U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF

Dixon et al v. City of St. Louis et al Assigned to: District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 01/28/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff

David Dixon

represented by

Mary B. McCord GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 600 New Jersey Avenue, NW Suite 312 Washington, DC 20001 571-447-3902 Email: mbm7@georgetown.edu LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maureen Hanlon ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314-361-8834 Email: mhanlon@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael-John Voss ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855-724-2489 x1002 Fax: 855-925-1307 Email: mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathaniel Richard Carroll ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314-361-8834 Fax: 314-925-1307

Email: ncarroll@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert D. Friedman INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 600 New Jersey Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001 202-661-6599 Email: rdf34@georgetown.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314-461-8834 x2006 Fax: 314-925-1307 Email: satri@archcitydefenders.org TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander G. Karakatsanis CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 1601 Connecticut Avenue N.W. Suite 800 Washington, DC 20009 202-681-2409 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102

855-724-2489 x1003 Fax: 314-925-1307 Email: bstrode@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacki J. Langum ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855-724-2489 Fax: 314-925-1307 Email: jlangum@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314-361-8834 x1024 Fax: 314-925-1307 Email: jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.or g ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314-361-8834 x1021 Fax: 314-925-1307 Email: jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam R Nemeth ADVANCEMENT PROJECT

Plaintiff

1220 L. Street NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 202-728-9557 Fax: 202-728-9558 Email: mnemeth@advancementproject.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth T. Wayne INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 600 New Jersey Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001 202-662-4192 Email: sw1098@georgetown.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas B. Harvey ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 1220 L. Street NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 314-482-3342 Fax: 314-925-1307 Email: tharvey@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.

represented by

Mary B. McCord (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maureen Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael-John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert D. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Blake Alexander Strode

Plaintiff

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacki J. Langum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam R Nemeth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth T. Wayne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Aaron Thurman

represented by

Mary B. McCord (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maureen Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael-John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert D. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Blake Alexander Strode

Plaintiff

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacki J. Langum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam R Nemeth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth T. Wayne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Richard Robards On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by

Mary B. McCord (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maureen Hanlon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael-John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert D. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Blake Alexander Strode

V. Defendant

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacki J. Langum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Miriam R Nemeth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seth T. Wayne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

City of St. Louis Defendant

represented by

Robert H. Dierker ST. LOUIS CITY COUNSELORS OFFICE - 2 1200 Market Street Room 314 St. Louis, MO 63103 314-622-4378 Fax: 314-622-4956 Email: dierkerr@stlouis-mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew David Wheaton ST. LOUIS CITY COUNSELORS OFFICE - 2 1200 Market Street Room 314 St. Louis, MO 63103 314-622-4594 Fax: 314-622-4956 Email: wheatona@stlouis-mo.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Kathleen G Bruyns SCHLICHTER BOGARD LLP Law Department 100 S. Fourth St. Suite 1200 St. Louis, MO 63102 314-621-6115 Fax: 314-621-7151 Email: mbruyns@uselaws.com TERMINATED: 05/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Vernon Betts Sheriff
Defendant

represented by

Robert H. Dierker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew David Wheaton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Kathleen G Bruyns (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robin Ransom Judge, in her official capacity as preseiding judge

represented by

Michael E. Pritchett OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Jefferson City 207 W. High St. P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0899 573-751-4526 Fax: 573-751-9456 Email: michael.pritchett@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Isaacson OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI - St. Louis P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314-340-7861 Fax: 314-340-7029 Email: robert.isaacson@ago.mo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Albus UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE - St Louis Department of Justice 111 S. Tenth St. 20th Floor St. Louis, MO 63102 573-751-7421 Fax: 573-751-0774 Email: usamoe.crimdock@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles D. Shull OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Jefferson City

Defendant

207 W. High St. P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0899 573-526-6505 Fax: 573-522-2636 Email: doug.shull@ago.mo.gov TERMINATED: 04/15/2019
Christopher Robert Wray SHOOK HARDY LLP - Kansas City 2555 Grand Blvd. 19th Floor Kansas City, MO 64108 816-474-6550 Fax: 816-421-5547 Email: cwray@shb.com TERMINATED: 07/09/2020
Dean John Sauer OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Jefferson City 207 W. High St. P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0899 573-751-8807 Email: john.sauer@ago.mo.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter T. Reed ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Old Post Office Building P.O. Box 861 St. Louis, MO 63188 314-340-7366 Email: preed@usa.doj.gov TERMINATED: 03/26/2020

Rex Burlison in his official capacity as interim Presiding Judge

represented by

Michael E. Pritchett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Isaacson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Albus (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles D. Shull (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2019

Christopher Robert Wray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2020

Dean John Sauer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Marie Blake OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI Jefferson City 207 W. High St. P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65102-0899 573-751-3321 Fax: 573-751-0774 Email: Julie.Blake@ago.mo.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter T. Reed (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2020

Defendant

Elizabeth Hogan

represented by

Judge, in her official capacity as

Division 16 Judge and Duty Judge

Michael E. Pritchett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Isaacson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Albus (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles D. Shull (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2019

Christopher Robert Wray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2020

Dean John Sauer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Marie Blake (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter T. Reed (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2020

Defendant

David Roither

represented by

Judge, in his official capacity as

Division 25 Judge and Duty Judge

Michael E. Pritchett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Isaacson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Albus (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles D. Shull (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2019

Christopher Robert Wray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2020

Dean John Sauer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Marie Blake (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter T. Reed (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2020

Defendant

Thomas McCarthy Judge, in his official capacity as Division 26 Judge

represented by

Michael E. Pritchett (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert J. Isaacson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas C. Albus (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles D. Shull (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/15/2019

Christopher Robert Wray (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/09/2020

Dean John Sauer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie Marie Blake (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter T. Reed (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2020

Defendant

Dale Glass Commissioner, in his official capacity as St. Louis Commissioner of Corrections

represented by

Robert H. Dierker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew David Wheaton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Megan Kathleen G Bruyns (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/28/2019

#

Docket Text

1

COMPLAINT against defendant All Defendants with receipt

number 0865-7002160, in the amount of $400 Non-Jury

Demand,, filed by Aaron Thurman, Jeffrey Rozelle, David Dixon,

Richard Robards. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Ex. A, # ​2​ Exhibit Ex.

B, # ​3​ Exhibit Ex. C, # 4​ ​ Exhibit Ex. D, # ​5​ Exhibit Ex. E, # ​6

Exhibit Ex. F, # ​7​ Exhibit Ex. G, # ​8​ Exhibit Ex. H, # 9​ ​ Exhibit Ex.

I, # ​10​ Exhibit Ex. J, # ​11​ Exhibit Ex. K, # ​12​ Exhibit Ex. L, # ​13

Exhibit Ex. M, # ​14​ Exhibit Ex. N, # ​15​ Exhibit Ex. O, # ​16​ Exhibit

Ex. P, # ​17​ Exhibit Ex. Q, # ​18​ Exhibit Ex. R, # ​19​ Exhibit Ex. S,

# ​20​ Exhibit Ex. T, # ​21​ Exhibit Ex. U, # ​22​ Exhibit Ex. V, # ​23

Exhibit Ex. W, # ​24​ Exhibit Ex. X, # ​25​ Exhibit Ex. Y, # ​26​ Exhibit

Ex. Z, # ​27​ Exhibit Ex. AA, # 2​ 8​ Exhibit Ex. BB, # ​29​ Exhibit Ex.

CC, # ​30​ Exhibit Ex. DD, # ​31​ Exhibit Ex. EE, # ​32​ Exhibit Ex.

FF, # ​33​ Exhibit Ex. GG, # ​34​ Exhibit Ex. HH, # ​35​ Exhibit Ex. II,

# ​36​ Civil Cover Sheet Civil Cover Sheet, # ​37​ Original Filing

Form Original Filing Form, # ​38​ Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​39

Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​40​ Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​41

Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​42​ Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​43

Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​44​ Waiver of Service Waiver, # ​45

Waiver of Service Waiver)(Atri, Sima) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/28/2019 01/28/2019 01/28/2019 01/28/2019 01/28/2019 01/28/2019
01/28/2019 01/28/2019

Case Opening Notification: Waivers issued 8. All parties must file the Notice Regarding Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction Form
consenting to or opting out of the Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Click ​here​ for the instructions. Judge Assigned: Honorable Shirley P. Mensah. (MFG) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

2

Pursuant to Local Rule 2.08, the assigned/referred magistrate

judge is designated and authorized by the court to exercise full

authority in this assigned/referred action or matter under 28

U.S.C. Sec. 636 and 18 U.S.C Sec. 3401, including any case

budgeting matters. (CSAW) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

3

MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Atri, Sima) (Entered:

01/28/2019)

4

MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​3​ MOTION to Certify

Class filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey

Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Ex. 1, # ​2

Exhibit Ex. 2, # ​3​ Exhibit Ex. 3, # ​4​ Exhibit Ex. 4)(Atri, Sima)

(Entered: 01/28/2019)

5

MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Plaintiffs David

Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman.

(Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Ex. 1 Proposed Order, # ​2​ Exhibit Ex. 2

Proposed Bond Order)(Atri, Sima) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

6

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron

Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Memorandum in Support of

TRO Motion, # ​2​ Exhibit Ex. A, # ​3​ Exhibit Ex. B, # ​4​ Exhibit Ex.

C, # ​5​ Exhibit Ex. D, # ​6​ Exhibit Ex. E, # ​7​ Exhibit Ex. F, # ​8

Exhibit Ex. G)(Atri, Sima) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

7

NOTICE by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey

Rozelle, Aaron Thurman re ​5​ MOTION for Temporary

Restraining Order (Atri, Sima) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

8

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron

Thurman. (Atri, Sima) (Entered: 01/28/2019)

01/29/2019 01/29/2019 01/29/2019
01/29/2019 01/29/2019 01/29/2019

9

ENTRY of Appearance by John McCann Waldron for Plaintiffs

David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman.

(Waldron, John) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

10

ENTRY of Appearance by Blake Alexander Strode for Plaintiffs

David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman.

(Strode, Blake) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

11

REASSIGNMENT ORDER (GJL). - The above styled and

numbered case was opened on January 28, 2019, and randomly

assigned to the Honorable Shirley Padmore Mensah, United

States Magistrate Judge. After assignment of this case, the

plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.

Therefore, this case must be reassigned to a District Judge of the

court. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the

above-styled cause is randomly reassigned to the Honorable

Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge. (JWD) (Entered:

01/29/2019)

12 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the undersigned United States District Judge is disqualified from handling any matters in this case, and the Clerk of Court shall randomly reassign the case to another judge. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 1/29/2019. (Forwarded Order to KXS to re-assign case.)(AFC) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

13

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Seth Wayne. The

Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100

receipt number 0865-7004491) by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1

Certificate of Good Standing DC Bar Certificate of Good

Standing)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

14

REASSIGNMENT ORDER (GJL). Pursuant to the order of

recusal by the Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District

Judge entered on January 29, 2019. ​IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the above styled cause is reassigned to the Honorable

Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge. District Judge

Ronnie L. White no longer assigned to case. Case reassigned to

District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig for all further proceedings.

(MRC) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

01/29/2019 01/29/2019 01/30/2019 01/30/2019
01/30/2019 01/30/2019

15 ENTRY of Appearance by Michael-John Voss for Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Voss, Michael-John) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

16

ENTRY of Appearance by Thomas B. Harvey for Plaintiff David

Dixon. (Harvey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

17

ENTRY of Appearance by Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder for

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron

Thurman. (Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

18

ELECTRONIC MINUTE ENTRY (no pdf attached) for

proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig:

Motion Hearing held on 1/30/2019 re ​5​ MOTION for Temporary

Restraining Order filed by Aaron Thurman, Jeffrey Rozelle,

Richard Robards, David Dixon. The parties reach an agreement

before the hearing commences. The parties discuss the details of

a stipulation before the Court. The parties will submit the final

stipulation today. The case is set for a status hearing on Friday,

February 1, 2019 at 12:30 PM. Order to issue. (Court

Reporter:Patti Dunn Wecke,

Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314-244-7984)

(proceedings started: 9:34 AM) (proceedings ended: 10:33

AM)(Deputy Clerk: B. Porter)(Appearance for Plaintiff: Michael

John Voss, Sima Atri, Blake Strode, John Waldron, Thomas

Harvey, Jacqueline Kutnik-Bauder, Alec Karakatsanis (via

phone))(Appearance for Defendant: Thomas Albus, Robert

Dierker) (BRP) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

19

STIPULATION ​OF THE PARTIES​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Voss,

Michael-John) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

20

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall

proceed as set forth in the stipulation. IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that that parties shall appear for a status conference

on the record in this matter on Friday, February 1, 2019, at 12:30

PM. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/30/19.

(KXS) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

01/30/2019
01/31/2019 01/31/2019 01/31/2019 01/31/2019 01/31/2019 01/31/2019 01/31/2019

21 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Robert D. Friedman. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865-7009109) by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Friedman, Robert) (Entered: 01/30/2019)

22

ENTRY of Appearance by Charles D. Shull for Defendants Rex

Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom,

David Roither. (Shull, Charles) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

23

ENTRY of Appearance by Michael E. Pritchett for Defendants

Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin

Ransom, David Roither. (Pritchett, Michael) (Entered:

01/31/2019)

24 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​21​ Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Robert D. Friedman by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 31, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

25

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​6​ Motion for Leave to File in Excess of

Page Limitation by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards,

Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed

by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 31, 2019. (SAA)

(Entered: 01/31/2019)

26

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​8​ Motion for Leave to File in Excess of

Page Limitation by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards,

Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed

by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 31, 2019. (SAA)

(Entered: 01/31/2019)

27 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​13​ Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Seth Wayne by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards,
Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 31, 2019. (SAA)
(Entered: 01/31/2019)

28

SUPPLEMENTAL ​Brief in Response to Court Order​ by Plaintiffs

David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman.

(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 01/31/2019)

02/01/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019
02/01/2019 02/01/2019 02/01/2019

29

ENTRY of Appearance by Alexander G. Karakatsanis for

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron

Thurman. (Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

30

ENTRY of Appearance by Robert H. Dierker for Defendants

Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert)

(Entered: 02/01/2019)

31 ENTRY of Appearance by Dean John Sauer for Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

32

ENTRY of Appearance by Robert J. Isaacson for Defendants

Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin

Ransom, David Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered:

02/01/2019)

33

MEMORANDUM re ​19​ Stipulation ​Defendant Judges'

Memorandum Per the Parties' Stipulation Paragraph 6​ by

Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy,

Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered:

02/01/2019)

34

ENTRY of Appearance by Jacki J. Langum for Plaintiffs David

Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman.

(Langum, Jacki) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

35

ENTRY of Appearance by Thomas C. Albus for Defendants Rex

Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom,

David Roither. (Albus, Thomas) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

36

ELECTRONIC MINUTE ENTRY (no pdf attached) for

proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Status

Conference held on 2/1/2019. The Court hears from attorney in

regards to the status of the case. The TRO is resolved until the

Court hears from counsel. (Court Reporter:Susan Moran,

Susan_Moran@moed.uscourts.gov, 314-244-7983) (proceedings

started: 12:39pm) (proceedings ended: 1:02pm)(Deputy Clerk: K.

Battle)(Appearance for Plaintiff: Michael-John Voss, Robert

Friedman (telephone), Sima Atri, Alexander Karakatsanis

(telephone), Blake Strode, Jacqueline Kutnik-Bauder, Seth

Wayne (telephone), and Thomas Harvey

02/04/2019 02/05/2019 02/06/2019 02/08/2019 02/21/2019

(telephone))(Appearance for Defendant: Robert Dierker, Robert Isaacson, and Dean Sauer) (KCB) (Entered: 02/01/2019)

37

STATUS REPORT by David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey

Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 02/04/2019)

38

MEMORANDUM re ​37​ Status Report by Defendants Vernon

Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered:

02/05/2019)

39

STATUS REPORT by David Dixon. (Harvey, Thomas) (Entered:

02/06/2019)

40

ENTRY of Appearance by Megan Kathleen G Bruyns for

Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Bruyns,

Megan) (Entered: 02/08/2019)

41

MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments:

# ​1​ Exhibit Dixon Declaration, # 2​ ​ Exhibit Rozelle Declaration, #

3​ Exhibit Aaron Thurman Declaration, # ​4​ Exhibit Robards

Declaration, # ​5​ Exhibit Forester Declaration, # ​6​ Exhibit Waldron

Declaration, # ​7​ Exhibit Roy Declaration, # ​8​ Exhibit Carter

Stewart Declaration, # ​9​ Exhibit R. Lee Declaration, # ​10​ Exhibit

Bracken Declaration, # ​11​ Exhibit Anderson Declaration, # ​12

Exhibit Marcum Declaration, # ​13​ Exhibit White Declaration, # ​14

Exhibit Carter Declaration, # ​15​ Exhibit Johnson Declaration, #

16​ Exhibit M. Lee Declaration, # ​17​ Exhibit Moorehead

Declaration, # ​18​ Exhibit Williams Declaration, # ​19​ Exhibit

Adrianna Thurman Declaration, # ​20​ Exhibit S. Thurman

Declaration, # ​21​ Exhibit Martin Declaration, # ​22​ Exhibit Bryant

Declaration, # ​23​ Exhibit Holman Declaration, # ​24​ Exhibit Harris

Declaration, # ​25​ Exhibit Lehmkuhl Declaration, # ​26​ Exhibit

Tinyan Declaration, # ​27​ Exhibit Dailey Declaration, # ​28​ Exhibit

Heimberger Declaration, # ​29​ Exhibit Letter from The Bail

Project, # ​30​ Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Wayne,

Seth) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

02/21/2019 02/22/2019 02/22/2019 02/26/2019 02/27/2019

42

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation ​for

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Class-wide

Preliminary Injunction​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1

Attachment Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a

Class-wide Preliminary Injunction, # ​2​ Text of Proposed Order

Proposed Order)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 02/21/2019)

43 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​42​ Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation for Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Class-wide Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 22, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 02/22/2019)

44

MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​41​ MOTION for

Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth)

(Entered: 02/22/2019)

45

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to ​44

Memorandum in Support of Motion, ​4​ Memorandum in Support of

Motion, ​3​ MOTION to Certify Class , ​41​ MOTION for Preliminary

Injunction by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,

Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Isaacson,

Robert) (Entered: 02/26/2019)

46 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​45​ Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to ​44​ Memorandum in Support of Motion, 4​ Memorandum in Support of Motion, ​3​ Motion to Certify Class, ​41 Motion for Preliminary Injunction by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 27, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

02/27/2019
03/01/2019 03/01/2019 03/01/2019 03/01/2019 03/01/2019 03/05/2019

47

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall meet

and confer and shall file, by March 6, 2019, a joint proposed

schedule for proceedings on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary

injunction (ECF No. 41). The proposed schedule should set forth

a schedule for any discovery, including any expedited discovery

sought, a proposed date for a hearing on the motion, and an

estimate of the time necessary for such hearing. Prior to the

hearing, the Court will issue a Case Management Order requiring

the parties to file pre-trial materials, including but not limited to a

joint stipulation of uncontested facts, a list of all witnesses and a

short synopsis of the subject matter of their expected testimony,

a list of all discovery responses and portions of depositions to be

offered into evidence, proposed findings of fact and conclusions

of law, and trial briefs. (Joint Scheduling Plan due by 3/6/2019.)

Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 27,

2019. (BRP) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

48

ENTRY of Appearance by Peter T. Reed for Defendants Rex

Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom,

David Roither. (Reed, Peter) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

49 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

50 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​49​ MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,
Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

51

MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of

St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

52 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​51​ MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 03/01/2019)

53

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file

the following: Joint Proposed Schedule ;Proposed extension date

3-11-2019 by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,

Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered:

03/05/2019)

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03/06/2019
03/11/2019 03/14/2019 03/14/2019 03/14/2019

54

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

as to ​51​ MOTION to Dismiss Case , ​49​ MOTION to Dismiss

Case by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle,

Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 03/05/2019)

55

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​53​ Consent Motion for Extension of

Time to File the following: Joint Proposed Schedule; Proposed

extension date 3-11-2019 by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth

Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither; ORDERED

GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on

March 6, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

56

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​54​ Consent Motion for Extension of

Time to File Response/Reply as to ​51​ Motion to Dismiss Case,

49​ Motion to Dismiss Case by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED

GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on

March 6, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 03/06/2019)

57

JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. ​By Consent of

Defendants and Including Proposed Competing Scheduling

Orders.​ (Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 03/11/2019)

58

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by

Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy,

Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered:

03/14/2019)

59

RESPONSE in Opposition re ​41​ MOTION for Preliminary

Injunction filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,

Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Attachments:

# ​1​ Exhibit 1)(Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 03/14/2019)

60 RESPONSE in Opposition re ​3​ MOTION to Certify Class filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit 1)(Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 03/14/2019)

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03/22/2019 03/22/2019 03/29/2019

61 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​58​ Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 15, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 03/15/2019)

62

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

as to ​60​ Response in Opposition to Motion, ​59​ Response in

Opposition to Motion by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards,

Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered:

03/19/2019)

63

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​62​ Consent Motion for Extension of

Time to File Response/Reply as to ​60​ Response in Opposition to

Motion, ​59​ Response in Opposition to Motion by Plaintiffs David

Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman;

ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G.

Fleissig on March 20, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 03/20/2019)

64

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall file, by

April 2, 2019, memoranda of law addressing the propriety and

possible scope of such depositions and the feasibility of

protective or alternative measures for obtaining the information

sought. (Response to Court due by 4/2/2019.) Signed by District

Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/22/2019. (AFC) (Entered:

03/22/2019)

65

MEMORANDUM in Opposition re ​49​ MOTION to Dismiss Case

by Defendant Judges​ filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth)

(Entered: 03/22/2019)

66

MEMORANDUM in Opposition re ​51​ MOTION to Dismiss Case

by City Defendants​ filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth)

(Entered: 03/22/2019)

67

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

as to ​66​ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion ​to dismiss​ by

Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker,

Robert) (Entered: 03/29/2019)

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04/01/2019 04/02/2019

68

Consent MOTION for Extension of: Time to Respond to Court

Order March 22, 2019 (ECF No. 64) by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Atri, Sima)

(Entered: 03/29/2019)

69

Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply

as to ​65​ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion ​to dismiss​ by

Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy,

Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Reed, Peter) (Entered:

03/29/2019)

70

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​67​ Consent Motion for Extension of

Time to File Response/Reply as to ​66​ Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion to dismiss by Defendants Vernon Betts,

City of St. Louis, Dale Glass; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by

District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 1, 2019. (SAA)

(Entered: 04/01/2019)

71

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​68​ Consent Motion for Extension of

Time to Respond to Court Order March 22, 2019 (ECF No. 64)

by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle,

Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District

Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 1, 2019. (SAA) (Entered:

04/01/2019)

72

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​69​ Consent Motion for Extension of

Time to File Response/Reply as to ​65​ Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion to dismiss by Defendants Rex Burlison,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David

Roither; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey

G. Fleissig on April 1, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

73

MOTION for Extension of: Time to File Their Memorandum of

Law Pursuant to the Courts Order by Defendants Rex Burlison,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David

Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 04/01/2019)

74 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​73​ Motion for Extension of Time to File Their Memorandum of Law Pursuant to the Courts Order by
Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed

04/02/2019
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by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 2, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

75

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Mary B. McCord.

The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100

receipt number 0865-7127803) by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1

Certificate of Good Standing)(McCord, Mary) (Entered:

04/02/2019)

76

REPLY to Response to Motion re ​51​ MOTION to Dismiss Case

filed by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass.

(Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

77 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​75​ Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Mary B. McCord by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 3, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

78

MOTION to Amend/Correct ​Plaintiff's Name on the Docket​ by

Plaintiff Jeffrey Rozelle. (Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered:

04/04/2019)

79

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron

Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of

Their Motion for a Class-wide Preliminary Injunction)(Friedman,

Robert) (Entered: 04/04/2019)

80

REPLY to Response to Motion re ​3​ MOTION to Certify Class

filed by Plaintiff David Dixon. (Harvey, Thomas) (Main Document

80 replaced on 4/5/2019) (BRP). (Entered: 04/04/2019)

81

Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​78​ MOTION to Amend/Correct

Plaintiff's Name on the Docket. filed by Plaintiff Jeffrey Rozelle;

ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G.

Fleissig on April 5, 2019. (AGF) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

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82

Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​79​ MOTION for Leave to File in

Excess of Page Limitation, filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman; ORDERED

GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April

5, 2019. (AGF) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

83

REPLY to Response to Motion re ​41​ MOTION for Preliminary

Injunction filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards,

Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit

Second Declaration of Elizabeth Forester, # ​2​ Exhibit Bond

Commissioner Forms)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 04/05/2019)

84

MOTION for Ruling on re ​41​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

on the Papers​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey

Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered:

04/09/2019)

85

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants may

supplement the evidentiary record by April 18, 2019. IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may respond to Defendants'

supplement by April 23, 2019. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a

conference call is set for April 24, 2019, at 11:15 a.m. to discuss

further scheduling in this matter, if necessary. If, however, upon

the supplemental filings, the parties decide to submit the case on

the record and briefs such that a scheduling call is unnecessary

at that time, then the parties shall inform the Court of their

determination in that regard by 9:00 a.m. on April 24, 2019.

(Status Conference set for 4/24/2019 11:15 AM in Telephone

before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District

Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/10/2019. (AFC) (Entered:

04/11/2019)

86 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm C. Douglas Shull by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Shull, Charles) (Entered: 04/12/2019)

87

MEMORANDUM re ​64​ Order, ​Depositions of Judges​ by

Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy,

Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered:

04/12/2019)

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04/23/2019 04/23/2019
04/24/2019

88

REPLY to Response to Motion re ​49​ MOTION to Dismiss Case

filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas

McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean)

(Entered: 04/12/2019)

89 MEMORANDUM re ​64​ Order, ​Depositions of Judges​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 04/12/2019)

90

Docket Text ORDER Re: ​86​ Motion to Withdraw as Attorney C.

Douglas Shull by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,

Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither; ORDERED

GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April

15, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

91

SUPPLEMENTAL ​Defendant Judges' Supplement to the

Evidentiary Record Pursuant to the Court's Order​ by Defendants

Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David

Roither. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Supplemental Affidavit of

Donald Kearbey)(Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 04/18/2019)

92

STIPULATION re ​41​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 04/23/2019)

93

MEMORANDUM re ​91​ Supplemental, ​Plaintiffs' Response to

Defendant Judges' Supplemental Evidence​ by Plaintiffs David

Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman.

(Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit A - Initial Appearance Orders, # ​2

Exhibit B - Declaration of Mary Fox, # ​3​ Exhibit C - Declaration of

Elizabeth Forester)(Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered:

04/23/2019)

94

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for

ruling on the papers is GRANTED. ECF No. ​84​ . Signed by

District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/24/2019. (AFC) (Entered:

04/24/2019)

05/21/2019 06/11/2019 06/12/2019

NOTICE: IF YOU HAVE ALREADY UPGRADED YOUR PACER ACCOUNT YOU CAN DISREGARD THIS NOTICE. IF YOU DO
NOT UPGRADE YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FILE IN THE SYSTEM AFTER MAY 31, 2019. PLEASE UPGRADE
IMMEDIATELY. If you are using a shared account to file cases, you will need to create an individual account; instructions can be
found at:​https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/Register-for-N
ew-PACER-account.pdf.​ If you already have an individual account, it will need to be upgraded; instructions can be found https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/Upgrade-Current -PACER-Account.pdf.​ If you need further assistance contact the
MOED CM/ECF Help Desk at 314-244-7650 or moedml_cmecf_help@moed.uscourts.gov. (CSAW) (Entered:
05/21/2019)

95

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiffs motion for class certification is GRANTED. ECF No. ​3​ .

The class shall consist of all arrestees who are or will be

detained in the Medium Security Institution (the Workhouse) or

the City Justice Center (CJC), operated by the City of St. Louis,

post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary

release condition. Plaintiffs counsel is appointed counsel for the

class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants motions to

dismiss are DENIED. ECF Nos. ​49​ and ​51​ . IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction is

GRANTED. ECF No. ​41​ . Defendant Jail Commissioner Dale

Glass is enjoined from enforcing any monetary condition of

release that results in detention solely by virtue of an arrestees

inability to pay, unless the order is accompanied by a finding that

detention is necessary because there are no less restrictive

alternatives to ensure the arrestees appearance or the publics

safety. [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS] (cc:USMS).

Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/11/2019.

(KCB) (Entered: 06/11/2019)

96

MOTION to Clarify ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, by Defendants

City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered:

06/12/2019)

06/12/2019
06/13/2019 06/13/2019

97

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for

Clarification is GRANTED. ECF No. ​96​ . The Preliminary

Injunction Order (ECF No. ​95​ ) is clarified to provide that the

Order does not extend to federal prisoners housed in the City jail

facilities or to arrestees in custody pursuant to probation violation

warrants. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, by June 17, 2019,

Plaintiffs shall show cause why the definition of the class certified

should not be amended to reflect these same limitations. ( Show

Cause Response due by 6/17/2019.) Signed by District Judge

Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/12/2019. (KCB) (Entered: 06/12/2019)

98

NOTICE OF APPEAL as to ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, by

Defendants City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. Filing fee $ 505, receipt

number AMOEDC-7276620. (Entered: 06/13/2019)

99

MOTION to Stay re ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, by Defendants

City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Attachments: # ​1​ Affidavit Glass

declaration, # ​2​ Affidavit Phillips declaration, # ​3​ Exhibit criminal

complaint)(Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

06/13/2019 06/13/2019 06/13/2019
06/13/2019

100 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​99​ MOTION to Stay re 95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, filed by Defendants City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

101

RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE re ​97​ Order,, by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

102 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing is scheduled for Friday, June 14, 2019, at 2:00 PM, on the City Defendants motion (ECF No. ​99​ ) to stay this Courts preliminary injunction
order (ECF No. ​95​ ). Counsel for all parties shall appear. ( Motion Hearing set for 6/14/2019 02:00 PM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge
Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/13/2019. (KCB) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

103

NOTICE OF APPEAL as to ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, by

Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy,

David Roither. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number

AMOEDC-7277559. (Entered: 06/13/2019)

06/13/2019

104 MOTION to Stay re ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin
Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

06/13/2019 06/14/2019 06/14/2019 06/14/2019 06/14/2019

105 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​104​ MOTION to Stay re 95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

106

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation ​for

Opposition to Defendants Motion for Stay or Modification​ by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Attachment Proposed

Brief)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 06/14/2019)

107 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​106​ Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation for Opposition to Defendants Motion for Stay or Modification by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 14, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 06/14/2019)

108

RESPONSE in Opposition re ​104​ MOTION to Stay re ​95

Memorandum & Order,,,, , ​99​ MOTION to Stay re ​95

Memorandum & Order,,,, filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth)

(Entered: 06/14/2019)

109

ELECTRONIC MINUTE ENTRY (no pdf attached) for

proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: The

Court is present for a Motion Hearing. The Court hears

arguments from counsel. Order to issue. (Court Reporter:Lisa

Paczkowski, Lisa_Paczkowski@moed.uscourts.gov,

314-244-7985) (proceedings started: 2:10pm) (proceedings

ended: 3:16pm)(Deputy Clerk: K. Battle)(Appearance for Plaintiff:

Sima Atri (telephone), Thomas Harvey, Jacqueline

Kutnik-Bauder, Michael-John Voss, John Waldron, Alexander

Karakatsanis (telephone), Seth Wayne (telephone), Robert

Friedman (telephone),)(Appearance for Defendant: Robert

Dierker, Robert Isaacson, and Dean Sauer) (KCB) (Entered:

06/14/2019)

06/17/2019 06/17/2019
06/17/2019

110 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motions to stay the Courts preliminary injunction order are DENIED. ECF Nos. ​99​ and 1​ 04​ . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/17/2019. (KCB) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
111 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding ​104​ MOTION to Stay re ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, , ​99​ MOTION to Stay re ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,, . Notice of Appeal filed on 06/13/2019 by Defendants City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE.(MFG) (Main Document 111 replaced on 6/17/2019) (MFG). (Entered: 06/17/2019)
112 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' respective motions for additional time to comply with the Court's preliminary injunction order are GRANTED in part. ECF Nos. ​99​ and 1​ 04​ . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Courts preliminary injunction order is MODIFIED to amend the requirement that arrestees already in detention at the time of the Order receive a hearing within seven days thereof. ECF No. ​95​ . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall have until June 19, 2019, to collect data with respect to the backlog detainees, after which time the parties shall confer in good faith and propose a joint plan for the orderly and expeditious completion of hearings for the backlog detainees. The parties shall submit their joint plan (or if unable to agree, noting the points on which there is disagreement), on or before June 21, 2019. Said plan should include a logical prioritization and a realistic yet appropriately urgent time frame. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pending the filing of the joint plan, the Defendant Judges shall conduct thirty (30) hearings per work day beginning June 17, 2019, with respect the arrestees who were already in detention pursuant to non-compliant bond orders prior to the Court's Order (the backlog detainees). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' counsel shall provide to Plaintiffs' counsel the names and case information of all backlog detainees and, as it becomes ascertainable, the date, time, and location of their hearings. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 17, 2019. (BRP) (Entered: 06/17/2019)

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06/19/2019
06/19/2019 06/19/2019 06/20/2019 06/21/2019

113

ANSWER to ​1​ Complaint,,,,, by Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis,

Dale Glass.(Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 06/18/2019)

114 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding ​95​ Memorandum & Order,,,,. Notice of Appeal filed on 06/13/2019 by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE.(MFG) (Entered: 06/18/2019)

115

TRANSCRIPT of 109 (MOTION HEARING) held on 6/14/2019

before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa

Paczkowski, Lisa_Paczkowski@moed.uscourts.gov,

314-244-7985. Transcript may be viewed at the court public

terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber

before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After

that date it may be obtained through PACER. (Redaction

Request due 7/10/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for

7/22/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/17/2019.)

(AFC) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

116

Briefing Schedule from USCA for ​98​ Notice of Appeal filed by

Dale Glass, City of St. Louis USCA Appeal Number: 19-2251,

19-2254 Transcript due: 7/29/2019 (See attached document for

all other deadlines.)(AFC) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

117

Initial Notification from USCA for ​98​ Notice of Appeal filed by

Dale Glass, City of St. Louis USCA Appeal Number: 19-2251,

19-2254(AFC) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

118

RULE 16 ORDER This case is assigned to Track: 2: Standard.

[SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS.] (Joint Scheduling

Plan due by 7/24/2019. Rule 16 Conference set for 7/31/2019

02:00 PM in Chambers before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.)

Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/20/2019. (AFC)

(Entered: 06/20/2019)

119

MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the

following: report to court ;Proposed extension date disposition of

appellate stay by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis,

Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 06/21/2019)

06/21/2019 06/24/2019
06/25/2019 06/26/2019 07/03/2019
07/23/2019 07/23/2019

120 STATUS REPORT by David Dixon. (Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Main Document 120 replaced on 6/25/2019) (KXS). (Entered: 06/21/2019)

121

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City Defendants'

motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants

shall file a status report by June 26, 2019, advising the Court

what if any measures are currently being taken, and what

measures have been taken, to address the backlog and

implement revised Supreme Court Rule 33.01. Signed by District

Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/24/2019. (AFC) Modified on

6/25/2019 (KXS). (Entered: 06/24/2019)

122 ANSWER to ​1​ Complaint,,,,, by Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither.(Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 06/25/2019)

123

STATUS REPORT by Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St.

Louis, Dale Glass, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin

Ransom, David Roither. (Moore, Justin) (Entered: 06/26/2019)

124 ORDER of USCA as to ​98​ Notice of Appeal filed by Dale Glass, City of St. Louis, ​103​ Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth Hogan, Rex Burlison, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy USCA Appeal #: 19-2251 and 19-2254. On June 20, 2019 the court entered a temporary stay of the district court's June 11, 2019 preliminary injunction, pending review of the plaintiffs' response to the defendants' motions for stay pending appeal. The court has now considered plaintiffs' response, and well as defendants' replies, and it is hereby ordered that defendants' motions for a stay pending appeal are granted. (CLO) (Entered: 07/03/2019)

125

MOTION to Stay ​Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal​ by

Defendants Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale

Glass, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither.

(Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 07/23/2019)

126

MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​125​ MOTION to Stay

Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal​ filed by Defendants

Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Isaacson,

Robert) (Entered: 07/23/2019)

07/24/2019 07/26/2019 07/29/2019 07/29/2019 08/02/2019
08/09/2019

127

JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. . (Friedman,

Robert) (Entered: 07/24/2019)

128 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to ​125​ MOTION to Stay ​Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Friedman, Robert) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
129 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​128​ Consent MOTION for Extension of Time up to and including August 2, 2019, to File Response/Reply as to ​125​ MOTION to Stay ​Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman ; ORDERED GRANTED( Response to Court due by 8/2/2019.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/29/19. (KXS) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
130 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's order setting a Rule 16 conference for July 31, 2019 (ECF No. 118) is
VACATED pending disposition of Defendants' motion to stay proceedings pending interlocutory appeal (ECF No. 125). Signed
by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 29, 2019. (MCB) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
131 RESPONSE in Opposition re ​125​ MOTION to Stay ​Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal​ filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Example Orders, # ​2​ Exhibit Louzell
Docket, # ​3​ Exhibit Kelting Docket, # ​4​ Exhibit Haag Declaration, # ​5​ Exhibit Dierker Email, # ​6​ Exhibit Defendant City Eighth
Circuit Statement of Issues, # ​7​ Exhibit Defendant Judges Eighth Circuit Motion to Stay)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 08/02/2019)

132 REPLY MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​125​ MOTION to Stay ​Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal​ filed by
Defendants Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 08/09/2019)

08/22/2019 09/12/2019 10/02/2019 10/22/2019
01/31/2020 02/03/2020
02/28/2020

133

ORDER (See Full Order) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Defendants' motion is GRANTED. ECF No. ​125​ . The case will

be stayed and administratively closed pending a decision and

mandate from the Eighth Circuit. Signed by District Judge Audrey

G. Fleissig on 8/22/19. (EAB) (Entered: 08/22/2019)

134

ENTRY of Appearance by Maureen Hanlon for Plaintiffs David

Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman.

(Hanlon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/12/2019)

135

NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED CLERK'S RECORD

regarding ​115​ Transcript,,.. USCA Appellate Docket Number:

19-2251, 19-2254.(MFG) (Entered: 10/02/2019)

136 TRANSCRIPT of 36 (STATUS CONFERENCE) held on 2/1/2019 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Susan Moran, Susan_Moran@moed.uscourts.gov, 314-244-7983. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. (Redaction Request due 11/12/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for
11/22/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/21/2020.) (AFC) (Entered: 10/22/2019)

137

MOTION to Withdraw ​Sima Atri​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman.

(Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 01/31/2020)

138 Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​137​ MOTION to Withdraw ​Sima Atri​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) filed by Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman, Richard Robards, David Dixon ;
ORDERED GRANTED, Attorney Sima Atri terminated.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/3/20. (KJS) (Entered:
02/03/2020)

139

OPINION from USCA re ​98​ Notice of Appeal, ​103​ Notice of

Appeal : USCA Appeal #: 19-2251 & 19-2254: Conclusion - The

preliminary injunction is vacated and the case remanded for

proceedings consistent with this opinion. (AFC) (Entered:

02/28/2020)

02/28/2020 03/03/2020
03/04/2020 03/23/2020

140

USCA JUDGMENT as to ​98​ Notice of Appeal filed by Dale

Glass, City of St. Louis, ​103​ Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth

Hogan, Rex Burlison, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy: This

appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on

the record of the district court, briefs of the parties and was

argued by counsel. After consideration, it is hereby ordered and

adjudged that the order of the district court granting preliminary

injunction is vacated and the cause is remanded to the district

court for proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.

(AFC) (Entered: 02/28/2020)

141 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay in this case is VACATED. ECF No. ​133​ . The Clerk of the Court shall re-open the case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within the next two weeks, the parties shall meet and confer with respect to the course of further proceedings. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file, either jointly or separately, by March 17, 2020, (1) a case management proposal and schedule with respect to further proceedings and (2) a factual statement advising the Court of the effective status of MissouriSupreme Court Rule 33.01, implementation of the Rule in the City of St. Louis, and any other related developments since the date of this Court's stay of proceedings. (Joint Scheduling Plan due by 3/17/2020.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/3/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 03/03/2020)

142 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court's most recent order (ECF No. ​141​ ) is stayed pending issuance of the Eighth Circuit's mandate. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the deadline
of March 17, 2020, set forth in Court's previous order, is vacated. Instead, the parties shall file their proposals and statements
within fourteen (14) days following the Circuits mandate. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/4/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 03/04/2020)

143

OPINION from USCA re ​98​ Notice of Appeal, ​103​ Notice of

Appeal : USCA Appeal #: 19-2251. (AFC) (Entered: 03/23/2020)

03/23/2020 03/25/2020 03/26/2020 03/30/2020
03/31/2020 03/31/2020

144

MANDATE of USCA as to ​98​ Notice of Appeal filed by Dale

Glass, City of St. Louis, ​103​ Notice of Appeal filed by Elizabeth

Hogan, Rex Burlison, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy - USCA

#:19-2251: In accordance with the corrected opinion of

03/23/2020 and judgment of 02/28/2020, and pursuant to the

provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the

formal mandate is hereby issued in the above-styled matter.

(AFC) (Entered: 03/23/2020)

145 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ​of Peter T. Reed​ ;attorney/firm Peter T. Reed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,
Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Reed, Peter) (Entered: 03/25/2020)

146 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​145​ MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney of Peter T. Reed​ ;attorney/firm Peter T. Reed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither; ORDERED GRANTED. Attorney Peter T. Reed terminated. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/26/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 03/26/2020)

147

MOTION for Leave to File Renewed Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, File Overlength Brief, and Expedited Briefing by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, # ​2​ Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'

Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # ​3​ Exhibits to

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and

Memorandum in Support)(Kutnik-Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered:

03/30/2020)

148

RESPONSE in Opposition re ​147​ MOTION for Leave to File

Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, File Overlength Brief,

and Expedited Briefing filed by Defendants Rex Burlison,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David

Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 03/31/2020)

149

RESPONSE in Opposition re ​147​ MOTION for Leave to File

Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, File Overlength Brief,

and Expedited Briefing filed by Defendants City of St. Louis, Dale

Glass. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit Glass declaration, # 2​ ​ Exhibit

Exhibit to Glass declaration)(Dierker, Robert) (Entered:

03/31/2020)

04/01/2020 04/06/2020 04/06/2020 04/06/2020
04/06/2020 04/06/2020

150

ENTRY of Appearance by Christopher Robert Wray for

Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy,

Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Wray, Christopher) (Entered:

04/01/2020)

151

ENTRY of Appearance by Andrew David Wheaton for

Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass.

(Wheaton, Andrew) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

152

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Miriam R. Nemeth.

The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100

receipt number AMOEDC-7851583) by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman.

(Attachments: # ​1​ Certificate of Good Standing Certificate of

Good Standing)(Nemeth, Miriam) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

153

ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for

leave to file a renewed preliminary injunction specifically in light

of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as Plaintiffs' related motion

for leave to file an overlength brief and request for expedited

briefing and oral argument, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. ECF No. ​147​ . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs

shall have seven days, to and including April 13, 2020, to file a

renewed motion for preliminary injunction, limited to the

Defendants' implementation of the new Missouri Supreme Court

rules and the constitutionality of Defendants current bail

practices, consistent with the Complaint filed herein. Defendants

will have thirty (30) days to respond to Plaintiff's renewed motion,

and Plaintiffs will have ten (10) days to reply. After the briefing is

complete, the Court will schedule a conference call with the

parties to discuss further proceedings with respect to Plaintiffs'

renewed motion for preliminary injunction. (Response to Court

due by 4/13/2020.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig

on 4/6/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

154

JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. . (Friedman,

Robert) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

155 REPORT TO COURT ORDER re ​142​ Order, ​141​ Order,,,, Case Reopened,,,, Set/Clear Flags,,, by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Friedman, Robert) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

04/06/2020 04/06/2020 04/07/2020 04/10/2020
04/13/2020 04/13/2020

156

RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re ​141​ Order,,,, Case

Reopened,,,, Set/Clear Flags,,, ​Defendant Judges Factual

Statement Pursuant to the Courts Order​ by Defendants Rex

Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom,

David Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

157 MEMORANDUM re ​142​ Order, 1​ 41​ Order,,,, Case Reopened,,,, Set/Clear Flags,,, by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 04/06/2020)

158 Docket Text ORDER Re: ​152​ MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Miriam R. Nemeth by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/7/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 04/07/2020)

159

SCHEDULING ORDER [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE

DETAILS.] (ADR Future Reference 11/16/2020. Bench Trial set

for 6/14/2021 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S - St. Louis before

District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Discovery Completion due by

12/14/2020. Motion to Join Parties due by 5/15/2020. Dispositive

Motions due by 1/29/2021. Non-Dispositive Motions due by

12/25/2020.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on

4/10/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 04/10/2020)

160

MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman.

(Friedman, Robert) (Entered: 04/13/2020)

161

MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by

Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Attachment Plaintiffs'

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, # ​2​ Attachment Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in

Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction)(Friedman,

Robert) (Entered: 04/13/2020)

04/14/2020
04/14/2020 05/13/2020 05/13/2020 05/13/2020 05/13/2020 05/14/2020

162

Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​161​ MOTION for Leave to File in

Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # 1

Attachment Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Attachment Exhibits to

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for

Preliminary Injunction)(Friedman, Robert) filed by Jeffrey

Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman, Richard Robards, David Dixon ;

ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G.

Fleissig on 4/14/20. (KJS) (Entered: 04/14/2020)

163

MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​160​ MOTION for

Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard

Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1

Exhibit)(KJS) (Entered: 04/14/2020)

164 MOTION for Leave to Exceed the Page Limit by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 05/13/2020)

165

MEMORANDUM in Opposition re ​160​ MOTION for Preliminary

Injunction filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,

Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Attachments:

# ​1​ Exhibit A, # ​2​ Exhibit B, # ​3​ Exhibit C)(Sauer, Dean)

(Entered: 05/13/2020)

166 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 05/13/2020)

167

MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re ​166​ MOTION for

Judgment on the Pleadings ​and opposing preliminary injunction

filed by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass.

(Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit state order, # ​2​ Exhibit state

order)(Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 05/13/2020)

168 Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​164​ MOTION for Leave to Exceed the Page Limit by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan,
Thomas McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) filed by Elizabeth Hogan, Robin Ransom, Rex Burlison, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy ; GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/14/20. (JMP) (Entered: 05/14/2020)

05/15/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/26/2020
05/26/2020 05/27/2020
05/28/2020

169 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Answer by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit A- Amended Answer)(Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 05/15/2020)

170

MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in

Support​ by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas

McCarthy, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 05/22/2020)

171

MOTION to Certify Class ​Motion to Decertify the Class and

Memorandum in Support​ by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth

Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean)

(Entered: 05/22/2020)

172 MOTION to Stay re ​170​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings and Memorandum in Support​, ​160​ MOTION for Preliminary
Injunction , ​166​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​And For Expedited Discovery​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit
Attached Emails)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

173

MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Megan Bruyns

by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass.

(Bruyns, Megan) (Entered: 05/26/2020)

174 Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​173​ MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Megan Bruyns by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Bruyns, Megan) filed by Dale Glass, City of St. Louis, Vernon Betts ; ORDERED GRANTED, Attorney Megan Kathleen G Bruyns terminated.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/27/20. (KJS) (Entered: 05/27/2020)

175

RESPONSE in Opposition re ​172​ MOTION to Stay re ​170

MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in

Support,​ ​160​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , ​166​ MOTION

for Judgment on the Pleadings ​And For Expedited Discovery​ filed

by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas

McCarthy, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 05/28/2020)

05/29/2020 05/29/2020 06/04/2020 06/05/2020 06/05/2020

176 RESPONSE to Motion re ​171​ MOTION to Certify Class ​Motion to Decertify the Class and Memorandum in Support​, ​172​ MOTION to Stay re ​170​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in Support,​ 1​ 60​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , ​166​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​And For Expedited Discovery​ filed by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 05/29/2020)

177

REPLY to Response to Motion re ​172​ MOTION to Stay re ​170

MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in

Support,​ ​160​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , ​166​ MOTION

for Judgment on the Pleadings ​And For Expedited Discovery​ filed

by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Exhibit A - 4.17.20 Request

for Production)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 05/29/2020)

178 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to ​170 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in Support,​ ​160​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , ​166​ MOTION
for Judgment on the Pleadings by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Friedman, Robert) (Entered: 06/04/2020)

179 Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​178​ MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to ​170​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in Support,​ ​160​ MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , ​166​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Friedman, Robert); GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/5/2020. (JMP) (Entered: 06/05/2020)

180

RESPONSE in Opposition re ​171​ MOTION to Certify Class

Motion to Decertify the Class and Memorandum in Support​ filed

by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.,

Aaron Thurman. (Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 06/05/2020)

06/09/2020
06/09/2020 06/16/2020 06/17/2020

181 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall confer in good faith and shall file by June 16, 2020, a joint proposed schedule specific to Plaintiffs' renewed motion for preliminary injunction, including: 1. What specific additional discovery is required to resolve Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, and a schedule for such discovery; 2. What, if any, other discovery may be needed to resolve Defendants motions; 3. When the parties will be prepared for a hearing on Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, and how long the hearing is
expected to last; and 4. Whether the parties anticipate having live testimony and seek to conduct the hearing in person, as opposed
to by video or teleconference. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to stay is GRANTED in part. ECF No. ​172​ . All briefing deadlines on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction
(ECF No. 160) and Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings and to decertify the class (ECF Nos. ​166​ , ​170​ , ​171​ ) are STAYED pending further order of the Court. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that the Defendant Judges' motion for leave to amend their answer is GRANTED. ECF No. ​169​ . ( Response to
Court due by 6/16/2020.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/9/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 06/09/2020)

182

FIRST AMENDED ANSWER to ​1​ Complaint by Rex Burlison,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither.(AFC)

(Entered: 06/09/2020)

183 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to ​181​ Order,,,,, by Defendants Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Isaacson, Robert) (Entered: 06/16/2020)

184

Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​183​ Joint MOTION for Extension of

Time to File Response/Reply as to ​181​ Order,,,,, by Defendants

Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass,

Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Isaacson,

Robert) filed by Elizabeth Hogan, Dale Glass, City of St. Louis,

Vernon Betts, Rex Burlison, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy ;

ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G.

Fleissig on 6/17/20. (KJS) (Entered: 06/17/2020)

06/23/2020 07/07/2020
07/08/2020 07/09/2020 07/21/2020

185

JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Defendants Vernon Betts, Rex

Burlison, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas

McCarthy, Robin Ransom, David Roither. . (Isaacson, Robert)

(Entered: 06/23/2020)

186

ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Courts previous

stay of briefing on Defendants motion to de-certify the class (ECF

No. ​171​ ) and Defendants motions for judgment on the pleadings

(ECF Nos. ​166​ , ​170​ ) is lifted (ECF No. ​181​ ), and briefing shall

resume as follows: 1. Any reply by Defendants to their motion to

de-certify the class (ECF No. ​171​ ) shall be filed within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Order; and 2. Plaintiffs opposition to

Defendants motions for judgment on the pleadings (ECF Nos.

166​ , ​170​ ) shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the date

of this Order. Defendants will have fourteen (14) days thereafter

to file a reply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that discovery shall

proceed as follows: (See full order for details.). Signed by District

Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/7/20. (KJS) (Entered: 07/07/2020)

187

MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Christopher R.

Wray by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas

McCarthy, David Roither. (Wray, Christopher) (Entered:

07/08/2020)

188 Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​187​ MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Christopher R. Wray by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Wray, Christopher) filed by Elizabeth Hogan, Rex Burlison, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy ; ORDERED GRANTED, Attorney Christopher Robert Wray terminated.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/9/20. (KJS) (Entered: 07/09/2020)

189 REPLY to Response to Motion re ​171​ MOTION to Certify Class Motion to Decertify the Class and Memorandum in Support​ filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 07/21/2020)

07/28/2020

190 Consent MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation for Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the
Pleadings​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Attachments: # ​1​ Attachment
Proposed Brief)(Wayne, Seth) (Entered: 07/28/2020)

07/29/2020
07/29/2020 08/10/2020 08/11/2020 08/11/2020 08/11/2020

191

Docket Text ORDER: Re: ​190​ Consent MOTION for Leave to

File in Excess of Page Limitation ​for Opposition to Defendants'

Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings​ by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman.

(Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Brief)(Wayne, Seth) filed

by Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman, Richard Robards, David

Dixon ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey

G. Fleissig on 7/29/20. (KJS) (Entered: 07/29/2020)

192

RESPONSE to Motion re ​170​ MOTION for Judgment on the

Pleadings ​and Memorandum in Support,​ ​166​ MOTION for

Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Plaintiffs David Dixon,

Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (KJS)

(Entered: 07/29/2020)

193 ENTRY of Appearance by Nathaniel Richard Carroll for Plaintiffs David Dixon, Richard Robards, Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr., Aaron Thurman. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 08/10/2020)

194 REPLY to Response to Motion re ​170​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings ​and Memorandum in Support​ filed by Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Sauer, Dean) (Entered: 08/11/2020)

195 ENTRY of Appearance by Julie Marie Blake for Defendants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth Hogan, Thomas McCarthy, David Roither. (Blake, Julie) (Entered: 08/11/2020)

196 REPLY to Response to Motion re ​166​ MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Vernon Betts, City of St. Louis, Dale Glass. (Dierker, Robert) (Entered: 08/11/2020)

 
 Case: 4:19-cv-00112 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 01/28/19 Page: 1 of 29 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

DAVID DIXON,

)

JEFFREY ROZELLE,

)

AARON THURMAN, and

)

RICHARD ROBARDS,

)

On behalf of themselves and all

)

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, SHERIFF VERNON )

BETTS, JUDGE ROBIN RANSOM in her )

official capacity as presiding judge, JUDGE )

REX BURLISON in his official capacity as )

interim Presiding Judge, JUDGE ELIZABETH )

HOGAN in her official capacity as Division 16 )

Judge and Duty Judge, JUDGE DAVID

)

ROITHER in his official capacity as Division 25)

Judge and Duty Judge, JUDGE THOMAS )

MCCARTHY in his official capacity as

)

Division 26 Judge, COMMISSIONER DALE )

GLASS in his official capacity as St. Louis )

Commissioner of Corrections,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Cause No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1. Every day in the City of St. Louis, presumptively innocent individuals remain in

jail simply because they are too poor to pay for their freedom. Hundreds of people—the vast

majority of whom are poor and Black—are condemned to remain confined in jail for weeks,

months, or even years. They are locked in jail until they either have their day in court or, more

likely, accept a plea that allows them to escape custody and return to their lives. This system

inflicts devastating harm on people solely because of their poverty and violates the most

fundamental of American axioms, that all people are equal under the law.

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2. The Defendant Judges in the 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri and officials from the City of St. Louis are responsible for these harms, as they employ policies and practices that imprison people on unaffordable money bail, deny them even the most basic procedural protections, and violate their fundamental constitutional right to pretrial liberty and their equal protection right not to be detained because of their poverty.
3. The Supreme Court has directed judges that pretrial detention should be a “carefully limited exception” in our legal system. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Nevertheless, individuals arrested and charged in St. Louis City are subject to an unconstitutional system where they are denied any process to argue for their liberty. In fact, the first hearing on release conditions1 only occurs when an individual obtains counsel. Because appointment of a public defender typically takes four to five weeks, those too poor to pay the monetary release conditions or to hire a private attorney are subjected to extended pretrial incarceration before they have any opportunity to contest their release conditions.
4. Conversely, wealthier individuals are released from custody almost immediately because they can pay the monetary conditions of release.
5. As a result, Plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection under the law, as well as substantive and procedural due process, are systematically violated by Defendants. The City of St. Louis violates Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected rights by contributing to a system where arrestees are imprisoned without adequate process, including no assessment of their ability to pay, and no determination that pretrial detention is necessary to advance a compelling
1 In the 22nd Judicial Circuit and other jurisdictions, various terms are used to refer to conditions of release. For the purposes of this complaint, “bail” is synonymous with “release conditions.” The phrases “money bail,” “secured money bail,” “monetary bail,” or “financial condition of release” refer to the requirement that a bail amount be paid upfront in order for a person to be released. The terms “unsecured bail,” “unsecured bond,” or “recognizance bond” refer to release upon a promise to pay an amount of money at a later date if they do not appear for court.
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government interest. Specifically, the Bond Commissioner, a City employee, violates Plaintiffs’ rights through his policy and practice of failing to assess detained individuals’ economic circumstances or consider non-monetary conditions of release. He instead only recommends monetary release conditions when making recommendations to the Duty Judge, who formally sets conditions of release. The St. Louis Sheriff’s department violates Plaintiffs’ rights through its practice of telling individuals that they cannot speak to the court about their release conditions at their first appearances.
6. The Defendant judges of the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court further violate Plaintiffs’ rights by (1) setting arbitrary release conditions without any investigation into an individual’s ability to pay financial release conditions, (2) issuing de facto detention orders without determining whether detention is necessary to advance a compelling government interest or if there exist less restrictive alternatives available, and (3) doing all of the foregoing without providing any process at all to the incarcerated individual to contest their jailing until weeks or months have passed and an attorney enters an appearance.
7. As a result of Defendants’ unconstitutional policies and practices, 85% of the over one thousand individuals locked in St. Louis City jails are there awaiting trial because they are too poor to pay for their release.
8. Pretrial detention not only subjects these individuals to the unconscionable conditions in St. Louis’ jails, but also significantly impacts their personal lives and jeopardizes their legal defense. The collateral consequences of pretrial incarceration are severe: pretrial detainees routinely suffer losses in employment, child custody, and housing and experience greater risks of physical and emotional illness, barriers to counsel, and—critically—statistically worse trial and sentencing outcomes than released individuals who were charged with the same
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offense. See, e.g., Paul Heaton, et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 786-87 (2017).
9. This is despite compelling evidence that alternatives to monetary release conditions are more effective in ensuring appearance for trial and reduce the risk of re-arrest before trial. Pretrial Justice Institute, The Pretrial Services Agency For the District of Columbia: Lessons From Five Decades of Innovation and Growth, 2 Case Studies 1, 2 (Aug. 2018), https://perma.cc/8KAD-TY5H (“The high nonfinancial release rate has been accomplished without sacrificing the safety of the public or the appearance of people in court. Agency data show that 90 percent of released people make all court appearances and that 91 percent complete the pretrial release period without any new arrests.”).
10. This lawsuit is brought by Plaintiffs David Dixon, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman, and Richard Robards (collectively, “Named Plaintiffs”) in their individual capacity and as representatives of the class of individuals including all arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution (referred to as “the Workhouse”) or the City Justice Center (“CJC”), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition. Each named Plaintiff has already suffered over 10 days of incarceration without process due to Defendants’ actions.
11. On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court that Defendants’ policies and practices violate Plaintiffs’ equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process rights. Plaintiffs further request the Court remedy these unconstitutional actions by issuing appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief that will ensure the substantive and procedural safeguards outlined below are followed and that individuals in St. Louis do not remain jailed based solely on their poverty.
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12. Plaintiffs further ask that this Court immediately take up their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and order the immediate release of the Named Plaintiffs unless they are provided the procedures outlined below, as the parties work to remedy these issues.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 14. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391.
PARTIES 15. Plaintiff David Dixon is a 52-year-old Black man who lives in St. Louis. He has been incarcerated for the last 18 days solely because he cannot afford his $30,000 cash bond, set by Duty Judge Roither. Mr. Dixon’s family struggles without him. He is the primary caregiver for his paralyzed Vietnam-vet uncle and his 2 sons. Mr. Dixon suffers from seizures and high blood pressure and has been denied adequate medical treatment while incarcerated. Mr. Dixon fears he will not make it out alive. After suffering for 6 days in a holding cell at St. Louis’ City Justice Center (“CJC”), without a shower, sleep, or any medication, he now suffers at the Workhouse, unable to eat and in fear for his safety. Mr. Dixon was arrested on January 10, 2019, when the Court gave Mr. Dixon a two minute first appearance through a video monitor. Before the appearance, a sheriff deputy told him to “nod and say yes and come back out.” The Bond Commissioner did not interview him regarding ability to pay monetary conditions of release nor learn relevant personal information prior making a bond recommendation or Mr. Dixon’s first appearance. When Judge Roither announced his bond, Mr. Dixon expressed that he could not afford that amount. Judge Roither ordered Mr. Dixon’s continued incarceration, gave him a new
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court date, and told him to speak with an attorney. Mr. Dixon has applied for a public defender but still has not heard back.
16. Plaintiff Jeffrey Rozelle is a 42-year-old Black man from St. Louis. Mr. Rozelle has been incarcerated 13 days without a hearing because he is too poor to pay the $15,000 cash bond set in his case by Duty Judge Roither. Mr. Rozelle has four teenage children who look up to him and rely on his care. He is suffering due to the conditions at the Workhouse, including the mold in the showers, rodents, and extremely cold temperatures. Mr. Rozelle saw Judge Roither through video for less than 2 minutes. Before his appearance, a Sheriff Deputy told him he could not say anything. The Bond Commissioner did not interview him regarding his ability to pay monetary conditions of release or learn relevant personal information prior making a bond recommendation or Mr. Rozelle’s first appearance. At his first appearance, Mr. Rozelle tried to ask for a change in his release conditions, but the judge told him that he would have to wait until he retained counsel and filed a motion related to release conditions. Judge Roither ordered Mr. Rozelle to remain in custody unless he could pay $15,000. Mr. Rozelle attempted to immediately apply for a public defender but was told by officials at CJC that he would have to wait until he was transferred to the Workhouse to do so, six days later.
17. Plaintiff Aaron Thurman is a 24-year-old Black man from St. Louis. He has been incarcerated for the last 13 days because he cannot afford his cash bond set at $30,000, cash only, by Duty Judge Hogan. Prior to his incarceration, Mr. Thurman moved back home to care for his sister who was just diagnosed with Stage IV breast cancer. Since he stays home to care for her full-time, he also cares for his siblings’ children and his own 3 young daughters. Mr. Thurman struggles with his inability to support his family knowing that his family needs him home. See Ex. S, ¶¶ 3-7; Ex. T, ¶¶ 3-7; Ex. U, ¶¶ 3-8. On January 15th, Mr. Thurman saw Judge
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Roither through a video monitor. Prior to this appearance, a Sheriff’s deputy told him that he could not speak to the judge. His first appearance lasted less than 2 minutes, during which Judge Roither announced his charges and his bond, and asked him whether he was planning on applying for a public defender. Mr. Thurman was asked no further questions about his individual situation, including his ability to pay the bond, nor given an explanation for the bond set. Judge Roither ordered Mr. Thurman to remain in custody unless he could pay $30,000. The Bond Commissioner did not interview Mr. Thurman regarding his ability to afford monetary conditions of release or learn relevant personal information prior to making a bond recommendation or Mr. Thurman’s first appearance. Mr. Thurman has applied for a public defender but has not heard back.
18. Plaintiff Richard Robards is a 25-year-old white man from St. Louis. Mr. Robards has been incarcerated for 18 days because he is too poor to pay the $10,000, 10% secured cash bond set in his case by Duty Judge Roither. Mr. Robards is desperate to be released in order to care for his pregnant partner and to be present at the birth of their child, who is due in July. See Ex. V, ¶¶ 3-5; Ex. W, ¶¶ 3-4. Mr. Robards was not interviewed regarding his ability to afford monetary conditions of release nor to learn relevant personal information prior to his first appearance. Mr. Robards first appearance before Judge Roither lasted 2 minutes through a video monitor where he was told his charges and the bond amount set in his case. Mr. Robards wanted to explain his inability to afford his bond, but saw the judge cut people off if they tried to speak. At the conclusion of his hearing, the Judge ordered Mr. Robards to remain in custody unless he could pay for his release.
19. Defendant City of St. Louis is responsible for setting policy regarding pretrial release through its Public Safety Director, the office of the Mayor, and most specifically through
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the Bond Commissioner and the Defendant Sheriff.2 As a city employee, the Bond Commissioner is directly responsible for recommending release conditions to the Duty Judge, and thus represents and implements the policies and practices of the City. The Bond Commissioner is responsible for determining what information to provide to the Duty Judge when making a recommendation and has a practice of not inquiring into ability to pay. He also has a practice of only recommending monetary conditions of release. The Sheriff’s role is outlined below. The City is sued for injunctive and declaratory relief.
20. Defendant Sheriff Vernon Betts is the head of the St. Louis Sheriff’s Department and has authority over individuals in St. Louis City custody during the time of their first appearance before the court by video conference. The Sheriff and the City are liable for the Sheriff’s unconstitutional policy and practice of having his deputies direct individuals in their custody not to speak and thereby not to challenge their release conditions during their first appearance before a judge. Sheriff Vernon Betts is sued in his official capacity for injunctive and declaratory relief.
21. Named Defendant Circuit and Associate Circuit Judges are all judges in the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri and are sued in their official capacity. Judge Hogan and Judge Roither, in their capacity as Duty Judge, are responsible for setting release conditions and have a practice of setting unaffordable release conditions without any process or findings, let alone constitutionally sound ones. Judge Hogan, Judge Roither, and Judge McCarthy, in their capacity as Judges presiding over Divisions 16, 25, and 26, are responsible for conducting first
2 The “Bond Commissioner’s Office” operated by the City of St. Louis was formerly known as the “Pre-Trial Services Office.” The Bond Commissioner operates with the powers of its predecessor, which are outlined in 22nd Judicial Circuit Rule 67.1.3. The Bond Commissioner is a City of St. Louis employee. City of St. Louis, FY19-Line-Item-Judicial-as-adopted (budget), available at https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/ departments/budget/documents /upload/FY19-Line-Item-Judicial-as-adopted.pdf.
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appearances, adopting release conditions set without any process or findings. Presiding Judge Ransom and Interim Presiding Judge Burlison, in their capacities as Presiding Judges in the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court oversee the court’s policies and practices. During the first appearance, judges do not inquire into an individual’s ability to pay financial release conditions, likelihood to appear for trial, or any countervailing government interests—in violation of those individuals substantive due process and equal protection rights. Judges are sued in their official capacity for declaratory relief.
22. Defendant Commissioner Dale Glass is the Commissioner of the St. Louis Division of Corrections. Commissioner Glass directs the Division of Corrections and enforces the pretrial detention of individuals confined in the City’s two jails. The Commissioner is liable for enforcing unconstitutional de facto detention orders. Commissioner Glass is sued in his official capacity for the purposes of ordering prospective injunctive relief.
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO PROVIDE ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY MEANINGFUL PRETRIAL RELEASE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUALS REMAIN INCARCERATED
DUE TO THEIR POVERTY 23. Individuals enter St. Louis custody upon arrest by a law enforcement agency. Prior to issuance of a warrant, a monetary release condition is set by the Duty Judge based on a recommendation by the Bond Commissioner. When someone is arrested by police without a warrant, the Bond Commissioner will make a recommendation regarding release conditions to a Duty Judge who sets bond at some point prior to the individual’s first appearance before a judge. 24. The Bond Commissioner, when making a recommendation to the judge, will usually rely only on the individual’s prior criminal record and the charges alleged against them. The Bond Commissioner does not inquire into the detained individual’s ability to afford monetary conditions for their release, their ties to the community, or other relevant factors when making a recommendation. Ex. BB. In fact, the Bond Commissioner often does not even
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interview the individual prior to making a recommendation. Ex. C, ¶ 8; Ex. D, ¶ 3; Ex. E, ¶ 6; Ex. F, ¶ 5; Ex. H, ¶ 6; Ex. I, ¶ 3; Ex. K, ¶ 2; Ex. L, ¶ 3; Ex. N, ¶ 3; Ex. O, ¶ 8; Ex. P, ¶ 6 . Despite not knowing whether any given arrestee is wealthy or poor, the Bond Commissioner has a policy or practice of virtually always recommending monetary conditions of release.
25. The Duty Judge has a policy or practice of setting the initial release conditions based solely on information in the warrant application, information provided by the Bond Commissioner, and the Bond Commissioner’s recommendation, without performing any independent inquiry. As a result, the median bond amount set in the city is $25,000—an amount far beyond most individuals’ ability to pay—resulting in de facto orders of detention for poor people lasting weeks or months, while simultaneously allowing wealthy individuals to buy their freedom. In the vast majority of cases the initial condition set by the judge is a monetary cashonly bond that an individual must pay in full in order to be released.
26. The first time an individual sees a judge is at their first appearance, which is held by video conference from CJC and usually within 48 hours of their arrest. Deputies who are overseen by Sheriff Betts maintain custody over individuals during their first appearances. Pursuant to a policy or practice of the Sheriff’s Office, deputies inform detained individuals that they are not allowed to speak or request a change in their release conditions during the first appearance. Ex. A, ¶ 3; Ex. B, ¶ 3; Ex. C, ¶ 3; Ex. D, ¶ 4; Ex. G, ¶ 5; Ex. H, ¶ 3; Ex. I, ¶ 4; Ex. J, ¶ 5; Ex. K, ¶ 3; Ex. Q, ¶ 3.
27. As a result, the first appearance is limited to the judge reading the charges and informing the individual of the release conditions already set in their case. Detained individuals are given no opportunity to provide the judge with information about their ability to meet those release conditions. Individuals are not represented by counsel and are not allowed to speak to the
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judge except to inform the judge whether they plan to retain counsel. This first appearance lasts only 1-2 minutes and is not on the record. Ex. A, ¶ 5; Ex. B, ¶ 3; Ex. C, ¶¶ 5-6; Ex. D, ¶¶ 5-6; Ex. E, ¶ 4; Ex. F, ¶ 6; Ex. G, ¶ 6; Ex. H, ¶¶ 4-5; Ex. I, ¶ 5; Ex. L, ¶ 3; Ex. M, ¶ 5; Ex. N, ¶ 4; Ex. O, ¶ 7; Ex. Q, ¶¶ 3-4.
28. Further, if an individual dares to speak, the judge will inform them that the first appearance is not the appropriate time to talk about their release conditions. Judges have repeatedly told individuals that if they would like to challenge the conditions set, they must wait for an attorney to file a motion and cannot do so themselves. Ex. A, ¶ 5; Ex. M, ¶ 5.
29. Indigent individuals are therefore denied any opportunity to challenge or request modification of their release conditions until a public defender enters on their case. This process takes an average of four weeks from the time of arrest due to the chronic underfunding of the Missouri State Public Defender system. Even after a public defender enters as counsel and files a motion to reduce bond, at least a week elapses before a judge hears the motion. See, e.g. Ex. DD, St. v. Calvin Lamont Wiley, Jr., 1822-CR03442 (14 days between entry of public defender and bond reduction hearing); Ex. EE, St. v. Dion Joseph Clerk, 1822-CR03462 (12 days between entry of public defender and bond reduction hearing). Thus, indigent defendants remain incarcerated on average four to five weeks before they are given any opportunity to challenge or modify the release conditions set in their case. Poor individuals who do not qualify for a public defender, but also cannot afford to hire a private attorney, may face even longer delays waiting for a court determination that they are eligible for services by a public defender.
30. Conversely, wealthier individuals can either immediately pay the set monetary amount or hire an attorney to quickly challenge their release conditions.
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31. Even when hearings are finally held regarding an individual’s release conditions, such hearings fail to make findings on the individual’s ability to afford the release conditions, the insufficiency of non-financial alternatives to monetary conditions of release, and why a particularly release condition is necessary to meet a compelling government interest.
32. Empirical research indicates no correlation exist between monetary release conditions and an individual’s likelihood to appear in court. The Bail Project - St. Louis has a 94.5% re-appearance rate for individuals they have bailed out since December 1, 2017. Ex. CC; also see Tim Schnacke, United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resources Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform (2014), available at http://www.clebp.org/images/2014-1105_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf. Further, a decision-maker cannot determine risk to public safety based solely upon allegations of charges.
33. Defendants’ policies and practice regarding bond further violate Missouri state law requirements and Missouri Supreme Court rules. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.457; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.455; Mo. S. Ct. R. 33.05; Mo. S. Ct. R. 33.06.
34. As the result of Defendants’ policies and practices, indigent and poor detainees are subject to de facto orders of detention based solely on their economic circumstances.
35. Defendants have long been aware that their policies and procedures violate St. Louis City detainees’ equal protection, substantive due and procedural due process rights, but have failed to take action. As far back as 1990, the Eastern District of Missouri entered an order stating:
[St. Louis City] detainees are not convicts; they are waiting for trial. Therefore, neither the State of Missouri nor the City of St. Louis can impose penal punishment upon any individual not yet proven guilty, in the absence of a specific judicial finding denying the individual defendant bail.
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Tyler v. United States, 737 F.Supp. 531, 537 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1980)).
ST. LOUIS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRETRIAL PRACTICES HARM INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES
36. Due to the Defendants’ unconstitutional policies and practices, less than 5% of individuals are ordered released without any monetary conditions. As a result, over one thousand individuals are detained in St. Louis every day—around 85% of which are being held pretrial and are therefore presumptively innocent—solely because they are too poor to pay the monetary release conditions imposed without any hearing, let alone a hearing that meets constitutional standards.
37. The majority of people in jail pretrial are incarcerated at “the Workhouse” where they face unconscionable conditions, including but not limited to: extreme heat and cold, abysmal medical care, rat and cockroach infestations, snakes and mold. There is a documented history of inmate abuse by jail guards, deaths and suicides in the jail, and inadequate training of jail staff. E.g., Cody v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:17-cv-2707 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017); Ex. A, ¶¶ 10-15; Ex. B, ¶ 7; Ex. C, ¶ 16; Ex. D, ¶ 10; Ex. G, ¶ 10; Ex. H, ¶ 12; Ex. K, ¶¶ 6-7; Ex. L, ¶¶ 5-6; Ex. M, ¶¶ 3, 8-10; Ex. N, ¶ 7; Ex. Q, ¶ 7. Thus, Defendants force individuals who are too poor to pay for their freedom to suffer unnecessary and intolerable conditions of confinement because of their policies and practices.
38. Prior to detained individuals’ transfer to the Workhouse, individuals are kept in a holding cell at CJC without access to showers or medical care. These individuals, some of whome are held nearly a week before transfer are denied access to applications for a public
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defender until their transfer to the Workhouse. Ex. A, ¶¶ 2, 16; Ex. B, ¶ 4; Ex. E, ¶ 2; Ex. F, ¶ 3; Ex. H, ¶ 13; Ex. J, ¶ 4; Ex. M, ¶ 8; Ex. O, ¶ 2; Ex. P, ¶¶ 2-5.
39. Further, it is well documented that pretrial incarceration harms individuals’ lives far beyond their loss of liberty and the conditions they face in jails. Collateral consequences of pretrial incarceration include:
● Loss of income and wages when individuals lose their jobs because of their incarceration;
● Loss of housing and missed payments on bills because individuals cannot work or pay bills while incarcerated;
● Loss of physical and/or legal custody of children; ● An increase of mental illness symptoms because conditions in jail can put an
individual under a lot of stress and restrict access to needed medications, exacerbating or even causing mental illness; and ● Increased risk of assault, including sexual assault, are shockingly common in St. Louis jails, especially in the first few days of incarceration. Close the Workhouse, A Plan to Close the Workhouse & Promote a New Vision for St. Louis (2018), https://www.closetheworkhouse.org/new-close-theWorkhouse-report; Melissa Neal, Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money for Bail, Justice Policy Institute (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf. 40. In addition, merely being detained pretrial can have a significant impact on the legal outcome of an individual’s case. Detained people have a harder time preparing for their defense, gathering evidence and witnesses, and meeting with their lawyers. It is also well documented that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial and sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offenses. Data collected by the Bail Project St. Louis demonstrates the stark difference in outcomes. 53% of individuals they have bailed out see their cases dismissed. See Ex. CC. Nationally, individuals incarcerated pretrial have a 13% increased chance of being found guilty, have a 21% increased chance they will plead guilty, are
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four times more likely to be sentenced to jail times, and have three times longer jail sentences (an average of 4.6 months longer) than those free while waiting for their trial. Christopher Lowenkamp, et al., Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (November, 2013), available at https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/investigating-the-im; Megan Stevenson (2018), Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 34, Issue 4 (511-542). https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy019. Also see Harvey, T. B., Rosenfeld, J. H., & Tomascak, S. (2017). Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Prosecutions After Alabama v. Shelton: No-Lawyer-Courts and Their Consequences on the Poor and Communities of Color in St. Louis. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 29(6-7), 688-709. doi:10.1177/0887403417743301.
41. Thus, the policy or practice of issuing de facto detention orders by setting unaffordable monetary bail without process or requisite findings results in significant collateral consequences to individuals based solely on their economic status.
Class Action Allegations 42. The named Plaintiffs bring the Claims in this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a class action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1)-(4) and 23(b)(2). 43. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), certification of a class is appropriate where: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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44. This class is composed of all arrestees who are or will be detained in the Workhouse or CJC, operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay the monetary release conditions.
45. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This action satisfies the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Numerosity and Impracticability of Joinder 46. The proposed class is composed of all individuals who are detained in St. Louis’ custody pretrial without an opportunity to challenge their release conditions and without any inquiry into their ability to pay the preset secured bond amounts. 47. On average, 85% of individuals in St. Louis’ jail are incarcerated while awaiting their trial because they cannot afford monetary conditions of their bail. Monthly Report, July 2018, St. Louis City Department of Public Safety, Division of Corrections, https://www.stlouismo.gov/government/departments/public-safety/corrections/documents/upload/JULY-2018REPORTING-OF-STATISTICS.pdf.; Close the Workhouse, A Plan to Close the Workhouse & Promote a New Vision for St. Louis (2018), https://www.closetheworkhouse.org/ new-close-the-workhouse-report (last visited January 27, 2019). The vast majority of individuals who are incarcerated pretrial in St. Louis are impoverished. The number of current and future individuals subject to Defendants’ policies and practices who will remain incarcerated and be unconstitutionally stripped of their liberty—if it is not enjoined—numbers well into the thousands every year.
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48. Joinder is impracticable because of the numerosity of the class and their impoverished economic status.
Commonality 49. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class. The named Plaintiffs seek common declarative and injunctive relief concerning whether Defendants’ wealth-based policies, practices, and procedures violate the rights of the class members, and relief mandating that the Defendants stop these constitutional violations. 50. The Plaintiffs’ claims raise common legal and factual questions arising from one central set of policies and practices: Defendants’ post-arrest procedurally deficient bail setting and wealth-based detention system. Defendants operate this system in materially the same manner every day with respect to all individuals arrested and held in St. Louis’ pretrial custody. Resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek. 51. Among the most important common questions of fact for the class are:
a. Whether Defendants have a policy and practice where Defendants set pretrial release conditions without process or a hearing;
b. Whether, when, and how any official determines what conditions of pretrial release should be and whether, for example, any official considers ability to pay, makes findings concerning ability to pay, and offers non-monetary release conditions for those unable to pay;
c. What standard post-arrest procedures created, implemented, and enforced by the Defendants apply to arrestees; for example, whether Defendants use any other
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alternate procedures for promptly releasing indigent people determined otherwise eligible for release but who are unable to afford a monetary payment; d. How long individuals arrested must wait in jail after arrest before they have an opportunity to challenge pretrial release conditions, raise their inability to pay for their release or to request alternative, non-monetary conditions; e. How long individuals arrested must wait to be appointed an attorney that may challenge their pretrial detention; f. Whether the Sheriff instructs defendants not to speak before the video conference at which their charges are read and release conditions are announced; g. The role of the City Bond Commissioner’s Office in the setting of bail and conditions of release, whether any individualized analysis occurs, and whether and how inability to pay is considered; h. The standards and factors used by judges to set release conditions; and i. Any supervision or training given to City employees and used to help determine release conditions. 52. Among the most important common questions of law are: a. Whether requiring an individual to pay money to secure release from pretrial detention without an inquiry into or findings concerning the individual’s present ability to pay the amount required, the need for detention, and less restrictive alternative release conditions, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses; and b. Whether it is lawful to impose a monetary release condition that operates as a de facto order of pretrial detention because of a person’s inability to pay without
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complying with the substantive findings, legal standards, and procedures required for issuing and enforcing a de facto order of preventive detention. c. Whether the setting of pretrial release conditions without an individual's ability to consult and be represented by Counsel violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause;
Typicality 53. The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class. Each class member is incarcerated in St. Louis custody pretrial and remains incarcerated based on the same lack of due process, suffering the same injury because Defendants refuse to comply with basic due process constitutional requirements. Class members all remain confined in jail because they cannot afford to pay the Defendants’ secured money bail. The answer to whether the Defendants’ policies and practices are unconstitutional will determine the specific claims and specific relief sought by the Named Plaintiffs and every other class member. All class members seek the same declaratory and injunctive relief.
Adequacy 54. The Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because their interests in the vindication of the legal claims they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of the other class members, each of whom has the same basic constitutional claims. The Named Plaintiffs are members of the class, and their interests do not conflict with those of the other class members. 55. There are no known conflicts of interest among members of the proposed class. All of the members of the class have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the face of Defendants’ pay-for-freedom and no process post-arrest detention system.
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56. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from ArchCity Defenders, the Advancement Project, Civil Rights Corps, and the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection. Plaintiffs’ counsel have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ unconstitutional actions and the relevant law. Counsels’ relevant qualifications are more fully set forth in the contemporaneously filed Motion for Class Certification.
57. The combined efforts of class counsel have so far included extensive investigation into money bail schemes and pretrial release condition processes over the last year, including dozens of interviews with individuals in St. Louis’ pretrial jail, conversations with attorneys practicing in state courts throughout the region, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of state and local courts, empirical researchers, and consultation with national experts in constitutional law, post-arrest procedure, law enforcement, judicial procedures, criminal law, pretrial services, and jails. Local counsel has additionally represented individuals in state criminal court who are detained pretrial.
58. Counsel have devoted significant time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with Defendants’ unconstitutional pretrial incarceration system and related laws. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
Injunctive or Declaratory Relief — Rule 23(b)(2) 59. Class-action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its wealth-based post-arrest detention system, have acted in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members.
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60. The class therefore first seeks declaratory relief, requesting this Court find that current processes and practices relating to the conditions of pretrial release in the St. Louis City courts violate individuals’ rights.
61. The class also seeks injunctive relief to institute a constitutional custody-process and to prevent the Defendants from detaining individuals pretrial who have not been afforded this process and who remain incarcerated because they cannot afford cash payments and the judges have failed to consider their economic circumstances or the availability of less restrictive pretrial release conditions.
62. Because the putative class challenges the Defendants’ system as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief that would apply the same relief to every member of the class, Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate and necessary.
63. Further, a class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the Named Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the Defendants’ unconstitutional actions and obtain the necessary immediate declaratory and injunctive relief sought for themselves and all other members of the class.
Appointment of Class Counsel Rule 23 (g)
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) requires that the court appoint class counsel for any class that is certified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). Class counsel must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”
65. For reasons fully set forth in the Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification, undersigned counsel meet the factors the court must consider under Rule 23 (g): 1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in this action”; 2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims
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asserted in the action;” 3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law;” and 4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.”
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due Process through a Policy or Practice that Jails Individuals Based on their Poverty under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants 66. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 67. Plaintiffs have a right against wealth-based detention. In the pretrial detention context, courts have regularly found that setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that exceed an individual’s ability to pay violates the equal protection clause. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her inability to make a monetary payment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Because Plaintiffs are detained based solely on their inability to pay, heightened scrutiny is implicated. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) ( “[T]he Supreme Court has found that heightened scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their indigence.”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 24142 (1970). 68. Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive rights by enforcing against them a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment.
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69. Defendants do not inquire into an individual’s ability to afford monetary release conditions or consider less restrictive alternatives before recommending or setting unaffordable monetary bail.
70. Defendants’ actions fail any form of scrutiny, as empirical research indicates no correlation between monetary release conditions and an individual’s likelihood to appear in court.
71. Here, Defendants’ policies and practice result in poor arrestees being detained when similarly situated wealthy arrestees are not, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus Defendants deny individuals their equal protection and due process rights.
COUNT II Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Right to
Liberty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 73. Defendants, acting under color of law, deny pretrial detainees their constitutionally protected right to liberty without any compelling state interest. 74. It is well settled that freedom from imprisonment “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679, 690 (2001); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 117, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). Pretrial detention infringes upon this right and may only be applied if it is “narrowly focuse[d]” to serve “compelling” interests. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
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75. The state’s interest at the pretrial bond stage is limited to ensuring the accused will appear for trial and protecting the public from danger associated specifically with that individual’s release. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452-54 (2013).
76. Here, the City’s Bond Commissioner and individual judges fail to consider a particular detainee’s likelihood to appear or whether that individual poses any danger to the community, and make no findings regarding the necessity of detention, before setting de facto detention orders through imposition of unaffordable monetary conditions of release. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus Defendants deny pretrial detainees their fundamental right to liberty in the absence of any compelling government interest and in violation of their substantive due process rights.
COUNT III Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process 42
U.S.C. § 1983 By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against all Defendants 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 78. Defendants provide absolutely no process before detaining individuals for weeks on unaffordable monetary release conditions. No hearing occurs, much less a hearing with sufficient process. Since no hearing occurs, no determination is made that any government interests require detention, in violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. 79. Before an individual may be detained pretrial, procedural due process requires an individual be given the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
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manner” before being deprived of liberty. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
80. Defendants’ total lack of procedures—including no notice that a hearing will occur, no notice that the issue at the hearing will be whether the individual arrested is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community, no hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and no hearing with counsel present—flagrantly violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
81. Individuals who qualify for public defenders remain incarcerated an average of 45 weeks before they are given any hearing to challenge or modify their release conditions. Individuals who do not qualify for the public defender, but cannot afford to hire a private attorney, fair even worse—often being denied an opportunity to address their release conditions or discuss their financial status even longer. Conversely, wealthier individuals can obtain almost immediate release or obtain counsel to immediately challenge release conditions.
82. Defendant Judges’ failure to provide any process until an individual retains an attorney, combined with the setting of bond amounts unrelated to an individual’s ability to pay, denies Plaintiffs’ their fundamental right to liberty without procedural due process. The Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders.
Requests for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the other Class members request this Court issue the following relief:
A. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights by issuing detention orders without due process;
B. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Named Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights by operating a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail because they cannot afford to pay monetary conditions of
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release without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of non-financial alternatives, and without findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
C. A declaratory judgment that when Defendants are determining conditions of release, an individualized determination on release conditions must occur promptly and at an individual hearing with the following procedures:
● Defendants must provide notice to the individual arrested that financial information will be collected and must explain the significance of the financial information to be collected;
● Defendants must determine each individual’s ability to pay money bail and the amount of money they can afford;
● The individual arrested must be given an opportunity to be heard at the first opportunity concerning their ability to afford money bail and what nonmonetary release conditions, if any, are necessary. The individual must have the opportunity to present evidence, make argument concerning those issues, and to contest any evidence or argument offered by the government concerning those issues;
● The judge conducting the hearing must make substantive findings on the record about why an individual’s continued incarceration is warranted and that no less restrictive alternatives to detention address the state’s concerns;
● The individual must be provided free counsel at the hearing;
D. A declaratory judgment that the Sheriff and Commissioner of Corrections must not enforce any order requiring secured money bail or a monetary release condition that was imposed prior to an individualized hearing and that is not accompanied by a record showing that the procedures and findings described above were provided;
E. An order permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and enforcing a system of wealth-based detention that keeps the Named Plaintiffs and class members in jail because they cannot afford a monetary release condition without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of non-financial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest.
F. An order permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and enforcing pretrial detention without constitutionally valid process that complies with the above outlined process;
G. An order directing Defendant Sheriff not to instruct individuals in their custody to refrain from speaking at their hearings.
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H. A temporary restraining order requiring the Sheriff and Commissioner of Corrections to release the Named Plaintiffs unless they are provided the procedures stated above;
I. Any other order and judgment this Court deems necessary to permanently enjoin Defendants from implementing and enforcing a system of wealth-based pretrial detention that keeps arrestees in jail because they cannot afford a monetary release condition without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of non-financial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
J. An order certifying the class defined above;
K. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 28, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
By:/s/ Sima Atri______________ ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, INC. Blake A. Strode (MBE #68422MO) Michael-John Voss (MBE #61742MO) Jacqueline Kutnik-Bauder (MBE # 45014MO) Sima Atri (MBE #70489MO) John M. Waldron (MBE #70401MO) 440 N. 4th Street, Suite 390 Saint Louis, MO 63102 855-724-2489 314-925-1307 (fax) bstrode@archcitydefenders.org mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.org satri@archcitydefenders.org jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT /s/ Thomas B. Harvey Thomas B. Harvey (MBE #61734MO) Derecka Purnell D.C. Bar No. 252634 (pro hac vice application forthcoming) 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 728-9557
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Fax: (202) 728-9558 tharvey@advancementproject.org
INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (ICAP) /s/ Seth Wayne Seth Wayne D.C. Bar No. 888273445 (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Nicolas Riley* N.Y. Bar No. 5039607 (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Robert Friedman D.C. Bar No. 1046738 (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection Georgetown University Law Center 600 New Jersey Ave. NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: 202-662-9042 sw1098@georgetown.edu rdf34@georgetown.edu nr537@georgetown.edu
* Admitted solely to practice law in New York; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).
CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS /s/ Alec Karakatsanis Alec Karakatsanis D.C. Bar No. 999294 (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming) Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-599-0953 Fax: 202-609-8030 alec@civilrightscorps.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Case: 4:19-cv-00112 Doc. #: 1 Filed: 01/28/19 Page: 29 of 29 PageID #: 29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of January, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, using the electronic case filing system of the Court. The Summons and Complaint will be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
By: /s/ Sima Atri
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 Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 19 Filed: 01/30/19 Page: 1 of 7 PageID #: 209

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

DAVID DIXON, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:19-cv-00112

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STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES Pursuant to the terms of this stipulated agreement, Plaintiffs agree to suspend hearing on their

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 5) with option to renew at a later date

pending potential resolution as follows:

1. The Defendant Judges agree that no later than close of business on Thursday, January 31, 2019, a Judge of the 22nd Judicial Circuit will hold a hearing for each of the Named Plaintiffs regarding their conditions of release.
2. Defendant Judges will set the time and location of these hearings without requiring a motion from Plaintiffs and provide notice to the Circuit Attorney’s Office.
3. The Defendant Judges agree that the hearing will comply with the requirements in the forthcoming Missouri Supreme Court Rules regarding the conditions of release, particularly Rule 33.01, set forth below.
4. The Parties agree that Rule 33.01 states as follows:
33.01 MISDEMEANORS OR FELONIES – RIGHT TO RELEASE – CONDITIONS
(a) A defendant charged with a bailable offense shall be entitled to be released from custody pending trial or other stage of the criminal proceedings.
(b) The defendant's release shall be upon the conditions that:
(1) The defendant will appear in the court in which the case is prosecuted or appealed, from time to time as required to answer the criminal charge;
(2) The defendant will submit to the orders, judgment and sentence, and process of the court having jurisdiction over the defendant;
(3) The defendant shall not commit any new offenses and shall not tamper
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with any victim or witness in the case, nor have any person do so on the defendant's behalf; and
(4) The defendant will comply fully with any and all conditions imposed by the court in granting release.
(c) The court shall release the defendant on the defendant's own recognizance subject only to the conditions under subsection (b) with no additional conditions of release unless the court determines such release will not secure the appearance of the defendant at trial, or at any other stage of the criminal proceedings, or the safety of the community or other person, including but not limited to the crime victims and witnesses. If the court so determines, it shall set and impose additional conditions of release pursuant to this subsection.
The court shall set and impose the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions of release, and the court shall not set or impose any condition or combination of conditions of release greater than necessary to secure the appearance of the defendant at trial, or at any other stage of the criminal proceedings, or the safety of the community or other person, including but not limited to the crime victims and witnesses.
When considering the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions of release to set and impose, the court shall first consider non-monetary conditions. Should the court determine non-monetary conditions alone will not secure the appearance of the defendant at trial, or at any other stage of the criminal proceedings, or the safety of the community or other person, including but not limited to the crime victims and witnesses, then the court may consider monetary conditions or a combination of non-monetary and monetary conditions to satisfy the foregoing. After considering the defendant's ability to pay, a monetary condition fixed at more than is necessary to secure the appearance of the defendant at trial, or at any other stage of the criminal proceedings, or the safety of the community or other person, including but not limited to the crime victims and witnesses, is impermissible.
If the court determines additional conditions of release are required pursuant to this subsection, it shall set and impose one or more of the following conditions of release:
(1) Place the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise the defendant;
(2) Place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the defendant during the period of release, including the holding by the court of the defendant's passport;
(3) Require the defendant to report regularly to some officer of the court
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or peace officer, in such manner as the court directs;
(4) Require the use of electronic monitoring of defendant's location, the testing of defendant for drug or alcohol use, or the installation and use of ignition interlock devices. The court may order the eligible defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of such conditions, but the court shall consider how best to minimize the costs to the defendant and waive the costs for an eligible defendant who is indigent and who has demonstrated to the court an inability to pay all or a portion of the costs;
(5) Require the defendant to seek employment, to maintain employment, or to maintain or commence an educational program;
(6) Require the defendant to comply with a specified curfew;
(7) Require the defendant to refrain from possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon;
(8) Require the defendant to abstain from possession or use of alcohol or any controlled substance without a physician's prescription;
(9) Require the defendant to undergo available medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency and remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose;
(10) Require the defendant to return to custody for specified hours following release for employment, school, treatment, or other limited purpose;
(11) Require the defendant to be placed on home supervision with or without the use of an electronic monitoring device. The court may order the eligible defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of the electronic monitoring, but the court shall consider how best to minimize the costs of such condition to the defendant and waive the costs for an eligible defendant who is indigent and who has demonstrated to the court an inability to pay all or a portion of the costs;
(12) Require the defendant to execute a monetary bond in a stated amount wherein the defendant promises to pay to the court the stated amount should the defendant fail to appear or abide by the conditions of release;
(13) Require the execution of a monetary bond in a stated amount with sufficient sureties, or the deposit in the registry of the court of a sum in cash or negotiable bonds of the United States or the State of Missouri or any political subdivision;
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(14) Require the execution of a monetary bond in a stated amount and the deposit in the registry of the court of 10 percent, or such lesser sum as the court directs, of such sum in cash or negotiable bonds of the United States or the State of Missouri or any political subdivision;
(15) Require the deposit of a property bond of sufficient value as approved and directed by the court;
(16) Impose other conditions necessary to secure the appearance of the defendant at trial, or at any other stage of the criminal proceedings, or the safety of the community or other person, including but not limited to the crime victims and witnesses.
(d) Should the court determine upon clear and convincing evidence that no combination of non-monetary conditions and monetary conditions will secure the safety of the community or other person, including but not limited to the crime victims and witnesses, then the court shall order the defendant detained pending trial or any other stage of the criminal proceedings. A defendant so detained shall, upon written request filed after arraignment, be entitled to a trial which begins within 120 days of the defendant's request or within 120 days of an order granting a change of venue, whichever occurs later. Any request by the defendant to continue the trial beyond the 120 days shall be considered a waiver by the defendant of the right to have the trial conducted within 120 days.
(e) In determining whether to detain the defendant pursuant to subsection (d) or release the defendant with a condition or combination of conditions of release, if any, pursuant to subsection (c), the court shall base its determination on the individual circumstances of the defendant and the case. Based on available information, the court shall take into account: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of the evidence against the defendant; the defendant's family ties, employment, financial resources, including ability to pay, character, and mental condition; the length of the defendant's residence in the community; the defendant's record of convictions; the defendant's record of appearance at court proceedings or flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings; whether the defendant was on probation, parole or release pending trial or appeal at the time the offense for which the court is considering detention or release was committed; and a validated evidentiary-based risk assessment tool approved by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
(f) A court detaining or releasing the defendant under this rule shall enter an order stating the condition or combination of conditions of release, if any, set and imposed by the court. If the defendant is detained and unable to comply with any condition of release, the defendant shall have the right to a release hearing pursuant to Rule 33.05. At any hearing conducted under Rule 33, the court shall permit but not require either party to make a record on the defendant's financial status and ability to pay any monetary condition. At such hearing, the court shall
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also make written or oral findings on the record supporting the reasons for detention or conditions set and imposed. The court shall inform the defendant of the conditions set and imposed, if any, and that the conditions of release may be revoked and the defendant detained until trial or other stage of the criminal proceedings for violation of any of the conditions of release and that a warrant for the defendant's arrest may be issued immediately upon notification to the court of any such violation. 5. The Defendant Judges agree that the hearings for Named Plaintiffs will comply with the following requirements: a. That at hearings on conditions of release for Named Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs will have the ability to present evidence, including witnesses, that pertain to their conditions of release, and may contest any evidence and cross-examine any witnesses presented by the state. b. That hearings for the Named Plaintiffs will be on the record in open court, and that this record will contain written findings stating the standard of review and the reason for any order continuing to detain plaintiffs on a monetary condition of release. c. That this record shall be preserved and maintained by the court in each case and made available for review in the above styled matter. d. That Plaintiffs’ Counsel will make arrangements for the Named Plaintiffs to be represented by legal counsel for the limited purpose of these hearings concerning conditions of release. 6. The Court has set a status hearing on this matter at 12:30 PM on Friday February 1, 2019 at which time parties will have briefed the issue of whether a monetary condition of release set at an amount higher than the arrestee has the ability to pay is a de facto order of detention. 7. This agreement does not constitute waiver or concession of any legal arguments or objections in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Michael-John Voss ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, INC. Blake A. Strode (MBE #68422MO) Michael-John Voss (MBE #61742MO) Jacqueline Kutnik-Bauder (MBE # 45014MO) Sima Atri (MBE #70489MO) John M. Waldron (MBE #70401MO) 440 N. 4th Street, Suite 390 Saint Louis, MO 63102 855-724-2489 314-925-1307 (fax) bstrode@archcitydefenders.org mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org
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jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.org satri@archcitydefenders.org jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
/s/ Thomas B. Harvey Thomas B. Harvey (MBE #61734MO) 1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 728-9557 Fax: (202) 728-9558 tharvey@advancementproject.org
INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (ICAP)
/s/ Seth Wayne Seth Wayne (D.C. Bar No. 888273445) (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Nicolas Riley* (N.Y. Bar No. 5039607) (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Robert Friedman (D.C. Bar No. 1046738) (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection Georgetown University Law Center 600 New Jersey Ave. NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: 202-662-9042 sw1098@georgetown.edu rdf34@georgetown.edu nr537@georgetown.edu * Admitted solely to practice law in New York; not admitted in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).
CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS /s/ Alec Karakatsanis Alec Karakatsanis D.C. Bar No. 999294 (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-599-0953
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Fax: 202-609-8030 alec@civilrightscorps.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ERIC SCHMITT MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL
/s/ Thomas C. Albus Thomas C. Albus #46224MO Assistant Attorney General State of Missouri 207 W High St Jefferson City MO 65101 573-751-7421 Tom.albus@ago.mo.gov Attorney for Defendant Judges JULIAN L. BUSH CITY COUNSELOR /s/ Robert H. Dierker Robert H. Dierker 23671MO Associate City Counselor dierkerr@stlouis-mo.gov 1200 Market St. City Hall, Rm 314 St. Louis, MO 63103 314-622-3361 Fax 314-622-4956 Attorneys for Defendants City of St. Louis, Betts, Glass
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 Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 95 Filed: 06/11/19 Page: 1 of 34 PageID #: 1313

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID DIXON, et al. Plaintiffs,
vs. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 4:19-cv-0112-AGF ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification (ECF No. 3) and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 41) and Defendants’ motions to dismiss the case (ECF Nos. 49, 51). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motions will be granted, and Defendants’ motions will be denied.
BACKGROUND Named Plaintiffs David Dixon, Jeffrey Rozelle, Aaron Thurman, and Richard Robards were detained in St. Louis jails because they were unable to afford bail. Defendants are the City of St. Louis, its Commissioner of Corrections Dale Glass, and its Sheriff Vernon Betts (together, the City) and several judges of the 22nd Circuit (the Judges).1 On January 28, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C.

1 The named judicial Defendants are: Judge Robin Ransom in her official capacity as presiding judge, though, since the time of filing, Judge Ransom has been elevated to the Missouri Court of Appeals; Judge Rex Burlison in his official capacity as interim presiding judge; Judge Elizabeth Hogan in her official capacity (Division 16 and duty
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§ 1983 asserting that Defendants violated their constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive and procedural due process by detaining them after arrest without an opportunity to challenge the conditions of their release. The facts set forth in the complaint can be summarized as follows.
Plaintiffs’ Claims When a person is arrested in the City of St. Louis, a bond commissioner employed by the City makes a recommendation to a duty judge to set bond to secure the arrestee’s court appearance.2 In formulating the recommendation, the commissioner considers the charges and any prior convictions but does not inquire into the arrestee’s ability to pay, risk of flight, or danger to the public; the duty judge then sets bond on the commissioner’s recommendation. If an arrestee can afford to pay the cash bond in full, then the City will release him upon payment. If not, he remains detained until a first appearance, which is held within 48 hours of arrest and by videoconference from the jail. Plaintiffs allege that the sheriff’s deputies who escort arrestees to their video hearings instruct them not to speak and specifically not to request a bond modification. The judge reads the charges, states the bail amount pursuant to the commissioner’s recommendation, and asks the arrestee whether he intends to retain counsel. The hearing lasts one to two minutes and is not on the record. Plaintiffs allege that, if an arrestee
judge); Judge David Roither in his official capacity (Division 25 judge and duty judge); and Judge Thomas McCarthy in his official capacity (Division 26). 2 The parties also refer to the bond commissioner as the pre-trial release commissioner. The terms bail and bond are used interchangeably, as are the terms arrestee, detainee, and defendant. The Court will refer to Plaintiffs and class members as arrestees or detainees.
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attempts to contest his bail amount, the judge informs him that he cannot request a modification until he obtains counsel and sets a motion hearing. For indigent individuals eligible for a public defender, that process takes approximately five weeks. Arrestees who do not qualify for a public defender but cannot afford to pay a private attorney often remain detained even longer.
Plaintiffs aver that, even when arrestees receive the assistance of counsel on a motion for modification, the Judges’ bail-setting practices remain constitutionally inadequate in that the Judges fail to consider an arrestee’s financial circumstances or make specific findings as to alternative release conditions. Plaintiffs further state that detainees in the Workhouse are exposed to dangerous and inhumane conditions such as extreme temperatures, lack of sanitation, vermin infestations, and violence. This period of incarceration often results in physical and mental health problems, loss of employment, eviction, and family separation.
Plaintiffs request the following forms of relief: 1. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights by issuing detention orders without due process; 2. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Plaintiffs’ and class members’ rights by operating a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail because they cannot afford to pay monetary conditions of release, without an inquiry or findings concerning their ability to pay, the necessity of detention, and alternative release conditions; 3. A declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to an individualized hearing regarding release conditions and including: a. Notice that financial information will be collected, and the significance thereof;
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b. An individualized determination of the arrestee’s ability to pay and how much;
c. An opportunity to be heard concerning one’s ability to pay and the necessity of non-monetary release conditions, including an opportunity to present and rebut evidence and argue the issues;
d. Substantive findings by the court on the record as to why detention is warranted and why less restrictive alternatives are insufficient; and
e. Free legal counsel;
4. A declaratory judgment that the Sheriff and Commissioner of Corrections must not enforce any order requiring secured money bail or a monetary release condition that was imposed prior to an individualized hearing and that is not accompanied by a record reflecting the foregoing procedures and findings;
5. An order permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and enforcing a system of wealth-based detention that keeps Plaintiffs and class members in jail because they cannot afford to pay monetary release conditions, without an inquiry or findings concerning their ability to pay, alternative release conditions, and the necessity of detention;
6. An order permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and enforcing pretrial detention without constitutionally valid process as described above; and
7. An order directing the Sheriff not to instruct arrestees to remain silent during their hearings.
Procedural History
Concurrent with their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining
order (ECF No. 5), which was served on Defendants on Tuesday, January 29, 2019. The
next day, the parties appeared through counsel for a hearing and informed the Court that
they had reached a tentative agreement obviating the immediate need for a hearing on the
TRO motion. The parties’ finalized the terms of that agreement on the record and filed it
later that day (ECF No. 19). Principally, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs would receive a
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bond hearing in accordance with proposed revised Missouri Supreme Court Rule 33.01, scheduled to take effect July 1, 2019. This revised rule clarifies that a court cannot impose cash bail absent an individualized assessment of an arrestee’s financial circumstances, flight risk, threat to public safety, and consideration of alternative release conditions; it further provides the right to a review hearing on the record within seven days and requires the court to make written findings supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The next day, Thursday, January 31, Defendants held bond hearings for the named Plaintiffs, who appeared through counsel. At the close of those hearings, two Plaintiffs were released without bond, with other conditions. Two others did not receive any reduction in bond. On Monday, February 4, Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to post bail for the two Plaintiffs still detained, by cashier’s checks for $15,000 and $30,000, respectively. Defendants initially refused to accept payment by cashier’s check. Plaintiffs’ counsel spent the entirety of Tuesday, February 5 communicating with various Defendants and other officials to secure approval and acceptance of payment by cashier’s check, resulting in the two men’s release from the Workhouse at 8 p.m. that night.
On February 21, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Defendants’ practice of detaining arrestees who are unable to pay cash bail without an individualized hearing on their financial circumstances and the necessity of detention. Specifically, Plaintiffs demand: (1) notice of the nature and significance of the financial information required, (2) a prompt hearing, on the record, regarding the person’s ability to pay, (3) legal counsel at such hearings, (4) findings on the record as to
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whether the person has the ability to pay, and (5) clear and convincing evidence supporting the necessity of detention. Attached to Plaintiffs’ motion is a proposed order enjoining Jail Commissioner Glass from enforcing any bail order that operates as a de facto detention order due to an arrestee’s inability to pay, unless such order is accompanied by a determination, reflecting the foregoing safeguards, that detention is necessary because there are no less restrictive alternatives to ensure the arrestee’s future court appearance or the public’s safety.
On March 1, 2019, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the case. The City Defendants assert that they have no authority to establish bail conditions and no policy or custom of silencing arrestees in initial appearances. The Defendant Judges assert theories of immunity and abstention.
On April 9, 2019, Plaintiffs requested that their motion for preliminary injunction be decided on the written record. ECF No. 84. After some discussion among counsel, the parties agreed to submit the matter on the written record. The evidence before the Court consists of the following documents (referenced in further detail infra):
• 17 declarations by Plaintiffs and other arrestees describing: a lack of process at their initial appearances; inhumane living conditions and deprivations in detention facilities; and the personal impact of detention on their families and other dependents (ECF No. 41, Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28);
• Nine declarations by arrestees’ family members and other dependents describing hardships resulting from their absence, such as loss of income, loss of caregiving, displacement of children, loss of transportation, and loss of benefits (ECF Nos. 41, Ex. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25);
• Bond commissioner reports on the four named Plaintiffs and three other arrestees, only one of which contains an arrestee’s personal information
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(e.g., family ties, employment, financial resources, character, mental condition, length of residency in the community); ECF No. 41, Ex. 6. • Three declarations by law student Elizabeth Forester, who observed initial appearances in the 22nd circuit and collected information from a random sample of 222 cases (ECF No. 41, Ex. 5; No. 83, Ex. 1; No. 93, Ex. 3); • 164 bond commissioner reports from Forester’s sample containing virtually no personal information relevant to individual release conditions (ECF No. 83, Ex. 2.) • The declaration of the 22nd circuit district defender, Mary Fox, who observes initial appearances on a regular basis (ECF No. 93, Ex. 2); • A letter from The Bail Project of St. Louis providing statistics about its clients’ demographics and rate of court appearances (ECF No. 41, Ex. 29); and • Two affidavits by a bond officer supervisor, Donald Kearbey, generally describing Defendants’ practices at initial appearances (ECF Nos. 59 and 91, Ex. 1). The case is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
DISCUSSION
Class Certification
Also concurrent with their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class
comprised of “all arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution
(the Workhouse) or the City Justice Center (CJC), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-
arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition.” ECF No. 3.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) allows individuals to sue on behalf of a
class if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
(numerosity); (2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class (commonality);
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class (typicality); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
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adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy).
Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class action where defendants have “acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”
(cohesiveness).
Standing
As a preliminary matter, Defendants submit that many putative class members
lack standing because their alleged injury is now in the past, while Plaintiffs seek
prospective relief. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), where the named plaintiffs were arrested without
warrants and held without a prompt probable cause determination. The plaintiffs were in
custody when they filed their complaint, so their injury was then capable of being
redressed through injunctive relief. By the time the matter was ripe for ruling, however,
it was too late for a prompt hearing. The defendants argued, therefore, that plaintiffs’
constitutional violation was “completed,” so they lacked standing. The Court disagreed
and explained:
It is true, of course, that the claims of the named plaintiffs have since been rendered moot; eventually, they either received probable cause determinations or were released. Our cases leave no doubt, however, that by obtaining class certification, plaintiffs preserved the merits of the controversy for our review. … [T]he termination of a class representative’s claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class. … That the class was not certified until after the named plaintiffs’ claims had become moot does not deprive us of jurisdiction. … [S]ome claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest
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expires. In such cases, the “relation back” doctrine is properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution. Accordingly, we proceed to the merits. Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Likewise here, the fact that the named Plaintiffs eventually received bond hearings and are no longer detained in the Workhouse or CJC does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class. Consistent with Riverside, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the members of a class be so numerous as to make joinder impractical. Plaintiffs aver that, according Defendants’ data, 1,238 individuals were incarcerated prior to trial in the summer of 2018 alone, and thousands of current and future arrestees are affected by Defendants’ practices every year. Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to numerosity, and the Court finds this criterion satisfied. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the members of a class be united by a common question of law or fact. Commonality requires a showing that class members have suffered the same injury. Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Services, Inc., 776 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ practice of imposing cash bail without considering alternatives or an arrestee’s ability to pay resulted in their de facto detention in violation of the 14th Amendment. Thus, they suffered the same injury. But further, what matters is the capacity of a class action to generate common answers to resolve the litigation. Id. Plaintiffs seek resolution in the form of timely individualized bond
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hearings to determine the necessity of bail, an arrestee’s ability to pay, and appropriate release conditions based on actual risks of flight or harm to others. Though Defendants argue that such an individualized process is the opposite of a common answer, the relief Plaintiffs seek here is entirely systemic. As such, this criterion is satisfied.
Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the named plaintiffs assert claims typical of the class. Typicality tends to merge with commonality, but the Eighth Circuit has given it independent meaning by requiring a “demonstration that there are other members of the class who have the same or similar grievances as the plaintiff.” Huskey v. Birch Telecom of Missouri, Inc., 4:17-CV-02415 JAR, 2018 WL 4679738, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2018) (citing Paxton v. Union National Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 (8th Cir. 1982)). This can be met when the claims of the members and representatives are based on the same legal or remedial theory. Id. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not typical of the putative class because (1) pursuant to the parties’ stipulation resolving Plaintiffs’ TRO motion, Plaintiffs already received the individualized bond hearings they seek on behalf of the class and (2) Plaintiffs have been released and thus are no longer part of a class of “arrestees who are or will be detained.” The Court declines to distort the parties’ good faith cooperation into class destruction and rejects these arguments for the same reasons articulated above with respect to standing. Moreover, Plaintiffs were detained for two to three weeks prior to any hearing at which their ability to pay was considered. Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that the injury prompting their complaint and the legal and remedial
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theories advanced therein are typical of the putative class. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the named plaintiffs adequately protect the interests of
the class. Defendants seem to suggest that Plaintiffs are not adequate representatives because they do not satisfy the typicality criterion, which the Court has rejected.
The adequacy factor serves “to ensure due process for absent class members, who generally are bound by a judgment rendered in a class action.” Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 614 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2010). Class representatives and their attorneys must be able and willing to prosecute the action competently and vigorously, and each representative’s interests must be sufficiently similar to those of the class that it is unlikely that their goals and viewpoints will diverge. Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 303 F.R.D. 543, 553 (W.D. Mo. 2014). “The experience and capability of the representative’s counsel bears upon the adequacy of the representative.” Rattray, 614 F.3d at 836. The Court is confident that Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with the putative class and their counsel quite competent to prosecute the action.
Cohesiveness Rule 23(b)(2) applies when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011). Defendants argue that the proposed class is not cohesive because Plaintiffs seek individualized bail determinations for each member, though Defendants simultaneously claim that Plaintiffs seek pre-trial release of the entire class. Both arguments mischaracterize Plaintiffs’ objective. Plaintiffs seek neither wholesale release
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of all arrestees nor case-by-case injunctions. Rather, they seek systemic procedural reforms, applicable to all class members, in the form of a prompt and proper hearing. This is precisely the purpose of Rule 23(b). “[C]ivil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples of what (b)(2) is meant to capture.” Id. at 361.
Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class will be granted. Pursuant to Rule 23(g), the Court will appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as counsel for the class.
Motions to Dismiss The Judges and the City have filed separate motions to dismiss on distinct legal theories. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s allegations must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard “simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in plaintiff's favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc'ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768–69 (8th Cir. 2012). A court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” and consider the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8thCir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
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Judicial Immunity The Judges first assert that § 1983 does not authorize an action for declaratory or injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in their official capacity. Plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief with respect to the Judges. Section 1983 states: “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” (emphasis added) Stated inversely, a judge can be sued in an official capacity, and injunctive relief can be granted, when the judge violates a declaratory decree or when declaratory relief is unavailable. Necessarily then, §1983 also contemplates declaratory relief. The cases cited by the Judges do not support a contrary conclusion. Principally, the Judges cite Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Missouri, 1:16CV54RLW, 2017 WL 836558 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 2, 2017). There, an arrestee alleged that a state judge violated his rights by setting an excessive bond and detaining him for seven days without an opportunity to be released on his own recognizance. While this may appear analogous on the surface, a closer reading reveals that the immunity analysis is inapposite. The plaintiff in Hamilton sought monetary damages and asserted that judicial immunity did not apply because the judge acted beyond his jurisdiction. Id. at *5. This Court (J. White) disagreed because the judge was acting in his official capacity. Id. The Court summarily rejected Hamilton’s claim for injunctive relief because he did not even argue that the language of § 1983 currently at issue applied there. Hamilton simply did not examine the immunity issues now before this Court. The other cases cited by the Judges are also inapposite.
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Dancer v. Haltom involved an inmate’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act where the pro se plaintiff did not allege that the prerequisites of § 1983 were met, and he had an adequate remedy at law. 4:10-CV-4118, 2010 WL 5071239, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 16, 2010). Taylor v. Smithart likewise involved a pro se inmate’s complaint that failed to plead the prerequisites of § 1983 (2:10-CV-1057-ID, 2011 WL 1188553, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2011)) and where the plaintiff could have sought relief in state court (2:10-CV-1057-ID, 2011 WL 1188697, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2011)). Howell v. Hofbauer does not examine or even mention the relevant language of § 1983. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1185 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
Circuit courts have confirmed that declaratory relief is available against judicial officers in appropriate circumstances, as is injunctive relief when declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate. Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 Fed. Appx. 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting the district court’s injunctive relief against other defendants but only declaratory judgment against the presiding state judge).
Nonetheless, the Judges assert that Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief in the present circumstances because they have an adequate remedy at law, namely by extraordinary writ in state court. While it is generally true that a plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief when there is an adequate remedy at law (Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000)), the Court cannot conclude, on dismissal standards, that Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. The very adequacy of the process afforded to Plaintiffs
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goes to the heart of this case on the merits. “The adequacy of the state court review of bail-setting procedures is essential to [plaintiff’s] federal cause of action. To find that plaintiffs have an adequate hearing on their constitutional claim in state court would decide its merits.” O’Donnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018). Of course, the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ bond hearings and the adequacy of state writ proceedings to address any constitutional defects in those hearings are separate inquiries, which leads to the Judges’ second theory in support of dismissal.
Adequate Remedy / Younger Abstention To be entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish (1) a violation, (2) a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if the relief is not granted, and (3) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242 (reviewing a § 1983 claim against a federal judge). The Younger abstention doctrine3 instructs that courts should not exercise federal jurisdiction where “(1) there is an ongoing state proceeding,4 (2) which implicates important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions in the state proceeding.” Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n, 715 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 2013). The Judges contend that the
3 The Younger abstention doctrine stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 (1971), holding that a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding except when an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury. Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n, 715 F.3d 674, 676 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013). The Court’s decision was based on equitable principles and respect for the fundamental role of States in our federal system. Id. 4 For purposes of applying Younger abstention, the relevant time for determining if there are ongoing state proceedings is when the federal complaint is filed. Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 2012).
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Younger abstention doctrine precludes Plaintiffs’ claim because an adequate remedy exists in the form of an extraordinary writ. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 33.09 (authorizing appellate review of an excessive bail order by remedial writ) and 84.24 (governing procedures for original writs).
In support of their argument, the Judges rely on Oglala, where the plaintiffs sought systemic procedural reform in child welfare proceedings. 904 F.3d at 606. Specifically, the Oglala plaintiffs alleged that temporary custody hearings occurring within 48 hours of removal did not provide an opportunity for parents to contest the allegations; rather, parents were forced to wait 60 to 90 days for a meaningful evidentiary hearing. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief imposing certain procedural requirements (e.g., notice, right to counsel, right to cross-examine witnesses, evidenced-based decisions). The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that abstention was warranted because the reforms interfered with ongoing state proceedings and because the plaintiffs had not established that the state courts were unwilling or unable to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ federal claims. Id. at 612-613. In reaching this conclusion, the Circuit Court discussed two Supreme Court cases involving pre-trial detention practices also relevant here: O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
In O’Shea, the plaintiffs alleged that state court judges engaged in racially discriminatory practices in setting bonds, fees, and sentences. The Supreme Court held that Younger abstention was warranted there because the injunction sought by the plaintiffs was “aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that
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might take place in the course of future state criminal trials” and amounted to “an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings.” 414 U.S. at 500. “A federal court should not intervene to establish the basis for future intervention that would be so intrusive and unworkable.” Id. The O’Shea Court also noted that adequate state remedies were available in the form of a change of judge or venue, direct appeal or postconviction review, judicial discipline, or federal habeas relief. Id. at 502. By contrast, in Gerstein v. Pugh, post-arrest detainees sought injunctive relief to receive prompt probable cause determinations where Florida law did not provide for such hearings. There, the Supreme Court held that Younger abstention did not apply because the injunction was “not directed at the state proceedings as such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.” 420 U.S. at 108, n. 9.
Comparing O’Shea and Gerstein, the Eighth Circuit in Oglala deemed O’Shea controlling in that the “relief requested [by the Oglala plaintiffs] would interfere with the state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to comply with numerous procedural requirements at future 48-hour hearings.” Oglala, 904 F.3d at 612. “A federal court order dictating what procedures must be used in an ongoing state proceeding would ‘interfere’ with that proceeding by inhibiting the legitimate functioning of the individual state’s judicial system.” Id. at 611. The Circuit Court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that state law lacked an adequate remedy, noting that state law provided for a writ of mandamus and right to appeal, and the state supreme court could review moot questions of public importance. Id. at 613. Importantly, the Ogala court
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distinguished its facts from Gerstein, where the plaintiffs could not raise the legality of their pre-trial detention in the criminal prosecution and thus did not have an opportunity to press their claims in state court. Id. at 612-613.
This Court is not persuaded that the Eighth Circuit would apply its reasoning in Oglala to the present facts, particularly given the Circuit’s characterizations of O’Shea and Gerstein. In O’Shea, the plaintiffs challenged the underlying prosecutions and sought reforms at every stage from bond to sentencing, and the injunction “contemplate[d] interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 500. Likewise in Oglala, the plaintiffs sought reforms permitting them to litigate the merits of the child welfare case at an earlier stage. Conversely, in Gerstein, the plaintiffs sought reform (a hearing) at a finite stage (postarrest) involving a discrete determination (probable cause) separate from the merits of the criminal prosecution. Such is the case here, too.
In cases virtually identical to this one, other Circuits and district courts have not abstained from exercising jurisdiction.5 In O’Donnell, the plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action against various county officials, including judges and the sheriff, alleging that the county’s bail practices resulted in the detention of indigent arrestees in violation of equal protection and due process. 892 F.3d at 152. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants’ Younger argument, citing Gerstein and explaining that the relief sought (i.e.,
5 See e.g., Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015); Little v. Frederick, 6:17-CV-00724, 2017 WL 8161160 at *4 (W.D. La. Dec. 11, 2017); and Caliste v. Cantrell, CV 17-6197, 2017 WL 3686579, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017).
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improvement of pretrial procedures and practice) “is not properly reviewed by criminal proceedings in state court.” Id. at 156. “The adequacy of the state court review of bailsetting procedures is essential to O’Donnell’s federal cause of action. … To find that the plaintiffs have an adequate hearing on their constitutional claim in state court would decide its merits.” Id. Further, the “non-discretionary procedural safeguards” sought would “not require federal intrusion into pre-trial decisions on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit, too, relied on Gerstein to conclude that Younger abstention does not apply where plaintiffs challenged the imposition of bail without an individualized determination of a person’s ability to pay and alternative release conditions. Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018). “Younger does not readily apply here because [plaintiff] is not asking to enjoin any prosecution. Rather, he merely seeks prompt bail determinations for himself and his fellow class members.” Id. at 1254. “Walker does not ask for the sort of pervasive federal court supervision of State criminal proceedings that was at issue in O’Shea. Instead, as in Gerstein, Walker merely asks for a prompt pre-trial determination of a distinct issue, which will not interfere with subsequent prosecution.” Id. at 1255.
Though neither O’Donnell nor Walker specifically discussed the adequacy of state writ relief as the Judges argue here, such avenues exist in Texas and Georgia as they do in Missouri.6 Missouri Supreme Court precedent recognizes that a judge is required to consider an individual defendant’s financial resources and other relevant factors, and that

6

GA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-20 (providing for writs of mandamus); TEX. GOV’T. CODE

ANN. § 22.002 (same).

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bail should only be imposed when necessary to assure the defendant’s court appearance or the public’s safety. State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 216-217 (Mo. 2012) (declaring cash-only bail constitutional). But Defendants cite no Missouri precedent where an appellate court has considered mandamus relief on these principles, and the Court’s own research reveals only scant and notably dated cases providing individual habeas relief. See e.g., Ex parte Chandler, 297 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. App. 1957). The Court cannot ascertain whether Missouri appellate courts have already considered and rejected due process claims such as Plaintiffs’, as summary denials are not published. Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.24(d) and (k). While the Court appreciates the deferential confines of appellate review, the lack of state jurisprudence examining Defendants’ longstanding practices suggests that a state writ remedy is only theoretical. An illusory remedy cannot be an adequate remedy.
Moreover, the Judges’ position that a pro se indigent arrestee must litigate the constitutionality of his initial appearance and resultant bail by petition for extraordinary writ under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 84.24 appears inadequate in the context of Plaintiffs’ grievance. Centrally, Plaintiffs aver that they have neither funds nor counsel to avoid weeks-long incarceration awaiting a meaningful hearing on their release conditions. To require a lay citizen to exhaust state writ proceedings from the Workhouse is tantamount to a guaranty of his continued detention. This is hardly an adequate remedy for the injury Plaintiffs allege here, where the irreparable harm of detention is not only immediate but also enduring due to ruinous collateral consequences. “A necessary predicate for a Younger dismissal is the opportunity to raise and have timely
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decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). That is not happening in Defendants’ system. The Court therefore finds that the circumstances prescribing Younger abstention are not present here.
For the foregoing reasons, the Judges’ motion to dismiss will be denied. The City’s Authority In its separate motion to dismiss, the City asserts that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against it because the City has no authority to set bail or release conditions; rather, such authority lies with the Judges. A municipal defendant advanced a similar argument, unsuccessfully, in Fant v. The City of Ferguson, 4:15-CV-00253-AGF, 2016 WL 6696065 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2016). There, as here, Plaintiffs do not seek to hold the City liable for judicial decisions or practices. Rather, Plaintiffs identify the City’s own role in violating class members’ constitutional rights.7 “Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Corwin v. City of Indep., Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only allege facts sufficient to draw an inference that the
7 Though Fant involved municipal court whereas this case involves state circuit court, the distinction is not material to the analysis here. In both cases, by attempting to shift the focus to judicial discretion, the defendants fail to acknowledge their own independent actions, completely separate from the judicial process. Fant, 2016 WL 6696065 at *6.
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conduct complained of resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom. Crumpley– Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff may establish liability through an unofficial custom by demonstrating (1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation. Corwin, 829 F.3d at 700 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs here allege that “pursuant to a policy or practice of the sheriff’s office, deputies inform detained individuals that they are not allowed to speak or request a change in their release conditions during the first appearance.” The complaint also incorporates multiple arrestees’ declarations stating that deputies instructed them not to speak at their first appearances. Thus, separate from the Judges’ role in Plaintiffs’ injury, Plaintiffs plead with respect to the City itself: (1) the existence of a pattern, (2) the sheriff’s authorization, and (3) the deprivation of an opportunity to be heard.
Equally separate from the Judges’ bail-setting authority, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the sheriff and jail commissioner from enforcing unconstitutional bail orders by detaining arrestees deprived of a meaningful hearing. It is well-established that a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief is cognizable against an official charged with enforcement of the challenged law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908); Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (enjoining a highway patrol superintendent from enforcing a
22

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state statute); Moore v. Urquhart, 899 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2018) (enjoining a sheriff from enforcing unconstitutional eviction orders). Other courts have granted such relief against custodial officials on similar facts. For example, in McNeil v. Community Probation Services, LLC, the district court reasoned that the sheriff could be enjoined from enforcing unconstitutional bail orders because he had an independent duty to refrain from violating the Constitution. 1:18-CV-00033, 2019 WL 633012, at *15 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019). In Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, the district court denied a sheriff’s motion to dismiss with respect to injunctive relief where the sheriff detained arrestees who were unable to pay bail set by the court. 15-CV-04959-YGR, 2016 WL 6025486, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016). Even in O’Donnell where the Harris County sheriff was not considered a policy-maker under Texas law, the Fifth Circuit authorized the sheriff to decline to enforce bail orders absent a record reflecting an individual determination and an opportunity for review. 892 F.3d at 165.
Plaintiffs plead that Sheriff Betts has authority over arrestees in City custody at the time of their first appearance and that Jail Commissioner Glass enforces pre-trial detention orders. Without deciding at the dismissal stage whether or what relief is proper with respect to these City Defendants, the Court cannot conclude that they are entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim. As such, the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied.8
8 The City Defendants also contend, in their motion to dismiss, that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the City and Sheriff Betts for the alleged custom and practice of silencing arrestees at their initial video appearances. The parties have stipulated not to litigate this issue at the preliminary injunction stage. ECF No. 92. Pursuant to their
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Preliminary Injunction Proceeding to the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion, when determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the court considers: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. D.M. by Bao Xiong v. Minnesota State High Sch. League, 917 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). Likelihood of Success on the Merits “While no single factor is determinative, the probability of success factor is the most significant.” Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013). When assessing the movant’s probability of success on the merits, the court asks whether the movant has a “fair chance of prevailing.” D.M., 917 F.3d at 999. This standard does not require a movant to show a likelihood of success greater than fifty percent. Id. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ procedures violate equal protection and due process because Defendants failed to make findings about an arrestee’s ability to pay before setting bail. Federal courts have repeatedly held that jailing persons who are unable to pay a court-ordered fine, after a conviction, without first inquiring into their ability to pay and considering alternatives to imprisonment, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. “[T]he Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as
agreement, Sheriff’s deputies will be instructed not to tell arrestees to be silent at their first appearance. More particularly, deputies will not discourage arrestees from asking questions or seeking bond reductions.
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a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971). “By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of
reducing the fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison sentence” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden v Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983).
Plaintiffs submit that the detention, before trial, of arrestees who are presumed innocent is even more egregious. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed in O’Donnell that “detainment solely due to a person’s indigency because the financial conditions for release are based on predetermined amounts beyond a person’s ability to
pay and without any ‘meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives’” is discriminatory and unconstitutional. 892 F.3d at 161 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that pretrial imprisonment solely because of indigent status violates due process and equal protection)). This Court and other district courts throughout the country have reached the same conclusion.9
9 See e.g., Pierce v. City of Velda City, 4:15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Services, LLC, 1:18-CV-00033, 2019 WL 633012 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019); Jones v. The City of Clanton, 215CV34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015); Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ala. 2018); Edwards v. Cofield, 3:17-CV-321-WKW, 2017 WL 2255775 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 2017); Thompson v. Moss Point, 1:15CV182LG-RHW, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015); Cooper v. City of Dothan, 1:15-CV-425-WKW, 2015 WL 10013003 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015); Snow v. Lambert, CV 15-567-SDD-RLB, 2015 WL 5071981 (M.D. La. Aug. 27, 2015).
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In fact, Defendants firmly agree that excessive bail is unconstitutional, that a person cannot be imprisoned solely due to indigence, and that federal and state law require a prompt and individualized determination of pre-trial release conditions. The Court need not expound on these accepted principles. Defendants assert, however, that existing procedures are constitutionally adequate both as written in the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure and as practiced in the 22nd Circuit.
Missouri Rule 33.01 provides that “any person charged with a bailable offense shall be entitled to be released pending trial.” Mo. R. Civ. P. 33.01(a). “The court shall in all cases release the accused upon his written promise to appear, unless the court determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the accused,” in which case the court may impose release conditions including supervision, restrictions on travel, domicile, and associations, reporting requirements, or bond. Mo. R. Civ. P. 33.01(d). Most notably:
In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure appearance, the court shall, on the basis of available information, take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused’s family ties, employment, financial resources, character, mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings. Mo. R. Civ. P. 33.01(e). Recent revisions to this rule and new related provisions will take effect July 1, 2019, adding that: (1) a court should first consider non-monetary release conditions and only the least restrictive conditions as will secure the defendant’s
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Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 95 Filed: 06/11/19 Page: 27 of 34 PageID #: 1339
appearance at trial; (2) a court may order detention only upon clear and convincing
evidence that other release conditions will not secure the safety of the community or
other persons; (3) a detained defendant has a right to a release hearing within seven
working days to present evidence of his financial status and ability to pay, and (4) at any
hearing under Rule 33, the court must make findings on the record supporting detention or other conditions.10
But Defendants’ recognition of precedent and citation to written rules do not
evidence the constitutional adequacy of the process afforded to Plaintiffs and other class
members. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that Defendants do not actually apply
those principles or rules in practice. Ample evidence in the record shows that the duty
judge presiding over initial appearances rarely considers information about an arrestee’s
financial circumstances because the bond commissioner rarely provides it and arrestees
are instructed not to speak. Plaintiffs submit multiple declarations by arrestees who were instructed not to speak at their initial appearance. 11 ECF No. 41 Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 17,
18. In the random sample of 222 cases reviewed by law student Elizabeth Forester
10 The impending rule change does not render this case moot. Even voluntary cessation of a challenged practice, such as the City’s stipulation that deputies will no longer instruct arrestees not to speak, does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006). If it did, a defendant could “return to its old practices without fear of reprisal.” Id. Given Defendants’ systemic non-compliance with the more lenient standards of the current rule, Defendants’ operational capacity to satisfy the higher standards of the new rule remains to be seen. 11 As one example: “The Sheriffs escorted me and the group of people to see a judge … through a video screen. The Sheriff told me, ‘Do not talk to the judge.’ They said, ‘Nobody talk or ask questions. We are just trying to get it done.’” ECF No. 41 Ex. 10.
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shortly before this lawsuit was filed, the bond commissioner interviewed only nine defendants (i.e., 4%), and only five of the nine reports from those interviews (i.e., 2% overall) contained information relevant to the person’s ability to pay. ECF No. 83 Ex. 1. Thus, in roughly 98% of sampled cases, the duty judge set bail without any information on this constitutionally critical factor. The 164 pre-trial release reports contained in the sample reflect, almost universally, that the form is completed only with respect to a person’s pending charges and criminal history, while sections related to his family ties, employment, financial resources, character, mental condition, and length of residency in the community are left blank. ECF No. 83 Ex. 2. Forester stated in a declaration, based on her observations of first appearances on February 1, 2019, that such appearances lasted approximately 45-60 seconds and that the judge did not solicit any information about arrestees’ ability to pay, silenced those who asked questions, told those requesting reduction to wait for an attorney to file a motion, and never modified the fixed bail amount. ECF No. 41, Ex. 5. District Defender Mary Fox, who observes initial appearances on a regular basis, confirmed in her declaration that judges do not inquire into an arrestee’s ability to pay or other factors. ECF No. 93, Ex. 2. These practices do not comport with applicable Supreme Court and Circuit precedent.
Defendants’ evidence consists of two affidavits of a bond officer supervisor, Donald Kearbey, generally describing the bail-setting process. ECF Nos. 59 and 91, Ex. 1. Kearbey explains that bond is fixed when an arrest warrant is issued, the bond commissioner interviews arrestees (which Plaintiffs’ data credibly belies), and the judge reviews the commissioner’s recommendation and decides whether to modify conditions.
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The first affidavit does little to refute Plaintiffs’ evidence that arrestees have no opportunity to be heard and that the court conducts no individual inquiry as to a person’s ability to pay and alternatives to detention. ECF No. 59, Ex. 1. In his supplemental affidavit, Kearbey adds that the court does allow arrestees to speak to request bond reductions. When they do, the court responds by advising them to obtain counsel and file a motion. ECF No. 91, Ex. 1. Kearbey explicitly confirms that arrestees who can post bail are allowed to leave immediately, and those who cannot are detained. ECF No. 59, Ex. 1. This is precisely what Plaintiffs lament and what federal precedent prohibits. “[I]mprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.” Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1056 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate, 401 U.S. at 398).
Though Defendants advocate for rational basis review, this Court agrees with other courts that have applied heightened scrutiny. See e.g., O’Donnell, 892 F.3d at 162 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973)); Buffin, 2018 WL 424362 at *8 (stating that “an examination of the Bearden-Tate-Williams line of cases persuades the Court that strict scrutiny applies.”). But even under rational basis review, Defendants’ practices fall short of constitutional standards in that Defendants fail to articulate any governmental interest in detaining indigent defendants while releasing moneyed defendants facing the same charges, without any consideration of individual
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factors. The foregoing evidence persuades the Court that Plaintiffs have a high probability of prevailing on the merits.12
However, Plaintiffs have not supplied binding authority supporting their demand
for appointed counsel at initial appearances. The Court will not grant their prayer for
preliminary relief in that respect.
Remaining Factors
The Court finds that the remaining Dataphase factors weigh heavily in Plaintiffs’
favor. Plaintiffs’ evidence from Forester’s random sample of 222 cases indicates that
only about half of arrestees unable to post bail receive a bond reduction hearing, and even
then only after an average of 47 days in detention, after which 69% receive a reduction or
are released on their own recognizance. ECF No. 93, Ex. 3. The threat of irreparable
harm to the movants is obvious, not only in the form of prolonged incarceration itself, but also in the form of its severe collateral consequences such as physical illness and injury,13 mental trauma,14 loss of employment,15 loss of benefits,16 and family crisis.17
12 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs should seek relief by petition for habeas corpus rather than under § 1983. This theory is predicated on Defendants’ characterization that Plaintiffs seek wholesale, unconditional release of all class members, which is inaccurate. Plaintiffs do not seek blind, class-wide release; rather, they seek individualized determinations of release conditions with a presumption against bail, as opposed to bail as the default rule for all. As discussed above, ample federal precedent recognizes a § 1983 claim on the present facts. 13 ECF No. 41, Ex. 9 & 28 (witnessed guards mace a detainee who asked for his medication), Ex. 14 (serious health issues, missing medication and doctor appointments), Ex. 17 (maced by guard while in chokehold), Ex. 22 (missed medication, dragged down stairs). 14 ECF No. 41, Ex. 26 (“In here, a lot of people want to commit suicide.”).
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Next, the Court must balance these threats of irreparable harm against potential
harm to other litigants. On this factor, Defendants argue that the state court will suffer
harm in the form of federal court interference. The Court has already rejected
Defendants’ Younger argument and does not find it persuasive here. As more fully
discussed above, this Court is not reviewing the underlying state criminal charges or
interfering in any manner with the state processes that apply to the merits of those
charges.
Finally, a preliminary injunction would not jeopardize the public interest. To the
contrary, it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s
constitutional rights. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). That is
especially true here, where the collateral consequences of incarceration affect not only
arrestees but also, by ripple effect, the stability of their entire families and thus the
community. Defendants provide no support for the suggestion that arrestees released
15 ECF No. 41, Ex. 1 (terminated from warehouse job), Ex. 7 (missed a job interview), Ex. 9 (“I had a good job before I was arrested. … I feel like I am losing everything in here.”), Ex. 10, 15, 16, 18. 16 ECF No. 41, Ex. 8 & 14 (food stamps). 17 Numerous declarations depict extreme hardship on arrestees’ families due to the detention of breadwinners, parents, and other caregivers. ECF No. 41, Ex. 1 (caregiver for sick uncle), Ex. 9 (“Is it my role to protect my sister and her son. … My girlfriend is also relying on me. Since I’ve been arrested, her utilities were shut off. She has a two year old child …and there’s nothing I can do for them.”), Ex. 13 (loss of head of household, caregiver, school driver), Ex. 14 (loss of primary parent to three small children – “We didn’t know where she was until she was able to call us about six days after she went missing.”), Ex. 15 (loss of primary financial provider); Ex. 16 (sister and nephews homeless), Ex. 19 & 20 (loss of caregiver for sister with cancer and multiple extended family members, children), Ex. 21, 24 ,25 (loss of caregiver and primary transportation), Ex. 26.
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without bail are more likely to commit crimes or less likely to appear in court than those released upon payment. Further, as other courts have observed, there is no evidence that financial conditions of release are more effective than alternatives for ensuring court appearances and public safety. O’Donnell, 892 F.3d at 154 (noting “reams of empirical data” suggesting the opposite); McNeil, 2019 WL 633012 at 14-15 (noting statistics showing a high rate of court appearance for those released and higher rates of recidivism among those detained); Schultz, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1363 (citing New York data that 95% of arrestees whose bail was paid by non-profit organizations made their court appearances). Here, Plaintiffs offer statistics from The Bail Project of St. Louis reflecting that 94.4% of defendants for whom the organization paid bail made their scheduled court appearances.18 ECF No. 41, Ex. 29. Defendants’ position is further belied by the fact that, as noted above, at bond reduction hearings, 69% of detainees received a reduction or were released on their own recognizance. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not request wholesale release of all class members but simply a presumption favoring non-monetary release conditions and a hearing that comports with due process.
Upon careful consideration of all Dataphase factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is meritorious and should be granted.
18 Plaintiffs’ evidence from The Bail Project further indicates that, in the City of St. Louis, 53.4% of resolved cases ended in dismissal of all charges. Almost 3/4 of the project’s clients are African-American. The average age is 32, and over one third have minor children. ECF No. 41, Ex. 29.
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Waiver of Security Finally, Plaintiffs request a waiver of the security normally required under Rule 65(c). Given that Plaintiffs and class members are indigent and that this matter involves the public interest and carries no risk of monetary loss to Defendants, the Court exercises its discretion to waive that requirement. Johnson v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 929, 952 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (waiving security in a civil rights case brought by indigent plaintiffs).
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is GRANTED. ECF No. 3. The class shall consist of “all arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution (the Workhouse) or the City Justice Center (CJC), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition.” Plaintiffs’ counsel is appointed counsel for the class. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED. ECF Nos. 49 and 51. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. ECF No. 41. Defendant Jail Commissioner Dale Glass is enjoined from enforcing any monetary condition of release that results in detention solely by virtue of an arrestee’s inability to pay, unless the order is accompanied by a finding that detention is necessary because there are no less restrictive alternatives to ensure the arrestee’s appearance or the public’s safety. The order must reflect that: (1) a hearing was held on
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the record within 48 hours of arrest or, for those currently detained, within seven days of this order; (2) the arrestee had an opportunity to present and rebut evidence as to whether detention is necessary, with the government bearing the burden of proof; and (3) if financial conditions of release are imposed, the court made specific findings regarding the arrestee’s ability to pay and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that no alternative conditions would reasonably assure the arrestee’s future court appearance or the safety of others.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the security requirement of Rule 65(c) is waived.

Dated this 11th day of June, 2019.

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

34

 
 Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 110 Filed: 06/17/19 Page: 1 of 3 PageID #: 1441

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID DIXON, et al. Plaintiffs,
vs. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 4:19-cv-0112-AGF ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 99, 104) to stay

execution of the Court’s preliminary injunction order (ECF No. 95) pending appeal or,

alternatively, to extend the deadline for compliance with the Court’s order.

The parties appeared through counsel for a hearing on June 14, 2014. During that

hearing, Defendants asked that their requests in the alternative be treated as separate

motions. As such, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to stay in this memorandum and

order and will grant in part their motion for additional time by separate order.

A party seeking a stay while a petition for permission to appeal is pending bears the

burden of showing that: (1) the party is likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal; (2) the

party will be irreparably injured unless the stay is granted; (3) the non-moving party will not

be substantially injured by granting the stay; and (4) the public interest will not be harmed

by granting the stay. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011).

The most important factor is the appellant’s likelihood of success on the merits, but

Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 110 Filed: 06/17/19 Page: 2 of 3 PageID #: 1442
ultimately the court must consider the relative strength of all factors. Id. Considering all factors, the Court finds that a stay is not warranted.
First, the Court carefully examined Defendants’ substantive arguments in its analysis of their motions to dismiss and ultimately concluded that applicable precedent does not prescribe dismissal on the facts of this case. In particular, the Court rejects Defendants’ position that members of the Plaintiff class are confined to individual writ relief, whether by habeas corpus or mandamus. As discussed in the Court’s memorandum and order, those remedies are inadequate in the context of Plaintiffs’ actual circumstances. Other courts have recognized § 1983 class actions on similar facts, and Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2018), is distinguishable insofar as the 48-hour hearings at issue there touched the merits of the underlying case rather than a distinct collateral issue. Although the Eighth Circuit could disagree with the Court’s conclusions, the Court is not persuaded that Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal.
Second, there is no risk that Defendants will be irreparably harmed absent a stay. On the contrary, Defendants fully accept the propriety of compliance with the due process requirements described in the Court’s preliminary injunction order and in greater detail in new Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.01, to take effect in two weeks. This Court’s order does not harm Defendants but instead benefits their system and the public by ensuring actual implementation of Rule 33.01 in the 22nd Circuit. Moreover, the Court has modified its preliminary injunction order to give Defendants additional time to comply.
Third, the non-moving party would indeed be substantially injured by a stay insofar as Plaintiff class members would remain incarcerated without due process.
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Fourth, a stay would not serve the public interest. As the Court emphasized repeatedly in Friday’s hearing, the Court in no way advocates for the release of individuals who pose a safety risk. Rather, the Court’s order and Rule 33.01 require an individualized determination of factors that include an arrestee’s risk of flight or danger to the public or to specific individuals. But it is always in the public interest to uphold the Constitution and to avoid the incarceration of arrestees solely based on indigency. The Court will not suspend those objectives pending further examination of the adequacy of state procedures.
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motions to stay the Court’s preliminary injunction order are DENIED. ECF Nos. 99 and 104.

Dated this 17th day of June, 2019.

________________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 124 Filed: 07/03/19 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 1546
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No: 19-2251 David Dixon, et al.
Appellees v. City of St. Louis
Appellant Vernon Betts, Sheriff, et al. Dale Glass, Commissioner, in his official capacity as St. Louis Commissioner of Corrections
Appellant
No: 19-2254 David Dixon, et al.
Appellees v. City of St. Louis, et al. Rex Burlison, in his official capacity as interim Presiding Judge, et al.
Appellants Dale Glass, Commissioner, in his official capacity as St. Louis Commissioner of Corrections ______________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis (4:19-cv-00112-AGF) (4:19-cv-00112-AGF)
______________________________________________________________________________ ORDER
On June 20, 2019 the court entered a temporary stay of the district court's June 11, 2019 preliminary injunction, pending review of the plaintiffs' response to the defendants' motions for stay pending appeal. The court has now considered plaintiffs' response, and well as defendants'
Appellate Case: 19-2251 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/03/2019 Entry ID: 4804582

Case: 4:19-cv-00112-AGF Doc. #: 124 Filed: 07/03/19 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 1547 replies, and it is hereby ordered that defendants' motions for a stay pending appeal are granted.
July 03, 2019 Order Entered at the Direction of the Court: Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. ____________________________________
/s/ Michael E. Gans
Appellate Case: 19-2251 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/03/2019 Entry ID: 4804582

 
 950 F.3d 1052 (2020)
David DIXON; Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.; Aaron Thurman; Richard Robards, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated PlaintiffsAppellees, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS Defendant-Appellant
Vernon Betts, Sheriff; Robin Ransom, Judge, in her official capacity as presiding judge; Rex Burlison, in his official capacity as interim Presiding Judge; David Roither, Judge, in his official capacity as
Division 25 Judge and Duty Judge; Elizabeth B. Hogan, Judge, in her official capacity as Division 16 Judge and Duty Judge; Thomas McCarthy, Judge, in his official capacity as Division 26 Judge Defendants Dale Glass, Commissioner, in his official capacity as St. Louis Commissioner of Corrections Defendant-Appellant
Texas Public Policy Foundation; Right on Crime; National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies; Pretrial Justice Institute; National Association for Public Defense; American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation; American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Southern Poverty Law Center
Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s) David Dixon; Jeffrey Rozelle, Jr.; Aaron Thurman; Richard Robards, On
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated PlaintiffsAppellees v.
City of St. Louis; Vernon Betts, Sheriff; Robin Ransom, Judge, in her official capacity as presiding judge Defendants
Rex Burlison, in his official capacity as interim Presiding Judge; Elizabeth B. Hogan, Judge, in her official capacity as Division 16 Judge and Duty Judge; David Roither, Judge, in his official capacity as Division
25 Judge and Duty Judge; Thomas McCarthy, Judge, in his official capacity as Division 26 Judge Defendants-Appellants
Dale Glass, Commissioner, in his official capacity as St. Louis Commissioner of Corrections Defendant 1053*1053
Texas Public Policy Foundation; Right on Crime; National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies; Pretrial Justice Institute; National Association for Public Defense; American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation; American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri; Lawyers'

Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Southern Poverty Law Center Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s).
No. 19-2251, No. 19-2254.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: December 12, 2019. Filed: February 28, 2020.
Appeals from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri — St. Louis.
1054*1054 Sima Atri, Jacqueline Marie Kutnik-Bauder, Jacki Janelle Langum, Blake A. Strode, Michael-John Voss, John McCann Waldron, ARCH CITY DEFENDERS, Saint Louis, MO, Jonathan Backer, Robert D. Friedman, Mary McCord, Nicolas Y. Riley, Seth T. Wayne, INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, Elizabeth Bewley, WILMER & CUTLER, Boston, MA, Arpit Kumar Garg, Daniel Volchok, WILMER & CUTLER, Washington, DC, Thomas B. Harvey, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, Washington, DC, Alexander G. Karakatsanis, CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Megan K. B. Bruyns, Robert Henry Dierker, Jr., CITY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellants City of St. Louis, Dale Glass.
Thomas Christian Albus, Michael Pritchett, Assistant Attorneys General, Dean John Sauer, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Jefferson City, MO, Robert J. Isaacson, Assistant Attorney General, Peter T. Reed, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellants Rex Burlison, Elizabeth B. Hogan, David Roither, Thomas McCarthy.
Jeffrey T. Green, Tobias Samuel Loss-Eaton, David W. McAloon, Carter G. Phillips, SIDLEY & AUSTIN, Washington, DC, Robert Henneke, TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION, Austin, TX, for Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s) Texas Public Policy Foundation, Right on Crime.
Alicia N. Netterville, BRADLEY & ARANT, Jackson, MS, J. Bradley Robertson, BRADLEY & ARANT, Birmingham, AL, for Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s) National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Pretrial Justice Institute, National Association for Public Defense.
Brandon Buskey, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU of New York, New York, NY, Jon M. Greenbaum, Leah Watson, LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, Washington, DC, Anthony E. Rothert, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI, Saint Louis, MO, Micah West, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Montgomery, AL, Andrea Woods, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, NY, for Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s) American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Southern Poverty Law Center.
Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
On January 28, 2018, the Plaintiffs, a group of pretrial arrestees who were detained in St. Louis jails, filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They challenge the constitutionality of the procedures by which defendants, state and city officials, set money bail. By allegedly failing to consider non-monetary conditions of release, and Plaintiffs' respective abilities to afford bond, these officials oversee, it is claimed, an illegal wealth-based detention regime. On June 11, 2019, the district court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of any monetary condition of release resulting in detention, unless there are findings that detention is necessary because there are no less restrictive alternatives to ensure the arrestee's appearance or public safety. The Defendants have brought this interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we reverse.
1055*1055 I. Background
The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges a system of pretrial detention where secured bail is routinely ordered without an individualized determination of arrestees' respective ability to pay, risk of flight, or danger to the public. They assert that shortly after arrest a bond commissioner recommends to a duty judge that a cash bond be set in a certain amount. The duty judge usually accepts the recommendation. Once the bond is set, those who can post the bond are released while those who are unable to post the bond are held on bail and afforded an initial appearance within forty-eight hours. On the way to the appearance, the arrestees are allegedly told by a police officer that this is not the time to request a bond modification and that it would be best if they remained silent. If an arrestee asks about bond during the hearing, the judge tells him that his lawyer should make a motion for a bond reduction. It is alleged that it usually takes five weeks to receive a bail review hearing and that at these hearings the judges routinely fail to tailor bond to arrestees' individual circumstances.
The Plaintiffs assert that this procedure violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it contravenes the Missouri Supreme Court's rules governing pretrial release, which required judges to "take into account" information, if available, on an arrestee's "financial resources" before setting release conditions. Mo. R. Crim. P. 33.01(e) (1994). Rule 33.01 has been modified twice in the last year, once on July 1, 2019, and again on January 1, 2020. The first of these amendments was announced on December 18, 2018, almost six months before the district court's injunction. The new rules clarify that a court may not impose cash bail absent an individualized assessment of an arrestee's financial circumstances. They also provide that within seven days of an arrest the court must conduct a review hearing on the record and

make written findings supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mo. R. Crim. P. 33.01 (2020).
We stayed the district court's injunction on July 3, 2019, pending this appeal.
II. Discussion
The grant of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. TCF Nat'l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2011). We will find an abuse of discretion when the district court relies on clearly erroneous factual findings or an error of law. Phyllis Schlafly Revocable Tr. v. Cori, 924 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir. 2019). An abuse of discretion also occurs when "a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment." Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d 885, 893 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
The district court identified the applicable Dataphase factors: "(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest." Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). We find, however, that it gave too little weight in its discussion of these factors to the recent changes to the Missouri rules governing pretrial release. These rules were announced 1056*1056 months before, and took effect just three weeks after, the district court issued its injunction. And, as the district court recognized, they addressed the very procedures with which Plaintiffs take issue. Dixon v. City of St. Louis, Case No. 4:19-cv-0112-AGF, 2019 WL 2437026, at *2 (June 11, 2019).
The district court, in fact, considered the effect of the rule changes on the question of mootness. See id. at *13 n.10 ("The impending rule change does not render this case moot."). But it failed to adequately account for their effect on the question of whether a preliminary injunction served the public interest in comity between the state and federal judiciaries. In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 1996) (including comity as a public interest to be considered in a preliminary injunction analysis). "Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies." R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ("Cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict, are essential to the federal design."); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976) ("Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law." (quotation marks omitted)). We note that "[t]his principle of comity takes on special force when federal courts are asked to decide how state courts

should conduct their business." Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2018).
The Missouri Supreme Court, by initiating an update to the rules pertaining to cash bail, was presumably using its superintendence powers to signal to the lower state courts that the status quo was unacceptable. The Defendants took the hint, "fully accept[ing] [before the district court] the propriety of compliance with the ... new Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.01, to take effect in two weeks." Dixon v. City of St. Louis, Case No. 4:19-cv0112-AGF, 2019 WL 2509792, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 17, 2019). These are important facts that distinguish this case from similar cash-bail cases recently decided by our sister circuits. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 2018); ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 152-55 (5th Cir. 2018). Here the district court resorted to the "extraordinary remedy" of a preliminary injunction without giving adequate consideration to the new rules and their implementation. Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). By doing so, it interjected the power of the federal government into the Missouri Supreme Court's attempt to police its own lower courts, without contemplating what this would mean for federal-state relations. This failure constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion.
We do not decide today whether the district court should have abstained from hearing the case altogether, but only that it improperly omitted from its analysis "a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight." Novus Franchising, Inc., 725 F.3d at 893 (quotation marks omitted). On remand the district court should consider this factor as well as the necessity of an injunction in light of the course of conduct since this court's issuance of the stay pending appeal.
1057*1057 III. Conclusion
The preliminary injunction is vacated and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.