigration

I

status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing public assistance and State Medicaid benefits to

these class members on account of immigration status, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122,

131(1) & (3) (public assistance), 366(1)(a) (State Medicaid), and 18 N'y.C.R.R. §§ 349, et seq.

(public assistance).

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against tbe City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Denying State Food Stamps to Eligible Class Members

363. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying State food stamp benefits to eligible

class members on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing class

members' State food stamps on account of immigration status, violated N.Y. Soc. Servo Law

§ 95(1O)(b) (State Food Assistance Program).

TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against tbe City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Certain Class Members From Applying for Public Assistance and State Medicaid

364. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members who

are not lawful pennanent residents from applying for public assistance and State Medicaid;

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refusing to pennit these class members to submit applications for those benefits; and/or discouraging or refusing to pennit class members seeking to apply for those benefits to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366a(l) (State Medicaid) 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(a) and (b) (public assistance).
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant)
Unlawful Policy and Custom of Deterring and Discouraging Class Members From Applying for State Food Stamps
365. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for State food stamps; refusing to permit class members to submit applications for those benefits; and/or discouraging or refusing to permit class members seeking to apply for those benefits to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violated N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 95(10)(b) (State Food Assistance Program).
TWELTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Against the City Defendant)
Unlawful Policy and Custom of Failing to Provide Adequate and Timely Notice of the Denial, Discontinnance, or Reduction of State Benefits 366. HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide notice of the denial ofpubJic benefits to immigrants: (I) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violates 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.8(b) and 358-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(3)(b) (Medicaid).
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Page 90

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367. HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it

difficult if not impossible to determine whether public assistance and State Medicaid were

correctly denied or provided in the proper amount andlor whether to appeal when such benefits

are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violates

18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 35J.8(b) and 358.2-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-

a(3)(b) (Medicaid).

THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Against the City Defendant)

Unlawful Policy aud Custom of Requiring Applicants for Public Assistance and State Medicaid Who Cannot Obtain Social Security Numbers to Furnish Social Security Numbers

368. No provision of the New York State Social Services Law requires applicants for

public assistance or State Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of

eligibility.

369. To the extent that HRA acts to enforce State regulations, State directives, and City

directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State

Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security

number is impossible to obtain, those actions violate N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122, 134-a(2) and

366-a(2)(a).

REOUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter a judgment in their

favor as follows:

I. CertifY this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)

with a plaintiff class defined as:

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All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for State or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, and/or food stamps, and wbo either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have public benefits discontinued or reduced; (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying for public benefits; and/or (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application for public benefits, by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term "Affected Immigrants" means (I) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case ofbattered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in tbat status for less than five years; and (4) persons wbo are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
2. Issue a declaratory judgment declaring: (a) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal food stamps to eligible class members on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal food stamps on account of immigration status, violates 7 U.S.C. § 2020{e)(3) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.2{a), (g){l) (food stamps);
(b) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying federal Medicaid benefits to eligible class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing federal Medicaid benefits to these class members on account ofimrnigration status, violates 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (Medicaid);
(c) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps; refusing to permit class members to apply for federal
food stamps; andlor discouraging or refusing to permit class members seeking to apply for federal food stamps to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violates 7 U.S.c. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iii);
NY 1008585JDOC

I.
Page 92

(d) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members from

applying for federal Medicaid; refusing to permit class members who are not lawful

permanent residents to apply for federal Medicaid; andlor discouraging or refusing to

permit class members seeking to apply for federal Medicaid to be added to the existing

public benefits case ofahousehold member, violates 42 C.F.R. § 435.906 (Medicaid);

(e) HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide timely and adequate notice of the

denial offederal food stamps and federal Medicaid to class members: (I) when

assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on

immigration status; (2) when class members apply to be added to an existing public

benefits case and are denied; and (3) when class members are discouraged or prohibited

from applying for assistance, violates 7 C.F.R. § 273.l0(g)(1) (food stamps), and 42

C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid);

I

(f) HRA's policy, custom, and usage offailing to provide timely and adequate notice of the denial of public benefits to immigrants: (I) when assistance is granted to some

household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when class

members apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3)

when class members are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violates

the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution;

(g) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if

not impossible to determine whether federal food stamps or federal Medicaid were

correctly denied or provided in the proper amount andlor whether to appeal when federal

food stamps and federal Medicaid are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced

Page 93

)

because of immigration status, violates 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g)(l) (food stamps), and 42

I

C.F.R. §§ 435.911 & 435.912 (Medicaid);

I

(h) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if

not impossible to detennine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided in

the proper amount and/or whether to appeal when such benefits are denied in whole or in

part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violates the due process

clause of the U.S Constitution;

(i) HRA has been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and

supervision to HRA employees at job centers;

(j) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of referring applicants for federal food stamps and

federal Medicaid to SSA with docwnentation that fails to comply with SSA's

requirements, thereby making it likely or certain that SSA will not issue them a Social
Security nwnber, violates 7 C.F.R. 1 273.6(b)(food stamps) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.910(e)

(Medicaid);

(k) actions and omissions by State OTDA and State DOH have caused and/or contributed to

the violations of federal law by HRA challenged in this action, for which State OTDA

and State DOH are jointly and severally liable;

(I) through their actions and omissions that have caused and/or contributed to the federal

violations by HRA challenged in this action, State OTDA and State DOH have violated

their responsibilities under federal law as the single state agencies responsible for

administering and supervising the federal food stamp and federal Medicaid programs,

respectively, in New York State, in violation of7 U.S.C. § 20l2(n) (food stamps); 42

U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (Medicaid), and 42 C.F.R. § 431.10 (Medicaid);

NY lOO8585_3.DOC

Page 94
(m) State OTDA and State DOH have been deliberately indifferent to the need to provide proper training and supervision to HRA employees who administer federal food stamps and federal Medicaid at job centers;
(n) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of denying public assistance and State Medicaid benefits to eligible class members who are not lawful permanent residents on account of immigration status, and of discontinuing and/or reducing public assistance and State Medicaid benefits to these class members on account of immigration status, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122, 131(1) & (3) (public assistance), 366(J)(a) (State Medicaid), and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 349, et seq. (public assistance);
(0) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of deterring and discouraging class members who are not lawful permanent residents from applying for public assistance and State Medicaid; refusing to permit these class members to submit applications for those benefits; and/or discouraging or refusing to permit these class members seeking to apply for those benefits to be added to the existing public benefits case of a household member, violates N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(l) (State Medicaid) and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.3(a) and (b) (public assistance);
(P) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of failing to provide timely an adequate notice of the denial ofpublic assistance and State Medicaid to immigrants; (1) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; (2) when immigrants apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied; and (3) when immigrants are discouraged or prohibited from applying for assistance, violates 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.8(b) and 358-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(3)(b) (Medicaid);
NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 95
(q) HRA's policy, custom, and usage of issuing misleading notices that make it difficult if not impossible to determine whether public assistance and State Medicaid were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal when public assistance and State Medicaid are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status, violates 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.8(b) and 358-2.2 (public assistance) and N.Y. Soc. Servo Law § 366-a(3)(b) (Medicaid); and
(r) to the extent that HRA acts to enforce State regulations, State directives, and City directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security number is impossible to obtain, those actions violate N.Y. Soc. Servo Law §§ 122, 134-a(2) and 366-a(2)(a);
3. Issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as requested in plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause submitted in conjunction with this complaint.
4. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining the City defendant: (a) to refrain from unlawfully denying, discontinuing, and/or reducing federal food stamps at job centers on account of immigration status to class members who are eligible for those benefits; (b) to refrain from denying, discontinuing, and/or reducing Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits at job centers on account of immigration status to class members who are not lawful permanent residents and who are eligible for those benefits; (c) to refrain from turning away, deterring, or discouraging class members from applying for federal food stamps, at job centers, or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these benefits, on account ofimmigration status;

Page 96
(d) to refrain from turning away, deterring, or discouraging class members who are not lawful permanent residents from applying for Medicaid and public assistance benefits at job centers, or encouraging them to withdraw applications for these benefits, on account of immigration status;
(e) to permit all plaintiff class members to submit an application to HRA for federal food stamps at job centers regardless oftheir immigration status;
(f) to permit all plaintiff class members who are not lawful permanent residents to submit an application to HRA for Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits at job centers regardless of their immigration status;
(g) to provide timely and adequate notice of the denial offood stamps, Medicaid, and/or public assistance benefits at job centers to class members (I) when assistance is granted to some household members but denied to others based on immigration status; and (2) when class members apply to be added to an existing public benefits case and are denied;
(h) to refrain from issuing misleading notices that make it difficult or impossible to determine whether public benefits were correctly denied or provided in the proper amount and/or whether to appeal when such benefits are denied in whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status;
(i) to ensure that all disabled Qualified Alien class members are referred for Medicaid disability determinations ifthere is an indication that they may qualify for disabilityrelated Medicaid, and that those determined to be disabled receive the food stamps to which they are legally entitled;
(j) to refrain from enforcing State regulations, State directives, and City directives and instructions that purport to require applicants for public assistance and State Medicaid to
NY 1008585JDOC

Page 97
apply for and furnish a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility when a Social Security number is impossible to obtain; (k) to provide class members who do not have Social Security numbers and who apply for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid with the necessary documentation so that they can obtain a Social Security number from SSA; (I) to provide retroactive State food stamps to those eligible class members who were wrongly denied them due to their immigration status; and (m)to develop and implement a plan of correction that will: (i) correct all policy memoranda and other instructional material that misstate immigrant
eligibility rules for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance, or the requirement that applicants and recipients furnish or apply for a Social Security number; (ii) reconfigure their computer systems so that class members' food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance cases can be properly entered into those computer systems and opened; (iii) retrain their employees on the correct immigrant eligibility rules for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance benefits and Social Security number requirements; and (iv) implement a plan for regular monitoring and reporting on applications for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance by class members so that corrective action may be taken if noncompliance with immigrant eligibility rules for public benefits is found. 5. Issue a permanent injunction enjoining the State defendants:

I Page 98

(a) to supervise and oversee the conduct and actions of the City defendant to ensure that the

City defendant complies with all federal mandates regarding immigrant eligibility for

federal food stamps and federal Medicaid, and to ensure that timely and adequate notice

is provided when food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance benefits are denied in

whole or in part, discontinued, or reduced because of immigration status; and

(b) to develop and implement a plan of correction that will:

(i) correct all policy memoranda and other instructional material that misstate immigrant

eligibility rules for federal food stamps and federal Medicaid benefits;

(ii) reconfigure the computer systems for which State defendants are responsible to the

extent necessary so that class members' federal food stamps and federal Medicaid

cases can be proper!y entered into those computer systems and opened;

(iii) retrain their employees on the correct immigrant eligibility rules for federal food

stamps and federal Medicaid benefits;

(iv) implement a plan for regular monitoring and reporting on applications for federal

, I

food stamps and federal Medicaid benefits by class members so that corrective action

may be taken if noncompliance with immigrant eligibility rules for public benefits is

found.

6. award reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

NY IOO8585JDOC

Page 99

7. order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York December 13, 2005

Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief (SB0987) THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Adriene L. Holder (ALHI872) Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Practice Area Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR5579) Director of Litigation, Civil Practice Area ChristopherD. Lamb (CDLS145) Attorney-in-Charge, Staten Island Neighborhood Office Elizabeth Sykes Saylor, of Counsel (ESS809J) Jennifer Baum, of Counsel (JB4030) 199 Water Street, 3m Floor NewYork,NewYork 10038 Phone: (718) 422-2871

Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (YS31 07) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Jane G. Stevens, of Counsel (JS4790) Caroline Hickey, of Counsel (CHI41O)
Kevin KenneaJly, of Counsel (KK0710) 450 West 33Td Street, 11th Floor New York, NY 10001 Phone: (212) 613-5000

HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson (RA0979) Russell Jacobs, of Counsel (RJ3657) One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004-1482 Phone: (212) 837-6000

Of Counsel:
THE EMPIRE JUSTICE PROJECT Barbara Weiner 119 Washington Ave. Albany, N.Y. 12210 Phone: 518-462-6831

BY::~fL~~~~~~~<Z~~~'~'~<~~'~_______
I/)--Y'
ffs and the Plaintiff Class

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
- against -
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
Defendants.

05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT
WHEREAS, plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by complaint filed December 13, 2005, against Verna Eggleston, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”) (the “City defendant”), Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”) and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health (“SDOH”) (collectively “State defendants”); and

- 1 -

WHEREAS, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and for
certification of a class, by Notice of Motion dated January 11, 2006; and
WHEREAS, City and State defendants opposed said motion; and
WHEREAS, the Court, by Order dated February 16, 2006, directed City
and State defendants to undertake certain actions as specifically directed therein and
further ordered a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and class
certification (the “Feb. 16, 2006 Order”); and
WHEREAS, the Court held such hearing on dates beginning March 14,
2006 through March 24, 2006; and
WHEREAS, the Court by Order dated August 29, 2006 granted plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification (the “Aug. 29, 2006 Order”)
and issued a preliminary injunction which injunction incorporated by reference the
Feb. 16, 2006 Order; and
WHEREAS, in the Aug. 29, 2006 Order, the Court certified this action as
a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), with the class defined as:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City Job Center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children, or in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C.
- 2 -

§ 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL). hereinafter the “Class”; and WHEREAS, State defendants, by Notice of Motion dated September 13, 2006 moved for reconsideration of that portion of the Court’s Aug. 29, 2006 Order certifying the Class which motion was joined by City defendant; and WHEREAS, the Court, by Order dated October 13, 2006 and decision dated November 8, 2006 denied said motion for reconsideration; and WHEREAS, State defendants have fulfilled and completed their obligations pursuant to the Feb. 16, 2006 Order as set forth at pages “2 - 3” paragraphs numbered (7) through (9) of that Order; and WHEREAS, defendants have denied any and all wrongdoing alleged in the complaint by Answers filed on behalf of City defendant, dated November 6, 2006 and on behalf of State defendants, dated June 14, 2006; and WHEREAS, the parties believe that the best interests of the parties will be advanced by the settlement of this action; and WHEREAS, plaintiffs and defendants are entering into the within Stipulation and Order of Settlement (the “Stipulation”) solely for the purpose of settling the disputes between them and to avoid further litigation, and without admitting any fault or liability; and NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for the respective parties herein, that this action is settled, subject to the approval of the Court pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the following terms and conditions:
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Definitions For purposes of this Stipulation, the following definitions shall apply: 1. “Battered qualified aliens” means Class Members who are battered
aliens treated as qualified aliens, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c). 2. “Job Center” means all offices in New York City operated by the New
York City Human Resources Administration at which an application for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance may be submitted.
3. “Family Assistance” means cash public assistance benefits reimbursed in part by the federal program of block grants to States for temporary assistance to needy families authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq., implemented in New York pursuant to New York Social Services Law (“N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law”) §§ 349 et seq.
4. “Safety Net Assistance” means assistance provided pursuant to N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 157 et seq. to persons not eligible to receive Family Assistance.
5. “Food Stamps” means benefits provided pursuant to the federal food stamp program authorized by 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7, and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq., and federal regulations at 7 C.F.R. Parts 271 through 282 and implemented in New York by N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 95 and 147 and State regulations at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. Parts 358, 359 and 387.
6. “Federal Medicaid” means payments for medical assistance reimbursed in part by the federal program of medical assistance authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq., implemented in New York pursuant to N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 363 et seq.
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7. “State Medicaid” means medical assistance provided pursuant to N.Y.
Soc. Serv. Law §§ 363 et seq. to persons not eligible to receive Federal Medicaid.
8. “State food assistance benefits” (hereinafter “FAP”) means benefits
provided pursuant to the state food assistance program, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 95(10),
which program ended as of September 30, 2005.
9. “Public benefits” means collectively Family Assistance, Safety Net
Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and Food Stamps.
10. “Plaintiffs” means the individually named plaintiffs as set forth in the
action and the Class.
11. “City defendant” means Verna Eggleston, as Commissioner of the
New York City Human Resources Administration and her successor in that office.
12. “State defendants” means Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New
York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”) and Antonia C.
Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health (“SDOH”) and
their successors in those offices.
13. “Class” means:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City Job Center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children, or in the case of
- 5 -

battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL). 14. “Class Member” means a member of the Class as defined above. 15. “Effective Date” means thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of the judgment in this action. 16. “Applicable federal and state law or regulations” means 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 349 et seq., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 157 et seq., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 363 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. 17. “Apply for” and “application” mean any application by a Class Member for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, and any application made for Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and/or Food Stamps made in conjunction with an application for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance made at a Job Center, including any request to be added to an existing public benefits case. An application made by one member of a mandatory filing unit is deemed an application by all members of the mandatory filing unit to the extent required by N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 131-c. 18. Action taken “based on immigration status” means an action taken based on: (i) a Class Member’s immigration status or immigration documentation, including documentation relating to battered qualified alien status; and/or (ii) a Class Member’s provision of or application for a Social Security Number (“SSN”), when the failure to provide a SSN is as a result of the United States Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of an application for a SSN based on immigration status.
- 6 -

19. “Immigrant Liaison” means an employee or agent of City defendant who has received specialized training in the eligibility of Class Members for public benefits based on immigration status, and who functions in a Job Center as a specialist for making determinations regarding the eligibility of Class Members for public benefits. General Provisions
During the term of this Stipulation: 20. City defendant shall refrain from denying, discontinuing or reducing public benefits at Job Centers based on immigration status to Class Members, who are eligible for those benefits, pursuant to applicable federal and state law or regulations. 21. City defendant shall refrain at Job Centers from (i) refusing to permit Class Members to submit applications for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, and applications for Federal Medicaid and/or State Medicaid and/or Food Stamps made in conjunction with an application for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance at a Job Center, based on immigration status, and (ii) refrain from turning away, deterring or discouraging Class Members from submitting such applications based on immigration status. 22. City and State defendants may require Class Members to apply for a SSN to the extent necessary to establish or maintain eligibility for Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid or Food Stamps. City and State defendants may require Class Members to apply for a SSN with the SSA once at the time of an application for Safety Net Assistance. City defendant shall not deny and/or discontinue Safety Net Assistance, and State Medicaid applied for or received in conjunction with Safety Net Assistance, to a Class Member based on a failure to furnish a SSN, so long as the Class Member makes a timely and complete application to SSA for a SSN. If the Class Member cannot obtain
- 7 -

a SSN, a receipt for the application or a letter of denial of an SSN from SSA, then the Class Member may submit to the Job Center an attestation for the purpose of establishing his/her eligibility for Safety Net Assistance and State Medicaid in conjunction with the Safety Net Assistance application describing how s/he applied for an SSN. A copy of the attestation form is attached as Exhibit A. If the Class Member does not present the form attached as Exhibit A, City defendant will provide the Class Member with the form. An application for Safety Net Assistance or State Medicaid made in conjunction with the application for Safety Net Assistance may not be delayed or denied if the Class Member applied for a SSN and cannot get proof from SSA that s/he applied for a SSN and submits the completed attestation. If the Class member makes no attempt to obtain a SSN or does not execute a statement attesting to the Class Member’s efforts to apply for one, the application may be denied. If the Class Member’s case file indicates a change in the Class Member’s immigration status to a qualified status as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) or (c), City defendant shall require a Class Member to reapply for a SSN after providing assistance to the extent required by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.5(a) in obtaining information or documents necessary to apply for a SSN. If a Class Member is otherwise eligible for Food Stamps, but for having furnished a SSN, and the individual is denied a SSN by SSA, City defendant may require the Class Member to reapply for a SSN. City defendant will provide assistance to the applicant to the extent required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 and to the extent required by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.5(a) in obtaining information or documents necessary to apply for a SSN.
23. If a Class Member is eligible for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid and/or Food Stamps, but for any
- 8 -

requirement to apply for or provide a SSN, City defendant shall provide the Class Member with a letter addressed to SSA, in a form approved by State defendants, and shall otherwise assist the Class Member in obtaining information or documents necessary to apply for a SSN to the extent required by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.5(a) and to the extent required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.6.
24. As described further in this paragraph, defendants shall provide Class Members who apply for public benefits at a Job Center and are denied or have their public benefits discontinued or reduced at a Job Center with notice of the denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of public benefits. Notice, whether issued by City defendant or State defendants, shall be adequate as defined by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.2 and shall be provided within the time frames required by law. Notice, whether issued by City or State defendants, shall include a separate indication of which household members are accepted for public benefits, which household members are denied public benefits, and for which public benefits such household members have been accepted or denied. When City defendant issues such notice, City defendant shall provide notice, in such form(s) for notice as are approved by State defendants, for the denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of public benefits at a Job Center. When State defendants issue such notice, State defendants shall provide Class Members with adequate notice of the denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of assistance based on the information entered into the Welfare Management System (WMS) by City defendant, within the time frames required by law if City defendant entered such information into WMS with sufficient time to cause State defendants’ WMS system to issue such notices within the time frames required by law. Nothing in this paragraph relieves City and State defendants from their obligations
- 9 -

to make timely determinations and to provide notice in compliance with the time frames
required by law.
25. City defendant agrees to comply with its obligations to the Class
pursuant to paragraphs numbered (1) through (6) of the Feb. 16, 2006 Order and
paragraphs numbered (1) through (6) of page 76 of the Aug. 29, 2006 Order, which
paragraphs are hereby set forth as follows:
February 16, 2006 Order:
(1) Defendant Verna Eggleston (the “City Defendant”) is ordered to publish, by March 8, 2006, a revised Policy Bulletin concerning the Human Resource [sic] Administration’s (“HRA”) responsibility to undertake a Medicaid Disability Review where necessary to establish eligibility for food stamps. See City Def. Letter Br. dated Feb. 8, 2006 (“City Br.”) at 1; Declaration of Seth Diamond, dated Jan. 24, 2006 (“Diamond Decl.”), at ¶ 4; see also General Information System Message 06MA0005, attached to Defs. Doar and Novello’s Letter Br. dated Feb. 8, 2006 (“State Br.”).
(2) City Defendant is ordered to modify, by April 28, 2006, HRA’s benefits administration computer system (“POS”) to recognize through a “code” the category of battered aliens who hold an I-130 petition and present proof of domestic violence. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at ¶ 3.
(3) City Defendant is ordered to publish, by February 28, 2006, an interim Policy Bulletin directing workers to refer all applications by battered qualified aliens (and PRUCOL aliens, see Diamond Decl. at ¶ 2), to the Job Center’s designated subject matter experts for handling, and to train staff, in March 2006, to comply with this interim Policy Bulletin. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at ¶ 2.
(4) City Defendant is ordered to publish, by February 28, 2006, an interim Policy Bulletin that provides instructions on opening the cases of those battered qualified aliens to whom the United States
- 10 -

Custom and Immigration Service (USCIS) will not issue Alien Registration numbers, and to train staff, in March 2006, to comply with this interim Policy Bulletin. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at ¶ 2.
(5) City Defendant is ordered to publish, within four weeks of the implementation of the modification to the POS system described in (2), a revised Policy Bulletin concerning the handling of battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens, and, to train staff, during the month following its publication, to comply with the revised Policy Directive. See City Br. 3; Diamond Decl. at ¶ 5.
(6) City Defendant is ordered to establish, by February 28, 2006, an informal relief system for non-citizen applications, if such, applications are not already covered by other informal relief systems implemented in connection with other litigation, through which Plaintiffs’ counsel may contact a designee of City Defendant on behalf of plaintiffs or members of the proposed class whose eligibility has been erroneously assessed. See City Br. at 4.
August 29, 2006 Order:
(1) An order directing City defendant to correct all errors in its revised policy directives and bulletins regarding Social Security Numbers, and to conduct comprehensive training on these policy directives for all staff involved in eligibility determinations.
(2) An order directing City defendant to correct errors regarding PRUCOL eligibility in PD-06-24-ELI. See Letter from Scott Rosenberg, Counsel for Plaintiffs, to the Court, dated August 1, 2006.
(3) An order directing the City to refer all cases involving green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years to the immigrant liasons [sic], or in the alternative to train all workers involved in eligibility determinations on how to determine the number of years that an alien has been in qualified status, and to train workers on which dates must be entered into POS and WMS.
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(4) An order directing the City to conduct trainings for all staff who are involved in opening cases for immigrants directly in WMS.
(5) An order directing the City to issue a policy directive and conduct training on the necessity of providing notices when individuals ask to be added to an existing case, and the need to issue notices listing the individual accepted, those denied public benefits, and the reason for the denial, whenever some members of a household are accepted and others are denied due to immigration status.
(6) An order directing the City to provide all staff that handle eligibility determinations for proposed Class Members with the same training immigrant liaisons receive.
26. The State defendants agree to comply with their obligations pursuant
to paragraphs numbered (1) through (4) of page 76 of the Aug. 29, 2006 Order, which
paragraphs are hereby set forth as follows:
(1) An order directing OTDA to add a second date field to WMS so that the date an immigrant became a qualified alien and the date the immigrant entered the country can both be recorded. An order directing the State to issue instructions explaining the use of these fields and clarifying that time accrued in different alien statuses should be added together to determine eligibility for federal food stamps.
(2) An order directing OTDA to issue clear and comprehensive instructions on how to open cases for aliens directly in WMS, focusing particularly on multi-suffix cases.
(3) An order directing OTDA to correct 02-INF-40, which on its face is not sufficient to cause SSA to issue a non-work Social Security Number (SSN) to an immigrant who lacks work authorization.
(4) An order directing the State to revise its training materials so that they accurately and
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comprehensively explain which immigrants are eligible for Federal Medicaid. 27. For the duration of this Stipulation, City defendant shall refer all public benefits applications, recertifications, and discontinuances based on immigration status of battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens who are members of the Class to the Immigrant Liaisons or workers with equivalent training for the handling of that part of the eligibility determination (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status. For the duration of this Stipulation, City defendant shall refer all applications, recertifications, and discontinuances based on immigration status of lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years who are members of the Class to workers with training equivalent to that provided to the Immigrant Liaisons for the handling of that part of the eligibility determination (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status. City defendant shall conduct periodic reinforcement training for front line workers on such referrals. 28. Within sixty (60) days of the Effective Date of this Stipulation, City defendant shall issue a policy directive or bulletin reinforcing the instruction that a true copy of all documents related to immigration status presented by a Class Member, or a person acting on their behalf, to a Job Center in connection with an application for or receipt of Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and/or Food Stamps shall be included in the Class Member’s file through such means as City defendant determines in her discretion are appropriate for such retention including but not limited to scanning, imaging, or copying. 29. City defendant shall maintain an informal relief system established pursuant to paragraph (6) of the Court’s Feb. 16, 2006 Order for the duration of this
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Stipulation (“Informal Relief”). In the case of an applicant for Informal Relief,

submission of a document to a Job Center may be demonstrated by presentation of a copy

of the document faxed to the Job Center together with a fax confirmation indicating

receipt of all pages faxed to the Job Center. Any requests for Informal Relief should be

addressed to the attention of M.K.B. v. Eggleston Informal Relief, at the HRA Office of

Legal Affairs or such other office that City defendant designates. Plaintiffs and City

defendant shall each maintain a single point of contact for the submission and processing

of M.K.B. v. Eggleston Informal Relief requests.

30. When Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance for a Class Member

is denied or discontinued at a Job Center based on immigration status, City defendant

shall enter a computer code that indicates the denial or discontinuance is based on

immigration status and that causes the case to be referred for a separate determination for

Medicaid.

Training

31. City defendant shall conduct periodic additional training regarding the

policy directive or bulletin described in ¶ 28 supra for all personnel at a Job Center who

receive documents pertinent to Class Members’ eligibility for public benefits.

32. On or before sixty (60) days after the Effective Date of this

Stipulation, City defendant shall train one hundred and fifty (150) Immigrant Liaisons. If

City defendant’s failure to meet the time frame set forth in this paragraph is solely due to

the State defendant(s)’ failure to take timely action to approve or modify City defendant’s

materials necessary for training, plaintiffs will not seek relief against City defendant

regarding the provisions of this paragraph.

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33. On or before sixty (60) days after the Effective Date of this Stipulation, City defendant shall develop appropriate curricula and training on (i) immigrant status recognition and the documentation relevant to the immigrant status, and (ii) eligibility of Class Members for public benefits, including SSN related requirements. City defendant will deliver training on these topics to all staff who handle the part of eligibility determinations (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status for Class Members. The full elements of the curriculum will be incorporated into “new hire” training for all staff who handle the part of eligibility determinations (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status for Class Members. City defendant will conduct periodic reinforcement training on (i) immigrant status recognition and the documentation relevant to the immigrant status, and; (ii) eligibility of Class Members for public benefits, including SSN related requirements. If City defendant’s failure to meet the time frame set forth in this paragraph is solely due to the State defendants’ failure to take timely action to approve or modify City defendant’s materials necessary for training, plaintiffs will not seek relief against City defendant regarding the provisions of this paragraph. Retroactive Relief
34. On or before ninety (90) days after the Effective Date of this Stipulation, City defendant shall identify all Class Members (i) whose application at a Job Center as reflected in computer records concerning them and/or any other Class member in their mandatory filing unit for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, and any application for Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and/or FAP benefits made in conjunction with an application for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, was denied, and/or whose assistance under those programs was discontinued, based on
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immigration status, between December 13, 2002 and the Effective Date of this Stipulation, or in the case of FAP benefits, whose FAP application was denied or whose FAP benefits were discontinued between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, and (ii) whose application for Food Stamps at a Job Center as reflected in computer records concerning them and/or any other Class member in their mandatory filing unit was denied, and/or whose Food Stamps were discontinued, based on immigration status between December 13, 2004 and the Effective Date of this Stipulation. A Class Member who applied for Food Stamps shall be deemed to have applied for FAP benefits. The list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph shall be generated only by means of an automated retrieval.
35. Within five (5) days of identifying Class Members pursuant to ¶ 34 supra, City defendant shall provide plaintiffs’ counsel: (i) a detailed description of the methodology used to identify Class Members pursuant to ¶ 34 supra, including any and all computer codes, such as Alien Citizenship Indicator (“ACI”) codes, Reason Denial Codes and/or WMS Error Codes, if any, used, and; (ii) a list of all Class Members identified using the methodology. If plaintiffs dispute the methodology or require more information regarding the methodology, they shall notify the defendants in writing within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the methodology. The parties shall meet and confer within seven (7) business days of plaintiffs’ counsel’s notification. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, plaintiffs may seek appropriate relief from the Court within ten (10) business days, or such additional period as the parties may agree to. After the list of Class Members is finalized pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs’ counsel and State defendants.
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36. On or before forty-five (45) days after the creation of the final list of Class Members pursuant to ¶¶ 34 and 35 supra, City defendant shall identify, from among the Class Members identified pursuant to ¶¶ 34 and 35 supra, those Class Members whose U.S. citizen children were accepted for or receiving Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid at a Job Center, but the Class Member was not accepted for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid based on immigration status. After City defendant finalizes the list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs’ counsel and State defendants.
37. If the Class Member identified pursuant to ¶ 36 supra was eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance at the time the U.S. citizen child was accepted, and the Class Member is currently in receipt of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, then City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance that the Class Member would have received but for the failure to accept the Class Member for assistance based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. If the Class Member is not currently in receipt of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, or currently remains excluded from the grant providing assistance to her U.S. citizen child(ren), then the procedure in ¶ 49 infra will apply. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their public benefits made pursuant to this paragraph. Copies of these notices are attached as Exhibit B1 and Exhibit B2. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with
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Exhibits B1 and B2. In any review conducted pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall determine whether the Class Member identified pursuant to ¶ 36, or any other Class Member(s) in the Mandatory Filing Unit: (i) is eligible for retroactive Food Stamps, and if so, shall issue retroactive Food Stamps back to no earlier than December 13, 2004, and (ii) was eligible for FAP at any time between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, and if so, will provide such Class Member with a payment from non-welfare funds in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the FAP review. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit C. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit C.
38. If City defendant determines that a Class Member identified in ¶ 36 is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to ¶ 37, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during the retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance eligibility period and, if the Class Member is financially eligible, also for the three month period preceding the month of application (collectively “Medicaid Retroactive Period A”), paid through the Medicaid program for Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: a. received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period A based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or b. previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, Index No.403748/98 (Sup Ct., N.Y. Co.) and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills
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for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to ¶ 37 who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period A that was denied by City defendant’s Medical Insurance and Community Service Administration (“MICSA”) for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period A until three-months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. The notice sent to Class Members pursuant to ¶ 37 (Exhibits B1 and B2) shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period A paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such medical bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such medical bills to City defendant for payment.
39. If City defendant determines that a Class Member identified in ¶ 36 is not eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to ¶ 37, the case shall be referred for a separate determination of Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid using the application date of the citizen child as the application date for Medicaid. If, when making the separate determination, City defendant determines that the Class Member would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination been made at the time the application of the citizen child for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was accepted, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during any period after the application date during which the Class Member is
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otherwise eligible and, if the Class Member is financially eligible, also for the three month period preceding the month of application (collectively “Medicaid Retroactive Period B”), paid through the Medicaid program for Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: (a) received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period B based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or (b) previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member who would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination been made at the time the application of the citizen child for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was accepted, who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period B that was denied by MICSA for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period B until three months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members whose cases are reviewed under this paragraph which shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid retroactive period B paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such bills to City defendant for payment. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit D. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit D.
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40. On or before forty-five (45) days after the creation of the final list of Class Members pursuant to ¶¶ 34 and 35 supra, City defendant shall identify, from among the Class Members identified pursuant to ¶¶ 34 and 35 supra, those Class Members who were battered qualified aliens at the time of application or Lawful Permanent Residents who had been in that status for less than five years at the time of application whose non citizen children (under 18 at any time during the retroactive period) were not accepted for Food Stamps based on immigration status. If the failure to accept those children for Food Stamps was incorrect, City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive Food Stamps in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of Food Stamps that the Class Member would have received on behalf of those children but for the failure to accept those children for Food Stamps based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2004. In any review conducted pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall determine whether the Class Member, or any other Class member who is part of the Mandatory Filing Unit: (i) is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, and if so, shall follow the procedure set forth for the provision of retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance set forth in ¶ 37, (ii) if not already reviewed for retroactive Food Stamps pursuant to this paragraph, is eligible for retroactive Food Stamps, and if so, shall issue retroactive Food Stamps back to no earlier than December 13, 2004, (iii) was eligible for FAP at any time between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, and if so, will provide such Class Member with a payment from non-welfare funds in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program and (iv) is eligible for retroactive Medicaid
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in accordance with the procedures set forth in ¶¶ 38 and 39. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their public benefits made pursuant to this paragraph, copies of which are attached as Exhibits B1, B2 and C. After City defendant finalizes the list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs’ counsel and State defendants.
41. For all Class Members identified pursuant to ¶¶ 36 and 40 supra, City defendant shall determine whether (i) their case files contain immigration documentation demonstrating I-130, K or V visa status; or (ii) their case files do not contain immigration documentation sufficient to determine whether the Class Member may be eligible for retroactive assistance pursuant to ¶¶ 37 and 40 supra; or (iii) their case files do not contain financial information sufficient to determine the amount of retroactive payments, if any, for which the Class Member may be eligible pursuant to ¶¶ 37 and 40 supra. For each such Class Member, City defendant shall send a notice to all Class Members, attached hereto as Exhibit E, informing Class Members of their opportunity to prove their eligibility for retroactive relief or payments. City defendant will schedule an appointment for such Class Members in connection with redeterminations pursuant to this paragraph. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit E. If the Class Member does not attend this appointment or reschedule it, the Class Member shall be entitled to receive retroactive benefits based only on information contained in the case file. City defendant shall complete any redetermination pursuant to this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date of the appointment or the date the Class Member submits all necessary documents, whichever is later. All determinations made pursuant
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to ¶¶ 37-40 shall be completed within twenty-one (21) months of the identification of Class Members pursuant to ¶¶ 36 and 40.
42. City defendant will issue a notice, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F, based on a schedule of mailing one twelfth of the total number of Exhibit F notices every thirty (30) days, beginning six months after Class Members are identified pursuant to ¶¶ 36 and 40 supra. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit F. City defendant will send Exhibit F to all Class Members identified pursuant to ¶¶ 34 and 35, who are not identified pursuant to ¶¶ 36, 40 and 45. Such notice will inform them of their right to request a redetermination of their eligibility for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid. The deadline for Class Members to request such a redetermination shall be one (1) year from the date of the mailing of the Class Member’s Exhibit F notice. City defendant will issue a notice, attached hereto as Exhibit G, to all Class Members who timely request a redetermination in response to Exhibit F. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit G. A Class Member who timely requests such a redetermination in response to the Exhibit F notice must attend an appointment in connection with such redetermination as required by City defendant. If the Class Member does not attend this appointment or attend any rescheduled appointment, the Class Member shall not be entitled to receive retroactive benefits pursuant to this Stipulation. City defendant shall complete any redetermination requested by a Class Member pursuant to this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date the redetermination is requested or the date the Class Member submitted all necessary documents, whichever is later. If it is determined that the Class Member’s application for
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Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was erroneously denied, or such benefits were erroneously discontinued, based on immigration status, and the Class Member is currently in receipt of such benefits, City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive benefits in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of benefits that the Class Member would have received but for the erroneous denial or discontinuance based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. If it is determined that the Class Member’s application for Food Stamps was erroneously denied, or such benefits were erroneously discontinued, based on immigration status, City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive Food Stamps in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of Food Stamps the Class Member would have received but for the erroneous denial or discontinuance based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2004. City defendant shall apply the provisions of ¶¶ 43 and 44 infra, when considering the eligibility for Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid of Class Members who respond to the Exhibit F notice. If the Class Member is not currently in receipt of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, then the procedure in ¶ 49 infra will apply. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their public benefits made pursuant to this paragraph. Copies of these notices are attached as Exhibits B1 and B2.
43. If City defendant determines that a Class Member who responds to the Exhibit F notice is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during the retroactive Family Assistance or
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Safety Net Assistance eligibility period and, if the Class Member is financially eligible, also for the three-month period preceding the month of application (collectively “Medicaid Retroactive Period C”), paid through the Medicaid program for federal Medicaid or state Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: (a) received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period C based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or (b) previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to the review authorized by ¶ 42 who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period C that was denied by MICSA for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period C until three months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. The notice sent to Class Members pursuant to ¶ 42 (Exhibits B1 and B2) shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period C paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such medical bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such medical bills to City defendant for payment.
44. If City defendant determines that a Class Member who responds to the Exhibit F notice is not eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net
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Assistance, the case shall be referred for a separate determination of federal Medicaid or state Medicaid using the date the Class Member applied at a Job Center for public benefits as the application date for Medicaid. If the notice after the review described in ¶ 42, supra, (Exhibits B1 and B2) informs the recipient that after review no other public benefits are being provided to the recipient, the notice shall inform the recipient that a separate review of the Class Member’s retroactive Medicaid eligibility will be made by City defendant. If, when making the separate determination, City defendant determines that the Class Member would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination of Medicaid eligibility been made at the time the Job Center application for other public benefits was denied, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during any period after the Class Member’s application date during which the Class Member is otherwise eligible for Medicaid and, if the Class Member is financially eligible for Medicaid, also for the three-month period preceding the month of application (collectively “Medicaid Retroactive Period D”), paid through the Medicaid program for federal Medicaid or state Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: (a) received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period D based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or (b) previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member who would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination been made at the time the Job
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Center application for other public benefits was denied, who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period D that was denied by MICSA for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period D until three-months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members whose cases are reviewed under this paragraph which shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period D paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such bills to City defendant for payment. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit D. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit D.
45. From among all Class Members identified pursuant to ¶ 34 and 35 supra, City defendant shall identify all battered qualified aliens, and lawful permanent residents who were 60 years of age or older when they applied for assistance, who received Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, but who did not receive Food Stamps or state food assistance benefits during that same period. City defendant shall send the Exhibit H notice on the same schedule as the Exhibit F notice is provided pursuant to ¶ 42 supra, to all Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit H. The deadline for Class Members to request a redetermination of their benefits shall be one (1) year from the date of the mailing of the Class Member’s Exhibit H notice. City defendant will issue
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a notice, attached hereto as Exhibit G, to all Class Members who timely request a redetermination in response to Exhibit H. A Class Member who timely requests such a redetermination in response to the Exhibit H notice must attend an appointment in connection with such redetermination as required by City defendant. If the Class Member does not attend this appointment or attend any rescheduled appointment, the Class Member shall not be entitled to receive retroactive benefits pursuant to this Stipulation. City defendant will review the eligibility of all Class Members who timely respond for retroactive Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps and for a payment in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program. City defendant will also review the eligibility of all Class Members who timely respond for retroactive Federal and State Medicaid in accordance with the procedures set forth in ¶¶ 43 and 44. City defendant shall complete any redetermination requested by a Class Member pursuant to this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date the redetermination is requested or the date the Class Member submitted all necessary documents, whichever is later. If it determined that the Class Member is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid or Food Stamps, City defendant shall issue such retroactive benefits in the amount the Class Member would have received but for any erroneous denial or discontinuance based on immigration status. If a Class Member who timely responds to the Exhibit H notice is determined to have been eligible for FAP benefits during the retroactive period, but did not receive FAP benefits based on immigration status, City defendant will provide such Class Member with a payment from non-welfare funds in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member
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would have received under the FAP program, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their benefits made pursuant to this paragraph. Copies of these notices are attached as Exhibits B1, B2 and C. After City defendant finalizes the list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs’ counsel.
46. If any notice mailed to a Class Member pursuant to ¶¶ 37-45 supra is returned as undeliverable, City defendant shall retain a “People Locator” service for the purpose of finding a current address for that Class Member. City defendant shall mail a second notice to any Class Member for whom the People Locator provides a different address.
47. All eligibility determinations made by HRA Family Independence Administration pursuant to ¶¶ 37-45 supra shall be performed by personnel with training equivalent to that of an Immigrant Liaison. Starting thirty (30) days after City defendant begins making retroactive determinations pursuant to this Stipulation, and every thirty (30) days thereafter, City defendant will provide plaintiffs’ counsel with a copy of all such determinations made during the relevant thirty day period. A Class Member who is denied retroactive relief for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid and/or Food Stamps, or who disputes the amount of such relief or payment may challenge the determination in a fair hearing. A Class Member who is denied a retroactive payment in lieu of State Food Assistance Program benefits, or who disputes the amount of such payment may challenge the determination by seeking informal relief through the M.K.B.
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v Eggleston Informal Relief process (supra ¶ 29.) The informal relief determination is a final determination by City defendant but is not reviewable in a fair hearing.
48. For the purpose of eligibility determinations made pursuant to ¶¶ 3745 supra the following shall apply:
a. Any Class Member, whose application was not completed and/or for whom all necessary documentation was not copied or scanned into POS at the time of application, will be given an opportunity to provide information and/or documentation proving his or her eligibility as of the date of the original application or discontinuance.
b. Class Members will not be required to come into a Job Center to resubmit information if that information is already contained within POS or otherwise in their public benefits case file.
c. If a Class Member is required to attend an appointment in connection with the determination of his or her eligibility for or receipt of retroactive benefits, the Class Member will be given an appointment date and an opportunity to reschedule the appointment. If the Class Member does not attend the appointment or reschedule it, then City defendant will make a determination of eligibility for retroactive benefits based on information contained in the Class Member’s case file.
d. City defendant will determine a Class Member’s eligibility for retroactive relief based on eligibility rules applicable during the period for which the retroactive relief is determined.
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49. For Class Members who have been determined eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to ¶¶ 37, 40, 41, 42 or 45 supra, and who, as of the date of the retroactive determination: (i) do not have an active Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance case, or (ii) are not on the active assistance case of their citizen children, the following procedures will apply:
a. If the Class Member did not previously receive public benefits:
(i) If the Class Member seeks ongoing Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits as well as retroactive benefits, City defendant will conduct a complete application process. If the Class Member is found currently eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits, the Class Member shall be paid ongoing and retroactive benefits. If the Class Member is found not currently eligible, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future. City defendant shall keep a computerized record of any underpayment correction credit issued pursuant to this Stipulation.
(ii) If the Class Member does not attend the appointment or attend on any rescheduled date, or does not seek ongoing Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit
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shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future.
b. If the Class Member previously received Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits:
(i) If the Class Member seeks only retroactive relief, City defendant will only verify information relevant to current financial eligibility for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits. Such Class Members will not be required to re-verify items already on file, and will not be required to participate in orientation or other “up front” activities (except finger imaging for purposes of verifying identity). If found currently financially eligible, the Class Member will be paid the retroactive relief or payment. If the Class Member is found not currently financially eligible, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future.
(ii) If the Class Member seeks ongoing Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits as well as retroactive benefits, City defendant will conduct a complete application process. If the Class Member is found currently eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits, the Class Member shall be paid ongoing and retroactive benefits. If found not currently eligible, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit
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shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future.
c. As of the date of the determination made pursuant to ¶¶ 37, 40, 41, 42 or 45 supra, if the children or sibling of the Class Member have an active Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance case but the Class Member is currently not on the case, the Class Member shall be added to the active case and retroactive relief shall be provided in the amount necessary to provide the household with the amount of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance that the household would have received but for the failure to include the Class Member in the assistance unit, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. City Monitoring and Quality Assurance
50. For purposes of this Stipulation, the term “the A Period” shall refer to the first six months of each year starting on the Effective Date of this Stipulation. The term “the B Period” shall refer to the second six months of each year after the Effective Date of this Stipulation.
51. Semiannually, City defendant will review a random sample of 150 public benefits cases drawn as described below. The first semiannual review shall be drawn from applications and undercare cases, including requests to be added to existing cases, filed at Job Centers during the A Period of each year; the second semiannual review shall be drawn from applications and undercare cases, including requests to be added to existing cases, filed at Job Centers during the B Period of each year.
a. 50 applications on which a final determination was made during the relevant period to a Job Center in which at least one household member was assigned an Alien Citizenship Indicator (“ACI”) code of (1) B (Battered
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Qualified Alien), (2) O (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR) who has under five years of qualifying status, or (4) Blank, E, or 9.
b. 50 undercare cases in which at least one household member is assigned an ACI code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) O (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR), or (4) Blank, E, or 9, in which an action to discontinue or reduce Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid was made during the relevant period at a Job Center based on codes indicating that the determination was based on the immigration status (excluding codes relating to SSN issues). All parties will meet and confer regarding the codes to be used pursuant to this paragraph.
c. 25 undercare cases (not included among the 50 undercare cases in ¶ 51(b) supra) in which an action to discontinue, or reduce Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid was made during the relevant period at a Job Center based on the failure to furnish a Social Security number (SSN) regarding a household member who was assigned an ACI code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) O (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR), or (4) Blank, E, or 9.
d. 25 applications (not included among the 50 applications in ¶ 51(a) supra) in which at least one household member was assigned an ACI code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) O (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR) who also has under five years of qualifying status, (4) Blank, E, or 9, in which a determination to deny both Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance was made during the relevant period at a Job Center based on codes indicating that the
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determination was based on immigration status that trigger a separate determination for Medicaid. All parties will meet and confer regarding the codes to be used pursuant to this paragraph.
e. The strata will be defined, if feasible, by a two-way classification according to (1) status of the application (e.g., denied vs. accepted, denied for certain codes or not, denied for given types of benefits or not denied), and (2) four Alien Citizenship Indicators, grouped as identified above as (1) through (4).
52. For each application and undercare case action reviewed pursuant to ¶ 51 supra, City defendant will determine, based on all documents in the case file at the time of each determination:
a. whether each Class Member in the household was eligible for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid at the time of the determination based on immigration status;
b. whether each Class Member in the household was accepted or denied for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid at the time of the determination based on immigration status;
c. whether, in the case of applications for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid, the provision of benefits was delayed beyond the statutory time frame for making a decision on the person’s application, denied, or not accepted because the case “errored out” in WMS.
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d. in the case of actions based on failure to furnish a SSN, whether the Class Member was required to furnish a SSN as a condition of receiving the benefits that were denied, discontinued, or reduced at the time of the determination; and if so, whether the Class Member was furnished a letter that complies with ¶ 23 supra and was provided with assistance in applying for a SSN as required by this Stipulation.
e. whether adequate notice of the acceptance, denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid was provided in the manner required by this stipulation and within the time frames required by law for each determination.
53. If City defendant determines that an error based on immigration status was made in a case reviewed, it shall correct the error within 15 days. An “error type” refers to an error occurring within one of the strata defined in ¶ 51. If City defendant determines that the same type of error based on immigration status occurred in three or more cases reviewed during a Period, then it shall conduct reinforcement training in the affected Job Centers and/or, if necessary, shall correct any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors. If City defendant’s position is that the error is caused by a policy or procedure of the State defendants, City defendant will notify State defendants and plaintiffs. If the State defendant in receipt of such a request agrees with City defendant, the State defendant shall modify its policy. City Reporting
54. Within 90 days after the end of each Period, except for the last report which shall be due 60 days after the end of the final Period, City defendant shall report
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the results of the reviews and determinations made pursuant to ¶¶ 51, 52 and 56 to plaintiffs’ counsel. The reports shall include identification of all cases reviewed pursuant to ¶ 51 supra, and for each case, all information determined pursuant to ¶ 52 supra.
55. Upon reasonable notice, City defendant will make the files reviewed by City defendant pursuant to ¶¶ 51-52 available for inspection by plaintiffs’ counsel, including but not limited to: WMS Budget Print outs, WMS Benefits History Screens, NYCWAY screens, POS screens relevant to immigration status, POS case comments, and Application Print Outs.
56. As set forth in ¶ 54, City defendant shall submit a report to plaintiffs’ counsel indicating:
a. the total number of applications or cases in each of the categories (a) through (d) in ¶ 51 supra, broken down by Job Center and by ACI Code;
b. the total number of applications in category (a) in ¶ 51 supra, in which the application was one made to add a Class Member to an existing Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid case, broken down by Job Center and by ACI Code;
c. the total number of applications in category (d) in ¶ 51 supra, in which the application was accepted and denied for Medicaid based on immigration status.
d. the total number of active undercare cases in which one household member is assigned an Alien Citizenship Indicator (“ACI”) code of B
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(Battered Qualified Alien), O (PRUCOL), K or S (LPR), or Blank, as of the last date of the relevant period.
57. Upon reasonable written notice by plaintiffs, within 30 days after the receipt of each semi-annual report, the plaintiffs may request a randomly drawn sample of a total of 15 applications and 15 undercare cases (occurring only at Job Centers) in which one or more household members have an ACI code of A, E, F, G, H, J, M, N, R, T, or V, for the purpose of evaluating whether such persons are Class Members in this action. After the first report is provided, or such other period as the parties may agree to, the parties will negotiate a threshold number of such misclassified persons that will require reinforcement training regarding the proper use of the ACI codes.
58. After drawing the cases as described in ¶ 51 supra, City defendant shall run the case numbers against the data contained in the Fair Hearing Information System (“FHIS”). If a fair hearing was requested, or a decision after fair hearing was rendered during the A Period or B Period being reviewed, City defendant will discard that case and draw another case of the same type so that the universe of cases consists of cases with no fair hearing requests or decisions pending or decisions after fair hearings rendered equal to the numbers in the four categories listed in ¶ 51(a)-(d).
59. City defendant shall inform counsel for all parties about the cases excluded from the list of cases reviewed pursuant to ¶ 58 supra, including the case number, fair hearing number, and sufficient identifying information to allow plaintiffs’ counsel to investigate the case and pursue remedies as plaintiffs’ counsel deems appropriate. At the same time City defendant reports pursuant to ¶ 54 infra, City
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defendant shall provide plaintiffs’ counsel with the complete case files, including all information referred to in ¶ 55, of all cases excluded from the sample pursuant to ¶ 58. State Monitoring and Quality Assurance
60. Semiannually, OTDA shall review one out of every four cases reviewed by City defendant, up to a maximum of 37 cases, during the A Period and the B Period, respectively, pursuant to ¶ 51 supra. An “independently” determined review is one that is conducted de novo and in which the state reviewer does not have access to the result of City defendant’s monitoring determinations pursuant to ¶¶ 52 and 53. For each case reviewed, OTDA shall determine, independently of City defendant, whether any member of the applicant household should have been categorized as a recipient of Family Assistance or Food Stamps. OTDA shall review whether persons to whom City defendant furnished Safety Net Assistance should have received ACI codes B, K or S. If OTDA determines that an error was made in a case reviewed and City defendant has not corrected the error, then it shall issue a directive to City defendant requiring City defendant to correct the identified error within fifteen (15) business days after receipt of the directive from OTDA. If OTDA determines that a policy of City defendant may have led to the errors found in cases reviewed by OTDA, OTDA shall notify City defendant of its determination and shall direct City defendant to take corrective action. If, upon receipt of such a directive, City defendant believes that a policy of OTDA governing the administration of Family Assistance or Food Stamps results in the error, City defendant shall notify OTDA of its belief, and if OTDA agrees with City defendant, OTDA shall modify its policy. If OTDA determines that the same type of errors occurred in three or more cases reviewed during a Period, then OTDA shall determine whether City defendant has conducted reinforcement training in the affected Job Centers and/or, if
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necessary, whether City defendant has corrected any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors. If City defendant has not undertaken such actions, then OTDA shall direct City defendant to conduct reinforcement training in the affected Job Centers and/or, if necessary, to correct any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors.
61. Semiannually, SDOH shall review 15 applications made by Class Members and reviewed by City defendant pursuant to ¶ 51(d) in which a determination to deny Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was made at a Job Center during the A Period or the B Period based on a reason code indicating that the determination was based on immigration status, and where the application was subsequently referred for separate determination of Medicaid eligibility. For each application reviewed, SDOH shall determine, independently of City defendant, whether any member of the applicant household should have been categorized as a recipient of federally participating Medicaid, or a recipient of State-funded Medicaid with ACI codes of B, K or S. (See earlier definition of “independently.”) If SDOH determines that a policy of City defendant may have led to the errors found in cases reviewed by SDOH, SDOH shall notify City defendant of its determination and shall direct City defendant to take corrective action. If, upon receipt of such a directive, City defendant believes that a policy of SDOH governing the administration of Federal Medicaid results in the error, City defendant shall notify SDOH of its belief and if SDOH agrees with City defendant, SDOH shall modify its policy. If SDOH determines that an error was made in a case reviewed and City defendant has not corrected the error, then it shall issue a directive to City defendant requiring City defendant to correct the error within 15 business days. If
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SDOH determines that the same type of error occurred in three or more cases reviewed during a Period, then SDOH shall determine whether City defendant has conducted necessary reinforcement training and/or, if necessary, whether City defendant has corrected any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors. If City defendant has not undertaken such actions, then SDOH shall direct City defendant to conduct reinforcement training and, if necessary, to correct any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors.
62. City defendant shall provide State defendants with access to the information maintained on POS and the POS viewer connected to the case files drawn pursuant to ¶ 51 and copies of documents not scanned into POS but which are considered part of those case files, at State defendants’ New York City Offices for the purpose of State defendants’ conducting the reviews required by ¶¶ 60-61 within five (5) business days of the completion of the drawing of the sample in each six month sample period.
63. Within ninety (90) days after the end of each Period, with the exception of the last report which shall be due 60 days after the end of the final period, State defendants shall report the results of the reviews and determinations made pursuant to ¶¶ 60-61 supra to plaintiffs’ counsel.
64. Plaintiff’s counsel shall protect the confidentiality of all identifying information (such as name, address, case number and SSN) concerning an individual Class Member that is provided to plaintiffs’ counsel by defendants under the terms of this Stipulation and shall not disclose such information to any individual, or organization other than defendants and the individual whose case is involved, except to the extent
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necessary to enforce any right that individual Class Member may have under this Stipulation. Other Provisions
65. During the term of this Stipulation, prior to taking any action against defendants based on alleged non-compliance with the provisions of this Stipulation, plaintiffs’ counsel shall notify defendants’ counsel in writing of the specific basis and evidence for the claim of non-compliance. Within thirty (30) days of such notice, counsel for the parties shall meet and confer in an attempt to resolve any differences or disputes arising from or out of the Stipulation. At the end of that 30-day period, plaintiffs may, if necessary, take steps to enforce and/or modify this Stipulation. Defendants may oppose.
66. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter against City defendant solely for purposes of modification and enforcement of this Stipulation until four years after its Effective Date, except as set forth in ¶¶ 68 and 70 infra, at which time the Court’s jurisdiction over City defendant shall end and City defendant’s obligations under this Stipulation shall terminate.
67. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter against State defendants solely for purposes of modification and enforcement of this Stipulation until thirty-one months (31) past the date the second monitoring reports by State defendants are due pursuant to ¶ 63, except as set forth in ¶¶ 69 and 70 infra, at which time the Court’s jurisdiction over the State defendants shall end and State defendants’ obligations under this Stipulation shall terminate.
68. Plaintiffs may, by motion filed no later than two (2) months prior to termination of this Stipulation as against City defendant, seek an order extending the term
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of this Stipulation, based upon City defendant’s alleged non-compliance with its provision(s). Plaintiffs will notify the defendants in writing of their intention to make such a motion at least twenty (20) days prior to making the motion. In any motion to extend the term of this Stipulation, plaintiffs shall bear the burden of establishing that the alleged noncompliance is not minimal and isolated, but is sufficiently frequent or widespread as to be systemic. In any motion to extend the term or modify the provision(s) of this Stipulation, no party shall rely on the first set of reports provided pursuant to ¶¶ 54 and 63. If the Court determines that there has been a systemic failure by City defendant to comply with the provision(s) of the Stipulation, it may extend the Stipulation for an additional period as against City defendant to be determined by the Court in accordance with ¶ 70. In the event that plaintiffs move to seek an order extending the jurisdiction of the Court, the jurisdiction shall not lapse and this Stipulation shall remain in full force and effect until such motion has been decided.
69. Plaintiffs may, by motion filed prior to the termination of this Stipulation, seek an order extending the term of this Stipulation as against either State defendant based on that individual State defendant’s alleged non-compliance with the Stipulation’s provisions or extending the term of the Stipulation as against both State defendants, based upon both State defendants’ alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Stipulation. Plaintiffs will notify the defendants in writing of their intention to make such a motion at least twenty (20) days prior to making the motion. In any motion to extend the term of this Stipulation, plaintiffs shall bear the burden of establishing that the alleged noncompliance is not minimal and isolated, but is sufficiently frequent or widespread as to be systemic. In any motion to extend the term
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or modify the provision(s) of this Stipulation, no party shall rely on the first set of reports provided pursuant to ¶¶ 54 and 63. If the Court determines that there has been a systemic failure to comply with the provision(s) of the Stipulation, it may extend the Stipulation for an additional period to be determined by the Court. In the event that plaintiffs move to seek an order extending the jurisdiction of the Court, the jurisdiction shall not lapse and this Stipulation shall remain in full force and effect against either or both State defendant(s) until such motion has been decided. In the event that plaintiffs make a motion to extend pursuant to ¶ 68 to extend jurisdiction against City defendant based upon conduct related to the provision of Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps required to be monitored by either or both State defendant(s) pursuant to this Stipulation, plaintiffs may move the Court for an order extending jurisdiction against the State defendant(s) responsible for monitoring such conduct pursuant to this Stipulation.
70. In the event that plaintiffs seek further extensions of the Stipulation as against City defendant, the provisions of ¶ 68 shall apply to each extension against City defendant, provided, however, that the total duration of the Stipulation shall not exceed seven years. In the event that plaintiffs seek further extensions of the Stipulation as against State defendants, the provisions of ¶ 69 shall apply to each extension against State defendant, provided, however, that the total duration of the Stipulation shall not exceed seven years. Any motion for an extension of the Stipulation against State defendants shall be based on a systemic failure by City defendant to provide Family Assistance, Food Stamps, or Federal Medicaid to Class Members, or a systemic failure to provide adequate and timely notice regarding Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food
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Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid to Class Members. In such event, the motion shall be made two (2) months before the end of the extension period. Any additional extensions shall be for a period to be determined by the Court, but the total duration of the Stipulation, including all extensions, shall not exceed seven years. Nothing herein shall preclude the plaintiffs from moving for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in connection with enforcing or extending the term(s) of the Judgment.
71. In the event that the State defendants comply with the injunctive provisions of the Court’s Orders of August 29, 2006, and fully and timely fulfill their obligations regarding Monitoring and Quality Assurance set forth in ¶¶ 60 and 61 supra, including promptly issuing corrective action orders to City defendant when violations of this Stipulation are found, then the plaintiffs will not seek to hold State defendants responsible for any violations by City defendant of the terms of this Stipulation. In the event of such violations by City defendant, nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the plaintiffs from seeking additional relief against State and City defendants regarding Monitoring and Quality Assurance as may be necessary to remedy violations of this Stipulation, provided, however, that the total number of cases reviewed as part of Monitoring and Quality Assurance by City and State defendants shall not exceed the number set forth in this Stipulation.
72. In the event of any change in federal or state law that any party believes changes his or her responsibilities pursuant to this Stipulation, such party shall so notify all other parties and the parties shall attempt to come to an agreement as to any modifications of the Stipulation that are warranted by the changes in federal or state law. If, after thirty (30) days, the parties have not been able to agree, the dispute shall be
- 45 -

submitted to the Court. If any defendant seeks to modify its responsibilities based on a change in federal or state statutory law or federal regulation, in order to stay the proposed modification plaintiffs shall seek relief from the Court. If any defendant seeks to modify its responsibilities based on a change in state regulation not required by Federal statute or regulation or state statute, the defendant must seek approval of the Court to implement the proposed modification. Any application to the Court with respect to alleged changes in law shall be made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When plaintiffs have sought to prevent or modify implementation of the proposed change, City defendant will not implement the proposed modification until plaintiffs’ application has been decided by the District Court, or one hundred and twenty (120) days after the application was filed, whichever is sooner. The filing by plaintiffs of an appeal of an adverse decision shall not operate as a stay of the defendant’s right to implement the proposed modification without further order of the District Court or the Court of Appeals.
73. Upon the Court’s approval of this Stipulation as fair, reasonable and adequate, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of each member of the Class, and on behalf of the respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of each of themselves and each of the members of the Class (the “Releasors”), hereby jointly and severally release and forever discharge, on the merits with prejudice, City defendant, the City of New York, including without limitations its past and present officials, employees, departments, agencies, representatives, directors and agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representative, and transferees and each of them, and the State
- 46 -

defendants, the State of New York, including without limitations its past and present officials, employees, departments, agencies, representatives, directors and agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, and transferees and each of them (collectively the “Releasees”), from any and all claims, actions, costs, expenses and attorneys’ and expert fees whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, matured or unmatured, accrued or not accrued, direct or indirect, from the beginning of time through the date the Court “so orders” this Stipulation that the individual plaintiffs and the members of the Class, and each of them, ever had, now has or have, or can, shall or may hereafter have against the Releasees or any of them, either alone or in any combination with others, for, by reason of, involving, concerning, arising from or in any way relating to any claim which has been raised, or any claim fairly encompassed in the named, individual plaintiffs’ claims or the claims of the Class that could have been raised based upon the facts, acts or omissions alleged against the Releasees in the complaint filed in this action. Nothing herein releases the defendants from complying with the terms of this Stipulation.
74. If any of the dates or periods of time described in this Stipulation fall or end on a public holiday or on a weekend, the date or period of time shall be extended to the next business day.
75. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to be an admission by City defendant, the City of New York, HRA, or State defendants, State of New York, SDOH and OTDA, of liability or of the truth of any of the allegations set forth in the complaint, or that they have in any manner or way violated plaintiffs’ rights, or the rights of any other person or entity, as defined in the constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules or
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regulations of the United States, the State of New York, the City of New York, or any other rules, regulations or bylaws of any department or subdivision of the City of New York or of the State of New York.
76. This Stipulation contains all of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Stipulation regarding the subject matter of the Stipulation shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the parties or to vary the terms and conditions contained herein.
77. Each of the undersigned represents that he or she has been duly authorized to enter into this Stipulation.
78. All parties to this Stipulation have participated in its drafting; consequently, any ambiguity shall not be construed for or against any party.
79. All correspondence concerning this Stipulation should be sent to the following (or to such other address as the recipient named below shall specify by notice in writing hereunder):
To City defendant: David Lock Deputy General Counsel HRA Office of Legal Affairs 180 Water Street, 17th Floor New York, NY 10038 Email: lockd@hra.nyc.gov Jane Tobey Momo Jesse Levine
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Corporation Counsel of the City of New York 100 Church Street, Room 2-192 New York, New York 10007 (212) 788-1281 Email: jmomo@law.nyc.gov
jlevine@law.nyc.gov
To the State defendants:
Robert L. Kraft Ivan B. Rubin Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271 Email: robert.kraft@oag.state.ny.us
ivan.rubin@oag.state.ny.us
John DiBari, Esq. Associate Attorney Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance 40 North Pearl Street Albany, New York 12243 Email: john.dibari@otda.state.ny.us
Jane E. McCloskey, Esq. Senior Attorney New York State Department of Health Corning Tower, 24th Floor Albany, New York 12237 Email: jem07@health.state.ny.us
To plaintiffs’ counsel:
Scott A. Rosenberg The Legal Aid Society 199 Water Street, 3d Floor New York, New York 10038 Attn: M.K.B. v. Eggleston Email: srosenberg@legal-aid.org
Jane Greengold Stevens Caroline Hickey New York Legal Assistance Group 450 West 33rd Street, 11th Floor
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New York, NY 10001 Attn: M.K.B. v. Eggleston Email: jstevens@nylag.org
chickey@nylag.org Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP One Battery Park Plaza New York, NY 10004 Attn: Chair, Pro Bono Committee All reports to be sent to any party pursuant to this Stipulation shall be sent to all parties at the addresses indicated above. Attorneys Fees 80. All parties shall attempt to come to an agreement on attorneys’ fees. If the parties are unable to agree, within sixty (60) days of the date this Stipulation is signed, or such additional time as the parties agree to, plaintiffs shall move the Court, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an Order awarding reasonable costs, fees and disbursements to plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Notice, Opportunity to Comment and Approval of this Stipulation 81. After notice and an opportunity to comment on this Stipulation have been provided to the Class, the Court shall determine whether to approve this Stipulation as being a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement of this action. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(e), the Court will determine the manner in which notice of this Stipulation and an opportunity to comment will be given to members of this Class. This Stipulation shall not take effect until the Court enters an order approving the Stipulation as a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement of this action.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, counsel for the parties in this action, have executed this stipulation on January 12, 2007.
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- 52 -

- 53 -

54

EXHIBIT A
55

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------X M.K.B., et al,
Plaintiffs,
- against -
VERNA EGGLESTON, et al,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------X

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 1
05 CV 10446 (JSR) DECLARATION OF APPLICATION FOR A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

1. On __________ ____, 20____, I,

________________________________________,

Month

Day Year Name

submitted a complete application for a Social Security Number in connection with my

combined application for Safety Net Assistance and State-funded Medicaid at the

following office of the Federal Social Security Administration:

Address:

____________________________________________________

Street

City

State

2. I applied for a Social Security Number for: (check all applicable boxes):

____myself

____ another household member whose name is:________________________ (Name of public benefits Applicant)

____ another household member, whose name is:________________________ (Name of public benefits Applicant)

____ another household member, whose name is:________________________ (Name of public benefits Applicant)

____ another household member, whose name is:________________________ (Name of public benefits Applicant)

56

EXHIBIT A, PAGE 2
3. I offered a Social Security Administration employee the letters for myself and each household member I was given by an employee of the New York City Human Resources Administration that requests the Social Security Administration to assign a Social Security Number to me and other household members named in paragraph 2.
4. The Social Security Administration employee took my application for a Social Security Number.
5. I asked the Social Security Administration employee for a written acknowledgment that I applied for a Social Security Number for myself and for other household members named in paragraph 2, but the Social Security Administration employee did not give it to me. .
6. I have not received a letter from the Social Security Administration denying the application I made on behalf of myself or any household member named in paragraph 2 for a Social Security Number.
7. I understand that if I did not apply for a Social Security Number I may be ineligible for Safety Net Assistance and/or State-funded Medicaid and/or subject to recovery of any benefits that I did receive.
I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct.
________________________________ (Signature)
Date: ___________________________
57

EXHIBIT B1
58

M.K.B. NOTICE OF DETERMINATION

EXHIBIT B1, PAGE 1

HRA LOGO

DATE

IMPORTANT NOTICE: SOMEONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD IS ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS THEY DID NOT RECEIVE IN THE PAST.

Dear________:

You are receiving this notice because you or someone in your household is a member of a class in a lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of the settlement of that lawsuit, we have reviewed the denial and/or discontinuance of public benefits (cash assistance, Medicaid and/or Food Stamps) for class members in your household. This letter explains the determination we have reached in your case.

We have enclosed an insert describing the lawsuit, who is a class member and who may be entitled to benefits as a result of the settlement of the lawsuit. It is possible that not every member of your household is a class member. Only class members are eligible to receive retroactive public benefits as a result of the settlement.
CASH ASSISTANCE

In deciding how much retroactive public assistance that each class member in your household is eligible to receive, we used a starting date of either December 13, 2002, or the date your cash assistance application was denied or your cash assistance was discontinued if it was after December 13, 2002. We used an ending date for the retroactive period of either the date of this notice, or the date you started to receive cash assistance or the date you became ineligible if it was before the date of this notice.

______In reviewing your retroactive cash assistance, we determined that the following class members ARE eligible to receive retroactive cash assistance under the settlement in the amounts below:

NAME

AMOUNT

START DATE

END DATE

______In reviewing your retroactive cash assistance, we determined that the following class members are NOT eligible to receive retroactive cash assistance under the settlement:
59

NAME

EXHIBIT B1, PAGE 2
REASON FOR DENIAL

FOOD STAMPS

In deciding how much retroactive food stamps that each class member in your household is eligible to receive, we used a starting date of either December 13, 2004, or the date your food stamps application was denied or your food stamps were discontinued if it was after December 13, 2004. We used an ending date for the retroactive period of either the date of this notice, or the date you started to receive food stamps or the date you became ineligible if it was before the date of this notice.

______In reviewing your retroactive food stamps, we determined that the following class members ARE eligible to receive retroactive food stamps under the settlement in the amounts below:

NAME

AMOUNT

START DATE

END DATE

______In reviewing your retroactive food stamps, we determined that the following class members are NOT eligible to receive retroactive food stamps under the settlement:

NAME

REASON FOR DENIAL

MEDICAID

Members of your household who are eligible for retroactive cash assistance as listed above may also be eligible for retroactive Medicaid. There are certain exceptions as described in the enclosed insert.

We have determined that the following class members may be eligible for retroactive Medicaid for the periods listed below (from Start Date to End Date).

NAME

START DATE

END DATE

60

EXHIBIT B1, PAGE 3
Class Members in your household who are not eligible for retroactive cash assistance as listed above may be eligible for retroactive Medicaid and will be referred for a separate determination. To be eligible for retroactive Medicaid, the individuals must meet the requirements described in the enclosed insert. The individuals referred for a separate determination will receive a separate notice informing them of whether they are eligible for retroactive Medicaid under the settlement.
HOW YOUR RETROACTIVE MEDICAID WILL BE PROCESSED:
If the person listed above as eligible for retroactive Medicaid has bills for medical services provided during this period that are unpaid or for which they have not been reimbursed, you must mail or bring copies of any such bills, along with a copy of this notice, to:
Medicaid Reimbursement Unit, 330 West 34th Street, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10001, Attention MKB.

HOW YOUR CASH ASSISTANCE AND/OR FOOD STAMPS BENEFITS WILL BE ISSUED TO YOU:

______ ______

EBT card. If you do not currently have an active EBT card, please contact HRA at [INSERT]. If you do not receive the additional benefits as listed above, please call HRA TEL NUMBER.
Underpayment Correction Credit Because you are not currently eligible to receive public benefits, or you failed to attend a previously scheduled appointment in connection with your eligibility for retroactive benefits, we have issued the retroactive benefits listed above as an underpayment correction credit. This means you will receive the retroactive benefits listed above if and when you start to receive public benefits in the future.

IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS DETERMINATION, SEE THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed on the last page, which represent you.

61

EXHIBIT B1, PAGE 4

CONFERENCE AND FAIR HEARING SECTION – DO YOU THINK WE ARE WRONG?

If you think our decision was wrong, you can ask for a review of our decision. We will correct our mistakes. You can do both 1 and 2:

1. Ask for a meeting (conference) with one of our supervisors; 2. Ask for a State fair hearing with a State hearing officer.

1. CONFERENCE (Informal meeting with us) If you think our decision was wrong, or if you do not understand our decision, please call us to set up a meeting. To do this, call the conference phone number on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. Sometimes this is the fastest way to solve any problem you may have. We encourage you to do this even when you have asked for a fair hearing.

2. STATE FAIR HEARING – You have the following number of days from the date of this notice

to ask for a fair hearing:

BENEFIT AREA

TIME LIMIT

Public Assistance, Medical Assistance, Social Services 60 days

Food Stamp Benefits

90 days

These time limits apply even if you have asked for a conference (meeting) with us.
HOW TO ASK FOR A FAIR HEARING: You can ask for a fair hearing by mail, by phone, by fax or online.
Mail: Send a copy of Part A and Part B to the Office of Administrative Hearings, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, P.O. Box 1930, Albany, New York 12201. Please keep a copy of each notice for yourself.
I want a fair hearing. I do not agree with the agency’s action. (You may explain why you disagree below, but you do not have to include a written explanation.)
Phone: 800-342-3334 (PLEASE HAVE THIS NOTICE WITH YOU WHEN YOU CALL.) Fax: Fax a copy of the front and reverse of this notice to: (518) 473-6735 or Online: Complete an online request form at: http://www.otda.state.ny.us/oah/forms.asp. If you cannot reach the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance by phone, by fax or online, please write to ask for a fair hearing before the deadline
WHAT TO EXPECT AT A FAIR HEARING: The State will send you a notice that tells you when and where the fair hearing will be held.
At the hearing, you will have a chance to explain why you think our decision is wrong. You can bring a lawyer, a relative, a friend or someone else to help you do this. If you cannot come yourself, you can send someone to represent you. If you are sending someone who is not a lawyer to the hearing instead of you, you must give this person a letter to show the hearing officer that you want this person to represent you at the hearing.
At the hearing, you and your lawyer or other representative will have a chance to explain why we are wrong and a chance to give the hearing officer written papers that explain why we are wrong.
To help you explain at the hearing why you think we are wrong, you should bring any witnesses who can help you. You should also bring any papers you have, such as: pay stubs, leases, receipts, bills, doctor’s statements.
At the hearing, you and your lawyer or other representative can ask questions of witnesses which we bring or which you bring to help your case.
LEGAL ASSISTANCE: If you think you need a lawyer to help you with this problem, you should call one of the legal offices listed at the end of this notice or another lawyer of your choice.

62

EXHIBIT B1, PAGE 5
ACCESS TO YOUR FILE AND COPIES OF DOCUMENTS: To help you get ready for the hearing, you have a right to look at your case file. If you call or write to us, we will provide you with free copies of the documents from your file that we will give to the hearing officer at the fair hearing. Also, if you call or write to us, we will provide you with free copies of other documents from your file that you think you may need to prepare for your fair hearing. To ask for documents or to find out how to look at your file, call us at the Record Access phone number on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. If you want copies of documents from your case file, you should ask for them ahead of time. They will be provided to you within a reasonable time before the date of the hearing. Documents will be mailed to you only if you specifically ask that they be mailed. INFORMATION: If you want more information about your case, how to ask for a fair hearing, how to see your file, or how to get additional copies of documents, call us at the phone numbers on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. [INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]
63

EXHIBIT B2
64

M.K.B. NOTICE OF DENIAL

EXHIBIT B2, PAGE 1

HRA Logo
Date
IMPORTANT: NOTICE OF DENIAL OF PAST BENEFITS UNDER SETTLEMENT OF A LAWSUIT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL. PLEASE READ CAREFULLY.

Dear________:

You are receiving this notice because you or someone in your household is a member of a class in a lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of the settlement of that lawsuit, we have reviewed the denial and/or discontinuance of public benefits (cash assistance, Medicaid and/or Food Stamps) for class members in your household. This letter explains the determination we have reached in your case.

We have enclosed an insert describing the lawsuit, who is a class member and who may be entitled to benefits as a result of the settlement of the lawsuit. It is possible that not every member of your household is a class member. Only class members are eligible to receive retroactive public benefits as a result of the settlement.

We have determined that the following individuals are not eligible for retroactive benefits, as described below, under the settlement.

CASH ASSISTANCE

In deciding whether class members in your household are eligible to receive retroactive cash assistance, we used a starting date of either December 13, 2002, or the date your cash assistance application was denied or your cash assistance was discontinued if it was after December 13, 2002. We used an ending date for the retroactive period of either the date of this notice, or the date you started to receive cash assistance or the date you became ineligible if it was before the date of this notice.

In reviewing your retroactive cash assistance, we determined that the following class members are NOT eligible to receive retroactive cash assistance under the settlement:

NAME

REASON FOR DENIAL

START DATE END DATE

65

EXHIBIT B2, PAGE 2

FOOD STAMPS

In deciding whether class members in your household are eligible to receive retroactive food stamps, we used a starting date of either December 13, 2004, or the date your food stamps application was denied or your food stamps were discontinued if it was after December 13, 2004. We used an ending date for the retroactive period of either the date of this notice, or the date you started to receive food stamps or the date you became ineligible if it was before the date of this notice.

In reviewing your retroactive food stamps, we determined that the following class members are NOT eligible to receive retroactive food stamps under the settlement:

NAME

REASON FOR DENIAL

START DATE END DATE

MEDICAID
Class Members in your household who are not eligible for retroactive cash assistance as listed above may be eligible for retroactive Medicaid and will be referred for a separate determination. To be eligible, the individuals must meet the requirements described in the enclosed insert. The individuals referred for a separate determination will receive a separate notice informing them of whether they are eligible for retroactive Medicaid under the settlement.
IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS DETERMINATION, SEE THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed on the last page, which represent you.

66

EXHIBIT B2, PAGE 3

CONFERENCE AND FAIR HEARING SECTION – DO YOU THINK WE ARE WRONG?

If you think our decision was wrong, you can ask for a review of our decision. We will correct our mistakes. You can do both 1 and 2:

1. Ask for a meeting (conference) with one of our supervisors; 2. Ask for a State fair hearing with a State hearing officer.

1. CONFERENCE (Informal meeting with us) If you think our decision was wrong, or if you do not understand our decision, please call us to set up a meeting. To do this, call the conference phone number on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. Sometimes this is the fastest way to solve any problem you may have. We encourage you to do this even when you have asked for a fair hearing.

2. STATE FAIR HEARING – You have the following number of days from the date of this notice

to ask for a fair hearing:

BENEFIT AREA

TIME LIMIT

Public Assistance, Medical Assistance, Social Services 60 days

Food Stamp Benefits

90 days

These time limits apply even if you have asked for a conference (meeting) with us.
HOW TO ASK FOR A FAIR HEARING: You can ask for a fair hearing by mail, by phone, by fax or online.
Mail: Send a copy of Part A and Part B to the Office of Administrative Hearings, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, P.O. Box 1930, Albany, New York 12201. Please keep a copy of each notice for yourself.
I want a fair hearing. I do not agree with the agency’s action. (You may explain why you disagree below, but you do not have to include a written explanation.)
Phone: 800-342-3334 (PLEASE HAVE THIS NOTICE WITH YOU WHEN YOU CALL.) Fax: Fax a copy of the front and reverse of this notice to: (518) 473-6735 or Online: Complete an online request form at: http://www.otda.state.ny.us/oah/forms.asp. If you cannot reach the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance by phone, by fax or online, please write to ask for a fair hearing before the deadline
WHAT TO EXPECT AT A FAIR HEARING: The State will send you a notice that tells you when and where the fair hearing will be held.
At the hearing, you will have a chance to explain why you think our decision is wrong. You can bring a lawyer, a relative, a friend or someone else to help you do this. If you cannot come yourself, you can send someone to represent you. If you are sending someone who is not a lawyer to the hearing instead of you, you must give this person a letter to show the hearing officer that you want this person to represent you at the hearing.
At the hearing, you and your lawyer or other representative will have a chance to explain why we are wrong and a chance to give the hearing officer written papers that explain why we are wrong.
To help you explain at the hearing why you think we are wrong, you should bring any witnesses who can help you. You should also bring any papers you have, such as: pay stubs, leases, receipts, bills, doctor’s statements.
At the hearing, you and your lawyer or other representative can ask questions of witnesses which we bring or which you bring to help your case.
LEGAL ASSISTANCE: If you think you need a lawyer to help you with this problem, you should call one of the legal offices listed at the end of this notice or another lawyer of your choice.

67

EXHIBIT B2, PAGE 4
ACCESS TO YOUR FILE AND COPIES OF DOCUMENTS: To help you get ready for the hearing, you have a right to look at your case file. If you call or write to us, we will provide you with free copies of the documents from your file that we will give to the hearing officer at the fair hearing. Also, if you call or write to us, we will provide you with free copies of other documents from your file that you think you may need to prepare for your fair hearing. To ask for documents or to find out how to look at your file, call us at the Record Access phone number on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. If you want copies of documents from your case file, you should ask for them ahead of time. They will be provided to you within a reasonable time before the date of the hearing. Documents will be mailed to you only if you specifically ask that they be mailed. INFORMATION: If you want more information about your case, how to ask for a fair hearing, how to see your file, or how to get additional copies of documents, call us at the phone numbers on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. [INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]
68

EXHIBIT C
69

EXHIBIT C, PAGE 1
M.K.B. NOTICE OF DETERMINATION REGARDING PAST STATE FOOD ASSISTANCE
HRA LOGO
DATE
IMPORTANT: NOTICE OF DECISION ON PAST STATE FOOD ASSISTANCE BENEFITS UNDER SETTLEMENT OF A LAWSUIT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL. PLEASE READ CAREFULLY.
Dear________:
You are receiving this notice because you or someone in your household is a member of a class in a lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of the settlement of that lawsuit, we have reviewed the previous denial and/or discontinuance of state food assistance benefits as described below. This letter explains the determination we have reached in your case.
We have enclosed an insert describing the lawsuit, who is a class member and who may be entitled to benefits as a result of the settlement of the lawsuit. It is possible that not every member of your household is a class member. Only class members are eligible to receive retroactive public benefits as a result of the settlement.
Some time between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, you, or a member of your family, applied at a Job Center for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid Food Stamps and/or State Food Assistance. Your State Food Assistance application may have been mistakenly denied or not accepted because of your immigration status. Or you, or a member of your family, may have had some or all of your Food Stamps benefits mistakenly reduced or discontinued because of your immigration status.
In deciding how much each class member in your household will be paid, we used a starting date of either December 13, 2002, or the date the class member’s State Food Assistance application was denied or was discontinued if it was after December 13, 2002. We used an ending date of September 30, 2005 or the date the class member became ineligible if it was before September 30, 2005. This payment will be 50% of the benefit the class member would have received under the State Food Assistance program.
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EXHIBIT C, PAGE 2

We have determined that the following members of your household are eligible to receive such a payment for the periods described below.

NAME

START DATE

END DATE

AMOUNT

We have determined that the following members of your household are NOT eligible for such a payment.

NAME

REASON FOR DENIAL

If you disagree with the decision described in this notice, you should contact one of the legal services offices listed below. They will assist you in seeking review of this decision through an informal relief process. If you do not contact the legal services office within sixty days of the date of this notice, you will lose your right to a review of this decision – even if you have already requested a fair hearing about other benefits.

If you have any questions regarding this notice, you may call one of the legal services offices listed below, which represent you.
[INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]

71

EXHIBIT D
72

EXHIBIT D, PAGE 1

M.K.B. NOTICE OF MEDICAID DETERMINATION

HRA Logo

Date

IMPORTANT: NOTICE OF DECISION ON PAST MEDICAID BENEFITS UNDER SETTLEMENT OF A LAWSUIT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL. PLEASE READ CAREFULLY.

Dear________:

You are receiving this notice because you or someone in your household is a member of a class in a lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of the settlement of that lawsuit, we have made a separate determination about the eligibility of class members in your household for retroactive Medicaid during the period listed below.

We have enclosed an insert describing the lawsuit, who is a class member and who may be entitled to benefits as a result of the settlement of the lawsuit. It is possible that not every member of your household is a class member. Only class members are eligible to receive retroactive public benefits as a result of the settlement.

________We have determined that the following members of your household are eligible for retroactive Medicaid for the following periods:

NAME

START DATE

END DATE

If the person listed above as eligible for retroactive Medicaid has bills for medical services provided during this period that are unpaid or for which they have not been reimbursed, you must mail or bring copies of any such bills, along with a copy of this notice to:
Medicaid Reimbursement Unit, 330 West 34th Street, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10001, Attention MKB.

73

EXHIBIT D, PAGE 2

Some of these same individuals listed above may have been denied retroactive Medicaid for the following periods for the following reasons:

NAME

START DATE

END DATE

REASON FOR DENIAL

Some individuals in your household have been denied retroactive Medicaid for the entire period we reviewed:

NAME

START DATE

END DATE

REASON FOR DENIAL

IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS DETERMINATION, SEE THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed below, which represent you.
[INSERT LEGAL OFFICES]

74

EXHIBIT D, PAGE 3

CONFERENCE AND FAIR HEARING SECTION – DO YOU THINK WE ARE WRONG?

If you think our decision was wrong, you can ask for a review of our decision. We will correct our mistakes. You can do both 1 and 2:

1. Ask for a meeting (conference) with one of our supervisors; 2. Ask for a State fair hearing with a State hearing officer.

1. CONFERENCE (Informal meeting with us) If you think our decision was wrong, or if you do not understand our decision, please call us to set up a meeting. To do this, call the conference phone number on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. Sometimes this is the fastest way to solve any problem you may have. We encourage you to do this even when you have asked for a fair hearing.

2. STATE FAIR HEARING – You have the following number of days from the date of this notice to ask for

a fair hearing:

BENEFIT AREA

TIME LIMIT

Public Assistance, Medical Assistance, Social Services 60 days

Food Stamp Benefits

90 days

These time limits apply even if you have asked for a conference (meeting) with us.
HOW TO ASK FOR A FAIR HEARING: You can ask for a fair hearing by mail, by phone, by fax or online.
Mail: Send a copy of Part A and Part B to the Office of Administrative Hearings, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, P.O. Box 1930, Albany, New York 12201. Please keep a copy of each notice for yourself.
I want a fair hearing. I do not agree with the agency’s action. (You may explain why you disagree below, but you do not have to include a written explanation.)
Phone: 800-342-3334 (PLEASE HAVE THIS NOTICE WITH YOU WHEN YOU CALL.) Fax: Fax a copy of the front and reverse of this notice to: (518) 473-6735 or Online: Complete an online request form at: http://www.otda.state.ny.us/oah/forms.asp. If you cannot reach the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance by phone, by fax or online, please write to ask for a fair hearing before the deadline
WHAT TO EXPECT AT A FAIR HEARING: The State will send you a notice that tells you when and where the fair hearing will be held.
At the hearing, you will have a chance to explain why you think our decision is wrong. You can bring a lawyer, a relative, a friend or someone else to help you do this. If you cannot come yourself, you can send someone to represent you. If you are sending someone who is not a lawyer to the hearing instead of you, you must give this person a letter to show the hearing officer that you want this person to represent you at the hearing.
At the hearing, you and your lawyer or other representative will have a chance to explain why we are wrong and a chance to give the hearing officer written papers that explain why we are wrong.
To help you explain at the hearing why you think we are wrong, you should bring any witnesses who can help you. You should also bring any papers you have, such as: pay stubs, leases, receipts, bills, doctor’s statements.
At the hearing, you and your lawyer or other representative can ask questions of witnesses which we bring or which you bring to help your case.

75

EXHIBIT D, PAGE 4
LEGAL ASSISTANCE: If you think you need a lawyer to help you with this problem, you should call one of the legal offices listed at the end of this notice or another lawyer of your choice. ACCESS TO YOUR FILE AND COPIES OF DOCUMENTS: To help you get ready for the hearing, you have a right to look at your case file. If you call or write to us, we will provide you with free copies of the documents from your file that we will give to the hearing officer at the fair hearing. Also, if you call or write to us, we will provide you with free copies of other documents from your file that you think you may need to prepare for your fair hearing. To ask for documents or to find out how to look at your file, call us at the Record Access phone number on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice. If you want copies of documents from your case file, you should ask for them ahead of time. They will be provided to you within a reasonable time before the date of the hearing. Documents will be mailed to you only if you specifically ask that they be mailed. INFORMATION: If you want more information about your case, how to ask for a fair hearing, how to see your file, or how to get additional copies of documents, call us at the phone numbers on the front of this notice or write to us at the address on the front of this notice.
76

EXHIBIT E
77

M.K.B. APPOINTMENT NOTICE

EXHIBIT E, PAGE 1

HRA LOGO
DATE
IMPORTANT NOTICE: YOU MAY NOW BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS NOT ISSUED TO YOU IN THE PAST (EVEN IF YOU ARE NOT NOW RECEIVING PUBLIC BENEFITS)
Dear __________:
You are receiving this notice because of a settlement of a class action lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of that settlement, you may now be entitled to receive benefits not issued to you in the past. These benefits include cash assistance, food stamps and Medicaid, including reimbursement of certain medical bills. For more information about the settlement of the lawsuit and how it affects you, please read the enclosed M.K.B insert.
Some time between December 13, 2002 and ____________(Date of identification of autos list), you, or a member of your family, applied at a Job Center for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid and/or Food Stamps. This application may have been mistakenly denied or not accepted because of your immigration status. Or you, or a member of your family, may have had some or all of your public benefits mistakenly reduced or discontinued because of your immigration status.
Now, as a result of the settlement of the M.K.B. v. Eggleston case, we are reviewing your household’s eligibility to receive the benefits not issued to your household in the past. In order to decide whether you will receive these benefits and if so, how much, we need more information from you.
WE HAVE MADE AN APPOINTMENT FOR YOU TO COME TO ___________ AT_____________________________. If you are unable to make this appointment, you MUST call TEL NO.________ on or before the date of the appointment to reschedule.
IMPORTANT: IF YOU DO NOT ATTEND THIS APPOINTMENT OR RESCHEDULE IT, YOU MIGHT NOT RECEIVE ANY OF THE BENEFITS DESCRIBED ABOVE OR YOU MIGHT RECEIVE ONLY A REDUCED AMOUNT.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed below, which represent you. [INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]

78

EXHIBIT F
79

EXHIBIT F, PAGE 1
M.K.B. IMPORTANT NOTICE OF YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST RETROACTIVE BENEFITS
HRA LOGO
DATE
IMPORTANT NOTICE: YOU MAY NOW BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS NOT ISSUED TO YOU IN THE PAST (EVEN IF YOU ARE NOT NOW RECEIVING PUBLIC BENEFITS)
Dear __________:
You are receiving this notice because of a settlement of a class action lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of that settlement, you may be entitled to additional public benefits. The additional public benefits you might receive include cash assistance, food stamps and Medicaid, including reimbursement of certain medical bills.
Some time between December 13, 2002 and ____________(Date of creation of retro universe), you, or a member of your family, applied at a Job Center for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid and/or Food Stamps. This application may have been mistakenly denied or not accepted because of your immigration status. Or you, or a member of your family, may have had some or all of your public benefits mistakenly reduced or discontinued because of your immigration status.
We have enclosed an insert describing the lawsuit, who is a class member and who may be entitled to benefits as a result of the settlement of the lawsuit. It is possible that not every member of your household is a class member. Only class members are eligible to receive retroactive public benefits as a result of the settlement.
IF YOU WANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE RETROACTIVE BENEFITS YOU MUST FILL IN THE FORM THAT IS ENCLOSED WITH THIS NOTICE AND RETURN IT TO US IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE, TO
[INSERT ADDRESS]
IF YOU DO NOT REQUEST A REVIEW WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THIS
NOTICE, YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ANY ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.
If you request a review, we will require you to attend an appointment in order to determine if you are entitled to receive retroactive benefits.
If you have any questions about this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed below, which represent you. [INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]
80

EXHIBIT G
81

EXHIBIT G, PAGE 1
M.K.B. APPOINTMENT NOTICE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR REVIEW HRA LOGO DATE IMPORTANT NOTICE: YOU MAY NOW BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS NOT ISSUED TO YOU IN THE PAST (EVEN IF YOU ARE NOT NOW RECEIVING PUBLIC BENEFITS) Dear __________:
You are receiving this notice because you requested a review pursuant to M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). In order to decide whether you will receive additional benefits and if so, how much, we need more information from you.
WE HAVE MADE AN APPOINTMENT FOR YOU TO COME TO ___________ AT _______________. If you are unable to make this appointment, you MUST call TEL NO. _____________ to reschedule on or before the date of the appointment.
IMPORTANT: IF YOU DO NOT ATTEND THIS APPOINTMENT OR RESCHEDULE IT, WE WILL NOT REVIEW YOUR CASE AND YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.
If you have any questions regarding this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed below, which represent you.
[INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]
82

EXHIBIT H
83

EXHIBIT H, PAGE 1
M.K.B. IMPORTANT NOTICE OF YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST RETROACTIVE BENEFITS AND A PAYMENT IN PLACE OF PAST STATE FOOD ASSISTANCE
HRA LOGO
DATE
IMPORTANT NOTICE: YOU MAY NOW BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS NOT ISSUED TO YOU IN THE PAST (EVEN IF YOU ARE NOT NOW RECEIVING PUBLIC BENEFITS)
Dear __________:
You are receiving this notice because of a settlement of a class action lawsuit called M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). As a result of that settlement, you may be entitled to additional public benefits. The additional benefits you might receive include cash assistance, Food Stamps and/or Medicaid, including reimbursement of certain medical bills. You may also be eligible to receive a payment from the City of New York to replace State Food Assistance benefits not issued to you in the past.
Some time between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, you, or a member of your family, applied at a Job Center for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid, Food Stamps and/or State Food Assistance. This application may have been mistakenly denied or not accepted because of your immigration status. Or you, or a member of your family, may have had some or all of your benefits mistakenly reduced or discontinued because of your immigration status.
We have enclosed an insert describing the lawsuit, who is a class member and who may be entitled to benefits as a result of the settlement of the lawsuit. It is possible that not every member of your household is a class member. Only class members are eligible to receive retroactive public benefits and/or a payment from the City of New York as a result of the settlement.
IF YOU WANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE RETROACTIVE BENEFITS YOU MUST FILL IN THE FORM THAT IS ENCLOSED WITH THIS NOTICE AND RETURN IT TO US IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE, TO
[INSERT ADDRESS]
IF YOU DO NOT REQUEST A REVIEW WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, YOU WILL NOT BE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ANY ADDITIONAL BENEFITS.
If you request a review, we will require you to attend an appointment in order to determine if you are entitled to receive additional benefits.
If you have any questions about this notice, please call ---.---.---- [at HRA]. You may also call one of the legal services offices listed below, which represent you. [INSERT LIST OF LEGAL SERVICES OFFICES]
84

EXHIBIT I
85

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
- against -
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
Defendants.

EXHIBIT I, PAGE 1
05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT EXPLANATION OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE SETTLEMENT OF THE M.K.B. v. EGGLESTON LAWSUIT.
What is the M.K.B. v. Eggleston lawsuit?
In December 2005, a lawsuit called MKB v. Eggleston, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR), was filed in the federal court for the Southern District of New York. The lawsuit is a class action. This means that the individuals who brought the case (“the named plaintiffs”) represent everyone else in the same situation. Non-citizens who are affected by the case are called members of the class. The case is about whether or not certain non-citizens who applied for public benefits at New York City Job Centers correctly received the public benefits for which they applied.

86

EXHIBIT I, PAGE 2
Why am I receiving a notice about this lawsuit?
You are receiving this notice because you, or a member of your household, may be a member of the class in this case. This means that you, or a member of your household, appear to be in one of the immigration statuses listed below and may have been incorrectly denied public benefits because of that immigration status. In some households, some people may be members of the class even though other people in the household are not.

Who is a member of the class?

The class in this case has been defined by the Court. It includes certain non-citizens in the categories described below who were incorrectly denied cash assistance, Food Stamps, Medicaid and/or State Food Assistance Payments (FAP) at a New York City Job Center.

Lawful Permanent Resident who has been in that status for less than five years
Battered Qualified Alien (and their battered children)

This means people who are Lawful Permanent Residents (I-551 Permanent Resident Card or “green card” holders) who had their Lawful Permanent Resident status for less than five years when they applied for public benefits. This includes individuals who are in certain immigration statuses, such as those set forth below, who have proof of domestic violence, for example:
• Prima facie notice for Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) selfpetition (FORM 1-360)
• Approval notice for VAWA selfpetition (FORM I-360)
• Pending or Approved I-130 Petition • K3 or K4 visa • V-1, V-2 or V-3 visa • Employment Authorization Card
with Category Code (a)(9) or (a)(15) Even if you are not in one of these specific categories, you may still be a Battered

87

Permanently Residing Under Color Of Law (PRUCOL)

Qualified Alien.
Generally, this includes non-citizens whom the immigration service knows are in the U.S. and permits to remain. For example:
• K Visa • S Visa • V Visa • U-Visa Interim Relief • Asylum Applicant (Notice of
Receipt of Form I-589)(Medicaid only) • Employment Authorization Card with certain Category Codes Even if you are not in one of these specific categories, you may still be PRUCOL.

The full definition of the plaintiff class, as ordered by the Court is:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City Job Center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term “Affected Immigrants” means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1641(c); (2) their immigrant children, or in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).

What happened in the lawsuit? The plaintiffs in this case claimed that the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”) had incorrectly denied them cash assistance benefits (Family Assistance and/or Safety
88

EXHIBIT I, PAGE 4
Net Assistance), Medicaid, Food Stamps, and/or State Food Assistance Program Benefits (“FAP”) because of their immigration status. Plaintiffs also sued the New York State Department of Health (“SDOH”) and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”) claiming that they did not supervise HRA properly. HRA, SDOH and OTDA denied all claims.
The immigrant plaintiffs and the Defendants agreed to settle the case instead of having a full trial. The settlement has been approved by the Court and is binding on all class members. As part of the settlement of the case, the Defendants agreed to make changes to their procedures and their computer systems. HRA agreed to provide additional training for some staff. HRA also agreed to review the cases of certain members of the class to see if they were incorrectly denied benefits and should receive retroactive benefits. Although the Defendants agreed to settle the case, they did not admit liability.
A copy of the full settlement agreement is on file with the Court. To receive a copy, you may contact one of the legal offices listed below.
Who is eligible to receive retroactive benefits under the settlement?
Members of the class may be eligible to receive retroactive benefits under the settlement. Each class member is being sent a notice with this insert that describes what the class member must do in order to receive retroactive benefits. Please read the notice that has been sent to you with this insert and follow all of the instructions in that notice in order to receive retroactive benefits under this settlement.
This insert describes the process that HRA has or will use to review your case for retroactive benefits under the settlement. Each class member has been placed into a group. The process HRA has or will use to review your file depends upon the group in which you (or a member of your household has been placed). Each group is described below.
Group 1.
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If your public benefits application was denied because of your immigration status, but the public benefits application of your U.S. citizen child(ren) was accepted, your case will be automatically reviewed.
Group 2. If according to HRA’s records you are a battered qualified alien (see description above) or a Lawful Permanent Resident who has been in that status for less than five years, and your non-citizen child(ren) were denied Food Stamps based on immigration status, your case will be automatically reviewed.
For class members in Group 1 or Group 2, HRA will look at your household’s case file to see if class members in your household were incorrectly denied Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid, Food Stamps and State Food Assistance Payments. If HRA has enough information in its own files to make this decision, then it will decide whether you will receive retroactive benefits and will notify you of the outcome of its review, the amount of any retroactive benefits that you will receive and your right to appeal that decision. HRA will also determine whether you were incorrectly denied FAP benefits and, if so, will issue you a payment equal to fifty percent of the FAP benefits it determined you should have received.
If HRA does not have enough information to decide whether a class member in Group 1 or Group 2 is eligible to receive retroactive benefits or a payment (or the correct amount of the benefits or payment) under the settlement, then class members will receive a notice called “M.K.B. APPOINTMENT NOTICE.”
If you received an “M.K.B. APPOINTMENT NOTICE”, it means HRA does not have enough information in its files to determine if the decision to deny your or your child’s public benefits was correct, or the amount of retroactive benefits your household may receive under the settlement. If the notice you receive asks you to attend an appointment, you must cooperate with the request, and attend the appointment, or reschedule it and attend a rescheduled appointment. If you do not cooperate, you will not get the retroactive benefits
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you may be eligible for, or you may get only a reduced amount of retroactive benefits based on just the information already in HRA’s files.
IF YOU RECEIVED A NOTICE CALLED “M.K.B. IMPORTANT NOTICE OF YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST RETROACTIVE BENEFITS”, or “M.K.B. IMPORTANT NOTICE OF YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST RETROACTIVE BENEFITS AND A PAYMENT IN PLACE OF PAST STATE FOOD ASSISTANCE” YOU ARE A MEMBER OF GROUP 3. Group 3. If you are in Group 3, then you have been identified as a class member but you will only have your public benefits case reviewed if you ask for a review. If the notice you are receiving asks you to mail back a completed form to request a review, you must send back the form to request a review. After you send back the form, HRA will send you a letter telling you the date and time of your appointment. You must keep that appointment, or reschedule it and attend a rescheduled appointment. IF YOU DO NOT ATTEND SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY RETROACTIVE BENEFITS UNDER THIS SETTLEMENT.
How will HRA determine the amount of retroactive benefits a class member may receive under the settlement?
How the amount of retroactive cash assistance benefits a class member is eligible for under the settlement is calculated: If a class member’s application for cash assistance (Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance) was incorrectly denied or the class member’s cash assistance was incorrectly terminated based on immigration status during the time periods described in the next two sentences, then the class member is eligible to receive the cash assistance he or she would have received. The retroactive cash assistance will be for the period beginning on the date the application was incorrectly denied, or the class member’s cash assistance was incorrectly terminated based on immigration status (but not before December 13, 2002). The period will continue until either (i) the date of the notice in this mailing, or (ii) the
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date the class member started to receive cash assistance, or (iii) the date the class member became ineligible for cash assistance. If the notice you receive with this document tells you about the decision HRA has made about your case, the Start Date and End Dates of your household’s retroactive cash assistance and what amount, if any, retroactive cash assistance your household is eligible for under the settlement are listed on that notice. The class member is eligible for cash assistance that he or she should have received for each month.
How the amount of retroactive Food Stamps benefits a class member is eligible for under the settlement is calculated: If the class member’s food stamps application was incorrectly denied, or the class member’s food stamps were incorrectly terminated, based on immigration status during the time periods described in the next two sentences, the class member is eligible for the food stamps he or she would have received. The retroactive Food Stamps will start from the date the class member’s application was incorrectly denied (but not before December 13, 2004) or the class member’s Food Stamps were incorrectly terminated (but not before December 13, 2004). The class member’s retroactive Food Stamps will continue until either (i) the date of this notice; or (ii) the date the class member started to receive food stamps; (iii) the date an otherwise eligible child turned 18; or (iv) the date the class member became ineligible for food stamps. If the notice you receive with this document tells you about the decision HRA has made about your case, the Start Date and End Dates of your household’s retroactive food stamps and what amount, if any, retroactive food stamps your household is eligible for under the settlement are listed on that notice. The class member is eligible for the amount of food stamps that he or she should have received for each month.
How your retroactive Medicaid is determined: If you are eligible for retroactive cash assistance under the settlement, you are eligible for retroactive Medicaid. This means that you can submit unpaid medical bills that HRA will process so that your medical provider can be paid. You can also submit certain
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medical bills that you paid for reimbursement. These medical bills must be for medical services that were provided during the period beginning three months before the date of your public benefits application until the date that your retroactive cash assistance ended -- (i) the date of this notice, or (ii) the date you started to receive cash assistance, or (iii)
the date you became ineligible for cash assistance.
• You are not eligible for retroactive Medicaid under this settlement for any period during which you already received Medicaid based on a separate application for Medicaid-only.
• You are not eligible to receive reimbursement under this settlement for medical bills previously submitted, or that were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time you submitted bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, Index No.403748/98 (Sup Ct., N.Y. Co.)
• If you made a separate application for Medicaid that was denied for reasons other than immigration status, you may only be eligible for retroactive Medicaid under this settlement up to the date three months prior to the denial of that separate application.
If I am eligible for retroactive benefits, how will I get them? Cash Assistance (Family Assistance/ Safety Net Assistance): If you, or a member of your household currently receives cash assistance (Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance), then any retroactive cash benefits your household is eligible for under this settlement will be issued to your EBT card.
If you or a member of your household does not currently receive cash assistance (Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance), then there are three possibilities:
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• You may apply for ongoing public benefits. If your application for ongoing public benefits is approved, the retroactive benefits you are eligible for under this settlement will be issued to your EBT card
• If you received public benefits in the past but do not want to, receive ongoing public benefits now, you may apply for a one-time payment. To do this, you must give information regarding your financial eligibility for public benefits to HRA. This means you will only have to give information about your finances. You will not be required to attend any appointment not related to your financial eligibility or give any other information. If you are currently financially eligible, you will receive the retroactive benefits you are eligible for now as a one-time payment. This means you will be given a short-term EBT card and your retroactive benefits will be issued to that card. .
• If you do not want to apply for ongoing public benefits now or for a one-time payment, or if your application for ongoing public benefits or a one-time payment is denied, then the retroactive benefits you are eligible for will be issued as an underpayment correction credit. This means you will only receive the retroactive benefits you are eligible for if and when you start to receive public benefits in the future.
Retroactive Food Stamps:
Your retroactive Food Stamps will be issued to the head of your household on an EBT card. You will receive any retroactive Food Stamps you are eligible for even if your public assistance case is closed, and even if you are not currently eligible for public assistance.
Retroactive Medicaid and how to submit unpaid medical bills:
If you are eligible for retroactive Medicaid and have bills for medical services that are unpaid or medical bills that you paid, you must mail copies of any such bills, along with a copy of this notice, to the Medicaid Reimbursement Unit, 330 West 34th Street, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10001, Attention MKB.
How to get a payment if you were incorrectly denied benefits under the State Food Assistance program:
If HRA determines that State Food Assistance benefits were incorrectly not paid to you in the past, you will receive money, in the form of a check, to replace these benefits. The
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amount of money you will get represents fifty percent of the benefits you should have received under the State Food Assistance Program while it was in effect.
What if I disagree with the decision about the amount of retroactive benefits I am eligible for under the settlement?
If you disagree with any decision made about the retroactive cash assistance, food stamps and/or Medicaid benefits you are eligible for under this settlement, you can request a fair hearing to challenge the decision. Instructions about how to request a fair hearing are on the notice you received in this mailing.
If you disagree with any decision made about the payment you are eligible for under the settlement to replace State Food Assistance benefits, you can call one of the legal services offices listed below who will help you seek a review of the decision through an informal relief process.
I have questions. Who should I call to get more information? If you have any questions about the M.K.B. v. Eggleston lawsuit, why you are receiving this notice, any other notice you may have received in connection with the M.K.B. lawsuit, or your retroactive benefits under the settlement, you should call INSERT LEGAL SERVICES OFFICE at 212.666.6666. They represent you, and all other members of the class, in the M.K.B. case they are your attorneys.
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 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 172 Filed 06/26/07 Page 1 of 49

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.l., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner ofthe New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
Defendants.

r
eCLr
05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT
WHEREAS, plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by complaint filed December 13, 2005, against Verna Eggleston, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA") (the ''City defendant"), Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office ofTemporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner ofthe New York State Department of Health ("SDOH") (collectively "State defendants"); and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and for certification of a class, by Notice of Motion dated January 11, 2006; and
WHEREAS, City and State defendants opposed said motion; and

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WHEREAS, the Court, by Order dated February 16, 2006, directed City and State
defendants to undertake certain actions as specifically directed therein and further ordered a
hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification (the "Feb. 16, 2006
Order"); and WHEREAS, the Court held such hearing on dates beginning March 14, 2006
through March 24, 2006; and
WHEREAS, the Court by Order dated August 29, 2006 granted plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction and class certification (the "Aug. 29, 2006 Order") and issued a
preliminary injunction which injunction incorporated by reference the Feb. 16, 2006 Order; and
WHEREAS, in the Aug. 29, 2006 Order, the Court certified this action as a class
action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), with the class defined as:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City Job Center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term "Affected Immigrants" means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 164l(c); (2) their immigrant children, or in the case ofbattered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL). hereinafter the "Class"; and
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WHEREAS, State defendants, by Notice of Motion dated September 13, 2006 moved for reconsideration of that portion of the Court's Aug. 29, 2006 Order certifying the Class which motion was joined by City defendant; and
WHEREAS, the Court, by Order dated October 13, 2006 and decision dated November 8, 2006 denied said motion for reconsideration; and
WHEREAS, State defendants have fulfilled and completed their obligations pursuant to the Feb. 16, 2006 Order as set forth at pages "2- 3" paragraphs numbered (7) through (9) of that Order; and
WHEREAS, defendants have denied any and all wrongdoing alleged in the complaint by Answers filed on behalf of City defendant, dated November 6, 2006 and on behalf of State defendants, dated June 14, 2006; and
WHEREAS, the parties believe that the best interests of the parties will be advanced by the settlement of this action; and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs and defendants are entering into the within Stipulation and Order of Settlement (the "Stipulation") solely for the purpose of settling the disputes between them and to avoid further litigation, and without admitting any fault or liability; and
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for the respective parties herein, that this action is settled, subject to the approval of the Court pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the following terms and conditions: Definitions
For purposes of this Stipulation, the following definitions shall apply: 1. "Battered qualified aliens" means Class Members who are battered aliens treated as qualified aliens, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c).
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2. "Job Center" means all offices in New York City operated by the New York

City Human Resources Administration at which an application for Family Assistance or Safety

Net Assistance may be submitted.

3. "Family Assistance" means cash public assistance benefits reimbursed in part

by the federal program of block grants to States for temporary assistance to needy families

authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611

implemented in New York pursuant to New York Social Services Law ("N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law")

§§ 349

4. "Safety Net Assistance" means assistance provided pursuant to N.Y. Soc.

Serv. Law§§ 157

to persons not eligible to receive Family Assistance.

5. "Food Stamps" means benefits provided pursuant to the federal food stamp

program authorized by 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7, and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et

seq., and federal regulations at 7 C.F.R. Parts 271 through 282 and implemented in New York by

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§§ 95 and 147 and State regulations at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. Parts 358, 359 and

387.

6. "Federal Medicaid" means payments for medical assistance reimbursed in

part by the federal program of medical assistance authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 seq., 42

U.S.C. § 1320b-7 and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq., implemented in New York pursuant to N.Y.

Soc. Serv. Law§§ 363 et seq.

7. "State Medicaid" means medical assistance provided pursuant to N.Y. Soc.

Serv. Law§§ 363 seq. to persons not eligible to receive Federal Medicaid.

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5
8. "State food assistance benefits" (hereinafter "FAP") means benefits provided
pursuant to the state food assistance program, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§ 95(10), which program
ended as of September 30, 2005.
9. "Public benefits" means collectively Family Assistance, Safety Net
Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and Food Stamps.
10. "Plaintiffs" means the individually named plaintiffs as set forth in the action
and the Class.
11. "City defendant" means Vema Eggleston, as Commissioner of the New York
City Human Resources Administration and her successor in that office.
12. "State defendants" means Robert Doar, as Commissioner ofthe New York
State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") and Antonia C. Novello, as
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health ("SDOH") and their successors in
those offices.
13. "Class" means:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City Job Center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term "Affected Immigrants" means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children, or in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
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14. "Class Member" means a member of the Class as defined above. 15. "Effective Date" means thirty (30) days from the date ofthe filing of the judgment in this action. 16. "'Applicable federal and state law or regulations" means 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§§ 349 et seq., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§§ 157 seq., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§§ 363 seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. 17. "Apply for" and "application" mean any application by a Class Member for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, and any application made for Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and/or Food Stamps made in conjunction with an application for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance made at a Job Center, including any request to be added to an existing public benefits case. An application made by one member of a mandatory filing unit is deemed an application by all members of the mandatory filing unit to the extent required by N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§ 131-c. 18. Action taken "based on immigration status" means an action taken based on: (i) a Class Member's immigration status or immigration documentation, including documentation relating to battered qualified alien status; and/or (ii) a Class Member's provision of or application for a Social Security Number ("SSN"), when the failure to provide a SSN is as a result of the United States Social Security Administration's ("SSA") denial of an application for a SSN based on immigration status. 19. "Immigrant Liaison" means an employee or agent of City defendant who has received specialized training in the eligibility of Class Members for public benefits based on
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Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 172 Filed 06/26/07 Page 7 of 49 7
immigration status, and who functions in a Job Center as a specialist for making determinations regarding the eligibility of Class Members for public benefits. General Provisions
During the term of this Stipulation: 20. City defendant shall refrain from denying, discontinuing or reducing public benefits at Job Centers based on immigration status to Class Members, who are eligible for those benefits, pursuant to applicable federal and state law or regulations. 21. City defendant shall refrain at Job Centers from (i) refusing to permit Class Members to submit applications for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, and applications for Federal Medicaid and/or State Medicaid and/or Food Stamps made in conjunction with an application for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance at a Job Center, based on immigration status, and (ii) refrain from turning away, deterring or discouraging Class Members from submitting such applications based on immigration status. 22. City and State defendants may require Class Members to apply for a SSN to the extent necessary to establish or maintain eligibility for Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid or Food Stamps. City and State defendants may require Class Members to apply for aSSN with the SSA once at the time of an application for Safety Net Assistance. City defendant shall not deny and/or discontinue Safety Net Assistance, and State Medicaid applied for or received in conjunction with Safety Net Assistance, to a Class Member based on a failure to furnish aSSN, so long as the Class Member makes a timely and complete application to SSA for aSSN. If the Class Member cannot obtain aSSN, a receipt for the application or a letter of denial of an SSN from SSA, then the Class Member may submit to the Job Center an attestation for the purpose of establishing his/her eligibility for Safety Net Assistance and State Medicaid in conjunction with the Safety Net Assistance application describing how s/he applied for an SSN. A copy ofthe
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Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 172 Filed 06/26/07 Page 8 of 49 8
attestation form is attached as Exhibit A. If the Class Member does not present the form attached as Exhibit A, City defendant will provide the Class Member with the form. An application for Safety Net Assistance or State Medicaid made in conjunction with the application for Safety Net Assistance may not be delayed or denied if the Class Member applied for a SSN and cannot get proof from SSA that s/he applied for aSSN and submits the completed attestation. If the Class member makes no attempt to obtain a SSN or does not execute a statement attesting to the Class Member's efforts to apply for one, the application may be denied. If the Class Member's case file indicates a change in the Class Member's immigration status to a qualified status as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) or (c), City defendant shall require a Class Member to reapply for aSSN after providing assistance to the extent required by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.5(a) in obtaining information or documents necessary to apply for aSSN. If a Class Member is otherwise eligible for Food Stamps, but for having furnished aSSN, and the individual is denied aSSN by SSA, City defendant may require the Class Member to reapply for aSSN. City defendant will provide assistance to the applicant to the extent required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.6 and to the extent required by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.5(a) in obtaining information or documents necessary to apply for a SSN.
23. If a Class Member is eligible for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid and/or Food Stamps, but for any requirement to apply for or provide aSSN, City defendant shall provide the Class Member with a letter addressed to SSA, in a form approved by State defendants, and shall otherwise assist the Class Member in obtaining information or documents necessary to apply for aSSN to the extent required by 18 N. Y.C.R.R. § 351.5(a) and to the extent required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.6.
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24. As described further in this paragraph, defendants shall provide Class Members who apply for public benefits at a Job Center and are denied or have their public benefits discontinued or reduced at a Job Center with notice of the denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of public benefits. Notice, whether issued by City defendant or State defendants, shall be adequate as defined by 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358-2.2 and shall be provided within the time frames required by law. Notice, whether issued by City or State defendants, shall include a separate indication of which household members are accepted for public benefits, which household members are denied public benefits, and for which public benefits such household members have been accepted or denied. When City defendant issues such notice, City defendant shall provide notice, in such form(s) for notice as are approved by State defendants, for the denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of public benefits at a Job Center. When State defendants issue such notice, State defendants shall provide Class Members with adequate notice of the denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of assistance based on the information entered into the Welfare Management System (WMS) by City defendant, within the time frames required by law if City defendant entered such information into WMS with sufficient time to cause State defendants' WMS system to issue such notices within the time frames required by law. Nothing in this paragraph relieves City and State defendants from their obligations to make timely determinations and to provide notice in compliance with the time frames required by law.
25. City defendant agrees to comply with its obligations to the Class pursuant to paragraphs numbered (1) through (6) of the Feb. 16, 2006 Order and paragraphs numbered (1) through (6) of page 76 of the Aug. 29, 2006 Order, which paragraphs are hereby set forth as follows:
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10
February 16, 2006 Order:
(1) Defendant Vema Eggleston (the "City Defendant") is ordered to publish, by March 8, 2006, a revised Policy Bulletin concerning the Human Resource [sic] Administration's ("HRA") responsibility to undertake a Medicaid Disability Review where necessary to establish eligibility for food stamps. See City Def. Letter Br. dated Feb. 8, 2006 ("City Br.") at 1; Declaration of Seth Diamond, dated Jan. 24, 2006 ("Diamond Decl."), at~ 4; see also General Information System Message 06MA0005, attached to Defs. Doar and Novello's Letter Br. dated Feb. 8, 2006 ("State Br.").
(2) City Defendant is ordered to modifY, by April28, 2006, HRA's benefits administration computer system ("POS") to recognize through a "code" the category of battered aliens who hold an I-130 petition and present proof of domestic violence. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at~ 3.
(3) City Defendant is ordered to publish, by February 28, 2006, an interim Policy Bulletin directing workers to refer all applications by battered qualified aliens (and PRUCOL aliens, see Diamond Decl. at~ 2), to the Job Center's designated subject matter experts for handling, and to train staff, in March 2006, to comply with this interim Policy Bulletin. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at~ 2.
(4) City Defendant is ordered to publish, by February 28, 2006, an interim Policy Bulletin that provides instructions on opening the cases of those battered qualified aliens to whom the United States Custom and Immigration Service (USCIS) will not issue Alien Registration numbers, and to train staff, in March 2006, to comply with this interim Policy Bulletin. See City Br. at 3; Diamond Decl. at~ 2.
(5) City Defendant is ordered to publish, within four weeks of the implementation of the modification to the POS system described in (2), a revised Policy Bulletin concerning the handling ofbattered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens, and, to train staff, during the month following its publication, to comply with the revised Policy Directive. See City Br. 3; Diamond Decl. at~ 5.
(6) City Defendant is ordered to establish, by February 28, 2006, an informal relief system for non-citizen applications, if such, applications are not already covered
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11
by other informal relief systems implemented in connection with other litigation, through which Plaintiffs' counsel may contact a designee of City Defendant on behalf of plaintiffs or members of the proposed class whose eligibility has been erroneously assessed. See City Br. at 4.
August 29, 2006 Order:
(1) An order directing City defendant to correct all errors in its revised policy directives and bulletins regarding Social Security Numbers, and to conduct comprehensive training on these policy directives for all staff involved in eligibility determinations.
(2) An order directing City defendant to correct errors regarding PRUCOL eligibility in PD-06-24-ELI. See Letter from Scott Rosenberg, Counsel for Plaintiffs, to the Court, dated August 1, 2006.
(3) An order directing the City to refer all cases involving green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years to the immigrant liasons [sic], or in the alternative to train all workers involved in eligibility determinations on how to determine the number of years that an alien has been in qualified status, and to train workers on which dates must be entered into POS and WMS.
(4) An order directing the City to conduct trainings for all staff who are involved in opening cases for immigrants directly in WMS.
(5) An order directing the City to issue a policy directive and conduct training on the necessity of providing notices when individuals ask to be added to an existing case, and the need to issue notices listing the individual accepted, those denied public benefits, and the reason for the denial, whenever some members of a household are accepted and others are denied due to immigration status.
(6) An order directing the City to provide all staff that handle eligibility determinations for proposed Class Members with the same training immigrant liaisons receive.
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12
26. The State defendants agree to comply with their obligations pursuant to
paragraphs numbered (1) through (4) of page 76 of the Aug. 29,2006 Order, which paragraphs
are hereby set forth as follows:
(1) An order directing OTDA to add a second date field to WMS so that the date an immigrant became a qualified alien and the date the immigrant entered the country can both be recorded. An order directing the State to issue instructions explaining the use of these fields and clarifying that time accrued in different alien statuses should be added together to determine eligibility for federal food stamps.
(2) An order directing OTDA to issue clear and comprehensive instructions on how to open cases for aliens directly in WMS, focusing particularly on multi-suffix cases.
(3) An order directing OTDA to correct 02-INF-40, which on its face is not sufficient to cause SSA to issue a non-work Social Security Number (SSN) to an immigrant who lacks work authorization.
(4) An order directing the State to revise its training materials so that they accurately and comprehensively explain which immigrants are eligible for Federal Medicaid.
27. For the duration of this Stipulation, City defendant shall refer all public
benefits applications, recertifications, and discontinuances based on immigration status of
battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens who are members of the Class to the Immigrant
Liaisons or workers with equivalent training for the handling of that part of the eligibility
determination (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status.
For the duration of this Stipulation, City defendant shall refer all applications, recertifications,
and discontinuances based on immigration status of lawful permanent residents who have been
in that status for less than five years who are members of the Class to workers with training
equivalent to that provided to the Immigrant Liaisons for the handling of that part of the
eligibility determination (including applications and recertifications) that is based on
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immigration status. City defendant shall conduct periodic reinforcement training for front line workers on such referrals.
28. Within sixty (60) days of the Effective Date ofthis Stipulation, City defendant shall issue a policy directive or bulletin reinforcing the instruction that a true copy of all documents related to immigration status presented by a Class Member, or a person acting on their behalf, to a Job Center in connection with an application for or receipt of Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and/or Food Stamps shall be included in the Class Member's file through such means as City defendant determines in her discretion are appropriate for such retention including but not limited to scanning, imaging, or copying.
29. City defendant shall maintain an informal relief system established pursuant to paragraph (6) of the Court's Feb. 16, 2006 Order for the duration of this Stipulation ("Informal Relief'). In the case of an applicant for Informal Relief, submission of a document to a Job Center may be demonstrated by presentation of a copy of the document faxed to the Job Center together with a fax confirmation indicating receipt of all pages faxed to the Job Center. Any requests for Informal Relief should be addressed to the attention of M.K.B. v. Eggleston Informal Relief, at the HRA Office of Legal Affairs or such other office that City defendant designates. Plaintiffs and City defendant shall each maintain a single point of contact for the submission and processing ofM.K.B. v. Eggleston Informal Relief requests.
30. When Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance for a Class Member is denied or discontinued at a Job Center based on immigration status, City defendant shall enter a computer code that indicates the denial or discontinuance is based on immigration status and that causes the case to be referred for a separate determination for Medicaid.
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Training
31. City defendant shall conduct periodic additional training regarding the policy directive or bulletin described in~ 28 supra for all personnel at a Job Center who receive documents pertinent to Class Members' eligibility for public benefits.
32. On or before sixty (60) days after the Effective Date of this Stipulation, City defendant shall train one hundred and fifty (150) Immigrant Liaisons. If City defendant's failure to meet the time frame set forth in this paragraph is solely due to the State defendant(s)' failure to take timely action to approve or modify City defendant's materials necessary for training, plaintiffs will not seek relief against City defendant regarding the provisions of this paragraph.
33. On or before sixty (60) days after the Effective Date of this Stipulation, City defendant shall develop appropriate curricula and training on (i) immigrant status recognition and the documentation relevant to the immigrant status, and (ii) eligibility of Class Members for public benefits, including SSN related requirements. City defendant will deliver training on these topics to all staff who handle the part of eligibility determinations (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status for Class Members. The full elements of the curriculum will be incorporated into "new hire" training for all staff who handle the part of eligibility determinations (including applications and recertifications) that is based on immigration status for Class Members. City defendant will conduct periodic reinforcement training on (i) immigrant status recognition and the documentation relevant to the immigrant status, and; (ii) eligibility of Class Members for public benefits, including SSN related requirements. If City defendant's failure to meet the time frame set forth in this paragraph is solely due to the State defendants' failure to take timely action to approve or modify City defendant's materials necessary for training, plaintiffs will not seek relief against City defendant regarding the provisions of this paragraph.
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Retroactive Relief 34. On or before ninety (90) days after the Effective Date of this Stipulation, City
defendant shall identify all Class Members (i) whose application at a Job Center as reflected in computer records concerning them and/or any other Class member in their mandatory filing unit for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, and any application for Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid, and/or FAP benefits made in conjunction with an application for Family Assistance and/or Safety Net Assistance, was denied, and/or whose assistance under those programs was discontinued, based on immigration status, between December 13, 2002 and the Effective Date of this Stipulation, or in the case ofFAP benefits, whose FAP application was denied or whose FAP benefits were discontinued between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, and (ii) whose application for Food Stamps at a Job Center as reflected in computer records concerning them and/or any other Class member in their mandatory filing unit was denied, and/or whose Food Stamps were discontinued, based on immigration status between December 13, 2004 and the Effective Date of this Stipulation. A Class Member who applied for Food Stamps shall be deemed to have applied for FAP benefits. The list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph shall be generated only by means of an automated retrieval.
35. Within five (5) days of identifying Class Members pursuant to~ 34 supra, City defendant shall provide plaintiffs' counsel: (i) a detailed description of the methodology used to identify Class Members pursuant to~ 34 supra, including any and all computer codes, such as Alien Citizenship Indicator ("ACI") codes, Reason Denial Codes and/or WMS Error Codes, if any, used, and; (ii) a list of all Class Members identified using the methodology. If plaintiffs dispute the methodology or require more information regarding the methodology, they shall notify the defendants in writing within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the methodology. The parties shall meet and confer within seven (7) business days of plaintiffs' counsel's
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notification. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, plaintiffs may seek appropriate relief from the Court within ten (1 0) business days, or such additional period as the parties may agree to. After the list of Class Members is finalized pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs' counsel and State defendants.
36. On or before forty-five (45) days after the creation of the final list of Class Members pursuant to~~ 34 and 35 supra, City defendant shall identify, from among the Class Members identified pursuant to~~ 34 and 35 supra, those Class Members whose U.S. citizen children were accepted for or receiving Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid at a Job Center, but the Class Member was not accepted for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid based on immigration status. After City defendant finalizes the list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs' counsel and State defendants.
37. If the Class Member identified pursuant to~ 36 supra was eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance at the time the U.S. citizen child was accepted, and the Class Member is currently in receipt of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, then City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance that the Class Member would have received but for the failure to accept the Class Member for assistance based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. If the Class Member is not currently in receipt of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, or currently remains excluded from the grant providing assistance to her U.S. citizen child(ren), then the procedure in~ 49 infra will apply. City
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defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their public benefits made pursuant to this paragraph. Copies of these notices are attached as Exhibit B 1 and Exhibit B2. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibits B 1 and B2. In any review conducted pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall determine whether the Class Member identified pursuant to~ 36, or any other Class Member(s) in the Mandatory Filing Unit: (i) is eligible for retroactive Food Stamps, and if so, shall issue retroactive Food Stamps back to no earlier than December 13, 2004, and (ii) was eligible for FAP at any time between December 13,2002 and September 30,2005, and if so, will provide such Class Member with a payment from non-welfare funds in the amount of fifty percent (50%) ofthe benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the FAP review. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit C. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit C.
38. If City defendant determines that a Class Member identified in~ 36 is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to~ 37, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during the retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance eligibility period and, if the Class Member is financially eligible, also for the three month period preceding the month of application (collectively "Medicaid Retroactive Period A"), paid through the Medicaid program for Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: a. received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period A based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or b. previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, Index No.403748/98 (Sup Ct.,
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N.Y. Co.) and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to~ 37 who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period A that was denied by City defendant's Medical Insurance and Community Service Administration ("MICSA") for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period A until three-months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. The notice sent to Class Members pursuant to ~ 37 (Exhibits B 1 and B2) shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period A paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such medical bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such medical bills to City defendant for payment.
39. If City defendant determines that a Class Member identified in~ 36 is not eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to~ 37, the case shall be referred for a separate determination of Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid using the
u: application date ofthe citizen child as the application date for Medicaid. when making the
separate determination, City defendant determines that the Class Member would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination been made at the time the application of the citizen child for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was accepted, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during any period after the application date during which the Class Member is
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otherwise eligible and, if the Class Member is financially eligible, also for the three month period preceding the month of application (collectively "Medicaid Retroactive Period B"), paid through the Medicaid program for Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: (a) received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period B based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or (b) previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member who would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination been made at the time the application of the citizen child for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was accepted, who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period B that was denied by MICSA for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period B until three months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members whose cases are reviewed under this paragraph which shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid retroactive period B paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such bills to City defendant for payment. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit D. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit D.
40. On or before forty-five (45) days after the creation of the final list of Class Members pursuant to~~ 34 and 35 supra, City defendant shall identify, from among the Class
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Members identified pursuant to~~ 34 and 35 supra, those Class Members who were battered qualified aliens at the time of application or Lawful Permanent Residents who had been in that status for less than five years at the time of application whose non citizen children (under 18 at any time during the retroactive period) were not accepted for Food Stamps based on immigration status. If the failure to accept those children for Food Stamps was incorrect, City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive Food Stamps in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of Food Stamps that the Class Member would have received on behalf of those children but for the failure to accept those children for Food Stamps based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2004. In any review conducted pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall determine whether the Class Member, or any other Class member who is part of the Mandatory Filing Unit: (i) is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, and if so, shall follow the procedure set forth for the provision of retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance set forth in~ 37, (ii) if not already reviewed for retroactive Food Stamps pursuant to this paragraph, is eligible for retroactive Food Stamps, and if so, shall issue retroactive Food Stamps back to no earlier than December 13,2004, (iii) was eligible for FAP at any time between December 13,2002 and September 30, 2005, and if so, will provide such Class Member with a payment from nonwelfare funds in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program and (iv) is eligible for retroactive Medicaid in accordance with the procedures set forth in~~ 38 and 39. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their public benefits made pursuant to this paragraph, copies of which are attached as Exhibits B 1, B2 and C. After City defendant
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finalizes the list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs' counsel and State defendants.
41. For all Class Members identified pursuant to ~~ 36 and 40 supra, City defendant shall determine whether (i) their case files contain immigration documentation demonstrating I-130, K or V visa status; or (ii) their case files do not contain immigration documentation sufficient to determine whether the Class Member may be eligible for retroactive assistance pursuant to~~ 37 and 40 supra; or (iii) their case files do not contain financial information sufficient to determine the amount of retroactive payments, if any, for which the Class Member may be eligible pursuant to 4J~ 37 and 40 supra. For each such Class Member, City defendant shall send a notice to all Class Members, attached hereto as Exhibit E, informing Class Members of their opportunity to prove their eligibility for retroactive relief or payments. City defendant will schedule an appointment for such Class Members in connection with redeterminations pursuant to this paragraph. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit E. If the Class Member does not attend this appointment or reschedule it, the Class Member shall be entitled to receive retroactive benefits based only on information contained in the case file. City defendant shall complete any redetermination pursuant to this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date of the appointment or the date the Class Member submits all necessary documents, whichever is later. All determinations made pursuant to~~ 3740 shall be completed within twenty-one (21) months ofthe identification of Class Members pursuant to ~,-r 36 and 40.
42. City defendant will issue a notice, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F, based on a schedule of mailing one twelfth of the total number of Exhibit F notices every thirty (30) days, beginning six months after Class Members are identified pursuant to ,-r,-r 36
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22
and 40 supra. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit F. City defendant will send Exhibit F to all Class Members identified pursuant to ~~ 34 and 35, who are not identified pursuant to~~ 36, 40 and 45. Such notice will inform them of their right to request a redetermination of their eligibility for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid. The deadline for Class Members to request such a redetermination shall be one (1) year from the date of the mailing of the Class Member's Exhibit F notice. City defendant will issue a notice, attached hereto as Exhibit G, to all Class Members who timely request a redetermination in response to Exhibit F. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit G. A Class Member who timely requests such a redetermination in response to the Exhibit F notice must attend an appointment in connection with such redetermination as required by City defendant. If the Class Member does not attend this appointment or attend any rescheduled appointment, the Class Member shall not be entitled to receive retroactive benefits pursuant to this Stipulation. City defendant shall complete any redetermination requested by a Class Member pursuant to this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date the redetermination is requested or the date the Class Member submitted all necessary documents, whichever is later. If it is determined that the Class Member's application for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was erroneously denied, or such benefits were erroneously discontinued, based on immigration status, and the Class Member is currently in receipt of such benefits, City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive benefits in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of benefits that the Class Member would have received but for the erroneous denial or discontinuance based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. If it is determined that the Class Member's application for Food Stamps was erroneously denied, or such benefits were
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erroneously discontinued, based on immigration status, City defendant will reverse the determination and issue retroactive Food Stamps in the amount necessary to provide the Class Member with the amount of Food Stamps the Class Member would have received but for the erroneous denial or discontinuance based on immigration status, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2004. City defendant shall apply the provisions of ~~ 43 and 44 infra, when considering the eligibility for Federal Medicaid or State Medicaid of Class Members who respond to the Exhibit F notice. If the Class Member is not currently in receipt of Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, then the procedure in~ 49 infra will apply. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their public benefits made pursuant to this paragraph. Copies of these notices are attached as Exhibits B1 and B2.
43. If City defendant determines that a Class Member who responds to the Exhibit F notice is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during the retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance eligibility period and, if the Class Member is financially eligible, also for the three-month period preceding the month of application (collectively "Medicaid Retroactive Period C"), paid through the Medicaid program for federal Medicaid or state Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: (a) received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period C based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or (b) previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in Aliessa v. Novello, and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to :L!;!.!~~
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v. Novello. A Class Member eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to the review authorized by~ 42 who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period C that was denied by MICSA for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period C until three months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. The notice sent to Class Members pursuant to~ 42 (Exhibits Bl and B2) shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period C paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such medical bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such medical bills to City defendant for payment.
44. If City defendant determines that a Class Member who responds to the Exhibit F notice is not eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance, the case shall be referred for a separate determination of federal Medicaid or state Medicaid using the date the Class Member applied at a Job Center for public benefits as the application date for Medicaid. If the notice after the review described in~ 42, supr!!, (Exhibits B1 and B2) informs the recipient that after review no other public benefits are being provided to the recipient, the notice shall inform the recipient that a separate review of the Class Member's retroactive Medicaid eligibility will be made by City defendant. If, when making the separate determination, City defendant determines that the Class Member would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination of Medicaid eligibility been made at the time the Job Center application for other public benefits was denied, City defendant will determine that the Class Member is eligible to have medical bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during
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any period after the Class Member's application date during which the Class Member is otherwise eligible for Medicaid and, if the Class Member is financially eligible for Medicaid, also for the three-month period preceding the month of application (collectively "Medicaid Retroactive Period D"), paid through the Medicaid program for federal Medicaid or state Medicaid, unless City defendant determines that the Class Member: (a) received Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period D based on a separate application for Medicaid-only; or (b) previously submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to the final order in=-===-:...: ~'-'-==' and the medical bills for which reimbursement is sought in this action were or could have been submitted for reimbursement at the same time the Class Member submitted medical bills for reimbursement pursuant to Aliessa v. Novello. A Class Member who would have been found eligible for Medicaid had a separate determination been made at the time the Job Center application for other public benefits was denied, who made a subsequent separate application for Medicaid during Medicaid Retroactive Period D that was denied by MICSA for reasons other than immigration status, is eligible to have medical bills paid through the Medicaid program that were incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period D until three-months before the month the subsequent separate Medicaid application was denied for reasons other than immigration status. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members whose cases are reviewed under this paragraph which shall indicate whether the Class Member has been found eligible to have bills for services provided by Medicaid incurred during Medicaid Retroactive Period D paid through the Medicaid program and shall instruct Class Members who may have such bills paid by Medicaid how to submit such bills to City defendant for payment. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit D. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit D.
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45. From among all Class Members identified pursuant to ,134 and 35 supra, City defendant shall identify all battered qualified aliens, and lawful permanent residents who were 60 years of age or older when they applied for assistance, who received Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid between December 13, 2002 and September 30, 2005, but who did not receive Food Stamps or state food assistance benefits during that same period. City defendant shall send the Exhibit H notice on the same schedule as the Exhibit F notice is provided pursuant to ~ 42 supra, to all Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph. A copy of the Insert attached as Exhibit I will be sent with Exhibit H. The deadline for Class Members to request a redetermination of their benefits shall be one (1) year from the date ofthe mailing of the Class Member's Exhibit H notice. City defendant will issue a notice, attached hereto as Exhibit G, to all Class Members who timely request a redetermination in response to Exhibit H. A Class Member who timely requests such a redetermination in response to the Exhibit H notice must attend an appointment in connection with such redetermination as required by City defendant. If the Class Member does not attend this appointment or attend any rescheduled appointment, the Class Member shall not be entitled to receive retroactive benefits pursuant to this Stipulation. City defendant will review the eligibility of all Class Members who timely respond for retroactive Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps and for a payment in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program. City defendant will also review the eligibility of all Class Members who timely respond for retroactive Federal and State Medicaid in accordance with the procedures set forth in~~ 43 and 44. City defendant shall complete any redetermination requested by a Class Member pursuant to this paragraph within ninety (90) days of the date the redetermination is requested or the date the Class Member
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submitted all necessary documents, whichever is later. If it determined that the Class Member is eligible for retroactive Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Federal Medicaid, State Medicaid or Food Stamps, City defendant shall issue such retroactive benefits in the amount the Class Member would have received but for any erroneous denial or discontinuance based on immigration status. If a Class Member who timely responds to the Exhibit H notice is determined to have been eligible for FAP benefits during the retroactive period, but did not receive FAP benefits based on immigration status, City defendant will provide such Class Member with a payment from non-welfare funds in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of the benefit the Class Member would have received under the FAP program, but not for any period prior to December 13, 2002. City defendant will issue a notice to Class Members informing them of the outcome of the redetermination of their benefits made pursuant to this paragraph. Copies of these notices are attached as Exhibits B 1, B2 and C. After City defendant finalizes the list of Class Members identified pursuant to this paragraph, City defendant shall promptly provide the list to plaintiffs' counsel.
46. If any notice mailed to a Class Member pursuant to~~ 37-45 supra is returned as undeliverable, City defendant shall retain a "People Locator" service for the purpose of finding a current address for that Class Member. City defendant shall mail a second notice to any Class Member for whom the People Locator provides a different address.
47. All eligibility determinations made by HRA Family Independence Administration pursuant to~~ 37-45 supra shall be performed by personnel with training equivalent to that of an Immigrant Liaison. Starting thirty (30) days after City defendant begins making retroactive determinations pursuant to this Stipulation, and every thirty (30) days thereafter, City defendant will provide plaintiffs' counsel with a copy of all such determinations
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made during the relevant thirty day period. A Class Member who is denied retroactive relief for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Medicaid and/or Food Stamps, or who disputes the amount of such relief or payment may challenge the determination in a fair hearing. A Class Member who is denied a retroactive payment in lieu of State Food Assistance Program benefits, or who disputes the amount of such payment may challenge the determination by seeking informal relief through the M.K.B. v Eggleston Informal Relief process (supra~ 29.) The informal relief determination is a final determination by City defendant but is not reviewable in a fair hearing.
48. For the purpose of eligibility determinations made pursuant to~~ 37-45 supra the following shall apply:
a. Any Class Member, whose application was not completed and/or for whom all necessary documentation was not copied or scanned into POS at the time of application, will be given an opportunity to provide information and/or documentation proving his or her eligibility as of the date of the original application or discontinuance.
b. Class Members will not be required to come into a Job Center to resubmit information if that information is already contained within POS or otherwise in their public benefits case file.
c. If a Class Member is required to attend an appointment in connection with the determination of his or her eligibility for or receipt of retroactive benefits, the Class Member will be given an appointment date and an opportunity to reschedule the appointment. If the Class Member does not attend the appointment or reschedule it, then City defendant will make a determination of eligibility for retroactive benefits based on information contained in the Class Member's case file.
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d. City defendant will determine a Class Member's eligibility for retroactive relief based on eligibility rules applicable during the period for which the retroactive relief is determined.
49. For Class Members who have been determined eligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance pursuant to,;,; 37, 40, 41,42 or 45 supra, and who, as ofthe date of the retroactive determination: (i) do not have an active Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance case, or (ii) are not on the active assistance case of their citizen children, the following procedures will apply:
a. If the Class Member did not previously receive public benefits: (i) If the Class Member seeks ongoing Family Assistance or
Safety Net Assistance benefits as well as retroactive benefits, City defendant will conduct a complete application process. If the Class Member is found currently eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits, the Class Member shall be paid ongoing and retroactive benefits. If the Class Member is found not currently eligible, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future. City defendant shall keep a computerized record of any underpayment correction credit issued pursuant to this Stipulation.
(ii) If the Class Member does not attend the appointment or attend on any rescheduled date, or does not seek ongoing Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit shall be usable if and when the Class
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Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future.
b. If the Class Member previously received Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits:
(i) If the Class Member seeks only retroactive relief, City defendant will only verify information relevant to current financial eligibility for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits. Such Class Members will not be required to re-verify items already on file, and will not be required to participate in orientation or other "up front" activities (except finger imaging for purposes of verifying identity). If found currently financially eligible, the Class Member will be paid the retroactive relief or payment. If the Class Member is found not currently financially eligible, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future.
(ii) If the Class Member seeks ongoing Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits as well as retroactive benefits, City defendant will conduct a complete application process. If the Class Member is found currently eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance benefits, the Class Member shall be paid ongoing and retroactive benefits. If found not currently eligible, an underpayment correction credit shall be issued. Such underpayment correction credit shall be usable if and when the Class Member is found eligible for Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance in the future.
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c.

As of the date of the determination made pursuant to~~ 37, 40, 41,

42 or 45 supra, if the children or sibling of the Class Member have an active Family

Assistance or Safety Net Assistance case but the Class Member is currently not on the

case, the Class Member shall be added to the active case and retroactive relief shall be

provided in the amount necessary to provide the household with the amount of Family

Assistance or Safety Net Assistance that the household would have received but for the

failure to include the Class Member in the assistance unit, but not for any period prior to

December 13, 2002.

City Monitoring and Quality Assurance 50. For purposes ofthis Stipulation, the term "the A Period" shall refer to the first

six months of each year starting on the Effective Date of this Stipulation. The term "the B

Period" shall refer to the second six months of each year after the Effective Date of this

Stipulation.

51. Semiammally, City defendant will review a random sample of 15 0 public

benefits cases drawn as described below. The first semiannual review shall be drawn from

applications and undercare cases, including requests to be added to existing cases, filed at Job

Centers during the A Period of each year; the second semiannual review shall be drawn from

applications and undercare cases, including requests to be added to existing cases, filed at Job

Centers during the B Period of each year.

a. 50 applications on which a final determination was made during

the relevant period to a Job Center in which at least one household member was assigned

an Alien Citizenship Indicator ("ACI") code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) 0 (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR) who has under five years of qualifying status, or (4) Blank,

E, or 9.

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b. 50 undercare cases in which at least one household member is assigned an ACI code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) 0 (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR), or (4) Blank, E, or 9, in which an action to discontinue or reduce Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid was made during the relevant period at a Job Center based on codes indicating that the determination was based on the immigration status (excluding codes relating to SSN issues). All parties will meet and confer regarding the codes to be used pursuant to this paragraph.
c. 25 undercare cases (not included among the 50 undercare cases in ,; 51 (b) supra) in which an action to discontinue, or reduce Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid was made during the relevant period at a Job Center based on the failure to furnish a Social Security number (SSN) regarding a household member who was assigned an ACI code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) 0 (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR), or (4) Blank, E, or 9.
d. 25 applications (not included among the 50 applications in ,-r 51(a) supra) in which at least one household member was assigned an ACI code of (1) B (Battered Qualified Alien), (2) 0 (PRUCOL), (3) K or S (LPR) who also has under five years of qualifying status, (4) Blank, E, or 9, in which a determination to deny both Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance was made during the relevant period at a Job Center based on codes indicating that the determination was based on immigration status that trigger a separate determination for Medicaid. All parties will meet and confer regarding the codes to be used pursuant to this paragraph.
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e. The strata will be defined, if feasible, by a two-way classification according to (1) status of the application (e.g., denied vs. accepted, denied for certain codes or not, denied for given types of benefits or not denied), and (2) four Alien Citizenship Indicators, grouped as identified above as (1) through (4).
52. For each application and undercare case action reviewed pursuant to~ 51 supra, City defendant will determine, based on all documents in the case file at the time of each determination:
a. whether each Class Member in the household was eligible for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid at the time of the determination based on immigration status;
b. whether each Class Member in the household was accepted or denied for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid at the time of the determination based on immigration status;
c. whether, in the case of applications for Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, and/or State Medicaid, the provision of benefits was delayed beyond the statutory time frame for making a decision on the person's application, denied, or not accepted because the case "errored out" in WMS.
d. in the case of actions based on failure to furnish aSSN, whether the Class Member was required to furnish aSSN as a condition of receiving the benefits that were denied, discontinued, or reduced at the time of the determination; and if so, whether the Class Member was furnished a letter that complies with~ 23 supra and was provided with assistance in applying for aSSN as required by this Stipulation.
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e. whether adequate notice of the acceptance, denial, discontinuance and/or reduction of Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid was provided in the manner required by this stipulation and within the time frames required by law for each determination.
53. If City defendant determines that an error based on immigration status was made in a case reviewed, it shall correct the error within 15 days. An "error type" refers to an error occurring within one of the strata defined in~ 51. If City defendant determines that the same type of error based on immigration status occurred in three or more cases reviewed during a Period, then it shall conduct reinforcement training in the affected Job Centers and/or, if necessary, shall correct any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors. If City defendant's position is that the error is caused by a policy or procedure of the State defendants, City defendant will notify State defendants and plaintiffs. If the State defendant in receipt of such a request agrees with City defendant, the State defendant shall modify its policy. City Reporting
54. Within 90 days after the end of each Period, except for the last report which shall be due 60 days after the end of the final Period, City defendant shall report the results of the reviews and determinations made pursuant to ~~ 51, 52 and 56 to plaintiffs' counsel. The reports shall include identification of all cases reviewed pursuant to~ 51 supra, and for each case, all information determined pursuant to~ 52 supra.
55. Upon reasonable notice, City defendant will make the files reviewed by City defendant pursuant to ~,] 51-52 available for inspection by plaintiffs' counsel, including but not limited to: WMS Budget Print outs, WMS Benefits History Screens, NYCWAY screens, POS screens relevant to immigration status, POS case comments, and Application Print Outs.
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56. As set forth in~ 54, City defendant shall submit a report to plaintiffs' counsel indicating:
a. the total number of applications or cases in each of the categories (a) through (d) in~ 51 supra, broken down by Job Center and by ACI Code;
b. the total number of applications in category (a) in~ 51 supra, in which the application was one made to add a Class Member to an existing Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid case, broken down by Job Center and by ACI Code;
c. the total number of applications in category (d) in~ 51 supra, in which the application was accepted and denied for Medicaid based on immigration status.
d. the total number of active undercare cases in which one household member is assigned an Alien Citizenship Indicator ("ACI") code of B (Battered Qualified Alien), 0 (PRUCOL), K or S (LPR), or Blank, as of the last date of the relevant period.
57. Upon reasonable written notice by plaintiffs, within 30 days after the receipt of each semi-annual report, the plaintiffs may request a randomly drawn sample of a total of 15 applications and 15 undercare cases (occurring only at Job Centers) in which one or more household members have an ACI code of A, E, F, G, H, J, M, N, R, T, or V, for the purpose of evaluating whether such persons are Class Members in this action. After the first report is provided, or such other period as the parties may agree to, the parties will negotiate a threshold number of such misclassified persons that will require reinforcement training regarding the proper use ofthe ACI codes.
58. After drawing the cases as described in~ 51 supra, City defendant shall run the case numbers against the data contained in the Fair Hearing Information System ("FHIS"). If
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a fair hearing was requested, or a decision after fair hearing was rendered during the A Period or B Period being reviewed, City defendant will discard that case and draw another case of the same type so that the universe of cases consists of cases with no fair hearing requests or decisions pending or decisions after fair hearings rendered equal to the numbers in the four categories listed in ~ 51 (a)-(d).
59. City defendant shall inform counsel for all parties about the cases excluded from the list of cases reviewed pursuant to~ 58 supra, including the case number, fair hearing number, and sufficient identifying information to allow plaintiffs' counsel to investigate the case and pursue remedies as plaintiffs' counsel deems appropriate. At the same time City defendant reports pursuant to~ 54 infra, City defendant shall provide plaintiffs' counsel with the complete case files, including all information referred to in~ 55, of all cases excluded from the sample pursuant to~ 58. State Monitoring and Quality Assurance
60. Semiannually, OTDA shall review one out of every four cases reviewed by City defendant, up to a maximum of 37 cases, during the A Period and the B Period, respectively, pursuant to~ 51 supra. An "independently" determined review is one that is conducted de novo and in which the state reviewer does not have access to the result of City defendant's monitoring determinations pursuant to~~ 52 and 53. For each case reviewed, OTDA shall determine, independently of City defendant, whether any member of the applicant household should have been categorized as a recipient of Family Assistance or Food Stamps. OTDA shall review whether persons to whom City defendant furnished Safety Net Assistance should have received ACI codes B, K or S. If OTDA determines that an error was made in a case reviewed and City defendant has not corrected the error, then it shall issue a directive to City defendant requiring City defendant to correct the identified error within fifteen (15)
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business days after receipt of the directive from OTDA. If OTDA determines that a policy of City defendant may have led to the errors found in cases reviewed by OTDA, OTDA shall notify City defendant of its determination and shall direct City defendant to take corrective action. If, upon receipt of such a directive, City defendant believes that a policy of OTDA governing the administration of Family Assistance or Food Stamps results in the error, City defendant shall notify OTDA of its belief, and if OTDA agrees with City defendant, OTDA shall modify its policy. If OTDA determines that the same type of errors occurred in three or more cases reviewed during a Period, then OTDA shall determine whether City defendant has conducted reinforcement training in the affected Job Centers and/or, if necessary, whether City defendant has corrected any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors. If City defendant has not undertaken such actions, then OTDA shall direct City defendant to conduct reinforcement training in the affected Job Centers and/or, if necessary, to correct any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors.
61. Semiannually, SDOH shall review 15 applications made by Class Members and reviewed by City defendant pursuant to~ 51(d) in which a determination to deny Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance was made at a Job Center during the A Period or the B Period based on a reason code indicating that the determination was based on immigration status, and where the application was subsequently referred for separate determination of Medicaid eligibility. For each application reviewed, SDOH shall determine, independently of City defendant, whether any member of the applicant household should have been categorized as a recipient of federally participating Medicaid, or a recipient of State-funded Medicaid with ACI codes ofB, K or S. (See earlier definition of"independently.") IfSDOH determines that a policy of City defendant may have led to the errors found in cases reviewed by SDOH, SDOH
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shall notify City defendant of its determination and shall direct City defendant to take corrective action. If, upon receipt of such a directive, City defendant believes that a policy of SDOH governing the administration of Federal Medicaid results in the error, City defendant shall notify SDOH of its belief and if SDOH agrees with City defendant, SDOH shall modify its policy. If SDOH determines that an error was made in a case reviewed and City defendant has not corrected the error, then it shall issue a directive to City defendant requiring City defendant to correct the error within 15 business days. If SDOH determines that the same type of error occurred in three or more cases reviewed during a Period, then SDOH shall determine whether City defendant has conducted necessary reinforcement training and/or, if necessary, whether City defendant has corrected any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors. If City defendant has not undertaken such actions, then SDOH shall direct City defendant to conduct reinforcement training and, if necessary, to correct any policy or procedure responsible in whole or in part for the errors.
62. City defendant shall provide State defendants with access to the information maintained on POS and the POS viewer connected to the case files drawn pursuant to 'If 51 and copies of documents not scanned into POS but which are considered part of those case files, at State defendants' New York City Offices for the purpose of State defendants' conducting the reviews required by ,!'1!60-61 within five (5) business days of the completion of the drawing of the sample in each six month sample period.
63. Within ninety (90) days after the end of each Period, with the exception of the last report which shall be due 60 days after the end of the final period, State defendants shall report the results of the reviews and determinations made pursuant to '11'1!60-61 supra to plaintiffs' counsel.
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64. Plaintiffs counsel shall protect the confidentiality of all identifYing information (such as name, address, case number and SSN) concerning an individual Class Member that is provided to plaintiffs' counsel by defendants under the terms of this Stipulation and shall not disclose such information to any individual, or organization other than defendants and the individual whose case is involved, except to the extent necessary to enforce any right that individual Class Member may have under this Stipulation. Other Provisions
65. During the term of this Stipulation, prior to taking any action against defendants based on alleged non-compliance with the provisions of this Stipulation, plaintiffs' counsel shall notify defendants' counsel in writing ofthe specific basis and evidence for the claim of non-compliance. Within thirty (30) days of such notice, counsel for the parties shall meet and confer in an attempt to resolve any differences or disputes arising from or out of the Stipulation. At the end of that 30-day period, plaintiffs may, if necessary, take steps to enforce and/or modify this Stipulation. Defendants may oppose.
66. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter against City defendant solely for purposes of modification and enforcement of this Stipulation until four years after its Effective Date, except as set forth in~~ 68 and 70 infra, at which time the Court's jurisdiction over City defendant shall end and City defendant's obligations under this Stipulation shall terminate.
67. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter against State defendants solely for purposes of modification and enforcement of this Stipulation until thirty-one months (31) past the date the second monitoring reports by State defendants are due pursuant to~ 63, except as set forth in~~ 69 and 70 infra, at which time the Court's jurisdiction over the State defendants shall end and State defendants' obligations under this Stipulation shall terminate.
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Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 172 Filed 06/26/07 Page 40 of 49
40
68. Plaintiffs may, by motion filed no later than two (2) months prior to termination of this Stipulation as against City defendant, seek an order extending the term of this Stipulation, based upon City defendant's alleged non-compliance with its provision(s). Plaintiffs will notify the defendants in writing of their intention to make such a motion at least twenty (20) days prior to making the motion. In any motion to extend the term of this Stipulation, plaintiffs shall bear the burden of establishing that the alleged noncompliance is not minimal and isolated, but is sufficiently frequent or widespread as to be systemic. In any motion to extend the term or modifY the provision(s) of this Stipulation, no party shall rely on the first set of reports provided pursuant to ~~ 54 and 63. If the Court determines that there has been a systemic failure by City defendant to comply with the provision(s) of the Stipulation, it may extend the Stipulation for an additional period as against City defendant to be determined by the Court in accordance with ~ 70. In the event that plaintiffs move to seek an order extending the jurisdiction of the Court, the jurisdiction shall not lapse and this Stipulation shall remain in full force and effect until such motion has been decided.
69. Plaintiffs may, by motion filed prior to the termination of this Stipulation, seek an order extending the term of this Stipulation as against either State defendant based on that individual State defendant's alleged non-compliance with the Stipulation's provisions or extending the term of the Stipulation as against both State defendants, based upon both State defendants' alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Stipulation. Plaintiffs will notify the defendants in writing of their intention to make such a motion at least twenty (20) days prior to making the motion. In any motion to extend the term of this Stipulation, plaintiffs shall bear the burden of establishing that the alleged noncompliance is not minimal and isolated, but is sufficiently frequent or widespread as to be systemic. In any motion to extend the term or
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Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 172 Filed 06/26/07 Page 41 of 49
41
modify the provision(s) of this Stipulation, no party shall rely on the first set of reports provided pursuant to,, 54 and 63. If the Court determines that there has been a systemic failure to comply with the provision(s) of the Stipulation, it may extend the Stipulation for an additional period to be determined by the Court. In the event that plaintiffs move to seek an order extending the jurisdiction of the Court, the jurisdiction shall not lapse and this Stipulation shall remain in full force and effect against either or both State defendant(s) until such motion has been decided. In the event that plaintiffs make a motion to extend pursuant to , 68 to extend jurisdiction against City defendant based upon conduct related to the provision of Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps required to be monitored by either or both State defendant(s) pursuant to this Stipulation, plaintiffs may move the Court for an order extending jurisdiction against the State defendant(s) responsible for monitoring such conduct pursuant to this Stipulation.
70. In the event that plaintiffs seek further extensions of the Stipulation as against City defendant, the provisions of, 68 shall apply to each extension against City defendant, provided, however, that the total duration of the Stipulation shall not exceed seven years. In the event that plaintiffs seek further extensions ofthe Stipulation as against State defendants, the provisions of, 69 shall apply to each extension against State defendant, provided, however, that the total duration of the Stipulation shall not exceed seven years. Any motion for an extension of the Stipulation against State defendants shall be based on a systemic failure by City defendant to provide Family Assistance, Food Stamps, or Federal Medicaid to Class Members, or a systemic failure to provide adequate and timely notice regarding Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, Food Stamps, Federal Medicaid, or State Medicaid to Class Members. In such event, the motion shall be made two (2) months before the end of the extension period. Any additional
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extensions shall be for a period to be determined by the Court, but the total duration of the Stipulation, including all extensions, shall not exceed seven years. Nothing herein shall preclude the plaintiffs from moving for an award of attorney's fees and costs in connection with enforcing or extending the tenn(s) of the Judgment.
71. In the event that the State defendants comply with the injunctive provisions of the Court's Orders of August 29, 2006, and fully and timely fulfill their obligations regarding Monitoring and Quality Assurance set forth in~~ 60 and 61 supra, including promptly issuing corrective action orders to City defendant when violations of this Stipulation are found, then the plaintiffs will not seek to hold State defendants responsible for any violations by City defendant of the terms of this Stipulation. In the event of such violations by City defendant, nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the plaintiffs from seeking additional relief against State and City defendants regarding Monitoring and Quality Assurance as may be necessary to remedy violations of this Stipulation, provided, however, that the total number of cases reviewed as part of Monitoring and Quality Assurance by City and State defendants shall not exceed the number set forth in this Stipulation.
72. In the event of any change in federal or state law that any party believes changes his or her responsibilities pursuant to this Stipulation, such party shall so notifY all other parties and the parties shall attempt to come to an agreement as to any modifications of the Stipulation that are warranted by the changes in federal or state law. If, after thirty (30) days, the parties have not been able to agree, the dispute shall be submitted to the Court. If any defendant seeks to modify its responsibilities based on a change in federal or state statutory law or federal regulation, in order to stay the proposed modification plaintiffs shall seek relief from the Court. If any defendant seeks to modify its responsibilities based on a change in state regulation not
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required by Federal statute or regulation or state statute, the defendant must seek approval of the Court to implement the proposed modification. Any application to the Court with respect to alleged changes in law shall be made pursuant to Rule 60(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When plaintiffs have sought to prevent or modify implementation of the proposed change, City defendant will not implement the proposed modification until plaintiffs' application has been decided by the District Court, or one hundred and twenty (120) days after the application was filed, whichever is sooner. The filing by plaintiffs of an appeal of an adverse decision shall not operate as a stay of the defendant's right to implement the proposed modification without further order of the District Court or the Court of Appeals.
73. Upon the Court's approval of this Stipulation as fair, reasonable and adequate, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of each member of the Class, and on behalf of the respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of each of themselves and each of the members of the Class (the "Releasors"), hereby jointly and severally release and forever discharge, on the merits with prejudice, City defendant, the City of New York, including without limitations its past and present officials, employees, departments, agencies, representatives, directors and agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representative, and transferees and each of them, and the State defendants, the State ofNew York, including without limitations its past and present officials, employees, departments, agencies, representatives, directors and agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, and transferees and each ofthem (collectively the "Releasees"), from any and all claims, actions, costs, expenses and attorneys' and expert fees whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, matured or unmatured, accrued or not accrued, direct or indirect, from
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the beginning of time through the date the Court "so orders" this Stipulation that the individual plaintiffs and the members of the Class, and each ofthem, ever had, now has or have, or can, shall or may hereafter have against the Releasees or any of them, either alone or in any combination with others, for, by reason of, involving, concerning, arising from or in any way relating to any claim which has been raised, or any claim fairly encompassed in the named, individual plaintiffs' claims or the claims of the Class that could have been raised based upon the facts, acts or omissions alleged against the Releasees in the complaint filed in this action. Nothing herein releases the defendants from complying with the terms of this Stipulation.
74. If any of the dates or periods of time described in this Stipulation fall or end on a public holiday or on a weekend, the date or period of time shall be extended to the next business day.
75. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to be an admission by City defendant, the City ofNew York, HRA, or State defendants, State ofNew York, SDOH and OTDA, of liability or of the truth of any of the allegations set forth in the complaint, or that they have in any manner or way violated plaintiffs' rights, or the rights of any other person or entity, as defined in the constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations of the United States, the State of New York, the City of New York, or any other rules, regulations or bylaws of any department or subdivision ofthe City ofNew York or ofthe State ofNew York.
76. This Stipulation contains all of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Stipulation regarding the subject matter of the Stipulation shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the parties or to vary the terms and conditions contained herein.
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45
77. Each of the undersigned represents that he or she has been duly authorized to
enter into this Stipulation.
78. All parties to this Stipulation have participated in its drafting; consequently,
any ambiguity shall not be construed for or against any party.
79. All correspondence concerning this Stipulation should be sent to the following
(or to such other address as the recipient named below shall specify by notice in writing
hereunder):
To City defendant:
David Lock Deputy General Counsel HRA Office of Legal Affairs
180 Water Street, 1th Floor
New York, NY 10038 Email: lockd@hra.nyc.gov
Jane Tobey Momo Jesse Levine Corporation Counsel of the City ofNew York I00 Church Street, Room 2-192 New York, New York 10007 (212) 788-1281 Email: jmomo@law.nyc.gov
jlevine~law.nyc.gov
To the State defendants:
Robert L. Kraft I van B. Rubin Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271 Email: robert.kraft~oag.state. ny. us
ivan.rubin\a{oag.state.ny. us
John DiBari, Esq. Associate Attorney
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46
Office ofTemporary and Disability Assistance 40 North Pearl Street Albany, New York 12243 Email: john.dibari@otda.state.ny.us
Jane E. McCloskey, Esq. Senior Attorney New York State Department ofHealth Coming Tower, 24th Floor Albany, New York 12237 Email: jem07@health.state.ny.us
To plaintiffs' counsel:
Scott A. Rosenberg The Legal Aid Society 199 Water Street, 3d Floor New York, New York 10038 Attn: M.K.B. v. Eggleston Email: srosenberg@legal-aid.org
Jane Greengold Stevens Caroline Hickey New York Legal Assistance Group 450 West 33rd Street, II th Floor New York, NY 10001 Attn: M.K.B. v. Eggleston Email: jstevens@nylag.org
chickey@nylag.org
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP One Battery Park Plaza New York, NY 10004 Attn: Chair, Pro Bono Committee
All reports to be sent to any party pursuant to this Stipulation shall be sent to all parties at the
addresses indicated above.
Attorneys Fees
80. All parties shall attempt to come to an agreement on attorneys' fees. If the
parties are unable to agree, within sixty (60) days of the date this Stipulation is signed, or such
additional time as the parties agree to, plaintiffs shall move the Court, pursuant to Rule 54 of the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an Order awarding reasonable costs, fees and disbursements to plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Notice, Opportunity to Comment and Approval of this Stipulation
81. After notice and an opportunity to comment on this Stipulation have been provided to the Class, the Court shall determine whether to approve this Stipulation as being a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement of this action. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(e), the Court will determine the manner in which notice of this Stipulation and an opportunity to comment will be given to members of this Class. This Stipulation shall not take effect until the Court enters an order approving the Stipulation as a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement of this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, counsel for the parties in this action, have
executed this stipulation on January _R_, 2007.

ANDREW M. CUOMO

Attorney General ofthe State ofNew York

120 Broadway, 24th Floor

New York, N

k 10271

Attorney fo State de

By:

ROBERT L. KRAF

5418)

Assistant Attorney General

(212) 416-8632

By: IVAN B. RUBIN (IR-5138) Assistant Attorney General (212) 416-6046

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Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 172 Filed 06/26/07 Page 48 of 49 48
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
Corporation Counsel of the City ofNew York Attorney for City Defendant 100 Church Street, Room 2-192 New York, New York 10007 (212) 788-1281
ssistant Corporation Counsel (JL-8829)
Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief (SB-0987) Adriene L. Holder (ALH-1872)
Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Practice Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR-5579)
Attorney-in-Charge, Law Reform, Civil Practice Christopher D. Lamb (CDL-8145)
Attorney-in-Charge, Staten Island Neighborhood Office Jennifer Bawn, of Counsel (JB-4030) Camille Carey, of Counsel (CC-1435) 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 10038 212-577-3325
By~ fA_
NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Yisroel Schulman (YS31 07) Jane Greengold Stevens (JS4790) Caroline Hickey (CH1410) 450 West 33rd Street, 11th Floor New York, NY 10001 212-613-5000
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By:_-f----'-----'-~_._~
HUGHE HUBBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson (RA-0979) Russell Jacobs (RJ-3657) One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004 212-837-6000
Dated: New York, New York
¥ ~ t Ita ,2oo'fr
'
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 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTIIERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their o\W behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
Defendants.

STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT OF ATIORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

WHEREAS plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on behalf ofthemselves and all others similarly situated, by complaint filed December 13, 2005, against Vema Eggleston, as Commissioner ofthe New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA")(the "City defendant"), Robert Doar, as Commissioner ofthe New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner ofthe New York State Department of Health ("SOOH'') (collectively "State defendants"};
WHEREAS the Complaint seeks an award of reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and disbursements pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
WHEREAS defendants have denied any and all wrongdoing alleged in the complaint by Answers filed on behalf ofCity defendant. dated November 6, 2006 and on behalf of State defendanlS, dated June 14, 2006; and
1

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 2 of 11
WHEREAS by Opinion and Order dated August 29,2006, the Court certified this action
as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), with the class defined as:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; {b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City Job Center because of a misapplication ofimmigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes ofthe foregoing paragraph, the term ..Affected Immigrants" means (1) battered spouses and battered children ofU.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children, or in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful pennancnt residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and {4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color ofLaw (PRUCOL). (hereinafter the "class..).
WHEREAS on January 12, 2007, counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants
signed a Stipulation and Order of Settlement (the "Stipulation of Settlement") on behalf of and
with authorization of the parties for the purpose of settling the disputes between the plaintiffs and
the class (collectively "plaintiffclass") and the defendants and
WHEREAS by order filed on June 6, 2007, the Court approved the Stipulation of
Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e);
and
WHEREAS the parties now seek to resolve the issues of attorneys• fees, costs, and disbursements without further litigation on terms just and fair to all parties and hereby enter into the within Stipulation of Settlement of Attorneys• Fees, Costs and Disbursements ("Fee
Stipulation..);
2

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 3 of 11

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED as follows:

1. The City ofNew York shall pay the sum ofone million, nine hundred thousand

dollars ($1,900,000.00) (..City Fee Payment"), to class counsel as set forth in paragraph "2"

herein, and the plaintiff class hereby agrees to accept said payment in full satisfaction of all

claims for attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements, in, arising from, or in connection with this

action for the time period and to the extent set forth in paragraph 11 below.

2. Payment ofthe City Fee Payment shall be made by checks, issued in the amounts

specified herein, payable to the following entities. at the addresses shown below:

,--·
Organization

Amont

Address

The Legal Aid Society
New York Legal Assistance
Group
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP

$734,232.73 $308,771.17 $856,996.10

199 Water Street, 3"' Floor New York, N.Y. 10038 Attention: Scott Rosenberg 450 West 33~'~~ Street, 11m Fl.
New York, N.Y. 10001 Attention: Jane Greengold Stevens One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004 Attn: Managing Partner

3. The City defendant will issue the City Fee Payment within ninety days from the date the within Fee Stipulation ..so ordered" by the Court with post-judgment interest accruing if payment is issued after that date.
4. In consideration of the payment of the City Fee Payment, the plaintiffs individually and on behalf of each member ofthe class. and on behalf of the respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of each of themselves and each ofthe members of the class hereby jointly and severally release and forever discharge the City Defendant, the City ofNew York, including without limitation its past and present

3

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 4 of 11
officials, employees, departments, agencies, representatives, directors and agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representative, and transferees and each ofthem from any and all claims for fees, costs, and disbursements arising from or in connection with the above-captioned action through the time period and to the extent set forth in paragraph 11 below, and this Fee Stipulation shall be deemed a release to that effect.
5. The State of New York shaH pay the plaintiff class, and the plaintiff class agrees to accept, nine hundred fifty thousand dollars ($950,000.00) ("State Fee Payment"), in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements in, arising from, or in connection with this action for the time period and to the extent set forth in paragraph 11 below.
6. Payment ofthe State Fee Payment by the State defendants is subject to the approval of all appropriate New York State officials in accordance with the provisions for indemnification under New York Public Officers Law§ 17, subdivision 3(a). In the event such approval is denied, counsel for the State defendants shall so notify the plaintiffs' counsel within five (5) days ofthe disapproval. In the event of such disapprovalt plaintiffs shall have 90 days from such notice within which to make a motion seeking from the State defendanm fees, costs, litigation expenses and disbursements.
7. Plaintiffs shall promptly execute and deliver to the City and State defendants• attorneys the documents and information reasonably necessary to effectuate the City Fee Payment and the State Fee Payment, which includes any requisite payment vouchers.
8. Payment ofthe State Fee Payment shall be made by checks, issued in the amoW1ts that follow, made payable to the following entities, and at the addresses shown below:
4

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 5 of 11

Organization
IThe Legal Aid Society
I I
New York Legal Assistance I
1 Group
[Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP

AmoWlt
$367,116.36
$154,385.59
$428,498.05

Address
199 Water Street, 3m Floor New York, N.Y. 10038
Attn: Scott Rosenberg
450 West 33ro Street, 11m Fl.
. New York. N.Y. 10001 ! Attention: Jane Greengold
I Stevens
, One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004
Attn: ~a ·n Partn~

9. The State defendants will deliver the State Fee Payment within ninety days of the
date this Stipulation is "so ordered" by the Court. with post·judgment interest accruing if
payment is made after that date. 10. In consideration ofthe payment of the State Fee Payment, the plaintiffs
individually and on behalf ofeach member ofthe class, and on behalfofthe respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of each of themselves
and each of the members ofthe class hereby jointly and severally release and forever discharge
the State defendants, any present or fonner employees or agents of the State ofNew York. and
the State ofNew York, including without )imitation its past and present officials, employees,
departments, agencies, representatives, directors and agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representative, and transferees and each of them from any and all claims for fees, costs, and disbursements arising from or in connection
with the above-captioned action through the time period and to the extent set forth in paragraph
ll below, and this Fee Stipulation shall be deemed a release to that effect. 11. This Fee Stipulation resolves all claims for attorney's fees, costs, and
disbursements accruing from the beginning of time through the duration ofthe Court's retention

5

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 6 of 11
ofjurisdiction in accordance with the provisions ofthe Stipulation of Settlement as set forth in paragraphs 66 through 70 of the Stipulation of Settlement. provided however, that the plaintiff class reserves claim{s), if any by them, for attorneys fees, costs and disbursements which may be accrued or incurred in connection with a motion as against the City defendant and/or the State defendants seeking an order extending the term of the Stipulation in accordance with the court's reservation ofjurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs 66 through 70 ofthe Stipulation of Settlement based upon defendants' alleged non-compliance with its provisions or a motion as against defendants seeking an order for enforcement ofand/or any and all remedies for failure to comply with the provisions of the Stipulation.
12. This Fee Stipulation shall not be admissible in, nor is it reJated to, any other litigation or settlement negotiations outside ofthe above-captioned actions and shal1 not be construed to be, an admission ofany liability or wrongdoing whatsoever. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to be an admission by City defendant, the City ofNew York, HRA, or State ofNew Ym:k, DOH and OTDA. of liability or ofthe truth of any of the allegations set forth in the complaint, or that they have in any manner or way violated plaintiffs' rights, or the rights of any other person or entity, as defined in the constitutions. statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations of the United States, the State ofNew Yolk. the City ofNew Yolk. or any other rules, regulations or bylaws of any department or subdivision ofthe City ofNew York or ofthe State ofNew York.
13. This Fee Stipulation contains all the tenus and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto, and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Fee Stipulation regarding the subject matter of this agreement
6

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 7 of 11 P.02

shall be 4eelnm to ~~ or to bind the parties hereto, or to '1/lfY the tenD& and conditioDI
contained herein, except as set forth ben:iD. 14. Each ofthe und«aigaed rcpreaa1tS that he or the bas been duly autborized to

e:nter into tbia Fee Stipulati.OD-
lS. Facsimile signamrea are accopUble for execution a:nd. fi1jng ofthis Fee

Stipulation.
Dated: Nr:w Yorlt, New York
JulyS, 2007

ANDRBW M. C:UOMO Attomey Gen.era! oftbe State ofNew Yo:rk 120 aro.4way. 24* :Ptoor NwYOik, New YOlk 10271 Attomeyfor State~ 212-416-6046
·By.~~
Ivan B:Jibill{niihs>
Aai$blDt Attor'IJI:Y Gt:Dcrlal
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO Carporalion CouDsel ofdie City of'New York .Attam.ey for City Dollld.at 100 Churcll Stl'eat, RDam 2-192 Nc:w YOlk, New Yom 10007 212-788-1281

BJAarlnsei.sUT~om-bte-Cy-oM-tpo-omr-lot-io-n -CO-U-d-iC-l (-JM---1-01-3-) -

7
PAGE 212• RCVD.AT 71512007t37:11 AM l!a*m ~lR)1 MMFAXI31DIIB:MM•CSI):• D1.11A1101-):oo..M

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 8 of 11

shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the parties h~o. or to vaty the terms and conditions
contained herein, except as set forth herein
14. Each of the undersigned represents that he or she has been duly authorized to
enter into this F~ Stipulation.
lS. Ji'acsimile signatures arc ac.ceptable for execution and filing ofthis F~:~e
Stipulation.
Dated: New York. N~ York July 5, 2007
ANDREW M. CUOMO
Attorney Oeueral oftbe S1ate ofNrrw York
120 Broadway, 24m Floor Ncnv YOlk, New York 10271 Attorney for State Defendants 212-416-«>46

By:
Ivan~ ll.~ R~ ub= in- (IR~-5~13-8- ) --------
Assistant Attorney Gen.-al

MlCHABL A. CARDOZO

Corporation Counael oftho City of New Yotk

AUomey for City Defeadant

100 Church Street. Room 2-192

New YOlk, New York 10007

,..

212-788-1281

7 80"d

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 9 of 11

So ordered:

TilE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Steven Banks, Attomey-in..chief(SB-0987)
Adriene L. Holder (ALH-1872) Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Practice
Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR-5579)
Attnmey-in..cbarge. Law Reform. Civil Practice 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor
New York. New York 10038 212-577-3325

A&d"%-Q /2Jf By.
Scott A. Rosenberg

r r

NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Yisroel Schulman (YS-3107) Jane Greengold Stevena (18-4790) Caroline Hickey (CH-1410) 450 West 33rd Street, 11th. Floor New York. NY 10001 212-613-SOOO

By: ~-~-::-------Jane Greengold Stevens
HUGHES HUBBARD & R.KBD LLP
Ronald Abmmaon (RA-o979) One Battery Park Plaza New York. N.Y. 10004 212-837--6000
By. _________________________ Ronald Abramson

Hon. Jed S. R.ak:off
/
Dated: New York, New York July ____,J 2007
8

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 10 of 11

- - - - - - - 07/0t/07 11:01 FAI 2127100820

NYUG

~ooz

nm LBOAL AlD socmrY Steven Banks, Au:omcy-in-Chicf (SB-Q987)

Adriene L. Holder (Alll-1872)

Attorney·ill*Cbatgc, Civil Pramice

Scott A. R.os=nbcq (SAR-5579)

.• .

Attomey..m...cbaz'P, Law R.cfonn. C1Y1l Practice

199 Watm Street. 3rd floor
New York, New YOlk 10038

212-571-3325

By:------.------------------
Soott A. Rosonbc:rl
NEW YORK LBOAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Yisrocl Schulman (YS-31 07) Jane Qreertgold. SttMmJ (JS-4790)
CuolD Hickey (CH-1410) 450 West 33rd Street. 11th Floor NewYorktNY 10001
212-613-5000

So ordered:

HUG~~B&~~~~m
Raaald 1/fJJJdcm •...-.."7
Qua BatterY Park PIP& New York, N.Y. 10004 212-837-6000
By: _____________________
Ronald Abra:maon

Hon. Jed S. Rakoft'
Dated: New York. New York July ___, 2007 8

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 175 Filed 07/16/07 Page 11 of 11

!".
So ordered:

THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Steven Banks, Attorney-in..Chief(SB-0987)
Adriene L. Holder (ALH-1872)
Attorney-in-Charge. Civil Practice
Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR-5579) Attorney-in-Charge", Law Refonn, Civil Practice
199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 10038 212-577-3325
By: ______~---------------Seott A. Rosenberg
NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Yisroel Schulman (YS-31 07) Jane Greengold Stevens (JS-4790) Caroline Hickey (CH-1410) 450 West 33rd Street, II th Floor New York, NY 10001 212-613-5000
JBayn:e -G-re-e-ng-o-ld-S-t-ev-e-ns-------------
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson (RA-0979) One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004
::243~!1~
RonaldAbramson

Dated: New York, New York
July ltJ.._, 2007
8

 
 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 176 Filed 07/16/07 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marierne Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalfof their minor children and all others similarly siruated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner ofthe New York State Department
of Health,
Defendants.

\ USDCSDNY
\'\ DOCU"NlENT \'ELECTRONICALLY FILED

0 - I\ DOC #: -----:-:---;:;--:;-

\\ DATE FILED:

O l

... I"i-..- -..-.--- ~ ~-_-,.-,-..·-~

JUDGMENT

05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

WHEREAS counsel for the parties having jointly sought, pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, approval by this Court ofthe Stipulation and Order of Settlement entered into by the parties, dated January 12, 2007 (the ••Settlement"); and
WHEREAS the Comt, by Order filed on January 31, 2007, having directed that notice be given to the class in the manner set forth in said Order and that a fairness bearing be held on May 24, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. before the Hon. Jed S. Rak:off in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York which order was amended by Order filed March 15. 2007; and the Court having ordered thereafter that the date of the aforesaid fairness hearing be changed to June 5, 2007 at 4:30p.m. and that notice of the change in the hearing date be published at HRA Job Centers; and

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 176 Filed 07/16/07 Page 2 of 3
WHEREAS notice ofthe proposed Settlement and fairness hearing ("Notice..) was
provided to the Class in accordance with said Orders and further direction of the Court; and WHEREAS the Court, having held a fairness bearing on June 5, 2007 at which it
determined that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the reasons set forth at that
hearing and by Order filed June 6, 2007.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that:
1. Judgment is hereby entered based on the provisions set forth in the Stipulation and Order of Settlement filed on June 26, 2007.
2. This action has been certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Class is defined as:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid. or food stamps, and who either (a) have been. or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits
discontinued or reduced. (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; {d) have beat or will be encouraged to
withdraw an application by a New York Center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term ••Affected Immigrants'' means {1) battered spouses and battered children ofU.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1641(c); (2) their
immigrant children, or in the case of battered children, their
immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. §1641c; (3) lawful permanent residents who
have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Pennanently Residing Under Color ofLaw (PRUCOL).
3. This judgment is binding on all members of the Class.
4. The Court hereby awards attorneys fees and costs in accordance with the
Attorneys• Fees Stipulation on file with the Court as follows:
2

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 17-6· - -F-iled 0-7/-16-/07-P-ag-e-3 o-f 3- - - - - - -

The Legal Aid Society New York Legal Assistance Group Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP
Total

$1,101,349.09 $ 463,156.76 $1.285.494.15 $2,850,000.00

5. This Judgment and the Settlement are not, and shall not be construed to be, an

admission of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever.

6. The Clerk is hereby directed forthwith to enter this Judgment.

Dated: New York, New York
July ___kl2007

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

nONnsTHDEODCOUCMKBBNTT;OwN'4_8....B....N.__ 'i'ld_J)

3

 
 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 177 Filed 11/25/08 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M.K.B., et al., Plaintiff, vs.
VERNA EGGLESTON, et al., Defendant.

05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)
STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER

WHEREAS, Judgment in the within action was entered based on the provisions set forth in the Stipulation and Order of Settlement filed on June 26, 2007 (the "Settlement") as further set forth in the Judgment, dated July 12, 2007, which was filed on July 16, 2008; and
WHEREAS defendants are obliged to produce certain documents in connection with and pursuant to the Settlement, as further set forth therein; and
WHEREAS, the parties seek appropriate protection to assure the confidentiality of personal information about individuals contained in these documents;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants, as follows:
1. As used herein, "Confidential Materials" shall mean identifying information concerning any individual referenced in the documents, including but not limited to: the name; address; personal identifier, such as an individual's case number, Social Security number, alien number, and Medicaid number; and a list ofpersonal characteristics that make the individual's identity easily traceable.

1

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 177 Filed 11/25/08 Page 2 of 6
2. Such information as is specified in Paragraph "1" above shall not be deemed "Confidential Materials" to the extent, and only to the extent, that it is obtained by plaintiffs from sources other than defendants.
3. Plaintiffs' attorneys shall not disclose Confidential Materials to any individual or organization other than defendants and the individual whose case is involved, except under the following conditions:
a) Disclosure may be made to the extent necessary to enforce any right that individual may have under the Settlement;
b) Disclosure may be made if necessary to monitoring defendants' compliance with the Settlement and or enforcement of the Settlement;
c) Disclosure may be made to an expert who has been retained or specially employed by plaintiffs' attorneys in connection with the Settlement ofthis action or to the Court in this action;
d) Before any disclosure is made to a person listed in subparagraph (c) above (other than to the Court), plaintiffs' attorneys shall provide each such person with a copy of this Stipulation and Protective Order, and such person shall consent in writing, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A, to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order, and not to disclose the Confidential Materials except in testimony taken in connection with the Settlement in this action. The signed consent shall be retained by plaintiffs' attorneys and a copy shall be furnished to defendants' attorneys upon their request. 4. Deposition testimony, if any, subsequent to the Judgment filed July 16, 2007 in this action, concerning any Confidential Materials that reveals the contents of such materials
2

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 177 Filed 11/25/08 Page 3 of 6
shall be deemed confidential, and the transcript of such testimony, together with any exhibits referred to therein, shall be separately bound, with a cover page prominently marked "CONFIDENTIAL." Such portion ofthe transcript shall be deemed to be Confidential Materials within the meaning of this Stipulation and Protective Order.
5. If any document that incorporates any Confidential Materials or reveals the contents thereof is filed in this Court, those portions of said document shall not be electronically filed with the court except in redacted form and the same shall be delivered to the Court enclosed in a sealed envelope bearing the caption of this action, an indication of the nature of the contents, and the following legend:
CONFIDENTIAL This envelope contains documents or information designated confidential pursuant to an order entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in the abovecaptioned action. This envelope shall not be opened or unsealed without the express direction of a judge of this Court, and its contents shall not be displayed or revealed except as the Court may order. This envelope and its contents shall at all times be maintained separate and apart from the publicly available files of this case. 6. Nothing in this Stipulation and Protective Order shall be construed to limit defendants' use of the Confidential Materials in any manner, provided that defendants shall be bound by paragraphs "4" and "5" of this Stipulation and Protective Order to the extent that Confidential Materials are contained in deposition transcripts and/or in documents filed with the Court. Dated: New York, New York July 29, 2008
3

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 177 Filed 11/25/08 Page 4 of 6

THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO

Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief (SB-0987) Corporation Counsel of the City ofNew York

Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR-5579)

Jane Tobey Momo (JM-1013)

Attorney-in-Charge, Law Reform, Civil

Assistant Corporation Counsel

Practice

100 Church Street, Room 2-192

199 Water Street, 3d Floor

New York, New York 10007

New York, New York 10038

212-788-1281

212-577-3325
B y : / - £ 2 , / ) L Attorney for City Defendant By
//.~~~~-~~ ... ,

Scott A. Rosenberg (SAR-5579)

NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Yisroel Schulman (YS31 07) Jane Greengold Stevens (JS4790) 450 West 33rd Street, 11th Floor New York, New York 10001 212-613-5000

Attorney General of the State of New York Robert L. Kraft (RK 5418) 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271 212-416-8632

Attorney for State Defendants

9418) Robert L.

By:/

/ . ) :II k ·
. /

I

·~7."···

Ct.

L~<- . I I
.··· I
. .;_

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class

4

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 177 Filed 11/25/08 Page 5 of 6 SO ORDERED:
r
5

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 177 Filed 11/25/08 Page 6 of 6

EXHIBIT A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

M.K.B., et al., Plaintiff, vs.
VERNA EGGLESTON, et al., Defendant.

05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)
STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER

NAME OF DECLARANT declares as follows, subject to the penalties of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746:
1. I am [insert connection to this action]. 2. The undersigned hereby declares that he/she has read the Stipulation and Protective Order entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on [insert date of entry, 2008], in the action entitled M.K.B. v. VERNA EGGLESTON, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR), and understands the terms thereof The undersigned agrees to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order, and not to disclose the Confidential Materials except in testimony taken in connection with the Settlement in this action, 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). Dated: New York, New York Day, Month, 200_
Signature ofDeclarant

Printed Name ofDeclarant

6

 
 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 197 Filed 07/29/11 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----x _____ • ___• _____ ••____. h______________•••• ___ • __• __. _•••- •••

M.K.B. O.P., L.W., M.A. MARIEME DIONGUE, M.E.
P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A.J., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,

05 Civ ]0446 (JSR)

-against-

Plaintiffs,

STIPULATION AND ORDER

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner oftbe New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner ofthe New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance: and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health

\ Defendants.

--------------.-.--------.------------.----.-------.------------.-.-----x STIPULATION At;!D ORDER QI1'SETl'LEMENT

WHEREAS, plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on bebalf of themselves and

otbers similarly situated, by complaint filed December 13, 2005, against Vema Eggleston, as

Commissioner oftbe New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA") (the "City

defendant"), Robert Doar, as Commissioner oftbe New York State Office of Temporary and

Disability Assistance ("OTDA") and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York

State Department of Health ("SDOH") (collectively "State defendants"); and

WHEREAS, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a Stipulation and Order of

Settlement (the "Stipulation of Settlement") for the P\U'posc of settling the disputes between them

and to avoid further litigation, and without admitting any fault or liability; and

WHEREAS, the Court determined that the StipuJation of Settlement was fair,

reasonable, and adequate by order filed on June 6, 2007; and

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 197 Filed 07/29/11 Page 2 of 6
WHEREAS, Judgment based on the provisions set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement was entered on July 16,2007; and
WHEREAS, by its terms the Stipulation of Settlement is set to expire on August 15,201] absent an extension; and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs filed a motion on June 23, 2011, pursuant to paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Stipulation of Settlement, seeking an order extending the tenns of the Stipulation of Settlement against the City defendant and State defendants for an additional period or periods of time to be detennined by the Court; and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs and City defendant are entering into the within Stipulation solely for the purpose of extending the term of the Stipulation of Settlement without admitting any fault or liability;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs and City defendant,
1. The term of the StipUlation of Settlement is hereby extended to February 15,2013.
2. In consideration of the terms of this agreement, plaintiffs' motion to extend the term of the Stipulation of Settlement is settled as to City defendant only.
3. All tenus of the Stipulation of Settlement remain in full force and effect until February 15,2013, except that
(a) City defendant's obligations under paragraphs 39, 40(iv), 44, and 45 are modified to the extent that City defend8l11 wil.l send all applicable class members who were found ineligible for retroactive Family Assistance or Safety Net Assistance notice(s) to be agreed on by City defendant and plaintiffs' counsel, and will refer for a separate detennination of

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 197 Filed 07/29/11 Page 3 of 6
federal or state Medicaid eligibility only those class members who return proof of medical bills incurred during the relevant Medicaid retroactive period for services covered by Medicaid; and
(b) the City defendant agrees not to assert a statute of limitations as a defense (I) in any fair hearing sought by plaintiffs' eounsel on behalf of a class member challenging a determination on eligibility for retroactive relief where more than 30 days elapsed between the City defendant's issuance of the notice of detennination and the production of tile notice of determination to the plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to paragraph 47 ofthe Stipulation and Order of Settlement; and (ii) in any fair hearing sought by a putative class member challenging a detennination of eligibility for retroactive relief issued after March 1, 201 I ; and
(c) City defendant will continue to provide the monitoring described in paragraphs 54 through 59 ofthe Stipulation of Settlement for three additional cycles.
4. The City defendant and plaintiffs agree to continue to negotiate in good faith over actions to be undertoken by the City defendant in response to issues raised by p1aintiffs' counsel pursuant to paragraph 65 of the Stipulation of Settlement, which shall be memorialized in II separate understanding. The actions to be undertaken by the City defendant will include, at a minimum, those described in the letters dated July 13,2011 and July 15,2011
from City defendant's counsel to plaintiffs' counsel. The parties' separate understanding will
include means of assessing the effectiveness of the actions taken by the City defendant to be negotiated by the parties. Should the parties fail to reach a separate understanding satisfactory to all parties to this Stipulation, plaintiffs reserve the right to ask the Court fOf further relief.
5. Nothing contained in this Stipulation extending the tenn of the StipUlation of Settlement shall be deemed to be, or be used as evidence of, in this or any other proceeding, an admission by the City defendant of systemic non-compliance with the terms of the StipUlation

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 197 Filed 07/29/11 Page 4 of 6
of Settlement, of any liability or v.rrongdoing, or an admission of the truth of any of the allegations set forth in plaintiffs' motion to extend the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement.
6. Nothing contained in this Stipulation extending the term of the Stipulation of Settlement prevents plaintiffs from using the evidence upon which the motion to extend is based in a future motion to enforce.
7. Nothing contained in this Stipulation prohibits plaintiffs from moving for II further extension of the Stipulation of Settlement, consistent with paragraphs 68 and 70 of the Stipulation. based on non-compliance after the date ofthis Stipulation.
4

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 197 Filed 07/29/11 Page 5 of 6

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, counsel for the City defendant and plaintiffs, have

executed this stipulation on JUly 18, 201]

Dated:

New York, New York July 18,2011

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO

Corporation Counsel for the City of New York

Attorney for Defendant City of New York

100 Church Street, Room 2-189

New York, N.Y. 10007

(21,2~3
By.._

~

~"~'--_--' '-

I

Mariba A. Calhoun

Assistant Corporation Counsel

mcalhoun@law.nyc.gov

THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Steven Banks, Attomey-in-Chief Scott A. Rosenberg, General Counsel Adriene Holder, Attorney-in-Charge Civil Practice Judith Gotdiner, Supervising Attorney, Law Refonn Unit Susan Welber, of Counsel 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 10038 Phone: 212-577-3300 SRosenberg@Jegal-aid.org SEWelber@Jegal-aid.org
Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (yS31 07) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Jane O. Stevens, of Counsel 450 West 33rd Street, 11 th Floor New York, NY 10001 Phone: (212) 613-5000 yschulman@nylag.Qrg jstevens@nylag.org

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 197 Filed 07/29/11 Page 6 of 6
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson One Battery Park Plaza 

New York, N.Y. 100041482 
 Phone: (212) 837 6000 
 abramllon@hughe.shub/;}ard.com
Dated: 
 New York~ew York 

.-.-.-2f~-' 2011 


 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------- X
M.K.B, O.P, L.W., M.A., MARIEME DIONGUE, M.E., P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A.I., L.M., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, AND J.Z., on their behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-v-
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
Defendants.
------------------------------------- X
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

05 Civ. 10446(JSR) ORDER

USDCSDNY

DOCUtvfENT

ELECI'RONICALLY FILED

DOC#:

----- DATE FILED: .~:::-_-:-l:_::-_-~:C:?- -1-1-_-

....:~:::..:.-.::::-....

.

On June 26, 2007, the parties in this case entered into a Stipulation settling the plaintiffs' claims. The Stipulation provided that it would govern the parties' conduct for four years and that, at the end of four years, the plaintiffs could move in accordance with certain terms to extend the Stipulation. On June 23, 2011, the plaintiffs moved to extend the stipulation. The Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration settled with plaintiffs, extending the Stipulation until February 15, 2013. The New York State defendants, in contrast, opposed extension. The parties extensively briefed the motion, and the Court held both an oral argument and an

evidentiary hearing. Having now fully considered the matter, the Court hereby extends the Stipulation against the State defendants until February 15, 2013. A written opinion stating the reasons for this ruling will issue in due course. In the interim, the Court directs the parties to jointly call Chambers to schedule such additional proceedings, if any, as may be required.
SO ORDERED. U.S.D.J.
Dated: New York, New York September 29, 2011
2

 
 CCaassee: 111:0-455-c2v6-104D4o6c-uJmSRent:D4o8cumPeangt e2:11 F0ile4d/0064/2/091/212 P57a4g0e718of 22

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

1:05-cv-10446-JSR

SECOND CIRCUIT

____________________________________________

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of April, two thousand and twelve,

____________________________________

M.K.B., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, O.P., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, L.W., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, M.A., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Marieme Diongue, on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, M.E., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, P.E., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Anna Fedosenko, on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, A.I., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, L.A.M., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, L.M., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Denise Thomas, on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,

ORDER Docket Number: 11-4526
USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: _________________ DATE FILED: A_P__R_IL__0_9_,__2_01_2_

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

Verna Eggleston, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Elizabeth R. Berlin, as Executive Deputy Commissioner

CERTIFIED COPY ISSUED ON 04/06/2012

CCaassee: 111:0-455-c2v6-104D4o6c-uJmSRent:D4o8cumPeangt e2:121 F0ile4d/0064/2/091/212 P57a4g0e728of 22
of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Nirav R. Shah, as Commissioner of the New York, State Department of Health, Defendants - Appellants. _______________________________________
The parties in the above-referenced case have filed a stipulation withdrawing this appeal pursuant to Local Rule 42.1.
The stipulation is hereby "So Ordered".
For The Court: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
x
M.K.B, O.P, L.W., M.A., MARIEME DIONGUE, M.E., P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A. I., L.M., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, AND J.Z., on their behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

-v-

VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,

Defendants.

- ----- --- -- --- --------------

x

JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

05 civ. 10446 (JSR) MEMORANDUM

In 2006, the Court issued a preliminary injunction necessary to help correct systemic deficiencies in New York City's and New York State's distribution of state and federal benefits to the battered immigrant spouses and children of United States citizens. See generally M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Rather than proceed to trial, the parties entered into a "Stipulation and Order of Settlement" on June 26, 2007 that governed the defendants' provision of those benefits and was intended to eliminate the prior deficiencies. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement dated June 26, 2007, Docket #172 ("Stipulation"). The Stipulation provided

that its prophylactic and corrective measures would be undertaken over
a period of four years and that, at the end of that period, the
plaintiffs could move in accordance with certain terms for an
extension. Stipulation ~~ 66, 68-69. On June 23, 2011, the
plaintiffs moved to extend the stipulation against all defendants.
The Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration
("HRA") agreed with plaintiffs to extend the term of the Stipulation
until February 15, 2013. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement
dated June 29, 2011, Docket #197. The New York State defendants, in
contrast, opposed extension as to them. After full briefing, an
evidentiary hearing, and careful consideration of the parties'
arguments, the Court, on September 30, 2011, issued a "bottom-line"
Order extending the Stipulation against the State defendants until
February 15, 2013, the date until which it was extended against the
City defendant. This Memorandum explains the reasons for that
decision.
Paragraph 69 of the Stipulation - hardly a model of tight
drafting - provides that:
In the event that plaintiffs make a motion to extend pursuant to ~ 68 to extend jurisdiction against City defendant based upon conduct related to the provision of Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps required to be monitored by either or both State defendant{s) pursuant to this Stipulation, plaintiffs may move the Court for an order extending jurisdiction against the State defendant{s) responsible for monitoring such conduct pursuant to this Stipulation. (emphasis added)
2

To put this provision in context, one needs to remember that, under

the Stipulation, the New York Office of Temporary and Disability

Assistance (\\OTDA") had to review one of every four cases reviewed by

HRA to determine, among other things, whether HRA should have

designated any member of the applicant household as a recipient of

Food Stamps. Stipulation ~ 60. Similarly, the New York State

Department of Health ("SDOH") had to review fifteen applications that

the HRA denied with respect to certain benefits in order to determine

whether the HRA should have designated any member of the applicant

household as a recipient of Medicaid. Stipulation ~ 61. Plaintiffs'

motion to extend the Stipulation alleged that the HRA systematically

misinformed class members about their eligibility for Food Stamps and

Medicaid and erroneously denied those benefits to many class members.

See, e.g., Decl. of R.W. dated March 17, 2011, Docket #184, ~ 6. As

noted, the City, rather than contesting these allegations, agreed to

extend the Stipulation through February 15, 2013. The OTDA and the

SDOH also do not dispute that the HRA has systematically and

erroneously denied plaintiffs benefits, the provision of which OTDA

and SDOH had at least some responsibility for monitoring.

Instead, the parties dispute the meaning of \\conduct

required to be monitored." Plaintiffs contend that this phrase

indicates the HRA's conduct in providing benefits, a sample of which

the ODTA and the SDOH had to monitor to ensure compliance. In

contrast, the State argues that "conduct

required to be

3

monitored" means only the particular sample of HRA conduct that the

agencies actually monitored. The Court found both constructions

plausible, and it held an evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2011 to

discover what the parties intended when they drafted the stipulation.

In support of their interpretation of the

tical phrase,

plaintiffs note that the initial drafts of the stipulation did not

distinguish between extending the stipulation against the City and the State defendants. Pl.'s Ex. 2A ~ 9. During later negotiations,

however, the parties differentiated between the City and the State

defendants and agreed that plaintiffs could extend against the State

based only on the State's own systemic non-compliance. See Pl. 's Ex.

5A ~ 69. Unsatisfied with Paragraph 69 as it then stood, however,

plaintiffs proposed to add an additional basis for extending against

the State defendants so that plaintiffs would remain able to obtain

State assistance to enforce the stipulation against the City even

the State had complied with the Stipulation so far as its own

activities were concerned. See Transcript of 8/24/11 ("Tr.") at

13:25 14:4. The defendants agreed, and the part s added much of the

relevant language (including "conduct .

required to be monitored")

to Paragraph 69 as a result. Pl.'s Ex. 6A ~ 69. According to the

plaintiffs, this addition protected an important interest. The

plaintiffs might need cooperation from the State in order to obtain

appropriate relief under the Stipulation from the ty. Tr. at

14:7-21; cf. In re Beaudoin v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 343, 347 (1978) ("[T]he

4

local commissioners act on behalf of and as agents for the State.") . Thus I in the event that the State complied with the Stipulation l but the City did not l the language noted above would allow the plaintiffs to ensure the cooperation from the State that they needed to obtain complete relief from the City. Tr. at 14:7-21.
Subsequently, the State defendants requested further modification of Paragraph 69. SpecificallYI they asked for the insertion of "related to the provision of Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps" between "conduct" and "required to be monitored." PI./s Ex. 7A. According to the plaintiffs l this addition ensured that the State retained its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suits against the State based on the provision of state benefits. Tr. at 22:14-21.
Based on this evidence I plaintiffs make two arguments. First l plaintiffs argue that interpreting "conduct . . required to be monitored II as the State now does would subvert plaintiffs' purpose requesting this language. If the plaintiffs had to prove that the specific cases the OTDA and the SDOH monitored contained systemic non compliance I then they would not be able to extend the Stipulation against the State where the City engaged in systemic non-compliance but where the sample of cases those agencies monitored happened, by chancel not to contain evidence of that non-compliance. Tr. at 14:7-21.
5

Second, plaintiffs argue that the drafting history provides

further support for their interpretation. As noted above, the State

defendants requested that the parties add "related to the provision of

Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps" to Paragraph

69 in order to preserve its immunity from challenges based on the

City's provision of state benefits. According to plaintiffs, this

addition reveals that "conduct .

required to be monitored"

included more than what the state agencies actually inspected. Had

the parties understood "conduct . . required to be monitored" in the

limited way that the State contends, then specifying a relationship to

federal benefits would have accomplished nothing since, under

Paragraphs 60 and 61, the State monitored only determinations that

"related to" the provision of federal benefits. Tr. at 20:6-12. For

example, how the City classified plaintiffs with regard to certain

state benefits that OTDA and SDOH monitored affected plaintiffs'

ability to receive federal benefits. Id. at 20:16-22:9. Since the

State had to monitor applications for state benefits, but only insofar

as they related to federal benefits, the mention of federal benefits

would be meaningless unless it clarified that violations that did not

relate to federal benefits, while they occurred in the very

applications the State had to monitor for other purposes, could not

provide a basis for extending the Stipulation. Thus, "conduct .

required to be monitored," according to plaintiffs, necessarily

denotes the City's conduct in making determinations that "related to"

6

the provision of federal benefits, excluding the City's provision of other benefits that, while not itself "required to be monitored," might arguably form part of the same "conduct" that the State had to monitor.
The State defendants respond with three arguments favoring its interpretation. First, the State defendants note that the parties added the relevant language to Paragraph 69 as a limited exception to the general rule that plaintiffs could extend based only on the State's non compliance. Tr. at 29:21-23. According to the State defendants, plaintiffs' interpretation does not limit the exception, but instead allows it to swallow the rule, permitting extension against the OTDA and SDOH whenever the City systematically fails to comply with the Stipulation. Tr. at 37:9-15. Second, the State defendants argue that, contrary to plaintiffs' claims, its monitoring reports included more than just federal Medicaid, also including Safety Net Assistance and State Medicaid. Tr. at 31:15-20. Thus, according to the State defendants, the specification of "Family Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps" narrowed the bases on which the plaintiffs could extend the stipulation against the State even though, contrary to plaintiff's suggestion, it applied only to conduct the state actually monitored under Paragraphs 60 61. Third, the State defendants argue that, because the plaintiffs drafted the language in dispute, the Court should construe that ambiguous language against plaintiffs. Albany Savings Bank, FSB v. Halpin, 117 F.3d 669,
7

674 (2d Cir. 1997) ("New York contract law includes the rule that

ambiguities in contracts should be construed against the drafter.").

The Court adopts plaintiffs' interpretation of "conduct .

to be monitored." First, the Court declines the State defendants'

invitation to find that the plaintiffs drafted the relevant language.

While plaintiffs proposed the original language, the State defendants

recommended the addition of "related to the provision of Family

Assistance, Federal Medicaid and/or Food Stamps. II Construing "related

to" against the defendants would render the mention of federal

benefits unnecessary, as plaintiffs argued, because even the State

defendants acknowledge that a plaintiff's classification with regard

to the relevant state benefits affects her eligibility for federal

benefits. Tr. at 31:16 18. Thus, rather than bring the different

words of the provision into conflict with each other by adopting the

State defendants' approach, the Court regards the provisions as

drafted jointly by both parties, an approach that reflects the back­

and-forth negotiations described at the evidentiary hearing.

Second, plaintiffs' interpretation makes better sense of

Paragraph 69 given the parties' intentions. Plaintiffs wanted to

extend the Stipulation against the State defendants when the City

systematically failed to comply with the Stipulation because they

needed the State defendants' assistance

order to obtain complete

relief from the City. The State defendants did not dispute this

purpose, but instead tried to limit it.

Tr. at 37:7-9. While the

8 


State defendants argue that their interpretation of "conduct . required to be monitoredlf is one such limitation, such a limitation would make little sense. By that interpretation, the State defendants would have prevented extension of the Stipulation only in the statistically anomalous event that systematic non compliance by the City was not, through chance, reflected in the set of cases that the State defendants actually monitored. Such a limitation would only rarely and arbitrarily have force. Indeed, the State defendants' interpretation would frustrate the plaintiffs' abilities to obtain needed benefits based simply on bad luck. The part s could not reasonably have intended such an outcome. Accordingly, the Court adopts plaintiffs' interpretation of "conduct . . required to be monitored," finding that it better realizes the intentions of both parties to the Stipulation.
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Paragraph 69 permits extension of the Stipulation against the State defendants based on the showing that plaintiffs have already made against the City. To resist this outcome, the State defendants make two final arguments. First, the State defendants argue that plaintiffs' broad construction of Paragraph 69 conflicts with Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2007), which required plaintiffs to uprove. . that the state defendants' inadequate supervision actually caused or was the moving force behind the alleged violations." Unlike in Reynolds, however, the plaintiffs base extension not on § 1983, but instead on a
9 


stipulation that the parties entered before Reynolds, at a time when the State defendants had incentives to consent to a less favorable standard than Reynolds ultimately imposed. Reynolds did not relieve the state defendants of their obligations under the Stipulation, and thus it is irrelevant.
Second, the State defendants argue that the plaintiffs did not provide the notice required by the Stipulation. Under Paragraph 69, plaintiffs must notify the State defendants of their intention to move to extend the Stipulation at least twenty days before doing so. Stipulation ~ 69. Nonetheless, plaintiffs wrote to the State defendants regarding their intention to move to extend the stipulation as early as May 13, 2011, see Decl. of Susan Welber dated June 23, 2011 Exs. 40 & 41. Moreover, plaintiffs mentioned the possibility of a motion to extend in a letter to the State defendants sent on June 3, 2011, exactly twenty days before the motion. pI.'s Ex. 10. Notwithstanding this notification, the State defendants argue that the Stipulation requires a thirty day "meet and confer" period before plaintiffs can take "any action against defendants based on alleged non-compliance." Stipulation ~ 65. Close reading of that paragraph, however, suggests that it applies only to actions to "enforce and/or modify" the Stipulation. Id. Given that Paragraph 69 contains its own notice provision, one that the additional requirement in Paragraph 65 would render largely irrelevant, the Court concludes that the "meet and conferH requirement does not apply to motions to extend the
10

Stipulation. As noted above, the plaintiffs satisfied the applicable

twenty-day notice requirement.

It was for the foregoing reasons that the Court issued its

Order of September 30, 2011 extending the Stipulation against the

State defendants until February 15, 2013.

SO ORDERED.

~s.D.J.

Dated: New York, New York
January 3, 2012

11 


 
 414 F.Supp.2d 469 (2006)
M.K.B., O.P., LW., MA., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all
others similar situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary
and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Defendants.
No. 05 Civ. 10446(JSR).
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
February 15, 2006.
470 *470 Caroline Jane Hickey, Jane Greengold Stevens, Yisroel Schulman, New York Legal Assistance Group, Jennifer Baum, Scott Alan Rosenberg, Steven R. Banks, The Legal Aid Society, Ronald Abramson, Russell Winston Jacobs, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, New York City, Elizabeth Sykes Saylor, The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Robert Lewis Kraft, Office of the Attorney General, New York State, New York City, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
RAKOFF, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is the motion of defendant Verna Eggleston (the "City Defendant") to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel, as well as various paralegal assistants and interns in plaintiffs' counsel's firms, and to prohibit Reena Ganju, Esq., who represented some of plaintiffs in prior, related actions, from testifying in this action. Defendants Doar and Novello (the "State Defendants") join the motion in certain respects.
The defendants argue that plaintiffs' counsel, their paralegals and interns, and Ms. Ganju, all of whom had submitted declarations based on personal knowledge in support of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, are essential fact witnesses, particularly in connection with plaintiffs' "Monell" claim that defendants have a policy or practice of erroneously denying benefits to plaintiffs and members of the purported class. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). On this premise, defendants argue that plaintiffs' counsel and their paralegals and interns should be disqualified from representing plaintiffs, and that Ms. Ganju should be disqualified from testifying on plaintiffs' behalf, pursuant to the so-called "advocatewitness rule." That rule "generally instruct[s] counsel to avoid the risks associated with participating as both advocate and witness in the same proceeding." Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 130, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997). Among other things, the rule seeks to avoid the confusion and prejudice that may result where a testifying lawyer may have to offer arguments about his own credibility, or where adversary counsel may have to cross-examine the testifying counsel, or where there may be an implication that the testifying lawyer is lying to benefit his client. See Ramey v. Dist. 141 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 282 (2d Cir.2004).
In this District, the Court applies the version of the advocate-witness rule embodied in Disciplinary Rule 5-102 of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility. See S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(5). Rule 5-102 provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not act, or accept employment that contemplates the lawyer's acting, as an advocate on issues of fact before any tribunal if the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the lawyer

ought be called as a witness on a significant issue on behalf of the client, except that the lawyer may act as an advocate and also testify:

(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested issue.

471

*471 (2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe

that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony.

(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or the lawyer's firm to the client.

(4) As to any matter, if disqualification as an advocate would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer as a counsel in the particular case.

(b) Neither a lawyer nor the lawyer's firm shall accept employment in contemplated or pending litigation if the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the lawyer or another lawyer in the lawyer's firm may be called as a witness on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony would or might be prejudicial to the client.

(c) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer ought to be called as a witness on a significant issue on behalf of the client, the lawyer shall not serve as an advocate on issues of fact before the tribunal, except that the lawyer may continue as an advocate on issues of fact and may testify in the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section.

(d) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer or lawyer in his or her firm may be called as a witness on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, the lawyer may continue the representation until it is apparent that the testimony is or may be prejudicial tot he client at which point the lawyer and the firm must withdraw from acting as an advocate before the tribunal.

22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.21 (2006).

On its face, the rule has no applicability to a lawyer like Ms. Ganju who is not appearing for any party in this case 0907 let alone to non-lawyers such as paralegals and interns 0907 and defendants have not cited to any other rule that would warrant restrictions either on Ms. Ganju or the paralegals and interns. It is true that Ms. Ganju, while employed as a lawyer at Sanctuary for Families, previously represented some of the named plaintiffs and other proposed class members in connection with their efforts to obtain benefits administered by the New York City Human Resources Administration, of which defendant Eggleston is the Commissioner, see Declaration of Reena Ganju, dated Feb. 13, 2006 ("Ganju Decl. III") at ¶¶ 3-4. But, as rioted, Ms. Ganju does not presently represent any of the named plaintiffs or proposed class members in any capacity and has never appeared as counsel in this action. See id. at ¶¶ 6-8. As for the paralegals and interns, they are in principle no different from the office investigators that law firms typically call to testify to disputed facts.

The fact that Ms. Ganju is free to testify is significant because plaintiffs' counsel and Ms. Ganju have both represented that Ms. Ganju can testify to most, if not all, of the relevant facts that plaintiffs' attorneys might testify to. See transcript, 2/2/06, at 35; Declaration of Reena Ganju, dated Dec. 12, 2005 ("Ganju Decl. I") at ¶¶ 8-117; Declaration of Reena Ganju, dated Jan. 31, 2006 ("Ganju Decl. II") at ¶¶ 3-20, 22-25; Ganju Decl. III at ¶ 4. In addition to Ms. Ganju's testimony, plaintiffs represent that their Morrell claims can also be proved through 472 documentary evidence, deposition testimony, testimony of defendants' employees, and *472 testimony of plaintiffs themselves. Based on what the Court already knows about this case, it is apparent to the Court that the testimony of plaintiffs' counsel will be, at best, merely cumulative to such other evidence and that plaintiffs will be in no way prejudiced by not being able to call their counsel to the stand. Nor is there any reason to believe that the testimony of plaintiffs' counsel is necessary or material to the defense.

The Court cannot but take note that plaintiffs' counsel in effect invited this motion by submitting affidavits averring on personal knowledge numerous facts regarding the underlying claims. Even in the special circumstances of an

application for emergency relief, this was inappropriate, and any further such confusion of roles will invite discipline. But this limited misstep hardly warrants the drastic remedy of disqualification. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby denies the instant motion in its entirety. SO ORDERED.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 445 F.Supp.2d 400 (2006)
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all
others similar situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary
and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Defendants.
No. 05 Civ. 10446(JSR).
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
August 29, 2006.
40123 *401 *402 *403 Caroline Jane Hickey, Jane Greengold Stevens, Yisroel Schulman, New York Legal Assistance Group, Jennifer Baum, Scott Alan Rosenberg, Steven R. Banks, Legal Aid Society, Ronald Abramson, Russell Winston Jacobs, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, New York, NY, Elizabeth Sykes Saylor, The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Jane Tobey Momo, Jesse Ira Levine, New York City Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Robert Lewis Kraft, Ivan B. Rubin, Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
RAKOFF, District Judge.
It is not the policy of the United States, nor of the State of New York, to leave destitute the battered immigrant wives and children of lawful U.S. residents just because their abusive husbands are no longer supporting them or providing them with a basis for obtaining aid. But this case, at least as it has proceeded thus far, suggests that, just such dire consequences are occurring with respect to these and certain other immigrant groups who, because of bureaucratic customs and usages, have fallen between the cracks of New York's welfare system.
This proposed class action, brought principally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that defendant Verna Eggleston (the "City Defendant"), sued in her official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA"), and defendants Robert Doar and Antonia C. Novello (the "State Defendants"), sued in their official capacities as, respectively, Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") and Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health ("DOH"), have a policy, custom, or usage of denying federal benefits and providing inadequate notice of eligibility determinations to 404 eligible battered qualified aliens and their children, as well as to certain lawful permanent residents who *404 have been in that status for less than five years, all in violation of plaintiffs' federal statutory and constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also assert pendent state law claims against the City Defendant, alleging that HRA has unlawfully denied state benefits not only to eligible battered qualified aliens and individuals who have been lawful permanent residents for less than five years, but also to aliens who are permanently residing in the United States under color of law, known as "PRUCOL" aliens (for "permanently residing under color of law").
Plaintiffs have moved for preliminary injunctive relief and for class certification. By Order dated February 16, 2006, the Court held that plaintiffs were likely to prevail against various legal defenses asserted by defendants and entered a partial preliminary injunction where the relevant material facts were substantially undisputed. The Court thereafter conducted a nine day evidentiary hearing to further assess the factual basis for these initial determinations and to determine whether additional preliminary injunctive relief and/or class certification were

warranted. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in further support of the preliminary injunctive relief granted by the February 16 Order, the further preliminary injunctive relief granted herein, and the Court's determinations with respect to class certification.
By way of background, federal law establishes certain food stamp, health care, and public assistance programs that are federally-funded, in whole or in part, but are state-administered. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). States may directly administer these programs or may delegate the administration to agencies of local government, subject to state supervision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4); 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (n)(1).
Some but not all aliens resident in the United States qualify for assistance under some or all of these programs. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), divides aliens into two categories: qualified aliens and non-qualified aliens, see 8 U.S.C. § 1641. An otherwise qualified alien is eligible for federal Medicaid and federal Temporary Assistance benefits if she entered the United States before August 22, 1996 or has been in a qualified alien status for five or more years, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(b)(1), 1613(a), or if she is exempted from the five year residency requirement by § 1613(b), (d). Even if ineligible for federal Medicaid and federal Temporary Assistance, however, qualified aliens are eligible for Statefunded Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 158(1)(g), 122(1)(b), 366(1)(a). Furthermore, a qualified alien is eligible for food stamps if, inter alia, she has resided in the United States in a qualified alien status for five or more years, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(L), or is under 18 years of age, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J).
While some non-qualified aliens are not eligible for any benefits, one exception is the group known as "PRUCOL aliens," i.e., aliens living in the United States with the knowledge and permission or acquiescence of the federal immigration authorities and whose departure the federal immigration authorities do not contemplate enforcing. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 571-72 (2d Cir.2001). For example, PRUCOL status is frequently accorded to applicants for so-called "V" visas, which are available to victims of crimes 0907 including crimes of 405 domestic violence *405 who have cooperated in the investigation or prosecution of those crimes. PRUCOL aliens, although ineligible for many federal benefits, see 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a), may nonetheless qualify in New York for state-funded Medicaid and Safety Net Assistance, see N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 158(1)(g), 122(1)(c), 366(1)(a).
Among qualified aliens, two groups that are the primary foci of much of this case are those battered spouses (or children) who have filed their own petitions for lawful immigrant status and those for whom immigration petitions were initially filed by their lawfully resident or citizen spouses (or parents) by whom they have now been battered and from whom they have now frequently separated. In both situations, the battered person was originally permitted residence here because she was married to (or the child of) a lawful resident or citizen. If that lawful resident filed a petition (known as an "I-130" petition) to obtain lawful residence on behalf of the alien spouse (or child), but the alien spouse (or child) subsequently was the subject of domestic violence, then the battered alien, upon presenting proof of domestic violence and proof that the I-130 had been filed on her behalf, would become a qualified alien eligible for benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(iv). Alternatively, the battered alien could "selfpetition" for lawful status under the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") a 0907 petition known as an "I-360" or a "VAWA self-petition"0907and, upon receiving a notice either that she had made out a prima facie case for eligibility (a "prima facie notice") or that her petition had been approved, would become eligible for benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(1)(B)(i) and (ii).
Finally, one other group that may under certain conditions qualify for benefits are certain lawful residents who, even though in that status for less than five years, meet alternative qualifications for eligibility. For example, victims of human trafficking can apply for a so-called "T visa" that exempts them from the five-year requirement. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact based on the evidence of record, reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, assessment of credibility and demeanor, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence. Exhibit and testimonial references cited below indicate some but not necessarily all of the direct evidence pertaining to a

given finding.[1] Certain additional findings of fact are also made, where appropriate, in the subsequent section on Conclusions of Law.
New York State has elected to delegate the administration of public benefits program to agencies of local government under the supervision of state agencies. New York is divided into 58 local social services district, with the City of New York constituting one such district. Tr. 643: 6-16; see also N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 56, 61. HRA is the agency responsible for administering these public assistance programs for residents of New York City.
In New York State, DOH supervises the provision of federal and state Medicaid, and OTDA supervises the administration of the Family Assistance, Safety Net Assistance, and Food Stamp programs. The State Defendants' supervision of the City Defendant consists, in relevant part, of OTDA's policy directives and 406 instructions issued to HRA, OTDA's regular meetings *406 and communications with HRA staff (including availability for on-call assistance), the State's conduct of the "fair hearing" system of appeals from HRA determinations, the State Defendants' computerized Welfare Management System ("WMS"), and the State's occasional training of HRA staff. Also, HRA may not issue policy directives or policy bulletins without the approval of OTDA. Tr. 728:7-10.
HRA maintains offices known as Job Centers, where applications for cash assistance, Medicaid and food stamps are processed. Tr. 726:11-25. To train frontline workers at the Job Centers, HRA uses a system called "training the trainers," whereby senior trainers develop curricula and train "center based trainers," who then train, in turn, the staff at their respective Job Centers. Tr. 1194:6-1195:18; 1204:3-10; 1247: 2-1248:7; City Def. Ex. HHHH at C15784-C15787. HRA conducts basic training of new hires, Tr. 1279:14-18, and all staff in the Job Centers receive updated training every month, Tr. 1308: 10-25, including training on any new policies or procedures put in place during the previous month, Tr. 974:12-975:9. In addition, a topic is selected each month for "refresher" training, known as "Back to Basics." Tr. 1279:19-24. Finally, workers who need special training on a particular subject are given "elbow training." Tr. 1310:1-3.
At least some HRA training has been conducted in the past on a number of the specific issues raised by this litigation, including training on alien eligibility for public benefits, PRUCOL status, relevance of Social Security numbers, use of WMS and of the City's computerized Paperless Office System ("POS"), notice to be provided to clients, and handling of lost or expired documentation. Tr. 1273:1-1285:5. As described below, however, that training has been woefully inadequate.
In 2000, HRA established its Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs ("ORIA"). ORIA serves as a resource within HRA for caseworkers, advocates, and other people who have questions relating to the intersection of immigration law and public benefits. Tr. 909:16-20. In June 2003, Elaine Witty became Director of ORIA. Tr. 907:23-909:13. Ms. Witty established a pilot advocacy program within ORIA for battered immigrants. Tr. 911:18-25. In response to this Court's Order of February 16, 2006, HRA established a procedure intended to ameliorate the erroneous denial of benefits to battered qualified aliens and to eligible PRUCOL aliens. Tr. 1227:1-11; City Ex. LLL. Under this procedure, if an HRA worker determines that an applicant or recipient is a PRUCOL alien or is the battered spouse of a lawful permanent resident or citizen, then that person should be referred to an immigrant liaison, who receives special training on how to handle those types of cases. Tr. 1228:16-1229:8. As of the time of the submission of the instant motions, however, HRA had not yet decided what part of a case, outside of the initial eligibility determination, these immigrant liaisons would handle. For example, it is unclear whether immigrant liaisons will handle recertifications of aliens for benefits.
In the past, the Court finds, battered qualified aliens were unlawfully denied benefits by HRA. Partly this was because HRA employees failed to understand what was the appropriate documentation to qualify for such eligibility. For example, with respect to VAWA self-petitions, eligibility under the law could be shown by presenting a notice from the immigration authorities indicating that an I-360 petition had been filed that presented a prima facie case of eligibility (a "prima facie notice") or by presenting evidence (in any of several forms) that the I-360 407 petition had *407 been approved. But in numerous cases, HRA workers rejected valid applications for benefits by eligible VAWA self-petitioners because they thought that only a prima facie notice would suffice and/or because they thought that other documentation beyond the I-360 petition was required, such as a Social Security number,

or a work authorization "green card," or the like. This was true, for example, in the cases of P.E., J.Z., A.M., Denise Thomas, N.M., N.E., W.J., Nicole Prince, M.T. and M.H.[2]
As to P.E., in March 2005 and June 2005 employees at the Riverview and Linden Job Centers erroneously discontinued benefits for P.E., who had an approved VAWA self-petition, and her immigrant son. A March 2005 case note explaining the decision reads "casehead and child are nonresidential aliens and do not have social security numbers." Pl.Ex. 244. In June 2005, P.E. met with an HRA worker at the Linden Job Center, who wrongly told P.E. that she and her son were ineligible for public benefits because she did not have a Social Security number. The June 2005 case note states "No legal status nor Refugee (no social security number, no green card)." Pl.Ex. 244 at C12209. Violeta Petrova, a legal intern with Legal Aid, testified that in July 2005 in connection with P.E.'s case, Josephine Pierre, a supervisor at the Linden Job Center, erroneously told Petrova that P.E., who Ms. Pierre knew had an approved VAWA self-petition, nonetheless needed a prima facie notice. Tr. 1041:16-1042:3.
As to J.Z., in the summer of 2005 Ms. Scantlebury, an HRA employee at the Hamilton Job Center, told J.Z. that she was ineligible for public benefits because her prima facie notice was about to expire. Tr. 214:2-5. J.Z. then furnished her approval notice for an I-360 self-petition, and was wrongly told that the approval notice was irrelevant to her immigration status and eligibility for benefits. Tr. 214:25-215:3. Mr. Sosa, another worker at the same Center, wrongly told J.Z. that she needed a new prima facie notice. Tr. 215:15-16. Additionally, in January 2006, an HRA employee at the Riverview Job Center who was shown J.Z.'s VAWA approval notice wrongly told her that she was ineligible for public benefits because she did not have a green card and a social security number. Tr. 215:15-16.
As to A.M., in February 2005 four different HRA employees at the Queens Job Center, including a frontline eligibility worker, a supervisor, and two deputy directors, told Megan Dorton, an intern at the Battered Women's Rights Clinic who accompanied A.M. to the job center, that they were unfamiliar with VAWA self-petitions. As a result, they failed to recognize that, under the circumstances, A.M.'s VAWA prima facie notice qualified her for public benefits. Tr. 532:21-533:14; 534:10-15; 536:8-23; 539:6-14. The supervisor misleadingly suggested that A.M. might be able to achieve eligibility for public benefits if she applied to USCIS for trafficking documents. Tr. 534:317-22.
As to Denise Thomas, in September 2004 and again in January 2005 Ms. Thomas presented a VAWA prima facie notice to employees at the Greenwood Job Center and was erroneously told that she was ineligible for public benefits. Thomas Decl. ¶¶ 18-19. One caseworker wrongly told Ms. Thomas that she needed a Social Security number or a green card in order to be eligible for benefits. Id. ¶¶ 18. Another caseworker wrongly told Ms. 408 Thomas *408 as that she needed to be a citizen for five years to be eligible for benefits. Id. ¶ 19.
As to N.M., in the summer of 2005 Ms. Shulzberg, an HRA employee at the Coney Island Job Center, wrongly told N.M. that her VAWA self-petition approval notice did not entitle her to public benefits and tried to turn her away without taking an application from her. Tr. 1053:1-19.
As to N.E., in October 2004, December 2004, and March 2005, HRA employees at the Euclid Job Center erroneously told N.E. that the notice she presented that her VAWA self-petition had been approved did not confer eligibility for public benefits. In October 2004, Ms. Gibbs, an HRA worker, wrongly told N.E. that she needed a Social Security number to be eligible for benefits. N.E. Decl. ¶ 12. In March 2005, another HRA worker wrongly told N.E. that even though a VAWA prima facie notice would qualify her for benefits, the notice approving her petition did not. Id. ¶24.
As to W.J., in June 2003, after W.J. provided her VAWA prima facie notice to HRA, an HRA employee at the Greenwood Job Center erroneously rejected W.J.'s request to be added to her daughters' public benefits case, using a code that indicates a finding of ineligibility because of alien status. Pl.Ex. 996 at MKB11568. Although W.J., with the help of an attorney and a favorable fair hearing decision was thereafter able to reverse this decision, she only received benefits for a short time, as an HRA employee at the Greenwood Center wrongly told her she was ineligible because she did not have a green card and terminated her benefits in April 2004. W.J. Decl. ¶ 24.

As to Nicole Prince, in February 2005 Ms. Prince presented her VAWA prima facie notice to Ms. Bent, an HRA employee at the Linden Job Center. Ms. Bent told Ms. Prince that she had never seen a prima facie notice before and did not know how to handle Ms. Prince's request to be added to her child's public benefits case because Ms. Prince did not have a Social Security number. Prince Decl. ¶ 12. After the case was transferred to the Riverview Center, Ms. Prince was wrongly told in March 2005 by Ms. Torres, an HRA employee at Riverview, that she could not be added to her child's case because she did not have a Social Security number. Id. ¶ 18-19, 22; Pl.Ex. 805; see also Pl.Ex. 808. In April 2005, Ms. Mustrafa, a supervisor at Riverview, wrongly told Ms. Prince that she was not eligible for public assistance or food stamps because she had not been a qualified alien for at least five years. Prince Decl. ¶ 25; Pl.Ex. 816.
As to M.T., in January 2003 M.T. presented a VAWA prima facie notice, but an HRA employee at the Hamilton Job Center erroneously refused to add her to her children's public benefits case. M.T. Decl. ¶ 14. Thereafter, even after she was finally added to the case, HRA employees repeatedly and erroneously tried to remove her from the budget because she did not have a Social Security number. M.T. Decl. ¶¶ 20-22.
As to M.H., she was not added to her daughter's public benefits case until January 2005, four months after she had presented her VAWA prima facie notice and asked to be added. Pl.Ex. 592 at C11788; M.H. Decl. ¶ 9. Then, just two weeks after she was added, an HRA employee at the Euclid Job Center wrongly removed her from the case because she had "failed to provide citizenship verification." Pl.Ex. 592 at C11788; M.H. Decl. ¶ 9.
Another group of wrongful denials occurred in the case of I-130 petitioners. HRA employees frequently failed to 409 understand that applicants who presented proof of domestic violence and an approved *409 or pending I-130
petition thereby established eligibility for public benefits. Rather, the workers either were unfamiliar with I-130 altogether, or believed that a "prima facie notice" (which was not even available in I-130 cases) was required, or believed that some other additional documentation was needed. This led to wrongful denials of benefits in the cases, for example, of A.I., P.E., L.W., J.Z., M.E., M.A., W.J. and C.W.S.
As to A.I., in July 2004 A.I. gave Ms. Walker at the Jamaica Job Center so-called "V-1" and "V-3" visas (for herself and her daughter) that demonstrated the filing of I-130 petitions on their behalf. Tr. 102:2-104:4; Pl.Ex. 5 at 000017-20. A.I. was wrongly told by Ms. Walker that they were ineligible for benefits because they did not have green cards. Tr. 105:23-106:1. Ms. Walker repeated this assertion seven or eight times over the next year when A.I. repeatedly inquired about receiving benefits for herself and her daughter. Tr. 106:2-19.
As to P.E., in November 2003 P.E. provided proof of her pending I-130 petition and proof of domestic violence to an HRA employee at the Euclid Job Center. Tr. 276:16-277:2; Pl.Exs. 227, 234, 235. P.E. was erroneously told that she and her son were ineligible for public benefits because they did not have green cards or Social Security numbers. Tr. 277:12-19.
As to L.W., in May 2005 L.W. provided a "K-3 visa" (which demonstrates the existence of a pending I-130 petition) and proof of domestic violence. Tr. 556:11-18; Pl.Ex. 76. By a notice dated May 31, 2005, HRA wrongly denied expedited issuance of food stamps benefits to L.W. "because of alien status." Pl.Ex. 76.
As to J.Z., in July 2004 J.Z. provided the receipt notice for her I-130 petition and proof of domestic violence, but Mr. Gonzalez, an HRA employee at the Colgate Job Center, erroneously told her that these documents did not establish her immigration status and that she was therefore ineligible for public benefits. Tr. 207:4-7. In September 2004, Ms. White, another HRA employee at the Colgate Job Center, wrongly told J.Z., after reviewing the same documents, that she was ineligible for public benefits because she was not a citizen. Tr. 209:4-7.
As to M.E., in September 2004 M.E. provided proof of pending I-130 petitions for herself and her daughter and proof of domestic violence. Ms. Gonzalez, an HRA employee at the Hamilton Job Center, told M.E. that she did not know why she was receiving public assistance because she did not have a Social Security number or a green card. Tr. 141:6-142:8. A case note dated October 27, 2004 documents a reduction in benefits paid to M.E.'s family because M.E. and her daughter were perceived, erroneously, to be "not legal residence [sic] and we do not have proof of legal status." Pl.Ex. 200. Later, in June 2005, after M.E.'s benefits had been restored, Ms. Gonzalez again told M.E. that her benefits would (wrongly) be discontinued, this time because she did not have a prima facie notice. Tr. 143:24-145:10. Ms. Gonzalez subsequently stated, erroneously, that a prima facie notice was

required under the circumstances. Tr. 498:9-16. On or about July 2005, another HRA employee at the Hamilton Job Center, Mr. Hynes, repeated that error, wrongly telling M.E. that she needed a prima facie notice in order to be eligible for benefits. Tr. 145:11-146:14. In September 2005, after M.E.'s case was transferred to the Bushwick Job Center, Ms. Baptista, an HRA employee at that Center, told M.E. that she did not know why M.E. was getting 410 public assistance, as she did not have a green card or a social security number. Tr. 147:2-8. In November *410 or early December 2005, Ms. Wright, the Administrative Assistant to the Director of the Euclid Job Center, which was then handling M.E.'s case and had just reduced her benefits, wrongly stated that if M.E. did not have an immigration status that qualified her for a Social Security number, she was not eligible for public benefits. Tr. 503:11-504:2.
As to M.A., in November 2005, Ms. Bonilla, an HRA employee at the Crotona Job Center, erroneously told M.A. that she was ineligible for public benefits because she did not have a prima facie notice, even though she had provided her I-130 receipt notice and proof of domestic violence. Tr. 252:4-253:2; PI.Ex. 91A. A few days later, a different HRA employee, Ms. Delone, wrongly told M.A. that she was ineligible for public benefits until she had a green card. Tr. 254:10-17; Pl.Ex. 592 at C11708.
As to W.J., in late 2002 an HRA employee at the Greenwood Job Center wrongly told W.J., who had presented proof of a pending I-130 petition and proof of domestic violence, W.J. Decl. ¶ 12; Pl.Ex. 990, that W.J. and her son were ineligible for public benefits because they did not have Social Security numbers, W.J. Decl. ¶ 16.
As to C.W.S., who had an approved I-130 petition, Ms. Garcia, the Assistant to the Director of the Waverly Job Center, told C.W.S.'s representative that she (Ms. Garcia) had spoken with Ms. Adeno, the trainer at the welfare center, and that Ms. Adeno had (wrongly) determined that C.W.S. needed a prime facie notice in order to be eligible for benefits. Tr. 454:20-455:5.
As further explained below, these numerous instances of wrongful denials with respect to battered aliens who were eligible for benefits under either an I-360 or an I-130 approach were likely the result, in material part, of a custom and practice on the part of HRA of failing to adequately train its personnel with respect to the eligibility for benefits of battered qualified aliens. Furthermore, battered qualified aliens were also unlawfully denied benefits in part because of the content of the City's training materials and policy directives, which often misstated the eligibility requirements for battered qualified aliens.
For example, in discussing battered qualified aliens' eligibility for benefits, HRA's training materials, until recently, totally ignored eligibility of applicants with approved or pending I-130 petitions or with so-called "K" and "V" visas. [3] Thus, HRA's "April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Instructor's Guide" defines a battered qualified alien solely as a person who has "filed a petition showing they are prima facie eligible for LPR status, under the Violence Against Women Act." PI.Ex. 469 at MKB01171-2. No other battered qualified aliens are mentioned. Id. at MKB01168-80. Similarly, HRA's "April 2005 Training Release" defines a battered qualified alien solely as a person who has "filed a petition showing they are prima facie eligible for LPR status, under the Violence Against Women Act." Pl.Ex. 464 at C12928. No other battered qualified aliens are mentioned. Id. at C12928-41. And HRA's April and June 411 2005 "Trainer's Manual" for its "new hires training" poses the question "What is the `battered alien' *411 provision?" and answers with reference only to battered aliens with approved I-360 petitions and those with a "prima facie case." Ex. 468 at MKB01166-7. Battered aliens with I-130 petitions or K or V visas are not mentioned. Id.
Similarly, prior to 2002, the City's alien eligibility desk aid, used as a reference by HRA workers, specified an "INS `Notice of Prima Facie Case'" as the only document that a battered qualified alien could provide to qualify for benefits. Pl.Ex. 498 at MKB01064. In 2002, the desk aid added to the list of permissible documentation an 360 approval notice, Pl.Ex. 500 at MKB01220, but it was not until February 2005 that the desk aid further added to the list of permissible documentation a number of additional documents that are evidence of a pending or approved I-130 or I-360, such as certain "K" and "V" visas and employment authorization cards with certain codes. Pl.Ex. 515 at MKB01127. Moreover, the current City desk aid still leaves out documents that some battered qualified immigrants may offer as proof of their status, such as "V-3" visas. Pl.Ex. 515 at MKB01127. Also, the "Description of Status" column in the current City desk aid refers only to those battered aliens who "obtain[ ] `Notice of Prima Facie Case from USCIS' or [are] found prima facie eligible under the Violence Against

Women Act (VAWA)." Pl.Ex. 515 at MKB01127. The description column does not reference those with pending or approved I-130 petitions or those with approved I-360 VAWA self-petitions. Id. Likewise, a 2003 policy directive setting forth HRA's domestic violence program requirements discusses only those battered qualified aliens who have been issued a "Notice of Prima Facie Case." Pl.Ex. 507 at MKB01067. No mention is made of battered qualified aliens with VAWA approval notices or I-130 family based petitions. Id.[4]
Another persistent problem exemplified by some of the instances discussed above is that, prior to the filing of this lawsuit, HRA policy memoranda and training materials stated that a Social Security number is required for the receipt of benefits, even though the State's actual policy is that battered qualified aliens do not have to provide a Social Security number. Thus, for example, City Policy Directive 03-11-ELI stated that for non-working aliens "Furnishing a Social Security Number (SSN) is a condition of eligibility for Public Assistance (PA), Food Stamps (FS), and Medical Assistance (MA)." Pl.Ex. 504 at MKB01499. The form letter attached to the directive for furnishing to applicants also states that "all applicants and legally responsible relatives must provide a Social Security Number as a condition of eligibility for receipt of temporary assistance." Pl.Ex. 504 at MKB01505.
A VAWA self-petitioner, however, cannot obtain a Social Security number until her petition is approved, a process that ordinarily takes 14 to 18 months. Thus, even though the State's actual policy is for VAWA self-petitioners to 412 become eligible for benefits from the time they file their petition, the insistence of HRA employees *412 that aliens furnish Social Security numbers has made it impossible for VAWA self-petitioners to obtain public benefits. Tr. 661:23-662:8; 646:14-16.
In 2004, Paul Dichian, employed as a Temporary Assistant Specialist 2 at OTDA and, in that capacity, responsible for interpreting policy for local social service districts, Tr. 640:24-641:4, met with his supervisors at OTDA to discuss this problem. At that meeting, "[t]hey agreed to say that the domestic violence victims should receive benefits and that HRA should stop denying benefits because of their inability to obtain Social Security numbers and they should write a directive to their centers instructing them." Tr. 664:17-21. He testified that "they agreed with me that it was an inappropriate denial of benefits and that the controlling regulation was not 351.2 but really should be 369.2." Tr. 666:19-22. But in the end, rather than issuing their own written instructions to correct the problem, State officials orally instructed HRA to issue its own directive, reasoning that this is "a city problem." Tr. 664:24-665:16.
The City issued a new Social Security number policy bulletin, Policy Bulletin 04-171-ELI. Pl.Ex. 639. Although that policy bulletin acknowledges that battered immigrants with I-130 petitions or VAWA self-petitions may be eligible for benefits even if they are denied a Social Security number until their petitions are approved, the title of the bulletin and the introductory paragraph only refer to those with an "approved prima facie determination." Id. Moreover, there is nothing in the bulletin that makes clear an intent to reverse and rescind the pre-existing directive that a Social Security number is a prerequisite to receiving benefits. Id.; see also Tr. 690:20-691:7. Mr. Dichian testified that the City directive was seriously flawed and that he would not have approved it if he had seen it. Tr. 690:11-14. James Whelan, the Deputy Director of Policy, Procedures and Training, acknowledged that HRA needed to issue a revised policy memorandum on Social Security numbers and to provide additional training to its staff on this issue. Tr. 1246:7-1247:4.
It was only after the issuance of this Court's Order of February 16, 2006, that corrective measures were taken, and even then the new policy directives that were issued were not as explicit as they might have been in identifying the problem that I-360 and I-130 petitioners face in obtaining Social Security numbers and why this should not disqualify them for benefits. See PB # 06-63, attached as Ex. C to Supplemental Declaration of James Whelan ("Supp Whelan Decl."); PD # 06-10-ELI, attached as Ex. B to Supp. Whelan Decl.; and PD # 06-15-ELI, attached as Ex. D to Supp. Whelan Decl. Indeed, even at the time of the evidentiary hearing in this case, Ive Sisco, the HRA's Director of Procedures for Public Assistance Medicaid and Food Stamps, who is responsible for drafting policies regarding alien eligibility, Tr. 967:11-15, 968:10-14, testified to her (erroneous) belief that a Social Security number is a requirement "at least at some point" to receive state-funded safety net assistance, Tr. 997:24-998:4.
In addition to the problems caused by inadequate training, manuals, and directives, battered qualified aliens have also partly been unlawfully denied benefits because of flaws in the design of the City's computer system, POS,

specifically, the computer program used at HRA Job Centers to determine eligibility for federal and state benefits. Tr. 801:22-803:13. POS presents the HRA worker with a structured set of questions relevant to the applicant's 413 eligibility. Tr. 803:21-804:2. HRA workers interview applicants and input the relevant responses to POS's queries. *413 Tr. 803:1-13. Some of the information entered in POS is then forwarded to the State's WMS computer system. Tr. 751:13-17.
If the worker indicates that an applicant for benefits is not a U.S. citizen or national, POS launches the alien type determination script, which inquires about the applicant's immigration status. Tr. 754:16-21. The script initially asks the worker to choose which "immigrant status option" describes the applicant's immigration status. Id.; Pl.Ex. 579 at C11055. Until June 2006, there was no immigration status option for a battered qualified alien. Moreover, until November 2005, a worker could access the screen used to open a case for a battered qualified alien, PI.Ex. 579 at C11098, only by choosing Option 9 (parolee for at least one year), Option 11 (legal permanent resident), or Option 12 (conditional entrant) from the first page of the alien type determination script (Pl.Ex. 579 at C11055), Tr. 756:21-757:80907none of which accurately describes a battered qualified alien.
After selecting any of these options, the worker is presented with a list of documents that the applicant may present to establish the chosen immigration status; but the list for each of those statuses does not include an approved I-360 VAWA self-petition, the establishment of prima facie eligibility for an I-360 VAWA self-petition, a receipt notice showing that an I-360 VAWA self-petition is pending, or an I-130 petition in any respect. Pl.Ex. 579 at C11064, C11068, C11069; Tr. 769:22-770-7, 770:24-771:2.
Furthermore, until mid-March 2006, in order to open a case for a battered qualified alien in POS, an Alien number had to be entered. Tr. 1389:9-12; Pl.Ex. 579 at C11082. If an Alien number was not entered, the case would error out. Tr. 865:4-11; Pl.Ex. 579 at C11082. But not every battered qualified immigrant has an Alien number. Thus, for example, two clients of Reena Ganju, formerly a lawyer at Sanctuary for Families, were denied public benefits, or had their receipt of public benefits delayed, because they did not have Alien numbers or because their Alien numbers could not be located. Tr. 472:9-474:15. As of January 27, 2006, Michele Shepard, Director of the Design Team for POS, was unaware of any instructions for how to open a case for a battered qualified alien who did not have an Alien number. Tr. 1389:15-19.
POS also did not advise workers that "two suffix cases" cannot be opened in POS and must be processed directly in WMS. Tr. 1360:16-18; Tr. 1094:3-19; see also Tr. 792:14-19. A case must have two suffixes if, inter alia, one person in the family is eligible for state public benefits and another is eligible for federal public benefits. Tr. 791:20-792:10, 856:25-857:3.
HRA discovered these problems as a result of a call by a worker to its help desk in 2004. Tr. 758:6-11. But HRA did not even partially correct the problem until November 2005, a year later. Tr. 762:25-763:5. During the period after HRA discovered the problem, and before it implemented a partial correction, HRA notified its help desk that workers should be told to open a case for a battered qualified alien by choosing the "legal permanent resident" option. Tr. 758:6-10, 759:7-12. But this (rather dubious) "work-around" was not directly communicated to job center workers. Tr. 769:5-10.
In November 2005, POS was modified to enable workers to reach the "battered qualified alien" screen, Pl.Ex. 579 at C11098, by selecting the "PRUCOL" or "undocumented" options on the first page of the alien type 414 determination script (Pl. Ex. 579 at C11055). Tr. 764:1-12. But a battered qualified alien is not a PRUCOL *414 alien and is not "undocumented." Furthermore, the PRUCOL flow presented the worker with a list of supporting documents the applicant can provide, but the list did not include an I-360 VAWA self-petition or an I-130 petition. Pl.Ex. 579 at C11075; Tr. 772:1-7.
As a result of these problems, HRA workers were often unable to open a case in POS for a battered qualified alien. For example, in November 2004, an HRA worker, Ms. Morales, showed Ms. Ganju that POS did not have a category for VAWA self-petitioner. Tr. 395:13-19. In Summer 2005, another HRA worker, Mr. Gladly, of the Manhattan Immigrant and Refugee Center (Center 47), advised Ms. Ganju that although he knew that an applicant was eligible based on an approved VAWA self-petition, he, his colleagues, and his supervisors "could not input her proper immigration status into the computer." Tr. 393:11-394:20.

If, despite such problems, HRA workers manage to reach the "battered qualified alien" screen on POS, Pl.Ex. 579 at C11098, they are presented with a series of additional questions, to which they must answer "yes" or "no." Until June 2006, a worker, to open a case for a battered qualified alien, had to answer "yes" to the question "Has the individual been granted a petition or have a petition pending with the INS that sets forth a `Prima Facie Case.'" Id.; Tr. 773:17-22. In actuality, applicants with a pending I-130 do not have any such prima facie notice; but under the law they are nonetheless eligible for benefits. The screen, however, appears to require either an approved I-130 or a prima facie notice. Pl.Ex. 579 at C11098. Furthermore, to satisfy POS as to eligibility, the worker had to answer "yes" to the question "Does there appear to be a substantial connection between the battery or extreme cruelty and the need for the benefits sought." Pl.Ex. 579 at C11098. But until June 2006, POS provided no instructions regarding how a worker should make this determination. Tr. 778:10-25.
In order to achieve what the law actually required, some workers deliberately "miscoded" applicants as citizens or green card holders in order to open their cases. Mr. Gladly told Ganju that "caseworkers would oftentimes answer questions in a way that may not be truthful but would give [ ] the outcome that they thought was warranted." Tr. 395:23-396:4. Several of the plaintiffs' cases were miscoded: M.A. was coded as a citizen ("C") prior to December 29, 2005 when her status was changed to battered alien ("B"), Pl.Ex. 557 at C10832; L.A.M. was also coded as a citizen ("C"); Pl.Ex. 556 at C110817; A.I. and her immigrant daughter were entered incorrectly as conditional entrants, Pl.Ex. 564 at C10028. But when an application is miscoded, benefits may be discontinued at a later date if the recipient is unable to verify the immigration status wrongly entered into the computer. Tr. 391:14-25; 396:8-13. For example, in October 2004, the public assistance benefits for M.E., a plaintiff in this action, and her minor child were going to be discontinued because they had been miscoded in the computer as citizens. Tr. 398:13-399:13.
HRA had notice of this problem. On or about June 30, 2005, Ms. Ganju contacted Elaine Witty, Executive Director of HRA's Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, about the case of R.J., a battered qualified immigrant with an I-130 and proof of domestic violence. Tr. 397:13-24. Referring to a WMS computer printout for R.J.'s case, Witty stated that R.J. had been coded as a citizen. Tr. 397:24-398:3. Ms. Ganju testified that "[Witty] pointed this out 415 and indicated that it was a problem that it may have been done to expedite the *415 entry of this client's immigration status into the computer in response to her request that the center act on this case, but unfortunately the immigration status was not that which the client actually possessed. . . ." Tr. 398:3-9.[5]
The inadequacies recounted above led not only to wrongful denials of benefits for battered qualified aliens but also to wrongful denials of benefits for PRUCOL aliens, who, as noted above, are eligible for state benefits even though they are non-qualified aliens and therefore ineligible for federal benefits. There was ample evidence presented to the Court that not only the City's frontline eligibility workers but also the supervisory staff in the Job Centers are often completely unfamiliar with the rules governing the eligibility of PRUCOL aliens for benefits and fail to recognize the immigration documents that demonstrate this status. For example, HRA employees who were presented documents establishing a PRUCOL immigration status by Marieme Diongue, O.P., L.A.M., Khady Fofana, R.R., Lucia Rios, Christina Rios, Angelica Higinio, and J.R. failed to recognize that these individuals had shown an immigration situation that made them eligible for state benefits.
As to Marieme Diongue, in March 2005, Ms. Swaby, an HRA employee at the Melrose Job Center, to whom Marieme Diongue had given a deferred action notice and a letter from Diongue's attorney explaining the basis for 416 her eligibility, Tr. 23:11-5. *416 21, 24:10-22, 26:19-24; 64:3-11; Pl.Exs. 39, 40, 41, wrongly advised Ms. Diongue, after consulting with a supervisor, Tr. 28:11-17, 29:3-6, that Ms. Diongue was ineligible for public benefits, Tr. 30:3-6. Even after Ms. Diongue prevailed at a subsequent fair hearing and HRA was instructed by the State to reconsider her eligibility, Pl.Ex. 43, HRA sent Ms. Diongue a letter erroneously advising her that she was ineligible "due to [her] immigration status which is only temporary and work only," Pl.Ex. 44.
As to O.P., in May 2006 O.P. showed Ms. Castillo, an HRA employee at the Hamilton Job Center, her birth certificate, passport, deferred action notice, Social Security card, and employment authorization card. Tr. 353:12-20, 354:20-23; Pl.Exs. 98, 99. In response, Ms. Castillo wrongly told O.P. that she was ineligible for public benefits because she did not have a green card. Tr. 353:12-20, 354:20-23; 355:5-9; Pl.Exs. 98, 99, 592 at C11699. O.P. subsequently received a notice informing her that her application for public benefits was denied

because she did not present verification of citizenship or lawful permanent residence. Tr. 355:10-12; Tr. 355:22-356:1; Pl.Ex. 101. A POS case note, dated May 18, 2005, stated that O.P. was not issued expedited food stamps because she was "illegal." Pl.Ex. 592 at C11699. Subsequently, in August and October 2005, O.P. once again showed HRA employees the same documents, but was wrongly told that she was ineligible because she did not have a green card. Tr. 358:1-3; Tr. 359:16-25; Pl.Ex. 592 at C11699. A POS case note from August 27, 2005, refers to O.P. as "undocumented." Pl.Ex. 592 at C11723.
As to L.A.M., in the summer of 2005 L.A.M. presented her employment authorization card, which had been coded to indicate deferred action status, to Ms. Kirkendall, an HRA employee at the Linden Job Center. Pl.Ex. 612; Declaration of L.A.M., dated Nov. 29, 2005 at 1116. After consulting with her supervisor, Ms. Kirkendall wrongly told L.A.M. that she was ineligible for public benefits because she was not a citizen and did not have a green card or a "prima facie." L.A.M. Decl. 1117. In October 2005, three more HRA employees examined L.A.M.'s employment authorization card and wrongly told her that she was ineligible because she was not a citizen or a green card holder. L.A.M. Decl. ¶¶ 23-24.
As to Khady Fofana, in May 2005 and July 2005 Ms. Fofana provided her employment authorization card and Social Security card to Mr. Jean0907Pierre, an HRA employee at the Manhattan Immigrant and Refugee Center. Mr. Jean0907Pierre wrongly told Ms. Fofana that she was ineligible for public benefits without a decision from an immigration judge. Tr. 572:19-573:2; Pl.Exs. 116, 624, 592 at C11738, C11762. Subsequently, HRA formally, and wrongly, denied her application because she failed to verify her immigration status. Tr. 572:19-573:2; Pl.Exs. 116, 624, 592 at C11738, C11762.
As to R.R., in the Spring and Summer of 2005 HRA employees at the Dyckman Job Center reviewed R.R.'s notice of deferred action and employment authorization card and wrongly told her that she was ineligible for public benefits. R.R. Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14. In May 2005, one of those employees wrongly told R.R. that she was ineligible for benefits because she did not have a green card and had not been a green card holder for five years. R.R. Decl. ¶ 12. In August 2005, accompanied by Jami Johnson, a paralegal at Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, R.R. returned to Dyckman and gave her employment authorization card to Ms. Santiago, who then said 417 repeatedly *417 (and wrongly) that R.R. was not entitled to benefits. Tr. 605:1; Pl.Ex. 451A.
As to Lucia Rios, in March 2005 Ms. Rios presented her deferred action notice, passport, Social Security card, and birth certificate to Ms. Atumi, an HRA employee at the Queens Job Center. Tr. 623:9-12. Both Ms. Atumi and her supervisor refused to recognize Ms. Rios's deferred action notice, and both wrongly stated that Rios was ineligible for public benefits based on her immigration status. Tr. 623:9-12, 624:12-16.
As to Christina Rios, in March 2005 Ms. Rios presented her deferred action notice, birth certificate, Social Security card, and passport to Ms. Harris, an HRA employee at the Queens Job Center. Tr. 626:11-14. Ms. Harris refused to recognize Ms. Rios's deferred action notice and wrongly stated that Rios was ineligible for public benefits based on her immigration status. Tr. 626:15-19. Ms. Harris's supervisor, Ms. Garcia, also erroneously advised Rios that she was ineligible for public benefits based on her immigration status. Tr. 626:20-627:10.
As to Angelica Higinio, in March, April, and May 2005 Ms. Higinio presented her deferred action notice and employment authorization card to HRA employees at the Melrose Job Center. Higinio Decl. ¶ 18-21. Ms. De La Cruz, an HRA employee, and her supervisor both wrongly told Ms. Higinio that she had to be a permanent resident or citizen to be eligible for benefits. Higinio Decl. ¶¶ 18-19. Subsequently, Ms. Abelo and her supervisor, Ms. Charriez, of the Fordham Job Center, reviewed Ms. Higinio's deferred action notice and employment authorization card and wrongly told her that those documents only permitted her to work, not to receive public benefits. Higinio Decl. ¶ 22.
As to J.R., in November 2005, despite HRA's having J.R.'s deferred action notice and employment authorization card in its files, HRA employees erroneously removed her from her family's public benefits case, noting "no legal status in country only work permit." Pl.Ex. 797, 792.
PRUCOL aliens were also unlawfully denied benefits because of the content of HRA's training materials and policy directives, which misstate the eligibility requirements for PRUCOL aliens.

For example, HRA's "April 2005 Monthly Staff Meeting Instructor's Guide" states that only "qualified immigrants" are eligible for Safety Net Assistance (state public assistance) and does not indicate that PRUCOL aliens are also eligible for Safety Net Assistance. Pl.Ex. 469 at MKB01176. Similarly, HRA's "April 2005 Training Release" states that "qualified immigrants" are eligible for Safety Net Assistance, Pl. Ex. 464 at C12932, but does not mention PRUCOL aliens, id. at C12927-41.
Until 2003, HRA's alien eligibility desk aid did not contain a list of immigration statuses that are considered PRUCOL. Compare Pl.Ex. 502 at MKB01489 with Pl.Ex. 505 at MKB01516. Furthermore, OTDA and DOH have different interpretations of who is and is not PRUCOL, Tr. 712:12-13, but HRA's desk aid does not explain these different interpretations, Pl. Ex. 515 at MKB01129-32. Although the current HRA desk aid includes a broad category of individuals eligible for PRUCOL status0907"Any other aliens living in the U.S. with knowledge and written permission of the USCIS and whose departure the agency does not contemplate enforcing," Pl.Ex. 515 at MKB011310907it does not explicitly list certain categories of PRUCOL aliens that DOH considers eligible for Medicaid. Compare Pl.Ex. 515 at MKB01129-32 with Pl.Ex. 539 at attachments B-1, B-2, D-1, D-3. For example, 418 DOH policy is that applicants for adjustment *418 of status whose applications USCIS has accepted as "properly filed" and applicants for asylum status (such as Khady Fofana) are PRUCOL aliens and therefore eligible for Medicaid. Pl.Ex. 539 at D-3, but the HRA desk aid does not list these categories, Pl.Ex. 515 at MKB01129-32.
HRA had notice of this problem. In February 2003, an employee in HRA's OIRA Office sent an e-mail to various City and State officials, including Mr. Dichian, stating "that the centers/workers need more specific guidance on PRUCOL eligibility. . . . This office has received a lot of inquiries from the centers and other program areas on the documentation necessary to establish PRUCOL status and eligibility for Safety Net Assistance. We have been unable to find any policy guidance on the required documentation to establish PRUCOL in the context of eligibility for Safety Net Assistance. . . ." City Ex. MM at MKB 0907OTDA 10236. Mr. Dichian responded in an e-mail by providing a list of immigrants that OTDA considers PRUCOL. Id. at MKB0907OTDA 10234-35.[6]
The flaws in City policy bulletins and policy directives previously discussed also apply to PRUCOL aliens. Since PRCOL aliens are unable to obtain a Social Security number, these erroneous policy directives and training materials result in the denial of public benefits to many persons who are PRUCOL. Notably, HRA Policy Bulletin 04-1710907ELI, which was intended to correct problems with an earlier, incorrect instruction that Social Security numbers are required to be eligible for state benefits, says nothing about PRUCOL aliens. Pl.Ex. 639. Mr. Dichian acknowledged that it was incorrect to exclude PRUCOL aliens on this basis, Tr. 685:21-686:22; that he knew of no policy reason for distinguishing between PRCOL aliens and battered qualified aliens in this regard, Tr. 688:6-10; and that he knew of at least one PRUCOL alien (H.G.) who had been adversely affected by this problem, Tr. 687:25-688:2.
PRUCOL aliens were also unlawfully denied benefits because of the flawed design of the City's computer system, POS. In addition to those flaws previously discussed, POS provides separate lists of documentation that may be presented to establish PRUCOL status for purposes of Medicaid, Pl.Ex. 579 at C11070-74, and public assistance, Pl.Ex. 579 at C11075-79. But aside from the first document on each list, the lists are identical. Compare Pl. Ex. 579 at C11070 with Pl.Ex. 579 at C11075. As a result, the POS PRUCOL-Medicaid screen fails to list certain documentation that, under State DOH policy, Pl.Ex. 539, is sufficient to confer eligibility for Medicaid.
In addition to all of the foregoing problems, HRA frequently fails to provide both battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens with written notice when their applications for benefits have been denied, thus frequently leaving them uncertain as to how next to proceed. This problem was present in the cases of M.A., Nicole Prince, L.A.M., M.H., K.T., and Angela Higinio.
419 As to M.A., on July 14, 2005 M.A. asked to be added to her child's public assistance *419 case. Tr. 244:12-21. M.A. received no written notice in response to this request. Tr. 250:19-20.
As to Nicole Prince, on February 22, 2005, Pl.Ex. 803, and again in March 2005, Pl.Ex. 805, she asked to be added to her child's case. Ms. Prince never received a written notice in response to either of her requests to be added to the case. Prince Decl. ¶ 22.

In addition, L.A.M., M.H., K.T., and Angela Higinio did not receive written notices in response to their requests to be added to their children's public assistance cases. L.A.M. Decl. ¶ 25; Higinio Decl. ¶¶ 18-19, 21, 22; M.H. Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; K.T. Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9.
Additionally, HRA does not always provide battered qualified aliens and PRCOL aliens with written notice when an immigrant household applies for public benefits and a case is accepted for the citizen children and denied for the parents. In these cases, HRA only issues acceptance notices, but the notices do not state which family members were accepted and which were rejected. Although some versions of the acceptance notices have a space in which to write the name of persons denied benefits when other family member's applications are accepted, HRA workers often do not fill in this space. These problems were present, for example, in the cases of Marieme Diongue, A.I., P.E., W.J., M.K.B., W.S., and M.T.
As to Marieme Diongue, Ms. Diongue received a notice dated April 21, 2005 that stated that her family was accepted for public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps. Pl.Ex. 45; see also Tr. 33:14-17. The notice (revision February 3, 2003) had a space in which to write the names of family members denied benefits, but Ms. Diongue's name was not written in this space. Id. A budget printout shows, however, that only Ms. Diongue's citizen daughter was accepted for public benefits, Pl.Ex. 50 at MKB 07836, and that Ms. Diongue was rejected due to her alien status, id. at MKB07837. As to A.I., in March 12, 2004, HRA issued a notice on A.I.'s family's case stating that the case was accepted. Pl.Ex. 32. The notice did not state who in the family was accepted, id., even though, in fact, HRA had accepted the citizen child's application but denied A.I. and her immigrant child's applications, Tr. 104:9-11. Furthermore, the notice (revision February 2003) did not contain a space in which workers could indicate who was accepted and who was denied. Pl.Ex. 32.
As to P.E., in November 2003 P.E. received two notices accepting her family's public benefits case. Pl.Exs. 258, 259. The first notice, dated November 7, 2003, accepted the case for food stamps but did not state which family members were accepted for benefits and which were rejected, Pl.Ex. 259, even though, in fact, P.E. and her immigrant child E.E. were denied food stamps. The second notice, dated November 22, 2003, stated that the case was accepted for public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid. Pl.Ex. 258. That notice (revision January 24, 2001) did not have a space in which to indicate which family members were denied public assistance or food stamps but did have a space in which to indicate which family members were denied Medicaid. Pl.Ex. 258. Although P.E. and E.E.'s names were not written in that space, id., they did not receive Medicaid benefits, Tr. 277:8-278:18. And P.E. never received a separate notice stating that she and E.E. were denied benefits. Tr. 280:20-23.
As to W.J., in February 2003 W.J. received a notice from the Greenwood Job Center stating that her family's 420 benefits case had been accepted. Pl.Ex. 991. The *420 notice did not state which family member's applications
were accepted or denied, id., even though W.J. and her immigrant child K.M. were in fact denied public benefits and only her citizen children were accepted. W.J. Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15-16. The notice (revision January 24, 2001) did not have space in which to indicate which family members were denied public assistance or food stamps, but did have space in which to indicate which family members were denied Medicaid, and this space was left blank. Pl.Ex. 991. W.J. never received a written notice stating that she and her immigrant child were denied benefits. W.J. Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15-16.
As to M.K.B., in October 2005 M.K.B. received a notice stating that her case had been accepted for public assistance and Medicaid. Pl.Ex. 765. The notice did not inform M.K.B. that only her citizen child would be receiving assistance and that she and her two older children would not be receiving benefits. Id. The notice (revision May 2005) had a space in which to indicate which family members were denied benefits, but all the spaces were left blank, id. The same problem arose with M.K.B.'s food stamps case. The notice (revision date May 2005), dated October 20, 2005, indicated that the application was approved, and included a space in which to indicate which family members were denied benefits, but it was left blank, M.K.B. Decl. Ex. M, even though M.K.B. and her immigrant children were denied food stamps. M.K.B. never received a written notice informing her that she was denied benefits. M.K.B. Decl. ¶ 11.
As to W.S., a notice dated April 14, 2005, was issued to W.S. stating that her family's public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamp case was accepted. W.S. Decl. Ex. F. The notice (revision February 2003) had a space in which

to indicate which family members were accepted and which were denied for each type of benefit. Id. Those spaces were all left blank, even though W.S.'s child was accepted for all benefits and W.S. was accepted only for public assistance and Medicaid. W.S. Decl. ¶ 23; see also Tr. 405:2-24, 424:23-425:10.
As to M.T., in August 2002 M.T. applied at the Hamilton Job Center for benefits for herself and her two children. M.T. Decl. ¶ 12. Subsequently, her two children were approved for benefits, but the center denied benefits to M.T. because of her immigration status. Id. The notice approving benefits for her children did not address M.T.'s application, and she never received a written notice of the denial of her application. M.T. Decl. ¶ 12; Pl.Ex. 938.
As noted, some of the wrongful denials described above were partly based on the misperception that anyone who had not been a lawful resident for five years could not qualify for benefits. In addition to this being a wrongful ground for denial in the case of battered qualified aliens and PRU-COL aliens, it was also the basis for wrongful denials in other cases. For example, Galina Rybalko[7] became a qualified alien in April 2000, Pl.Ex. 173; received her green card in June 2003, Pl.Ex. 173; became eligible for food stamps in April 2005, five years after she became a qualified alien, but was wrongly denied same, because the City failed to add together the time in which she was a parolee and the time she had been a lawful permanent resident, Tr. 325:20-326:17, 329:13-330:8.
The fact that the numerous problems evidenced above were not only frequent but also were the result of HRA 421 customs and usages is shown, among other ways, by the fact that HRA policy makers, such *421 as Elaine Witty,
Ivelia Sisco, Cecile Noel and Jane Corbett, were aware that HRA workers were having difficulty appropriately handling the cases of battered qualified aliens, certain lawful permanent residents, and PRUCOL aliens, and yet took little action to correct the problems.
Elaine Witty, Director of OIRA, is responsible for overseeing all of HRA's "refugee, immigrant, and limited Englishspeaking ability (LESA) policies and implementing a comprehensive set of strategies to ensure equal access and effective services to LESA and refugee/immigrant clients." Pl.Ex. 889. Ivelia Sisco has been the director of procedures for public assistance, Medicaid and food stamps for five years. Tr. 967:11-15. In that capacity, she has primary responsibility for developing procedures relating to immigrant eligibility for public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid. Tr. 968:10-14.
On more than one occasion in the last two years Elaine Witty told Ivelia Sisco that immigrants were being denied public benefits because workers do not understand the eligibility rules. Tr. 971:4-14. Ms. Sisco, in turn, shared this information with the participants in the weekly Office of Procedures and Training managers' meeting. Tr. 971:15-18. Ms. Witty also knew that "workers have trouble identifying immigration documents," Tr. 921:18-21, and that immigrant victims of domestic violence were experiencing difficulty in having benefits issued to them, Tr. 925:16-22. Ms. Witty informed Jane Corbett, Tr. 925:23-926:6, and Ivelia Sisco, Tr. 926:7-9, of this problem. Jane Corbett is Executive Deputy Commissioner of the Office of Policy and Program Development and Ms. Witty's direct supervisor. Tr. 925:23-926:6.
Ms. Witty was also aware that HRA employees had trouble applying the eligibility rules pertaining to persons with filed or approved I-130 petitions and proof of abuse. Tr. 927:7-11, 928:5-11. She told Ms. Corbett, Tr. 928:19-929:10, and Ms. Sisco, Tr. 981:20-24, of this problem. Ms. Sisco told Mr. Dichian in the summer or fall of 2004 that domestic violence victims with I-130s were being denied public benefits. Tr. 700:18-702:4.
Ms. Witty was also aware that HRA workers sometimes had difficulty with the eligibility rules regarding PRUCOL individuals. Tr. 932:6-8. She informed Ms. Sisco of this problem. Tr. 932:16-21. Ms. Witty also told Ms. Sisco within the last year that workers were having difficulty handling mixed status households. Tr. 934:23-935:3, 980:19-22. Ms. Witty also knew that HRA workers were having difficulty opening cases in the computer system for people who did not have Social Security numbers. Tr. 918:13-16.
Yet despite all this high-level awareness of the problems, no meaningful corrective action was taken.
By way of example, in July 2004, Ms. Ganju and other advocates attended a meeting with Cecile Noel. Cecile Noel is HRA's Deputy Commissioner for Domestic Violence Emergency Services. Tr. 478:21-23. One of Ms. Noel's responsibilities is supervision of the "ADVENT" program that consists of units within Job Centers that deal

exclusively with domestic violence victims. Tr. 479:1-4. Although ADVENT workers are not involved in processing initial applications, they are involved at subsequent stages after the initial application has been completed. Tr. 512:1-5. At that meeting, Ms. Ganju expressed her belief that ADVENT workers "did not know the alien eligibility rules," and that it was important that they do so because they were dealing with battered qualified immigrants 422 frequently. Tr. 479:16-20, 482:21-483:1. Ms. Ganju also presented Ms. Noel with a letter requesting *422 additional and comprehensive training for ADVENT staff on battered immigrant eligibility for public benefits. Pl.Ex. 778. Ganju stated that she had seen ADVENT workers discontinue benefits based on a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules. She sent a copy of this letter to Elaine Witty. Tr. 512:13-16. In October, Ganju followed up on her initial conversation and provided training materials to Ms. Noel and Ms. Witty on immigrant eligibility issues. Tr. 483:5-18. Yet Ms. Witty's office subsequently failed to provide ADVENT workers with any training on immigrant eligibility, nor is Ms. Witty aware of anyone else at HRA having done so. Tr. 947:7-18.
While most of the difficulties in the system described above result from inadequacies in the City's practices, the State Defendants also have some responsibility for these inadequacies not only as a matter of failure to adequately supervise but also as a result of their own inadequate training materials and the like. For example, some OTDA training materials, which are produced by Rockefeller College, Pl.Ex. 677; Tr. 1163:25-1164:6, leave all battered qualified aliens off the list of immigrants eligible for federal and State public benefits. Indeed, the December 2005 OTDA training materials0907the State's most current training materials on food stamp household composition and alien eligibility, Tr. 1154:40907omit battered qualified aliens from the list of immigrants eligible for federal food stamps. Pl.Ex. 677 at MKB-OTDA 10437. Likewise, the February 2004 OTDA training materials repeatedly omit battered qualified aliens from the list of immigrants eligible for federal public benefits. Pl.Ex. 536 at MKB01355-1358. These materials list the groups of immigrants who may be eligible for federally-funded public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid, Pl.Ex. 536 at MKB01355, but do not indicate that battered qualified aliens are eligible for benefits, Pl.Ex. 536.
These same materials also omit battered qualified aliens from the list of immigrants eligible for State public assistance and State Medicaid. They state only that lawful permanent residents who are ineligible for federal public assistance may receive Safety Net Assistance (State public assistance). Pl.Ex. 536 at MKB01357. These materials never explain that battered qualified aliens who are ineligible for federal Medicaid or federal public assistance may nonetheless be eligible for State Medicaid or State public assistance. Pl.Ex. 536.
In addition, previous versions of the OTDA desk aid failed to note that battered aliens may qualify for benefits if they present certain documents besides a "prima facie" notice. OTDA's 2000 desk aid, which was utilized in trainings at least through December 2002, Tr. 1166:21-25, 1167:2, listed an "INS `Notice of Prima Facie Case'" as the only document that a battered qualified alien may provide. Pl. Ex. 1165. It is true that in May 2003, OTDA amended the desk aid, adding an 360 approval notice to the list of common documentation supporting the battered qualified alien status, Pl.Ex. 529 at MKB01287, and that in December 2004, OTDA amended the desk aid again, adding to the list of common documentation supporting the battered qualified alien status a number of documents that are evidence of a pending or approved I-130 or I-360, including certain K and V visas and employment authorization cards with certain codes. Pl.Ex. 532 at MKB01300. But it was not until after the Court's Order of February 16, 2006 that OTDA issued a new desk aid that clarified the proper rules, and even then it had to be further amended on June 26, 2006. See State Ex. WW; State Ex. XX; see also Letter from Ivan B. Rubin, 423 Counsel for State Defendants, *423 to the Court, dated July 18, 2006, referencing 06-INF-23. And even today, no other OTDA policy statements or training materials besides the desk aid indicate that individuals with an I-130 and evidence of domestic violence are eligible for benefits. Tr. 702:8-11.
Likewise, in a 2002 overview of domestic violence policies and procedures, OTDA responded to the question, "What is the `battered alien' provision," by referring only to immigrants with approved I-360 petitions or prima facie notices under VAWA. Pl.Ex. 526 at MKB01242. No mention was made of battered immigrants who could provide evidence that an I-130 had been filed on their behalf. Id. Similarly, in a 2002 informational letter answering the same question, OTDA again only referred to those battered immigrants with approved or prima facie notice under VAWA. Pl.Ex. 523 at MKB01213. Again, it was only as a result of this lawsuit that OTDA, on March 22, 2006, issued an updated information letter on battered qualified alien benefit eligibility and a new Alien Eligibility Desk Guide that corrected the earlier oversights. Tr. 1142, 1147; State Defs.' Ex. WW and XX.

Regarding the problem with Social Security numbers, State policy memoranda and training materials state that a Social Security number is required for the receipt of State public benefits, even though the State's actual policy is that battered qualified aliens do not have to provide a Social Security number in order to be eligible for such benefits. For example, State Informational Letter 02 INF 40 notes that "Furnishing an SSN is a condition of temporary assistance eligibility" and instructs that "Districts should advise aliens as early as possible of the requirement to furnish a Social Security number. . . ." Pl.Ex. 631 at 2. Likewise, the letter prescribed by the State for use by clients in applying for a Social Security number, see infra, refers to 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.2 and states unconditionally that "all applicants and legally responsible relatives must provide a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility for receipt of temporary assistance." Pl.Ex. 631, Attachment.
Mr. Dichian testified that "we have conflicting regulations," Tr. 656:20-21, and that he "rel[ies] on a different regulation, which is in 369.2," which requires that people need only be furnished or apply for a Social Security number as a condition of eligibility, Tr. 657:7-10. In open court, counsel for the State represented that "it [is] the state's position right now that VAWA self petitioners who have been denied Social Security numbers because they can't qualify for Social Security numbers until the VAWA self petition is approved should receive public assistance." Tr. 668:13-18.
When a government entity, such as HRA or OTDA, refers an alien to the Social Security Administration for a Social Security number because the alien needs one to qualify for a federal benefit, the Social Security Administration requires that the referral letter, inter alia, cite "the federal statute or regulations requiring the SSN as a condition to receive the benefit or service." Pl.Ex. 541 at MKB01475-76. OTDA prescribes such a letter, Pl.Ex. 631, but the letter cites only to state law and regulations, not the federal law or regulations requiring the SSN, id., as required by the relevant SSA regulation, Pl.Ex. 541. As a result, aliens who apply for a Social Security number using these letters are denied Social Security numbers. The same is true at the City level. Pl.Ex. 504 at MKB01505.
The State's computer system also contributes to the problem. Most of the plaintiffs' and declarants' cases 424 "errored *424 out" in WMS, the State's computer system. Tr. 1370:7-9; Pl.Ex. 569, 570, 593.
Some of the State's computer problems in these cases result from the fact that the process for opening a multisuffix case is not explained in OTDA's Authorization of Grants Manual. State Defs.' Ex. QQ; Tr. 1356:9-12, 880:25-881:4; Tr. 1346:24-1347:1. There is nothing in OTDA's Authorization of Grants manual explaining how to open a multi-suffix case involving a family with immigrants. Tr. 877:8-12. Mr. Conly, an HRA worker, did not receive training on when a case needs to have two suffixes. Tr. 1097:1-6. OTDA does not provide training to HRA employees on how to open multi-suffix cases. Tr. 883:21-884:13. The "error correction specialist" and a supervisor at the Greenwood Job Center also did not know how to open a case of this type. Tr. 1095:10-18.[8]
When workers attempted to open cases with two "suffixes" in WMS, they errored out. Many of the plaintiffs' cases errored out because they were mixed households or one family member was eligible for state public assistance and one for federal public assistance. Tr. 1377:2-6; Tr. 403:7-404:5.
It takes several days to open a multi-suffix case in WMS. WMS is a "batch" system that cycles information on a daily basis. Tr. 818:5-6, 820:21-25. When a family member seeking addition to an existing case is eligible for state benefits and has a case in a rejected ("RJ") status, and when the household member with an active case is receiving federal benefits, the steps that must be taken to open such a multi-suffix case in WMS are extremely complex and must be taken over a series of days. Tr. 1343:15-21. On the first day, the worker must change the entire family to Safety Net Assistance. On the second day, the worker must put the immigrants into applying ("AP") status. Then the worker must activate the lines. Finally, the worker must split the suffix into two so that those family members eligible for federal public benefits are on a separate line from those eligible for state public benefits. Tr. 1354:18-1356:8. A number of the plaintiffs' cases errored out because workers followed the wrong steps when trying to follow these complex procedures. Tr. 1377:7-13.
Although multi-suffix errors may eventually be corrected if a case is pursued through advocacy, even in such cases these errors cause delays in clients' receiving benefits for which they are eligible. For example, S.M.'s case errored out no fewer than six or seven times before it was finally opened. Tr. 403:22-404:5. Furthermore, even

after the State Defendants represented to the Court that benefits would be provided to the named plaintiffs, some of their cases continued to error out multiple times. For example, after this action commenced, the City determined that A.I. and her six-year-old daughter W.A. were eligible for Safety Net Assistance and Medicaid and 425 that W.A. was eligible for *425 Food Stamps. On December 23, 2005, HRA's Deputy General Counsel, David Lock, reported prior attempts to activate their cases "have been unsuccessful," and that another corrective action to activate their cases "has been processed." Pl.Ex. 30A at 2. Four days later, on December 27, Mr. Lock reported that "[a]n additional effort occurred which prevented us from activating this case over the weekend. We are continuing to work on activating this case." Pl.Ex. 30B. On the next day, December 28, Mr. Lock again reported: "We were not able to open AI's ongoing case today because [of] additional errors. . . . We are continuing to work on the error correction on this case and hope to have it open tomorrow." Pl.Ex. 30C. The case did not open successfully until December 29. Pl.Ex. 30D.
Although this case has primarily focused on battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens, it should also be noted that certain lawful permanent residents were unlawfully denied benefits due to an error in the State's computer system, WMS. In particular, the date a person becomes a qualified alien is relevant to their eligibility for food stamps, Tr. 1381:1-3, and the date an immigrant entered the country is relevant to their eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Tr. 1380:19-25. These dates are sometimes not the same, Tr. 1381:4-5, but WMS has only one date field for immigrants, which must be used to record the date an immigrant entered the country, the date the person became a qualified alien, or any other relevant date. Tr. 871:22-872:17; see also Tr. 1365:5-7. WMS cannot record two separate dates. Tr. 875:4-10, 1335:8-10.
In her testimony, Elaine Witty explained the problem that the single date field causes for people who attain Qualified Alien status prior to attaining lawful permanent residency:
Q. Isn't it true that some time in 2004, you learned that WMS cannot maintain a record of both the date someone became a qualified alien and the date that person became a lawful permanent resident?
A. Yes.
Q. And did this feature of WMS cause you concern?
A. Yes.
Q. And why did it cause you concern?
A. I was concerned that the LPR date would override the date of becoming a battered qualified alien.
Q. And why did that cause you concern?
A. I was concerned that by losing the date a person becomes a battered qualified alien, it would affect their eligibility for public benefits.
Tr. 945:19-946:7; see also Tr. 1334:20-22 ("workers were changing the date on the system which was making these people ineligible"). Ms. Ganju testified that this was the problem that prevented Ms. Harris at the Seaport Job Center from opening the state food stamp case of the declarant W.S. in the computer. Tr. 405:2-24 ("She said that if the client did not have five years of qualified alien status, she couldn't get into the computer.").
However, as a result of this litigation, the WMS system has been modified so that the original date of qualified status for a benefits recipient cannot be overwritten ("lock") when changing to new qualified status such as Legal Permanent Resident. Tr. 1333-1334; see also Tr. 1339-1340; affidavit of David Spielman, sworn to May 5, 2006.
Another type of State notice is generated by the Client Notice System ("CNS"), for which OTDA writes the public 426 assistance and food stamp language, and DOH writes the Medicaid Language, Tr. 861:5-21. *426 See, e.g.,
Pl.Ex. 1006. When an application for public assistance is rejected, the notice advises the applicant that "The types of aliens who may be able to get Family Assistance benefits or Safety Net Assistance benefits include: . " Id. Similarly, when an application for food stamps is rejected, the notice advises that "In order to be eligible to

receive benefits in the Food Assistance Program an individual must: . . ." Id. Until March 2006, battered qualified aliens were not included in the lists following this language in either situation. Tr. 1398:17-1400:21.
For example, on April 22, 2004 a computerized CNS notice was issued to W.J., stating that she and her son K.M. would no longer receive public assistance and food stamps because they did not meet the eligibility requirements. Pl.Ex. 1006. The notice contained a list of immigrant statuses that were eligible for benefits, but battered qualified aliens were not listed. Id. at MKB02602-03, MKB02604-05. On April 28, 2004, W.J.'s attorney faxed Elaine Witty a copy of the notice, noting that the eligibility criteria set forth in the notice were wrong and that the omission was "probably a systemic issue." PI.Exh. 1025 at C14624-36. After receiving the fax, Ms. Witty showed the notice to lye Sisco, who concluded that there was nothing wrong with it. Tr. 945:12-17.
Similarly, sample CNS notices included in OTDA training materials from 2005 leave battered qualified aliens off the list of immigrants eligible for food stamps. Pl. Ex. 1164; Tr. 1167:17-23. These sample notices were identical to the notices in use by OTDA at the time. Tr. 1167:17-20.[9]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the basis of the foregoing facts (and a few additional factual findings recited below), the Court reaches the following conclusions of law regarding plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief relating to their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law:
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must, at a minimum, establish "(1) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of such an injunction, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation plus a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary relief." Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir.2000). Moreover, when, as here, the injunction sought is mandatory, rather than prohibitory, such that it will alter, rather than preserve, the status quo, the party seeking the injunction must make a "clear" or "substantial" showing of a likelihood of success. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting 427 Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir.1995); SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d *427 1028, 1039 (2d Cir.1990)). Based on the foregoing facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have amply met these burdens in all respects.
At the outset, the Court rejects defendants' argument that the instant suit is barred by res judicata.[10] The pending claims principally relate to the allegedly defective process by which defendants make benefit eligibility determinations for certain categories of immigrants. These issues were not adjudicated, and need not have been raised, in the case on which defendants rely for their res judicata argument, Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F.Supp.2d 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y.1999). That case involved allegations that defendants deterred and discouraged persons seeking to apply for public benefits, failed to provide qualified applicants with emergency pre-acceptance "immediate needs" public assistance grants and expedited food stamps, and failed to make separate determinations on applications for each category of benefits when people filed joint applications for public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid. See Complaint, Reynolds v. Giuliani, attached as Ex. A to Aff. of David Lock, sworn to January 24, 2006. Reynolds thus had nothing to do with the accuracy of eligibility determinations. See generally Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, 107 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.1997) ("The fact that both suits involve [] essentially the same course of wrongful conduct is not decisive; nor is it dispositive that the two proceedings involved the same parties, similar or overlapping facts, and similar legal issues. A first judgment will generally have preclusive effect only where the transaction or connected series of transactions at issue in both suits is the same, that is where the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and where the facts essential to the second were present in the first.").[11]
Turning, then, to likelihood of success, plaintiffs' federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on any person who, under color of law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law." Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes as well as the Constitution, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555

(1980), but plaintiffs must establish the violation of a federal right, not just the violation of federal law. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) ("it is rights, not the broader or vaguer `benefits' or `interests,' that may be enforced under the authority of [Section 1983]." (emphasis in original)). Such federal 428 rights must be "unambiguously conferred" *428 in the relevant statute, as indicated by "rights-creating" language and by an individual, rather than aggregate, focus. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 287, 288, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002). More specifically, the following factors are particularly relevant in assessing whether a statute confers a federal right:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353.
Plaintiffs argue that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3), and 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9), along with various implementing regulations, confer such federal rights. The Court agrees.
With respect to Medicaid benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), a provision of the Medicaid Act, provides that "all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the [Medicaid] plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." Thus, the statute, on its face, was plainly designed to benefit persons like the plaintiffs here, and Congress's focus in enacting this provision was on the individual, rather than the aggregate or the responsibilities of state actors. Further, the obligations imposed are neither vague nor amorphous, especially since plaintiffs are primarily challenging the accuracy of eligibility determinations, an evaluation of which is well within the judiciary's competence. Further, the statutory language is mandatory ("shall have opportunity to do so" (emphasis added) and "assistance shall be furnished" (emphasis added)). It is therefore apparent, as numerous courts have held, that this provision unambiguously confers a federal right to receive Medicaid benefits, if eligible, enforceable in an action brought under § 1983. See Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189-93 (3d Cir.2004); Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir.2002); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714, 719 (11th Cir.1998); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F.Supp.2d 331, 341 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Alexander A. v. Novello, 210 F.R.D. 27, 35 (E.D.N.Y.2002); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir.2004) (enforcing a similar right under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6(a)).[12]
Similarly, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3), a provision of the Food Stamp Act on which plaintiffs also rely, provides that "the State agency shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant household by way of verification of income . . ." This language, too, is plainly intended to benefit the plaintiffs, applicants for food stamps; the obligations imposed are neither vague nor amorphous; and the statute is couched in mandatory terms ("the State agency shall" (emphasis added)). As a result, the Court concludes that this statute likewise confers a federal 429 right, *429 enforceable under § 1983. See Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F.Supp.2d 561, 574-78 (S.D.N.Y.2005); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F.Supp.2d at 340-41; Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F.Supp.2d at 340-41; cf. Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 721 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) ("We conclude that the [Food Stamp] Act creates enforceable rights within the meaning of section 1983."); Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 10900(DLC), 2000 WL 760300, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jun 12, 2000); Meachem v. Wing, 77 F.Supp.2d 431, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Finally, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9), another provision of the Food Stamp Act, provides that, in the context of applications for expedited food stamps, "the State agency shall 0907(A) provide coupons no later than 7 days after the date of application to any household which [falls below certain income levels]." Once again, the provision is obviously intended to benefit the plaintiffs; it is neither vague nor amorphous in its requirement that food stamps be provided to eligible individuals; and it speaks in mandatory terms ("the State agency shall" (emphasis added)). Under these circumstances, the Court finds that this provision also confers a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See Reynolds, 35 F.Supp.2d at 340-41; Roberson, 2000 WL 760300 at *3-4, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7965 at *11.[13]

Plaintiffs also allege violations of the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, which are, of course, cognizable under § 1983.
Additionally, plaintiffs assert pendent causes of action under state law 0907 specifically, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 158 (1)(g), 122(1)(b), 122(1)(c), and 366(1)(a). Defendants nowhere contend that plaintiffs do not have a right of action under these statutes0907undoubtedly because they recognize that New York uses a very permissive standard to determine whether a private right of action is implied in a statute, to wit: "(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme." Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, 73 N.Y.2d 629, 633, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18, 541 N.E.2d 18 (1989); Carrier v. Salvation Army, 88 N.Y.2d 298, 302, 644 N.Y.S.2d 678, 667 N.E.2d 328 (1996); see also Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 231 (2d Cir.2006). In the case of each of the four state statutes here invoked, a private right of action is clearly implied under the foregoing test, because each of the statutes was enacted to benefit plaintiffs; recognizing a private right of action would further the legislative purpose, see Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 330, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 451 N.E.2d 459 (1983); and doing so would in no way be inconsistent with the legislative enforcement scheme, see Uhr v. East Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist., 94 N.Y.2d 32, 40, 698 N.Y.S.2d 609, 720 N.E.2d 886 (1999).
430 *430 As to plaintiffs' very substantial likelihood of success under each of their causes of action, it is obvious from the foregoing findings of fact that each of the plaintiffs was erroneously denied public assistance, Medicaid benefits, and/or food stamps, in violation of their federal and state rights. As set forth in detail in the foregoing findings of fact:
Plaintiff Marieme Diongue, a PRUCOL alien, initially applied for Medicaid and public assistance in March 2005; was repeatedly and wrongly told that she was ineligible; and did not receive benefits until after this suit was initiated.
Plaintiff A.I., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public assistance, Medicaid, and food stamps in March 2004; was repeatedly and wrongly told that she was ineligible; and did not receive benefits until after this suit was initiated.
Plaintiff M.E., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public assistance in July 2002; was directed to apply for a Social Security number and was rejected by the Social Security Administration; began receiving benefits many months later; had her benefits reduced in September 2004 because the caseworker erroneously believed she needed a Social Security number or green card; had her benefits restored due to advocacy; was later told she needed a prima facie notice to be eligible; was again told to apply for a Social Security number and was denied, leading a caseworker to wrongly decrease her benefits; and did not have her benefits fully restored until after this suit was filed.
Plaintiff J.Z., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public benefits in July 2004; was erroneously told that she had failed to establish an eligible immigration status; re-applied in September 2004 and was wrongly told that she was ineligible because she was not a citizen; presented a copy of her I-360 prima facie notice, which she had received the month before, in January 2005, and was added to her children's case but was wrongly rejected for food stamps; received a favorable fair hearing decision regarding her eligibility for food stamps; presented the fair hearing decision to a HRA worker, who wrongly rejected it because J.Z.'s prima facie notice was about to expire, even though J.Z. had an I-360 approval notice; and wrongly had her benefits terminated.
Plaintiff M.A., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public benefits in July 2005; was wrongly advised that she was ineligible; received a favorable fair hearing decision; presented her documentation and the fair hearing decision to the caseworker, who erroneously said that M.A. was ineligible because she did not have a prima facie notice; returned several days later and was wrongly told by another worker that she was ineligible because she did not have a green card; and did not receive benefits until December 29, 2005 after the filing of this action.
Plaintiff P.E., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public benefits in June 2003 to an HRA worker who wrongly refused to take an application from her; re-applied in November 2003 and was wrongly told that she

was ineligible because she did not have a green card or Social Security number; re-applied in November 2004, and was initially approved, but in March 2005 her benefits were wrongly terminated because she did not have a Social Security number; met with another HRA worker in June 2005, who erroneously told her that she was ineligible due to immigration status and because she did not have a Social Security number; and received a favorable fair hearing decision, but HRA failed to comply with the decision until this action was filed in December 2005.
431 *431 Plaintiff O.P., a PRUCOL alien, initially applied for public benefits in May 2005; was erroneously told that she was ineligible because she did not have a green card; received a favorable fair hearing decision; re-applied in August 2005, but was again wrongly told by a worker that her application would be denied because she did not have a green card; returned in September 2005 and was wrongly told that her application would be denied because of her deferred action immigration status; re-applied in October 2005 and was wrongly told that she was ineligible because she did not have a green card; and is currently receiving public assistance and Medicaid, which she began receiving in January 2006, shortly after this suit was filed.
Plaintiff L.W., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public benefits in March 2005; received cash and food stamps for a short period of time but then the benefits stopped; re-applied in May 2005 and was erroneously rejected "because of alien status"; began receiving benefits, but not food stamps, in July 2005 due to advocacy; and did not receive food stamps until December 2005, after this suit was filed.
Plaintiff M.K.B., an I-130 battered qualified alien, initially applied for public benefits in September 2005; was asked for Social Security numbers for her two older children and was wrongly told they were ineligible when she could not produce them; was rejected for public benefits because the HRA worker wrongly categorized her as an "undocumented alien"; finally had a case opened for her in February 2006 as a result of this litigation, but by which time M.K.B. had filed an 360 VAWA self-petition, which included her children as "derivatives"; as a result of which, the case was a "multi-suffix" case and repeatedly "errored out."
Plaintiff Denise Thomas, an I-360 battered qualified alien, met with HRA workers in September 2004, January 2005, and March 2005; was wrongly told that she needed a Social Security number and that she needed to be a citizen for five years; presented her prima facie notice, but did not receive any benefits; and eventually received benefits in July 2005 due to advocacy, but only received retroactive benefits in December 2005.
Plaintiff L.A.M., a PRUCOL alien, asked to be added to her citizen daughter's public assistance case in summer 2005; was wrongly told by an HRA worker, after consulting with a supervisor, that she was ineligible because she was not a citizen or green card holder and did not have a prima facie notice; re-applied in October 2005, spoke with three different workers, and was repeatedly but erroneously told that she was ineligible because she was not a citizen or green-card holder; and finally received benefits in December 2005 in connection with the filing of this suit.
Plaintiff Galina Rybalko, a qualified alien as of April 2000 and a lawful permanent resident (with a green card) as of June 2003, became eligible for food stamps in April 2005 because she had resided in the United States in a qualified status for five or more years; was wrongly told by an HRA worker that she was ineligible because she had not had her green card for five years; and had not yet received benefits at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in this case.
Plaintiffs were also denied adequate notice of the denial of their applications, in violation of the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. In evaluating a procedural due process claim, the Court evaluates "whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes" 432 and, if so, "what process was due *432 before the plaintiff could be deprived of that interest." Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir.1995). Persons who are qualified to receive welfare benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (public assistance benefits); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128, 105 S.Ct. 2520, 86 L.Ed.2d 81 (1985) (food stamp benefits); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (social security disability benefits); Reynolds, 35 F.Supp.2d at 340-41; Rooney v. Shalala, 879 F.Supp. 252, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("There is now generally recognized a significant property interest in the fair adjudication of a claimant's eligibility

to receive disability benefits." (internal quotations omitted)); see generally McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 286 (2d Cir.2001).
Under the test set forth in Mathews, a court, in order to determine what process is due, must balance three factors: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The Court here concludes that the notice afforded plaintiffs was inadequate because the plaintiffs had a considerable private interest in being accurately apprised of adverse eligibility determinations; the inaccurate notices they received made it extremely difficult to identify and rectify erroneous determinations; modified notices that accurately convey HRA's decisions would be of considerable value; and the cost to develop and implement such notices is minimal.
Thus, as set forth in detail in the foregoing findings of fact, when plaintiff Marieme Diongue was rejected for benefit, she received a notice that stated that her family's case was accepted for public assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid, but did not state which family members were accepted and which were rejected for public benefits.
When plaintiff A.I. was rejected for benefits, she received a notice that stated that her family's case was accepted for food stamps, but that did not state which family members were accepted and which were rejected for public benefits.
When plaintiff J.Z. was rejected for benefits, she received no written notice whatever informing her that she was rejected.
When plaintiff M.A. was rejected for benefits, she received no written notice whatever informing her that she was rejected.
When plaintiff P.E. was rejected for benefits, she received two notices that stated that her family's case was accepted for benefits, but that did not state which family members were accepted and which were rejected for public benefits.
When plaintiff O.P. was rejected for benefits in September 2005, she received no written notice whatever informing her that she was rejected.
When plaintiff M.K.B. was rejected for benefits in October 2005, she received two notices that stated that a public assistance case had been opened and that the case was also accepted for Medicaid and food stamps, but that did not state which family members were accepted and which were rejected for public benefits.
433 When plaintiff L.A.M. was rejected for benefits in October 2005, she received no *433 written notice whatever informing her that she was rejected.
Although it is thus clear that plaintiffs have made an overwhelming showing that the defendants' employees violated federal rights of the plaintiffs conferred by the Constitution and federal laws, as well as plaintiffs' rights under state law, plaintiffs, by bringing suit against the City HRA commissioner in her official capacity and the OTDA and DOH commissioners in their official capacities, are seeking determinations of liability and injunctive relief against the relevant City and State agencies. As to the City, although it is well-settled that municipalities are considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore amenable to suit thereunder, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978),[14] a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 for the isolated unlawful acts of its employees; rather, "[i]t is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992); see also Walker v. New York, 974 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1992).[15] Plaintiffs must therefore establish that the City itself has a policy, custom, or usage that caused the deprivation of plaintiffs' rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir.2004). "To show a policy, custom, or practice, the plaintiff need not identify an express rule or regulation." Patterson v.

County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir.2004). For example, a municipality will be liable under § 1983 if it is established that subordinates' unlawful practices are "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a `custom or usage' with the force of law," thereby implying the constructive acquiescence of policy-making officials. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 871 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018); see also Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ("Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a `custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law."); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (municipal liability may result from "acquiescence in a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the `standard operating procedure' of the local governmental entity."). Similarly, a municipality will be 434 liable under § 1983 for failure to train its employees where the failure to train *434 amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those within its jurisdiction. See Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 126 ("where a policymaking official exhibits deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates, such that the official's inaction constitutes a "deliberate choice," that acquiescence may be properly thought of as a city `policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983") (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). Under any scenario, however, there must be a causal link between the policy, custom, or practice and the alleged injury in order to find liability against a municipality. See Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir.1983).
Here, plaintiffs have not shown simply "isolated unconstitutional acts of . . . employees," Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 870. Instead, they have made a very substantial showing that the mistaken determinations were the direct results of the flawed design of the City's computer system ("POS"), the pervasive errors in the City's training materials and policy directives, and the widespread worker ignorance resulting from the inadequate training of the City employees. Moreover, the City Defendant had notice of all of these systemic failings. Effectively, then, the City had a policy, custom, and usage of denying benefits to eligible qualified battered aliens, lawful permanent residents who had been in that status for less than five years, and (with respect to state benefits) PRUCOL aliens. Put another way, the plaintiffs have made a clear and substantial showing that the City itself was the "moving force" behind the violations of plaintiffs' federal and state rights, and is therefore liable under § 1983 and cognate state statutes. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).
For example, the City's computer system, POS, was so plagued with errors that, for a period of time, workers could only access the appropriate screens for opening a case for a battered qualified alien by selecting an inappropriate option. As a result, many workers did not know how to access the screens. Others miscoded battered qualified aliens so that they would receive benefits, but the benefits would later be discontinued when the alien could not verify the status chosen. HRA policymakers were aware of these systemic deficiencies, but did little or nothing to fix them.
Again, because of the lapses and misinformation in the City manuals and directives, City workers repeatedly misapplied the relevant eligibility rules, demanded irrelevant documentation (such as "prima facie notices," green cards, and Social Security numbers) from immigrants who were eligible even though they did not have those documents, and wrongly denied eligibility as a result. Moreover, for the same reasons, City workers were often entirely unaware that I-130 battered qualified aliens were eligible for benefits; indeed, many City policy documents and training materials made no mention whatever of this category of aliens. These problems were pervasive, affecting many aliens, and were brought to the attention of HRA policymakers.
Moreover, as a result of inadequate training and information, the City had a pervasive custom affecting many aliens0907 and one of which City policymakers were well aware of 0907 wrongly denying state benefits to eligible aliens who could not obtain Social Security numbers.
In addition, the form letters provided by the City (and State) to aliens to obtain a Social Security number failed to 435 reference the information required to obtain a Social *435 Security number and therefore were destined to fail.
These are standard forms, the inadequacy of which was repeatedly called to policymakers' attention.
Further, the City's notices in cases involving parents and children frequently failed to indicate that only the children were being approved for benefits. Additionally, the City (and State) issued misleading computerized

notices that failed to list battered qualified aliens as one of the categories of immigrants eligible for public benefits.
Further still, the City's rules governing PRUCOL eligibility were systematically misapplied, chiefly because City policy bulletins and training materials contained many errors concerning PRUCOL eligibility (or ignored the category altogether), and HRA policymakers had ample notice of these problems.
Without multiplying examples even further, the Court readily concludes that, given the pervasive and systemic nature of the various problems resulting in the unlawful denial of benefits to plaintiffs, plaintiffs have established a very high likelihood that the City will be found liable on all of plaintiffs' claims.
Beyond all else, plaintiffs have also clearly established for these purposes an overwhelming likelihood of success on their contention that the City, in its failure to adequately train its employees, was "deliberately indifferent" to the violation of plaintiffs' federal rights. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197. A municipality will be liable because its failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference if the plaintiff can show "(1) that `a policymaker of the municipality knows to a moral certainty that its employees will confront a given situation'; (2) that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation'; and (3) that the wrong choice by the employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights.'" Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir.1992)). See also Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir.2004) ("While a failure to supervise claim requires allegations as to the violation itself and policymakers' reaction to it, a failure to train claim also requires evidence as to the city's training program and the way in which that program contributed to the violation."). All of these requirements are here satisfied:
First, HRA policymakers knew to "a moral certainty" that their employees would encounter the kinds of problems here at issue in processing applications of battered qualified aliens, PRUCOL aliens, and certain lawful permanent residents who had been in that status for less than five years. The evidence establishes that these policymakers were aware that these constituencies frequently applied for benefits, and that eligibility workers often misunderstood the eligibility rules. For example, Ms. Ganju testified that she alone represented 50 to 60 battered aliens applying for public benefits during her 28 months at Sanctuary for Families. Tr. 474:16-475:2.[16]
Second, adequate training or supervision would clearly have made the responsibilities of the City workers less 436 difficult in this situation, and, in its absence, there is a clear history of employees mishandling the *436
determinations. For example, the lack of awareness by HRA caseworkers of the eligibility of I-130 battered qualified aliens and PRUCOL aliens is attributable in large part both to defective training materials used by the City to train those workers and to corresponding defects in the POS computer system that they utilize on a daily basis. The Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, in an e-mail to senior State and City officials, expressly stated that "centers/workers need more specific guidance on PRUCOL eligibility," and that "[w]e have been unable to find any policy guidance on the required documentation to establish PRUCOL." City Ex. MM. Yet the City took no meaningful action to rectify the situation until this lawsuit was brought.[17]
Third, the wrong choices by HRA employees brought about by the foregoing conditions "frequently caused the deprivation" of plaintiffs' rights, as already described in detail.
The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have established a clear or substantial likelihood of success on their claims brought against the City Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
As for the liability of the State Defendants, although the State had some direct role in the problems here at issue, it is sufficient for present purposes for the Court to conclude, as it does, that the plaintiffs have clearly established a likelihood that the State Defendants will be held vicariously liable for the City Defendant's violations of plaintiffs' federal rights. Under the federal and state statutory scheme governing the administration of public benefits in New York State, HRA is the agent of the State Defendants.[18]See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 65(3) ("The county commissioner shall act as the agent of the department . ."); Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 534 (4th Cir.1992) ("A state that chooses to operate its program through local, semi-autonomous social service agencies cannot thereby diminish the obligation to which the state, as a state, has committed itself, namely, compliance

with federal requirements governing the provision of the food stamp benefits that are funded by the federal government."); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1984) ("While the state may choose to delegate some administrative responsibilities, the ultimate responsibility for operation of the [food stamp] plan remain[s] with the state.") (quoting California v. Block, 663 F.2d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1981)); DaJour B. v. City of New York, 2001 WL 830674, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251 (S.D.N.Y.2001) ("the DOH, as the agency responsible 437 for New York State's Medicaid program is accountable for violations *437 of the substantive . . . provisions, which do create enforceable rights."); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F.Supp.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y.2000).
Although the Second Circuit has not ruled on this issue in the exact factual context here presented, nonetheless, in Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286-87 (2d Cir.2003), the Court of Appeals, in addition to generally acknowledging that a number of courts have "take[n] the view that the state's assumption of liability under the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts renders it liable for violations of those acts by local agencies," 331 F.3d at 286-87, concluded that the State was vicariously liable for the City's constitutional torts in violation of the Rehabilitation Act:
"The common law of contracts strongly suggests that the state defendant is liable to ensure that localities comply with the Rehabilitation Act in their delivery of federally-funded social services. An `obligor'0907that is, one who promises performance in exchange for consideration-cannot rid itself of a duty merely by making an effective delegation. Thus, once a party has made a promise, it is responsible to the obligee to ensure that performance will be satisfactory, even if the promising party obtains some third party to carry out its promise. Here, in accepting federal funds, New York State has promised that its programs will comply with the mandate of the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, under our contract analogy, New York State is also liable to guarantee that those it delegates to carry out its programs satisfy the terms of its promised performance, including compliance with the Rehabilitation Act." (internal citations omitted).
In light of the clear statutory obligations imposed on the State Defendants, the Court finds that it is consistent with congressional intent and the bargain struck between the parties to hold the State Defendants vicariously liable under § 1983 for the City Defendant's violation of plaintiffs' federal rights.
As for considerations of state sovereignty, "[t]he Eleventh Amendment . . . does not preclude suits against state officers in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law." Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 287 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)).
Having thus established a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits against both the City Defendant and State Defendants, plaintiffs are entitled to such injunctive relief as necessary to prevent irreparable harm. Cf. Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1983). Given the often perilous economic circumstances of the plaintiffs in this case, and those similarly situated, the denial of public benefits to such individuals unquestionably constitutes irreparable harm. See Mass. Ass'n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749, 753 (1st Cir.1983); Martin v. Weiner, 2006 WL 435477, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8698 (W.D.N.Y.2006); Reynolds, 35 F.Supp.2d at 339 ("To indigent persons, the loss of even a portion of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable injury."); Cincotta v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., No. 00 Civ. 9064(JSR), 2001 WL 897176, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11457 (S.D.N.Y. August 9, 2001) ("The loss or potential loss of welfare benefits, including food stamp benefits, can constitute irreparable injury warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunction."); Hurley v. Toia, 432 F.Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.1977); cf. Commc'ns Workers of Am., Dist. One v. NYNEX Corp., 898 F.2d 887, 891 (2d Cir.1990) ("the threat of termination of medical benefits to striking workers has been held to 438 constitute *438 irreparable harm"); Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir.1979) ("the threatened termination of benefits such as medical coverage for workers and their families obviously raised the spectre of irreparable injury"). See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-65, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).
As documented in their declarations, plaintiffs suffer from hunger and poor nutrition because they do not have enough money for food, see, e.g., M.K.B. Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; L.M. Decl. ¶¶ 14-21; L.W. Decl. ¶¶ 22, 27; Fedosenko Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Fofana Decl. ¶¶, 27; are unable to buy various household necessities, see, e.g., L.A.M. Decl. ¶¶ 37, 41, 43; M.A. Decl. ¶ 21; M.K.B. Decl. ¶¶ 18-22; A.I. Decl. ¶¶ 33-41; are unable to obtain routine health care, treat serious medical conditions, and obtain essential prescription medicines if denied Medicaid, see, e.g., O.P.

Decl. ¶¶ 36-40; P.E. Decl. ¶¶ 20, 53; M.K.B. Decl. ¶ 17; and have sometimes become homeless or been threatened with eviction, see, e.g., P.E. Decl. ¶¶ 18, 50; N.E. Decl. ¶¶ 20, 31.
It is true that defendants have undertaken extensive and commendable ameliorative measures since the filing of this lawsuit, but not to the point where this action is thereby rendered moot, nor the Court deprived of its authority to grant injunctive relief or determine the other questions before it. See N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 172, 185 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) ("a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.")); Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 705-06 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ("[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.")); Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 574 (2d Cir.2003) ("The defendant's burden is a heavy one to ensure the allegedly illegal activities do not temporarily cease only to resume after the claims have been dismissed.") (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)).[19]
The simple truth, moreover, is that the ameliorative actions now taken by the City and State Defendants would not likely have been taken if this lawsuit had not been brought and had the Court not issued its initial injunction. The Court therefore keeps that initial injunction in place in all respects, its value reconfirmed by the evidence adduced at the subsequent evidentiary hearing. The only open question is whether still more injunctive relief is required.
In this regard, the Court, by Order dated July 12, 2006, directed the City and State defendants to submit letter briefs specifying such additional ameliorative measures, if any, that the defendants had undertaken since the defendants submitted their post-hearing briefs that might bear on the relief sought by plaintiffs, and gave plaintiffs leave to respond. By letter dated July 20, 2006, in response to defendants' letter briefs, the plaintiffs advised the Court that they still sought the following relief:
439 *439 As against the State Defendants, plaintiffs seek:
(1) An order directing OTDA to add a second date field to WMS so that the date an immigrant became a qualified alien and the date the immigrant entered the country can both be recorded. The plaintiffs also seek an order directing the State to issue instructions explaining the use of these fields and clarifying that time accrued in different qualified alien statuses should be added together to determine eligibility for federal food stamps.
(2) An order directing OTDA to issue clear and comprehensive instructions on how to open cases for aliens directly in WMS, focusing particularly on multi-suffix cases.
(3) An order directing OTDA to correct 02 INF-40, which on its face is not sufficient to cause SSA to issue a nonwork Social Security number (SSN) to an immigrant who lacks work authorization.
(4) An order directing the State to revise its training materials so that they accurately and comprehensively explain which immigrants are eligible for federal Medicaid.
As against the City defendant, plaintiffs seek:
(1) An order directing the City defendant to correct all errors in its revised policy directives and bulletins regarding Social Security numbers, and to conduct comprehensive training on these policy directives for all staff involved in eligibility determinations.
(2) An order directing the City Defendant to correct errors regarding PRUCOL eligibility in PD 06-24-ELI. See Letter from Scott Rosenberg, Counsel for Plaintiffs, to the Court, dated August 1, 2006.
(3) An order directing the City to refer all cases involving green card holders who have had their green cards for less than five years to the immigrant liaisons, or in the alternative to train all workers involved in eligibility determinations on how to determine the number of years that an alien has been in qualified status, and to train workers on which dates must be entered into POS and WMS.

(4) An order directing the City to conduct trainings for all staff who are involved in opening cases for immigrants directly in WMS.
(5) An order directing the City to issue a policy directive and conduct training on the necessity of providing notices when individuals ask to be added to an existing case, and the need to issue notices listing the individual accepted, those denied public benefits, and the reason for the denial, whenever some members of a household are accepted and others are denied due to immigration status.
(6) An order directing the City to provide all staff who handle eligibility determinations for proposed class members with the same training immigrant liaisons receive.
The aforesaid items sought by plaintiffs are not only reasonable on their face but appear directly designed to remedy any remaining material likelihood that the numerous misdeterminations caused by the City and State's failings will re-occur.[20] Accordingly, the Court hereby supplements its prior preliminary injunctive order by 440 adding each of the orders sought by plaintiffs as stated above, to be complied *440 with within a reasonable time (with exact deadlines to be set later only if necessary).
The Court notes that none of these additional requirements is either burdensome or expensive; indeed, in light of what has already been established, they simply make common sense. At the same time, the Court again commends defendants for their ameliorative actions undertaken since this case commenced and forecasts that good faith compliance with these remaining measures may make any but the most general provisions unnecessary in any permanent injunction the Court may ultimately impose.
CLASS CERTIFICATION
Having resolved the motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court now turns to plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the following class:
All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or prevented from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
For purposes of the foregoing paragraph, the term "Affected Immigrants" means (1) battered spouses and battered children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (2) their immigrant children or, in the case of battered children, their immigrant parents, provided that they too are Qualified Aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c); (3) lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years; and (4) persons who are Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL).
Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may not certify a class unless (1) "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable" (numerosity), (2) "there are questions of law or fact common to the class" (commonality), (3) "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class" (typicality), and (4) "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" (adequacy). Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). If these requirements are met, the Court may still not certify the proposed class unless it also falls into one of the categories set forth in Rule 23(b), Fed. R.Civ.P.
All of the requirements of Rule 23(a) are here satisfied. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Impracticable does not mean impossible, but simply difficult or inconvenient. See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir.1993). The Second Circuit has presumed numerosity "at a level of 40 members." Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir.1995). A survey of organizations in New York City that assist indigent battered immigrants with filing these applications shows that at least 488

VAWA self-petition cases, 58 battered spouse waiver cases, and 157 applications for U visa interim relief are filed annually on behalf of indigent battered immigrants in New York City. Declaration of Camille Carey dated Dec. 6, 2005 at ¶¶ 3-16. Over 90 percent of these applications were submitted with fee waiver requests, demonstrating 441 that the immigrants *441 were impoverished and likely to be class members in this case. Id. at ¶ 16. Moreover, although invited by the Court to do so, Tr. 467:10-14, defendants never proffered any evidence to dispute the numerosity of the proposed class.

The commonality and typicality requirements tend to merge, so that similar considerations enter into analysis of Rules 23(a)(2) and (3). See General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 597 (2d Cir.1986). The crux of both requirements is to ensure that "maintenance of a class action is economical and [that] the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence." Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364. Specifically, "[t]he commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs' grievances share a common question of law or of fact." Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam). Typicality "requires that the claims of the class representatives be typical of those of the class, and is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, class members share common issues of law and fact: defendants erroneously and systemically fail to provide public benefits to members of the class as a result of flaws in computer systems, erroneous policy bulletins and directives, and inadequate training. Although defendants argue that each member of the class was denied benefits for slightly different reasons and under slightly different circumstances, the Court of Appeals, in strikingly similar circumstances, has found that the commonality and typicality requirements are met:

The court identified as a common question of law "whether each child has a legal entitlement to the services of which that child is being deprived." 929 F.Supp. at 690. It identified as a common question of fact "whether defendants systematically have failed to provide these legally mandated services." Id. In characterizing the legal and factual issues in this way, the district court determined that the myriad constitutional, regulatory, and statutory provisions invoked by the plaintiffs are properly understood as creating a single scheme for the delivery of child welfare services and as setting standards of conduct for those charged with providing such services-standards that the defendants are alleged to have violated in a manner common to the plaintiff class by failing to operate and maintain a functioning child welfare system. The district court explained:

The unique circumstances of each child do not compromise the common question of whether, as plaintiffs allege, defendants have injured all class members by failing to meet their federal and state law obligations. Indeed, as plaintiffs argue, the actions or inactions of defendants are not isolated or discrete instances but, rather, form a pattern of behavior that commonly affects all of the proposed class members.

The core issue presented by this appeal is whether, by conceptualizing the common legal and

factual questions at this high level of abstraction (or, understood differently, by aggregating all of

the plaintiffs' claims into one "super-claim"), the district court abused the discretion granted it by

442

Rule 23 to provide for the orderly and efficient maintenance of this *442 lawsuit. We find that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying this class at this time.

Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 377. Here, too, plaintiffs are alleging that defendants have failed to properly administer benefits due to systemic errors and have, indeed, already adduced very substantial evidence that this is true.

Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that plaintiffs demonstrate that "class counsel is qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation" and that "there is no conflict of interest between the named plaintiffs and other members of the plaintiff class." Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 378. As to counsel, plaintiffs' counsel are experienced in class action litigation in both federal and state courts, including matters relating to public benefits, and their performance so far already has shown that they will prosecute this action vigorously and competently.

As for the individual class representatives, there is no indication of any conflict between the named plaintiffs and members of the class. Rather, the interests of the named plaintiffs are identical to those of the proposed class because the named plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to assure that defendants conform their computer systems, policy directives, and worker training to the statutes and regulations governing immigrant eligibility so that class members will receive the benefits for which they are eligible. Such relief will have no detrimental effect on any of the other class members, but will only benefit them as it will increase their chances of obtaining benefits to which they are entitled.[21] Thus, the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 (a)(4).
Turning to Rule 23(b), the Court concludes that the proposed class falls within Rule 23(b)(2), which authorizes class actions where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Rule 23(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. "The (b)(2) class action is intended for cases where broad, classwide injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary to redress a group-wide injury." Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir.2001).
In this suit, plaintiffs are principally seeking injunctive relief to remedy what they allege are systemic deficiencies in defendants' administration of the statutes and regulations governing immigrant eligibility for benefits. There is no need for any individualized assessment regarding the need for injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals has affirmed the certification of a 23(b)(2) class under very similar circumstances: "Insofar as the deficiencies of the child welfare system stem from central and systemic failures, the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a 23(b)(2) class at this stage of the litigation." Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 378; see also Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 796 (2d Cir.1994) (Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied "because the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and they predicate the lawsuit on the defendants' acts and omissions with respect to" the class); Marisol A. by Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F.Supp. 662, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (certifying 23(b)(2) class in case alleging systemic failures of New York City's child welfare system, and holding that "The instant case poses exactly the situation contemplated by 443 Rule 23(b)(2). An order requiring defendants to comply *443 with federal and state law in order to remedy the systemic failures that are the source of plaintiffs' claims constitutes relief that would serve the entire putative class."); Jeanine B. by Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1288 (D.Wis.1995) ("civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a large and amorphous class . . . fall squarely into the category" of 23(b) (2) actions); Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Plaintiffs' complaint falls within Rule 23(b) (2). Defendants' failure to act is said to be institutional not merely a cumulation of individual cases. The final injunctive and declaratory relief requested here would inure to the benefit of all class members in gaining a timely processing of their applications for benefits."); Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision (b)(2) ("Illustrative are various actions . . . where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.")
For the foregoing reasons, the Court (i) grants plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief by reconfirming the relief set forth in the Order of February 16, 2006, and adding to it each of the provisions set forth at pages 75-76 above; and (ii) grants plaintiffs' motion for class certification by certifying the class described at pages 77-78 above. Counsel for the parties are hereby directed to jointly telephone Chambers no later than September 6, 2006 to schedule further proceedings in this case.
SO ORDERED.
[1] "Tr." refers to the transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing. "Pl.Ex.," "City Def. Ex.," and "State Def. Ex." refer to the respective parties' exhibits received at that hearing. "Decl." refers to sworn declarations that were received in connection with that hearing.
[2] On consent, the names of some of the victims of domestic violence are referred to only by initials, in order to protect the victims' safety and privacy.
[3] A "V" visa, issued pursuant to INA § 101(a)(15)(v), is issued to a lawful permanent resident's spouse ("V-1") or unmarried child ("V-2" or "V-3") for whom an I-130 petition was filed on or before December 21, 2000. See 8

C.F.R. §§ 214.15(a) and (c). A "K" visa, issued pursuant to INA § 101(a)(15)(k) is issued to a spouse ("K-3") or child ("K-4") for whom an I-130 petition was filed for the purpose of allowing family reunification. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (k)(7).
[4] Following the issuance of the Court's Order of February 16, 2006, HRA, on February 28, 2006, issued Policy Bulletin # 06-31, titled "Battered Immigrants and Immigrants who are Permanently Residing in the U.S. under Color of Law." This Policy Bulletin describes the immigrant liaison procedure with greater accuracy. City Def. Ex. LLL. Furthermore, after the evidentiary hearing in this case, the City, after receiving approval from OTDA, issued Policy Directive PD 06-240907ELI, titled "Determining Qualified Alien Status for Battered/Abuse Noncitizens and PRUCOL Eligibility." By letter dated August 1, 2006, plaintiffs did not lodge any objections regarding the discussion of the eligibility of battered qualified aliens in PD 06-24 0907ELI.
[5] Only in response to this Court's Order of February 16, 2006, was POS modified so that a case could proceed without an Alien number. Tr. 865:12-16. Furthermore, as of June 2006 (and seemingly as a result of the evidentiary hearing), POS was further modified so that "Battered (Abused) Spouse and/or Dependent Child of U.S. Citizen or LPR" is included among the listed immigrant status options that appear on the first page of the alien determination script. See Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard, Director of POS Design Team, dated May 5, 2006 ("Supp. Shepard Decl."), at ¶ 2 & Ex. A; see also Policy Bulletin # 06-84-SYS: Release Notes for POS Version 10.1.1, attached as Ex. A to Letter from Jane Tobey Momo, Counsel for City Defendant, to the Court, dated July 18, 2006. If the worker selects this new immigration status option, POS will eventually display a list of acceptable documentation in the Battered Documentation Window. Supp. Shepard Decl. at ¶ 3 & Ex. B. That list now includes a notice of action showing the approval of an I-360 VAWA self-petition, the establishment of prima facie eligibility for an I-360 VAWA self-petition, or a Receipt Notice showing that an I-360 VAWA self-petition is pending; notice of action showing that an 130 visa petition is pending or approved; an order of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) granting suspension of deportation under Section 244(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); an order of the EOIR granting cancellation of removal under Section 240A (b)(2) of the INA; an I-94 annotated (a)(9) or (a)(15); and any other USCIS documentation indicating that the alien has a K or V visa. Id. Furthermore, the list includes an option labeled "None of the Above" that workers are directed to choose if the client must return with documentation, has lost her immigration documents, or is a Derived Child covered by the parents' petition. Id. After the worker enters the documentation provided by the applicant, the case is referred to the Domestic Violence Liaison ("DVL"), who determines whether the applicant's claim of domestic violence is credible. Id. at ¶ 4. If the DVL finds the client to be a credible victim of domestic violence, the worker will indicate, in the "Evidence of Battery or Abuse Window," that the "Results of the Special Assessment Appointment" were positive. Id. & Ex. C. The worker must then determine whether there is a substantial connection between the abuse and the need for benefits, using the guidance provided in POS, and whether the abused applicant lives apart from the abuser. Id. If the answers to those two question are "yes," the applicant may then be found eligible for qualified alien status under the Battered Alien criteria if they satisfy all other eligibility requirements (income verification, expense verification, requisite referrals, and other necessary documentation). Tr. 811:6-813:3.
[6] After the evidentiary hearing in this case, the City, upon receiving approval from OTDA, issued Policy Directive PD 06-24-ELI, titled "Determining Qualified Alien Status for Battered/Abuse Noncitizens and PRUCOL Eligibility." By letter dated August 1, 2006, however, plaintiffs lodged various objections concerning the discussion of PRUCOL eligibility in PD 06-24-ELI, such as that the revised Policy Directive fails to explain DOH and OTDA's different definitions of PRUCOL. To the extent these objections are not mooted by what follows below, they will be considered by the Court as part of the further proceedings in this case.
[7] The Court hereby grants Galina Rybalko's motion to intervene.
[8] Some of the errors were also caused by "cross-edits," which are rules requiring that data entered into a field be compatible with information in other fields. If cross-edit rules are violated, the case will error out and will not process successfully. Tr. 1364:1-15, 809:11-20, 849:3-9. Specifically, information entered by HRA workers regarding alien status (date element 382), Alien number (data element 381), and date of entry (data element 389) are incompatible with information entered regarding whether the individuals are eligible for state or federal benefits (elements 307, 325, 376, 377, and 343), thus leading to errors. Tr. 1364:19-1365:24, 1370:10-14,

1376:19-1377:1. For example, an HRA employee testified that A.I.'s case errored out in WMS on March 16, 2004, because of alien status, Tr. 1348:24-1349:15, and errored out again because of alien status starting on November 14, 2005, Tr. 1349:16-1350:21.
[9] This problem has been partly corrected. In March 2006, to comply with this Court's Order of February 16, 2006, OTDA changed the language in the Food Stamp section of the computer generated notice of denial issued through CNS to include battered qualified aliens with 5 years in qualified status, or on other specified conditions, as potentially eligible as recipients of food stamps. Tr. 1398-1400, State Defs.' Ex. RR and VV. OTDA also changed the language in the Public Assistance section of the computer generated notice of denial issued through the Central Notice System ("CNS") to include a broadened description of battered qualified aliens as potentially eligible recipients of public assistance. Tr. 1398-1400, State Defs' Ex. UU. OTDA also changed the language in the Public Assistance section of the computer generated notice of denial issued through CNS to include holders of four types of visas as PRUCOL aliens and thus as potentially eligible recipients of public assistance. Tr. 1398-1400, State Defs.' Ex. UU.
[10] Defendants' other purely legal defenses, to the extent applicable to injunctive relief and not otherwise addressed below, were previously rejected in connection with the issuance of the Court's Order of February 16, 2006.
[11] It is true that one of plaintiffs' additional claims that defendants have a practice of preventing, discouraging, or deterring persons from applying for public benefits was in issue in Reynolds, but here it pertains to conduct that occurred after April 2001, when the record in Reynolds closed. See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 383 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Claims arising subsequent to a prior action need not, and often perhaps could not, have been brought in that prior action; accordingly, they are not barred by res judicata regardless of whether they are premised on facts representing a continuance of the same course of conduct."). Moreover, the claim is not addressed in the instant motion for injunctive relief.
[12] To the extent, however, that plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5), see Complaint ¶ 360, this Court adheres to its prior conclusion that this provision does not confer a federal right. See Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F.Supp.2d 540, 543 (S.D.N.Y.1998); see also DaJour B. v. City of New York, 2001 WL 830674, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251 (S.D.N.Y.2001).
[13] Defendants have failed to rebut the resulting presumption that these rights are enforceable under § 1983 by offering evidence that Congress has explicitly foreclosed a § 1983 remedy in this instance or has established a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant the § 1983 remedy, see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353. In particular, the Court notes that the availability of a State "fair hearing" does not deprive plaintiffs of a § 1983 remedy. See Wright v. City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418, 428, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) ("the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to § 1983").
[14] "The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances, but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (internal citations omitted); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S., 622, 647 n. 30, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 ("By including municipalities with the class of `persons' subject to liability for violation of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress0907the supreme sovereign on matters of federal law0907 abolished whatever vestige of the State's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed.") Id. at 647-648, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (footnote omitted).
[15] While it is not clear whether there is a similar requirement under state law, cf. Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 194, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (1996), the Court need not decide this issue at this juncture, since it finds that, at most, the state requirement would not exceed the federal requirement, which here is amply met.
[16] At the evidentiary hearing, the Court invited the defendants to introduce evidence, if there were any, that the number of such cases was small, Tr. 467:10-44; but they chose not to do so, leading to the clear inference that there is a significant number of such cases.

[17] Although the City Defendant argues that she is without authority to rectify the erroneous policy directives and bulletins without approval of OTDA, see Tr. 728:7-10, there remains, even setting aside the flawed directives and bulletins, ample evidence of a custom and practice sufficient to give rise to municipal liability under § 1983.
[18] As a result, the Court concludes that hearsay statements of City Defendant's employees are admissible against the State Defendants pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(D), Fed.R.Evid. That Rule provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship." In order to introduce evidence of an out-of-court statement as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a party must lay a sufficient foundation by establishing "(1) the existence of the agency relationship, (2) that the statement was made during the course of the relationship, and (3) that it relates to a matter within the scope of the agency." Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir.1992). All these requirements have been met here.
[19] For similar reasons, the Court hereby denies the State Defendants' motion to vacate the Court's previous injunction in this case.
[20] It may also be noted that contrary to a fear sometimes voiced by the State Defendants, none of these items is the equivalent of an order requiring the State Defendants to comply with requirements of State law.
[21] Given the overall commonality of issues, the Court sees no need at this time to certify sub-classes, but will reconsider this possibility if the need arises later in this litigation.
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 M.K.B. v. Eggleston, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

2006 WL 453215 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise
Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others
similar situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration;
Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Defendants.
No. 05 Civ. 10446(JSR). | Feb. 24, 2006.
Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

RAKOFF, J.
*1 By Memorandum Order dated February 15, 2006, the Court denied the motion of defendant Verna Eggleston (the “City Defendant”), joined, in certain respects, by defendants Doar and Novello, to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as various paralegal assistants and interns in plaintiffs’ counsel’s firms, and to prohibit Reena Ganju, Esq., who represented some of plaintiffs in prior, related actions, from testifying in this action. City Defendant now moves for reconsideration, arguing that the Court’s Memorandum Order cited to a prior version of Disciplinary Rule 5-102 (the New York “advocate-witness” rule), see Memorandum Order at 2-3,1 since replaced by the version codified at 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.21 (2006).2

1

The version cited by the Court provides,

(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated

or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious

that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a

witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from

the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not

continue representation in the trial....

(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated

or pending litigation, a lawyer learns that or it is

obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as

a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may

continue the representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.

2

The current version of the rule in New York provides,

(a) A lawyer shall not act, or accept employment that

contemplates the lawyer’s acting, as an advocate on

issues of fact before any tribunal if the lawyer knows or

it is obvious that the lawyer ought to be called as a

witness on a significant issue on behalf of the client,

except that the lawyer may act as an advocate and also

testify:

(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested

issue.

(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of

formality and there is no reason to believe that

substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the

testimony.

(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and

value of legal services rendered in the case by the

lawyer or the lawyer’s firm to the client.

(4) As to any matter, if disqualification as an advocate

would work a substantial hardship on the client because

of the distinctive value of the lawyer as a counsel in the

particular case.

(b) Neither a lawyer nor the lawyer’s firm shall accept

employment in contemplated or pending litigation if the

lawyer knows or it is obvious that the lawyer or another

lawyer in the lawyer’s firm may be called as a witness

on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client,

and it is apparent that the testimony would or might be

prejudicial to the client.

(c) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or

pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that

the lawyer ought to be called as a witness on a

significant issue on behalf of the client, the lawyer shall

not serve as an advocate on issues of fact before the

tribunal, except that the lawyer may continue as an

advocate on issues of fact and may testify in the

circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (a)(1) through

(4) of this section.

(d) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or

pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that

the lawyer or a lawyer in his or her firm may be called

as a witness on a significant issue other than on behalf

of the client, the lawyer may continue the

representation until it is apparent that the testimony is

or may be prejudicial to the client at which point the

lawyer and the firm must withdraw from acting as an

advocate before the tribunal.

The Court is grateful to counsel for alerting the Court to this oversight (which the Court has now corrected through an Erratum issued today), but the differences between the two versions, insofar as City Defendant’s motion to disqualify is concerned, are immaterial. Indeed, in every respect here relevant, the current version relaxes the restraints on advocates serving as witnesses. Specifically, the current version only prohibits a lawyer who is
1

M.K.B. v. Eggleston, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)
testifying on the lawyer’s client’s behalf from serving as an “advocate on issues of fact,” id. § 1200.21(a) & (c) (emphasis added), and only when the lawyer will be called as a witness “on a significant issue,” id. § 1200.21(a)-(d) (emphasis added). Moreover, the current version enumerates several exceptions to the general prohibition on the testimony of advocates on their client’s behalf, see 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.21(a)(1)-(4), one of which allows a lawyer to act as an advocate and testify “as to any matter, if disqualification as an advocate would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer as a counsel in the particular case,” id. § 1200.21(a)(4).
Accordingly, there is no reason for the Court to revisit its ruling of February 15. City Defendant argues again that Ms. Ganju should be disqualified from testifying because, while employed as a lawyer at Sanctuary for Families, she represented named plaintiffs before the New York City Human Resources Administration and at their Fair Hearing tribunals. But it remains the case that the current

version of Disciplinary Rule 5-102 is inapplicable to Ms. Ganju, who has not, and will not, advocate on plaintiffs’ behalf in this matter; nor does her testifying here implicate any of the considerations underlying the advocate-witness rule, see Ramey v. Dist. 141 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 282 (2d Cir.2004). Since it is further clear to the Court that neither party will be prejudiced by Ms. Ganju’s testimony, the Court abides by its earlier ruling refusing to disqualify Ms. Ganju from testifying. Therefore, for the reasons articulated in the Court’s prior Memorandum Order, there is no reason to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel or paralegal assistants and interns in plaintiffs’ counsel’s firms.
*2 Accordingly, City Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
	  

2

 
 M.K.B. v. Eggleston
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York November 7, 2006, Decided ; November 7, 2006, Filed 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR)

Reporter: 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81704; 2006 WL 3230162 M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., MARIEME DIONGUE, M.E., P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, J.Z. and GALINA RYBALKO, on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similar situated, Plaintiffs, -v- VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Defendants.
Subsequent History: Later proceeding at M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 3, 2012)

For Verna Eggleston as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Defendant: Jane Tobey Momo, New York City Law Depart. Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York, NY; Jesse Ira Levine, New York City Law Department, New York, NY.
For Robert Doar as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Antonia C. Novello as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Defendants: Robert Lewis Kraft, Office of the Attorney General, New York State, New York, NY; Ivan B. Rubin, Office of the NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, New York, NY.

Prior History: M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61347 (S.D.N.Y., 2006)
Counsel: [*1] For M.K.B. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, O.P. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, L.W. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, M.A. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Marieme Diongue on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, M.E. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, P.E. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Anna Fedosenko on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, A.I. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, L.A.M. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, L.M. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Denise Thomas on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others [*2] similarly situated, J.Z. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs: Caroline Jane Hickey, Jane Greengold Stevens, Yisroel Schulman, New York Legal Assistance Group, New York, NY; Elizabeth Sykes Saylor, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP, New York, NY; Jennifer Baum, Legal Aid Society, New York, NY;Ronald Abramson, Russell Winston Jacobs, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, New York, NY; Scott Alan Rosenberg, Steven R. Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY.

Judges: JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
Opinion by: JED S. RAKOFF
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
[*3] JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
By Order dated October 13, 2006, this Court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Opinion and Order entered August 29, 2006, M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), full familiarity with which is here assumed. This Memorandum states the reasons for that denial.
A motion for reconsideration is neither an opportunity to advance new facts or arguments nor to reiterate arguments that were previously rejected. See Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Wholesale Liquidators, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19246 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Rather, the sole function of a proper motion for reconsideration is to call to the Court's attention dispositive facts or controlling authority that were plainly presented in the prior proceedings but were somehow overlooked in the Court's decision: in other words, an obvious and glaring mistake. See Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 624 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see alsoLocal Rule 6.3. On this ground alone, the instant motion for reconsideration must be denied, for the defendants have raised nothing that was not

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81704, *3

Page 2 of 2

previously considered, and [*4] rejected, by the Court, either Declaration of Polina Benyiminov, dated Aug. 25, 2005, P6;

explicitly or implicitly.

Declaration of R.R., dated Sept. 29, 2005, P 12; Declaration

Most of the arguments defendants advance in the instant motion are directed to this Court's decision to certify a class that includes all lawful permanent residents ("LPRs") who have held that status for less than five years and who have been illegally denied benefits. Defendants contend, first, that one of the two named representatives of that class, Galina Rybalko, is an inadequate representative, and her personal claims moot, because the defendants have now, belatedly, rectified the error that led to the denial of her benefits. But it

of W.S., dated Nov. 22, 2005, PP [*6] 14-15; Declaration of Anna Fedosekno, dated Nov. 21, 2005, P 8. Despite the different paths that led them to LPR status, all class members were victims of a "unitary course of conduct by a single system," thereby satisfying the commonality, typicality and other relevant requirements of Rule 23. See, e.g., Marisol A. by Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598 (2d Cir. 1986).

is settled law of this Circuit that "the fact that the [named] [*7] Separately, the defendants challenge the inclusion in the

plaintiffs received their unlawfully delayed benefits after the certified class of so-called "PROCUL" aliens, i.e., aliens

lawsuit was commenced [does] not mean that the action living in the United States with the knowledge and permission

thereby became moot." See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, or acquiescence of authorities. But their objection raised in

938 (2d Cir. 1993); see also County of Riverside v. the instant motion - to the effect that because PRUCOL aliens

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51-52, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. are entitled to benefits under state law, but no longer under

2d 49 (1991). Moreover, even if, under these circumstances, federal law, the Eleventh Amendment bars including

Rybalko did not wish to continue as class representative - and PRUCOL aliens in the certified class - is one the Court

there is no indication of this - co-plaintiff Anna Fedosekno previously rejected explicitly. Specifically, the Court held

remains an adequate representative of this class. that, since the relief it was ordering (and contemplating) with

Finally, [*5] even if both named representatives were not respect to the PRUCOL class was limited to the City

adequate for that purpose, the remedy would be to appoint defendant, the Eleventh Amendment was irrelevant. See

another member of the class as class representative. See M.K.B., 445 F. Supp. 2d at 439; id. at 440 n.20; see also Mt.

Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 799-801 (2d Cir. 1994); see Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. 280, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471(1977) ("The bar of the

Ed. 2d 54 (1975). There is not the slightest suggestion that Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to

such an additional representative could not be found.

States and state officials in appropriate circumstances, but

In the alternative, the defendants contend that the LPR class certified by the Court was "overbroad" in that it should have been divided into four subclasses. 1 But the alleged

does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations."); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1979).

distinctions between the four subclasses posited by defendants The Court also considered defendants' other [*8] arguments,

are irrelevant to this lawsuit, for the wrong of which the LPR but found them wholly lacking in merit, and, accordingly, by

class complains - i.e., that "the City had a policy, custom, and Order dated October 13, 2006, denied the motion for

usage of denying benefits to . . . lawful permanent residents reconsideration.

who had been in that status for less than five years," M.K.B., 445 F. Supp. 2d at 434 - was and is common to all four JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

alleged subclasses. See, e.g., Declaration of K.T., dated Oct.

12, 2005, PP 3, 5;

Dated: New York, New York

November 7, 2006

1 According to defendants, the four appropriate "categories" are: (1) aliens who entered the United States in LPR status and those who obtained LPR status after being in a non-qualified alien status; (2) aliens who entered the United States in a qualified alien status and changed to LPR status thereafter; (3) aliens who entered the country in what is known as a "specially qualified" status, a term used to include refugees, persons granted asylum, persons granted withholding of deportation, Cuban or Haitian entrants, Amerasians and certain veterans who lawfully reside in the United States; and (4) aliens under eighteen years of age who are eligible for food stamps, aliens who receive certain disability payments, and aliens who can be credited with forty qualifying quarters of coverage as defined under Title II of the Social Security Act. Def's. Br. at 4-7.

 
 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
··················-··········-··········---···-------····----·-·····X
M.K.B. O.P., L.W., M.A. MARIEME DlONGUE, M.E. P.E., Al\TNA FEDOSENKO, A .I., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE THOMAS, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,

05 Civ !0446 (JSR)

Plaintiffs,
-against-
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City !-Iuman Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Ofl1ce of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONIA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health

STIPULATION AND ORDER

·-::::==:::::::;:.-=·=·==. .. ,._. .,__. ._. ,. .-----. -

..,_ _ _ _ _.... _ ........~....- ......., . -... !

US'DC&DNY

DJ0(.'1J~1E~T

II:

Defendants.
-----·--·-----------------------------------------·-······-··-·-----····---X

STIPULATION AND ORDER EXTENDING TERM OF PRIOR STIPUlATION OF SETTI~EMENT

WHEREAS, plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and

others similarly situated, by complaint filed December 13, 2005, against Verna Eggleston, as

Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA") (the "City

defendanC'), Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office ofTemporary and

Disability Assistance ("OTDA") and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York

State Department of Health ("SDOH") (collectively "State defendants"); and

WHEREAS, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a Stipulation and Order of

Settlement (the ·'Settlement") for the purpose of settling the disputes between them and to avoid

further litigation, and without admitting any fault or liability; and

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 2 of 7
\VHEREAS, the Court detennined that the Stipulation of Settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate by order filed on June 6, 2007; and
WHEREAS, Judgment based on the provisions set forth in the Settlement was entered on July 16. 2007; and
WHEREAS, by its original terms, the Settlement was set to expire on August 15, 2011 absent an extension; and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs filed a motion on June 23, 2011, pursuant to paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Settlement, seeking an order extending the terms of the Settlement against the City defendant and State defendants for an additional period or periods of time to be determined by the Court; and
WHEREAS, the City defendant and plaintiffs agreed to alia, extend the term of the Settlement until February 15, 2013 pursuant to a Stipulation and Order (the "First City Stipulation") so ordered by the Court on July 28, 20 I I; and
\VHEREAS, the Court ordered the Settlement extended against the State defendants on September 30, 20 II; and
\VHEREAS, the plaintiffs, City defendant and State defendants agreed to extend the term of the Settlement until August 15, 2013 pursuant to a Stipulation and Order (the "Second Extension Stipulation") so ordered by the Court on January 3, 201 3; and
\\'1lEREAS, plaintiffs, City defendant and State defendants are entering into the within Stipulation solely for the purpose of further extending the term of the Settlement without admitting any i'ault or liability;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs and defendants:

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 3 of 7
I. The term ofthe Settlement is hereby extended to August 15,2014. 2. All terms of the Settlement and the Fio·st City Stipulation remain in full force and effect until August 15, 2014, except that City and State defendants will provide the monitoring described in paragraphs 54 through 63 of the Settlement for two additional cycles. for the period February 16, 2013 - August 15, 2013 ("6B") and August 16, 2013 through February 15, 20 I4 ("7 A"), with the monitoring report for cycle 7A due by May 15, 2014. 3. Plaintiffs' right to seek fees for any work done during the period August 16,2013 through August !5, 2014 payable by the State defendants is limited to reasonable fees totaling no more than $50,000. Plaintiffs' counsel agrees that they will confer with counsel for the State defendants regarding their fees, and that they wll! provide all necessary documentation to counsel for the State defendants, including but not limited to plaintiffs' counsel's billing records. Payment by State defendants pursuantto this paragraph is subject to the approval of all appropriate New York State officials, in accordance with New York Public Officers Law§ 17. In the event sud1 approval is denied, counsel for State defendants shall notify plaintiffs' counsel within five business days of the disapproval. In the event of such disapproval, plaintiffs shall have ninety days from such notice within which to make a motion seeking reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements from the State defendants. In the event plaintiffs make such a motion, the limitation, or cap, on fees described herein shall no longer apply. 4. PlaintiffS' right to seek fees for any work done during the period August 16, 2013 through August 15, 2014 payable by the City defendant is limited to reasonable fees totaling no more than $100,000.00. Plaintiffs' counsel agrees that they will confer with counsel for the City defendant regarding their fees, and that they will provide all necessary documentation to counsel for the City defendant, including but not limited to plaintiffs' counsel's

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 4 of 7
billing records. Payment of any fees by the City defendant is subject to the approval of all appropriate New York City officials. In the event such approval is denied, counsel for the City defendant shall notifY plaintiffs' counsel within five business days of the disapprovaL In the event of such disapproval, plaintiffs shall have ninety days from such notice within which to make a motion seeking reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements from the City defendant. In the event plaintiffs make such a motion, the limitation, or cap, on fees described herein shall no longer apply.
5. Nothing contained in this Stipulation ~xtending the term of the Settlement shall be deemed to be, or be used as evidence of, in this or any other proceeding, an admission by the City or State defendants of systemic non-compliance with the terms of the Settlement, noncompliance with the First City Stipulation, or an admission of any liability or wrongdoing.

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 5 of 7

6. This Stipulation may be executed in one or more counterparts, All

executed counterpa1is shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, counsel for the City defe.ndant, the State defendants,

and plaintiffs, have executed this stipulation on June 27,2013

Dated:

New York, 1\ew York June27,20l3

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO Corporation Counsel for the City of New York Attorney for Defendant City ofNew York I00 Church Street, Room 2- I 89
New York, N.Y. 10007 (212) 788-0889

J. Rauchberg Assistant Corporation Counsel arauchbe@la'A'. nyc.gov
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attomey for State Defendants 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271 (212) 416-8632
By: ·---·---··-·-··-ROBERT L. KRAFT Assistant Attorney General robert.kraft@ag.ny .gov

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 6 of 7

6. This Stipulation may be executed in one or more counterparts. All

executed counterparts shall be deemed 1o be one and the same instrument.

IN WiTNESS VIHEREOF, the Wldersigned. coooset for the City defendant, the State defendants,

and ptaintiffs, have executed this stipulation on June 27, 20!3

Dated:

New York. New York June 27, 2013

MICHAEL A CARDOZO Corporation Counsel for the City of New York Attorney fm Defendant City ofNew York 100 Church Street, Room 2-1 89 New York, N.Y. 10007 (212) 788·0889

fidrcw J. Rauchberg / Assistant Corporation Counsel
arauchbe@law.nyc.gov
ERIC T. SCHNEIDE~AN Attorney General ofthe State ofNew York Attorney for State Defendants 120 Broadway, 24th Floor ~ew York. New York 10271 (212) 416-8632

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 214 Filed 07/03/13 Page 7 of 7

THE LEGAL JJD SOCIETY Steven Banks, Attorney-in-Chief
Adriene Holder, Attorney-in-Charge Civil Practice Judith Goldiner, Attorney-in-Charge Civil Practice Law Reform Unit
Susan Welber, of Counsel 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 1003 8 Phone: 212-577-3300 .!Goldiner@lega/-aid. org SETVelber@legal-aid.org
Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (YSJ 107) NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP Jane G. Stevens, of Counsel 450 West 33rd Street, ll th Floor New York, NY 10001 Phone:(212)613-5000 yschulman@nylag.org jstevens@nylag. org
HUGHES HU!JBARD & REED LLP Ronald Abramson One Battery Park Piaza New York, N.Y. 10004 1482 Phone: (212} 837 6000 abramson ~~ gheshubbard.com

So ordered:

Dated:

~Ne-w-Y-o-rk=, ~N

f;

ork
'2013

6

 
 Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 1 of 13

. ;

UNfTED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------x
M.K.B. O.P., L.W., M.A. MARIEME DlONGUE, M.E. P.E., ANNA FEDOSENKO, A.l., L.A.M., L.M., DENISE
THOMAS, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
VERNA EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; ROBERT DOAR, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and ANTONlA C. NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

05 Civ ! 0446 (JSR)
STIPULATION AND ORDER

WHEREAS, by complaint filed December 13, 2005, plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit

("the Action") on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against STEVEN BANKS,

s/h/a Verna Eggleston, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources

Administration ("City defendant"); KRISTIN M. PROUD, s/hJa, Robert Doar, as Commissioner

of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and HOWARD A.

ZUCKER, M.D., s/h/a Antonia C. Novello, as Acting Commissioner of the New York State

Department

of Health

(collectively,

"State

de

f

endant

s"

)

1 ;

and

1 All defendants are public officers who have been automatically substituted as parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 25(d)( I) for claims originally brought against their predecessors in public office.

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 2 of 13
WHEREAS, by Order dated August 29, 2006, the Court certified this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and appointed plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel ("Class Counsel") (Docket #150); and
WHEREAS, plaintiff class and defendants entered into a Stipulation and Order of Settlement ("Settlement") for the purpose of settling the disputes between them and to avoid further litigation, and without admitting any fault or liability (Docket #172); and
WHEREAS, by order filed on June 6, 2007 the Court detennined that the Settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate (Docket #171 ); and
WHEREAS, by Stipulation so ordered July 12, 2007, plaintiffs and defendants settled plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees, costs and disbursements incurred from the beginning of time through the duration of the Court's retention ofjurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the Settlement, provided however, that the plaintiff class reserved claim(s) for attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements which may be accrued or incurred in connection with a motion as against City defendant and/or State defendants seeking an order extending the term of the Settlement based upon defendants' alleged non-compliance with its provisions or a motion as against defendants seeking an order for enforcement of and/or any and all remedies for failure to comply with the provisions of the Settlement (Docket #175); and
WHEREAS, the Settlement would have expired on August 15, 20 l l absent an extension; and
WHEREAS, on June 23, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order extending the tenn of the Settlement against defendants (Docket #179) (the "Extension Motion"); and
2

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 3 of 13
WHEREAS, by Stipulation and Order so ordered by the Court on July 28, 2011, plaintiffs and City defendant agreed to, inter alia, extend the tenn of the Settlement until February 15. 2013 (Docket# 197) (the "First Extension Stipulation"); and
WHEREAS, on September 29, 2011, the Court ordered the tenn of the Settlement extended until February 15, 2013 against State defendants (Docket #203); and
WHEREAS, State defendants appealed the Court's September 29, 2011, Order (Docket #208), and such appeal was withdrawn pursuant to a so ordered stipulation filed on June 11, 2012 (Docket #212) (the "State Appeal"); and
WHEREAS, by Stipulation and Order so ordered by the Court on January 3, 2013 (the "Second Extension Stipulation"), plaintiffs and defendants agreed to extend the term of the Settlement until August 15, 2013, and further agreed thal plaintiffs' claims for attorney's fees, costs and disbursements accrued during said extended period would be limited to no more than the amounts named in the Second Extension Stipulation (Docket #213); and
WHEREAS, by Stipulation and Order so ordered by the Court on Jtme 29, 2013 (the
"Third Extension Stipulation"), plaintiffs and defendants agreed to extend the tenn of the Settlement until August 15, 2014, and further agreed that plaintiffs' claims for attorney's fees, costs and disbursements accrued during said extended period would be limited to no more than amounts named in the Third Extension Stipulation (Docket #214); and
WHEREAS, the parties now seek to resolve plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses without further litigation on tenns just and fair to all parties and hereby enter into this Stipulation and Order (the "Fee Stipulation");
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants:
J

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 4 of 13
PART I: CITY FEE PAYMENT
I. The City of New York shall pay the sum of two hundred seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($217,500.00} ("City Fee Payment"), to class counsel as set forth in paragraph
;.2'' herein, and the plaintiff class hereby agrees to accept said payment in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses, arising from, or in connection with this action for the time period through and including September 30, 2011.
2. Payment of the City Fee Payment shall be made by checks made payable to the following entities in the following amounts, and shall be mailed to the addresses shown below:
The Legal Aid Society $217,500.00 Susan Welber, Esq. The Legal Aid Society 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 10038
3. City defendant will issue the City Fee Payment within ninety days from the date this Fee Stipulation is "so ordered" by the Court, or within 90 days of Plaintiffs delivery of the documents described in paragraph "4" below, whichever is later, with post-judgment interest accming if payment is issued after that date.
4. Plaintiffs shall promptly execute and deliver to City defendants' attorneys the
documents and information reasonably necessary to effectuate the City Fee Payment, which includes any requisite payment vouchers.
5. In consideration of the payment of the City Fee Payment, the plaintiffs individually and on behalf of each member of the plaintiff class, and on behalf of the respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and ~signs of each of themselves and each of the members of the plaintiff class hereby jointly and severally release
4

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 5 of 13

and forever discharge the City Defendant and the City ofNew York, including without limitation

its past and present officials, employees, departments, agencies, representalives, directors and

agents, their successors and assigns and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal

representatives, and transferees and each of them from any and all claims for attorneys' fees.

costs. disbursements, and expenses arising from or in connection with the above-captioned action

through September 30, 2011, and this Fee Stipulation shall be deemed a release to that effect.

PART II: STATE FEE PAYMENT

6. The State of New York, on behalf of the State defendants, shall pay to Class

Counsel the sum of one hundred forty seven thousand, five hundred dollars ($147,500.00)

("State Fee Payment"), for which an I.RS. Form 1099(s) shall be issued, in full satisfaction of:

(i) any and alI claims, allegations, or causes of action for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements,

and expenses in, arising from, or in connection with the Action incurred by the plaintiff class for

any and all legal counsel who have at any time represented the plaintiff class in this action for the

period July 13, 2007, to September 30, 201 l; and (ii) any and all claims, allegations, or causes of

action for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses in, arising from, or in connection

with the Extension Motion and State Appeal incurred by the plaintiff class for any and all legal

counsel who have at any time represented the plaintiff class in the Extension Motion and State

Appeal.

7.

Payment of the State Fee Payment shall be made by a single check, made payable

to "The Legal Aid Society," and shall be mailed to "The Legal Aid Society c/o Susan Welber,

Esq., 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor, New York, New York 10038."

8. Payment of the State Fee Payment is subject to the approval of all appropriate

New York State officials in accordance with New York Public Officers Law§ 17. Jn the event

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 6 of 13
such approval is denied, counsel for State defendants shall so notify Class Cowisel. ln the event of such disapproval, Part II of this Fee Stipulation shall be null, void, and of no further force and effect, and plaintiffs shall have 90 days from such notice within which to make a motion seeking from the State defendants fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses.
9. The plaintiff class and Class Counsel agree to execute and deliver all necessary and appropriate vouchers and other documentation requested with respect to obtaining such approval and effectuating payment.
10. In the event that the State Fee Payment has not been made by the one hundred twentieth (120th) day after receipt by the Office of the Attorney General of a "So Ordered" copy of this Stipulation, entered into the record by the Clerk of the Court, together with all other documentation required under Paragraph 8 of this Stipulation, interest on any part of the State Fee Payment not paid by the one hundred twentieth (120th) day shall accrue at the statutory rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, commencing on the one hundred twenty-first (12lst) day.
11. The plaintiff class and Class Counsel agree that any taxes on the payments, and/or any interest or penalties on the taxes on the payments, made pursuant to Part II ofthis Stipulation shall be their sole and complete responsibility. The plaintiff class and Class Counsel shall have no claim, right, or cause of action against State defendants, the State of New York (including, but not limited to, any and all agencies, departments, and subdivisions thereot), or any of their officials, employees, or agents, whether in their individual or official capacities, on account of such taxes, interest, or penalties, and agree that they will defend, indemnify and hold harmless State defendants, the State of New York (including, but not limited to, any and all agencies, departments, and subdivisions thereof), and any of their officials, employees, or agents, whether
6

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 7 of 13
in their individual or official capacities, for the satisfaction of any such taxes, interest, or
penalties.
12. The plaintiff class and Class Counsel agree that neither State defendants, the State of New York (including, but not limited to, any and all agencies, departments, and subdivisions thereot), nor any of their officials, employees, or agents, whether in their individual or official capacities, shall be responsible for any liens of any kind (including, but not limited to, any and all workers' compensation, tax, or child support liens) which may attach to the State Fee Payment made pursuant to Part II of this Stipulation. The plaintiff class and Class Counsel shall have no claim, right, or cause of action against State defendants, the State of New York (including, but not limited to, any and all agencies, departments, and subdivisions thereof), or any of their officials, employees, or agents, whether in their individual or official capacities, on
account of such liens, and agree that they will defend, indemnify, and hold harmless State defendant, the State of New York (including, but not limited to, any and all agencies,
departments, and subdivisions thereot), and any of their officials, employees, or agents, whether in their individual or official capacities, for the satisfaction of any such liens.
13. fn consideration of the payment of the State Fee Payment, the plaintiffs individually and on behalf of each member of the plaintiff class, and on behalfof the respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of each of themselves and each of the members of the class hereby jointly and severally release and forever discharge the State defendants, the State of New York (including, but not limited to, any and all agencies, departments, and subdivisions thereof), and all of their present and former principals, officers, directors, members, trustees, shareholders, affiliates, employees, agents, attorneys, insurers, subdivisions, subsidiaries, heirs, administrators, and assigns, whether in their individual
7

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 8 of 13
or official capacities, from any and all claims, allegations, or causes of action: (i) any and all
claims, allegations, or causes of action for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses in, arising from, or in connection with the Action incurred by the plaintiff class for any and all legal
counsel who have at any time represented the plaintiff class in this action for the period July 13, 2007, to September 30, 2011; and (ii) any and all claims, allegations, or causes of action for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses in, arising from, or in connection with the Extension Motion and State Appeal incurred by the plaintiff class for any and al! legal counsel
who have at any time represented the plaintiff class in the Extension Motion and State Appeal.,
and this Stipulation shall be deemed a release to that effect with the plaintiff class reserving the right to seek attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses for work done between September 30, 2011, through August 15, 2014, apart from work done on the extension motion and the State Appeal, subject to the caps applicable to the period February 16, 2013 through August 15, 2014 as set forth in the Second Extension Stipulation and the Third Extension Stipulation.
PART Ill: GENERAL PROVISIONS 14. Nothing contained in this Stipulation shall be deemed to be an agreement or an admission by any defendant as to the reasonableness of the number of hours spent or the particular hourly rates claimed by class counsel, or that the original fees stipulation (Docket # l 75) entitles the Plaintiff class to payment for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses for each category of work or task included in counsel's time slips submitted in connection with the application resolved by this Stipulation, or that the Plaintiff Class will be entitled to any attorney's fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses in connection with the Action in the future other than as provided in Paragraphs S and 13 of this Fee Stipulation, and

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 9 of 13
defendants do not waive any defenses to any future application by the Plaintiff Class for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses, and the limitations set forth in the Second and Third Extension Stipulations (docket #s 213 and 214) shall apply to any such application made for fees and expenses covered thereby.
15. This Fee Stipulation shall not be admissible in, nor is it related to, any other litigation or settlement negotiations outside of the above-captioned action and shall not be construed to be, an admission of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to be an admission by City defendant or the City of New York, or State defendants or the State of New York, of liability or of the truth of any of the allegations set forth in the complaint, or that they have in any manner or way violated plaintiffs' rights, or the rights of any other person or entity, as defined in the constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations of the United States, the State of New York, the City of New York, or any other rules, regulations or bylaws of any department or subdivision of the City of New York or of the State of New York.
16. This Fee Stipulation contains all the tenns and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto, and no oral agreement entered into at any time nor any written agreement entered into prior to the execution of this Fee Stipulation regarding the subject matter of this agreement shall be deemed to exist, or to bind the parties hereto, or to vary the tenns and conditions contained herein.
17. The Parties acknowledge that this Fee Stipulation has been fully negotiated by all Parties and the Parties agree that for purposes of constmction no party is deemed to be the drafter thereof.
9

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 10 of 13

18. If any date or period of time described in this Fee Stipulation falls or ends on a

public holiday or on a weekend, the date or period of time shall he extended to the next business

day.

19. Each of the undersigned represents that he or she has authority to enter into this

Fee Stipulation.

20. Facsimile signatures are acceptable for execution and filing of this Fee

Stipulation, and this Stipulation may be executed in one or more counterparts. All executed

counterparts shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument.

Dated:

N~·w Ynrk, New York ,.,.,. JH.h-J*,-2· 0J4

ZACHARY W. CARTER Corporation Counsel for the City of New York Attorney for City defendant
100 Church Street, Room 2-189 New York, N.Y. 10007 (212) 356-0891

By:
Andr~·w J. Rauchberg 1\ssistant Corporation Counsel arauchbe@law.nyc.gov
ERJC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York Attorney for State Defendants
Dy: Ro!Brt L. kraf+ (Py W1iholl) t+ .Bnstw
ROBERT L. KRAFT Assistant Attorney General 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, New York 10271
10

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 11 of 13
Tel. (212) 416-8632
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Seymour W. James Jr., Attorney-in-Chief
Adriene Holder, Attorney-in-Charge Civil Practice Judith Goldiner, Attorney-in-Charge Civil Practice Law Reform Unit Susan Welber, of Counsel 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor New York, New York 10038 Phone:212-577-3300
By: Susan Welber SEWelber@legal-aid.org
Yisroel Schulman, Executive Director (YS3 107)
NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
Jane Greengold Stevens, of Counsel 7 Hanover Square, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 Phone: (212) 613-5000
/
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP
Vilia B. Hayes One Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004 1482 Phone: (212) 837 6000
By: __.__ --- · - Vilia B. Hayes hayes@hugheshubbard.com
It

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 12 of 13
Td. (212) 4 l6-8632
THE LEGAL AlD SOCIETY
Seymour W. fames Jr., Attorney-in-Chic!"
Adriene Uokler, Allorney-in-Cbarge Civil Practice Judith Uoldiner, Attorncy-in-Chnrge Civil Practice Law Reform Unit
Susan Welbcr, of Counsel 199 Water Street, 3rd Floor
New York. New York I 0038 Phone: 212-577-3300
By: Susan \Vclbcr
SEIVelh!!rfliJ./egal-aid org
Yisroel Schulman, Exect1tive Director (YS3107) Nl~W YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
Jane Clreengold Stevens, of Counsel 7 l Ianovcr Square. I81h Floor
New York, NY I0004 Phone: {212) 613-5000
By: _ _ _ _ _~-----Jane Greengold Stevens jsreve11sfri}nylag org llUGJIES HUBBARD & REED LLP Vilia B. I !ayes One 83ttery Park Plaza New York. N.Y. 10004 1482 Phone: (2 l 2) 83 7 6000
f:.r·~~-·· By:_/://!i(L;uJ_L _·L..1 -. ,U
Vilia B. Hayes !wyes(lilh11~hesh11hbc1rd. com
II

Case 1:05-cv-10446-JSR Document 216 Filed 08/08/14 Page 13 of 13

:\tlorneys for lhc plaintil'!s

so ordcn:d:

~J./~JiA.~R.£,(,~/~

71 Da1ed:
New Yorkf'

York IJ

- - - -~ --~··

~-

.

, 20\~l.

12

 
 2006 WL 1793014 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cite as: 2006 WL 1793014)

Page 1

For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. No. 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR) (FM). May 5, 2006.
State Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Vacate the Court's February 16, 2006 Order as to Them, and in Further Opposition to Plaintiffs' Applic-
ation for a Preliminary Injunction Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Attorney for State Defendants, 120 Broadway -- 24th Floor, New York, New York 10271, (212) 416-6046.Ivan B. Rubin, Vincent Leong, Robert Kraft, Assistant Attorneys General, of Counsel.
Table of Contents
Table of Authorities ... ii
Preliminary Statement ... 1
POINT I - STATE DEFENDANTS HAVE COMPLETELY FULFILLED THEIR PROMISES INCORPORATED BY THE COURT IN ITS FEBRUARY 16, 2006 ORDER; THE ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED AS MOOT ... 3
POINT II - THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT STATE DEFENDANTS' CURRENT SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS WILL CAUSE THE CITY DEFENDANT TO SYSTEMATICALLY DEPRIVE ELIGIBLE IMMIGRANTS OF BENEFITS IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL FOOD STAMP OR MEDICAID ACT, LET ALONE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOUGHT-AFTER INJUNCTION AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE CITY DEFENDANT FROM SYSTEMATICALLY DEPRIVING ELIGIBLE IMMIGRANTS OF FEDERAL FOOD STAMPS OR MEDICAID ... 7
CONCLUSION ... 15
Table of Authorities
Cases
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), reh. denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984) ... 8
Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2004) ... 10, 11,
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

2006 WL 1793014 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cite as: 2006 WL 1793014)

Page 2

12 Barris/Fraser Enterprises v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 638 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Weinfeld, J.) ... 13 Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) ... 10 Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667 (1st Cir. 1999) ... 9, 13, 15 City of New York v. Nexicon, Inc., 2006 WL 647716 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2006) ... 4 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ... 4 Haley v. Pataki, 60 F.3d 137 (2nd Cir. 1995) ... 4 Intimate Bookshop, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2003 WL 22251313 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) ... 9 Iwachin v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, 299 F.Supp.2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) aff'd 396 F.3d 525 (2nd Cir. 2005) ... 12 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) ... 7, 9, 10 Lamar Advertising of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 4, 6 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) ... 9 Lillbask v. State of Connecticut Department of Education, 397 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 2005) ... 4 Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 2005) ... 12 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) ... 8 Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367 (2nd Cir. 1996) ... 9 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, n. 20 (1976) ... 9 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) 8 Federal Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... 7, 8, 10, 12 Article III of the Constitution ... 8 Preliminary Statement The plaintiffs brought this action on December 12, 2005 seeking a broad spectrum of

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

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prospective relief with respect to the determinations of eligibility of aliens for cash assistance, food stamps and Medicaid benefits at Job Centers operated by the New York City's (NYC) Human Resources Administration (HRA) (or City defendant). Plaintiffs sued the Commissioners of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA) and the New York State Department of Health (DOH), claiming that they failed adequately to supervise the City defendant's staff agencies, in administering the federal Food Stamp and Medical program in violation of plaintiffs' federal rights.
The City and State Defendants had filed opposition to plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and class certification of this action as a class action, plaintiffs filed reply papers and oral argument was held before this Court on February 2, 2006. In response to a direction by this Court, all defendants, by letter of February 8, 2006, promised this Court that they voluntarily would take specific actions to ameliorate or eliminate problems with respect to the eligibility determinations which the plaintiffs identified at the February 2, 2006 argument. The Court memorialized the defendants' promises in an Order of February 16, 2006. As set forth more completely below, and in the accompanying State Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact (FOF), the State Defendants fulfilled the voluntary promises made, mooting the Court's February 16, 2006 Order as to them.
Expedited discovery was then taken by the parties and an evidentiary hearing was conducted by this Court from March 14, 2006 through March 24, 2006.
In accord with the schedule set by the Court, State Defendants herewith submit this supplemental memorandum of law, their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and affidavits detailing additional voluntary measures they have undertaken with respect to alleged problems which arise in eligibility determinations.
POINT I
STATE DEFENDANTS HAVE COMPLETELY FULFILLED THEIR PROMISES INCORPORATED BY THE COURT IN ITS FEBRUARY 16, 2006 ORDER; THE ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED AS MOOT.
In its February 16, 2006 Order, this Court directed OTDA to complete four actions which OTDA had voluntarily promised to do by various dates certain in its February 8, 2006 letter to the Court. These actions were that OTDA: (1) answer a set of questions posed to it by HRA by February 9, 2006; (2) remove the requirement, by April i, 2006, from the Welfare Management System (WMS) that if an applicant is categorized as a battered qualified alien, so that the Alien Citizenship Indicator (ACI) is coded as “B” that there also be an entry in the WMS field for Alien Registration Number or the eligibility transaction would not be processed by WMS successfully; (3) amend by March 8, 2006, the list of aliens potentially eligible for food stamps in the food stamp section of denial notices generated by the state's computerized Central Notice System(CNS), to include battered qualified aliens; and (4) issue a new informational document concerning the eligibility of battered qualified aliens (along with an updated Alien Eligibility Desk Guide) in six weeks (March 22, 2006).
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These four actions, which were voluntarily undertaken, were completed in accord with the Court's Order. FOF 1,8-10. Voluntarily actions taken by a defendant to eliminate an alleged violation of rights, whether private or public, moot the claims which are based on the alleged violations. Lillbask v. State of Connecticut Department of Education, 397 F.3d 77, 88(2nd Cir. 2005); City of New York v. Nexicon, Inc., 2006 WL 647716 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2006). The fact the State defendant was complying with the Court's injunction does not alter the analysis. Haley v. Pataki, 60 F.3d 137, 140-41 (2nd Cir. 1995). This is true notwithstanding that other claims remain. Lamar Advertising of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 376, 379 (2d Cir. 2004).
Moreover, in the circumstances of the history of this case, a claim of the possibility of any of the four actions being reversed by OTDA is not a basis for denial of the application to vacate the Court's February 16, 2006. Only if the violation is capable of repetition would it be correct that this Court decide that the claims which led to the OTDA actions are not moot. The test is that there not be a reasonable expectation that OTDA would change these positions (and that the problem is eliminated, as it has been here). Id. at 375. This court should not decide that these matters are not moot absent evidence that the purported misconduct will recur. Id. at 377. In this case the evidence is that it is highly unlikely the actions by OTDA will be reversed. These actions involved computer programming changes for two of the voluntary actions, and significant staff efforts and higher level approvals were required to accomplish the other two. Moreover, the evidence is that OTDA is undertaking yet additional voluntary actions to improve the system of eligibility determinations which should lead to HRA's reduction of the number of alleged incorrect benefit decisions.
In order to avoid the possibility of an HRA worker incorrectly changing the date of qualified status of an applicant, OTDA and DOH voluntarily instituted a lock on the appropriate date field in WMS. FOF 66. This change was accomplished without any Order being entered. When amending the CNS notices section regarding denial of cash assistance, also known as public assistance (PA), OTDA has, without a Court Order, voluntarily broadened the description of battered qualified aliens and the description of who would be eligible for state funded benefits if the alien was someone categorized as Permanently Residing Under Color of Law (PRUCOL)[FN1] FOF 1112.
FN1. This amendment to the notice regarding PRUCOL, which affects solely state-funded benefits, would not be within the Court's power to order. See Point I.B.I. of State Defendants' Memorandum of Law submitted January 25, 2006. However, the fact that the change was made is evidence that OTDA would not take action in the future to undo voluntary changes made to improve the distribution of benefits to eligible aliens.
The alien eligibility module used in training of HRA Job Center supervisors, which began before the hearing ended and is ongoing, already included battered qualified aliens as an alien group potentially eligible for benefits. FOF 106. Improvements were voluntarily made to the module, in this example driven training, to include fact examples involving battered aliens. FOF 107. This was done within the time al-

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lotted by the Court to add to the record. Tr. 1432.[FN2]
FN2. “Tr.” refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in this case from March 14, 2006 through March 24, 2006.
The informational letter issued March 22, 2006 has been further improved and the Alien Eligibility Desk Guide with it. FOF 108. Additionally the Food Stamp Source Book has also been revised. FOF 109.
The voluntarily changes described above are strong evidence that OTDA is highly unlikely to undo the voluntary changes which were made previously, and had thus complied with the Court's Order of February 16, 2006. Determining that this is so requires that the Court dismiss the underlying specific claims. Lamar Advertising, supra, 356 F.3d at 379. There are two further reasons for concluding that there is no reasonable expectation that the changes embodied in the Order will not be reversed. First, government entities are to be given deference when indicating the purported violations have been eliminated. Id. at 377 Moreover, the fact that there is no evidence in the record that even suggests that there is any expectation at all, that the specific alleged violations will recur, strongly supports a decision that the specific claims are moot. Id.
Because the matters embodied in the Court's Order of February 16, 2006 are now moot as to the State Defendants, the Order should be vacated as to the State defendants. Id. at 379.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT STATE DEFENDANTS' CURRENT SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS WILL CAUSE THE CITY DEFENDANT TO SYSTEMATICALLY DEPRIVE ELIGIBLE IMMIGRANTS OF
BENEFITS IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL FOOD STAMP OR MEDICAID ACT, LET ALONE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOUGHT-AFTER INJUNCTION AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANT IS NECESSARY IN
ORDER TO PREVENT THE CITY DEFENDANT FROM SYSTEMATICALLY DEPRIVING ELIGIBLE IMMIGRANTS OF FEDERAL FOOD STAMPS OR MEDICAID.
This action is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint at parag, 1), which states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .....
(Emphasis added).
Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), this Court's jurisdiction over the State defendants is limited to redressing, on a prospective basis, ongoing violations of federal law. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14.
Also, under Article III of the Constitution's standing requirement, a “plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful

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conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), reh. denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984), citing Valley Forge christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
Such lack of a causative link against a supervisory defendant was the basis for Supreme Court's holding in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), that class action plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement for an injunction against the Police Commissioner which was aimed at curtailing alleged unconstitutional misconduct by the Commissioner's police officers: As the facts developed, there was no affirmative link between the occurrences of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners -- express of otherwise -- showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection found by the District Court between petitioners and the individual respondents was that in the absence of a change in police disciplinary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not with respect to them but as to the members of the classes they represented.
423 U.S. at 371.
Thus, in order to succeed in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants' alleged misconduct or omission will cause the deprivation of a federal right claim. E.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (State governmental liability requires that it be the moving force leading to the deprivation of a federal right). This applies to any claim based on a federal violation. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1379 (2nd Cir. 1996) (Equal Protection); Intimate Bookshop, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2003 WL 22251313 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (price discrimination).
The standard that there must be evidence of causation applies to whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. Rockefeller, supra, at 1369, 1378 at n. 17, 1383; Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667; 673-74 (1st Cir. 1999) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
“That a suit may be a class action ... adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.’ ” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996), quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976).
While assuming arguendo, plaintiffs' counsel cite certain omissions within the State defendants' training materials, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that these omissions actually caused the violation of plaintiffs' federal rights under the food stamp or Medicaid acts. This is especially true with respect to training materials and the OTDA Alien Desk guide. With respect to training materials omissions, plaintiffs' counsel contend that there were training materials which omitted the category of battery qualified aliens from a list of qualified aliens who are poten-
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tially eligible for benefits. Plaintiffs' FOF[FN3] 260 and 262. When a training omission is claimed, in order to succeed in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that there was a direct causal link between the government action and the deprivation of federal rights.[FN4] Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997); Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford; 361 F.3d 113, 129-130 (2nd Cir. 2004). In the circumstances, as here, where evidence has been taken, the requirement means that the plaintiffs must show that the specific deficiency they have purportedly proven (omission of battered qualified aliens from the list in the training materials).is closely related to the ultimate injury such that it “actually caused the violation of the federal right”. Amnesty America, supra, 361 F.3d at 130. This the plaintiffs have not done. Moreover, this should apply with equal force to any claimed deficiency in the computer systems or any other part of the support for the relief they seek against the State Defendants.
FN3. Plaintiffs' FOF refers to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact.
FN4. In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), the Court stated that to establish liability against a State entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff had to prove that the governmental entity itself was the “moving force” behind the deprivations of the federal right. The Court cited 2 municipal liability cases, one of which was Monell, as support. 473 U.S. at 166 and n. 12. Thus, it is correct to apply this standard for municipal liability, at a minimum, where the defendant is a sovereign state.
First, this case was specifically brought about HRA job centers and so the training material with which Steven Ptak was cross-examined, used in food stamp centers, has not been shown to have any impact on job center workers. See Tr. 1153-1155. Second, the HRA workers are regularly trained on HRA materials. FOF 54-56. The HRA Alien Eligibility Desk Guides for 2003, 2004 and 2005, received in evidence, all include battered qualified aliens as potentially eligible for cash assistance, food stamps and Medicaid benefits. Exh. 505, 506, 509, and 515. All of these guides include the several kinds of documentation as common documentation, which plaintiffs have emphasized. The evidence is that the City workers do turn to the HRA guide when faced with questions about alien eligibility. Tr. 1010. In light of these facts, there is no evidence that the omission of battered qualified aliens from the list in the food stamp training materials resulted in plaintiffs being denied benefits, which is the violation of a federal right which plaintiffs claim. There were four job center workers who were witnesses, none of whom testified that they were influenced or even saw the OTDA-HRA training materials in question. Thus, this evidence about OTDA's training materials[FN5] does not demonstrate that the omissions “actually caused the violation of the federal right” as required. Amnesty America, supra, 361 F.3d at 130.[FN6]
FN5. No evidence was introduced regarding training materials generated by NYS DOH.
FN6. Similarly, there was no evidence that the omission of battered qualified aliens from the list of potentially eligible benefit recipients on a public

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assistance or food stamp denial notice generated by CNS, deterred applicants from continuing to seek benefits. That notice was exhibit 14 to the declaration of Wendy Josephs but there is no mention in her declaration that she failed to continue to pursue benefits because of this omission. Declaration of Wendy Joseph executed September 30, 2005 ¶¶ 25 26. There was no testimony adduced at the hearing to this effect, either. Thus, there is no causal link demonstrated between this notice and any denial of benefits.
Moreover, there is no evidence that any of these omissions were anything other than allegedly negligent and “negligence is not a valid basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Iwachin v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, 299 F.Supp.2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations omitted) (negligent maintenance of computer system) aff'd 396 F.3d 525, 527 (2nd Cir. 2005) (affirmed with respect to the substantive claims substantiately for the reasons stated by the District Court). Accord, Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 93 (2nd Cir. 2005) (mechanical failure of voting machine).
Nor is there evidence of a causal link between the two computer issues raised in the requests for a preliminary injunction against the State defendants and the violation of any plaintiff's federal rights under the Food Stamp or Medicaid Act, let alone, a systematic denial of benefits.
The plaintiffs' seek preliminary injunctive relief requiring that a second date field be created in WMS because of the slight chance that federal cash and Medical assistance will not be provided to an otherwise eligible immigrant. The potential applicants at risk is very likely to be a very small number because only those people who entered the United States before August 22, 1996 are eligible and it is now 10 years beyond that. The lack of this second date field does not affect anyone else, even in theory. FOF 67-22. In this case, there is no practical effect on any member of the plaintiffs' proposed class because such a person would receive like benefits from the state SNA and Medicaid programs. FOF 68-72. The funding source would be transparent to the benefit recipient. Accordingly, this feature of WMS attacked by plaintiffs, does not have any causal connection to the claimed irreparable harm to proposed class members, i.e. denial of benefits. Where the evidence doesn't prove the causal connection, a preliminary injunction is not supported. Rockefeller, supra, 74 F.3d at 1379; Bolduc, supra, 167 F.3d at 673. The likelihood of injury and the causal connection are not to be presumed on a motion for a preliminary injunction. Barris/Fraser Enterprises v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 638 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Weinfeld, J.). The only evidence potentially regarding a benefit recipient and a computer issue date was the case of Galinka Rybalko. She was not an individual who entered the United States before August 22, 1996 and there was no mention of the computer entries having caused her problem. See Plaintiffs' FOF 64-77. Any claim that the date and a benefit recipient became a qualified alien could be changed to a more recent date in WMS due to a change in qualified status is now moot. FOF 73.
Similarly, the request for a specific example regarding aliens and opening multisuffix cases in the Authorization of Grants manual and specific targeted training for the entire HRA staff with respect to multi-suffix cases is not supported by a

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evidence of a causal connection of a systematic denial of benefits to proposed class members. Rather, the evidence is that the situation involving splitting a case into a multi-suffix cases and benefits for aliens is rare. FOF 87, 91. Where it is necessary to do so, assistance by the various help desks, and the experience by the worker utilizing the assistance provided by the help desk, results in these problems being resolved more quickly. FOF 86. Thus, the causal connection between the alleged harm and the purported deficiencies in the system manual is not demonstrated sufficiently to support the issuance of an injunction on by this Court on this record. Bolduc, supra, 167 F.3d 675 (A finding of success sufficient to support a preliminary injunction would require evidence of the causal connection not just assertion).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the State defendants and class certification should be denied.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2006 WL 1793014 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M.,
L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. No. 05 Civ. 10446 (JSR). January 31, 2006.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Further Support of Their Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
ARGUMENT ... 1
I. Plaintiffs Meet the Standards for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction ... 1
A. Class Members Are Suffering Irreparable Injury ... 1
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits ... 2
1. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Not Barred From By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata ... 2
2. Named Plaintiffs Have A Clear Legal Right to the Relief Sought ... 5
3. The Statutes Relied On By The Plaintiffs Are Enforceable under§ 1983 ... 9
(a) The City defendant's arguments regarding § 1983 are without merit ... 9
(b) State Defendant's § 1983 arguments are without merit ... 14
4. Plaintiffs have Established Liability under Monell ... 16
5. State Defendants' Remaining Arguments Are Without Merit ... 19
a. The Plaintiffs' Claims Are Not Barred by the Eleventh Amendment ... 19
b. Disabled Qualified Aliens Are Eligible for Food Stamps ... 19

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c. The Fair Hearing Process is Not Adequate Supervision ... 22 II. The Proposed Class Should Be Certified ... 23 CONCLUSION ... 25
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Ass'n of Comm. Org. for Reform Now v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ... 12 Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ... 1 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) ... 10, 11, 14 Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002) ... 13 Burgio and Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000 (2d Cir. 1997) ... 19 Burley v. City of New York, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4439 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ... 24 Cokely v. NYCCOC, 2003 WL 1751738 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) ... 25 Community Health Care Ass'n v. DeParle, 69 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ... 16 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 24 DaJour B. v. City of New York, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001) ... 14 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 4441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908) ... 19 Freir v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002), 538 U.S. 998 (2003) ... 10 Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003) ... 13 Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) ... 9, 10 Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ... 14 Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1977) ... 1 Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86 (2d. Cir. 1997) ... 3, 4, 5 McCree v. Odom, No. 4.00 Civ. 173 (E.D.N.C. 2002) ... 13 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 683 (1978) ... 16

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Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995.) ... 24 Mundell v. Bd of County Comm., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1985 (2005) ... 13 Pecere v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 194 F.R.D. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ... 24 Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004) ... 10, 13, 15 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 386 ... 15, 24 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ... 1 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 43 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ... 1 Reynolds v. Giuliani, No.98 Civ. 8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) ... passim Roberson v. Giuiliani, No.99 Civ. 100900, 2000 WL 760300 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2000) ... 11 Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1992) ... 24 Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004) ... 10, 15 Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996) ... 4 Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002) ... 12 Walker v. Eggleston, No. 04 Civ. 0369 (WHP), 2005 WL 639584 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ... 11, 15, 24 White v. Martin, No. 02-4 54 Civ. (C.D. October 3, 2002) ... 13 White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed. 2d 500 (1978) ... 24 Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 2006 WL. 163491 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 2006) ... passim Wright v. Roanoke Redev. Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) ... 10 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 7 U.S.C. § 2020 ... 22 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(b)(iii) ... 14 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) ... 14 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(2) ... 19 8 U.S.C. § 2012(r) ... 19

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28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ... 12
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 ... 13
42 U.S.C. § 1396a ... 22
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) ... 14, 15, 16
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) ... 10, 13, 14
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... passim
69 Fed. Reg. 20724 (April 16, 2004) ... 20
RULES
Fed. R. Evid. 802 ... 25
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ... 23
MISCELLANEOUS
Restatement 2d of Judgments, § 24, d(9) ... 3
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiffs submit this memorandum of law in reply to the opposition of the defendants to their pending motions. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs' motions should be granted.
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiffs Meet the Standards for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.
A. Class Members Are Suffering Irreparable Injury.
As courts have held time and again, the erroneous deprivation of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable harm. Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1977); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Becker v. Toia, 439 F. Supp. 324, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The City does not dispute plaintiffs' poverty and hunger set forth in detail in the declarations accompanying plaintiffs' moving papers. The City argues instead that because it promises to do better tomorrow, members of the proposed class do not suffer irreparable injury today. (City Mem. 20-21.) The City cites no authority for this proposition, however. As set forth below, the City has not corrected many deficiencies that are directly responsible for harm to the putative plaintiff class. Indeed, HRA admits one of the central allegations in this case: that immigrants “with an approved or pending immigrant visa petition (Form I-130) with evidence of domestic violence, are not accommodated within the agency's computer program.” (City Mem. 21.) HRA claims to be “in the process of remedying the situation now,” (id.), although in depositions the City acknowledged that the earliest any correction could be in place
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would be in March. (Shepard Dep. 110:8-12; 113:13-23, Jan 27, 2006.) Meanwhile, computer problems continue to bedevil the City efforts even to provide benefits to the plaintiffs they agree are eligible in this action. Because of computer difficulties, seven of the plaintiffs who were supposed to receive their benefits by court-ordered deadlines in this case did not do so on time. (Saylor Decl. II, ¶¶ 6-16.) Clearly there is a substantial and continuing risk of irreparable injury unless a preliminary injunction is granted.
B. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits.
1. Plaintiffs Claims Are Not Barred By The Doctrine of Res Judicata.
The claims of the proposed class are not barred as a matter of claim preclusion by the judgment in Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In its brief, the City maintains alternatively that all of the claims in this case either were adjudicated in Reynolds (City Mem. 1) or, to the extent they were not, that they “could have been raised there.” (Id. 24). Both arguments are clearly wrong.
That the principal claims in this action were not actually litigated in Reynolds is obvious and beyond doubt. Reynolds concerned the public benefits application process up to, but not including, eligibility determinations for ongoing public benefits. Specifically, the Reynolds plaintiffs alleged that as part of the defendants' conversion of Income Maintenance Centers to “Job Centers,” defendants deterred and discouraged persons seeking to apply for public benefits; failed to provide qualified applicants with emergency pre-acceptance “immediate needs” public assistance grants and expedited food stamps; and failed to make separate determinations on applications for each category of benefits when people filed joint applications for public assistance, food stamps and Medicaid. (See complaint in Reynolds v. Giuliani, attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of David Lock, dated January 24, 2006.) In its brief the City acknowledges that “the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that defendants have erroneously determined their eligibility for benefits” (City Mem. 49, emphasis added) - an issue clearly not litigated in Reynolds.
The notice claims in this case were not litigated in Reynolds either. In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege that defendants fail to provide appropriate notices of denial when accepting some family members while denying others and when refusing to add family members to an already open case and that defendants provide denial notices that mislead plaintiffs by providing inaccurate information about immigrant eligibility issues. None of these issues was raised or litigated in Reynolds.
The only claims in this action that overlap with the claims in Reynolds are the claims that defendants have a practice of preventing, discouraging, or deterring persons from applying for public benefits, and of failing to process applications. The claims in Reynolds, however, all pertain to conduct in or before April 2001, when the record closed in Reynolds. Obviously the Reynolds court's holding that the plaintiffs did not prove the claims in 2001 is not and cannot be res judicata with regard to whether HRA currently deters, discourages, or prevents immigrants from applying for benefits today. The Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that res judicata does not apply to subsequent transactions. Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pi-
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lots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 91 (2d. Cir. 1997); see also Restatement 2d of Judgments, § 24, Comment d(9).
The City's alternative argument - that the correctness of HRA's eligibility determinations “could have been raised” in the Reynolds case - is equally without merit. Claims that “could have been raised” are barred by claim preclusion only if they involve the same “claim” or “nucleus of operative fact,” Interoceanica Corp., 107 F.3d at 90, as a claim previously adjudicated. The claims in this action clearly do not involve the same “claim” or “nucleus of operative fact” as those adjudicated in Reynolds.
A prior judgment will “have preclusive effect only where the transaction or connected series of transactions at issue in both suits is the same, that is where the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and where the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463-64 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997). “If the second litigation involved different transactions, and especially subsequent transactions, there generally is no claim preclusion.” Id. at 1464; see Interoceanica Corp., 107 F.3d at 91.
Whether the City's eligibility determinations for ongoing public benefits were correct was not at issue in Reynolds, and for good reason. Reynolds was not restricted to a class of immigrants or to any particular category of applicants. Rather, Reynolds plaintiffs alleged systemic flaws in the treatment of applicants prior to determinations of their eligibility for ongoing benefits. To have included allegations in that case of systemic flaws in eligibility determinations for ongoing benefits, in addition to systemic flaws in the pre-determination process, would have involved a vast, if not impossible, expansion of the litigation. Entirely different evidence would have been necessary, including a systematic review of the correctness of eligibility determinations for ongoing benefits involving every conceivable aspect of public benefits law. Because the evidence would have been vastly different, and because the facts essential to this case were not present in Reynolds, the cases do not involve the same “claim” for purposes of claim preclusion. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1463-64.
Moreover, as has already been noted, the Reynolds case went to trial in April 2001. Even if the issues at trial “could have been” vastly expanded to include whether eligibility decisions for ongoing public benefits were systemically wrongly made, it would only have governed eligibility decisions made before April 2001. None of the issues in this case concerns whether eligibility determinations were wrongly made before April 2001. Therefore, claim preclusion could not possibly apply here. Interoceanica Corp., 107 F.3d at 91.
Finally, HRA points to several examples of Reynolds informal relief complaints to allege that plaintiffs' counsel saw Reynolds as pertaining to erroneous denials of eligibility. As explained in the supplemental declaration of Elizabeth Saylor (Saylor Decl. II), dated January 31, 2006, those cases involved Reynolds violations as well as erroneous eligibility decisions. The advocates properly sought a correc-

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tion of the Reynolds violations. In asking that counsel for HRA also correct the erroneous denials of benefits in those specific cases, the advocates did not somehow transform the Reynolds action into an entirely different lawsuit. For all these reasons, the judgment in Reynolds is not res judicata with regard to the claims alleged in this case.
2. Named Plaintiffs Have A Clear Legal Right to the Relief Sought.
The City asserts that the named plaintiffs do not have a clear legal right to the relief sought because “[i]n almost every case, the required documentation to demonstrate eligibility for benefits was not provided.” (City Mem. 25.) This assertion is factually and legally incorrect.
After this action was commenced, the City determined that all of the named plaintiffs were eligible for benefits, and it provided them with ongoing assistance. The City also provided all of the named plaintiffs except for M.K.B. with retroactive assistance. Now, however, the City argues that O.P., J.Z., L.W., Marieme Diongue, M.K.B., and M.E. were never eligible for benefits in the first place. These arguments, addressed individually below, are without merit.
O.P.: O.P. is and was at all relevant times PRUCOL. She was granted deferred action on her U-visa application on January 25, 2005. (The City is wrong that O.P. did not file for an extension; she did so timely on January 6, 2006. (Saylor Decl. II, Ex. P.)) In May, August and October 2005, she applied for public benefits and provided caseworkers with all the necessary documentation establishing her PRUCOL status and categorical eligibility for public benefits. (O.P. Decl. ¶¶ 18, 30, 31, 41, Ex. G; O.P. Dep. 83:1-25; 84:1-25; 85:1-9; 88:20-22, Dec. 27, 2005[FN1]) On each occasion, her application was wrongfully denied. (O.P. Decl. ¶¶ 19, 33, 42, Ex. H; O.P. Dep. 88:11-13.)
FN1. Excerpts from deposition transcripts cited in this Memorandum are attached to the supplemental declaration of Elizabeth Saylor, dated January 31, 2006.
Marieme Diongue: The City's claim that Marieme Diongue lives in Yonkers is patently false. The City pays the rent on Ms. Diongue's Bronx apartment at 15 Place, and has done so at all times relevant to this action. (Diongue Dep. 57:7-8, 124:9-20; 125:7-126:6; Dec. 28, 2005.) The City sends notices and other mail to Ms. Diongue at her 15 Place apartment. (See, e.g., Diongue Decl. Ex. F (listing 15. Place as Ms. Diongue's address).) Ms. Diongue lives, as she repeatedly testified, and as official documents and correspondence repeatedly demonstrate, at 15 Place, in the Bronx.
The City points to only one page out of 110 produced in discovery thus far relating to Ms.Diongue, a New York State ID card listing an address at 97 Avenue, in Yonkers, as the sole basis for its claim that Ms. Diongue lives outside of the City. At her deposition, Ms. Diongue repeatedly explained the reason for this ID card, but the City did not inform the Court of her explanation. As Ms. Diongue repeatedly explained, she uses that address solely for receipt of mail. She does not live there. (Diongue Dep. 99:2-100:12.).
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L.W.: The City's suggestion that L.W. failed to provide documents needed to establish her eligibility is simply untrue. She has submitted, among other documents, her K-3 visa and documentation that she is a victim of domestic violence.[FN2] (L.W. Dep. 29:13 -16; L.W. Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, Exs. B and C.) Because L.W. has a filed I-130 petition and proof of abuse, she is eligible for benefits. The City identifies no specific additional documents necessary to establish her eligibility that L.W. failed to provide. There are no such documents.
FN2. The expiration of her original K-3 visa is irrelevant to L.W.'s claims. It is the filed I-130 petition underlying the visa, along with proof of domestic violence, that establishes her eligibility for benefits. L.W.'s March 17, 2005, application for benefits was wrongly denied.[FN3] She applied again on May 31, 2005, and in an apparent admission of her eligibility for benefits, HRA accepted her case. (See Saylor Decl. II ¶ 8.). Repeatedly thereafter, attorneys for L.W. requested a Medicaid disability determination for the purposes of establishing entitlement to federal food stamps. (Rolnick Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 9-12, 21-23, 26; Exs. 1, 3.) L.W. also repeatedly informed HRA personnel of her disabilities. (LW. Dep. 46:6-14; 53:18-22, Jan. 10, 2006.) However, the disability determination was not done. L.W. did not receive food stamps until this action was commenced and HRA belatedly conducted a disability determination and found her disabled.
FN3. The City incorrectly claims that L.W. received public assistance after her March 2005 application. She did not. (L.W. Decl. ¶ 11; Saylor Decl. ¶¶ 149-57.)
M.E.: The City approved M.E. for benefits in August, 2004, and M.E.'s non-citizen daughter in September, 2004. The City then terminated those benefits in November 2005. The City is wrong in claiming that M.E. failed to provide proof that she had applied for and had been denied a Social Security number prior to November 2005. M.E.'s attorney provided that proof to the City in July and October 2004. (Ganju. Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. 26; Ganju Decl. II ¶ 20.)
Furthermore, HRA told M.E.'s attorney that benefits were terminated because M.E. and her daughter had been denied Social Security numbers. (Ganju Decl. ¶¶ 101-102.) The City's extensive and irrelevant discussion of M.E.'s deposition testimony raises no justification for the City's unlawful denial of benefits to M.E. and her daughter. The City restored benefits to M.E. after this action was commenced.
J.Z.: The City's claim that J.Z.'s case casts doubt on her identity is ridiculous. It is unclear how J.Z.'s public benefits cards, bearing her maiden name, her married name, or both, cast doubt on her identity. HRA created the errors itself. Moreover, HRA refused to correct the problem despite J.Z.'s request that it do so. (J.Z. Dep. 8:4-9:25; 15:9-16:5; 18:7-12; 23:14-24:13, Jan 5, 2006.)
Other documents belonging to J.Z. contain slight misspellings of her first name. J.Z. has been unable to get these corrected. The City has not explained why these slight misspellings have any bearing on benefits eligibility. (J.Z. Dep. 34:21-35:13; 40:2-41:16.)
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The City's suggestion that J.Z. was lying when she denied traveling to Santo Domingo is particularly troubling. (City Mem. 27.) The basis for this claim is an exhibit that the City created by stapling together a page from J.Z.'s passport and a page from what obviously is the passport of another person (different page sizes, nonsequential page numbers, different alien numbers, travel date earlier than passport issuance date). (J.Z. Dep. Ex. 9.; 75:13-14; 76:2-13; 76:24-77:8; 78:5-6; 78:10-24.)
The City's claim that J.Z. did not present documents relating to her I-130 family petition and proof of abuse is simply false. (J.Z. Dep. 99:22-100:1; 101:16-102:14; 109:18-110:8; 110:17-21; 112:1-14; J.Z. Decl. ¶ 9.)
M.K.B.: The City does not dispute that M.K.B. and her non-citizen children are currently eligible for ongoing benefits. The City argues, however, that the initial denial of benefits was correct because M.K.B.'s I-130 petition had been denied when her abusive husband failed to complete the application process on her behalf. (M.K.B. subsequently restarted the process on her own behalf through a self-petition.)
This rationale, however, must fail. When M.K.B. first applied for benefits, the reasons HRA gave for the denial was that her children lacked Social Security numbers and that they were generally ineligible immigrants. (M.K.B. Decl. ¶¶ 10-12, Ex. N.) These unlawful grounds for denial of eligibility were typical of those applied to many of the plaintiffs. Only after this litigation commenced did HRA offer a new ground for denying benefits to M.K.B. HRA's post hoc argument is legally incorrect. Battered spouses with denied I-130 petitions, and certainly those like M.K.B. whose petitions were denied solely because their batterers abandoned their petitions are PRUCOL. M.K.B. has requested a fair hearing before OTDA on this issue.
3. The Statutes Relied On By Plaintiffs Are Enforceable under § 1983.
(a) The City's arguments regarding § 1983 are without merit.
Contrary to the City's arguments, plaintiffs have a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the rights they assert under the Food Stamp Act and Medicaid Act are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Despite their many pages of rhetoric contending that the Food Stamp Act and Medicaid Act are not enforceable through § 1983, defendants have not cited a single case standing for the proposition that the substantive provisions of the Food Stamp Act and the Medicaid Act relied on by plaintiffs are not enforceable under § 1983. In fact, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and district courts within the Circuit have repeatedly held that the Food Stamp and the Medicaid Acts do give rise to statutory rights enforceable under §1983. And they have continued to find these statutes enforceable since the decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), relied on so heavily by the defendants.
As the Supreme Court made clear, the decision in Gonzaga did not change, but only clarified, the test for determining whether a federal statute and implementing regulations are enforceable. Gonzaga clearly articulates the difference between those statutes giving rise to a § 1983 claim and those that do not. Citing specifically to
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its decisions in Wright v. Roanoke Redev. Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987), and Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), the Court stated that the question is whether the statute confers “a mandatory [benefit] focusing on the individual.” See Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183-94 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that “the [Gonzaga] court did not abandon the [Blessing] test” and finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) met the Blessing test and is enforceable under § 1983).
In the Second Circuit's only post-Gonzaga decision ruling on the issue of the enforceability of the provisions of a federal benefit program under § 1983, Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2004), the Court of Appeals recognized that “In Gonzaga, the [Supreme] Court held that “[o]nce a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Id. at 201 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284). In analyzing whether an enforceable right existed, the Rabin court examined the statutory provision's “language, the context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole” (quoting Freir v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 197 (2d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 998 (2003)). Following this approach adopted by the Second Circuit, it is clear that the provisions of the Food Stamp Act and Medicaid Act at issue in this case create rights that are enforceable under § 1983.
The City concedes, as it must, that “judges in this district have previously held that certain provisions of the Food Stamp Act create a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” citing Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877 (WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. February 14, 2005) (City Mem. 46.) The court in Reynolds, and other courts in this district, have looked squarely at the ruling in Gonzaga, and have recognized that it reaffirms the three-prong test for federal court enforceability set forth in Blessing. The court in Reynolds found that the provisions of the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts at issue in the case are enforceable under § 1983 because they are “framed unambiguously in terms of eligible individuals rights...the right conferred is neither vague nor amorphous ... and this provision unequivocally binds the States,” thus meeting all the requirements of Blessing and Gonzaga. Reynolds at *15, 16. See also, Williston v. Eggleston 379 F. Supp. 2d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
In the case at bar, the City has asserted that the two sections of the Food Stamp Act upon which plaintiffs rely, namely 7 U.S.C. §§ 2020(e)(3) and 2020(e)(2)(b)(iii), are not enforceable under § 1983. Section 2020(e)(3) specifically mandates that the agency administering the Food Stamp program “shall ... provide an allotment [of Food Stamps] retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household not later than thirty days following its filing of an application.” That language clearly creates an enforceable right on behalf of eligible households to receive food stamps within 30 days of filing an application. Both prior to and subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga, numerous courts, including this Court, have held that these very sections meet the Blessing test and create rights that are enforceable under § 1983. See Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F.Supp.2d 561, 574-577 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Williston v. Eggleston, ---F.Supp.2d ---, 2006 WL 163491 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 2006); Reynolds v. Giuliani, No.98 Civ. 8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. February 14, 2005); Roberson v. Giuiliani, No.99 Civ. 100900, 2000 WL 760300 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2000); see also, Walker v.
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Eggleston, No. 04 Civ. 0369 (WHP), 2005 WL 639584 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2005) (finding analogous section of the Food Stamp Act enforceable under § 1983).
Most recently, in Williston v. Eggleston 379 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), Judge Sweet adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Rabin v. Wilson-Coker and applied it to the Food Stamp Act, ruling that these same provisions of the Food Stamp Act create rights that are enforceable under § 1983. “The provisions of the FSA here appear to relate to the individual household that applies for benefits just as the provisions of the Medicaid Act at issue in Rabin with respect to a specific relief to a specific class of beneficiaries and time frames within which eligible households must receive the benefits provided.” Williston, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 575. Indeed, last week Judge Sweet held that the issue is so clear that no substantial grounds for a difference of opinion exist warranting certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Williston v. Eggleston, --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2006 WL 163491 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2006).
The City's reliance on Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002), and Ass'n of Comm. Org. for Reform Now v. NYC Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), is wholly inapt. As Judge Sweet specifically recognized in Williston, the statutes at issue in those cases (the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 and the No Child Left Behind Act) do not have the kind of rightsconferring language that the Food Stamp Act contains. 379 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77; see also Williston v. Eggleston, -- F.Supp.2d ---, 2006 WL 163491 (S.D.N.Y., January 24, 2006) (again rejecting HRA's reliance on Taylor).
The City argues equally unsuccessfully that the section of the Medicaid Act upon which plaintiffs rely, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), does not create rights enforceable under § 1983. The overwhelming weight of authority, both in this Circuit and others, is contrary to that position. Section 1396a(a)(8) mandates that medical “assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals” (emphasis added). Congress could not possibly have been clearer in creating a right to assistance on behalf of eligible individuals. The City has not cited a single case in which 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) was found not to be enforceable under § 1983. Many courts examining the question have held that § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act is enforceable under § 1983. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2003); Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005); White v. Martin, No. 02-4 54 Civ., 2002 WL 32596017 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2002).
The City argues that the provisions of the Medicaid Act are unenforceable because they are couched in terms of State Plan requirements. (City Mem. 51.) However, the Second Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 specifically forecloses this argument, because this section provides that “in an action brought to enforce provision of this chapter, such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a state plan or specifying the required contents of a state plan.” See Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d at 201-02.
The City also argues that the regulations on which plaintiffs rely are not enforce-

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able under § 1983, because they are not tethered to a “foundational statutory right.” (City Mem. 47-50 (citing Mundell v. Bd. of County Comm., 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1985 (D. Colo. Sept. 2, 2005)). But the regulations relied on by the plaintiffs are tethered to the Food Stamp and Medicaid statutes, and to the requirements of due process of law in relation to notices that must be given to applicants and recipients of public benefits.
The fact that the regulations are addressed to the state agencies does not defeat their enforceability any more than it defeats the enforceability of the foundational statutes. These regulations “further define the substance of statutory (or constitutional) provision[s] that [themselves] create an enforceable right,” as this Court found necessary for enforceability in Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F. Supp. 2d 540, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
In sum, the overwhelming weight of authority supports a finding that the relevant sections of the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts create individual rights enforceable under § 1983. Plaintiffs therefore have a high likelihood of success on the merits of this issue. And of course, there can be no question but that plaintiffs can enforce, through §1983, their rights to due process of law, as raised in their Fifth Claim for Relief against the City.
(b) State Defendants' § 1983 arguments are without merit.
Relying on this court's decision in Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F. Supp. 2d 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y, 1998), the State defendants contend that plaintiffs have no private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) to enjoin the State to supervise HRA with regard to alien eligibility issues. (State Mem. 48-49.) But this is not plaintiffs' argument. The plaintiffs need not and do not contend that §1396a(a)(5) creates enforceable rights under the Blessing and Gonzaga standards. Rather, plaintiffs contend that DOH, as the State agency responsible for New York State's Medicaid program, and OTDA, as the agency responsible for the Food Stamp program, are accountable for violations of the substantive obligations to deliver benefits to eligible class members set forth in 7 U.S.C. §§ 2020(e)(3) and (e)(2)(B)(iii) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8).
Judge Koeltl cogently explained this important distinction in DaJour B. v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 2044 (JGK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001), an action seeking to compel HRA and State DOH to provide certain Medicaid services (known as “EPSDT” services). In DaJour B., Judge Koeltl concluded, as did this Court in Graus v. Kaladjian, that § 1396a(a)(5) alone created no enforceable rights. But the Court nonetheless denied State DOH's motion to dismiss. Judge Koeltl's reasoning is directly applicable here: DOH next argues it is not liable for the City's alleged deficiencies in providing EPSDT services. DOH essentially asserts that its delegation of the administration of the state's Medicaid plan to the local social services districts, including the City's HRA, relieves it of its responsibility to ensure that the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act are enforced. This argument is without merit. While a participating state may delegate certain administrative responsibilities to political subdivi-

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sions, including the administration of EPSDT services, Congress has placed the ultimate responsibility to administer the Medicaid Act on the State, and that duty is non-delegable. .... Thus, although 42 U.S.C. § 1396a-(a)(5) does not provide the plaintiffs with an enforceable right under Section 1983, the DOH, as the agency responsible for New York State's Medicaid program is accountable for violations of the substantive EPSDT provisions, which do create enforceable rights.
Id. at *42.
Judge Koeltl's holding in Dajour B. is fully applicable here and is supported by ample legal authority. In Reynolds, for example, the court held that “a violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Food Stamp, Medicaid and cash assistance programs by the City can “give [ ] rise to corresponding Section 1983 claims against the State defendants.” Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. Civ. 8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106, *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 386.) The Reynolds court recognized that local social services districts are “agents of the state,” and that “states bear the ultimate responsibility for supervising compliance” with the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts. “[T]he City defendant's failure to satisfy their obligations under the Food Stamp and Medicaid Acts ... is persuasive evidence that the State defendants have failed in their oversight obligations.” Id. at 22.
Likewise, other cases finding provisions of the Food Stamp Act and the Medicaid Act enforceable under § 1983 are enforceable against state agencies. See, e.g., Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Sabree v. Richman, 367 F. 3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004); Williston v. Eggleston, 379 F.Supp.2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Walker v. Eggleston, No. 04 Civ. 0369 (WHP) 2005 WL 639584 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005). Those courts have reasoned not that § 1396a(a)(5) alone created enforceable rights, but rather that other federal statutes create enforceable rights and that the State may not escape liability under those statutes by purporting to delegate its responsibilities to HRA.
The State maintains that plaintiffs have no enforceable right “to prescribe the manner by which State defendants must supervise the issues herein.” (State Mem. 42-49.) But that is a gross mischaracterization of plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs do not seek to prescribe the “manner” in which State DOH and OTDA supervise the City. Instead, the plaintiffs challenge the failure of those agencies, as the entities responsible for the administration of the Food Stamp Act and the Medicaid Act in New York State, to comply, directly or through their agents, the local districts, with the requirements of the Acts.[FN4]
FN4. The State defendants' dereliction of responsibility for ensuring the lawful delivery of public benefits in New York City is nowhere more evident than in their complete lack of responsibility for ensuring the proper design and execution of the POS system. In depositions, the State admitted it had no role in the design of the POS system. It currently has no role with regard to making or approving changes made to the POS system. (Iannucci Dep. 62:16-22.)
4. Plaintiffs Have Established Liability under Monell.
The legal standards for establishing liability under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs.,
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436 U.S. 683 (1978), are not in dispute. The City acknowledges that liability may be established if a practice is “so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a ‘custom or usage’ and implies the constructive knowledge of policy-making officials,” or “a failure by official policy-makers to properly train and supervise subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into contact.” (City Mem. 52-53.) (quoting Community Health Care Ass'n v. DeParle, 69 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
The City claims that its policy is “to help putative class members to obtain benefits to which they are entitled.” (City Mem. 53.) But whether or not that was the City's intention, its defective systems have created a “custom and usage” of causing benefits to be erroneously denied to class members in this case.
Evidence of that custom and usage is overwhelming. Many of the problems relate to the City's and State's flawed computer programs that are used to administer public benefits. In its brief, HRA candidly admits that “in fact one category of eligible aliens, those with an approved or pending immigrant visa petition (Form I-130) with evidence of domestic violence, are not accommodated within the agency's computer program.” (City Mem. 21.) That admission establishes liability under Monell for a substantial portion of the class. But HRA's computer flaws go far deeper than that.
As depositions have demonstrated, the City Paperless Office System (POS) computer program lacks a drop-down menu choice for all battered qualified aliens - not just those with approved or pending I-130 petitions and proof of domestic violence. Workers must first choose either “PRUCOL (PA)” or “Undocumented Aliens” from the dropdown menu for this group of immigrants. But these immigrants are not either PRUCOL or undocumented. Workers must therefore make choices that are erroneous in order to coax the computer into opening the cases properly. There are no instructions on the pertinent POS windows explaining how to do this. (Shepard Dep. 66:7-78:2.)
Likewise, the City's Alien Eligibility Desk Aid mislabels I-130 petitioners as prima facie holders. Because POS uses information from the Alien Eligibility Desk Aid, this error is also built into the POS screens that are presented to workers. In her deposition, Michelle Shepard, head of the POS design team, candidly admitted that this error is a source of confusion. As she testified, “everybody understood that it was confusing because it talks about prima facie for battered, period.” (Shepard Dep. 134.) Asked whether HRA workers would be confused by this error, Ms. Shepard stated: “It was said that, if-- if we're confused, we imagine workers will be confused, too.” (Id. at 134-135.)
The State Welfare Management System (WMS) is also partly at fault. Both the State WMS computer system and the City's POS computer system require workers to enter an Alien Registration number for all battered qualified aliens (Eisenstein Dep. 30:3-14; Shepard Dep. 165:14-18), even though many eligible battered qualified aliens do not have an A number (Eisenstein Dep. 36:22-37:2). If an Alien Registration number is not entered, the case will “error out.” (Shepard Dep. 165:14-18; Eisenstein Dep. 40:5-8.) The State knows of a “work-around” that can be used to circum-

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vent this error (involving use of a dummy Alien Registration number consisting of the letter A followed by a series of “9s.” (Eisenstein Dep. 40:12-17.)) But the State has never issued a procedure describing this “work-around” (Eisenstein Dep. 40:21-42:6), and HRA has never received instructions regarding it (Shepard Dep. 165:19-25.) The head of the POS design team, who presumably knows the computer system as well as anyone in HRA, was asked in her deposition: “Are you aware of any way to open a case for somebody in alien category B [battered aliens] if they do not have an alien number?” She answered: “I don't.” (Shepard Dep. 166:3-6) The State acknowledged that at least one of the plaintiffs' or declarants' cases “errored out” for this reason. (Eisenstein Dep. 106:16-08:14.)
Similarly, the notices generated by the Computerized Notice System (“CNS”) are flawed. They omit “battered qualified aliens” as a category of immigrants eligible to receive benefits. (Ptak Aff. Ex. C.)
These serious flaws have led to systemic and erroneous denials of public benefits to eligible immigrants. Regardless of whether the City intended its systems to work properly, they clearly do not. Indeed, the defendants' computer systems are so severely flawed, that HRA was unable to open the cases of six of named plaintiffs found eligible for ongoing benefits - M.A., A.I., O.P., M.B., L.W. and Anna Fedosenko - within the time frames agreed upon in Court because of computer problems. (Saylor Decl. II, ¶¶ 3-16.)
5. State Defendants' Remaining Arguments Are Without Merit.
a. The Plaintiffs' Claims Are Not Barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Contrary to the argument of State defendants, it is well settled that prospective injunctive relief against a state officer sued in his official capacity is permissible. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Burgio and Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir. 1997).
b. Disabled Qualified Aliens Are Eligible for Food Stamps.
The State defendants argue that plaintiffs Fedosenko and L.W., and other disabled immigrants like her who have been in a qualified status for fewer than five years, are not eligible for federal food stamps. (State Mem. 35-36.) This argument is squarely wrong.
As the State observes, qualified aliens must be “receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability (within the meaning of section 2012(r) of Title 7)” in order to be eligible to receive federal food stamps without a five-year waiting period. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F)(2). Disingenuously, quoting only part of § 2012(r) in its brief, the State claims that this section defines the phrase “elderly or disabled member” as “a member of a household who - ... receives disability related medical assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act” (in other words, federal Medicaid). But the State ignores the rest of § 2012(r). The remainder of that section provides that an elderly or disabled person also includes a household member who receives “disability-based State general assistance benefits, if the Secretary

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determines that such benefits are conditioned on meeting disability or blindness criteria at least as stringent as those used under title XVI of the Social Security Act.”
Apparently, counsel for the State defendants are unaware that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has determined that State Medicaid is included within the meaning of “disability-based State general assistance benefits.” In early January of 2003, USDA issued guidance to all of its Regional Directors that stated, among other clarifications, that qualified aliens receiving medical assistance under a State program that uses criteria as stringent as the federal SSI criteria must be considered disabled for the purpose of food stamp eligibility. (Saylor Decl. II Ex. N at 4.) When USDA recently issued proposed regulations implementing amendments to the Food Stamp Act, it again confirmed that receipt of medical assistance under a State disability-based Medicaid program was sufficient to confer food stamp eligibility on an immigrant in a qualified alien status. USDA stated: “Under Section 3(r) of the Act (§ 2012(r)), ... persons receiving ... state-funded medical assistance benefits ... may be considered disabled for food stamp purposes if they are determined disabled using criteria as stringent as federal SSI criteria.” See 69 Fed. Reg. 20724, at 20740 (April 16, 2004) (emphasis added).
No one disputes that New York State's requirements for disability-based State Medicaid are as stringent as the SSI disability criteria. Accordingly, disabled immigrants who have been in a qualified status for fewer than five years are eligible for federal food stamp benefits when a determination is made that they are eligible for disability-based State Medicaid. The State's error on this score is simply confirmation that it has not correctly implemented federal food stamp law.
The State also claims that State DOH does not pay “to have a doctor determine that someone who already receives State Medicaid due to low income is disabled,” and therefore eligible for federal food stamps. (State Mem. 36.) That, too, is mistaken. By letter dated March 28, 2003, Linda LeClair, Director of the Bureau of Eligibility Operations and Family Health Plus, assured advocates that “local districts are currently required to have a procedure which identifies disabled Medicaid recipients for FS [Food Stamps] staff, so that FS benefits for eligible individuals can be appropriately authorized.” She continued: “Individuals who are also applying for or receiving Medicaid benefits, including applicants/recipients of temporary assistance and Medicaid, may be required to have a medical disability determination if there is indication that they may qualify for disability related Medicaid. Disability-related Medicaid is a benefit that meets the food stamp eligibility criteria for qualified aliens.” (Saylor Decl. II Ex. O.) Notably, Ms. LeClair did not limit that statement to disability-related federal Medicaid.
On April 2, 2003, defendant OTDA formally confirmed that position, stating that “individuals who are also applying for or receiving Medicaid benefits, including applicants/recipients of temporary assistance and Medicaid, must have a Medicaid disability determination if there is indication that they may qualify for disability-related Medicaid.” (Declaration of Jennie Baum, dated Dec. 12, 2005, Ex. 34 (OTDA, 03 INF-14 (April 2, 2003).)

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It is precisely the failure of State defendants to ensure that the local social services districts, including HRA, abide by this policy and refer those qualified aliens who appear to be disabled or who identify themselves as disabled for a disability determination that has effectively barred plaintiffs Fedesenko and L.W. and the class they represent from access to the federal food stamp benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled.
c. The Fair Hearing Process Is Not Adequate Supervision.
State defendants erroneously claim that because some of the plaintiffs received “favorable” fair hearing decisions, it has not failed to supervise HRA.[FN5] But the State's account of the resolution of the plaintiffs' fair hearings proves just the opposite. Despite numerous fair hearings, none resulted in any systemic correction of the problems at issue in this lawsuit. Indeed, the notion that individual fair hearing decisions could somehow result in a correction of the computer problems at issue here is sheer fancy. Moreover, the State's characterization of these fair hearing decisions as “favorable” is very misleading. Many plaintiffs are still unable to obtain benefits, and receive them only as a result of mechanisms other than the fair hearing process. (Pl. Mem. 28-29.)
FN5. State defendants incorrectly allege that three plaintiffs, M.K.B., A.I. and L.A.M. did not request fair hearings. (State Mem. 38.) L.A.M. and A.I. both requested fair hearings prior to filing and M.K.B. requested one subsequently. (Saylor Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. M.). Further, State defendants ignore the existence of multiple fair hearings for the plaintiffs and the difficulties obtaining compliance with those decisions. (See, e.g., J.Z. Decl. ¶¶ 29-33.)
The State defendants also contend that there is no traceable link between supervision of the City through the fair hearing process and systemic denial of the plaintiffs' cases. (State Mem. 36-42.) But the “link” is imposed by federal law. As set forth above, the State defendants have a non-delegable duty to administer and supervise the federal benefits regime under 7 U.S.C. § 2020 and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ. 8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005). If the fair hearing system is supposed to be the mechanism for ensuring the lawful delivery of benefits to immigrants, then it is failing miserably.
The fair hearing system fails in part because fair hearings generally result in remands that are ineffective in correcting underlying problems. The State remands fair hearings on procedural issues even when advocates request decisions on the substantive issues and present evidence establishing eligibility (State Mem. 19-23; See, e.g., transcripts at Hopkins Decl. Ex. 2 at 24; Ex. 4 at 27; Ex. 5 at 6, 39). Further, fair hearing decisions on immigrant eligibility either omit discussion on the relevant law or misstate it. (See McEnnis Decl.) Moreover, State defendants have not responded to advocates' requests for assistance when the City fails to comply with the fair hearing decision. (See supplemental declaration of Jami Johnson, dated January 31, 2006; Decl. of Reena Ganju, dated Jan. 31, 2006 ¶¶61-80; Saylor Decl. II ¶¶ 34-35.)
II. The Proposed Class Should Be Certified.
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The City's main arguments against certification of the class are first, that there is no common question of fact as required by Rule 23 (a)(2) and second, that defendants have not acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as required by Rule 23 (b)(2). (City Mem. 56-57, 58-59.) These arguments, which are closely related, are without merit.
The central question of law and fact in this case, common to all class members, is whether defendants systematically and erroneously deny public benefits to class members. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class by systematically denying public benefits to class members. Plaintiffs have submitted convincing evidence demonstrating defendants' systemic violations of the laws regarding alien eligibility for public benefits. Defendants consistently deny public benefits to class members because of actions and omissions that are generally applicable to the proposed class, including, inter alia: (i) systemic flaws in the computer system that are generally applicable to the class because every class member's application for public benefits is processed using the POS and WMS systems; and (ii) lack of training of HRA workers and erroneous policy directives that consistently result in the systematic misapplication of the rules regarding alien eligibility for public benefits and erroneous denials of class members applications for public benefits.
Issues of fact and law about these systemic failures predominate over any questions about the individual eligibility of class members. This Court has repeatedly certified classes of public benefits applicants and recipients in which the eligibility of individual class members would also have been a factor to be determined, but did not predominate over the systemic questions affecting the class as a whole. See Williston v. Eggleston 379 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Walker v. Eggleston, No. 04 Civ.0369 (WHP), 2005 WL 639584 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2005); Reynolds, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 113; Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Furthermore, minor factual differences in the circumstances of each class representative and the class members are not determinative, so long as they share the ultimate issues of entitlement to and denial of public benefits. Morel, 927 F. Supp. 2d at 633; White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
Defendants assert several additional, insubstantial arguments against certification of the class. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is met by any measure in this case. In support of their motion for class certification, plaintiffs submitted the declaration of Camille Carey, reporting statistics indicating that over 1000 class members are identified annually. A showing of forty or more class members is presumptively deemed sufficient in the Second Circuit to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995). “Courts have not required evidence of exact class size or identity of class members to satisfy the numerosity requirement.” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs may make common sense assumptions to support a finding of numerosity. Burley v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 735, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4439 at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2005); Pecere v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 194 F.R.D. 66, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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The City also asserts “grave doubt” regarding the adequacy of representation of the named class. (City Mem. 57.) These doubts are premised on the erroneous contention that the named plaintiffs were properly denied benefits. As explained supra in Section I.B.2, today and at all times relevant to their applications for public benefits, all of the named plaintiffs were eligible and continue to be eligible for public benefits. In fact, the City has made determinations regarding the current eligibility of the named plaintiffs, issuing ongoing benefits to all of the named plaintiffs and retroactive benefits to all but one plaintiff (M.K.B.).
The State defendants attack plaintiffs' numerosity showing on evidentiary grounds as “hearsay” inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 802. (State Mem. 52). However, neither Cokely v. NYCCOC, No. 00 Civ. 4637 (CBM) 2003 WL 1751738 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003), cited by the State defendants, nor any other authority, precludes consideration of hearsay evidence per se under Rule 23. Finally, the State defendants suggest that the proposed class should not be certified because the class definition includes “qualified alien categories which are not represented by the named plaintiffs.” (State Mem. 50.) This is simply incorrect. The only categories of qualified aliens included in the class are battered qualified aliens and lawful permanent residents who have been in that status for less than five years. Named plaintiffs M.K.B., L.W., M.E., P.E., A.I., Denise Thomas, J.Z are all qualified aliens, and plaintiff Anna Fedosenko is an lawful permanent resident.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motions should be granted.
M.K.B., O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2006 WL 739012 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

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For Opinion See 2006 WL 3230162, 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 2006 WL 453215, 414 F.Supp.2d 469
United States District Court, S.D. New York. M.K.B. O.P., L.W., M.A. Marieme Diongue, M.E. P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor
children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Health, Defendants. No. 05 Civ 10446 (JSR). 2005.
City Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for A Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ... 2
Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs ... 3
Policy Directives ... 7
Policies/Procedures regarding the Benefits to Which Immigrant Aliens May be Entitled ... 8
Training ... 10
Related Case-Reynolds v. Giuliani ... 11
The Named Plaintiffs ... 15
ARGUMENT
POINT I BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY TO ENJOIN GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST PURSUANT TO A STATUTORY OR REGULATORY SCHEME, THEIR MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DENIED ... 17
A. Plaintiffs Cannot Demonstrate Irreparable Injury ... 20
B. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits ... 22
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1. Plaintiffs are barred from asserting their claims by the doctrine of res judicata ... 22
2. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that even the named plaintiffs have a clear legal right to the relief sought. ... 25
3. Plaintiffs do not have a clear legal right to relief as they do not have an enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce the statutes and regulations they alleged HRA violated ... 35
A. The Federal Food Stamp Act ... 36
B. Medicaid ... 37
C. Under Gonzaga, Absent An Express Cause Of Action, A Federal Spending Provision May Be Enforced In Court Only If The Text And Structure Of The Statute Indicate That Congress Unambiguously Intended To Create A Privately Enforceable Federal Right ... 39
D. The Food Stamp Act and Regulations on Which Plaintiffs Rely evince no intent by Congress to create an enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. §1983 ... 44
(i) The express statutory language of 7 U.S.C.§2020(e)(3) and 7 U.S.C.§2020 (e)(2)(B) does not evince an intent by Congress to create an enforceable right ... 44
(ii) The federal regulations, 7 CFR §§ 273.2 (a) and (g), 7 C.F.R. §273.6(b) and §273.10(g)(1) which interpret the Food Stamp Act, do not evince a Congressional intent to create an enforceable federal right ... 47
E. The Sections of the Medicaid Law and Regulations on Which Plaintiffs Rely Evince No Intent By Congress To Create An Enforceable Right Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 ... 50
(i) The express statutory language of 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(8) does not evince an intent by Congress to create an enforceable right ... 51
(ii) The Medicaid Regulations On Which Plaintiffs Rely, 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.906; 435.911; 435.912; and 435.910 are not enforceable under Section 1983 ... 52
POINT II PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION SHOULD BE DENIED ... 55
Standard for Class Certification ... 55
CONCLUSION ... 59
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) ... 48, 50

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Alexander v. Novello, 210 F.R.D. 27 (E.D.N.Y/ 2002) ... 52 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001) ... 48, 50 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ... 24 Associate of Community Organizations for Reform Now, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 344 ... 39, 43, 45, 46, 50, 51 Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999) ... 18, 25 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d. Cir. 1996) ... 18 Bishop, et al., v. New York City Department of HPD, 141 F.R.D. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ... 57 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) ... 40 Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ... 20, 21 Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3f (2002) ... 51 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) ... 40 Caridad v. Metropolitan-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999) ... 56 Cerpac v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ... 19 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 24 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) ... 53 Community Health Care Association of New York v. Min De Parle, 69 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ... 52 D.D. v. New York City Board of Education, 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5189 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004) ... 18, 20, 27 Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998) ... 52 Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) ... 19 Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986) ... 42 Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2002) ... 18 Gherardi v. New York, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 28548 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2005) ... 24 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) ... 35 Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S. Ct. 2268, [INSERT JUMP CITE] (2002) ... passim
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Graus v. Kaladjian, 2F. Supp. 2d 540 (Rakoff, J. 1998) ... 47, 48 Himes v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1993) ... 40 JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990) ... 18 Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979) ... 18 Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) ... 15 Latino Officers Associate v. City of New York, 196 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 1999) ... 18 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) ... 35, 41, 45 Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997) ... 24, 56 Monahan v. City Department of Correction, 10 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 214 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2000) ... 24 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 683 (1978) ... 53 Mundell v. Board of County Committee, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19815 (2005) ... 47, 55 Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) ... 25 Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) ... 53 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) ... 42 Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1989) ... 18 Reuters Ltd. v. United Press International, Inc., 903 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1990) ... 20 Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ... passim Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) ... 19 Sabree v Meade, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004 ) ... 52 Selby, et al v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co., 197 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ... 57 Sheehan v. Purlator, Inc, et al, 103 F.R.D.641 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 839 F.2d 99(2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988) ... 57 Sperry International Trade, Inc., 670 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982) ... 18 Taylor v. Vermont Department of Education, 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002) ... 42, 43 Tom Doherty Associate Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 214 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995) ... 20 Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) ... 40

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Tucker Anthony Realty Corp v Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1989) ... 20 Woodfield Equities, L.L.C. v. The Incorporated Village of Patchogue, 357 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D.N.Y.) aff'd 2005 U.S. App Lexis 26960 (2d Cir. 2005) ... 18 Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 2000) ... 18 Statutes 7 C.F.R. §173.10 ... 49 7 C.F.R. §273 ... passim 7 C.F.R. §276.1 ... 37 7 U.S.C.S. §2011 ... 23 7 U.S.C.S. §2013 ... 36 7 U.S.C.S. §2020 ... passim 7 U.S.C.S. §2024 ... 36 20 U.S.C. §1232 ... 39, 41, 42 20 U.S.C. §1681 ... 45 42 C.F.R. §430 ... 38, 39 42 C.F.R. §431.200 ... 39 42 C.F.R. §435.906 ... 35, 51, 52 42 C.F.R. §§435.911 ... passim 42 C.F.R. §§435.912 ... 35, 51, 52 42 U.S.C. §405 ... 39 42 U.S.C. §1395 ... 39 42 U.S.C. §1396 ... passim 42 U.S.C. §1983 ... passim 42 U.S.C. §2000 ... 42, 45 Civil Rights Act ... 42, 45, 48 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ... 24, 55, 56, 58 FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act) ... 39, 42, 45

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Food Stamp Act ... 36
Public Law 88-525 ... 36
DEFENDANT EGGLESTON'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND CLASS CERTIFICATION
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendant Eggleston, the Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”), submits this Memorandum of Law in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification. We submit that for the following reasons, this action is wholly improper and unnecessary and the motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.
1. All of the issues and claims raised herein have been resolved by the final judgment, (the “Reynolds Judgment”) entered on December 14, 2005 in the case of Reynolds v. Giuliani, 98 Civ 8877 (WMP).
2. The Reynolds Judgment contains an ongoing mechanism for addressing all of plaintiffs' allegations in this case. All of the complaints about the alleged failure of HRA to address the needs of the putative class representatives here could have been addressed within that framework, and specific issues have in fact been raised therein by plaintiffs' counsel.
3. Plaintiffs' advocates chose not to avail themselves of other avenues within HRA and the Reynolds mechanism available to them with respect to allegedly systemic failures in delivery of benefits, stopped communicating with the HRA office established specifically to address the needs of the putative class representatives, and did not communicate any of their concerns allegedly giving rise to this action to the HRA Legal Advisory Council on which plaintiffs' advocates sit..
4. Plaintiffs cannot show deliberate indifference to their rights under the Monell standard. The putative class should not be certified.
5. Plaintiffs do not have the right under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce the statutes and regulations invoked by them.
6. A majority of the named plaintiffs were properly denied public assistance until the defects in their applications were cured.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction as a matter of law. First, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they can meet the standard of proof required to obtain a preliminary injunction in the form of a mandatory injunction compelling government action, because they cannot prove any systemic deprivation of plaintiffs' right to public assistance. Second, all of the claims herein are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Third, the preliminary injunction sought would effectively grant the ultimate relief sought and impose a new regime on the entire system of benefits distribution by HRA. Fourth, plaintiffs are not suffering, nor do they face the prospect of suffering, irreparable injury.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs in this action allege a systemic indifference and antipathy to the needs of the putative plaintiff class. In fact, HRA has gone out of its way, on its own, and formerly in cooperation with plaintiff's advocates, to provide benefits to all immigrants and refugees entitled to those benefits. See accompanying Declaration of Elaine H. Witty, dated January 24, 2006 (“Witty Dec.”).
The putative class of plaintiffs is defined as All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have benefits discontinued or reduced; (c) have been or will be discouraged or preventing from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs
In 2000 HRA established the Office of Refugee and Immigrant Affairs (ORIA) to serve the City's immigrant communities. The mission of the office is to improve access for refugees, immigrants and limited English-speaking (LESA) applicants and participants to HRA programs and services. The office is responsible for oversight and implementation of all immigrant, refugee and LESA policies in HRA. (The immigrant, refugee and asylee population is collectively referred to herein as “Immigrants”).
There are two HRA Job Centers specifically established for the benefit of that client community, at 2 Washington Street in Manhattan, and in Brooklyn. Those Centers are staffed by workers specifically trained to deal with those special needs, with fluency in many languages. Witty Dec. ¶6.
Moreover, Elaine Witty, the Executive Director of ORIA has constantly been available to counsel for plaintiffs in their role as advocates for Immigrants, and responded to previous complaints of individual and systemic deficient handling of Immigrants' applications for public benefits. That is, until plaintiffs' counsel unilaterally discontinued communicating with Ms. Witty, and accumulated a list of grievances to form the basis of this class action[FN1] (Witty Dec. ¶¶46-48. ).
FN1. We note that plaintiffs' counsel have made themselves important fact witnesses in regard to both the merits of the action and the existence of a certifiable class. Inasmuch as their factual contentions will be the subject of both deposition and trial testimony, defendant is considering asking counsel to withdraw from representation of plaintiffs, or with the Court's permission, moving to disqualify counsel.
In fact, ORIA dealt with 35 individual complaints referred by client advocate groups between June 2002 and July 29, 2004. Those advocates were the Center for Battered Women's Services, The Legal Aid Society, New York Asian Women's Services, and New York Legal Assistance Group. ORIA attempted to institutionalize the interaction between advocacy groups and HRA, not just accept ad hoc communications. In 2004, it

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created a pilot program for advocacy groups. The task of the person running the program was to: “Investigate complaints by advocacy groups, seek resolution of the issue, log responses, coordinate response with other program areas, review Agency policy directives to ensure compliance with immigration and government benefits law; participate in policy initiatives and legislative analysis...”.
Basically, except for an isolated email from Elizabeth Saylor to Ms. Witty in April, 2005, the advocate groups chose not to avail themselves of this program, or the informal contacts with ORIA, after September 2004. (Witty Dec. ¶49). Previously, plaintiffs counsel Saylor, Baum and Ganju had communicated directly with Ms. Witty, or her subordinates, with respect to specific clients (Witty Dec. ¶¶29-48).
Ms. Witty's office acted, in fact, as an advocate for immigrants generally, and especially for battered immigrants. On March 10, 2004, at the invitation of Julie Dinnerstein, with whom Ms. Witty had previously worked, Ms. Witty attended the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, City Bar center Training on Public benefits for Battered Immigrants (see Exhibit A to the Witty Dec.). The speakers at this training were: Julie Dinnerstein, Elizabeth Saylor of the Legal Aid Society, Jennifer Baum of the Legal Aid Society, Reena Ganju of Sanctuary for Families, and Barbara Weiner of the Greater Upstate Law Project.
This training was primarily attended by immigrant advocates and attorneys involved in pro bono work on behalf of battered immigrants. Julie Dinnerstein gave an introduction and overview of “the confusing world of immigration and public benefits. (See Exhibit B to Witty Dec. p. 2). On Slide# 1 of the PowerPoint presentation, the first Question states, “Is there an easy way to figure out the immigration status of a client who comes to your office?” Answer: “No.”[FN2]
FN2. Slide 3 of the PowerPoint entitled, “Variety in Immigration Land Variety in Public benefits Land = Confusion,” states, “in reality there are over 60 different kinds of visas that a non-US citizens/non-green card holders might have; there are 45 different categories of non-US citizens authorized to work in the United States.”. Slide 6 of the PowerPoint entitled, “Slicing and dicing immigration statutes, “states, “there are too many different immigration situations to review in any single training.” Slide 18 of the Power Point entitled, “PRUCOL The immigration situation that is NOT an immigration status,” states, “In many ways, PRUCOL, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.” At Slides 74 and 78 of the PowerPoint, instructions were given on using “Reynolds Informal Relief forms, and at Slides 81 and 83, instructions were given as to the use of “Reynolds Complaints.” At Slides 77 and 85, instructions were given on the use of “Brown Relief.”
At a virtually identical training at Fordham University” Interdisciplinary Center for Family and Child Advocacy on September 30, 2004, the PowerPoint there again contained references to “Reynolds Relief” and “Brown Relief.” See Witty Dec. Ex. C. Three of plaintiffs' counsel, Dinnerstein, Saylor and Ganju were presenters.
As will be addressed in more detail below, one of the items discussed by Ms. Ganju was “Reynolds Relief.” In the Power Point presentation, Ms. Ganju referred to “Reyn-
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olds Informal Relief Form,” and gave the following examples of illegal deterrence covered by Reynolds: client is orally told she is ineligible based on status; client is told she needs a SSN to get benefits; client is told the case will only be opened for citizen children; client is told she came to wrong welfare center; client is told to come back tomorrow.
Ms. Ganju further instructed that in a sample case the client's advocate could file a “Reynolds Complaint Form,” As will be discussed in more detail below, the Declaration of David Lock, Esq., dated January 24, 2006 (“Lock Dec.”) sets forth the evolution of the Reynolds case and requests for relief. In fact, client advocates sought Reynolds intervention on behalf of one of the declarants in this case, N.E. The Legal Aid Society specifically referred to Ms. E. as a “Reynolds class member”. (Lock Dec. ¶12g).
ORIA continues to actively pursue adaptations to changing legal standards and procedures mandated by the state and federal governments, and to propose program and training modifications to respond to those mandates and field conditions. (Witty Dec. ¶64).
In addition to helping HRA create policy directives concerning immigrant and refugee affairs, Ms. Witty conducted training for HRA personnel. Ms. Witty conducted training in how to process applications for public benefits for the FIA Office of Training in November, and December of 2004, June, 2005 and November, 2005. Additionally, she conducted training at a Refugee Center (Job Center 47) on four dates in October, 2005. (Witty Dec. ¶53).
In the 2004 and June, 2005 trainings, Ms. Witty was accompanied by Shyconia BurdenNoten of the New York District United States Custom and Immigration Service (USCIS). Ms. Noten is the USCIS community affairs officer. She came to HRA and launched the USCIS Guide for Immigrants which was then color xeroxed and distributed. She brought with her the USCIS codes utilized for I-94 cards and LPR codes. She also explained the various immigrant and non-immigrant codes and what it means to be an immigrant or a non-immigrant. Ms. Witty took the information Ms. Noten presented and translated that into the government benefits context, utilizing the W-205V desk guide and advocacy cases as illustrations to review proper procedures. (Witty Dec. ¶52).
Ms. Witty consistently made herself available to counsel for plaintiffs in their role as advocates for Immigrants, and responded to previous complaints of individual and systemic deficient handling of Immigrants applications for public benefits. That is, until plaintiffs' counsel unilaterally discontinued communicating with Ms. Witty, and accumulated a list of grievances to form the basis of this class action. (Witty Dec. ¶49).
Basically, except for an isolated email from Elizabeth Saylor to Ms. Witty in April, 2005, the advocate groups chose not to avail themselves of this program, or the informal contacts with ORIA, after September 2004. Previously, plaintiffs counsel Saylor, Baum and Ganju had communicated directly with Ms. Witty, or her subordin-
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ates, with respect to specific clients.
Policy Directives
James Whelan is the Deputy Commissioner of the Office of Policy procedures and Training in the Family Independence Administration (“FIA”). His Declaration outlines his responsibilities, including the development and issuance of written procedures and policies for FIA's Job Centers. FIA also conducts appropriate training in these procedures to facilitate their implementation. (Declaration of James Whelan, dated January 25, 2006 (“Whelan Dec.”) ¶1, submitted herewith.).
Applicants may apply for public benefits such as cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid at Job Centers. It is the practice and policy of HRA that each applicant seeking assistance, whether it be for food stamps, cash assistance or Medicaid benefits (in conjunction with other benefits, or alone) be allowed to apply for such benefits on the date when the applicant first seeks to apply, and be provided with a written determination in regard to such application for benefits. (Whelan Dec. ¶3). Additionally, it has been and continues to be the policy and practice of HRA to train job center staff on eligibility requirements of aliens for public benefits, and the steps necessary to implement determinations in regard to public benefits for aliens, including implementation of fair hearing decisions. (Whelan Dec.¶3.)
The policies and procedures in effect for FIA's Job Centers necessarily have evolved over the years in order to account for changes in applicable law, directives and other guidance provided by State regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over HRA, that relate to the provision of benefits to aliens, and the development of the HRA electronic Paperless Office System (“POS”).
Policies/Procedures regarding the Benefits to Which Immigrant Aliens May be Entitled
The FIA has developed numerous policies and procedures which apply generally to all applicants for cash assistance, food stamps and Medicaid. These policies and procedures are applicable to aliens who apply for public benefits, all of whom are included within the class of all individuals who are eligible for public benefits. The Whelan Declaration concentrates on procedures that specifically pertain to aliens. Because of the volume of the material, only certain of these documents are presented for discussion.
Policy Directive (“PD”) #00-62R reiterates that “Any person has the right to file an application for public assistance. This includes the individual applying, any adult member of his family or any person acting on his/her behalf such as a relative, friend, other agency or institution. Under no circumstances is a person to be denied the right to file an application for Public Assistance. This includes situations where it is clear that the person is ineligible (such as an undocumented alien) or when it appears that the person has already applied and is pending a decision.” PD#0062-R is annexed to the Whelan Dec. as Exh A.
Alien eligibility for food stamps was addressed in Policy Bulletin (“PB”) #03-88 which was issued after changes in Food Stamp legislation. P.B. #03-88 is annexed to

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the Whelan Declaration as Exhibit B. In that extensive Policy Bulletin formatted as questions and answers, there is an entire section dealing with victims of domestic abuse including the rules regarding battered aliens, and the conditions that must be met to obtain qualified alien status in that category. The Policy Bulletin specifically included in a list of documentation which would show that an alien has an approved or pending petition which makes a prima facie case for alien status such as “a Form I-130,” a “self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act” or “an application for cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation filed as a victim of domestic violence.” See Exh. B to the Whelan Dec. at p. 20.
The policy that “an alien's eligibility for social service benefits is based on the immigration status s/he is granted by the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS)” and that “the immigrations status must be verified as a condition of eligibility” is contained in P.D. #03-36-ELI. which also sets forth the steps for the worker to take in regard to the documentation of that status. P.D. #03-36-ELI is annexed to the Whelan Dec. as Ex. C.
Policy and procedures have been issued for the verification and documentation of alien eligibility. In Policy Bulletin #05-38-)PE, dated February 24, 2005, the revised Alien Eligibility Desk Aid (W-205V0, which replaced prior versions of the desk aid, was issued. A copy of P.B. #05-38-OPE is annexed to the Whelan Declaration as Exhibit D.
Policy Bulletin #04-171-ELI was issued after tighter controls were imposed by the Social Security Administration on the issuance of social security numbers to aliens following September 11, 2001. That Policy Bulletin contained specific instructions for processing applications by individuals with pending or approved I-130 or 1-360 petitions who were not able to obtain a Social Security Number. Policy Bulletin #04-171 ELE is annexed as Exhibit E to the Whelan Dec.. Policy Directives have been issued in regard to the Paperless Office System (POS) utilized in the Job Centers. Policy Directive #05-42-SYS, dated November 29, 2005, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit F to the Whelan Dec., sets forth recent revisions to POS. Significantly, this update enables POS to capture the date a non-citizen applicant entered the United States, and the date the non-citizen applicant obtained legal status.
Training
In addition to the training conducted by ORIA set out in the Witty Declaration, FIA routinely conducts training with regard to Policy Directives and other policies and procedures. Center-based trainers employed by the Office of Training Operations attend a “train the trainer” session at the beginning of every month. These sessions are at least one full day a month, and sometimes two full days. Center-based trainers are instructed in new Policy Directives and Policy Bulletins that were drafted and approved during the preceding month. Senior trainers use curricula that are to be used to train Job Center staff during the coming month. The Center-based trainers then return to their Job Centers and train the Center staff over the course of the month in the new Policy Directives and Policy Bulletins. (Whelan Dec. ¶ 12, 13).
Policy Directives and policy bulletins are routinely posted on FIA's web site and
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are widely distributed to all FIA workers who interview applicants.
There are also numerous resources not only for staff but clients and their representatives if there are questions at any time that concern alien eligibility for public benefits, including the assistance provided by ORIA. Technical assistance is also available from MIS in regard to applications including assistance with POS and the New York State WMS system related to applicant eligibility and determination of benefits. (Whelan Dec. ¶15).
Related Case-Reynolds v. Giuliani
As discussed in the Argument below, the plaintiffs in this case are clearly members of the class certified in another case in this Court, Reynolds v. Giuliani, 98 CV 8877 (WMP), in which a final judgment was entered on December 14, 2005. A brief summary of the relationship of that case to the instant matter, is set forth in the accompanying Lock Dec. David Lock is Deputy General Counsel in the Office of Legal Affairs of HRA. He supervises a unit of attorneys and support staff called the Litigation and Program Counseling Unit that provides litigation support for class action litigation including Reynolds. The Reynolds litigation addressed most of the issues raised in the instant case. Indeed, the plaintiffs attorneys in the instant case have freely invoked Reynolds to obtain relief for individual clients, whom they characterized as Reynolds class members. (Lock Dec. ¶ 2).
The complaint in Reynolds, (Exhibit A to the Lock Dec.), filed in December, 1998, initially focused on the conversion of New York City welfare centers from the Income Support Center model to the Job Center model, which is currently in effect. The complaint alleged that in converting centers from Income Support Centers to Job Centers, HRA maintained a policy and practice of: i) providing false and misleading information about the availability of food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance; ii) prohibiting individuals from applying for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance on the first day they visit the Job Center; iii) discouraging and deterring individuals from filing applications for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, including applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigative grants; iv) pressuring individuals to withdraw applications for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, including applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigative grants; v) failing to process all applications for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, including applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigative grants, within the time frames required by law; vi) failing to make eligibility determinations for food stamps and Medicaid separate from eligibility determinations for cash assistance; and vii) failing to send individuals timely and adequate written notices of determinations for any and all benefits applied for. See Reynolds Complaint, Request for Relief. (Lock Dec. ¶ 3).
In an order dated December 23, 1998, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit B to the Lock Dec., the court in Reynolds established an “informal intervention” process whereby HRA would review any individual cases brought to their attention by the Reynolds plaintiffs' counsel.

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In an order dated January 25, 1999, the court in Reynolds issued a preliminary injunction against HRA. In addition to halting the conversion of Income Support Centers to Job Centers, the preliminary injunction directed HRA to 1) continue the “informal intervention” process established in the December 23, 1998 order; 2) allow individuals to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance, including expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigative grants, on the first day they visit a Job Center; 3) process all applications for expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigative grants at Job Centers within the time frames required by law; 4) make eligibility determinations regarding food stamps and Medicaid applications at Job Centers separate from the eligibility determinations for cash assistance; and 5) send individuals applying for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, including expedited food stamps and temporary pre-investigative grants at Job Centers timely and adequate written notices of determinations of eligibility for all the benefits they seek.
In an order dated July 21, 2000, the court in Reynolds certified a class consisting of “all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center.” Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). No provision was made to exempt non-citizen applicants from the Reynolds class.
The parties went to trial on the merits in April 2001. The trial focused on an audit of applications submitted in September 2000. The audit was conducted under protocols agreed to by the parties. Non-citizen applicants were not excluded from the audit (Lock Dec. ¶8).
In a decision dated February 14, 2005, the court issued a permanent injunction against the HRA and the State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2743. The court directed the parties to submit judgment consistent with the court's decision. On December 14, 2005, one day after the filing of the instant case, the court in Reynolds issued its final judgment. A copy of the judgment is annexed as Exhibit C to the Lock Dec.
The judgment requires HRA to: 1) provide expedited food stamps to eligible class members within the time frames established by federal and state law; 2) process applications for food stamps and Medicaid separately when an application for cash assistance is denied or withdrawn; 3) provide class members with adequate and timely notice confirming voluntary withdrawals for Medicaid and/or document withdrawals of food stamp applications; 4) provide class members with adequate and timely notice of decisions on eligibility for cash assistance (including immediate needs cash grants); food stamps (including expedited food stamps) and Medicaid by correctly completing the applicable forms; 5) provide class members with accurate information concerning eligibility for cash assistance, food stamps and Medicaid in relation to a withdrawal from the cash assistance, food stamp or Medicaid programs; and 6) provide immediate needs cash grants on the day of application to eligible class members. Reynolds Judgment ¶3.
The Judgment does not differentiate between citizen and non-citizen applicants. In

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addition, the Judgment requires HRA to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with several sets of monitoring reports, including a semi-annual sample of 200 applications that are to be reviewed to determine whether HRA incorrectly denied expedited food stamps and/or immediate needs cash grants for lack of food. Non-citizen applicants are included in the sample. The Judgment also requires HRA to provide certain notices of eligibility determination. Judgment ¶9. Finally, the Judgment continues to provide a mechanism for plaintiffs' counsel to obtain individual relief for alleged violations of the Judgment. Judgment ¶6.
Plaintiffs counsel in the instant case have long viewed immigrant eligibility determinations as falling within the scope of the Reynolds preliminary injunction, and have utilized the Reynolds “informal intervention” process to obtain relief for clients they claim were wrongly denied benefits. The following are some examples of Reynolds informal intervenors brought by the plaintiffs' counsel that present issues identical to those in the instant case:
1. In a fax dated December 5, 2002 (Ex. D to the Lock Dec.) the Legal Aid Society invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of A. F. Legal Aid's fax alleged that Mr. F was incorrectly denied benefits to which he was entitled as a PRUCOL.
2. In a fax dated December 10, 2003 (Ex. E to the Lock Dec.) the Legal Aid Society invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of C. V.. Legal Aid's fax alleged that Ms. V. was incorrectly denied benefits to which she was entitled as a PRUCOL.
3. In a fax dated May 27, 2002 (Ex. F to the Lock Dec.) the Legal Aid Society invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of R.A. Legal Aid's fax, which included a copy of a letter from Legal Aid attorney Elizabeth Saylor, alleged that Ms. A. was incorrectly denied benefits to which she was entitled based on her status as a lawful permanent resident.
4. On December 12, 2005, one day before filing the instant lawsuit, the New York Legal Assistance Group submitted a letter (Ex. G to the Lock Dec.) in which it invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of R.F. NYLAG's letter alleged that Ms. F was incorrectly denied benefits to which she was entitled as a VAWA self-petitioner.
5. In a fax dated January 30, 2004 (Ex. H. to the Lock Dec.) the Legal Aid Society invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of F. H. Legal Aid's fax alleged that she was incorrectly denied benefits to which she was entitled to as a VAWA self-petitioner.
6. In a letter dated February 14, 2005 (Ex. I to the Lock Dec.) NYLAG invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of W.S. NYLAG's letter, which included an accompanying letter from Reena Ganju of Sanctuary for Families, alleged that Ms. S. was incorrectly denied benefits to which she was entitled based on her immigration status and the fact that she is a domestic violence victim. Plaintiffs in the instant case included HRA's response to the February 14, 2005 letter in their papers
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in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction. See Declaration of Reena Ganju, Exhibit 34.
7. In a letter dated November 3, 2004 (Ex. J to the Lock Dec.) NYLAG invoked the Reynolds informal relief process on behalf of N.E. Ms. E has submitted a declaration in this case. NYLAG's letter alleges that she was incorrectly denied benefits to which she was entitled as a VAWA self-petitioner.
The Named Plaintiffs
A majority of the named plaintiffs who seek to represent the putative class, were in fact, properly denied benefits. (See further discussion below. and the deposition testimony of plaintiffs annexed to the accompanying Declaration of Jane Tobey Momo, dated January 25, 2005 (“Momo Dec.”).)
M.K.B.: In the case of M.K.B., an initial eligibility determination would be dependent on the existence of a pending or approved I-130 petition for Family Reunification plus proof of domestic violence. MKB did not have a pending or approved I-130 application at the time she applied for benefits in September 2005 as set forth in the excerpts from her deposition testimony taken in this action.
O. P.: OP remained unlawfully in the country after her tourist visa expired. She is a holder of a U Visa application/interim relief request which has expired as of January 24, 2006.
J.Z.: The deposition of J.Z. raised serious questions concerning her identity as she has three different benefit cards issued in 3 different names, two passports in different names, a marriage certificate and a birth certificate in different names and immigration documents where her name has been incorrectly indicated. J.Z.. was employed while her children received public assistance benefits, and she has incredibly claimed not to know that the husband had applied for public benefits for himself and the children while J.Z. and her husband were living together. There is also a serious question about whether benefits for J.Z.'s children were utilized for their benefit or were accessed by J.Z. at a time when she has testified that she did not access those benefits. When J.Z. applied for benefits in July 2004 she did not submit sufficient documentation for herself in order to qualify for benefits. J.Z. should have submitted an I-130 family reunification petition together with proof of domestic violence but did not do so. After a period of time, J.Z. obtained a primafacie notice in regard to an 1-360 petition and then presented the prima facie notice at a job center and was determined eligible for benefits for the period of time until the I-360 prima facie notice expired. Subsequently J.Z. obtained and presented an approved I-360 and received benefits for herself.
L.W.: L.W. admittedly does not have an I-130 notice or approval or an I-360 prima facie notice or approval under VAWA. While L.W. has a Visa, that Visa expired on September 29, 2005. Although L.W.'s assessment of her own condition is that she is disabled, she admittedly worked in 2005. Like many of the other individual plaintiffs L.W. did not fully understand what had been written in her declaration that she signed in connection with the plaintiffs application for a preliminary in-
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junction in this case.
Marieme. Diongue: This plaintiff does not even live in New York City according to her N.Y.S. Identification card issued on April 13, 2005, she lives in ?? which is in ?? She is not entitled to benefits from the City of New York.
M.E.: M.E. did not provide sufficient documentation to the job center at the times she applied for benefits. She should have presented an I-130 with proof of domestic violence, in order to obtain benefits for herself and her immigrant daughter. She didn't do so. M.E. did receive benefits for her two citizen children. In addition, M.E. failed to cooperate in obtaining documentation in regard to social security.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY TO ENJOIN GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST PURSUANT TO A STATUTORY OR REGULATORY SCHEME, THEIR MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DENIED.
A preliminary injunction is considered to be “an extraordinary remedy” that should not be routinely granted. D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5189 *73 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004) (citing JSG Trading Corp. v. TrayWrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1990)). When a preliminary injunction “seeks to stay governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,” it is necessary to establish (a) that the injunctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm, and (b) that the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits of the underlying claim. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d. Cir. 1996), cert den. 520 U.S. 1251 (1997) (citing Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1989)).
This “likelihood of success” standard is more rigorous than the alternate, “sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief,” which is ordinarily available to a movant seeking injunctive relief. Id. (citing Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc., 670 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979))). It is well established in this Circuit that this extraordinarily high “likelihood of success” standard of proof is necessary to enjoin government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme. See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F. 3d 570, 573-74 (2d Cir. 2002); Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2000); Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999); Latino Officers Assoc. v. City of New York, 196 F. 3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1999); Woodfield Equities, L.L.C. v. The Incorporated Village of Patchogue, 357 F. Supp. 2d 622, 635 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 2005 U.S. App LEXIS 26960 (2d Cir. 2005).
Moreover, when an injunction is mandatory, in that it will alter the status quo, rather than prohibitory, which would maintain the status quo, the standard for show-

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ing both irreparable harm and likelihood of success is even higher. Cerpac v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761, 773 (2d Cir. 1981).
Furthermore, injunctive relief is not warranted if the defendant has initiated efforts to substantially comply with statutory mandates, and the Court may consider extrinsic factors and the defendants' activities and efforts in determining that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a clear or substantial likelihood of success. D.D., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5189 at *80-82. See also Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (“In the context of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise”).
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, HRA has, since the creation of ORIA, a standing policy and practice of not only accepting suggestions from immigrant client advocates with respect to improving the system, it actively encourages and solicits demonstration of flaws and suggestions for improvement. Not only was ORIA open to communication at all time, but it created a pilot program to investigate complaints from advocacy groups and resolve the issues. While plaintiffs' advocates purportedly made case specific complaints to the agency's middle management, they were avoiding bringing the alleged systemic violations to the attention of the office created to handle those problems.
Where plaintiffs seek preliminary relief that will provide them with “substantially all the relief sought” in the underlying action, the standard for plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction is even higher. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996). Not only must plaintiffs meet the burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits, but the showing they make must be “clear” or “substantial.” Tom Doherty Assoc. Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 60 F3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995). As, with the exception of case specific action for the named plaintiffs, the plaintiffs seek all their final relief in this motion for a preliminary injunction; they cannot meet the appropriate burden of proof for such relief.
A. Plaintiffs Cannot Demonstrate Irreparable Injury.
On a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court will first consider whether the movant has established that he suffered irreparable injury; “the moving party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the issuance of an injunction will be considered.” Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 903 F. 2d 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1990). In fact, the showing of irreparable harm is “the single most important prerequisite” for a preliminary injunction. D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 03 CV 2489, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5189 *73 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2004) (citing Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)). Furthermore, the irreparable harm must be “imminent,” not “remote or speculative.” Id. (citing Brown 158 F.R.D. at 264 (quoting Tucker Anthony Realty Corp v Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989))).
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate on this record that they will suffer irreparable harm because HRA has constructed a program and methodology to accommodate the needs of
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the putative class, and is open to suggestions for improvement to the processes designed to aid these applicants for public benefits. Moreover, plaintiffs' advocates have in the past successfully used “Reynolds relief” and “Brown relief” on issues of immigrant eligibility for benefits. Indeed, as demonstrated above, plaintiffs' counsel and HRA worked for a period of time to devise a cooperative plan for advocacy for immigrants and refugees. Thus, even if plaintiffs do not use the ORIA process, they simply cannot show irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted, because as is the case with the named plaintiffs, individual grievances have been addressed, and will continue to be addressed, through the Reynolds and Brown enforcement mechanisms.
With respect to plaintiffs' allegations regarding the inadequacies of the computer generated instructions and processing programs designed to address the needs of the putative class, HRA will accept notification in the same manner as currently being employed, and plan for and correct deficiencies that are discovered. HRA acknowledges that in fact one category of eligible aliens, those with an approved or pending immigrant visa petition (Form I-130) with evidence of domestic violence, are not accommodated within the agency's computer program. HRA is in the process of remedying the situation now.
The Declaration of Seth Diamond, Executive Deputy Commissioner of FIA, identifies not only the computer issue that HRA is willing to address, but states that in addition to the ORIA resources, HRA will appoint specialists to work with Job Center employees before Immigrants are declared ineligible for benefits. Additionally, HRA will seek from the State expanded flexibility in making food stamp and disability Medicaid eligibility determinations. This will help Job Center case workers provide for immediate needs where appropriate. Further, HRA will issue a revised procedure covering issues relating to battered aliens and PRUCOL. HRA will then provide training on the new procedure to all appropriate personnel.
Thus, apart from the case by case relief presently available to plaintiffs and other putative class members, HRA is moving forward to address those systemic problems that can be identified and dealt with. If plaintiffs have both individual remedies and responsiveness to systemic concerns, they cannot be said to be suffering irreparable injury.
As noted above, HRA has been proactive in developing programs to assist immigrants and refugees in obtaining public benefits, not, as plaintiff alleges, resistant to complying. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable injury if the Court denies the motion for a preliminary injunction.
B. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits.
1. Plaintiffs are barred from asserting their claims by the doctrine of res judicata
Plaintiffs assert that they are representing a class consisting of: All Affected Immigrants who are, have been, or will be eligible for state or federally funded public assistance, Medicaid, or food stamps, and who either (a) have been or will be denied public benefits in whole or in part; (b) had or will have be-
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nefits discontinued or reduced, (c) have been or will be discouraged or preventing from applying; (d) have been or will be encouraged to withdraw an application by a New York City job center because of a misapplication of immigrant eligibility rules.
In Reynolds v. Giuliani, 98CV 8877 (WMP), the court certified a class consisting of “all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center”.
Clearly, the class for which certification is sought here is subsumed in the class certified in Reynolds. Although the plaintiffs in Reynolds originally sought to enjoin the conversion of Income Support Centers to Job Centers, before the trial on the merits of the permanent injunction, plaintiffs agreed to vacate the prohibition against conversion, and attacked HRA's determination of eligibility for, and distribution of, public benefits across the board. The evolution of the Reynolds litigation is set out in the Lock Dec., which, along with the Witty Dec., also demonstrates: that one of the declarants here claimed to be a member of the Reynolds class, that plaintiffs' counsel instructed client advocates to apply for “Reynolds relief”, and that the primary issues raised here were litigated and adjudicated in Reynolds.
We are at a loss to understand how plaintiffs can assert class status here without reference to Reynolds. Where one of the declarants on the motion for a preliminary injunction (N.E.) has been asserted by counsel here to be a member of the Reynolds class, it would seem that even if this case need not have been filed as a related case, it is incumbent on plaintiffs to explain why this putative class is not subsumed within the Reynolds class.
In certifying the class action in Reynolds in 2000, Judge Pauley found that “Like the Marisol A. court, this Court believes ‘the myriad [of] constitutional, regulatory and statutory provisions invoked by the plaintiffs are properly understood as creating a single scheme for the delivery of... welfare and as setting standards of conduct for those charged with providing such services- standards that the defendants are alleged to have violated in a manner common to the plaintiff class”. (118 F. 2d 352 at 390)
Plaintiffs here allege a sweeping indictment of the delivery of public benefits to those for whom their advocates have sought relief within Reynolds. In his decision of February 14, 2005, containing finding of facts and conclusions of law, Judge Pauley decided issues raised concerning the following areas of the delivery of benefits: 1. Expedited Food Stamps 2. Immediate Needs Grants 3. Separate Determinations for Food Stamps and Medicaid 4. Application Withdrawals 5. Provision of Notices
(2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2743)
Here, as in Reynolds, plaintiffs claim that they were denied the benefits to which
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they were entitled under the Federal Food Stamp program, 7 U.S.C § 2011, et seq., Medicaid, 42 U.S.C 1396, et seq., the New York State Food Assistance Program, (Laws of 1997, ch. 436, Part B) and Federal and State Public Assistance.
The Judgment entered in Reynolds on December 14, 2005 was sweeping with respect to both declaratory and injunctive relief. See Exhibit “C” to the Lock Declaration.
Clearly, whatever issues raised in the complaint herein that were not actually resolved in that case could have been raised there. Indeed, advocates for battered aliens sought and received “Reynolds relief” for members of the putative class here. Moreover, there is a continuing enforcement provision in the Reynolds Judgment that requires the City to “provide Plaintiffs' counsel with a mechanism to notify them of written complaints regarding the individual cases, to investigate the complaints and address the complaints promptly, reporting to Plaintiffs; counsel.”
Moreover, plaintiffs could have easily sought certification as a sub-class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ( c )(4) which would have been completely appropriate under the circumstances. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378-379 (2d Cir. 1997).
Under these circumstances, application of the doctrine of res judicata is appropriate. The doctrine applies in a §1983 case. Alien v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980). The doctrine takes effect when (1) there exists an adjudication on the merits in a prior lawsuit, (2) the prior lawsuit involved the party to be precluded or a party in privity with that party, and (3) the claim sought to be precluded was raised, or might reasonably have been raised in the prior lawsuit. Monahan v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Correction, 10 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 214 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2000); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F. 3d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1995); Monahan, supra, 10 F.Supp. 2d at 423. Gherardi v. New York, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 28548 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2005).
The doctrine applies where the party to be precluded is a member of a group that has brought an action on behalf of its members. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F. 2d 675, 679 (2d Cir. 1989). The parties are at least partly self defined as members of the Reynolds class, represented at least in part by the same counsel; that counsel has sought “Reynolds relief” for some putative class members, all issues relating to the application for benefits and eligibility determinations were raised, or could have been raised in Reynolds, and the judgment entered there provides a continuing methodology for relief for the putative class members.
The use of “Reynolds Intervention” Forms in behalf of putative class members, clearly establishes that Immigrant eligibility issues were part of the Reynolds case, which resulted in a final judgment. And, as noted above, to the extent that the putative class here requires special resources, those resources are available, and have been utilized, in the Reynolds intervention procedure.
2. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that even the named plaintiffs have a clear legal right to the relief sought.

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Each of the named plaintiffs here had difficulty in obtaining benefits, and the complaint alleges that HRA was at fault in every instance. However, at the depositions of these plaintiffs a different story emerged. In almost every case the required documentation to demonstrate eligibility for benefits was not provided.
M.K.B.
In the case of M.K.B., an initial eligibility determination would be dependent on the existence of a pending or approved I-130 petition for Family Reunification plus proof of domestic violence. MKB did not have a pending or approved I-130 application at the time she applied for benefits in September 2005 as set forth in the excerpts from her deposition testimony taken in this action which are summarized below.[FN3]
FN3. Excerpts of Deposition Transcripts of the named plaintiffs are annexed to the accompanying Declaration of Jane Tobey Momo, dated January 25, 2006. (“Momo Dec.”). All references to the Transcript (Tr.) are to the portions of deposition testimony of the relevant plaintiff
M.K.B.'s husband applied for an I-130 on her behalf. Tr. p. 70, lines 3-7; Tr. p. 86 lines 20-22.). The I-130 petition was denied. (Tr. p. 89, lines 11 - 21), in a decision dated August 24, 2005 which was provided to Rena [Ganju], her attorney at the time. ( Tr. pp. 91 lines. 13 - 17 and 21 - 22.; p. 93 lines 1 6.) The decision was appealed. (Tr. p. 94, lines 8 - 13).
After the 1-130 petition was denied, M.K.B. applied for benefits in September 2005 when she applied for Food Stamps, Medicaid and Cash Assistance for herself and her children. (Tr. pp. 95 -96 lines 14-21).
O.P.
OP remained unlawfully in the country after her tourist visa expired. She is a holder of a U Visa application/interim relief request which has expired as of January 24, 2006. Excerpts of her testimony (see Momo Dec. Ex. B.) are summarized below:
She came to New York from Peru May 22, 2001 as a visitor on a 6 month tourist visa and decided to stay in the United States. Tr. p. 30, line 19 - p. 32, line 7; p. An extension of her tourist visa was denied at the end of 6 months. Tr. p. 32, lines 2 - 21.
As of November 23, 2001 she did not have a visa or any immigration papers which allowed her to be in the US after the expiration of her tourist visa. Tr. p.35 lines 3 -12. She doesn't remember when she applied for a U Visa but more or less she applied for a U Visa in October of 2004. Tr. pp. 36 lines 4 - 10.
In April 2005 O.P. received the Notice of Deferred Action, Notice Date January 25, 2005 “Early U Visa application/Interim Relief Request.” Tr. p. 64 lines 4 - p. 65 line 22. and Exhibit OP7. The Deferred Action Validity Period, according to the Notice of Deferred Action (Exh. OP7) is January 25, 2005 to January 24, 2006. Tr. p. 64, Exh. OP 7. O.P. has not made any application for any other kind of Visa or for a green card. Tr. p 67 lines 9 - 11. O.P. did not sign or receive any papers with re-
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gard to an extension of the Early U Visa application/Interim Relief Request. Tr. p. 70 lines 4 20.
O.P. applied for benefits for the first time on May 15th or May 16th of 2005 and a second time on August 9, 2005. Tr. p. 80 lines 14 - p. 81 line 4. In May 2005 and August 9, 2005 she applied for public assistance, Medicaid and Food Stamps for herself and her two children L
A M. and daughter J P. Tr. pp. 82 lines 14 - 21; 25 - p. 83 lines 1 - 3; p. 88 11 23 - 25; p. 89, line 19 p. 90 line.7; pp. 91 line 24 - p. 92 line 2.
O.P. applied for public assistance, Medicaid and Food Stamps for herself and two children in October 2005. Tr. p93 line 6 - p. 94 - line 6; p. 98 line 25 - p. 99 line 5.
O.P. received a fair hearing in regard to the application for benefits in May 2005. p. 110 lines 12 - p. 111 line 3. In a Fair Hearing Compliance Statement (Exhibit K to Exh. OP 13) dated 8/25/05 received by O.P. she was informed that HRA cannot complete any compliance action until she supplied the information requested in the letter. Tr. p. 116 lines 1 23.
O.P. failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in regard to the applications for benefits of August 9, 2005 and October 2005. O.P. did not request a Fair Hearing in regard to her applications for benefits on August 9, 2005 and October 2005 although she was receiving assistance from and represented by Kevin Kanealy an attorney at NYLAG. Tr. 116 lines 24 - p. 118 line 15; p. 114 lines 1- 16.
J.Z.
The deposition of J.Z. raised serious questions concerning her identity as she has three different benefit cards issued in 3 different names, two passports in different names, a marriage certificate and a birth certificate in different names and immigration documents where her name has been incorrectly indicated. Excerpts of the testimony (see Momo Dec. Ex. C) are summarized below.
J.Z. has 3 benefit cards (used to access public benefits - public assistance and Food Stamps) in three different names, J Z J A and J A Tr. p. 7 line 1 - p11 line 9; JZ Exhibit 1; p. 15 line 9 - p. 16 line 3; JZ Exhibit 2; p. 17 line 10 - p. 18 line 1; p. 18 line 24 - p. 19 line 22; Tr. p. 23 line 14 - p. 24 line 21; JZ Exhibit 3.
J.Z.'s marriage certificate had her first name indicated incorrectly. Tr. p. 10 lines 1 - 12; JZ Exhibit 4.
J.Z. has two passports which have been issued to her in two different names: G J A and G Y A De Z Tr. p. 32 line 2 - p. 35 line 19; JZ Exhibit 5; Tr. p. 72 line 21 p. 74 line 11; JZ Exhibit 9. Although JZ testified that since she came to New York in 1985 she never left the United States, page two of what J.Z. identified as her passport (Exhibit J.Z. 9) contains a stamp indicating Santo Domingo and what J.Z. has identified as the alien number for her husband. Tr. p. 45 lines 13 - 24; p. 75 line 13 - p. 77 line 22;
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J.Z. presented a foreign passport to HRA on or about February 25, 2002 in connection with an application for food stamp and presented the passport she has identified as JZ Exhibit 9 to HRA. Tr. p. 77 lines 9 -22; JZ Exhibit 9.
J.Z.'s birth certificate is in the name of G Y A P which she has testified is not her correct name.p.39 line 2 - p. 40 line 23.
Immigration status of J.Z. and access to benefits:
J.Z. has provided a copy of an I-130 Receipt notice wherein she testified her name is incorrectly indicated as Z, J G. p. 51 line 17 - p. 52 line 2; p. 53 lines 7 18; JZ Exhibit 7.
J.Z. was born in Mexico and entered the United States when she was 7 or eight years old traveling from Puebla Mexico to Tijuana Mexico crossing the United States border into California and then going directly to New York. Tr. p. 44 line 20 - p. 45 line 17. She has not returned to Mexico since 1985, does not have any documents that would allow her to travel outside of the United States and has no green card or Social Security card and a Mexican passport issued only for identification purposes.. Tr. p. 46 line 25 - p. 47 line 6.
J.Z.'s husband, a holder of a green card, filed an I-130 petition on her behalf receipt of which was acknowledged in a notice dated May 16, 2001 (JZ Exhibit 7) and which was approved in a notice dated September 30, 2004 (JZ Exhibit 8) Tr. p.51 line 17 - p. 52 line 15; p. 56 lines 6-8; JZ Exhibit 8.
J.Z. has given conflicting testimony about when she no longer continued to live with her husband, testifying that she no longer lived together with her husband as of September 13, 2004 and as of July 5, 2004. Tr. p. 57 line 16 p. 58 line 2.
J.Z.. was employed while her children received public assistance benefits, and she has incredibly claimed not to know that the husband had applied for public benefits for himself and the children while J.Z. and her husband were living together. There is also a serious question about whether benefits for J.Z.'s children were utilized for their benefit or were accessed by J.Z. at a time when she has testified that she did not access those benefits. When J.Z. applied for benefits in July 2004 she did not submit sufficient documentation for herself in order to qualify for benefits. J.Z. should have submitted an I-130 family reunification petition together with proof of domestic violence but did not do so. After a period of time, J.Z. obtained a prima-facie notice in regard to an I-360 petition and then presented the prima facie notice at a job center and was determined eligible for benefits for the period of time until the I-360 prima facie notice expired. Subsequently J.Z. obtained and presented an approved I-360 and received benefits for herself.
J.Z. has two children, Ju Z and Ja Z who were born in the United States on 1997 and 2001 who are both United States citizens. Tr. p. 58 line 6 - p. 59 line18.
J.Z.'s husband was a barber and she testified that he stopped working in or around November 2003. Tr. p. 62, lines 21 - 24; p. 64 line 20 - p. 65 line 2 J.Z. worked in

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a supermarket beginning in the summer of 2003 until the beginning of 2004, earning $5.15 hour for an average of 20 - 25 hours a week, for which she was paid in case, and did not report her income to anyone. Tr. p. 59 line 19 - p. 60 line 17; p. 61 line 7 - 16; p. 62 line 12 - 14. Her husband stopped working but he used to get money from somewhere, and she testified she did not know where. Tr. p. 65 lines 8 16; p. 66 lines 5 - 7..
J.Z. testified that even though she knew that her husband could go and apply for public assistance benefits for himself and the children and that he stopped working in 2003 and that he was bringing in money she wasn't aware that he had applied for public benefits. Tr. p. 67 lines 5 - 21. J.Z. told her husband he could apply for public benefits and encouraged him to do so in 2003. Tr. p. 67 line 22 -p. 68 line 2. J.Z. had seen a card that looked like a Medicaid/Public Assistance card in December 2003 with her husband's name on it. Tr. p. Tr. p.90 line 10 - p. 91 line 1. Her husband told J.Z. that he applied for Medicaid in 2003. Tr. p. 91 lines 12 - 16.
J.Z. applied for Medicaid in February 2004 and May of 2004 and the applications were granted. Tr. p. 126 line 19 Tr. p. 127 line 25.
Exhibit JZ 10 is a notice of decision on public assistance, food stamps and medical assistance directed to Z Christian in which the “public assistance case has been RECERTIFIED for the period September 1, 2004 to August 31, 2005. Tr. p. 84 line 9 - p. 85 line 4. J.Z. testified that after she learned about this notice in September 2004 she went to public assistance and spoke to the worker to ask why she hasn't started receiving benefits and her husband was. Tr. p. p. 85 line 5 9.
J.Z. testified that she went to apply for public assistance and was told, only when she arrived at the center that her children had benefits and that it was time for her husband to recertify for public assistance and that the children's benefits were due for recertification. Tr. p. 86 line 25 - p. 87 line 7; p. 98 line 11 - p. 99 line 3.. However, J.Z. stated in her declaration that “in July 2004 after my husband left our apartment I went to Colgate Job Center No. 32 for recertification of my children's public benefits case. Tr. p. 99 lines 4 - 9; Exhibit JZ 11, Par. 16.
On the day J.Z. applied for benefits in July 2004 at the Colgate Job Center, she did not bring with her sufficient documentation for her to receive benefits for herself. She brought her passport, a police report, and although she testified that she brought a temporary order of protection she admitted that she did not provide the order of protection annexed as Exhibit I to her declaration, as it was dated July 2005 She could not identify what (if any) order of protection she provided. Tr. p. 109 line 24 - p. 110 line 8; JZ Exhibit 5; Exhibits F and I to J.Z. Exhibit 11. She also admitted that she did not submit an I-130 document but testified that she submitted it the following day. Tr. p. 110, lines 11 - 15.
J.Z. testified that she did not use any public benefits to support herself and children in July 2004 and supported herself through contributions from her family and her mother and had not other means of support. Tr. p. 93 - line 22 - p. 94 line 2. However, in her declaration (Exhibit JZ 11) she stated “in July 2004 I was unemployed. At that time my husband was receiving food stamps, public assistance and
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Medicaid for himself and our children. We supported ourselves with those benefits. Tr. p. 94 - lines 6 - p. 97 line 21; Exhibit JZ 11 at Par. 11.
J.Z. testified at first that she did not have her husbands EBT card but that she found it and learned the pin number - still insisting that she has never used it. Tr. p. 120, line 23 - p. 121 line 9. Upon information and belief the card was used to access benefits during the period July - September 2004. Tr. p. 146 lines 10 14; Tr. p. 125, lines 9 12.. She knew that if she had the PIN number and the card she could use the card to get benefits. Tr. p. 122 lines 9-15. She received a card in October 2004 which she used to pick up benefits from the card. Tr. p. 128 lines 3 - 6.
J.Z. received assistance from a lawyer in October 2004 to “fix her immigration status without the help of her husband.” The lawyer assisted her in filing for a VAWA self-petition in December or November 2004. Tr. p. 129 lines 8 - p. 131 line 3. She admittedly did not give the VAWA notice document to anyone in July 2004 when she went to the Colgate Job Center, and obtained it only months later. JZ Exh. 12; Tr. p. 134 lines 2 - 6. As of December 2004 J.Z. had not been informed that the prima facie notice had been issued. Tr. p. 140 lines 22 - 25.
J.Z. met with Mr. Martinez at HRA and showed him her prima facie notice in January 2005 which he gave to another HRA worker at the job center. Tr. p. 142 lines 10- 21. As of March 2005 JZ had been receiving cash assistance, and Medicaid, and she received a notice informing her of the determination in March 2005. Tr. p. 143 line 8 - p. 144 line 6. She requested a fair hearing in April 2005, after receiving a notice, because her benefits had decreased. Tr. p. 144 line 13 - p. 145 line 11. J.Z. admitted that her public assistance and food stamp amounts would change depending upon the type of facility where she lived, and that each time it changed she was aware that she was entitled to a hearing. Tr. p. 150 lines 18 - p. 151 line 19.
J.Z. showed her VAWA prima facie in connection with a recertification for public benefits in June 2005. Tr. p. 136 line 20 - p. 137 line 10. At the time she went to recertify she testified first that she had not received an approval notice of her VAWA self-petition and was told that her prima facie notice would expire in a few days after her certification. Tr. p. 154 line 8 - p. 155 line 2. J.Z. knew that her lawyer wrote to the U.S. Citizenship and Customs Service in a letter dated June 14, 2005 to “request an extension of her [J.Z.'s] I-130 prima facie determination which expires on June 18, 2005.” Tr. p. 155 lines 7-21; JZ Exhibit 14. J.Z. received benefits for June 2005 for that portion of the month before her prima facie notice expired and received a notice of the benefits she was going to get and understood that she could have a fair hearing. Tr. p. 158 lines 8 - 17; p. 159 1. 6 24. JZ received benefits retroactive to the summer of 2005. Tr. p. 159 line 25 - 14.
J.Z. is currently receiving public assistance, and food stamps for all of the people in her household, including herself. She is living in a four room NYCHA apartment for which she pays $137.00 dollars per month. Tr. p. 160 line 15 p. 161 line 20. J.Z. receives ongoing assistance and has received payment of retroactive money. She testified that she received payments in December 24 of more than $800 dollars in

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food stamps and $555 in cash assistance which represented retroactive benefits. Tr. p. 168 - line 15 - p. 169 line 1.
In October 2005 J.Z. went to a recertification interview at Center 28. She brought with her documents including the approval notice of her I-360 VAWA self-petition, Exhibit JZ 13.Tr. p. 166 lines 10 25. After the interview she understood that she was going to receive cash assistance, Medicaid and food stamps for herself and for her children. Tr. p. 147 lines 1 - 21.
L.W.
L.W. admittedly does not have an I-130 notice or approval or an I-360 prima facie notice or approval under VAWA. While L.W. has a Visa, that Visa expired on September 29, 2005. Although L.W.'s assessment of her own condition is that she is disabled, she admittedly worked in 2005. Like many of the other individual plaintiffs, L.W. did not fully understand what had been written in her declaration that she signed in connection with the plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction in this case. Excerpts follow from L.W.'s deposition testimony in this action are summarized below and set out as Ex. D to the Momo Dec.:
L.W. is a citizen of Jamaica. Tr. p 10 line 25 - p. 11 line 1. Her husband, whom she married in Jamaica and who is a naturalized citizen of the U.S., sent for her in October 2003. Tr p. 14 lines 2 - 3; p. 15 lines10 - 16; 23-24.; L.W. Exh 1.
L.W. came to the United States from Jamaica on October 15, 2003 and intended to live in the United States with her husband. Tr. p. 14, lines 22 - 24; p. 16 lines 13 19. On October 15, 2003 L.W. presented a Visa to immigration which has since expired on September 29, 2005. Tr. p. 19 lines 14 - 16; LW Exh. 2. L.W. is being helped by an attorney with the Safe Horizon Immigration Law Project to obtain a new visa. Tr. p. 20 lines 11 - 16, p. 21 lines 3 - 11.
L.W. testified that she does not have an I-130. p. 21 line 24 - p. 22 line 1.
L.W. does not have a VAWA self-petition prima facie or approval and has not applied under VAWA. Tr. p. 22, lines 7 - 17. L.W. testified that she has applied for a green card.
L.W. applied for food stamps, public assistance and Medicaid on or about March 17, 2005. Tr. p. 27 lines 16 - 22. She could not remember the name of the worker she met with at the center or the borough where the center was located. Tr. p. 18 lines 10 22.
L.W. testified that she thinks she brought a letter from the shelter, her birth certificate, her passport and her marriage license and her social [security] card, and nothing else when she applied for benefits in March 2005. Tr. p. 19 lines 10 - 22. She identified the birth certificate she brought as LW Exhibit 2, the Social Security card as LW Exh. 5, but could not produce a copy of the letter from the shelter to which she referred in connection with her March 17, 2005 application for benefits. Tr. p. 31 lines 22 - 25; p. 32 lines 1-15.

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In connection with L.W.'s application for benefits in March 2005 she was asked to provide documentation of her alien status, specifically USCIS documentation or evidence of continuous U.S. residence since prior to 1/1/72, which she acknowledge on April 13, 2005 in her signed acknowledgment.. Tr. p. 37 lines 3 - 21; p. 38 lines 18 22; Exhibit L.W. 10; Exhibit L.W. 9.
After L.W. applied for benefits in March 17, 2005 she received Food Stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance, but the food stamps stopped. p. 32 line 21 - p. 33 line 7. L.W. received a notice that she was approved for Food Stamps for the period Mach 17, 2005 to August 31, 2005. Tr. p. 33 line 8 -p. 34 line 7; L.W. Exh. 6.
L.W. applied for public assistance, medical assistance and food stamps on May 31, 2005, but does not remember what documents she brought into the job center in connection with that application, although in subsequent questions, when prompted, stated she submitted a social security card, her passport, a statement from a shelter, and an alien registration card, but doesn't remember submitting any documents concerning her health on that date. Tr. p. 44 line 17 p. 45 line 24.
L.W. received a notice that she was accepted for public assistance for the period June 30, 2005 - November 30, 2005 and for Medicaid effective June 1, 2005. Tr. p40 line 22 -p. 41 line 23; Exhibit L.W. 11.
L.W. was asked to recertify her benefits and went to a recertification appointment at a job center on September 8, 2005 to recertify for cash assistance, medical assistance and food stamps as reflected in her signed application. Tr. p. 52 lines 17 - 22; Exhibit L.W. 15.
L.W. worked in 2005 as a babysitter caring for an infant three days per week for 8 hours/day. Tr. p. 56 line 12 - 13; p. 57 lines 4 - 5. L.W. went to an appointment on October 24, 2005 with FIA employment office at which she was asked about her health but does not remember the questions that she was asked as it was “so long, you know, I just can't remember everything.”. Tr. p. 59 line 19 -
L.W. admitted that every time she went to an appointment she always turned up but she doesn't really remember the majority of what they asked her and what she said to them “and so on.” Tr. p. 61 line 16 - 20. L.W. testified that she doesn't really have a memory of what happened on March 17, 2005 when she applied for public benefits. Tr. p. 67 lines 2 - 5.
L.W. does not understand the meaning of the words Medicaid disability determination. Tr. p. 69 lines 6 12. In December 2005 L.W. received cash assistance of $110 dollars and food stamps of $1000 dollars. Tr. p. 72 lines 11 - 21.
L.W. had a Fair Hearing at which she was represented by an attorney. Tr. p. 72 lines 7 10.
Marieme Diongue
This plaintiff does not even live in New York City according to her N.Y.S. Identification card issued on April 13, 2005, she lives in ?? which is in ?? She is not
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entitled to benefits from the City of New York as reflected in this excerpt summarized below. See Momo Dec. Ex. E.
As of April 13 2005 Marieme Diongues address was listed on her N.Y.S. Identification Card (Diongue Exhibit 10) as a ?? address: ?? Tr. p. 99 lines 16 -25; Diongue Exhibit 10. She is not a New York City resident according to her identification
M.E.
M.E. did not provide sufficient documentation to the job center at the time she applied for benefits. She should have presented an I-130 with proof of domestic violence, in order to obtain benefits for herself and her immigrant daughter. She didn't do so. M.E. did receive benefits for her two citizen children. In addition, M.E. failed to cooperate with obtaining documentation in regard to social security. Following are excerpts summarized from M.E.'s testimony in this case: See Momo Dec. Ex. F.
M.E. came to the United States from Mexico in 1994. She did not have a passport from any country when she came to the United States in 1994. M.E. did not have a visa of any kind when she came to the United States in 1994. Tr. p. 67 lines 17 - 22. M.E. did not show any documents of any kind to anybody at immigration in order to gain entry into the United States in October 1994. Tr. p. 68 lines 18 - 20. M.E. walked across the border from Mexico to the United States with her daughter E Tr. p. 68 line 21 -p. 69 line 3. A person helped get her across. Tr. p. 75 lines 13 - p. 76 line 7; Tr. p. 11 lines 22 - 25.
After M.E. crossed over the border into the United States she had not been granted permission by anyone to remain lawfully in the United States. p. 73 lines 1 - 6. In response to the questions “Did there come a time when you were granted permission to remain in the United States?” M.E. responded “No.” Tr. p. 73 lines 12 - 14.
In July 2002 M.E. applied for public benefits for her two children who were born in the United States.(D and J, ) and are U.S. citizens. Tr. p. 11 lines 1 - 19; p. 12 lines 12 - 15. M.E. did not apply for benefits for herself or for her daughter E in July 2002. p. 12 line 23 - p. 13 line 1. When M.E. applied for benefits in July 2002 she presented the birth certificate and social security cards of both citizen children and proof of address. M.E. also presented her birth certificate. Tr. p. 32 lines 23 - 6.
M.E. testified that she had an 1-130 listing her as a beneficiary in 2002 but she does not remember whether she brought that or any other immigration documents with her when she applied for benefits in 2002. M.E. did not possess any immigration documents apart from an I-130 in 2002. Tr. p. 34 line 14 - p. 35 line 9; p. 38 line s 7 - 11. M.E.'s two citizen children received benefits after M.E. applied on their behalf in July 2002. Tr. p. 49 lines 17 - 19.
M.E. obtained a lawyer (Reina Gangu) to represent her in 2004 and M.E. gave Reina M.E.'s I-130; Exh. M.E. 5. Tr. p. 47 line 18 - p. 49 line 5. M.E. obtained a temporary order of protection on May 11, 2004 in Family Court and a final order of protec-

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2005 WL 3881693 (S.D.N.Y.) (Cite as: 2005 WL 3881693)

Page 29

tion on July 20, 2004. p. 84 line 24 - p. 86 line 9; Exhibit M.E. 7; Exhibit M.E. 8.
M.E. applied for benefits for herself in 2004. Tr. p. 49 lines 20 - 24. She did not go down to a job center to make application for herself to be added to her citizen childrens' case in June 2004 and relied on Reena Ganju, her lawyer, to make such application on M.E.'s behalf. Tr. p. 89 lines 15 - 23. M.E. gave the I-130 naming M.E. as a beneficiary and the order of protection to her lawyer, Ms. Ganju and other documents. She did not give the 1-130 naming her daughter Evelyn as a beneficiary to her lawyer. Tr. p. 91 lines 20 -25. M.E. does not remember whether she gave Ms. Ganju the temporary order of protection or the final order of protection (Exhibit M.E. 7; Exhibit ME 8) or any other documents in regard to domestic violence. Tr. p. 92 lines 4 - 12.
M.E. and her daughter were added to he citizen childrens' case. Tr. p. 86 lines 11 19; p. 87 lines 2-3. M.E. began receiving assistance in June 2004 after M.E.'s lawyer Ms.. Ganju asked for M.E. to be added to her citizen childrens' case. M.E.'s daughter was also added to the case after M.E. provided Ganju with an I-130 for this daughter.
Between 9/23/04 and 10/27/05 HRA sent four different notices and a letter requesting that M.E. provide social security cards or letters from social security for M.E. and her children. Exhibits M.E. 11 - 1; Tr. p. 5 line 11. Although M.E. was in possession of a letter dated July 1, 2004 denying her application for a social security card, M.E. Exhibit 16, she did not submit the letter in response to any of the requests. She was also asked to submit documentation regarding her social security in connection with a recertification of benefits on June 9, 2005. Tr. p. 14 line lines 6 - 9; p. 19 lines 8 - 20.. She was also told by a worker at the job center, Ms. Sosa to go to Social Security to obtain a letter from them and Ms. Sosa gave her the application. Tr. p. 19 line20 - p. 20 line 20; M.E. Exhibit 19.
M.E. finally went to the social security administration and took the letter Ms. Sosa had given her and received a letter from Social Security for herself, dated November 10, 2005 and one for her daughter E dated November 20, 2005. and submitted them to H.R.A. Tr. p. 20 line 14 - p. p. 23 line 21; Exhibit M.E. 20; Exhibit M.E. 21.
After the recertification M.E. received benefits for herself and E for food stamps, public assistance and Medicaid. Tr. p. 30 lines 13 - 15. Although benefits briefly stopped according to the testimony they were paid retroactively and restored.
M.K.B. O.P., L.W., M.A. Marieme Diongue, M.E. P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, and J.Z., on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Verna EGGLESTON, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration; Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; and Antonia C. Novello, as Commissioner of the New York State 2005 WL 3881693 (S.D.N.Y.)
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

 
 Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 1 of 45
U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Foley Square) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05−cv−10446−JSR

CLOSED,ECF

M.K.B. et al v. Eggleston et al Assigned to: Judge Jed S. Rakoff Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff M.K.B. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

Date Filed: 12/13/2005 Date Terminated: 06/06/2007 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 444 Civil Rights: Welfare (DISCONTINUED AFTER 1/1/2012) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Caroline Jane Hickey New York Legal Assistance Group 7 Hanover Square, 7th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212)−613−5077 Fax: (212)−750−0820 Email: caroline.hickeyzalka@weil.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth S. Saylor Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP 600 Fifth Avenue 10th Floor New York, NY 10020 212−763−5065 Fax: 212−763−5001 Email: esaylor@ecbalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jane Greengold Stevens New York Legal Assistance Group 7 Hanover Square, 7th Floor New York, NY 10004 212 613 5031 Fax: 212 750 0820 Email: jstevens@nylag.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Baum St. John's University School of Law 8000 Utopia Parkway Jamaica, NY 11439 (718) 990−1424 Fax: (718) 990− 6696 Email: baumj@stjohns.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ronald Abramson Lewis Baach Kaufmann Middlemiss 405 Lexington Avenue 62nd Floor New York, NY 10174 212−826−7001 Fax: 212−826−7146 Email: ronald.abramson@lbkmlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff
O.P. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

Russell Winston Jacobs Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP (NY) One Battery Park Plaza New York, NY 10004 2128376738 Fax: 2122996738 Email: jacobsr@hugheshubbard.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Alan Rosenberg The Legal Aid Society (Civil Div. NYC) 199 Water Street 3rd Floor New York, NY 10038 212−440−4226 Fax: 212−509−8753 Email: srosenberg@legal−aid.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven R. Banks The Legal Aid Society (Civil Div. NYC) 199 Water Street 3rd Floor New York, NY 10038 212−577−3277 Fax: 212−509−8432 Email: SBANKS@LEGAL−AID.ORG LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Elizabeth Welber The Legal Aid Society (Brooklyn) 111 Livingston Street Brooklyn, NY 11201 (718) 422−2845 Email: sewelber@legal−aid.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yisroel Schulman New York Legal Assistance Group 7 Hanover Sq., 18th Fl. New York, NY 10004 (212)−613−5050 Fax: (212)−758−9970 Email: yschulman@nylag.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 3 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.W. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 4 of 45

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.A. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Marieme Diongue on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 5 of 45

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
M.E. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 6 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
P.E. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Anna Fedosenko on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 7 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
A.I. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 8 of 45

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.A.M. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
L.M. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 9 of 45

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Denise Thomas on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 10 of 45

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
J.Z. on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated

represented by Susan Elizabeth Welber (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Caroline Jane Hickey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth S. Saylor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Greengold Stevens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Baum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald Abramson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell Winston Jacobs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Alan Rosenberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven R. Banks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Yisroel Schulman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Appellant
Elizabeth R Berlin as Executive Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance

represented by Robert Lewis Kraft Office of the Attorney General, New York State 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 212−416−8632 Fax: 212−416−6075 Email: robert.kraft@ag.ny.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Verna Eggleston as Commissioner of the New York City

represented by Andrew James Rauchberg New York City Law Department

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Human Resources Administration TERMINATED: 07/29/2011

100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 (212)−788−0889 Fax: (212)−788−0940 Email: arauchbe@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jane Tobey Momo New York City Law Depart. Office of the Corporation Counsel 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−788−1281 Fax: 212−788−0940 Email: jmomo@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jesse Ira Levine New York City Law Department 100 Church Street Room 6−188 New York, NY 10007 (212)−442−3329 Fax: (212)−788−0300 Email: jlevine@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martha Anne Calhoun NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel (NYC) 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−356−0856 Fax: 212−356−1148 Email: mcalhoun@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Robert Doar as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance

represented by Robert Lewis Kraft Office of the Attorney General, New York State 120 Broadway 24th Floor New York, NY 10271 212−416−8632 Fax: 212−416−6075 Email: robert.kraft@ag.ny.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ivan B. Rubin Office of the NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 120 Broadway (Litigation Bureau) New York, NY 10271 212 416 6046 Fax: 212 416 6077 Email: Ivan.Rubin@oag.state.ny.us TERMINATED: 06/01/2010

Defendant
Antonia C. Novello as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health

represented by Robert Lewis Kraft (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 12 of 45
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ivan B. Rubin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2010

Date Filed 12/13/2005
12/13/2005 12/13/2005 12/13/2005
12/13/2005
12/13/2005
12/13/2005 12/13/2005 12/14/2005
12/14/2005
12/19/2005 12/21/2005 12/21/2005 01/05/2006 01/06/2006
01/10/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Verna Eggleston, Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B..(lb, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 12/15/2005 (mbe, ). (Entered: 12/14/2005)
SUMMONS ISSUED as to Verna Eggleston, Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (lb, ) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
Magistrate Judge Frank Maas is so designated. (lb, ) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
2 RULE 7.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B..(lb, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 12/15/2005 (mbe, ). (Entered: 12/14/2005)
3 Ex Parte Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Anonymously(FILED ON SERVICE DATE): Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (lb, ) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
4 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification: Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (lb, ) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
Case Designated ECF. (lb, ) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Show Cause Hearing held on 12/13/2005. The Court scheduled further hearing for 12/14 at 11:00 a.m.. (sac, ) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
***REJECTION OF ATTEMPTED PAPER FILING IN ECF CASE. The following document(s) Attorney's Declaration in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order by Elizabeth S, Sailor, was rejected by the Clerk's Office and must be FILED ELECTRONICALLY on the Court's ECF System. (rdz, ) (Entered: 12/14/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Interim Pretrial Conference held on 12/14/2005. The Court scheduled an oral argument for January 26, 2006 at 10:00a.m and an evidentiary hearing for February 15, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. contested Issue; No. (djc, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
5 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Robert Lewis Kraft on behalf of Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
6 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 12/14/2005 at 11:00 am before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (mbe, ) (Entered: 12/21/2005)
7 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 12/13/2005 at 4:10 pm before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (mbe, ) (Entered: 12/21/2005)
8 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal. Document filed by L.M.. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
9 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 8 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed by L.M. Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her claims in this action. ENDORSEMENT: SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 1/6/06) (kco, ) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
10 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. Verna Eggleston served on 12/21/2005, answer due 1/10/2006. Service was accepted by Deta Hylton, paralegal aurhorized to

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 13 of 45

01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/11/2006 01/12/2006 01/20/2006
01/20/2006
01/20/2006

accept service on behalf of the Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration. Document filed by O.P.; L.W.; M.A.; Marieme Diongue; M.E.; P.E.; Anna Fedosenko; A.I.; L.A.M.; L.M.; Denise Thomas; J.Z.; M.K.B.. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
11 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. Antonia C. Novello served on 12/27/2005, answer due 1/16/2006. Service was accepted by Susan G. Cartier, Assistant Counsel, Bureau of Litigation, Division of Legal Affairs, who was authorized to accept service on behalf of Antonia Novello, New York State Department of Health. Document filed by O.P.; L.W.; M.A.; Marieme Diongue; M.E.; P.E.; Anna Fedosenko; A.I.; L.A.M.; L.M.; Denise Thomas; J.Z.; M.K.B.. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
12 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. Robert Doar served on 12/23/2005, answer due 1/12/2006. Service was accepted by Sabastien Addmo, authorized to accept service on behalf of the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. Document filed by O.P.; L.W.; M.A.; Marieme Diongue; M.E.; P.E.; Anna Fedosenko; A.I.; L.A.M.; L.M.; Denise Thomas; J.Z.; M.K.B.. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
13 MOTION to Certify Class., MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Abramson, Ronald) Modified on 2/24/2006 (js, ). (Entered: 01/11/2006)
14 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. with Certificates of Service of the Memorandum of Law. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
15 DECLARATION of Elizabeth Saylor in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2(a)# 3 Exhibit 2(b)# 4 Exhibit 3# 5 Exhibit 4# 6 Exhibit 5# 7 Exhibit 6# 8 Exhibit 7# 9 Exhibit 8# 10 Exhibit 9# 11 Exhibit 10# 12 Exhibit 11# 13 Exhibit 12# 14 Exhibit 13# 15 Exhibit 14# 16 Exhibit 15# 17 Exhibit 16# 18 Exhibit 17# 19 Exhibit 18# 20 Exhibit 19# 21 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
16 DECLARATION of Reena Ganju in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9# 10 Exhibit 10# 11 Exhibit 11# 12 Exhibit 12# 13 Exhibit 13# 14 Exhibit 14# 15 Exhibit 15# 16 Exhibit 16# 17 Exhibit 17# 18 Exhibit 18# 19 Exhibit 19# 20 Exhibit 20# 21 Exhibit 21# 22 Exhibit 22# 23 Exhibit 23# 24 Exhibit 24# 25 Exhibit 25# 26 Exhibit 26# 27 Exhibit 27# 28 Exhibit 28# 29 Exhibit 29# 30 Exhibit 30# 31 Exhibit 31# 32 Exhibit 32# 33 Exhibit 33# 34 Exhibit 34# 35 Exhibit 35# 36 Exhibit 36# 37 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
17 DECLARATION of Shawn McEnnis in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Certificate of Service

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with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
18 DECLARATION of Camille Carey in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
19 DECLARATION of M.K.B. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
20 DECLARATION of O.P. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
21 DECLARATION of L.W. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
22 DECLARATION of M.A. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
23 DECLARATION of Marieme Diongue in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
24 DECLARATION of M.E. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme

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Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Exhibit Q# 18 Exhibit R# 19 Exhibit S# 20 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
25 DECLARATION of P.E. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Exhibit Q# 18 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
26 DECLARATION of Anna Fedosenko in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
27 DECLARATION of A.I. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
28 DECLARATION of L.A.M. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
29 DECLARATION of L.M. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
30 DECLARATION of Denise Thomas in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald)

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(Entered: 01/23/2006)
31 DECLARATION of J.Z. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Exhibit Q# 18 Exhibit R# 19 Exhibit S# 20 Exhibit T# 21 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
32 DECLARATION of Polina Benyminov in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
33 DECLARATION of N.E. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
34 DECLARATION of Khady Fofana in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
35 DECLARATION of Angelica Higinio in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
36 DECLARATION of M.H. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
37 DECLARATION of W.J. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of

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Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9# 10 Exhibit 10# 11 Exhibit 11# 12 Exhibit 12# 13 Exhibit 13# 14 Exhibit 14# 15 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
38 DECLARATION of Marie Lourdes−Merilien in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
39 DECLARATION of Nicole Prince in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
40 DECLARATION of R.R. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
41 DECLARATION of P.S. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
42 DECLARATION of W.S. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
43 DECLARATION of M.T. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)

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44 DECLARATION of K.T. in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
45 DECLARATION of Joel Borenstein in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
46 DECLARATION of Megan Dorton in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
47 DECLARATION of Anya Emerson in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
48 DECLARATION of Diane Gonzalez in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Pretrial Conference held on 1/23/2006, concerning discovery disputes. (sac, ) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
49 DECLARATION of Olivia Herman in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
50 DECLARATION of Caroline Jane Hickey in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (1)# 2 Exhibit A (2)# 3 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 19 of 45

01/24/2006
01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006

51 DECLARATION of Russell W. Jacobs in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9# 10 Exhibit 10# 11 Exhibit 11# 12 Exhibit 12# 13 Exhibit 13# 14 Exhibit 14# 15 Exhibit 15# 16 Exhibit 16# 17 Exhibit 17# 18 Exhibit 18# 19 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
52 DECLARATION of Jami Johnson in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
53 DECLARATION of Kevin Kenneally in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
54 DECLARATION of Angela Migally in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 1# 2 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
55 DECLARATION of Lisa Pearlstein in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
56 DECLARATION of Violeta Petrova in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
57 DECLARATION of Nicole Sara Price in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 20 of 45

01/24/2006 01/24/2006
01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/27/2006 01/30/2006 01/30/2006 01/30/2006

58 DECLARATION of Gella Pyetranker in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
59 DECLARATION of Jennifer D. Rolnick in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5 (A)# 6 Exhibit 5 (B)# 7 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
60 DECLARATION of Maryanne Sexton in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
61 DECLARATION of Carrie Wollmershauser in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
62 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Jane Tobey Momo on behalf of Verna Eggleston (Momo, Jane) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
63 ORDER; plaintiffs are granted leave to file the declaration of Jennifer Baum electronically without the exhibits. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file the exhibits to Jennifer Baum's declaration in hard copy with the Clerk of the Court (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 1/25/06) (kco, ) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
64 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
65 DECLARATION of Jennifer Baum in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Part 2 to Baum Declaration# 2 Certificate of Service by hand with Statement of Delayed Filing Due to ECF Service Interruption)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
66 NOTICE of the Order of the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff filed January 27, 2006, that the Exhibits to the Declaration of Jennifer Baum are on file with the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York re: 65 Declaration in Support of Motion,,. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 01/30/2006)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 21 of 45

01/30/2006 01/30/2006
01/30/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006

67 DECLARATION of Robert L. Kraft in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
68 AFFIDAVIT of Linda LeClair in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Exhibit O# 16 Exhibit P# 17 Exhibit Q# 18 Exhibit R)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/30/2006)
71 EXHIBITS 1 through 25 to the declaration of Jennifer Baum. Document filed by M.K.B. et al.(cd, ) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
69 AFFIDAVIT of exhibits R S and T in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit S# 2 Exhibit T)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
70 AFFIDAVIT of Rochelle Eisenstein in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
72 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Ptak in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit D)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
73 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Ptak, Exh C pp 1−52 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
74 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Ptak exh C pp 53−105 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
75 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Ptak exh c pp 106−209 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
76 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Ptak Exh B pp 1−23 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
77 AFFIDAVIT of Stephen Ptak exhibit B pp 24−46 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 01/31/2006)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 22 of 45

02/01/2006 02/01/2006 02/02/2006 02/02/2006 02/02/2006 02/06/2006 02/06/2006 02/06/2006
02/06/2006
02/06/2006
02/06/2006

78 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 1/23/2006 @5:15 p.m. before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (lb, ) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
79 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 1/23/06 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (jbe, ) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
80 AFFIDAVIT of pamela hopkins in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
81 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 3 Part 1 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3 part 2)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
82 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 4 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
83 AFFIDAVIT of pamela hopkins exhibit 6 part 1 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 6 part 2)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
84 AFFIDAVIT of pamela hopkins exhibit 7 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 8# 2 Exhibit 9)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
85 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service via hand delivery)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
86 DECLARATION of Elizabeth S. Saylor in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Part 2# 2 Part 3# 3 Part 4# 4 Part 5# 5 Part 6# 6 Certificate of Service via hand delivery)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
87 DECLARATION of Reena Ganju in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service via hand delivery)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
88 DECLARATION of Jami Johnson in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by O.P., L.W.,

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 23 of 45

02/08/2006
02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006

M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service via hand delivery)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 02/06/2006)
89 AFFIDAVIT of letter of Robert L. Kraft in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
90 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Jane Tobey Momo)(Momo, Jane) Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg). (Entered: 02/10/2006)
91 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING FOR NON−ECF DOCUMENT − MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 1. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg, ). (Entered: 02/10/2006)
92 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING FOR NON−ECF DOCUMENT − MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix Part 2. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg, ). Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg, ). (Entered: 02/10/2006)
93 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING FOR NON−ECF DOCUMENT − MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 3. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg, ). (Entered: 02/10/2006)
94 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING FOR NON−ECF DOCUMENT − MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 4. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg, ). (Entered: 02/10/2006)
95 FILING ERROR − WRONG DOCUMENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Disqualify Counsel (City Defendant's Memorandum of Law)>. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) Modified on 2/10/2006 (kg, ). (Entered: 02/10/2006)
96 AFFIDAVIT of pamela hopkins exhibit 1 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Jane Momo to RE−FILE Document 90 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. ERROR(S): Filing Error of Attachment. Supporting Documents must be filed separately. (kg) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Jane Momo to RE−FILE Document 95 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Memorandum of Law.. Use the document type Memorandum of Law in support of motion found under the document list Responses and Replies. (kg, ) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
97 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 2 part 1 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
98 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 2 part 2 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 24 of 45

02/13/2006 02/13/2006
02/13/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006 02/15/2006
02/15/2006

Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
99 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 2 part 3 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
100 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 5 part 1 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5 part 2)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
101 AFFIDAVIT of Pamela Hopkins Exhibit 5 part 3 in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
102 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 2/2/2006 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (jar, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
104 DECLARATION of Jane Tobey Momo in Support re: 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Part 1# 2 Appendix Part 2# 3 Appendix Part 3# 4 Appendix Part 4)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
105 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
106 DECLARATION of Seth Diamond in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
107 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service via Electronic Means on February 15, 2006)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
108 DECLARATION of Reena Ganju in Opposition re: 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion.. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service via Electronic Means on February 15, 2006)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
109 DECLARATION of Elaine H. Witty in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E−Redacted# 6 Exhibit F−Redacted# 7 Exhibit G−Redacted# 8 Exhibit H−Redacted# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J−Redacted# 11 Exhibit K−Part 1# 12 Exhibit K−Part 2# 13 Exhibit K−Part 3# 14 Exhibit K−Part 4# 15 Exhibit K−Part 5# 16 Exhibit K−Part 6# 17 Exhibit K−Part 7# 18 Exhibit L# 19 Exhibit M)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
110 DECLARATION of David Lock in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 25 of 45

02/15/2006
02/15/2006
02/15/2006
02/15/2006
02/16/2006 02/21/2006 02/23/2006 02/24/2006 02/24/2006 02/24/2006 03/01/2006 03/03/2006 03/03/2006

Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D−Redacted# 5 Exhibit E−Redacted# 6 Exhibit F−Redacted# 7 Exhibit G−Redacted# 8 Exhibit H−Redacted# 9 Exhibit I−Redacted# 10 Exhibit J−Redacted)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
111 DECLARATION of James Whelan in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F−Part 1A# 7 Exhibit F−Part 1B# 8 Exhibit F−Part 2A# 9 Exhibit F−Part 2B)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
112 DECLARATION of Jane Tobey Momo in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Redacted# 2 Exhibit B−Redacted# 3 Exhibit C−Part 1−Redacted# 4 Exhibit C−Part 2−Redacted# 5 Exhibit D−Redacted# 6 Exhibit E−Redacted# 7 Exhibit F−Redacted)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
113 DECLARATION of Supplemental Declaration of Jane Tobey Momo in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Redacted# 2 Exhibit B−Redacted# 3 Exhibit C−Part 1−Redacted# 4 Exhibit C−Part 2−Redacted# 5 Exhibit D−Redacted# 6 Exhibit E−Redacted# 7 Exhibit F−Redacted)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
114 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. City Defendant's Memo of Law Part 1. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement City Defendant's Memo of Law−Part 2# 2 Appendix A# 3 Appendix B)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
115 ORDER denying 103 Motion to Disqualify Counsel in its entirety. . (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 2/15/06) (cd, ) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
116 ORDER granting 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction . (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 2/16/06) (js, ) Modified on 2/24/2006 (js, ). (Entered: 02/24/2006)
117 ORDER; Settlement Conference set for 2/24/2006 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Frank Maas. (Signed by Judge Frank Maas on 2/23/06) (pl, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
118 ORDER that a non substantive error in the court's memorandum order dated 2/15/06 is hereby corrected as further set forth in this order. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 2/23/06) (dle, ) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
119 ORDER that City dft's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 2/23/06) (dle, ) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Frank Maas : Settlement Conference held on 2/24/2006. No settlement reach. Next settlement conference set for 3/3/06. (db, ) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
120 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 2/2/06 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (jbe, ) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Frank Maas : Settlement Conference held on 3/3/2006; no settlement reached. (cd, ) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Telephone Conference held on 3/3/2006. (djc, ) (Entered: 03/09/2006)

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03/06/2006
03/06/2006
03/08/2006 03/10/2006 03/20/2006 03/29/2006 03/31/2006 04/14/2006 04/14/2006 04/19/2006 04/19/2006 04/19/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006

121 ORDER Defedants Doar and Novello move for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction issued by the Court on February 16,2006, disputinhg the Court's characterixation that they essentially consented to the preliminary injunction. Although the Court is now persuaded that State Defendants never consented, essentially or otherwise, to the injunction, the Court is not convinced that the injunction should be vacated. There is sufficient evidence in the present record of irreparable harm and other requirements necessarey to justify the limited provisional relief set forth in the order of February 16,2006, at least until the Court has the benefit of the fuller record to be provided by the evidentiary hearing in this matter firmly sceduled for March 14,2006. However, the Court will re−consider the need for this provisional relief following the evidentiary hearing. So ordered. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 3/5/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
122 ORDER stated from the bench, see transcript, 3/3/2006, non−party Sanctuary for Families is hereby ordered to produce to plaintiffs' counsel,by no later than 9 p.m. on Saturday, March 4,2006, all unprivileged documents responsive to defendants' discovery requests in this case. If Sanctuary for Families wish to be heard in opposition to this Order, Counsel for all affected parties are directed to contact the Court by no later than 5 p.m. on Saturday, March 4,2006. So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 3/3/2006) (jmi, ) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Telephone Conference held on 3/8/2006. (cd, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Telephone Conference held on 3/10/2006. (cd, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
123 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 3/3/2006 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (jar, ) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Telephone Conference held on 3/29/2006. (sac, ) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
124 ORDER that following distributionof the transcripts the copies of the depositions with the designations and the court's rulings must be returned to chambers no later than 4/5/06. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 3/31/06) (dle, ) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
125 PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B..(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
126 TRIAL MEMORANDUM. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B..(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
127 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on March 14, 15, 16, 17 2006 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (lma, ) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
128 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on March 20, 21, 22, 23 2006 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (lma, ) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
129 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 3/24/06 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (lma, ) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
130 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Ivan B. Rubin on behalf of Antonia C. Novello (Rubin, Ivan) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
131 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Ivan B. Rubin on behalf of Robert Doar (Rubin, Ivan) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
132 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. City Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)

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05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006
05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006
05/05/2006

133 RESPONSE in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. City Defendant's Proposed Conclusions of Law. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
134 RESPONSE in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. City Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
135 AFFIDAVIT of Steven ptak in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
136 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. Supplemental Memorandum of Law of State Defendants in Support of Their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in Further Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for a Preliminary Injunction. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Rubin, Ivan) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
AFFIDAVIT of david spielman in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
137 RESPONSE in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. State Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law. Document filed by Robert Doar. (Rubin, Ivan) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
138 DECLARATION of David Lock in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A to Supplemental Declaration of David Lock)(Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
139 DECLARATION of Michele Shepard in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard# 2 Exhibit B to Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard# 3 Exhibit C to Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard# 4 Exhibit Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard# 5 Exhibit E to Suplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard# 6 Exhibit F to Supplemental Declaration of Michele Shepard)(Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
140 DECLARATION of James Whelan in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to Supplemental Declaration of James Whelan# 2 Exhibit B to Supplemental Declaration of James Whelan# 3 Exhibit C to Supplemental Declaration of James Whelan# 4 Exhibit D to Supplemental Declaration of James Whelan)(Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)

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05/05/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006
05/19/2006
06/14/2006 07/13/2006 07/18/2006
07/21/2006 07/28/2006 08/29/2006

141 DECLARATION of Elaine H. Witty in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
142 AFFIDAVIT of david spielman in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
143 AFFIDAVIT of ROBERT SHARKEY in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A SEPARATOR# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B SEPARATOR# 4 Exhibit B# 5 Exhibit C SEPARATOR# 6 Exhibit C# 7 Exhibit D SEPARATOR# 8 Exhibit D# 9 Exhibit E SEPARATOR# 10 Exhibit E)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
144 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. Plaintiff's Post−Hearing Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification. Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service of Shawn McEnnis Dated May 19, 2006)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 05/19/2006)
145 ANSWER to Complaint. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello.(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
146 ORDER that in anticipation of the court's completing its decision concerning plaintiffs' pending motions for a preliminary injunction and for class certification, the City and State dfts are directed to fax to the court, by no later than 5p.m. 7/14/06, letter briefs as further set forth in this order. If plaintiffs challenge any aspect of dfts' letter briefs, they may submit a responsive letter brief, not to exceed the combined total pages of dfts' letter briefs to be faxed by plaintiffs to the court by no later than 5p.m. on 7/18/06. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 7/12/06) (dle, ) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
147 RESPONSE in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. City Defendant's Supplemental Post Hearing Submission. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Part 1# 2 Exhibit A−Part 2# 3 Exhibit A−Part 3# 4 Exhibit B−Part 1# 5 Exhibit B−Part 2# 6 Exhibit B−Part 3# 7 Exhibit B−Part 4# 8 Exhibit B−Part 5)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 07/18/2006)
148 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Jesse Ira Levine on behalf of Verna Eggleston (Levine, Jesse) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
149 RESPONSE in Opposition re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. City defendant's Supplemental Letter Brief Submission. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Enclosure − Part 1# 2 Exhibit Enclosure−Part 2# 3 Exhibit Enclosure−Part 3)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
150 OPINION AND ORDER #93598; re: 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. For the foregoing reasons, the Court (i) grants plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction relief by reconfirming the relief set forth

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 29 of 45

09/13/2006 09/13/2006 09/13/2006 09/14/2006 09/14/2006
09/20/2006
09/20/2006
09/27/2006 09/28/2006 09/28/2006 09/28/2006

in the Order of 2/16/2006, and adding to it each of the provisions set forth at pages 75−76 within; and (ii) grants plaintiffs' motion for class certification by certifying the class described at pages 77−78 within. Counsel for the parties are hereby directed to jointly telephone Chambers no later than 9/6/2006 to schedule further proceedings in this case. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 8/29/06) (kco, ) Modified on 8/31/2006 (lma, ). (Entered: 08/29/2006)
FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) Modified on 9/14/2006 (kg). (Entered: 09/13/2006)
151 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Telephone Conference held on 9/13/2006. (cd, ) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY ERROR. Note to Attorney Robert Lewis Kraft to RE−FILE Document MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion. ERROR(S): Document number missing. (kg) (Entered: 09/14/2006)
152 MOTION for Reconsideration re; Note to Attorney to Re−File Document − Deficient Docket Entry Error, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Attachments: # 1 proof of timely filing# 2 note from ECF to refile)(Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 09/14/2006)
153 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 152 MOTION for Reconsideration re; Note to Attorney to Re−File Document − Deficient Docket Entry Error, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,... Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Rosenberg, Scott) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
154 DECLARATION of Jane Tobey Momo in Support re: 152 MOTION for Reconsideration re; Note to Attorney to Re−File Document − Deficient Docket Entry Error, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,... Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
155 NOTICE OF APPEAL from 150 Memorandum & Opinion. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. Filing fee $ 455.00, receipt number E 592175. (nd, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal to the District Judge re: 155 Notice of Appeal. (nd, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Certified Copy of Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 155 Notice of Appeal. (nd, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
Appeal Record Sent to USCA (Electronic File). Certified Indexed record on Appeal Electronic Files for 124 Order, 67 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 70 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 136 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Robert Doar,, 12 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 45 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 152 MOTION for Reconsideration re; Note to Attorney to Re−File Document − Deficient Docket Entry Error, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,.. filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 98 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 55 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 154 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 107 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 30 of 45
Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 36 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 32 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 2 Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 18 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 88 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 74 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 134 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 61 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 37 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 139 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 52 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 75 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 83 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 87 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 94 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 4. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 72 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 22 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 1 Complaint, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 132 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 23 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 62 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston,, 76 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 135 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 119 Order, 93 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 3. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 81 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 131 Notice of Appearance filed by Robert Doar,, 73 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 147 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 50 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 38 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 20 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 111 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 117 Order, Set Scheduling Order Deadlines, 59 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 64 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 48 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 143 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 21 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 35 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 77 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 31 of 45
Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 58 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 153 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 44 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 34 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 115 Order on Motion to Disqualify Counsel, 66 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 53 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 148 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston,, 17 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 95 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Memorandum of Law. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 110 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 29 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 26 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 108 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 99 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 80 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 96 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 19 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 125 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 85 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 51 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 140 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 56 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 86 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 109 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 84 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, 63 Order,, 43 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 130 Notice of Appearance filed by Antonia C. Novello,, 101 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 54 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 31 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 57 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 126 Trial Memorandum filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 141 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 68 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 42 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 65 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 33 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 155 Notice of

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09/28/2006 09/29/2006

Appeal filed by Verna Eggleston,, 118 Order, 60 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 100 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 30 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 15 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 11 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 138 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 122 Order,,, 24 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 49 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 16 Declaration in Support of Motion,,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 151 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 116 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 149 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 112 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 14 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 69 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 47 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 144 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 40 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 10 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 114 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 133 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 142 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 82 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 91 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 1. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 97 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 28 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 90 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 46 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 137 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Robert Doar,, 105 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by Verna Eggleston,, 9 Memo Endorsement, 41 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 104 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 39 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 89 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 106 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 27 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 92 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix Part 2. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 146 Order,,, 121 Order,,,, 8 Notice (Other) filed by L.M.,, 145 Answer to Complaint filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 113 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston, were transmitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals. (nd, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
156 NOTICE OF APPEAL from 150 Memorandum & Opinion. Document filed by Robert Doar. Filing fee $ 455.00, receipt number E 592252. (tp, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Certified Copy of Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 156 Notice of Appeal. (tp, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)

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09/29/2006 09/29/2006

Transmission of Notice of Appeal to the District Judge re: 156 Notice of Appeal. (tp, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
Appeal Record Sent to USCA (Electronic File). Certified Indexed record on Appeal Electronic Files for 124 Order, 67 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 70 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 136 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Robert Doar,, 12 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 45 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 152 MOTION for Reconsideration re; Note to Attorney to Re−File Document − Deficient Docket Entry Error, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,.. filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 98 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 55 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 154 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 107 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 36 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 32 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 2 Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 18 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 88 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 74 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 134 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 61 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 37 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 139 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 52 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 75 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 83 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 87 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 94 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 4. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 72 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 22 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 1 Complaint, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 132 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 23 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 5 Notice of Appearance filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 62 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston,, 76 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 135 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 119 Order, 93 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 3. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 81 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 131 Notice of Appearance filed by Robert Doar,, 73 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 147 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 34 of 45
Eggleston,, 50 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 38 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 20 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 111 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 117 Order, Set Scheduling Order Deadlines, 59 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 64 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 48 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 143 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 21 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 35 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 77 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 58 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 153 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 44 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 34 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 115 Order on Motion to Disqualify Counsel, 66 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 53 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 148 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston,, 17 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 95 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Memorandum of Law. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 110 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 29 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 26 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 108 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 99 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 80 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 96 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 19 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 125 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 85 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 51 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 140 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 56 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 86 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 109 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 84 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, 63 Order,, 43 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,,

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 35 of 45
M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 130 Notice of Appearance filed by Antonia C. Novello,, 101 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 54 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 31 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 57 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 126 Trial Memorandum filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 141 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 68 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 42 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 65 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 33 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 155 Notice of Appeal filed by Verna Eggleston,, 118 Order, 60 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 100 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 30 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 15 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 11 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 138 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 122 Order,,, 24 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 49 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 16 Declaration in Support of Motion,,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 156 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert Doar,, 151 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 116 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 149 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 112 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 14 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 69 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 47 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 144 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 40 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 10 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 114 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 133 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 142 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 91 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 1. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 82 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 97 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 28 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 90 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 46 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 137 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Robert Doar,, 105 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by Verna Eggleston,, 9 Memo Endorsement, 41 Declaration in Support of

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 36 of 45

10/13/2006 10/16/2006 11/06/2006 11/07/2006 11/08/2006
11/08/2006
11/08/2006 01/05/2007 01/31/2007
02/28/2007 03/14/2007

Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 104 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 39 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 89 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 25 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 106 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 92 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix Part 2. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 27 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 146 Order,,, 121 Order,,,, 8 Notice (Other) filed by L.M.,, 145 Answer to Complaint filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 113 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston, were transmitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals. (tp, ) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
157 ORDER denying 152 Motion for Reconsideration. An opinion elaborating the reasons for this ruling will issue shortly . (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 10/13/06) (cd, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
158 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 10/4/06 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (tro, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
159 ANSWER to Complaint. Document filed by Verna Eggleston.(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
160 MEMORANDUM; the Court also considered defendants' other arguments, butfound them wholly lacking in merit, and, accordingly, by Order datedOctober 13, 2006, denied the motion for reconsideration. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 11/7/06) (pl, ) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
161 MANDATE of USCA WITHDRAWING APPEAL (Certified Copy) as to 156 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert Doar, USCA Case Number 06−4549−cv....that the appeal is hereby WITHDRAWN pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thomas Asreen, Acting Clerk USCA. Certified: 11/7/2006. (nd, ) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
162 MANDATE of USCA WITHDRAWING APPEAL (Certified Copy) as to 155 Notice of Appeal filed by Verna Eggleston, USCA Case Number 06−4498−cv....that the appeal is hereby WITHDRAWN pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thomas Asreen, acting Clerk USCA. Certified: 11/7/2006. (nd, ) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
Transmission of USCA Mandate/Order to the District Judge re: 162 USCA Mandate Withdrawing Appeal,, 161 USCA Mandate Withdrawing Appeal,. (nd, ) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff : Telephone Conference held on 1/5/2007. (jco) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
163 ORDER that the parties to the proposed settlement shall, on or before 45 days after the date of the filing of this order, provide notice containing the language annexed as Exhibit A, to the Class Members, as further set forth in this document. Objections by Class Members to the proposed settlement will be considered if fld in writing at the address of plntfs' counsel as specified in the notice on or before 5/3/07. The court will hold a hearing to consider whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate on 5/24/07, at 10:00 am, in courtroom 14B. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 1/31/07) (cd) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
164 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 1/31/07 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (jbe) (Entered: 02/28/2007)
165 ORDER that the actions required by paragraph 1 of the 1/31/07 order shall be performed on or before 3/26/07; the notice annexed as Exhibit A to the 1/1/07 shall be replaced with the notice attached hereto as Exhibit A. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 3/12/07) (cd) (Entered: 03/15/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 37 of 45

05/17/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007 06/05/2007 06/06/2007 06/26/2007
06/29/2007 07/11/2007 07/16/2007
07/16/2007
11/25/2008 06/01/2010

166 BRIEF in Support of Approval of Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Rule 23(e). Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B..(Rosenberg, Scott) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
167 DECLARATION of Scott A. Rosenberg re: 166 Brief in Support of Approval of Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Rule 23(e). Document filed by O.P., L.W., M.A., Marieme Diongue, M.E., P.E., Anna Fedosenko, A.I., L.A.M., L.M., Denise Thomas, J.Z., M.K.B.. (Rosenberg, Scott) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
168 DECLARATION of Jane Tobey Momo in Support. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Momo, Jane) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
169 DECLARATION of David Lock in Support. Document filed by Verna Eggleston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Momo, Jane) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
170 DECLARATION of Ivan B. Rubin in Support. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Rubin, Ivan) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
MEMORANDUM TO THE DOCKET CLERK: A fairness hearing was held before Jed S. Rakoff, U.S.D.J. on 6/5/07 in this case. There were no objections to the proposed settlement agreement. The Court approved the settlement. (jco) (Entered: 06/11/2007)
171 ORDER. For the reasons stated from the bench, see transcript, 6/5/07, the Court hereby gives final and binding approval to the final settlement agreement that the Court preliminarily approved on January 31, 2007. The Clerk is directed to close this case. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 6/5/07) (djc) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
172 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT; by and among the undersigned attorneys for the respective parties, this action is settled, subject to the approval of the Court pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the F.R.C.P. on terms and conditions as described within this stipulation and order. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 1/12/07) (kco) Modified on 7/3/2007 (kco). (Entered: 06/27/2007)
173 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on 6/5/07 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (jbe) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
174 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings held on June 5, 2007 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. (lca) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
175 STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS; the City of NY shall pay the sum of $1,900,000.00, to class counsel as set forth in paragraph "2", and the plaintiff class hereby agrees to accept said payment in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements, in arising from, or in connection with this action for the time period and to the extent set forth in paragraph 11 within. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 7/12/07) (kco) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
176 JUDGMENT # 07,1357 on Attorney Fees. Fees in favor of the Legal Aid Society in the amount of $ 1,101,349.09; in favor of the New York Legal Assistance Group in the amount of $ 463,156.76; in favor of the Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP in the amount of $ 1,285,494.15. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 7/12/07) (Attachments: # 1 notice of right to appeal)(ml) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
177 STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER: regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material.... (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 11/21/08) (js) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
178 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AND APPEARANCE AND ORDER. Ivan Rubin will no longer be employed by the office of the Attorney General of the State of New York and, accordingly, hereby withdraws as counsel of record for the State Defendants in the above−captioned action and requests that his appearance herein be terminated. The Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York continues to serve as counsel of record for the State Defendants through Assistant Attorney General Robert Kraft, who requests that copies of all notices, pleadings and other papers herein continue to be served upon him in accord with his appearance which he previously entered (Signed

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 38 of 45

06/08/2011 06/16/2011 06/17/2011 06/23/2011 06/23/2011 06/23/2011 06/23/2011 06/23/2011 06/23/2011 06/23/2011
06/23/2011
07/12/2011 07/12/2011 07/12/2011

by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 4/28/10) (djc) Modified on 6/1/2010 (djc). (Entered: 06/01/2010)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff: Telephone Conference held on 6/8/2011. (ft) (Entered: 06/14/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff: Status Conference held on 6/16/2011. (mbe) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff: Status Conference held on 6/17/2011. (mbe) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas.(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
180 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
181 DECLARATION of Class Members (Redacted) A−D in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
182 DECLARATION of Class Members(Redacted) G−H in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
183 DECLARATION of Class Members(Redacted) H−L in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
184 DECLARATION of Class Members(Redacted) N−Z in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
185 DECLARATION of Shira Wisotsky in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
186 DECLARATION of Susan E. Welber in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Part I, # 2 Exhibit 1 Part II, # 3 Exhibit 2−4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5 Exhibit 6−9, # 6 Exhibit 10−14, # 7 Exhibit 15−19, # 8 Exhibit 20−24, # 9 Exhibit 25−30, # 10 Exhibit 31−34, # 11 Exhibit 35−41, # 12 Exhibit 42−45, # 13 Exhibit 46 Part I, # 14 Exhibit 46 Part II, # 15 Exhibit 47, # 16 Exhibit 48, # 17 Exhibit 49−51, # 18 Exhibit 52−56)(Abramson, Ronald) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
187 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Susan Elizabeth Welber on behalf of M.K.B. (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
188 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Susan Elizabeth Welber on behalf of All Plaintiffs. New Address: The Legal Aid Society, Civil Practice Law Reform Unit, 199 Water Street, New York, NY, NY 10038, 212/577−3320. (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
189 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Susan Elizabeth Welber on behalf of A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 07/12/2011)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 39 of 45

07/18/2011 07/18/2011 07/18/2011 07/18/2011 07/18/2011 07/22/2011 07/25/2011 07/29/2011
07/29/2011 09/16/2011 09/16/2011 09/16/2011 09/20/2011
09/20/2011

190 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Martha Anne Calhoun on behalf of Verna Eggleston (Calhoun, Martha) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
191 DECLARATION of Robert L. Kraft in Opposition re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
192 DECLARATION of Jane McCloskey in Opposition re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
193 DECLARATION of Paul Dichian in Opposition re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
194 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
195 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Andrew James Rauchberg on behalf of Verna Eggleston (Rauchberg, Andrew) (Entered: 07/22/2011)
196 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
197 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT, that the term of the Stipulation of Settlement is hereby extended to February 15, 2013. 2. In consideration of the terms of this agreement, plaintiffs' motion to extend the term of the Stipulation of Settlement is settled as to City defendant only. 3. All term of the Stipulation of Settlement remain in full force and effect until February 15, 2013. Additional relief as set forth in this Order. Verna Eggleston terminated. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 7/28/11) (pl) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff: Oral Argument held on 7/29/2011 re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement. filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas. (ft) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
198 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello. (Kraft, Robert) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
199 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement. on behalf of named plaintiffs and all others smilarly situated. Document filed by M.K.B.. (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
200 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement.. Document filed by A.I., Marieme Diongue, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 09/16/2011)
201 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Conference held on 6/17/2011 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Denise Richards, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/14/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/24/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/22/2011.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 09/20/2011)
202 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Conference proceeding held on 6/17/11 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 09/20/2011)

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 40 of 45

09/30/2011 10/25/2011
10/25/2011
10/25/2011
10/25/2011
10/26/2011 10/28/2011 10/28/2011 10/28/2011

203 ORDER: The Court hereby extends the Stipulation against the State defendants until February 15, 2013. A written opinion stating the reasons for this ruling will issue in due course. In the interim, the Court directs parties to jointly call Chambers to schedule such additional proceedings, if any, as may be required. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 9/29/2011) (lmb) (Entered: 09/30/2011)
204 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Hearing held on 8/24/2011 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/18/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/28/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/26/2012.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
205 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Hearing proceeding held on 8/24/11 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
206 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Argument held on 7/29/2011 before Judge Jed S. Rakoff. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jennifer Thun, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/18/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/28/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/26/2012.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
207 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Argument proceeding held on 7/29/11 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
208 NOTICE OF APPEAL from 203 Order,. Document filed by Nirav R. Shah, Elizabeth R Berlin. Filing fee $ 455.00, receipt number 465401020252. (nd) (Entered: 10/28/2011)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal to the District Judge re: 208 Notice of Appeal. (nd) (Entered: 10/28/2011)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Certified Copy of Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 208 Notice of Appeal. (nd) (Entered: 10/28/2011)
Appeal Record Sent to USCA (Electronic File). Certified Indexed record on Appeal Electronic Files for 203 Order, 179 MOTION For An Order Extending The Stipulated Settlement Agreement. filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 190 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston, 184 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 202 Notice of Filing Transcript, 186 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 208 Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth R Berlin, Antonia C. Novello, 172 Stipulation and Order, 171 Order, 204 Transcript,, 197 Stipulation and Order, Add and Terminate Parties,,,, 176 Judgment on Attorney Fees, 189 Notice of Appearance filed by A.I., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 175 Stipulation and Order,, 177 Protective Order, 198 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello, 162 USCA Mandate Withdrawing Appeal, 182 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 195 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston, 200 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna

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Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 185 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 160 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, 199 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by M.K.B., 168 Declaration in Support filed by Verna Eggleston, 181 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 165 Order, 188 Notice of Change of Address filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 161 USCA Mandate Withdrawing Appeal, 201 Transcript,, 205 Notice of Filing Transcript, 163 Order,, 194 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello, 167 Declaration, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 169 Declaration in Support filed by Verna Eggleston, 193 Declaration in Opposition to Motion filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello, 170 Declaration in Support filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello, 196 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 192 Declaration in Opposition to Motion filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello, 191 Declaration in Opposition to Motion filed by Robert Doar, Antonia C. Novello, 180 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 187 Notice of Appearance filed by M.K.B., 207 Notice of Filing Transcript, 178 Order,, 166 Brief filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 159 Answer to Complaint filed by Verna Eggleston, 183 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by A.I., M.K.B., O.P., L.A.M., Anna Fedosenko, M.A., Marieme Diongue, L.W., M.E., P.E., J.Z., L.M., Denise Thomas, 157 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, 206 Transcript,, 124 Order, 67 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 70 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 136 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Robert Doar,, 12 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 45 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 152 MOTION for Reconsideration re; Note to Attorney to Re−File Document − Deficient Docket Entry Error, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re; 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,.. filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 98 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 55 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 154 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 107 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 36 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 32 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 2 Rule 7.1 Disclosure Statement filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 18 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 88 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 74 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 134 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 61 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 37 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 139 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 52 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 75 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 83 Affidavit in Opposition to

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Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 87 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 94 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 4. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 72 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 22 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 1 Complaint, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 132 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 23 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 5 Notice of Appearance filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 62 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston,, 76 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 135 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 119 Order, 93 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 3. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 81 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 131 Notice of Appearance filed by Robert Doar,, 73 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 13 MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. MOTION to Certify Class. MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Certificate of Service by hand on January 11, 2006. filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 147 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 50 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 38 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 20 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 111 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 117 Order, Set Scheduling Order Deadlines, 59 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 64 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 48 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 143 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 21 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 35 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 77 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 58 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 153 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 44 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 34 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 115 Order on Motion to Disqualify Counsel, 66 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 53 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 103 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel Notice of Motion. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 148 Notice of Appearance filed by Verna Eggleston,, 17 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 95 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Memorandum of Law. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 110 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 29 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,,

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L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 26 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 108 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 99 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 80 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 96 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 19 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 125 Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 85 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 51 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 140 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 56 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 86 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 109 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 84 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 150 Memorandum & Opinion,,,, 63 Order,, 43 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 130 Notice of Appearance filed by Antonia C. Novello,, 101 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 54 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 31 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 57 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 126 Trial Memorandum filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 141 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 68 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 42 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 65 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 33 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 155 Notice of Appeal filed by Verna Eggleston,, 118 Order, 60 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 100 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 30 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 15 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 11 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 138 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 122 Order,,, 24 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 49 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 16 Declaration in Support of Motion,,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 156 Notice of Appeal filed by Robert Doar,, 151 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 116 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 149 Response in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 112 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 14 Memorandum of Law in Support

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01/04/2012
02/09/2012 04/09/2012 04/10/2012 06/11/2012

of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 69 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 47 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 144 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 40 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 10 Summons Returned Executed, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 114 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 133 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 142 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 91 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix−Part 1. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 82 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 97 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 28 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 90 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 46 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 137 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Robert Doar,, 105 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion filed by Verna Eggleston,, 9 Memo Endorsement, 41 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 104 Declaration in Support of Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 39 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 89 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion, filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 25 Declaration in Support of Motion,,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 106 Declaration in Opposition to Motion, filed by Verna Eggleston,, 92 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel City Defendant's Appendix Part 2. filed by Verna Eggleston,, 27 Declaration in Support of Motion,, filed by Denise Thomas,, O.P.,, M.K.B.,, L.W.,, M.A.,, Marieme Diongue,, M.E.,, P.E.,, Anna Fedosenko,, A.I.,, L.A.M.,, L.M.,, J.Z.,, 146 Order,,, 121 Order,,,, 8 Notice (Other) filed by L.M.,, 145 Answer to Complaint filed by Antonia C. Novello,, Robert Doar,, 113 Declaration in Opposition to Motion,, filed by Verna Eggleston were transmitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals. (nd) (Entered: 10/28/2011)
209 MEMORANDUM: Given that Paragraph 69 contains its own notice provision, one that the additional requirement in Paragraph 65 would render largely irrelevant, the Court concludes that the "meet and confer" requirement does not apply to motions to extend the Stipulation. As noted above, the plaintiffs satisfied the applicable twenty−day notice requirement. It was for the foregoing reasons that the Court issued its Order of September 30, 2011 extending the Stipulation against the State defendants until February 15, 2013. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 1/3/2012) (rdz) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
210 TRUE COPY ORDER of USCA as to 208 Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth R Berlin, Antonia C. Novello USCA Case Number 11−4526....that the appeal is hereby WITHDRAWN pursuant to Local Rule 42.1. Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk USCA for the Second Circuit. Certified: 2/9/2012. (nd) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
211 TRUE COPY ORDER of USCA as to 208 Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth R Berlin, Antonia C. Novello USCA Case Number 11−4526. The parties in the above−referenced case have filed a stipulation withdrawing this appeal pursuant to Local Rule 42.1. The stipulation is hereby "So Ordered". Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk USCA for the Second Circuit. Certified: 4/6/12. (tp) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
Transmission of USCA Mandate/Order to the District Judge re: 211 USCA Order. (tp) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
212 MANDATE of USCA (Certified Copy) as to 208 Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth R Berlin, Antonia C. Novello USCA Case Number 11−4526. The parties in the above−referenced case have filed a stipulation withdrawing this appeal pursuant to

Case: 1:05-cv-10446 As of: 06/01/2017 02:56 PM EDT 45 of 45

12/18/2012 01/04/2013 07/03/2013
08/05/2014 08/08/2014

Local Rule 42.1. The stipulation is hereby "So Ordered". Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk USCA for the Second Circuit. Issued As Mandate: 06/11/2012. (nd) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Jed S. Rakoff: Telephone Conference held on 12/18/2012. (Kotowski, Linda) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
213 STIPULATION AND ORDER: Extending term of prior stipulation of settlement to 8/15/2013. All terms of the Settlement and the First City Stipulation remain in full force and effect until August 15, 2013, and as further set forth in this document. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 1/3/2013) (cd) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
214 STIPULATION AND ORDER: NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs and defendants: 1. The term of the Settlement is hereby extended to August 15, 2014. 2. All terms of the Settlement and the First City Stipulation remain in full force and effect until August 15, 2014, except that City and State defendants will provide the monitoring described in paragraphs 54 through 63 of the Settlement for two additional cycles. for the period February 16, 2013 − August 15, 2013 ("6B") and August 16, 2013 through February 15, 2014 ("7A"), with the monitoring report for cycle 7 A due by May 15, 2014. 3. Plaintiffs' right to seek fees for any work done during the period August 16, 2013 through August 15, 2014 payable by the State defendants is limited to reasonable fees totaling no more than $50,000. All other provisions as further set forth in this order (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 6/29/2013) (js) Modified on 7/8/2013 (js). (Entered: 07/08/2013)
215 NOTICE of Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. Document filed by A.I., Elizabeth R Berlin, Marieme Diongue, Robert Doar, Anna Fedosenko, J.Z., L.A.M., L.M., L.W., M.A., M.E., M.K.B., Antonia C. Novello, O.P., P.E., Denise Thomas. (Welber, Susan) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
216 STIPULATION AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and among the undersigned attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants: The City of New York shall pay the sum of two hundred seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($217,500.00) ("City Fee Payment"), to class counsel as set forth in paragraph "2" herein, and the plaintiff class hereby agrees to accept said payment in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses, arising from, or in connection with this action for the time period through and including September 30, 2011. The State of New York, on behalf of the State defendants, shall pay to Class Counsel the sum of one hundred forty seven thousand, five hundred dollars ($147,500.00) ("State Fee Payment"), for which an I.RS. Form 1099(s) shall be issued, in full satisfaction of: (i) any and all claims, allegations, or causes of action for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses in, arising from, or in connection with the Action incurred by the plaintiff class for any and all legal counsel who have at any time represented the plaintiff class in this action for the period July 13, 2007, to September 30, 2011; and (ii) any and all claims, allegations, or causes of action for attorneys' fees, costs, disbursements, and expenses in, arising from, or in connection with the Extension Motion and State Appeal incurred by the plaintiff class for any and all legal counsel who have at any time represented the plaintiff class in the Extension Motion and State Appeal, and the following further set forth herein. Nothing contained in this Stipulation shall be deemed to be an agreement or an admission by any defendant. This Fee Stipulation contains all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties hereto. Facsimile signatures are acceptable for execution and filing of this Fee Stipulation, and this Stipulation may be executed in one or more counterparts. All executed counterparts shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument. (Signed by Judge Jed S. Rakoff on 8/7/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 08/08/2014)