IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION<-

JOSEPH LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

V.

JOHN W OARRA~ ’ .

CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICER ~OMEZ,.~nd

POLICE OFFICERS,

~i~~

Defendants% 1 @ ~%~

COMPLAINT

) 1823
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
~vlAG]STRATE JUDGE
E~Lr’~ALD~NE BOAT BROWN

NOW COMES Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, by his attorneys,

LOEVY & LOEVY, and complaining of Defendants, CITY OF CHICAGO,

OFFICER GOMEZ, and OTHER AS-YET UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICERS (collectively, "Defendant Police Officers"), states as follows:

Introduction

i.

This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

Section 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of law of

Plaintiff’s rights as secured by the United States Constitution.

2.

By means of inhuman treatment, including shackling

him to the wall for days and intentionally depriving him of

sleep, the Defendant Police Officers attempted unlawfully to

coerce Plaintiff to confess to a murder which he did not commit. Jurisdiction and Venue

3.

This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. ~ 1391(b).

On information and belief, all parties reside in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims asserted

herein all occurred within district.

Background

4.

On or about July 19, 2000, in the Humbolt Park

neighborhood on the West side of Chicago, 27-year-old Miguel

Figueroa stood in the sunroof of a moving Pontiac Bonneville and

fired shots from a .38-caliber weapon at rival gang members.

A stray bullet struck 12-year old Miguel DeLaRosa,

killing him.

6. Within a week, Miguel Figueroa confessed to the

murder on videotape. He presently faces the death penalty for

his crime.

The Parties

Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez, is an 18-year-old

resident of the Humbolt Park neighborhood. He attended C!emente

High School, and presently works at United Parcel Service.

8.

Some time after the DeLaRosa shooting, Plaintiff

was talking to a friend on the street when the two of them were

approached by several Chicago police officers.

9.

One of the officers was Officer Gomez, an officer

known in Plaintiff’s neighborhood as a dangerous and violent man.

i0. Without any reasonable suspicion to believe

Plaintiff had committed any wrongdoing, the officers handcuffed

Plaintiff and placed him in their squad car.

ii. Plaintiff was driven to an alley. Following a

brief interrogation, Officer Gomez punched Plaintiff in the face.

12. The officers told Plaintiff they believed he was a

witness to the shooting Miguel DeLaRosa. Plaintiff was then

taken to the police station.

The Chicago Police’s Unlawful Attempts To Coerce A Confession 13. Upon his arrival at the police station, Defendants placed Plaintiff in a small room/cell and shackled his wrist to the wall with handcuffs. 14. Without charging him, the Defendant Police Officers proceeded to keep Plaintiff in custody for approximately four days while attempting unlawfully to coerce him into confessing to the DeLaRosa murder. 15. During this entire four days, Plaintiff remained in a small room/cell with his wrist handcuffed to a ring on the wall. The only human contact permitted Plaintiff was when he was interrogated by various Defendant Police Officers who attempted to coerce him into confessing to the murder. 16. Plaintiff was unchained from the wall only for brief periods of time when he needed to use the bathroom. 17. The Defendant Police Officers kept Plaintiff shackled to the wall intending to deprive Plaintiff of sleep in an attempt to coerce his confession. Sleep in his position was very difficult, if not impossible. 18. During Plaintiff’s entire four days in custody, Defendants refused to allow him to contact anyone, including members of his family. 19. Defendants also refused to accommodate attempts by Plaintiff’s relatives to contact Plaintiff. 20. Plaintiff’s mother, for example, attempted to locate her son without success. After being sent by the police

to various different police stations around the City, she was later told she would not be permitted to speak to her son until after he was charged.
21. During this time, Defendants also denied Plaintiff access to an attorney.
22. Plaintiff was also interrogated without having received the required Miranda rights.
23. During this time, Defendants also denied Plaintiff the right to use the telephone. A detective told Plaintiff he would get a phone call "when pigs fly."
24. The reason the Defendants did not allow Plaintiff access to a telephone, his relatives, or an attorney was because Plaintiff had a right under Supreme Court precedent to be released from custody after 48 hours if not charged.
25. In this case, the Defendant Police Officers held Plaintiff approximately 96 hours without charging him, attempting unlawfully to coerce a confession.
26. In Plaintiff’s sleep-deprived state and without the benefit of assistance of a lawyer, the Defendant Police Officers administered a lie detector test. The Defendants later falsely claimed the lie detector test proved Plaintiff was the killer.
27. One night during his detention, the Defendant Police Officers picked up Plaintiff’s girl friend at 2:00 a.m. and brought her to the station, though they did not let the two of them speak. In an attempt to make him confess to the murder,

the Defendants lied to Plaintiff, telling him his "bitch" had

already signed a confession.

28. The Defendant Police Officers also lied to Plaintiff in telling him that his friend Tyson had confessed that

Plaintiff was the killer.

29. Plaintiff was also told (wrongfully) that other

friends had already implicated Plaintiff in the shooting. 30. At no time, however, did plaintiff confess to the

murder, a murder he did not commit.
Plaintiff Is Charged With A Murder He Did Not Commit

31. On July 24, 2000, the Chicago Police announced to

the newspapers that Plaintiff was the killer.

32. That same day, Plaintiff was charged with first

degree murder. Prosecutors told the judge they would seek the death penalty.

33. Extremely traumatized by the prospect of being put

to death by the State despite his innocence, Plaintiff cried all

night.

Plaintiff’s Innocence

34. One hour after prosecutors announced they were

seeking the death penalty against Plaintiff, police arrested

Miguel Figueroa for the crime Plaintiff allegedly committed.

35. Thereafter, Figueroa (who, at age 28, is about ten

years older than Plaintiff) gave a video-taped confession to the Chicago Police regarding the DeLaRosa shooting.

36. Thereafter, Plaintiff was released and the wrongful charges against him were dismissed.
37. Notwithstanding the decision to initiate and pursue Plaintiff’s prosecution, the Defendant Police Officers had actual knowledge that Plaintiff was not the killer~
38. Some of the eye-witnesses to the shooting told the Defendant Police Officers that Lopez was not the man who shot DeLaRosa. The shooter had a different complexion than Plaintiff and longer hair. Plaintiff’s head was shaved at the time.
39. The Defendant Police Officers intentionally and without justification ignored these eyewitnesses who attested to Plaintiff’s innocence, and instead claimed to have relied upon the purported identification of Plaintiff by several gang members hostile to Plaintiff.
40. This line-up conducted by the Defendant Police Officers, supposedly resulting in the positive identification of Plaintiff who was bald and ten years younger than the longerhaired shooter, was deeply flawed. The Defendant Police Officers intentionally chose to ignore the eyewitnesses who claimed Plaintiff was innocent and instead only attempted line-up identifications from gang members hostile to Plaintiff.
41. The decision to conduct the flawed line-up referenced in the preceding paragraphs was undertaken intentionally to frame Plaintiff for a murder he did not commit.
6

COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 Excessive Force

42. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-41 as if

fully stated herein.

43. As a result of Officer Gomez’s unjustified and

excessive use of force, Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as

well as emotional distress. 44. As a result of Officer Gomez’s partner’s failure

to intervene to prevent Officer Gomez’s excessive use of force,

Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as well as emotional

distress~ Officer Gomez’s partner had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm had he been so inclined, but failed to do so.

45. The misconduct described in this Count was

objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

46. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.

47. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department in that:

a.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department directly encourages, and is thereby the

moving force behind, the very type of excessive force at issue

here by failing to adequately train, supervise and control its

officers, such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate

indifference;

b.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of excessive

force at issue here by failing to adequately punish and

discipline prior instances of misconduct, thereby leading Chicago

Police Officers to believe their actions will never be

scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff;

c.

Generally, as a matter of widespread practice

so prevalent as to comprise municipal policy, officers of the

Chicago Police Department use excessive force against citizens in

a manner similar to that alleged by Plaintiff in this Count on a

frequent basis, yet the Chicago Police Department makes findings

of wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases;

d.

Municipal policy-makers are aware of (and

condone and facilitate by their inaction) a "code of silence" in

the Chicago Police Department, by which officers fail to report misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at

issue in this case; and

e.

The City of Chicago has failed to act to

remedy the patterns of abuse describe in the preceding sub-

paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing

the types of injuries alleged here.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendants, CITY OF CHICAGO and OFFICER GOMEZ, awarding

compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees, along with punitive damages against Defendant OFFICER GOMEZ in his individual

capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just.

COUNT II - State Law Claim Assault and Battery
48. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-47 as if fully stated herein.
49. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, Plaintiff was attacked by Defendant Officer Gomez without justification or provocation.
50. The actions of Defendant Officer Gomez constituted an offensive physical contact, undertaken willfully and wantonly, proximately causing Plaintiff’s injuries.
51. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
52. As a result of the offensive touching, Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries, including but not limited to a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant OFFICER GOMEZ, awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
COUNT III- State Law Claim Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 53. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-52 as if fully stated herein. 54. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, Defendant Gomez and the other Chicago Police Officers
9

engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with respect to Plaintiff, to wit, the Defendants used violence (punch in the face) and unlawful methods to attempt to coerce Plaintiff into confessing to a murder he did not commit.
55. This misconduct described in this Count was rooted in an abuse of power or authority.
56. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with intent or knowledge that there was a high probability that the conduct would inflict severe emotional distress and with reckless disregard of that probability.
57. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
58. As a proximate result of this misconduct, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and anguish.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant OFFICER GOMEZ, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
Count IV - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 Unlawful Detention
59. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-58 as if fully stated herein.
60. As described more fully above, Defendants held Plaintiff for more than 48 hours without charging him with a crime and without permitting him access to an attorney.
I0

61. As described more fully above, Defendants also

interrogated Plaintiff without the benefit of full Miranda rights.

62. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.

63. As a result of this misconduct, Plaintiff sustained serious emotional injuries.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

the Defendant Police Officers, awarding compensatory damages,

punitive damages, and any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate under the circumstances.

64. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago

Police Department in that:

a.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department directly encourages, and is thereby the moving force behind, the very type of misconduct at issue here by

failing to adequately train, supervise and control its officers,

such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference;

b.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of misconduct

at issue here by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of misconduct, thereby leading Chicago police

Officers to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and,

Ii

in that way, directly encouraging future abuses such as those

affecting Plaintiff;

c.

Generally, as a matter of widespread practice

so prevalent as to comprise municipal policy, officers of the

Chicago Police Department unlawfully detain citizens in a manner similar to that alleged by Plaintiff in this Count on a frequent

basis, yet the Chicago Police Department makes findings of wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases;

d.

Municipal policy-makers are aware of (and

condone and facilitate by their inaction) a "code of silence" in

the Chicago Police Department, by which officers fail to report misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at

issue in this case; and

e.

The City of Chicago has failed to act to

remedy the patterns of abuse describe in the preceding sub-

paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing

the types of injuries alleged here.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages

against the Defendant Police Officers in the individual

capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate under the circumstances.

Count V - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983

Police Torture

65. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-64 as if fully stated herein.

12

66. In attempting unlawfully to coerce Plaintiff to

confess to a murder he did not commit, the Defendants employed

such inhuman methods as shackling Plaintiff’s wrist to the wall

for excessive amounts of hours and intentionally depriving Plaintiff of sleep.
67. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.

68. As a result of this misconduct, Plaintiff

sustained physical and emotional injuries. 69. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago

Police Department in that:

a.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department directly encourages, and is thereby the

moving force behind, the very type of mistreatment at issue here

by failing to adequately train, supervise and control its

officers, such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate

indifference;

b.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of abuse at

issue here by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of misconduct, thereby leading Chicago Police Officers

to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses such as those affecting

Plaintiff;

13

c.

Generally, as a matter of widespread practice

so prevalent as to comprise municipal policy, officers of the

Chicago Police Department commit misconduct against citizens in a

manner similar to that alleged by Plaintiff in this Count on a

relatively frequent basis, yet the Chicago Police Department makes findings of wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number

of cases;

d.

Municipal policy-makers are aware of (and

condone and facilitate by their inaction) a "code of silence" in

the Chicago Police Department, by which officers fail to report

misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at

issue in this case; and

e.

The City of Chicago has failed to act to

remedy the patterns of abuse describe in the preceding sub-

paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing

the types of injuries alleged here.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

the Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages against the Defendant Police Officers in the individual

capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate under the circumstances.

Count VI - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 Conspiracy
70. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-69 as if

fully stated herein.

14

71. As described more fully in the preceding

paragraphs, which are expressly incorporated herein, Defendants,

acting in concert with other known and unknown co-conspirators,

reached an understanding to deprive Plaintiff of his

Constitutional rights.

72. Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional

rights in the manner described in the preceding paragraphs.

73. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Defendants

committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in

joint activity with state actors acting under color of law.

74. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to

the rights of others.

75. As a proximate result of Defendants’ conspiracy,

Plaintiff suffered damages, including severe emotional distress

and anguish.

76. The conspirators committing the misconduct

described in this Count were motivated by personal bias in terms

of their own self-interest in furthering their careers by

receiving credit for catching the DeLaRosa shooter.

77. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago

Police Department in that:

a.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department directly encourages, and is thereby the

moving force behind, the very type of police abuse at issue here

by failing to adequately train, supervise and control its

15

officers, such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate

indifference; b.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of excessive

force at issue here by failing to adequately punish and

discipline prior instances of misconduct, thereby leading Chicago

Police Officers to believe their actions will never be

scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses

such as those affecting Plaintiff;

c.

Generally, as a matter of widespread practice

so prevalent as to comprise municipal policy, officers of the

Chicago Police Department utilize unlawful methods of

interrogation against citizens in a manner similar to that

alleged by Plaintiff in this Count on a frequent basis, yet the

Chicago Police Department makes findings of wrongdoing in a

disproportionately small number of cases;

d.

Municipal policy-makers are aware of (and

condone and facilitate by their inaction) a "code of silence" in

the Chicago Police Department, by which officers fail to report misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at

issue in this case; and

e.

The City of Chicago has failed to act to

remedy the patterns of abuse describe in the preceding subparagraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

16

the Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages

against the Defendant Police Officers in their individual

capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate under the circumstances.

COUNT VII

State Law Claim

Civil Conspiracy

78. Plaintiffs reallege each of paragraphs 1-77 as if

fully stated herein.

79. As described more fully in the preceding

paragraphs, Defendants, acting in concert with other known and

unknown co-conspirators, conspired by concerted action to

accomplish an unlawful purpose by an unlawful means.

80. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Defendants

committed overt acts and were otherwise willful participants in

joint activity.

81. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to

the rights of others.

82. As a proximate result of Defendants’ conspiracy,

Plaintiff suffered damages, including severe emotional distress

and anguish.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

the Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages

against the Defendant Police Officers in the individual

capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate under the circumstances.

17

COUNT VIII - State Law Claim: Respondeat Superior DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO
83. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-82 as if fully stated herein.
84. In committing the acts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendant Police Officers were members of, and agents of, the Chicago Police Department acting at all relevant times within the scope of their employment.
85. Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agent.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant, CITY OF CHICAGO, in an amount equal to any award against the Defendant Police Officers, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
COUNT IX - State Law Claim: Indemnification 86. Plaintiff realleges each of paragraphs 1-83 as if fully stated herein. 87. Illinois law provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities. 88. The Defendant Police Officers are or were employees of the City of Chicago who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the misconduct described herein.
18

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO in the amounts awarded to Plaintiffs against Defendant Police Officers as compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
~URY Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, hereby demands a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Arthur Loevy Jon Loevy Danielle Loevy LOEVY & LOEVY 434 West Ontario Suite 400 Chicago, IL 60610 (312) 274-1700

The JS-44 civil cover sheet~tion confined e n neither replace nor supp ement the filing and service o1 pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules ot tour1. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1£74, is required for th~ o~ the Clerk ot Court fo[ the purpose ol injtL~t~,acUjyit~ll¢~Ql I~/bVteIl.~~qAb~ePP.~.t."(~SDEEEFINESNTDRUACNTTIOSNS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.) I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
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COUNTY OF RESlDENOE OF FIRS’;; LISTED DE:FENDAhn

(IN U.S, PLAINTIFF CASF_.~..~ONLY)

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ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN)
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|II, CmZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PAR~IES

(For Diversity Cases Only)

AND ONE BOX FOR OEFENDA~t~

PTF DEF

Cffizen of This State D ~ [] ~ Incorpo[ated or Principal Place

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Ci~zen of Another State ~ 2 [] ~ C~zen or Subject of a D ,9 13 a
Foreign Country

Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another S~te
Foreign Nation

~. ORIGIN Odgin~ Proceeding

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(PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

D ~ Remanded from [] ~ Reinstated or

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Transferred from D ~ another district
(specify}

Multidistrict Litigation

Appeal te ~ Judge from D 7 JMuadggismtraetnet

V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACEAN "X" /N ONE BOX ONLY)

CC;NT RACT

"fORTS

FORFEITUREtPENAL’rY BA N KR U P"~C¥ O"fliER SlrATU’[ES

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Vl. CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FLUNG AND wRrrE BRIEF STATF_MEN3 OF CAUSE.
DO NOT CITE JURISDICTt.ONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY,)

VII. REQUESTED IN
COMPLAINT \

n UCNHDEECRKF,RIF,CT.PH,IS23IS A CLASS ACTION .

DEMAND $

VI ] I. This case ~ is not a refiling of a previously dismissed action.

[] is a refiting of case number

, previously dismissed by Judge

CHECK YES only ii derr~nd~d in cornplaJrit JURY DEMAND:~¢Es [3 ~o

Matter of

APPEARANCES ARE HEREBY F]LED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AS ATTORNEY(S) FOR:
(A)
$IGNATOKE NAI¢~

M~MB~ O~ TIUAL ~7

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(c)

c--rFw~-/A TE,.Z IP
E.~IL ADDP.T~$ ID£N’IIFICA’IION N]J’MBER ($E~ ITEM ¯ ON R.EVEP..~E)

DESIGNATED AS LOCAL CO’I..,3’VSF-.[.?

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NO []

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DESIGNA’I’ED AS LOCal. COUN$I~L?

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~mMBER OF 7~^1. BAR?
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DESIGNATED AS Lm COLrNSE.L?

YES

[]

YES []

Yi~

NO
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

V.

CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICER GOMEZ and OTHER AS-YET-UNIDENTIFIED CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS,
Defendants.

Judge Darrah 01 C 1823

~OTICE OF FI~.ING

NOV I 2002

TO:

Darcy Proctor

CLERK, tl.S. DlSl’i~ICT cO~I~T

Michael Tootooian

Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Rolek

140 South Dearborn, Suite 600

Chicago, IL 60603

Please take notice that on November 12, 2002, I filed the attached SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT at the United States Courthouse, 219 South Dearborn, Chicago, IL.

At’t0rn~y" for P~l~inti ff
Michael Kanovitz LOEVY & LOEVY 434 West Ontario, Ste. 400 Chicago, IL 60610
CERTIFICATE OF_SERVICE
I, Michael Kanovitz, an attorney, certify that on November 12, 2002, I served by fax a copy of the attached SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT and Notice on the above-named parties of record.

FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVI~N,

JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs,

)

MICHAELW, DoB5INS

)

CLERi(,U.$.D|STNCTCOURT

)

)

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, DETECTIVE JAMES

)

DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA,

)

DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE )

GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and

)

OFFICER ROBERT MYERS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Judge Darrah 01 C 1823
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SECOND AMeNDeD COMgLAZNT NOW COMES Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated (the putative ~Class"), by counsel, and complaining of Defendants DETECTIVE JAMES DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS, OFFICER ROBERT MYERS (collectively, "Defendant Police Officers") and CITY OF CHICAGO, states as follows:
Introduction I. This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Fed. R. Cir. P. 23(b) (3). Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the Class to reform an unconstitutional police procedure known as the "hold past court call" procedure. This procedure allows police to continue investigating and interrogating recent arrestees without taking them before a judicial official for a determination of probable cause. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are all persons who have

been detained at CPD police stations in excess of 48 hours under this procedure while the CPD continued its investigation of the crime for which they were arrested.
2. In addition to causing unlawful detentions in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the ~hold" procedure as implemented by the CPD also violates arrestees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to minimally appropriate conditions of confinement. During the "hold" period, arrestees are forced to (attempt to) sleep on the floor of small interrogation rooms where they are held or on the standard four foot by ten inch metal benches within.
3. The CPD furnishes them no sleeping facility during this time (not even a mattress, blanket or pillow). The CPD maintains no such facilities to offer them because the investigatory hold, itself, is an exception to the standard CPD practice of releasing arrestees to the Cook County Department of Corrections, which entity takes them to the probable cause hearing and houses them in its jail facility.
4. As a result, arrestees detained under the hold past court call procedure are kept from disinterested judicial officials and are isolated for days in interrogation rooms and deprived of necessary sleep while police continue to interrogate them and build evidence against them; all raising the specter of torture, false confessions, and unlawful convictions.

5. Plaintiff and the Class seek a judgment which will remedy their injuries and reform this unconstitutional procedure.
Relevant CPD Procedures 6. In felony arrests, CPD practice and procedure prohibits the arrestee from being taken to court for a probable cause hearing until the State’s Attorney’s Office ("SAO") approves the charges being sought by the CPD. The CPD refers to this as the "felony review process" 7. In cases where the ev±dence known to the CPD at the time of the arrest is insufficient in the SAO’s opinion to decide whether charges should be approved or denied, the arrestee is neither taken to court nor released. Rather, CPD officers are permitted to continue their investigation to develop more evidence to support the charges. 8. Normal CPD procedure is that recent arrestees are automatically transferred out of the various CPD police station "lock-ups" (bare cells with no accommodations for extended detentions) to the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("Cook County") either immediately prior to or at the time of the arrestee’s probable cause hearing. 9. Thus, in the normal course, Cook County would either transport the arrestee directly from CPD custody to the scheduled court call or would receive the arrestee from the CPD at that hearing. If probable cause is found, Cook County then takes the prisoner for housing at its jail facility.

I0. To prevent this series of events from automatically taking place, when a police officer or detective is unable to obtain felony approval from the SAO, the officer can place a written "hold" on the arrestee. This is known as the hold past court call procedure. The hold procedure prevents the arrestee from being taken to court or transferred to the custody of Cook County.
Ii. The hold is required by CPD policy that the arrestee may not be taken for a probable cause hearing until felony charges are approved. During the period of the hold, the officers or detectives continue gathering evidence to support the charges sought, as by interrogating the arrestee, interviewing witnesses and conducting line-ups.
12. The hold is continued until the investigating officers or detectives have developed sufficient evidence to obtain approval of charges from the SAO or until the SAO exercises its discretion to refuse to charge. In most cases, when the SAO finally states that charges are being denied, the Assistant Deputy Superintendent may override and approve charges. Otherwise, the arrestee must be released. In homicide cases, no override may be exercised.
13. Only after felony approval is obtained will an arrestee held under the procedure finally be taken to court for a probable cause hearing, where evidence developed during the hold
4

period is presented. Such investigatory holds routinely last in excess of 48 hours.
14. The hold past court call procedure violates Fourth Amendment requirements for a prompt post-arrest judicial determination of whether there is probable cause to detain the arrestee. The Supreme Court has held that police may not unreasonably delay presenting an arrestee for a probable cause hearing following a warrantless arrest, that it is unreasonable to delay for purposes of continuing to develop evidence after the arrest, and that a delay which exceeds 48 hours is presumptively unreasonable regardless of the purpose for the delay.
15. This very CPD procedure has already been declared unconstitutional as violating the Fourth Amendment in the case of Robinson v. ChicaGo, 638 F.Supp. 186 (N.D. III. 1986), rev’d o_~n othe~r~rounds, 868 F.2d 959 (7TM Cir. 1989). In appealing, that decision, the CPD represented to the Seventh Circuit that it had abolished the hold past court call procedure. However, the procedure is alive and well and still in use throughout the CPD.
16. As implemented by the CPD, the hold past court Call procedure also violates arrestees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free of torture. The CPD does not maintain any facilities designed to house arrestees in its custody and in particular it does not provide them even minimally appropriate facilities for sleeping.

17. Rather, during the duration of the investigatory "hold," usually amounting to more than 48 hours and often days longer, the arrestee is kept in a small interrogation room (an "interview room~ in CPD parlance) which is not designed for housing prisoners and which furnishes them no facility for sleeping.
18. The CPD maintains no sleeping facilities because, absent a "hold," arrestees are routinely transferred to the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections which maintains a jail for housing prisoners, including bunks for sleeping.
19. By contrast, the interrogation rooms contain no amenities. The sole furnishing is a small metal bench four feet in length and ten inches in width. No mattresses, no blankets and no pillows are furnished by the CPD to those in its custody. Arrestees may also be kept in a police station lock-up during part of the "hold" period, however, the lock-up has no sleeping facility either.
20. As a result, arrestees detained under the hold past court call procedure are routinely deprived of meaningful sleep in a manner which has long been recognized as torturous and unconstitutional.
21. In totality, the procedure allows CPD officers and detectives to deprive arrestees, who have not even received a judicial determination of probable cause, of necessary sleep

while continuing to interrogate them, all in a manner that raises the specter of false confessions due to coercion and exhaustion.
Jurisdiction and Venue 22. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ~ 1331. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. ~ 1391(b). On information and belief, all parties reside in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein all occurred within district.
Class Ac~ionAllegatioms 23. Each of the foregoing Paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 24. The named Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez, brings this action on his own behalf, and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a) and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 25. The named Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of the following individuals: All persons arrested by the Chicago Police Department without an arrest warrant and who were detained in excess of 48 hours pending approval of felony charges by the State’s Attorney at any time from March 15, 1999 to the present day (the "Class Period"). 26. The individuals in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The named Plaintiff estimates that the Class numbers in at least the thousands. a. On information and belief, approximately 200,000 persons have been arrested by the CPD in each year of the Class
7

Period. In the year 1999 alone, the Chicago Police Department arrested over 268,000 persons. Many of these were held over awaiting trial; and
b. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the CPD and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that most CPD felony arrests take in excess of 48 hours to obtain SAO approval of the charges and that all those arrestees would be detained in the manner described above during that time;
c. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the CPD and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that the hold past court call procedure is invoked routinely and often and that the CPD maintains computerized forms for this procedure; and
d. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the Chicago Police Department and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that there is no policy or practice of the CPD which limits the length of time an arrestee can be held in an interview room, making it likely that this unconstitutional condition of detention occurs again and again.
27. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the hold past court call procedure violates arrestees’ Fourth Amendment rights in a manner which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
8

b. Whether the CPD’s practice of housing arrestees in excess of 24 hours without furnishing them any sleeping facilities violates the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983; and
c. Whether the City of Chicago maintains policies and/or practices that are the moving force behind the challenged conduct.
28. Named Plaintiff Lopez’ unlawful detention and torture claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Mr. Lopez alleges, inter alia, that he was detained in excess of 48 hours based on CPD policy which prevents felony arrestees from receiving a probable cause hearing until the SAO approves charges and the hold past court call procedure and for purposes of continuing the investigation against him; that he was denied any facility for s~eeping during that time; and that he has suffered damages as result.
29. Named Plaintiff Lopez will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. Mr. Lopez has retained skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class in this litigation.
30. The questions of law and fact common to the Class, as described in paragraph 27 above, predominate over individual issues.
9

Plaintiff Lopez’ Individual Allegations 31. On or about July 19, 2000, in the Humbolt Park neighborhood on the West side of Chicago, 27-year-old Miguel Figueroa stood in the sunroof of a moving Pontiac Bonneville and fired shots from a .38-caliber weapon at rival gang members. 32. A stray bullet struck a nearby 12-year old boy, killing him. 33. Within a week, Miguel Figueroa confessed to the murder on videotape. He presently faces the death penalty for his crime. 34. At the time of the shooting Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez, was an 18-year-old resident of the Humbolt Park neighborhood. 35. The day following the shooting, Plaintiff was talking to a friend on the street when the two of them were approached by several Chicago police officers. 36. One of the officers was Officer Gomez, an officer known in Plaintiff’s neighborhood as a dangerous and violent man. 37. Without any probable cause to believe Plaintiff had committed any wrongdoing, the officers handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in their squad car. 38. The officers drove Plaintiff to a nearby alley. Following a brief interrogation, Officer Gomez punched Plaintiff in the face.
I0

39. The officers told Plaintiff they believed he was a witness to the shooting. Plaintiff was then taken to the police station.
40. Upon his arrival at the police station, Defendants took Flaintiff to the "Area 5" detective division where he was placed in a small "interview room" and shackled to the wall with handcuffs.
41. Plaintiff Lopez was kept in this room for the approximately five days. The room contained no facility for sleeping. The room contained only a small metal bench of four feet in length and ten inches in width. At no time was Plaintiff furnished a mattress, blanket or pillow.
42. At no time during this approximately five day period was Plaintiff taken to court for a probable cause hearing. Rather, Plaintiff was kept from court pursuant to CPD policy which prevents felony arrestees from receiving a probable cause hearing or being transferred to the Cook County jail facility until the SAO approves charges against them. During this period of time several "hold forms" were issued to prevent Mr. Lopez from being transferred to the custody of Cook County or from receiving a probable cause hearing.
43. " During virtually this entire period, Pla±ntiff remained in a small room/cell with his wrist handcuffed to a ring on the wall. The only human contact permitted Plaintiff was when
Ii

he was interrogated by various Defendant Police Officers who attempted to coerce him into confessing to the murder.
44. Under these conditions of confinement, Plaintiff was unable to obtain proper sleep.
45. During this approximately five day period, the Defendant officers and the CPD continued to investigate and develop evidence purportedly linking Mr. Lopez with the shooting.
46. During this time, Defendants also denied Plaintiff access to an attorney despite his requests to speak with an attorney.
47. Plaintiff’s faculties were overcome by sleep deprivation and the unconstitutional and torturous tactics being used on him. Plaintiff at one point made an inculpatory statement indicating that he shot the boy. However, the facts of the statement conflicted with the true facts of the shooting. Upon being told that his facts were incorrect, Plaintiff recanted his statement.
48. After five days, the SAO approved the charge of capital murder against Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez, then only 18 years old, was informed that the death penalty would be sought against him. The CPD also announced to the public media that Plaintiff was the murderer.
49. Approximately one hour after prosecutors stated they were seeking the death penalty against Plaintiff, police
12

arrested Miguel Figueroa for the crime Plaintiff allegedly committed.
50. Thereafter, Figueroa (then age 28) gave a videotaped confession to the Chicago Police regarding the shooting.
51. Thereafter, Plaintiff was released and the wrongful charges against him were dismissed.
52. Notwithstanding the decision to initiate and pursue Plaintiff’s prosecution, the Defendant Police Officers had actual knowledge that Plaintiff was not the killer.
53. Some of the eye-witnesses to the shooting told the Defendant Police Officers that Lopez was not the man who shot DeLaRosa. The shooter had a different complexion than Plaintiff and longer hair. Plaintiff’s head was shaved at the time.
54. The Defendant Police Officers intentionally and without justification ignored these eyewitnesses who attested to Plaintiff’s innocence, and instead claimed to have relied upon the purported identification of Plaintiff by several gang members hostile to Plaintiff.
55. This line-up conducted by the Defendant Police Officers, supposedly resulting in the positive identification of Plaintiff who was bald and ten years younger than the longerhaired shooter, was deeply flawed. The Defendant Police Officers intentionally chose to ignore the eyewitnesses who claimed Plaintiff was innocent and instead only attempted line-up identifications from gang members hostile to Plaintiff.
13

56. The Defendant Police Officers’ actions referenced

above were all taken intentionally to frame Plaintiff for a

murder he did not com~nit.

COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983: Unlawful Detention Claim Of Plaintiff and The Class
Against Defendant City of Chicago

57. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing

paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 58. As described more fully above, Plaintiff and the
members of the Class have been detained without being afforded a prompt post-arrest probable cause hearings, all in a manner which

violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This deprivation of Plaintiff and the Class members’

constitutional rights was effected under color of law, and

Plaintiff and the men~bers of the Class have been damages as a

result.

59. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of

rights and is liable for Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’

damages, inter alia, because:

a. The City of Chicago maintains an unjustified

and unconstitutional policy preventing arrestees from obtaining a probable cause hearing until the SAO has completed a felony

review process. The policy makes no exception for instances when

the SAO does not complete its review within 48 hours. Indeed,

the City Of Chicago maintains the hold past court call procedure

14

which is designed to prevent an arrestee from obtaining a probable cause hearing while CPD gather additional evidence;
b. The City of Chicago fails to adequately train its officers on the constitutional requirements for affording prompt probable cause hearings, and fails to supervise and control its officers’ activities in this area, and is thereby the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue here, and its failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference;
c. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct, thereby leading Chicago Police Officers to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff and the members of the Class; and
d. The City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding sub-paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
WHEREFORE, the named Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated, respectfully requests that the Court certify the Class defined herein and enter judgment against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, awarding appropriate compensatory damages, establish a common fund with
15

all of these monies to award Plaintiff a portion thereof for his attorneys fees, award statutory attorneys’ fees, and award any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Fourteenth Amendment Claim Of Plaintiff and The Class
Against Defendant City of Chicago 60. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 61. As described more fully above, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been subjected to torturous conditions of confinement while being held in the custody of the CPD including being deprived of even minimally proper facilities for sleeping, all in a manner which violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The deprivation of Plaintiff and the Class members’ constitutional rights was under color of law, and Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been damages as a result. 62. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ damages, inter alia, because:
a. The City of Chicago maintains an unjustified and unconstitutional policy discussed above which prevents arrestees from being transferred to the Cook County jail for extended periods of time in order to prevent them from being transported to court for a probable cause hearing. This policy causes arrestees to remain in CPD custody for extended periods of
16

time, but yet the City of Chicago fails to provide any facility designed for housing arrestees for such duration and in particular for affording them minimally appropriate facilities for sleeping. The need for appropriate sleeping facilities while being detained for extended periods by the CPD is so obvious that the failure to provide them while continuing to maintain this policy manifests deliberate indifference;
b. The City of Chicago maintains no policies regarding furnishing proper sleeping facilities to arrestees, nor does it maintain any policies regarding the maximum duration for which an arrestee may be kept in an interview room. The failure to maintain such policies is likely to result in the unconstitutional use of such rooms to house arrestees that it manifests deliberate indifference;
c. The City of Chicago fails to adequately train its officers on the constitutional requirements for affording proper care for persons detained in its custody for extended periods, and fails to supervise and control its officers activities regarding care for arrestees needs during such detentions, and is thereby the moving force behind, the very type of misconduct at issue here, and its failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference;
d. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Chicago Police Department fac±litates the very type of deprivation at issue here by failing to adequately punish and
17

discipline officers involved in prior instances of similar deprivations, thereby leading Chicago Police Officers to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encourages abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff and the members of the Class; and
e. The City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of deprivation described in the preceding sub-paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
WHEREFORE, the named Plaint±ff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated, respectfully requests that the Court certify the Class defined herein and enter judgment against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, awarding appropriate compensatory damages, establish a common fund with all of these monies to award Plaintiff a portion thereof for his attorneys fees, award statutory attorneys’ fees, and award any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COUNT III- 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983: Individual Excessive Force Claim Of The Plaintiff
63. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
64. As a result of Officer Gomez’s unjustified and excessive use of force, Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as well as emotional distress.
65. As a result of the failure of Officer Myers, Officer Gomez’s partner, to intervene to prevent Officer Gomez’s
18

excessive use of force, Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as well as emotional distress. Officer Myers had a reasonable

opportunity to prevent the harm had he been so inclined, but

failed to do so.

66. The misconduct described in this Count was

objectively unreasonableand was undertaken intentionally with

willful indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 67. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.

68. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago

Police Department in that:

a. As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department directly encourages, and is thereby the moving force behind, the very type of excessive force at issue

here by failing to adequately train, supervise and control its

officers, such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate

indifference; b.

As a matter of both policy and practice, the

Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of excessive

force at issue here by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of misconduct, thereby leading Chicago

Police Officers to believe their actions will never be

19

scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses

such as those affecting Plaintiff;

c.

Generally, as a matter of widespread practice so

prevalent as to comprise municipal policy, officers of the

Chicago Police Department use excessive force against citizens in

a manner similar to that alleged by Plaintiff in this Count on a frequent basis, yet the Chicago Police Department makes findings

of wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases;

d.

Municipal policy-makers are aware of (and condone

and facilitate by their inaction) a "code of silence" in the

Chicago Police Department, by which officers fail to report

misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at

issue in this case; and

eo

The City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy

the patterns of abuse describe in the preceding sub-paragraphs,

despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types

of injuries alleged here. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

Defendants, CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS, awarding compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees,

along with punitive damages against Defendants OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ

and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS in their individual capacities, and any

other relief this Court deems just.

COUNT IV - State Law Claim: Plaintiff’s Individual Claim ForAssault and Battery
69. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
70. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, Plaintiff was attacked by Defendant Officer Gomez without justification or provocation.
71. The actions of Defendant Officer Gomez constituted an offensive physical contact, undertaken willfully and wantonly, proximately causing Plaintiff’s injuries.
72. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
73. As a result of the offensive touching, Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries, including but not limited to a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
COUNT V - State Law Claim: Plaintiff’s Individual Claim For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 74. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
21

75. As described more fully in the preceding

paragraphs, the Defendant Police Officers engaged in extreme and

outrageous conduct with respect to Plaintiff, to wit, the Defendants used violence, torture and unlawful methods to attempt

to coerce Plaintiff into confessing to a murder he did not

commit.

76. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with intent, knowledge or callous disregard for the fact that there was a high probability that the conduct would

inflict severe emotional distress on Plaintiff. 77. The misconduct described in this Count was

undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to

the rights of others.

78. As a proximate result of this misconduct,

Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and anguish.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

the DETECTIVE JAMES, DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL

JACOBS and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and any other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate under the circumstances.

22

Count VI - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983: Individual Claim for Unlawful Detention By The Defendant Officers
79. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
80. As described more fully above, Defendants held Plaintiff without affording him a probable cause hearing in a manner which violated the Fourth Amendment.
81. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
82. As a result of this misconduct, Plaintiff sustained damages.
83. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department in the manner described more fully above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages against DETECTIVE JAMES, DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS in their individual capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
23

Count VII - 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 Individual Claim For Police Torture By Defendant Officers
84. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
85. In attempting unlawfully to coerce Plaintiff to confess to a murder he did not commit, the Defendants employed such inhuman methods as shackling Plaintiff’s wrist to the wall for excessive amounts of hours and intentionally depriving Plaintiff of sleep.
86. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
87. As a result of this misconduct, Plaintiff sustained physical and emotional injuries.
88. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department in the manner described more fully above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages against the DETECTIVE JAMES, DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS in their individual capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
24

Count VIII - State Law Claim: Individual Claim For Respondeat Superior 89. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 90. In committing the acts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendant Police Officers were members of, and agents of, the Chicago Police Department acting at all relevant times within the scope of their employment. 91. Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agent. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant, CITY OF CHICAGO, in an amount equal to any award against the Defendant Police Officers, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
COUNT IX - State Law Claim: Individual Claim Based On Indemnification Statute
92. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
93. Illinois law, 735 ILCS 10/9-102, provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities.
25

94. The Defendant Police Officers are or were employees of the City of Chicago who acted within the scope of their employment in committing the misconduct described herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO in the amounts awarded to Plaintiffs against Defendant Police Officers as compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, hereby demands a trial by jury pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues so triable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Jon Loevy Jon Rosenblatt LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May St. Suite I00 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

Attorneys

 
 aanCase 1:01-cv-01823 Document 314-2

Filed 08/28/2007 Page 117 of 119

Law Offices.
.4., PETER. J. FARACI

203

N.

LaSaile Street • Suite 312-606-0909 Tel

2:350 • Chicago, illinois a 31 2r606-9066 Fax

60601

peter.jfaraci@faradilawcom

Of Counsel Farad & Faraci

October 13, 2003

Michael Kanot
LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May St. Suite 100 Chicago, illinois, 60607
relative to Lopez v. City of Chicago, et aL, Case# 0 IC 1823 Re: Opinion Testimony
Sent Via Facsimile312-243-6453 and hand-delivery

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Case 1:01-cv-01823 Document 314-2 Filed 08/28/2007 Page 119 of 119

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mentioned above are unreasonable, and provide an environment conducive

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interviews of the suspect prior to contaminate any statement by the

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to a reasonable the opportunity

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thank you for the opportunity issues. I welcome any further

to

requests to provide commentarY'on these and related issues.

Very Truly Yours,
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Peter .1. F'araci

 
 Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Declined to Follow by Robinson v. City of Chicago, N.D.Ill., July 15, 2013
2005 WL 563212 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Joseph LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Detective James Delafont, Detective Jennifer Delucia, Detective Hector Vergara, Officer Jose Gomez, Officer Daniel Jacobs and Officer Robert Myers, Defendants.
No. 01 C 1823. | March 8, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jonathan I. Loevy, Arthur R. Loevy, Danielle Loevy, Jonathan A. Rosenblatt, Michael I Kanovitz, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Michael P. Manly, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, Thomas George Dicianni, Michael W. Tootooian, Darcy L. Proctor, Allen Duarte, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, Dicianni & Rolek, P.C., Paul W. Schroeder, June K. Ghezzi, James Cordray Dunlop, Alicia Marie Hawley, Karey Vering Skiermont, Jones Day, Dina Marie Kapernekas, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DERYEGHIAYAN, J.
*1 This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Joseph Lopez’s (“Lopez”) motion for judgment on the pleadings on the unlawful detention claim in Count IV against Defendants City of Chicago (“City”). This matter is also before the court on the parties’ motions in limine. For the reasons stated below, we deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings. We also grant in part and deny in part the motions in limine.
BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2000, near 2820 West Cortland in Chicago, Illinois, an occupant of a gold colored vehicle fired shots intended for the occupants of a beige colored van. The

shooter missed his target and instead shot and killed a twelve year old boy. Witnesses described the shooter as a male Hispanic. Defendant officers Robert Meyers (“Meyers”) and Jose Gomez (“Gomez”) are partners on the Chicago police force. The officers became aware of the shooting and learned from another officer that the shooting might have involved the Latin Kings and YLO Cobras gangs. Gomez learned from another source that it was the Cobras shooting at the Latin Kings. Meyers and Gomez received a tip that a girl named BeBe was a witness at the shooting. The officers spoke to BeBe and she indicated that a YLO Cobra with the nickname of JoJo had done the shooting. Meyers claims that he knew that Plaintiff Joseph Lopez (“Lopez”) was nicknamed JoJo. Meyers claims that at a previous meeting on the street, Lopez admitted that he belonged to the Cobras and that his nickname was JoJo. On July 20, 2000, the officers brought BeBe into the police station and she gave a description of JoJo as 5′8″ to 5″9′ tall and approximately 150 pounds. She also indicated that he was thin and medium to light skinned. Meyers claims that the physical description of JoJo matched his recollection of the person he knew as Joseph Lopez. BeBe was later brought to the station and interviewed by Detective Delucia. BeBe successfully picked Lopez out of a photo lineup. Lopez was arrested the day after the shooting.
Lopez alleges that he was taken to the police station and placed in an interview room. According to Lopez, he was kept in the interview room for approximately five days, and during that time he was handcuffed to a ring in the wall. Lopez claims that the room had no facility for sleeping and contained only a small metal bench of four feet in length and ten inches in width. Lopez claims that he was not furnished with a mattress, blanket, or pillow and that he was denied access to his attorney during the five day period. According to Lopez, he was not taken to court for a probable cause hearing during the alleged five day detention. Lopez claims that he was not given a probable cause hearing because the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) is required to wait until the State’s Attorney’s Office (“SAO”) has decided whether to approve the charges sought by the CPD. Lopez claims that if the SAO is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the CPD to support a charge, the SAO will request a continued investigation while the prisoner remains in custody. Lopez claims that the SAO declined to initially approve charges against him and that he remained in custody for the five days while the CPD continued to investigate the case. Lopez alleges that at some point during the detention he made a statement indicating that he shot the boy and the SAO then approved the charge of capital murder against Lopez. Lopez also claims that approximately one hour after prosecutors told Lopez they were seeking the death penalty against him, the CPD arrested Miguel Figueroa
1

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

for the crime. Lopez claims he was then released and the charges against him were dismissed.
*2 Lopez’s third amended complaint includes an excessive force claim alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)(Count I), a state law assault and battery claim (Count II), an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count III), a Section 1983 unlawful detention claim (Count IV), a Section 1983 claim alleging torture (Count V), a state law respondeat superior claim (Count VI), and a state law indemnification claim (Count VII).
LEGAL STANDARD
A party is permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) to move for judgment on the pleadings after the parties have filed the complaint and the answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir.1998). The courts apply the Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss standard for Rule 12(c) motions and thus the court may “grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.” ’ Id. (quoting Craigs, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.1993)). The court, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations,” Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 364 (7th Cir.2000), and “view the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party....” Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc., 163 F.3d at 452(quoting GATX Leasing Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir.1995)). The main difference between a Rule 12(b) motion and a Rule 12(c) motion is that a Rule 12(b) motion may be filed before the answer to the complaint is filed, whereas, a Rule 12(c) motion may be filed “after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial.” Id. n. 2
A court may rule on a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) based upon a review of the pleadings alone. Id. at 452. The pleadings include the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits, such as affidavits, letters, contracts, and loan documentation. Id. at 452-53. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings a “district court may take into consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings ... [and] may also take judicial notice of matters of public record.” U.S. v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir.1991). If the court considers matters outside the pleadings, the court should convert the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc.,

163 F.3d at 453 n. 5.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings We first want to make clear that Lopez chose on his own initiative to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings at such a late juncture in these proceedings. The filing of this motion was independently done by Lopez rather than in accordance with the schedule set in these proceedings by the court. Specifically, we note that Lopez filed the motion for judgment on the pleadings after discovery had been completed. Despite the lateness of the motion in these proceedings, in the interest of justice, we shall address it below.
A. Admissions in Answers to the Complaint *3 Lopez argues that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because of the Defendants’ admissions in their answers to the third amended complaint. Lopez claims that Defendants admit that Lopez was held in police custody for at least four days without a judicial determination verifying that there was probable cause. Lopez also cites County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) in which the Supreme Court provides that “[w]here an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the burden of proof shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance, which cannot include intervening weekends or the fact that in a particular case it may take longer to consolidate pretrial proceedings.” Id. at 45. Lopez argues that based upon the pleadings in this action it is clear that the City did not have “a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” and that Lopez is entitled to judgment.
First of all, as is illustrated by the above quoted language in McLaughlin, “the burden of proof shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court thus indicated that the government must present evidence to “demonstrate” the existence of an extraordinary circumstance which entails a consideration of evidence rather than a review of the pleadings to determine whether the government responded in the affirmative or negative to an allegation by the plaintiff. The Court in McLaughlin did not state that the government must allege in its answer to the complaint or indicate in the form of a response in its answer to the complaint that there was an extraordinary
2

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

circumstance. Lopez also cites Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7th Cir.2004) for the proposition that “[i]n the case of detentions over forty-eight hours, the government bears the burden of proving an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance which justifies the delay.” Id. at 746. However, in Chortek as is indicated by the language “bears the burden of proving,” the Court did not hold that the defendant had failed to meet its burden at the pleading stage. Rather, the Court was reviewing a district court ruling granting a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 744.
In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) the Court made clear that the concept of notice pleading applies to both claims and defenses. Id. at 47-48 (stating that “[s]uch simplified ‘notice pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”)(emphasis added). In regards to defenses other than affirmative defenses, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) only requires a defendant at the pleading stage to “admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies” or to state that the defendant does not have sufficient information to respond to an averment in the affirmative or negative. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b).
*4 Lopez has provided no authority for the proposition that a defendant is required to introduce in its answer to the complaint the entire universe of facts that the defendant is going to bring out at trial as part of its defense. Neither does Lopez even cite to a response in any of the Defendants’ answers that establishes an admission by Defendants that there was no emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Lopez cites collectively to the same paragraphs of the answers of Defendants James Delafont (“Delafont”), Jennifer DeLucia (“DeLucia”), Daniel Jacobs (“Jacobs”), and Hector Vergara (“Vergara”). For example, the only paragraphs cited by Lopez in Defendants’ answers on this issue are Paragraphs 22, 23, 24, 26, and 58. In Paragraphs 22 through 24 Defendants merely admit that Lopez was detained in a witness room for approximately four days. (Ans. Par. 22-4). In Paragraph 26 Defendants admit that Lopez did not receive a judicial hearing to determine whether there was probable cause. (Ans. par. 26). In Paragraph 58 Defendants merely admit that they were acting under the color of state law. Thus, Lopez has failed to point to any admission that pertains to the absence of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance and Lopez has not shown that a judgment on the pleadings is warranted.
B. Monell Waiver

Lopez argues that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the City waived the right to contest the claim when the City filed its Monell waiver in this action. On October 27, 2004, we granted the City’s motion to bar trial of policy issues on the Section 1983 claim against the City. In support of the City’s motion, the City filed a stipulation which waived the need for Lopez to prove a portion of the Monell claim against the City. However, in the stipulation provided by the City in support of that motion, the City did not consent to judgment being entered against the City on the Monell claim. Rather, the City merely waived the need for Lopez to prove at trial that a City policy, custom, or practice caused damage to Lopez. Before the City waiver would be of any importance in this action, Lopez must first prove, as is provided in the City’s stipulation, that one of the individual officers violated his constitutional rights. Lopez is thus not entitled to judgment based solely upon the City’s stipulation. Lopez argues that the City’s answer to the third amended complaint “demonstrates that the Individual Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Reply 6). However, the responses provided by the City in its answer are insufficient to show conclusively that any individual Defendant violated Lopez’s constitutional rights. Therefore, we deny Lopez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. Lopez’s Motions In Limine In Lopez’s motions in limine Lopez seeks to have the court: 1) bar Defendants from arguing that there were circumstances that prevented the state court from conducting a timely probable cause hearing, 2) bar evidence that Lopez was affiliated with a gang, 3) bar testimony by the City’s witness John Wilson (“Wilson”), 4) bar evidence of convictions and other arrests, 5) and bar prior bad act evidence involving drug sales.
A. Circumstances Preventing Timely Hearing (Motion 1) *5 Lopez asks the court to bar Defendants from presenting evidence that shows that there were circumstances that prevented the state court from conducting a timely probable cause hearing. According to Lopez, Defendants have not provided any evidence during discovery that would indicate that the state court was not capable of providing Lopez with a probable cause hearing during the five days of detention. Defendants correctly point out that they will have a burden at trial to show the reasonableness of detention after 48 hours. Defendants correctly point out that a plaintiff cannot limit a defendant’s right to choose the scope of his defense that he plans to present at trial. Lopez cannot simply foreclose Defendants from presenting evidence at trial on this issue. If Defendants attempt to introduce at trial unsupported
3

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

facts or evidence that was not produced during discovery, Lopez may raise the appropriate objection at that time. If Defendants attempt to introduce evidence that is contrary to the pleadings or other evidence produced regarding the feasibility of a hearing, Lopez can point out those inconsistencies at trial. Therefore, we deny Lopez’s motion to bar Defendants from arguing that there were circumstances that prevented the state court from conducting a timely probable cause hearing.
B. Gang Affiliation (Motion 2) Lopez requests that the court bar any evidence that he had a gang affiliation. Lopez argues that the information is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Defendants argue that Lopez’s gang affiliation is relevant because Lopez admitted that his gang affiliation caused him emotional distress which undercuts Lopez’s claims that his detention caused emotional distress. Defendants also argue that his gang affiliation is relevant because it shows that Defendants reasonably believed Lopez to be a flight risk because of the severe sentence enhancement he would have received as a result of his affiliation.
Lopez argues that his gang affiliation is not relevant to his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Significantly Lopez acknowledges that his claim is limited to seeking damages for “emotional distress he experienced while he was in custody.” (L In Lim Mot. 9). With this limitation in mind, although it is possible that Lopez had some emotional distress during his confinement due to his gang affiliation, Lopez clearly bases his claims of emotional distress upon Defendants’ conduct during the detention. We agree that Lopez’s gang affiliation would have only minimal relevance. Having ruled thus, Lopez will be bound by his representation in his motion and will not be allowed at trial to seek damages for emotional distress that occurred other than during his confinement.
In regards to Defendants’ argument that Lopez was a flight risk because of the gang member sentence enhancement, Lopez correctly points out that, regardless of whether or not he had a gang affiliation, if he was convicted of murder he faced a severe sentence and could possibly be deemed a flight risk. We also conclude that the introduction of Lopez’s gang affiliation would be prejudicial to Lopez. Therefore, we grant Lopez’s motion to bar any evidence that he had a gang affiliation.
C. Testimony of John Wilson (Motion 3) *6 Lopez requests that the court bar testimony by the City’s expert witness Wilson who is a psychologist. Lopez argues that Wilson’s opinions are limited to criticizing Lopez’s expert witness Henry Lahmeyer

(“Lahmeyer”). Lopez also argues that Wilson’s testimony will be irrelevant because Lopez “has determined not to call Dr. Lahmeyer on the issue of Plaintiff’s individual damages.” (L In Lim Mot. 8). Defendants concede that Wilson’s testimony will be limited to criticizing the testimony provided by Lahmeyer. (D In Lim Ans. 7). Defendants state that “to the extent Plaintiff, as he indicates, will not be calling Lahmeyer as a witness, then Defendants concede that there is no relevance to Wilson’s testimony, and he should not be called as a witness.” (D In Lim Ans. 7-8). We agree and grant Lopez’s motion. However, again, Lopez will be bound by his representation made in his motion and Lopez will not be allowed to introduce testimony by Lahmeyer at trial on the issue of individual damages.
D. Convictions and Other Arrests (Motion 4) Lopez requests that the court bar evidence of his prior convictions and arrests. Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) (“Rule 609(a)”) provides the following:
a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a). Lopez argues that none of his prior arrests or convictions will be admissible under Rule 609(a). Lopez also argues that regardless, the arrests and convictions should be excluded because they are unduly prejudicial. Defendants argue that evidence of Lopez’s prior convictions and arrest is relevant to show that Lopez had prior experience being in police custody which undermines Lopez’s contention that he suffered emotional distress when in custody during the pertinent period in this action. We acknowledge that the prior experience in custody may be relevant. However, we also find that there is no need to introduce the additional connected prejudicial facts that Lopez was arrested or was convicted of a crime. Defendants will be allowed to present evidence that Lopez was detained in custody by police on prior occasions. However, Defendants are barred from presenting testimony or eliciting testimony that reveals that Lopez was arrested, convicted of a crime, or served a
4

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

prison sentence.
Defendants seek to present a wide spectrum of evidence in this regard such as Lopez’s confinement in youth facilities and in jail. Defendants claim that such evidence is relevant to the extent that it shows Lopez’s familiarity “with different forms of institutional confinement.” We think that it is too far afield to compare such forms of long-term confinement with the five day confinement during an interrogation alleged in the instant action. Also, Lopez is clearly not basing his emotional distress damages claims on the mere fact that he was being detained. The main thrust of his argument for emotional distress damages relates to the alleged wrongdoing by Defendants during the interrogation. Any relevance of the jail term or time in the youth facilities would be minimal. On the other hand, such evidence that shows prior jail sentences or time spent in youth facilities would be prejudicial. Therefore, we grant in part and deny in part Lopez’s motion to bar evidence of his prior convictions and arrests.

motions in limine brief is properly spaced only for the first four lines. After that point, Defendants present eighteen pages of single spaced text. Local Rule 5.2(b) is a rudimentary rule of filings in this district and Defendants’ error should have been apparent to Defendants when glancing at the document. Secondly, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 the page limitation for a brief is fifteen pages. Defendants’ motions in limine brief is eighteen pages long when single spaced. Were the text converted to 1 ½ spacing, the text would clearly far exceed the fifteen page limitation. Defendants did not request leave for a page extension from the court. Thus, Defendants’ motions are deficient on their face and could be denied under the Local Rules. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, since the trial date is approaching, we shall address the motions below. Although we have agreed in our discretion to proceed to a certain extent despite Local Rule violations, we note that all of the denials provided below are further reinforced by the fact that Defendants failed to comply with the Local Rules.

E. Bad Act Evidence Involving Drug Sales (Motion 5) *7 Lopez requests that we bar bad act evidence involving drug sales. Lopez admits that when he was questioned during his deposition he stated that he had sold small quantities of drugs on a few occasions. Lopez argues that such evidence is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Defendants argue that it is relevant that Lopez “supported himself selling drugs” because the fact that he was involved in such dangerous and thus stressful activity undermines Lopez’s claims of emotional distress due to his confinement. Defendants also argue that Lopez admitted that in July of 2000, the sale of illegal drugs was Lopez’s only form of income. We agree with Lopez’s contention that since he is not going to introduce testimony of Lahmeyer that Defendants’ first argument is nullified. Also, the relevance of the stressfulness of drug sales is of limited relevance and is prejudicial. Lopez also acknowledges that he is not seeking a claim for lost wages. (L In Lim Reply 15), Therefore, we grant Lopez’s requests that we bar bad act evidence involving drug sales.

A. Complaints Filed Against Police Personnel (Motion 1) Defendants request that the court bar any evidence of complaints filed with the Office of Professional Standards (“OPC”) regarding police personnel and evidence of resulting disciplinary actions. Although we are not ruling that such evidence will be admissible, we cannot find at this juncture that all such potential evidence would be inadmissible. Therefore, we deny Defendants’ motion to bar evidence of OPS complaints.
B. DeLucia’s Criminal History (Motion 2) *8 Defendants request that the court bar evidence that DeLucia was convicted of reckless homicide and aggravated reckless driving earlier this year and evidence of her resignation. Lopez argues that he does not have sufficient information about the conviction to properly respond to the motion. Lopez has not shown that the conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a) and we grant the motion to bar evidence of De Lucia’s conviction and resignation.

III. Defendants’ Motions In Limine Defendants have filed twenty-four motions in limine. We first note that although Defendants could have filed their motions in limine in separate documents, Defendants chose to file all their motions in one memorandum. Defendants filing is deficient on its face for two reasons. Pursuant to Local Rule 5.2(b) the minimum spacing for a brief is 1 ½ spacing. Defendants are apparently aware of this rule since Defendants’ briefs other than the motion in limine brief comply with the rule. However, Defendants’

C. Delafont’s Criminal History (Motion 3) Lopez requests that the court bar evidence of Delafont’s criminal history. Lopez does not contest this motion and we grant the motion.
D. Absence of Probable Cause (Motion 4) Defendants request that the court bar all testimony from
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

an extensive list of witnesses because Defendants anticipate that their testimony will be used to contest probable cause. Lopez provides several explanations for the usage of testimony by the individuals other than to contest probable cause. Defendants’ motion is overly broad and we cannot find that all testimony by the mentioned witnesses would be inadmissible. Therefore we deny the motion.
E. Confession By Other Person and Dropped Charges (Motion 5) Defendants request that the court bar evidence that another person confessed to the crime for which Lopez was detained and the charges against Lopez were dropped. We agree with Lopez that evidence that shows that another person confessed to the crime and that the charges against Lopez were dropped are relevant to allow an inference that he was innocent and thus suffered the anguish during detention that an innocent person would suffer when wrongfully accused of a crime. Also, absent such an explanation, a possible reasonable inference by a trier of fact from the fact that Lopez was detained by police for a crime would be that he was ultimately charged and convicted of the crime or simply released because the police could not collect enough evidence. Therefore, we deny the motion.
F. Testimony of Lahmeyer (Motion 6) Defendants request that the court bar any testimony of Lahmeyer. Lopez does not contest the motion and we grant the motion.
G. Testimony of Peter Faraci (Motion 7) Defendants request that the court bar any testimony of Peter Faraci (“Faraci”) because his opinions are unreasonable and he is not qualified to give such opinions. Lopez claims that Faraci formerly worked as an Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney (“State’s Attorney”) for ten years until 1998 and that he has experience and training which enable him to present evidence about the felony review process, State’s Attorney procedures, the importance of a confession to a detective, the fact that police are responsible to provide for a detainee’s needs, and the propriety of extended interrogation room detentions. We agree with Defendants that Lopez has failed to show that Faraci would be admissible as an expert. Faraci is clearly not allowed to provide opinion testimony on any of the topics other than perhaps State’s Attorney procedures and the felony review process. However, Lopez himself concedes that Faraci’s employment at the State’s Attorney ended two years before the detention occurred which undermines

any relevance regarding State’s Attorney procedures or processes. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion to bar any testimony of Faraci.
H. False Confession by Lopez (Motion 8) *9 Defendants request that the court bar evidence that Lopez gave a confession and as Defendants themselves concede “falsely confessed” since Lopez was innocent. (D Ans. In Lim Mot. 10). Defendants also seek to bar evidence that shows that Lopez was not given proper Miranda warnings and was questioned after he requested a lawyer. Defendants contend that such evidence is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We agree with Lopez that Defendants are seeking to exclude evidence that is at the heart of Lopez’s claims and is relevant evidence. The basis of Lopez’s case is that he was coerced into confessing even though he was innocent and that the police were not following the law when they obtained a false confession. We do not find such evidence to be unfairly prejudicial. Therefore, we deny Defendants’ motion.
I. Class Allegations, Monell Claim, Rule 30(b)(6) Witnesses (Motion 9) Defendants request that the court bar any reference to Lopez’s class allegations or the Monell claim. Defendants also request that we bar the testimony provided by Vergara, Delafont, and Jacobs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) (“Rule 30(b)(6)”). Lopez concedes that the class allegations are not relevant, but contends that the motion referring to Monell claim evidence is too vague. We do not agree that the Monell request is too vague and we grant Defendants’ request. In regards to the Rule 30(b)(6) evidence, Lopez takes issue with an apparent representation by the City that it is no longer a party in this action. However, in a recent status hearing before this court, the City expressly acknowledged that it remains a party in this action. In regards to the testimony of Vergara, Delafont, and Jacobs, each of these individuals were designated as Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses. Each of them indicated that they were designated by the City as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion to bar evidence of class allegations and the Monell claim. We deny the motion to bar the Rule 30(b)(6) testimony.
J. Unrelated Police Misconduct (Motion 10) Defendants request that the court bar any evidence of police misconduct that is not the subject of this lawsuit. Such evidence would include other civil lawsuits and citizen complaints. Defendants contend that such evidence is irrelevant and is inadmissable hearsay. Lopez
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

first complains that he has not been provided evidence of other lawsuits during discovery. Next Lopez argues that he intends to present evidence that he was mistreated by non-defendant City police officers prior to the pertinent detention. Lopez also intends to introduce evidence that shows that his girlfriend was harassed by police. We agree with Defendants that it is highly unlikely that any evidence relating to police misconduct other than during the pertinent detention period in this action would be admissible. However, we cannot find in the abstract that all such evidence would be irrelevant or inadmissable. For example, in regards to Defendants’ hearsay objection, it is possible that a piece of evidence may be admissible through one of the hearsay exceptions. Therefore, we deny Defendants’ motion to exclude all evidence of other police misconduct. However, we caution Lopez that any such evidence that he may seek to introduce at trial will need to be relevant and supported with an evidentiary basis.
K. Testimony of Charles Gruber (Motion 11) *10 Defendants request that the court bar certain opinion testimony by Lopez’s expert Charles Gruber (“Gruber”). Specifically, Defendants seek to bar Gruber’s opinion that the Defendant officers’ conduct was not “lawful” and that the “hold past call practice” is not lawful because such opinions are legal conclusions. We agree. Defendants also seek to bar Gruber’s opinion that the officers did not follow Chicago Police Department rules and regulations because such evidence is prejudicial and would mislead the jury into concluding that such evidence is sufficient to show a constitutional violation. We agree with Lopez that such evidence may be relevant and that confusion in this regard may be avoided with a proper jury instruction. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ request to bar the above mentioned opinion testimony of Gruber and we deny Defendants’ request to bar evidence of non-compliance with department rules and regulations. We are not finding that all such evidence is admissible, and note that Defendants may raise objections on a case by case basis at trial.

Defendants argue that such evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial. We agree and grant Defendants’ motion.
N. City Indemnification and Monell Waiver (Motion 14) Defendants request that we bar evidence that shows that the City will provide indemnification for individual Defendants and evidence of the Monell waiver. Lopez does not contest this motion and we grant Defendants’ motion.
M. Lopez Testimony as to his Medical Condition (Motion 15) Defendants request that we bar Lopez’s testimony relating to any medical conditions, causation, diagnoses, or prognoses, since Lopez is not qualified to provide such opinion testimony. Lopez argues that he should be allowed to testify as to his subjective experiences and symptoms. While we agree that Lopez can provide a recitation of subjective feelings, such subjective testimony is not what is at issue in Defendants’ motion. Lopez cannot testify as to medical conditions, diagnoses, prognoses, or causation and therefore we grant Defendants’ motion.
O. Office of Professional Standards Investigation (Motion 16) Defendants request that the court bar evidence regarding the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) investigation. Lopez argues that an in limine bar on this issue would be inappropriate. For example, Lopez contends that if Defendants argue that Lopez was making up his allegations that Defendants struck him during his detention, the complaint filed by Lopez with the OPS would corroborate Lopez’s story. We agree that it would not be appropriate to bar all evidence pertaining to the OPS investigation at this juncture and therefore deny Defendants’ motion.

L. Police Misconduct in the News (Motion 12) Defendants request that the court bar any reference to recent police misconduct that was in the news such as the O.J. Simpson trial. Lopez does not object to this motion and the motion is granted.
M. General Tendency For Police Cover-Up (Motion 13) Defendants request that the court bar any evidence that shows that police in general protect each other from misconduct and that there is a “code of silence.”

P. Police Disclaimer (Motion 17) *11 Defendants request that the court bar evidence regarding the disclaimer provided by the Defendant officers in their police report which was formulated by the police union. Defendants argue that the disclaimer would confuse the jury. However, we agree with Lopez and find that since the Defendant officers chose to put the disclaimer in their reports, they should therefore be required to explain that decision at trial. Defendants are free to introduce other evidence at trial to explain that the disclaimer was a standard practice endorsed by the police union. Therefore, we deny Defendants’ motion.
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

Q. Testimony of Matt Brady (Motion 18) Defendants request that the court bar testimony of Matt Brady (“Brady”) because his testimony would confuse the jury and would be prejudicial. Brady is the person designated by the City to examine the City records. Brady answered certain interrogatories on behalf of the City. We agree with Lopez that it is not proper to bar all testimony by Brady at this juncture and therefore deny Defendants’ motion.
R. Standard of Care (Motion 19) Defendants request that the court bar any evidence that shows that Defendants failed to act in accordance with a standard of care other than the standard defined by the jury instructions. We agree with Lopez that such a request is too vague. The jury will be properly instructed on the law relating to such issues and we therefore deny Defendants’ motion as moot.
S. Remaining Motions 20-24 Defendants seek in motions 20 to 24 to bar evidence indicating a duty by Defendants to provide medical care. Defendants also seek to bar the presence in the court room

of non-party witnesses during the proceedings, any evidence not produced prior to trial, any testimony by witnesses not previously disclosed, and any expert testimony not previously disclosed. Lopez does not object to these motions and we grant Defendants’ motions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny Lopez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We deny Lopez’s motion in limine number 1. We grant Lopez’s motion in limine numbers: 2, 3, and 5. We grant in part and deny in part Lopez’s motion in limine number 4. We deny Defendants’ motion in limine numbers: 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, and 19. We grant Defendants’ motion in limine numbers: 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, and 24. We grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion in limine number 9.
Parallel Citations
66 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 873
	  

8

 
 Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Reversed and Remanded by Lopez v. City of Chicago, 7th Cir.(Ill.), September 22, 2006
2005 WL 711986 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Joseph LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Detective James Delafont, Detective Jennifer Delucia, Detective Hector Vergara, Officer Jose Gomez, Officer Daniel Jacobs and Officer Robert Myers, Defendants.
No. 01 C 1823. | March 23, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jonathan I. Loevy, Arthur R. Loevy, Danielle Loevy, Jonathan A. Rosenblatt, Michael I. Kanovitz, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Michael P. Manly, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, Paul W. Schroeder, June K. Ghezzi, James Cordray Dunlop, Alicia Marie Hawley, Karey Vering Skiermont, Jones Day, Dina Marie Kapernekas, Seyfarth Shaw, Thomas George Dicianni, Michael W. Tootooian, Darcy L. Proctor, Allen Duarte, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, Dicianni & Rolek, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DERYEGHIAYAN, J.
*1 This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Joseph Lopez’s (“Lopez”) motion for judgment as a matter of law and on Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons stated below, we deny Lopez’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and we grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
In July of 2002, a gun was fired by an individual riding in an automobile in the City of Chicago and a twelve year old boy was killed. Chicago Police officers conducted an investigation of the shooting and arrested Lopez. Lopez

claims that Defendant Jose Gomez, one of the arresting officers punched Gomez in the face while he was handcuffed in the police car. Lopez was brought to the police station and was placed in an interrogation room. According to Lopez, he was not given adequate food, was not allowed to go to the bathroom, and was continually handcuffed to the wall. Lopez also contends that he was not provided with a bed to sleep in during his detention. Lopez has brought five claims in the instant action which include: 1) an excessive force claim, 2) a battery claim, 3) an unlawful extended detention claim, 4) an unlawful conditions of confinement claim, 5) and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. A jury trial was commenced and at the close of both sides’ arguments, Lopez moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful detention claim. Defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful detention claim, unlawful conditions of confinement claim, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Defendants also moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Lopez could recover punitive damages for the unlawful detention claim, unlawful conditions of confinement claim, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) “[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). A court may only grant judgment as a matter of law “where there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party.” Zimmerman v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 360 F.3d 612, 623-24 (7th Cir.2004). In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law the court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. The court cannot “weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses, nor ... substitute [the court’s] view of the contested evidence for the jury’s.” Id.
DISCUSSION
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

I. Unlawful Extended Detention Claim *2 Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful extended detention claim. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Supreme Court found that under the Fourth Amendment “a judicial determination of probable cause” is required before there may be an “extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id. at 114. Subsequently, in City of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), the Court found that after 48 hours of confinement “the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving unreasonable delay” in regards to the failure to obtain a probable cause determination, and that “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id. at 57. In determining whether there was a “bona fide emergency or extraordinary circumstance” a court “cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays.” Bostic v. City of Chicago, 981 F.2d 965, 967-68 (7th Cir.1992). The court must determine “on a case-by-case basis whether the period of detention is reasonable in light of all the circumstances,” Patrick v. Jasper County, 901 F.2d 561, 567-68 (7th Cir.1990), and the court must consider “practical realities” that stem from the surrounding circumstances. Bostic, 981 F.2d at 967-68. In determining whether a delay was unreasonable the court “must allow a substantial degree of flexibility” and cannot rigidly find unreasonableness based upon the fact that detention continued beyond 48 hours. Id.
In instances where a detainee’s probable cause hearing has been delayed a court should consider matters such as “unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities.” Id.; See also Patrick, 901 F.2d at 567-68 (stating that the court should consider “all the circumstances accompanying the detainee’s arrest, including transportation, booking, filing, photographing, fingerprinting, identity verification and criminal record “wanted” checks, as well as the number of individuals to be processed with the detainee in question.”).
In the instant action, the evidence clearly shows that there were circumstances that constituted extraordinary circumstances. When the police arrested Lopez they were actively attempting to solve a crime involving the shooting of an innocent twelve year old boy. Thus, the police were dedicating their efforts to solve that heinous crime. The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the police were working around the clock attempting to solve the crime. It is not disputed that there existed probable cause to arrest Lopez as a suspect for the crime. Several witnesses had identified Lopez as the shooter of the victim. The evidence clearly shows that it was Lopez

himself who created the delays he now accuses the Defendants for. Lopez, when arrested, lied to the police about his identity. While at the police station, Lopez gave the police two false alibis. In addition, Lopez made statements admitting that he was the shooter, but his statements turned out to be false, and he subsequently recanted. Lopez’s actions in lying to the police, in providing false alibis, in admitting to being the killer and providing false information relating to such admission, and in subsequently recanting his latest lie required the allocation of police resources, and the continuation of the investigation of this murder. It is unclear what Lopez’s motives were in lying to the police, providing false alibis, admitting to the crime and then recanting. It appears that Lopez was trying to “outsmart” the police officers and trying to “play games” while the officers were working around the clock to solve the murder of a twelve year old child. Lopez’s lies and his hindrance of a murder investigation resulted in the delay of probable cause hearing. Therefore, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Defendants have established extraordinary circumstances for the extended detention of Lopez.
*3 In addition to the extraordinary circumstances in this action, we note that the Defendant officers are protected by qualified immunity in regards to the unlawful extended detention claim. Generally, law enforcement officers “typically receive qualified immunity for conduct performed within the scope of their official duties.” Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 347 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir.2003). In determining whether an officer is protected by qualified immunity in a “ § 1983 case, the court must decide: (1) whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of her constitutional rights, and, if so, (2) whether those constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the violation, ‘such that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violates those rights.” ’ Id.
In addition, in regards to a determination of whether Lopez’s detention was unreasonable after 48 hours, there is no definitive standard as to what situation constitutes a “bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” City of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 47. The Seventh Circuit has made clear that there is no bright line rule and that each situation must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Whether a situation constitutes a “bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” is often debated in litigation and is a difficult determination for legal counsel and a court much less a law enforcement officer. Id. Thus, even if the Defendant officers were to be found to have violated the admonitions inRiverside, due to the vague and generalized nature of the 48 hour rule, we find that the Defendant officers are protected by qualified immunity because they would not have reasonably understood that they were violating Lopez’s constitutional rights. Therefore, we
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

deny Lopez’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful extended detention claim and we grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful extended detention claim.
II. Unlawful Conditions of Confinement Claim Defendants have moved for judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful conditions of confinement claim. It is not clear upon which part of the Constitution Lopez bases his unlawful conditions of confinement claim. For instance, in support of Lopez’s proposed jury instructions on this case, when Lopez indicates his understanding of the pertinent law for the unlawful conditions of confinement claim Lopez cites portions of rulings that dealt with conditions of confinement claims based upon the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)(addressing Eighth Amendment); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir.1997)(addressing Eighth Amendment). Lopez also makes reference in his third amendment claim to “deliberate indifference” which is a consideration for claims brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. (T Compl. Par. 60(b)(d)). Id.
*4 A plaintiff who is proceeding under a Section 1983 due process claim, needs “[t]o demonstrate a constitutional violation for the conditions of his confinement, [and the plaintiff] must prove both the objective component of his substantive due process claim (Did the conditions amount to punishment?) and the subjective or state of mind component (Did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?).” Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir.1998). The Seventh Circuit has made clear that the required culpable statement of mind is “deliberate indifference” which is defined as “recklessness in a criminal or subjective sense.” Id. at 475. To show deliberate indifference “it is not enough to show that a state actor should have known of the danger his actions created.” Id. Instead a plaintiff must establish “that the defendant had actual knowledge of impending harm which he consciously refused to prevent.” Id. (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and finding that thee was no question of material fact as to whether defendants acted with deliberate indifference). In the instant action, none of the evidence introduced at trial indicates that Defendant officers acted with intentional malice or with deliberate indifference. Even when viewing the evidence in the best light for Lopez the evidence shows at best that the Defendant officers were negligent. However, the Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “negligent acts are not enough to state a due process claim.” Id.
To the extent that Lopez seeks to proceed under the

Fourth Amendment for unlawful conditions of confinement, he is foreclosed because after he was placed in confinement his due process protections took over. See Gonzalez v. Tilmer, 775 F.Supp. 256, 261 (N.D.Ill.1991)(quoting Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.1989) for the proposition that “the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures lasts only until such time as the arrestee ‘has been securely placed in custody.” ’); See also Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194 (explaining that “[t]he question whether an interrogation was too coercive raises different issues, which the text, history, and judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment do not illuminate....”); Reed v. City of Chicago, 867 F.Supp. 714, 718 (N.D.Ill.1994)(rejecting notion that the Fourth Amendment applied to claim of unlawful confinement and detention and following Wilkins ); Jones v. Thompson, 818 F.Supp. 1263, 1267 (S.D.Ind.1993) (stating that “[i]t is clear that between arrest and trial a detainee is entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Edwards v. May, 718 F.Supp. 1379, 1382 (N.D.Ill.1989). Also, even if the Fourth Amendment were found to apply to his detention, as is explained above, under the circumstances based upon the undisputed evidence in this case that showed Lopez’s lies and the extraordinary circumstances that were occurring during Lopez’s confinement, no reasonable juror could find that the conditions of confinement were unreasonable. See Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir.,1987)(explaining the Fourth reasonableness standard).
III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim *5 Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) claim. Under Illinois law, for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant either intended that his conduct should inflict severe emotional distress, or knew that there was a high probability that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress; (3) the defendant’s conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.” Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir.2003)(quoting Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374, 204 Ill.Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d 498 (Ill.1994)). In order for conduct to be deemed extreme and outrageous, that conduct “must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75, 83 (Ill.2003)). As is explained above, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Lopez the conduct of Defendant officers was at best negligent conduct. There was no evidence that indicates that Defendant officers intentionally caused Lopez severe emotional distress and there is not sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant officers “knew
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

that there was a high probability that [their] conduct would cause severe emotional distress.” Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as matter of law on the IIED claim.
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny Lopez’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on unlawful extended

detention claim. We grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful extended detention claim, we grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful conditions of confinement claim, and we grant Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the IIED claim. Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law in regards to any punitive damages relating to the above three claims is denied as moot.
	  

4

 
 United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:01-cv-01823

Lopez v. Cty of Chgo, et al Assigned to: Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo Demand: $0 Case in other court: 05-01877 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 03/15/2001 Date Terminated: 11/20/2007 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Joseph Lopez

represented by Jonathan I. Loevy Loevy & Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243-5900 Email: loevylaw@loevy.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell R Ainsworth Loevy & Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243-5900 Email: russell@loevy.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arthur R. Loevy Loevy & Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243-5900 Email: loevylaw@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle Loevy

V. Defendant City of Chicago

Loevy & Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243-5900
Jonathan A. Rosenblatt Office of the Illinois Attorney General 100 West Randolph Steet 11th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-4720 Fax: (312) 814-4452 Email: rosenblatt@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael I Kanovitz Loevy & Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243-5900 Email: mike@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Caroline K. Sheerin City of Chicago Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street 1040 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-6437 TERMINATED: 02/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Darcy L. Proctor Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Rolek, P.C. 140 South Dearborn Street 6th Floor

Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 782-7606 Email: dproctor@ancelglink.com TERMINATED: 12/04/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
June K. Ghezzi Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601-1692 (312) 782-3939 Fax: (312) 782-8585 Email: jkghezzi@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul W. Schroeder Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601-1692 (312)782-3939 TERMINATED: 02/22/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alicia Marie Hawley Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601-1692 (312)782-3939 Email: ahawley@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/22/2005
Allen Duarte Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C. 140 South Dearborn Street 6th Floor Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 782-7606 Email: aduarte@ancelglink.com

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Joseph Murray Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601-1692 (312)782-3939 Fax: (312)782-8585 Email: bjmurray@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/22/2005
Dina Marie Kapernekas Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603-5577 (312) 460-5000 Fax: (312) 460-7000 Email: dkapernekas@seyfarth.com TERMINATED: 02/22/2005
James Cordray Dunlop Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601-1692 (312)782-3939 TERMINATED: 02/22/2005
Karey Vering Skiermont Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601-1692 (312)782-3939 Email: kskiermont@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/22/2005
Michael P. Manly Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg Two North LaSalle Street Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 269-8000 TERMINATED: 02/22/2005

Defendant Ofc Officer Gomez TERMINATED: 11/12/2002
Defendant Other as-yet-unidentified Chicago Police Officers TERMINATED: 11/12/2002

Michael W. Tootooian Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Rolek, P.C. 140 South Dearborn Street 6th Floor Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 782-7606 Email: mtootooi5316@oakton.edu TERMINATED: 12/04/2002
Thomas George DiCianni Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C. 140 South Dearborn Street 6th Floor Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 782-7606 Email: tdicianni@ancelglink.com TERMINATED: 12/04/2002
represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/12/2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dina Marie Kapernekas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/12/2002
Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/12/2002
Thomas George DiCianni (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/12/2002

Defendant Detective James Delafont
Defendant Detective Jennifer DeLucia
Defendant Detective Hector Vergara

represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allen Duarte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas George DiCianni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allen Duarte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allen Duarte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Officer Jose Gomez
Defendant Officer Daniel Jacobs

Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas George DiCianni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allen Duarte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Joseph Murray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/22/2005
Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas George DiCianni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allen Duarte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Officer Robert Meyers

Thomas George DiCianni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Darcy L. Proctor (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Allen Duarte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael W. Tootooian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas George DiCianni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/15/2001
03/15/2001 03/21/2001 04/17/2001
04/17/2001

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT; jury demand - Civil cover sheet - Appearance(s) of Jonathan A. Rosenblatt, Danielle Loevy, Arthur R. Loevy, and Jonathan I. Loevy as attorney(s) for plaintiff ( No summons(es) issued.) ( Documents: 1-1 through 1-3) (las) (Entered: 03/16/2001)

RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 3/15/01 in the amount of $ 150.00, receipt # 10612944. (las) (Entered: 03/16/2001)

SCHEDULE set on 3/21/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing set to 9:30 4/17/01 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 03/21/2001)

SCHEDULE set on 4/17/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 5/30/01. Defendants answer or responsive pleading to be filed by 5/17/01. Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 04/18/2001)

2 MINUTE ORDER of 4/17/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status

04/17/2001 04/17/2001 05/15/2001 05/22/2001
06/18/2001 06/19/2001 06/21/2001 06/27/2001 07/05/2001 07/09/2001 07/17/2001

hearing held and continued to 5/31/01 at 9:30 a.m. Defendant City of Chicago's oral motion for leave to file appearance instanter is granted. Defendnt City of Chicago's oral motion for leave to file an answer or otherwise plead is granted. Answer due by 5/17/01. Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered: 04/20/2001)
3 MOTION by defendant City of Chgo for leave to file appearance instanter , and for time extension . (mw) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
4 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant City of Chicago by Darcy L. Proctor, Thomas George DiCianni, Dina Marie Kapernekas. (mw) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
5 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to extend time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint ; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
6 MINUTE ORDER of 5/22/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Defendant City of Chicago's motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint is granted [5-1] to and including 6/21/01. All initial discovery to be filed on or before 6/5/01. Status hearing set for 6/27/01 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
7 RESPONSE by defendant Cty of Chgo to plaintiff's first set of requests to admit; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
8 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Ofc Gomez by Darcy L Proctor, Thomas G DiCianni, Dina M Kapernekas. (lc) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
9 ANSWER by defendant Cty of Chgo to complaint and affirmative defenses [1-1]; Jury demand. (lc) Modified on 06/25/2001 (Entered: 06/22/2001)
SCHEDULE set on 6/27/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 8/2/01 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 06/27/2001)
10 ANSWER by defendant Officer Jose A. Gomez to complaint [11] and affirmative defenses; Jury demand. (fce) (Entered: 07/06/2001)
11 RESPONSE by defendant Offficer Gomez to plaintiff's first set of request to admit; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
12 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file an amended complaint ; Notice (yap) (Entered: 07/18/2001)

07/17/2001 08/02/2001 08/29/2001 10/01/2001 11/05/2001 11/08/2001 11/08/2001 11/15/2001
11/28/2001 11/28/2001 12/06/2001 12/06/2001

13 MINUTE ORDER of 7/17/01 by Hon. Blanche M. Manning: Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint [12-1] is granted. Defendant to answer or otherwise plead by 8/16/01. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 07/18/2001)
SCHEDULE set on 8/2/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 8/29/01 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 08/03/2001)
SCHEDULE set on 8/29/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 10/1/01 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 08/30/2001)
SCHEDULE set on 10/1/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 11/15/01 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 10/01/2001)
14 MINUTE ORDER of 11/5/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah: The status hearing set for 11/15/01 at 9:30 a.m. is reset to 11/15/01 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/06/2001)
15 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to stay discovery on monell policy claims and sever such claims for later resolution (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/16/2001)
16 MOTION by defendants for entry of protective order (Attachments). (fce) (Entered: 11/16/2001)
17 MINUTE ORDER of 11/15/01 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status hearing held and continued to 1/10/02 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff's response to defendant City of Chicago's motion to stay discovery on monell policy claims [15-1] and sever such claims for later resolution [15-2] and defendnats' motion for entry of protective order [16-1] to be filed by 12/06/01. Defendants' reply to be filed by due 12/13/01. Mailed notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/16/2001)
Text not available. (Entered: 11/30/2001)
18 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Myers by Darcy L. Proctor, Thomas G. DiCianni. (yp) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
19 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion for entry of protective order [16-1]; Notice (jmp) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
20 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion to stay discovery on monell policy claims [15-1] and sever that issue for deferred resolution [15-2]; Notice (jmp) (Entered: 12/14/2001)

12/21/2001 12/21/2001 12/21/2001 12/21/2001 12/21/2001 12/21/2001 12/21/2001 01/04/2002
01/08/2002 01/10/2002

21 ANSWER by defendant Officer Robert Myers and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
22 ANSWER by defendant Officer Daniel Jacobs and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
23 ANSWER by defendant Hector Vergara and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
24 ANSWER by defendant Jennifer Delucia and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
25 ANSWER by defendant James Delafont and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
26 ANSWER by defendant Cty of Chgo and affirmative defenses to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
27 MOTION by Cty of Chgo for leave of court to file its reply briefs in support of its motion to stay policy discovery and motion for protective order, instanter (Attachment); Notice. (vmj) (Entered: 01/07/2002)
28 MINUTE ORDER of 1/4/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Defendant City of Chicago's motion for leave of court to file its reply briefs in support of its motion to stay policy discovery and motion for protective order, instanter is granted [27-1]. Defendant's reply memorandum to be filed on or before 1/8/02. Status hearing set for 1/10/02 is stricken and reset to 2/13/02 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered: 01/07/2002)
29 MOTION by defendant Cty of Chgo for time extension to file its reply briefs in support of its motion to stay policy discovery and motion for protective order ; Notice. (mw) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
30 MINUTE ORDER of 1/10/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Defendant City of Chicago's motion for time extension to file its reply briefs in support of its motion to stay policy discovery and motion for protective order [29-1] is granted. Replies to be filed on or before 01/29/02. Status hearing set for 02/13/02 is stricken and reset to 02/28/02 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mw) (Entered: 01/11/2002)

01/14/2002 01/23/2002 01/28/2002 01/28/2002 01/31/2002
02/01/2002 02/04/2002 02/07/2002 02/08/2002
02/13/2002 02/15/2002

31 MOTION by plaintiff to compel responses to discovery , for entry of default as to defendants and for further relief (Attachment); Notice. (jmp) (Entered: 01/24/2002)
32 MINUTE ORDER of 1/23/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Plaintiff's motion to compel responses to discovery is granted [31-1]. (Entered Agreed Order). Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 01/24/2002)
33 REPLY memorandum by defendant in support of its motion to stay policy discovery [15-1], and to sever/bifurcate such claims for later resolution [15-2] (cdy) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
34 REPLY memorandum by defendant in support of its motion for entry of protective order [16-1]; Notice. (cdy) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
35 MINUTE ORDER of 1/31/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Defendants' motion for a protective order [16-1] is denied. The parties are ordered to confer and present an agreed protective order to the Court on the next scheduled status date of 02/28/02 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mw) (Entered: 02/01/2002)
37 MOTION by plaintiff for oral argument ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
36 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant Ofc Gomez to first amended complaint [1-1]; jury demand. Notice. (ntf) Modified on 02/11/2002 (Entered: 02/05/2002)
38 MINUTE ORDER of 2/7/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Plaintiff's motion for oral argument [37-1] is denied. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
40 MOTION by defendants Cty of Chgo, Ofc Gomez, James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Myers to file additional appearance on behalf of defendants, City of Chicago, detectives Delafont, Delucia, Vergara and officers Gomez, Jacobs and Myers ; Notice. (air) (Entered: 02/19/2002)
39 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff by Michael I Kanovitz; Notice. (air) Modified on 02/14/2002 (Entered: 02/14/2002)
41 MINUTE ORDER of 2/15/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Defendant's motion to file additional appearance on behalf of defendants, City of Chicago, detectives Delafont, Delucia, Vergara and officers Gomez, Jacobs and Myers is granted [40-

02/19/2002 02/25/2002 02/25/2002 02/26/2002 02/28/2002
02/28/2002
03/04/2002 03/05/2002
04/02/2002 04/05/2002 06/14/2002

1]. Mailed notice (air) Modified on 02/20/2002 (Entered: 02/19/2002)
42 ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Michael W. Tootooian; Notice. (cdy) (Entered: 02/20/2002)
45 RENEWED MOTION by defendants for entry of protective order (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 03/04/2002)
48 MOTION by plaintiff to compel defendants to comply with plaintiff's written discovery request and for further relief (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 03/06/2002)
43 RESPONSE and consent by plaintiff's to defendants' protective order (Attachment); Notice [16-1]. (ntf) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
44 MINUTE ORDER of 2/28/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: (Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order). The City's motion to stay discovery on Monell policy claims and sever such claims for later resolution is denied in part and granted in part. The City's motion to stay discovery on Monell policy claims [15-1], is granted. The City's motion sever such claims for later resolution [15-2], is denied. Mailed notice (cdy) Modified on 03/04/2002 (Entered: 03/01/2002)
46 MINUTE ORDER of 2/28/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status hearing held. Defendant's renewed motion for entry of protective order [45-1], is granted. (Entered protective order.) Mailed notice (cdy) Modified on 03/04/2002 (Entered: 03/04/2002)
47 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's second motion to compel (Attachments); Notice. (cdy) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
49 MINUTE ORDER of 3/5/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Plaintiff's second motion to compel defendants to comply with plaintiff's written discovery request and for further relief [48-1] is entered and continued. Status hearing is set for 04/02/02 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cdy) Modified on 03/06/2002 (Entered: 03/06/2002)
50 MINUTE ORDER of 4/2/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to compel [48-1], is granted as stated on the record. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/03/2002)
51 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 04/02/02 before Honorable John W. Darrah (cdy) (Entered: 04/08/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 6/14/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status

06/19/2002 06/25/2002 06/28/2002 07/03/2002 07/09/2002 07/10/2002 07/10/2002
07/25/2002 07/30/2002 08/02/2002 08/07/2002

hearing set to 9:00 7/10/02 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
52 MOTION by plaintiff to require City of Chicago to provide 30(b)(6) deponent(s) by 07/15/02 (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
53 MINUTE ORDER of 6/25/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Plaintiff's motion to require City of Chicago to provide 30(b)(6) deponent(s) by 07/15/02 [52-1], is granted. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
54 MOTION by defendants for additional time to respond/object to plaintiff's requests to admit (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 07/10/2002)
56 THIRD MOTION by plaintiff to compel (Attachments); Notice (yap) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
55 MINUTE ORDER of 7/9/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Defendants motion for additional time to respond/object to plaintiff's requests to admit [54-1], is granted to and including 07/31/02. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 07/10/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 7/10/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 9/4/02 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 07/11/2002)
57 MINUTE ORDER of 7/10/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Parties agreed that defendants will provide written responses to second set of discovery requests by Friday, 7/12/02. Defendants will provide written responses to plaintiff's third motion to compel by close of business today, 7/10/02 [56-1]. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
60 FOURTH MOTION by plaintiff to compel proper responses to request for production 10 in the plaintiff's first set of request for production to the individual defendants (Attachments); Notice (cdy) Modified on 08/12/2002 (Entered: 08/12/2002)
58 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's motion to compel [561] (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
61 MOTION by defendants for additional time to complete plaintiff's deposition ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 08/12/2002)
59 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion for additional time to complete plaintiff's deposition (Attachments); Notice (cdy) Modified on 08/08/2002 (Entered: 08/08/2002)

08/08/2002
08/14/2002 08/28/2002 09/04/2002
09/18/2002 09/25/2002 10/24/2002 11/12/2002 11/25/2002

62 MINUTE ORDER of 8/8/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Defendants' motion for additional time to complete plaintiff's deposition [61-1], is granted. Deposition is limited to hours. Plaintiff's fourth motion to compel [60-1], is granted in part as stated in open court. Defendants to respond to requests within 14 days (8/22/02). Status hearing set for 09/04/02 at 9:00 a.m. to stand. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 08/12/2002)
63 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 08/08/02, before Honorable John W. Darrah (cdy) (Entered: 08/15/2002)
64 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file amended complaint stating class action allegations and for scheduling order on certification and completion of discovery (Attachments); Notice. (gcy) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
65 MINUTE ORDER of 9/4/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 10/24/02 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff's third motion to compel [56-1] is granted. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for leave to file amended complaint stating class action allegations and for scheduling order on certification and completion of discovery to be filed by 09/18/02. Plaintiff's reply to be file by 09/25/02. Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
66 MEMORANDUM by defendant City of Chicago in opposition to plaintiff's motion for leave to file amended complaint stating class action allegations and for scheduling order on certification and completion of discovery [64-1]; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 09/19/2002)
67 REPLY by plaintiff to defendant's response to motion for leave to file amended complaint stating class action allegations [64-1] (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 09/26/2002)
68 MINUTE ORDER of 10/24/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status hearing held and continued to 12/03/02 at 9:00 a.m. Vladic's motion for leave to file amended complaint stating class action allegations [64-1], is granted. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/25/2002)
69 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [1-1] by plaintiff; jury demand; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/13/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 11/25/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing reset to December 4, 2002 at 9:00a.m. The status hearing previously scheduled for December 3, 2002 is stricken

11/25/2002 11/25/2002 12/04/2002
12/04/2002 12/10/2002 01/02/2003 01/02/2003 01/02/2003 01/02/2003 01/23/2003 02/05/2003

Mailed notice (slb) (Entered: 11/25/2002)
70 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to extend time to answer or otherwise plead in response to second amended complaint ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
71 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for leave to withdraw appearance , and substitute counsel (cdy) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
72 MINUTE ORDER of 12/4/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status hearing held and continued to 01/23/03 at 9:00 a.m. Defendant City of Chicago's motion for leave to withdraw appearance Ancel Glink Diamon Bush DiCianni & Rokek P.C. [71-1] and leave to substitute the appearance of Ms. Ghezzi and Mr. Manly from Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue is granted. Defendant City of Chicago's unopposed motion to extend time to answer or otherwise plead in response to second amended complaint [701] is granted to and including 12/10/02. Individual defendants are given to and including 01/02/03 to respond to second amended complaint. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
73 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant City of Chicago by June K. Ghezzi and Michael P. Manly (cdy) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
74 MINUTE ORDER of 12/10/02 by Hon. John W. Darrah: All defendants have to and including 01/02/03 in which to file their answer. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/11/2002)
75 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant to plaintiff's second amended complaint [69-1]; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
76 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant Officer Jose Gomez to plaintiff's complaint [69-1] (cdy) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
77 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant Officer Robert Meyers to plaintiff's second amended complaint [69-1] (cdy) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
78 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant City of Chicago to plaintiff's second amended complaint [69-1]; jury demand (cdy) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 1/23/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 2/6/03 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 01/24/2003)
79 MOTION by plaintiff for a rule to show cause (Attachments);

02/06/2003 02/13/2003 02/26/2003 03/19/2003 03/28/2003 04/10/2003 04/22/2003
04/22/2003 05/13/2003 07/31/2003

Notice of motion (eav) (Entered: 02/18/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 2/6/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 2/13/03 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 02/07/2003)
80 MINUTE ORDER of 2/13/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held. Plaintiff's motion for a rule to show cause is entered and continued to 2/26/03 at 9:00 a.m. [79-1] Mailed notice (eav) (Entered: 02/18/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 2/26/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing set to 9:00 3/19/03. All parties to be present . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
81 MINUTE ORDER of 3/19/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Status hearing held. Respondent will provide information to plaintiff by 03/20/03. Plaintiff's motion for a rule to show cause [79-1], is denied without prejudice to refile if documents are not complete. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 03/20/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 3/28/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing set to 9:00 4/22/03 . Mailed notice (wah) (Entered: 03/28/2003)
82 MOTION by defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Meyers to file additional appearance on behalf of defendants Detectives Delafont, DeLucia, Vergara and Officers Gomez, Jacobs and Myers (Attachment); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 04/23/2003)
83 MINUTE ORDER of 4/22/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held and continued to 5/13/03 at 9:00 a.m. Defendants' motion to file additional appearance on behalf of defendants Detectives Delafont, DeLucia, Vergara and Officers Gomez, Jacobs and Myers is granted [82-1]. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 04/23/2003)
84 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Meyers by Allen Duarte; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 04/23/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 5/13/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah : Status hearing held. Discovery ordered closed on 12/9/03 . Pretrial conference set to 11:30 4/8/04. Jury trial set to 10:00 5/3/04 . Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
86 MOTION by Cty of Chgo for protective order barring

08/05/2003 08/11/2003 08/12/2003 09/04/2003
09/17/2003 09/22/2003
10/02/2003 10/10/2003 10/16/2003 10/16/2003

deposition of Chicago Police Department Superintendent Terry Hillard ; Notice (yap) (Entered: 08/15/2003)
EXECUTIVE committee 8/5/03 This case is reassigned to the Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan Mailed notice (nlf) (Entered: 08/07/2003)
85 NOTICE of withdrawal by defendant City of Chicago of its motion for protective order barring deposition of Chicago Police Department Superintendent Terry Hillard (cdy) (Entered: 08/13/2003)
87 MINUTE ORDER of 8/12/03 by Hon. John W. Darrah: Motion for protective order barring deposition of Chicago Police Department Superintendent Terry Hillard [86-1] is withdrawn. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 08/15/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 9/4/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Status hearing set for 09/22/03 at 9:00 a.m. before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan in Courtroom 1719. The parties are directed to submit a joint status report as set out on the reverse of this order. Mailed notice (mw) (Entered: 09/04/2003)
88 JOINT STATUS REPORT by the parties (cdy) (Entered: 09/18/2003)
89 MINUTE ORDER of 9/22/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Status hearing held and continued to 12/15/03 at 9:00a.m. Plaintiff is given leave to file motion for class certification on or before 10/15/03. Defendants' response to plaintiff's motion for class certification is due 11/15/03. Plaintiff's reply is due 11/30/03. Counsel for the parties are direct to submit to chambers a joint report regarding the parties' settlement negotiations to date. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 09/23/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 10/2/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : On the Court's own motion, the status hearing set for 12/15/03 is stricken and reset to 01/06/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mw) (Entered: 10/02/2003)
97 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for case management conference , and for extension of briefing schedule on class certification ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
90 MOTION by plaintiff for class certification ; Memorandum in support; Notices (cdy) Modified on 10/17/2003 (Entered: 10/17/2003)
91 EXHIBITS by plaintiff in support of motion for class

10/17/2003 10/20/2003 10/22/2003 10/23/2003 10/23/2003
10/30/2003 11/13/2003
11/17/2003

certification [90-1] (cdy) (Entered: 10/17/2003)
93 AGREED MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file instanter ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
92 FIFTH MOTION by plaintiff to compel (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/21/2003)
95 RESPONSE by defendant City of Chicago in opposition to plaintiff's fifth motion to compel [92-1] (Attachments) (cdy) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 10/23/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : As previously order, the status hearing set for 12/15/03 is stricken and reset to 01/06/03 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mw) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
94 MINUTE ORDER of 10/23/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Plaintiff's motion for leave to file his motion for class certification, memorandum and exhibit instanter [93-1], is granted. Briefing schedule on the plaintiff's motion for class certification is amended as follows: defendants' response is to be filed by 11/17/03. Plaintiff's reply is to be filed by 12/01/03. Plaintiff's fifth motion to compel [92-1] is entered and continued. Plaintiff's reply is to be filed on or before 10/30/03. Status hearing set for 12/15/03 stands. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/24/2003)
96 REPLY BRIEF by plaintiff to his fifth motion to compel [92-1] (Attachments) (cdy) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
98 MINUTE ORDER of 11/13/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Defendant City of Chicago's motion for case management conference [97-1] and for extension of briefing schedule on class certification [97-1], is denied as moot. Defendants' response to the plaintiff's motion for class certification [90-1] is to be filed by 12/01/03. The plaintiff's reply in support of his motion for class certification is to be filed by 12/08/03. The pretrial conference set for 04/04/04 is stricken. Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda, by any party, are to be filed by 01/09/04. All responses, if any, to the dispositive motions are to be filed by 01/23/04. All replies, if any are to be filed by 01/30/04. Status hearing set for 01/06/04 is stricken and reset to 02/26/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
100 SIXTH MOTION by plaintiff to compel (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/21/2003)

11/18/2003 11/19/2003 11/19/2003 11/20/2003
12/02/2003 12/02/2003 12/08/2003
12/08/2003 12/09/2003 12/16/2003 12/19/2003

99 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant City of Chicago by Paul W. Schroeder, James Cordray Dunlop, Karey Vering Skiermont, Alicia Marie Hawley (cdy) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
102 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for protective order (Attachments); Notices; with responses (cdy) (Entered: 11/25/2003)
102 RESPONSE by defendant City of Chicago to plaintiff's motion to compel; Notice; with Motion (cdy) (Entered: 11/25/2003)
101 MINUTE ORDER of 11/20/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Plaintiff's 5th and 6th motions to compel [92-1], [100-1], are denied. Defendant's motion for protective order is denied as moot. Status hearing set for 02/26/04 to stand. Previously set deadlines are to stand. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
103 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for leave to file opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification, instanter (Attachment); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
104 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to strike plaintiff's two expert disclosures (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
105 MINUTE ORDER of 12/8/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Defendant City of Chicago's motion for leave to file opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification instanter is granted [103-1]. The plaintiff is given one additional day until 12/9/03 to file his reply in support of his motion for class certification. Defendant City of Chicago's motion to strike 2 expert disclosures [104-1] is entered and continued. The plaintiff is given until 12/15/03 to file is response. The Defendant City of Chicago is given until 12/22/03 to file its reply in support. Status set for 2/26/04 to stand. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
106 MEMORANDUM by defendant City of Chicago in opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification [90-1] (Attachments). (cem) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
107 REPLY by plaintiff in support of motion for class certification [90-1] (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 12/10/2003)
108 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file response instanter ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
109 MINUTE ORDER of 12/19/03 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan:

12/19/2003 12/22/2003 12/29/2003 01/02/2004 01/05/2004
01/09/2004 01/09/2004 01/09/2004
01/12/2004 01/12/2004

Plaintiff's motion for leave to file response to the defendants motion to strike instanter [108-1], is granted. Dates previously set are to stand. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
110 RESPONSE by plaintiff to Chicago's motion to strike plaintiff's two expert disclosures [104-1] (Attachments) (cdy) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
111 REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in support to motion to strike plaintiff's two expert disclosures [104-1] (Attachments) (cdy) (Entered: 12/23/2003)
113 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file a surreply to Chicago's motion to strike (Attachment); Notice. (air) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
112 RESPONSE by defendant Cty of Chgo in opposition to plaintiff's motion for leave to file sur-reply to City of Chicago's motion to strike. (emd) (Entered: 01/05/2004)
114 MINUTE ORDER of 1/5/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply to defendant City of Chicago's motion to strike is denied [113-1]. Status hearing set for 2/26/04 to stand. Mailed notice (air) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
115 JOINT MOTION by Robert Myers, Jose Gomez for summary judgment ; Memorandum in support. (vmj) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
116 LOCAL RULE 56.1(a)(3) statement of undisputed facts by defendants Robert Myers, Jose Gomez (Attachments). (vmj) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
117 NOTICE of motion by defendants Robert Myers, Jose Gomez regarding Local Rule 56 statement [116-1], motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support [115-1]. (vmj) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
118 AMENDED NOTICE of motion by defendants Robert Myers, Jose Gomez of regarding [117-1]. (vmj) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
119 MINUTE ORDER of 1/12/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: The court having previously set a briefing schedule on dispositive motions on 11/13/03, the amended notice of motion set for 1/21/04 by defendants Myers and Gomez is stricken. On 11/13/03, the court entered the following briefing schedule: Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda, by any party, are to be filed by 1/9/04. All responses, if any, to the dispositive motions are to be filed by 1/23/04. All responses, if any, to the

01/23/2004 01/23/2004 01/23/2004 01/27/2004 01/30/2004 01/30/2004 02/02/2004
02/09/2004 02/20/2004 02/24/2004 02/24/2004

dispositive motions are to be filed by 1/23/04. All replies, if any are to be filed by 1/30/04. Mailed notice Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered: 01/13/2004)
120 LOCAL RULE 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement of additional facts by plaintiff (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/26/2004)
121 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants Gomez and Myers' motion for summary judgment [115-1]; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/27/2004)
122 LOCAL RULE 56.1(b)(3)(A) by plaintiff to response to defendants' statement of material facts; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/27/2004)
125 MOTION by plaintiff to strike portions of defendants Gomez and Myers' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) joint statement ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
123 REPLY MEMORANDUM by defendants Jose Gomez, Robert Meyers in support of their joint motion for summary judgment [115-1]. (air) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
124 JOINT RESPONSE by defendants Jose Gomez, Robert Meyers to plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) statement of additional facts [120-1] (Attachment); Notice. (air) (Entered: 02/02/2004)
126 MINUTE ORDER of 2/2/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Plaintiff's motion to strike portions of defendants Gomez and Myers' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) joint statement [125-1] is taken advisement. The defendants are given until 02/09/04 to file a response, if any, to plaintiff's motion to strike portions of defendants Gomez and Myers' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) joint statement [125-1]. Status hearing set for 02/26/04 to stand. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
127 RESPONSE by defendants Robert Myers and Jose Gomez to plaintiff's motion to strike portions of their Rule 56.1 statement [125-1]; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 02/10/2004)
128 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to provide supplemental authorities in support of class certification (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
129 RESPONSE by defendant to plaintiff's motion for leave to provide supplemental authorities in support of class certification [128-1] (cdy) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
130 MINUTE ORDER of 2/24/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Status hearing set for 02/26/04 is reset to 04/14/04 at 9:00 a.m.

03/31/2004
03/31/2004 04/05/2004 04/06/2004
04/12/2004 04/12/2004 04/13/2004 04/13/2004 04/14/2004

Plaintiff's motion for leave to provide supplemental authorities in support of class certification [128-1], is granted. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
131 MINUTE ORDER of 3/31/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, the Court hereby grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment [115-1] and denies the plaintiff's motion to strike [125-1]. All pending dates and motions are hereby stricken as moot terminating case. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
132 ENTERED JUDGMENT (cdy) (Entered: 03/31/2004)
133 MOTION by plaintiff for clarification , or in the alternative to alter judgment ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
134 MINUTE ORDER of 4/6/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Status hearing set for 05/05/04 at 9:00 a.m. This matter comes to be heard on the plaintiff's motion for clarification or in the alternative to alter judgment. On 03/31/04 this Court entered a memorandum opinion granting defendants Myers and Gomez' motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against defendant Myers. The only remaining claim against defendant Gomez is the excessive force claim. All claims against defendants Delafont, DeLucia, Jacobs, Vegara and the City of Chicago are still pending. Case reinstated. Plaintiff's motion for clarification [133-1] or in the alternative to alter judgment [1332], is stricken as moot. The 03/31/04 minute order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Myers is a final and appealable order. Case reopened. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
135 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff Joseph Lopez motion minute order [131-3], all all Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. [131-2], Scheduling order terminating case. [131-1], judgment entered [132-1] ( Fee Paid) (dj) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
136 DOCKETING STATEMENT by plaintiff Joseph Lopez appeal [135-1] regarding appeal [135-1] . (dj) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
FORWARDED representation and disclosure statements to USCA (dj) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal appeal [135-1] . Mailed notice to all counsel. (dj) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
137 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal

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05/24/2004 06/15/2004 06/21/2004

[135-1] USCA 04-1932 (cdy) (Entered: 04/16/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 5/4/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Status hearing set for 05/05/04 is reset to 6/30/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed and telephoned notice (mw) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. 04-1932 consisting of 3 volumes of pleadings, 2 transcripts, 1 exhibit and 6 loose pleadings. [135-1] Mailed notice to all counsel. (dj) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
138 LETTER from the 7th Circuit: Retaining record on appeal no. 04-1932. Records will be returned at a later date (cdy) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
139 CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: appeal dismissed [135-1]. ( 04-1932) (cdy) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
140 MOTION by plaintiff to withdraw his motion for class certification and to set a trial date for his individual claims ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
141 MINUTE ORDER of 5/20/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Status hearing set for 06/30/04 is stricken and reset to 06/21/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his motion for class certification [140-1] and to set a trial date on his individual claims [140-2], is granted. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
142 LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal no. 04-1932 consisting of three volumes of pleadings, six loose pleadings, two volumes of transcripts, one volume of exhibits (cdy) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
143 MOTION by individual defendants Jose Gomez, Jennifer Delucia, Hector Vergara, James Delafont, Daniel Jacobs to join in the City of Chicago's motion to strike plaintiff's expert disclosures (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 06/22/2004)
144 MINUTE ORDER of 6/21/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Status hearing held and continued to 08/26/04 at 9:00 a.m. Individual defendants' motion to join in the City of Chicago's motion to strike plaintiff's expert disclosures [143-1] is entered and continued. The plaintiff is given to and including 06/30/04 to file his response. The defendants' are given until 07/07/04 to file their reply. Defendants' oral motion for leave to serve expert disclosures is granted. The defendants are given to and including 07/21/04 to serve their expert disclosures and reports. Defendants' experts depositions are to be completed by

06/30/2004 07/07/2004 08/03/2004 08/09/2004
08/23/2004 08/30/2004 09/29/2004 09/30/2004 10/05/2004
10/18/2004

08/20/04. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 06/22/2004)
145 RESPONSE by plaintiff to individual defendants' motion to join City of Chicago's motion to strike plaintiff's expert disclosures; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
146 REPLY by defendant in support of their motion to join in the City of Chicago's motion to strike Dr. Lahmeyer's expert disclosures as to Joseph Lopez [143-1]; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 07/08/2004)
147 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to bar trial of "policy" issues on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim against the City (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
148 MINUTE ORDER of 8/9/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Status hearing set for 08/26/04 is reset to 10/26/04 at 9:00 a.m. Defendant City of Chicago's motion to bar trial of "policy" issues on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim against the City [147-1] is entered and continued. No one appeared on behalf of the plaintiff on the defendant City's noticed motion. Plaintiff's response is to be filed by 08/23/04. Defendant City's reply is to be filed by 08/30/04. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
149 RESPONSE by plaintiff to the City of Chicago's motion to bar trial of "policy" issues Section 1983 claim against the City [1471] (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
150 REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in support of motion to bar trial of "policy" issues on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim against the City [147-1] (Attachments) (cdy) (Entered: 08/31/2004)
152 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file plaintiff's third amended complaint (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
151 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 06/21/04; before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan (cdy) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
153 MINUTE ORDER of 10/5/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to file plaintiff's third amended [152-1], is granted. The defendants are given until 10/26/04 to answer, move or otherwise plead to the plaintiff's third amended complaint. All other previously set dates are to stand. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
154 ANSWER by defendant Jose Gomez to plaintiff's third amended

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11/03/2004 11/09/2004 11/15/2004

complaint [69-1]; Notice (cdy) Modified on 10/19/2004 (Entered: 10/19/2004)
155 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant Daniel Jacobs to plaintiff's third amended complaint [69-1] (cdy) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
156 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant Hector Vergara to plaintiff's third amended complaint [69-1] (cdy) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
157 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant James Delafont to plaintiff's third amended complaint [69-1] (cdy) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
158 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant to plaintiff's third amended complaint [69-1] (cdy) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
159 ANSWER by defendant City of Chicago to third amended complaint and affirmative defenses [69-1]; jury demand (cdy) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
160 MINUTE ORDER of 10/27/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Status hearing held. Individuals' motion to strike is denied. For the reasons stated on the reverse side of this minute order, defendant City of Chicago's motion to bar trial of "policy" issues on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim against the City is granted. The parties are given until 11/25/04 to exchange proposed trial witness lists. Motions in limine are to be filed by 12/16/04. Responses to the moltions in limine are to be filed by 01/06/05 and replies by 01/13/05. Joint pretrial order shall be submitted to this Court's chambers by 02/15/05 as outlined in this Court's standing order regarding pretrial orders. The parties may obtain a copy of the Court's standing order regarding pretrial orders from this Court's web page or from this Court's Courtroom Deputy. Pretrial conference set for 03/08/05 at 10:30 a.m. Jury trial set to begin on 03/14/05 at 9:30 a.m. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
161 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for clarification (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/10/2004)
162 MINUTE ORDER of 11/9/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: For the reasons stated on the reverse side of this minute order, defendant City's motion for clarification [161-1], is granted. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/10/2004)
163 MOTION by plaintiff for a one week extension in the briefing

11/15/2004 11/18/2004
11/22/2004 11/23/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 11/30/2004 12/01/2004
12/03/2004 12/07/2004

schedule for motions in limine ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
164 MOTION by plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings against City of Chicago pursuant to the City's Monell waiver (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
165 MINUTE ORDER of 11/18/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Plaintiff's motion for one week extension in the briefing schedule motions in limine [163-1], is granted. Motions in limine are to be filed by 12/23/04. Responses are to be filed by 01/13/05 and replies are to be filed by 01/20/05. Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings against City of Chicago pursuant to the Monell waiver [164-1] is entered and continued. Defendants' response are to be filed by 12/07/04 and plaintiff's reply in support is to be filed by 12/14/04. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
168 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for reassignment of cases as related (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
169 AMENDED NOTICE by defendant City of Chicago regarding motion for reassignment of cases as related [168-1] (cdy) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
166 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants City of Chicago, Delafont, DeLucia, Vergara, Gomez, Jacobs, Myers by Brian Joseph Murray; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
170 SECOND AMENDED NOTICE by defendant City of Chicago regarding motion for reassignment of cases as related [168-1] (cdy) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
167 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant City of Chicago by Caroline K. Sheerin; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
171 MINUTE ORDER of 12/1/04 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Defendant City's motion for reassignment of cases as related [168-1] is entered and continued. Plaintiff's response shall be filed by 12/03/04. City defendant's reply in support shall be filed by 12/10/04. All other previously set dates are to stand. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
172 RESPONSE by plaintiff to Chicago's motion for reassignment of cases as related [168-1] (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
173 RESPONSE by defendant City of Chicago in opposition to

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01/13/2005 01/13/2005 01/14/2005 01/20/2005
01/20/2005 01/20/2005 01/24/2005

motion for judgment on the pleadings against City of Chicago pursuant to the City's Monell waiver [164-1] (cdy) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
174 REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in support of its motion for reassignment of cases as related [168-1] (cdy) (Entered: 12/13/2004)
175 REPLY BRIEF by plaintiff in support of his motion for judgment on the pleadings against Chicago; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
178 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiff to extend the time to file motions in limine ; Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
176 MOTION by defendants Gomez, Delucia, Vergara, Delafont, Jacobs in limine (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/29/2004)
177 MOTION by plaintiff in limine (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 12/29/2004)
179 MINUTE ORDER of 1/5/05 by Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan: Plaintiff's unopposed motion to extend the time to file motions in limine [178-1], is granted. All other previously set dates are to stand. Mailed notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
180 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion in limine [176-1] (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
181 RESPONSE by defendants to plaintiff's motion in limine [1771] (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
182 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file corrected response to defendants' motions in limine (Attachment); Notice (las) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
183 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file corrected response to defendants' motions in limine 182 is granted. All other previously set dates are to stand. (mw, ) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
184 REPLY by plaintiff Joseph Lopez in support of his motion in limine 177; Notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
185 RESPONSE by plaintiff Joseph Lopez to defendants' motion in limine. (cdy, ) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
186 MOTION by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs for leave to file

01/24/2005
01/27/2005 01/27/2005 02/04/2005 02/08/2005 02/08/2005
02/14/2005 02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/22/2005

reply in support of their motions in limine. (rbf, ) (Entered: 01/26/2005)
187 NOTICE of Motion by Allen Duarte for presentment of motion by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs for leave to file reply in support of their motions in limine 186 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 1/27/2005 at 09:00 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 01/26/2005)
188 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Motion for leave to file 186 is granted. All other dates to remain the same. (tlp, ) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
189 REPLY by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Meyers, City of Chicago in support of their motions in limine176. (jmm, ) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
190 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 06/25/02; Before the Honorable John W. Darrah. (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/07/2005)
191 MOTION by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs to extend due date of the final pretrial order. (gma, ) (Entered: 02/08/2005)
192 NOTICE of Motion by Allen Duarte for presentment of MOTION by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs to extend due date of the final pretrial order 191 before Honorable Samuel DerYeghiayan on 2/14/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 02/08/2005)
193 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Defendants' motion to extend due date of the final pretrial order 191 is granted to and including 02/22/05. All other previously set trial dates are to stand. (mw, ) (Entered: 02/14/2005)
194 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to withdraw and substitute counsel (Attachments: # 1)(rbf, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
195 NOTICE of Motion by Karey Vering Skiermont for presentment of motion for leave to withdraw and substitute counsel 194 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 2/22/2005 at 09:00 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
196 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : City of

02/25/2005 02/25/2005
02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/28/2005 02/28/2005 02/28/2005

Chicago's motion for leave to withdraw and substitute counsel 194 is granted. Caroline Sheerin, June Ghezzi, Michael Manly, Paul Schroeder, James Dunlop, Alicia Hawley, Karey Skiermont and Brian Murray are given leave to withdraw their appearances as counsel for defendant City of Chicago. Thomas DiCianni, Darcy L. Proctor and Allen Duarte are given leave to substitute and file their appearances as counsel for defendant City of Chicago. Defendants' oral motion for a 1-day extension of time to file the joint pre-trial order is granted without objection. All other previously set dates are to stand. Attorney Alicia Marie Hawley; Dina Marie Kapernekas; Michael P. Manly; Brian Joseph Murray; Paul W. Schroeder; Caroline K. Sheerin; Karey Vering Skiermont; James Cordray Dunlop and June K. Ghezzi terminated. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
197 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to supplement his pending motion for judgment on the pleadings to incorporate the stipulated issues and facts framed in the pretrial order (gma, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
198 NOTICE of Motion by Arthur R. Loevy for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to supplement his pending motion for judgment on the pleadings to incorporate the stipulated issues and facts framed in the pretrial order 197 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 3/2/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
199 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to enforce defendant City of Chicago's Section 1983 liability for the fifth day of his detention; Exhibits. (gma, ) Modified on 5/30/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/28/2005)
200 NOTICE of Motion by Arthur R. Loevy for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to enforce defendant City of Chicago's Section 1983 liability for the fifth day of his detention 199 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 3/2/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
201 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
202 NOTICE of Motion by Russell Ainsworth for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 201 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 3/3/2005 at 09:00 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
203 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for writ of habeas corpus

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ad testificandum (gma, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
204 NOTICE of Motion by Arthur R. Loevy for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 203 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 3/3/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
206 MOTION by plaintiff Joseph Lopez for leave to file an additional appearance. (cdy, ) Modified on 7/11/2006 (ef, ). (Entered: 03/03/2005)
207 NOTICE of motion by Russell Ainsworth for presentment of motion for leave to file 206 before Honorable Samuel DerYeghiayan on 3/3/2005 at 09:00 a.m.(cdy, ) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
205 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and on Plaintiff's motion to file an additional appearance. We grant both motions. This matter is also before the court on Defendants' motion for reassignment. We deny Defendants' motion for reassignment. This matter is also before the court on Plaintiff's motion to enforce Defendant City of Chicago's Section 1983 liability for the fifth day of detention. During oral arguments before the court, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that Plaintiff seeks in the motion either to enforce the City of Chicago's liability regarding the fifth day of detention because the City waived it or, in the alternative, to have the court allow the issue of the City of Chicago's liability for the fifth day of detention to be resolved at trial. Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim against the City of Chicago pertaining to the fifth day of detention. The issue of the City of Chicago's liability relating to the fifth day of detention is still a live issue in this action and will need to be addressed at trial since it is not encompassed within the scope of the prior Monell waiver by the City of Chicago. Therefore, we grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff's motion to "enforce" Defendant City of Chicago's Section 1983 liability for the fifth day of detention. This matter is also before the court on Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. We deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings. A memorandum opinion shall follow this order. We also deny Plaintiff's motion to supplement his motion for judgment on the pleadings as moot. Judge's staff mailed notice (mw, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 4/1/2005 (cdy, ). (Entered: 03/02/2005)
208 ATTORNEY appearance for plaintiff Joseph Lopez by Russell R Ainsworth. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)

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WRIT of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued, four originals on 03/04/05 and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service on Callie Baird, directing her to deliver detainee Joar J. Michel (#2004-0081059) to Courtroom 1719 of USDC on 3/16/05 and continuing until he has completed his testimony in this matter. Forwarded two certified copies of order dated 03/02/05 to the U.S. Marshal's Office. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
209 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for entry of declaration of payment of judgment and consent to entry of judgment; Exhibit A. (gma, ) Modified on 7/18/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 03/04/2005)
210 NOTICE of Motion by Allen Duarte for presentment of MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for entry of declaration of payment of judgment and consent to entry of judgment 209 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 3/10/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
211 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Pretrial conference held. For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, the parties' motions in limine 177 are granted in part and denied in part. Defendant City of Chicago's motion for entry of declaration of payment of judgment and consent to judgment is denied. Enter Memorandum Opinion. Mailed notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/10/2005)
212 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 3/8/2005. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/10/2005)
213 NOTICE by defendants of filing regarding amended waiver of requirement of proof that defendant City of Chicago caused constitutional violation. (mjc, ) (Entered: 03/10/2005)
214 AMENDED waiver of requirement of proof that defendant City of Chicago caused constitutional violation.(cdy, ) (Entered: 03/10/2005)
215 Duplicate of entry # 213 . Modified on 8/2/2006 (lcw, ). (Entered: 03/10/2005)
216 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for adjudication of objections in the video testimony of Charles Gruber; Notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
217 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Plaintiff's

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motion for adjudication of objkections in the video testimony of Charles Gruber 216 is granted as stated below. Notices mailed by judicial staff. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
218 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held on 3/14/2005 and continued to 3/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice, advised in open Court (mw, ) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
219 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held and continued to 3/16/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice advised in open Court (mw, ) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
220 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held and continued to 03/17/05 at 9:30 a.m. No notice advised in open Court (mw, ) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
221 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held and continued to 3/21/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice advised in open Court (mw, ) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
222 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held and continued to 3/22/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice advised in open Court. (mw, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
223 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : The Court's ruling on defendants' objection to Kevin Casey's video deposition are as stated below. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/23/2005)
235 MOTION by plaintiff Joseph Lopez for judgment as a matter of law on his claim of unlawful detention past forty-eight hours; Notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
236 MOTION by plaintiff Joseph Lopez for judgment as a matter of law. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/30/2005)
224 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held and continued to 3/23/2005 at 09:30 AM. Closing arguments to begin at 12:30 p.m. No notice (mw, ) (Entered: 03/23/2005)
225 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Jury trial held. The jury returns a verdict for defendants City of Chicago and Officer Jose Gomez on plaintiff's excessive force claim and on plaintiff's battery claim. The Court enters judgment on the verdict as stated. Any post trial motions are to be filed by 04/06/05. Trial ends - Jury. All pending dates and motions are hereby stricken as moot. Civil case terminated. Judge's staff mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)

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227 DEPOSITION of Kevin Casey taken on 03/19/05.(cdy, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
228 TRIAL VIDEO DEPOSITION of Charles Gruber taken on 3/9/05(cdy, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
229 OBJECTIONS by defendants to Kevin Casey's video deposition. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
230 TRIAL EXHIBITS, one box containing (1) plaintiff's trial exhibits; (2) defendantss' trial exhibits; and (3) joint trial exhibits. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
231 PROPOSED JURY Instructions submitted by plaintiff; Notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
232 MEMORANDUM Opinion. Signed by Judge Samuel DerYeghiayan on 3/23/2005. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
233 JURY Verdict Form. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
234 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted. Enter Memorandum Opinion. Mailed notices. Memorandum Opinion distributed in open Court. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2005)
226 ENTERED JUDGMENT. Signed by Michael Wing, Deputy Clerk, on 3/24/2005. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
237 NOTICE of appeal by Joseph Lopez regarding orders 132, 160, 225, 232, 134, 234, 131, 226 ; Filing fee $ 255.00 paid; Receipt number 10327124 (dj, ) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
238 DOCKETING Statement by Joseph Lopez regarding notice of appeal237 (dj, ) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
239 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal237. Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 04/01/2005)
240 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal237 ; USCA Case No. 05-1877. (cdy, ) (Entered: 04/07/2005)
241 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 3/14/05 and 3/14/05,; Before the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan. (241-1 through 241-2). (cdy, ) . (Entered: 04/07/2005)
242 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by plaintiff. (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/18/2005)

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243 MOTION by Defendants for extension of time to file their bill of costs (gma, ) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
244 NOTICE of Motion by Allen Duarte for presentment of MOTION by Defendants for extension of time to file their bill of costs 243 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 4/27/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
245 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Defendants' motion for extension of time to file their bill of costs 243 is granted to and including 05/23/05 without objection. Judge's staff mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
246 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 237 (USCA no. 05-1877) consisting of 7 vol. of pleadings, 8 vol. of transcripts, 1 box of trial exhibits, 1 loose exhibit and 9 loose pleadings. (air, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 4/28/2005 (dj, ). (Entered: 04/27/2005)
248 BILL of Costs by defendants; Notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
249 MEMORANDUM by defendants in support of their bill of costs. (cdy, ) (Entered: 05/25/2005)
247 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Plaintiffs' response to the defendants' bill of costs shall be filed by 06/08/05. Judge's staff mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 05/24/2005)
250 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 3/15/05, 3/15/05, 3/16/05, 3/17/05, 3/21/05, 3/22/05, 3/23/05; Before the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan (250-1 through 250-8) (cdy, ) Modified on 5/31/2005 (cdy, ). (Entered: 05/31/2005)
251 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit supplemental record on appeal 237 (USCA no. 05-1877) consisting of eight volumes of transcipts. (cdy, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 6/6/2005 (cdy, ). (Entered: 06/02/2005)
252 MOTION by Plaintiff to stay defendants' petition for costs pending appeal (gma, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
253 NOTICE of Motion by Joseph Lopez for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiff to stay defendants' petition for costs pending appeal 252 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 6/14/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
254 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Plaintiff's

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motion to stay defendants' petition for costs pending appeal 252 is denied. Plaintiff is given until 06/17/05 to respond to defendants' bill of costs. Judge's staff mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
255 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to defendants' petition for costs ; Notice of filing (eav, ) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
256 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : For the reasons stated below, defendants' bill of costs is approved in its entirety and order payment to be made to defendant City of Chicago. Mailed notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
257 BILL of Costs by City of Chicago in the amount of $24,491.11 dated 5/24/05. (cdy, ) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
258 COSTS Taxed in favor of City of Chicago in amount of $ 25,491.11 and against plaintiffs. (cdy, ) (Entered: 07/20/2005)
259 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 11/05/03; Before the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan (cdy, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 3/7/2006 (cdy, ). (Entered: 08/19/2005)
260 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit supplemental record on appeal 237 (USCA no. 05-1877) consisting of one volume of transript. (cdy, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/23/2005 (cdy, ). (Entered: 08/19/2005)
261 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to vacate order on motion to stay, motion hearing,, 254 and for further relief (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
262 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to vacate, motion for relief, 261 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 12/20/2005 at 09:00 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
263 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to vacate order on motion to stay, motion hearing,, 254 and for further relief261 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
264 CORRECTED NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to vacate, motion for relief, 261 before Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 12/20/2005 at 09:00 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
265 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez Amended Exhibit regarding exhibit263, notice of motion262 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered:

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12/16/2005)
266 NOTICE by Joseph Lopez re exhibit265 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
267 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Plaintiff's motion to vacate this Court's judgment awarding costs to Chicago and for such further relief and/or sanctions as the Court deems appropriate 261 is entered and continued. City defendant is given until 1/3/06 to file its response and plaintiff is given until 1/10/06 to file his reply in further support. The Court will issue its ruling by mail. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
268 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago to motion to vacate, motion for relief, 261 (Duarte, Allen) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
269 REPLY by Joseph Lopezin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to vacate order on motion to stay, motion hearing,, 254 and for further relief261 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
270 NOTICE by Joseph Lopez re reply to response to motion269 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
271 MINUTE entry before Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan : Fore the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion to vacate the Court's ruling awarding costs to defendants is denied. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
272 LETTER from the USCA retaining the record on appeal in USCA no. 05-1877 consisting of 7 pleadings, 9 loose pleadings, 17 transcripts and 1 exhibit. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
273 OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Argued 2/22/2006; Decided 9/22/2006 in USCA case no. 05-1877. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
274 MANDATE of USCA dated 9/22/2006 regarding notice of appeal237 ; USCA No. 05-1877. We Reverse the judgment of the district court, with costs, and Remand this case to the district court for entry of judgment for Lopez on his duration of confinement claim and for a new trial. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
275 BILL of Costs. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
MAILED Rule 40.5 letter to counsel of record. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/20/2006)

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276 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 05-1877 consisting of seven volumes of pleadings, nine volumes of loose pleadings, fourteen volumes of transcripts, one volume of exhibits, and one box of exhibits. (td, ) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
279 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to Judge Elaine E. Bucklo for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 10/31/2006. (For further details see order).(gej, ) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
277 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : This case having been remanded for a new trial, status hearing set for 11/21/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
278 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : On court's own motion, status hearing set for 11/21/06 is vacated. Final Pretrial Conference set for 11/21/2006 at 01:30 PM. This case is placed on the court's January pool trial calendar beginning 1/9/07 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
280 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to reset Trial Date (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 11/10/2006)
281 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to reset280 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/16/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 11/10/2006)
282 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiff's unopposed motion to reset 280 trial heard and the motion is granted. Accordingly, Jury Trial set for 1/9/07 is reset for 4/30/2007 at 09:30 AM. Pretrial Conference set for 11/21/06 is reset for 4/18/2008 at 04:30 PM. The case is referred to Magistrate Judge Brown for a settlement conference. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
283 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown for the purpose of holding proceedings related to settlement conference.(mpj, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 11/16/2006)
284 MINUTE entry before Judge Geraldine Soat Brown : This matter having been referred to Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown for a settlement conference, an initial status hearing is hereby set before Magistrate Judge Brown on 11/27/06 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1812 for the purpose of setting a date for the

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settlement conference. Counsel for parties shall review Judge Brown's Standing Order for Settlement Conference before appearing for the initial status hearing. See www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE BROWN. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/17/2006)
285 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Pretrial Conference set for 4/18/2008 in error is reset for 4/18/07 at 04:30 PM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/17/2006)
286 MINUTE entry before Judge Geraldine Soat Brown : Status hearing held. Off the record settlement conference held. Settlement conference set for 1/04/07 at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff shall serve the settlement letter on defendants pursuant to paragraph one of this Court's standing order for settlement conference by 12/04/06. Plaintiff shall include a reasonable breakdown of the fees and costs the plaintiff would be seeking. The defendants shall serve the responsive letter to the plaintiff's settlement letter by 12/18/06. Plaintiff's counsel shall fax or deliver copies of the letters to this Court's courtroom deputy by 12/28/06. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/27/2006)
287 MINUTE entry before Judge Geraldine Soat Brown : At the parties' request, the settlement conference previously set for 1/04/07 at 1:30 p.m. is stricken and reset to 01/08/07 at 1:30 p.m. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 11/27/2006)
288 MINUTE entry before Judge Geraldine Soat Brown :At the court's direction, a telephone conference is set for 01/04/07 at 4:00 p.m. Plaintiff's counsel shall initiate the call. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
289 MINUTE entry before Judge Geraldine Soat Brown :Telephone status hearing held. Off the record settlement conference held with counsel. Parties have reached an agreement with respect to the settlement of plaintiff's claims except for the issue of attorney's fees. Accordingly, Joseph Lopez is not required to attend the settlement conference set for Monday, January 08, 2007. Counsel for the parties shall attend the settlement conference and be prepared to discuss the issue of attorney's fees. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
290 MINUTE entry before Judge Geraldine Soat Brown :Settlement conference held with counsel. Parties have reached an agreement with respect to the settlement of plaintiff's claims for damages. However, the parties are not able to reach an agreement with respect the issue of attorney's fees. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the

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referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned judge. If at a later time the parties agree that a settlement conference would be useful, they should request another referral.Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/08/2007)
291 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiff's counsel having advised the court that a settlement has been reached as to all claims except the issue of attorney's fees, trial set for 4/30/07 and pretrial conference set for 4/18/07 are now vacated. Status hearing with respect to fee issue set for 4/20/07 at 10:00 a.m.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
292 MOTION by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Meyers, City of Chicago, Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for order Requiring the City to Pay Plaintiff the Agreed Settlement Amount (Attachments: # 1 Release and Settlement Agreement)(Duarte, Allen) (Entered: 04/19/2007)
293 NOTICE of Motion by Allen Duarte for presentment of motion for order, 292 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/24/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Duarte, Allen) (Entered: 04/19/2007)
294 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Parties' joint motion for order 292 requiring the city to pay plaintiff the agreed settlement amount is granted. Accordingly, the City is ordered to pay plaintiff Joseph Lopez the Settlement Amount of $50,000.00 pursuant to the terms of the Release and Settlement Agreement. Status hearing held on 4/20/2007. Plaintiff's fee petition will be due by 5/20/07; response by 6/20/07; and any reply by 7/6/07. Target date for ruling by mail set for 8/8/07. Following final resolution of the fee petition, plaintiff to file an agreed order of dismissal.Mailed notice (mpj, ) Modified on 9/6/2007 (mpj, ). (Entered: 04/23/2007)
295 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Pursuant to parties' request, briefing schedule on plaintiff's fee petition is amended as follows: Plaintiff's fee petition will be due by 7/13/07; response by 8/10/07; and any reply by 8/24/07. Target date for ruling by mail set for 8/8/07 is reset for 9/28/07.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
296 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for extension of time To File His Bill Of Costs (Kanovitz, Michael) (Linked Document has the incorrect case number) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
297 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of extension of time296 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on

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5/16/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
298 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Plaintiff's motion for extension of time 296 until 7/17/07 to file his bill of costs is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
299 MOTION by Defendants James Delafont, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Jose Gomez, Daniel Jacobs, Robert Meyers, City of Chicago, Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for extension of time of Briefing Schedule, Joint (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
300 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of extension of time299 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/16/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
301 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Parties' joint motion for extension of time 299 is granted. Accordingly, defendants to provide plaintiff with their final LR 54.3 materials by 7/16/07. Plaintiff's fee petition due by 7/18/07; response by 8/13/07; and any reply by 8/27/07. Target date for ruling by mail set for 9/28/07.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 07/13/2007)
302 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for leave to file petition instanter (Liskow, Samantha) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
303 NOTICE of Motion by Samantha Anne Liskow for presentment of motion for leave to file302 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/23/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Liskow, Samantha) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
304 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez A-Z regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for leave to file petition instanter302 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D-H# 2 Exhibit I-V# 3 Exhibit W, part 1# 4 Exhibit W, part 2# 5 Exhibit W, part 3 - Y# 6 Exhibit Z, part 1# 7 Exhibit Z, part 2# 8 Exhibit Z, part 3# 9 Exhibit Z, part 4# 10 Exhibit Z, part 5# 11 Exhibit Z, part 6# 12 Notice of Filing Certificate of Service)(Loevy, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
305 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file oversized memorandum in support of Fee Petition instanter is granted.Mailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
306 MEMORANDUM exhibit, 304, bill of costs275 by Joseph Lopez (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2007)

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307 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file excess pages Instanter (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Duarte, Allen) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
308 NOTICE of Motion by Allen Duarte for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages307 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/20/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Duarte, Allen) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
309 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendant City's motion for leave to file brief in excess of 15 pages, instanter 307 is granted.No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
310 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago to memorandum306 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Errata K)(Duarte, Allen) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
311 MOTION by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez for leave to file Oversized Reply Instanter (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 08/27/2007)
312 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for leave to file311 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/30/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 08/27/2007)
313 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Plaintiff's motion for leave to file 311 oversized reply brief is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
314 REPLY by Plaintiff Joseph Lopez to memorandum306 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, with attachments A-N# 2 Exhibit 2-8# 3 Exhibit 9# 4 Exhibit 10-15)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
315 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants are ordered to pay expenses and costs in the amounts of $11,537.12 (for taxable expenses) and $26,905.68 (for non-taxable expenses). See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details.Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
316 ENTERED JUDGMENT Signed by Judge Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/20/2007:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
317 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/20/2007:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered:

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 464 F.3d 711 (2006)
Joseph LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Jennifer Delucia, James Delafont, Daniel Jacobs, and Hector Vergara, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-1877.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
ARGUED February 22, 2006. DECIDED September 22, 2006.
7123 *712 *713 Michael Kanovitz (argued), Arthur Loevy, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Myriam Zreczny (argued), Suzanne M. Loose, Office of the Corporation Counsel Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
714 *714 SYKES, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Lopez was arrested by Chicago police for a murder he did not commit. The murder victim was a twelveyear-old boy, an innocent bystander hit by gunfire in a drive-by shooting. Lopez was arrested without a warrant, although with probable cause an 0907 eyewitness identified him as the shooter.
Following his arrest, the individual defendants0907all detectives with the Chicago Police Department 0907kept Lopez shackled to the wall of a windowless, nine-by-seven-foot interrogation room for four days and nights while they investigated the case. Lopez had nowhere to sleep but a four-foot-by-ten-inch metal bench or the dirty brick floor. The interrogation room had no toilet or sink; he had to "scream" for the detectives to let him out to use a bathroom. He was given only one bologna sandwich and one serving of juice as food and drink during the entire four days and nights he was kept in the interrogation room. The detectives questioned him from time to time and made him stand in two lineups.
After two-and-a-half days in these conditions, Lopez started to become disoriented and began hearing voices telling him to confess. He ultimately gave a statement containing a false confession that did not match the details of the crime. On the fifth day of his detention, Lopez was moved to the city lockup, charged, and finally taken to court. The following day, the police investigation led detectives to another individual who confessed to the murder. Lopez was released the next day.
Those were the facts the jury was entitled to believe based on evidence Lopez presented during a seven-day trial on his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights and his supplemental state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The detectives testified differently about their treatment of Lopez while he was in their custody, but there was no dispute that they detained him for five days after his warrantless arrest without taking him before a judge for a probable cause hearing. Remarkably, after hearing this evidence, the district court refused to submit the claims to the jury and instead granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law.
We reverse. Lopez was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claim that the detectives violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), holds that if a Gerstein probable cause hearing is not held within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest, the government must demonstrate the existence of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance to justify its failure to promptly present the person arrested to a judicial officer for a probable cause determination. Here, the defendants offered no reason for the five-day delay other than the continuation of their investigation,

but delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence are per se unreasonable under McLaughlin. Id.; see also Willis v. City of Chi., 999 F.2d 284, 288-89 (7th Cir.1993).
There was conflicting evidence at trial on Lopez's treatment while in the detectives' custody, raising a jury issue on his constitutional claim relating to the conditions of his warrantless detention and his state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district judge should not have taken these claims from the jury and resolved the factual conflict himself; they are remanded for retrial.
715 *715 I. Background
Given the procedural posture of this case, we recount the facts based on the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to Lopez, the party against whom the district court entered judgment as a matter of law. See Zimmerman v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 360 F.3d 612, 623 (7th Cir.2004) (when considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor). The facts pertinent to Lopez's duration-of-confinement claim under Gerstein and McLaughlin are undisputed.
On July 19, 2000, a twelve-year-old boy was shot and killed in a drive-by shooting in Lopez's Chicago neighborhood. Based on one eyewitness's identification, Chicago police officers arrested Lopez without a warrant at approximately 2 p.m. on July 20. Lopez stipulated at trial that the officers had probable cause to arrest him. The arresting officers took him to the Chicago Police Department's Area 5 detective headquarters where they left him in the custody of the defendant detectives: Jennifer Delucia, James Delafont, Daniel Jacobs, and Hector Vergara.
Lopez was placed in a nine-by-seven-foot interrogation room, and one of his arms was handcuffed to a metal ring fastened to the wall about three feet off the floor. When he asked if he could be unshackled from the wall, one of the detectives0907Lopez does not remember who0907told him "no" because he "was a murderer." The room's brick floor was dirtied with gum, cigarette butts, used matches, wrappers, and dust. Next to the wall and below the ring to which Lopez was shackled was a metal bench that was four feet long and ten inches wide. There was no sink, toilet, or running water in the room. There was a small window in the door, but it was covered over with paper so it was impossible to see through it. The room had no clock and Lopez did not have a watch or other timekeeping device with him, so he could not tell how long he was in the room or whether it was night or day. The detectives kept Lopez shackled to the wall of this room for four days and four nights.
Lopez's expert on police practices testified that a suspect should be held in such an interrogation room only for "short durations" not to exceed "eight hours." He testified that "generally you want to 0907you don't want to do it longer than what would normally be a business day or would normally be something somebody could tolerate for a period of time." He also said it would "[a]bsolutely not" be appropriate to hold a suspect in an interrogation room for even twenty-four hours, let alone the four days and nights Lopez endured.
The detectives let Lopez out of the interrogation room for only a few brief moments. They removed him twice to appear in police lineups, first on the evening of July 20 and then on the evening of July 21. At some point during his detention, the detectives transferred Lopez to a second interrogation room that was essentially the same as the first. To leave the interrogation room to use the bathroom, Lopez said he had to "scream[ ] from the top of [his] lungs" to get the detectives' attention in order to be let out. It is not clear how many times Lopez asked to use the bathroom. He implied on direct examination that it was multiple times: "Sometimes I'd be yelling for a while. I don't know how long. I couldn't time myself." But on cross-examination he said he thought he only asked once to use the bathroom. At any rate, because the interrogation room lacked a sink or running water, Lopez was 716 unable to attend to his personal hygiene in any way for the four days. He realized he *716 began to smell badly and Detective Jacobs told him he stunk.
Lopez had great difficulty sleeping during the four days and nights he was shackled to the wall of the interrogation room. He tried once to lie down on the brick floor to get some sleep, but he woke up with shooting pains down his shackled arm, which had begun to turn purplish blue, and pain in his shoulder, hip, and knees. Lopez then sat up on the bench and kept his shackled arm level with the ring on the wall in order to restore

proper circulation. He gave up trying to sleep lying down and just sat on the bench and leaned back against the wall. It seemed to Lopez that whenever he fell asleep in that seated position, he would bump his head on the wall and wake up. The little sleep he got was not restful.
For his first two-and-a-half days in the interrogation room, no one brought Lopez anything to eat or drink. He testified that he was able to grab a drink of water during his trips to the bathroom. He said, "[T]he only way I could use the bathroom or drink some water [was] if the detectives that were working on my case were there. If not, I had to wait." Lopez testified that he became disoriented and began to hear voices in his head at some point after he was brought back from the second police lineup, about a day and a half into his detention. He told the jury:
I couldn't even put my ideas in place. I couldn't even think straight. And every time I would, like, say something, I would tell myself man, you know, I didn't shoot that little boy and then a voice will click in and say yeah, you did shoot him. . . . It was just some voice that was coming from the back of my head just kept telling me yeah, you did shoot him. So after awhile me fighting against that voice, it just came true. I was like you know what, I started to believe that I did shoot [him]. . . . I was sitting there for a while and after me crying so much and trying to put thoughts all together, which wasn't even going together, I was sitting looking at the wall and I would feel like the wall was like coming in closer. And as I would feel it, it looked like it was coming in closer to me.
Lopez told the jury that by this point in his detention he could no longer think rationally and that "[his] mind was nowhere near [his] head." About 60 hours into his detention, Lopez gave a statement to Detectives Jacobs and Delafont in which he falsely confessed to having shot the twelve-year-old boy.
The details of Lopez's confession did not match the forensic evidence from the crime scene, and shortly thereafter Detective Jacobs returned to the interrogation room and angrily called Lopez a liar. The detective told Lopez he did not deserve to be a father0907Lopez's girlfriend was pregnant 0907and suggested that his girlfriend should get an abortion. Lopez retracted his confession and told Jacobs that he had not shot anyone. One of the detectives then brought Lopez a bologna sandwich and some juice; according to Lopez, it was the only food he received during his four-day stay. The detectives testified that they fed Lopez regularly by purchasing fast food with their own money, but they produced no receipts or other record of these purchases and there are no police documents indicating Lopez was fed in this manner.
On July 24, four days into Lopez's detention, an assistant state's attorney approved murder charges against him and he was transferred to the city lockup. There, Lopez was placed in a cell with a padded bunk for sleeping, a 717 toilet, and a sink. He also received a meal that he recalls as a hot bologna sandwich, french fries, and a *717 soda. All indications are that Lopez was fed regularly once he moved to the lockup.
Lopez appeared before a judge for arraignment and a probable cause hearing on July 25, five days after his warrantless arrest. The police continued to investigate the killing, and leads pointed to another individual, Miguel Figueroa, as the shooter. On July 26 Figueroa confessed to the murder. The state's attorney's office dropped the charges against Lopez and he was released on July 27.
Lopez sued the City of Chicago and the four detectives pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging they had subjected him to an unconstitutional detention0907because of the conditions he was subjected to and the extended duration of the detention in light of the warrantless arrest in 0907 violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.[1] He also asserted a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case was tried to a jury, which heard seven days of evidence. At the close of the evidence, both sides moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 50. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, and Lopez moved for judgment on his constitutional claim relating to the duration of his detention.
The district court denied Lopez's motion and granted judgment for the defendants on the duration-of-detention claim, concluding that extraordinary circumstances justified the five-day delay in presenting Lopez to a judicial officer for a probable cause hearing. The judge held that because the police were "actively attempting to solve a crime" involving the "heinous" shooting of "an innocent twelve-year old boy," and because Lopez had lied to police about his identity when he was arrested and gave "false alibis" and a false confession during detention, the

detectives were justified in delaying his presentment for a probable cause hearing so they could continue their investigation.
Regarding Lopez's claim relating to the conditions of his detention, the parties had agreed during trial that the Fourth Amendment's "objectively unreasonable" standard applied to the detectives' conduct and submitted jury instructions reflecting that standard. The district judge disagreed. He concluded that the evidence would have to establish the detectives acted with deliberate indifference a 0907 standard from the Eighth Amendment and due process contexts0907not merely that they acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. The judge concluded that "none of the evidence introduced at trial indicates that Defendant officers" were deliberately indifferent; "at best," the judge held, "the Defendant officers were negligent." On this basis the court entered judgment for the defendants on this claim.
Similarly, the district judge thought the evidence was insufficient to support Lopez's intentional infliction of 718 emotional distress claim because the detectives' conduct *718 "was at best negligent conduct." The court entered
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants on this claim as well. Lopez appealed.
II. Discussion
We review de novo the district court's decision to grant judgment as a matter of law. Mendenhall v. Mueller Streamline Co., 419 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir.2005). A court may enter judgment as a matter of law only if "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). When ruling on a Rule 50 motion, a court must view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Davis v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 445 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir.2006).
A. Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement
As we have noted, during trial the parties agreed that the Fourth Amendment governed Lopez's claim that the detectives subjected him to unconstitutional conditions and treatment during his warrantless detention. The district judge thought otherwise and evaluated Lopez's unconstitutional conditions claim using the more demanding "deliberate indifference" standard applicable to convicted prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and similar claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir.2006) (deliberate indifference requires a culpable state of mind such as ignoring a known risk of harm; it "is more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.2005) (convicted prisoners' challenge to conditions of confinement governed by the Eighth Amendment, "which has been interpreted to require proof that the convicts' custodians were deliberately indifferent to a serious hazard created by those conditions"); Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir.2003) (Fourteenth Amendment's due process standard as applicable to claims of pretrial detainees is the same "deliberate indifference" standard of the Eighth Amendment). The district court's application of the deliberate indifference standard made things more difficult for Lopez; the Fourth Amendment requires only proof that the defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir.2005).
The district court should have analyzed the detectives' conduct under the Fourth Amendment and its "objectively unreasonable" standard. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures; an arrest is a seizure, and the Fourth Amendment affords persons who are arrested the further, distinct right to a judicial determination of probable cause "as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 95 S.Ct. 854. The judicial determination of probable cause may be made before the arrest (in the form of an arrest warrant) or promptly after the arrest, at a probable cause hearing (sometimes called a Gerstein hearing). But whether the arresting officer opts to obtain a warrant in advance or present a person arrested without a warrant for a prompt after-the-fact Gerstein hearing, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause. See Haywood v. City of Chi., 378 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir.2004) (even though warrantless arrest 719 was "clearly" supported by probable cause, *719 Fourth Amendment required a probable cause hearing before a judicial officer).

McLaughlin established a general rule that persons arrested without a warrant must receive a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. (We will have more to say on the McLaughlin issue later.) Because Lopez was arrested without a warrant and had not yet been presented for a probable cause hearing, the Fourth Amendment should have been applied to his claim relating to the treatment and conditions he endured during his four days and nights in warrantless detention. Although his claim does not challenge the existence of probable cause, our cases hold that the Gerstein probable cause hearing is the event that terminates the Fourth Amendment's applicability following a warrantless arrest.
Accordingly, we have held that "the Fourth Amendment governs the period of confinement between arrest without a warrant and the preliminary hearing at which a determination of probable cause is made, while due process regulates the period of confinement after the initial determination of probable cause." Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 n. 14 (7th Cir.2000) (after a probable cause hearing the Fourth Amendment no longer applies); Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir.1999) (Fourth Amendment applies before the probable cause hearing and Due Process Clause applies after); Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.1996) (the "seizure" of an arrestee ends after the probable cause hearing). Our cases thus establish that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply at arrest and through the Gerstein probable cause hearing, due process principles govern a pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement after the judicial determination of probable cause, and the Eighth Amendment applies following conviction.
Although the defendants agreed in the district court that the Fourth Amendment's "objectively unreasonable" standard should apply, they have changed their tune on appeal. They now agree with the district court and argue that the claim is governed by the due process analysis applicable to claims of pretrial detainees, which borrows from the Eighth Amendment's "deliberate indifference" standard, applicable to conditions-of-confinement claims by convicted prisoners. See Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 620. They cite Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 193-95 (7th Cir.1989), but their reliance on that case is misplaced. Although Wilkins held that the period between arrest and charge falls under the rubric of due process rather than the Fourth Amendment, later cases, cited above, have limited Wilkins in light of Gerstein and McLaughlin. In particular, Villanova specifically recognized the tension between this court's holding in Wilkins and the Gerstein/McLaughlin line of cases, which apply the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard to the deprivation of liberty suffered by a warrantless arrestee. Villanova, 972 F.2d at 797. Villanova held that the conflict in the cases "can be reconciled" by applying the Fourth Amendment to the period between a warrantless arrest and the judicial probable cause determination and the principles of due process to confinement after probable cause has been judicially determined. Id.
The defendants cite Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees. But Bell concerned "persons who have been 720 charged with a crime but who have not yet been tried on the *720 charge"0907that is, pretrial detainees for whom a judicial determination of probable cause has already been made. Id. at 523, 99 S.Ct. 1861. That the Fourth Amendment does not apply to postarraignment detention does not make its protections inapplicable to the period between Lopez's arrest and his probable cause hearing. Bell is inapposite.
Lopez's trial evidence, if credited by the jury, was more than adequate to support a finding that the detectives' conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, this case should not have been taken from the jury even if the more burdensome standard of deliberate indifference applied. The defendants concede on appeal that the district court should have permitted the jury to consider Lopez's claim insofar as it alleged that shackling him to the wall of the interrogation room for four days and nights violated his constitutional rights. The jury should have been permitted to consider the totality of Lopez's evidence, not just the evidence of shackling. Lopez presented evidence that he was deprived of food, drink, and sleep during the four days and nights he spent shackled to the wall of the interrogation room, and was forced to yell for an extended period of time before being let out to use the bathroom. The defendants argue there is no evidence Lopez ever asked for food or drink or soiled himself. This is an argument for a jury, not a reviewing court.
If Lopez's version of events is believed, common sense alone would justify a conclusion that the detectives' conduct was objectively unreasonable; when the fact finder's task is to decide whether an act or omission is objectively unreasonable, reliance upon common sense is particularly appropriate. See United States v. Sharpe,

470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ("Much as a `bright line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria."). But the jury need not have relied on common sense alone. Lopez's police practices expert testified that it would "[a]bsolutely not" be appropriate to confine an arrested person in an interrogation room for twenty-four hours, much less for four days. On this record, the district court's refusal to submit this claim to the jury was unjustified; the court impermissibly weighed the evidence and drew inferences in favor of the defendants rather than Lopez, contrary to Rule 50's governing standards. Lopez's unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim must be retried.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
For similar reasons, we also reverse the judgment entered for the defendants on Lopez's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prove this claim, Lopez needed to establish the following: (1) that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) that they intended their conduct to inflict severe emotional distress or knew there was at least a high probability their conduct would inflict such distress; and (3) that their conduct did in fact cause him severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78, 127 Ill.Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill.1988). Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which goes "beyond all bounds of decency and [is] considered intolerable in a civilized community." Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 (Ill.1992)); 721 Campbell v. A.C. Equip. Servs. Corp., 242 Ill.App.3d *721 707, 182 Ill.Dec. 876, 610 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ill.App.Ct.1993).
Here again, the defendants concede on appeal that the district court erred by refusing to let the jury consider Lopez's shackling allegations. They argue nonetheless that there is no evidence from which jurors could have inferred intent, at least on the matter of the extent to which Lopez was receiving food, drink, and bathroom access. But if the jurors believed Lopez's evidence that he received food and drink only once over the course of four days and nights in custody, then they must also conclude the defendants lied about feeding him regularly with fast-food purchases. It is not as if the detectives tried to explain away Lopez's claim by saying they all thought someone else was giving him food. Instead, they claimed they fed him several times. Either Lopez is lying or the defendants are; their stories are incompatible.
If the jurors believed Lopez's version of events, they rationally could have inferred that the detectives intentionally deprived Lopez of food and drink and deliberately withheld bathroom access for extended periods. Lopez's evidence at trial essentially painted a picture of interrogators subjecting a captive suspect to several days of dire physical deprivation in order to coerce a confession. A jury rationally could have found this conduct extreme, outrageous, and intended to inflict severe emotional distress.
This is especially so because "[t]he more control which a defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely that defendant's conduct will be deemed outrageous, particularly when the alleged conduct involves either a veiled or explicit threat to exercise such authority or power to plaintiff's detriment." McGrath, 127 Ill.Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d at 809. The detectives exercised nearly complete control over Lopez's ability to move, sleep, eat, drink, and use the bathroom for the four days and nights he spent in their custody.
Finally, if the jurors believed Lopez's testimony, they rationally could have concluded that he suffered severe emotional distress when he became disoriented and started hearing voices telling him to confess to a murder he did not commit. The district court should not have granted judgment for the defendants on Lopez's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claim must be retried, and the retrial is not limited to Lopez's shackling evidence.
C. Unconstitutional Duration of Confinement
The district court also granted judgment for the defendants on Lopez's claim that the detectives unconstitutionally held him in custody for more than 48 hours before taking him before a judge for a probable cause hearing. The defendants do not dispute that Lopez was held for five days following his warrantless arrest before he received his Gerstein hearing, well beyond the 48-hour general limit established in McLaughlin. The defendants argue that this delay is not actionable in damages under § 1983 because the 48-hour rule of McLaughlin is not a core

constitutional right but a procedural safeguard designed to secure the Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest.
McLaughlin and Gerstein, read together, foreclose this argument. Gerstein clearly held that a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest is a core Fourth Amendment requirement: "the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of 722 liberty following *722 [warrantless] arrest." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 95 S.Ct. 854. McLaughlin, in turn, reiterated that "[u]nder Gerstein, warrantless arrests are permitted[,] but persons arrested without a warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause." McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53, 111 S.Ct. 1661. Police may postpone a Gerstein hearing for a reasonable amount of time in order to "cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice system." Id. at 55, 111 S.Ct. 1661. McLaughlin held that a "judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of [warrantless] arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein." Id. at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661. A lesser delay might still be unconstitutional "if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably." Id.; see also Willis, 999 F.2d at 287-89. But if the delay extends beyond 48 hours, "the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance" to justify the delay. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661; see also Haywood, 378 F.3d at 717 ("Haywood was arrested lawfully [with probable cause]. But he could not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, be continued in custody beyond 48 hours . . . unless a judicial officer determined there was probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime."); Luck, 168 F.3d at 324.
Lopez was thus constitutionally entitled to a prompt probable cause determination by a judicial officer. Under McLaughlin, "prompt" in this context usually means "within 48 hours." Because the detectives held Lopez without a judicial probable cause determination beyond the 48-hour safe harbor of McLaughlin, it was their burden to justify the delay by demonstrating the existence of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. They did not do so. The defendants wisely do not defend the rationale supplied by the district court 0907 that Lopez's "lying" (allegedly false alibis and what we know to be a false confession) prolonged their investigation. McLaughlin held unequivocally that delays for purposes of gathering evidence are per se unreasonable. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661; see also Willis, 999 F.2d at 288-89. Lopez was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his duration-of-confinement claim.
On remand, Lopez may recover compensatory damages for the unlawful duration of his confinement. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (compensatory damages are the norm when a plaintiff prevails on a § 1983 claim for constitutional violations and can prove actual damages). The defendants argue that Lopez is entitled to only nominal damages because he stipulated there was probable cause to arrest him. This argument is weak. Lopez presented evidence that he suffered physical and mental injuries as a result of his extended detention in the interrogation room. The jury could rationally conclude that if Lopez had received the Gerstein hearing to which he was constitutionally entitled, he would at least have been moved from the interrogation room to the jail before his body and mind deteriorated into the delusional state he described at trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND this case to the district court for entry of judgment for Lopez on his duration-of-confinement claim and for a new trial on: (1) Lopez's 723 unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim; (2) his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; *723 and (3) damages. Circuit Rule 36 shall apply on remand.
[1] Lopez sued the City of Chicago under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), alleging the City had a policy or practice of detaining persons arrested without a warrant beyond McLaughlin's 48-hour time period for a probable cause hearing. Lopez obtained affidavits from fourteen warrantless detainees who were held in interrogation rooms by Chicago police for multiple days, in violation of McLaughlin, shackled, deprived of food and sleep, and otherwise treated in the same manner as Lopez. The City then entered a Monell waiver consenting to entry of judgment against it in the event "the finder of fact in this case finds that any City of Chicago employee violated Plaintiff's rights under the Constitution." On the basis of this waiver, the City moved to bar evidence of the other detainees' treatment, and the district court granted the motion.

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 Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Distinguished by Grant ex rel. Estate of Ware v. City of Chicago, N.D.Ill., February 10, 2006
2002 WL 335346 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
Joseph LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Detective James Delafont, Detective Jennifer DeLucia, Detective Hector Vergara, Officer Jose Gomez, Officer Daniel Jacobs, and Officer Robert Myers, Defendant.
No. 01 C 1823. | March 1, 2002.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DARRAH, District J.
*1 Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez (“Lopez”), filed a nine-count complaint against the City of Chicago (“the City”) and several detectives and police officers. Counts I, IV, V, and VI are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of excessive force, unlawful detention, police torture, and conspiracy, respectively. Counts II, III, VII, VIII, and IX are state law claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, respondeat superior liability, and indemnification against the City, respectively. Presently before the Court is the City’s Motion to Stay Discovery on Monell Policy Claims and Sever1 Such Claims For Later Resolution.
A reading of the complaint supports the following abbreviated summary of the alleged conduct of the parties.
In July 2000, shortly after a twelve-year old boy, M.D., was shot and killed in Chicago, Lopez was taken into police custody. For the next four days, Lopez was handcuffed to a ring on the wall of a small room were he was interrogated by various police officers who attempted to coerce Lopez to confess to the above murder. Lopez was also subjected to a flawed line-up, excessive force, offensive physical contact, and denied sleep.
Five days after the murder, the Chicago Police charged Lopez with the murder and announced to the press that he had been so charged. That same day, Miguel Figueroa was arrested and confessed to murdering M.D.

Subsequently, Lopez was released, and the charges against him were dismissed.
Lopez’s Section 1983 claims against the City generally allege that the City failed to train, supervise, control, and discipline its police officers. These claims are commonly referred to as Monell policy claims. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Monell ); Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F.Supp.2d 893, 894 (N.D.Ill.2000) (Medina ). In conjunction with these claims, Lopez has propounded discovery requests seeking a substantial amount of information. For example, Lopez seeks the identification of every individual who ever complained to the City regarding police officers in the Fourteenth District and/or Area Five and their use of excessive force, unlawful detention, improper interrogation/investigation, and police torture for the past ten years. For each such complaint, he further seeks additional information, i.e., names of complainant, police officers involved, any and all witnesses, substance of the complaint, etc.
The City seeks to bifurcate the Monell claims and the claims against the individual officers. The City argues that bifurcation will conserve both the parties’ and the Court’s time and resources and is proper because Lopez cannot prevail on his Monell claims unless he first prevails on the claims against the individual officers.
It is within this Court’s “considerable discretion” to order the bifurcation of a trial. Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir.2000). Federal Rule of Civil procedure 42(b) permits a separate trial of any issue when such separation would be in the furtherance of the convenience of the parties, or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials are conducive to expedition and economy. Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir.1994) (Berry ). “Only one of these criteria need be satisfied for a court to order a separate trial.” Berry, 28 F.3d at 610. This broad discretion has been applied to suits involving Monell claims. See Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 365 (7th Cir.2000) (affirming District Court’s bifurcation of Monell claims); Medina, 100 F.Supp.2d at 894; Jones v. City of Chicago, 1999 WL 160228 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 10, 1999) (Jones ).
*2 Bifurcating the Monell claims has several advantages. First, in most cases, a disposition of the individual claims will either legally or practically end the litigation. If a plaintiff fails to prove that he suffered a constitutional injury based on the individual police officer’s conduct, plaintiff’s claim against the individual police officer fails and, as such, so does plaintiff’s claim against the municipality. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Furthermore, if the plaintiff prevails against the individual police officer, he may not want or
1

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

need to move forward on the Monell claims because Illinois law, 745 ILCS 10/9–102, directs the local government to pay tort judgments for compensatory damages for which the local government employee is liable. This statute allows a Section 1983 plaintiff to bring a claim directly against the municipality and obtain a judgment against the municipality to pay the officer if required to pay the plaintiff. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir.1997) (Wilson ).
Second, bifurcation is generally likely to bring about an earlier disposition of the suit because bifurcation allows a bypass of discovery relating to the Monell claims, which can add significant, and possibly unnecessary, time, effort, cost, and complications to the discovery process. See Medina, 100 F.Supp.2d at 895; Jones, 1999 WL 160228 at * 3.
Third, bifurcation can remove potentially unfair prejudice against the police officers at trial. Without bifurcation, the jury would likely hear evidence against the City of various acts of alleged police misconduct committed by numerous non-party officers to establish a policy or practice. Such evidence can be prejudicial to the individual defendants. See Medina, 100 F.Supp.2d at 895; Jones, 1999 WL 160228 at * 3.
Bifurcation of Monell claims also can have disadvantages. For example, individual public employees may be able to defeat a plaintiff’s claims through the defense of qualified immunity. See Wilson, 100 F.Supp.2d at 896. However, municipalities are not entitled to this defense. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Therefore, if a plaintiff losses his claim against individual public employees based on the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff may still go forward with his claims against the municipality. Thus, a second trial is not avoided, and a large part of the second trial is likely to be duplicative of the first trial.
In addition, there is no guarantee that a municipality will concede liability under 745 ILCS 10/9–102 if a verdict is rendered against the individual officers. The municipality may dispute payment, arguing that the police officer was not acting within the scope of his employment—a requirement under the Illinois statute. See 745 ILCS 10/9–102; Wilson, 120 F.3d at 685. If the municipality does contest 9–102 liability, additional litigation time and costs will be required.
*3 Last, a finding of liability against individual public employees, as compared to a finding of liability against a

municipality, may decrease the likelihood of the municipality’s acting to prevent future violations when that municipality is, or is not, named in a judgment.
In the instant case, discovery has began and is still proceeding. At this stage of the discovery, it is not possible to determine if the individual police officers will be prejudiced by the introduction of evidence relating to the Monell claims. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that two trials or further litigation will not be required because the individual police officers have not offered to waive the defense of qualified immunity and the City has not offered to stipulate to a judgment against the City for any compensatory damages awarded against the individual police officers. See Treece, 213 F.3d at 361 (bifurcation allowed after the City agreed to entry of judgment against itself if there was a finding of liability against the individual police officer). In light of these factors, bifurcation is not appropriate at this time.
The City also seeks to stay discovery on the Monell claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows the Court to control the sequence and scope of discovery. A review of Lopez’s discovery requests relating to the Monell claims demonstrates that Lopez seeks a large quantity of information and documentation that may not ultimately be needed. Therefore, discovery on the Monell claims will be deferred until after the completion of fact discovery on the claims against the individual police officers. See Medina, 100 F.Supp.2d at 898; Jones, 1999 WL 160228 at * 3; Kunz v. City of Chicago, 01 C 1753 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 2, 2001) (oral ruling) (collectively deferring discovery on Monell claims).
Discovery as to the claims against the individual police officers shall continue. At the time discovery is completed against the individual police officers, the parties and the Court will be able to reassess the case, including the prospects of settlement, the particular municipal policies or customs at issue, and the scope of discovery the Monell claims require.
For the reasons state above, the City’s Motion to Stay Discovery on Monell Policy Claims and Sever Such Claims For Later Resolution is denied in part and granted in part. The City’s Motion to Stay Discovery on the Monell Policy Claims is granted. The City’s Motion to Sever Such Claims For Later Resolution is denied.
	  

Footnotes

1

In their reply brief, Defendants’ state that they used the term “sever” in the motion, but the relief sought is actually bifurcation.

2

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)
	  
3

 
 Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Distinguished by Nelson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., W.D.Wis., March 8, 2013
2002 WL 31415767 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Joseph LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Detective James Delafont, Detective Jennifer DeLucia, Detective Hector Vergara, Officer Jose Gomez, Officer Daniel Jacobs, and Officer Robert Myers, Defendants.
No. 01 C 1823. | Oct. 25, 2002.
Detainee sued city and several detectives and police officers, asserting claims under § 1983 for excessive force, unlawful detention, police torture, and conspiracy, and under Illinois law for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil and conspiracy. On detainee’s motion to amend complaint to add class action allegations, the District Court, Darrah, J., held that: (1) detainee had standing to sue on behalf of proposed class; (2) proposed class action related back to time of filing of detainee’s individual action; and (3) proposed class satisfied numerosity requirement.
Motion granted.

West Headnotes (6)

[1]

Civil Rights

Criminal Law Enforcement;   Prisons

Detainee had standing to sue on behalf of proposed class of persons arrested by city’s police department without warrant and held for more than 48 hours pending prosecutor’s approval of felony charges, pursuant to city’s alleged “hold past court call policy,” since detainee alleged that city and police officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting him to policy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.

Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Limitation of Actions Class Actions, Matters Peculiar To
Detainee’s proposed class action against city and police officers on behalf of class of persons arrested without warrant and held for more than 48 hours pending prosecutor’s approval of felony charges, in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to city’s alleged “hold past court call policy,” arose out of same conduct or occurrence as detainee’s individual claims, as required for class action to relate back to filing of detainee’s individual action for purpose of assessing timeliness of claims raised in class action; detainee claimed that he was held pursuant to policy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[3] Limitation of Actions Class Actions, Matters Peculiar To
Detainee shared identity of interest with proposed class of persons arrested without warrant and held for more than 48 hours pending prosecutor’s approval of felony charges, in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to city’s alleged “hold past court call policy,” as required for proposed class action against city and police officers to relate back to filing of detainee’s individual action for purpose of assessing timeliness of claims raised in class action; detainee claimed that he was held pursuant to policy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Limitation of Actions Class Actions, Matters Peculiar To
City and police officers had fair notice of claims raised in detainee’s proposed class action on behalf of class of persons arrested without warrant and held for more than 48 hours pending prosecutor’s approval of felony charges, in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth
1

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

Amendments, pursuant to city’s alleged “hold past court call policy,” as required for class action to relate back to filing of detainee’s individual action for purpose of assessing timeliness of claims raised in class action; new claims arose out of same conduct as detainee’s individual claims, new claims did not alter known facts or issues, and new claims were based on same legal theories. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[5] Limitation of Actions Class Actions, Matters Peculiar To
City and police officers were not prejudiced by relation back of detainee’s proposed class action on behalf of class of persons arrested without warrant and held for more than 48 hours pending prosecutor’s approval of felony charges, in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to city’s alleged “hold past court call policy,” to filing of detainee’s individual action for purpose of assessing timeliness of claims raised in class action; discovery was not greatly extended, and burden and expense on city and officers was not so great as to constitute undue prejudice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[6] Federal Civil Procedure Prisoners and Inmates
Detainee’s proposed class of persons arrested without warrant and held for more than 48 hours pending prosecutor’s approval of felony charges, in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to city’s alleged “hold past court call policy,” satisfied numerosity requirement for certification; it was clear that at least 40 of 200,000 annual arrests included felony arrest where individual was detained for over 48 hours. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DARRAH, J.
*1 Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez (“Lopez”), filed a nine-count complaint against the City of Chicago (“the City”) and several detectives and police officers. Counts I, IV, V, and VI are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of excessive force, unlawful detention, police torture, and conspiracy, respectively. Counts II, III, VII, VIII, and IX are state law claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, respondeat superior liability, and indemnification against the City, respectively. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint Stating Class Action Allegations.
Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add class action allegations in light of recently discovered information, through depositions, that the Chicago Police Department detained Plaintiff, and others, pursuant to a longstanding policy called the “hold past court call policy”. The proposed amended complaint challenges the Chicago Police Department’s hold past court call policy under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint on behalf of himself and the following putative class:
All persons arrested by the Chicago Police Department without an arrest warrant and who were detained in excess of 48 hours pending approval of felony charges by the State’s Attorney at any time from March 15, 1999 to the present day.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that where an answer to a complaint has been filed, “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). A motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied “when there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or when the amendment would be futile.” Bethany Pharmacal, Inc. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir.2001).
[1] The City objects to the filing of the amended complaint
2

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

on several grounds. First, the City argues that the amendment would be futile because he lacks standing to represent the putative class.
“To have standing to sue as a class representative it is essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he represents.” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592–93 (7th Cir.1998), quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 216 (1974).
Here, Vladic alleges that the Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting him to the hold past court call policy. This same hold past court call policy is the basis of the putative class members’ causes of action for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, Vladic has standing to sue as a class member.
Defendants also argue that the amendment would be futile because some of the class members’ causes of action, as defined by Vladic, would be time barred. The basis of Defendants’ argument is that class actions do not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Therefore, Vladic’s claims could not relate back to March 15, 1999; but the class allegations could only date back to August 28, 2000, two years before the filing of the proposed second amended complaint.
*2 The “relation back” doctrine found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) is liberally applied. See Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 138 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1041 (N.D.Ill.2000) (Olech ). The relation back doctrine and Rule 15(c) are “intimately connected” with the policy underlying the statute of limitations. Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1041, quoting Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir.1987). Under this doctrine, an amended complaint is deemed to be filed on the date the original complaint was filed for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. See Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 744, 752 (N.D.Ill.1996).
In this district, courts have applied a four-factor inquiry when determining whether additional claims by new plaintiffs relate back. Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1045; Hawkins v. Groot Indust., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 226, –––– (2002 WL 31064313) (N.D.Ill. Aug.7, 2002); see also Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 494 F.Supp. 687, 688–89 (N.D.Ill.1980), aff’d, 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir.1981). These factors include whether or not: (1) the new plaintiff’s claim arose out of the ‘same conduct, transaction or occurrence’ as set forth in the original complaint; (2) the new plaintiff shares an ‘identity of interest’ with the original plaintiff; (3) the defendants have ‘fair notice’ of the new plaintiff’s claim; and (4) the addition of a new plaintiff will not cause the defendants prejudice. Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1044–45.

[2] As stated above, the “hold past court call policy” that forms the basis of Vladic’s original complaint is also the basis of the putative class members’ causes of action. Accordingly, the new plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the same conduct or occurrence as set forth in the original complaint.
[3] A new plaintiff shares an identity of interest when there is a relationship so close that a court can conclude that a defendant had notice of a new party’s potential claims and, therefore, would not suffer any prejudice by adding the party. See Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1045. In the present case, the basis of the claims is the City of Chicago’s policy of using the hold past court call policy in violation of the individuals’ Constitutional rights. The identity of the new plaintiffs would include those identical to Vladic, i.e., a person arrested by the Chicago Police Department without an arrest warrant who were detained in excess of over forty-eight hours pending the approval of felony charges. Furthermore, the original complaint alleged that the Defendants’ conduct was not exclusive to Vladic. Instead, Vladic alleged that he was illegally detained “as a matter of widespread practice” and such occurred “on a frequent basis”. Furthermore, the Chicago Police Department failed to try to remedy “the patterns of abuse ... despite actual knowledge of the same”. Thus, for purposes of this factor, Vladic satisfies the “identity of interest” test.
*3 [4] An amended complaint does not relate back unless the original complaint provided the defendant with fair and timely notice that it might have to defend a claim brought by a new plaintiff. See Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1045. Fair and timely notice is generally found if: (1) the new plaintiff’s cause of action arose from the same conduct, transaction or occurrence; (2) if the amended complaint does not alter the known facts and issues as found in the original complaint; and (3) the new claims are based on the same legal theories and facts as set forth in the original complaint. See Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1045–46.
As explained above, the new claims arise from the same conduct or occurrence as pled in the original complaint. In addition, the new claims would not alter the known facts or issues found in the original complaint. Furthermore, the new claims are clearly based on the same legal theories and facts as set forth in the original complaint. Under these circumstances, the Defendants had fair notice of the new claims. See Doe v. Calumet City, 128 F.R.D. 93, 94–95 (N.D.Ill.1989) (allegations of the existence of a policy and the municipality’s failure to take action to prevent similar misconduct in the original complaint sufficient to put defendant on notice that there were other possible plaintiffs).
[5] A defendant may be subject to undue prejudice if
3

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2002)

relevant evidence has been compromised or lost due to the passage of time or where the new claims would not afford the defendant adequate time for discovery. See Olech, 138 F.Supp.2d at 1046. Defendants argue that they would be unduly prejudiced by the addition of a class claim because it would cause undue delay in the final disposition of the case, greatly extend discovery, and be burdensome and expensive. Defendants do not specify what additional discovery would be required; instead, they argue that the additional parties would “exponentially increase the amount of discovery required”.
Discovery is still open in the instant case. In addition, discovery for Vladic’s Monell claims has been stayed and has, therefore, not yet began. The discovery as to the Monell claims is similar, if not identical, to the discovery that will be needed for the issue of class certification. Accordingly, discovery may not be greatly extended by the addition of the class allegations, and the burden and expense on the Defendant is not so great to constitute undue prejudice. Furthermore, a trial date has not been set. While the additional class allegation will likely increase some of the needed discovery and may add some time for final disposition of the case, such is the case with most any amendment to a pleading in which a claim is being added. See Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 1989 WL 64715 (N.D.Ill.1989) (increased liability an unavoidable result when amendments are granted); Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 1997 WL 543116 (N.D.Ill.1997) (increased exposure to potential liability does not constitute undue prejudice).
*4 [6] Lastly, Defendants argue that Vladic has failed to plead numerosity.

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be so numerous that joinder of all the members is impracticable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiff need not demonstrate the exact number of class members so long as a conclusion is apparent from good faith estimates (Peterson v. H & R Block Tax Servs., 174 F.R.D. 78, 81 (N.D.Ill.1997)); and the court is entitled to make “common sense assumptions” in order to support a finding of numerosity (Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 781, 785 (N.D.Ill.1984)). Generally, a class of forty is considered sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement. See Steinbrecher v. Oswego Police Officer Dickey, 138 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1106 (N.D.Ill.2001).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Vladic alleges, based on Defendants’ own witness testimony, that the hold past court call policy is applied to felony arrestees “routinely and often” and that over 200,000 total arrests take place in Chicago each year. Most of these arrests result in a detention in excess of forty-eight hours, and such detainees are held without sleeping facilities while in police custody. Based on these allegations, common sense would dictate that Vladic has sufficiently pled numerosity. While the 200,000 arrests include both felony and misdemeanor arrests and all of the arrests do not include a detention for over 40 hours, a common sense assumption can be made that at least 40 of the 200,000 arrests include a felony arrest where the individual was detained for over 48 hours.
For the reasons stated above, Vladic’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint Stating Class Action Allegations is granted.
	  

4

 
 Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)

2004 WL 725790 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Joseph LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
No. 01 C 1823. | March 31, 2004.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jonathan I. Loevy, Arthur R. Loevy, Danielle Loevy, Jonathan A. Rosenblatt, Michael I. Kanovitz, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Michael P. Manly, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, Thomas George DiCianni, Michael W. Tootooian, Darcy L. Proctor, Allen Duarte,Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Rolek, P.C., Paul W. Schroeder, June K. Ghezzi, James Cordray Dunlop, Alicia Marie Hawley, Karey Vering Skiermont, Jones Day, Dina Marie Kapernekas, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Opinion

was the Cobras shooting at the Latin Kings. Myers and Gomez received a tip that a girl named BeBe was a witness at the shooting. The officers spoke to BeBe and she indicated that a YLO Cobra with the nickname of JoJo had done the shooting. Myers claims that he knew that Plaintiff Joseph Lopez (“Lopez”) was nicknamed JoJo. Myers claims that at a previous meeting on the street that Lopez admitted that he belonged to the Cobras and that his nickname was JoJo. On July 20, 2000 the officers brought BeBe into the police station and she gave a description of JoJo as 5′8″ to 5″9′ tall and approximately 150 pounds. She also indicated that he was thin and medium to light skinned. Myers claims that the physical description of JoJo matched his recollection of the person he knew as Joseph Lopez. BeBe was later brought to the station and interviewed by Detective Delucia. BeBe successfully picked Lopez out of a photo lineup. Lopez was arrested the day after the shooting. In the squad car on the way to the police station Gomez admits to punching Lopez. Lopez has brought a nine count complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and state law actions. Gomez and Myers have moved for summary judgment on Counts V, VI, and VII of Lopez’s second amended complaint and Meyers has moved for summary judgment on Count III of the second amended complaint.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
DERYEGHIAYAN, J.
*1 This matter is before the court on Defendants Robert Meyers’ (“Meyers”) and Jose Gomez’s (“Gomez”) joint motion for summary judgment and on Plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of the officers’ 56.1 statement of facts. For the reasons stated below we grant the motion for summary judgment and deny the motion the strike.
BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2000 near 2820 West Cortland in Chicago, Illinois, an occupant of a gold colored vehicle fired shots intended for the occupants of a beige colored van. The shooter missed his target and a twelve year old girl was shot and killed. Witnesses described the shooter as a male Hispanic. Defendants Myers and Gomez are partners on the Chicago police force. The officers learned of the shooting and learned from another officer that the shooting might have involved the Latin Kings and YLO Cobras gangs. Gomez learned from another source that it

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the moving party must identify “those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). This initial burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”Id. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations or denials in the pleadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence
1

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir.2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir.2000).

Section 1983 claim based on an officer’s failure to intervene to prevent excessive force a plaintiff must show that the officer failing to intervene had reason to know that excessive force was being used and had a reasonable opportunity to step in and prevent the excessive force. Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1994). In this case the facts show that the punch by Gomez was sudden and there was only one punch. There is no evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Myers had an opportunity to preempt the punch. Therefore, we grant Myers’ motion for summary judgment on Count III.

DISCUSSION
I. Unlawful Detention Claim *2 If defendant officers can show probable cause it is an absolute bar to a Section 1983 claim. Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.1998). In determining whether officers had probable cause the court must consider the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of the arrest. Beauchamp v. City of Nobelsville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.2003). In this case there is overwhelming evidence that the defendant officers had probable cause. The officers had information that the shooting was done by the Cobras. They had a description of the shooter as a Hispanic male. They had spoken to BeBe and she told them that JoJo was the shooter and gave a description that matched Lopez’s description. Myers knew from previous encounters with Lopez what he looked like and he knew that Lopez was a Cobra and went by the nickname JoJo. BeBe picked Lopez out of a photo lineup at the police station. It is undeniably clear that Gomez and Lopez had probable cause. There is no evidence at all that Myers and Gomez were responsible for the extended detention of Lopez once he was at the station. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.1995)(stating that a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct or turn a blind eye to be held liable under Section 1983). Therefore we grant summary judgment on the Section 1983 unlawful detention claim.
II. Alleged Police Torture Lopez claims that he was shackled to the wall at the police station in order to coerce him into confessing to the shooting. There is absolutely no evidence in this case that Myers or Gomez had any responsibility for or control over the manner in which Lopez was detained during his detention. Therefore we grant Gomez’ and Myers’ motion for summary judgment on Count VII.

IV. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Lopez also brings an IIED claim. To establish an IIED claim under Illinois law a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant either intended that his conduct should inflict severe emotional distress, or knew that there was a high probability that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress; [and] (3) the defendant’s conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.” Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641, (7th Cir.2003)(quoting Doe v. Calumet City 161 Ill.2d 374, 204 Ill.Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d 498, 506 (Ill.1994)). In this case Lopez has not provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous or that Defendants intended their conduct to cause him severe distress or knew that their conduct would do so. One punch by Gomez is insufficient to support an IIED claim. Therefore, we grant summary judgment on the IIED claim (Count V).
V. Motion to Strike *3 Lopez has moved to strike portions of Defendants’ 56.1 statement of facts. Lopez’s motion is entirely without merit and it serves only to allow Lopez a basis to deny many of the facts alleged by Defendants in their 56.1 statement. Lopez denies facts in Defendants’ statement of facts because they are moot and irrelevant and then Lopez advances those same facts in his 56.1 statement of additional facts. For example, Lopez allegations in his complaint seek relief based upon the alleged conduct of Gomez. Now, however, Lopez requests this court strike to ¶ 96 of Defendants Rule 56.1 statement stating that “Gomez punched Plaintiff”. Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to Defendants’ 56.1 statement of facts are without merit. Therefore we deny the motion to strike.

III. Excessive Force Claim Myers moves for summary judgment on Count III. For a

CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant the Defendants’
2

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)

motion for summary judgment and deny the motion to

	  

strike.

3

 
 Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 4162805 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois,
Eastern Division.
Joseph LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, James Delafonte, Jennifer Delucia, Hector Vergara, Daniel Jacobs, Defendants.
No. 01 C 1823. | Nov. 20, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Jonathan I. Loevy, Russell R. Ainsworth, Arthur R. Loevy, Danielle Loevy, Jonathan A. Rosenblatt, Michael I. Kanovitz, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Allen Duarte, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, Dicianni & Krafthefer, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ELAINE E. BUCKLO, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff Joseph Lopez filed a lawsuit against defendants, the City of Chicago (“the City”), James Delafonte, Jennifer DeLucia, Hector Vergara, Daniel Jacobs, Jose Gomez, and Robert Meyers (collectively “defendants”) raising a number of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising from plaintiff’s arrest by Chicago police for a murder he did not commit. Lopez has petitioned for (1) attorney and paralegal fees in the amount of $888,592.00, (2) taxable expenses in the amount of $33,177.72, and (3) other costs in the amount of $28,932.00 pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006), and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006). Defendants raise several objections. For the following reasons, the petition is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
The following includes a brief review of the facts described in detail by the Seventh Circuit in Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 715-17 (7th Cir.2006). On July 19, 2000, a 12-year-old boy was killed in a drive-by

shooting. Based on one eyewitness’s identification, Lopez was arrested without a warrant around 2 p.m. on July 20 by Officers Gomez and Myers. Lopez initially lied to the police about his identity, but was identified by a police officer who was familiar with him. After Lopez was taken into custody by Officers Gomez and Myers, Lopez was handcuffed, placed in the police car, and punched in the face by Gomez. Lopez was then taken to the Chicago Police Department’s Area 5 detective headquarters where they left him in the custody of the defendant detectives: Jennifer Delucia, James Delafont, Daniel Jacobs, and Hector Vergara.
Lopez was placed in a nine-by-seven-foot interrogation room and his arm was handcuffed to a metal ring fasted to the wall about three feet off the floor. When Lopez asked to be unshackeld from the wall one of the detectives told Lopez “no” because he “was a murderer.” There was no sink, toilet, or running water in the room. The room had no clock and Lopez did not have a watch. He was kept shackled in the room for four days and four nights. During that period he was fed once and was allowed limited access to the bathroom, only after screaming for detectives to grant him permission to leave the room.
Lopez filed his initial nine-count complaint on March 15, 2001 alleging: (1) excessive force against Officer Gomez and a policy claim against the City under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, (1978); (2) assault and battery against Gomez; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Gomez; (4) unlawful detention against all defendants and a policy claim against the City; (5) police torture against all defendants and a policy claim against the City; (6) conspiracy against all defendants and a policy claim against the City; (7) common law civil conspiracy against all defendants; (8) respondeat superior against City; and (9) indemnification against the City. On July 17, 2001, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint which added claims for failure to prevent excessive force against Myers and a policy claim against the City, and expanded the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all defendants.
*2 On November 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint which contained class allegations, omitted the initial conspiracy counts, and added claims by plaintiff and the class against the City for an unlawful detention policy under (1) the fourth amendment and (2) the fourteenth amendment. Also, although false arrest was not formally pleaded in a specific count, defendants contended the second amended complaint contained allegations that “without probable cause” the officers arrested Lopez. On March 31, 2004, the court granted summary judgment to Officers Gomez and Myers on the false arrest, police torture, and intentional infliction of
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

emotional distress claims and also granted summary judgment to Officer Myers on the failure to intervene to prevent excessive force claims.
The court never reached the issue of class certification because plaintiff withdrew his class certification motion and then filed a third, and final, amended complaint on September 22, 2004 alleging the same claims as the initial complaint, but limiting the intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful detention, and police torture claims with respect to the individual defendants to DeLucia, Delafont, Vergara, and Daniels. The third amended complaint also omitted the original conspiracy counts.
A trial was held in March 2005. The court granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s unlawful detention, police torture, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The only claims to go to the jury were the excessive force and assault and battery claims against Gomez. The jury found for Officer Gomez on all claims.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded on appeal, finding that Lopez was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his unlawful detention claim and the police torture and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims should have been decided by the jury. On remand, the case was reassigned to this Court, and the parties reached a settlement of all claims. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, plaintiff could seek reasonable attorneys’ fees.
II.
Defendants do not take issue with plaintiff’s entitlement to fees as a prevailing party under § 1988, but with the computation of the fee award in light of plaintiff’s dropped and unsuccessful claims. (See Resp. Br. at 7) (“Nonetheless, the City does not object to a good portion of counsel’s claimed time.”). Under § 1988, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’ ” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). Where a prevailing party has succeeded on some, but not all, of his claims an award of fees for time expended on unsuccessful claims may not be appropriate if these do not “involve a common core of facts or ... [are] based on related legal theories.” Id. at 435.
*3 Plaintiff and his counsel litigated this case for a period

of almost 6 years. The claims can be generally grouped as follows: claims pertaining to (1) Lopez’s initial arrest, (2) Lopez’s subsequent detention, and (3) the class action. With respect to claims pertaining to Lopez’s initial arrest, the court granted summary judgment against Lopez on some claims and the remaining claims were rejected by the jury. Accordingly, these were not “successful.” With respect to the detention claims, the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the unlawful detention claim, and that plaintiff was entitled to submit his remaining claims regarding his detention to the jury. The City concedes plaintiff is entitled to fees with respect to at least some of the detention claims. Finally, the class action claims were withdrawn by plaintiff. Accordingly, these claims were not “successful.” The issue, then, is what degree of overlap, if any, exists among these claims in relation to the time entries objected to by defendants and the fees sought.
A. Objections to Time Entries Concerning Gomez and Myers Defendants first take issue with specific entries they claim were devoted solely to the unsuccessful arrest claims against Officers Gomez and Myers. As an initial matter, plaintiff points out that even if he had not proceeded against Gomez and Myers on the arrest claims these individuals would still have been witnesses and subject to discovery because there is a common core set of facts and the claims are based on related legal theories. While I need not determine the broader question of whether all arrest claims are necessarily related to detention claims, the court’s ruling granting defendants judgment as a matter of law makes clear that these arrest claims were considered related for purposes of Lopez’s unlawful detention claim against the detective defendants and the City. The court stated that there were extraordinary circumstances which warranted Lopez’s extended detention, specifically that
[w]hen the police arrested Lopez they were actively attempting to solve a crime involving the shooting of an innocent twelve year old boy. Thus, police were dedicating their efforts to solve that heinous crime. The undisputed evidence shows that police were working around the clock attempting to solve the crime .... it was Lopez himself who created the delays he now accuses the Defendants for. Lopez, when arrested, lied to the police about his identity.
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Lopez v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 1823, 2005 WL 711986, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar.23, 2005) rev’d by Lopez, 464 F.3d at 717, 722-23. Although the district court may have been incorrect on this point, plaintiff was clearly entitled to conduct discovery and research on this issue in making his case for unlawful detention against the City and remaining defendants. Indeed, as early as 2001 the individual defendants alleged plaintiff was responsible for his own injuries. (See Doc. Entries # 23-25, 75, 156, 155-57.) Most of the entries objected to by defendants describe issuing discovery requests and reviewing responses generally and/or by Officers Gomez and Myers. All these entries are appropriate in light of the overlap in legal issues and fact questions. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. For example, entries 41, 73, 101-05, 122, 306-07, 769-70 are not specifically restricted to work related solely to the claims against Gomez and Myers, but concern general discovery and review of answers and court rulings. The only exception is entry 36, which simply provides “Gomez waiver issue.” On its face, this does not appear to relate to discovery and plaintiff fails to explain how this entry pertained to general discovery. Accordingly, I will grant defendants’ objection with respect to entry 36.
*4 I must also sustain the defendants’ objection with respect to plaintiff’s entries concerning the plaintiff’s response to Gomez and Myers’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, these entries are 658, 669, 672, 675-81, 684, 687, 692-93, 699, 702, 704-08, and 710-13 and paralegal Thayer’s 1/23/04 entry. Nothing in plaintiff’s briefs in support of this petition sufficiently addresses the relationship between this claim and the remaining claims. As set forth in the plaintiff’s own response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, that motion addressed a distinct issue. In plaintiff’s words:
Defendant’s[sic] dispositive Motion is far narrower and much less dispositive than it purports to be.
...
Despite the Defendants’ voluminous submission, there is only one question which even arguably needs resolution by the Court: whether Officer Myers had a reasonable opportunity to prevent his partner, Officer Gomez, from committing excessive force after Gomez announced that he intended to strike Plaintiff.
(Pl. Resp. at 1-2, Doc. Entry # 121.) In light of such a statement, and the fact that plaintiff did not appeal the summary judgment order, I cannot find that these specific entries required work that overlapped with the unlawful detention claim against the remaining defendants. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s decision and recitation of the pertinent facts reinforces the notion that this claim was discrete and did not affect the consideration of

plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim against the remaining defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for fees is also denied with respect to entries 658, 669, 672, 675-81, 684, 687, 692-93, 699, 702, 704-08, and 710-13 and paralegal Thayer’s 1/23/04 entry.
B. Objections to Class Action/Monell Entries Defendants object to a number of entries as pertaining to plaintiff’s withdrawn class action allegations. At the outset, I note that plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ objection to entry 243. Accordingly, defendants’ objection is sustained with respect to that entry. As to the remaining entries, plaintiff disputes these pertain to Monell discovery, which required discovery on whether the City had an unlawful practice or policy in place (contrary to the City’s assertions) and whether other detainees had been subjected to similar treatment under the practice or policy.
Defendants’ objections rely heavily on the fact that on February 28, 2002 the court stayed all Monell discovery pending the completion of fact discovery against the individual officers. But this argument fails for two reasons. First, plaintiff’s investigation was not in violation of the stay for plaintiff was free to investigate his claims in the meantime because the stay pertained only to formal discovery with defendants. Second, the stay was lifted, for all functional purposes by Judge Darrah’s October 24, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order, which states “The discovery as to the Monell claims is similar, if not identical, to the discovery that will be needed for the issue of class certification.” I agree with plaintiff, and Judge Darrah, that there was a substantial overlap between the Monell claim and the class action claim and, therefore, these entries do not pertain solely to the class action claims.
*5 Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff did not prevail on his Monell claim. As already described, plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim against the City arises from the same common core of facts and is a related legal theory. The City’s decision to moot the issue by entering into a waiver a few months before trial (and which it amended just six days prior to trial) does not extinguish plaintiff’s entitlement to the discovery entries on this issue. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to recovery for entries 85-86, 90-91, 94, 126, 144, 217, 234, 238, 748-50, 753-57, 1011 and 1013.
III.
Defendants next take issue with the reasonableness of plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. “The most useful starting point
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 433. “The party seeking the fee award bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours worked and the hourly rates claimed.” Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.1999).
Plaintiff “may recover only those hours that his attorneys would bill in the private sector.” Garcia v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 8945, 2003 WL 22175620, at *3, (N.D.Ill. Sept.9, 2003) (Holderman, J.) (citation omitted). Accordingly, I must exclude “hours that are excessive, redundant, otherwise unnecessary.” Id. As with the determination of reasonable hourly rates, the applicant for fees must provide sufficient description of the type of work performed. Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1187 (7th Cir.1992). “A court should not require any more than the level of detail paying clients find satisfactory.” Garcia, 2003 WL 22175620, at *3 (citation omitted).

not sufficiently complex to even warrant entries by counsel’s paralegal staff. “The relevant inquiry for requested paralegal fees is ‘whether the work was sufficiently complex to justify the efforts of a paralegal, as opposed to an employee at the next rung lower on the pay-scale ladder.’ ” Id. at 553 (quoting People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1315 (7th Cir.1996)). Paralegal time spent on “ ‘clerical’ or secretarial tasks” should be disallowed. Id.
*6 Unlike the type of work generally identified in Spegon as administrative or clerical, the entries at issue here are reflective of more complex tasks. Document review, as mundane as it sounds, cannot be categorically labeled as “non-legal work.” In fact, it is how a lot cases are made and won. Lawyers are trained to understand the relevance of a written statement or existence of a document and its potential for admissibility, and this task cannot be summarily delegated to secretarial staff. Accordingly, the objections to entries concerning document review are overruled.

A. Objections to Duplicative Entries Defendants argue plaintiff’s counsel has billed for duplicative efforts in entries 72, 122, 143, 157, 201, 222, 258, 575, 580, 590, 593, 597-98, 604, and 739-41. I agree with defendants that entries 72, 143, 157, 201, 580, 590, 593, and 739 reflect duplicative efforts involving more than one of plaintiff’s counsel attending a status hearing or deposition and are not sufficiently justified by plaintiff.1 Accordingly, these are stricken.
The remaining entries pertain to collaborative efforts among members of plaintiff’s legal team (including reviewing discovery responses and addressing other discovery issues, as well as preparing witnesses for depositions) and are reasonable and consistent with the nature of the case. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir.2007) (“There is no hard-and-fast rule as to how many lawyers can be at a meeting or how many lawyers can spend discussing a project.”). Accordingly, defendants’ remaining objections on this ground are denied.
B. Objections to Non-Legal Work Defendants take issue with a number of attorney entries on the ground that they are for non-legal tasks which could have been performed by other staff members. See Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553. In particular, defendants take issue with entries for document review (including of arrest reports and the response to the subpoena for the State’s Attorney’s Office), telephone interviews of other arrestees, and entering information about those people into a database. Defendants also contend these tasks are

Similarly, the entries concerning the investigation of the plaintiff’s Monell claim and interviews of other arrestees cannot be easily delegated to secretarial staff. Assessments concerning the relevance and potential admissibility of evidence in support of plaintiff’s Monell claims are legal and were properly conducted by lawyers. Accordingly, the entries are not for “non-legal” work.
Finally, it is likely there will be some organizational tasks associated with compiling and maintaining an expanding electronic and physical database of discovery materials in a large case such as this. Paralegals are trained to maintain and manage such databases and all of the entries complained of by defendants are not for strictly clerical tasks as identified in Spegon, but involve organizational and case management skills. Therefore, I deny defendants’ objections with respect to entries 1/20/04, 2/15/05, 2/24/05, 3/1/05, 3/25/05, 3/28/05, and 5/7/07. The only paralegal entries which do appear to identify strictly clerical tasks are 10/21/03 (“Delivery of courtesy copy of motion”); 11/17/03 (“Photocopying”); 11/21/03 (same); 8/24/04 (“Messenger service or Plaintiff’s response to [motion]”); 2/23/05 (“Photocopying and shipping”); 2/25/05 (“Photocopying”); and 3/22/05 (“Delivering Plaintiff’s motion”). Accordingly, the defendants’ objections with respect to the paralegal entries 10/21/03, 11/17/03 (second entry), 11/21/03, 8/24/04, 2/23/05, 2/25/05, and 3/22/05 are sustained. Plaintiff also withdraws entries 10/15/03, 10/16/03, 12/9/03, and 2/20/04, which pertain to filings related to the motion for class certification and fails to respond to defendants’ objection with respect to the 10/23/03 entry (which also pertained to the motion for class certification). In sum, defendants’ objections on paralegal entries 10/15/03, 10/16/03, 10/21/03, 10/23/03, 11/17/03 (second entry), 11/21/03, 12/9/03, 2/20/04, 8/24/04,
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2/23/05, 2/25/05, and 3/22/05 are sustained.
C. Objections for Excessive, Unreasonable, and Unnecessary Work Defendants complain the following entries are excessive or redundant in some manner: 40, 73, 79, 220-21, 253, 256, 353-58, 418, 575, 643, 646, 648-49, 653, 654, 691, 718, 720, 723, 724-26, 793, 843, 939, and 942. I have reviewed these entries and find they are reasonable. For example, entry 220 is for 1.5 hours spent reviewing draft discovery responses and in a conference with another attorney; entry 353 is for 1.00 hour for a conference discussing settlement strategies with 2 other attorneys; entry 793 is for 3.00 hours of drafting motions in limine addressing a Daubert challenge and detention law. Accordingly, defendants’ objections to these entries are denied.
*7 Defendants also complain the following entries are too vague or lack sufficient detail: 242, 403, 408, 413, 415, 421, 442, 528, 535, 727, 810, 839, 840, 842, 951, 956-58, 960, 963, 964, 973, 974, 976, 977, and 980. I have reviewed all these entries and find only entry 403 is vague because it only reads “[r]eview documents” and does not specify what kind of documents or in relation to what claim. Accordingly, defendants’ objections are denied with respect to the remaining entries and granted with respect to entry 403.
Defendants also object to the following paralegal entries: 7/8/03, 7/15/03, 10/20/03, 10/21/03, 10/30/03, 11/17/03 (first entry), 12/9/03, 8/23/04, 2/28/05, 3/10/05, 3/13/05, 3/14/05, and 9/22/06.2 I deny the objections with respect to the entries pertaining to plaintiff’s fifth and sixth motions to compel because the documents sought overlapped with plaintiff’s Monell discovery. Similarly, plaintiff’s response to the City’s motion to bar trial of policy issues was not unwarranted or unreasonable in relation to the issues in this case and plaintiff’s concerns about the waiver as expressed in his response in opposition. (See Doc. Entry 149.) Moreover, in light of plaintiff’s larger success before the Seventh Circuit on the unconstitutionality of his detention (which as a result of the waiver would also apply to the City), see Lopez, 464 F.3d at 717 n. 1, work on this motion in limine is recoverable. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 414-15 (7th Cir.1998) (“an unsuccessful but reasonable argument in support of a successful claim may be compensable”). With respect to the remaining paralegal entries, plaintiff fails to respond to defendants’ objection to entry 9/22/06 and I find entry 3/14/05 for “Task unspecified” too vague despite plaintiff’s purported explanation. Accordingly, paralegal entries 9/22/06 and 3/14/04 are stricken.
Finally, unlike the cases relied on by defendants, I do not find the remaining entries defendants attack as “lumping”

(by attorneys or paralegals) prevent a court from determining whether the time was reasonably spent. The entries provided sufficient detail as to the nature of the tasks, which are consistent with the total time spent on the tasks. The only exception is the time for paralegal Sharon Walsh, who billed in excess of 200 hours but failed to accompany any of her time entries with descriptions of the tasks accomplished, instead providing only a general affidavit. In the case of paralegals Ainsworth, Kanovitz, their accompanying affidavits provide sufficient description of the type of tasks they performed and do not render their time entries unreasonable in light of the limited nature of their time entries. Nor do I find plaintiff’s counsel practice of billing quarter-hour increments unreasonable. Accordingly, defendants’ remaining objections on these grounds are denied with the exception of the time for paralegal Sharon Walsh.
In sum, defendants’ objections to attorney entry 403 and paralegal entries 9/22/06 and 3/14/04 are sustained. As is their objection to the time of paralegal Walsh.
D. Reasonableness of Attorney and Paralegal Hourly Rates *8 Determination of an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is based on the market rate for services rendered, “the rate that lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work in question.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 555. An attorney’s affidavit alone does not establish his or her reasonable market rate, but “in conjunction with other evidence of the rates charged by comparable lawyers is sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs’ burden.” Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir.2000).
Plaintiff has submitted his counsel’s billing records, affidavits by counsel of record, case law, news periodicals, and the Laffey Matrix in support of the rates set forth in the petition for attorneys’ fees. This evidence, in particular the case law, satisfies plaintiff’s burden with respect to his attorneys’ hourly rates. Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir.2001) (“The fee applicant can meet his initial burden ‘either by submitting affidavits from similarly experienced attorneys attesting to the rates they charge paying clients for similar work or by submitting evidence of fee awards the attorney has received in similar cases.’ ”) (quoting Spegon, 175 F.3d at 556). “[O]nce an attorney provides evidence establishing his market rate, the opposing party has the burden or demonstrating why a lower rate should be awarded.” Gautreaux, 491 F.3d at 659-60.
Defendants’ attempts to demonstrate that a lower rate should be awarded are unavailing. As pointed out by plaintiff, the cases cited by defendants in support for lower rates are not current, instead ranging from
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Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

1999-2002. Furthermore, defendants’ argument that civil rights attorneys are not compensated at rates higher than $300 an hour is contradicted by more current case law. See, e.g., Delgado v. Village of Rosemount, No. 03 C 7050, 2006 WL 3147695, *4-5 (N.D.Ill. Oct.31, 2006); Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, No. 05 C 4265, 2006 WL 3694851, at *2-3 (N.D.Ill. Aug.9, 2006). Plaintiff has also voluntarily reduced attorney Kurt Feuer’s rate to $350 an hour and his fees are to be calculated accordingly.
Similarly, plaintiff has submitted his paralegals’ billing records or affidavits, and case law in support of the rate set forth in the petition for paralegal fees. The evidence satisfies plaintiff’s burden with respect to his paralegals’ hourly rates.
E. Degree of Success Obtained The degree of success obtained is a critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). In determining the degree of success obtained, I consider (1) the difference between the judgment actually recovered and the recovery sought; (2) the significance of the legal issues on which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) the public interest at stake in the litigation. See Connolly v. Nat’l Sch. Bus. Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.1999). “[T]he notion that the fees must be calculated proportionally to damages” has been rejected by Seventh Circuit. See Alexander v. Gerhardt Enter., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 194 (7th Cir.1994) (citing City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986)); see also Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1048 (7th Cir.1999); Riter v. Moss & Bloomberg, Ltd., No. 96 C 2001, 2000 WL 1433867, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept.26, 2000) (Pallmeyer, J.).
*9 The second and third factors weigh heavily in favor of a finding of reasonableness, for the significance of plaintiff’s case and public interest at stake cannot be easily understated. After intensely contested proceedings, plaintiff vindicated his constitutional right. His case shed light on police practice and procedure in the City of Chicago, both with respect to the individual defendants and through the Monell waiver, and resulted in a finding by the Seventh Circuit that this practice and procedure was a violation of the Constitution. It is more difficult to gage what disparity, if any, existed between the settlement amount and recovery initially sought. Plaintiff’s complaints never set forth a specific dollar amount for the relief sought and defendants fail to address this issue in their brief. Overall, in light of the nature of the case and the time span of the litigation, I decline to reduce the lodestar amount as unreasonable.

IV.
Defendants object to several of plaintiff’s expenses and costs entries as excessive and vague. At the outset, plaintiff withdraws the following entries with respect to taxable expenses: 9, 18, 19, 32, 57, 58, 59, 223, 232, 237, 240, and 242-45. Plaintiff also withdraws the following entries with respect non-taxable expenses and costs: 12-16, 17-18, and 20. With respect to the remaining entries, plaintiff points out that although defendants’ own bill of costs, granted by the trial judge in 2005, was for $25,491.00, defendants now argue plaintiffs are not entitled to costs exceeding $13,504.24. Plaintiff’s point is well taken-the defendants’ own bill of costs in 2005 establishes a general reasonableness benchmark for purposes of costs in this litigation which defendants are hard-pressed to dispute. Moreover, an examination of the remaining costs entries at issue confirm these are not unreasonable or excessive. For example, plaintiff’s attempt to create a replica of the small bench he was forced to sit and lie on for 4 days with the intention of using it as an exhibit at trial is not unreasonable. Nor are plaintiff’s counsel taxi and other travel costs in light of the extensive nature of the litigation, hours worked, and length of trial. Plaintiff has submitted numerous receipts supporting the charges and I find this documentation sufficient. See generally Telular Corp. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 01 C 431, 2006 WL 1722375, at *10 (N.D.Ill. June 16, 2006). The overwhelming majority of these receipts are for taxis from plaintiff counsel’s office to the federal court building. The entries for expenses and costs do not lack sufficient detail rendering them any vaguer than defendants’ own bill of costs. Accordingly, the remaining objections are denied.
V.
Plaintiff’s petition for fees and costs is granted in part and denied in part. The following attorney entries have been stricken or withdrawn: 36, 72, 143, 157, 201, 243, 403, 580, 590, 593, 658, 669, 672, 675-81, 684, 687, 692, 693, 699, 702, 704-08, 710-13 and 739. Attorney Kurt Feuer’s rate is reduced to $350 an hour (for a total of 94.5 hours worked). The following paralegal entries have been stricken or withdrawn: 10/15/03, 10/16/03, 10/21/03, 10/23/03, 11/17/03, 11/21/03, 12/9/03, 1/23/04, 2/20/04, 8/24/04, 2/23/05, 2/25/05, 2/28/05, 3/14/05, 3/22/05, and 9/22/06 (all by paralegal Thayer). Also, the time entries for paralegal Walsh have been stricken (these totaled 209.5 hours at a rate of $105). These entries and the difference in Feuer’s rates ($4,725.00) are to be subtracted from plaintiff’s request for $888,592.00 in fees.3 Accordingly, defendants are ordered to pay attorneys’ and paralegal fees in the amount of $819,577.00.
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*10 As for expenses and costs, the following entries have been stricken or withdrawn: 9, 18, 19, 32, 57, 58, 59, 223, 232, 237, 240, and 242-45, with respect to taxable expenses, and entries 12-16, 17-18, and 20 with respect to non-taxable expenses and costs. These entries are to be subtracted from plaintiff’s request of $33,177.72 and $28,932.00, respectively.4 Accordingly, defendants are

ordered to pay expenses and costs in the amounts of $11,537.12 (for taxable expenses) and $26,905.68 (for non-taxable expenses).
ENTER ORDER.
	  

Footnotes

1

Some of these entries also identify additional activities by counsel, but fail to specify how much time was spent on each task and

therefore must be stricken in their entirety.

2

Objections to entries 10/21/03 and 12/9/03 have already been sustained in section III.B.

3

The stricken entries break down as follows:

Entry

36

72

143

157

201

243

403

580

590

593

658

669

672

675

676

677

678

679

680

681

684

# Attorney JL 365 JL 365 JL 365
MK 350 MK 350 MK 350 AL 450 MK 350 MK 350 MK 350 RA 250 AL 450 RA 250 RA 250 AL 450 MK 350 RA 250 MK 350 AL 450 MK 350 MK 350

Rate 0.25
1 1 1.5 1.25 1 1 11.5 7.5 2.25 2.75 2.25 2.25 5 0.5 13.5 3.75 16 1.75 9.5 7

Time $ 91.25 $ 365.00 $ 365.00 $ 525.00 $ 437.50 $ 350.00 $ 450.00 $ 4,025.00 $ 2,625.00 $ 787.50 $ 687.50 $ 1,012.50 $ 562.50 $ 1,250.00 $ 225.00 $ 4,725.00 $ 937.50 $ 5,600.00 $ 787.50 $ 3,325.00 $ 2,450.00

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687 692 693 699 702 704 705 706 707 708 710 711 712 713 739
10/15/2003 10/16/2003 10/21/2003 10/23/2003 11/17/2003 11/21/2003
12/9/2003 1/23/2004 2/20/2004 8/24/2004 2/23/2005 2/25/2005 2/28/2005 3/14/2005 3/22/2005 9/22/2006

MK 350 MK 350 AL 450 MK 350 AL 450
JR 290 JR 290 MK 350 JR 290 MK 350 MK 350 MK 350 AL 450 MK 350 MK 350 Walsh 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105 Thayer 105

3.25 3.5 1
0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25
0.5 0.75 2.25
1.5 2
0.25 6
1.25 209.5
4 3 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 2 0.75 3

$ 1,137.50 $ 1,225.00
$ 450.00 $ 87.50
$ 337.50 $ 217.50
$ 72.50 $ 175.00 $ 217.50 $ 787.50 $ 525.00 $ 700.00 $ 112.50 $ 2,100.00 $ 437.50 $21,997.50 $ 420.00 $ 315.00
$ 52.50 $ 52.50 $ 157.50 $ 52.50 $ 52.50 $ 105.00 $ 52.50 $ 52.50 $ 52.50 $ 78.75 $ 78.75 $ 210.00 $ 78.75 $ 315.00
8

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Total

Billed

4

The stricken expenses and costs break down as follows:

NONTAXABLE

ENTRY

9

18

19

32

57

58

59

223

232

237

240

242

243

244

245

Total

$ 2,026.32

TAXABLE

ENTRY

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

Total

$21,640.60

$64,290.00
# AMOUNT $ 24.50 $ 2.21 $ 6.70
$ 231.00 $ 368.05 $ 368.05 $ 112.50
$ 30.00 $ 285.00 $ 119.27
$ 8.00 $ 48.00 $ 141.03 $ 12.98 $ 269.03
# MOUNT $ 4,000.00 $ 6,237.50 $ 4,025.00 $ 4,050.00
$ 700.00 $ 925.00 $ 1,362.50 $ 340.60
9

Lopez v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
	  
10