UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA DAVENPORT DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, and QUIANNA KNOWLES,
Plaintiff-Intervenor
v.
REMEDY INTELLIGENT STAFFING, INC., Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3-02-10067

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COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Quianna Knowles, by and through her attorneys, John M. Wright and Curtis R. Dial, and hereby dismisses her suit against the defen with prejudice.

Copy to: Martha Shaff Brian Tyndall

702 Av ue F, Suite F adison, IA 52627
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Curtis R. Dial 10 13 Concert Street Keokuk, IA 52632 (319)524-7665 FAX (319)524-5846
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

Civil Action No, 3-02-10067

Plaintiff,

QUIANNA M, KNOWLES, P laintiff-Intervenor,

CONSENT DECREE AND ORDER

vs,

REMEDY INTELLIGENT STAFFING, INC,

Defendant

This action was filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission") on June 12, 2002, pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. The Commission alleged that Remedy Intelligent Staffing Inc, (hereinafter, "defendant") violated the ADA when it refused to hire Quianna Knowles for a job with the Scotts Company and refused to accommodate her disability, deafuess. Defendant has denied the Commission's allegations. Knowles intervened in this action by filing a complaint herein on October 15,2002; the Court's order granting said intervention was filed November 8, 2002.
The Commission, Knowles, and defendant (the "parties") have agreed to resolve this matter pursuant to this Consent Decree, without continuing to trial on the merits of the claims of the Commission and Knowles.
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NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having carefully examined the terms and provisions of this Consent Decree, and based on the pleadings, record and stipulations ofthe parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT: I. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the parties for
purposes of entering and enforcing this Decree. 2. The terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable and just. 3. This Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not in derogation
of the rights or privileges of any person. The entry ofthis Decree will further the objectives of the ADA, and will be in the best interests of the parties, those for whom EEOC seeks relief, and the public. 4. This Decree resolves all claims arising out of the Charge of Discrimination filed by Quianna Knowles, EEOC Charge No. 260-AI-0892, and constitutes a complete resolution of all claims under the ADA that were made or could have been made by the parties to that charge. The parties further agree that this Decree does not resolve any other claims. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 5. Injunction. Defendant and its officers, agents, employees, successors, franchisees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them shall be and are hereby permanently enjoined from engaging in any employment practice that discriminates on the basis of disability.

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2. Training. Defendant shall provide training in regard to the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA") to all of its management and supervisory employees in all of its U.S. offices, including franchisees, once per year for the next two years from the date of entry of this Consent Decree and Order, and shall annually provide the EEOC's Milwaukee District Office with a list of those trained and the date and description of the training provided. Such training may be conducted by video tape or other means as chosen by Remedy. The video shall include training in regard to disability discrimination, reasonable accommodation, stereotypes involving persons with disabilities, and the ADA. 3. Posting.
Defendant shall place a public notice, in a conspicuous place, at all of its U.S. offices, including franchisees, for a period of two years from the date of entry of this Consent Decree and Order. The notice shall be in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A and captioned "Notice To All Employees." Defendant shall annually provide the EEOC's Milwaukee District Office with proof of compliance with this provision. 4. Dissemination of Policy Statement
Within 30 days of execution of this Consent Decree, Defendant agrees to issue and disseminate a statement to all its human resources staff, recruiting department personnel, and all others with day-to-day ADA responsibility, including franchisees, in the form attached as Exhibit B (or in such other form as it may choose, with the consent of the Commission), affirming its obligation to comply with the ADA, and affirming that it is the responsibility of all
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of Defendant's employees to comply with the ADA. Once each year for the next two years, Defendant shall re-issue the policy statement on an annual basis, to all of its human resources staff, recruiting department personnel, and all others with day-to-day ADA responsibility. 5. Certification to Commission.
Upon each annual compliance with the foregoing provision of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall promptly certify to the undersigned counsel for the Commission that Defendant has complied with it. 6. Reporting
For two years from the entry of this Consent Decree and Order, Defendant shall, at its branches (but not at its franchisees nor licensees) maintain written records of (I) the names and addresses of its applicants who advise Defendant during the application process that they have a disability and need a reasonable accommodation for a disability; and (2) Defendant's complete actions in regard to such individuals. Defendant shall make available to the EEOC, on a semiannual basis starting June 30, 2004 ending December 31, 2005, the following information: (I) the number of such individuals; (2) the outcomes of their applications and accommodation requests; and (3) an explanation as to why any requested accommodations were not granted. The EEOC will not require as a part ofthis Consent Decree that the names and addresses ofthe individuals be furnished to the EEOC as part of the monitoring of this Consent Decree, except as follows:
Ifthe EEOC, upon review of the information described in the preceding paragraph, concludes that its monitoring ofthis Consent Decree requires access to one or more names and
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addresses of the individuals, then the EEOC shall so notifY Defendant and seek to resolve any

disputes informally. If such informal resolution is not possible, the EEOC may then move the

Court for production of said information. Defendant reserves its rights to assert objections to

such discovery of such names and addresses.

Defendant shall maintain such documents for the full two year reporting period, and for

one year thereafter.

7. Right of Entry for Inspection

The Commission shall have the right, on 96 hours' written notice to Defendant, to enter

upon Defendant's offices and inspect any relevant documents or records for the purpose of

determining Defendant's compliance with this Consent Decree and Order. The provisions of this

paragraph do not apply to paragraph 6, specifically the EEOC will not have the right to inspect

the names or addresses of any individuals as identified in paragraph 6, except as provided in

paragraph 6.

MONETARY RELIEF

Defendant agrees, within 15 days of signature of this Consent Decree and Order by the

Court, to pay $80,000 to Ms. Knowles and her attorneys. Defendant shall mail the payments to

Ms. Knowles clo her counsel, John Wright, Esq. and Curt Dial, Esq., and shall simultaneously

provide a copy of the payment check to the undersigned counsel for the Commission.

#!- fo.k--, SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this

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day of

2004.

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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 "L" Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507
Nicholas Inzeo Acting Deputy General Counsel
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Milwaukee District Office 310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 800 Milwaukee, WI 53203 (414) 297-1130
Jean P. Kamp Regional Attorney

Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc.

i Date 2--/12-/0

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Exhibit A

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

This notice is being posted by per the terms of a settlement agreement between Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc. ("Remedy") and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC alleged that Remedy violated the Americans With Disabilities Act ("the ADA") by refusing to hire an applicant for an assigmnent at one of Remedy's clients and refusing to accommodate the applicant's disability, deafness. Remedy agrees not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because he or she has a disability.

Should you have any complaints of discrimination on the basis of

disability, you can contact [

], or the local EEOC office.

EEOC charges no fee for its services, and has employees who speak languages

other than English. EEOC's offices are accessible to individuals with disabilities.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE

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Exhibit B [Remedy Letterhead] Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc. believes in hiring, placing, and promoting individuals on the basis of qualifications and merit. It is Remedy's policy that all employment practices, including recruiting, hiring, promotion, layoff, recall from layoff, training, compensation, benefits, and other terms, privileges and conditions of employment, be free from discrimination of any kind, including discrimination on the basis of disability. Remedy believes in full compliance with fair employment laws, including specifically the federal Americans With Disabilities Act, or ADA, which makes it illegal to discriminate against individuals with disabilities. Remedy will make reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities, in compliance with the ADA. It is the responsibility of all Remedy employees to comply with this policy in fact and in spirit. Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
President
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA DAVENPORT DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

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COMMISSION,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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REMEDY INTELLIGENT STAFFING, INC., )

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Defendant.

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.. u2CVI0067 rCi-~l~!.../~~,tion J:io.
COMPLAINT (Jury Trial Demand)

Nature Of The Action This is an action under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability and to provide appropriate relief to Quianna Knowles, who was adversely affected by such practices. As alleged with greater particularity in Paragraph 8 below, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that the defendant Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc. violated the ADA when it refused to hire Quianna Knowles for a job with the Scotts Company and refused to accommodate her disability. Knowles is deaf.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451,1331,1337, 1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed withinjhe jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Davenport Division.
PARTIES 3. The plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title I of the ADA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, the defendant, Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc. (" Remedy"), has continuously been doing business in the State of Iowa, and has continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, Remedy has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Section 101(5) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12111(5), and Section 101(7) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12111(7), which incorporates by reference Sections 701(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(g) and (h). 6. At all relevant times, Remedy has been a covered entity under Section 101(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2),
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Knowles filed a charge
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with the EEOC alleging violations of Title I of the ADA by Remedy. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfIlled.
8. Since at least on or about October 2000, Remedy has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Fort Madison, IA office in violation of Section 102(a) and (b) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (b), as follows:
(a) Knowles is deaf in both ears, and has been since birth. She is therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
(b) In September 2000, in response to a newspaper advertisement, Knowles contacted Remedy and inquired whether there were employment opportunities at The Scotts Company ("Scotts") for persons who are hearing impaired. She was told by Randy Sorrell, a manager at Remedy, that it would be too dangerous for someone with a hearing impairment to work at Scotts.
(c) On or about October 2, 2000, Knowles completed a written job application for a production level job with Remedy to work at Scotts. After completing her application she was again told by Sorrell that she could not work at Scotts because she is hearing impaired.
(d) Remedy violated the ADA when it refused to hire Knowles for a position at Scotts because of her disability, deafness.
(e) Knowles was qualified to perform all of the essential functions of the production level position at Scotts with or without a reasonable accommodation.
9. The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraph 8 above has been to deprive Knowles of equal employment opportunities because of disability.
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10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 8 above were and are intentional.
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 8 above were and are done with malice or with reckless indifference to Knowles' federally-protected rights.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the EEOC respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Remedy and its officers, successors, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from failing and refusing to employ disabled individuals such as Knowles in positions for which they are qualified. B. Order Remedy to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs that provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities, and that eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Remedy to make Knowles whole by providing appropriate backpay, front pay, pre-judgment interest, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including (but not limited to) hiring Knowles into a position in which she can perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. D. Order Remedy to make Knowles whole by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in Paragraph 8 above, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation. F. Order Remedy to pay Knowles punitive damages for its malicious and reckless
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,
conduct, as described in Paragraph 8 above, in amounts to be determined at trial. G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public
interest. H. Award the EEOC its costs of this action.
JURy TRIAL DEMAND
The EEOC requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Barbara L. Henderson Senior Trial Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION Milwaukee District Office 310 West Wisconsin Avenue - Suite 800 Milwaukee, WI 53203-2292 (414) 297-3548
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA DAVENPORT DIVISION

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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff

NO.3-02-CV-I0067

vs.
REMEDY INTELLIGENT STAFFING, INC. Defendant

COMPLAINT OF PROPOSED INTERVENOR (Jury Trial Demand)

Nature of Action

This is an action under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

("ADA") and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment

practices on the basis of disability and to provide appropriate reliefto Quianna Knowles,

who was adversely affected by such practices.

As alleged with greater particularity in Paragraph 9 below, the Proposed

Intervenor, Quianna Knowles, alleges that the defendant, Remedy Intelligent Staffing,

Inc. violated the ADA when it refused to hire Quianna Knowles for a job with the Scotts

Company and refused to accommodate her disability. Knowles is deaf.

Jurisdiction and Venue

I. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. secs. 451,1331,

1337, 1343 & 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 107(a) of

the ADA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(f)(I)

and 93) of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. secs.

2000e-5(f)(I) and (3), and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil rights Act of 1991,42

U.S.c. sec. 1981a.

2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District ofIowa, Davenport Division.
Parties 3. The Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title I of the ADA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12117(a), which incorporates by reference Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) ofTitie VII, 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000e-5(f)(I)and (3). 4. At all relevant times, the defendant, Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc. ("Remedy"), has continuously been doing business in the State ofIowa, and has continuously had at lest IS employees. 5. At all relevant times, Remedy has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Section 101(5) ofthe ADA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(5), and Section 101(7) ofthe ADA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(7), which incorporates by reference Sections 701(g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000E(g) and (h). 6. At all relevant times, Remedy has been a covered entity under Section 101(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.c. sec. 12111(2). 7. Quianna Knowles ("Knowles") is the proposed intervenor. Knowles is deaf and is the person who the Plaintiff filed this suit on behalf of. Knowles is person who was adversely affected by the practices of the Defendant as set out in the statement of claims as alleged in the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff and further alleged in this complaint.

Statement of Claims 8. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Knowles filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violations of Title I of the ADA by Remedy. A Complaint was filed by the EEOC regarding these violations. Knowles now requests that she be allowed to intervene as plaintiff in this matter. All conditions precedent to the institution ofthe lawsuit were fulfilled before suit was filed by the EEOC. 9. Since at least on or about October 2000, Remedy has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Fort Madison, IA office in violation of Section 102(a) and (b) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and (b), as follows: (a) Knowles is deaf in both ears, and has been since birth. She is therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA. (b) In September 2000, in response to a newspaper advertisement, Knowles contacted Remedy and inuired whether there were employment opportunities at the Scotts Company ("Scotts") for persons who are hearing-impaired. She was told by Randy Sorrell, a manager at Remedy, that it would be too dangerous for someone with a hearing impairment to work at Scotts. (c) On or about October 2, 2000, Knowles completed a written job application for a production level job with Remedy to work at Scotts. After completing her application she was again told by Sorrell that she could not work for Scotts because she is hearing impaired. (d) Remedy violated the ADA when it refused to hire Knowles for a position at Scotts because of her hearing disability. (e) Knowles was qualified to perform all of the essential functions ofthe

production level position at Scotts with or without a reasonable accommodation. 10. The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above has been to
deprive Knowles of equal employment opportunities because of a disability. 11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above
were and are intentional. 12. The unlawful employment practices complaintied of in Paragraph 9 above
were and are done with malice or with reckless indifference to Knowles' federally protected rights.
Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, the proposed intervenor, Quianna Knowles, respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Remedy and its officers, successors, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from failing and refusing to employ disabled individuals such as Knowles in positions for which they are entitled. B. Order Remedy to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs that provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities, and that eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Remedy to make Knowles whole by providing appropriate back pay, front pay, pre-judgment interest, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including (but not limited to) hiring Knowles into a position in which she can perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.

D. Order Remedy to make Knowles whole by providing compensation for past and future non-pecuniary losses resulting form the unlawful practices complained of in Paragraph 9 above, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment oflife and humiliation.
E. Order Remedy to pay Knowles punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct, as described in Paragraph 9 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
G. Award the proposed intervenor her costs of this action. Jurv Trial Demand
The proposed Intervenor requests a Jury Trial on all questions of fact raised by this Complaint.

QUIANNA KNOWLES, proposed
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By: Curtis Dial Law Office of Curtis Dial 206 N. 7th St. Keokuk, IA 52632 319-524-7585 - telephone 319-524-7379 - fax
By:
2 Ave. F, Suite 1 Fort Madison, IA 52627 319-372-0448 - telephone 319-372-0939 - fax
ATTORNEYS FOR PROPOSED INTERVENOR

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)
2003 WL 23354543 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Davenport Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Quianna M. KNOWLES, Plaintiff–Intervenor, v.
REMEDY INTELLIGENT STAFFING, INC., Defendant.
No. Civ.3:02–CV–10067. | Dec. 22, 2003.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Brian C. Tyndall, Barbara L. Henderson, Jean P. Kamp, EEOC, Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff.
Martha L. Shaff, Betty Neuman & McMahon, Davenport, IA, for defendant.
John M. Wright, Fort Madison, IA, Curtis Dial, Keokuk, IA, for intervenor–plaintiff.
Opinion
ORDER
LONGSTAFF, Chief J.
*1 The Court has before it plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s motion for partial summary judgment and motion in limine, filed October 1, 2003. Plaintiff-intervenor Quianna M. Knowles joined the motions on October 20, 2003. Defendant filed its resistance on November 3, 2003 and plaintiff filed a reply on December 12, 2003. The motions are now fully submitted.
In its motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff seeks a judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiff’s motion in limine seeks a determination that the record supports the submission of punitive damages to the jury.
I. BACKGROUND The following facts are either not in dispute or are viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the non-moving party. Defendant Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc. (“Remedy”) is a contract employment or temporary employment agency that provides staffing for the production area of the Scotts Company in Fort Madison, Iowa. Randall Sorrell was the branch manager of Remedy’s Fort Madison location on all relevant dates. Sorrell’s job was to recruit and retain staff. On September 27, 200, Quianna Knowles, who is deaf, applied for production work at Scotts through Remedy. She was interviewed by Sorrell and turned down for the position because Sorrell did not think it would be safe for her to work at Scotts. Sorrell told Knowles that she would not be able to hear the audible startup signal from the production lines, and that she would be in close proximity to forklifts. Although Knowles’ work experience included working in factories around machinery and forklifts, Sorrell did not ask Knowles about her experience as it related to his concerns. Sorrell admits that he did not ask Knowles if she needed reasonable accommodation. Sorrell also did not ask Scotts whether they could reasonably accommodate Knowles.
The parties both had experts inspect the Scotts plant. The expert hired by defendant determined that a person who is hearing-impaired cannot perform the essential functions of the production job at Scotts with or without reasonable accommodation. He also found that if reasonable accommodation was required it would create an undue financial hardship on defendant. The EEOC expert determined that reasonable accommodation for Knowles could be easily achieved by making
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E.E.O.C. v. Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)
slight alterations to the workplace at low to moderate costs to Scotts.
Plaintiffs Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Knowles now allege that Remedy violated Sections 102(a) and (b) of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (b), by refusing to hire Knowles and by failing to provide her with reasonable accommodation.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir.1994). The moving party must establish its right to judgment with such clarity there is no room for controversy. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir.1982). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine,” if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
*2 “Summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases.” Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994). Summary judgment should be granted only on the rare occasion where no dispute of fact exists and there is only one conclusion. Id. (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). The Court should not grant plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion “unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.” Id. (citations omitted).
B. Qualified Individual with a Disability In order to recover under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job at issue, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir.2000). In the present case, defendant does not appear to dispute that Knowles is disabled as defined by the ADA or that Knowles suffered adverse employment action because of her disability. See Defendant’s Memorandum. The principal issue, then, is whether Knowles was a “qualified individual” for purposes of the ADA.
An individual with a disability is “qualified” under the ADA if she possesses the requisite skill, education, experience or training required for the position, and she can perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. See Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir., 1998). The Court first notes that Knowles worked in several factories prior to applying for work with defendant. Defendant does not appear to suggest that Knowles lacks the requisite skill, education, experience or training for the position with Remedy. Instead, defendant argues that, in light of her disability, Knowles cannot perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.
1. Essential functions ADA regulations advise that a job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including, but not limited to the following: (1) the purpose of the position is the performance of that function, (2) only a limited number of employees are available among whom performance of that function can be delegated, or (3) an employee is hired because of her experience or ability to perform a specialized function. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(n)(2). In making their determination, courts may consider: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (4) the consequences of not requiring the job to be performed, and (5) the work experience of both past and present employees in the job. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(n)(3).
In the present case, a manager at Scotts described the essential function of the job on their production line as “[t]o service our package lines with supplying components to the packaging lines. Doing job tasks that support the operation of the packaging lines.” Defendant’s Appendix, exhibit 4, p. 39, dep p. 103. As plaintiffs points out, Knowles has successfully worked in
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E.E.O.C. v. Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003)
factories in the past without any problems. See EEOC’s Memorandum at 4. Moreover, a report issued by the EEOC’s industrial safety expert, completed after an inspection of the plant, argues that Knowles is able to perform all production packaging jobs at Scotts with or without reasonable accommodation. Id.
*3 Conversely, defendant contends the ability to hear is an essential function to the job with respect to both working safely on the production line and to being able to identify jams in the machinery. See Defendant’s Memorandum at 5–6. Defendant first argues that Knowles cannot safely perform the essential functions of the job because “working around forklifts and startup of the machines are real safety concerns to a deaf person working in this environment.” Defendant’s Memorandum at 5. Defendant expresses concern that Knowles will either be injured by a passing forklift, which announces its presence using horns, or will not be able to identify jams in the machinery by sound. Defendant also notes that Knowles will not be able to hear the machines starting up. While defendant admits that lights could signal the start up, defendant contends “[i]t is not realistic to guarantee that the worker will be facing the direction of the light at all times.” Id. at 6. Most importantly, however, an expert hired by defendant conducted an inspection of the Scotts plant and determined that a person who is hearing-impaired cannot perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.
Plaintiff argues that defendant’s expert is directly contradicted by testimony of defendant’s Vice President, Susan Cooksey. EEOC’s Reply Brief at 2. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the statement by defendant’s expert does raise material issues of fact as to whether the ability to hear is integral to performing the essential functions of the production line jobs at Scotts. The remaining analysis, then, is whether or not reasonable accommodation could have been made to assist Knowles in performing the job at Scotts.
2. Reasonable accommodation Under the ADA, the term “reasonable accommodation” includes the “acquisition or modification of equipment or devices” that would enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). At all times, a plaintiff has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the plaintiff has been the victim of illegal discrimination due to her disability. Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.1995). If a plaintiff makes a facial showing of the availability of a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential functions of the job, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that such an accommodation constitutes an undue hardship. Id. In the present case, Knowles contends she can work safely in a factory environment without accommodation. Even assuming accommodation is necessary, however, she argues the report by the EEOC’s expert provides the necessary facial showing that accommodation is possible. The EEOC’s expert found reasonable accommodation for Knowles could be easily achieved by making slight alterations to the workplace at low to moderate costs to Scotts. Defendant’s expert disagrees. He contends that “the cost to retrofit the place of employment with warning lights or assigning another worker to be with the hearing impaired person as they move throughout the facility would create an undue hardship on the hiring employer.” Defendant’s Appendix, Exhibit 3, p. 23.
*4 In light of this conflicting evidence, this Court finds that triable issues of fact exist regarding whether Knowles could be reasonably accommodated in fulfilling the essential function of the production job at Scotts or whether such accommodation would place an undue hardship on defendant.
C. Conclusion For the aforementioned reasons, the Court concludes that material issues of fact remain as to the essential functions of the production job at Scotts, whether Knowles can perform the essential functions of the job despite being deaf, and, if not, whether a reasonable accommodation by Scotts would enable her to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied.
III. MOTION IN LIMINE It is premature at this time for the Court to address the issue of whether punitive damages should be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion in limine is denied.
3

E.E.O.C. v. Remedy Intelligent Staffing, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2003) IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons outline above, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and motion in limine are DENIED. IT IS ORDERED.
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TERMED
U.S. District Court United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (Davenport)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:02-cv-10067-REL

EEOC v. Remedy Intelligent S Assigned to: Senior Judge Ronald E. Longstaff Demand: $0 Cause: 29:0794 Job Discrimination (Handicap)

Date Filed: 06/12/2002 Date Terminated: 02/27/2004 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Brian C Tyndall EEOC MILWAUKEE DISTRICT OFFICE 310 W WISCONSIN AVE STE 800 MILWAUKEE, WI 53203-2292 414 297 1130 Fax: 414 297 3146 Email: brian.tyndall@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jean P Kamp EEOC MILWAUKEE DISTRICT OFFICE 310 W WISCONSIN AVE STE 800 MILWAUKEE, WI 53203-2292 414 297 1860 Fax: 414 297 3146 Email: jean.kamp@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barbara L Henderson EEOC MILWAUKEE DISTRICT OFFICE 310 W WISCONSIN AVE STE 800 MILWAUKEE, WI 53203-2292 414/297-3465

V. Defendant

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Remedy Intelligent Staffing Inc
Intervenor Plaintiff Quianna Knowles

represented by Martha L Shaff Betty Neuman & McMahon, LLP 600 Union Arcade Building 111 E Third Street Davenport, IA 52801 563 326 4491 Fax: 326 4498 Email: mls@bettylawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Curtis Dial 2454 RIVER ROAD KEOKUK, IA 52632-2151 Fax: 3195247379 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John M Wright JONES DAY REAVIS & POGUE 77 WEST WACKER BLVD STE 3500 CHICAGO, IL 60601-1692 Fax: 3127828585 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/12/2002 09/03/2002 10/07/2002 10/07/2002
10/15/2002 10/18/2002

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (Summons not issued); Rule 16 Dismissal Notice set for 10/10/02; Dismissal ddl (service) set for 10/10/02 (rmj) (Entered: 06/12/2002)

2 ANSWER by defendant Remedy Intelligent complaint [1-1]; jury demand (rmj) (Entered: 09/03/2002)

PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER SUBMITTED by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Remedy Intelligent Staffing; Report not adopted, referred to Magistrate Walters. (rmj) (Entered: 10/07/2002)

3 SCHEDULING ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters; dispositive mtn ddl set 8/2/03; Case ready for trial as of 12/3/03; estimated length of trial - 3-4 day jury trial; Discovery ddl set for 6/4/03 (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 10/07/2002)

4 MOTION by Quianna Knowles to intervene agst dft before Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters (rmj) (Entered: 10/15/2002)

5 ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL and FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ; Jury trial 3-4 day jury trial 3/15/04 @ 9:00 in

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11/08/2002 11/08/2002 11/13/2002 12/17/2002
01/13/2003 02/11/2003 02/12/2003
05/28/2003 05/31/2003 08/13/2003 08/18/2003
09/25/2003 09/29/2003

Davenport, IA; Final pretrial cnf (MAG) 2/13/04 @ 10:00 /s/ JRR, Clerk (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
6 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters granting Motion by Quianna Knowles to intervene agst dft [4-1] (cc: all counsel) (lh) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
7 INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT and JURY DEMAND by Intervenorpltf Quianna Knowles (lh) (Entered: 11/08/2002)
8 ANSWER by defendant Remedy Intelligent to complaint of intervenor [7-1]; jury demand (rmj) (Entered: 11/13/2002)
9 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to extend time to disclose expert witnesses and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters granting motion; Expert ddls to be extended by two months; Plf/Plf-Intervenor 3/6/03, Dft 5/6/03, and Plfs' rebuttal 6/6/03; expert discovery conducted by 8/6/03 [9-1] (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 12/18/2002)
10 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC by BRIAN C TYNDALL, Milwaukee, WI (rmj) (Entered: 01/13/2003)
REMARK: STIPULATED/UNOPPOSED MOTION AND ORDER TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER sent to DSM on this date (rmj) (Entered: 02/11/2003)
11 MODIFIED SCHEDULING ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters; dispositive mtn ddl set 10/1/03; Discovery ddl set for 8/15/03; See orders for expert witness ddls (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 02/12/2003)
REMARK: Stipulated motion w/ order to modify scheduling order sent to DSM (rmj) (Entered: 05/28/2003)
12 STIPULATED MOTION by plaintiff, defendant to amend Scheduling Order and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters granting motion [12-1] (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 06/02/2003)
REMARK - sent to U.S. Magistrate Judge Walters a stipulation and protective order (bp) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
13 STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters : Any personnel records shall be us only fo rpurposes of prosecuting or defending this litigation or appeal; any records or copies shall be returned to defendant's counsel at the conclusion of this litigation or appeal; anyone who is shown any of such record shall agree to be bound by these provisions. see order for specs. (cc: all counsel) (bp) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
REMARK: Stipulation and Protective Order sent to Judge Walters this date (rmj) (Entered: 09/25/2003)
14 PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters : Any such record, and all copies thereof, shall be returned to Remedy's counsel at

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10/01/2003 10/01/2003 10/01/2003 10/01/2003 10/16/2003
10/20/2003 10/21/2003
10/22/2003 10/30/2003
11/03/2003 11/03/2003 11/03/2003

the conclusion of this litigation or any related appeals. Any allegedly proprietary records provided b remedy to the EEOC and plaintiffintervenor and stamped "Confidential" shall be used only for purposes of prosecuting or defending this litigation or any appeals. see order for specs. (cc: all counsel) (bp) (Entered: 09/29/2003)
15 MOTION by plaintiff for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
16 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support [15-1] of motion for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
17 STATEMENT/FINDINGS OF FACT by plaintiff [15-1] in support of motion for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
18 APPENDIX filed by plaintiff [15-1] re: motion for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
19 ORDER SETTING RULE 16(b) Telephone conference re settlement conference dates by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters Telephone Hearing 10/20/03 @ 4:15; Counsel shall cooperate in placing the call to the Court (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 10/16/2003)
20 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Quianna Knowles for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 10/20/2003)
21 ORDER SCHEDULING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE AND FOR SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENTS by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters Settlement cnf (MAG) 10/29/03 at 9:30 at Federal Courthouse in Rock Island, IL; Statements to be submitted at least 3 days prior to conference; Telephone Hearing HELD , (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 10/21/2003)
22 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant to extend time to resist motion for summary judgment and ORDER granting motion [22-1]; New ddl 10/20/03 /s/ JRR, Clerk (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 10/22/2003)
23 ORDER FOLLOWING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters Settlement cnf (MAG) HELD; Matter did not settle Dft's Responsive brief ddl 11/3/03; Plaintiff/Intervenor's Reply brief ddl 12/1/03 (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 10/30/2003)
24 RESISTANCE by defendant Remedy Intelligent to motion for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff [15-1] (rmj) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
25 MEMORANDUM by defendant in support [24-1] of its resistance to plf's motion for summary judgment (rmj) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
26 STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS by defendant [24-1] in support of motion response (rmj) (Entered: 11/03/2003)

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11/03/2003 11/03/2003 12/03/2003
12/05/2003
12/12/2003 12/12/2003 12/12/2003 12/22/2003 01/07/2004
02/12/2004
02/25/2004 02/27/2004 02/27/2004

27 RESPONSE to Plf's Statement of Facts by defendant [17-1] re: motion for summary judgment (rmj) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
28 APPENDIX filed by defendant [24-1] re: its resistance to plf's motion for summary judgment (rmj) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
29 MOTION by plaintiff to amend Briefing Schedule and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters granting motion [29-1] re [23-3] order; New ddl 12/9/03 for Plf's Reply (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 12/03/2003)
30 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to extend time to file a reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment until December 12 2003 and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters granting motion [30-1] (cc: all counsel) (bp) (Entered: 12/05/2003)
31 REPLY by plaintiff EEOC to Dft's statement of disputed facts [26-1] (rmj) (Entered: 12/12/2003)
32 REPLY by plaintiff EEOC re [15-1] motion for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 12/12/2003)
33 SUPPLEMENT by plaintiff EEOC [18-1] to Appendix, [15-1] to motion for partial summary judgment before Judge Ronald E. Longstaff (rmj) (Entered: 12/12/2003)
34 ORDER by Judge Ronald E. Longstaff denying motion for partial summary judgment and motion in limine. see order for specs. [20-1] (cc: all counsel) (bp) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
35 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Remedy Intelligent S to extend the discovery depositions until February 1, 2004 and ORDER by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters granting motion [35-1] (cc: all counsel) (bp) (Entered: 01/07/2004)
36 ORDER CANCELING TRIAL AND FINAL PRETRIAL AND FOR CLOSING DOCUMENTS by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters; Counsel have notifed the Court settlement has been reached Dismsl papers ddl 3/12/04 Jury trial CANCELED; Final pretrial cnf CANCELED (cc: all counsel) (rmj) (Entered: 02/12/2004)
REMARK Proposed Consent Decree and Order sent to DSM (rmj) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
37 NOTICE OF CASE DISMISSAL with Prejudice by Intervenor-Plaintiff Quianna Knowles [see 02-12-04 Order Case Settled - Pldg #36] (lh) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
38 CONSENT DECREE AND ORDER by Judge Ronald E. Longstaff re [71] Plaintiff/Intervenor Complaint - this Decree resolves all claims arising out of the Charge of Discrimination filed byu Quianna Knowles, EEOC Charge No. 260-A1-0892, and constitutes a complete resolution of all claims under the ADA that were made or could have been made by the parties to that charge. The parties further agree that this Decree does not

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resolve any other claims...[See Consent Decree for further details on Injunctive Relief, Posting of Public Notice, etc] (cc: all counsel) (lh) (Entered: 02/27/2004)

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