Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 1

Filed 09/28/2000 Page 1 of 5
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

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UNlTEDSTATESEQUALEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNlTY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,

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COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

v.

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, d.h.a ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR,

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REOUESTED

Defendant. ______________________________~I

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race, and to provide appropriate relief to Antonio D. Anglin who was adversely affected by such practices. As stated with greater particularity in the paragraphs below, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter the "EEOC or "Commission") alleges that Antonio D. Anglin, was consistently denied promotion from an entry level management position because of his race, Black, while employed by Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida, d.b.a. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (hereinafter "Enterprise").
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1} and (3) of

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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 1 Filed 09/28/2000 Page 2 of 5
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(t)(l) and (3) ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A.
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the EEOC, is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(t)(l) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Enterprise, an international automobile rental and leasing company, has continuously been a Florida corporation doing business in the State of Florida, and has continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Enterprise, has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h). 6. The economic territorial area of Defendant Enterprise within which the wrongful acts alleged herein occurred is designated by the Defendant as "Group 42", an area encompassing 13 counties of West Central Florida (Polk, Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Hernando, Citrus, Manatee, Sarasota, Highlands, Charlotte, Hendry, Collier and Lee Counties).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Antonio Anglin filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Enterprise. All
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 1 Filed 09/28/2000 Page 3 of 5
conditions precedent to the institution ofthis lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. Since at least July 1996, Defendant Enterprise has engaged in unlawful
employment practices at certain of its facilities located in Group 42, in or near Polk County, Florida, in violation of Section 703(a)(l) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a):
a. Antonio Anglin was hired by the Defendant into the position of Management Trainee.
b. Throughout his employment, Antonio Anglin applied for and/or requested promotions to the positions of Rental Representative, Management Assistant, and Assistant Manager for which he was qualified.
c. Antonio Anglin was consistently denied promotion to these positions, because of his race, Black.
d. Similarly situated non-blacks with lesser qualifications were given the promotions.
9. The effect of unlawful employment practices complained of above has been to deprive Antonio Anglin of equal employment opportunities, and otherwise has adversely affected his status as an employee because of his race.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were intentional. 11. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Antonio Anglin.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors,
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 1 Filed 09/28/2000 Page 4 of 5
assigns, and all other persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in racial discrimination in its promotion policies, practices and procedures, at all its facilities within Group 42, and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of race.
B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for blacks, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices within Group 42.
C. Order Defendant to make whole Antonio Anglin by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement, rightful-place hiring, and front pay
D. Order Defendant to make whole Antonio Anglin by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the employment practices described in paragraphs seven through eleven above, including but not limited to, out of pocket losses, medical expenses and job search expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant to make whole Antonio Anglin by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the employment practices described in paragraphs seven through eleven above, including but not limited to, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant to pay Antonio Anglin punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraphs seven through eleven above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 1 Filed 09/28/2000 Page 5 of 5
interest. H. Award the Commission its costs of this action. JURY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint. C.GREGORYSTEWART General Counsel GWENDOLYN REAMS Deputy General Counsel DELNER FRANKLIN-THOMAS Regional Attorney MICHAEL 1. FARRELL Supervisory Trial Attorney (Acting)
~b: fkt,t,..~ '1 q, AULINE TERRELONGE'" Senior Trial Attorney State Bar No. 113896 (California) United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 East Polk Street Room 1020 Tampa, Florida 33602 Tel: (813) 228-2240 Fax: (813) 228-2841
5

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 64 Filed 10/05/2001 Page 1 of 5

1c- 0 \ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FL9~A

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TAMPA DIVISION

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UNITEDSTATESEQUALENWLOYMENT

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OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

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)

CML ACTION NO.

)

8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

Plaintiff,

)

)

AMENDED CONWLAINT

v.

)

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

)

ENTERPRISE LEASINGCONWANY,

)

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REOUESTED

)

Defendant.

)

)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race, and to provide appropriate reliefdue to Antonio D. Anglin who was adversely affected by such practices. As stated with greater particularity in paragraphs below, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter the "EEOC" or "Commission") alleges that Antonio D. Anglin was consistently denied promotion from an entry level management position because ofhis race, Black, while employed by Enterprise Leasing Company, (hereinafter "Enterprise").
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. lurisdictionofthis Court is invokedpursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§ 451,1331,1337,1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706 (f)(I) and (3) ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(I) and (3) ("Title VIlli) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 64 Filed 10/05/2001 Page 2 of 5
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the EEOC, is the agency ofthe United States ofAmerica charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement ofTitle VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Enterprise, an international automobile rental and leasing company, has continuously been a Florida Corporation, doing business in the State of Florida, and has continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Enterprise, has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h). 6. The economic territorial area of Defendant Enterprise within the wrongful acts alleged herein occurred is designated by the Defendant as "Group 42", an area encompassing 13 counties ofWest Central Florida (polk, Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Hernando, Citrus, Manatee, Sarasota, Highlands, Charlotte, Hendry, Collier and Lee Counties).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Antonio Anglin filed a charge with the Commission allegingviolations ofTitle VII by Defendant Enterprise. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. Since at least July 1996, Defendant Enterprise has engaged in unlawful employment practices at certain ofits facilities located in Group 42, in or near Polk County, Florida, in violation
2

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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB

Document 64

Filed 10/05/2001 Page 3 of 5

of Section 703(a)(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). a. Antonio Anglin was hired by the Defendant into the position ofManagement Trainee. b. Throughout his employment, Antonio Anglin applied for and/or requested promotions to the positions ofRental Representative, Management Assistant, and Assistant Manager for which he was qualified. c. Antonio Anglin was consistently denied promotion to these positions, because of his race, Black. d. Similarly situated non-blacks with lesser qualifications were given the promotions.
9. The effect ofunlawful employment practices complained ofabove has been to deprive Antonio Anglin ofequal employment opportunities, and otherwise has adversely affected his status as an employee because of his race.
10. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were intentional. 11. The unlawful employment practices complained ofabove were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Antonio Anglin.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in racial discrimination in its promotion policies, practices and procedures, at all its facilities within Group 42, and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of race.
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 64 Filed 10/05/2001 Page 4 of 5
B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for blacks, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices within Group 42.
C. Order Defendant to make whole Antonio Anglin by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affIrmative reliefnecessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to, reinstatement, rightful-place hiring, and front pay.
D. Order Defendantto make whole Antonio Anglin by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the employment practices described in paragraphs seven through eleven above, including but not limited to, out-of-pocket losses, medical expenses and job search expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant to make whole Antonio Anglin by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the employment practices described in paragraphs seven through eleven above, including but not limited to, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant to pay Antonio Anglin punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraphs seven through eleven above, in an amount to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 64 Filed 10/05/2001 Page 5 of 5
JURy TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests ajwy trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
NICHOLAS M. INZEO Acting Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN Y. REAMS Associate General Counsel DELNER FRANKLIN-THOMAS Regional Attorney MICHAEL J. FARRELL Supervisory Trial Attorney
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Senior Trial Attorney Florida Bar Number 0955876 United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., #2700 Miami, Florida 33131 Tel: (305) 530-6010 Fax: (305) 536-4494
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 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67

Filed 10/16/2001 Page 1 of 13
i l l FILED

~ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CaURII"! CST 16 p;;

IN THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

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UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ANTONIO D. ANGLIN,

CASE NO: 8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

Plaintiff,

vs.

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY,

Defendant.
--------------------------------,/
AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF, ANTONIO ANGLIN. AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title I of

the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to correct

unlawful employment practices. Following a complaint by Antonio Anglin, the

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated,

found cause (Exhibit "A") and attempted to conciliate the complaint.

Defendants are on notice of all of Mr. Anglin's charges as the conciliation

efforts included the issues of race discrimination, retaliation and constructive

discharge. After conciliation was unsuccessful, the EEOC filed a Complaint and

an Amended Complaint alleging that Antonio D. Anglin was denied promotion

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 2 of 13
from an entry level management position because of his race, black, while employed by Defendant. The EEOC opted not to file suit alleging retaliation and constructive discharge. Mr. Anglin petitioned the Court for leave to intervene. By Order of the Court dated October 1, 200 1 Antonio Anglin was granted permission to intervene. On October 16, 2001, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Antonio Anglin (Exhibit "B").
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)(4). This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to § 706(f)( 1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1 )(3) and § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 A. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as that claim arises under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. 2. Venue is appropriate in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, where the Defendant is doing business. The claims arose in this district.
PARTIES 3. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is an agency of the United States charged with the administrative interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and it is authorized to bring civil actions pursuant to §
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 3 of 13
796(f)(1 )(3) of Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1 )(3).
4. Antonio Anglin is a black male and a resident of Hillsborough County. Mr. Anglin was formerly employed by Defendant in its Polk County locations from December 12, 1994 to August 8, 1997.
5. The Defendant, Enterprise Leasing Company, was the employer of Antonio Anglin.
6. On or about April 1, 1997 Antonio Anglin filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC filed suit on September 29, 2000. On October 16, 2001, Antonio Anglin received a right to sue letter for retaliation and constructive discharge. All conditions precedent to the filing of this suit have been satisfied by Antonio Anglin.
COUNT I - CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. 1991 AND 42 U.S.C. § 1981 7. Plaintiff is a black male. Throughout Plaintiff's employment, the
Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practice at certain of its facilities located in or near Polk County, Florida in violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. These unlawful practices consisted of denial of promotions to positions for which he was qualified.
8. Antonio Anglin was denied promotions to these positions because of his race, black.
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 4 of 13
9. Similar situated non-blacks with lesser qualifications were given the promotions.
10. In December 1996 Antonio Anglin complained to the Human Resources office of Defendant that he was being discriminated against because of his race, black. As a result of his complaint, and because of his race, the Defendant retaliated against Mr. Anglin by convening a committee to review his charges, by placing Mr. Anglin on a ninety (90) day observation period (probation) and by refusing to promote him. The process of convening a committee to review Mr. Anglin's performance was a new creation of Defendant and had not been used to address employment deficiencies by other employees regardless of race.
11 . The effect of the unlawful employment practices referenced in paragraphs 7 through 10 above denied Antonio Anglin equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely effected his status as an employee because of his race and because of his complaints.
12. The Defendant established criteria for promotion which were designed to deny Antonio Anglin promotion and to retaliate against him for his complaints and because of his race. The criteria established for promotion were waived or otherwise not followed for non-black employees seeking promotion.
13. The unlawful employment practices complained of above were intentional and done with the express purpose of denying Antonio Anglin
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 5 of 13
promotion, to retaliate against him for his complaints and because of his race with the purpose of forcing Antonio Anglin's resignation as an employee.
14. As a result of the unlawful employment practices, Antonio Anglin was left with no alternative but to involuntarily terminate his employment with Defendant. This termination was caused by Defendant's failure to adhere to and abide by its own established criteria for promotion with respect to all of its employees. Non-whites were promoted without meeting the criteria while the Defendant strictly adhered to those criteria to deny Antonio Anglin promotions. Additionally, Mr. Anglin was told he would not be promoted.
15. The unlawful employment practices alleged above was done with malice and reckless indifference and disregard to the protected rights of Antonio Anglin.
WHEREFORE, based on the above, Plaintiff Anglin seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, front pay, back pay, compensatory damages, including damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity and other intangible injuries, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
COUNT II - THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992 16. The EEOC sent Mr. Anglin's charge to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The FCHR did not investigate the complaint and plans no further action (Exhibit "C"). All conditions precedent to filing suit under
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 6 of 13
Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (1999), have been satisfied or waived. 17. Antonio Anglin realleges paragraphs 3 through 6, 7 through 10
and 11 through 15 above and incorporates them by reference herein. Specifically excluded from adoption in this Count are the allegations of retaliation in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13.
18. The unlawful employment practices referenced in paragraphs 7 through 10 and 11 through 15, excluding the retaliation claims in Count I above, denied Antonio Anglin his equal employment opportunity and resulted in his termination as an employee. These acts constitute violations of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (1999) which prohibits unlawful employment practice.
19. Antonio Anglin has suffered damages as a result of the unlawful employment actions of the Defendant.
WHEREFORE, based on the above, Plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting the discriminatory practices of Defendant, injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, including damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity and other intangible injuries, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Antonio Anglin demands a trial by jury on all issues triable by a jury.
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Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 7 of 13
Respectfully submitted,
GRAY HARRIS ROBINSON LANE TROHN
~ c::- ~ ELL D. FRANKS, ESQUIRE
Florida Bar No.1 02824 NEIL A. RODDENBERY, ESQUIRE Florida Bar No. 366919 One Lake Morton Drive (33801) Post Office Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003 Telephone: 863/284-2200 Facsimile: 863/688-9771 Attorneys for Plaintiff Antonio Anglin CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and
~ctober, foregoing has been furnished by regular U.S. mail this
2001, to: M. TERESA RODRIGUEZ, ESQ., U.S. EEOC, 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., #2700, Miami, Florida 33131; PETER W. ZINOBER, ESQ. and LUISETTE GIERBOLlNI, ESQ., 201 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800, Tampa, FL 33602.
7

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 8 of 13
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Tampa Area Office

SOl East Polk SIIect. Room 1020

Tampa. FL lJan (813) 221-2310
111(813)221-2003 FAX (813) 228-2841

Charge Number: 151970960

Antonio Anglin 3504 Shady Brooke Drive North Mulberry. Florida 33860
Enterprise Rent-a-Car 3909 W. Hillsborough Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614

Charging Party Respondent

Letter of Determination
On behalf of the Commission I issue the following determination on the merits of this charge.
Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and timeliness, deferral and all other requirements for coverage have been met.
Charging Party alleged that he was denied opportunities for promotion by the Respondent because of his race, Black, in violation of Title VII. Charging Party further alleged that the Respondent retaliated against him because of his opposition to its unlawful employment practices, also in violation of Title VII.
Examination of the evidence indicates that the Charging Party was eligible and qualified for promotion to available management positions with the Respondent during the relevant time period. The evidence further indicates that the Charging Party was subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race, Black, and retaliation for complaining of such discrimination, when the Respondent repeatedly denied him opportunities for promotion to those positions and placed him on probationary status. In addition, examination of the evidence demonstrates that Similarly situated Black individuals were also denied opportunities for promotion to management pOSitions by the Respondent because of their race.
I have determined that the evidence obtained during the investigation establishes that there is reasonable cause to believe that violations of the statute have

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 9 of 13
LETTER OF DETERMINATION EEOC Charge No. 151970960 page 2
Upon finding that there is reason to believe that violations have occurred, the Commission attempts to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices by informal methods of conciliation. Therefore, the Commission now invites the parties to join with it in reaching a just resolution of this matter. Please complete the enclosed Invitation to Conciliate and return it to the Commission at the above address no later than August
20. 1999. You may also fax your response directly to (813) 228-2841.
If the Respondent declines to discuss $ettlement or when, for any other reason, a settlement acceptable to the office Director is not obtalned, the Director will inform the parties and advise them of the court enforcement alternatives available to aggrieved persons and the Commission.
You are reminded that Federal law prohibits retaliation against persons who have exercised their right to inquire or complain about matters they believe may violate the law. Discrimination against persons who have cooperated in Commission investigations is also prohibited. These protections apply regardless of the Commission's determination on the merits of the charge.
On Behalf of the Commission:
8/t,flqQ
Date
enclosures: Invitation to Conciliate
cc: Wayne A. Schrader, Esq.
Gibson. Dunn & Crutcher LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue., N.W.
Washington. D.C. 20036-5306
Robert H. Grizzard. II. Esq. P.O. Box 992 Lakeland. Florida 33802-0992

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 10 of 13

I!t!OC Parm 161-" (10196)

U. S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNITY COMMISSION
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
(CONCTllATTON FAll.URE)

To: Antonio Anglin POBox 4822 Plant City, Florida 33564-4822

From:

u. S. Bqual Employment Opporrunity CommillSion
Tampa Area Office
501 E. Polk Street, Room 1020
Tampa. Florida 33602

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CONFID6NT1AL(29CFRI1601.7(~)

Ch-ae Hilt.

F.F.OC R.,,.......d~.

151-97-9060

Karen Oshiro

Tellpllowe Nn. (813) 228-2310

TO THE PERSON AGGRIEVED:
The EEOC found reasonable cawe to believe that violations ofthe 5tatute(s) occurred with respec::t to some or all ofthe matters
alleged in the charge. BEOC attempted to conciliate the issue! of 1'Bce-balled failure to promote, retaliation and constructive discharge, but could not obtain a settlement with the Respondent that would provide relieffor you. The EEOr. has decided that it will not bring suit against the Respondent at this time based on any of those igsu(!s, other than race-baled failure to promote, and will close its files on those issues. 1his does not mean that the EEOC is certifying that the Respondent is in compliance with the law. or that the EEOC will not SUe the Respondent tater or intervene later in your lawsuit jfyou decide to sue on your own behalf.
- NOTICE OF SUIT RIGHTS -
ta (Se~ ttrldlttDnal inform"';",, atrrlclr~rI to this form.)
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and/or the Age Diserlmjnation in Employment Ad: Thi!l win be the
onIy notice ofyour right to sue that we will send you. You may pursue this matter further by bringing suit in federal or state
m,d court against the Respondent(s) named in the charge. Your suit must be WITHIN 90 DAYS fro.. your receipt of
tbts Notice. Otherwise your right to sue based on the above-numbered charge will be lost.
Equal Pay Ad (EPA): EPA suits must be brought in fode or state court within 2 yt;1II5 (3 )'C~ for willful violation:!) ofthe alleged EPA underpayment. 1bis means that backpay due for any violations that occurred IIIQrt than 2 vears (3 yelD'll befon you me soit may Dot be colledlble.
On behalf of the Commission

Endo.!!lln! Copy of Charge

cc:

{..'hargilll Party Attmley:

Mit~hen FranlaI, Esq

Gray. Harris &: Robimon

Ona Lake Morton Drive, P.O. Box 3

Lakeland. florida 33802-0003

Tampa. Fl, 33601

Respondent Attorney:
Peter W. Zinober. Esq 201 East Kennedy Blvd. Suite 800 Tamp... Floriua 33602

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 11 of 13

O~t-18-01 OA:1G

From-iM1O EEOC

3055364,(94

T-383 P 03/01 F-550

INFORMATION aELATED·TO FILING SUIT UNDER THE LAWS ENFORCRJ) BY THE EEOC

(Thi~ infimrUlrioll ~kJI~1 10 jililrg sulZ in Fnkmt or Stfll~ COllrT yndr, F~tJnql UzM,. IfYDN GlrD plan 10 Sfle ('tDlming "';Dl4rIoJU 01 Srott law. plftle be "wort rhol JJm~ limits rvrd fJrlter
provisions of Srt.R~ (QW may b~ Jhoner or "",,,e limildl rhan ffW$t tkrcribnJ ~Iow.)
PRIVATE St.·IT RIGHTS - Tide VII ofdlc Chon Rip~ Act, Ih AlDericaus with Disabilities Act (ADA.), OC the Age DiscrimiDatiou ia EIDplo)'blmr Acr (ADEA):

In ordt!r to pu ;ue this ma~r fUnher. you must ilk lawsuit against the respondent(5) named in the charge !lithia 90 du~
· of die daR yo II re~ Ibis Notice. Tberefore. you should keep a record of lhi! da~. One.! this 9O-day period is over, your rig! t to sue ba!Sed on dI~ charge referred fO in this Notice will be lost. If you intend t() consull an IUOruey.
you SbOuJd dQ ~o promptl)'. Funbermon:. in order to avoW lUly ql1~\ln that you die nOt act in • rimi'l) manner. aI is
prudent thal y.:ur SUil be filed widliD 90 daJ5 of die date this Nodre was mailed to you CatS indicated wbere me Nonce
I:S SIgned)

Your lawsuit: Ilay be filed in U.S. Disuit:'t Coun or a Sm~ court of t"ompefe'l[JurHdictiOfJ. (Usuall),. the appropriate State coon is lilt: general dvil ttial tau!1-) Whelh.!r you file in PedenJJ or Slate coon is a matter for you to decide after talkiaJ; to you. ;ano~. Filing thIS Norice jo; nOt e1lDUJ:h. You ~ fil~ a ·complaint"' dlar contains a shnn 'lUltement of · tb~ f4CtS of ~(lIlr case which shDws that you are entirl~d (0 relid. Your suit may lflcJ~ aDl' mat~r alleged in me charge or. to me ~JCtt III permitred by coon deeisions. mailers lUte or- related to the maners allC!ged in the cb".ce. GenerallY,
suits ar(" brou!:bl in Ibe State wbc=re me alleged uub",fuJ pract\Ce occumcJ, bUt in some cases can be- brnught where
relevant emplr~D'kmr reeords are~. Wbrre Ih~ employment ",auJd have; been. or where rhe responck"lll hao; in main office. If YOl have simpl~ questions. you usually can get ans.....ers from the office of the clerk of the t:oun where you are
brinl1ng lIuit. 'lUt: do not expect mit otfi~e 10 ,.,rite your complaint OT make legal 8tralegy d~isioDS fur you.

· PRIVATE S1. llT RIGHTS - Equal Pay Ad (EPA>:

EPA su;ts tnu·.c be filed in court WIthin 2 years (3 yem for willful "Iotalions) afthe alleged EPA underpaymem·
backpay due /·)f violation-i tbaI OCCUlTed more m.u2 yam (3 years) before )'Ob file suit lDay DOl he collectiblt: for
eumplc:. if y::,u were underpaid under the EPA for work pc:rfn~ from 7/1196 to 12/1196. you should tile suit before 711198 - not 12/1/98 .. fn order to r~oyer uapaid wages tlu~ for July 1996, This rime timit for filing as" EPA suit is
<;epar.ltL" frOfTl the 9O-day filiog period under litJe Vll. O1e ADA or &he ADEA referred to above Therefore. if you also
plan to S\l~ ul.c1er Tide vn. the ADA o( We ADHA. in addition w suing OD the EPA claim. SUit mUll bt- filed wiThin 90
dayo; of this ~, olice! ~ Within the 2- or 3-year EPA back pay recovery period

ATl'ORNE' REPRESENTATION - Titk VII and 1he .-\01\:

Cf you caaD.OI afford or l'lavc been UllablC! to abram a lawyer ro repret'DC you, me U.S. Di5U1CI Courr ha\ling jurl!dlCtion in your case I uy, in limited circumsrances. assist you in obrainlng IJ lawyer. Reql1eSlS for "Such assl<;rmce must be made 10 the U.S. [; 1S1l~ Coun in lhe: form and manner it requires (you should be prcpaTcd to explain in dMaU your effom co ~Wn an .rtc.,."C')') Request~ should be made weU before the end of die 9O-d.ay period ~ntioned abo\'e. because: lIuch
me reqUt'stS dQ rM~ ..~li.e\re you of requirement 10 bnDg SUK Wlthin 90 days.

AITORNE'r REFERRAL AND EEOC ASSISTANCE - All SUlturd:

You may COl I~[ ~ EEOC reprcesematt"c sho","o on YOLir Nmice if you ~ help in tinding a Ja"'~eT or if you haY," any
ql1esooos ttb.lln your legal righJS, including advice: on whIch U.S. District Coun can bear your case. Tf you ne~d [0
in~t or ot,lain It copy ot'information ;Q EEOC's file on me chargt!. pJease rr:quest il promptly in wntmg and pro.,ide
your ('huge 1111mrer (as shaM! on your No(i~e). While EEOC desuoys charge files after a certain limt". all cliarges are
kept for at k·.l'R 6 mont:h~ afteT our last attion Oll the case. Therefore, if you fi'~ suit and wu" (0 rC\'iew Ute charge file,
please makl' your review requ~ within 6 moollls or this Notire. (Before ruing suit. auy requeq shoUld ~ made
within dl~ III ({ 90 days.)

_ _-,-IF YI:?U FILE stIl1'. PLEASE SEND A COPY OF YOUR,COURT COMPLAINT TO T1II8 OFFICE.

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 12 of 13

28-11 USEEOC-TAMPA AREA OFC

~002/002

EaUAL El~.. ·LOfMENT OPPORTUNITY COftt.....I~_.!)N

I FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN ftEL. 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BLDG. F; ROOM 2~0 TALLAHASSEE~ FL 32399
:~::. '-

DA~ _ _--"'-°.42."-'~O.:::..~L'.z.9,L.7_ _ __ eeoc GIWIGE 1.5191Q 9 G0
I'a"A QWIQE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

SUBJE:r: CHAAGE TRAHSIlITIAl

~~~glin. Antonio 0 (C/tIlrPtI PaTty)

v_ .ENTERPRISE RENT A-CAR (Rnpond.tmtJ

~ Trans.itted herewith is a enarge of e.ploy••nt Gtlcrilination initially reee~ved by the:

(X) EEOC

CJ _______~~~~~--_______-------------on Q4/01/97

(NfIm#o{FEPAJ

(DaI~ofRt,eipt)

DD Pursuan~ to tn. workshar1ng agreement, thiS charge i8 to be initially invest~gate~ Dy tne EEOC.

[J pursuant to tne workS hiring agree~ent. this charge is to be initially investigated by the FEPA.

~~ The worksnarln; .gr.eman~ does not deter.ln@ which agency 1S to initially investigate the cnarg~.

o EEOC "eqlJuts II waivar

o FEPA waiveS

[] NO waiver requested

[J FEPA will investigate the charge initially

Please co_plate the botto. portIon Of this tor. to acknowleoge appropriate. to indicate whether the Agency will initially in

where

Angl1n.

To wnom ~t may concarn~

[] Th1s w111 aCknowledga rec.1p~ o~ tne referenced charga and indicate this Agency's intention to lnitallv investigate tna enarga

[J This will aCknOW1~Of the referenceu cnarge anc indicate thiS Agency's ~ntent1on

not to 1n1~lal~ t

atEfthe charge

o T"~$ wJ.ll acknowledge rec·.!P't'~of the re1'erencaa charge and request a wBlller Of l.nitul
investigation by th* receivfng agency.

o This lUll ICknawl'dg.··r.~~~ of The referenced charge and indicate this agency's intent1.0n
to dUIIUS{elos.lnert: dac:kat tne char-g. for the fallowing reason ~

TYf'ED NAME 0,. EEOC OR F£PI\ DIRECTOA
TO: EEOC - TAMPA AREA OFFICg 501 EAST POLK STRE!T
ROOM 1020 TAMPA~' FLORIDA

DAn _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-
EeOC QIARQE 1.51970960
FEPA CIlAACE _ _ .____ . _ _- , - _ -
000060

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 67 Filed 10/16/2001 Page 13 of 13

AFFIDAVIT
I, __D_'_An_t_o_in_e_t_t_e_D_a_v_i_s_ _ _ _" being first duly sworn, make the following statement:
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and competent to make this statement.
2. On, April 1, 1997, Antonio Anglin filed a claim with the EEOC, EEOC Charge Number 151970960. A copy of Mr. Anglin's charge was filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR).
3. Pursuant to the Work Sharing Agreement between the EEOC and FCHR, the charge was referred to the EEOC for investigation. The Florida Commission did not investigate this matter.
4. The Florida Commission has not made any cause determination nor a finding of "no cause".
5. Under the Work Sharing Agreement with the EEOC, the Florida Commission may conduct a substantial weight review of the EEOC decision but other than that plans no further action as the EEOC has investigated and issued a Letter of Determination.
FURTHER, Affiant sayeth naught.

:bt:WkS A Signature
Printed Name:

})

f.
t11-z,1

nc.+I~

L...

•

State of

~ ~r
~ ,~ ~

County o- f _- __~ _\ =- D- =qy-=- =:.;._ ...:- .... _ -_ -_-

BEFORE ME personally appeared

!)'A. (\~ifl.e...4k. 1)Ct." 1<

_ _to me well known

wn to me 0 be the person described herein or who has

produced

fL...

as identification and who did take an oath

and who executed the foreg g instrument, and acknowledged to and before me that

he/she executed said instrument for the purpo'ses therein expressed.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 5'~ dayof J~ ,2001.

My commisQJxPiresPhoecta D. Malory

• !*t t.f(COtMSSDt, CC9S0155 EXPIES

~ •:

Ju.. 28, 2004

"

1OIIDlD..,1IO'I"_.......

Q iiri2~-J() W:e
NorypubliC

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77

Filed 12/10/2001 Page 1 of 27
I-'· IIL:-.-10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

.('

TAMPA DIVISION

- : - . '" "'1
J I II 0 "-" ,)

UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, d/b/a ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR,
_____D__e_f_e_n_d_a_n_t.________________1

_ VI .1 ..... 1"\
L\~ H, ,J i .... ·J.\,~A
Case No: 8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

ORDER Before the court is defendant's MOtion to Compel More Complete Responses to Request to Produce and for Sanctions (Dkt. 24); plaintiff's response (Dkt. 28); plaintiff's Notice of Filing Declaration of EEOC Chairwoman Ida L. Castro (Dkt. 39)1; defendant's Memorandum in Response to Declaration of Ida L. Castro (Dkt. 46); defendant's Notice of Filing Supplemental Materials in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel (Dkt. 66); and Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Notice of Filing Supplemental Materials in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel (Dkt. 70).

The court provided plaintiff with a brief period of time in which

to invoke the deliberative process privilege.

Plaintiff

subsequently filed the declaration of Ida L. Castro, EEOC

Chairwoman.

71

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 2 of 27
Oral argument has been held. After oral argument, plaintiff submitted its withheld documents for an in camera inspection by the court (Dkt. 40). This review has now been completed. I. BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from discovery sought by defendant, Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida ("defendant" or "Enterprise"), in connection with an employment discrimination lawsuit filed against it in October of 2000. Defendant served its First Request for Production of Documents on plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("plaintiff" or "EEOC"), on January 12, 2001. Plaintiff served its response on February 20, 2001 and obj ected to twenty-seven of the twenty-nine requests. Plaintiff asserted to twenty-four of the document requests various privileges, including attorney-client privilege, deliberative process privilege, and work-product doctrine, and attached a document privilege log to its response.
Defendant now brings its motion to compel plaintiff to produce more complete responses to its request to produce and for sanctions. (Dkt. 24). Plaintiff responds that it has already produced all of the "non-privileged" documents in its possession and that its log is sufficiently detailed to establish the basis of the claimed privileges. (Dkt.28).
2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 3 of 27
II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL
Defendant contends that plaintiff's reliance on the attorneyclient privilege, deliberative process privilege, and work-product doctrine are not well-founded. These objections to disclosure by plaintiff are addressed separately.
A. Attorney-C1ient Privi1ege Plaintiff asserts that the attorney-client privilege protects withheld documents responsive to Production Request Numbers 2, 4-7, 9-10, and 18-23. Moreover, plaintiff argues that the common interest rule protects from disclosure communications between the EEOC and Antonio Anglin ("Anglin"), the charging party, in this case. Defendant contends, on the other hand, that the documents are not privileged because there was no attorney-client relationship between Anglin and the EEOC prior to the EEOC's decision to sue defendant. "The party invoking the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that an attorney-client relationship existed and that the particular communications were confidential." United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F. 2d 1554, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Confidential communications between an attorney and his or her client remain protected unless the privilege is waived by
3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 4 of 27

disclosure to a third party.2 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d

244, 248 (4 th Cir. 1990). The common interest rule is an exception,

however.

Id. at 249.

The common interest rule protects

communications made by one party to an attorney for another party

where a joint legal effort or strategy is undertaken by the parties

and their respective counsel. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d

237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 502 u.S.

810 (1991). The parties must share identical legal interests.

Katz v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433, 437 (E. D. Pa. 2000) (citations

omitted) . Interests that are merely similar in nature are

insufficient. Id.

Defendant contends that prior to the EEOC's decision to sue,

the EEOC was acting as a neutral party in investigating the charges

asserted by Anglin, the charging party. Therefore, according to

defendant, the EEOC was not aligned with either party and

communications between Anglin and EEOC attorneys or agents are not

privileged.

2
Communications between EEOC attorneys and EEOC staff members are protected by the attorney-client privilege as long as the elements are otherwise met. See,~, Silvester v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 839 F.2d 1491, 1499 n.6 (11th Cir. 1988) (where in-house attorney acted as a lawyer, not as an editor, his communications with his company's editorial employees, as well as his pre-broadcast notes and work product, were protected by the attorney-client privilege); EEOC v. The Pasta House Co., No. 4:94CV1715 TIA, 1996 WL 153959, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 1996) (confidential communications between EEOC attorneys and EEOC Commissioners were protected by the attorney-client privilege).
4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 5 of 27
A number of courts have held that confidential communications between an aggrieved employee and EEOC attorneys and their agents are protected by the attorney-client privilege. See generally EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 5481(LBS), 1998 WL 778369, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1998); EEOC v. Chemtech Int'l Corp., Civ. A. No . H- 9 4- 2 8 4 8 , 1995 WL 608 333 , at * 1-2 (S . D. Te x as May 1 7 , 1995); EEOC v. HBE Corp., No. 4:93-CV-722(CEJ), 1994 WL 376273, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 19, 1994); Bauman v. Jacobs Suchard, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 460, 461-63 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 133 F.R.D. 50, 53 (M.D. Fla. 1990); EEOC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. 69-101, 1975 WL 267, at *2-3 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 1975). The attorney-client relationship still exists even when the charging party has his or her own private counsel. Chemtech Int'l, 1995 WL 608333, at *1-2.
Such privilege applies to communications made prior to the initiation of charges, since communications made for the purpose of securing legal services or assistance are privileged. Bauman, 136 F. R. D. at 462 (holding attorney-client privilege applicable to communications that took place before EEOC filed complaint); Georgia-Pacific, 1975 WL 267, at *2-3 (holding attorney-client privilege applicable where plaintiff brought case as an individual
. plaintiff against employer but sought EEOC's legal assistance in
assuring compliance with judgment).
5

- - - - - --- - - -- --
Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB

Document 77

Filed 12/10/2001 Page 6 of 27

In the instant case, the court must first determine whether

the documents at issue qualify for protection pursuant to the

attorney-client privilege. If the elements of the attorney-client

privilege are met, then the court must determine whether the common

interest rule prevents their disclosure.

The court has conducted an in camera review of the withheld

documents and the privilege log which accompanies them. With

respect to plaintiff's Tab 10, Number 74, the court finds that the

document is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The

document reflects notes taken by the investigator concerning a

telephone conference she had with an EEOC attorney for the purpose

of securing legal advice. Accordingly, this document need not be

disclosed to defendant.3

Plaintiff's Tab 15, Number 1235, is likewise protected by the

attorney-client privilege.

The document consists of the

investigator's notes concerning a voice mail message she received

from an EEOC attorney concerning the matter at hand. 4

Plaintiff's Tab 16, Numbers 1236-1240, is protected by the

attorney-client privilege. 5

The document consists of the

3
Plaintiff also asserts that the deliberative process privilege protects this document from disclosure. The court need not address the applicability of the deliberative process privilege, as the document is protected by the attorney-client privilege.
4See supra note 3.
5S ee supra note 3.
6

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 7 of 27

investigator's notes concerning a meeting she had with an EEOC

attorney and the attorney's instructions to the investigator.

Plaintiff's Tab 22, Numbers 2166-2177, consists of a letter

from the EEOC trial attorney to the investigator regarding the

investigation. This document is protected by the attorney-client

privilege.

Plaintiff's Tab 23, Numbers 2188-2190, is protected by the

attorney-client privilege. First, the document is a communication

between Anglin's attorney, Mitchell D. Franks ("Franks"), and an

EEOC investigator, in each individual's professional capacity.

Second, the document involves matters within the scope of Anglin's

attorney-client relationship with both Franks and with EEOC

counsel.

Accordingly, the elements of the attorney-client

privilege are met with respect to this document.

Since this document was prepared by Anglin's private attorney,

the court must next determine whether the common interest rule

protects it from disclosure. First, as the aggrieved party in a

suit brought by the EEOC, Anglin has an attorney-client

relationship with the EEOC's attorneys and investigators. Johnson

& Higgins, 1998 WL 778369, at *4; Chemtech Int'l, 1995 WL 608333,

at *1-2; HBE Corp.,1994 WL 376273, at *2; Bauman, 136 F.R.D. at

461-62; Georgia-Pacific, 1975 WL 267, at *2-3.

Second, Anglin's attorney and the EEOC have a common interest

in pursuing a discrimination claim against defendant. Thus, the

7

----------------------
Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 8 of 27

court finds that the parties are aligned and have identical legal

interests. See Katz, 191 F.R.D. at 437; Chemtech, 1995 WL 608333,

at *2.

Accordingly, document number 2188-2190 is privileged and need

not be disclosed pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and the

common interest rUle. 6

Next, plaintiff's Tab 29, Numbers 2286-2292, consists of a fax

transmittal from the EEOC's Tampa Area Director to an EEOC trial

attorney. The document includes the charge of discrimination,

letter of determination, and correspondence to and from the Tampa

Area Director and defendant. Plaintiff provided a redacted version

of this document to defendant. The remaining portions of the

document are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 7

Plaintiff's Tab 30, Numbers 2296-2302, consists of a fax

transmittal and correspondence8 between defendant's counsel and the

investigator.

The fax transmittal and correspondence to

defendant's counsel, Numbers 2296-2300, are protected by the

6
Plaintiff also asserts the document is protected by the workproduct doctrine. Since the attorney-client privilege protects this document from disclosure, the court need not address the applicability of the work-product doctrine.
7 See supra note 3.
8
Correspondence to defendant's counsel from the investigator appears to be draft correspondence for the attorney's review.
8

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 9 of 27
attorney-client privilege. 9 However, the correspondence from defendant's counsel to the EEOC investigator, Numbers 2301-2302, is not privileged and shall be disclosed to defendant.
Next, plaintiff's Tab 31, Numbers 2303-2311, consists of an investigative memorandum that was faxed by the investigator's supervisor to the EEOC attorney. 10 The document is protected by the attorney-client privilege. ll Tab 31, Numbers 2312-2314 is a letter from Franks to the EEOC relating to a settlement proposal. It is also protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Plaintiff's Tab 32, Number 2315, consists of a Westlaw research cover sheet. This document is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The document is, however, protected by the work-product doctrine, which will be discussed in Section B, infra.
Plaintiff's Tab 34, Numbers 2344-2346, consists of the handwritten notes of an EEOC attorney. It is covered by the attorney-client privilege.
Next, plaintiff's Tab 36, Numbers 2359-2360, consists of a memorandum and legal transmittal form from the investigator's
9 See supra notes 3 and 6.
10
Number 2304 is missing from the documents submitted in camera. This omission is not fatal to the asserted privilege, given the nature of the privilege.
II See supra note 3.
9

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 10 of 27
supervisor to an EEOC attorney. The attorney-client privilege protects this document from disclosure. 12
Plaintiff asserts the attorney-client privilege with respect to Tab 38, Number 2410, which consists of a case synopsis prepared by an EEOC attorney. This document is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, it is protected by the workproduct doctrine as discussed infra, Section B.
Plaintiff's Tab 40, Numbers 2429-2431, consists of a memorandum by an EEOC attorney. After reviewing the document, the court is unable to determine the document's intended recipient. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that the document is protected by the attorney-client privilege. It is, however, protected by the work-product doctrine, discussed infra, Section B.
Finally, plaintiff asserts both the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine with respect to Tab 41, Numbers 24322440. This document is a memorandum from one EEOC attorney to another. The attorney-client privilege does not protect this document. On the other hand, it is covered by the work product doctrine, discussed infra, Section B.
B. Work-Product Doctrine Plaintiff asserts that several documents are protected by the work-product doctrine because they were prepared in anticipation of litigation and contain legal analysis.
12 See supra note 3. 10

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 11 of 27
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the documents are not protected by the work-product doctrine because they were prepared in the EEOC's investigatory capacity. Further, according to defendant, the documents are relevant to the allegations in the complaint. Additionally, defendant argues the documents would be helpful in comparing Anglin's earlier statements with his recent deposition testimony. Finally, the documents may not be obtained from any other source, according to the defendant.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3) provides that a party may obtain materials "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Moreover, Rule 26(b) (3) provides that, in ordering discovery of work product materials when the required showing has been made, "[t]he court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of any attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation."
Thus, plaintiff's documents located at Tabs 32, 38, 40, and 41 are primarily mental impressions of attorneys and are protected by
11

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 12 of 27

the work-product doctrine.13 To the extent that any factual work

product is contained in these documents, defendant has not made a

sufficient showing of substantial need and undue hardship. The

memorandum located at Tab 39 does not appear to relate to the

instant case as it refers to a bank as the workplace in question.

This document need not be disclosed because it is not relevant.

c. Deliberative Process Privilege

Plaintiff asserts that certain documents contain, inter alia,

investigator's interpretations and analysis of the data provided by

defendant concerning its liability and that the analysis is

inextricably intertwined with the factual information, thereby

making redaction impossible.

Defendant responds that the deliberative process privilege

does not protect the documents because they contain factual

information.

Accordingly, any documents containing factual

information should be disclosed with agency analysis, if any,

redacted therefrom.

The deliberative process privilege applies to "communications

relating to policy formulation at the higher levels of government;

it does not operate indiscriminately to shield all decision-making

13
With respect to Tabs 34 and 38, plaintiff also asserts that they are protected from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege. As these documents are protected under the work-product doctrine, the court need not address the applicability of the deliberative process privilege.
12

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 13 of 27

by public officials." Grossman v. Schwarz, 125 F.R.D. 376, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation omitted). The privilege was designed to
protect from disclosure those
governmental processes related to legal and policy decisions which cannot be carried out effectively if they must be carried out under the public eye. Government officials would hesitate to offer their candid and conscientious opinions to superiors or co-workers if they knew that their opinions of the moment might be made a matter of public record at some future date.
Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 881-82 (5 th Cir. 1981).14
The deliberative process privilege consists of two elements.
Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dept. of
Commerce, 961 F.2d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506
U.s. 969 (1992). First, the government must establish that the
document is predecisional, or "prepared in order to assist the
decisionmaker in arriving at his [or her] decision." Id. (quoting
Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.s. 168,
184 (1975)). Second, the document must be deliberative in that it
involves "a direct part of the deliberative process" by making
recommendations or expressing opinions on legal or policy matters. 15

14
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) , the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding the case law of the Fifth Circuit handed down as of September 30, 1981.

15

Basically, the second element involves answering the question,

"Does it contain advice or opinion or does it reflect the give-and-

take of the consultative process?"

Florida House of

Representatives, 961 F.2d at 949. Stated differently, if the

13

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 14 of 27
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the privilege does not protect factual information that is neither inseparably intertwined with the agency's analysis nor reflective of the agency's deliberative process. Branch, 638 F.2d at 882 (citations omitted); see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Roberts v. Hunt, 187 F.R.D. 71, 74-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
The party invoking the privilege bears the burden of establishing its existence. King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing procedures that govern all discovery disputes over police records in federal civil rights actions where privilege is claimed, regardless of the label used to classify the privilege); see also Grossman, 125 F. R. D. at 381 (addressing deliberative process privilege). A department head or other responsible agency official must personally review the documents and then state in an affidavit the factual basis for the privilege. Grossman, 125 F.R.D. at 381. "The factual basis must be stated with particularity, so that the court can make an intelligent and informed choice as to each requested piece of information." Id. (citing King, 121 F.R.D. at 189). An assertion by the government agency's attorney or the document's author is insufficient, as are mere conclusory statements. rd. (citing King, 121 F.R.D. at 189);
information in the documents appears to be advice or opinion, then it is deliberative. rd.
14

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 15 of 27
see also United States v. O'Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 225 (3d Cir. 1980) .
At oral argument, plaintiff argued that an agency attorney can assert the deliberative process privilege, rather than a department head or other official, citing Scott v. PPG Industries, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. W. Va. 1992), as authority.
In Scott, the court analyzed the deliberative process privilege in terms of oral testimony at a deposition, not documents requested by a party, and held that the deponent could invoke the privilege without first obtaining the authority of an agency department head or other official. 142 F.R.D. at 293-94. Thus, the court distinguished the method for invoking the privilege as it relates to testimony about privileged documents, not as it relates to the documents themselves, which is at issue in the present case. Id.
Despite its initial assertions, Plaintiff has now filed the affidavit of EEOC Chairwoman Ida L. Castro. (Dkt. 39).
Procedurally, plaintiff has properly invoked the deliberative process privilege with respect to its withheld documents. Ms. Castro' s affidavit states: (1) that she personally reviewed the withheld documents; 2) the reasons for invoking the privilege; and 3) the nature of the documents.
Moreover, plaintiff's amended privilege log identifies each specific document withheld and relevant information, where
15

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 16 of 27

applicable, such as the date, addressee, author, document type,

description, number of pages, privilege asserted, and the

production request to which it pertains. This information is

sufficiently detailed to invoke the deliberative process privilege.

Since plaintiff has properly invoked the deliberative process

privilege, the court now turns to its merits. To determine whether

plaintiff's claim of privilege is meritorious, the court must

analyze whether the documents are both predecisional and

deliberative. See Florida House of Representatives, 961 F.2d at

945.

Defendant seeks documents that plaintiff categorizes as either

1 ) internal memoranda; 2) internal notes; 3) internal

correspondence; or 4) attorney research and documentation.

All of the documents appear to be predecisional since they

were created prior to the EEOC's issuance of a right to sue letter

in 2000 and prior to the filing of its complaint in October of

2000. Accordingly, the documents satisfy the first element of the

deliberative process privilege.

Next, the court must evaluate whether the documents are

deliberative. A document is deliberative if it reflects subjective

opinions rather than factual information. Roberts, 187 F.R.D. at

74 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff claims that the withheld

documents contain "analysis, opinions, and recommendation regarding

meri ts of charge and further charge processing. II (Dkt. 39.)

16

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 17 of 27
Plaintiff also claims that to the extent the documents contain factual information, it would be impossible to extract the facts from the analyses without revealing privileged information. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that even if the documents are deliberative, they should be produced pursuant to a protective order.
The court has reviewed the withheld documents in camera and will now address whether the claimed deliberative process privilege prevents their disclosure. 16
Plaintiff's Tab 1, Numbers 7-12, consists of an internal memorandum from an EEOC investigator to the District Director. Plaintiff asserts that it has provided defendant with a redacted version of this document. Upon review, however, the court finds that plaintiff's version redacted more information than was protected under the deliberative process privilege. Specifically, plaintiff provided defendant with all of page 7, except for the "Recommendation" line and only a small portion of page 8. Plaintiff shall also provide defendant with the remaining portions of page 8, excluding the two paragraphs pertaining to Anglin's prima facie case. Similarly, plaintiff shall provide defendant with pages 9-11, and 12, excluding the last paragraph entitled "Conclusion."
16
Because this is the only basis for non-production asserted by plaintiff, the applicability of any other privileges need not be addressed.
17

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 18 of 27
Plaintiff's Tab 2, Numbers 13-15, consists of a memorandum from an EEOC investigator to the headquarter's library researcher regarding request for EEO-1 and demographics reports. The document is not protected by the deliberative process privilege because it does not contain the analysis, opinion, or recommendation of the EEOC investigator. Thus, it shall be disclosed to defendant.
Plaintiff's Tab 3, Numbers 16-17, consists of an "On-Site Report." This document shall be disclosed to defendant excluding the last paragraph on Number 17. The document contains factual investigative information, with the exception of the last paragraph, which contains the investigator's opinion.
Next, plaintiff's Tab 4, Numbers 18-33, consists of the investigator's handwritten notes. The document, with the exception of the two lines of Number 18 and Numbers 32-33, is factual in nature and does not include the investigator's analysis or opinion to assist in the agency's determination of this matter. Accordingly, the document shall be disclosed to defendant, except for the first two lines of Number 18 and Numbers 32-33.
Plaintiff's Tab 5, Numbers 35-36, also consists of the investigator's handwritten notes. Likewise, this document is not protected by the deliberative process privilege because it contains factual information uncovered during the investigation. Thus, this document shall be disclosed to defendant in its entirety.
18

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 19 of 27

Similarly, plaintiff's Tab 6, Numbers 37-39, consists of the

investigator's handwritten notes. This document is factual in

nature and is subject to disclosure to defendant.

Plaintiff's Tab 7, Number 40, consists of an EEOC supervisor's

handwritten notes. Although it is barely legible, it does not

appear to contain any opinion or recommendation concerning the

matter at hand, and thus shall be disclosed to defendant.

Plaintiff's Tab 8, Number 47, consists of six questions to

consider for a prospective witness. It does not contain opinion or

recommendation and does not satisfy the requirements of the

deliberative process privilege.

Accordingly, it shall be

disclosed.

Plaintiff's Tab 9, Number 73, consists of handwritten notes by

the investigator concerning a discussion she had with her

supervisor. This document is protected by the deliberative process

privilege. First, it was prepared in order to assist in the

decision-making process. Second, the document is deliberative in

nature and contains the agency's analysis of the EEOC charge(s).

Accordingly, plaintiff need not disclose this document to

defendant.

Next, plaintiff's Tab 11, Number 77, consists of the

investigator's handwritten notes concerning her investigation. It

does not contain recommendations or opinion on a legal matter.

Accordingly, this document shall be disclosed to defendant.

19

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 20 of 27
Plaintiff's Tab 12, Number 306, consists of a draft letter with handwritten notations prepared by the investigator to be sent to defendant. Neither the handwritten notes nor the letter contain opinions or recommendations. It shall be disclosed.
Plaintiff's Tab 13, Numbers 1155-1192, consists of handwritten notes by the investigator. With the exception of the notes on Number 1156, the document is not protected by the deliberative process privilege. Thus, plaintiff shall disclose Numbers 1155 and 1157-1192, but not Number 1156, to the defendant.
Plaintiff's Tab 14, Number 1193, consists of handwritten notes by the investigator to her supervisor and it is protected by the deliberative process privilege as it contains the investigator's opinion, prepared in order to assist in the EEOC's determination of the charges against defendant.
Plaintiff's Tab 17, Numbers 1241-1254a, consists of a draft request for information, "class case development" containing guidelines for investigating the case, and handwritten notes by the investigator. The deliberative process privilege elements are met with respect to this document; therefore, it need not be disclosed to defendant.
Plaintiff's Tab 18, Numbers 1254b-1258, consists of a memorandum from an EEOC investigator to an EEOC researcher detailing the manner in which the investigator should request
20

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 21 of 27

computerized data from defendant. This document is also protected

by the deliberative process privilege.

Plaintiff's Tab 19, Numbers 1259-1275, consists of the

investigator's handwritten notes. Numbers 1260 and 1262-1264 fall

within the deliberative process privilege. The remaining portions,

Numbers 1259, 1261, and 1265-1275, are not protected by the

deliberative process privilege and shall be disclosed to defendant.

Plaintiff's Tab 20, Numbers 1829-1844, consists of a

compilation of workforce data by the Chief of the Research and

Technical Information Program Research and Survey Division,

preceded by a two page memorandum. This document, including the

data, is protected by the deliberative process privilege. Not only

was the document prepared to assist in the decision-making process,

but also it contains statistical analysis of the demographics of

defendant's workforce. Statistical analysis is characterized as

"opinion" information for purposes of the deliberative process

privi lege and is protected from disclosure. Florida House of

Representatives, 961 F.2d at 949-50 (adjusted block level census

data were opinion, not fact).

Plaintiff's Tab 21, Numbers 1846-1849, consists of an on-site

report for charges 151980236, 151971795, and 151980074. The

document is not protected by the deliberative process privilege as

it contains purely factual information obtained during the

investigation.

Consequently, plaintiff shall disclose this

21

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 22 of 27
document to defendant. Part of Number 1847 is obscured by two business cards. The entire page shall be produced.
Plaintiff's Tab 24, Numbers 2191-2207, consists of a compilation of data by the Chief of the Research and Technical Information Program Research and Survey Division. As with Tab 20, this document is protected by the deliberative process privilege.
Plaintiff asserts that it provided defendant with Numbers 2214-2216, plaintiff's Tab 25. Thus, the court need not address whether this document is privileged.
Plaintiff's Tab 26, Numbers 2234-2264, consists of an investigative memorandum prepared by the investigator. The deliberative process privilege applies to portions of this document; however, it contains factual portions that can be segregated. Specifically, the document shall be produced with the following portions redacted: Number 2236 - the last two paragraphs continuing with the first two sentences on the next page; Number 2237 - the last two sentences of the second paragraph, and the fifth and six paragraphs in their entireties; Number 2239 - the second paragraph; Number 2244 - the first two paragraphs; Number 2246 - all but the first paragraph; Number 2247 - the first five paragraphs; Number 2248 - the last six paragraphs; Number 2250 the first three paragraphs; Number 2253 - the first paragraph and the last paragraph; Number 2255 - the four paragraphs under the heading "Comparisons:"; Number 2257 - the second paragraph under
22

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 23 of 27
the heading "Promotion History"; Number 2260 - the second paragraph under the heading "Promotion History"; Number 2262 - the first line; Number 2263 - the seventh paragraph; and Number 2264 - the first and last paragraphs under the heading "Analysis:". The entirety of Numbers 2241, 2243, 2249, 2251, 2252, 2254 is opinion and is covered by the deliberative process privilege.
Plaintiff's Tab 27, Numbers 2265-2269, consists of the investigator's handwritten notes. This document is factual in nature and not protected by the deliberative process privilege.
Plaintiff asserts that its document listed as Tab 28, Numbers 2270-2285, is the same as the document listed in Tab 20. Accordingly, the court's analysis with respect to Tab 20 applies equally to Tab 27.
Plaintiff's Tab 33, Numbers 2316-2343,17 consists of the investigator's notes and analysis. The deliberative process privilege protects portions of this document from disclosure. However, the document contains factual portions that are not inseparably intertwined with analysis. Accordingly, the document shall be disclosed to defendant with the following paragraphs redacted from certain pages: Number 2316 - the six paragraphs following the "Analysis" heading; Number 2323 - the last three
17
The court notes that numbers 2317-2321 are missing from the sealed document submitted by plaintiff. Plaintiff shall promptly submit these for in camera review within 10 days.
23

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 24 of 27

paragraphs; Number 2324 - the first two paragraphs; Number 2326 -

all but the first paragraph; Number 2327

the first five

paragraphs; Number 2329 - the last four paragraphs; Number 2330 -

the first three paragraphs; Number 2331 - all paragraphs except the

first line; Number 2335 - the first five paragraphs; Number 2342 -

the first line; and Number 2343 - the seventh paragraph which

begins with the number "4". However, Number 2332 and Number 2334

shall not be disclosed as these pages are covered by the

deliberative process in their entirety.

Plaintiff's Tab 35, Numbers 2356-2358, consists of handwritten

notes by the investigator and a Federal Express receipt. The

handwritten notes, Numbers 2356-2357, are protected by the

deliberative process privilege because they contain opinions. The

Federal Express receipt, Number 2358, however, is not protected and

shall be disclosed.

Plaintiff asserts that Tab 37 is a duplicate of Tab 26.

Therefore, the analysis under Tab 26 applies equally to Tab 37.

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege

that may be overcome by a showing that the need for the documents

outweighs the interest in not disclosing them. United States v.

Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see

also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38.

In the case at bar, defendant argues that the documents are

relevant to plaintiff's allegations. Moreover, defendant asserts

24

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 25 of 27
that the documents would illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff's case and would also reveal any inconsistencies in the facts as articulated by Anglin, defendant's former employee and EEOC complainant, in his recent deposition.
Relevancy alone is an insufficient reason to overcome the privilege. Farley, 11 F.3d at 1390. Also, defendant has not shown how information concerning the deliberative process leading up to the EEOC's action is relevant to impeachment of Anglin. 18
Accordingly, defendant has not shown that its need for the redacted portions of the documents outweighs the potential harm to the EEOC's decision-making process.
D. Medical Records At oral argument, defendant argued that Anglin's medical records are in plaintiff's control and should, therefore, be produced as requested by plaintiff. Specifically, defendant contends that since Anglin is the EEOC's client, the records are in its control. Plaintiff responded that it has no medical records in its possession. At oral argument, the court ordered that release forms be provided to Anglin's attorney for execution. Accordingly, the issue as to the medical records appears moot.
18
Nothing in defendant's supplemental materials (Dkt. 66) strengthens defendant's arguments for overcoming the deliberative process privilege.
25

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 77 Filed 12/10/2001 Page 26 of 27
III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS The Motions for Sanctions is DENIED subject to reconsideration
if circumstances warrant. Conclusion
It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: 1) defendant's Motion to Compel More Complete Responses to
Request to Produce and for Sanctions (Dkt. 24) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; 2) plaintiff shall produce the documents described in this order within ten days from the date of this order; 3) within the same time-period, plaintiff shall file in camera Numbers 2317-2321 of Tab 33 for review by the court.
DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida this I~~ay of December,
2001.
Copies to: Counsel of record
26

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Date Printed: 12/11/2001~

DoFcuImLentE77 CFOilePd 1Y2/10/2001

Page 27 of 27

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 118 Filed 03/15/2002 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY,

Case No.: 8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

Defendant.
_________________________1

ORDER Before the court are Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") Motion to Strike and for Protective Order In

Response to Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure (Dkt.97), which

was filed on January 30, 2002, and Defendant, Enterprise Leasing Company's ("Enterprise") Memorandum of Law in Opposition To EEOC's

Motion to Strike Defendant's Expert Disclosure (Dkt. 110). The EEOC requests that the court strike Enterprise's expert
designations and issue an order protecting Antonio Anglin from a Rule 35 mental examination. On December 14, 2001, Defendant apparently served the EEOC with an expert disclosure naming three experts, Dr. Stein, a psychiatrist, Dr. Otto, a forensic psychiatrist and Dr. Piette, an economist. l

IThe EEOC has not attached a copy of Defendant's expert disclosures. Additionally, the EEOC's motion appears to be aimed toward striking the designated psychiatrist and psychologist. The EEOC has not provided any basis to strike the designation Of~~

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 118 Filed 03/15/2002 Page 2 of 5
The EEOC argues that Enterprise's expert disclosures do not comply with Rule 26 because they fail to include expert reports authored and signed by the proposed experts. The EEOC also argues that Defendant's experts (presumably the psychiatrist and psychologist) will likely not be allowed to testify because they will not have sufficient foundation for their expert opinions. The EEOC argues that Defendant's experts would necessarily need to examine Mr. Anglin under Rule 35 and that the Defendant will likely not establish that it is entitled to a Rule 35 physical and/or mental examination.
The EEOC also seeks to protect Antonio Anglin from being forced to submit to a physical and/or mental examination pursuant to Rule 35. This motion is premature in that Defendant has not sought a mental and/or physical examination of Mr. Anglin.
In response to the EEOC's motion, Defendant asserts Mr. Anglin, by orders dated October 1, 2001 and January 23, 2002 has been granted leave to file an Intervenor Complaint and that Anglin's Intervenor Complaint "is likely to broaden the substantive scope and potential damages" of the lawsuit. Enterprise asserts
that if Mr. Anglin is given leave to seek claims under 42 u.s.c.
§1981 or the Florida Civil Rights Act, Enterprise will likely seek a mental examination of Mr. Anglin pursuant to Rule 35. Enterprise
economist, Dr. Piette, other than the conclusory allegation that Defendant's expert disclosures do not comply with Rule 26.
2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 118 Filed 03/15/2002 Page 3 of 5
also asserts that since the court has not yet set deadlines for expert witness disclosures related to Mr. Anglin's Intervenor Complaint, Enterprise, "in an abundance of caution, disclosed the experts it intends to use in this case if Anglin is permitted to
assert claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act and/or 42 u.s.c.
§1981. " With respect to the EEOC's allegation that Defendant's expert
disclosures are deficient in that they do not attach expert reports, authored and signed by the experts, Enterprise asserts that it complied with Rule 26 "to the extent possible, since no mental examination under Rule 35 had been undertaken, and therefore, no reports had been rendered."
Based upon the pleadings before this court, the EEOC's designation of Dr. Stein and Dr. Otto is deficient and does not comply with Rule 26. Further, the expert testimony of Dr. Stein and Dr. Otto does not appear relevant to the claim asserted by the EEOC against Enterprise. 2 Should Mr. Anglin assert additional claims against Enterprise, Enterprise at that time should seek leave of court to supplement its expert disclosures.
Accordingly, and upon consideration, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
2Enterprise concedes in its opposition to the EEOC's motion to strike that if the only issue in the case is the EEOC claim, " . . .Enterprise would not have requested that Anglin submit to a Rule 35 mental examinaiont."
3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 118

Filed 03/15/2002 Page 4 of 5
--

(1) Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant's expert disclosures

(Dkt. 97) is GRANTED to the extent that Defendant's expert

designations of Dr. Stein and Dr. Otto are STRICKEN.

(2) Plaintiff's motion for protective order (Dkt. 97) is DENIED as

premature. DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this

/.'7-rt

-day

of

March, 2002.

Copies to: Counsel of Record

4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB FDoIcuLmeEnt 11C8 OPFileYd 03/15/2002 Page 5 of 5 Date Printed: 03/18/2002

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Miami District Office
One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq.
Zinober & McCrea, P.A.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800
Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 136 Filed 04/19/2002 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

~ 4:47 -'; ,~r,."
,,-1·.,,1,)

r"',
l i

.

' . ! l), \,1...;,..\

I~ 1. !oj II,

I

~~ ''.;~f~

Plaintiff,

and

ANTONIO ANGLIN

Intervenor

v.

Case No.: 8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY,

Defendant.
-------------------------------------,/
ORDER

Before the court is Defendant's Motion To Compel Compliance

With Rule 26 (Dkt.122), which was filed on March 20, 2002.

Defendant seeks an order compelling Intervenor, Antonio Anglin, to provide Defendant with specific figures for the amount

of compensatory and punitive damages Anglin seek from Defendant.

Defendant also seeks an order compelling Anglin to provide specific

information supporting and explaining Anglin's back pay calculations in his Rule 26(a) (1) initial disclosures and documentation supporting such calculations. To date, Intervenor

has not responded to this motion.

The Local Rules of this district provide that a party shall

respond within ten (10) days to any motion to which it is opposed.

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 136 Filed 04/19/2002 Page 2 of 3
See Local Rule 3.01(b), M.D. Fla. As the time for responding has passed and Anglin has not filed a response, Anglin is deemed to have no objection to the relief requested in Defendant's motion.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED: (1) Defendant's motion to compel compliance with Rule 26 (Dkt. 122) is GRAN'l'ED. Intervenor, Antonio Anglin shall serve Defendant with specific figures for the amount of compensatory and punitive damages he seeks, specific information supporting and explaining Anglin's back pay calculations and documentation supporting Anglin's back pay calculations within ten days from the date of this order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this April, 2002.

EL
Copies to: Counsel of Record

Judge

2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB FDoIcuLmeEnt 13C6 OPFileYd 04/19/2002 Page 3 of 3 Date Printed: 04/22/2002

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148

Filed 06/10/2002 Page 1 of 19
fiLED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6'J-.Y

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 02 JU:il 0 Pi1 I: 22

TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUALEMWLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
and
ANTONIO ANGLIN,
Intervenor, vs.
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, d/bla ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR,
Defendant. __________________________________,1

Case No. 8:00-civ-2012-T-24 EAJ

ORDER This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff EEOC's claims (Doc. No. 78). Plaintiff EEOC fIled a response in opposition (Doc. No. 101), and Defendant fIled a reply to Plaintiff's response (Doc. No. 111). Ie Back&ronnd
Plaintiff filed suit for race discrimination under Title vn due to Defendant's failure to
promote Antonio Anglin during his tenure with the company. Anglin, an African-American man, was hired as a management trainee on December 12, 1994. Anglin worked for Defendant until he resigned in August of 1997.
The management trainee position for which Anglin was hired is an entry level position. The next level up from his position is management assistant. The management assistant position

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 2 of 19

is a non-competitive position, which means that any number of qualified management trainees could be promoted to management assistant at any time.
The next level up from management assistant is assistant manager. While the assistant manager position is a competitive position, a management trainee can bypass the management assistant position and be promoted directly to assistant manager. The next level up from assistant manager is branch manager. Like the assistant manager position, the branch manager position is also competitive.
There were no written requirements for promotion from management trainee to management assistant until March of 1997. (Doc. No. 85, p.76-78). Prior to that time, Anglin contends that in order to qualify for a promotion to management assistant, a management trainee needed to achieve a Collision Damage Waiver ("COW") sales percentage of 55% and needed to pass a certain qualifying exam called the "grill." Id. at 123,201. Anglin met this COW sales goal in March of 1995, August of 1995, January of 1996, and February of 1996. 1 Anglin took the grill in September of 1996. (Doc. No. 85, p.149-150; Doc. No. 102, Ex. 4).
The grill is a two part exam-there is an objective portion and a subjective portion. (Doc. No. 85, p.150-51; Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9). Anglin passed the objective portion, but he failed the subjective portion. Id. The subjective portion, which consisted of a mock sales call, was administered by Drew Akers. Id. Akers, who was the Area Manager at that time, was the sole decision maker as to Anglin's performance on the mock sales call portion. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9).

I(Doc. No. 103, Item Number 4, Bates stamped page 000548; chart summarizing Item

Number 4).

.

2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 3 of 19
Anglin was entitled to retake the grill, and he attempted to retake the subjective portion within 30 days after he had failed it. (Doc. No. 89, p.183; Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9). After he had scheduled to retake the subjective portion, Steven Barger (who became the new Area Manager) told Anglin that the rules had changed, and therefore, he was barred from retaking the grill. (Doc. No. 85, p.153).
Anglin believes that Akers discriminated against him. (Doc. No. 85, p.258). Previously, in July or August of 1996, Akers told Anglin that he could not put in for any more promotions. Id. at 135-138. At that time, Akers told Anglin that he could not be promoted because he did not have a dynamic presence-that if they lined up every employee in the office and no one was allowed to say a word and a customer walked in and was asked who they thought the branch manager was, the customer would never choose Anglin.2 rd. at 137. Akers had also told Anglin that he could train a monkey to do the things that Anglin does. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9).
Akers once commented to another employee, William Westergom, that if you lined up all of the management trainees, Anglin just does not look like a manager. (Doc. No. 105, p.l04-05). Westergom asked Akers what he meant by that comment, and Westergom asked if it was because Anglin is black. Id. at 105. Akers responded, "'Well, there you go. ,,, Id.
In March of 1997, the 55% CDW sales requirement that had to be met in order to be eligible to become a management assistant was reduced to 52%. (Doc. No. 84, p. 201-02.). However, Anglin remained a management trainee throughout his entire tenure with Defendant. Plaintiff contends that Defendant discriminated against Anglin by failing to promote him while
2Akers contends that Anglin was not considered for promotions, because Anglin was repeatedly counseled in 1995 and 1996 for performance deficiencies which had not improved. (Doc. No. 81,1 17).
3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 4 of 19
promoting equally or less qualified white employees. Anglin identified eleven comparators3, and he contends that a review of his and their employment histories reveals that he was discriminatorily denied several promotions.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See Celotex Com. v. Catrett, 477 u.S. 317 (1986). A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by "showing" or "pointing out" to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and by its own affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11 th Cir. 1989); Samples on behalf of Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th
3Kristen Beeman, Mary Mortensen, Dave Straquadine, Dana Sheffield, Bill Westergom, Bob Offerman, Sherri Williams, Tim Grubisic, Robert Boehmler, Dave Lenton, and Cathy Kelly.
4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 5 of 19
Cir. 1988). Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one
inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. See Augusta Iron & Steel Works v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (lith Cir. 1988). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter oflaw." Id. at 251-52.
In. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment in which it argues that (l) Plaintiffs claims regarding certain promotions are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case; and (3) Defendant has legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not selecting Anglin for each of the challenged promotions. Accordingly, the Court will address each argument.
A. Time-Barred Promotions Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs claims regarding certain promotions are timebarred. Specifically, Defendant points out that an aggrieved party must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action, and any claims arising more than 300 days prior to the filing of the charge are time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l); Malone v. K-Mart Com., 51 F. Supp.2d 1287, 1300 (M.D. Ala. 1999)(citations omitted). Since Anglin filed his charge with the EEOC on April 1, 1997, Defendant argues that
5

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 6 of 19
any claims arising prior to June 5, 1996 are time-barred. Since Kristen Beeman's, Mary Mortensen's and Dave Straquadine's promotions4all occurred before June 5, 1996, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot pursue claims relating to these promotions because the claims would be time-barred. Plaintiff responds that the non-promotion of Anglin was a continuing violation, and therefore, none of its claims related to these promotions are time-barred.
The continuing violation doctrine is an exception to the 300 day filing requirement. See id. The "doctrine prohibits an employer who has continuously maintained an illegal employment policy or has committed a series of discrete acts amounting to a practice of discrimination from relying on the statute of limitations to bar suits as long as at least one discriminatory act occurred within the" 300 day period prior to filing a charge with the EEOC. Butler v. Matsushita Communication Indus. Com. of U.S.A., 203 F.R.D. 575,583 (N.D. Ga. 2001)(citation omitted). The purpose of the 300 day filing requirement "is to protect an employer from having to defend against claims arising out of remote decisions." See Blalock v. Dale County Board of Education, 84 F. Supp.2d 1291, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 1999)(citation omitted)
In order to determine whether the continuing violation doctrine applies, courts consider, among other things, the subject matter, frequency, and the degree of permanence of the alleged acts. See Malone, 51 F. Supp.2d at 1301 (quoting Bell)' v. Board of Supervisors ofL.S.U., 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983)). With regards to subject matter, courts consider whether "'the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination.'" Id. With regards to frequency, courts consider whether the alleged acts are recurring versus a series of isolated employment decisions. Id. With
4Kristin Beeman was promoted to assistant manager on October 1, 1995. Mary Mortensen was promoted to assistant manager on February 1, 1996. Dave Straquadine was promoted to branch manager on March 16, 1996.
6

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 7 of 19
regards to the degree of pennanence of the alleged acts, courts consider whether the alleged acts "have the degree of pennanence which should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights." Id. Additionally, the Court notes that "in the absence of a continuing discriminatory policy, a plaintiff cannot extend the life of an otherwise barred failure-to-promote claim under the continuing violation doctrine, for such an employment action is generally deemed a discrete act of past discrimination." Miller v. Bed. Bath & Beyond, 185 F. Supp.2d 1253, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2002)
In the instant case, the otherwise time-barred acts consist of three promotions. Even assuming that the Court found that the time-barred acts were related in subject matter to the timely filed claims, the Court finds that the time-barred acts consisted of isolated employment decisions and that the degree of pennanence resulting from Defendant's promotion decisions as to these three positions should have triggered Anglin's awareness and duty to assert his rights. See id. (finding that the failure to promote the plaintiff was not a continuing violation); Butler, 203 F.R.D. at 583 (finding that the denial of promotions was not a continuing violation). Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs failure to promote claim as to the positions that were filled before June 5, 1996 are time-barred, because the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to those claims.s Therefore, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgement as to these claims.
Yfhe Court notes, however, that even though Plaintiff cannot pursue failure to promote claims as to promotions which occurred before June 5, 1996. Plaintiff may use such promotions as background evidence when proving its failure to promote claim as to the management assistant and assistant manager positions. See Thigpen v. Bibb County. Georgia Sheriff s Department, 223 F.3d 1231, 1243 n.19 (11 th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted).
7

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 8 of 19

B. Promotions to Assistant Manager

Plaintiff contends that Anglin was discriminatorily denied several promotions for

assistant manager positions. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the following promotions to

assistant manager:

•

Dana Sheffield - 9/1196

•

Bill Westergom - 10/1196

•

Bob Offerman - 11/1196

•

Dave Lenton - 411/97

•

Robert Boehmler - 711/97

Under the McDonnell DouGlas Com. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), method of proving

discrimination, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a

preponderance of the evidence. If such a prima facie case is made, the burden of production, not

proof, shifts to Defendant. The burden of production is to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its employment decision. Once Defendant produces such evidence, Plaintiff must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered evidence is but a pretext to

cover up an actual discriminatory motive. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the

opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could

reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11 th Cir. 1990) (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986».

In order to establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show (1) that Anglin belongs to a

racial minority; (2) that he applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) that he was rejected;

and (4) thereafter, the position was fIlled by a person not of the same racial minority. See Sledge

v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, 275 F.3d 1014, 1015 n.1 (11 th Cir. 2001); Walker v. MOrtham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1186 (11 th Cir. 1998)(citing Crawford v. Western Electric Co., 614

8

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 9 of 19
F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980)). Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish that Anglin was qualified to become an assistant manager.
The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was qualified. To begin with, there were no written qualifications until March of 1997, and then the qualifications kept changing. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 11).
Defendant contends that promotions to assistant manager are based on an evaluation of sales and marketing ability, customer service skills, and leadership skills. (Doc. No. 89, p.6768). Based on these qualities, Defendant contends that Anglin was not qualified. However, a review of the evidence submitted indicates that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anglin possessed these skills and whether Defendant actually required these skills.
For example, Anglin's performance review on May 6, 1996 reveals that his supervisor felt that Anglin met all of the customer service skills requirements. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 10). The only negative comment about his customer service skills was that he should talk louder on the phone~ however, he was still evaluated as meeting the requirements for telephone skills. Id.
With regards to Anglin's leadership skills, Anglin's performance review on May 6, 1996 reveals that his supervisor felt that Anglin met the requirements that he be able to lead and train others. Id. Anglin's branch manager at the Winter Haven office. Todd Shakne, assigned several people to Anglin to train. (Doc. No. 85, p.92-94). Additionally, when key people were out ofthe Winter Haven office, Anglin would run the office. (Doc. No. 102. Ex. 11). The only negative comments in Anglin's May 6, 1996 performance review with respect to his leadership skills were that he needed to take a more active role as a manager versus employee and that he needed to improve his ability to delegate and share functions. (Doc. No. 102. Ex. 10).
9

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 10 of 19

The final attribute that Defendant contends that it focuses on is sales and marketing ability. According to Defendant, CDW sales are considered an important indicator of a person's ability to sell. (Doc. No. 114, p.2). However, Bob Offerman was promoted to assistant manager on November 1, 1996 despite the fact that his CDW sales percentages were quite low. (Doc. No. 103, Item Number 4, chart summarizing Item Number 4). Offerman's CDW sales percentages were much lower than Anglin's CDW sales percentages during the same time, as shown below:

1/96 2/96 3/96 4/96 5/96 6/96 7/96 8/96 9/96 10/96

Offerman 38 46 51 25

35

23

41

16

23

23

22

Anglin 59 58 55 37

31

40

34

31

30

42

46

Additionally, William Westergom was promoted to assistant manager on October 1, 1996 even though Drew Akers told him that he did not qualify to interview for the position. (Doc. No.

105, p.22-25; Doc. No. 84). Based on the above, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Anglin was qualified to become an assistant manager and/or whether the articulated promotion requirements were in fact required to be met in order to be promoted. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that Anglin cannot establish a prima facie

case.

Defendant also argues that it has legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for each of its challenged promotion decisions to assistant manager. Plaintiff contends that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Accordingly, the Court will address each of the challenged promotions to assistant manager positions.

10

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 11 of 19
1. Dana Sheffield Dana Sheffield was promoted on September 1, 1996. Defendant states that Sheffield was promoted because she was better qualified than Anglin due to her higher CDW sales, strong customer service skills, and potential leadership skills. However, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether this reason is pretextual, given that Anglin was told by his branch manager, Todd Shakne, that he could not apply for the position, because he did not have enough experience. (Doc. No. 85, p.141-45). However, Shakne pennitted Sheffield, who had only been with the company for six months and whom Anglin was training at the time, to apply for the position. Id. Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this promotion.
2. Bill Westergom Bill Westergom was promoted on October 1, 1996. Even assuming that Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for this promotion, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual. Plaintiff has submitted evidence that Defendant bent its promotion requirements when promoting Westergom, since Westergom has stated that Akers told him that he did not qualify to interview for the position. Such non-adherence to its own promotion requirements is suspicious when it gives a non-minority applicant an edge in the promotion process. Carter v. Three Sprin~s Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635,644 (11th Cir. 1998)(citing Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1373-74 (11 th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this promotion.
11

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 12 of 19
3. Bob Offerman Bob Offerman was promoted on November 1,1996. Even assuming that Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for this promotion, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual. Plaintiff has submitted evidence that Defendant bent its promotion requirements when promoting Offerman, since Offerman's CDW sales percentages were lower than Anglin's and yet Defendant has argued that Anglin's CDW sales percentages indicate that he was not qualified for the position. As stated above, such non-adherence to its own promotion requirements is suspicious when it gives a non-minority applicant an edge in the promotion process. Carter, 132 F.3d at 644 (citing Morrison, 763 F.2d at 1373-74). Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this promotion.
4. Dave Lenton Dave Lenton was promoted on April 1, 1997. Defendant contends that Lenton was more qualified than Anglin, because his CDW sales percentages were consistently higher than Anglin's, and Lenton's direct supervisor recommended him for promotion. (Doc. No. 103, Item No.4, chart summarizing Item No.4; Doc. No. 93). Additionally, Defendant contends that Lenton had superior sales, leadership skills, and customer service skills. (Doc. No. 93). Based on the above, the Court finds that Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its promotion decision. Plaintiff has not addressed why Defendant's proffered reason is pretextual as to this promotion decision. The only reference to Lenton in Plaintiffs response in opposition is that Lenton is one of the comparators who did not achieve the 55% or 52% CDW sales percentage in
12

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 13 of 19
more than one month. (Doc. No. 101, p.16). However, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that the 55% or 52% CDW sales percentages were required in order to be promoted to the assistant manager position. Instead, the evidence submitted only shows that such percentages were required in order to be promoted to the management assistant position. (Doc. No. 85, p.77, 201-02; Doc. No. 89, p.169-70).
Additionally, the Court notes that there must be "a strong showing of a disparity in qualifications in order for an inference of discrimination to arise." Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1187 (11 th Cir. 2(01). Pretext cannot be shown simply by showing that Anglin was more qualified, unless his superior qualifications are so apparent as to '''virtually ... jump off the page and slap you in the face.'" Id. (quoting Lee v. GTE Florida. Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2000)(quoting Deines v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999»(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, since Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant's proffered reason is pretextual, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this promotion.
5. Robert Boehmler Robert Boehmler was promoted on July 1, 1997. Defendant contends that Boehmler was more qualified than Anglin, because Boehmler's CDW sales percentages were consistently higher than Anglin's, and Boehmler's sales and marketing abilities and leadership abilities were stronger than Anglin's. (Doc. No. 103, Item No.4, chart summarizing Item No. 4~ Doc. No. 93). Based on the above, the Court finds that Defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its promotion decision. Plaintiff has not specifically addressed why Defendant's proffered reason is pretextual.
13

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 14 of 19
Plaintiff does point out that Boehmler did not ever achieve the 55% or 52% CDW sales percentage. (Doc. No. 101, p.16). However, as stated above, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that the 55% or 52% CDW sales percentages were required in order to be promoted to the assistant manager position. Instead, the evidence submitted only shows that such percentages were required in order to be promoted to the management assistant position. (Doc. No. 85, p.77, 201-02; Doc. No. 89, p.169-70).
Additionally, Plaintiff disputes Defendant's assertion that Boehmler was more qualified than Anglin. However, as stated above, there must be "a strong showing of a disparity in qualifications in order for an inference of discrimination to arise." Denney, 247 F.3d at 1187. Accordingly, since Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant's proffered reason is pretextual, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this promotion.
c. Promotion to ManaKement Assistant
Plaintiff also contends that Anglin was discriminatorily denied a promotion to management assistant. Plaintiff contends that a review of the eleven comparators,6 employment histories reveals that Anglin was discriminatorily denied a promotion to this non-competitive position. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that Anglin was not qualified for the management assistant position and that the people who were promoted to this position were more qualified than Anglin.
The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Anglin was
6Anglin identified the following comparators: Kristen Beeman, Mary Mortensen, Dave Straquadine, Dana Sheffield, Bill Westergom, Bob Offerman, Sherri Williams, Tim Grubisic, Robert Boehmler, Dave Lenton, and Cathy Kelly. However, since there is no evidence that Cathy Kelly was ever promoted, she cannot be used as a comparator in support of Plaintiffs failure to promote claim. (Doc. No. 84, 16).
14

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 15 of 19
qualified for the management assistant position. There were no written requirements for promotion from management trainee to management assistant until March of 1997. Prior to that time, Anglin contends that in order to qualify for a promotion to management assistant, a management trainee needed to achieve a CDW sales percentage of 55% and needed to pass the grill. Anglin met this CDW sales goal in March of 1995, August of 1995, January of 1996, and February of 1996. When Anglin took the grill in September of 1996, he passed the objective portion and failed the subjective portion. The subjective portion, which consisted of a mock sales call, was administered and evaluated by Drew Akers.
Anglin was entitled to retake the grill, and he had scheduled to retake the subjective portion within thirty days of failing it. However, Steven Barger told Anglin that the rules for retaking the grill had changed, and therefore, he was barred from retaking it.
Defendant contends that in order to be promoted to any position within the company, an employee is evaluated based on his or her sales and marketing ability, customer service skills, and leadership skills. The Court has previously found that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anglin possessed these skills.
Upon review of the evidence submitted, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Anglin was qualified for the management assistant position despite the fact that he failed the subjective portion of the grill, due to the fact that (1) Defendant changed the rules for retaking the grill at the same time that Anglin was attempting to retake it; (2) Defendant did not adhere to its promotion requirements for other managerial positions; and (3) it appears7 that some
7Anglin has stated that many employees did not have to take the grill in order to be promoted. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9). Additionally, in his deposition, Anglin states that Kristen Beeman, who was promoted to management assistant, never took any qualifying exams. (Doc.
15

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 16 of 19
employees may have been promoted to the management assistant position without taking the grill.
Defendant contends that it has legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for failing to promote Anglin to the management assistant position-Anglin was not qualified and those promoted to the management assistant position were more qualified. However, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reasons are pretextual, given the fact that it appears that Defendant did not always adhere to its own promotion requirements. Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the management assistant position. IV. Damaees
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant also requests that some of Plaintiff s damages claims be dismissed as a matter of law. Specifically, Defendant contends that if Plaintiff is awarded back pay damages, such damages should be cut off as of February 28, 2001. To support this contention, Defendant argues that on February 28,2001, Defendant learned that Anglin had lied on his employment application. Furthermore, Defendant contends that according to its employment policies, it would have terminated Anglin's employment upon learning of such information. (Doc. No. 84, '117). Plaintiff responds that it is only seeking back pay through August of 1997 (when Anglin resigned). Therefore, since Plaintiff is not seeking back pay after February 28,2001, the Court will grant Defendant's motion on this issue.
Defendant also contends that Anglin's punitive damages claims should be stricken or
dismissed, because of its good faith efforts to comply with Title vn. Plaintiff contends that
No. 85, p. 106). 16

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 148 Filed 06/10/2002 Page 17 of 19

despite Defendant's anti-discrimination policy, the jury could find that Defendant acted with

malice or reckless indifference. Upon review of the evidence submitted, the Court finds that

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.

Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment on this issue.

Accordingly it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff EEOC's claims (Doc. No. 78) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART: The motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff EEOC is attempting to pursue

claims for promotions that occurred prior to June 5, 1996 and for claims that Anglin was

discriminatorily denied the assistant manager promotions that Dave Lenton and Robert

Boehmler received. The motion is also GRANTED to the extent that any award of backpay for

Plaintiff's claims will be cut off as of February 28,2001. Otherwise, the motion is DENIED.

~OO2. DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June

~

~'C7uf~~Ll
United States District Judge

Copies to: Counsel of Record

17

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB DFocuI mLenEt 148COFPiledY06/10/2002 Page 18 of 19 Date Printed: 06/11/2002

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower
2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Delner Franklin-Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Gwendoln Y. Reams, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Michael J. Farrell, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

C. Gregory Stewart, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602

Luisette Gierbolini, Esq.
Zinober & McCrea, P.A.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800
Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

Neil A. Roddenbery, Esq.

Case 8:0G0r-acvy-,02H01a2r-rSiCsB, RDobocinusmoenn,t 1L48ane, FiTlerdoh06n/10/2002 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Page 19 of 19

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 152

Filed 07/03/2002 Page 1 of 7
fiLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

~ L,JL:t\;
., . - , ... '" '.,,~ fLORIUA rAt1L" t LOHIOA

Plaintiff,

and

ANTONIO ANGLIN,

PlaintifflIntervener

vs.

Case No.: 8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY

Defendant.
--------------------------~/

ORDER Before the court are Defendant's Motion to Compel Rule 35 Mental Examination (Dkt. 142) filed on May 20, 2002, and Plaintiff EEOC's Plaintiff-Intervener's Joint Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Rule 35 Mental Exam (Dkt. 147) filed on June 7,2002. Defendant seeks an order requiring Intervener Antonio Anglin ("Anglin") to submit to a mental examination, to be conducted by Dr. Barbara Stein, M.D. and Randy Otto, Ph.D. Dr. Otto is to conduct psychological testing and Dr. Stein, a forensic psychiatrist, will evaluate plaintiff. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges race discrimination and retaliation by defendant. Paragraph 19 alleges that plaintiff has "suffered damages" as a result of defendant's unlawful employment actions. (Dkt. 67)

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 152 Filed 07/03/2002 Page 2 of 7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) states, in relevant part: When the mental or physical condition (including blood group) ofa party or of a person...is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner... The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
The "in controversy" and "good cause" requirements of Rule 35 "are not met by mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings - nor by mere relevance to the case - but require an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering each examination." Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964)
Defendant asserts that this court should order a mental examination based on 1) Anglin's deposition testimony concerning the emotional distress caused by defendant's alleged discrimination; and 2) plaintiffs demand for close to $1 million dollars in compensatory damages. Additionally, defendant asserts that because Anglin has not seen any mental health professionals, there is no possibility of examining medical records or deposing his health care providers to gain relevant information.
Plaintiffand Anglin respond that the court should deny the motion because defendant has not met its burden as outlined in Rule 35(a), by establishing that plaintiffs mental condition is "in controversy" and there is "good cause" for the requested examination. They also contend that defendant's proposed examination is so broad as to be invasive.
A mere claim for emotional damages, without more, does not justify a Rule 35 mental
2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 152 Filed 07/03/2002 Page 3 of 7
examination at the request of the opposing party. See ~ Ali v. Wong Laboratories, 162 F.RD. 165, 167 (M.D. Fla. 1995); See also Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch. Inc., 201 F.RD. 551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001)("The majority of courts have held that plaintiffs do not place their mental condition in controversy merely by claiming damages for mental anguish or 'garden variety' emotional distress")(citations omitted).
A mental exam is warranted when one or more ofthe following factors are present: (1) a tort claim is asserted for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) allegations of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder is made; (3) a claim of unusually severe emotional distress is made; (4) plaintiff intends to offer expert testimony in support of a claim for emotional distress damages; and/or (5) plaintiffconcedes that her mental condition is in controversy within the meaning of Rule 35. Stevenson, 201 F.RD. at 553 (citations omittedV
Factors (1), (2), (4) and (5) do not apply to this case. Plaintiff has not brought a tort claim ofinfliction ofemotional distress, intentional or otherwise, and he has not conceded that his mental condition is in controversy within the meaning ofRule 35. Nor has plaintiff indicated that he will offer expert testimony in support of his claim of emotional distress.2
There is also no indication that plaintiff sought or received treatment for his emotional distress; the deposition excerpts submitted by defendant do not include a claim that he suffers from
iEven where these five factors have not been expressly recognized, most cases allowing mental examinations involve a separate tort claim for emotional distress or an allegation of ongoing severe mental injury. See Stevenson, 201 F.RD., at 553 (citations and quotation marks omitted)
2Plaintiff admits that she has submitted expert disclosures "in an abundance of caution" in the event that defendant's motion to compel a Rule 35 examination is allowed. (Dkt. 147 at 6 n.4) This conditional disclosure does not establish that plaintiff intends to offer expert testimony to support his claim of emotional distress.
3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 152 Filed 07/03/2002 Page 4 of 7
a specific mental injury or disorder. The only remaining issue is whether plaintiff has presented a claim of "unusually severe
emotional distress." Id. at 553. Defendant cites portions of plaintiffs deposition testimony that defendant's alleged
discrimination was "life altering", "changing", and made him feel "the lowest ofthe low"; that his employment with defendant was one of the worst experiences he has ever had; and that only his mother's death was more traumatic than defendant's alleged actions. (Okt. 142 at 2)
Additionally, defendant contends that plaintiffs demand for almost one million dollars in compensatory damages evidences a claim for a severe mental injury.
While at least one court has emphasized the amount of compensatory damages sought in ordering a Rule 35 mental examination, see EEOC and Calvo. Ferlk and Scarborough v. Rio Bravo International, case number 8:99-CV-1371-T-17MAP (M.D. Fla. 2001)(request for at least one million dollars in non-economic damages)3, this approach is problematic. Rule 35 motions are necessarily fact-intensive; drawing a line between substantial and insubstantial compensatory damages is a slippery slope this court declines to descend.
Emotional distress is not synonymous with the term "mental injury" for the purpose of ordering a Rule 35 examination. See Id. at 96; see also Neal v. Siegel-Robert. Inc., 171 F.R.D. 264, 267 (E.D. Mo. 1996)(where plaintiffs amended complaint and deposition testimony demonstrated that plaintiff"is not complaining ofany definable psychological symptoms, but rather suffering from basic complaints that are within the understanding of the jury," plaintiff has not placed his mental
3A copy of this unreported decision is attached to defendant's motion. (Dkt. 142, exhibit 3)
4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 152 Filed 07/03/2002 Page 5 of 7

condition in controversy). But see She,pard v. American Broadcasting Companies. Inc., 151 F.R.D.

194,212 (D.D.C. 1993)(Plaintiffs placed mental condition in controversy by demanding damages

to compensate them for emotional distress and submitting affidavits describing at great length the

emotional distress each claimed; one oftwo plaintiffs also consulted a physician about her emotional

problems) rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Upon consideration, this court finds that plaintiffhas not made a claim of"unusually severe

mental distress", Stevenson, 201 F.R.D. at 553, which places his mental condition in controversy.

Nor has defendant shown good cause for the requested mental examination by a psychiatrist

and forensic psychologist to explore his claim ofemotional distress. The request for an open-ended

mental status examination and administration ofunidentified psychological tests lacks the requisite

specificity for a Rule 35 mental examination.

Accordingly, and upon consideration, it is ORDERED:

1) Defendant's motion to compel a Rule 35 mental examination (Dkt. 142) is DENIED.

M DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this

day of July, 2002.

Copies To: Counsel ofRecord

~
United States Magistrate Judge

5

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB DFocuI mLenEt 152COFPiledY07/03/2002 Page 6 of 7
Date Printed: 07/05/2002
Notice sent to:
,/ M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131
Delner Franklin-Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131
Gwendoln Y. Reams, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131
Michael J. Farrell, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131
C. Gregory Stewart, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131
/ Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602
Luisette Gierbolini, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602
/ Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, Trohn 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003
Neil A. Roddenbery, Esq.

Case 8:G00r-acyv-,02H01a2r-rSiCs,B RoDboicnusmoenn,t 1L5a2ne, FTilerdoh0n7/03/2002 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Page 7 of 7

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 154 Filed 07/11/2002 Page 1 of 8

Fil ~.O

~ ~'-

UNITED STA S DISTRICT COURT'

-

MIDDLE DIS RICTOFFLORIDA G~>' JU_ Fil 5: 45

TAMPA DIVISION

'

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fAliPA. fLORIDA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff~

and

ANTONIO ANGLIN

Intervener
v. ENTERPRI~E LEASING COMPANY,

Case No.: 8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

Defendant. ____________________________~I

~RDER

Before the court is Defendant's Motion To Compel EEOC To Disclose Its Calculation

Of Back Pay Damages In Compliance With Rule 26 (Dkt. 143) filed on May 24,2002; Motion

for Sanctions Against Intervener For His F11ure To Comply With This Court's April 19, 2002,

Order To Provide Back Pay Disclosures Pursuant To Rule 26 (Dkt. 146) filed on May 29,2002;

Plaintiff EEOC's Response To Defendant's Motion To Compel EEOC To Disclose Its

Calculations Of Back Pay Damages In Compliance With Rule 26 (Dkt. 149) filed on June 13,

2002; Antonio D. Anglin's, Plaintiffllntervener, Response To Defendant's Motion For

Sanctions (Dkt. 150) filed on June 17, 2<f2; and Defendant's Memorandum Of Law In

Atto1eys' Opposition To Anglin's Motion For

Fees And Costs On Behalf Of Himself And

EEOC (Dkt. 151) filed on July 2, 2002.

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 154 Filed 07/11/2002 Page 2 of 8
Defendant, Enterprise Leasing Company ("Enterprise"), seeks to compel Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and Plaintiff Intervener Antonio Anglin ("Anglin") to provide it with more specific back pay disclosures. Enterprise seeks to compel Anglin to provide it with a more specific damages disclosure of his claim for constructive discharge. Enterprise also seeks sanctions against the EEOC and Anglin.
I. Procedural Backeround
Enterprise originally filed its motion to compel the EEOC to disclose the back pay damages on March 20, 2002, (Okt. 123) but formally withdrew that motion on the April 8, 2002, (Dkt. 131) and indicated to the court that the EEOC had agreed to provide Enterprise with more specific disclosures.
Enterprise filed its first motion to compel more specific initial disclosures against Anglin on March 20, 2002, (Dkt. 122) which was granted when Anglin failed to respond (Okt. 136). Anglin, in his response to Enterprise's motion for sanction, contends that Enterprise did not confer with his counsel before filing the original motion. Anglin attaches a letter that he sent Enterprise dated April 1, 2002, pointing out that no 3.01(g) conference had been held before Enterprise filed its first motion. Anglin contends that he informed Enterprise that he would be responding to Enterprise's motion by letter. Anglin, by letter dated April 22, 2002, supplemented his Rule 26 disclosures. Anglin argues that Enterprise never contacted his attorneys once it deemed the letter of April 22, 2002, deficient and before Enterprise filed the pending motion against him.
II. Analysis
Rule 26(a)(1)(C), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires a party to provide to other parties: a computation ofany category ofdamages claimed by the disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 154 Filed 07/11/2002 Page 3 of 8
the documents or other evidentiary material not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such calculation is based. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 26(e), parties are under a duty to supplement Rule 26 disclosures ifthe party learns that in some material respect, the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if additional information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process.! If a party fails to comply with Rule 26, the party does so at its peril. The EEOC and Anglin disclosed that they are seeking $49,300, plus interest, in back pay damages. This calculation is based on what Anglin allegedly made as a Management Trainee at Enterprise, $22,OOO/year, and what he would have earned had he been promoted to higher levels of management, a maximum of $50,000/year. Enterprise contends that the EEOC and Anglin have refused to identify the specific promotions that they claim Anglin was discriminatorily denied. Enterprise also contends Plaintiffs have not indicated how they arrived at the maximum figure of$50,OOO per year. Finally, Enterprise argues that the EEOC and Anglin were required, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(l)(C), Fed. R. Civ. P., to provide it with a computation of how they arrived at the $49,300 figure with reference to specific promotions that Anglin was allegedly discriminatorily denied, and the dates that these specific promotions were denied Anglin, as well as any documentation to support this calculation. The EEOC and Anglin argue that their calculation for back pay damages is based on Anglin's personal knowledge of what he earned as a Management Trainee and the approximate salaries of employees at Enterprise with higher level management positions (approximately $50,000) and
lPlaintiffs are reminded that a party that fails to disclose information as required by Rule 26(e) is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion, any witness or information not so disclosed. Rule 37(c)(l) Fed. R. Civ. P.
3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 154 Filed 07/11/2002 Page 4 of 8
therefore there is no documentation to produce in connection with those figures. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant is the one in the best position to obtain any documentation figures as Anglin worked for Enterprise from 1994 through 1997 and Enterprise would have the best knowledge concerning all of its employees' salaries.
The EEOC and Anglin argue that Enterprise is deliberately mis-characterizing their claims as claims that Anglin was denied "specific" promotions. Rather, Plaintiffs' claims are that Enterprise, throughout Anglin's tenure, "consistently" deniedhim promotional opportunities because of his race (Dkt. 149, pp. 8).
Anglin also seeks backpay damages in a claim for constructive discharge. Anglin has disclosed that he is seeking $146,000 in backpaydamages on this claim. Enterprise asserts that this disclosure is also deficient. Anglin states that this figure represents what he could have earned at Enterprise from 1997 to present, minus what he earned in interim employment. Anglin contends that he produced to Enterprise, during discovery, his tax records from that period. Enterprise asserts that Anglin has not produced all ofhis tax returns, but it does not state the specific years that are missing. Anglin also responds that he testified during his February 28, 2001, deposition about his employment after he was allegedly constructively discharged from Enterprise.
In sum, the EEOC and Anglin represent that they have nothing further to provide Enterprise. Accordingly, this court denies Enterprise's motions.
Local Rule 3.01(g), M. D. Fla., as amended on July 1, 2002, requires a party filing a civil motion to meet and confer with the opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion.
Both the EEOC and Anglin claim that Enterprise, despite its good faith certificates, did not
4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 154 Filed 07/11/2002 Page 5 of 8
comply with Local Rule 3.01(g). The EEOC argues that Enterprise relies on two letters dated February 13, 2002, and March
19,2002, as well as its withdrawal of its first motion to compel as its good faith efforts to resolve the dispute prior to filing the pending motion. The EEOC argues that the letters were written and the motion filed and withdrawn before the EEOC provided Enterprise with more specific calculations, and Enterprise did not contact the EEOC before filing this new motion.
Anglin argues that Enterprise likewise did not comply with Local Rule 3.0 I(g) before fi ling either of its motions to compel against him. When Anglin raised this issue with Enterprise after the pending motion was filed, Enterprise took the position that the letters it sent to the EEOC in February and March 2002, before Anglin supplemented his responses on April 22, 2002, were sufficient to satisfy Local Rule 3.01(g).
This court also finds that Enterprise did not comply with Local Rule 3.01(g). However, this court declines to award the EEOC and Anglin sanctions at this time as it appears that a "meet and confer" could not have resolved these disputes.
Enterprise is reminded, in future motion practice, that it must fully comply with both the letter and the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this district's local rules.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED: (1) Defendant's Motion To Compel EEOC To Disclose Its Calculation Of Back Pay Damages In Compliance With Rule 26 (Dkt. 143) is DENIED; (2) Defendant's Motion for Sanctions Against Intervener For His Failure To Comply With This Court's April 19, 2002 Order To Provide Back Pay Disclosures Pursuant To Rule 26 (Dkt. 146) is DENIED;
5

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 154 Filed 07/11/2002 Page 6 of 8 (3) Plaintiff Intervener's Motion For Sanctions (Dkt. 150) is DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiffre-asserting it at a later date or on the court's own motion in appropriate circumstances.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this //1l,day of July, 2002.
EL~
United States Magistrate Judge Copies to: Counsel ofRecord
6

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB DFocIumLenEt 154COFPileYd 07/11/2002 Page 7 of 8 Date Printed: 07/12/2002

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office t . One Biscayne Tower
~ 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131
Delner Franklin-Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Gwendoln Y. Reams, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Michael J. Farrell, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

C. Gregory Stewart, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602

Luisette Gierbolini, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800
Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

Neil A. Roddenbery, Esq.

Case 8G:00ra-cyv,-0H20a1r2r-SisC,B RoDboincusmone,nt L15a4ne, FTilreodh0n7/11/2002
1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Page 8 of 8

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES EQUALEMWLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
and
ANTONIO ANGLIN,
Intervenor, vs.
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, d/b/a ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR,
Defendant.
--------------------------------~/

Case No. 8:00-civ-2012-T-24 EAJ

ORDER This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Intervenor Antonio Anglin's Claims (Doc. No. 138). Anglin filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 144). Ie Background Anglin, an African-American man, was hired as a management trainee on December 12, 1994. Anglin worked for Defendant until he resigned in August of 1997. Thereafter, Anglin filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII and §1981 due to Defendant's failure to promote him during his tenure with the company. Additionally, Anglin asserts a retaliation claim under Title VII and constructive discharge claims under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act C'FCRA").

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 2 of 15
The management trainee position for which Anglin was hired is an entry level position. The next level up from his position is management assistant. The management assistant position is a non-competitive position, which means that any number of qualified management trainees could be promoted to management assistant at any time.
There were no written requirements for promotion from management trainee to management assistant until March of 1997. (Doc. No. 85, p.76-78). Prior to that time, Anglin contends that in order to qualify for a promotion to management assistant, a management trainee needed to achieve a Collision Damage Waiver ("CDW") sales percentage of 55% and needed to pass a certain qualifying exam called the "grill." Id. at 123,201. Anglin met this CDW sales goal in March of 1995, August of 1995, January of 1996, and February of 1996. 1 Anglin took the grill in September of 1996. (Doc. No. 85, p.149-150; Doc. No. 102, Ex. 4).
The grill is a two part exam-there is an objective portion and a subjective portion. (Doc. No. 85, p.150-51; Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9). Anglin passed the objective portion, but he failed the sUbjective portion. Id. The sUbjective portion, which consisted of a mock sales call, was administered by Drew Akers. Id. Akers, who was the Area Manager at that time, was the sole decision maker as to Anglin's performance on the mock sales call portion. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9).
Anglin was entitled to retake the grill, and he attempted to retake the SUbjective portion within 30 days after he had failed it. (Doc. No. 89, p.183; Doc. No.1 02, Ex. 9). After he had scheduled to retake the subjective portion, Steven Barger (who became the new Area Manager)
I(Doc. No. 103, Item Number 4, Bates stamped page 000548; chart summarizing Item Number 4).
2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 3 of 15
told Anglin that the rules had changed, and therefore, he was barred from retaking the grill. (Doc. No. 85, p.153).
Anglin believes that Akers discriminated against him. (Doc. No. 85, p.258). Previously, in July or August of 1996, Akers told Anglin that he could not put in for any more promotions. Id. at 135-138. At that time, Akers told Anglin that he could not be promoted because he did not have a dynamic presence-that if they lined up every employee in the office and no one was allowed to say a word and a customer walked in and was asked who they thought the branch manager was, the customer would never choose Anglin.2 Id. at 137. Akers had also told Anglin that he could train a monkey to do the things that Anglin did. (Doc. No. 102, Ex. 9).
Akers once commented to another employee, William Westergom, that if you lined up all of the management trainees, Anglin just does not look like a manager. (Doc. No. 105, p.l 04-05). Westergom asked Akers what he meant by that comment, and Westergom asked ifit was because Anglin is black. Id. at 105. Akers responded, "'Well, there you go.'" Id.
In mid-December of 1996, Anglin filed a complaint with Christina Roberts in human resources regarding the alleged discriminatory treatment. (Doc. No. 92, p.30). Christina Roberts discussed Anglin's complaint with Dave Finklea, the Group Rental Manager. Id. at 35-36. Thereafter, in December, Dave Finklea spoke with Anglin about Anglin's concerns. (Doc. No. 85, p.226-27). The next day, Dave Finklea called Anglin and told Anglin that he was being put on a 12 week review, which Plaintiff characterizes as a "probationary period." Id. at 227,24243. Bill Westergom, an assistant manager, stated that he had never heard of Defendant putting
2Akers contends that Anglin was not considered for promotions, because Anglin was
repeatedly counseled in 1995 and 1996 for performance deficiencies which had not improved.
(Doc. No. 81, , 17). 3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 4 of 15
anyone else on this type of probationary period. The 12 week probationary period consisted of Mary Mortensen, Anglin's branch
manager, meeting with Anglin weekly to review his performance in ten specified areas. Id. at 245-47. Anglin did not complete the 12 week probationary period, because he felt that the reviews were a means ofretaliating against him. Id. at 247-48. Anglin was not disciplined for failing to complete the probationary period; Dave Finklea told Anglin that he would not be fired, but that he also would not be promoted. (Doc. No. 85, p.224).
On April 1, 1997, while still employed by Defendant, Anglin filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 256. Anglin contends that near the end of his employment with Defendant, customers began questioning why he had not been promoted, which caused him humiliation and validated his feelings of discrimination. Id. at 361-65. Anglin resigned on August 8, 1997.
Anglin remained a management trainee throughout his entire tenure with Defendant. Plaintiff contends that Defendant discriminated against Anglin by failing to promote him while promoting equally or less qualified white employees. Anglin identified eleven comparators3, and he contends that a review of his and their employment histories reveals that he was discriminatorily denied several promotions. II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate "ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that the moving
3Kristen Beeman, Mary Mortensen, Dave Straquadine, Dana Sheffield, Bill Westergom, Bob Offerman, Sherri Williams, Tim Grubisic, Robert Boehmler, Dave Lenton, and Cathy Kelly.
4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 5 of 15
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by "showing" or "pointing out" to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and by its own affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (lIth Cir. 1989); Samples on behalf of Samples v. City of Atlant!!, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (lIth Cir.1988).
Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. See Augusta Iron & Steel Works v. Employers Ins. ofWausay, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc~ 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
5

---~------------------------
Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002

Page 6 of 15

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter oflaw." Id at 251-52. III. Defendant's Motion for Summary Jud2ment
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, in which it argues that the Court should grant it summary judgment as to all of Anglin's claims. Accordingly, the Court will address each
of Anglin's claims. A. Race Discrimination Under Title VII and § 1981
Defendant argues that the Court should grant it summary judgment as to Anglin's race discrimination claims under Title VII and §1981. The Court previously addressed an identical claim ofrace discrimination alleged by the EEOC.4 Therefore, the Court adopts and incorporates by reference its analysis in its prior summary judgment order (Doc. No. 148) regarding the EEOC's race discrimination claims. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment to the extent that Anglin is attempting to pursue claims for promotions that occurred prior to June 5, 1996 and for claims that Anglin was discriminatorily denied the assistant manager positions that Dave Lenton and Robert Boehmler received. Otherwise, the motion is denied as to Anglin's race discrimination claims under Title VII and §1981 due to Defendant's failure to promote him. B. Retaliation Under Title VII
Next, Defendant argues that the Court should grant it summary judgment on Anglin's
%e EEOC alleged a claim ofrace discrimination under Title VII due to Defendant's failure to promote Anglin, and Anglin challenges the same promotions. The Court notes that Anglin's race discrimination claims are based on Title VII and §1981; however, race discrimination claims under §1981 are analyzed in the same way as race discrimination claims under Title VII. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale. Florid~ 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.l1 (11 th Cir. 2000) Therefore, the Court's analysis ofthe EEOC's discrimination claim applies equally to the Court's analysis of Anglin's discrimination claims.
6

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 7 of 15
retaliation claim. Anglin contends that Defendant retaliated against him after he reported the alleged discrimination to Christina Roberts in human resources. Specifically, Anglin contends that Defendant retaliated against him by (1) inadequately investigating his claim of discrimination; (2) instituting goals that were applied stringently to Anglin and waived for other employees; and (3) placing Anglin on the 12 week probationary period.s
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Anglin must show three things: (1) that he "engaged in [a] statutorily protected activity, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that the adverse action was causally related to [his] protected activities." Coutu v. Martin County Board of County Commissioner~ 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11 th Cir. 1995). If Anglin establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to Defendant to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. See Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecommunications. Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11 th Cir. 2002). If Defendarrt produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to Anglin to show that the proffered reason is pretextual. See
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Anglin's complaint to Christina Roberts in human resources constituted a statutorily protected activity. Defendant, however, contends that there was no adverse employment action to support Anglin's retaliation claim.
5Anglin also argues in his response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment that Steven Barger's decision not to allow Anglin to retake the mock sales portion of the grill also constituted an adverse action. (Doc. No. 144, p.8). However, it appears that the decision not to let Anglin retake the grill occurred before Anglin complained to human resources in December of 1996 about the alleged discrimination (because Anglin contends that he was entitled to retake the grill within 30 days, and he had taken the grill in September of 1996). Therefore, the failure to allow Anglin to retake the grill could not have been done in retaliation for Anglin making the complaint.
7

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 8 of 15
Adverse employment actions include not only ultimate employment decisions, such as termination, but they also include actions falling short of an ultimate employment decision if the actions rise to a threshold level of substantiality. See id. at 716 (citation omitted). '''While not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action, conduct that alters an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment does constitute adverse'" employment actions. Id. (quoting Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'r~ 256 F.3d 1095, 1118 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
Anglin contends that the adverse actions consisted of Defendant's (1) inadequate investigation of his claim of discrimination; (2) instituting newly created qualifications in January of 1997 in order to be promoted to the management assistant position, which were stringently applied to Anglin but waived for other employees; and (3) placing Anglin on the 12 week probationary period. The Court finds that the challenged acts, considered together, do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.
To begin with, Anglin provides no authority for his assertion that an inadequate investigation of his claim of discrimination somehow constitutes an adverse employment action. Further, Anglin provides no evidence that the newly created qualifications were more stringently applied to him and waived for other employees. Instead, Anglin points to the deposition testimony of Steven Barger in which Barger states that he "did the best [he] could to make sure that everybody met those set criteria ... [but] there have been times that [Defendant] ha[s] had to take ... [the] best employee candidate, that best person for promotability and promote them" even if they did not meet the set criteria. (Doc. No. 87, p.63-64, 67-68). Anglin offers no evidence of specific times that the rules were more stringently applied to him even though he was
8

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 9 of 15
better qualified; instead, Anglin makes the vague, conclusory assertion that Defendant imposed newly created qualifications that were more stringently applied to Anglin and waived for other employees.
Additionally, Anglin has not cited to any case law to support his assertion that the 12 week probationary period, during which he had weekly review meetings with Mary Mortensen, constitutes an adverse employment action. Anglin does not contend that his salary was decreased, that his job title changed, that his benefits were affected, that his responsibilities changed, or that being put on a probationary period affected his future with the company;. Further, the Court notes that Anglin chose not to complete the probationary period by failing to attend all of the weekly meetings, and Anglin suffered no repercussions beyond being told that he was still not promotable. Therefore, the Court concludes that the probationary period did not constitute an adverse employment action. See Christopher v. Motorola, 2001 WL 293935, No. 99 C 6532, at *11 n.12 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 2001)(stating that without evidence that an informal performance improvement plan "had some material or adverse effect on [the plaintiffs] job or future job prospects, the court would not find that" the performance improvement plan constituted an adverse employment action).
Taking all of the alleged adverse actions together, the Court finds that they do not rise to the level of substantiality required to qualify as an adverse employment action. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Anglin's retaliation claim.
~e Court notes that Anglin contends that the probationary period was used as a means ofcollecting negative performance reviews. However, Anglin does not contend that the act of being placed on probation, in itself, affected his future with the company.
9

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 10 of 15
C. Constructive Dischar&e Under Title VII and the FCRA Next, Defendant contends that the Court should grant it summary judgment as to Anglin's
constructive discharge claim.' Anglin contends that he was constructively discharged due to Defendant's consistent failure to promote him and Defendant's apparent decision that he would never be promoted. Anglin supports his contention by pointing out that Mary Mortensen, his branch manager, told him that he would never be promoted. (Doc. No. 85, p.217-18). Therefore, Anglin contends that a reasonable person would have quit long before he did.
In order to succeed on a claim of constructive discharge, Anglin must show "that his working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [his] ... shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Wardwell v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, Florid~ 786 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1986)(citation omitted). "While a discriminatory refusal to promote [is] relevant to the issue of whether [a plaintiff] was constructively discharged, such evidence is not always sufficient." Id. (citation omitted).
Defendant argues that Anglin's constructive discharge claim must fail for four reasons: (1) there was not a sufficient degree of deterioration in Anglin's working conditions that would warrant his resignation; (2) Defendant's allegedly discriminatory actions were not done for the purpose of forcing Anglin to resign; (3) Anglin cannot show that his allegedly intolerable conditions were due to his race; and (4) Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Accordingly, the Court will address each argument.
'The analysis of Anglin's constructive discharge claim under Title VII also applies to his constructive discharge claim under the FCRA. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11 th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1000 (1998).
10

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 11 of 15
1. Intolerable Working Condition Defendant first argues that there was not a sufficient degree of deterioration in Anglin's working conditions that would warrant his resignation. To support this contention, Defendant cites Weaver v. Tech Data Comoration, 66 F. Supp.2d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 199). In Weaver, the plaintiff was removed from a time-sensitive project because the defendant believed that she was going to miss a deadline. See id. at 1268. As a result, the plaintiff was offered the opportunity to transfer to a non-managerial position on another project without a decrease in pay. See id. Instead of accepting the transfer, the plaintiff resigned. See id. The plaintiff filed suit for constructive discharge, but the court found that the plaintiff was not constructively discharged despite the fact that the plaintiff was told that she had no future with the defendant, that she would not be made a manager, and that the she should look for employment elsewhere. See id. at 1262, 1273-74. While this Court acknowledges that Weaver provides some support for Defendant's position, this Court finds that under the facts alleged in the instant case, Anglin has submitted sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that his working conditions were so intolerable that he was compelled to resign. Anglin was consistently denied a promotion to the management assistant position, which is a non-competitive position. Further, Drew Akers, Anglin's Area Manager, barred Anglin from putting in for promotions. Additionally, Mary Mortensen, Anglin's branch manager, told Anglin that he would never be promoted. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's consistent refusal to promote Anglin or to even consider him for promotion i~ sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Anglin's conditions were so
11

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 12 of 15
intolerable that he was compelled to resign.8 2. Purpose of Defendant's Actions Next, Defendant argues that since its allegedly discriminatory actions were not done for
the purpose of forcing Anglin to resign, such actions cannot form the basis of a constructive discharge claim. The Court finds that this argument has no merit, since the argument has been rejected in this Circuit. See Bourgue v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61,65 (5th Cir. 1980).
3. Relationship of Intolerable Condition to Anilin's Race Next, Defendant argues that Anglin cannot show that his allegedly intolerable conditions were due to his race. The Court, however, rejects this argument and finds that Anglin has submitted evidence that the refusal to promote Anglin (which forms the basis for his constructive discharge claim) was due to his race. Drew Akers, who served as the Area Manager during part of Anglin's employment with Defendant, barred Anglin from putting in for promotions and told Anglin that he could not be promoted because he did not have a dynamic presence. Akers also commented to another employee that Anglin did not look like a manager, and when Akers was asked ifit was because Anglin was black, Akers responded, "Well, there you go." The Court has already found that Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that his working conditions were so intolerable that he was compelled to resign.
8The Court notes that a discriminatory refusal to promote is not always sufficient to support a constructive discharge claim. See Wardwell, 786 F.2d at 1557 (citation omitted). However, this Court finds that under the facts ofthis case-where there is a consistent failure to promote the plaintiff to a non-competitive position and the plaintiff is told that he will never be promoted-a genuine issue offact arises as to whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would feel compelled to resign.
12

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 155 Filed 07/16/2002 Page 13 of 15
Further, the Court has found that Anglin has submitted sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the intolerable conditions were created due to his race. Therefore, the Court finds that Anglin has submitted sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he has established a prima facie case of constructive discharge.
4. Defendant's Leeitimate. Non-Discriminatory Reason Next, Defendant argues that it has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Defendant contends that Anglin was not qualified for promotion and that those promoted were more qualified. However, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reasons are pretextual, given the fact that it appears that Defendant did not always adhere to its own promotion requirements.9 Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Anglin's constructive discharge claim is denied. Accordingly it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Intervenor Antonio Anglin's Claims (Doc. No. 138) is GRANTED as to Anglin's retaliation claim and DENIED as to Anglin's constructive discharge claim.
~02. DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on July

Copies to: Counsel of Record

United States District Judge

9The Court adopts and incorporates by reference its analysis in its prior summary judgment order (Doc. No. 148) regarding Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
13

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB DoFcuImeLntE155 COFiPledY07/16/2002 Page 14 of 15 Date Printed: 07/17/2002

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower
2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Delner Franklin-Thomas, Esq. Equal .Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Gwendoln Y. Reams, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Michael J. Farrell, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

C. Gregory Stewart, Esq.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800
Tampa, FL 33602

Luisette Gierbolini, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

Neil A. Roddenbery, Esq.

Case 8:0G0-rcavy-0, 20H1a2l-SCsB, RDoobciunmsoennt, 15L5ane,FilTedro0h7n/16/2002
1 Lake M~on Dr.
P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Page 15 of 15

 
 Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176

Filed 09/30/2002 Page 1 of 11
fiLEO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDPuZ S£.P 30

: 08

TAMPA DNISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

and

)

)

ANTONIO ANGLIN,

)

)

Plaintiffllntervenor,

)

)

vs.

)

)

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY

)

)

Defendant.

)

-----------------------------)

CASE NO.8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ

CONSENT DECREE

1. This Consent Decree ("Decree") is made and entered into by and between

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as the

"Commission" or "EEOC"), Plaintiff-Intervenor, Antonio D. Anglin (hereinafter referred to as

"Plaintiff-Intervenor" or "Anglin") and Defendant, Enterprise Leasing Co. (hereinafter referred to

as "Defendant" or "Enterprise"). The Commission, Anglin and Enterprise are collectively referred

to herein as "the Parties."

2. On September 28,2001, EEOC initiated this action by filing its Complaint against

Enterprise. EEOC's Complaint alleged that Enterprise violated Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of1991, by

SUbjecting Anglin to disparate treatment by management officials when Enterprise failed to

consistently promote him from his entry-level position of Management Trainee to higher level

1

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 2 of 11
management positions because of his race, Black Anglin intervened in this action and brought claims ofrace discrimination and constructive discharge under Title VII, as well as under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of1992, Section 760.01 et. seq., Fla. Stat. (1997)("FCRA").
3. In the interest ofresolving this matter to avoid the cost oflitigation, and as a result ofhaving engaged in comprehensive settlement negotiations, the Parties have agreed that this action should be dismissed by the Court and finally resolved by the entry ofthis Decree. This Decree is final and binding on the Parties, their successors and assigns.
4. The Parties agree that this Decree resolves all claims against Enterprise alleged III EEOC Charge Number 151 970960 and the Complaints filed in this action. The Parties further agree that this Decree does not resolve any Charges ofDiscrimination that may be pending with the EEOC other than the Charge referred to in this paragraph.
S. Since the parties have entered into this Decree to avoid the substantial cost, risk and inconvenience oflitigation, it is further understood that Enterprise denies that it has acted wrongfully towards Anglin, and execution ofthis Decree does not constitute an admission by Enterprise that it violated Title VII.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having carefully examined the terms and provisions ofthis Decree, and based on the pleadings filed by the Parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
2

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 3 of 11
JURISDICTION 6. This Court has jurisdiction ofthe subject matter ofthis action and over the Parties for the purposes of entering and enforcing this Decree. 7. No Party shall contest jurisdiction of this federal court to enforce this Decree and its terms or the right ofthe EEOC to seek enforcement ofthe Decree in the event ofDefendant's noncompliance with any ofthe terms of this Decree. 8. For purposes of this Decree, "Enterprise" will be defined as Group 42 of Enterprise Leasing Company ( a Florida corporation), and the scope of relief herein will be limited to that entity.
GENERAL INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS 9. Enterprise, its officers, managers, employees and agents are hereby enjoined from discriminating against employees regarding promotion decisions because of their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
TRAINING 10. Enterprise has established a written policy ofcompliance with Title VII which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. A complete copy ofthis policy will be distributed to all ofEnterprise's current employees at all of its facilities in Group 42 by September 30, 2002. 11. Inorder to further ensure the effective implementation ofDefendant Enterprise's anti-discrimination policies, Enterprise will conduct annual training throughout the duration ofthis Decree for all of its managers and supervisory personnel at its facilities in Group 42, with specific emphasis on race-neutral promotion practices. Defendant agrees to provide the EEOC with at least two (2) weeks notice before it conducts its training session(s), with the date(s) and location(s) ofthe training and the identification ofthe training materials to be used at the training session. The name
3

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 4 of 11
and job title ofthe employees who attended the training will be provided to the EEOC within thirty (30) days ofthe training session. Such training will be at least four (4) hours in length, and will be conducted by a person selected by Enterprise who is qualified to undertake the training.
12. Defendant agrees that the training described in paragraph 11 shall be conducted within sixty (60) days ofthe entry ofthis Decree, and, should thereafter take place by September 30th annually for the duration of this Decree. Defendant further agrees that the training described in paragraph 11 shall be given to all new managers and supervisors who did not attend the annual training, no later than the next scheduled training program.
POSTING 13. Enterprise will post within seven (7) days from the Court's execution ofthis Decree a laminated 11" x 14" sized copy of the Notice attached hereto as Exhibit B. Said notice shall be posted at all ofEnterprise's facilities within Group 42 for the duration ofthis Decree in conspicuous locations accessible to all employees (i.e. employee bulletin board or lunch room).
MONITORING 14. Enterprise will retain all employment records relating in any way to any complaint, allegation and investigation of race discrimination at any of Enterprise's facilities in Group 42 for the duration of this Decree and as required by federal law. 15. Enterprise will provide the EEOC with the name, address and phone number of any person who alleges to a Branch Manager, Area Manager, Group Rental Manager, the Group/Region Human Resources Department and/or the Corporate Human Resources Department that he/she has been subjected to racial discrimination with respect to promotions while working at any of Enterprise's facilities in Group 42. Enterprise will also state its actions taken in response to each such allegation. The first report shall be submitted within six (6) months of entry of this Decree.
4

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 5 of 11
Thereafter, Enterprise shall produce said reports to the EEOC every six (6) months throughout the duration of this Decree. Enterprise will provide, upon request by the Commission, any and all documentation associated with each such complaint.
16. Enterprise will certify to the EEOC every six (6) months throughout the duration of this Decree that it is in compliance with all aspects of this Decree. The first such certification will be due no later than September 30,2002, and thereafter by September 30th , and March 31 5t annually.
MONETARY RELIEF 17. Enterprise shall pay a lump sum in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($104,900.00) in resolution ofthis litigation. The sum of$99,900.00 shall be representative of compensatory damages, and the sum of$5,000.00 shall be representative of costs incurred by Anglin in this action. Enterprise will also issue an I.R.S. form 1099 to Anglin substantiating the payment(s) made by Defendant to Plaintiff-Intervenor. All payments shall issue within thirty (30) calendar days from the Court's entry of this Decree, by certified mail, to Antonio Anglin at the following address: 4920 Smith Ryals Road, Plant City, FL 33567. Copies of drafts shall be forwarded to the attention ofM. Teresa Rodriguez, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, One Biscayne Tower, 2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2700, Miami, Florida 33131. 18. If Enterprise fails to tender the above-mentioned payments as set forth in paragraph 17 above, then Enterprise shall pay interest on the defaulted payment at the rate calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Section 6621(b) until the same is paid, and bear any additional costs incurred by the EEOC caused by the non-compliance or delay of the Defendant.
5

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 6 of 11

19. Attorney's fees shall either be resolved or litigated by counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor

and counsel for Defendant. The parties agree that the Court will retain jurisdiction in order to

address the issue of attorney's fees for Anglin's attorney. In this regard, Enterprise agrees that

Anglin is a "prevailing party" for purposes of the award of attorney's fees. Should counsel for

Defendant and counsel for Anglin be unable to agree upon an appropriate attorney's fee award

following good faith negotiations, a petition for award of attorney's fees, with appropriate factual

and legal support, including time entries for all time for which recompense is sought, must be filed

and served no later than thirty (30) days from the date of entry ofthis Decree. Enterprise shall then

have thirty (30) days within which to file and serve its response to the attorney's fee petition.

ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE

20. The Commission shall have independent authority to seek the judicial enforcement

of any aspect, term or provision of this Decree.

21. The Court will take whatever measures necessary to effectuate the terms of this

Decree.

COSTS

22. Other than the costs referenced in paragraph 17 above, each Party shall bear its own

costs associated with this litigation.

DURATION OF CONSENT DECREE

23. The duration of this Decree shall be three (3) years from the date of entry of the

Decree.

o

;

N

SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, this ~\ay OfSePtem~OP2.~

&\LHL!4 c.&w!lL_li SUSAN C. BUCKLEW

= i -0
~ <::~.;

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE~~~I ::-

00 0

:::Uc ......

6

> - , C ; ; T )

-..

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 7 of 11
AGREED TO: FOR THE PLAINTIFF, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
by: kD&ud14clQ;. iJUc-Delner Franklin-Thomas Regional Attorney U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower, Suite 2700 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Telephone: (305) 530-6001 Facsimile: (305) 536-4494
AGREED TO: FOR THE PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR ANTONIO D. ANGLIN

itchell D. Franks, Esquire RAY, HARRIS & ROBINSON, P.A.
e Lake Morton Drive Lakeland, Florida 33802-0003 Telephone: (863) 284-2200 Facsimile: (863) 688-9771
AGREED TO: FOR THE DEFENDANT ENTERPRISE
{)"J~;4
by: Peter W. Zinober, Esquire ZINOBER & MCCREA, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Boulevard; Suite 800, Tampa, Florida, 33602 Telephone: (813) 224-9004 Facsimile: (813) 223-4881
7

, Date: ~J..3.,;bt!J~

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 8 of 11
EXHIBIT A
Enterprise is an equal opportunity employer and does not discriminate on any basis as defined by applicable federal, state and local laws. The company maintains its nondiscriminatory policies in compliance with not only the letter but the spirit ofthese laws. Upon hire, each employee will sign the acknowledgment page of the Enterprise Personnel Policies and Benefits Summary to acknowledge all such policies including, without limitation, the foregoing policy concerning Equal Opportunity Employer policy.
All employees are expected and required to accomplish their work in a businesslike manner with concern for the well-being oftheir co-workers. Any harassment ofemployees and/or retaliation against employees complaining of harassment by fellow employees is prohibited, regardless of working relationship. Similarly, harassment ofemployees by customers, vendors or referral sources will not be tolerated. Specifically forbidden is harassment of a sexual, racial, ethnic, age, or religious nature or any other factor prohibited by applicable law.
Any employee who feels that he or she is a victim of discrimination or harassment by any manager, management official, employee, customer or client ofEnterprise shall bring the matter to the immediate attention of his or her manager. An employee who is uncomfortable for any reason in bringing such a matter to the attention ofthis individual, or who is not satisfied that doing so will resolve or has resolved the matter, shall report the matter to the next level of management, the GrouplRegion Human Resources Department, or the Corporate Human Resources by phone or letter. Any questions about this policy or potential discrimination or harassment shall also be brought to the attention of the same persons.

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB Document 176 Filed 09/30/2002 Page 9 of 11

EXHIBITB
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES POSTED PURSUANT TO A CONSENT DECREE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND
ENTERPRISE
This notice is being posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered by the Court in EEOC vs. Enterprise Leasing Co., CASE NO.8:00-CV-2012-T-24EAJ. Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida, Group 42, has agreed that it will not discriminate against employees by denying them promotions on the basis of race in violation of Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Title VII protects individuals from employment discrimination because of their race, religion, color, national origin, or sex. Enterprise will not condone employment discrimination of any kind as set forth in federal anti-discrimination laws.
Furthermore, Enterprise assures its employees that it supports Title VII and will not take any action against an individual because he/she has exercised hislher rights under the law to oppose discriminatory acts or to file charges with the EEOC.
Appropriate corrective action, up to and including termination, shall be taken against any employee (including management personnel) found to violate the policies regarding discrimination, based upon the circumstances involved.
This notice shall remain posted for three (3) years from the date signed. Employees or applicants for employment who have questions about their rights under Title VII or any other federal anti-discrimination law may telephone the Miami District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 1-800-669-4000.
~ J - Signed this!!L day of ft'/?!f,.011" ,2002.

BRECHT

VICE P

ENT/GENERAL MANAGER

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY

1"' JL/- DO NOT REMOVE BEFORE

2005.

Case 8:00-cv-02012-SCB DFocuI mLenEt 176COFPiledY09/30/2002 Page 10 of 11 Date Printed: 09/30/2002

Notice sent to:

M. Teresa Rodriguez, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Delner Franklin-Thomas, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Gwendoln Y. Reams, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
iami District Office ne Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Michael J. Farrell, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

C. Gregory Stewart, Esq. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131

Peter W. Zinober, Esq. Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800
Tampa, FL 33602

Luisette Gierbolini, Esq.
Zinober & McCrea, P.A.
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800
Tampa, FL 33602

Mitchell Dean Franks, Esq. Gray, Harris, Robinson, Lane, 1 Lake Morton Dr. P.O. Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Trohn

Neil A. Roddenbery, Esq.

Case 8:0G0-rcavy-0, 20H1a2r-Sl CB,RoDboicnumsoennt, 17L6ane,FilTedro0h9n/30/2002

1 Lake Mor"t6n Dr.

.../

P.O. Box 3

Lakeland, FL 33802-0003

Page 11 of 11

 
 Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida -... https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?769340594590692-L_3...

U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida (Tampa) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 8:00-cv-02012-SCB

CLOSED, EAJ

EEOC v. Enterprise Leasing Assigned to: Judge Susan C Bucklew Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race) Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1 of 20

Date Filed: 09/28/2000 Date Terminated: 08/23/2002 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by C. Gregory Stewart Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131 305/530-6010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Delner Franklin-Thomas Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Suite 2700 2 S Biscayne Blvd Miami, FL 33131 305/530-6001 Email: delner.franklin-thomas@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gwendolyn Y. Reams Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131 305/530-6010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M. Teresa Rodriguez Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
6/5/2007 2:11 PM

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V.
Defendant
Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida doing business as Enterprise Rent-A-Car

Miami District Office One Biscayne Tower 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700 Miami, FL 33131 305/530-6010 Fax: 305/536-4494 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Farrell Jill S. Schwartz & Associates, PA Suite 200 180 Park Ave N Winter Park, FL 32789 407/647-8911 Fax: 407/628-4994 Email: mfarrell@schwartzlawfirm.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pauline Terrelonge Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tampa Area Office 501 E. Polk St., Suite 1000 Tampa, FL 33602 813/228-2310 TERMINATED: 10/03/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Danielle R. May Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 800 Tampa, FL 33602 813/224-9004 TERMINATED: 10/04/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Luisette Gierbolini Zinober & McCrea, PA Suite 800 201 E Kennedy Blvd Tampa, FL 33602 813/224-9004 Fax: 813/223-4881

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Mediator Mary A. Lau TERMINATED: 08/29/2001
Intervenor Plaintiff Antonio Anglin

Email: lgierbolini@zmlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter W. Zinober Greenberg Traurig, P.A. Courthouse Plaza, Suite 100 625 Twiggs Street Tampa, FL 33602 813-318-5700 Fax: 813-318-5900 Email: zinoberp@gtlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, P.A. 100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1700 P.O. Box 838 Tampa, FL 33601-0838 813/229-2121 Email: Mlau@laulane.com PRO SE
Mary A. Lau Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, PA 100 S Ashley Dr - Ste 1700 PO Box 838 Tampa, FL 33601-0838 813/229-2121 Fax: 813/228-7710 Email: Mlau@laulane.com TERMINATED: 08/29/2001 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mitchell Dean Franks Law Office of Mitchell D. Franks, PA 414 Eunice Rd Lakeland, FL 33803-2618 863/603-0563 Fax: 863/603-0884 Email: mitch@brushpujol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A. Roddenbery

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Mediator Elizabeth A. Jenkins

GrayRobinson, PA One Lake Morton Drive PO Box 3 Lakeland, FL 33802-0003 863/284-2200 Fax: 863-683-7462 Email: nroddenbery@gray-robinson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth A. Jenkins # U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida 801 N. Florida Ave. Tampa, FL 33602 813/301-5550 PRO SE

Date Filed 09/28/2000 09/28/2000 09/28/2000 10/11/2000 10/11/2000 10/16/2000 11/07/2000 01/03/2001 01/11/2001 02/09/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT for injunctive relief filed; jury demand (jlg) (Entered: 09/29/2000)
MAGISTRATE JUDGE CASE ASSIGNMENT Magistrate assigned: Elizabeth A. Jenkins (jlg) (Entered: 09/29/2000)
SUMMONS(ES) issued for Enterprise Leasing . Consent(s) issued. (jlg) (Entered: 09/29/2000)
2 NOTICE of designation under Local Rule 3.05 - TRACK 2. (ctc) (jlh) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
3 NOTICE of expected deadlines (jlh) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
4 CERTIFICATE NOTICE of interested persons by EEOC (crb) (Entered: 10/17/2000)
5 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed as to Enterprise Leasing on 11/1/00 Answer due on 1/2/01 for Enterprise Leasing (crb) (Entered: 11/09/2000)
6 ANSWER and affirmative defenses to [1-1] complaint by Enterprise Leasing (crb) (Entered: 01/03/2001)
7 CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT (crb) (Entered: 01/12/2001)
8 CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting Discovery cutoff 9/4/01 ; dispositive motion filing deadline for 10/15/01 Pretrial statement due on or before 1/14/02 ; Pretrial conference for 9:30 1/15/02 ; Scheduled for Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ( signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 02/12/2001)

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02/09/2001 02/09/2001 02/20/2001 02/23/2001 02/23/2001 03/22/2001 03/27/2001 03/27/2001 04/19/2001
04/19/2001 04/20/2001
04/23/2001 04/23/2001
04/23/2001 04/24/2001 05/04/2001

DEADLINE updated; set jury trial for term commencing 2/4/02 scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew (crb) (Entered: 02/12/2001)
8 ORDER referring case to mediation; parties shall conduct hearing by 09/19/01 and select a mediator within 11 days ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 02/12/2001)
9 STIPULATION selecting mediator, Mary Lau by EEOC and defendant Enterprise Leasing (crb) (Entered: 02/21/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [9-1] stipulation selecting mediator, Mary Lau ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
10 ORDER appointing Mary Lau, mediator ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
11 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support for leave to amend [6-1] answer (crb) (Entered: 03/23/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [11-1] motion for leave to amend [6-1] answer ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 03/28/2001)
12 AMENDED ANSWER and affirmative defenses to complaint by Enterprise Leasing; amends [6-1] answer (crb) (Entered: 03/28/2001)
13 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support for protection regarding location of depositions of Drew Akers, Dave Finklea, Dennis Slavik and Enterprise's representative scheduled for 04/30/01 referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (crb) (Entered: 04/19/2001)
14 NOTICE of filing AFFIDAVIT of Christina Roberts by Enterprise Leasing in support of [13-1] motion for protection regarding location of depositions (crb) (Entered: 04/19/2001)
15 ORDER that ruling is deferred pending response; plaintiff's response set to 4/25/01 for [13-1] defendant's motion for protection regarding location of depositions noticed by plaintiff on 04/12/01 ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
16 NOTICE of filing affidavit of Christina Robert 17 by Enterprise Leasing (crb) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
17 ORIGINAL AFFIDAVIT of Christina Roberts by Enterprise Leasing in support of [13-1] motion for protection regarding location of depositions of Drew Akers, Dave Finklea, Dennis Slavik and Enterprise's representative (crb) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
18 NOTICE of withdrawal of motion for protection regarding location of depositions 13 by Enterprise Leasing (crb) (Entered: 04/24/2001)
19 ORDER denying as moot [13-1] defendant's motion for protection ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 04/25/2001)
20 MOTION with memorandum in support to intervene by Antonio Anglin ; proposed complaint of intervenor attached (plk) (Entered: 05/07/2001)

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05/21/2001 06/07/2001 06/11/2001 06/12/2001 06/14/2001 06/14/2001 06/21/2001 06/25/2001 06/25/2001
06/29/2001 07/05/2001 07/05/2001 07/06/2001
07/12/2001

21 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin (rjc) (Entered: 05/22/2001)
22 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing consented motion for leave to file memorandum in excess of 20 pages; Enterprise Leasing is preparing a motion to compel referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (crb) (Entered: 06/08/2001)
23 MOTION by Antonio Anglin with memorandum in support for leave to file reply brief re: motion to intervene (crb) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
24 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to compel complete responses to first request to produce , for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (crb) (Entered: 06/13/2001)
25 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [23-1] Antonio Anglin's motion for leave to file reply brief (crb) (Entered: 06/15/2001)
26 ORDER granting [22-1] consented motion for leave to file memorandum in excess of 20 pages; Enterprise Leasing is preparing a motion to compel ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 06/15/2001)
27 NOTICE OF HEARING by defendant Enterprise Leasing setting mediation conference for 9:00 11/14/01, Mary A. Lau, mediator (crb) (Entered: 06/22/2001)
28 RESPONSE by EEOC to [24-1] motion to compel more complete responses to first request to produce, [24-2] motion for sanctions, with supporting memorandum of law (plk) (Entered: 06/26/2001)
29 ORDER directing parties to schedule a mediation conference for a date on or before September 19, 2001, reset mediation conference for 9/19/01 ; on or before July 13, 2001, parties are directed to file an amended notice of mediation that informs the court of the re-scheduled mediation date (Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew) ctc (plk) (Entered: 06/26/2001)
30 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING by Enterprise Leasing; set mediation conference for 9:00 7/30/01; Mary A. Lau, mediator (crb) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
31 ORDER granting [23-1] Antonio Anglin's motion for leave to file reply brief; reply to response to motion reset to 7/19/01 for [20-1] motion to intervene ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 07/06/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [30-1] amended notice hearing set mediation conference for 9:00 7/30/01; Mary A. Lau, mediator ( by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 07/06/2001)
32 ORDER setting hearing for 9:30 7/16/01 for [24-1] defendant's motion to compel more complete responses to request to produce and for sanctions [24-2] scheduled for Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ; prior to hearing plaintiff shall furnish an amended privilege log to defendant ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ctc (crb) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
33 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to reschedule motion to compel hearing set for 7/16/01 to 07/18/01 referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (crb) (Entered: 07/13/2001)

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07/13/2001
07/16/2001 07/16/2001
07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/31/2001 08/13/2001
08/16/2001 08/16/2001 08/16/2001 08/17/2001 08/20/2001 08/20/2001 08/21/2001 08/29/2001

34 ORDER granting [33-1] defendant's motion to reschedule hearing; reset hearing for 2:00 7/16/01 for [24-1] motion to compel scheduled for Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins) ctc (crb) (Entered: 07/13/2001)
35 NOTICE of filing amended privilege log by EEOC (crb) (Entered: 07/16/2001)
36 ORDER setting plaintiff's response establishing its deliberative process privilege claim due for 8/6/01 to [24-1] motion to compel and [24-2] motion for sanctions ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
37 MOTION HEARING held on 07/16/01 on [24-1] defendant's motion to compel and [24-2] motion for sanctions before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (crb) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
38 REPLY by Antonio Anglin to response to [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin (crb) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
38 AFFIDAVIT of D'Antoinette Davis by Antonio Anglin re: [38-1] response reply; identified as exhibit E (crb) Modified on 07/18/2001 (Entered: 07/17/2001)
39 NOTICE of filing DECLARATION of Ida L. Castro, EEOC Chairwoman, in accordance with oral order dated 07/16/01 by EEOC (crb) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
40 ORDER that plaintiff shall submit its withheld documents under seal for in camera review by 08/21/01 regarding defendant's motion to compel and for sanctions 24 ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
41 NOTICE of attorney appearance for EEOC by M. Teresa Rodriguez (crb) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
42 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support (emergency) to extend dates in case management and scheduling order (crb) (Entered: 08/16/2001)
43 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE by EEOC [42-1] emergency motion to extend time; defendant is opposed to this motion (crb) Modified on 08/17/2001 (Entered: 08/16/2001)
44 NOTICE that these matters are ripe for court ruling by Antonio Anglin (crb) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
45 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [42-1] plaintiff's emergency motion to extend dates in case management and scheduling order (crb) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
46 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [39-1] declaration of Ida L. Castro (crb) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
SEALED DOCUMENT S- 1 submitted pursuant to order of 08/13/01 40 (crb) (Entered: 08/22/2001)
47 MEDIATION REPORT: Mediation conference held 7/30/01 with Mary Lau, mediator. Hearing outcome: impassed. (map) (Entered: 08/30/2001)

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09/04/2001 09/04/2001 09/07/2001 09/10/2001
09/12/2001 09/17/2001 09/21/2001 09/25/2001 09/25/2001
09/27/2001 09/28/2001 10/01/2001 10/02/2001

48 MOTION and memorandum by EEOC (consented) for leave to amend [1-1] complaint to accurately reflect name of defendant; proposed amended complaint attached (crb) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
49 MOTION by EEOC for leave to file reply to defendant's memorandum in opposition to emergency motion to extend discovery; proposed reply attached (crb) (Entered: 09/05/2001)
50 NOTICE OF HEARING: Motion hearing set for 10:00 9/25/01 for [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin Scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 09/12/2001)
51 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to strike [49-1] plaintiff's motion for leave to file reply to defendant's memorandum in opposition to emergency motion to extend discovery and proposed reply attached (crb) (Entered: 09/12/2001)
52 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [49-1] motion for leave to file reply to defendant's memorandum in opposition to emergency motion to extend discovery (crb) (Entered: 09/13/2001)
53 NOTICE OF HEARING: reset for 10:00 9/26/01 for [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ctc (crb) (Entered: 09/17/2001)
54 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support (unopposed) to attend hearing via telephone on 09/26/01 at 10:00 (crb) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
55 ORDER granting [54-1] plaintiff's unopposed motion to attend hearing via telephone on 09/26/01 at 10:00 ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 09/26/2001)
56 ORDER granting [48-1] consented motion for leave to amend [1-1] complaint to accurately reflect name of defendant; set amended complaint deadline at 10/9/01 for EEOC ; granting [49-1] motion for leave to file reply to defendant's memorandum in opposition to emergency motion to extend discovery; denying [51-1] defendant's motion to strike [49-1] ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 09/26/2001)
57 MOTION HEARING held on 09/26/01 on [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin before Judge Susan C. Bucklew Court Reporter: Paul Spangler (crb) (Entered: 09/28/2001)
58 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing (consented) to extend time to 10/15/01 to file dispositive motions (crb) (Entered: 10/01/2001)
59 NOTICE that Pauline Terrelonge, trial attorney, has not been assigned to represent defendant since 06/05/01 by EEOC (crb) (Entered: 10/03/2001)
60 ORDER granting [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin to the extent he seeks to intervene and add a claim for race discrimination under the FCRA; denied without prejudice as he seeks to add claim for retaliation under Title VII and constructive discharge; denied as he seeks to add a claim for retaliation under the FCRA; reset amended complaint deadline at 10/16/01 for EEOC ; granting [42-1] EEOC's emergency motion to extend dates in case management and

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10/03/2001
10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/04/2001 10/05/2001 10/05/2001 10/10/2001 10/16/2001 10/16/2001 10/16/2001 10/16/2001 10/17/2001 10/29/2001 11/01/2001 11/05/2001

scheduling order; reset discovery due for 12/3/01 , reset dispositive motion filing deadline for 1/14/02 , reset jury trial for term commencing 5/1/02 scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew SEE ORDER 10/10/01 65 making a correction ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ctc (crb) Modified on 10/12/2001 (Entered: 10/04/2001)
61 CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting Discovery cutoff 12/3/01 ; dispositive motion filing deadline for 12/3/01 Pretrial statement due on or before 4/5/02 ; Pretrial conference for 10:00 4/9/02 ; Scheduled for Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ( signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
DEADLINE updated; reset jury trial for term commencing 5/6/02 scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew (crb) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [58-1] defendant's consent motion to extend time; dispositive motion filing deadline for 10/15/01 ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
62 NOTICE of substitution of counsel (Liz Gierbolini for Danielle R. May) by Enterprise Leasing (ag) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
63 NOTICE of filing amended complaint in compliance with court's order dated 9/24/01 by EEOC. (jnb) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
64 AMENDED COMPLAINT by EEOC amending [1-1] complaint (Answer due 10/25/01 for Enterprise Leasing ); jury demand; injunctive relief requested. (jnb) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
65 ORDER amending order 60: Anglin is directed to file an amended complaint by 10/16/01 ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (crb) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
66 NOTICE of filing supplemental materials in support of defendant's motion to compel by Enterprise Leasing (crb) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
67 AMENDED COMPLAINT by EEOC, Antonio Anglin amending [64-1] amended complaint (Answer due 11/6/01 for Enterprise Leasing ); jury demand (crb) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
68 MOTION by Antonio Anglin with memorandum in support for leave to amend [64-1] amended complaint and add claims (crb) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
SUMMONS(ES) issued for Enterprise Leasing on the amended complaint Consent(s) issued. (crb) (Entered: 10/17/2001)
69 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by Enterprise Leasing to [67-1] amended complaint (crb) Modified on 10/22/2001 (Entered: 10/19/2001)
70 RESPONSE by EEOC to [66-1] notice of filing supplemental materials in support of motion to compel (jlh) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
71 Partial opposition by Enterprise Leasing to [68-1] motion for leave to amend [64-1] amended complaint and add claims (plk) (Entered: 11/02/2001)
72 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE regarding documents submitted, under seal, for in camera review pursuant to order of 08/13/01 by EEOC (crb) (Entered:

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11/08/2001 11/08/2001
11/19/2001 11/19/2001
12/10/2001
12/20/2001 01/07/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002

11/06/2001)
73 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support to strike [69-1] answer and affirmative defenses to amended complaint (plk) (Entered: 11/09/2001)
74 MOTION by Antonio Anglin with memorandum in support for leave to file a reply to defendant's partial opposition to intervenor 's motion to accept complaint and to add claims for retaliation under Title VII and Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (wlb) (Entered: 11/09/2001)
75 RESPONSE by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [73-1] motion to strike [69-1] answer and affirmative defenses to amended complaint. (jnb) (Entered: 11/19/2001)
76 RESPONSE by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [74-1] motion for leave to file a reply to defendant's partial opposition to intervenor 's motion to accept complaint and to add claims for retaliation under Title VII and Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (jnb) (Entered: 11/19/2001)
77 ORDER granting [24-1] motion to compel complete responses to first request to produce, denying [24-2] motion for sanctions. Plaintiff shall produce the documents described in this order within 10 days of this order. Plaintiff shall file in camera numbers 2317-2321 of tab 33 for review by the court. ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (rjc) (Entered: 12/11/2001)
SEALED DOCUMENT. S- 2 (wlb) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
SEALED DOCUMENT. S- 3 (jlh) (Entered: 01/08/2002)
78 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support for summary judgment (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
79 STATEMENT of facts in support of motion for summary judgment by Enterprise Leasing (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
80 NOTICE of filing affidavits and depositions in support of motion for summary judgment by Enterprise Leasing (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
81 AFFIDAVIT of Andrew Akers by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
82 AFFIDAVIT of Steven Barger by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
83 AFFIDAVIT of David Finklea by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
84 AFFIDAVIT of Christina Roberts by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
85 DEPOSITION of Antonio Demetris Anglin by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)

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01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/15/2002 01/17/2002 01/17/2002 01/23/2002
01/29/2002 01/29/2002 01/30/2002 02/01/2002

86 DEPOSITION of Andrew Patrick Akers by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
87 DEPOSITION of Steven Lawrence Barger by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
88 DEPOSITION of David Brooks by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
89 DEPOSITION of David E. Finklea by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
90 DEPOSITION of Mary Mortensen by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
91 DEPOSITION of Christina Roberts by Enterprise Leasing re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
92 NOTICE of filing affidavit of Steven L. Barger in support of motion for summary judgment by Enterprise Leasing (rm) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
93 AFFIDAVIT of Steven L. Barger by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (rm) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
94 ORDER vacating [60-1] order as to the portion granting Anglin's motion to add a claim for discrimination under the FCRA and denying [20-1] motion to intervene by Antonio Anglin; denying [74-1] motion for leave to file a reply to defendant's partial opposition to intervenor 's motion to accept complaint and to add claims for retaliation under Title VII and Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act; granting in part, denying in part [68-1] motion for leave to amend [64-1] amended complaint and add claims; denying [73-1] motion to strike [69-1] answer and affirmative defenses to amended complaint; granting [75-1] request for leave to amend answer (Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew) ctc AMENDED: See order [109-1] vacating the portion of this order denying plaintiff's attempt to pursue a claim under section 1981. (jlg) Modified on 02/15/2002 (Entered: 01/24/2002)
95 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support for reconsideration of portion of [94-1] order entered 1/23/02 (jlh) (Entered: 01/29/2002)
96 UNOPPOSED MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support (unopposed) to extend time one week in which to respond to motion for summary judgment (rm) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
97 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support to strike , and for protective order in respond to defendant's expert witness disclosure referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (jlh) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [96-1] consent motion to extend time one week in which to respond to motion for summary judgment, response to motion set to 2/11/02 for [78-1] motion for summary judgment by defendant ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (ch) (Entered: 02/04/2002)

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02/11/2002 02/11/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/13/2002 02/14/2002
02/15/2002 02/21/2002 03/01/2002

98 RESPONSE by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [95-1] motion for reconsideration of portion of [94-1] order entered 1/23/02 (rjc) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
99 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support for enlargement of page limitation of response to motion for summary judgment . Proposed response and statement of material facts in dispute attached. (rjc) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
100 ORDER granting [99-1] motion for enlargement of page limitation of response to motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
101 RESPONSE by EEOC to [78-1] motion for summary judgment (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
102 STATEMENT of material facts in dispute in support of response to motion for summary judgment by EEOC (jlh) Modified on 02/14/2002 (Entered: 02/13/2002)
103 NOTICE of filing depositions and exhibits in support of its response to motion for summary judgment by EEOC (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
104 DEPOSITION of Robert Boehmler by EEOC re: [101-1] motion response Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
105 DEPOSITION of William Westergom by EEOC re: [101-1] motion response Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
106 DEPOSITION of William Westergom by EEOC re: [101-1] motion response Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
107 DEPOSITION of Robert Patrick Offerman by EEOC re: [101-1] motion response Transcript filed separately. (jlh) (Entered: 02/13/2002)
108 CONSENTED MOTION by Enterprise Leasing (consented) for leave to file reply to plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment (src) (Entered: 02/15/2002)
109 ORDER granting plaintiff's [95-1] motion for reconsideration of portion of [94-1] order entered 1/23/02; granting [68-1] motion for leave to amend [64-1] amended complaint and add claims to the extent that plaintiff seeks to add a claim under section 1981. Court vacates the portion of of its 1/23/02 order [94-1] in which it denied plaintiff's attempt to pursue a claim under section 1981. See order for further details. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (src) (Entered: 02/15/2002)
110 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [97-1] motion to strike expert disclosure (jlh) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [108-1] motion for leave to file reply to plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jnb) (Entered: 02/22/2002)
111 REPLY by Enterprise Leasing to [101-1] response to motion to summary judgment. (lak) (Entered: 03/04/2002)

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03/01/2002 03/01/2002 03/01/2002 03/01/2002 03/11/2002 03/12/2002 03/15/2002
03/15/2002 03/18/2002 03/18/2002 03/20/2002 03/20/2002
03/22/2002 03/26/2002

112 NOTICE of filing affidavits in support of motion for summary judgment by Enterprise Leasing (lak) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
113 AFFIDAVIT of Andrew Akers by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (lak) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
114 AFFIDAVIT of David Finklea by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (lak) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
115 AFFIDAVIT of Christina Roberts by Enterprise Leasing Re: [78-1] motion for summary judgment (lak) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
116 ANSWER and AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Enterprise Leasing to [67-1] amended complaint (rdo) (Entered: 03/12/2002)
117 NOTICE OF HEARING: set preliminary pretrial conference for 10:00 on 4/25/02; scheduled for Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (By Deputy Clerk) ctc (rdo) (Entered: 03/12/2002)
118 ORDER granting [97-1] motion to strike defendant's expert disclosures to the extent that defendant's expert designations of Dr. Stein and Dr. Otto are stricken; denying [97-2] motion for protective order in respond to defendant's expert witness disclosure as premature. ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (jnb) (Entered: 03/18/2002)
119 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support for issuance of amended [8-1] Scheduling order , or, in the alternative, for Rule 16 conference (jnb) (Entered: 03/18/2002)
120 NOTICE of filing affidavit by Enterprise Leasing (bls) (Entered: 03/19/2002)
121 AFFIDAVIT of Christina Roberts by Enterprise Leasing Re: [111-1] reply to EEOC's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment (bls) (Entered: 03/19/2002)
122 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to compel compliance with Rule 26 referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (rm) Modified on 03/21/2002 (Entered: 03/21/2002)
123 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to compel Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to provide specific figures for the amount of compensatory and punitive damages sought referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (rm) (Entered: 03/21/2002)
124 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to strike or disregard [121-1] affidavit and documents submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment (rjc) (Entered: 03/25/2002)
125 NOTICE OF HEARING: Motion hearing set for 9:30 a.m. on 4/4/02 for [124-1] motion to strike or disregard [121-1] affidavit and documents submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment; set for 9:30 a.m. on 4/4/02 for [119-1] motion for issuance of amended [8-1] Scheduling order. Scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 03/27/2002)

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04/01/2002 04/03/2002 04/03/2002 04/04/2002 04/08/2002
04/08/2002 04/09/2002 04/10/2002 04/10/2002
04/18/2002 04/19/2002 05/06/2002
05/06/2002

126 RESPONSE by EEOC to [119-1] motion for issuance of amended [8-1] Scheduling order, [119-2] motion for Rule 16 conference (jlh) (Entered: 04/02/2002)
127 RESPONSE by Antonio Anglin to [119-1] motion for issuance of amended [8-1] Scheduling order, [119-2] motion for Rule 16 conference (jnb) (Entered: 04/04/2002)
128 RESPONSE by EEOC to [124-1] motion to strike or disregard [121-1] affidavit and documents submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment (jnb) (Entered: 04/04/2002)
129 RESPONSE by EEOC to [122-1] motion to compel compliance with Rule 26 (jnb) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
130 MOTION HEARING held on 4/4/02 re: [124-1] motion to strike or disregard [121-1] affidavit and documents submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment, [119-1] motion for issuance of amended [8-1] Scheduling order before Judge Susan C. Bucklew. Court Reporter: Paul Spangler (plj) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
131 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing to withdraw [122-1] motion to compel compliance with Rule 26 ; referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (plj) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
132 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [119-1] motion for issuance of amended [8-1] Scheduling order. An amended scheduling order will be issued; in all other respects, the motion is denied as moot. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jlg) (Entered: 04/10/2002)
133 ORDER granting [131-1] motion to withdraw [122-1] motion to compel compliance with Rule 26 ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (jlh) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
134 SECOND AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER setting dispositive motion filing deadline for 5/6/02 Pretrial statement due on or before 8/13/02 ; Pretrial conference for 8:30 8/16/02 ; Jury trial set for 9/3/02 ; Scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew ( signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jlh) (Entered: 04/11/2002)
135 NOTICE of filing second page of exhibit F/G to Andrew Akers' affidavit which was originally filed on 2/28/02 by Enterprise Leasing (bls) (Entered: 04/19/2002)
136 ORDER granting [122-1] motion to compel compliance with Rule 26 ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (jlg) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
137 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [124-1] motion to strike or disregard [121-1] affidavit and documents submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment; the motion to strike is DENIED. The motion to disregard is granted in part, denied in part; see order for details (Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew) ctc (plj) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
138 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support for summary judgment regarding intervenor Antonio Anglin's claims (bls) (Entered: 05/07/2002)

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05/06/2002
05/06/2002 05/06/2002
05/20/2002
05/24/2002
05/29/2002 05/29/2002 05/29/2002 06/07/2002 06/10/2002 06/13/2002
06/17/2002 06/17/2002 07/02/2002
07/03/2002 07/11/2002
07/11/2002

139 STATEMENT OF FACTS by Enterprise Leasing in support of [138-1] motion for summary judgment regarding intervenor Antonio Anglin's claims (bls) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
140 NOTICE of filing deposition by Enterprise Leasing (bls) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
141 DEPOSITION of David E. Finklea by Enterprise Leasing re: [138-1] motion for summary judgment regarding intervenor Antonio Anglin's claims. Transcript filed separately. (bls) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
142 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to compel Rule 35 mental examination ; referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (plj) (Entered: 05/21/2002)
143 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support to compel EEOC to disclose its calculation of back pay damages in compliance with Rule 26 referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (jlh) (Entered: 05/28/2002)
144 RESPONSE by Antonio Anglin to [138-1] motion for summary judgment regarding intervenor Antonio Anglin's claims. (eec) (Entered: 05/30/2002)
145 STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS by Antonio Anglin in support of [144-1] motion response. (eec) (Entered: 05/30/2002)
146 MOTION by Enterprise Leasing with memorandum in support for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins. (eec) (Entered: 05/30/2002)
147 JOINT RESPONSE by EEOC to [142-1] motion to compel Rule 35 mental examination (jlh) (Entered: 06/10/2002)
148 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [78-1] motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 06/11/2002)
149 RESPONSE by EEOC to [143-1] motion to compel EEOC to disclose its calculation of back pay damages in compliance with Rule 26 (jlh) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
150 RESPONSE by Antonio Anglin to [146-1] motion for sanctions (snp) (Entered: 06/18/2002)
150 MOTION by Antonio Anglin for sanctions referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins (mrh) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
151 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [150-1] motion for attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of himself and EEOC (jlg) (Entered: 07/10/2002)
152 ORDER denying [142-1] motion to compel Rule 35 mental examination ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (jlg) (Entered: 07/05/2002)
153 NOTICE of filing supplemental authority by Enterprise Leasing re: [138-1] motion for summary judgment regarding intervenor Antonio Anglin's claims. (jab) Modified on 07/12/2002 (Entered: 07/12/2002)
154 ORDER denying without prejudice [150-1] motion for sanctions, denying [146-1] motion for sanctions, denying [143-1] motion to compel EEOC to disclose its calculation of back pay damages in compliance with Rule 26 ( Signed

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07/16/2002 07/19/2002 07/23/2002
07/25/2002 07/31/2002 07/31/2002
07/31/2002 07/31/2002
08/01/2002 08/02/2002
08/05/2002

by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
155 ORDER granting [138-1] motion for summary judgment regarding intervenor Antonio Anglin's claims as to Anglin's retaliation claim and denied as to Anglin's constructive discharge claim. See order for details. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jnb) (Entered: 07/17/2002)
156 OBJECTIONS by Enterprise Leasing to [152-1] Magistrate Judge's order denying defendant's motion to compel Rule 35 mental examination (bls) (Entered: 07/22/2002)
157 OBJECTIONS by Enterprise Leasing to [154-1] order denying defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to disclose calculation of backpay damages in compliance with Rule 26 and motion for sanctions against intervenor for his failure to comply with this court's 4/19/02 order to provide backpay disclosures pursuant to Rule 26 (jnb) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
158 ORDER that Plaintiff and Anglin are directed to file responses to [146-1] and [143-1] motions by noon on 07/31/02 with courtesy copies to be delivered directly to chambers. (Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew) ctc (jab) (Entered: 07/26/2002)
159 RESPONSE by Antonio Anglin to [156-1] objection to order denying defendant's motion to compel Rule 35 mental examination. (eec) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
160 RESPONSE by Antonio Anglin to [157-1] objection to order denying defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to disclose back pay damages in compliance with Rule 26 and motion for sanctions against intervenor for his failure to comply with this court's 4/19/02 order to provide back pay disclosures pursuant to Rule 26. (eec) Modified on 08/02/2002 (Entered: 08/01/2002)
161 RESPONSE by EEOC to [156-1] objection to order denying defendant's motion to compel Rule 35 mental examination. (eec) (Entered: 08/01/2002)
162 RESPONSE by EEOC to [157-1] objection to order denying defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to disclose calculation of back pay damages in compliance with Rule 26 and motion for sanctions against intervenor for his failure to comply with this court's 4/19/02 order to provide back pay disclosures pursuant to Rule 26. (eec) Modified on 08/02/2002 (Entered: 08/01/2002)
163 ORDER overruling [156-1] defendant's objection to Magistrate's order denying defendant's motion to compel Rule 35 examination. The Magistrate judge's order (doc. 152) is affirmed. See order for further details. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (bls) Modified on 08/12/2002 (Entered: 08/02/2002)
164 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [157-1] objection; granted to the extent that defendant requests that plaintiff and Anglin supplement their back pay disclosures. Plaintiff and Anglin are directed to supplement their back pay disclosures by 8/7/02. Denied to the extent that defendant requests sanctions. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc(ch) (Entered: 08/05/2002)
165 JOINT NOTICE of pursuant to court's order dated 8/1/02 by EEOC, Antonio Anglin. (wlb) (Entered: 08/06/2002)

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08/07/2002
08/07/2002 08/14/2002 08/14/2002
08/15/2002
08/16/2002 08/16/2002 08/16/2002 08/16/2002
08/20/2002 08/20/2002
08/22/2002 08/23/2002
08/23/2002 09/30/2002 10/31/2002 11/04/2002

166 ORDER referring case to mediation before Magistrate Judge. Appointing Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins as mediator. Mediation conference will be conducted on 8/22/02 at 9:30 a.m. Mitchell Franks, Esq. is designated as lead counsel. (Signed Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins) ctc (ag) (Entered: 08/08/2002)
DEADLINE updated; setting mediation conference for 9:30 a.m. on 8/22/02 Magitrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins, mediator. (ag) (Entered: 08/08/2002)
167 JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT. (rm) (Entered: 08/14/2002)
168 MOTION by EEOC with memorandum in support for reconsideration of [164-1] order re: recovery for defendant's failure to promote plaintiff to branch manager position (ch) (Entered: 08/15/2002)
169 TRIAL CALENDAR for trial term commencing with the first case on 9/3/02 at 9:00 a.m. scheduled for Judge Susan C. Bucklew ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/16/2002)
170 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 8/16/02 before Judge Susan C. Bucklew. Court Reporter: Paul Spangler (jlg) (Entered: 08/19/2002)
ORAL MOTION in open court by Enterprise Leasing for protection from trial of 9/12/02 and 9/13/02 (jlg) (Entered: 08/19/2002)
ORAL ORDER granting [0-0] motion for protection from trial of 9/12/02 and 9/13/02 (Entered by Judge Susan C. Bucklew) (jlg) (Entered: 08/19/2002)
171 ORDER allowing Peter W. Zinober to bring a cellular telephone into the courthouse during the mediation conference scheduled for 8/22/02. ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins ) ctc (jlg) (Entered: 08/19/2002)
172 PRETRIAL ORDER filed. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (ch) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
173 ORDER denying [168-1] motion for reconsideration of [164-1] order re: recovery for defendant's failure to promote plaintiff to branch manager position ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (ch) (Entered: 08/21/2002)
174 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE held on 8/22/02 before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Jenkins. (bls) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
175 ORDER: On the basis of the magistrate's telephonic notice that this case settled during the settlement conference, this cause is dismissed without prejudice. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 08/26/2002)
CASE CLOSED. (bls) (Entered: 08/26/2002)
176 CONSENT DECREE by EEOC, Enterprise Leasing, Antonio Anglin. (jab) (Entered: 09/30/2002)
177 JOINT MOTION by Antonio Anglin, Enterprise Leasing to extend time until 11/13/02 to file attorneys' fee petition . (jab) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [177-1] joint motion to extend time until 11/13/02 to file attorneys' fee petition. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 11/04/2002)

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11/12/2002 11/14/2002 11/22/2002 11/22/2002 11/22/2002 11/22/2002 11/22/2002 11/22/2002 11/22/2002 12/27/2002
12/31/2002 12/31/2002 01/06/2003 01/08/2003 01/08/2003 01/22/2003

178 JOINT MOTION by Enterprise Leasing, Antonio Anglin to extend time to file attorneys' fees petition . (jab) (Entered: 11/12/2002)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [178-1] motion to extend time to file attorneys' fees petition ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (bls) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
180 NOTICE of filing affidavits of Mitchell D. Franks, David J. Linesch, Robert M. Brush, and M. Teresa Rodriguez by Antonio Anglin. (jab) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
179 MOTION by Antonio Anglin with memorandum in support for attorney fees . (jnb) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
180 NOTICE of filing affidavits of Mitchell Franks, David Linesch, Robert Brush, and M. Teresa Rodriguez by Antonio Anglin in support of its motion for attorneys' fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
181 AFFIDAVIT of Mitchell D. Franks, Esq. by Antonio Anglin Re: [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (not signed by affiant) (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
182 AFFIDAVIT of David J. Linesch by Antonio Anglin Re: [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
183 AFFIDAVIT of Robert M. Brush by Antonio Anglin Re: [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
184 AFFIDAVIT of M. Teresa Rodriguez by Antonio Anglin Re: [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
186 CONSENTED MOTION by Enterprise Leasing (consented) for leave to file memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorneys' fees in excess of 20 pages . Proposed order and original memorandum attached. (jab) Modified on 12/31/2002 (Entered: 12/30/2002)
187 ORDER granting [186-1] consent motion (consented) for leave to file memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorneys' fees in excess of 20 pages. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
188 MEMORANDUM by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/02/2003)
189 MOTION by Antonio Anglin with memorandum in support for leave to file a reply to the memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorneys' fees . (jab) (Entered: 01/06/2003)
ENDORSED ORDER granting [189-1] motion for leave to file a reply to the memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorneys' fees. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
190 RESPONSE by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [189-1] motion for leave to file a reply to the memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorneys' fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/09/2003)
191 NOTICE of filing affidavit of Pauline Terrelonge and second affidavit of attorneys' fees of Mitchell D. Franks by Antonio Anglin. Documents filed separately. (jab) (Entered: 01/23/2003)

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01/22/2003 01/22/2003 01/22/2003 01/29/2003 01/31/2003 01/31/2003 01/31/2003 01/31/2003 01/31/2003 02/03/2003
02/03/2003 02/04/2003 02/12/2003
02/18/2003
02/18/2003

192 AFFIDAVIT of Pauline Terrelonge by Antonio Anglin Re: [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/23/2003)
193 SECOND AFFIDAVIT of Mitchell D. Franks, Esq. by Antonio Anglin Re: [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/23/2003)
194 REPLY by Antonio Anglin to response to [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 01/23/2003)
195 MOTION by EEOC for leave to file reply, for limited purpose, to defendant's memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorney's fees . Original proposed reply is attached as Exhibit A. (jab) (Entered: 01/30/2003)
196 NOTICE of filing Exhibit 1 to the affidavit of Thomas M. Gonzalez by Enterprise Leasing. (jab) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
197 NOTICE of filing affidavits of Lynn H. Cole and Mark E. Levitt in support of defendant's memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorney's fees by Enterprise Leasing. (jab) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
198 AFFIDAVIT of Lynn H. Cole by Enterprise Leasing Re: [188-1] opposition memorandum. (jab) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
199 AFFIDAVIT of Mark E. Levitt by Enterprise Leasing Re: [188-1] opposition memorandum. (jab) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
200 REPLY by Enterprise Leasing to response to [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 02/03/2003)
201 ORDER granting [195-1] motion for leave to file reply, for limited purpose, to defendant's memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorney's fees. The clerk is directed to docket plaintiff's reply, attached as an exhibit to the motion for leave to file. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
203 REPLY by EEOC to response to [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 02/05/2003)
202 RESPONSE by Enterprise Leasing in opposition to [195-1] motion for leave to file reply, for limited purpose, to defendant's memorandum in opposition to intervenor's motion for attorney's fees. (jab) (Entered: 02/05/2003)
204 CONSENTED MOTION by Enterprise Leasing (consented) for leave to file reply to EEOC's response to defendant's memorandum in opposition to intervenor's attorneys' fee petition . Original proposed reply is attached. (jab) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
205 ORDER granting [204-1] consent motion for leave to file reply to EEOC's response to defendant's memorandum in opposition to intervenor's attorneys' fee petition. The clerk is directed to file the reply. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 02/19/2003)
206 REPLY by Enterprise Leasing to response to [179-1] motion for attorney fees. (jab) (Entered: 02/19/2003)

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05/13/2003

207 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [179-1] motion for attorney fees. ( Signed by Judge Susan C. Bucklew ) ctc (jab) (Entered: 05/14/2003)

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