Case 3:98-cv-00731 Document 455 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, et aI.,
Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.
Defendants.

Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin
No. 3:98 CV 0731 JURY DEMAND

ORDER
It appearing to the Court, as evidenced by the signatures of counsel hereon, that the Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Chester, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Houston, Jackson, Polk and Trousdale Counties for post-December 17, 2004, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses have been resolved;
It is therefore ORDERED that the claims of Plaintiffs, George Lane, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, A. Russell Larson and Beverly Jones against Defendants Chester, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Houston, Jackson , Polk and Trousdale Counties for post-December 17, 2004, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses are dismissed with prejudice.
Signed this __ day of August, 2005.

JU-DG\~ ~ TODD J~CACM:P..B..EWLo..L.~~~l~~~~O~Q=-_

279479
Case 3:98-cv-00731 Document 456 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 1 of 3

APPROVED FOR ENTRY:
t \JJ1.-- > )~~w ~~
WILt1'AM J. BROWN (BPR# 5450) 23 North Ocoee Street Post Office Box 10001 Cleveland, Tennessee 37364-1001 (423) 476-4515
Attorney for Plaintiffs

1f2~~~J/;~T~~ ~~~~
Tennessee Protection &Advocacy
2416 21st Avenue South, Suite 100 Nashville, Tennessee 37212 (615) 298-1080
Attorney for Plaintiffs

L~ /h,

"' ~11!-r-.1L~

LINDA M. DARDARIAN (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borge & Dardarian 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

j~1-G. Q~ L,--rY2-~~
JOHN E. QUINN (BPR # 12220) Manier & Herod One Nashville Place, Suite 2200 150 Fourth Avenue North Nashville, Tennessee 37219-2412 (615) 742-9351
Attorneys for Defendants Clay, Cocke, and Fayette Counties

279479

2

Case 3:98-cv-00731 Document 456 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 2 of 3

--- 7 ¢Yl-, ~
THdMAS M. DONN-ELL, JR. (BPR-#" 541) JOHN PAUL NEFFLEN (BPR # 20226) Stewart, Estes & Donnell Financial Center, Suite 1401 424 Church Street Nashville, Tennessee 37219 (615) 244-6538
Attorneys for Defendants Chester, Decatur, Houston, Jackson, Polk and Trousdale Counties

279479

3

Case 3:98-cv-00731 Document 456 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 3 of 3

 
 App. 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE JONES,

LANE

Plaintiffs,

and BEVERLY

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

and its

political subdivisions, POLK

COUNTY, BLEDSOE COUNTY,

CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY,

DECATUR COUNTY, FAYETTE

COUNTY, GRAINGER COUNTY,

HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY,

HOUSTON COUNTY, JACKSON

COUNTY, LAKE COUNTY,

LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY,

PERRY COUNTY, PICKETT

COUNTY, TROUSDALE

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN

COUNTY,

Defendants.

) )

) ) No. 3:98 CV 0731 ) Judge Higgins

) Magistrate ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
)
)

Griffin

DEFENDANT

STATE OF TENNESSEE'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Filed Oct. 5, 1998)

Defendant,

State

12(b)(1) of the Federal

Court to dismiss the

of Tennessee,

pursuant

Rules of Civil Procedure,

claims against Defendant

to Rule moves this
State of

App. 7

Tennessee.Plaintiffs claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131et seq., its regulations,

28 C.F.R. 35.10 et seq. and the Rehabilitation

Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794a are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to

the United States Constitution.

Congress did not have the

constitutional

authority to make either the ADA or the

Rehabilitation

Act applicable to the states.

This document was entered ance with Rule 58 and/or Rule By/s/ TLC.

on the docket in compli79(a), FRCP, on 11-12-98

[Order Motion denied /s/ Thomas A. Higgins USDJ/ll-10-98]

App. 8

No. 98-6730
UNITED STATESCOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGELANE, et al, Plaint£ffs-Appellees
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor

) ) )
)
) ORDER

v. STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Defendant-Appellant
POLK COUNTY, et al., Defendants

) (Filed Sep. 20, 2002) ) )
)
) )

Before: MARTIN, Chief Circuit RICH and SILER, Circuit Judges

Judge;

SUHRHEIN-

Upon the petition of the appellant State of Tennessee for panel rehearing of the court's decision in the appeal noted above, and the court having found the petition to be well taken; it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is hereby

GRANTED. The opinion and judgment of July 16, 2002

are hereby withdrawn,

and the case is restored to the

court's active docket. The parties are further instructed to

file briefs not in excess of 25 pages addressing the issue as outlined in the petition for rehearing, with each side's brief to be filed not later than the close of business on

Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Upon the filing of the briefs

the court will proceed to dispose of the case.

App. 9
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/Leonard Green Leonard Green, Clerk

 
 App. 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE JONES
Plaintiffs

and BEVERLY

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

and its

political subdivisions, POLK

COUNTY, BLEDSOE COUNTY,

CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY,

COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY,

GRAINGER COUNTY, HANCOCK

COUNTY, HAWKINS COUNTY,

HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY,

JEFFERSON

COUNTY,

JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY,

MEIGS COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY COUNTY,

PICKETT COUNTY,

TROUSDALE COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY

Defendants.

) )

)
) No.

)

3 98-0731

I JUDGE HIGGINS

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
)
)

COMPLAINT
(Filed Aug. 10, 1998)
Comes the plaintiffs, George Lane and Beverly Jones, by and through counsel, who would hereby sue the defendants noted above and for cause would show as follows:

App. 13

It
PARTIES

(a) The Plaintiff George Lane: The plaintiff Lane is a

citizen and resident of Polk County, Tennessee. He is a

qualified individual with a disability as is defined by 42

U.S.C. 12131(2) in that he is a paraplegic and is and has

been in need of the services of the judicial division of the

State of Tennessee and its political subdivisions.

It is

hereby requested that he be allowed to serve as a class

representative for all qualified individuals with a disabil-

ity needing the services of the judicial division of the State

of Tennessee and its political subdivisions.

(b) The Plaintiff Beverly Jones: The plaintiff Jones is

a citizen and resident of Macon County, Tennessee and resides at 143 Carter Circle, Woodland Estates, Lafayette,

Tennessee. She is a qualified individual with a disability as is defined by 42 U.S.C. 12131(2) in that she is a para-

plegic and confined to a wheelchair. Plaintiff Jones is a

certified court reporter who makes her living by attending judicial proceedings throughout the State of Tennessee

and recording those proceedings on behalf of attorneys and parties that present their cases before the courts of this

State. She is, and has been, in need of the services of the

judicial division of the State of Tennessee and its political

subdivisions for the purpose of supporting herself and her

family by being allowed to attend court proceedings and

transcribing these proceedings. It is hereby requested that

she be allowed to serve as a class representative

for all

qualified individuals with a disability needing the services

of the judicial division of the State of Tennessee and its

political subdivisions.

App. 14

(c) The Defendants:

The State of Tennessee is a

political subdivision of the United States of American and

as such it and its political subdivisions are subject to the

laws of the United States of America. They are specifically

charged under the terms of the United States Constitution

and the Tennessee Constitution with providing the service

of courts and judicial proceedings and other manifesta-

tions of that process such as courtrooms, clerk's offices and public meeting rooms that are conducted in the courthouses of the State of Tennessee. Polk County, Bledsoe

County, Cannon County, Chester County, Claiborne

County, Clay County, Cocke County, Decatur County,

Fayette Hawkins

County, Grainger County, Hickman

County, Hancock County, Jackson

County, County,

Jefferson County, Johnson County, Lake County, Lewis

County, Meigs County, Moore County, Perry County,

Pickett County, Trousdale County, and Van Buren County

are all political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee and

are required under the Constitution

of the State of Ten-

nessee to provide courthouses that provide services to all

persons including citizens of this State and qualified individuals with disabilities as definded [sic] by 42 U.S.C. 12131. Don Sundquist is the chief executive officer of the State of Tennessee. Each of the named counties has an

individual county executive shall be provided.

upon whom service of process

II.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over the matters contained in this complaint pursuant to the provisions of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq., 29 U.S.C. 794a and 28 C.F.R. 35.101 et seq.

App. 15

III.

PLAINTIFF

LANE'S PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

(a) That as noted above, the plaintiff, George a paraplegic and as such is a qualified individual disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).

Lane is with a

(b) In May and September

of 1996, the plaintiff

Lane, hereinafter

referred to as Lane, had two sets of

criminal charges brought against him by law enforcement

in Polk County, Tennessee in the name of the State of

Tennessee and under the laws of the State of Tennessee.

Lane was required by the orders of the court to appear at

the Polk County Courthouse

in Benton, Tennessee to

answer the charges.

(c) All court proceedings and all clerk's offices that

support the court systems of Polk County, Tennessee are conducted on the second floor of the courthouse. The only

access to the courtrooms and courts, up until June of 1998,

was by one of two staircases. Lane was required to crawl

up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom to meet the

requirements

of his appearance before the General Ses-

sions Court for Polk County, Tennessee. Lane was ar-

raigned and told to appear at a later date for his hearing.

Lane appeared and, not desiring to go through the hu-

miliation of crawling up the stairs again, waited on the first floor of the courthouse and sent word to the court that

he would not crawl to the courtroom again. Lane also declined to be carried by officers to the courtroom. The

court issued an attachment

for his arrest, and he was

arrested and taken to jail.

(d) Lane was later released from custody and retained counsel to represent him. Thereafter, Lane attended his

App. 16

court proceedings by waiting downstairs from the court-

room and having his attorney shuttle back and forth with

information

concerning his case. During this time, Lane

did not have an opportunity to view the court processes in

any way because of his inability to get to the courtroom.

(e) On February 24, 1997, a preliminary hearing was

held in the Courthouse

library concerning his charges.

This was done over his attorney's objections in that the

proceedings were held [sic] a location that was not regu-

larly frequented by the public. His case was bound over to

the Polk County Grand Jury.

(f) On March 17, 1997, the Polk County Grand Jury

reported two misdemeanor

indictments

against Lane. On

that date Lane's counsel appeared on his behalf advising

the court that Lane was on the first floor of the courthouse

and could not come to the courtroom because of the re-

quirement to climb the stairs to the courtroom. Counsel

then requested the court to continue the arraignment

until

such time as the courthouse could be made to conform to

the requirements

of the Americans with Disability Act.

The court declined, and without arraigning case for trial.

Lane, set the

(g) On or about April 23, 1997, Lane's counsel filed

an application for extraordinary

appeal to the Tennessee

Court of Criminal Appeals raising the issue of Lane's not

being able to get to the courtroom and the fact that the

courthouse did not accommodate handicapped individuals.

The Attorney General for the State of Tennessee argued in

his brief that this failure to provide services to Lane

should be condoned and that Lane should be required to

stand trial at the Polk County Courthouse

despite his

inability to get to the courtroom. This appeal was denied.

App. 17

On or about June 24, 1997, Lane fried an application for

extraordinary

appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of

Tennessee. Again, the Attorney General argued to the

court that the court should ignore this violation of Lane's

rights under the ADA. This appeal was likewise denied on

or about September 2, 1997.

(h) On or about December 12, 1997, the Honorable

Carroll Ross signed an order holding all criminal proceed-

ings in abeyance until the completion of the construction

of an elevator that would permit access to the courtrooms

and clerk's offices in the Polk County Courthouse.

The

construction 1998.

of this elevator was completed in June of

(i) Other than the proceeding where Lane crawled to the courtroom and his preliminary hearing in the library, he was unable to attend any court proceedings in the Polk County Courthouse until the installation of the elevator in June of 1998, and has been denied access to the services of the court that are conducted therein.

(j) That the Polk County Courthouse

still fails to

meet the requirements

of the American's with Disabilities

Act with reference to access to restroom facilities.

POLK COUNTY'S THE AMERICANS

IVo

HISTORY CONCERNING

WITH DISABILITY

ACT .

(a) That on January 26, 1992, regulations

were

established by the United States Department

of Justice

that made provisions for State and Local governments

of

the United States to meet the requirements

of the ADA.

These regulations were published by the Department

of

App. 18

Justice as 28 C.F.R. Part 35 pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 12134. As a part of that regulation, all public entities were required to evaluate its services, policies and practices and the effects thereof and make modifications within one year of the effective date of the regulation. 28 C.F.R. 35.105.

(b) In October of 1992, the Polk County Commission

had brought to its attention the requirement of the ADA

and the commission

appointed

a review committee to

review the facilities condition. In May of 1993, the ADA

Committee for Polk County prepared a Self-Evaluation and analysis and transition plan. This plan specifically

found that the county buildings did not conform to the

requirements

of the ADA. On October 20, 1994, the Polk

County Commission specifically voted not to construct an elevator in the courthouse, despite the recommendations

of the County ADA Committee.

(c) That Polk County has, as a matter of policy,

refused to come into compliance with the ADA until such

time as the plaintiff initiated a grievance procedure. This grievance was filed on October 31, 1996. A series of meet-

ing were held with the Grievance Committee and before

the Polk County Commission. However, it was not until

November of 1997, that the Polk County Commission

acted to authorize the construction

of an elevator to meet

the requirements

of the ADA. All the while the plaintiff

was compelled to present his defense against these viola-

tions in court. While Polk County has constructed

an

elevator, it s_ll fails to have its courthouse

the requirement

of the ADA.

comply with

(d) Throughout

these proceedings,

the plaintiff has

suffered extreme humiliation and embarrassment,

as well

App. 19
as incurring legal expensesin attempting to resist this illegal and discriminatory activity of the defendant, Polk County, while attempting to resolve this matter through the grievance process.
(e) That there are hundreds of individuals who are similarly situated with George Lane and being handicapped who have had and continue to have a need, requirement, or desire to participate in the judicial process of Polk County, Tennessee.

PLAINTIFF

JONES

V. PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

(a) Plaintiff Jones, hereinafter

referred to as Jones,

is a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair because of an

automobile accident in 1989. She is currently responsible

for the care and support of two minor children. Jones is a

certified court reporter. She became certified and has actively worked in her chosen field since 1990. She works

out of her home and is called upon by attorneys and other

parties to work all over Middle Tennessee in her profes-

sion. This specifically includes going to courthouses for the

purposes of recording proceedings before the state courts

in proceedings conducted in those courthouses. Her inabil-

ity to gain access to the courtroom has caused her to

continue to have difficulty accessing the services of the

judiciary.

(b) She has specifically attempted to gain access to

the courthouses in Trousdale, Jackson, Clay and Pickett

Counties. Jones has not been able to gain access to the

courtrooms courtrooms

due to the lack of handicap access to the used in those counties. She would also be

App. 20

prepared to appear in any and all other courthouses of this
state to provide services to the courts, attorneys and parties, if called upon to do so.

(c) Jones has specifically brought to the attention of

authorities

in the four defendant counties, Trousdale,

Jackson, Clay and Pickett, their failure to comply with the

requirements

of the ADA, yet, with the exception of

Trousdale County, they have failed to comply with the

requirements.

Trousdale County installed an elevator in

1998, however the courtroom itself is set up where Jones

cannot gain access to the court proceedings. The proceed-

ings occur on an elevated platform to which she cannot

gain ready access.

(d) As a direct result of the courthouses located in

Trousdale, Jackson, Clay and Pickett Counties of this

State not complying with the ADA Jones has lost work and

an opportunity

to participate

in the judicial process

because of her inability to gain access to their courthouses.

Vim

THE STATE OF TENNESSEE'S

AND OTHER

DEFENDANT'S

HISTORY CONCERNING

THE AMERICANS

WITH DISABILITY ACT

(a) That the State of Tennessee administers

its

judicial functions in the county courthouses of each Of the

counties of this state. As a part of that function, the State

of Tennessee provides services through these buildings to

all of its citizens and others. It is in these buildings that

virtually all trial level judicial proceedings,

civil and

criminal, are conducted. In addition, these buildings house

clerk's offices where the court's records are maintained. As

a part of these proceedings, individuals are called upon to

App. 21

participate as parties in civil and criminal proceedings, or

participate as witnesses and jurors, and go to these offices

to take care of public business in the form of filing papers

and researching records, and have a fundamental

right

under the Tennessee State Constitution to participate and

view the judicial courtrooms.

proceedings

that are conducted in those

(b) That like Polk County and the other named

defendants, the State of Tennessee is required to conform

to the Department

of Justice regulations

found at 28

C.F.R. Part 35 and is required to do an evaluation facilities in which its services are rendered.

of the

(c) That despite this evaluation process and the

requirement

of the ADA, the State of Tennessee persisted

in requiring Lane to participate in services and proceed-

ings in a building that failed to comply with the law, or

alternatively

not allowing him access to the same services

and proceedings of other citizens of the State and County

who are not individuals with a disability. This was despite the fact that the officials of the State of Tennessee were

• repeatedly confronted with the State and county's failure to comply with the ADA. The State of Tennessee has

repeatedly failed to comply with the law. Specifically,

counsel for the plaintiff Lane raised the ADA issue at every appearance required of plaintiff to the court and the

District Attorney General's office. Counsel addressed a

letter directly to Charles Burson, Attorney General for the

State of Tennessee, on December 4, 1996 al_r making

repeated phone calls to his office. None of these phone calls or the letter were responded to in any way. Plaintiff

Lane appealed the State Trial judges requirements

to

proceed with the case to all levels of the judiciary of the State of Tennessee. Each time, the office of the Attorney

App. 22

General insisted on ignoring the legal violation and

advocating the same to each court, and the State courts

specifically ignored the uncontradicted

facts that were

presented to them.

(d) That the State of Tennessee and other named

defendants persist on conducting their judicial proceedings

in facilities that do not conform to the requirements

of the

ADA and as such deny to all citizens similarly situated the

right to participate in the judicial process of this State as

conducted

in the defendant

counties. Specifically,

the

State of Tennessee conducts its judicial proceedings

in

county courthouses

that do not comply with the access

requirements

of the ADA. Those counties are: Bledsoe

County, Cannon County, Chester County, Claiborne

County, Clay County, Cocke County, Decatur County,

Fayette County, Grainger

County, Hancock County,

Hawkins

County, Hickman

County, Jackson County,

Jefferson County, Johnson County, Lake County, Lewis

County, Meigs County, Moore County, Perry County,

Pickett County, Trousdale

County, and Van Buren

County. There may well be other counties that do not hilly

comply with the requirements

of the ADA. These defen-

dants, like Polk County, have had a duty to comply with

the requirement

of the law since 1992, yet they have

knowingly and intentionally

failed to cause their court-

houses to conform to the ADA.

(e) That there are thousands

of individuals

who

reside in the State of Tennessee and have a need, as well

as a right, to participate

in the judicial processes of this

State without the obstructions

associated with the physi-

cal condition of the States Courthouses.

In the year 1998,

the State of Tennessee had issued over 200,000 handi-

capped placards for people with physical handicaps.

App. 23
Despite the fact that the regulations andlaw of the United States dictates [sic] that these Obstructionsbe eliminated, the State of Tennesseeand its subordinatepolitical bodies have failed to bring these buildings into compliance.

CAUSES

VIo
OF ACTION

(a) That the State of Tennessee and Polk County

have discriminated

against the plaintiff, George Lane in

that they have excluded him from participation

in, or

denied him the benefits of, the services of its court systems in violation of 42 U.S.C. 12132.

(b) That the State of Tennessee, Trousdale County,

Jackson County, Clay County, and Pickett Counties

specifically,

and the other defendants

generally, have

discriminated

against the plaintiff Beverly Jones in that

they have excluded her from participating

in the services

offered by the courthouses

and access to the Court pro-

ceedings of this State by failing to eliminate physical

obstacles to her participation

in the judicial processes of

this State in violation of 42 U.S.C. 12132.

(c) That the State of Tennessee and Bledsoe County,

Cannon County, Chester County, Claiborne County, Clay

County, Cocke County, Decatur County, Fayette County,

Grainger County, Hancock County, Hawkins County,

Hickman County, Jackson County, Jefferson County, John-

son County, Lake County, Lewis County, Meigs County,

Moore County, Perry County, Pickett County, Trousdale

County, and Van Buren County knowingly and intention-

ally Continue to discriminate

against George Lane, Beverly

Jones and all other individuals

similarly situated who

App. 24

have a need, responsibility,

or desire to attend the judicial

process of this state as it is conducted in the Courthouses

of this State in that they conduct their judicial proceedings

in facilities that are not in conformance with the require-

ments of the ADA. Further, there may be other counties of

this State that have failed to fully comply with the re-

quirement of the ADA.

(d) That the actions of the State of Tennessee and

Polk Country, Trousdale,

Jackson, Clay and Pickett

Counties and the other named defendants were conscious,

deliberate, and intentional

in their active discrimination

against the plaintiffs, George Lane and Beverly Jones, and

all other similarly situated handicapped individuals of this

State. That Polk County's consistent insistence in continu-

ing the prosecution

of Lane's case, without delay and

despite plaintiffs inability to gain access to the courtroom,

was with full knowledge of his disability and their knowl-

edge of the requirement to conform to the ADA.

(e) That the actions of the State of Tennessee,

Trousdale County, Jackson County, Clay County, and Pickett County were conscious, deliberate, and intentional

in their active discrimination

against the plaintiffs,

George Lane and Beverly Jones and all other similarly

situated handicapped

individuals of this State. That their

persistent

presentation

of the actions of the judicial

process was with full knowledge of plaintiffs' disability

and with their knowledge to the ADA.

of the requirements

to conform

(f) That the actions of the State of Tennessee and the

other defendant counties were conscious, deliberate, and

intentional in their active discrimination

against all other

similarly situated handicapped

individuals of this State.

App. 25

That their persistent presentation

of the actions of the

judicial process, knowing that handicapped

individuals

were unable to gain access to the courtrooms, was with full

knowledge of their disabilities and their knowing failure to

meet the requirements

to conform to the ADA.

(g) Tennessee from the

That in the and said
defendants'

alternative, the actions counties were knowing negligence in complying

of the State of and resulted with the law.

(h) That as a result of the defendants' actions, the

plaintiff Lane has suffered damages in the form of extreme

embarrassment,

and humiliation and anxiety of the delays

associated with this case. In addition, he has incurred

attorney fees and expenses including court costs in excess of $600 assessed by the State of Tennessee for his asking

the appellate courts of the State of Tennessee to delay his

prosecution

until the Polk County Courthouse

was

brought into compliance with the ADA.

(i) That as a result of the defendants' actions, the

plaintiff Jones has suffered damages in the form of extreme

embarrassment,

and humiliation

in attempting

to gain

access to the services provided by the State of Tennessee and

Trousdale, Jackson, Clay and Pickett Counties and not being

able to be accommodated. In addition, plaintiff has suffered

lost wages and earnings associated with her inability to

conduct her profession in said counties' courtrooms.

VII.

REQUEST

FOR CERTIFICATION

AS CLASS ACTION

(a) Now come the plaintiffs,who in addition to bringing this action on behalf of themselves, would request

App. 26

this court to certify them as class representatives

pursu-

ant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, on behalf of all individuals residing in the

State of Tennessee who are qualified individuals with a

physical disability that prevent them from climbing stairs

or walking up steep inclines in the courthouses

of the

named defendants. These individuals have been subjected

to discrimination

like the plaintiffs and continue to experi-

ence this discrimination

and the denial of services. Each of

these individuals

have [sic] the right to attend judicial

proceedings in the courthouses of this state and specifi-

cally the named defendant counties and would currently

not have access to the judicial processes in the named

defendant counties without going through the humiliation

and embarrassment

that the plaintiffs George Lane and

Beverly Jones have been forced to endure. In addition,

these individuals may be called or have cause to partici-

pate in those proceedings as parties, witnesses or jurors.

(b) Plaintiffs would show that the certification of this

class is proper in that (1) the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable,

(2) there are

questions of fact and law that are common to the class, (3)

the claims and defenses of the representative

party is [sic]

typical of the claims and defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative

party will fairly and adequately

interest of the class.

protect the

(c) Plaintiffs would further show that the defendants

have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally appli-

cable to the class, thereby making appropriate

final

injunctive relief or corresponding

declaratory

relief with

respect to the class as a whole. Further, that the questions

of fact and fact common to the members of the class

predominate

over any questions affecting only individual

App. 27
members. A class action is supe_or to other available methods for the fair and efficient a_udication of the controversy.

VIII.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff would hereby request this

Honorable Court to:

1. Render judgment against the State of Tennessee

and Polk County for damages for the plaintiff Lane's

humiliation and embarrassment

during the course of these

proceedings in an amount not to exceed $100,000 as well

as his attorney fees, cost and expenses pursuant to the

provisions of 42 U.S.C. 12133 and 29 U.S.C. 794a. for

defending him in the grievance procedure, his vindication

of his rights in the state court, and for bringing this action.

2. Render judgment against the State of Tennessee,

Trousdale; Jackson, Clay and Pickett Counties for damages

for the plaintiff Jones' humiliation

and embarrassment

associated with her attempting to gain access to the defen-

dants' courthouses and for her damages associated with her

lost earnings associated with her inability to work in said

courthouses in an amount not to exceed $250,000 as well as

her attorney fees, cost and expenses pursuant to the provi-

sions of 42 U.S.C. 12133 and 29 U.S.C. 794a. for bringing this action.

3. That this court certify this as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that proper notice be given to all individuals in the class in order that they may make the proper elections.

App. 28

4. That this court take such actions necessaryand

proper through declaratoryjudgment and injunctive relief

to compel the State of Tennesseeand other defendantsto

comply with the provisions of the Americans with Disabil-

ity Act, and further award such damages to the class

representatives

as are fair and proper. Further that this

court award damages to each member of the class for said

humiliation

and embarrassment

associated

with the

defendants failure to comply with the ADA. Further that the court compel the State of Tennessee to do a survey of all counties of the State of Tennessee to determine if they

in fact fully comply with the provisions of the State of

Tennessee, and if they fail to do so join them as party

defendants and compel them to comply with the ADA.

5. That this court grant general relief to the plaintiff and all other persons that are members of the class.

By:/s/

Respectfully Submitted, George Lane, and Beverly Jones, Plaintiffs
William Brown William J. Brown, Attorney 23 N. Ocoee, P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 (423) 476-4515 TBPR # OO545O

 
 Lane v. Tennessee
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee August 17, 2004, Decided NO. 3:98-0731

Reporter: 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25369; 16 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 189

GEORGE LANE, et al. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.

MEMORANDUM

Prior History: Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 2003 U.S.

App. LEXIS 303 (6th Cir. Tenn., 2003)

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Class

Certification (Docket No. 155) and Plaintiffs' Amended

Disposition: Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and Motion for Class Certification (Docket No. 186). The Court

Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification both denied. heard argument on Plaintiffs' Motions on August 13, 2004.

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Motions are

Counsel: [*1] For STATE OF TENNESSEE, POLK DENIED.

COUNTY, BLEDSOE COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY,

CHESTER COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY Plaintiffs allege that the State of Tennessee and 25 counties

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR COUNTY, therein have violated Title II of the Americans with

FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER COUNTY, HANCOCK Disabilities Act ("ADA") by denying Plaintiffs, and others

COUNTY, HAWKINS COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, similarly situated, access to the State's judicial program

HOUSTON COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON because of Plaintiffs' disabilities. Plaintiffs seek declaratory,

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE COUNTY, LEWIS injunctive and compensatory relief. This opinion is not a

COUNTY, MEIGS COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY ruling on the merits of the Plaintiffs' case.

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE COUNTY,

VAN BUREN COUNTY, defendants: S. Elizabeth Martin, In the pending Motion, Plaintiffs seek certification of a

Thomas Marshall Donnell Jr., Stewart, Estes & Donnell, John "hybrid" class for injunctive relief and compensatory damages

Edward Quinn, Manier & Herod, David Randall Mantooth, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) for the discrimination imposed

Leitner, Williams, Dooley, and Napolitan, Sarannah L. on them and other citizens similarly situated because of their

McMurtry, Nashville, TN; Floyd W. Rhea, Rhea & Rhea Law mobility disabilities. [*3] Plaintiffs ask the Court also to

Offices, Sneedville, TN; Nathan D. Rowell, Watson & certify a sub-class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), for

Hollow, PLC, Pamela L. Reeves, Anderson, Reeves & individuals who suffered additional personal damages, such as

Cooper, P.A., Knoxville, TN; Peggy L. Tolson, Stephen S. humiliation, embarrassment, and pain and suffering, in

Ogle, Tolson & Associates, Brentwood, TN; William connection with the alleged discrimination.

Lawrence Draper, Gainesville, TN; Howard L. Upchurch, Upchurch & Upchurch, Pikeville, TN; Larry B. Stanley, McMinnville, TN

Alternatively, Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify this litigation as a class action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and "categorical" damages pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)

For GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, DENNIS and also to allow the named Plaintiffs to pursue their

CANTREL, ANN MARIE ZAPPOLA, RALPH E. individual claims for compensatory damages. Thirdly, the

RAMSEY, A. RUSSELL LARSON, plaintiffs: Gary D. Plaintiffs alternatively ask the Court to certify a class solely

Housepian, Tennessee Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Martha for declaratory relief and injunctive relief pursuant to Fed. R.

M. Lafferty, [*2] Nashville, TN; William J. Brown, Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and to allow the named Plaintiffs to pursue

Cleveland, TN; Roberta L. Steele, Linda M. Dardarian, their individual claims for compensatory damages.

Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian, Oakland,

CA

Plaintiffs request that the Court certify a class of all persons

who (1) were Tennessee residents over 18 years of age; (2)

Judges: TODD J. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES had a physical disability that impaired their ability to walk

DISTRICT JUDGE

and/or climb stairs at any time during the period from January

26, 1993 to the present; (3) were otherwise qualified to

Opinion by: TODD J. CAMPBELL

participate in or receive the benefits of the judicial program of

the State of Tennessee; and [*4] (4) were discriminated

Opinion

against because of their disability.

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25369, *4

Page 2 of 4

Title II of the ADA provides that no qualified individual with

architectural accessibility standards. But in the case

a disability 1 shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded

of older facilities, for which structural change is

from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

likely to be more difficult, a public entity may

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

comply with Title II by adopting a variety of less

discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The

costly measures, including relocating services to

ADA is designed to provide a clear and comprehensive

alternative, accessible sites and assigning aides to

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

assist persons with disabilities in accessing services.

individuals with disabilities. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,

Only if these measures are ineffective in achieving

158 L. Ed. 2d 820, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1984 (2004).

accessibility is the public entity required to make

reasonable structural changes. And in no event is the

[*5] A public entity shall operate each service, program, or

entity required to undertake measures that would

activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed

impose [*7] an undue financial or administrative

in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, except the law does not (1) necessarily require a public entity to make each of its existing facilities accessible to and usable by individuals with

burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service.Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993-94 (citations omitted).

disabilities; (2) require a public entity to take any action that

would threaten or destroy the historic significance of an The party seeking class certification bears the burden of

historic property; or (3) require a public entity to take any proof. In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069,

action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). In order for a class to be certified, the

alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in Plaintiffs must first establish the requirements of Rule 23(a)

undue financial and administrative burdens. 28 C.F.R. § of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) the class is so

35.150(a).

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)

there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the

A public entity may comply with Title II through a variety of claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of

means. As the Supreme Court has stated:

the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

The remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

one. Recognizing that failure to accommodate

persons with disabilities will often have the same The district courts must conduct a "rigorous analysis" into

practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met before certifying

required the States to take reasonable measures to a class. American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1078-79. The

remove architectural and other barriers to trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a

accessibility. But Title II does not require States to class, but that discretion must be exercised [*8] within the

employ [*6] any and all means to make judicial framework of Rule 23. Id.

services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs. It requires only "reasonable modifications" that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service. As Title II's implementing regulations make clear, the reasonable modification requirement can be satisfied in a number of ways. In the case of facilities built or

The dispositive question for purposes of Rule 23(a) in this case is whether there are questions of law or fact common to the proposed class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). As the Supreme Court has stated, class relief is peculiarly appropriate when the issues involved are common to the class as a whole and when they turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2369 (1982).

altered after 1992, the regulations require compliance with specific

The Court finds that because of the individualized, diverse issues as to both liability and relief in this case, the

1 Persons with disabilities are "qualified" if they, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportational barriers, or the provisions of auxiliary aids and services, meet the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1984 (2004).

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25369, *11

Page 3 of 4

Plaintiffs have not met the requirement of sufficiently common questions of law or fact. The legal question of whether the Defendants are subject to the ADA is not contested. The issue here, however, is whether the Defendants have discriminated against the Plaintiffs because of the Plaintiffs' disabilities, and to determine that, the Court must decide whether the individual Defendant counties are complying with the ADA with regard to providing access to the courts, a question that is unique to each Defendant and courthouse. 2
[*9] The State of Tennessee's judicial program is held in each Defendant county at the county courthouses. Access to courts in the named Defendant counties is the fundamental issue presented. The State's liability depends upon the compliance of the various county courthouses with the ADA and thus involves individualized issues as well. Although the Plaintiffs argue that the State's failure to conduct selfevaluations and file a transition plan is the common element that ties these Defendants together, whether the Defendant counties are in compliance or not is a courthouse-bycourthouse inquiry.

[*11] Further, even if the issue of liability were common to all Defendants, the issue of injunctive relief would be different for each Defendant, decided on a courthouse-bycourthouse basis. Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate injunctive relief is to order the Defendants to comply with the ADA. But complying with the ADA is not simply one action that the Court can order and all Defendants can take uniformly.
How to make reasonable modifications and how to make the courts accessible in compliance with the ADA differs from county to county, depending upon the unique buildings, courts, personnel, and alternative facilities involved. In other words, remedies in this case, should Plaintiffs prevail, would not be the same for all Defendants.
Moreover, the issue of damages would be different for each Plaintiff. No party has identified any persuasive authority for the "categorical" damages of several hundred million dollars claimed by the putative class. As for compensatory damages, any harm suffered by an individual Plaintiff is unique to that Plaintiff, so there is no common question as to damages.

If the courthouse in one of the county Defendants is in compliance with the ADA -- by any of the variety of means available -- then there is no liability as to that Defendant. On the other hand, if "reasonable modifications" taken by an individual county Defendant are not effective in achieving accessibility, then liability may be found. What is reasonable modification in one county courthouse, however, may or may not be reasonable modification, or required, in another county courthouse.
The courthouses in the individual Defendant counties are not the same. They have unique designs and unique [*10] features or lack thereof. The individual courthouses were built at different times, are in different states of repair, and are maintained and operated by different entities. Liability for one courthouse does not necessarily mean liability for another courthouse. Reasonable accommodation in one county courthouse is not necessarily reasonable accommodation in another county courthouse. In other words, the issues for determining liability to the putative Plaintiff class are not common to all Defendants. 3 Whether the focus of this action is on the accessibility of courthouses or the accessibility of court proceedings, the questions remain independent from county to county.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion for Class Certification because the Plaintiffs have [*12] not carried their burden under Rule 23(a)(2). Having found that Plaintiffs fail to meet the second requirement of Rule 23(a), the Court need not address the other elements of subsection (a).
Alternatively, even if the Plaintiffs had carried their burden under Rule 23 (a), the Court finds that they have not carried their burden of demonstrating that their case falls within at least one of the subcategories of Rule 23(b).
Subsection (b) of Rule 23 provides that an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subsection (a) are met and one of three specific conditions is met. Plaintiffs here do not argue that they fall within the first category under Rule 23 (b)(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs must show that one of the two other subsections is met: (b)(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (b)(3) the questions of law or fact common to the members

2 Common questions may not be found when the decision regarding the propriety of injunctive or declaratory relief turns on a consideration of the individual circumstances of each class member or the defendant has not engaged in a common course of conduct toward them. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1763.
3 For example, Defendants assert that the current Jefferson County courthouse is a building on the National Historic Register, built before 1900. It has a large courtroom on the first floor and a smaller courtroom on the second floor. The Hickman County courthouse, on the other hand, is a one-story building, constructed after the enactment of the ADA. Docket No. 180.

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25369, *12

Page 4 of 4

of the class predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members and that a class action is superior to other For these reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification

available [*13] methods for the fair and efficient adjudication (Docket No. 155) and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class

of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2) and (3).

Certification (Docket No. 186) are DENIED. Nothing herein

prevents the named Plaintiffs from pursuing their ADA claims

For the same reasons that Plaintiffs have not shown against the named Defendants. Trial remains scheduled for

commonality under subsection (a), Plaintiffs have failed to March 15, 2005.

show that the Defendants have "acted or refused to act on

grounds generally applicable to the class." Further, the IT IS SO ORDERED.

uncommon questions of law and fact predominate over any common questions of law or fact. Thus, Plaintiffs have not TODD J. CAMPBELL

shown that they meet the additional requirements of Rule

23(b)(2) and (3).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CONCLUSION

 
 COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph Ramsey, Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson v. State of Tennessee, Bledsoe, Cannon, Chester, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Grainger, Hancock, Hawkins, Hickman, Houston, Jackson, Jefferson,
Johnson, Lake, Lewis, Meigs, Moore, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and Van Buren Counties.
United States District Court for Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Case No. 3:98 CV 0731

Plaintiffs (George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph Ramsey, Dennis

Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson) ("Plaintiffs") and the State of Tennessee ("State Defendant")

have agreed to settle the above-styled case. Furthermore, the County Defendants-Cross

Claimants (Bledsoe, Cannon, Chester, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Grainger,

Hancock, Hawkins, Hickman, Houston, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Lake, Lewis, Meigs,

Moore, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and Van Buren) ("County Defendants") have agreed to

settle and dismiss all claims including cross claims against the State Defendant. The terms of

this Settlement Agreement and Release of Liability are as follows:

1. The State Defendant enters into this Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") for the

purpose of deferring or eliminating litigation expenses, especially the time commitment that

would be required to adequately defend this case, including but not limited to, trial preparation

and participation at a trial. Such a time commitment would necessarily divert the State

Defendant and its employees from serving the needs of the State Defendant and from their day-

to-day job responsibilities. This Agreement represents a compromise and settlement of disputed

claims and, as such, does not constitute an admission of any liability whatsoever on the part of

the State Defendant or the County Defendants.

2. The State Defendant agrees to pay Plaintiffs the lump sum amount of Nine

Hundred and Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($905,000.00) for attorneys' fees, costs and

122572tSEM/mb

Page 1 of 43

expenses. This amount includes $40,000 for expenses and $100,000 for expert witness fees and represents all attomeys' fees in this case through December 17, 2004 and as needed to resolve any remaining matters with the State Defendant in this case. This amount may be paid partially in Fiscal Years 2004-05 and 2005-06 and is subject to the Tennessee General Assembly's authorization of sufficient appropriations. It is the intent of the parties that this agreement on attomeys' fees shall not serve as precedent with respect to the rate of attomeys' fees that may be requested by the Plaintiffs from County Defendants. This Agreement constitutes settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendant, and any ~laims or cross-claims by the County Defendants against the State Defendant.
3. Each County Defendant shall pay Plaintiffs Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty and 0011 00 Dollars ($2,680.00) per County upon Plaintiffs' executing a full release as to Plaintiffs' injunctive relief claims against the County Defendants. This total amount ($67,000.00) represents the complete payment of all attomeys' fees, costs and expenses incurred by Plaintiffs through December 17, 2004 that have not been paid by the State as a part of this Agreement.
4. The distribution and allocation of the monetary consideration provided herein regarding Plaintiffs' attomey fees, costs and expenses is made by Plaintiffs and their attomeys, and the State Defendant is not involved in the process of allocating such consideration and the State Defendant makes no representation conceming the allocation. Plaintiffs' attomeys shall execute the appropriate federal income tax disclosure forms including the Substitute W-9 Form and Attomey Fee Information Form. Plaintiffs acknowledge and agree that they are solely and entirely responsible for the payment and discharge of all federal, state, and local taxes, if any,

122572iSEM/mb

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which may be found to be due upon the payments made to them hereunder. 5. The State Defendant through the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts
will recommend to the Tennessee Supreme Court that the attached policy on access under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Exhibit A) be implemented, published on its website, and provided to appropriate state employees and county officials. In addition, the State Defendant will conduct training of judges under said policy as well as training of Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinators to effectuate the policy. The State Defendant through the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts will develop and publish a "Fr~quently Asked Questions" or similar type guidance (hereinafter "FAQ document") to assist in implementation of the State's policy on access under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Exhibit A), which shall include the guidance set forth in the attached Exhibit B. The County Defendants agree to cooperate with the State Defendant in implementation of the State's policy on access under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Exhibit A).
6. The State Defendant agrees that it will give notice to William J. Brown, Counsel for Plaintiffs, describing the actions taken by the State Defendant in furtherance of the provisions in Paragraph 4 of this Agreement on July 1, 2005, December 31, 2005 and July 1, 2006. The State Defendant anticipates that the attached policy on access under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Exhibit A) will be adopted, published on its website, and provided to appropriate state employees and county officials by July 1; 2005, that the training anticipated in Paragraph 4 will be commenced by October 1, 2005, that the FAQ document including the guidance in Exhibit B will be completed and published on its website, and provided to appropriate state employees and county officials by December 31, 2005, and that the Local

122572ISEM/mb

Page 3 of 43

Judicial Program ADA Coordinators will be appointed by July 1, 2006. The Parties recognize that the cooperation of non-parties as well as the County Defendants will be required in order to accomplish the appointment of the ninety-five Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinators. Therefore, scheduling flexibility may be required. Until such time as a Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator is appointed for a County, the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will serve as the contact person for such County. The State Defendant agrees to work in good faith to implement the provisions of Paragraph 5 and to meet these deadlines and if there is an unavoidable delay, the State Defendant will notify William J. Bro'Yn, Counsel for Plaintiffs, as soon as practicable.
7. This Agreement constitutes settlement of all of Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendant arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the State's judicial program or which could have been brought in this lawsuit, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory, damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys' fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any other damages.
8. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge the State Defendant, including, but not limited to, the State of Tennessee, its agencies, departments, officials, employees, and agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility

122572ISEM/mb

Page 4 of 43

of the State's judicial program or which could have been brought in this lawsuit, whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted in prior litigation.
9. The County Defendants agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge the State Defendant, including, but not limited to, the State of Tennessee, its agencies, departments, officials, employees, and agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, cross-claims (including indemnity), demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, arising out of this litigation that the County Defendants may have had or may now have against them, whether asserted in this case or otherwise. Hereinafter County Defendants agree to defend all of Plaintiffs' ADA claims brought in this litigation and will be responsible for any final judgment entered for Plaintiffs on such claims, any other clause in this agreement notwithstanding.
10. This Agreement does not release Plaintiffs' claims against the County Defendants for any County-related attorneys' fees, costs or expenses incurred by Plaintiffs after December 17, 2004. This Agreement does release the County Defendants from claims for attorneys' fees through December 17, 2004.
11. Plaintiffs and County Defendants agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice.
12. Plaintiffs further acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 2 herein constitutes the entire monetary consideration for the complete release provided for herein. The

122572iSEM/mb

Page 5 of 43

terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case as to the State Defendant. No additional compensation is to be paid from the State Defendant regarding damages, injuries to persons or property, interest, expenses, costs, attorneys' fees, or other fees. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subj ect to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
13. The parties acknowledge that they are executing this Agreement entirely upon their own volition, individual jUdgment, belie1~ and knowledge in consultation with counsel; that this Agreement is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of any party or any person not herein expressed; that no promise, inducement, or agreement not herein expressed, has been made to them; that the Agreement contains, and is, the entire agreement and understanding between the parties herein; and that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals.
14. Plaintiffs and County Defendants agree that, should they hereafter discover facts different from, or in addition to, those now known or believed to be true with respect to any aspect of Plaintiffs' or County Defendants' claims or damages sustained, that this Agreement shall, nevertheless, be and remain in full force and effect in all respects.
15. Should any provision of this Agreement be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be illegal or invalid, the validity of the remaining parts, terms, or provisions will not be affected thereby, and said illegal or invalid part, term or provision will be deemed not to be a part of this Agreement; provided, however, that if the releases contained in Paragraphs 7 and 8 herein are declared invalid, then the entire Agreement shall be invalid and the

122572SEM/mb

Page 6 of 43

consideration paid herein shall be immediately due and payable to State Defendant. The waiver by any party of a breach or violation of any provision of this Agreement shall not be construed as a waiver of any other provision or of any subsequent breach or violation of the Agreement. This Agreement is deemed to have been drafted jointly by the parties. Any uncertainty or ambiguity shall not be construed for or against any other party based on attribution of drafting to any party.
16. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
17. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement, then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph or after December 17, 2007. Notice to the State Defendant should be given in writing to the Administrative Director, Administrative Office of the Courts of the State of Tennessee. Notice to a County Defendant should be given in writing to the County Executive/Mayor and the County Attorney. Notice to Plaintiffs should be given in writing to William Brown.

122572tSEM/mb

Page 7 of 43

18. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
19. The undersigned declare that all of the terms of this Agreement have been completely read, are fully understood, and accepted by them, and that they have had the benefit of counsel with their attorneys in connection herewith or that, if attorneys, they are authorized to enter this agreement including on behalf of their clients. The undersigned further declare that these terms have been agreed to voluntarily, without any undue influence, coercion, or improper motive.
20. This Agreement is subject to the approval of the Attorney General, Comptroller, and Governor pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-103. Should this Agreement be rejected by any of those officials, then the dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

122572tSEM/mb

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",,0. " ~h'1 Exoires NOV. 22,2008

Notary Public

122572iSEM/mb

Page 12 of 43

Jan 14 05 04:1Bp

Stewart, Estes & Donnell 615 256 8386

p. 1

Plaintiff

On this the _ _ day of

,2005, personally appeared before 'De trw above

named known to me personally or made known to me by satisfactory proof, who '\Vas duly

sworn md an oath e~ ecuted the above ve(~

,

Notary Publi

My (olllmission expins: Ob- ;ll· 05

Page 13 of 11

DATE:

Df2

Dennis Cantrel

=

Plaintiff

Jet On this the It..f#' day of v\l{.Q~ , 2005, personally appeared before me the
above named known to me personally or made kno to me by satlsfactory proof, who was duly
=p;z anu:t:ed the above verification.

My commission expires: \ I,~:D8

....... "" ", ~ WIL",,,~'"

··'0 ~"O~·· "'~ s .: .... ~..
~" "•.

u~AU''I\'ue.

•

':.If~
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: . OF

':

-... .. .. .- : • TENNESSEE. :

:..-. NOTARY .~:

..... -~:'",.-'oI,k,•,'.I~~,•O'A•"IP'•f,U,•C,B•O"U•~u•C\"'•'\,•,",•\,'I•I"~i.,~§ ~'~I-

My Commission Expires NOV. 22. 2008

Notary Public

122572;SEM/mb

Page 14 of 43

~ Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATE: JI 101 JL ODS
DATE:- - - - - - - -

MarthaM. Lafferty Tennessee Protection and Advocac);: Attorneys for Plaintiff
Linda Dardarian Attorneys for Plaintiff

122572iSEM/mb

Page 15 of 43

- - - - - - 01/14/05 16:08 FAX 510 835 1417

Goldstein Demchak

-,Jan "14 05CJ7:01p·---;;-tewal""t,-;st.e:S~DQnnell Si5 256 8386

!4I003 p.2

. DATE: IJ~?

J

,

DATE:

~~c--Bro'WTI. r..,...; Attorneys for Plainti ff

tf~~- 1/1~~Zr~Y" (Z-

Advoca~ Tennessee Proteci'ior, and

)

Attorneys for PlaintiJf

DATE:

Linda Dardarian , Attorneys for Plainti:ff

Page 16 of 43

DATE: ~6 i~;)o~s f/

a . C~/L-wJlt~ LQa.nL
Defendant, State of Tennessee, Administrative Office of the Courts by Cornelia A. Clark, Director
SJ . ElTz. athMa~ rtill '~~
Office of the Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter Attorneys for State Defendant

122572,sEM/mb

Page 17 of 43

~~ D A T E : L . t . L
(f I

£m~~:::~f.f-Attorney for Defendant Counties Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and Van Buren

DATE rt'ltwJ,. 1:JlYi5
DATE: ------~

, sq. r Defendant Counties Jefferson and Hickman
Floyd Rhea Attorney for Defendant County Hancock

122572,SEM/mb

Page 18 of 43

(

DATE: - - - - - - - -

Thomas M. Donnell, Ir., Esq.

Attorney for Defendant Counties Bledsoe,

Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hawkins,

Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry,

Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and VanBuren

DATE: - - - - - - -

IoOO E. Quinn, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Counties Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, 'Cannon, Lewis, Fayette, Lake, and Moore

DATE: - - - - - - -

Peggy Tolson, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendant Counties I efferson

(

and Hickman

DATE:

duJ.~
. Floyd
Attorney or Defendant County Hancock

122572JSEMlmb

Page 19 of 43

DATE:_---'~'lFCl=M.L!.... .A2. .:. L~o-..!!t'-"..o-"'-"oS'---_

ttr\. On this the 2L{ day of

,2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or m de known to me by satIsfactory proof, who was duly sworn

and an oath executed the above verification.
~ t'lA ~\.~ I

My commission expires:_ _q1o---'--hY\I--'Q,",-",lp~_ __

1225721SEMImb

Page 20 of 43

JAN-25-2005 11:21

MANIER HEROD

For Defendant County:
Cannon County, Tennessee
hL- By: \ \;t
Mike Gannon, County Mayor
Date: For Defendant County:

615 242 4203 P.02

Page 21 of 43

TOTAL P.02

DATE: /--21- C5

On fuis the (2 I day o~

, 2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or ade known to me by satIsfactory proof, who was duly sworn

and an oath executed the abov er'fi~ation

r~

3 - My commission expires:

I ~ - ~ ({)6) 7

122572/SEMfmb

Page 22 of 43

For Defendant County:
7 I

STATE OF TEf\lN. /\TTORNEY GENFRAL
FEB 0,3 2005
ANTITRUST DIVISION

Page 23 of 43

For Defendant County: Clay County, TelUlessee By:
Date: / -/J b - (),5-
Page 24 of 43

For Defendant County:

Cocke

By: Iliff McMahan,

1:. Date:

,-z (!f'S

ATTSOTRA1T\!E/::"OvF~/:T:"EI\NIrN-:-PAI
FEB 0 :3 1005
ANT/TRUSI UIVISION

Page 25 of 43

DATE: / - .zf:,- [/ 5
On this the cPIu}~ day of .J- c.vta It W ,2005, personally appeared- before me the above
named known to me personally or made kno~ to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn
and an oath executed the abOV~i'{tk .fiCat~io(,&..':Vf4~ Notary PublIc
My commission expires:__9-,--,--.-...."dl=-o"'-",;$"--_-.0..."-'-"6,'---_

122572/SEMImb

Page 26 of 43

For Defendant County:
;1 Fayette CoUl~t,Y, Telmessee
By:..L/~-_----d-L.-/-~--p-/y_ n7-J _
'Rhea Taylor, County Mayor Date:

STATE OF TENN. ATTnRl\IFY GFI\lERAL
FER 0 3 2005
AI\iT i TRUST DIVISION

Page 27 of 43

DATE: d.-IS-oS'

On behalf of Gralng r County, Defendant

/~ On this the d.- day of ftf"8flu,A1Ur ,2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or made known to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn

W r and

an

oath

executed

the

above

y.~rification. 0~

~H

~2

~ ,,;:'\.'\. \\,\.\.I~i.lill/:i i./i~/ ~/~

Not y PublIc
" . My commISSIOn expIres: \\ - \S- - DC~J

2 .... IABy··.. ~ ~

:::: CC : NO \c '. r- ~

« : ~: : Cf) ':

pUBALI r::

:
.:

~

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::

~ ~'"
"~//"Y'1/~'.

.U..\.B..G..t.:.:".:.0..~~A-~_";:

///11 GER CO ,\\'

/11{ It 11I \ Ii \ \ \,\ •

122572/SEMImb

Page 28 of 43

DATE~tC2PQ~ On behalf ofHawkins County, Defendant .

On this the ~ day of..l,Qo~~~~2005, personally appeared before.,ffl'.e, th~,abov.¢c

named known to me personally 0 and an oath executed the above

wn to e by satisfactory proof, wh;(/'"f,~,',;~:«~~','dul.y:.sWO'Q'"}",,

f, n"", :"'JI

',J

.; ~

My commission eXPires:,~~ g Z Q ooS-

122572/SEMImb

Page 29 of 43

DATE:_ _' -_2_5"=_(1_~_

On ehalf of H/~k mil/IN County, Defendant

~ ~ay oJCvIlVU~ ~005, On this the

personally appeared before me the above

tJ named known to me personally or made known me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn

and an oath executed the above veri~~

Notary Public

8:",,- M

Y

\... commISSIOn expIres:_

_

_

_

_

_--.~1"'.',.\.,\~\\n-\~~\fl:

I"'
A.

,,

/

/

~

S' .... ..!.'>.t~o' X~''t•-•-..S.T..A.TE

:: ():

OF

'-;'.t7~. A~~~~'::.

i f TENNESSEE~

411! ;, NOTARY

:-

~~ _~~~\(4....P..U..B.-LIC

~
a

.-;i~ . :,:

~'I:~/I4I1's"0.N"'\c\;~;':;:.;._;,.........~Wi' ...

MYCOMMISSION EXPIRES AUStJSr1':'"

122572iSEM/mb

Page 30 of 43

DATE: L/~

On behalf ofHouston County, Defendant

fJ8"-A On this the

day of'Tanua rj ,2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or made knoWn to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn

and an oath executed the abo~n~
~iC~

expires: 0 S- d3 - 01

122572/SEMImb

Page 31 of 43

On behalf of Jackson County, Defendant
On this the ~ '1J(bday ~f'\.~r~ ,2005, personally appeared before me the above
named known to me personally or made known to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn and an oath executed the abov/:}?fication.~ ~
~~/..u:~~~

122572/SEMImb

Page 32 of 43

DATE:

/ h~ ;",)-
'.,

~""~ On~~o;<,.county, D<~ant

On this the ~1 day of ~~005, personally appeared before me the above
named known to me personally or ade known t6 me by satlsfactory proof, who was duly sworn and an oath executed the above verification.

\\\\1"""',I", My commission expires:_________ ~,,x\,'~\~••~••••A••.•••SC',{, ~

~..'~.".,.,,.)"..;. .. 0 "

STA'JE I"'\.

•• 'l'A_"

·

0 • •

•7~. o, ~

=... :. . -= : () :

OF

\ --"' ::.

TENNESSEE:

~ ';. NOTARY ; :

, ·0. '~'/~< -~ ~-'(.,:/;.'J•.lP.?.U.s• .B.O.LN.I.C• .C. O•\•~ ',I~,~~-~~ .':"­

111, , " , , \ \ \ \

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 12, 2008

122572tSEM/mb

Page 33 of 43

JlZJ!ll" DATE:---""'b-'-1+-=7-b-1Li.~---

--,--:c.c:.=-=-=--=:...::..:.-_ County, Defendant

On this the }..J day of ~f1 .,2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or mreknown to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn

and an oath executed the above v~ation. _ . ..-£?

lJf. ~Cd~~

Notal, Pabfic

Uc.CifA}v

My commission expires:__N--,~,---,-_ _ _ __

122572/SEMlmb

Page 34 of 43

For Defendant County: Lake County, Tennessee
Date: . ~~S-:: 0..1--

STATE OF TENN. ATTORNEY GENERAL
FEB 03 2005
ANTITRUST DIVISION

Page 35 of 43

For Defendant County:
Lewis County, Tennessee
By:
',/
.'
.•/ /
,,/
Date:

STATE OF TENN. ATTORNEY GEf'-IfRAL
FEB 03 2005
ANTITRUST DiVISION

Page 36 of 43

My commission expires:_---L+'-!--J..,.£-¥-_ _ __

122572/SEMImb

Page 37 of 43

For Def-endant County:

A lSl10AR1\E'.II=OV fGlFE\'N.INER~.\.\
tEB () 3 2005
ANllTRUST DiVISION

Page 38 of 43

DATE: /-)Q - o~

Ii ;l~ Ollbe~ Perry

County, Defendant

On this the ;). 6 day of kY'f1t:t1' ;,2005, personally appeared before me the above named known to me personally or made knoVln to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sWorn and an oath executed the above verif2i~ -e~

Notary Public

r

My commission expires: I () - e1 '1 - t:2 t1c/ P

......... 'f, ~~..'..,....'..'-..I'.'.\\""'~S\T"EA''T'QE'''~·1·~".r.-,"'"~.-~
: i OF \ :
: : TENNESSEE: :
.. ;.~..,",,'"(~)~'-.""~.."~NP."y.OU.".TaC.A.uo.R".C\.Y,5.,~\\.."•!,,",,::.:E.

122572/SEMImb

Page 39 of 43

DATE: (- ?--/- oS-
My commission expires:_-=~-=_=-_ __

122572/SEMImb

Page 40 of 43

DATE: } - rL5~ b 6On this the e:< 5' day of
---:::~~~~
named known to me personally 0 and an oath executed the above~JWl'l[J,«lIl
My commission expires:._.....!.-~~:.....--L.-L~"---'

122572/SEMlmb

Page 41 of 43

DATE:_",-f_,_i._V_._~__ { __ On beh£1rl!!I:le::ounty, Defendant

-.dL On this the

day of ~tI.ud., 2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or made knov!h to me by satIsfactory proof, who was duly sworn

~u=~~- and an oath executed the above ~fication" .--L..4L-'¥-'..dt.-""""""=Ct.u:."'---'."

="-"'---_

Notary Public

My commission expires:_ _4~--,-/'-c-'1_-_o__~ __

122572/SEMImb

Page 42 of 43

DATE: January 27, 2005

.a 1 On this the

day of1Q..X) ,2005, personally appeared before me the above

named known to me personally or made known to me by satisfactory proof, who was duly sworn

and an oath executed the above erific tion.

My commission expires:----",O'-...j·rtl--··-=~_I-'--···_o_g_,__

122572/SEMImb

Page 43 of 43

TENNESSEE JUDICIAL BRANCH AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY REGARDING ACCESS TO JUDICIAL PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq., prohibits discrimination against any qualified individual with a disability. Pursuant to the provisions of the ADA and 28 C.F.R. 35.130, the Judicial Branch ofthe State of Tennessee does not permit discrimination against any individual on the basis ofphysical or mental disability in accessing or participating in its judicial programs. Consistent with this policy, the Judicial Branch for the State of Tennessee shall conduct its services, programs or activities, when viewed in their entirety, in a manner that is readily accessible to and usable by qualified individuals with disabilities. This standard does not require that each existing facility be accessible, but rather ensures "program accessibility" which may be provided by methods including alteration of existing facilities, acquisition or construction of additional facilities, relocation of a service or program to an accessible facility, or provision of services at alternate sites. In choosing among available methods for meeting this requirement, the State of Tennessee shall give priority to those methods that offer the services, programs and activities ofthe Judicial Program in the most integrated setting appropriate. In furtherance of this policy and to ensure that those responsible for the administration ofjustice have a set of guidelines from which they will be able to execute this policy, the following guidelines and principles are hereby adopted.
STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO THE JUDICIAL PROGRAM OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
1. The Tennessee Judicial Branch will provide reasonable modifications in its rules, policies, services and practices, when necessary, to provide effective access to a qualified individual with a disability. A "reasonable modification" may include, but is not limited to, making a change in or exception to policies, practices, and procedures; furnishing, at no charge, to the qualified individual with disability auxiliary aids and services, which include but are not limited to equipment, devices, materials in alternative formats, and qualified interpreters or readers; and relocating judicial programs, services or activities to alternate accessible facilities or alternate accessible sites; or making each service, program or activity, when viewed in its entirety, readily accessible to be usable by qualified persons with a disability requesting modifications.
2. In the event that the reasonable modification requires relocation of a judicial program, service or activity to an alternate facility or site~ the alternate facility or site shall comply with the requirements ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act and the Tennessee Public Buildings Accessibility Act. The alternate facility or site shall also comply with Tennessee law concerning the location of county courthouses.
3. The Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator in a county where the county courthouse is not ADA compliant, shall maintain a list of alternate facilities or sites that may be used for
-1-

relocation ofjudicial programs, services and activities. An up to date copy of the alternate facility or site list shall be submitted to the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator.
4. The following terms are relevant to the operation of this policy. These definitions are derived from the provisions of28 C.F.R § 35.104. Other definitions material to the operation of this policy but not otherwise contained herein maybe found at 28 C.F.R § 35.104.
(a) Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.
(b) Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure or equipment is located.
(c) Individual with a disability means a person who has a disability.
(d) Qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
5. The Tennessee Judicial Branch has Judicial Program ADA Coordinator, employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), who oversees the administration of this policy, any complaints associated with issues raised by this policy, and Requests for Modification under the Americans with Disabilities Act within the Judicial Branch, and will have the ultimate responsibility for compliance with this policy. The Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator is PamelaL. Taylor, who maybe reached at (615) 741-2687or at 800-4487970
6. The Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will designate a Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator for each county in a judicial district, who will be responsible for handling all Requests for Modification to access judicial programs, activities and services within that county. The Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator should be involved with or familiar with the judicial program ofthe county.
REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION FOR ACCESS TO JUDICIAL PROGRAMS
7. Submission of Request. Persons requiring modification to obtain access to judicial
-2-

programs, services or activities at any facility used for such purposes should contact the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator (Coordinator). A written Request for Modification is preferred. However, this request may be made by telephone to the Coordinator. In such instances, the Coordinator shall commit such requests to writing. The Coordinator shall maintain a record of all Requests for Modification. A Request for Modification form is available and may be obtained from the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator, the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator, any court clerk's office, or online at '\"ww.tsc.state.tn.us. If appropriate or upon request, the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator or the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will provide assistance with writing and submitting the written request for Modification. Large print and Braille versions of the Request form are available upon request. If appropriate, other personnel associated with the judicial program, service or activity may assist the applicant in the submission of a completed Request for Modification to the Coordinator.
The written Request for Modification shall include a description of the person's disability, the role of the person in the judicial proceeding, the Modification sought, the date and time of the Modification requested, and the judicial proceeding for which the Modification is sought. Once a Request for Modification has been granted, the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will advise the applicant of the procedure to be followed with regard to subsequent proceedings associated with the original Request. Ifnecessary, the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator may require the applicant to provide additional information about the qualifying disability in order to determine the appropriate Modification to meet the applicant's needs, but only such information that may be required to make such a determination. Under no circumstances will the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator be permitted to request information regarding the applicant's disability that is not necessary for the evaluation of the Modification requested.
8. Who Should Submit a Request for Modification. An application requesting Modification may be submitted by any lawyer, party, witness, juror or other individual with an interest in attending any judicial program, activity or service or another person on behalf of such interested person.
9. When to Submit a Request. The Request for Modification should be submitted with as much advance notice as possible, but in any event should be made no less than five (5) business day prior to the date for which the Modification is sought. An immediate Request for Modification should be made when urgent andlor emergency circumstances arise. In criminal cases where a defendant is confined to jail, the Request for Modification should be made as soon as possible. However, it may be necessary that the Request for Modification may be made contemporaneously with his or her initial court appearance.
10. When There Is No Request. In the event that a person requiring a Modification has not made a timely Request for Modification, the court may, in its discretion, immediately grant such Modification without requiring an advance written request. In such a case, a Request
-3-

for Modification form shall be completed by either the person requesting Modification or court personnel for the court's records. Alternately, the court may, in its discretion, postpone, reschedule or otherwise delay the judicial program, service or activity affected. Under such circumstances, the individual requesting Modification shall be required to immediately submit a written request. If appropriate or upon request, court personnel will provide assistance with writing and sUbmitting the request for Modification.
11. Provision of Reasonable Modification. The Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will, as soon as practicable, notify the requesting individual of the Modification to be provided. An alternate Modification may be offered instead of the requested Modification if the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator determines that another equally effective Modification is available.
12. Additional Time to Achieve Modifications. If the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator determines that additional time may be necessary in order to achieve and/or obtain Modification, the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator shall notify the judge presiding over the matter, who will determine an appropriate course of action.
13. Denial of a Request for Modification. A request for Modification may be denied only if the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator finds that:
(a) The person making the request is not a qualified individual with a disability; or,
(b) The requested Modification would create an undue financial or administrative burden; or,
(c) The requested Modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the judicial program, service or activity; or,
(d) S. ome ot.her Modification would be as effective and involve less cost or mconvemence; or,
(e) The applicant has refused to comply with this Policy; or,
(f) The applicant's failure to comply with this Policy makes impossible or impracticable the ability to provide the requested Modification.
14. No employee of the Judicial Branch of the State of Tennessee shall retaliate against any person who exercises his/her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act or who requests modification pursuant to this policy.
APPEAL OF AN ADVERSE DECISION AS TO A REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION
-4-

15. Appeal to Presiding Judge of Judicial District. If a Request for Modification is denied or the offered alternate Modification is unsatisfactory to the applicant, the applicant may appeal the decision ofthe Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator to the presiding judge ofthe judicial district within ten (10) days of the denial of Modification or offer of alternate Modification. The judge shall rule on the appeal as soon as practicable, and where possible, in advance of the date of the hearing for which the Modification is requested.
16. Appeal to Administrative Office of the Courts. If an applicant is dissatisfied with the ruling of the presiding judge resulting from a request for review, the decision may be appealed to the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, or her designee, within ten (10) days ofthe ruling by the presiding judge on the request for review. A written request must include any reasons for disagreement with the previous determinations, as well as the remedy sought. The Director shall provide a ruling as to the request as expeditiously as possible.
PUBLIC NOTICE
17. A public notice shall be posted in visible places throughout each facility where judicial programs, services and/or activities are held, including but not limited to each court clerk's office, that identifies the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator and the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator. Such public notice shall also provide a website address where a copy of this policy, implementation guidance, and Request for Modification form may be obtained electronically.
Should the courthouse facility within which judicial programs, services andlor activities are provided be inaccessible, a public notice shall be posted on the outside of the building or at another such location at or near the building that is readily accessible.
NOTICE ON DOCUMENTS COMPELLING COURT PARTICIPATION
18. When a summons, subpoena, juror summons or other pleading, order or document compelling participation in a judicial program, service or activity is issued, said documents shall provide notice of the identity of the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator, the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator and a specific designation as to how each may be contacted, including telephone numbers and email addresses. Such notice shall also provide information about program accessibility and the procedure for submission of requests for reasonable modifications. Such notice shall also provide a website address where a copy of this policy and Request for Modification request form may be obtained electronically.
-5-

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION Applicant requests accommodation under Tennessee Judicial Branch Policy __N~u""m",b","e",r,--_

Applicant Information

Applicant is: __ Witness

Juror

__ Attorney _ _ Party

Other (Specify Nature ofInterest):_ __

Name:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Telephone: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Court:-------------------
Judge: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Case No.:__________________

1.

Type of proceeding.

Criminal

Civil

2.

Proceedings to be covered (e.g., bail hearing, preliminary hearing, particular witnesses at trial, sentencing

hearing, motion hearing, trial):____________________________

3.

Dates modification needed (specify): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4.

Disability necessitating modification (specify):_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

5.

Type of modification requested (specify):_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

6.

Special requests or anticipated problems (specify):_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I hereby certify that the above information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date:
o The request for modification is GRANTED.

(Signature of Applicant)

o OFFER OF REASONABLE ALTERNATE MODIFICATION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

o The request for modification is DENIED because:
__ the applicant is not a qualified individual with a disability __ the requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the judicial program, service or activity __ the requested modification would create an undue financial or administrative burden __ the applicant refused to comply with the Policy __ the applicant's failure to comply with the Policy makes impossible or impracticable the ability to provide the
requested Modification (Specify)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATE:

Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator

-6-

APPEALS

o

Presiding Judge Review requested. (Specify reason and the remedy you want): __________

DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(Signature of Person Requesting Review)

PRESIDING JUDGE REVIEW

I have reviewed the original request for modification, the offer of alternate modification OR the denial of modification and the reason for the denial, and the reason that this review has been requested and find as follows:

DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

PRESIDING JUDGE

o

Administrative Office of the Courts Review requested. (Specify reason and the remedy you want):._ _ _ __

DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(Signature of Person Requesting Review)

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS REVIEW

I have reviewed the original request for modification, the offer of alternate modification OR the denial of modification and the reason for the denial, and the reason that this review has been requested and fmd as follows:

DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

AOC DIRECTOR
-7-

PUBLIC NOTICE
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against any qualified individual with a disability. The Tennessee Judicial Branch does not permit discrimination against any individual on the basis ofphysical or mental disability in accessing its judicial programs. In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, if necessary, the Tennessee Judicial Branch will provide reasonable modifications in order to access all ofits programs, services and activities to persons with qualified individuals with disabilities. This notice is provided as required by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. If you need assistance, have questions or need additional information, please contact your Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator:
If you need assistance, have questions or need additional information, you may also contact the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator:
The Tennessee Judicial Branch Americans With Disabilities Act Policy Regarding Access to Judicial Programs, as well as a Request for Modification form may be found online at
-8-

NOTICE (To be sent along with Summons, Subpoenas, Juror Summons or other order compelling
participation in a judicial program) The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against any qualified individual with a disability. The Tennessee Judicial Branch does not permit discrimination against any individual on the basis ofphysical or mental disability in accessing its judicial programs. In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, if necessary, the Tennessee Judicial Branch will provide reasonable modifications in order to access all ofits programs, services and activities to persons with qualified individuals with disabilities. If you require a modification to access the judicial program and/or have special needs because of a qualified disability, you must submit a written Request for Modification to the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator listed below at least five (5) business days prior to the date ofthe judicial program, ifpossible. A form is available from the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator or from the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator. If you need assistance, have questions or need additional information, please contact the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator:
If you need assistance, have questions or need additional information, you may also contact the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator:
The Tennessee Judicial Branch Americans With Disabilities Act Policy Regarding Access to Judicial Programs, as well as a Request for Modification form may be found online at WV\'V\'.tsc.state.tn. us.
-9-

ADA JUDICIAL PROGRAM COORDINATORS STATE OF TENNESSEE ANDERSON COUNTY BEDFORD COUNTY BENTON COUNTY BLEDSOE COUNTY BLOUNT COUNTY BRADLEY COUNTY CAMPBELL COUNTY CANNON COUNTY CARROLL COUNTY CARTER COUNTY CHEATHAM COUNTY CHESTER COUNTY CLAIBORNE COUNTY
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CLAY COUNTY COCKE COUNTY COFFEE COUNTY CROCKETT COUNTY CUMBERLAND COUNTY DAVIDSON COUNTY DECATUR COUNTY DEKALB COUNTY DICKSON COUNTY DYER COUNTY FAYETTE COUNTY FENTRESS COUNTY FRANKLIN COUNTY GIBSON COUNTY GILES COUNTY
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GRAINGER COUNTY GREENE COUNTY GRUNDY COUNTY HAMBLEN COUNTY HAMILTON COUNTY HANCOCK COUNTY HARDEMAN COUNTY HARDIN COUNTY HAWKINS COUNTY HAYWOOD COUNTY HENDERSON COUNTY HENRY COUNTY HICKMAN COUNTY HOUSTON COUNTY
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HUMPHREYS COUNTY JACKSON COUNTY JEFFERSON COUNTY JOHNSON COUNTY KNOX COUNTY LAKE COUNTY LAUDERDALE COUNTY LAWRENCE COUNTY LEWIS COUNTY LINCOLN COUNTY LOUDON COUNTY MACON COUNTY MADISON COUNTY MARION COUNTY MARSHALL COUNTY
-13-

MAURY COUNTY MCMINN COUNTY MCNAIRY COUNTY MEIGS COUNTY MONROE COUNTY MONTGOMERY COUNTY MOORE COUNTY MORGAN COUNTY OBION COUNTY OVERTON COUNTY PERRY COUNTY PICKETT COUNTY POLK COUNTY PUTNAM COUNTY
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RHEA COUNTY ROANE COUNTY ROBERTSON COUNTY RUTHERFORD COUNTY SCOTT COUNTY SEQUATCHIE COUNTY SEVIER COUNTY SHELBY COUNTY SMITH COUNTY STEWART COUNTY SULLIVAN COUNTY SUMNER COUNTY TIPTON COUNTY TROUSDALE COUNTY
-15-

UNICOI COUNTY UNION COUNTY VAN BUREN COUNTY WARREN COUNTY WASHINGTON COUNTY WAYNE COUNTY WEAKLEY COUNTY WHITE COUNTY WILLIAMSON COUNTY WILSON COUNTY
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FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

Is building a new courthouse required if the current facility housing the judicial program is not accessible?

No. Public entities are not required to make structural changes to existing facilities if other methods may be effective in achieving compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. C.F.R. §35.150(b)(1).

What can be done to make the judicial program accessible in a courthouse that is not fully accessible to the disabled?

Some options might be:

•

Where a courtroom is on an inaccessible floor, i.e. second floor in a building with no

elevator, and an accessible courtroom or other room that may be appropriate for use

to house the judicial program, service or activity, restrooms, and other accessible

facilities exist on the first floor ofthe courthouse, the judicial program may be moved

to the accessible courtroom or other appropriate facilities.

•

Where a courthouse is inaccessible and/or the courtroom or other offices related to

the judicial program are inaccessible, the judicial program or service may be moved

to an alternate site that is readily accessible.

•

Where the appropriate modification requires the judicial program to employ the use

of audio/visual means from a remote location in the building in which the

proceedings are being held, the means for viewing should be of such quality that the

proceedings are able to be heard clearly and the participants in the courtroom are

identifiable.

•

Where a courtroom is inaccessible requiring the relocation of a judicial program,

service or activity, such program, service or activity should not be conducted in a

hallway. It is more appropriate to relocate such program, service or activity to an

accessible location (i.e., courtroom, library or office) on the first floor of the

courthouse or to an alternate site that is readily accessible.

If a judicial program has been relocated to an alternate location, can I announce from the bench the reason for moving the proceedings?

No comments should be made from the bench that would disclose the reason for relocation. Such disclosure could constitute a discriminatory or retaliatory act, both of which are prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Is carrying a person with a disability an acceptable method of achieving program
~ccessibility?
Generally, it is not. Carrying an individual with a disability is considered an ineffective and therefore an unacceptable method for achieving program accessibility. Carrying will be permitted only in manifestly exceptional cases, and only if all personnel who are permitted to participate in carrying are formally instructed on the safest and least humiliating means of carrying. "Manifestly exceptional" cases in which carrying would be permitted might include, for example, programs conducted in unique facilities, such as an oceanographic vessel, for which structural changes and devices necessary to adapt the facility for use by individuals with mobility impairments are unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Carrying is not permitted as an alternative to structural modifications such as installation of a ramp or chairlift. C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1), analysis supplement.

 
 CM/ECF - DC V2.5 (October 2005) - Docket Report
U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:98-cv-00731

Page 1 of 44 CASE-CLOSED

Lane, et al v. Tennessee State of, et al Assigned to: Chief Judge Todd J. Campbell Demand: $350,000 Cause: 42:12131 Americans with Disabilities Act
Plaintiff
George Lane

Date Filed: 08/10/1998 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Gary D. Housepian Tennessee Protection and Advocacy, Inc. P O Box 121257 2416 21st Avenue, S Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080 Email: garyh@dlactn.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roberta L. Steele Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian 300 Lakeside Drive Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763-9800 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William J. Brown 23 North Ocoee Street, P O Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 (423) 476-4515 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M. Dardarian Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian 300 Lakeside Drive Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612 (510) 763-9800 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Martha M. Lafferty 2129 Crystal Drive Nashville, TN 37210 (615) 889-7893

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Plaintiff Beverly Jones

Email: marthal@tpainc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary D. Housepian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roberta L. Steele (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William J. Brown (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda M. Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dennis Cantrel

Martha M. Lafferty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary D. Housepian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roberta L. Steele (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William J. Brown (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ann Marie Zappola

Linda M. Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha M. Lafferty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary D. Housepian (See above for address)

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Plaintiff Ralph E. Ramsey
Plaintiff A. Russell Larson

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roberta L. Steele (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William J. Brown (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda M. Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha M. Lafferty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary D. Housepian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roberta L. Steele (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William J. Brown (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda M. Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha M. Lafferty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary D. Housepian (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roberta L. Steele (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William J. Brown (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda M. Dardarian (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martha M. Lafferty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Tennessee State of TERMINATED: 02/03/2005
Defendant Polk County TN
Defendant Bledsoe County TN
Defendant Cannon County, Tennessee

represented by S. Elizabeth Martin Tennessee Attorney General's Office P O Box 20207 Nashville, TN 37202 (615) 741-3491 TERMINATED: 02/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & Donnell SunTrust Center 424 Church Street 14th Floor Nashville, TN 37219-2392 (615) 244-6538 Email: donnell@sedlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn Manier & Herod 150 Fourth Avenue, N 2200 First Union Tower Nashville, TN 37219-2494 (615) 244-0030 Email: jquinn@manierherod.com

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Defendant Chester County TN
Defendant Claiborne County TN
Defendant Clay County TN
Defendant Cocke County TN
Defendant Decatur County TN
Defendant Fayette County TN
Defendant Grainger County TN
Defendant Hancock County TN

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Floyd W. Rhea Rhea & Rhea Law Offices P O Box 84 Sneedville, TN 37869 (423) 733-2274 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Hawkins County TN
Defendant Hickman County TN

represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Randall Mantooth Leitner, Williams, Dooley, and Napolitan, PLLC 414 Union Street Suite 1900 Nashville, TN 37219-1782 (615) 255-7722 Fax: 615-780-2210 Email: randy.mantooth@leitnerfirm.com TERMINATED: 11/02/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathan D. Rowell Watson & Hollow, PLC P O Box 131 900 S Gay Street 1500 Riverview Tower Knoxville, TN 37901-0131 (423) 637-1700 TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pamela L. Reeves Anderson, Reeves & Cooper, P.A. Tyson Place 2607 Kingston Pike Suite 130 Knoxville, TN 37919 (865) 540-1977 Email: preeves@arclaw.net TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy L. Tolson Tolson & Associates Harpeth on the Green II 109 Westpark Drive Suite 200 Brentwood, TN 37027 (615) 221-8081 Email: PTolson@Tolsonlaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Sarannah L. McMurtry 2636 Elm Hill Pike Suite 520 Nashville, TN 37214 (615) 367-1969 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Houston County TN
Defendant Jackson County, Tennessee

Stephen S. Ogle Tolson & Associates Harpeth on the Green II 109 Westpark Drive Suite 200 Brentwood, TN 37027 (615) 221-8081 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Jefferson County TN

William Lawrence Draper P O Box 355 Gainesville, TN 38562 (931) 268-3305 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Randall Mantooth (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/02/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathan D. Rowell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Pamela L. Reeves (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2000

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Defendant Johnson County TN
Defendant Lake County TN
Defendant Lewis County TN
Defendant Meigs County TN
Defendant Moore County TN

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy L. Tolson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarannah L. McMurtry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen S. Ogle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Perry County TN Defendant Pickett County TN Defendant Trousdale County TN Defendant Van Buren County TN
Movant Darren S. Jernigan TERMINATED: 10/27/2004

represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard L. Upchurch Upchurch & Upchurch P O Box 381 Pikeville, TN 37367 (423) 447-2903 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Larry B. Stanley P O Box 568 100 W Main Street McMinnville, TN 37111-0568 (931) 473-4922 TERMINATED: 12/18/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gary D. Housepian (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/27/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William J. Brown (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/27/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Cross Plaintiff Hickman County TN
Cross Plaintiff Jefferson County TN

represented by David Randall Mantooth (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/02/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathan D. Rowell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pamela L. Reeves (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peggy L. Tolson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarannah L. McMurtry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen S. Ogle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Randall Mantooth (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/02/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathan D. Rowell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Pamela L. Reeves (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/12/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Peggy L. Tolson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarannah L. McMurtry (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Defendant Tennessee State of TERMINATED: 02/03/2005
Cross Plaintiff Cannon County, Tennessee
Cross Plaintiff Claiborne County TN
Cross Plaintiff Clay County TN
Cross Defendant Tennessee State of TERMINATED: 02/03/2005
Cross Plaintiff Bledsoe County TN
Cross Plaintiff

Stephen S. Ogle (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by S. Elizabeth Martin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John Edward Quinn (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by S. Elizabeth Martin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Chester County TN
Cross Plaintiff Decatur County TN
Cross Defendant Tennessee State of TERMINATED: 02/03/2005

represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Marshall Donnell, Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by S. Elizabeth Martin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/10/1998 08/10/1998 08/18/1998 08/20/1998 08/27/1998 09/01/1998
09/08/1998 09/08/1998
09/08/1998
09/08/1998

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (Summons(es) issued) Filing fee paid in the amount of : $150.00 Receipt # 64591 (bbj) (Entered: 08/18/1998)

2 NOTICE of Initial Case Management Conference ; Case Management Conference set for 1:30 10/23/98 before Judge Higgins (bbj) (Entered: 08/18/1998)

3 LETTER to William J. Brown re: Local Rule 1 (bbj) (Entered: 08/18/1998)

4 CERTIFICATE of Good Standing filed by pltfs by atty William J. Brown (dcap) (Entered: 08/20/1998)

5 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Meigs County TN by Thomas Marshall Donnell Jr. (tlc) (Entered: 08/28/1998)

6 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defts: Chester County TN, Hawkins County TN, Johnson County TN & Lewis County TN by Thomas Marshall Donnell Jr. (tlc) (Entered: 09/02/1998)

7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Hancock County TN by Floyd W. Rhea (tlc) (Entered: 09/08/1998)

8 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defts: Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN & Moore County TN by John Edward Quinn (tlc) (Entered: 09/09/1998)

9 RETURN OF SERVICE executed by certified mail upon deft State of Tennessee and signed for by Reuben Jordan, deft Polk County TN and signed for by Jake Russell & deft Meigs County TN and signed for by Ricky Bivers; all served on 8/20/98 (tlc) (Entered: 09/09/1998)

10 RETURN OF SERVICE executed by certified mail on 8/21/98 upon defts: Bledsoe County TN and signed for by Melba Reel, Cannon County TN and signed for by Billy Davis, Chester County TN (card signed), Claiborne County TN and signed for by Thelma Wolfenbarger, Clay County TN and signed for by Ray Frugge, Cocke County TN and signed for by Ruby Marion, Decatur County TN (card signed), Fayette County TN and signed for by T.L. Wilburn, Hancock County TN and signed

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09/08/1998 09/08/1998 09/08/1998 09/10/1998 09/10/1998 09/10/1998 09/11/1998 09/11/1998
09/11/1998 09/11/1998 09/15/1998 09/15/1998
09/15/1998
09/17/1998

for by Juanita H. Greene, Hawkins County TN and Martha Wallace, Hickman County TN and signed for by Ken Skelton, Jackson County TN (card signed), Jefferson County TN and signed for by Pam Hill, Johnson County TN and signed for by Joyce Crowder, Lake County TN and signed for by Debra Vaughn, Lewis County TN and signed for by Renita Tenry, Moore County TN and signed for by Wayne Harrison, Pickett County TN and signed for by Carolyn Smith, Trousdale County TN and signed for by Debbie Jenkins (tlc) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
11 RETURN OF SERVICE executed by certified mail on 8/24/98 upon defts: Grainger County TN and signed for by Karen Byrd and Perry County TN and signed for by Hugh Henson (tlc) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
12 RETURN OF SERVICE executed by certified mail upon deft Van Buren County TN on 8/27/98 and signed for by Carolyn Houston (tlc) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
13 RETURN OF SERVICE executed by certified mail upon deft Houston County TN on 9/1/98 and signed for by Carole Robinson (tlc) (Entered: 09/09/1998)
14 MOTION by deft Van Buren County TN to extend time 30 days to answer complaint (tlc) (Entered: 09/10/1998)
15 AFFIDAVIT of Howard L. Upchurch in support of deft Van Buren County's motion to extend time to answer complaint [14-1] (tlc) (Entered: 09/10/1998)
PROPOSED Order granting deft Van Buren County's motion to extend time to answer complaint (tlc) (Entered: 09/10/1998)
16 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting deft Van Buren Co's motion to extend time an additional 30 days to answer complaint [14-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 9/11/98) (tlc) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
17 LETTER from deft Lewis County TN's atty Thomas Donnell advising the atty appearance filed by Donnell was not to include Lewis County, just the other three; therefore, Donnell will be removed as atty representing Lewis Co (tlc) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
18 MOTION by deft Tennessee State of to extend time to answer complaint until 10/5/98 (pl) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
19 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting deft State of TN's motion to extend time to answer complaint until 10/5/98 [18-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 9/14/98) (tlc) (Entered: 09/14/1998)
20 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Cocke County TN by John Edward Quinn (tlc) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
21 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defts: Bledsoe County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Houston County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN & Van Buren County TN by Thomas Marshall Donnell Jr. (tlc) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
22 MOTION by defts: Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN & Van Buren County TN to extend time through 10/16/98, to respond to the complaint in this action (tlc) (Entered: 09/16/1998)
23 CERTIFICATE of Good Standing filed by deft Hancock County TN on behalf of Floyd W. Rhea; Eastern District of TN (tlc) (Entered: 09/18/1998)

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09/18/1998
09/22/1998
09/23/1998
09/23/1998 09/28/1998 09/30/1998 09/30/1998 09/30/1998 09/30/1998 09/30/1998 10/01/1998
10/01/1998
10/02/1998 10/05/1998 10/05/1998 10/09/1998 10/09/1998 10/09/1998

24 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting defts: Bledsoe Co, Chester Co, Decatur Co, Grainger Co, Hawkins Co, Houston Co, Johnson Co, Meigs Co, Perry Co, Pickett Co, Trousdale Co and Van Buren Co's motion to extend time through 10/16/98, to respond to the complaint in this action [22-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 9/18/98) (tlc) (Entered: 09/18/1998)
25 MOTION by deft: Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN & Moore County TN to extend time to 10/16/98 to respond to the complaint (tlc) (Entered: 09/23/1998)
26 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting defts: Claiborne Co, Clay Co, Cocke Co, Fayette Co, Lake Co and Moore Co's motion to extend time to 10/16/98 to respond to the complaint [25-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 9/23/98) (tlc) (Entered: 09/23/1998)
27 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Jackson County TN by William Lawrence Draper (tlc) (Entered: 09/23/1998)
28 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Van Buren County TN by Larry B. Stanley (mk) (Entered: 09/29/1998)
29 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Lewis County TN by John Edward Quinn (tlc) (Entered: 09/30/1998)
30 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Cannon County TN by John Edward Quinn (tlc) (Entered: 09/30/1998)
31 MOTION by deft Cannon County TN & deft Lewis County TN to extend time to 10/16/98 to respond to the complaint (tlc) (Entered: 09/30/1998)
32 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Hickman County TN & deft Jefferson County TN by David Randall Mantooth (tlc) (Entered: 10/01/1998)
PROPOSED Agreed Order allowing enlargement of time to respond to complaint for defts Hickman and Jefferson Cos (tlc) (Entered: 10/01/1998)
33 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting defts Cannon and Lewis Co's motion to extend time to 10/16/98 to respond to the complaint [31-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 10/1/98) (tlc) (Entered: 10/01/1998)
34 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins; time is extended to 10/9/98 for defts Hickman and Jefferson Counties to respond to the complaint in this action (cc: all counsel) (EOD 10/1/98) (tlc) (Entered: 10/01/1998)
35 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for deft Polk County TN & deft Jackson County TN by Thomas Marshall Donnell Jr. (tlc) (Entered: 10/05/1998)
36 MOTION by deft State of Tennessee to dismiss (tlc) (Entered: 10/05/1998)
37 MEMORANDUM by deft State of Tennessee in support of motion to dismiss [36-1] (tlc) (Entered: 10/05/1998)
38 MOTION by pltfs to extend time to respond to State of Tenn motion to dismiss (pl) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
39 MOTION by pltfs to extend time to file motion for determination of class action (pl) (Entered: 10/09/1998)
40 COMPLAINT - CLASS ACTION [1-1] by pltfs (tlc) (Entered: 10/13/1998)

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10/09/1998
10/09/1998
10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/22/1998 10/23/1998 10/26/1998
10/30/1998

41 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting pltfs' motion to extend time to 11/9/98 to respond to State of Tenn motion to dismiss [38-1][36-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 10/13/98) (tlc) (Entered: 10/13/1998)
42 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting pltfs' motion to extend time to file motion for determination of class action [39-1]; time for filing will be determined at CMC (cc: all counsel) (EOD 10/13/98) (tlc) (Entered: 10/13/1998)
43 ANSWER by deft Bledsoe County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
44 ANSWER by deft Chester County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
45 ANSWER by deft Decatur County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
46 ANSWER by deft Grainger County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
47 ANSWER by deft Hawkins County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
48 ANSWER by deft Houston County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
49 ANSWER by deft Jackson County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
50 ANSWER by deft Johnson County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
51 ANSWER by deft Meigs County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
52 ANSWER by deft Perry County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
53 ANSWER by deft Pickett County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
54 ANSWER by deft Polk County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
55 ANSWER by deft Trousdale County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
56 ANSWER by deft Van Buren County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 10/22/1998)
57 CLERK'S RESUME Case Management Conference set for 10/23/98 is reset for 1/8/99 at 1:30 C/R : J. Spence (tlc) (Entered: 10/26/1998)
58 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins; for reasons stated on the record at the hearing on 10/23/98, a second case management conference shall be held in this action: Case Management Conference reset for 1:30 on 1/8/99 (cc: all counsel) (EOD 10/26/98) (tlc) (Entered: 10/26/1998)
59 ANSWER by deft Hickman County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/02/1998)

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10/30/1998 11/06/1998 11/10/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/25/1998 11/30/1998
12/02/1998 12/02/1998 12/07/1998 12/08/1998 12/09/1998 12/14/1998
12/17/1998

60 ANSWER by deft Jefferson County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/02/1998)
61 RESPONSE by pltf to motion to dismiss [36-1] (tlc) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
62 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins denying deft State of TN's motion to dismiss [36-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 11/12/98) (tlc) (Entered: 11/12/1998)
63 ANSWER by deft Cannon County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
64 ANSWER by deft Claiborne County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
65 ANSWER by deft Clay County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
66 ANSWER by deft Cocke County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
67 ANSWER by deft Fayette County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
68 ANSWER by deft Lake County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
69 ANSWER by deft Lewis County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
70 ANSWER by deft Moore County TN to amended complaint [40-1]; jury demand (tlc) (Entered: 11/20/1998)
71 MOTION by deft Tennessee State of to extend time to 12/7/98 to answer (tlc) (Entered: 11/30/1998)
72 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting deft State of TN's motion to extend time to close of business on 12/7/98 to answer complaint [71-1] (cc: all counsel) (EOD 12/1/98) (tlc) (Entered: 12/01/1998)
73 NOTICE OF APPEAL by deft Tennessee State of from Dist. Court decision [62-1] (mg) (Entered: 12/03/1998)
74 RECEIVED filing fee and forwarded to 6th CCA, rcpt #66186 (mg) (Entered: 12/04/1998)
75 MOTION by deft State of Tennessee to stay pending appeal and memorandum of law in support thereof (mg) (Entered: 12/08/1998)
SR Record on Appeal sent to 6th CCA re [73-1] (mg) (Entered: 12/08/1998)
76 ANSWER by deft Hancock County TN to [40-1]; jury demand (mg) (Entered: 12/11/1998)
77 RESPONSE by Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN and Van Buren County TN to motion to stay pending appeal [75-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/15/1998)
78 RESPONSE by pltfs to motion to stay pending appeal [75-1] with Exh A attached

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12/17/1998 12/17/1998 12/17/1998 12/17/1998 12/18/1998
12/18/1998 12/21/1998 12/21/1998 12/22/1998
12/22/1998
12/29/1998 12/29/1998
12/29/1998
02/22/1999 03/26/1999
11/01/1999 11/02/1999
06/08/2000

(mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
79 MOTION by pltfs for class certification (mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
80 RESPONSE by deft State of TN to motion to stay pending appeal [75-1] (mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
81 MOTION by Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola and Ralph E. Ramsey,Sr. for joinder in complaint (mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
82 MOTION by deft Van Buren County TN to substitute attorney Thomas Donnell, Jr. and remove Larry B. Stanley, Jr. (mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
83 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting motion to substitute attorney [82-1] Thomas Donnell, Jr., and remove attorney Larry B. Stanley for Van Buren County TN (cc: all counsel) EOD 12/18/98 (mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
PROPOSED Agreed Order re Class Certification (mg) (Entered: 12/18/1998)
PROPOSED Agreed Order substituting counsel (tlc) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
86 NOTIFICATION by 6th CCA of Appellate Docket Number 98-6730 (mg) (Entered: 12/28/1998)
84 AGREED ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins substituting attorney Thomas Donnell, Jr. for atty Larry B. Stanley, Jr. for deft (cc: all counsel) (EOD 12/22/98) (tlc) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
85 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins; defts will not be required to respond until the response date is determined at the CMC set for 1/8/99 (cc: all counsel) (EOD 12/22/98) (tlc) (Entered: 12/22/1998)
87 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting motion to stay pending appeal [75-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 12/29/98 (mg) Modified on 09/16/2003 (Entered: 12/29/1998)
88 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins denying as moot motion for class certification [79-1] pending the outcome of the state's appeal. (cc: all counsel) EOD 12/29/98 (mg) (Entered: 12/29/1998)
89 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins denying as moot motion for joinder in complaint [81-1] pending the outcome of the State's appeal (EOD 12/29/98) (cc: all counsel) (mg) (Entered: 12/29/1998)
90 MOTION by pltfs Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey to reconsider denial of motion for permissive joinder (mg) (Entered: 02/23/1999)
91 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting motion to reconsider denial of motion for permissive joinder [90-1] vacating [89-1] order granting motion for joinder in complaint [81-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/29/99 (mg) (Entered: 03/29/1999)
PROPOSED Order substitution counsel. (mg) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
92 AGREED ORDER SUBSTITUTING COUNSEL by Judge Thomas A. Higgins: withdrawing attorney David Randall Mantooth for defts Jefferson County TN and Hickman County TN; substituting attorneys Nathan D Rowell and Pamela L. Reeves for defts Jefferson County TN and Hickman County TN (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/3/99 (bj) (Entered: 11/03/1999)
93 MOTION by defts Hickman County TN, and Jefferson County TN for attorney

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06/08/2000 06/08/2000 06/12/2000 06/12/2000 07/18/2002 09/23/2002
01/13/2003 03/17/2003 05/28/2003 06/05/2003 06/10/2003
06/10/2003

Sarannah L. McMurtry to appear pro hac vice (mg) (Entered: 06/09/2000)
94 AFFIDAVIT of Sarannah L. McMurtry re [93-1] (mg) (Entered: 06/09/2000)
PROPOSED Order re mtn for pro hac vice by McMurtry (mg) (Entered: 06/09/2000)
95 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins granting motion for attorney Sarannah L. McMurtry to appear pro hac vice [93-1] by defts Hickman County TN, Jefferson County TN (cc: all counsel) EOD 6/13/00 (mg) (Entered: 06/13/2000)
96 AGREED ORDER FOR SUBSTITUTUION OF COUNSEL by Judge Thomas A. Higgins withdrawing attorney attorneys Pamela L. Reeves and Nathan D Rowell for Jefferson County TN, for Hickman County TN, and Sarannah L. McMurry substituted. (cc: all counsel) EOD 6/13/00 (mg) (Entered: 06/13/2000)
97 INFORMATION COPY from 6th CCA dated 7/16/02 affirming district court's denial of Tennessee's mtn to dismiss and remanding case for further proceedings. (mk) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
98 ORDER from 6th CCA dated 9/20/02: Petition for rehearing is granted. Opinion and jgm of 7/16/02 are hereby withdrawn and case is restored to court's active docket. Parties further instructed to file briefs not in excess of 25 pages addressing the issue as outlined in the petitioner for rehearing, with each side's brief to be filed not later than close of business 10/23/02. Upon filing of briefs, court will proceed to dispose of the case. (mk) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
99 INFORMATION COPY from 6th CCA dated 1/10/03 (Amended Judgment on rehearing of an appeal): Ordered that district court's denial of deft State of TN's mtn to dismiss is affirmed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court. (mk) (Entered: 01/14/2003)
REMARK: Notice from Clerk of Supreme Court that application for extension of time within which to file petition for writ of certiorari was granted and extended the time to and including May 12, 2003. (mk) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
100 NOTICE from Supreme Court Clerk that petition for writ of certiorari was filed 5/12/03 and placed on docket 5/15/03 as 02-1667 (mk) (Entered: 05/30/2003)
101 ORDER by Judge Thomas A. Higgins: Pursuant to 28 USC Section 294 (b), case reassigned to Judge Todd J. Campbell. (cc: all counsel) EOD 6/5/03 (vh) (Entered: 06/05/2003)
102 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: This case set for jury trial [101-1] at 9:00 on 3/9/04 and PTC set for 9:00 on 3/1/04. Counsel to submit proposed PTO by 2/24/04 containing the items outlined in this order. Parties to submit to Court by 2/24/04 joint proposed jury instructions and verdict forms, witness and exhibit lists, stipulations. By 2/16/04 parties to file any mtns in limine and any mtns objecting to expert testimony. Any responses to such mtns shall be filed by 2/24/04. Counsel shall be prepared to discuss at the PTC the items listed in this order. EOD 6/10/03 (cc: all counsel) (mk) (Entered: 06/10/2003)
103 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: By order entered on 6/5/03, this case was transferred to this Court after remand from Court of Appeals, [101-2]. This case referred to Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin for entry of a scheduling order consistent with the 3/9/04 trial date set by contemporaneous order. All stays are hereby lifted and no stay shall issue except upon order of the District Judge. EOD 6/10/03 (cc: all counsel) (mk) (Entered: 06/10/2003)

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06/12/2003 06/24/2003 06/25/2003 07/01/2003 07/01/2003 07/07/2003
07/17/2003 07/18/2003 07/22/2003
07/23/2003 07/24/2003 07/30/2003

104 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: A Case Management Conference is set for 3:00 p.m. on 6/30/03. Counsel for parties shall confer and shall submit a proposed case management/scheduling order. (cc: all counsel) EOD 6/12/03 (vh) (Entered: 06/12/2003)
PROPOSED Agreed Order resetting scheduling conference set for 6/30/03 (vh) (Entered: 06/25/2003)
105 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Case Management Conference is reset for 1:00 p.m. on 7/18/03. (cc: all counsel) EOD 6/26/03 (vh) (Entered: 06/26/2003)
106 JOINT MOTION by parties to reimpose the stay for all proceedings in this case (vh) (Entered: 07/01/2003)
107 NOTICE from US Supreme Court granting partial grant of petition for writ of certiorari (Question 1 of petition) (mk) (Entered: 07/02/2003)
108 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: Motion to reimpose the stay for all proceedings in this case [106-1] is granted in part and denied in part. The case is stayed as to the State of TN due to the interlocutory appeal before the Supreme Court. The parties have failed to carry their burden for a stay, and further delay in this nearly five year old case, as to the other defts. Accordingly, the motion for a stay as to all the County Defts is denied. Pursuant to FRCP, all claims against State of TN are severed and shall be proceeded with separately. A separate trial as to the State of TN will be set by separate Order at the conclusion of the appeal before the Supreme Court. Case Management Conference set for 1:00 on 7/18/03; Jury trial set for 9:00 on 3/9/04; pretrial conference set 9:00 on 3/1/04. (EOD 7/7/03) (cc: all counsel) (km) (Entered: 07/07/2003)
109 MOTION by pltfs to reconsider request for stay of proceedings (vh) (Entered: 07/17/2003)
110 MOTION by A. Russell Larson for permissive joinder & complaint (vh) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
111 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: A Case Management Conference was held 7/18/03; Discovery deadline 1/15/04; Dispositive motion filing deadline 11/10/03 ; any response to any dispositive motion shall be filed by 12/10/03; pltfs' motion for permissive joinder & complaint [110-1] is granted; the Clerk is directed to add A. Russel Larson as a pltf in this case; defts shall have until 7/23/03 to file any motion related to the stay or the trial date; pltfs shall have until 9/19/03 to file a renewed motion for class certification; defts shall have until 10/19/03 to file a response to the motion; the Clerk is directed to forward the file in this case to Judge Campbell for his consideration of the pltfs' motion to reconsider [109-1]; Terminating case referral to Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin. (cc: all counsel) EOD 7/22/03 (vh) (Entered: 07/22/2003)
112 MOTION by county defts to continue trial date set for 3/9/04 (vh) (Entered: 07/24/2003)
113 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell denying pltf's motion to reconsider request for stay of proceedings [109-1] and defts' motion to continue trial date set for 3/9/04 [112-1]. (cc: all counsel) EOD 7/25/03 (vh) (Entered: 07/25/2003)
114 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: A telephone conference is set for 3:00 p.m. on 8/8/03 to be initiated by counsel for, inter alia, Cannon Co. (cc: all counsel) EOD 7/30/03 (vh) (Entered: 07/30/2003)

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08/18/2003
08/18/2003
08/19/2003 09/02/2003 10/01/2003 10/01/2003 10/09/2003 10/09/2003 10/14/2003 10/14/2003 11/07/2003
11/07/2003

115 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: Jury trial is reset for 9:00 a.m. on 11/2/04; pretrial conference is reset for 9:00 a.m. on 10/25/04; joint proposed pretrial order ddl 10/19/04 ; the parties shall also submit to the Court by 10/19/04 the following: joint proposed jury instructions and verdict forms, witness lists, exhibit lists, and stipulations; by 10/8/04 the parties shall file any mtns in limine and any mtns objecting to expert testimony; any responses to such mtns shall be filed by 10/19/04. (cc: all counsel) EOD 8/18/03 (vh) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
116 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: The order entered 7/25/03 [113-1] is vacated as to the motion by county defts to continue trial date [112-1] and the motion [1121] is granted to permit sufficient time for ADR. The trial is continued to 11/2/04 by contemporaneous order. The Court orders the parties to participate in ADR. The case is referred to Magistrate Judge Griffin. (cc: all counsel) EOD 8/18/03 (vh) (Entered: 08/18/2003)
117 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: A Case Management Conference is set for 1:00 p.m. on 8/29/03. (cc: all counsel) EOD 8/19/03 (vh) (Entered: 08/19/2003)
118 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: A Case Management Conference was held 8/29/03; A case management/status conference is set for 1:00 p.m. on 11/6/03. (cc: all counsel) EO 9/3/03 (vh) (Entered: 09/03/2003)
119 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for pltfs by Gary D. Housepian and Martha M. Lafferty (gi) (Entered: 10/01/2003)
REMARK-Per Atty Lafferty, she has two offices. Atty Housepian will receive ntc on cases involving TN Protection & Advocacy. Therefore, she wants her address in the system to remain 2129 Crystal Drive, Nashville, TN 37210 (gi) (Entered: 10/06/2003)
120 ANSWER by deft Hickman County TN to [40-1]; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 10/09/2003)
121 ANSWER by deft Jefferson County TN to [40-1]; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 10/09/2003)
122 ANSWER by deft Jefferson County TN to the complaint of Larson; jury demand (gi) Modified on 11/13/2003 (Entered: 10/15/2003)
123 ANSWER by deft Hickman County TN to the complaint of Larson; jury demand (gi) Modified on 11/13/2003 (Entered: 10/15/2003)
124 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Pltfs shall have until 5/3/04 to file a renewed motion for class certification; defts shall have until 6/2/04 to file a response; Discovery deadline 6/21/04; Dispositive motion filing deadline 7/6/04 ; responses shall be filed by 8/3/04; all motions to amend the pleadings shall be filed by 6/15/04. (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/10/03 (vh) (Entered: 11/10/2003)
125 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: By contemporaneously entered order the Court has approved and entered the parties' joint amended scheduling order. A Case Management Conference is set for 1:00 p.m. on 2/6/04 at which time the parties shall report on the inspections by the Fire Marshl, whether an agreement has been reached as to any counties that the pltf agrees are sufficiently ADA compliant, and any other appropriate issues. (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/10/03 (vh) (Entered: 11/10/2003)

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11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/12/2003 11/14/2003

126 ANSWER by deft Bledsoe County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) Modified on 11/13/2003 (Entered: 11/13/2003)
127 ANSWER by deft Chester County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
128 ANSWER by deft Decatur County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) Modified on 11/13/2003 (Entered: 11/13/2003)
129 ANSWER by deft Grainger County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
130 ANSWER by deft Hawkins County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
131 ANSWER by deft Houston County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
132 ANSWER by deft Jackson County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
133 ANSWER by deft Johnson County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
134 ANSWER by deft Meigs County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
135 ANSWER by deft Perry County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
136 ANSWER by deft Pickett County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
137 ANSWER by deft Polk County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
138 ANSWER by deft Trousdale County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
139 ANSWER by deft Van Buren County TN to motion for permissive joinder & complaint for Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr. and A. Russel Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
141 LETTER from Laura Jones, 6CCA with request to send file to U.S. Supreme Court (mk) (Entered: 11/21/2003)

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11/19/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/21/2003 11/24/2003 02/05/2004 02/10/2004
03/29/2004 04/09/2004

140 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: The 11/10/03 order [124-1], [124-2] is amended to provide that the deadline for filing all motions to amend the pleadings is 6/15/04. (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/20/03 (vh) (Entered: 11/20/2003)
CERTIFIED Record on Appeal sent to US Supreme Court re [73-1] (designated items only, w/ copies of pleadings transmitted retained in file) (mk) (Entered: 11/21/2003)
142 ANSWER by deft Cannon County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
143 ANSWER by deft Claiborne County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
144 ANSWER by deft Clay County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
145 ANSWER by deft Cocke County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
146 ANSWER by deft Fayette County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
147 ANSWER by deft Lake County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
148 ANSWER by deft Lewis County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
149 ANSWER by deft Moore County TN to complaint of Larson; jury demand (vh) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
150 LETTER from Elenor Lyles, Asst. Clerk, US Supreme Court requesting file be transmitted (mk) (Entered: 12/01/2003)
151 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Upon request of the pltfs the 1/30/04 ddl for pltfs to serve expert disclosures is extended and an amended ddl will be established at the CMC. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/6/04 (vh) (Entered: 02/06/2004)
152 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: A Case Management Conference was held 2/6/04; A Case Management Conference is set for 1:00 p.m. on 4/1/04 ; pltfs' expert shall conduct inspections of the county courthouses on 2/17/04 and shall conclude such inspections by 4/16/04; by 2/10/04 the parties shall determine a schedule for such inspections. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/11/04 (vh) (Entered: 02/11/2004)
153 NOTICE by deft Tennessee State of filing letters exchanged between Counsel for Pltfs & Counsel for the State of Tennessee. (w/ att'd letters) (dlt) (Entered: 03/29/2004)
154 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Case Management Conference held on 4/1/04 . Counsel for deft Hickman & Jefferson Counties requested an extension of 6/8/04, ddl for them to serve expert reports. This request is denied. The 4/30/04, ddl for completion of the mediation process, as provided in the orders entered 11/10/03, is extended & an extended ddl will be established by further order. A further case management conference set for 10:00 a.m. on 4/28/04 , to address the status of settlement discussions. EOD 4/12/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 04/12/2004)

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05/03/2004 05/03/2004 05/04/2004
05/06/2004
05/17/2004
05/20/2004 05/21/2004
05/25/2004
05/26/2004 05/26/2004 05/27/2004
06/01/2004 06/01/2004 06/01/2004 06/03/2004

155 MOTION by pltf for class certification . (dlt) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
156 MEMORANDUM by pltfs in support of motion for class certification [155-1]. (w/ att'd exhibit A) (dlt) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
157 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Case Management Conference reset for 1:00 p.m. on 6/7/04 , to address the status of settlement discussions. Except for the ddl for completion of mediation, the ddls provided in the orders entered 11/10/03 (DE#'s 124-25), as amended by the orders entered 11/20/03, & 2/11/04 (DE# 140 & 152) remain in full force & effect. EOD 5/4/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
158 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Defts shall have until 6/2/04, w/in which to file a response to motion for class certification [155-1]. Clerk is directed to forward the file in this case to Judge Campbell for his consideration of the pltfs' mtn for class certification; terminating case referral to Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin . EOD 5/6/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
159 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: In light of the Supreme Court's ruling today, a status conference is set for 8:00 on 6/3/04. Counsel for all parties shall attend. All stays as to the State of TN are lifted. EOD 5/17/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
160 MOTION by pltfs to consolidate parties . (dlt) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
161 RESPONSE by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Meigs County TN, Grainger County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN & Van Buren County TN to motion to consolidate parties [160-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
162 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lewis County TN, Lake County TN & Moore County TN to motion to consolidate parties [160-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 05/26/2004)
163 NOTICE from US Supreme Court of filing opinion on 5/17/04 affirming the jgm of the Court of Appeals (mk) (Entered: 05/26/2004)
164 RESPONSE by deft Hancock County TN to motion to consolidate parties [160-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
165 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin, ON 5/26/04, counsel for the parties called the Court, at which time defts' counsel requested an extension of the 6/2/04 ddl to respond to the pltfs' pending mtn for class certification [155-1]. The ddl for the defts to respond to the pltfs' pending mtn for class certification is extended to 6/8/04. EOD 5/27/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
166 ANSWER by deft Tennessee State of to amended complaint [40-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
167 RESPONSE (ANSWER) by deft Tennessee State of to mtn for permissive joinder & complaint of A. Russel Larson [110-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
168 RESPONSE (ANSWER) by deft Tennessee State of to mtn for permissive joinder & complaint of Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, & Ralph E. Ramsey, Jr. [81-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
169 CLERK'S RESUME: Status conference held on 6/3/04 . Certain ddls were

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06/03/2004
06/04/2004 06/07/2004 06/07/2004
06/07/2004 06/08/2004
06/08/2004 06/10/2004
06/10/2004 06/10/2004 06/10/2004 06/14/2004

discussed. Order to enter. C/R: Jim Spence (dlt) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
170 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: Status conference held on 6/3/04. By 6/14/04, parties shall file briefs on the issue of jury demand in this case; shall serve copies of all previously-served discovery responses on the State; pltf shall file and serve their mtn for class certification as to the State. Any claims by other defts against the State of Tennessee shall be filed w/in 10 days of this Court's decision on the pending mtn to consolidate. Status conference is reset for 2:00 p.m. on 6/21/04 . Oral argument on pltfs' mtn for class certification will be heard on 7/12/04 at 11:00 a.m. EOD 6/3/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 06/03/2004)
171 RESPONSE by defts Hickman County TN & Jefferson County TN to motion to consolidate parties [160-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/07/2004)
172 RESPONSE by deft Tennessee State of to motion to consolidate parties [160-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
173 MOTION by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Cannon County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN for a 10 page extension for respond to the mtn for class certification . (dlt) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
174 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin granting motion for a 10 page extension for respond to the mtn for class certification [173-1]. In no event, however, shall the defts' response exceed 35 pages. EOD 6/8/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
175 RESPONSE (BRIEF IN OPPOSITION) by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN & Van Buren County TN to motion for class certification [155-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
176 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN & Moore County TN to motion for class certification [155-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
177 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: On 6/7/04, counsel for the pltfs & for defts Jefferson, Hickman, Cannon, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Fayette, Lake, Lewis, & Moore Counties called the Court at which time the defts request an extension of time to serve expert disclosures, w/o objection from the pltf, & the Court granted the extension, see details w/in this order. EOD 6/10/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
178 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: The Court is in receipt of a letter from Leroy Gilliam dated 6/5/04, the Clerk is directed to file the letter as part of the record in this case. EOD 6/10/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
179 LETTER from Lee Roy Gilliam re: ADA Act. (dlt) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
180 BRIEF by defts Hickman County TN and Jefferson County TN to response to motion for class certification [155-1] (km) (Entered: 06/11/2004)
181 BRIEF FILED IN SUPPORT OF JURY DEMAND by defts Cannon County TN, Chester County TN, Claiborne County TN, Fayette County TN, Lewis County TN,

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06/14/2004 06/14/2004
06/14/2004 06/14/2004 06/14/2004 06/14/2004 06/15/2004 06/16/2004 06/18/2004
06/18/2004 06/23/2004 06/23/2004 06/23/2004 06/24/2004

Lake County TN & Moore County TN. (dlt) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
182 MEMORANDUM by deft State of Tennessee regarding the right to jury trial under Title II of the Americans w/ Disablities Act. (dlt) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
183 BRIEF FILED by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN & Van Buren County TN in support of Jury Demand [181-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
184 MOTION by pltfs to strike jury demand . (dlt) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
185 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by pltfs in support of motion to strike jury demand [184-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
186 AMENDED MOTION by pltfs for class certification as to deft State of Tennessee & 25 County defts [155-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
187 MEMORANDUM by pltfs in support of supplemental mtn for class certification as to deft State of Tennessee [186-1]. (w/ att'd exhibits A-C) (dlt) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
188 BRIEF FILED by defts Hickman County TN & Jefferson County TN in support of jury demand. (dlt) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
189 RESPONSE by deft Hancock County TN to motion for class certification [155-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
190 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: For the reasons described herein, the motion to consolidate parties [160-1] is granted. All claims among all parties shall be tired in one jury trial set for 3/15/05; pretrial conference set 1:00 p.m. on 3/4/05; pretrial order ddl set for 2/25/05 . Parties shall also submit to the Court, by 2/25/05, the following: joint proposed jury instructions & verdict forms; witness lists; exhibit lists; & any stipulations. EOD 6/18/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
191 REPLY by pltfs to response to motion for class certification [155-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
192 BRIEF FILED by deft Hancock County TN in support of jury demand. (dlt) (Entered: 06/23/2004)
193 MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT (cc: all counsel) (EOD 6/24/04) (dlt) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
194 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, pltfs' motion to strike jury demand [184-1] is denied. EOD 6/24/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
196 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Status conference held 7/21/04. Deft has until 7/6/04 to file response to pltf's mtn for class cert. Def to e-mail response no later than 12:00 noon 7/5/04. Pltfs have until 7/9/04 to file reply. By 7/6/04, the State to provide pltf any written policy re: accomodations for individuals w/ mobility disabilities & access to Court. State to respond to pltf's written discovery by 8/12/04. Defts time to respond to pltf's outstanding requests for admissions extended to 7/26/04. State of TN to have until 7/30/04 to serve written discovery. Deft has until 9/1/04 to serve expert disclosures. Discovery mtns to be filed no later than 11/5/04. By 7/12/04, parties to submit status report and a further Status conference set for 1:00 7/12/04 . EOD 6/25/04 (cc: all counsel) (mk) Modified on 06/25/2004

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06/25/2004 06/28/2004
06/28/2004
06/29/2004 06/30/2004 06/30/2004 07/01/2004
07/01/2004 07/06/2004 07/14/2004
07/16/2004 07/16/2004 07/16/2004 07/20/2004

(Entered: 06/25/2004)
195 MANDATE from 6th CCA reversing and remanding the Decision of the District Court [Appeal [99-1] (mk) Modified on 06/25/2004 (Entered: 06/25/2004)
197 MOTION by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hancock County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN to amend answer to include cross-claim against deft State of Tennessee . (w/ att'd proposed amended answer w/ cross-claim) (dlt) (Entered: 06/28/2004)
198 MOTION by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lewis County TN, Lake County TN & Moore County TN to amend answer to include cross-claim against deft State of Tennessee . (w/ att'd proposed amended answer w/ cross-claim) (dlt) (Entered: 06/28/2004)
199 MOTION by defts Hickman County TN and Jefferson County TN to amend answer to include cross-claim against deft State of Tennessee (w/attached orig amended answer) (km) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
REMARK: record returned from Supreme Court (mk) (Entered: 06/30/2004)
200 MOTION by deft Tennessee State of for extension of time to respond to mtn for class certification & to continue hearing . (dlt) (Entered: 06/30/2004)
201 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: State of Tennessee's motion for extension of time to respond to mtn for class certification & to continue hearing [200-1] is granted. The ddl for the State to respond to the motion for class certification [155-1] is 7/23/04. Hearing reset for 2:00 p.m. on 8/13/04 . EOD 7/1/04 (cc: all counsel) (dlt) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
202 RESPONSE by pltfs to mtn for extension of time and to continue hearing [200-1] (gi) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
203 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee in accordance w/ the Court's Order of 6/25/04 of filing policy of the State relating to accommodations for individuals w/ mobility disabilities & access to the Courts, which is att'd. (dlt) (Entered: 07/07/2004)
204 STATUS REPORT by pltfs & defts on settlement discussions: Telephone Conference held 7/6/04. Conference was beneficial. Additional conferences have been scheduled on August 3, 4, 5 and 6 to discuss ADA compliance issues to other deft counties. Patricia Colson, counsel for Hickman County and Jefferson County, TN will participate in the August 3 conference. (jb) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
205 STATUS REPORT by pltfs George Lane, Beverly Jones and deft Polk County TN re settlement discussions (km) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
206 STATUS REPORT by pltfs George Lane, Beverly Jones and deft Hickman County TN re settlement discussions (km) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
207 STATUS REPORT by pltfs & defts: Counsel for the tpys consulted via telephone on 7/14/04. Counsel for the ptys & respective experts will meet at the offices of William J. Brown on 8/6/04 and engage in discussions concerning renovations as to those respective defts' courthouses. (jb) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
208 ANSWER TO CROSSCLAIM by State of Tennessee to cross-claim by Cannon, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Fayette, Lewis, Lake and Moore Counties (km) (Entered:

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07/20/2004 07/20/2004 07/22/2004
07/23/2004 07/23/2004
07/23/2004
07/23/2004 07/23/2004 07/23/2004
07/23/2004 07/23/2004 07/23/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004

07/21/2004)
209 ANSWER TO CROSSCLAIM by State of Tennessee to cross-claim by Hickman and Jefferson Counties (km) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
210 ANSWER TO CROSSCLAIM by State of Tennessee to cross-claim by Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hancock, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and Van Buren Counties (km) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
211 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin granting motions to amend answers to include cross-claim against deft State of Tennessee [197-1] [198-1][199-1]. Clerk is directed to docket the amended answers and cross-claims. EOD 7/23/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 07/23/2004)
212 AMENDED ANSWER to include CROSSCLAIM by Hickman County TN andJefferson County TN against deft State of Tennessee (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
213 AMENDED ANSWER to include CROSSCLAIM by Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette Co TN, Lewis Co TN, Lake County TN and Moore County TN against deft State of Tennessee (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
214 CROSSCLAIM by Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hancock County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, mMigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Polk County TN, Trousdale County TN and Van Buren County TN against deft State of Tennessee (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
215 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing documents in opposition to mtn for class certification (w/attachments 1-6) (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
216 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing declaration (copy) of Paula Shaw (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
217 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing declarations (copies) of Judges and Clerks (1-8): Judges Vernon Neal, Leon C. Burns, Jr. and Lillie Ann Sells and Clerks Danny Tanner, Elizabeth Carpenter, Cora Sue McMillan, Connie Clark and Keith Frye (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
218 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing declaration of Cornelia Clark (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
219 DECLARATION of Cornelia A. Clark (w/attached Annual Reports of the TN Judiciary for 1997-2003 (gi) (Entered: 07/25/2004)
220 MOTION by deft State of Tennessee to exceed page limit for response memorandum (w/attached response in opposition to mtn for class certification) (gi) (Entered: 07/26/2004)
221 MOTION by deft Stte of Tennessee for extension of time for filing discovery (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
222 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing original declarations of Vernon Neal, Leon C. Burns Jr, Lillie Ann Sells, Elizabeth Carpenter, Cora Sue McMillan and Connie Clark (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
223 DECLARATION of the Honorable Vernon Neal re [215-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)

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07/30/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004 08/06/2004
08/06/2004
08/06/2004 08/06/2004 08/09/2004 08/09/2004 08/10/2004
08/10/2004 08/12/2004 08/12/2004 08/13/2004
08/16/2004

224 DECLARATION of the Honorable Leon C. Burns, Jr. re [215-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
225 DECLARATION of the Honorable Lillie Ann Sells re [215-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
226 DECLARATION of the Honorable Elizabeth Carpenter [215-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
227 DECLARATION of the Honorable Cora Sue McMillan re [215-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
228 DECLARATION of the Honorable Connie Clark re [215-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
229 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing unreported case re opposition to mtn for class certification (gi) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
230 REPLY by pltfs to the State of Tennessee's opposition to motion for class certification [155-1] (w/attached copy of declaration of Linda M. Dardarian) (jb) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
231 MOTION by pltfs for attorneys Linda M. Dardarian & Roberta L. Steele to appear pro hac vice (w/attached proposed order & certificates of good standing) (PHV fees paid 8/13/04) (jb) Modified on 08/13/2004 (Entered: 08/09/2004)
232 CERTIFICATE of Good Standing filed by pltfs for Roberta L. Steele from USDC/ND/CA (jb) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
233 CERTIFICATE of Good Standing filed by pltfs for Linda M. Dardarian from USDC/ND/CA (jb) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
234 LETTER from Clerk to Roberta L. Steele re: $75.00 fee for pro hac vice motion (PHV fee paid 8/13/04) (jb) Modified on 08/13/2004 (Entered: 08/09/2004)
235 LETTER from Clerk to Linda M. Dardarian re: $75.00 fee for pro hac vice motion (PHV fee paid 8/13/04) (jb) Modified on 08/13/2004 (Entered: 08/09/2004)
236 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell granting motion to exceed page limit for response memorandum [220-1]. Clerk is directed to file the opposition to mtn for class certification. EOD 8/9/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
237 RESPONSE by deft State of Tennessee to motion for class certification [155-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
238 NOTICE by deft State of Tennessee of filing the original declaration of Paula Shaw (gi) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
239 DECLARATION of Paula Shaw re [237-1] (gi) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
240 CLERK'S RESUME OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing held 8/13/04 on motion for class certification [155-1]; an order to follow w/in the next week. C/R: Cathy Leigh. (hv) Modified on 08/16/2004 (Entered: 08/16/2004)
241 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin followng status conference on 8/13/04: 1) pltf & deft Hancock County have entered into a memorandum of understanding, & they expect the deft will receive a federal grant in the near future, 2) counsel for the pltfs and remaining deft counties have met & reached a tentative consensus, subject to approval by counties' representatives, on injunctive relief as to all but Clay, Moore, Jackson, & Pickett Counties; the parties advised they do not

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08/16/2004 08/17/2004 08/17/2004
08/17/2004 08/19/2004
08/24/2004 08/26/2004 08/27/2004
09/01/2004
09/03/2004 09/24/2004 10/05/2004 10/05/2004 10/06/2004

anticipate a settlement as to the pltfs' claim for damages; 3) by 9/3/04, counsel for the pltfs, counsel for the State, and the Director of the Administrative Office for the Courts shall discuss potential resolution of any of the pltf's demands for injunctive relief against the state that are separate & apart from the pltfs' settlement demands to the deft counties relating to injunctive relief. Case Management Conference set for 11:00 10/1/04 (cc: all counsel) EOD: 8/16/04. (hv) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
242 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin granting motion for attorneys Linda M. Dardarian [231-1] and Roberta L. Steele to appear pro hac vice [231-2] by pltfs. EOD 8/16/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 08/16/2004)
243 MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT (cc: all counsel) EOD 8/17/04 (gi) (Entered: 08/17/2004)
244 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: For reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, pltfs' mtn for class certification [155-1] and amended mtn for class certification [186-1] are denied. EOD 8/17/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 08/17/2004)
245 LETTER from disabled citizen to Judge Campbell re: Compliance w/ADA (cc: all counsel) (jb) (Entered: 08/17/2004)
246 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin GRANTING motion for extension of time for filing discovery [221-1] Discovery deadline 9/30/04, the State shall have until 12/15/04 to serve requests for admissions. (cc: all counsel) EOD 8/20/03 (hv) Modified on 08/20/2004 (Entered: 08/20/2004)
PROPOSED Agreed Order of time extension (gi) (Entered: 08/25/2004)
247 MOTION by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to continue pretrial conference . (hv) (Entered: 08/27/2004)
248 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin to extend the deadline to 9/15/04 for service of pltfs' responses to deft State's Interrogatories and Requests for Production; the parties also agree to extend the ddl to 9/15/04 for service of deft State's expert disclosures. (cc: all counsel) EOD 8/27/04 (hv) (Entered: 08/27/2004)
249 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin that the deadline for counsel to address potential resolumtion is extended to 9/16/04; if this date is unsatisfactory the State of TN shall notify the Court by 9/1/04. (cc: all counsel) EOD 9/1/04 (hv) (Entered: 09/01/2004)
250 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion to continue pretrial conference [247-1] ;pretrial conference set 2:00 3/7/05 . (cc: all counsel) EOD 9/3/04 (hv) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
251 MOTION by movant Darren S. Jernigan for joinder in complaint (hv) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
252 MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones to amend complaint (hv) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
253 MOTION by pltf Dennis Cantrell to amend complaint (hv) Modified on 10/19/2004 (Entered: 10/06/2004)
254 RESPONSE by defts Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hancock County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN to motion for

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10/06/2004 10/06/2004
10/06/2004
10/06/2004 10/06/2004 10/08/2004 10/08/2004 10/08/2004 10/08/2004 10/08/2004 10/12/2004 10/12/2004

joinder in complaint [251-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
255 RESPONSE by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN to motion for joinder in complaint [251-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
256 MOTION by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hancock County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN for partial summary judgment (hv) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
257 STATEMENT of facts by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hancock County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN (hv) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
PROPOSED Order extending time until 10/8/04 to file dispositive motions (hv) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
258 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to motion for joinder in complaint [251-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
259 RESPONSE by deft Tennessee State of to motion for joinder in complaint [251-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
260 MOTION by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN for partial summary judgment (hv) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
261 STATEMENT of facts by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN in support of [260-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
263 STATEMENT of undisputed material facts by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN (hv) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
262 MEMORANDUM by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN in support of motion for summary judgment [266-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
264 AGREED ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Defts shall have through 10/8/04 to file their mtns for summary judgment. EOD 10/12/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
265 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Case management/status conference held 10/1/04. By 11/15/04 pltfs and defts Fayette, Lake and Cocke Counties and pltfs and defts Chester, Houston, Decatur, Jackson, Polk and Trousdale Counties shall each submit an agreed order on injunctive relief or file a status report on the issue. By 11/15/04 pltfs and the State shall file a status report. Defts were given until 10/8/04 to file any mtn or join in any mtn raising pltfs' standing based on whether the individual pltfs had actually been to the county courthouses. Pltfs shall have until 11/5/04 to respond to such mtns. Defts shall have until 11/15/04 to file a reply, if necessary. County defts shall have until 10/6/04 to respond to pltfs' mtn for permissive joinder and the State shall have until 10/8/04. Any reply shall be filed by 11/19/04. Order [241-1] is amended to reflect that further discussions were to be held relating to Jackson and Van Buren Counties (rather than Jackson and Pickett Counties) and that it appeared that a tentative consensus had been reached as to

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10/13/2004 10/18/2004 10/18/2004
10/18/2004 10/18/2004 10/18/2004
10/18/2004
10/18/2004 10/19/2004 10/20/2004 10/20/2004 10/22/2004 10/22/2004 10/22/2004 10/26/2004 10/26/2004

several counties, including Pickett County but not including Van Buren County. EOD 10/12/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
266 MOTION by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN for summary judgment (hv) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
267 OPPOSITION RESPONSE by defts to motion to amend Jones complaint [252-1] (w/attachments) (jb) (Entered: 10/18/2004)
268 RESPONSE by defts Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN, Polk County TN to JONES' motion to amend complaint [252-1] (hv) Modified on 10/19/2004 (Entered: 10/19/2004)
269 MOTION by deft Hancock County TN for partial summary judgment (hv) Modified on 10/19/2004 (Entered: 10/19/2004)
270 STATEMENT of undisputed material facts by deft Hancock County TN in support of [270-1] (hv) Modified on 10/19/2004 (Entered: 10/19/2004)
273 RESPONSE by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN to CANTREL'S motion to amend complaint [253-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
274 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to CANTREL'S motion to amend complaint [253-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
REMARK-No Docket Entry No. 271 due to clerical error (gi) (Entered: 10/26/2004)
272 REPLY by movant Darren S. Jernigan to response to motion for joinder in complaint [251-1] (with exhibits 1 & 2 in binder) (hv) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
275 RESPONSE by deft Tennessee State of to JONES' motion to amend complaint [2521] (hv) (Entered: 10/21/2004)
276 RESPONSE by deft State of Tennessee to motion to amend Cantrel complaint [2531] (gi) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
277 RESPONSE by defts Hickman County TN and Jefferson County TN to motion to amend complaint [253-1] (km) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
278 RESPONSE by defts Hickman County TN and Jefferson County TN to motion to amend complaint [252-1] (km) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
279 MOTION by deft Tennessee State of for leave to file sur-reply to Jernigan's reply to defts' response to Jernigan's mtn for permissive joinder . (w/ att'd proposed surreply) (dlt) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
280 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion for leave to file sur-reply to Jernigan's reply to defts' response to Jernigan's mtn for permissive joinder [279-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 10/26/04 (hv) (Entered: 10/26/2004)
281 SUR-REPLY by deft Tennessee State of to Jernigan's reply to Jernigan's motion for joinder in complaint [251-1] (hv) (Entered: 10/26/2004)

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10/27/2004 10/27/2004 10/29/2004 10/29/2004 10/29/2004 11/04/2004 11/05/2004
11/05/2004 11/05/2004 11/12/2004 11/15/2004
11/19/2004 11/23/2004

282 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin DENYING Jernigan's motion for joinder in complaint [251-1]. Any party wishing to appeal this order may do so by filing a motion for review no later than 10 days from the date of service of this order. (cc: all counsel) EOD 10/27/04 (hv) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
283 NOTICE OF FILING by Hickman County TN, Jefferson County TN a copy of the decision in Uttilla v. City of Memphis (attached). (hv) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
284 NOTICE OF FILING by pltfs a copy of the deposition of Beverly Jones (hv) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
285 REPLY by pltf Beverly Jones to response to motion to amend complaint [252-1] (hv) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
286 REPLY by pltf Dennis Cantrel to response to his motion to amend complaint [2531] (hv) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
287 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin GRANTING oral request to extend the response deadline for motions for summary judgment until 11/19/04, defts' reply is extended to 11/29/04 [269-1] [266-1] [260-1] [256-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/4/04 (hv) (Entered: 11/04/2004)
288 MOTION by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN for leave to file sur-replies in opposition to motions to amend complaints by Beverly Jones and Dennis Cantrell (with attached sur-replies with original signatures) (hv) (Entered: 11/08/2004)
290 SUR-REPLY by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to response to motion to amend complaint [253-1] (hv) (Entered: 11/15/2004)
291 SUR-REPLY by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to response to motion to amend complaint [252-1] (hv) (Entered: 11/15/2004)
289 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin GRANTING motion for leave to file sur-replies in opposition to motions to amend complaints by Beverly Jones and Dennis Cantrell [288-1]; the sur-replies will be file stamped as of 11/5/04 with the motion. (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/15/04 (hv) (Entered: 11/15/2004)
292 STATUS REPORT ON RESOLUTION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ISSUES by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN (hv) (Entered: 11/16/2004)
293 MOTION by pltfs for leave to exceed page limitations for Memorandum in Response to Deft Counties' motions for summary judgmetn on issue of pltfs' standing (with attached memorandum in response with original signatures & exhibits A-H) (hv) (Entered: 11/22/2004)
294 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion for leave to exceed page limitations for Memorandum in Response to Deft Counties' motions for summary judgment on issue of pltfs' standing [293-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 11/24/04 (hv)

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11/23/2004 11/29/2004
11/29/2004
11/30/2004 12/06/2004
12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004

(Entered: 11/24/2004)
295 RESPONSE by pltfs to deft Counties' motions for partial summary judgment [2691] [260-1] [256-1] and for summary judgment [266-1] (with attachments) (hv) (Entered: 11/24/2004)
296 REPLY by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to response to their motion for partial summary judgment [260-1] (hv) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
297 REPLY by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN to response to their motion for partial summary judgment [256-1] (hv) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
298 REPLY by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN to response to motion for summary judgment [266-1] (hv) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
299 SECOND MOTION by Counties of Cannon, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Fayette, Lake, Lewis and Moore for partial summary judgment (w/attached cys of depositions of A. Russell Larson, Dennis Cantrell, Ralph Ramsey and Beverly Jones) (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
300 MEMORANDUM by Counties of Cannon, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Fayette, Lake, Lewis and Moore in support of second motion for partial summary judgment [299-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
301 STATEMENT of undisputed material facts by Counties of Cannon, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Fayette, Lake, Lewis and Moore in support of [299-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
302 SECOND MOTION by Counties of Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainer, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale and Van Buren for partial summary judgment (w/attachments) (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
303 STATEMENT of undisputed material facts by Counties of Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainer, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale and Van Buren in support of [302-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
304 MOTION by deft State of Tennessee for summary judgment as to pltfs (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
305 MEMORANDUM by deft State of Tennessee in support of motion for summary judgment as to pltfs [304-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
306 NOTICE by State of Tennessee of filing declaration (copy) of Judge Ben Hooper, II (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
307 MOTION by State of Tennessee for summary judgment on counties' cross claims (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
308 MEMORANDUM by State of Tennessee in support of motion for summary judgment on counties' cross claims [307-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
309 STATEMENT of undisputed facts by State of Tennessee in support of [304-1] and [307-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)

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12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004
12/07/2004 12/07/2004
12/13/2004
12/13/2004 12/14/2004
12/14/2004 12/14/2004 12/17/2004 12/20/2004

310 NOTICE by State of Tennessee of filing documents of Ann Marie Zappola's case pleadings, Case No. 1180 from Houston County, TN (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
311 MOTION by State of TN for additional time to file supporting deposition pages (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
312 MOTION by pltfs for partial summary judgment against State of TN (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
PROPOSED Order granting pltfs' mtn for partial summary judgment against State of TN (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
313 MOTION by pltfs to exceed page limit for memorandum in support of mtn for partial summary judgment (w/attached memorandum) (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
314 STATEMENT of undisputed facts by pltfs in support of [312-1] (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
315 NOTICE by pltfs of filing documents 1-31 in support of mtn for partial summary judgment against State of TN (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
316 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin denying motions to amend complaint [252-1] and [253-1]. EOD 12/7/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
317 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Telephone conference set for 3:00 on 12/7/04 to report on the status of settlement negotiations. EOD 12/7/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
318 MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT (cc: all counsel) EOD 12/7/04 (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
319 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell denying motions for partial summary judgment [256-1], [260-1] and [269-1]; denying motion for summary judgment [266-1] for reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum. EOD 12/7/04 (cc: all counsel) (gi) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
320 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin ; Status conference set for 12:15 12/16/04 re agreement on atty fees, injunctive relief, and damages (cc: all counsel) EOD 12/13/04 (hv) (Entered: 12/13/2004)
321 MOTION by deft Tennessee State of to amend the scheduling order (hv) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
322 MOTION by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe County TN, Chester County TN, Decatur County TN, Grainger County TN, Hawkins County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County TN, Johnson County TN, Meigs County TN, Perry County TN, Pickett County TN, Trousdale County TN, Van Buren County TN for reconsideration of 12/7/04 order (hv) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
323 NOTICE OF FILING by deft Tennessee State of of the Declaration of the Honorable Ben W. Hooper II (hv) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
324 DECLARATION of the Honorable Ben W. Hooper II by deft Tennessee State of (with attachments) (hv) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
325 NOTICE by deft Tennessee State of of filing excerpts from depositions (w/attachments) (km) (Entered: 12/20/2004)
326 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin GRANTING motion to amend the scheduling order [321-1]: the deadline for filing responses to pending motions for

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12/30/2004
01/10/2005
01/11/2005 01/11/2005 01/12/2005 01/12/2005 01/12/2005 01/12/2005 01/12/2005 01/13/2005

summary judgment [312-1] [307-1] [304-1] [302-1] [299-1] is EXTENDED to 1/5/05 and ddl for replies extended to 1/19/05. Pltfs do not intend on filing a response to motion for reconsideration; pltfs & State of TN decided to have a settlement conference re atty fees on 12/17/04 and have made significant progress and have decided to give up their rights to file reply briefs to motions for summary judgment & partial summary judgment to their respective motions ; Status conference set for 1:00 12/29/04 to discuss atty fees & expenses. (cc: all counsel) EOD 12/21/04 (hv) (Entered: 12/21/2004)
327 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Telephone conference was held 12/29/04 at which time parties reported progress of settlement and other issues. Pltfs agreed to respond by 12/30/04 to settlement offer of county defts on damages. Following ddls were extended: Pltf's response to county defts' mtn for partial summary judgment [299-1], and time to respond to State's mtn for partial judgment [302-1] is extended to 1/12/05. Time to respond to mtn for summary judgment on counties' cross claims [307-1] is extended to 1/12/05. Ddl for pltfs to respond to State's mtn for summary jgm as to pltfs [304-1] remains 1/19/05 and ddl for State to respond to pltf's mtn for summary jgm [312] remains at 1/19/05. No replies shall be filed. Counsel for State shall arrange conference call at 2:00 on 1/7/05 to report on settlement. Counsel for Hancock Co. shall also participate. EOD 12/30/05 (cc: all counsel) (mk) (Entered: 12/30/2004)
328 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin ; Status conference held 1/7/05 : the parties have reached a settlement in principle on the damages claims of pltf Ralph Ramsey; the parties appear close to a resolution of the claoms for injunctive relief; parties continue to engage in settlement discussions on the damages claims of the 5 other pltfs, ; Status conference set for 1/14/05 (cc: all counsel) EOD 1/11/05 (hv) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
329 RESPONSE by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Trousdale & Van Buren to motion for summary judgment on counties' cross claims [307-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 01/12/2005)
330 RESPONSE by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Trousdale & Van Buren County TN to stmt of undisputed facts [309-1] filed by State of Tennessee. (dlt) (Entered: 01/12/2005)
331 RESPONSE by pltfs to SECOND MOTIONS for partial summary judgment [302-1] [299-1] by the "County Defts" (hv) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
332 NOTICE OF FILING by pltfs of Documents Cited as Supporting pltfs' response to defts' second motions for partial summary judgment (hv) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
333 SEPARATE STATEMENT of Disputed & Undisputed facts by pltfs in support of pltfs' opposition to defts' second motions for partial summary judgment (hv) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
334 DECLARATION of Beverly Jones by pltfs supporting their opposition to defts' second motions of partial summary judgment (hv) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
335 DECLARATION of Dennis Cantrel by pltfs in support of Response in opposition to defts' second motions for summary judgment (hv) Modified on 01/13/2005 (Entered: 01/13/2005)
336 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN,

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01/13/2005 01/14/2005 01/14/2005 01/18/2005
01/19/2005 01/19/2005
01/19/2005 01/19/2005
01/19/2005 01/19/2005 01/20/2005

Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to motion for summary judgment on counties' cross claims [307-1] (hv) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
337 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to the State of TN's statement of undisputed facts (hv) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
338 RESPONSE by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN to motion for summary judgment on counties' cross claims [307-1]; INCORPORATES & ADOPTS the response filed by deft Bledsoe, Chester, etc. (hv) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
339 RESPONSE by deft Hickman County TN, deft Jefferson County TN to State of TN's statement of undisputed facts (hv) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
340 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin extending the response ddl on motion for partial summary judgment against State of TN [312-1], summary judgment on counties' cross claims [307-1], and summary judgment as to pltfs [304-1] to 1/21/05 ; telephone conference set for 4:00 1/20/05 (cc: all counsel) EOD 1/18/05 (hv) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
341 MOTION by pltfs and Tennessee State of, to extend deadline for filing dispositive motions (hv) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
342 MOTION by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN & Moore County TN for permission to exceed the page limit on their reply brief in support of the deft counties' second mtn for partial summary judgment . (w/ att'd proposed reply) (dlt) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
343 STATEMENT of undisputed material facts by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN & Moore County TN in support of their second mtn for partial summary judgment [299-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
343 RESPONSE by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN & Moore County TN to separate stmt of disputed and undisputed facts [333-1]. (contained w/in the same pleading as defts' stmt of undisputed material facts) (dlt) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
344 REPLY by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Trousdale & Van Buren to response to motion for partial summary judgment [302-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
345 RESPONSE by defts Polk County TN, Bledsoe, Chester, Decatur, Grainger, Hawkins, Houston, Jackson, Johnson, Meigs, Perry, Pickett, Trousdale & Van Buren to pltfs' stmt of additional undisputed facts [333-1]. (dlt) (Entered: 01/20/2005)
346 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion to extend deadline for filing responses to dispositive motions [341-1]. Responses to motion for partial summary judgment against State of TN [312-1] and motion for summary judgment as to pltfs [304-1] are due 2/4/05 (cc: all counsel) EOD 1/21/05 (hv) (Entered: 01/21/2005)

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01/20/2005 01/20/2005 01/21/2005 01/24/2005 01/24/2005 01/31/2005
02/01/2005 02/02/2005 02/03/2005 02/15/2005
02/18/2005 02/18/2005 02/18/2005

347 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion for permission to exceed the page limit on their reply brief in support of the deft counties' second mtn for partial summary judgment [342-1]; the reply brief is filed. (cc: all counsel) EOD 1/21/05 (hv) (Entered: 01/21/2005)
348 REPLY by defts Cannon County TN, Claiborne County TN, Clay County TN, Cocke County TN, Fayette County TN, Lake County TN, Lewis County TN, Moore County TN to response to motion for partial summary judgment [299-1] (hv) (Entered: 01/21/2005)
349 MOTION by deft Tennessee State of to extend time to file reply to Counties' response to summary judgment on cross claims (hv) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
350 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion to extend time to file reply to Counties' response to summary on cross claims [349-1]; State of TN has until 2/4/05 to file a reply. (cc: all counsel) EOD 1/24/05 (hv) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
351 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: Telephone conference set for 4:00 on 1/28/05 , to be initiated by counsel for the State. (EOD 1/25/05) (cc: all counsel) (km) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
352 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin Status conference held 1/28/05 : the deft counties have all approved the settlement of the pltfs' claims against the State, an agreed order of dismissal is due by 2/2/05. The pltfs and deft counties have reached a settlement on the pltfs' claims for injunctive relief; the parties have reached a settlement on the damages claims of pltf Larson against Decatur, Chester, and Fayette Countes, the damages claims of pltf Ramsey against Cocke County , and the damages claims of pltf Cantrel against Fayette County. The other pltfs Jones, Zapploa and Lane's claims would not be resolved until after resolution of the motion for partial summary judgment. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/1/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
353 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin ; Discovery deadline unrelated to dispositive motion is extended to 2/15/05 (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/2/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
PROPOSED Order of dismissal of State of Tennessee (hv) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
354 AGREED ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: dismissing all claims against the State of Tennessee without prejudice to the right; upon good cause shown within 30 days, to reopen if settlement is not consummated. Dismissing party Tennessee State of (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/3/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
355 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin: the 2/14/05 deadline for parties to submit an agreed order of dismissal of the pltfs' claims for injunctive relief is extended to 2/22/05; all pltfs, except Beverly Jones (against Jackson & Clay Counties) have settled their claims for damages. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/16/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/16/2005)
356 MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones in limine #1: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or mading any reference to settlement negotiations and the settlement agreements entered into regarding injunctive relief (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
357 MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones in limine #2: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or making any reference to the parties' settlement agreement dismissing the State of Tennessee (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
358 MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones in limine #3: to exclude defts from producing any

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02/18/2005 02/18/2005 02/18/2005 02/18/2005 02/22/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005
02/23/2005 02/23/2005
02/23/2005
02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005

evidence in support of or making any reference to the statutory affirmative defenses of undue financial or administrative burden under the Americans with Disabilities Act due to their failure to disclose any such evidence during discovery (attachments) (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
359 MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones in limine #4: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or making any reference to pltf Jones' settlement award resulting from her automobile accident in 1984 (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
360 NOTICE OF FILING by pltfs of the depositions of Luke M. Collins & Charlie Hix (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
361 DEPOSITION of Charlie Hix taken on the following date(s): 2/7/05 (with exhibits) (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
362 DEPOSITION of Luke M. Collins taken on the following date(s): 2/1/05 (with exhibits) (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
363 NOTICE OF FILING by deft Jackson County TN of the deposition of Beverly Jones (hv) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
364 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion to exceed page limit for memorandum in support of mtn for partial summary judgment [313-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/23/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
365 MEMORANDUM by pltfs in support of motion for partial summary judgment against State of TN [312-1] (hv) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
366 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell finding the motion for partial summary judgment against State of TN [312-1] MOOT in light of the Agreed Order of Dismissal as to all claims against the State of TN. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/23/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
367 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell DENYING motion for reconsideration of 12/7/04 order [322-1] for the reasons stated in the Court's prior order. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/23/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
368 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: Responses to Beverly Jones' motions in limine are due by 3/2/05; the Court has been advised that certain claims have been settled; by 3/2/05 the remaining parties shall file notices with the Court re what claims & parties remain for trial on 3/15/05. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/23/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
PROPOSED Settlement Order w/ attached 25 settlement agreements for the following counties: Bledsoe, Cannon, Chester, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Grainger, Hancock, Hawkins, Hickman, Houston, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Lake, Lewis, Meigs, Moore, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, & Van Buren. (af) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
370 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Bledsoe County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
371 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Cannon County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
372 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Chester County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
373 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Claiborne County

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02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005 02/23/2005

TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
374 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Clay County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
375 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Cocke County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
376 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Decatur County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
377 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Fayette County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
378 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Grainger County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
379 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Hancock County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
380 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Hawkins County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
381 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Hickman County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
382 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Houston County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
383 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Jackson County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
384 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Jefferson County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
385 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Johnson County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
386 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Lake County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
387 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Lewis County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
388 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Meigs County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
389 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Moore County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
390 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Perry County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
391 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Pickett County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
392 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Polk County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
393 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Trousdale County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)

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02/23/2005 02/24/2005
02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 02/25/2005 03/02/2005 03/02/2005 03/02/2005
03/02/2005 03/02/2005
03/02/2005

394 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by pltfs & deft Van Buren County TN (af) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
369 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: pltfs' injunctive relief claims against defts Bledsoe, Cannon, Chester, Caliborne, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Grainger, Hancock, Hawkins, Hickman, Houson, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Lake, Lewis, Meigs, Moore, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and Van Buren Counties are dismissed without prejudice; pltf's injunctive relief claims may be revived if the parties' agreement with hte State of TN is not consummated. The Court retain jurisdiction & venue to construe & enforce the agreements and to resolve any & all disputes re the agreements. (cc: all counsel) EOD 2/24/05 (hv) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
PROPOSED pretrial Order by pltfs (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
395 STIPULATIONS by pltf and Clay County (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
396 EXHIBIT list by pltfs (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
397 WITNESS list submitted by pltfs (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by pltfs (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
398 PROPOSED VERDICT FORM by pltfs (disk submitted with proposed jury instructions & verdict form) (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
PROPOSED PRETRIAL Order by deft Clay County (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
399 EXHIBIT list by deft Clay County TN (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
400 WITNESS list submitted by deft Clay County TN (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
401 PROPOSED SPECIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS by deft Clay County TN (with disk) (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
402 PROPOSED JURY VERDICT FORM by deft Clay County TN (on disk) (hv) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
403 NOTICE by pltf Beverly Jones of Parties & Claims Remaining for Trial (hv) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
404 SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by pltf Beverly Jones (hv) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
405 RESPONSE by deft Clay County TN to motion in limine #1: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or mading any reference to settlement negotiations and the settlement agreements entered into regarding injunctive relief [356-1] (hv) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
406 NOTICE by deft Clay County TN of Parties & Claims remaining for trial (hv) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
407 RESPONSE by deft Clay County TN to motion in limine #2: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or making any reference to the parties' settlement agreement dismissing the State of Tennessee [357-1] (hv) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
408 RESPONSE by deft Clay County TN to motion in limine #3: to exclude defts from producing any evidence in support of or making any reference to the statutory affirmative defenses of undue financial or administrative burden under the Americans with Disabilities Act due to their failure to disclose any such evidence

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03/04/2005 03/07/2005 03/07/2005
03/07/2005
03/08/2005 03/08/2005 03/08/2005 03/08/2005 03/10/2005 03/10/2005 03/10/2005 03/11/2005 03/11/2005 03/11/2005 03/11/2005

during discovery [358-1] (hv) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
PROPOSED Order dismissing damage claims (hv) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
409 CLERK'S RESUME ;pretrial conference held 3/7/05 ; jury selection/voir dire procedures explained; witness/exhibit lists reviewed & discussed; order to enter. C/R : Cathy Leigh (hv) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
410 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell following pretrial conference: finding the motion in limine #2: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or making any reference to the parties' settlement agreement dismissing the State of Tennessee [357-1] MOOT. GRANTING motion in limine #4: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or making any reference to pltf Jones' settlement award resulting from her automobile accident in 1984 [359-1] as unopposed. By 3/11/05, the parties shall file any stipulations re issues discussed at pretrial conference & file amended witness/exhibit lists. (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/8/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
411 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: the damages claims of pltfs Lane, Zappola, Ramsey, Cantrel and Larsen are dismissed with prejudice as to all 25 deft counties; the damages claims of pltf Jones are dismissed with prejudice as to all 25 deft counties EXCEPT Clay County. See order for attorney fees claims. (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/8/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
412 MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT by Judge Campbell (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/8/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
413 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, DENYING motion for partial summary judgment [299-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/8/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
PROPOSED Order of dismissal as to all claims against the State of TN (settlement attachments) (hv) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
414 AGREED ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell of Dismissal with prejudice as to all Claims against the State of Tennessee (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/9/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/09/2005)
415 OBJECTION & MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones to exclude the testimony of Judge John Turnbull (with attachments) (hv) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
416 OBJECTION & MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones to exclude evidence re claims or defenses based on actions of the State of TN or any representation of the State (hv) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
417 MOTION by pltf Beverly Jones in limine #5 to exclude Clay County from offering any evidence of the existence of an oral policy re reasonable modifications in the judicial program to persons with mobility disabilities (hv) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
418 SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION by pltf Beverly Jones (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
419 AMENDED EXHIBIT list by pltf Beverly Jones (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
420 AMENDED WITNESS list submitted by pltf Beverly Jones (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
421 AMENDED WITNESS list submitted by deft Clay County TN (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)

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03/11/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005 03/14/2005
03/14/2005
03/14/2005
03/15/2005 03/16/2005 03/16/2005 03/17/2005

422 OBJECTION to pltf's supplemental proposed jury instruction re dismissal of the State of TN by deft Clay County TN (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
423 RESPONSE by deft Clay County TN to motion to exclude the testimony of Judge John Turnbull [415-1] (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
424 RESPONSE by deft Clay County TN to motion to exclude evidence re claims or defenses based on actions of the State of TN or any representation of the State [4161] (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
425 RESPONSE by deft Clay County TN to motion in limine #5 to exclude Clay County from offering any evidence of the existence of an oral policy re reasonable modifications in the judicial program to persons with mobility disabilities [417-1] (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
426 NOTICE OF FILING by deft Clay County TN of 3/9/05 deposition of Judge John Turnbull (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
427 DEPOSITION of Judge John Turnbull taken on the following date(s): 3/9/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
428 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell DENYING motion in limine #5 to exclude Clay County from offering any evidence of the existence of an oral policy re reasonable modifications in the judicial program to persons with mobility disabilities [417-1]; the evidence does nto violate Rule 403 Federal Rules of Evidence; DENYING motion to exclude evidence re claims or defenses based on actions of the State of TN or any representation of the State [416-1]; deft's witnesses will be allowed to testify consistent with the representations in deft's response to motion. (cc: all counsel, faxed on 3/14/05) EOD 3/15/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
429 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell DENYING motion to exclude the testimony of Judge John Turnbull [415-1]; the deft will be allowed to present the testimony to rebut pltf's allegation that she was never offered any type of accommodation in Clay Co other than being carried until approximately 2002. (cc: all counsel, faxed 3/14/05) EOD 3/15/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
430 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell DENYING motion in limine #3: to exclude defts from producing any evidence in support of or making any reference to the statutory affirmative defenses of undue financial or administrative burden under the Americans with Disabilities Act due to their failure to disclose any such evidence during discovery [358-1]; GRANTING in limine #1: to exclude defts from producing any evidence of or mading any reference to settlement negotiations and the settlement agreements entered into regarding injunctive relief [356-1] to the extent that deft shall not present evidence concerning or references to any settlement negotiations entered into between or among any parties or former parties to this case. (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/15/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
431 NOTICE of Peremptory Challenges by pltf & deft (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
432 LETTER from Dawn Scruggs, court reporter, to Atty William Brown re subpoena (with attachments) (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
437 LETTER FILED UNDER SEAL (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
433 CLERK'S RESUME : Jury trial held 3/15/05 . Motion on directed verdict by deft on 3/16/05 on statute of limitations ground & that pltf did not carry her burden of proof that she was discriminated against; Motions denied; Motion by pltf for directed verdict at close of proof - UNDER ADVISEMENT - case will go to jury. Verdict for

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03/17/2005 03/17/2005
03/17/2005 03/17/2005 03/17/2005 03/18/2005
03/18/2005 04/07/2005 04/07/2005 04/07/2005
04/18/2005
04/22/2005 04/27/2005 04/28/2005
05/04/2005
05/11/2005 05/12/2005
06/07/2005

deft; jury polled. C/R : Cathy Leigh (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
434 JURY INSTRUCTIONS by the Court (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
435 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell: jury requested transcripts, but they cannot be provided to the jury; office supplies will be provided. (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/21/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
436 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell re jury communications. (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/21/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
438 JURY NOTES filed (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
439 VERDICT for deft Clay County TN against pltf Beverly Jones; no discrimination by Clay County in violation of Title II of the ADA. (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
440 JUDGMENT: Jury Verdict in favor of the deft Clay County thus dismissing the complaint of Beverly Jones, Pltf; thereupon the jury was polled and each juror affirmed the verdict as being his/her individual verdict. (cc: all counsel) EOD 3/21/05 (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
441 WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST filed by Court (hv) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
442 MOTION by pltfs to extend time to file application for fees & expenses (hv) (Entered: 04/07/2005)
PROPOSED Order granting extension of time to file motion for fees (hv) (Entered: 04/07/2005)
443 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell granting motion to extend time until 5/8/05 to file application for post 12/14/04 fees & expenses [442-1] if not otherwise resolved by agreement. (EOD 4/7/05) (cc: all counsel) (km) (Entered: 04/07/2005)
444 BILL OF COSTS submitted by deft Clay County TN re [440-1] in the amount of $4,839.06 to be presented to the Clerk for taxation on 4/26/05 at 9:00 am. (hv) (Entered: 04/19/2005)
445 OBJECTIONS by pltf Beverly Jones to Clay County's Bill of Cost [444-1] (hv) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
446 MOTION by pltfs to extend time to file application for fees & expenses (with proposed order) (hv) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
447 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion to extend time to file post 12/17/04 application for fees & expenses [446-1] until 5/23/05 (cc: all counsel) EOD 4/28/05 (hv) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
448 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell DENYING Deft's bill of costs [444-1] as each party shall bear their own costs & fees. (cc: all counsel) EOD 5/5/05 (hv) (Entered: 05/05/2005)
449 MOTION by pltfs for further extension of time to file application for fees & expenses (with proposed order) (hv) (Entered: 05/12/2005)
450 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion for further extension of time to file application for fees & expenses [449-1] until 6/13/05 (cc: all counsel) EOD 5/12/05 (hv) (Entered: 05/12/2005)
451 MOTION by pltfs to extend time to file application for fees & expenses (hv) (Entered: 06/07/2005)

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PROPOSED Order extending time to file atty fees motion (hv) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
452 ORDER by Judge Todd J. Campbell GRANTING motion to extend time until 7/13/05 to file application for fees & expenses [451-1] (cc: all counsel) EOD 6/9/05 (hv) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
453 Fifth MOTION for Extension of Time to File Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses by George Lane, Dennis Cantrel, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, A. Russell Larson. Responses due by 7/25/2005 (Lafferty, Martha) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
454 ORDER granting 453 Motion for Extension of Time to File application for atty fees until 8/31/05. Signed by Judge Todd J. Campbell on 7/8/05. (hv) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
455 RESPONSE in Support re 453 Fifth MOTION for Extension of Time to File Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Agreed Order Dismissing Claims for Post-December 17, 2004 Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses filed by Cocke County TN, Decatur County TN, Fayette County TN, Houston County TN, Jackson County, Tennessee, George Lane, Trousdale County TN, Dennis Cantrel, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, A. Russell Larson, Tennessee State of, Polk County TN, Chester County TN, Clay County TN. (Donnell, Thomas) (Entered: 08/16/2005)
456 ORDER: the claims of pltfs against defts Chester, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Houston, Jackson, Polk and Trousdale Counties for post-December 17, 2004, attorneys' fees & costs have been resolved and are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Todd J. Campbell on 8/16/05. (hv) (Entered: 08/17/2005)
Notification sent to Atty Donnell re docket entry no. 455: The document was filed using the incorrect event; the atty will RE-FILE the document. (hv) (Entered: 08/17/2005)
Note: Pursuant to the ruling of Judge Campbell re the post-December 17, 2004 atty fees & expenses; pltfs' counsel does not need to refile docket entry no. 455. (hv) Modified date entered on 8/17/2005 (hv). (Entered: 08/17/2005)

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 (Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2003

1

Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus
TENNESSEE v. LANE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 02–1667. Argued January 13, 2004—Decided May 17, 2004
Respondent paraplegics filed this action for damages and equitable relief, alleging that Tennessee and a number of its counties had denied them physical access to that State’s courts in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation or denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity,” 42 U. S. C. §12132. After the District Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, the Sixth Circuit held the appeal in abeyance pending Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356. This Court later ruled in Garrett that the Eleventh Amendment bars private money damages actions for state violations of ADA Title I, which prohibits employment discrimination against the disabled. The en banc Sixth Circuit then issued its Popovich decision, in which it interpreted Garrett to bar private ADA suits against States based on equal protection principles, but not those relying on due process, and therefore permitted a Title II damages action to proceed despite the State’s immunity claim. Thereafter, a Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal denial in this case, explaining that respondents’ claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles. In response to a rehearing petition arguing that Popovich did not control because respondents’ complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion, explaining that due process protects the right of access to the courts, and that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II established, inter alia, that physical barriers in courthouses and courtrooms have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity for such access.

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Held: As it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, Title II constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment’s substantive guarantees. Pp. 4–23. (a) Determining whether Congress has constitutionally abrogated a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity requires resolution of two predicate questions: (1) whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate; and (2), if so, whether it acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73. The first question is easily answered here, since the ADA specifically provides for abrogation. See §12202. With regard to the second question, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456. That power is not, however, unlimited. While Congress must have a wide berth in devising appropriate remedial and preventative measures for unconstitutional actions, those measures may not work a “substantive change in the governing law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 519. In Boerne, the Court set forth the test for distinguishing between permissible remedial legislation and unconstitutional substantive redefinition: Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits “a congruence and proportionality” between an injury and the means adopted to prevent or remedy it. Id., at 520. Applying the Boerne test in Garrett, the Court concluded that ADA Title I was not a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 power because the historical record and the statute’s broad sweep suggested that Title I’s true aim was not so much enforcement, but an attempt to “rewrite” this Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 531 U. S., at 372–374. In view of significant differences between Titles I and II, however, Garrett left open the question whether Title II is a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 power, id., at 360, n. 1. Pp. 5–10. (b) Title II is a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 enforcement power. Pp. 11–23. (1) The Boerne inquiry’s first step requires identification of the constitutional rights Congress sought to enforce when it enacted Title II. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 365. Like Title I, Title II seeks to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on irrational disability discrimination, Garrett, 531 U. S., at 366. But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, including some, like the right of access to the courts here at issue, infringements of which are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336–337. Whether Title II validly enforces such constitutional rights is a question that “must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.” E.g., South Caro-

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lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308. Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment of persons with disabilities in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights. The historical experience that Title II reflects is also documented in the decisions of this and other courts, which have identified unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of public programs and services. With respect to the particular services at issue, Congress learned that many individuals, in many States, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities. A Civil Rights Commission report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by such persons. Congress also heard testimony from those persons describing the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses. And its appointed task force heard numerous examples of their exclusion from state judicial services and programs, including failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical disabilities. The sheer volume of such evidence far exceeds the record in last Term’s Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 728–733, in which the Court approved the family-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 as valid §5 legislation. Congress’ finding in the ADA that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . access to public services,” §12101(a)(3), together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes clear that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation. Pp. 11–18.
(2) Title II is an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment. Unquestionably, it is valid §5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services. Congress’ chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion and discrimination at issue, Title II’s requirement of program accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts. The long history of unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has persisted despite several state and federal legislative efforts to remedy the problem. Faced with considerable evidence of the shortcomings of these previous efforts, Congress was justified in concluding that the difficult and intractable problem of disability discrimination warranted added prophylactic measures. Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 737. The remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited one. Recognizing that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the

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States to take reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility. §12132. But Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible or to compromise essential eligibility criteria for public programs. It requires only “reasonable modifications” that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service. Ibid. Title II’s implementing regulations make clear that the reasonable modification requirement can be satisfied in various ways, including less costly measures than structural changes. This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard in its courts. Boddie, 401 U. S., at 379. A number of affirmative obligations flow from this principle. Cases such as Boddie, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, make clear that ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts. Judged against this backdrop, Title II’s affirmative obligation to accommodate is a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end. Pp. 18–23.
315 F. 3d 680, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER and BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed dissenting opinions.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 02–1667
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TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2004]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 337, 42 U. S. C. §§12131–12165, provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” §12132. The question presented in this case is whether Title II exceeds Congress’ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
In August 1998, respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this action against the State of Tennessee and a number of Tennessee counties, alleging past and ongoing violations of Title II. Respondents, both of whom are paraplegics who use wheelchairs for mobility, claimed that they were denied access to, and the services of, the state court system by reason of their disabilities. Lane alleged that he was compelled to appear to answer a set of criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no elevator. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. When Lane

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returned to the courthouse for a hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom; he consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she has not been able to gain access to a number of county courthouses, and, as a result, has lost both work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process. Respondents sought damages and equitable relief.
The State moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion without opinion, and the State appealed.1 The United States intervened to defend Title II’s abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. On April 28, 2000, after the appeal had been briefed and argued, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered an order holding the case in abeyance pending our decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356 (2001).
In Garrett, we concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA. We left open, however, the question whether the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for money damages under Title II. Id., at 360, n. 1. Following the Garrett decision, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard argument in a Title II suit brought by a hearing-impaired litigant who sought money damages for the State’s failure to accommodate his disability in a child custody proceeding. Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court, 276 F. 3d 808 (CA6 2002). A divided court permitted the suit to proceed despite the State’s assertion of Eleventh
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1 In Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993), we held that “States and state entities that claim to be ‘arms of the State’ may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 147.

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Amendment immunity. The majority interpreted Garrett to bar private ADA suits against States based on equal protection principles, but not those that rely on due process principles. 276 F. 3d, at 811–816. The minority concluded that Congress had not validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for any Title II claims, id., at 821, while the concurring opinion concluded that Title II validly abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to both equal protection and due process claims, id., at 818.
Following the en banc decision in Popovich, a panel of the Court of Appeals entered an order affirming the District Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss in this case. Judgt. order reported at 40 Fed. Appx. 911 (CA6 2002). The order explained that respondents’ claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles. In response to a petition for rehearing arguing that Popovich was not controlling because the complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion. It explained that the Due Process Clause protects the right of access to the courts, and that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II “established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” 315 F. 3d 680, 682 (CA6 2003). Moreover, that “record demonstrated that public entities’ failure to accommodate the needs of qualified persons with disabilities may result directly from unconstitutional animus and impermissible stereotypes.” Id., at 683. The panel did not, however, categorically reject the State’s submission. It instead noted that the case presented difficult questions that “cannot be clarified absent a factual record,” and remanded for further proceedings. Ibid. We granted certio-

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rari, 539 U. S. 941 (2003), and now affirm.
II
The ADA was passed by large majorities in both Houses of Congress after decades of deliberation and investigation into the need for comprehensive legislation to address discrimination against persons with disabilities. In the years immediately preceding the ADA’s enactment, Congress held 13 hearings and created a special task force that gathered evidence from every State in the Union. The conclusions Congress drew from this evidence are set forth in the task force and Committee Reports, described in lengthy legislative hearings, and summarized in the preamble to the statute.2 Central among these conclusions was Congress’ finding that
“individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.” 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(7).
Invoking “the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,” the ADA is designed “to provide a
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2 See 42 U. S. C. §12101; Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment 16 (Oct. 12, 1990); S. Rep. No. 101–116 (1989); H. R. Rep. No. 101–485 (1990); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101–558 (1990); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101–596 (1990); cf. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 389– 390 (2001) (App. A to opinion of BREYER, J., dissenting) (listing congressional hearings).

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clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” §§12101(b)(1), (b)(4). It forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.
Title II, §§12131–12134, prohibits any public entity from discriminating against “qualified” persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or activities. The Act defines the term “public entity” to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies and instrumentalities. §12131(1). Persons with disabilities are “qualified” if they, “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, mee[t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). Title II’s enforcement provision incorporates by reference §505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, as added, 29 U. S. C. §794a, which authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money damages. 42 U. S. C. §12133.
III
The Eleventh Amendment renders the States immune from “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Even though the Amendment “by its terms . . . applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State,” our cases have repeatedly held that this immunity also applies to unconsented suits brought by a State’s own citizens. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 363; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 72–73 (2000). Our

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cases have also held that Congress may abrogate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. To determine whether it has done so in any given case, we “must resolve two predicate questions: first, whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Id., at 73.
The first question is easily answered in this case. The Act specifically provides: “A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 42 U. S. C. §12202. As in Garrett, see 531 U. S., at 363–364, no party disputes the adequacy of that expression of Congress’ intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. The question, then, is whether Congress had the power to give effect to its intent.
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), we held that Congress can abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive guarantees of that Amendment. Id., at 456. This enforcement power, as we have often acknowledged, is a “broad power indeed.” Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 732 (1982), citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880).3 It includes “the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed [by
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3 In Ex parte Virginia, we described the breadth of Congress’ §5 power as follows:
“Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.” 100 U. S., at 345– 346. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517–518 (1997).

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the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 81. We have thus repeatedly affirmed that “Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.” Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 727–728 (2003). See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 518 (1997).4 The most recent affirmation of the breadth of Congress’ §5 power
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4 In Boerne, we observed: “Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’ Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 455 (1976). For example, the Court upheld a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements under Congress’ parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, §2, as a measure to combat racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966), despite the facial constitutionality of the tests under Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959). We have also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, [384 U. S. 641 (1966)] (upholding ban on literacy tests that prohibited certain people schooled in Puerto Rico from voting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970) (upholding 5-year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 161 (1980) (upholding 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that certain jurisdictions preclear any change to a ‘ “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” ’); see also James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1924) (upholding ban on medical prescription of intoxicating malt liquors as appropriate to enforce Eighteenth Amendment ban on manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes).” Id., at 518.

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came in Hibbs, in which we considered whether a male state employee could recover money damages against the State for its failure to comply with the family-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 107 Stat. 6, 29 U. S. C. §2601 et seq. We upheld the FMLA as a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination, even though there was no suggestion that the State’s leave policy was adopted or applied with a discriminatory purpose that would render it unconstitutional under the rule of Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979). When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, §5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.
Congress’ §5 power is not, however, unlimited. While Congress must have a wide berth in devising appropriate remedial and preventative measures for unconstitutional actions, those measures may not work a “substantive change in the governing law.” Boerne, 521 U. S., at 519. In Boerne, we recognized that the line between remedial legislation and substantive redefinition is “not easy to discern,” and that “Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies.” Id., at 519–520. But we also confirmed that “the distinction exists and must be observed,” and set forth a test for so observing it: Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id., at 520.
In Boerne, we held that Congress had exceeded its §5 authority when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). We began by noting that Congress enacted RFRA “in direct response” to our decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), for the stated purpose of “restor[ing]” a constitutional rule that Smith had rejected.

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521 U. S., at 512, 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though the respondent attempted to defend the statute as a reasonable means of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith, we concluded that RFRA was “so out of proportion” to that objective that it could be understood only as an attempt to work a “substantive change in constitutional protections.” Id., at 529, 532. Indeed, that was the very purpose of the law.
This Court further defined the contours of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” test in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627 (1999). At issue in that case was the validity of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (hereinafter Patent Remedy Act), a statutory amendment Congress enacted in the wake of our decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985), to clarify its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits. Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at 631–632. Noting the virtually complete absence of a history of unconstitutional patent infringement on the part of the States, as well as the Act’s expansive coverage, the Court concluded that the Patent Remedy Act’s apparent aim was to serve the Article I concerns of “provid[ing] a uniform remedy for patent infringement and . . . plac[ing] States on the same footing as private parties under that regime,” and not to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 647–648. See also Kimel, 528 U. S. 62 (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act exceeded Congress’ §5 powers under Boerne); United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act).
Applying the Boerne test in Garrett, we concluded that Title I of the ADA was not a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on unconstitutional disability discrimination in public employment. As in Florida Prepaid, we concluded Con-

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gress’ exercise of its prophylactic §5 power was unsupported by a relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations. 531 U. S., at 368, 374. Although the dissent pointed out that Congress had before it a great deal of evidence of discrimination by the States against persons with disabilities, id., at 379 (BREYER, J., dissenting), the Court’s opinion noted that the “overwhelming majority” of that evidence related to “the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III,” rather than Title I, id., at 371, n. 7. We also noted that neither the ADA’s legislative findings nor its legislative history reflected a concern that the States had been engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination. We emphasized that the House and Senate Committee Reports on the ADA focused on “ ‘discrimination [in] . . . employment in the private sector,’ ” and made no mention of discrimination in public employment. Id., at 371–372 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101–116, p. 6 (1989), and H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, p. 28 (1990)) (emphasis in Garrett). Finally, we concluded that Title I’s broad remedial scheme was insufficiently targeted to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination in public employment. Taken together, the historical record and the broad sweep of the statute suggested that Title I’s true aim was not so much to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions against disability discrimination in public employment as it was to “rewrite” this Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 531 U. S., at 372–374.
In view of the significant differences between Titles I and II, however, Garrett left open the question whether Title II is a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 enforcement power. It is to that question that we now turn.
IV
The first step of the Boerne inquiry requires us to iden-

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tify the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted Title II. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 365. In Garrett we identified Title I’s purpose as enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439 (1985). As we observed, classifications based on disability violate that constitutional command if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 366 (citing Cleburne, 473 U. S., at 446).
Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce this prohibition on irrational disability discrimination. But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336–337 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942). These rights include some, like the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, both guarantee to a criminal defendant such as respondent Lane the “right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 819, n. 15 (1975). The Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial proceedings. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 (1996). We have held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendants the right to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community, noting that the exclusion of “identifiable segments playing

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major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 530 (1975). And, finally, we have recognized that members of the public have a right of access to criminal proceedings secured by the First Amendment. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U. S. 1, 8–15 (1986).
Whether Title II validly enforces these constitutional rights is a question that “must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966). See also Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at 639–640; Boerne, 521 U. S., at 530. While §5 authorizes Congress to enact reasonably prophylactic remedial legislation, the appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of the harm it seeks to prevent. “Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 88, but it is also true that “[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one,” Boerne, 521 U. S., at 530.
It is not difficult to perceive the harm that Title II is designed to address. Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights. For example, “[a]s of 1979, most States . . . categorically disqualified ‘idiots’ from voting, without regard to individual capacity.”5 The majority of these laws remain on the books,6
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5 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 464, and n. 14 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 Yale L. J. 1644 (1979)).
6 See Schriner, Ochs, & Shields, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 437, 456–472 tbl. II (2000)

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and have been the subject of legal challenge as recently as 2001.7 Similarly, a number of States have prohibited and continue to prohibit persons with disabilities from engaging in activities such as marrying8 and serving as jurors.9 The historical experience that Title II reflects is also documented in this Court’s cases, which have identified unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of settings, including unjustified commitment, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 (1972); the abuse and neglect of persons committed to state mental health hospitals, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982);10 and irrational discrimination in zoning decisions, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985). The decisions of other courts, too, document a pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, including the penal system,11 public
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(listing state laws concerning the voting rights of persons with mental disabilities).
7 See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (Me. 2001). 8 E.g., D. C. Code §46–403 (West 2001) (declaring illegal and void the marriage of “an idiot or of a person adjudged to be a lunatic”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §402.990(2) (West 1992 Cumulative Service) (criminalizing the marriage of persons with mental disabilities); Tenn. Code Ann. §36–3–109 (1996) (forbidding the issuance of a marriage license to “imbecile[s]”). 9 E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §729.204 (West 2002) (persons selected for inclusion on jury list may not be “infirm or decrepit”); Tenn. Code Ann. §22–2–304(c) (1994) (authorizing judges to excuse “mentally and physically disabled” persons from jury service). 10 The undisputed findings of fact in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), provide another example of such mistreatment. See id., at 7 (“Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the ‘habilitation’ of the retarded”). 11 E.g., LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F. 2d 389, 394 (CA4 1987) (paraplegic inmate unable to access toilet facilities); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (Kan. 1999) (double amputee forced to crawl around the floor of

14

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Opinion of the Court
education,12 and voting.13 Notably, these decisions also demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice.14
——————
jail). See also, e.g., Key v. Grayson, 179 F. 3d 996 (CA6 1999) (deaf inmate denied access to sex offender therapy program allegedly required as precondition for parole).
12 E.g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 504 (EDNY 1979) (segregation of mentally retarded students with hepatitis B); Mills v. Board of Ed. of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972) (exclusion of mentally retarded students from public school system). See also, e.g., Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit School District No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002 (SD Ill. 1988) (elementary-school student with AIDS excluded from attending regular education classes or participating in extracurricular activities); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, 662 F. Supp. 376 (CD Cal. 1986) (kindergarten student with AIDS excluded from class).
13 E.g., Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (Me. 2001) (disenfranchisement of persons under guardianship by reason of mental illness). See also, e.g., New York ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12 (NDNY 2000) (mobility-impaired voters unable to access county polling places).
14 E.g., Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F. 2d 1128, 1132–1133 (CA5) (deaf criminal defendant denied interpretive services), opinion withdrawn as moot, 573 F. 2d 867 (1978); State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 64, 600 N. E. 2d 661, 672 (1992) (same); People v. Rivera, 125 Misc. 2d 516, 528, 480 N. Y. S. 2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same). See also, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F. 3d 469, 470–472 (CA8 1998) (mobility-impaired litigant excluded from a county quorum court session held on the second floor of an inaccessible courthouse); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533–534 (WD Ark. 1998) (wheelchair-bound litigant had to be carried to the second floor of an inaccessible courthouse, from which he was unable to leave to use restroom facilities or obtain a meal, and no arrangements were made to carry him downstairs at the end of the day); Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F. 2d 1288, 1289 (CA9 1982) (blind persons categorically excluded from jury service); Galloway v. Superior Court of District of Columbia, 816 F. Supp. 12 (DC 1993) (same); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399, 405 (WD Pa. 1989) (deaf individual excluded from jury service); People v. Green, 561 N. Y. S. 2d 130, 133 (Cty. Ct. 1990) (prosecutor exercised peremptory strike against prospective juror solely because she was hearing impaired).

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15

Opinion of the Court
This pattern of disability discrimination persisted despite several federal and state legislative efforts to address it. In the deliberations that led up to the enactment of the ADA, Congress identified important shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them “inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing.” S. Rep. No. 101–116, at 18. See also H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 47.15 It also uncovered further evidence of those shortcomings, in the form of hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions. See Garrett, 531 U. S., at 379 (BREYER, J., dissenting). See also id., at 391 (App. C to opinion of BREYER, J., dissenting). As the Court’s opinion in Garrett observed, the “overwhelming majority” of these examples concerned discrimination in the administration of public programs and services. Id., at 371, n. 7; Government’s Lodging in Garrett, O. T. 2000, No. 99–1240 (available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
With respect to the particular services at issue in this case, Congress learned that many individuals, in many States across the country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities. A report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and programs housed in stateowned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities, even taking into account the possibility that the services and programs might be restructured or relocated to other parts of the buildings. U. S. Civil Rights Commission, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 39 (1983). Congress itself
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15 For a comprehensive discussion of the shortcomings of state disability discrimination statutes, see Colker & Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075 (2002).

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Opinion of the Court
heard testimony from persons with disabilities who described the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses. Oversight Hearing on H. R. 4468 before the House Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 40–41, 48 (1988). And its appointed task force heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of persons with visual impairments and hearing impairments from jury service, failure of state and local governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, failure to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabilities in abuse cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical disabilities. Government’s Lodging in Garrett, O. T. 2000, No. 99– 1240. See also Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990).16
——————
16 THE CHIEF JUSTICE dismisses as “irrelevant” the portions of this evidence that concern the conduct of nonstate governments. Post, at 5– 6 (dissenting opinion). This argument rests on the mistaken premise that a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 power must always be predicated solely on evidence of constitutional violations by the States themselves. To operate on that premise in this case would be particularly inappropriate because this case concerns the provision of judicial services, an area in which local governments are typically treated as “arm[s] of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes, Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977), and thus enjoy precisely the same immunity from unconsented suit as the States. See, e.g., Callahan v. Philadelphia, 207 F. 3d 668, 670–674 (CA3 2000) (municipal court is an “arm of the State” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Kelly v. Municipal Courts, 97 F. 3d 902, 907–908 (CA7 1996) (same); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F. 3d 828, 831 (CA9 1995) (same). Cf. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 368–369.
In any event, our cases have recognized that evidence of constitutional violations on the part of nonstate governmental actors is relevant to the §5 inquiry. To be sure, evidence of constitutional violations by the States themselves is particularly important when, as in Florida

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17

Opinion of the Court
Given the sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services, the dissent’s contention that the record is insufficient to justify Congress’ exercise of its prophylactic power is puzzling, to say the least. Just last Term in Hibbs, we approved the family-care leave provision of the FMLA as valid §5 legislation based primarily on evidence of disparate provision of parenting leave, little of which concerned unconstitutional state conduct. 538 U. S., at 728–733.17 We explained that because the FMLA was targeted at sex-
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Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627 (1999), Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000), and Garrett, the sole purpose of reliance on §5 is to place the States on equal footing with private actors with respect to their amenability to suit. But much of the evidence in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 312–315, to which THE CHIEF JUSTICE favorably refers, post, at 11, involved the conduct of county and city officials, rather than the States. Moreover, what THE CHIEF JUSTICE calls an “extensive legislative record documenting States’ gender discrimination in employment leave policies” in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721 (2003), post, at 11, in fact contained little specific evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on the part of the States. Indeed, the evidence before the Congress that enacted the FMLA related primarily to the practices of private-sector employers and the Federal Government. See Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 730–735. See also id., at 745– 750 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).
17 Specifically, we relied on (1) a Senate Report citation to a Bureau of Labor Statistics survey revealing disparities in private-sector provision of parenting leave to men and women; (2) submissions from two sources at a hearing on the Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, a predecessor bill to the FMLA, that public-sector parental leave polices “ ‘diffe[r] little’ ” from private-sector policies; (3) evidence that 15 States provided women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only 4 States provided for similarly extended paternity leave; and (4) a House Report’s quotation of a study that found that failure to implement uniform standards for parenting leave would “ ‘leav[e] Federal employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal treatment,’ ” H. R. Rep. No. 103–8, pt. 2, p. 11 (1993). Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 728–733.

18

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Opinion of the Court
based classifications, which are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, “it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations” than in Garrett or Kimel, both of which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to rational-basis review. 538 U. S., at 735–737. Title II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights, including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sexbased classifications. And in any event, the record of constitutional violations in this case—including judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the enjoyment of public services—far exceeds the record in Hibbs.
The conclusion that Congress drew from this body of evidence is set forth in the text of the ADA itself: “[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(3) (emphasis added). This finding, together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.
V
The only question that remains is whether Title II is an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment. At the outset, we must determine the scope of that inquiry. Title II—unlike RFRA, the Patent Remedy Act, and the other statutes we have reviewed for validity under §5—reaches a wide array of official conduct

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19

Opinion of the Court
in an effort to enforce an equally wide array of constitutional guarantees. Petitioner urges us both to examine the broad range of Title II’s applications all at once, and to treat that breadth as a mark of the law’s invalidity. According to petitioner, the fact that Title II applies not only to public education and voting-booth access but also to seating at state-owned hockey rinks indicates that Title II is not appropriately tailored to serve its objectives. But nothing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole.18 Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power under §5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts. Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid §5

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18 Contrary to THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 15, neither Garrett nor Florida Prepaid lends support to the proposition that the Boerne test requires courts in all cases to “measur[e] the full breadth of the statute or relevant provision that Congress enacted against the scope of the constitutional right it purported to enforce.” In fact, the decision in Garrett, which severed Title I of the ADA from Title II for purposes of the §5 inquiry, demonstrates that courts need not examine “the full breadth of the statute” all at once. Moreover, Garrett and Florida Prepaid, like all of our other recent §5 cases, concerned legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a single constitutional right; for that reason, neither speaks to the issue presented in this case.
Nor is THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s approach compelled by the nature of the Boerne inquiry. The answer to the question Boerne asks—whether a piece of legislation attempts substantively to redefine a constitutional guarantee—logically focuses on the manner in which the legislation operates to enforce that particular guarantee. It is unclear what, if anything, examining Title II’s application to hockey rinks or voting booths can tell us about whether Title II substantively redefines the right of access to the courts.

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Opinion of the Court
legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services, we need go no further. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 26 (1960).19
Congress’ chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion and discrimination described above, Title II’s requirement of program accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts. The unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability discrimination. Faced with considerable evidence of the shortcomings of previous legislative responses, Congress was justified in concluding that this “difficult and intractable proble[m]” warranted “added prophylactic measures in response.” Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited one. Recognizing that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility. 42 U. S. C. §12131(2). But Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs. It requires only “reasonable modifications” that would not

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19 In Raines, a State subject to suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 contended that the law exceeded Congress’ power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment because it prohibited “any person,” and not just state actors, from interfering with voting rights. We rejected that argument, concluding that “if the complaint here called for an application of the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should have been an end to the question of constitutionality.” 362 U. S., at 24–25.

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21

Opinion of the Court
fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service. Ibid. As Title II’s implementing regulations make clear, the reasonable modification requirement can be satisfied in a number of ways. In the case of facilities built or altered after 1992, the regulations require compliance with specific architectural accessibility standards. 28 CFR §35.151 (2003). But in the case of older facilities, for which structural change is likely to be more difficult, a public entity may comply with Title II by adopting a variety of less costly measures, including relocating services to alternative, accessible sites and assigning aides to assist persons with disabilities in accessing services. §35.150(b)(1). Only if these measures are ineffective in achieving accessibility is the public entity required to make reasonable structural changes. Ibid. And in no event is the entity required to undertake measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service. §§35.150(a)(2), (a)(3).
This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, “within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard” in its courts. Boddie, 401 U. S., at 379 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).20 Our cases have recognized a number of affirmative obligations that flow from this principle: the duty to waive filing fees in certain family-law and criminal

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20 Because this case implicates the right of access to the courts, we need not consider whether Title II’s duty to accommodate exceeds what the Constitution requires in the class of cases that implicate only Cleburne’s prohibition on irrational discrimination. See Garrett, 531 U. S., at 372.

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Opinion of the Court
cases,21 the duty to provide transcripts to criminal defendants seeking review of their convictions,22 and the duty to provide counsel to certain criminal defendants.23 Each of these cases makes clear that ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts. Judged against this backdrop, Title II’s affirmative obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the administration of justice cannot be said to be “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Boerne, 521 U. S., at 532; Kimel, 528 U. S., at 86.24 It is, rather, a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end.
For these reasons, we conclude that Title II, as it applies
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21 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971) (divorce filing fee); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 (1996) (record fee in parental rights termination action); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for habeas petitions); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 (1959) (filing fee for direct appeal in criminal case).
22 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956). 23 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (trial counsel for persons charged with felony offenses); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) (counsel for direct appeals as of right). 24 THE CHIEF JUSTICE contends that Title II cannot be understood as remedial legislation because it “subjects a State to liability for failing to make a vast array of special accommodations, without regard for whether the failure to accommodate results in a constitutional wrong.” Post, at 17 (emphasis in original). But as we have often acknowledged, Congress “is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and may prohibit “a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 81. Cf. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721 (upholding the FMLA as valid remedial legislation without regard to whether failure to provide the statutorily mandated 12 weeks’ leave results in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).

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23

Opinion of the Court
to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.

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1

SOUTER, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 02–1667
_________________
TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2004]
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion subject to the same caveats about the Court’s recent cases on the Eleventh Amendment and §5 of the Fourteenth that I noted in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 740 (2003) (SOUTER, J., concurring).
Although I concur in the Court’s approach applying the congruence-and-proportionality criteria to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as a guarantee of access to courts and related rights, I note that if the Court engaged in a more expansive enquiry as THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests, post, at 15 (dissenting opinion), the evidence to be considered would underscore the appropriateness of action under §5 to address the situation of disabled individuals before the courts, for that evidence would show that the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very discrimination subject to congressional remedy under §5. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927), was not grudging in sustaining the constitutionality of the once-pervasive practice of involuntarily sterilizing those with mental disabilities. See id., at 207 (“It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three genera-

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SOUTER, J., concurring
tions of imbeciles are enough”). Laws compelling sterilization were often accompanied by others indiscriminately requiring institutionalization, and prohibiting certain individuals with disabilities from marrying, from voting, from attending public schools, and even from appearing in public. One administrative action along these lines was judicially sustained in part as a justified precaution against the very sight of a child with cerebral palsy, lest he “produc[e] a depressing and nauseating effect” upon others. State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Ed. of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 232, 172 N. W. 153 (1919) (approving his exclusion from public school).1
Many of these laws were enacted to implement the quondam science of eugenics, which peaked in the 1920’s, yet the statutes and their judicial vindications sat on the books long after eugenics lapsed into discredit.2 See U. S. Civil Rights Commission, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 19–20 (1983). Quite apart from the fateful inspiration behind them, one pervasive fault of these provisions was their failure to reflect the “amount of flexibility and freedom” required to deal with “the wide variation in the abilities and needs” of people with disabilities. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 445 (1985). Instead, like other invidious discrimination, they classified people without regard to individual capacities, and by that lack of regard did great harm. In sustaining the application of Title II today, the Court takes a welcome step away from the judiciary’s prior endorsement of blunt instruments imposing legal handicaps.
—————— 1 See generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432,
463–464 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment, 15 Santa Clara Law. 855 (1975); Brief for United States 17–19.
2 As the majority opinion shows, some of them persist to this day, ante, at 12–14, to say nothing of their lingering effects on society.

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1

GINSBURG, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 02–1667
_________________
TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2004]
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring.
For the reasons stated by the Court, and mindful of Congress’ objective in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act—the elimination or reduction of physical and social structures that impede people with some present, past, or perceived impairments from contributing, according to their talents, to our Nation’s social, economic, and civic life—I join the Court’s opinion.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U. S. C. §§12101–12213, is a measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with disabilities. See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 471 (2000) (ADA aims both to “guarante[e] a baseline of equal citizenship by protecting against stigma and systematic exclusion from public and private opportunities, and [to] protec[t] society against the loss of valuable talents”). As the Court’s opinion relates, see ante, at 5, the Act comprises three parts, prohibiting discrimination in employment (Title I), public services, programs, and activities (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III). This case concerns Title II, which controls the conduct of administrators of public undertakings.
Including individuals with disabilities among people who count in composing “We the People,” Congress under-

2

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GINSBURG, J., concurring
stood in shaping the ADA, would sometimes require not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but accommodation. Central to the Act’s primary objective, Congress extended the statute’s range to reach all government activities, §12132 (Title II), and required “reasonable modifications to [public actors’] rules, policies, or practices,” §§12131(2)–12132 (Title II). See also §12112(b)(5) (defining discrimination to include the failure to provide “reasonable accommodations”) (Title I); §12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring “reasonable modifications in [public accommodations’] policies, practices, or procedures”) (Title III); Bagenstos, supra, at 435 (ADA supporters sought “to eliminate the practices that combine with physical and mental conditions to create what we call ‘disability.’ The society-wide universal access rules serve this function on the macro level, and the requirements of individualized accommodation and modification fill in the gaps on the micro level.” (footnote omitted)).
In Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U. S. 581 (1999), this Court responded with fidelity to the ADA’s accommodation theme when it held a State accountable for failing to provide community residential placements for people with disabilities. The State argued in Olmstead that it had acted impartially, for it provided no community placements for individuals without disabilities. Id., at 598. Congress, the Court observed, advanced in the ADA “a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination,” ibid., one that embraced failures to provide “reasonable accommodations,” id., at 601. The Court today is similarly faithful to the Act’s demand for reasonable accommodation to secure access and avoid exclusion.
Legislation calling upon all government actors to respect the dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our Constitution’s commitment to federalism, properly conceived. It seems to me not conducive to a harmonious federal system to require Congress, before it

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3

GINSBURG, J., concurring
exercises authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, essentially to indict each State for disregarding the equal-citizenship stature of persons with disabilities. But see post, at 11 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“Congress may impose prophylactic §5 legislation only upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations.”); Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 743 (2003) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (to be controlled by §5 legislation, State “can demand that it be shown to have been acting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis in original)). Members of Congress are understandably reluctant to condemn their own States as constitutional violators, complicit in maintaining the isolated and unequal status of persons with disabilities. I would not disarm a National Legislature for resisting an adversarial approach to lawmaking better suited to the courtroom.
As the Court’s opinion documents, see ante, at 12–18, Congress considered a body of evidence showing that in diverse parts of our Nation, and at various levels of government, persons with disabilities encounter access barriers to public facilities and services. That record, the Court rightly holds, at least as it bears on access to courts, sufficed to warrant the barrier-lowering, dignity-respecting national solution the People’s representatives in Congress elected to order.

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1

REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 02–1667
_________________
TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2004]
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
In Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356 (2001), we held that Congress did not validly abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. §§12111–12117. Today, the Court concludes that Title II of that Act, §§12131–12165, does validly abrogate that immunity, at least insofar “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.” Ante, at 19. Because today’s decision is irreconcilable with Garrett and the wellestablished principles it embodies, I dissent.
The Eleventh Amendment bars private lawsuits in federal court against an unconsenting State. E.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 726 (2003); Garrett, supra, at 363; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73 (2000). Congress may overcome States’ sovereign immunity and authorize such suits only if it unmistakably expresses its intent to do so, and only if it “acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hibbs, supra, at 726. While the Court correctly holds that Congress satisfied the first prerequisite, ante, at 6, I disagree with its conclusion that Title II is valid §5 enforcement legislation.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Con-

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REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting
gress the authority “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the familiar substantive guarantees contained in §1 of that Amendment. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). Congress’ power to enact “appropriate” enforcement legislation is not limited to “mere legislative repetition” of this Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Garrett, supra, at 365. Congress may “remedy” and “deter” state violations of constitutional rights by “prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such “prophylactic” legislation, however, “must be an appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations, not ‘an attempt to substantively redefine the States’ legal obligations.’ ” Id., at 727–728 (quoting Kimel, supra, at 88); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 525 (1997) (enforcement power is “corrective or preventive, not definitional”). To ensure that Congress does not usurp this Court’s responsibility to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, valid §5 legislation must exhibit “ ‘congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’ ” Hibbs, supra, at 728 (quoting City of Boerne, supra, at 520). While the Court today pays lipservice to the “congruence and proportionality” test, see ante, at 8, it applies it in a manner inconsistent with our recent precedents.
In Garrett, we conducted the three-step inquiry first enunciated in City of Boerne to determine whether Title I of the ADA satisfied the congruence-and-proportionality test. A faithful application of that test to Title II reveals that it too “ ‘substantively redefine[s],’ ” rather than permissibly enforces, the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hibbs, supra, at 728.

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The first step is to “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Garrett, supra, at 365. This task was easy in Garrett, Hibbs, Kimel, and City of Boerne because the statutes in those cases sought to enforce only one constitutional right. In Garrett, for example, the statute addressed the equal protection right of disabled persons to be free from unconstitutional employment discrimination. Garrett, supra, at 365. See also Hibbs, supra, at 728 (“The [Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)] aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace”); Kimel, supra, at 83 (right to be free from unconstitutional age discrimination in employment); City of Boerne, supra, at 529 (right of free exercise of religion). The scope of that right, we explained, is quite limited; indeed, the Equal Protection Clause permits a State to classify on the basis of disability so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Garrett, supra, at 366–368 (discussing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985)); see also ante, at 11.
In this case, the task of identifying the scope of the relevant constitutional protection is more difficult because Title II purports to enforce a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled persons: not only the equal protection right against irrational discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due Process Clause. Ante, at 11– 12. However, because the Court ultimately upholds Title II “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,” ante, at 19, the proper inquiry focuses on the scope of those due process rights. The Court cites four access-to-the-courts rights that Title II purportedly enforces: (1) the right of the criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of the trial, Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 819 (1975); (2) the right of litigants to have a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” in judicial proceedings, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,

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379 (1971); (3) the right of the criminal defendant to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 530 (1975); and (4) the public right of access to criminal proceedings, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U. S. 1, 8–15 (1986). Ante, at 11–12.
Having traced the “metes and bounds” of the constitutional rights at issue, the next step in the congruence-andproportionality inquiry requires us to examine whether Congress “identified a history and pattern” of violations of these constitutional rights by the States with respect to the disabled. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 368. This step is crucial to determining whether Title II is a legitimate attempt to remedy or prevent actual constitutional violations by the States or an illegitimate attempt to rewrite the constitutional provisions it purports to enforce. Indeed, “Congress’ §5 power is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions.” Ibid. (emphasis added). But the majority identifies nothing in the legislative record that shows Congress was responding to widespread violations of the due process rights of disabled persons.
Rather than limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due process rights on which it ultimately relies, the majority sets out on a wide-ranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled. Ante, at 12– 15. This digression recounts historical discrimination against the disabled through institutionalization laws, restrictions on marriage, voting, and public education, conditions in mental hospitals, and various other forms of unequal treatment in the administration of public programs and services. Some of this evidence would be relevant if the Court were considering the constitutionality of the statute as a whole; but the Court rejects that approach

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in favor of a narrower “as-applied” inquiry.1 We discounted much the same type of outdated, generalized evidence in Garrett as unsupportive of Title I’s ban on employment discrimination. 531 U. S., at 368–372; see also City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 530 (noting that the “legislative record lacks . . . modern instances of . . . religious bigotry”). The evidence here is likewise irrelevant to Title II’s purported enforcement of Due Process access-tothe-courts rights.
Even if it were proper to consider this broader category of evidence, much of it does not concern unconstitutional action by the States. The bulk of the Court’s evidence concerns discrimination by nonstate governments, rather than the States themselves.2 We have repeatedly held that such evidence is irrelevant to the inquiry whether Congress has validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity, a privilege enjoyed only by the sovereign States. Garrett, supra, at 368–369; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 640 (1999); Kimel, 528 U. S., at 89. Moreover, the majority today cites the same congressional task force evidence we rejected in Garrett. Ante, at 15 (citing Garrett, supra, at 379 (BREYER, J., dissenting), and 531 U. S., at 391–424 (App. C to opinion of BREYER, J., dis-
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1 For further discussion of the propriety of this approach, see infra, at 14–15.
2 E.g., ante, at 13 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985) (irrational discrimination by city zoning board)); ante, at 14, n. 12 (citing New York ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12 (NDNY 2000) (ADA lawsuit brought by State against a county)); ante, at 13–14, n. 11 (citing four cases concerning local school boards’ unconstitutional actions); ante, at 14, n. 13 (citing one case involving conditions in federal prison and another involving a county jail inmate); ante, at 15 (referring to “hundreds of examples of unequal treatment . . . by States and their political subdivisions” (emphasis added)).

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senting) (chronicling instances of “unequal treatment” in the “administration of public programs”)). As in Garrett, this “unexamined, anecdotal” evidence does not suffice. 531 U. S., at 370. Most of the brief anecdotes do not involve States at all, and those that do are not sufficiently detailed to determine whether the instances of “unequal treatment” were irrational, and thus unconstitutional under our decision in Cleburne. Garrett, supra, at 370– 371. Therefore, even outside the “access to the courts” context, the Court identifies few, if any, constitutional violations perpetrated by the States against disabled persons.3
With respect to the due process “access to the courts” rights on which the Court ultimately relies, Congress’ failure to identify a pattern of actual constitutional violations by the States is even more striking. Indeed, there is nothing in the legislative record or statutory findings to indicate that disabled persons were systematically denied the right to be present at criminal trials, denied the meaningful opportunity to be heard in civil cases, unconstitutionally excluded from jury service, or denied the right to attend criminal trials.4
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3 The majority obscures this fact by repeatedly referring to congressional findings of “discrimination” and “unequal treatment.” Of course, generic findings of discrimination and unequal treatment vel non are insufficient to show a pattern of constitutional violations where rational-basis scrutiny applies. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 370 (2001).
4 Certainly, respondents Lane and Jones were not denied these constitutional rights. The majority admits that Lane was able to attend the initial hearing of his criminal trial. Ante, at 1. Lane was arrested for failing to appear at his second hearing only after he refused assistance from officers dispatched by the court to help him to the courtroom. Ante, at 2. The court conducted a preliminary hearing in the first-floor library to accommodate Lane’s disability, App. to Pet. for Cert. 16, and later offered to move all further proceedings in the case to a handicapped-accessible courthouse in a nearby town. In light of these facts, it can hardly be said that the State violated Lane’s right to be

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The Court’s attempt to disguise the lack of congressional documentation with a few citations to judicial decisions cannot retroactively provide support for Title II, and in any event, fails on its own terms. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U. S., at 368 (“[W]e examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern” of constitutional violations); ibid. (“[t]he legislative record . . . fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern” of constitutional violations) (emphases added). Indeed, because this type of constitutional violation occurs in connection with litigation, it is particularly telling that the majority is able to identify only two reported cases finding that a disabled person’s federal constitutional rights were violated.5 See ante, at 14, n. 14 (citing Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F. 2d 1128, 1132– 1133 (CA5), opinion withdrawn as moot, 573 F. 2d 867 (1978); People v. Rivera, 125 Misc. 2d 516, 528, 480 N. Y. S. 2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984)).6
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present at his trial; indeed, it made affirmative attempts to secure that right. Respondent Jones, a disabled court reporter, does not seriously contend that she suffered a constitutional injury.
5 As two JUSTICES noted in Garrett, if the States were violating the Due Process rights of disabled . . . persons, “one would have expected to find in decisions of the courts . . . extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations.” 531 U. S., at 376 (KENNEDY, J., joined by O’CONNOR, J., concurring).
6 The balance of the Court’s citations refer to cases arising after enactment of the ADA or do not contain findings of federal constitutional violations. Ante, at 14–15, n. 14 (citing Layton v. Elder, 143 F. 3d 469 (CA8 1998) (post-ADA case finding ADA violations only); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (WD Ark. 1998) (same); Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (DC 1993) (same); State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 600 N. E. 2d 661 (1992) (remanded for hearing on constitutional issue); People v. Green, 561 N. Y. S. 2d 130 (County Ct. 1990) (finding violation of state constitution only); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (WD Pa. 1989) (statute upheld against facial constitutional challenge; Rehabilitation Act of 1973 violations only); Pomerantz v. Los Angeles County, 674 F. 2d 1288 (CA9 1982) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973 claim; challenged jury-service statute later

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Lacking any real evidence that Congress was responding to actual due process violations, the majority relies primarily on three items to justify its decision: (1) a 1983 U. S. Civil Rights Commission Report showing that 76% of “public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible” to persons with disabilities, ante, at 15–16; (2) testimony before a House subcommittee regarding the “physical inaccessibility” of local courthouses, ante, at 16; and (3) evidence submitted to Congress’ designated ADA task force that purportedly contains “numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and programs.” Ibid.
On closer examination, however, the Civil Rights Commission’s finding consists of a single conclusory sentence in its report, and it is far from clear that its finding even includes courthouses. The House subcommittee report, for its part, contains the testimony of two witnesses, neither of whom reported being denied the right to be present at constitutionally protected court proceedings.7 Indeed, the witnesses’ testimony, like the U. S. Civil Rights Commission Report, concerns only physical barriers to access, and does not address whether States either provided means to overcome those barriers or alternative locations for proceedings involving disabled persons. Cf., n. 4, supra (de-
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amended)). Accordingly, they offer no support whatsoever for the notion that Title II is a valid response to documented constitutional violations.
7 Oversight Hearing on H. R. 4468 before the House Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 40–41 (1988) (statement of Emeka Nwojke) (explaining that he encountered difficulties appearing in court due to physical characteristics of the courthouse and courtroom and the rudeness of court employees); id., at 48 (statement of Ellen Telker) (blind attorney “know[s] of at least one courthouse in New Haven where the elevators do not have tactile markings”).

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scribing alternative means of access offered to respondent Lane).
Based on the majority’s description, ante, at 16, the report of the ADA Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities sounds promising. But the report itself says nothing about any disabled person being denied access to court. The Court thus apparently relies solely on a general citation to the Government’s Lodging in Garrett, O. T. 2000, No. 99–1240 which, amidst thousands of pages, contains only a few anecdotal handwritten reports of physically inaccessible courthouses, again with no mention of whether States provided alternate means of access. This evidence, moreover, was submitted not to Congress, but only to the task force, which itself made no findings regarding disabled persons’ access to judicial proceedings. Cf. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 370–371 (rejecting anecdotal task force evidence for similar reasons). As we noted in Garrett, “had Congress truly understood this [task force] information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act’s legislative findings.” Id., at 371. Yet neither the legislative findings, nor even the Committee Reports, contain a single mention of the seemingly vital topic of access to the courts.8 Cf. ibid.; Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S.,
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8 The majority rather peculiarly points to Congress’ finding that “ ‘discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as access to public services’ ” as evidence that Congress sought to vindicate the Due Process rights of disabled persons. Ante, at 18 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §12101(a)(3) (emphasis added by the Court)). However, one does not usually refer to the right to attend a judicial proceeding as “access to [a] public servic[e].” Given the lack of any concern over courthouse accessibility issues in the legislative history, it is highly unlikely that this legislative finding obliquely refers to state violations of the due process rights of disabled persons to attend judicial proceedings.

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at 641 (observing that Senate Report on Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) “contains no evidence that unremedied patent infringement by States had become a problem of national import”). To the contrary, the Senate Report on the ADA observed that “[a]ll states currently mandate accessibility in newly constructed state-owned public buildings.” S. Rep. No. 101–116, p. 92 (1989).
Even if the anecdotal evidence and conclusory statements relied on by the majority could be properly considered, the mere existence of an architecturally “inaccessible” courthouse—i.e., one a disabled person cannot utilize without assistance—does not state a constitutional violation. A violation of due process occurs only when a person is actually denied the constitutional right to access a given judicial proceeding. We have never held that a person has a constitutional right to make his way into a courtroom without any external assistance. Indeed, the fact that the State may need to assist an individual to attend a hearing has no bearing on whether the individual successfully exercises his due process right to be present at the proceeding. Nor does an “inaccessible” courthouse violate the Equal Protection Clause, unless it is irrational for the State not to alter the courthouse to make it “accessible.” But financial considerations almost always furnish a rational basis for a State to decline to make those alterations. See Garrett, 531 U. S., at 372 (noting that it would be constitutional for an employer to “conserve scarce financial resources” by hiring employees who can use existing facilities rather than making the facilities accessible to disabled employees). Thus, evidence regarding inaccessible courthouses, because it is not evidence of constitutional violations, provides no basis to abrogate States’ sovereign immunity.
The near-total lack of actual constitutional violations in the congressional record is reminiscent of Garrett, wherein

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we found that the same type of minimal anecdotal evidence “f[e]ll far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional [state action] on which §5 legislation must be based.” Id., at 370. See also Kimel, 528 U. S., at 91 (“Congress’ failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary”); Florida Prepaid, supra, at 645 (“The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act did not respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic §5 legislation” (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 526)).
The barren record here should likewise be fatal to the majority’s holding that Title II is valid legislation enforcing due process rights that involve access to the courts. This conclusion gains even more support when Title II’s nonexistent record of constitutional violations is compared with legislation that we have sustained as valid §5 enforcement legislation. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 729– 732 (tracing the extensive legislative record documenting States’ gender discrimination in employment leave policies); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 312– 313 (1966) (same with respect to racial discrimination in voting rights). Accordingly, Title II can only be understood as a congressional attempt to “rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court,” rather than a legitimate effort to remedy or prevent state violations of that Amendment. Garrett, supra, at 374.9
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9 The Court correctly explains that “ ‘it [i]s easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations’ ” when it targets state action that triggers a higher level of constitutional scrutiny. Ante, at 18 (quoting Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 736 (2003)). However, this Court’s precedents attest that Congress may not dispense with the required showing altogether simply because it

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The third step of our congruence-and-proportionality inquiry removes any doubt as to whether Title II is valid §5 legislation. At this stage, we ask whether the rights and remedies created by Title II are congruent and proportional to the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the record of constitutional violations adduced by Congress. Hibbs, supra, at 737–739; Garrett, supra, at 372–373.
Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U. S. C. §12132. A disabled person is considered “qualified” if he “meets the essential eligibility requirements” for the receipt of the entity’s services or participation in the entity’s programs, “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services.” §12131(2) (emphasis added). The ADA’s findings make clear that Congress believed it was attacking “discrimination” in all areas of public services, as well as the “discriminatory effect” of “architectural, transportation, and communication barriers.” §§12101(a)(3), (a)(5). In sum, Title II requires, on
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purports to enforce due process rights. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 645–646 (1999) (invalidating Patent Remedy Act, which purported to enforce the Due Process Clause, because Congress failed to identify a record of constitutional violations); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 530– 531 (1997) (same with respect to Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)). As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, that is precisely what the Court has sanctioned here. Because the record is utterly devoid of proof that Congress was responding to state violations of due process access-to-the-courts rights, this case is controlled by Florida Prepaid and City of Boerne, rather than Hibbs.

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pain of money damages, special accommodations for disabled persons in virtually every interaction they have with the State.
“Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability,” the broad terms of Title II “d[o] nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations.” Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at 646. By requiring special accommodation and the elimination of programs that have a disparate impact on the disabled, Title II prohibits far more state conduct than does the equal protection ban on irrational discrimination. We invalidated Title I’s similar requirements in Garrett, observing that “[i]f special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.” 531 U. S., at 368; id., at 372–373 (contrasting Title I’s reasonable accommodation and disparate impact provisions with the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements). Title II fails for the same reason. Like Title I, Title II may be laudable public policy, but it cannot be seriously disputed that it is also an attempt to legislatively “redefine the States’ legal obligations” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel, 528 U. S., at 88.
The majority, however, claims that Title II also vindicates fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause—in addition to access to the courts—that are subject to heightened Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. Ante, at 11 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 336– 337 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to move to a new jurisdiction); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and procreation)). But Title II is not tailored to provide prophylactic protection of these rights; instead, it applies to any service, program, or activity provided by any entity. Its provisions affect transportation, health, education, and recreation programs, among many others, all of

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which are accorded only rational-basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. A requirement of accommodation for the disabled at a state-owned amusement park or sports stadium, for example, bears no permissible prophylactic relationship to enabling disabled persons to exercise their fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, as with Title I in Garrett, the Patent Remedy Act in Florida Prepaid, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in Kimel, and the RFRA in City of Boerne, all of which we invalidated as attempts to substantively redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unlikely “that many of the [state actions] affected by [Title II] ha[ve] any likelihood of being unconstitutional.” City of Boerne, supra, at 532. Viewed as a whole, then, there is little doubt that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity.10
The majority concludes that Title II’s massive overbreadth can be cured by considering the statute only “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services.” Ante, at 20 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 26 (1960)). I have grave doubts about importing an “as applied” approach into the §5 context. While the majority is of course correct that this Court nor-

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10 Title II’s all-encompassing approach to regulating public services contrasts starkly with the more closely tailored laws we have upheld as legitimate prophylactic §5 legislation. In Hibbs, for example, the FMLA was “narrowly targeted” to remedy widespread gender discrimination in the availability of family leave. 538 U. S., at 738–739 (distinguishing City of Boerne, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000), and Garrett on this ground). Similarly, in cases involving enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, we upheld “limited remedial scheme[s]” that were narrowly tailored to address massive evidence of discrimination in voting. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 373 (discussing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966)). Unlike these statutes, Title II’s “indiscriminate scope . . . is particularly incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy.” Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at 647.

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mally only considers the application of a statute to a particular case, the proper inquiry under City of Boerne and its progeny is somewhat different. In applying the congruenceand-proportionality test, we ask whether Congress has attempted to statutorily redefine the constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This question can only be answered by measuring the breadth of a statute’s coverage against the scope of the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the record of violations it purports to remedy.
In conducting its as-applied analysis, however, the majority posits a hypothetical statute, never enacted by Congress, that applies only to courthouses. The effect is to rig the congruence-and-proportionality test by artificially constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a recognized constitutional right. But Title II is not susceptible of being carved up in this manner; it applies indiscriminately to all “services,” “programs,” or “activities” of any “public entity.” Thus, the majority’s approach is not really an assessment of whether Title II is “appropriate legislation” at all, U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §5 (emphasis added), but a test of whether the Court can conceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic legislation.
Our §5 precedents do not support this as-applied approach. In each case, we measured the full breadth of the statute or relevant provision that Congress enacted against the scope of the constitutional right it purported to enforce. If we had arbitrarily constricted the scope of the statutes to match the scope of a core constitutional right, those cases might have come out differently. In Garrett, for example, Title I might have been upheld “as applied” to irrational employment discrimination; or in Florida Prepaid, the Patent Remedy Act might have been upheld “as applied” to intentional, uncompensated patent infringements. It is thus not surprising that the only authority

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cited by the majority is Raines, supra, a case decided long before we enunciated the congruence-and-proportionality test.11
I fear that the Court’s adoption of an as-applied approach eliminates any incentive for Congress to craft §5 legislation for the purpose of remedying or deterring actual constitutional violations. Congress can now simply rely on the courts to sort out which hypothetical applications of an undifferentiated statute, such as Title II, may be enforced against the States. All the while, States will be subjected to substantial litigation in a piecemeal attempt to vindicate their Eleventh Amendment rights. The majority’s as-applied approach simply cannot be squared with either our recent precedent or the proper role of the Judiciary.
Even in the limited courthouse-access context, Title II does not properly abrogate state sovereign immunity. As demonstrated in depth above, Congress utterly failed to identify any evidence that disabled persons were denied constitutionally protected access to judicial proceedings. Without this predicate showing, Title II, even if we were to hypothesize that it applies only to courthouses, cannot be

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11 Raines is inapposite in any event. The Court there considered the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1957—a statute designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment—whose narrowly tailored substantive provisions could “unquestionably” be applied to state actors (like the respondents therein). 362 U. S., at 25, 26. The only question presented was whether the statute was facially invalid because it might be read to constrain nonstate actors as well. Id., at 20. The Court upheld the statute as applied to respondents and declined to entertain the facial challenge. Id., at 24–26. The situation in this case is much different: The very question presented is whether Title II’s indiscriminate substantive provisions can constitutionally be applied to the petitioner State. Raines thus provides no support for avoiding this question by conjuring up an imaginary statute with substantive provisions that might pass the congruence-and-proportionality test.

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viewed as a congruent and proportional response to state constitutional violations. Garrett, 531 U. S., at 368 (“Congress’ §5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions”).
Moreover, even in the courthouse-access context, Title II requires substantially more than the Due Process Clause. Title II subjects States to private lawsuits if, inter alia, they fail to make “reasonable modifications” to facilities, such as removing “architectural . . . barriers.” 42 U. S., C. §§12131(2), 12132. Yet the statute is not limited to occasions when the failure to modify results, or will likely result, in an actual due process violation—i.e., the inability of a disabled person to participate in a judicial proceeding. Indeed, liability is triggered if an inaccessible building results in a disabled person being “subjected to discrimination”—a term that presumably encompasses any sort of inconvenience in accessing the facility, for whatever purpose. §12132.
The majority’s reliance on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), and other cases in which we held that due process requires the State to waive filing fees for indigent litigants, is unavailing. While these cases support the principle that the State must remove financial requirements that in fact prevent an individual from exercising his constitutional rights, they certainly do not support a statute that subjects a State to liability for failing to make a vast array of special accommodations, without regard for whether the failure to accommodate results in a constitutional wrong.
In this respect, Title II is analogous to the Patent Remedy Act at issue in Florida Prepaid. That statute subjected States to monetary liability for any act of patent infringement. 527 U. S., at 646–647. Thus, “Congress did nothing to limit” the Act’s coverage “to cases involving arguable [Due Process] violations,” such as when the infringement was nonnegligent or uncompensated. Ibid.

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Similarly here, Congress has authorized private damages suits against a State for merely maintaining a courthouse that is not readily accessible to the disabled, without regard to whether a disabled person’s due process rights are ever violated. Accordingly, even as applied to the “access to the courts” context, Title II’s “indiscriminate scope offends [the congruence-and-proportionality] principle,” particularly in light of the lack of record evidence showing that inaccessible courthouses cause actual Due Process violations. Id., at 647.12
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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12 The majority’s invocation of Hibbs to justify Title II’s overbreadth is unpersuasive. See ante, at 22, n. 24. The Hibbs Court concluded that “in light of the evidence before Congress” the FMLA’s 12-week familyleave provision was necessary to “achiev[e] Congress’ remedial object.” 538 U. S, at 748. The Court found that the legislative record included not only evidence of state constitutional violations, but evidence that a provision merely enforcing the Equal Protection Clause would actually perpetuate the gender stereotypes Congress sought to eradicate because employers could simply eliminate family leave entirely. Ibid. Without comparable evidence of constitutional violations and the necessity of prophylactic measures, the Court has no basis on which to uphold Title II’s special-accommodation requirements.

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1

SCALIA, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 02–1667
_________________
TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2004]
JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Congress “shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions” of that Amendment—including, of course, the Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), we decided that Congress could, under this provision, forbid English literacy tests for Puerto Rican voters in New York State who met certain educational criteria. Though those tests were not themselves in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we held that §5 authorizes prophylactic legislation—that is, “legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct,” Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 728 (2003), when Congress determines such proscription is desirable “ ‘to make the amendments fully effective,’ ” Morgan, supra, at 648 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880)). We said that “the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment” is the flexible “necessary and proper” standard of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 342, 421 (1819). Morgan, 384 U. S., at 651. We described §5 as “a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ibid.

2

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SCALIA, J., dissenting
The Morgan opinion followed close upon our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), which had upheld prophylactic application of the similarly worded “enforce” provision of the Fifteenth Amendment (§2) to challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Fifteenth, is not limited to denial of the franchise and not limited to the denial of other rights on the basis of race. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997), we confronted Congress’s inevitable expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Morgan, beyond the field of racial discrimination.1 There Congress had sought, in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq., to impose upon the States an interpretation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause that this Court had explicitly rejected. To avoid placing in congressional hands effective power to rewrite the Bill of Rights through the medium of §5, we formulated the “congruence and proportionality” test for determining what legislation is “appropriate.” When Congress enacts prophylactic legislation, we said, there must be “proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.” 521 U. S., at 533.
I joined the Court’s opinion in Boerne with some misgiving. I have generally rejected tests based on such malleable standards as “proportionality,” because they have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges’ policy preferences. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U. S. 11, 31–32 (2003) (SCALIA, J., concur-
——————
1 Congress had previously attempted such an extension in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 318, which sought to lower the voting age in state elections from 21 to 18. This extension was rejected, but in three separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the Court. See infra, at 10.

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ring in judgment) (declining to apply a “proportionality” test to the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 954–956 (2000) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (declining to apply the “undue burden” standard of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992)); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 599 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (declining to apply a “reasonableness” test to punitive damages under the Due Process Clause). Even so, I signed on to the “congruence and proportionality” test in Boerne, and adhered to it in later cases: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627 (1999), where we held that the provisions of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U. S. C. §§271(h), 296(a), were “‘so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,’” 527 U. S., at 646 (quoting Boerne, supra, at 532); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000), where we held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), imposed on state and local governments requirements “disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act,” 528 U. S., at 83; United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000), where we held that a provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U. S. C. §13981, lacked congruence and proportionality because it was “not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe,” 529 U. S., at 626; and Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356 (2001), where we said that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 330, 42 U. S. C. §§12111–12117, raised “the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne,” 531 U. S., at 372.

4

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SCALIA, J., dissenting
But these cases were soon followed by Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, in which the Court held that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 9, 29 U. S. C. §2612 et seq., which required States to provide their employees up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave (for various purposes) annually, was “congruent and proportional to its remedial object [of preventing sex discrimination], and can be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” 538 U. S., at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted). I joined JUSTICE KENNEDY’s dissent, which established (conclusively, I thought) that Congress had identified no unconstitutional state action to which the statute could conceivably be a proportional response. And now we have today’s decision, holding that Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the remediation of constitutional violations, in the face of what seems to me a compelling demonstration of the opposite by THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent.
I yield to the lessons of experience. The “congruence and proportionality” standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policydriven decisionmaking. Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress’s taskmaster. Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) must regularly check Congress’s homework to make sure that it has identified sufficient constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent and proportional. As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal branch of Government. And when conflict is unavoidable, we should not come to do battle with the United States Congress armed only with a test (“congruence and proportionality”) that has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be shown to have been met or failed. As I wrote for the Court in an earlier case, “low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible

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in the heat of interbranch conflict.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 239 (1995).
I would replace “congruence and proportionality” with another test—one that provides a clear, enforceable limitation supported by the text of §5. Section 5 grants Congress the power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14 (emphasis added). Morgan notwithstanding, one does not, within any normal meaning of the term, “enforce” a prohibition by issuing a still broader prohibition directed to the same end. One does not, for example, “enforce” a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit by imposing a 45-mile-per-hour speed limit—even though that is indeed directed to the same end of automotive safety and will undoubtedly result in many fewer violations of the 55-mile-per-hour limit. And one does not “enforce” the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, see ante, at 19, by requiring that disabled persons be provided access to all of the “services, programs, or activities” furnished or conducted by the State, 42 U. S. C. §12132. That is simply not what the power to enforce means—or ever meant. The 1860 edition of Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language, current when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, defined “enforce” as: “To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws.” Id., at 396. See also J. Worcester, Dictionary of the English Language 484 (1860) (“To put in force; to cause to be applied or executed; as, ‘To enforce a law’ ”). Nothing in §5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or “remedy” conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Socalled “prophylactic legislation” is reinforcement rather than enforcement.
Morgan asserted that this commonsense interpretation “would confine the legislative power . . . to the insignifi-

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cant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the ‘majestic generalities’ of §1 of the Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 648–649. That is not so. One must remember “that in 1866 the lower federal courts had no general jurisdiction of cases alleging a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution.” R. Berger, Government By Judiciary 147 (2d ed. 1997). If, just after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, a State had enacted a law imposing racially discriminatory literacy tests (different questions for different races) a citizen prejudiced by such a test would have had no means of asserting his constitutional right to be free of it. Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights. One of the first pieces of legislation passed under Congress’s §5 power was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, entitled “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.” Section 1 of that Act, later codified as Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, authorized a cause of action against “any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.” 17 Stat. 13. Section 5 would also authorize measures that do not restrict the States’ substantive scope of action but impose requirements directly related to the facilitation of “enforcement”—for example, reporting requirements that would enable violations of the Four-

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SCALIA, J., dissenting
teenth Amendment to be identified.2 But what §5 does not authorize is so-called “prophylactic” measures, prohibiting primary conduct that is itself not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The major impediment to the approach I have suggested is stare decisis. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since Morgan, and many important and well-accepted measures, such as the Voting Rights Act, assume the validity of Morgan and South Carolina. As Prof. Archibald Cox put it in his Supreme Court Foreword: “The etymological meaning of section 5 may favor the narrower reading. Literally, ‘to enforce’ means to compel performance of the obligations imposed; but the linguistic argument lost much of its force once the South Carolina and Morgan cases decided that the power to enforce embraces any measure appropriate to effectuating the performance of the state’s constitutional duty.” Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 110–111 (1966).
However, South Carolina and Morgan, all of our later cases except Hibbs that give an expansive meaning to “enforce” in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all of our earlier cases that even suggest such an expansive meaning in dicta, involved congressional measures that were directed exclusively against, or were used in the particular case to remedy, racial discrimination. See
——————
2 Professor Tribe’s treatise gives some examples of such measures that facilitate enforcement in the context of the Fifteenth Amendment:
“The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctions against interference with the right to vote on racial grounds. The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86, permitted joinder of states as parties defendant, gave the Attorney General access to local voting records, and authorized courts to register voters in areas of systemic discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, expedited the hearing of voting cases before three-judge courts . . . .” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 931, n. 5 (3d ed. 2000).

8

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Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970) (see discussion infra); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880) (dictum in a case involving a statute that imposed criminal penalties for officials’ racial discrimination in jury selection); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 311–312 (1880) (dictum in a case involving a statute that permitted removal to federal court of a black man’s claim that his jury had been selected in a racially discriminatory manner); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318 (1880) (dictum in a racial discrimination case involving the same statute). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173–178 (1980) (upholding as valid legislation under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment the most sweeping provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 439–441 (1968) (upholding a law, 42 U. S. C. §1982, banning public or private racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property as appropriate legislation under §2 of the Thirteenth Amendment).
Giving §5 more expansive scope with regard to measures directed against racial discrimination by the States accords to practices that are distinctively violative of the principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment a priority of attention that this Court envisioned from the beginning, and that has repeatedly been reflected in our opinions. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1873), the Court’s first confrontation with the Fourteenth Amendment, we said the following with respect to the Equal Protection Clause:
“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”

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Racial discrimination was the practice at issue in the early cases (cited in Morgan) that gave such an expansive description of the effects of §5. See 384 U. S., at 648 (citing Ex parte Virginia); 384 U. S., at 651 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, and Virginia v. Rives).3 In those early days, bear in mind, the guarantee of equal protection had not been extended beyond race to sex, age, and the many other categories it now covers. Also still to be developed were the incorporation doctrine (which holds that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates and applies against the States the Bill of Rights, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147–148 (1968)) and the doctrine of so-called “substantive due process” (which holds that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects unenumerated liberties, see generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992)). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the many guarantees that it
——————
3 A later case cited in Morgan, James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 558–563 (1924), applied the more flexible standard of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), to the Eighteenth Amendment, which, in §1, forbade the “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States . . . for beverage purposes” and provided, in §2, that “Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Congress had provided, in the Supplemental Prohibition Act of 1921, §2, 42 Stat. 222, that “only spirituous and vinous liquor may be prescribed for medicinal purposes.” That was challenged as unconstitutional because it went beyond the regulation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and hence beyond “enforcement.” In an opinion citing none of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment cases discussed in text, the Court held that the McCulloch v. Maryland test applied. Unlike what is at issue here, that case did not involve a power to control the States in respects not otherwise permitted by the Constitution. The only consequence of the Federal Government’s going beyond “enforcement” narrowly defined was its arguable incursion upon powers left to the States—which is essentially the same issue that McCulloch addressed.

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now provides. In such a seemingly limited context, it did not appear to be a massive expansion of congressional power to interpret §5 broadly. Broad interpretation was particularly appropriate with regard to racial discrimination, since that was the principal evil against which the Equal Protection Clause was directed, and the principal constitutional prohibition that some of the States stubbornly ignored. The former is still true, and the latter remained true at least as late as Morgan.
When congressional regulation has not been targeted at racial discrimination, we have given narrower scope to §5. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), the Court upheld, under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, that provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314, which barred literacy tests and similar votereligibility requirements—classic tools of the racial discrimination in voting that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids; but found to be beyond the §5 power of the Fourteenth Amendment the provision that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in state elections. See 400 U. S., at 124– 130 (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 153–154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 293–296 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A third provision, which forbade States from disqualifying voters by reason of residency requirements, was also upheld—but only a minority of the Justices believed that §5 was adequate authority. Justice Black’s opinion in that case described exactly the line I am drawing here, suggesting that Congress’s enforcement power is broadest when directed “to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race.” Id., at 130. And of course the results reached in Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett are consistent with the narrower compass afforded congressional regulation that does not protect against or prevent racial discrimination.

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SCALIA, J., dissenting
Thus, principally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States. I would not, however, abandon the requirement that Congress may impose prophylactic §5 legislation only upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations. See Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 741–743 (SCALIA, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U. S., at 626–627; Morgan, 384 U. S., at 666–667, 669, 670–671 (Harlan, J., dissenting).4 I would also adhere to the requirement that the prophylactic remedy predicated upon such state violations must be directed against the States or state actors rather than the public at large. See Morrison, supra, at 625–626. And I would not, of course, permit any congressional measures that violate other provisions of the Constitution. When those requirements have been met, however, I shall leave it to Congress, under constraints no tighter than those of the Necessary and Proper Clause, to decide what measures are appropriate under §5 to prevent or remedy racial discrimination by the States.

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4 Dicta in one of our earlier cases seemed to suggest that even nonprophylactic provisions could not be adopted under §5 except in response to a State’s constitutional violations:
“When the State has been guilty of no violation of [the Fourteenth Amendment’s] provisions; when it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recognize and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon Congress.” United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 639 (1883).
I do not see the textual basis for this interpretation.

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SCALIA, J., dissenting
I shall also not subject to “congruence and proportionality” analysis congressional action under §5 that is not directed to racial discrimination. Rather, I shall give full effect to that action when it consists of “enforcement” of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, within the broad but not unlimited meaning of that term I have described above. When it goes beyond enforcement to prophylaxis, however, I shall consider it ultra vires. The present legislation is plainly of the latter sort.
***
Requiring access for disabled persons to all public buildings cannot remotely be considered a means of “enforcing” the Fourteenth Amendment. The considerations of long accepted practice and of policy that sanctioned such distortion of language where state racial discrimination is at issue do not apply in this field of social policy far removed from the principal object of the Civil War Amendments. “The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth ‘logical’ extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of gestative propensity calls for the ‘line drawing’ familiar in the judicial, as in the legislative process: ‘thus far but not beyond.’ ” United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U. S. 123, 127 (1973) (Burger, C. J., for the Court) (footnote omitted). It is past time to draw a line limiting the uncontrolled spread of a wellintentioned textual distortion. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court.

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1

THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 02–1667
_________________
TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2004]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent. I agree that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 cannot be a congruent and proportional remedy to the States’ alleged practice of denying disabled persons access to the courts. Not only did Congress fail to identify any evidence of such a practice when it enacted the ADA, ante, at 6, 10, Title II regulates far more than the provision of access to the courts, ante, at 15–16. Because I joined the dissent in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721 (2003), and continue to believe that Hibbs was wrongly decided, I write separately only to disavow any reliance on Hibbs in reaching this conclusion.

 
 No. 02-1667
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v.
GEORGE LANE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO THE BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
THEODORE B. OLSON Solicitor General
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA Assistant Attorney General
PAUL D. CLEMENT Deputy Solicitor General
PATRICIA A. MILLETT Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER SARAH E. HARRINGTON KEVIN RUSSELL
Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 (202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Appendix A (Cases Evidencing Unconstitutional Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities) ............ 1a
Appendix B (Disabilities Act Enforcement Reports) ......................................................................... 1b
Appendix C (Findings of Investigations Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act) ................................................................................. 1c
Appendix D (Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions) .................................................. 1d
(I)

APPENDIX A
Cases Evidencing Unconstitutional Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities:
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (Louisiana statute allowing continued confinement of the mentally ill, who were acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity, resulted in unconstitutional confinement, in violation of the Due Process Clause, where the hospital review committee had reported no evidence of mental illness and recommended conditional discharge); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (unconstitutional zoning discrimination); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 322 (1982) (institutionalized persons have due process “right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care,” “safe conditions,” and freedom from unreasonable physical restraint, as well as to “such training as may be reasonable in light of [the resident’s] liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (unconstitutional confinement); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 575-576 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming a jury verdict that included evidence of a police officer giving a sobriety test and Miranda warnings to a deaf plaintiff who could not understand him, and then arresting the plaintiff), cert. denied, No. 02-1223, 2003 WL 545392 (Oct. 6, 2003); Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corrs., 301 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002) (disabled inmate stated Eighth Amendment claims for denial of accommodations needed to protect his health and safety due to his degenerative nerve disease), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 332 F.3d 29 (2003) (en banc); MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2002) (“blanket prohibition of all metha-
(1)

2a
done clinics from the entire city is discriminatory on its face”); Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct. of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (deaf parent denied communication assistance in child custody proceeding), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to conduct parole and parole revocation proceedings in a manner that disabled inmates can understand and in which they can participate), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (seventh-grader suffering from clinical depression prohibited from singing in school choir); Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999) (deaf inmate denied access to sex offender program required as precondition for parole), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1120 (2000); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025-1026 (5th Cir. 1998) (failure for several months to provide means for amputee inmate to bathe led to infection); Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 742 (8th Cir. 2001) (paraplegic arrested for trespass improperly restrained in non-wheelchair-accessible police van, causing his urine bag to burst, “soaking him with his own urine” and resulting in serious medical problems), judgment rev’d in part on grounds not relevant, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 470-472 (8th Cir. 1998) (mobility-impaired veterans’ exclusion from a session of county quorum court and from courtroom due to their inability to access the second floor of the county courthouse); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1997) (building permit denied for drug and alcohol treatment center “based on stereotypes and unsupported fears”); Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 558, 560-561 (7th Cir. 1996) (quadriplegic inmate “was unable to participate in substance abuse, education, church, work, or transition pro-

3a
grams available to members of the general inmate population” due to “intentional discrimination”); Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (Eighth Amendment violated when inmate with serious vision problem denied glasses and treatment); Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993) (“squalor in which [prisoner] was forced to live as a result of being denied a wheelchair” violated the Eighth Amendment); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.) (unconstitutional confinement when appropriate community placement available), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 (1990); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1243-1244 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of paraplegic inmates; evidence showed that, “[d]espite his medical need for cleanliness, [an inmate] was not bathed for several days,” “was forced to remain for long periods of time in his own urine due to inadequate catheter supplies and was given inadequate aid for his bowel training needs despite his repeated requests for help”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (certified teacher barred from teaching after diagnosis of AIDS); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987) (Powell, J.) (failure to provide paraplegic inmate with an accessible toilet is cruel and unusual punishment); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603, 605 (6th Cir. 1986) (prison guard repeatedly assaulted paraplegic inmates with a knife, forced them to sit in their own feces, and taunted them with remarks like “crippled bastard” and “[you] should be dead”); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.) (unconstitutional confinement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1985) (failure to provide medications for epilepsy, which caused prisoner’s death,

4a
violated Eighth Amendment); Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984) (State subjected individuals awaiting civil commitment proceedings to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in county jails); Pomerantz v. Los Angeles County, 674 F.2d 1288, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (“undisputed facts show that the Los Angeles County Jury Commissioner, and other employees directly involved in the jury selection process for the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles had, prior to January 1, 1978, excluded all blind persons from jury service solely because they were blind”); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (doctor with multiple sclerosis unconstitutionally denied residency out of concern about patients’ reactions); Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir.) (deaf habeas petitioner’s “rights were reduced below the constitutional minimum” because he could not understand his trial), withdrawn due to death of petitioner, 573 F.2d 867 (1978); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding unconstitutional an irrebuttable presumption that blind teacher cannot instruct sighted students); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (unconstitutional conditions of confinement for the mentally ill); Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp. 2d 772, 791-792 (D. Md. 2001) (denying summary judgment for defendants on claim that town officials violated Equal Protection Clause through zoning decisions that excluded a home for individuals with mental retardation), after judgment, 223 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704-705 (2002) (jury found constitutional violation, and motion for new trial was denied); McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1279-1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (police officer had “not articulated any specific facts upon which suspicion reasonably could be founded” other than “the com-

5a
munication gap between a deaf man and herself ”), aff ’d in part & rev’d in part, No. 01-15756, 2003 WL 21067092 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2003) (Table); M.H. v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., 169 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24-25 (D. Conn. 2001) (possible substantive due process violation where school employees spat water in disabled student’s face and restrained him so forcibly as to result in bruising); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) (unconstitutional restriction on voting by those with mental disabilities); Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (D. Md. 2001) (unlawful rejection of permit for drug treatment facility based on “community prejudices”), aff ’d, No. 01-1754, 2002 WL 2012545 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002); Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (granting summary judgment for mentally ill plaintiff on claim that he was denied due process by State’s denial of an appropriate institutional placement without notice or hearing); New York v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp. 2d 19 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (inaccessible polling places); New York v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (inaccessible polling places); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan. 1999) (amputee forced to crawl around jail, resulting in injury and infection, in violation of Eighth Amendment); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (paraplegic litigant had to be carried up stairs to court room for all-day hearing at which he could not leave to get food or use the restroom to empty catheter, resulting in infection; eventually had to crawl down steps to get out after everyone left the courthouse without him); Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff ’s Dep’t, 991 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-1062 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (possible constitutional violation where deaf arrestee was denied the opportunity to post bond and make a telephone call because

6a
the police department failed to provide, despite his requests, alternatives to the conventional telephone, and that denial resulted in much longer detention than other, similarly situated arrestees); Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (Fourth Amendment prohibits use of force against an individual, whom officers know to be deaf, for not complying with officers’ spoken commands); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 739 (D.V.I. 1997) (“The abominable treatment of the mentally ill inmates shows overwhelmingly that defendants subject inmates to dehumanizing conditions punishable under the Eighth Amendment.”); Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (amputee hospitalized after fall in inaccessible jail shower); Bullock v. Gomez, 929 F. Supp. 1299, 1301, 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (possible constitutional violation where California Department of Corrections’ family visiting program precluded HIV-positive inmates from having the same overnight visits with spouses afforded other inmates, even where spouse was also HIV positive and incapable of bearing children); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding, inter alia, that state prison officials’ failure to provide interpreters or other assistive services to deaf and hearing impaired inmates during medical treatment violated the Eighth Amendment, as at least two such inmates experienced improper and possibly harmful treatment through provision of medical treatment in absence of qualified interpreters); Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 872 F. Supp. 682, 688 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that the Board of Police Commissioners’ licensing scheme violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it irrebuttably presumes that an individual with only one hand is unqualified for the position of armed security guard); Harrelson v.

7a
Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (paraplegic prisoner denied use of a wheelchair and forced to crawl around his cell); Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 306, 308 (D.N.H. 1994) (possible constitutional violation where children with disabilities in foster care alleged that the State failed “to take the required measures to maintain the integrity of plaintiffs’ families where possible, to reunite removed children with their families as soon as possible, or to place them in secure, permanent homes within an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner,” as well as failed “to provide services necessary to protect children in the class from harm”); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993) (statute prohibiting and voiding marriages between individuals with AIDS); Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 480-482 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (possible constitutional violation where semi-quadriplegic inmate confined to a wheelchair was confined to secluded padded cell for months, denied sufficient water to maintain kidney functioning or to permit sanitary handling of colostomy and urostomy bag, forcing him to “eat many meals with the human waste still on his hands,” and was unable to sleep in bed because his wheelchair could not fit through the doorway, all resulting in adverse medical conditions); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569, 1582-1583 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that prison’s failure to provide accessible bathrooms, showers, and cells to mobility-impaired inmates, as well as a consistent pattern of delays in prisoner receipt of hearing aids, violated the Eighth Amendment); Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993) (blind individuals categorically excluded from jury service); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J. 1991) (predominant motivation underlying city’s efforts to exclude group home

8a
for the handicapped “was discriminatory animus”), aff ’d, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992) (Table); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (Constitution violated where inmate with HIV was housed in the part of a prison reserved for inmates who are mentally disturbed, suicidal, or a danger to themselves, and was denied access to prison library and religious services); Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744, 744-751 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (courthouse and government buildings broadly inaccessible to individuals with mobility impairments); Bonner v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrs., 714 F. Supp. 420 (D. Az. 1989) (deaf, mute, and vision-impaired inmate denied communication assistance, including during disciplinary proceedings, counseling sessions, and medical treatment); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399, 405 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (decision to exclude deaf individual from jury was “unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”); Doe v. Dolton Elem. Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (elementary student with AIDS excluded from attending regular classes or extracurricular activities); Robertson v. Granite City Comm. Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (seven-year old student with AIDS confined to a modular classroom where he was the only student); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (kindergarten student with AIDS excluded from class and forced to take home tutoring); Thompson v. City of Portland, 620 F. Supp. 482, 485-487 (D. Me. 1985) (police violated the constitutional rights of a blind diabetic who was in insulin shock by arresting him, transporting him on floor of police cruiser, jailing him, and ignoring his explanation that he was in insulin shock, despite fact that he wore a Medic-Alert necklace and carried a white cane); Ass’n for

9a
Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 491-492 (D.N.D. 1982) (finding violations of mentally retarded residents’ constitutional rights to privacy, private property, and free association, as (1) many of the mentally retarded residents “are left fully naked in front of each other and assistants and such residents are not provided places where they can be in private” and “are denied the opportunity to decide for themselves how to dress”; (2) the State did not “adequately provide for an accounting of [each] resident’s personal property and for a safe place of storage”; and (3) the State did not “provide residents who are capable of communicating, reasonable opportunities to communicate with others both inside and outside the institution where they reside”), aff ’d, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 214 (D.N.H. 1981) (“blanket discrimination against the handicapped * * * is unfortunately firmly rooted in the history of our country”); New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (mentally retarded students excluded from public school system); Hairston v. Drosnick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (school refused to admit child with spina bifida without the daily presence of her mother, even though student was of normal mental competence and capable of performing easily in a classroom situation); Smith v. Fletcher, 393 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (government assigned paraplegic, who had a Master’s degree in physiology, to menial clerical tasks based on “arbitrary and unfounded decision as to her physical capabilities”), aff ’d as modified, 559 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1977); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (mentally retarded students excluded from public school system); Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp.

10a
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (mentally retarded students excluded from public school system); Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876, 880, 885 (Conn. 1993) (holding that the commissioner’s exercise of his “statutory authority to condition a motor vehicle operator’s license on the licensee’s reporting his or her medical status” violated the state constitution’s equal protection provision because the record “contained no evidence that th[e] reporting requirement was narrowly tailored either to the plaintiff ’s condition at the time of its issuance or to his probable future condition for the designated time period”); State v. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d 661, 672 (Ohio 1992) (under the Confrontation Clause, “[a] defendant who cannot hear is analogous to a defendant who cannot understand English, and a severely hearing-impaired defendant cannot be tried without adopting reasonable measures to accommodate his or her disability”); Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981) (holding that, while a parent’s physical condition is a valid consideration in the “best interests” approach to determining the issue of a child’s custody, the trial court’s overemphasis on the mother’s epilepsy rendered the custody award to the father an abuse of discretion); State v. Staples, 437 A.2d 266, 268 (N.H. 1981) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to secure assistance for hearing-impaired defendant whose disability made him “unable to assist effectively in the preparation of his defense”); In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979) (lower court “stereotype[d] William as a person deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply because he is physically handicapped”); Connecticut Inst. for the Blind v. Connecticut Comm’n on Human Rights & Opps., 405 A.2d 618, 621 (Conn. 1978) (blanket exclusion from state jobs of persons with visual impairments); State v. Board of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 153

11a
(Wis. 1919) (excluding a boy with cerebral palsy from public school because he “produces a depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children”); State v. Barber, 617 So. 2d 974, 976 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he Constitution requires that a defendant sufficiently understand the proceedings against him to be able to assist in his own defense. Clearly, a defendant who has a severe hearing impairment, without an interpreter, cannot understand the testimony of witnesses against him so as to be able to assist in his own defense.”); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (County Ct. 1990) (holding that prosecutor’s peremptorily striking a juror solely because she was hearing impaired, and not because of any doubt of the juror’s ability to communicate, violated the juror’s right to equal protection); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 965-966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that father’s visitation rights were improperly terminated because of evidence that he was infected with the AIDS virus); Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687, 690-691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to request an interpreter, where the hearing-impaired defendant was “probably unable to understand what was being said at trial”); District 27 Comm. Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (two school boards sought to prevent attendance of any student with AIDS in any school in the city, unless all of the students at that school had AIDS); Bednarski v. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a mother’s deafness was inappropriately weighed against her in a custody dispute over her two minor children); People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because the deaf defendant had no interpreter and did not understand his trial); In re

12a
Marriage of Paula R., 102 Cal. App. 3d 981, 988-989 (Ct. App. 1980) (reversing the trial court’s award of permanent custody of child to father because mother was confined to a wheelchair, as the trial court did not use the proper standard in determining who should receive custody: “whether the handicapped parent’s condition will in fact have a substantial and lasting adverse effect on the best interests of the child”); Bevan v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 345 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (statute allowing forced retirement of teacher who became blind), modified, 355 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1974); In re Adoption of Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 222, 239 (1967) (trial court “stated, in effect, he will systematically strike any and all deaf-mute petitioners from any list of prospective adopting parents”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 119 A.2d 620, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (holding that the fact that a father suing for custody of his son suffers from epilepsy is a factor that should be considered in determining whether to award custody).

APPENDIX B
The Justice Department publishes quarterly status reports, which include information from a sampling of the Department’s Disabilities Act enforcement efforts under 42 U.S.C. 12133. The status reports can be found at http:// www.ada.gov/enforce. htm. The 34 reports published to date list 110 matters concerning courthouse accessibility or effective access to judicial proceedings. The following is a list of those matters. One case (against the State of Massachusetts alleging problems with physical accessibility) resulted in a lawsuit (that remains pending), which was reported in the January 2003 status report. The Table includes the jurisdiction in which the courthouses are located, the type of problem reported by persons with disabilities, and the date of the status report in which the matter appears. There are 50 cases that resulted in formal settlement agreements, 51 cases that resulted in informal settlement agreements, and 8 cases that resulted in formal mediation. In cases resulting in informal settlements or mediation, the Justice Department does not identify the covered jurisdiction by name:
Complaints Resulting In Formal Settlement Agreements:

Jurisdiction Lucas County, OH Guernsey County, OH Essex County, NJ Windsor County, VT
Warren, OH Ben Hill County, GA Gulfport, MS

Type of Problem physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter

Status Report Jan. - Mar. 2003 Oct. - Dec. 2002 Oct. - Dec. 2002 Oct. - Dec. 2002
Apr. - June 2002 Apr. - June 2001 Apr. - June 2000

(1b)

2b

Shelby County, TN Adair County, OK Houston, TX Toledo, OH
Lake County, IL Oklahoma County, OK
Georgiana, AL State of Hawaii
McDowell County, WV Mendocino County, CA Johnson County, TN Citrus County, FL Chico County, AR Dickinson, ND Wetzel County, WV Twin Falls, ID
Philadelphia, PA

lack of assistive listening devices physical access lack of assistive listening devices physical access and lack of communication assistance lack of sign language interpreter physical access and lack of communication assistance physical access lack of sign language interpreter and assistive listening devices physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter and communication assistance lack of procedures for jurors to request accommodations

Apr. - June 2000 Jan. - Mar. 2000 Jan. - Mar. 2000 July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999 Apr. - June 1999
Apr. - June 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1998
July - Sep. 1998 July - Sep. 1998 July - Sep. 1998 Apr. - June 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998 Oct. - Dec. 1997
Oct. - Dec. 1997

3b

Boone County, IN Grand Rapids, MI Outagamie County, WI
Rome, NY Hancock County, MS
Harrison County, MS
Roswell, NM Santa Clara County, CA Jones County, CA Town of Lloyd, NY Tallahassee, FL Pickens County, SC Fulton, MO Wadsworth, OH

lack of assistive listening devices lack of assistive listening devices physical access and lack of assistive listening devices physical access assistive listening (deaf individual excluded from jury service) assistive listening (deaf individual excluded from jury service) lack of assistive listening devices lack of assistive listening devices physical access lack of communication assistance lack of communication assistance lack of assistive listening devices lack of communication assistance physical access

July - Sep. 1997 July - Sep. 1997 Apr. - June 1997
Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997
Jan. - Mar. 1997
Jan. - Mar. 1997 Oct. - Dec. 1996 Oct. - Dec. 1996 July - Sep. 1996 Apr. - June 1996 Oct. - Dec. 1994 Apr. - June 1994 Apr. - June 1994

4b

Alexandria, LA
Genesee County, MI Hickman County, KY Van Buren County, AR Harris County, TX
Scott County, AR Madison County, FL Pinellas County, FL Salt Lake City, UT
Paulding County, OH

lack of communication assistance and sign language interpreter physical access physical access physical access physical access and lack of communication assistance physical access physical access lack of communication assistance lack of communication assistance (deaf individual excluded from jury) physical access

Apr. - June 1994
Apr. - June 1994 April 1994 April 1994 April 1994
April 1994 April 1994 April 1994 April 1994
April 1994

Complaints Resulting In Informal Settlement Agreements:

Jurisdiction county in Ohio unnamed jurisdiction county in Mississippi county in Illinois county in Louisiana

Type of Problem lack of sign language interpreter lack of assistive listening devices lack of sign language interpreter lack of sign language interpreter lack of sign language interpreter

Status Report Jan. - Mar. 2003 Jan. - Mar. 2003 Jan. - Mar. 2003 Oct. - Dec. 2002 July - Sep. 2002

5b

county in Pennsylvania
county in Arizona county in Nebraska New England state court system
county in Arizona
county in Texas
county in California Iowa court
county in Texas county in Oklahoma county in Pennsylvania county in Texas
county in Colorado
Michigan court
city in Pennsylvania town in Ohio county in Michigan Louisiana parish county in Michigan county in Illinois
county in Michigan

lack of accessible parking physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter and assistive listening devices lack of assistive listening devices lack of sign language interpreter physical access lack of sign language interpreter physical access physical access physical access lack of assistive listening devices lack of accessible parking lack of communication assistance physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access lack of communication assistance lack of assistive listening devices

Apr. - June 2002
Apr. - June 2002 Jan. - Mar. 2002 Jan. - Mar. 2002
Oct. - Dec. 2001
July - Sep. 2001
July - Sep. 2001 July - Sep. 2001
Oct. - Dec. 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1999 July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1998 Oct. - Dec. 1998 Apr. - June 1998 Apr. - June 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998
Oct. - Dec. 1997

6b

county in Arizona
county in Florida Tennessee circuit court
county in California
county in Michigan
supreme court of a “southern state” Colorado judicial district county in Wyoming county in Michigan county in Virginia
city in California
county in West Virginia county in Washington
county in California
county in Pennsylvania “western state court”
Ohio court
county in Kentucky county in Colorado county in Colorado

lack of communication aids physical access lack of communication aids lack of assistive listening devices lack of auxiliary aids lack of auxiliary aids lack of auxiliary aids physical access physical access lack of auxiliary aids lack of auxiliary aids physical access
lack of visual communication assistance lack of accessible parking physical access lack of assistive listening devices lack of communication assistance physical access physical access physical access

Oct. - Dec. 1997 July - Sep. 1997 July - Sep. 1997 Apr. - June 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Oct. - Dec. 1996 Oct. - Dec. 1996 July - Sep. 1996 July - Sep. 1996 Apr. - June 1996
Apr. - June 1996 Jan. - Mar. 1995 Oct. - Dec. 1994 Oct. - Dec. 1994 July - Sep. 1994 July - Sep. 1994 Apr. - June 1994

7b

county in Missouri “various cities and towns in East and Midwest” county in Washington Michigan court
Pennsylvania county court

physical access physical access
physical access lack of assistive listening devices lack of accommodation for person with learning disability

April 1994 April 1994
April 1994 April 1994 April 1994

Complaints Resulting In Mediation:

Jurisdiction county in Illinois county in Arkansas town in New York county in South Carolina county in California county in Tennessee county in Nebraska Michigan court

Type of Problem physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter

Status Report Oct. - Dec. 2002 Oct. - Dec. 2001 Oct. - Dec. 2001 July - Sep. 2001
Apr. - June 2001 Jan. - Mar. 2000 Jan. - Mar. 2000 July - Sep. 1997

8b

In addition to the settlement agreements reported in the published status reports, there are several additional formal settlement agreements entered into between the Justice Department and various jurisdictions in cases dealing with courthouses. Although they are not reported in the status reports, they are available on the website: http://www. ada.gov

Jurisdiction
Summers County, WV
Craig County, VA Allendale County, SC Butte County, SD Boulder County, CO Warren County, IL Perry County, KY City of Cambridge, OH City of San Antonio, TX City of Savannah, GA City of Bismarck, ND Columbia County, NY Loudon County, TN
Madison County, MS Worcester County, MD

Problem
physical access and lack of assistive listening devices physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access
physical access
physical access physical access physical access physical access and lack of assistive listening devices physical access physical access

Date of Agreement 5/11/00
1/30/02 8/13/01 7/31/01 10/2/00 9/6/01 9/25/01 11/1/01
1/30/02
1/30/02 10/16/02 5/19/03 7/25/03
7/25/03 7/28/03

APPENDIX C Findings of Investigations Under the Civil Rights
Of Institutionalized Persons Act 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq.
Between 1980 and the enactment of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, Department of Justice investigations under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq., found unconstitutional treatment of individuals with disabilities in institutions in more than twenty-five States. From 1980 until the present, unconstitutional conditions have been found in more than 200 institutions in more than thirty States throughout the Country. The Tables below describe some of the findings issued by the Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997b(a)(1). Copies of the complete findings letters will be provided to the Court upon request, and have been served upon counsel for the petitioner and the private respondents.
(1c)

2c
I. Investigations Prior to Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Name of Facility
Rosewood Center

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

MD 1982 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Many residents sustained injuries during “low staffing periods” (p. 4).
One resident left the facility unobserved and died of exposure. A profoundly retarded resident drowned when staff left him unattended in a bathtub. Another died after being pushed down a flight of stairs (pp. 4-5).

On another occasion, “six severely handicapped female residents * * * were allegedly raped by an outside intruder. There was only one staff person on duty to supervise the 32 residents * * * and only one security officer on duty to cover the entire Rosewood facility. While the inability of the residents to communicate apparently prevented state officials from confirming the rapes * * * several of the

Name of Facility

3c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

residents had positive tests for gonorrhea of the throat right after the incident” (p. 4).

Abuse of residents Unsanitary conditions
Inadequate training

Several male patients “show[ed] the presence of venereal disease” and “nonconsensual sexual contact occurred between one resident and at least one and possibly three residents” (p. 4).
An employee sexually abused a resident (p. 4).
Facilities are deteriorating; the “stench of urine is prevalent in a number of buildings.” Plumbing problems left overflowing toilets unrepaired for days; heating problems subjected patients to “sub-freezing temperature in the buildings themselves” at times (p. 5).
“Over 900 of the 1125 residents receive less than 50% of the services

Name of Facility

4c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

called for in their program plans” (p. 2).

East Louisiana State Hospital

LA 1982 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Enid & Paul’s OK 1983 Inadequate

Valley State

medical and

Schools

mental health

care

Inadequate training

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

pp. 2-4
“Insufficient licensed physician coverage has resulted in serious harms to residents,” contributing to patient deaths (p. 2-3).
Lack of training “contributes to and manifests itself in residents’ aggressive and stereotypic behaviors * * * [such as] incessant disordered physical movements, headbanging, biting, hyperactivity, and assaultive behavior” (p. 5).
“For example, a group of 21 naked residents were observed being led to a shower area, where two staff sprayed the residents down with a large garden type hose” (p. 5).

Name of Facility

5c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

p. 5

Details

Abuse of residents

Unsanitary conditions

Wheat Ridge Regional Center

CO 1984 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Staff found “slapping, kicking, hitting, or spanking residents” while records also “reflect many instances of unexplained resident injuries” (p. 6).
Lack of sanitation practices contributed to parasitic and bacterial infections requiring quarantine of entire living areas (p. 6).
“Due to lack of staff, residents suffer neglect and numerous accidents and injuries. * * * [N]umerous residents have sustained injuries where the cause remains unknown. Resident on resident assaults are common; residents engaging in self-abusive behaviors are frequently unsupervised and unattended. Residents have been

Name of Facility

6c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

found with unexplained broken bones and burns to the body. For example, one resident was found with a femur segment protruding through the skin” (p. 2).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

During tour, staff came upon “approximately 20 adult women being cared for by one person amid great disorder and confusion. Many of these women were partially undressed, one was urinating on the floor of the living area and several were engaging in selfabusive behavior” (p. 2).
“A large number of Wheat Ridge residents suffer from severe contractures of their limbs and other body deformities due to the absence of necessary physical and occupational therapy” (p. 3). “One troublesome secondary effect of these immobilizing contractures due to lack of physical

Name of Facility
Logansport State Hospital

7c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

therapy is the dysfunctioning of the digestive system,” which has apparently caused an “abnormally high percentage of Wheat Ridge residents to require pureed diets or gastroatomies for tube feeding” (p. 4).

IN 1984 Inadequate medical and mental health care

pp. 1-2

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“Patients are not being adequately monitored and supervised to prevent suicidal behavior or patienton-patient violence, to notice and correctly diagnose symptoms of serious, physical or psychiatric dysfunctions, to monitor treatment responses and drug reactions, or to determine appropriate and reasonably safe modes of treatment for each patient” (pp. 2-3).

8c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Manteno and Eglin Mental Health Centers

IL 1984 Inadequate medical and mental health care; Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Lack of professional staff lead to “inappropriate uses of drugs and serious treatment errors which have resulted in physical danger to, or unnecessary physical or chemical restraint of, the involved patients” (p. 3). Patients are further “endangered by inadequate medical care relating to serious and sometimes debilitating or life-threatening drug side-effects” (p. 4).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“Units in the facilities are overcrowded to a point that makes it virtually impossible for staff to maintain control without regular and extensive use of physical and chemical restraints” (p. 4).

Unsanitary conditions

“Sanitation and maintenance in portions of the facilities are so inadequate as to present serious risks to patients of poisoning,

9c

Name of Facility
Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

infection, or disease” (pp. 4-5).

MI 1984 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Abuse of residents

Large number of patient deaths under unusual circumstances, some associated with restraint practices (p. 3).

A patient died after “a stranglehold was applied to him while he was being subdued. He reportedly lay on the seclusion room floor from 15-20 minutes before efforts were made to resuscitate him” (pp. 2-3).

“Another patient also died due to strangulation, and his body showed signs of a beating” (p. 3).

“A third patient allegedly died from injuries suffered in a beating. Still another patient, who had expressed her fear for her safety to her psychologist on a Friday, died over the weekend. Her body allegedly was bruised and battered” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Fairview Training Center

10c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Police found that another patient who had died in a seclusion cell “had contusions on his face and the back of his head” (p. 3).

There have also been “numerous incidents of rape, assault and threat of assault, broken bones and bruises” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
OR 1985 Inadequate training

A staff member was found to have had “sexual relations with three different patients in one night.” Other patients were beaten by staff, “including one who was stripped, placed in seclusion and severely beaten by several attendants” (p. 3).
Inadequate medical care contributed to several deaths and preventable suicides (pp. 3-4).
Training “is virtually nonexistent” and “results in a serious level of self-injurious and aggressive behaviors” (p. 3).

Name of Facility

11c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“[R]estraints are used at Fairview in lieu of training and for the convenience of staff,” and were employed more than 2,000 times per month (p. 4).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Records showed “an alarmingly high number of injuries,” such as 197 incidents of injuries in one month resulting from self-abuse or aggression. In one two-month period, there were 27 incidents of sexual abuse (p. 3 n.1).

“[W]e observed numerous residents with open wounds, gashes, abrasions, contusions, and fresh bite marks. Many other residents had deep scars and scabs from a long history of selfabuse or victimization” (p. 3).

Due to inadequate supervision of residents with pica behavior (ingesting inedible objects), “[r]esidents have had to undergo

Name of Facility

12c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

surgery, sometimes on a repeated basis, to remove foreign objects or to relieve bowel and other obstructions caused by pica. Physicians at Fairview have indicated that some residents have had surgery so frequently that any more operations resulting from pica would jeopardize their lives” (p. 8).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Dangerous psychotropic medication practices (p. 7-8).

Unsanitary conditions

“Seventy percent of residents institution-wide have gum disease” (p. 8).
“Many of the cottages we toured smelled of urine and waste. Sewage backup in cottage basements, up to three feet high on the walls, is permitted to remain for days. * * * [A]n August 1983 random sample of Fairview residents revealed

13c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

that 35% had pinworm infection, a parasite which is spread by fecal and oral routes in unclean environments” (p. 9).

Fort Stanton Hospital & Training School

NM 1985 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facilities’ sole physician wrote institution-wide prescriptions for prescription medications and powerful psychotropic medications, authorizing their use when nursing staff believes it necessary, in contravention of professional standards and creating substantial risk to patients (p. 2).

Unreasonable use of chemical restraints

Psychotropic drugs being used to restrain patients without any physician assessment for the need for such measures (p. 2.)

Inadequate mental health care

“Many residents are subjected to potentially dangerous” prescriptions of multiple psychotropic drugs

Name of Facility

14c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“without any medical justification” (p. 2)

Southbury Training School

CT 1985 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety
Inadequate medical and mental health care

Low staffing levels lead to inadequate supervision, which permitted one resident to leave the facility and die of exposure; another was able to remove and hide a large knife (p. 10).
In one cottage, staff compensate for low staffing level by placing “at least one resident in restraints for up to 12 hours a day due to the staff’s inability to monitor his activities” (p. 10).
Investigation found “dangerous medication interactions and errors, and found that acute medical problems, such as fractures and infections, frequently do not receive critically necessary follow-up treatment” (p. 3).

15c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Use of psychotropic medications substantially departed from professional standards, creating substantial health risks for patients (pp. 3-6).

Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Facility’s failure to provide adequate training program resulted in “a dangerous reliance on the use of both physical and chemical restraint” (p. 6).

Hinds County Detention Center

MS 1986 Inadequate medical and mental health care

County Jail was being used to house mentally ill persons awaiting civil commitment hearings or placement in a mental hospital for up to eleven days. At time of investigation, jail held 42 mentally-ill detainees (pp. 1-2).

No mental health treatment was provided during period of confinement (p. 3).

“Male mentally-ill detainees were confined * * * in a small cell designed to serve as the

Name of Facility
Westboro State Hospital

16c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

‘drunk tank.’ Some of the detainees were placed in hand and leg irons” (p. 3).

MA 1986 Unsanitary conditions

“The smell and sight of urine and feces pervade not only the toilet areas, but ward floors and walls as well” (p. 3).

“Bathrooms and showers were filthy. Living areas are infested with vermin. There are consistent shortages of clean bed sheets, face cloths, towels and underwear. Open commodes with human waste in them were often found in rooms to which many patients in unclean geri-chairs are confined all day, including meal times” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“[N]on-sterile techniques are used when changing patients’ dressings and feeding tubes” (p. 3).
Patients’ physical illnesses are often misdiagnosed as psychological

Name of Facility

17c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

problems, resulting in “increased dosages of potentially dangerous antipsychotic drugs” (p. 5).

“Acutely life threatening illnesses * * * are also not detected appropriately or on a timely basis.* * *

[I]nappropriate and inadequate medical care preceded many of the[] deaths” reviewed during the investigation (p. 5).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Patients also frequently do not receive prescribed medications because the ward or pharmacy lacks adequate supplies” (p. 4).
Facility used sedating drugs on elderly patients for no medically justifiable reason, but instead to control residents’ behavior “subjecting vulnerable geriatric patients to the dangerous effects of

18c

Name of Facility
Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hospital

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

inappropriate drug usage and overmedication” (p. 7).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training

pp. 7-8

MI 1986 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Inadequate staffing prevents the facility from providing treatment that could “reduce or eliminate unreasonable risks to [patients’] personal safety and the undue use of bodily restraint” (p. 2).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility fails to adequately monitor efficacy and side effects of potentially dangerous drugs, creating unjustifiable risk of “deleterious side effects, tardive dyskinesia, involuntary, abnormal muscle movements, akathisia, and parkinsonism” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Napa State Hospital

19c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

CA 1986 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Severe staffing shortages “result in patient management, in lieu of treatment, through the inappropriate use of seclusion, chemical restraint, and physical restraint” (p. 2).

Inadequate medical and mental health care; Inadequate training

Restraint practices “pose significant hazards to the personal safety of NSH patients” (p. 4).
Certain medication practices at facility “violated all known standards of medical practice” resulting in great danger to patient safety (p. 2).

There was no monitoring of drug side effects and several patients exhibited an “antipsychotic druginduced side effect, potentially irreversible, that may result in permanent physiological damage” (p. 3).

20c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Facility failed to provide training programs adequate to protect patient safety and avoid need for restraint and seclusion (p. 5).

Metropolitan LA 1986 Inadequate

Developmental

medical and

Center

mental health

care

“MDC employs antipsychotic medication primarily as a means of controlling behavior without proper [medical] justification.” As a result, “[n]umerous residents demonstrated serious neurological side effects from sustained exposure to high doses of antipsychotic drugs” (p. 2). Facility had no program to monitor for serious, potentially irreversible side effects of these medications (pp. 23).

Other residents “have been exposed to an extreme risk of drug-induced toxic poisoning by the absence of preliminary and periodic drug-level testing” (p. 3).

21c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Belle Chasse State School

LA 1986 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Administration of psychotropic drugs substantially departed from professional standards. There was no program to detect “Tardive Dyskinesia” which is “an antipsychotic drug induced side effect, potentially irreversible, that may result in permanent physiological damage” (p. 2).

Broadview,

OH 1987 Inadequate

Cleveland &

training;

Warrensville

Unreasonable

Developmental Centers

use of chemical restraints

In the absence of adequate training programs, “staff overuse psychotropic medication to control the behavior of residents” (p. 1).

Inadequate mental health care

p. 2

Montgomery

OH 1987 Inadequate

Developmental

medical and

Center

mental health care; Failure

to provide

reasonable

supervision

and safety

pp. 2-3

22c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Los Lunas Hospital and Training School

NM 1988 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of chemical restraints

“[S]traightjackets and ammonia inhalants are used as a consequence for antisocial behavior. Restrained individuals are in some cases isolated in a room with a closed door out of sight of staff. This practice, absent adequate surveillance, places severely handicapped residents at great risk of injury and is not professionally justifiable” (p. 2).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety
Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Los Lunas staff are using physical restraints, isolation and punishment * * * to control the behavior of residents in lieu of necessary training programs” (p. 2).
Due to lack of supervision, a woman was raped, developed peritonitis, and died (p. 3).
Facility provides almost no physical therapy to the large number of patients with body deformities who need

23c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

therapy “to prevent muscular or skeletal breakdown” (p. 3).

W.A. Howe

IL 1989 Inadequate

Developmental

training;

Center

Unreasonable use of

physical and

chemical

restraints

“To control resident behavior, in lieu of professionally designed training programs, staff resort to chemical and physical restraints” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Due to the lack of adequate medical supervision of patients, early signs of illness and disease go undetected and/or untreated” (p. 5).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Patient was dead on the floor of her room for some time before staff discovered her, after staff failed to perform scheduled room checks.

A patient strangled to death while left unsupervised in improperly-applied restraints.

A resident who was left unsupervised ran out the front door and into traffic, where she was killed (pp. 67).

Name of Facility
Great Oaks Center

24c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

MD 1990 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training

Investigation found that inadequate supervision contributed to “an alarmingly high frequency of resident injuries” (p. 5).

Inadequate training program “fails to reduce self-abusive, aggressive, and other maladaptive and inappropriate behaviors.” “As a result of these problems, rocking, pacing, and aimlessly wandering residents were seen throughout the institution. Instances of selfabuse were not an uncommon sight; observed attempts to intervene appropriately were rare. Many residents were observed to have cuts, bruises and scrapes. Clearly, many of the injuries may have been preventable with more effective programming and if more trained staff were available” (p. 3).

25c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Staff resort to chemical and physical restraints to control residents’ behavior, in lieu of professionally designed training programs” (p. 3).

Inadequate mental health care

p. 4

Abuse of residents

A number of staff had been disciplined or criminally charged for abusing patients (p. 5 n.1).

Hawaii State Hospital

HI 1990 Inadequate

Staff at facility

food, clothing confirmed that there

and shelter

was often

insufficient food;

“Staff reported that

patients are often

wrapped in blankets

and sheets due to

the absence of

adequate clothing”;

inadequate items for

basic personal

hygiene (p. 2).

Unsanitary conditions

“[S]anitation is grossly inadequate. During a tour of [one unit] our consultants had to walk around numerous puddles of urine. * * * * Kitchen facilities exhibited signs of serious cockroach

Name of Facility

26c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

infestation and other unsanitary practices” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints; Inadequate training

“[D]rug practices at HSH are seriously deficient and represent significant departures from generally accepted medical standards” (p. 3).
“In view of serious, chronic and facility-wide staffing shortages, HSH staff employ bodily restraints –physical restraints, seclusion, and chemical restraints –- at an unjustifiably high level solely for their own convenience or in lieu of professionally designed treatment programs” (p. 5).

27c
II. Investigations Subsequent To Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Arlington

VA 1991 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety;

unsanitary

conditions

“In many units, there was a pervasive smell of urine. Residents in diapers were wet; often their clothes were soaked through with urine” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical care

“[W]e observed young children, some as young as two, whose limbs were severely contracted” from lack of physical therapy. “Many residents were left unattended in cribs, with no efforts being made to move their limbs, position them, or to provide any real physical therapy services” (p. 3).

“The penis of another resident, a paraplegic with an in-dwelling Foley catheter, was eroded throughout its entire length due to inadequate care and monitoring” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Northern Virginia Training Center

28c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical care contributed to deaths of five residents in past six months (p. 4).

Abuse of residents

pp. 3-4

Inadequate training

pp. 8-9

VA 1991 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

In part because of inadequate training programs, use of restraints was pervasive: “restraint is used so frequently that it appears to be the treatment of choice rather than a technique of last resort” (p. 4).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Serious medical conditions and marked functional deterioration are not comprehensively evaluated or effectively treated” due to inadequate medical system (p. 5).

29c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Boswell Retardation Center

MS 1991 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Boswell’s staff are using restraints, isolation and punishment to control the behavior of residents in lieu of necessary training programs” (p. 2).

Inadequate mental health care

pp. 3-4

Unsanitary conditions

p. 5

Embreeville Center

PA 1991 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Delays in emergency medical care contributed to patient death (p. 2).

Abuse of residents

Undercover agent observed repeated instances of abuse over nine-week period (p. 3).

Inadequate training programs

p. 2

Agnews

CA 1991 Unsanitary

Developmental

conditions

Center

“Clients and residents smelled of urine and feces” (p. 2).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Bodily restraint and medication used in lieu of training programs or adequate staff supervision (pp. 4-5).

Name of Facility

30c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical care

Investigation found “resident after resident whose legs had lost all muscle tone and whose hip, knee and ankle joints had become permanently fixed or cemented in place in a deformed frog-leg or windswept position due to months and even years of inactivity” (p. 2).

Abuse of residents

“[I]nordinate delays in diagnosing and responding to serious resident illness” placed large population of medically fragile patients at substantial risk (pp. 5-6)
Administrators “confirmed to us that staff abuse of residents is a serious problem” (p. 2).

31c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Memphis

TN 1992 Inadequate

Mental Health

medical and

Institute

mental health

care

Deficiencies in the facility’s medical care system contributed to two recent deaths (pp. 5-6). Lack of psychiatrists leads to serious errors in diagnosis and medication prescription (pp. 78).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Patients at MMHI are subjected to both an undue amount of bodily restraint and dangerous restraint practices” (p. 9).

Fircrest Residential Habilitation Center

WA 1992 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“[S]taff members are placing patients inappropriately in physical restraints simply because they are confused or disoriented.” Patients are also restrained while sedated, “a substantial departure from accepted standards of psychiatric care” (pp. 9-10).
“[R]esidents suffer needless serious injuries” due to lack of supervision, including an average of “410 incidents per month for some

Name of Facility

32c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

440 residents” (p. 1).

“Numerous residents were seen with fresh wounds and lacerations, including shaved spots on heads revealing stitches and healing injuries; red marks and significant bruises; multiple scabs and scars, and large bandages or casts” (pp. 1-2).

“Our consultants observed residents engaged in selfinjurious behavior, having seizures, masturbating in open view -– all without staff intervention of any kind” (p. 2).

“[O]ne resident was found dead in the day room of a living unit; the resident had been dead for up to three hours before her body was discovered by staff” (p. 2).

Dangerous positioning and feeding practices put residents’ lives at risk (p. 2).

Name of Facility

33c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate training

“Due to a lack of human interaction and care, residents have developed significant stereotypic, maladaptive or antisocial behaviors” including “headbanging, eating foreign objects and pulling hair, to waving arms, flicking fingers and other selfstimulatory activities” (p. 1).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Much of the antisocial, maladaptive behavior, injuries and use of restraints is attributable, in significant part, to the lack of * * * training programs” (p. 5).
Physical restraints, including “staff incapacitating residents by holding them down involuntarily on the floor or elsewhere for a period of ‘enforced relaxation’” were pervasively “used as punishment, for the convenience of staff and in lieu of training programs” (p. 4-5).

34c

Name of Facility
Forrest County Jail

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

MS 1993 Inadequate mental health care

“There are no mental health services available at the jail and the holding cells into which disturbed or mentally-ill * * * prisoners are placed pose a direct threat to their health and safety” (p. 2).

Arizona State AZ 1993 Unreasonable

Hospital

use of

physical and

chemical

restraints

“During the course of our tour of the jail, our consultants observed a severely mentally ill inmate, clad only in an undershirt, housed in the general population” where he had been waiting for several weeks for a transfer to a mental health facility. “He had allegedly eaten some glass and was prone to defecate on the floor of the cell” (pp. 2-3).
Patients “are routinely put into five-point restraints (a practice where a patient is restrained on a bed and bound by the ankles, by the wrists with the arms to the side, and by

35c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

a strap across the abdomen) and placed into a locked seclusion room” for convenience of staff. Leaving a restrained patient unsupervised creates “great risk of harm from choking and asphyxiation” (p. 2).

Jones County Jail

MS 1993 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Mentally ill inmates, and mentally ill persons detained pending civil commitment proceedings, housed in five-by-six foot steel cage, sometimes for months (p. 4).

Chicago-Read IL 1993 Inadequate

Mental Health

mental health

Center

care; Inadequate

training

pp. 1-2

Unreasonable use of physical restraints

p. 2-3

Sonoma

CA 1994 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety

“As a result of inadequate supervision, residents have been subjected to numerous, serious, unnecessary injuries” (p. 2).

Name of Facility

36c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

In one incident, a resident drowned in a bathtub while unattended (p. 2).

Inadequate training
Inadequate medical care

In another, one resident was attacked by another with a knife (p. 2).
Training programs are inadequate and lead to harm from unaddressed behaviors and to the unnecessary and unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints (pp. 4-6).
Improper feeding practices for severely disabled residents “subject them to severe risk of choking, aspiration and aspiration pneumonia” (p. 3).

“The lack of physical therapists and physical therapy services has led to the development of undue contractures, muscle atrophy, inappropriate body growth, and physical degeneration” (p. 3).

37c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“The failure of staff to properly maintain [tracheostomy] tubes subjects residents to the risk of death from suffocation and presents other significant health risks, including infection” (p. 3).

Southern &

WI 1994 Failure to

Central

provide

Wisconsin

reasonable

Developmental Centers

supervision and safety

Inadequate supervision has led to serious resident injuries. For example, one elderly resident with a condition that creates a great risk of falling was taken to the hospital for an injury caused by a fall, whereupon hospital staff noted that she had fallen 62 times that day (p. 10).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

While facility has over 300 residents with seizure disorders, management practices are dangerously deficient; some patients kept on medications with strong and dangerous side effects for years after they are no longer necessary; some are kept on potentially

Name of Facility

38c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

dangerous drugs even though they are not helping. For example, one patient who had been seizure free for six years, was kept on medication even though lab results showed that dosage was too low to be having any effect and even though patient appeared to be suffering from dementia as a side effect of the drug (p. 3-4).

Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Facility’s use of psychotropic medications substantially departs from professional standards, exposing patients to unnecessary risks of dangerous side effects (pp.7-9).
pp. 10-13

39c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Eastern State VA 1994 Inadequate

Hospital and

mental health

Hancock Geriatric Center

care; Inadequate training; Unreasonable

use of

physical and

chemical

restraints

pp. 1-6

Clover Bottom TN 1995 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety

Many injuries linked to lack of supervision; “in one seven month period, a resident received injuries on twentysix occasions,” half of which required stitches (pp. 3-4).

Inadequate training programs

pp. 5-8

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Residents languish in carts and illfitting wheelchairs, which exacerbate or allow physical deformities to progress –- in some cases to a point that the deformity may preclude a person from sitting upright in a wheelchair” (p.12).

40c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Nat T.

TN 1995 Inadequate

Winston

training;

Developmental Center

Unreasonable use of physical and

chemical

restraints

“NTWDC, because of the ineffectiveness of its behavioral programs, relies on physical and chemical restraints to control residents’ behavior” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unsanitary conditions

Lack of training programs and supervision contribute to high incidence of injuries, including “multiple bites, lacerations, broken bones, bruises and abrasions. One individual was injured 25 times * * * in an eightmonth period. * * * Several residents were found attempting to cut themselves with knives or razorblades” (p. 4).
pp. 4-5
“Sanitary conditions were very poor at the food facility”; “Mold and mildew were prevalent throughout the refrigerators and

41c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

coolers” because of plumbing leaks (pp. 5-6).

Greene Valley TN 1995 Inadequate

Developmental

medical and

Center

mental health care

“Due to an inadequate medical care delivery system * * * residents are subjected to needless fractures, recurrent aspiration, preventable weight loss, recurring seizures, avoidable injuries, and other direct threats to their health” (p. 2).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Psychiatrists prescribing dangerous combinations of drugs “absent any rational justification in violation of medical standards” (p. 3).
Due to lack of supervision, residents “are repeatedly ‘found with blood’ on them from injuries that occur outside of staff supervision. On other occasions, residents’ severe injuries are discovered only during bathing or at bedtime” (p. 5).

Name of Facility

42c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“[O]ne eleven year old boy apparently lost the sight in one eye from repeated headslapping which resulted in a detached retina. Other residents were noted with swollen, disfigured features resulting from years of self-injury. Still others had permanent scars from continual selfmutilation of their faces and arms” (p. 6).

Inadequate training

Many residents’ “destructive behaviors remain unaddressed” by training programs. “For example, one resident had large scratches on her face that had been self-inflicted; our consultant psychologist was informed that there was no program to modify or eliminate this unsafe behavior.” The same was true for a patient who repeatedly reopened a face wound and one who had a history of pica for almost 20 years (p. 7).

43c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Northern

VA 1995 Inadequate

Virginia

medical and

Mental Health

mental health

Institute

care

“[P]sychiatric care is grossly inadequate” and “poses direct threats to the health and safety of patients” (p. 3).

“A county hospital is located only a few hundred yards [away], yet there have been a number of well-publicized deaths which are linked to substantial delays in providing adequate medical care” (p. 4).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“[O]ne patient died partly because of a toxic buildup of antidepressants in her body. Another patient died from meningitis after a psychiatrist requested that she be seen by an internist who failed to appear to assess her life-threatening condition” (p. 4).
“Due to inadequate staffing, NVMHI is unable to provide one-on-one monitoring for many residents who are suicidal or are in restraints or

44c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

seclusion and require such close supervision. Patients have been injured while being restrained and are then left unattended by medical personnel” (p. 5).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“[T]he lack of supervision and care is so grave that patients have been subjected to severe harm, including death” (p. 5).

Landmark Learning Center

FL 1996 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

pp. 3-4

Inadequate training and mental health care

pp. 4-10

Harold Jordan TN 1996 Inadequate

Habilitation

training and

Center

mental health

care

pp. 3-4

45c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Northern

VA 1996 Failure to

Virginia

provide

Mental Health

reasonable

Institute

supervision and safety

Problems with supervision persist: in the past year, there were 70 incidents of patients escaping from the facility, and an average of 27 incidents of patient self-injury and another 17 incidents of patient-onpatient violence each month (p. 7).

Patients repeatedly injured themselves even when “supposedly under careful supervision.” “One patient committed approximately 12 such acts of selfinjury while on ‘special observation’ status.”

Inadequate training

“One patient somehow managed to obtain a knife while in the seclusion room” (p. 7).
“[S]taff have resorted to calling the police and having patients arrested rather than addressing the underlying psychological issues” (p. 8).

46c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Central State VA 1997 Failure to

Hospital

provide

reasonable

supervision

and safety

Lack of staffing and failure to supervise patients leads to repeated incidents of preventable injury and suicide attempts (pp. 3-5).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

One patient supposedly under 24hour surveillance was found with 42 bruises over his body from unwitnessed incidents (p. 4).
pp. 5-7, 9-11
Facility’s use of restraints substantially departs from professional standards (pp. 7-9).

Patient died after being left in fivepoint restraint on bed as punishment; her psychiatrist had warned facility staff not to restrain her because of seizure risk. Nonetheless, the “patient had spent over 300 hours of the last two months of her life in restraints” (p. 8).

47c

Name of Facility
Los Angeles County Jail

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

CA 1997 Inadequate mental health care

Jail system housing approximately 1,700 mentally ill inmates provides virtually no treatment to most inmates other than medication (p. 8).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Centro de Reeducacion para Adultos

PR 1997 Unsanitary conditions/ inadequate shelter

Jail exacerbates many inmates’ illness by placing them in solitary confinement for 23 hours or more per day (p. 12).
Jail places many mentally ill inmates in general population, but requires them to wear uniforms that designate them as mentally ill. As a result, many inmates suffered from beatings and sexual assaults (pp. 14, 17).
“Many of the buildings are dilapidated, decaying, and lack adequate plumbing and lighting.” At one facility, “the showers do not work, the faucets do not work, and the toilets do not flush properly. In order to bathe the clients, staff dump

Name of Facility

48c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

water from water tanks into large movable garbage cans from which the staff manually extract water using smaller buckets to pour it on the residents.” Lack of water means that staff cannot wash hands after changing some patients’ diapers (p. 3).

Inadequate training and mental health care; Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Investigators found patient “sitting on the floor * * * moaning to himself. We noticed a stream of blood trickling down his helmet. * * * * When the nurse removed his helmet, we discovered that [the patient’s] head had been severely damaged due to years of self-abuse and head banging. [He] had butted and rammed his head into walls and post corners so often that he had pushed back completely his hair and skin on the front half of his head.” Nonetheless, “the Commonwealth has failed to provide [the patient] with

Name of Facility

49c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

professional psychological or behavioral services.”

Investigation found many other such individuals not receiving adequate care (p. 6).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Restraints are prevalent at many of the institutions * * * and are related lack of behavioral programming, training, and professional mental health intervention. * * * * [S]taff use a bed sheet to tie [a client’s] waist and torso to a bench and to one of the iron bars at the facility to keep her from walking around the building and engaging in aggressive, maladaptive behaviors such as biting and hitting other clients. Staff tie [another client] up in fourpoint restraints to her bed for the entire time she is menstruating” (p. 7)

Name of Facility
Center for Integral Services

50c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

PR 1997 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“On our tour of CIS, we generally found a dangerous environment for the clients. We noticed many CIS residents with fresh injuries, including lacerations and bruises, as well as historical remnants of past injuries suffered at CIS, such as disfiguring scars. Many clients had suffered facial injuries or severe injuries on the back of their heads with resulting deep scars and hair loss” (p. 3).

Parents of clients showed pictures of “son with a very swollen, bulbous, purple and black eye. The father told us that his son has suffered a host of other injuries at CIS including a broken nose, a severe knee injury * * * and various head injuries, some requiring sutures.” Another picture showed a client with a black eye, “a bloody left eye socket, bloody swollen lips, and a

Name of Facility

51c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

face marked with fresh lacerations. The mother reported that her son has also suffered a fractured arm, numerous lacerations, bites, broken teeth” and “is now limited in the use of his hands to one index finger and thumb on each hand” (p. 4).

Inadequate food, shelter and sanitation

“[T]he facility runs out of food monthly” and “is in a state of disrepair.” “Residents have to sleep on beds with old, worn mattresses that are dirty and often wet.” Toilets do not flush. As a result, “virtually all of the toilets on the men’s side had urine and/or feces in them, producing a health hazard and an unpleasant, malodorous environment” (pp. 56).

“Staff admitted to us that they routinely bathe the male clients by lining them up naked and hosing them down

Name of Facility

52c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

in groups * * * with a garden hose” (pp. 6-7).

Abuse of residents

Facility administrator acknowledged problems with protecting clients from staff abuse and stated that “one CIS staff member had recently been convicted for sodomizing a client” (p. 3).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“CIS frequently uses restraints as a substitute for meaningful activity during the day or for appropriate programs to address maladaptive behaviors * * * to control residents they routinely use mechanical restraints, such as leather cuff belts (which are tied to the heavy metal beds around the limbs of the clients), restraint vests and straight jackets, and restraint nets” (p. 8).

53c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility “routinely runs out of certain critical drugs” such as anti-convulsant medications for epileptic patients, who suffered repeated untreated seizures as a result (pp. 5, 10).

Inadequate training programs

Hammond

LA 1997 Failure to

Developmental Center and Pinecrest Developmental

provide reasonable supervision and safety

Center

Abuse of residents

“Most of the residents are put on psychotropic medication simply to control their behaviors without appropriate psychiatric assessments, diagnoses, treatment and monitoring” (p. 9).
pp. 7-9
Client went for weeks with an undetected fractured shoulder, even though obviously in pain and bruised (p. 6).
Four staff members recently indicted for abusing residents, many other incidents of abuse documented by facility (pp. 4-5, 15-16).

Name of Facility

54c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“A staff member left a client in full mechanical restraints unattended for hours in a room with a known aggressor” while staff watched television (p. 5).

Failure to provide adequate training programs leads to some patients being in restraints virtually non-stop (p. 12).

Inadequate training

Failure to monitor clients in restraints led to injuries (p. 12-13).
As a result of insufficient training programs, “residents’ aberrant behaviors continue unabated, often get worse, and lead frequently to other destructive behaviors” (p. 10).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Staff in one unit withheld food from clients if they misbehaved (p. 10).
pp. 13-15

55c

Name of Facility
Holly Center

State Year MD 1998

Categories of Constitutional Violations
Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate medical care

Details
Improper feeding techniques for severely disabled residents contributed to a constant rate of hospitalization and several deaths from choking and severe respiratory problems (pp. 3-5).

Inadequate training

Davies County KY 1998 Inadequate

Detention

mental health

Center

care

Systemic inadequacies in medical care contributed to the recent death of a severely handicapped and retarded resident (pp. 7-8).
pp. 8-13
No mental health services provided. “During our tour, we observed several acutely mentally ill individuals at the main jail, obviously in need of psychiatric evaluation and treatment, being left for days at a time in ‘observation’ –i.e., in a cell by themselves. One inmate was observed singing for hours on end, and eating his own feces” (p. 11).

56c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

As a result of inadequate mental health and suicide prevention system, a 15-year-old boy killed himself (p. 12).

New Castle

IN 1998 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety;

Inadequate

training

“Injuries are pervasive throughout the campus. With a census of 164 individuals, New Castle averaged over 1,000 resident injuries/incidents on a monthly basis”; over a four-month period, “88 percent of New Castle residents sustained injuries; 82 percent of the residents were injured more than one time during this period” (pp. 23).

In a single month, one resident was assaulted 20 times and another was assaulted 19 times (p. 3).
“Other injuries are unwitnessed by staff, including bone fractures, bloodied noses and body bruises” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Georgia Juvenile Facilities

57c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“[W]e witnessed instances in which residents engaged in aggressive and selfinjurious behaviors (including head slapping, hand biting, eye gouging and table banging) without appropriate and timely staff intervention (p. 4).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

While half of residents have epilepsy, facility’s seizure management practices dangerously depart from accepted medical practices, increasing risk of liver and permanent brain damage (pp. 56). Insufficient levels of nursing staff lead to failures to identify and treat serious medical problems (pp. 6-7).

GA 1998 Inadequate mental health care

Inadequate mental health care provided throughout State’s juvenile detention facilities and training schools (pp. 9-11, 19-22).

Many mentally ill youth “end up locked in security units where they spend

58c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

large portions of their days isolated in small rooms with few activities. In these units, and elsewhere, they are often restrained, hit, shackled, put in restraint chairs for hours, and sprayed with [pepper spray] by staff who lack the training and resources to respond appropriately to the manifestations of mental illness” (p. 20).

Western State VA 1999 Inadequate

Hospital

medical and

mental health

care

Facility fails to identify and address mental health needs, leading to inadequate treatment and risk of harm. In one case, patient identified as suicidal was given no treatment to address suicidal urges and subsequently hanged himself in his room (pp. 3-4).

Physicians are not permitted to prescribe some medically-indicated drugs for budget reasons (pp. 5-6).

59c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical care contributed to several recent deaths (p. 8).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Facility uses excessive and dangerous restraint techniques (p. 7).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training

Combination of inadequate staffing and training for patients results in high level of violence and injuries. Within one 90-day period, the facility of 370 patients “recorded 169 altercations, 81 instances of selfinjurious behavior, and 128 falls” as well as 8 suicide attempts and 13 escapes. In the recent past, one patient committed suicide and was dead for an hour before being discovered (p. 9).

Rainier

WA 1999 Unreasonable

School &

use of

Frances Haddon Morgan Center

physical and chemical restraints

“In 1998, Rainier logged many thousands of hours of restraint use, without demonstrating that less restrictive interventions were tried or that

Name of Facility

60c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

underlying behavioral support plans and services were adequate.” For example, the facility’s response to patients attempting to eat inedible objects (pica) or digging at their eyes or rectums was to place patients in nearly constant restraints: one patient with pica behavior spent 2,000 hours in a restraint suit over a six-month period; another averaged 600 hours per month for pica and rectal digging; another averaged 22 hours per day in the suit for rectal digging (pp. 2-3).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training; Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Without the necessary specialized treatment, * * * residents have suffered serious harm. Residents * * * have blinded themselves from chronic behaviors, such as eye poking and head banging, that the facilities have not addressed in accordance with

61c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

accepted professional standards” (p. 7).

Numerous incidents of unaddressed, dangerous behaviors, such as pica, headbanging, and eyepoking (pp. 7-8).

Clark County Detention Center

NV 1999 Inadequate mental health care

In one facility, “approximately 20 percent of all Morgan residents were admitted to the emergency room or hospital, some on more than one occasion, for treatment of injuries” in a oneyear period; during same year residents in another facility “suffered approximately 77 lacerations requiring sutures (32 involving the head), 37 bone fractures, 8 dislocated shoulders, and 2 incidents of finger amputation” (p. 10).
Jail failed adequately to identify mentally ill inmates and provide appropriate

62c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

treatment, resulting in serious harm and suicides (pp. 5-6).

Mercer County NJ 2002 Failure to

Geriatric

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety

Staff fail to supervise geriatric patients. In one case “a family member used to visit at odd hours, only to find her unattended relative lying in urine, with parts of her naked body exposed” and with “unexplained skin bruises” (p. 3).

More than a third of patients need assistance with eating and drinking, but poor nutrition and hydration practices result in substantial weight losses, hospitalization for dehydration, and even death. In one case, a resident with “an improperly positioned feeding tube” “slowly starved without adequate MCGC staff intervention.” In another case, “staff fed a resident so quickly, she aspirated and died” (p. 6).

63c

Name of Facility
BanksJacksonCommerce Medical Center and Nursing Home

State Year GA 2002

Categories of Constitutional Violations Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety, and unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Details
Staff “fail to assess and treat residents properly for potentially serious medical and mental health problems,” including failure to prevent and treat “residents with deep, bleeding bedsores, infections, and other potentially life-threatening conditions” (p. 4).
“Staff routinely restrain residents while the staff engage in various tasks” (p. 5).
Staff failed to take adequate measures to prevent serious falls, other than to restrain patients to chairs and beds (p.3). Other patients are injured by staff when transferred to and from bed, due to inadequate staff available or improper staff training (p. 4). Recently, one unsupervised resident wandered out of the facility in a wheelchair “crashed into a sidewalk curb,

Name of Facility

64c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

overturned” and was seriously injured (p. 4).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility fails to provide physical therapy that could “prevent contractures (i.e., permanent muscular contraction)” due to lack of adequate staff to implement physical therapy orders (p. 6).

Failure to move and reposition patients led to development of pressure sores, some of which became infected and require hospitalization (pp. 6-7).

“[T]here is insufficient psychiatric consultation and oversight of medication use” at the facility; a psychiatrist visits the facility only 4 times per year. As a result, many patients have been on inappropriate doses or types of powerful psychiatric medications for years (pp. 9-10).

Name of Facility

65c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“Approximately 60 residents at BJC have a diagnosis of depression, yet the facility fails to provide group or individual counseling, or other activities designed to treat depression” (p. 10).

Inadequate food, clothing and shelter

While facility provided ample food and drink, it frequently failed to assist patients who needed feeding and drinking assistance. As a result, “numerous residents were hospitalized for conditions related to lack of adequate hydration” (p. 9).

Oakwood

KY 2002 Abuse of

Developmental

residents

Center

Numerous incidents of staff abuse, leading to arrests of staff, including one incident in which “an Oakwood staff member stomped on a resident’s head and rendered the resident unconscious” (p. 3).

Name of Facility

66c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Very high incidence of harm to residents at facility. During one 3 month period, one patient “had 30 reported incidents of harm” (p. 4).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Even though treating professionals ordered close supervision of resident with pica, lax supervision permitted resident to engage in “at least 70 more attempted and/or actual incidents of pica behavior involving paper, trash, toilet paper, shoestrings, a washcloth, an ink pen, a sock, and fecal material.” In another case, failure to supervise resulted in surgery to remove five plastic gloves staff had not observed the resident eating (p. 5).
Lack of adequate behavior management leads to “increased use of physical and chemical restraints even though all of the Oakwood psychologists interviewed stated

Name of Facility

67c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

that restraints and other aversive or restrictive procedures such as helmets and mittens are unnecessary and unwarranted” (p. 7).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

More than half of the psychiatric diagnoses for patients are incorrect (p. 9).

Many residents receive powerful psychotropic medications with potentially serious side effects “in place of adequate behavioral treatment plans” (p. 9).

Facility does not adequately monitor those on psychotropic medications for serious, potentially irreversible side effects (p. 10).

Although facility has more than 200 residents with seizure disorders, it provided neurology consultations for only 10-15 residents per month. As a result, many residents are simply

Name of Facility

68c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

put on powerful anti-convulsant medications that might not be necessary, if treated properly, and which have serious side effects. One patient had been on such medications daily for 25 years, even though he had not had a seizure since 1976 and there was no indication that he had been seen by a neurologist until 2001 (p. 14).

Failure to provide adequate medical monitoring and care had contributed to preventable resident deaths (p. 11).

On numerous occasions, nurses gave medication to wrong patient, and pills are found lying on floors of living areas (p. 16).

Alexander Youth Services Center

AK 2002 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Inadequate mental health care systems contributed to preventable suicides (pp. 4-6).

69c

Name of Facility
Nevada Youth Training Center
Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center

State Year NV 2002 NM 2003

Categories of Constitutional Violations
Inadequate medical and mental health care
Inadequate medical and mental health care

Details
Facility provided no professional individualized treatment, other than medication, to seriously mentally ill residents (p. 7).
When mentally ill youth are receiving psychotropic medications at the time of entry into the facility, those “medications are automatically and permanently discontinued upon the youths’ arrival” without individualized review by a medical professional (p. 9).
Facility provides no qualified medical staff to treat inmates with serious mental illness, permitting counselors to make medical decisions about psychotropic medications (pp. 1617).

Nim Henson Geriatric Center

NM 2003 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility medication practices substantially depart from professional

70c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

standards, placing patients at risk (pp. 3-6)

Numerous patients put on feeding tubes unnecessarily, apparently for the convenience of staff (p. 11).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

New Lisbon

NJ 2003 Failure to

Developmental

protect from

Center

physical harm

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Mentally ill patients “either are untreated or treated incorrectly” (p. 15).
Facility sedates elderly patients for convenience of staff (pp. 8-9).
Residents subjected to frequent physical harm by other residents as well as by facility’s staff (pp. 3-6).
Inadequate medical care provided to residents with bowel obstructions and seizure disorders, placing residents at risk of serious complications (pp. 17-18).

Program to deal with behavioral problems does not comport with generally

71c

Name of Facility
Los Angeles County Juvenile Halls

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

accepted practice and staff are inadequately trained (pp. 7-9).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Unnecessary use of mechanical restraints (pp. 910).
Use of psychotropic drugs to control residents’ behavior does not comport with generally accepted practices (pp. 10-11).

CA 2003 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Failure to treat an estimated 75% of juveniles in need of mental health care (p. 7).

Failure to comport with professional standards regarding psychological counseling (pp. 1214).

Failure to administer psychotropic medications safely and effectively (pp. 14-16).

Failure to effectively treat youths on suicide watch (pp. 17-18).

72c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Excessive use of force

Unjustified use of Oleoresin Capsicum spray, including against juveniles with respiratory problems (pp. 2022).

Failure to protect from physical harm

Juveniles frequently subjected to violence from other juveniles, resulting in “significant injury” (pp. 22-23).

Garfield

OK 2003 Inadequate

County Jail & Garfield County Work

medical and mental health care

Center

Provision of medical services to inmates “is seriously deficient and places inmates at risk of harm” (p. 10).

Metropolitan State Hospital

CA 2003 Inadequate mental health care

Provision of mental health care inadequate, particularly in regard to suicide prevention (pp. 1415).
Psychiatric services “substantially depart from generally accepted professional standards of care and expose the children and adolescents [in the facility] to a significant risk of harm and to actual harm” (p. 3).

Name of Facility

73c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inappropriate use of psychotropic medications (pp. 911).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Reginald P.

MS 2003 Inadequate

White Nursing

mental health

Facility

care

Claudette Box AL 2003 Inadequate

Nursing Home

medical and

mental health

care

Oakley & Columbia Training Schools

MS 2003 Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Use of physical and chemical restraints “substantially departs” from standards of care and exposes children to “excessive and unnecessary restrictive interventions” (p. 25).
“[I]nappropriate use of multiple medications” and “excessive reliance on psychotropic medications (chemical restraints)” (p. 8).
Facility administers “excessive or unnecessary doses of psychotropics” (p. 3).
Use of physical restraints such as “[h]og-tying and [p]ole-shackling” despite lack of “penological justification or therapeutic or rehabilitative benefit” of such disciplinary methods (pp. 5-9).

Name of Facility

74c
State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Excessive use of force
Inadequate mental health care

Facility staff “use excessive force with impunity” (pp. 911).
“Many youth on psychiatric medications are not allowed to continue to receive those medications when they are admitted” (p. 15).
Facilities “fail to employ adequate suicide prevention measures” (p. 16).

APPENDIX D CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XI The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XIV SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
* * * * * SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
(1d)

2d
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
§ 12101. Findings and purpose
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that—
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards

3d
and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter—
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

4d
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.

5d
Title II, Part A, of The Americans With Disabilities Act
§ 12131. Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
(1) Public entity
The term “public entity” means— (A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose dis-
trict, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 2410(4) of title 49).
(2) Qualified individual with a disability The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
§ 12132. Discrimination Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

6d
§ 12133. Enforcement
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.
§ 12134. Regulations
(a) In general
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement this part. Such regulations shall not include any matter within the scope of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation under section 12143, 12149, or 12164 of this title.
(b) Relationship to other regulations
Except for “program accessibility, existing facilities”, and “communications”, regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (as promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on January 13, 1978), applicable to recipients of Federal financial assistance under section 794 of title 29. With respect to “program accessibility, existing facilities”, and “communications”, such regulations shall be consistent with regulations and analysis as in part 39 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, applicable to federally conducted activities under such section 794 of title 29.

7d
(c) Standards
Regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall include standards applicable to facilities and vehicles covered by this part, other than facilities, stations, rail passenger cars, and vehicles covered by part B of this subchapter. Such standards shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board in accordance with section 12204(a) of this title.
* * * * *

8d
Title II, Part B, of The Americans With Disabilities Act
§ 12141. Definitions
As used in this subpart:
(1) Demand responsive system
The term “demand responsive system” means any system of providing designated public transportation which is not a fixed route system.
(2) Designated public transportation
The term “designated public transportation” means transportation (other than public school transportation) by bus, rail, or any other conveyance (other than transportation by aircraft or intercity or commuter rail transportation (as defined in section 12161 of this title)) that provides the general public with general or special service (including charter service) on a regular and continuing basis.
(3) Fixed route system
The term “fixed route system” means a system of providing designated public transportation on which a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed schedule.
(4) Operates
The term “operates”, as used with respect to a fixed route system or demand responsive system, includes operation of such system by a person under a contractual or other arrangement or relationship with a public entity.
(5) Public school transportation
The term “public school transportation” means transportation by schoolbus vehicles of schoolchildren, per-

9d
sonnel, and equipment to and from a public elementary or secondary school and school-related activities.
(6) Secretary
The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Transportation.
§ 12142. Public entities operating fixed route systems
(a) Purchase and lease of new vehicles
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system to purchase or lease a new bus, a new rapid rail vehicle, a new light rail vehicle, or any other new vehicle to be used on such system, if the solicitation for such purchase or lease is made after the 30th day following July 26, 1990, and if such bus, rail vehicle, or other vehicle is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
(b) Purchase and lease of used vehicles
Subject to subsection (c)(1) of this section, it shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system to purchase or lease, after the 30th day following July 26, 1990, a used vehicle for use on such system unless such entity makes demonstrated good faith efforts to purchase or lease a used vehicle for use on such system that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.

10d
(c) Remanufactured vehicles
(1) General rule
Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system—
(A) to remanufacture a vehicle for use on such system so as to extend its usable life for 5 years or more, which remanufacture begins (or for which the solicitation is made) after the 30th day following July 26, 1990; or
(B) to purchase or lease for use on such system a remanufactured vehicle which has been remanufactured so as to extend its usable life for 5 years or more, which purchase or lease occurs after such 30th day and during the period in which the usable life is extended;
unless, after remanufacture, the vehicle is, to the maximum extent feasible, readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
(2) Exception for historic vehicles
(A) General rule
If a public entity operates a fixed route system any segment of which is included on the National Register of Historic Places and if making a vehicle of historic character to be used solely on such segment readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities would significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle, the public entity only has to make (or to purchase or lease a remanufactured vehicle with) those modifications which are necessary to

11d
meet the requirements of paragraph (1) and which do not significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle.
(B) Vehicles of historic character defined by regulations
For purposes of this paragraph and section 12148(b) of this title, a vehicle of historic character shall be defined by the regulations issued by the Secretary to carry out this subsection.
§ 12143. Paratransit as a complement to fixed route service
(a) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system (other than a system which provides solely commuter bus service) to fail to provide with respect to the operations of its fixed route system, in accordance with this section, paratransit and other special transportation services to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, that are sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system; or (2) in the case of response time, which is comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system.
(b) Issuance of regulations
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Secretary shall issue final regulations to carry out this section.

12d
(c) Required contents of regulations
(1) Eligible recipients of service
The regulations issued under this section shall require each public entity which operates a fixed route system to provide the paratransit and other special transportation services required under this section—
(A)(i) to any individual with a disability who is unable, as a result of a physical or mental impairment (including a vision impairment) and without the assistance of another individual (except an operator of a wheelchair lift or other boarding assistance device), to board, ride, or disembark from any vehicle on the system which is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
(ii) to any individual with a disability who needs the assistance of a wheelchair lift or other boarding assistance device (and is able with such assistance) to board, ride, and disembark from any vehicle which is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if the individual wants to travel on a route on the system during the hours of operation of the system at a time (or within a reasonable period of such time) when such a vehicle is not being used to provide designated public transportation on the route; and
(iii) to any individual with a disability who has a specific impairment-related condition which prevents such individual from traveling to a boarding location or from a disembarking location on such system;
(B) to one other individual accompanying the individual with the disability; and
(C) to other individuals, in addition to the one individual described in subparagraph (B), accompanying

13d
the individual with a disability provided that space for these additional individuals is available on the paratransit vehicle carrying the individual with a disability and that the transportation of such additional individuals will not result in a denial of service to individuals with disabilities.
For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), boarding or disembarking from a vehicle does not include travel to the boarding location or from the disembarking location.
(2) Service area
The regulations issued under this section shall require the provision of paratransit and special transportation services required under this section in the service area of each public entity which operates a fixed route system, other than any portion of the service area in which the public entity solely provides commuter bus service.
(3) Service criteria
Subject to paragraphs (1) and (2), the regulations issued under this section shall establish minimum service criteria for determining the level of services to be required under this section.
(4) Undue financial burden limitation
The regulations issued under this section shall provide that, if the public entity is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the provision of paratransit and other special transportation services otherwise required under this section would impose an undue financial burden on the public entity, the public entity, notwithstanding any other provision of this section (other than paragraph (5)), shall only be required to pro-

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vide such services to the extent that providing such services would not impose such a burden.
(5) Additional services
The regulations issued under this section shall establish circumstances under which the Secretary may require a public entity to provide, notwithstanding paragraph (4), paratransit and other special transportation services under this section beyond the level of paratransit and other special transportation services which would otherwise be required under paragraph (4).
(6) Public participation
The regulations issued under this section shall require that each public entity which operates a fixed route system hold a public hearing, provide an opportunity for public comment, and consult with individuals with disabilities in preparing its plan under paragraph (7).
(7) Plans
The regulations issued under this section shall require that each public entity which operates a fixed route system—
(A) within 18 months after July 26, 1990, submit to the Secretary, and commence implementation of, a plan for providing paratransit and other special transportation services which meets the requirements of this section; and
(B) on an annual basis thereafter, submit to the Secretary, and commence implementation of, a plan for providing such services.
(8) Provision of services by others
The regulations issued under this section shall—

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(A) require that a public entity submitting a plan to the Secretary under this section identify in the plan any person or other public entity which is providing a paratransit or other special transportation service for individuals with disabilities in the service area to which the plan applies; and
(B) provide that the public entity submitting the plan does not have to provide under the plan such service for individuals with disabilities.
(9) Other provisions
The regulations issued under this section shall include such other provisions and requirements as the Secretary determines are necessary to carry out the objectives of this section.
(d) Review of plan
(1) General rule
The Secretary shall review a plan submitted under this section for the purpose of determining whether or not such plan meets the requirements of this section, including the regulations issued under this section.
(2) Disapproval
If the Secretary determines that a plan reviewed under this subsection fails to meet the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall disapprove the plan and notify the public entity which submitted the plan of such disapproval and the reasons therefor.
(3) Modification of disapproved plan
Not later than 90 days after the date of disapproval of a plan under this subsection, the public entity which submitted the plan shall modify the plan to meet the requirements of this section and shall submit to the Secre-

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tary, and commence implementation of, such modified plan.
(e) “Discrimination” defined
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term “discrimination” includes—
(1) a failure of a public entity to which the regulations issued under this section apply to submit, or commence implementation of, a plan in accordance with subsections (c)(6) and (c)(7) of this section;
(2) a failure of such entity to submit, or commence implementation of, a modified plan in accordance with subsection (d)(3) of this section;
(3) submission to the Secretary of a modified plan under subsection (d)(3) of this section which does not meet the requirements of this section; or
(4) a failure of such entity to provide paratransit or other special transportation services in accordance with the plan or modified plan the public entity submitted to the Secretary under this section.
(f) Statutory construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a public entity—
(1) from providing paratransit or other special transportation services at a level which is greater than the level of such services which are required by this section,
(2) from providing paratransit or other special transportation services in addition to those paratransit and special transportation services required by this section, or
(3) from providing such services to individuals in addition to those individuals to whom such services are required to be provided by this section.

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§ 12144. Public entity operating a demand responsive system
If a public entity operates a demand responsive system, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for such entity to purchase or lease a new vehicle for use on such system, for which a solicitation is made after the 30th day following July 26, 1990, that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless such system, when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to the level of service such system provides to individuals without disabilities.
§ 12145. Temporary relief where lifts are unavailable
(a) Granting
With respect to the purchase of new buses, a public entity may apply for, and the Secretary may temporarily relieve such public entity from the obligation under section 12142(a) or 12144 of this title to purchase new buses that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if such public entity demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary—
(1) that the initial solicitation for new buses made by the public entity specified that all new buses were to be lift-equipped and were to be otherwise accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
(2) the unavailability from any qualified manufacturer of hydraulic, electromechanical, or other lifts for such new buses;
(3) that the public entity seeking temporary relief has made good faith efforts to locate a qualified manufac-

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turer to supply the lifts to the manufacturer of such buses in sufficient time to comply with such solicitation; and
(4) that any further delay in purchasing new buses necessary to obtain such lifts would significantly impair transportation services in the community served by the public entity.
(b) Duration and notice to Congress
Any relief granted under subsection (a) of this section shall be limited in duration by a specified date, and the appropriate committees of Congress shall be notified of any such relief granted.
(c) Fraudulent application
If, at any time, the Secretary has reasonable cause to believe that any relief granted under subsection (a) of this section was fraudulently applied for, the Secretary shall—
(1) cancel such relief if such relief is still in effect; and
(2) take such other action as the Secretary considers appropriate.
§ 12146. New facilities
For purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity to construct a new facility to be used in the provision of designated public transportation services unless such facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
§ 12147. Alterations of existing facilities
(a) General rule
With respect to alterations of an existing facility or part thereof used in the provision of designated public transportation services that affect or could affect the usability of the

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facility or part thereof, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a public entity to fail to make such alterations (or to ensure that the alterations are made) in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon the completion of such alterations. Where the public entity is undertaking an alteration that affects or could affect usability of or access to an area of the facility containing a primary function, the entity shall also make the alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area and the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon completion of such alterations, where such alterations to the path of travel or the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area are not disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope (as determined under criteria established by the Attorney General).
(b) Special rule for stations
(1) General rule
For purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity that provides designated public transportation to fail, in accordance with the provisions of this subsection, to make key stations (as determined under criteria established by the Secretary by regulation) in rapid rail and light rail systems readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.

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(2) Rapid rail and light rail key stations
(A) Accessibility
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, all key stations (as determined under criteria established by the Secretary by regulation) in rapid rail and light rail systems shall be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable but in no event later than the last day of the 3-year period beginning on July 26, 1990.
(B) Extension for extraordinarily expensive structural changes
The Secretary may extend the 3-year period under subparagraph (A) up to a 30-year period for key stations in a rapid rail or light rail system which stations need extraordinarily expensive structural changes to, or replacement of, existing facilities; except that by the last day of the 20th year following July 26, 1990, at least 2/3 of such key stations must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
(3) Plans and milestones
The Secretary shall require the appropriate public entity to develop and submit to the Secretary a plan for compliance with this subsection—
(A) that reflects consultation with individuals with disabilities affected by such plan and the results of a public hearing and public comments on such plan, and
(B) that establishes milestones for achievement of the requirements of this subsection.

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§ 12148. Public transportation programs and activities in existing facilities and one car per train rule
(a) Public transportation programs and activities in existing facilities
(1) In general
With respect to existing facilities used in the provision of designated public transportation services, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public transportation program or activity conducted in such facilities so that, when viewed in the entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
(2) Exception
Paragraph (1) shall not require a public entity to make structural changes to existing facilities in order to make such facilities accessible to individuals who use wheelchairs, unless and to the extent required by section 12147(a) of this title (relating to alterations) or section 12147(b) of this title (relating to key stations).
(3) Utilization
Paragraph (1) shall not require a public entity to which paragraph (2) applies, to provide to individuals who use wheelchairs services made available to the general public at such facilities when such individuals could not utilize or benefit from such services provided at such facilities.
(b) One car per train rule
(1) General rule
Subject to paragraph (2), with respect to 2 or more vehicles operated as a train by a light or rapid rail system,

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for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity to fail to have at least 1 vehicle per train that is accessible to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable but in no event later than the last day of the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of this section.
(2) Historic trains
In order to comply with paragraph (1) with respect to the remanufacture of a vehicle of historic character which is to be used on a segment of a light or rapid rail system which is included on the National Register of Historic Places, if making such vehicle readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities would significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle, the public entity which operates such system only has to make (or to purchase or lease a remanufactured vehicle with) those modifications which are necessary to meet the requirements of section 12142(c)(1) of this title and which do not significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle.
§ 12149. Regulations
(a) In general
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations, in an accessible format, necessary for carrying out this subpart (other than section 12143 of this title).
(b) Standards
The regulations issued under this section and section 12143 of this title shall include standards applicable to facilities and vehicles covered by this part. The standards shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers

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Compliance Board in accordance with section 12204 of this title.
§ 12150. Interim accessibility requirements
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to section 12149 of this title, for new construction or alterations for which a valid and appropriate State or local building permit is obtained prior to the issuance of final regulations under such section, and for which the construction or alteration authorized by such permit begins within one year of the receipt of such permit and is completed under the terms of such permit, compliance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards in effect at the time the building permit is issued shall suffice to satisfy the requirement that facilities be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities as required under sections 12146 and 12147 of this title, except that, if such final regulations have not been issued one year after the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board has issued the supplemental minimum guidelines required under section 12204(a) of this title, compliance with such supplemental minimum guidelines shall be necessary to satisfy the requirement that facilities be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities prior to issuance of the final regulations.
* * * * *
§ 12161. Definitions
As used in this subpart:
(1) Commuter authority
The term “commuter authority” has the meaning given such term in section 502(8) of Title 45.

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(2) Commuter rail transportation
The term “commuter rail transportation” has the meaning given the term “commuter rail passenger transportation” in section 502(9) of Title 45.
(3) Intercity rail transportation
The term “intercity rail transportation” means transportation provided by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
(4) Rail passenger car
The term “rail passenger car” means, with respect to intercity rail transportation, single-level and bi-level coach cars, single-level and bi-level dining cars, singlelevel and bi-level sleeping cars, single-level and bi-level lounge cars, and food service cars.
(5) Responsible person
The term “responsible person” means—
(A) in the case of a station more than 50 percent of which is owned by a public entity, such public entity;
(B) in the case of a station more than 50 percent of which is owned by a private party, the persons providing intercity or commuter rail transportation to such station, as allocated on an equitable basis by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation; and
(C) in a case where no party owns more than 50 percent of a station, the persons providing intercity or commuter rail transportation to such station and the owners of the station, other than private party owners, as allocated on an equitable basis by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation.

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(6) Station
The term “station” means the portion of a property located appurtenant to a right-of-way on which intercity or commuter rail transportation is operated, where such portion is used by the general public and is related to the provision of such transportation, including passenger platforms, designated waiting areas, ticketing areas, restrooms, and, where a public entity providing rail transportation owns the property, concession areas, to the extent that such public entity exercises control over the selection, design, construction, or alteration of the property, but such term does not include flag stops.
§ 12162. Intercity and commuter rail actions considered discriminatory
(a) Intercity rail transportation
(1) One car per train rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person who provides intercity rail transportation to fail to have at least one passenger car per train that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, in accordance with regulations issued under section 12164 of this title, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 5 years after July 26, 1990.
(2) New intercity cars
(A) General rule
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection with respect to individuals who use wheelchairs, it shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a

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person to purchase or lease any new rail passenger cars for use in intercity rail transportation, and for which a solicitation is made later than 30 days after July 26, 1990, unless all such rail cars are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(B) Special rule for single-level passenger coaches for individuals who use wheelchairs
Single-level passenger coaches shall be required to—
(i) be able to be entered by an individual who uses a wheelchair;
(ii) have space to park and secure a wheelchair;
(iii) have a seat to which a passenger in a wheelchair can transfer, and a space to fold and store such passenger’s wheelchair; and
(iv) have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair,
only to the extent provided in paragraph (3).
(C) Special rule for single-level dining cars for individuals who use wheelchairs
Single-level dining cars shall not be required to—
(i) be able to be entered from the station platform by an individual who uses a wheelchair; or
(ii) have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair if no restroom is provided in such car for any passenger.

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(D) Special rule for bi-level dining cars for individuals who use wheelchairs
Bi-level dining cars shall not be required to—
(i) be able to be entered by an individual who uses a wheelchair;
(ii) have space to park and secure a wheelchair;
(iii) have a seat to which a passenger in a wheelchair can transfer, or a space to fold and store such passenger’s wheelchair; or
(iv) have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair.
(3) Accessibility of single-level coaches
(A) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person who provides intercity rail transportation to fail to have on each train which includes one or more single-level rail passenger coaches—
(i) a number of spaces—
(I) to park and secure wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to remain in their wheelchairs) equal to not less than one-half of the number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train; and
(II) to fold and store wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to transfer to coach seats) equal to not less than one-half of the number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train,

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as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 5 years after July 26, 1990; and
(ii) a number of spaces—
(I) to park and secure wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to remain in their wheelchairs) equal to not less than the total number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train; and
(II) to fold and store wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to transfer to coach seats) equal to not less than the total number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train,
as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 10 years after July 26, 1990.
(B) Location
Spaces required by subparagraph (A) shall be located in single-level rail passenger coaches or food service cars.
(C) Limitation
Of the number of spaces required on a train by subparagraph (A), not more than two spaces to park and secure wheelchairs nor more than two spaces to fold and store wheelchairs shall be located in any one coach or food service car.
(D) Other accessibility features
Single-level rail passenger coaches and food service cars on which the spaces required by subparagraph (A) are located shall have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair and shall be able to

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be entered from the station platform by an individual who uses a wheelchair.
(4) Food service
(A) Single-level dining cars
On any train in which a single-level dining car is used to provide food service—
(i) if such single-level dining car was purchased after July 26, 1990, table service in such car shall be provided to a passenger who uses a wheelchair if—
(I) the car adjacent to the end of the dining car through which a wheelchair may enter is itself accessible to a wheelchair;
(II) such passenger can exit to the platform from the car such passenger occupies, move down the platform, and enter the adjacent accessible car described in subclause (I) without the necessity of the train being moved within the station; and
(III) space to park and secure a wheelchair is available in the dining car at the time such passenger wishes to eat (if such passenger wishes to remain in a wheelchair), or space to store and fold a wheelchair is available in the dining car at the time such passenger wishes to eat (if such passenger wishes to transfer to a dining car seat); and
(ii) appropriate auxiliary aids and services, including a hard surface on which to eat, shall be provided to ensure that other equivalent food service is available to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, and to passengers traveling with such individuals.

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Unless not practicable, a person providing intercity rail transportation shall place an accessible car adjacent to the end of a dining car described in clause (i) through which an individual who uses a wheelchair may enter.
(B) Bi-level dining cars
On any train in which a bi-level dining car is used to provide food service—
(i) if such train includes a bi-level lounge car purchased after July 26, 1990, table service in such lounge car shall be provided to individuals who use wheelchairs and to other passengers; and
(ii) appropriate auxiliary aids and services, including a hard surface on which to eat, shall be provided to ensure that other equivalent food service is available to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, and to passengers traveling with such individuals.
(b) Commuter rail transportation
(1) One car per train rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person who provides commuter rail transportation to fail to have at least one passenger car per train that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, in accordance with regulations issued under section 12164 of this title, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 5 years after July 26, 1990.

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(2) New commuter rail cars
(A) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to purchase or lease any new rail passenger cars for use in commuter rail transportation, and for which a solicitation is made later than 30 days after July 26, 1990, unless all such rail cars are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(B) Accessibility
For purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, a requirement that a rail passenger car used in commuter rail transportation be accessible to or readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, shall not be construed to require—
(i) a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair if no restroom is provided in such car for any passenger;
(ii) space to fold and store a wheelchair; or
(iii) a seat to which a passenger who uses a wheelchair can transfer.
(c) Used rail cars
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a person to purchase or lease a used rail passenger car for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation, unless such person makes demonstrated good faith efforts to purchase or lease a

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used rail car that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(d) Remanufactured rail cars
(1) Remanufacturing
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to remanufacture a rail passenger car for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation so as to extend its usable life for 10 years or more, unless the rail car, to the maximum extent feasible, is made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(2) Purchase or lease
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to purchase or lease a remanufactured rail passenger car for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation unless such car was remanufactured in accordance with paragraph (1).
(e) Stations
(1) New stations
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to build a new station for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secre-

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tary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(2) Existing stations
(A) Failure to make readily accessible
(i) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a responsible person to fail to make existing stations in the intercity rail transportation system, and existing key stations in commuter rail transportation systems, readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(ii) Period for compliance
(I) Intercity rail
All stations in the intercity rail transportation system shall be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 20 years after July 26, 1990.
(II) Commuter rail
Key stations in commuter rail transportation systems shall be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable but in no event later than 3 years after July 26, 1990, except that the time limit may be extended by the Secretary of

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Transportation up to 20 years after July 26, 1990, in a case where the raising of the entire passenger platform is the only means available of attaining accessibility or where other extraordinarily expensive structural changes are necessary to attain accessibility.
(iii) Designation of key stations
Each commuter authority shall designate the key stations in its commuter rail transportation system, in consultation with individuals with disabilities and organizations representing such individuals, taking into consideration such factors as high ridership and whether such station serves as a transfer or feeder station. Before the final designation of key stations under this clause, a commuter authority shall hold a public hearing.
(iv) Plans and milestones
The Secretary of Transportation shall require the appropriate person to develop a plan for carrying out this subparagraph that reflects consultation with individuals with disabilities affected by such plan and that establishes milestones for achievement of the requirements of this subparagraph.
(B) Requirement when making alterations
(i) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, with respect to alterations of an existing station or part thereof in the intercity or commuter rail transportation systems that affect or could affect the usability of the station or part

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thereof, for the responsible person, owner, or person in control of the station to fail to make the alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the station are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon completion of such alterations.
(ii) Alterations to a primary function area
It shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, with respect to alterations that affect or could affect the usability of or access to an area of the station containing a primary function, for the responsible person, owner, or person in control of the station to fail to make the alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area, and the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon completion of such alterations, where such alterations to the path of travel or the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area are not disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope (as determined under criteria established by the Attorney General).
(C) Required cooperation
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for an owner, or person in control, of a station governed by subparagraph (A) or (B) to fail to provide reasonable cooperation to a responsible person with

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respect to such station in that responsible person’s efforts to comply with such subparagraph. An owner, or person in control, of a station shall be liable to a responsible person for any failure to provide reasonable cooperation as required by this subparagraph. Failure to receive reasonable cooperation required by this subparagraph shall not be a defense to a claim of discrimination under this chapter.
§ 12163. Conformance of accessibility standards
Accessibility standards included in regulations issued under this subpart shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board under section 12204(a) of this title.
§ 12164. Regulations
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations, in an accessible format, necessary for carrying out this subpart.
§ 12165. Interim accessibility requirements
(a) Stations
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to section 12164 of this title, for new construction or alterations for which a valid and appropriate State or local building permit is obtained prior to the issuance of final regulations under such section, and for which the construction or alteration authorized by such permit begins within one year of the receipt of such permit and is completed under the terms of such permit, compliance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards in effect at the time the building permit is issued shall suffice to satisfy the requirement that stations be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabili-

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ties as required under section 12162(e) of this title, except that, if such final regulations have not been issued one year after the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board has issued the supplemental minimum guidelines required under section 12204(a) of this title, compliance with such supplemental minimum guidelines shall be necessary to satisfy the requirement that stations be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities prior to issuance of the final regulations.
(b) Rail passenger cars
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to section 12164 of this title, a person shall be considered to have complied with the requirements of section 12162(a) through (d) of this title that a rail passenger car be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the design for such car complies with the laws and regulations (including the Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design and such supplemental minimum guidelines as are issued under section 12204(a) of this title) governing accessibility of such cars, to the extent that such laws and regulations are not inconsistent with this subpart and are in effect at the time such design is substantially completed.

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Title IV of The Americans With Disabilities Act
§ 12201. Construction
(a) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.
(b) Relationship to other laws
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude the prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of employment covered by subchapter I of this chapter, in transportation covered by subchapter II or III of this chapter, or in places of public accommodation covered by subchapter III of this chapter.
(c) Insurance
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict—
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or

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(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter2 I and III of this chapter.
(d) Accommodations and services
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit which such individual chooses not to accept.
§ 12202. State immunity
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in3 Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.
2 So in original. Probably should be “subchapters”. 3 So in original. Probably should be “in a”.

40d
§ 12203. Prohibition against retaliation and coercion
(a) Retaliation
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
(c) Remedies and procedures
The remedies and procedures available under sections 12117, 12133, and 12188 of this title shall be available to aggrieved persons for violations of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, with respect to subchapter I, subchapter II and subchapter III of this chapter, respectively.
§ 12204. Regulations by Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
(a) Issuance of guidelines
Not later than 9 months after July 26, 1990, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board shall issue minimum guidelines that shall supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible

41d
Design for purposes of subchapters II and III of this chapter.
(b) Contents of guidelines
The supplemental guidelines issued under subsection (a) of this section shall establish additional requirements, consistent with this chapter, to ensure that buildings, facilities, rail passenger cars, and vehicles are accessible, in terms of architecture and design, transportation, and communication, to individuals with disabilities.
(c) Qualified historic properties
(1) In general
The supplemental guidelines issued under subsection (a) of this section shall include procedures and requirements for alterations that will threaten or destroy the historic significance of qualified historic buildings and facilities as defined in 4.1.7(1)(a) of the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards.
(2) Sites eligible for listing in National Register
With respect to alterations of buildings or facilities that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.), the guidelines described in paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, maintain the procedures and requirements established in 4.1.7(1) and (2) of the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards.

42d
(3) Other sites
With respect to alterations of buildings or facilities designated as historic under State or local law, the guidelines described in paragraph (1) shall establish procedures equivalent to those established by 4.1.7(1)(b) and (c) of the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, and shall require, at a minimum, compliance with the requirements established in 4.1.7(2) of such standards.
§ 12205. Attorney’s fees
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.
§ 12206. Technical assistance
(c) Plan for assistance
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after July 26, 1990, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chair of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall develop a plan to assist entities covered under this chapter, and other Federal agencies, in understanding the responsibility of such entities and agencies under this chapter.

43d
(2) Publication of plan
The Attorney General shall publish the plan referred to in paragraph (1) for public comment in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 (commonly known as the Administrative Procedure Act).
(b) Agency and public assistance
The Attorney General may obtain the assistance of other Federal agencies in carrying out subsection (a) of this section, including the National Council on Disability, the President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, the Small Business Administration, and the Department of Commerce.
(c) Implementation
(1) Rendering assistance
Each Federal agency that has responsibility under paragraph (2) for implementing this chapter may render technical assistance to individuals and institutions that have rights or duties under the respective subchapter or subchapters of this chapter for which such agency has responsibility.
(2) Implementation of subchapters
(A) Subchapter I
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Attorney General shall implement the plan for assistance developed under subsection (a) of this section, for subchapter I of this chapter.

44d
(B) Subchapter II
(i) Part A
The Attorney General shall implement such plan for assistance for part A of subchapter II of this chapter.
(ii) Part B
The Secretary of Transportation shall implement such plan for assistance for part B subchapter II of this chapter.
(C) Subchapter III
The Attorney General, in coordination with Secretary of Transportation and the Chair of the Architectural Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, shall implement such plan for assistance for subchapter III of this chapter, except for section 12184 of this title, the plan for assistance for which shall be implemented by the Secretary of Transportation.
(D) Title IV
The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, in coordinate with the Attorney General, shall implement such plan for assistance for title IV.
(3) Technical assistance manuals
Each Federal agency that has responsibility under paragraph (2) for implementing this chapter shall, as part of its implementation responsibilities, ensure the availability and provision of appropriate technical assistance manuals to individuals or entities with rights or duties under this chapter no later than six months after applica-

45d
ble final regulations are published under subchapters I, II, and III of this chapter and title IV.
(d) Grants and contracts
(1) In general
Each Federal agency that has responsibility under subsection (c)(2) of this section for implementing this chapter may make grants or award contracts to effectuate the purposes of this section, subject to the availability of appropriations. Such grants and contracts may be awarded to individuals, institutions not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit or any private shareholder or individual (including educational institutions), and associations representing individuals who have rights or duties under this chapter. Contracts may be awarded to entities organized for profit, but such entities may not be the recipients or1grants described in this paragraph.
(2) Dissemination of information
Such grants and contracts, among other uses, may be designed to ensure wide dissemination of information about the rights and duties established by this chapter and to provide information and technical assistance about techniques for effective compliance with this chapter.
(e) Failure to receive assistance
An employer, public accommodation, or other entity covered under this chapter shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this chapter because of any failure to receive technical assistance under this section,
1 So in original. Probably should be “of ”.

46d
including any failure in the development or dissemination of any technical assistance manual authorized by this section.
§ 12207. Federal wilderness areas
(a) Study
The National Council on Disability shall conduct a study and report on the effect that wilderness designations and wilderness land management practices have on the ability of individuals with disabilities to use and enjoy the National Wilderness Preservation System as established under the
Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.).
(b) Submission of report
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the National Council on Disability shall submit the report required under subsection (a) of this section to Congress.
(c) Specific wilderness access
(1) In general
Congress reaffirms that nothing in the Wilderness Act [16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.] is to be construed as prohibiting the use of a wheelchair in a wilderness area by an individual whose disability requires use of a wheelchair, and consistent with the Wilderness Act no agency is required to provide any form of special treatment or accommodation, or to construct any facilities or modify any conditions of lands within a wilderness area in order to facilitate such use.
(2) “Wheelchair” defined
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “wheelchair” means a device designed solely for use by a mobility-

47d
impaired person for locomotion, that is suitable for use in an indoor pedestrian area.
§ 12208. Transvestites
For the purposes of this chapter, the term “disabled” or “disability” shall not apply to an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite.
§ 12209. Instrumentalities of the Congress
The General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress shall be covered as follows:
(1) In general
The rights and protections under this chapter shall, subject to paragraph (2), apply with respect to the conduct of each instrumentality of the Congress.
(2) Establishment of remedies and procedures by instrumentalities
The chief official of each instrumentality of the Congress shall establish remedies and procedures to be utilized with respect to the rights and protections provided pursuant to paragraph (1).
(3) Report to Congress
The chief official of each instrumentality of the Congress shall, after establishing remedies and procedures for purposes of paragraph (2), submit to the Congress a report describing the remedies and procedures.

48d
(4) Definition of instrumentality
For purposes of this section, the term “instrumentality of the Congress” means the following:,1 the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress,.1
(5) Enforcement of employment rights
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title shall be available to any employee of an instrumentality of the Congress who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12112 through 12114 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.
(6) Enforcement of rights to public services and accommodations
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title shall be available to any qualified person with a disability who is a visitor, guest, or patron of an instrumentality of Congress and who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12131 through 12150 or section 12182 or 12183 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.
1 So in original. The comma probably should not appear.

49d
(7) Construction
Nothing in this section shall alter the enforcement procedures for individuals with disabilities provided in the General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980 and regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act.
§ 12210. Illegal use of drugs
(a) In general
For purposes of this chapter, the term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.
(b) Rules of construction
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as an individual with a disability an individual who—
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use; except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs; however, nothing in

50d
this section shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conducting of testing for the illegal use of drugs.
(c) Health and other services
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and section 12211(b)(3) of this title, an individual shall not be denied health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, on the basis of the current illegal use of drugs if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services.
(d) “Illegal use of drugs” defined
(1) In general
The term “illegal use of drugs” means the use of drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.]. Such term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.] or other provisions of Federal law. (2) Drugs
The term “drug” means a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 812].
§ 12211. Definitions
(a) Homosexuality and bisexuality
For purposes of the definition of “disability” in section 12102(2) of this title, homosexuality and bisexuality are not

51d
impairments and as such are not disabilities under this chapter.
(b) Certain conditions
Under this chapter, the term “disability” shall not include—
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.
§ 12212. Alternative means of dispute resolution
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter.
§ 12213. Severability
Should any provision in this chapter be found to be unconstitutional by a court of law, such provision shall be severed from the remainder of this chapter and such action shall not affect the enforceability of the remaining provisions of this chapter.

 
 App. 10
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 98-6730
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE LANE and BEVERLY JONES,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT
OF TENNESSEE
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g) limits citation to specific situations. Please see Rule 28(g) before citing in a proceeding in a court in the Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be served on other parties and the Cour_
This notice is to be prominently displayed if this de/ cision is reproduced.

(Filed Jul. 16, 2002)

BEFORE: MARTIN, Chief Circuit RICH and SILER, Circuit Judges

Judge,

SUHRHEIN-

PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs are paraplegics

who sued

the State of Tennessee under Title H of the Americans

with Disabilities Act because they were unable to access

the second floors of many county courthouses in the state.

App. ii

Tennessee filed a motion to dismiss,

Amendment

Immunity.

The district

motion and Tennessee appealed.

claiming Eleventh court denied the

In Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 816-18 (6th Cir. 2002), this court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Title II claims

against state entities that are based on Fourteenth

Amendment

due process principles. See also Trustees of

University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Because plaintiffs' Title II

claim is based on such due process principles, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Tennessee's motion to dismiss

and REMAND with Popovich.

this case for further

proceedings

consistent

 
 upreme

Supreme Court, U.S. FILED
NoP 2 1 6 6 7'MAY i 2 2003
OFFICE OF THE CLEFiK
Court of toe niteb £ tat¢

STATE OF TENNESSEE,
v.

Petitioner,

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
¢
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL G. SUMMERS

Attorney General & Reporter State of Tennessee

MICHAEL S. MOORE*

SolicitorGeneral S. ELIZABETH MARTIN

Senior Counsel

MARY MARTELLE

COLLIER

Assistant Attorney General

CivilLitigation& State Services Division

P. O. Box 20207

Nashville, Tennessee 37202

Telephone: (615) 741-2471

Attorneys for Petitioner *Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEFPRINTINGCO.(8002)25-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (4023)42-2831

QUESTIONS

PRESENTED

. Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2002), exceeds

Congress's authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment,

thereby failing validly to abrogate the

states' Eleventh Amendment

immunity from private

damage claims.

, Whether the abrogation analysis under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2002), differs when an individual Title II claim is purportedly tied to due process concerns rather than equal protection concerns.

ii
LIST OF PARTIES
The Plaintiffs in this action are George Lane and Beverly Jones. In addition to the State of Tennessee, twenty-five Tennessee counties - Bledsoe, Cannon, Chester, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Decatur, Fayette, Grainger, Hancock, Hawkins, Hickman, Houston, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Lake, Lewis, Meigs, Moore, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Trousdale, and Van Buren - were also named as defendants in the district court. The United States intervened as a party pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 in the Sixth Circuit. Only the parties named in the caption were parties on appeal to the Sixth Circuit.

oo°
111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented ................................................. List of Parties ........................................................... Table of Authorities ..... : ............................................

Page i ii
iv

Opinions Below .........................................................

1

Jurisdiction

.........................................

. ....................

1

Constitutional

and Statutory Provisions ..................

2

Statement of the Case ..............................................

3

Reasons for Granting the Petition ............................

8

I. There Is a Clear Split among the Circuits

Concerning

Whether, under Title II of the

ADA, Congress Has Validly Abrogated State

Sovereign

Immunity

under the Eleventh

Amendment ...................................................

10

II. The Sixth Circuit's

"As-Applied"

Analysis

Announced

in Popovich and Employed in

This Case Conflicts with This Court's Deci-

sions Delimiting

Congress's

Section 5 Au-

thority to Abrogate

Eleventh Amendment

Immunity .......................................................

15

Conclusion ................................................................

19

Appendix .....................................................

............... :App. 1

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146, cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000) .......................... 9, 12, 18

Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531

U.S. 356 (200I) .......................................................

passim

Bruggeman

v. Blagojevich,

324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir.

2003) ...............................................................................

12

City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) .................... 16

Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Ciro 1997) ...... 13, 14

College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) ........................ 16

Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1190 (2001) ............................

13, 14

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary

Educ. Expense Bd.

v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) ..................... 16

Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn,

280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001) ...................................

.....13, 18

Hason v. Medical Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167 (gth Cir.), cert. granted in part, 123 S. Ct. 561 (2002), : cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 1779 (2003) .......... 9, 10, 13, 14

Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 301

F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2002) ....................................................

10

Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ........ .16

Pennsylvania

Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524

U.S. 206 (1998) ................................................................

8

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627 (6th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated (6th Cir. 2000), on rehearing en banc, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002) ....................... 6, 7, 15, 17, 18

Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &

Eddy, 506 U.S. 139 (1993) .............................................

18

Reickenbacker

v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974 (5th Cir.

2001) ...............................................................................

11

Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002) ................ 11, 12

Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied sub nom. United States v. Snyder, 531

U.S. 1190 (2001) .............................................................

12

Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2002) ..... 11, 18

Wroncy v. Oregon Dep't of Transp., 9 Fed. Appx. 604

(9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................

14

Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) .................................

12

DOCKETED CASES

Bowers, etc. v. National Collegiate AthleticAss'n, etc., et al., (3d Cir. Nos. 01-4226/4492 & 02-1789)....10-11

Johnson v. State Technology Ctr. at Memphis, (6th

Cir. No. 98-6475) .............................................................

5

Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, (6th Cir.

No. 97-3933) ....................................................................

5

Parr v. Middle Tenn. State Univ., (6th Cir. No. 98-

6701) ................................................................................

5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Pomeroy v. Western Mich. Univ., (6th Cir. No. 97-

1751) ................................................................................

5

Satterfield v. Tennessee, (6th Cir. No. 98-5765) .................. 5

Wright v. Lima Correctional Inst., (6th Cir. No. 97-

3587) ................................................................................

5

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. amend. XI ...........................p.a.s.s.i.m..........

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ............................................

passim

FEDERAL STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .............................................................

1

42 U.S.C. § 12131 .............................................................

1, 3

42 U.S.C. § 12132 ................................................................

3

28 C.F.R. Part 35.101 ..........................................................

3

FED. R. CIV. R 23 ................................................................

4

OTttER AUTHORITY

Brief for the United States in Opposition, Thompson v. Colorado, cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002) (No. 01-1024) ............ :......................... ,............

9, 10

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Attorney General and Reporter of Tennessee, on behalf of the State of Tennessee, respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the State of Tennessee does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims by private individuals under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq., ffthe claim purports to arise from a due process-type violation.
OPINIONS BELOW
The amended opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1-5) is reported at 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003). The original opinion of the court of appeals (App. 10-11) and the order of the district court denying petitioner's motion to dismiss (App. 6-7) are unreported.
JURISDICTION
The initial judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 16, 2002. A timely petition for rehearing was filed on August 29, 2002. The petition for rehearing was granted, and an amended opinion was entered on January 10; 2003. On March 4, 2003, Justice Stevens extendedthe time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including May 12, 2003. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Eleventh Amendment Constitution provides:

of the United States

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
in equity, commenced or prosecuted against one • of the United States by citizens of another state,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

The Fourteenth

Amendment

Constitution provides in pertinent

of the United part:

States

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and the

state wherein they reside. No state shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-

leges or immunities

of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any state deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-

tion the equal protection of the laws.

° °°
Section 5. The congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. •

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

Title II of the Americans provides in pertinent part:

with Disabilities

Act of 1990

(1) Public entity

The term "public entity" means -

(A) any State or local government;

(B) any department,

agency, special

purpose district, or other instrumentality

of

a State or States or local government;...

42 U.S.C. § 12131.

Title II further provides:

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter,

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from par-

ticipation in or be denied the benefits of the ser-

vices, programs, or activities of a public entity, or

be subjected to discrimination

by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

STATEMENT

OF THE CASE

Respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this suit in. the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee and twenty-five Tennessee counties on August 10, 1998. The Complaint alleged that Defendants have violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA'), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and its regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.101, et seq., as more fully described below. (App. 12-28).

Respondent Lane alleged that he was denied access to the General Sessions Courts of Polk County when he was a defendant in a criminal action. (App: 15-17). Respondent Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she has been

denied access to the courthouses

in Trousdale, Jackson,

Clay and Pickett Counties for the purposes of transcribing

trials and other matters and has lost work as a court

reporter and the opportunity to participate in the judicial

process. (App. 19-20). Respondents

contended that the

State of Tennessee administers its judicial functions in the

county courthouses of each county of the state and that it

has failed to comply with the Department

of Justice

regulations

under the ADA found at 28 C.F.R. Part 35.

(App. 20). Both respondents

alleged that they have each

• been excluded from participation in the services offered by

the county courthouses

and denied equal access to the

court proceedings

of the State of Tennessee. (App. 23).

Respondents

also requested that the district court certify

this case as a class action and certify them as class repre-

sentatives pursuant to Rule 23, FED. R. CIV. P., on behalf of all individuals residing in the State of Tennessee who

are quahfied individuals with a physical disability that

prevents inchnes

them from climbing in the courthouses

stairs or walking up steep of the named defendants.

(App. 25-26). Respondent Lane sought monetary damages

for humiliation and embarrassment

in an amount not to

exceed $100,000. (App. 27). Respondent

Jones sought

monetary damages for humiliation

and embarrassment

and lost income in an amount not to exceed $250,000. Id.

Respondents

also requested that the district court compel

the State of Tennessee and the counties to comply with the

provisions

of the ADA.: (App. 28). Finally, respondents

sought monetary damages for themselves as class repre-

sentatives of the putative for each class member ment. Id.

class they seek to represent and

for humiliation

and embarrass-

The State of Tennessee moved to dismiss the claims

against it on the ground that Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity protects it from suits for money

damages under Title II of the ADA. By order entered November 10, 1998, the district court denied the motion

without comment (App. 6-7), and the State of Tennessee

immediately

appealed that order to the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals.

On motion of the State, the matter was consolidated for submission with two other cases pending before the Sixth Circuit. Johnson v. State Technology Ctr. at Memphis (6th Cir. No. 98-6475) and Parr v. Middle Tenn. State Univ. (6th Cir. No. 98-6701). Oral argument in the consolidated cases was further consolidated for argument with four other cases. I The cases were collectively heardby the Sixth Circuit on October 26, 1999, at which time the panel took them under advisement. On April 17, 2000, this Court granted review in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, on the issues of whether Title I and Title II of the ADA are valid exercises of Congress's authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).

On April 28, 2000, the Sixth Circuit panel issued an

order holding the cases in abeyance pending this Court's

decision in Garrett. On September

18, 2000, before this

Court's decision in Garrett, another panel of the Sixth

t Satterfield v. Tennessee (6th Cir. No. 98-5765); Nihiser v. Ohio • Envtl. Protection Agency (6th Cir. No. 97-3933); Wright v. Lima Correctional Inst. (6th Cir. No. 97-3587); and Pomeroy v. Western Mich. Univ. (6th Cir. No. 97-1751).

Circuit issued its opinion in another pending case present-

ing the issue of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity

from suit under Title II of the ADA. Popovich v. Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627 (6th Cir.),

rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated (6th Cir. 2000),

on rehearing en banc, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

123 S. Ct. 72 (2002). The original Popovieh panel held that

the plaintiff's Title. II claim in that ease was barred by

Eleventh Amendment

immunity. 227 F.3d at 641.

This Court heard oral argument in Garrett on October 11, 2000, and issued its opinion on February 21, 2001. The Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en bane in Popovich on December 12, 2000, but delayed rehearing pending this Court's decision in Garrett.

The en bane court of appeals issued its opinion in

Popovich on January 10, 2002. A sharply divided court

agreed in part with the original panel, holding that "lilt is

clear after Garrett that congressional

authority under

section 5 to enforce the Equal Protection Clause is limited

and will not sustain the Disabilities Act as an exception to

Eleventh Amendment

state immunity." 276 F.3d at 812.

The majority, however, distinguished

between Title II

claims sounding in equal protection and those sounding in

due process, concluding that the latter are not barred by

the EleventhAmendment.

Id. at 813-16.

After the en banc decision in Popovich was issued, the panel before whom this case was pending issued a per curiam order affirming the district court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss. Concluding, based on Popovich, "that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Title II claims against state entities that are based upon Fourteenth

Amendment due processprinciples," the panel determined that respondents' Title II claims were not barred _[b]ecause... [they are] basedon such due processprinciples."(App. 11).

On August 29, 2002, the State petitioned for a panel

rehearing, arguing that Popovich was not controlling

because the Complaint, properly analyzed, did not allege

due process violations. The petition was granted on Sep-

tember 20, 2002, and the court directed both parties to

submit briefs on the issue of whether respondents' claims

were based on due process principles. (App. 8). On Janu-

ary 10, 2003, the panel issued an amended opinion affirm-

ing the decision of the district court and remanding the

case for further proceedings.

(App. 1-5). Noting that

_[a]mong the rights protected by the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth

Amendment

is the right of access to the

courts" (App. 3), the court, without citation to authority,

asserted that "It]he evidence before Congress when it

enacted Title II of the [ADA] established

that physical

barriers in government

buildings, including courthouses

and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of

denying disabled people the opportunity

to access vital

services and to exercise fundamental

rights guaranteed by

the Due Process Clause" (App. 3-4), and that Congress

enacted Title II as an appropriate

means _.'te guarantee

meaningful enforcement' of the constitutional

rights of the

disabled," including %he right of access to the courts."

(App. 4, quoting Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815-16).

Turning to the allegations of the Complaint, the panel

concluded that both respondents

were seeking to redress

due process-type violations of Title II: _Jones and Lane are

seeking to vindicate their right of access to the courts in

Tennessee.

Lane alleges that he has been denied the

benefit of accessto the courts. Jonessimilarly allegesthat she has been excluded from courthouses and court proceedingsby an inability to accessthe physical facilities."

(App. 5). The court declined to answer the State's conten-

tion that respondents' allegations, particularly those made

by Jones, were based upon equal protection principles. Id.

"The difficult questions presented by this case cannot be

clarified absent a factual record," the court observed. Id.

And, because the case came to the Sixth Circuit "before

any development

of the facts," a remand to the district

court for further proceedings was deemed appropriate. Id.

On the State's motion, the court of appeals stayed the

mandate pending the filing and disposition for a writ of certiorari.

of this petition

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This Court has granted certiorari three times on the first question presented by this petition. 2 Each time the issue has been taken up by this Court, it has evaded review. Onc.e again, this petition squarely raises the issue and the State of Tennessee urges this Court to grant the petition and resolve the issue of the states' Eleventh

2 In 1998, in determining whether inmates in state prisons were

covered _by Title II, this Court held that state prisons fall within the definition of _public entity. _ Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206 (1998). However, the Court expressly declined to resolve

the issue of _whether application of the ADA to state prisons is a

constitutional exercise of Congress' power under...

, § 5 of the Four-

teenth Amendmenff' because it had not been addressed by the Court of

Appeals. Id. at 212.

Amendment

immunity

from suits for money damages

brought by private individuals under Title II of the ADA.

In 2000, this Court agreed to review the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision holding that Congress had not validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with Title II of the ADA. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146, cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000). However, certiorari was dismissed by agreement of the parties.

Then, this Court granted certiorari in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), to decide whether state employees can bring a private action against their employer under Title I and/or Title II of the ADA. However, after argument, the Court determined that the parties had not addressed the issue of whether state employees can sue under Title II and dismissed the Title II portion of the writ as improvidently granted. Id. at 360 n.1.

Most recently, this Court granted review in Medical

Board of California v. Hason on the question whether the

"Eleventh Amendment

bar[s] suit under Title II of the

ADA against the California Medical Board for denial of a

medical license based on the applicant's mental illness."

123 S. Ct. 561 (2002). However, that petition was dismissed on the motion of the State of California. 123 S. Ct.

1779 (2003).

This case presents yet another opportunity

for the

Court to decide the question whether the states enjoy

Eleventh Amendment

immunity from suits for money

damages brought by private individuals under Title II of

the ADA. Previously, the United States has acknowledged

that this issue "is an important question that may merit

10

review by this Court at the appropriate time and in the

appropriate

case." Brief for the United States in Opposi-

tion at 6, Thompson v. Colorado, cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.

1960 (2002) (No. 01-1024) (footnote omitted). As we now

show, the need for this Court's authoritative

guidance

concerning this important issue of constitutional

law has

not abated since the recent dismissal in Hason, and this is

the appropriate time and case for review by this Court.

I. There Is a Clear Split among the Circuits Con-

cerning Whether, under Title II of the ADA, Con-

gress Has Validly Abrogated

State Sovereign

Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

This Court should grant review in order to settle the

disagreement

among the lower courts concerning whether

Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amend-

ment immunity in enacting Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act. After this Court's decision in Garrett,

holding that the states are immune from suits for money

damages under Title I of the ADA, the lower circuit courts

have struggled to address Title II in relation to the Elev-

enth Amendment.

Currently, there is a four-way circuit

split, s While the majority of the circuits have held that the

The First and Third Circuits have not addressed the issue but will do so shortly. In Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 301 F.3d 13 (lst Cir. 2002), a panel of the First Circuit held that an individual plaintiff could bring an action under Title II only as Title H "is applied to cases in which a court identified a constitutional violation by the state.* Id. at 24. However, that opinion was vacated because the First Circuit has granted rehearing en banc. Oral argument is set for June 5, 2003. In addition, this issue has been briefed and is set to be argued before the Third Circuit during the week of July 7, 2003, in
(Continued on following page)

11

states have sovereign immunity from claims for monetary damages under Title II, the Sixth Circuit has joined the Second Circuit in holding that Title II plaintiffs may overcome state immunity in certain factual circumstances, while the Ninth Circuit simply allows all claims against public entities.

The five circuits holding that the states have immu-

nity from claims under Title similar fashion. The Fourth did not have an adequate

II have addressed the issue in Circuit held "that Congress record of unconstitutional

discrimination

by states against the disabled to support

abrogation." Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203, 213 (4th

Cir. 2002). Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded "that Congress did not validly abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states when it enacted Part A of Title II of the ADA."

Id. at 215. The Fifth Circuit also held that Congress "has

not validly acted through its Fourteenth

Amendment

Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity"

under Title II of the ADA. Reickenbacker

v. Foster, 274

F.3d 974, 984 (5th Cir. 2001).

The Tenth Circuit directly considered the plaintiffs'

claim that the ADA enforces both the Equal Protection

Clause and the Due Process Clause in Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002). The Tenth Circuit held that it could not

_conclude that Congress 'identified a history and pattern'

of unconstitutional

discrimination

by the states against

the disabled ... or extensive litigation and discussion of

Bowers, etc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, etc., et al. (3d Cir. Nos. 01-4226/4492 & 02-1789).

12

the constitutional violations." IS. at 1034. Thus, the Tenth

Circuit held that Title II is not "preventive or remedial

legislation that is congruent and proportional

to any

constitutional

violation." IS. In the Tenth Circuit, there-

fore, Title II ADA claims under either the Equal Protection

or Due Process Clauses are explicitly barred.

Before this Court's Circuit issued Walker 2000), cert. denieS sub

decision in Garret, the Seventh v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. nora. UniteS States v. Snyder, 531

U.S. 1190 (2001), which appears to hold that claims for

reasonable

modifications

under Title II of the ADA are

barred. Walker also held that Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), did not authorize suits for injunctive relief against state oiTicials under Title II of the ADA. The Seventh

Circuit later determined

that the latter holding was

overruled by Oarrett. See Bruggeman v. Blggojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 912-13 (7th Cir. 2003). However, Walker's hold-

ing barring monetary claims against the States appears to

remain good law.

Also before this Court's decision in Oarrett, the Eighth

Circuit held in Alsbrook v. City o[Maumelle,

184 F.Sd 999,

1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146,

cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000), "that the extension

of Title II of the ADA to the states was not a proper exer-

cise of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Consequently,

there is no Valid abrogation of

Arkansas' Eleventh Amendment

immunity from private

suit in federal courtand the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim."

Contrary to the well-reasoned

opinions in the above

circuits, the Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have failed

to apply C_rrett to cases brought by private plaintiffs

13

against state entities under Title II. The Second Circuit held that certain factual patterns will allow a plaintiff to

defeat state immunity and bring an action for money

damages against a state. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci-

ences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001). The

Second Circuit focused on Title Its remedial scheme. Id. at

111. Unlike Title I, which incorporates the remedial scheme

of Title VII, Title II of the ADA incorporates the remedial

scheme found in the Rehabilitation

Act, which incorpo-

rates Title vrs remedial scheme and which has only a

judicially implied private cause of action. Id. The Second

Circuit held that it had the latitude, indeed was required,

to shape a remedial scheme that would comply with

Congress's

constitutional

authority. Id. Thus, in the

Second Circuit, private individuals may sue an unconsent-

ing state for violation of Title II if %he plaintiff can estab-

lish that the Title II violation was motivated by either

discriminatory

animus or ill will due to disability." Id. at

112. _[A] plaintiff may rely on a burden-shifting

technique

similar to that adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v: Green

or a motivating-factor

analysis similar to that set out in

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins." Id. (citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit stands in complete opposition to the

other circuits. Before Garrett, the Ninth Circuit held that

Title II of the ADA is a valid abrogation by Congress of the

states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Dare v. California,

191 F.3d 1167, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531

U.S. 1190 (2001); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270-

71 (9th Cir. 1997). In more recent decisions, the Ninth

Circuit has specifically

declined to reexamine

Title II

under the analysis required by this Court in Garrett and

continues to apply its pre-Garrett

holdings to Title II.

Hason v. Medical Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th

14

Cir.), cert. granted in part, 123 S. Ct. 561 (2002), cert.

dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 1779 (2003). "[W]e ... conclude that

Garrett does not overrule either Clark or Dare, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar... Title II claims."

Id. at 1172. Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, private individuals

may bring claims for monetary

damages against the

states. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that Title II

_brings within its scope anything Wroncy v. Oregon Dep't of Transp., (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

a public entity does." 9 Fed. Appx. 604, 606

Thus, in the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and

Tenth Circuits, the states are immune from claims for

monetary damages brought by private individuals under

Title II of the ADA. However, in the Sixth Circuit, the

states have immunity only in cases alleging an equal

protection-type

violation and in the Second Circuit, the

states are protected only ff the plaintiff does not allege

actual intent to discriminate.

Finally, in the Ninth Circuit,

the states are completely unprotected from private claims

for monetary damages under Title II.

Clearly, there is a substantial

split among the lower

courts warranting this Court's intervention. As a result of

this split, the extent of Eleventh Amendment immunity

enjoyed by a state depends completely upon the circuit in which it is located. Plaintiffs and states alike have no

certainty so long as this important issue remains unre-

solved. The variety of approaches used by the circuits adds

to the confusion. matter.

Only this Court can finally settle the

15

II. The Sixth Circuit's "As-Applied"

Analysis An-

nounced in Popovich and Employed in This Case

Conflicts with This Court's Decisions Delimiting

Congress's Section 5 Authority to Abrogate Elev-

enth Amendment Immunity.

In this case, the Sixth Circuit applied its holding in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276

F.3d 808 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72

(2002), to conclude that the State of Tennessee does not

have Eleventh Amendment

immunity from a potential

class action 4 by mobility-impaired

persons seeking physi-

cal access to the county courthouses

in Tennessee. The

Sixth Circuit's analysis in Popovich and applied in this

case is fatally flawed.

In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, this Court held that Congress exceeded its power

under the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating the states'

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits brought under

Title I of the ADA, concerning employment.

531 U.S. at

374. The Court found that Title I did not fall under Con-

gress's power to enforce constitutional

rights, as Title I

created rights and remedies far beyond what the Constitu-

tion requires, and Congress was not responding

to a

pattern Id.

of previous

constitutional

violations by the states.

In Garrett, this Court accurately describes its section 5 analysis as a set of "now familiar principles." Id. at 365.

' Although Plaintiffs moved for class certification in their Complaint, the district court has not yet ruled on the issue. That issue, like all others in this case, was stayed while the State of Tennessee pursues this appeal.

16

There are several steps required to determ/me whether a

given enactment is justified by Congress's power under

section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,

to enforce consti-

tutional guarantees.

First, the Court "identif[ies] with

some precision the scope of the constitutional

right at

issue." Id. Second, the Court "examine[s] whether Con-

gress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional"

state action in the area in question (such as employment

discrimination

against the disabled), because Congress's

section 5 power "is appropriately

exercised only in re-

sponse to state transgressions."

Id. at 368. Third, whether

the alleged "pattern" of State misbehavior seems great or

small, the Court compares Congress's statutory remedial

scheme to the constitutional

problem it addresses in order

to determine 374.

if it is "congruent

and proportional."

Id. at

In an unbroken line of cases, this Court has applied

the congruence

and proportionality

test in examining

whether Congress exceeded its powers under section 5 of

the Fourteenth

Amendment

in abrogating

the states'

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 360 (ADA Title

I); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age

Discrimination

in Employment

Act); Florida Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527

U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Remedy Act); College Sav. Bank v.

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary

Educ. Expense Bd., 527

U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark

Remedy Clarification

Act);

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (I997) (Religious

Freedom Restoration

Act). In each of these cases, this

Court held that the statute in question was not a valid

exercise of Congress's section 5 enforcement

power, be-

cause Congress was not responding to a pattern of state

17

constitutional violations, and each statute granted rights and remediesbeyondwhat the Constitution requires.
In doing so, this Court reviewed and rejected each challenged statute on its face, not in an _as-applied" context such as the approachutilized by the Sixth Circuit. This Court has never looked to any individual claim or measured any particular plaintiff's claim against the relevant constitutional guarantee. Title II should be subject to the same form of analysis performed by this Court in Garrett.

In Garrett, for example, this Court compared Title I's

statutory provisions to the Constitution's

equal protection

guarantees

- it did not compare Ms. Garrett's specific

allegations

to the constitutional

standard. Garrett, 531

U.S. at 365-68. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit addressing

Title II stated, _[i]n defining the 'metes and bounds' of the

constitutional

right before us, we must consider whether

plaintiff's

due process-type

claim to participate

fully in

the hearing in his child custody suit is an exception to

Eleventh Amendment

immunity." Popovich, 276 F.3d at

813. Similarly, applying Popovich to the instant case, the

Sixth Circuit determined that respondents may be able to

sue the State of Tennessee under Title II, because their

particular claims implicate a due process _right of access

to the courts." (App. 5). The Sixth Circuit has now remanded

the case to the district court for further factual develop-

ment to test that hypothesis. Id. The end result of the

Sixth Circuit's analysis in this case is that respondents'

specific factual allegations will determine whether Con-

gress validly abrogated Tennessee's Eleventh Amendment

immunity when it enacted Title II of the ADA. This does

not comply with Garrett.

Moreover, the very process of additional fact-finding

envisioned by the Sixth Circuit's amended order remand-

ing this case to the district court will irretrievably

strip

Tennessee

of most of the protections

the Eleventh

Amendment was intended to secure, i.e., immunity from

suit, not simply immunity from liability. This Court has

long recognized that the states' Eleventh Amendment

immunity is immunity not just from l_ability but from suit

itself. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &

Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1993) and cases cited therein.

The lack of an adequate legislative history to support

the viability of Title II of the ADA is apparent. Had the

Sixth Circuit followed this Court's guidance in Garrett, it would have been constrained to reach the conclusion that

respondents

may not sue Tennessee. Title II is grounded

on the same provisions and legislative history that this

Court found inadequate to support abrogation in Garrett. See Wessel, 306 F.3d at 213; Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1009.

As discussed above, the Second Circuit's analysis of

Title II of the ADA in Gareia suffers from some of the same

problems the harms the Sixth

as the Sixth Circuit's Popovich analysis. Thus, of the as-apphed approach are not confined to Circuit. For this reason, this Court should not

only resolve the four-way split over the states' Eleventh

Amendment

immunity under Title II of the ADA, but

should also resolve whether section 5 analysis should ever

take this as:applied form.

This Court should take resolve the issue of whether

Amendment

immunity

from

brought by private individuals

this opportunity

to finally

the states have Eleventh

suits for money damages

under Title II of the ADA.

19

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, certiorari should be granted.

the petition

for a writ of

Dated: May 12, 2003

Respectfully submitted,
PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General & Reporter State of Tennessee
MICHAEL E. MOORE* Solicitor General
S. ELIZABETH I%fl_ARTIN Senior Counsel MARY MARTELLE COLLIER
Assistant Attorney General Ci__l Litigation & State Services
Division P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207 (615) 741-2471
Attorneys for Petitioner *Counsel of Record

App. 1

RECOMMENDED Pursuant

FOR FULL-TEXT

PUBLICATION

to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC

CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0010A (6th Cir. ) File Name: 03a0010a.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE LANE; BEVERLY JONES
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor,

V. STATE OF TENNESSEE_
Defendant-Appellant,

POLK COUNTY,

TENNESSEE,

et al.,

Defendants.

No. 98-6730

On Petition for Rehearing of an
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 98-00731--Thomas

A. Higgins,.District

Judge.

Decided and Filed: January 10, 2003

Before: MARTIN, Chief Circuit Judge;

SUHRHEINRICH

and SILER, Circuit Judges.

App. 2

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Mary M. Collier, S. Elizabeth Martin, OF-

FICE OF THE AT]?ORNEY GENERAL, CML LITIGATION & STAFF [sic] SERVICES DIK., Nash_lle, Tennessee,

for Appellant, William J. Brown, WILLIAM J. BROWN &

ASSOCIATES, Cleveland, Tennessee, for Appellees. Seth M.

Galanter, Sarah E. Harrington,

UNITED STATES DE-

PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DMSION,

Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.

AMENDED OPINION

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Circuit Judge. This

Court initially issued an opinion in this case on July 16,

2002. We held that Lane and Jones stated claims founded

in due process violations, and, under Popovich v. Cuya-

hoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th

Cir. 2002) (en banc) cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 72 (October 7,

2002), Tennessee and the other state defendants were not immune from Lane and Jones's damages claims under

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. On Sep-

tember 20, we granted the State of Tennessee's motion for

panel rehearing.

All parties submitted

supplemental

briefs. Tennessee argued that Lane and Jones's claims are

not based on due process violations and that Tennessee

therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit

on those claims. On rehearing and for the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Tennessee's motion to dismiss and REMAND this case for further

proceedings.

App. 3

In Popovich, we considered the validity of the abrogation of a state's immunity to suit by private parties under

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Guiding our

hand through our evaluation recent decision in University

was the Supreme Court's of Alabama v. Garrett, 531

U.S. 356 (2001), in which the Supreme Court affirmed that

Section Five of the Fourteenth

Amendment

grants Con-

gress the power immunity of the that the Eleventh of the Americans

to abrogate the EleVenth Amendment states to private damage suits. We held Amendment barred claims under Title II
with Disabilities Act based on equal

protection violations but Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity as to due process claims.

Among the rights protected by the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right of access to the

courts. For criminal defendants like Lane, the Due Process

Clause has been interpreted

to provide that =an accused

has a right to be present at all stages of the trial where his

absence might fi-ustrate the fairness of the proceedings."

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975). Parties

in civil litigation have an analogous due process right to be

present in the courtroom and to meaningfully participate in

the process unless their exclusion furthers important

governmental

interests. See Popovich, 276 F.3d at 813-14;

Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985). Further, those who fail to

appear in court may not be sanctioned for failing to appear

until they have been accorded due process. Groppi v.

Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502 (1972). These guarantees

are

protective courts.

of equal justice and fair treatment

before the

The evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II

of the Americans with Disabilities Act established

that

App. 4

physical barriers in government

buildings,

including

courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had

the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity

to

access vital services and to exercise fundamental

rights

guaranteed

by the Due Process Clause. In Popovich, we

found that Title II was enacted "to guarantee meaningful

enforcement"

of the constitutional

rights of the disabled.

276 F.3d at 815-16. In doing so, Congress may require

states to consider the nature of the constitutional

right at

issue, the often relatively small cost of compliance, and the

effect of failure to accommodate those with disabilities. In

the context of the case before us, Congress could ask states

to weigh the fundamental

importance of access to the

courts to our justice system, that the perpetuation

of the

current physical barriers force people with disabilities to

either forgo their right to be present in court or be carried

into court, and that the remedy is often inexpensive and

simple.

Based on the record before Congress in considering

the Americans with Disabilities legislation, it was reason-

able for Congress to conclude that it needed to enact

legislation

to prevent states from unduly burdening

constitutional

rights, including the right of access to the

courts. States have myriad ways to unburden these rights,

from the major step of renovating facilities to the rela-

tively minor step of assigning aides to assist in access to

the facilities. The record demonstrated

that public entities'

failure to accommodate the needs of qualified persons with

disabilities

may result directly from unconstitutional

animus and impermissible

stereotypes.

Title II ensures

that the refusal to accommodate

an individual with a

disability is genuinely based on unreasonable

cost or

App. 5

actual inability to accommodate,not on inconvenienceor unfoundedconcernsabout costs.

This statutory protection is a preventive measure commensurate to the gravity of precluding accessto the courts by those with disabilities. In addition, these re-

quirements are carefully tailored to the unique features of

disability discrimination

that persist s in public services. A

simple ban on discrimination

against those with disabili-

ties lacks teeth. The continuing legacy of discrimination

is

too powerful. Title II affirmatively those with disabilities.

promotes integration of

Jones and Lane are seeking to vindicate their right of access to the courts in Tennessee. Lane alleges that he has been denied the benefit of access to the courts. Jones

similarly alleges that she has been excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by an inability to access the

physical facilities. Tennessee responds that the violations

alleged are not due process violations. The difficult ques-

tions presented by this case cannot be clarified absent a

factual record. an appropriate of individuals,

Because in Popovich we held that Title II is means of enforcing the due process rights
and because this case came to us before any

development of the facts, we hold that the district court

appropriately action.

denied Tennessee's motion to dismiss this

We AFFIRM the

REMAND opinion.

for further

decision Of the district

proceedings

consistent

court and with this

App. 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE JONES,

LANE

Plaintiffs,

and BEVERLY

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

and its

political subdivisions, POLK

COUNTY, BLEDSOE COUNTY,

CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY,

DECATUR COUNTY, FAYETTE

COUNTY, GRAINGER COUNTY,

HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY,

HOUSTON COUNTY, JACKSON

COUNTY, LAKE COUNTY,

LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY,

PERRY COUNTY, PICKETT

COUNTY, TROUSDALE

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN

COUNTY,

Defendants.

) )

) ) No. 3:98 CV 0731 ) Judge Higgins

) Magistrate ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
)
)

Griffin

DEFENDANT

STATE OF TENNESSEE'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Filed Oct. 5, 1998)

Defendant,

State

12(b)(1) of the Federal

Court to dismiss the

of Tennessee,

pursuant

Rules of Civil Procedure,

claims against Defendant

to Rule moves this
State of

App. 7

Tennessee.Plaintiffs claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131et seq., its regulations,

28 C.F.R. 35.10 et seq. and the Rehabilitation

Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794a are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to

the United States Constitution.

Congress did not have the

constitutional

authority to make either the ADA or the

Rehabilitation

Act applicable to the states.

This document was entered ance with Rule 58 and/or Rule By/s/ TLC.

on the docket in compli79(a), FRCP, on 11-12-98

[Order Motion denied /s/ Thomas A. Higgins USDJ/ll-10-98]

App. 8

No. 98-6730
UNITED STATESCOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGELANE, et al, Plaint£ffs-Appellees
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor

) ) )
)
) ORDER

v. STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Defendant-Appellant
POLK COUNTY, et al., Defendants

) (Filed Sep. 20, 2002) ) )
)
) )

Before: MARTIN, Chief Circuit RICH and SILER, Circuit Judges

Judge;

SUHRHEIN-

Upon the petition of the appellant State of Tennessee for panel rehearing of the court's decision in the appeal noted above, and the court having found the petition to be well taken; it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is hereby

GRANTED. The opinion and judgment of July 16, 2002

are hereby withdrawn,

and the case is restored to the

court's active docket. The parties are further instructed to

file briefs not in excess of 25 pages addressing the issue as outlined in the petition for rehearing, with each side's brief to be filed not later than the close of business on

Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Upon the filing of the briefs

the court will proceed to dispose of the case.

App. 9
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/Leonard Green Leonard Green, Clerk

App. 10
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 98-6730
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE LANE and BEVERLY JONES,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT
OF TENNESSEE
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g) limits citation to specific situations. Please see Rule 28(g) before citing in a proceeding in a court in the Sixth Circuit. If cited, a copy must be served on other parties and the Cour_
This notice is to be prominently displayed if this de/ cision is reproduced.

(Filed Jul. 16, 2002)

BEFORE: MARTIN, Chief Circuit RICH and SILER, Circuit Judges

Judge,

SUHRHEIN-

PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs are paraplegics

who sued

the State of Tennessee under Title H of the Americans

with Disabilities Act because they were unable to access

the second floors of many county courthouses in the state.

App. ii

Tennessee filed a motion to dismiss,

Amendment

Immunity.

The district

motion and Tennessee appealed.

claiming Eleventh court denied the

In Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 816-18 (6th Cir. 2002), this court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Title II claims

against state entities that are based on Fourteenth

Amendment

due process principles. See also Trustees of

University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Because plaintiffs' Title II

claim is based on such due process principles, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Tennessee's motion to dismiss

and REMAND with Popovich.

this case for further

proceedings

consistent

App. 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE JONES
Plaintiffs

and BEVERLY

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

and its

political subdivisions, POLK

COUNTY, BLEDSOE COUNTY,

CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY,

COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY,

GRAINGER COUNTY, HANCOCK

COUNTY, HAWKINS COUNTY,

HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY,

JEFFERSON

COUNTY,

JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY,

MEIGS COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY COUNTY,

PICKETT COUNTY,

TROUSDALE COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY

Defendants.

) )

)
) No.

)

3 98-0731

I JUDGE HIGGINS

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
)
)

COMPLAINT
(Filed Aug. 10, 1998)
Comes the plaintiffs, George Lane and Beverly Jones, by and through counsel, who would hereby sue the defendants noted above and for cause would show as follows:

App. 13

It
PARTIES

(a) The Plaintiff George Lane: The plaintiff Lane is a

citizen and resident of Polk County, Tennessee. He is a

qualified individual with a disability as is defined by 42

U.S.C. 12131(2) in that he is a paraplegic and is and has

been in need of the services of the judicial division of the

State of Tennessee and its political subdivisions.

It is

hereby requested that he be allowed to serve as a class

representative for all qualified individuals with a disabil-

ity needing the services of the judicial division of the State

of Tennessee and its political subdivisions.

(b) The Plaintiff Beverly Jones: The plaintiff Jones is

a citizen and resident of Macon County, Tennessee and resides at 143 Carter Circle, Woodland Estates, Lafayette,

Tennessee. She is a qualified individual with a disability as is defined by 42 U.S.C. 12131(2) in that she is a para-

plegic and confined to a wheelchair. Plaintiff Jones is a

certified court reporter who makes her living by attending judicial proceedings throughout the State of Tennessee

and recording those proceedings on behalf of attorneys and parties that present their cases before the courts of this

State. She is, and has been, in need of the services of the

judicial division of the State of Tennessee and its political

subdivisions for the purpose of supporting herself and her

family by being allowed to attend court proceedings and

transcribing these proceedings. It is hereby requested that

she be allowed to serve as a class representative

for all

qualified individuals with a disability needing the services

of the judicial division of the State of Tennessee and its

political subdivisions.

App. 14

(c) The Defendants:

The State of Tennessee is a

political subdivision of the United States of American and

as such it and its political subdivisions are subject to the

laws of the United States of America. They are specifically

charged under the terms of the United States Constitution

and the Tennessee Constitution with providing the service

of courts and judicial proceedings and other manifesta-

tions of that process such as courtrooms, clerk's offices and public meeting rooms that are conducted in the courthouses of the State of Tennessee. Polk County, Bledsoe

County, Cannon County, Chester County, Claiborne

County, Clay County, Cocke County, Decatur County,

Fayette Hawkins

County, Grainger County, Hickman

County, Hancock County, Jackson

County, County,

Jefferson County, Johnson County, Lake County, Lewis

County, Meigs County, Moore County, Perry County,

Pickett County, Trousdale County, and Van Buren County

are all political subdivisions of the State of Tennessee and

are required under the Constitution

of the State of Ten-

nessee to provide courthouses that provide services to all

persons including citizens of this State and qualified individuals with disabilities as definded [sic] by 42 U.S.C. 12131. Don Sundquist is the chief executive officer of the State of Tennessee. Each of the named counties has an

individual county executive shall be provided.

upon whom service of process

II.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over the matters contained in this complaint pursuant to the provisions of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq., 29 U.S.C. 794a and 28 C.F.R. 35.101 et seq.

App. 15

III.

PLAINTIFF

LANE'S PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

(a) That as noted above, the plaintiff, George a paraplegic and as such is a qualified individual disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).

Lane is with a

(b) In May and September

of 1996, the plaintiff

Lane, hereinafter

referred to as Lane, had two sets of

criminal charges brought against him by law enforcement

in Polk County, Tennessee in the name of the State of

Tennessee and under the laws of the State of Tennessee.

Lane was required by the orders of the court to appear at

the Polk County Courthouse

in Benton, Tennessee to

answer the charges.

(c) All court proceedings and all clerk's offices that

support the court systems of Polk County, Tennessee are conducted on the second floor of the courthouse. The only

access to the courtrooms and courts, up until June of 1998,

was by one of two staircases. Lane was required to crawl

up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom to meet the

requirements

of his appearance before the General Ses-

sions Court for Polk County, Tennessee. Lane was ar-

raigned and told to appear at a later date for his hearing.

Lane appeared and, not desiring to go through the hu-

miliation of crawling up the stairs again, waited on the first floor of the courthouse and sent word to the court that

he would not crawl to the courtroom again. Lane also declined to be carried by officers to the courtroom. The

court issued an attachment

for his arrest, and he was

arrested and taken to jail.

(d) Lane was later released from custody and retained counsel to represent him. Thereafter, Lane attended his

App. 16

court proceedings by waiting downstairs from the court-

room and having his attorney shuttle back and forth with

information

concerning his case. During this time, Lane

did not have an opportunity to view the court processes in

any way because of his inability to get to the courtroom.

(e) On February 24, 1997, a preliminary hearing was

held in the Courthouse

library concerning his charges.

This was done over his attorney's objections in that the

proceedings were held [sic] a location that was not regu-

larly frequented by the public. His case was bound over to

the Polk County Grand Jury.

(f) On March 17, 1997, the Polk County Grand Jury

reported two misdemeanor

indictments

against Lane. On

that date Lane's counsel appeared on his behalf advising

the court that Lane was on the first floor of the courthouse

and could not come to the courtroom because of the re-

quirement to climb the stairs to the courtroom. Counsel

then requested the court to continue the arraignment

until

such time as the courthouse could be made to conform to

the requirements

of the Americans with Disability Act.

The court declined, and without arraigning case for trial.

Lane, set the

(g) On or about April 23, 1997, Lane's counsel filed

an application for extraordinary

appeal to the Tennessee

Court of Criminal Appeals raising the issue of Lane's not

being able to get to the courtroom and the fact that the

courthouse did not accommodate handicapped individuals.

The Attorney General for the State of Tennessee argued in

his brief that this failure to provide services to Lane

should be condoned and that Lane should be required to

stand trial at the Polk County Courthouse

despite his

inability to get to the courtroom. This appeal was denied.

App. 17

On or about June 24, 1997, Lane fried an application for

extraordinary

appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of

Tennessee. Again, the Attorney General argued to the

court that the court should ignore this violation of Lane's

rights under the ADA. This appeal was likewise denied on

or about September 2, 1997.

(h) On or about December 12, 1997, the Honorable

Carroll Ross signed an order holding all criminal proceed-

ings in abeyance until the completion of the construction

of an elevator that would permit access to the courtrooms

and clerk's offices in the Polk County Courthouse.

The

construction 1998.

of this elevator was completed in June of

(i) Other than the proceeding where Lane crawled to the courtroom and his preliminary hearing in the library, he was unable to attend any court proceedings in the Polk County Courthouse until the installation of the elevator in June of 1998, and has been denied access to the services of the court that are conducted therein.

(j) That the Polk County Courthouse

still fails to

meet the requirements

of the American's with Disabilities

Act with reference to access to restroom facilities.

POLK COUNTY'S THE AMERICANS

IVo

HISTORY CONCERNING

WITH DISABILITY

ACT .

(a) That on January 26, 1992, regulations

were

established by the United States Department

of Justice

that made provisions for State and Local governments

of

the United States to meet the requirements

of the ADA.

These regulations were published by the Department

of

App. 18

Justice as 28 C.F.R. Part 35 pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 12134. As a part of that regulation, all public entities were required to evaluate its services, policies and practices and the effects thereof and make modifications within one year of the effective date of the regulation. 28 C.F.R. 35.105.

(b) In October of 1992, the Polk County Commission

had brought to its attention the requirement of the ADA

and the commission

appointed

a review committee to

review the facilities condition. In May of 1993, the ADA

Committee for Polk County prepared a Self-Evaluation and analysis and transition plan. This plan specifically

found that the county buildings did not conform to the

requirements

of the ADA. On October 20, 1994, the Polk

County Commission specifically voted not to construct an elevator in the courthouse, despite the recommendations

of the County ADA Committee.

(c) That Polk County has, as a matter of policy,

refused to come into compliance with the ADA until such

time as the plaintiff initiated a grievance procedure. This grievance was filed on October 31, 1996. A series of meet-

ing were held with the Grievance Committee and before

the Polk County Commission. However, it was not until

November of 1997, that the Polk County Commission

acted to authorize the construction

of an elevator to meet

the requirements

of the ADA. All the while the plaintiff

was compelled to present his defense against these viola-

tions in court. While Polk County has constructed

an

elevator, it s_ll fails to have its courthouse

the requirement

of the ADA.

comply with

(d) Throughout

these proceedings,

the plaintiff has

suffered extreme humiliation and embarrassment,

as well

App. 19
as incurring legal expensesin attempting to resist this illegal and discriminatory activity of the defendant, Polk County, while attempting to resolve this matter through the grievance process.
(e) That there are hundreds of individuals who are similarly situated with George Lane and being handicapped who have had and continue to have a need, requirement, or desire to participate in the judicial process of Polk County, Tennessee.

PLAINTIFF

JONES

V. PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

(a) Plaintiff Jones, hereinafter

referred to as Jones,

is a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair because of an

automobile accident in 1989. She is currently responsible

for the care and support of two minor children. Jones is a

certified court reporter. She became certified and has actively worked in her chosen field since 1990. She works

out of her home and is called upon by attorneys and other

parties to work all over Middle Tennessee in her profes-

sion. This specifically includes going to courthouses for the

purposes of recording proceedings before the state courts

in proceedings conducted in those courthouses. Her inabil-

ity to gain access to the courtroom has caused her to

continue to have difficulty accessing the services of the

judiciary.

(b) She has specifically attempted to gain access to

the courthouses in Trousdale, Jackson, Clay and Pickett

Counties. Jones has not been able to gain access to the

courtrooms courtrooms

due to the lack of handicap access to the used in those counties. She would also be

App. 20

prepared to appear in any and all other courthouses of this
state to provide services to the courts, attorneys and parties, if called upon to do so.

(c) Jones has specifically brought to the attention of

authorities

in the four defendant counties, Trousdale,

Jackson, Clay and Pickett, their failure to comply with the

requirements

of the ADA, yet, with the exception of

Trousdale County, they have failed to comply with the

requirements.

Trousdale County installed an elevator in

1998, however the courtroom itself is set up where Jones

cannot gain access to the court proceedings. The proceed-

ings occur on an elevated platform to which she cannot

gain ready access.

(d) As a direct result of the courthouses located in

Trousdale, Jackson, Clay and Pickett Counties of this

State not complying with the ADA Jones has lost work and

an opportunity

to participate

in the judicial process

because of her inability to gain access to their courthouses.

Vim

THE STATE OF TENNESSEE'S

AND OTHER

DEFENDANT'S

HISTORY CONCERNING

THE AMERICANS

WITH DISABILITY ACT

(a) That the State of Tennessee administers

its

judicial functions in the county courthouses of each Of the

counties of this state. As a part of that function, the State

of Tennessee provides services through these buildings to

all of its citizens and others. It is in these buildings that

virtually all trial level judicial proceedings,

civil and

criminal, are conducted. In addition, these buildings house

clerk's offices where the court's records are maintained. As

a part of these proceedings, individuals are called upon to

App. 21

participate as parties in civil and criminal proceedings, or

participate as witnesses and jurors, and go to these offices

to take care of public business in the form of filing papers

and researching records, and have a fundamental

right

under the Tennessee State Constitution to participate and

view the judicial courtrooms.

proceedings

that are conducted in those

(b) That like Polk County and the other named

defendants, the State of Tennessee is required to conform

to the Department

of Justice regulations

found at 28

C.F.R. Part 35 and is required to do an evaluation facilities in which its services are rendered.

of the

(c) That despite this evaluation process and the

requirement

of the ADA, the State of Tennessee persisted

in requiring Lane to participate in services and proceed-

ings in a building that failed to comply with the law, or

alternatively

not allowing him access to the same services

and proceedings of other citizens of the State and County

who are not individuals with a disability. This was despite the fact that the officials of the State of Tennessee were

• repeatedly confronted with the State and county's failure to comply with the ADA. The State of Tennessee has

repeatedly failed to comply with the law. Specifically,

counsel for the plaintiff Lane raised the ADA issue at every appearance required of plaintiff to the court and the

District Attorney General's office. Counsel addressed a

letter directly to Charles Burson, Attorney General for the

State of Tennessee, on December 4, 1996 al_r making

repeated phone calls to his office. None of these phone calls or the letter were responded to in any way. Plaintiff

Lane appealed the State Trial judges requirements

to

proceed with the case to all levels of the judiciary of the State of Tennessee. Each time, the office of the Attorney

App. 22

General insisted on ignoring the legal violation and

advocating the same to each court, and the State courts

specifically ignored the uncontradicted

facts that were

presented to them.

(d) That the State of Tennessee and other named

defendants persist on conducting their judicial proceedings

in facilities that do not conform to the requirements

of the

ADA and as such deny to all citizens similarly situated the

right to participate in the judicial process of this State as

conducted

in the defendant

counties. Specifically,

the

State of Tennessee conducts its judicial proceedings

in

county courthouses

that do not comply with the access

requirements

of the ADA. Those counties are: Bledsoe

County, Cannon County, Chester County, Claiborne

County, Clay County, Cocke County, Decatur County,

Fayette County, Grainger

County, Hancock County,

Hawkins

County, Hickman

County, Jackson County,

Jefferson County, Johnson County, Lake County, Lewis

County, Meigs County, Moore County, Perry County,

Pickett County, Trousdale

County, and Van Buren

County. There may well be other counties that do not hilly

comply with the requirements

of the ADA. These defen-

dants, like Polk County, have had a duty to comply with

the requirement

of the law since 1992, yet they have

knowingly and intentionally

failed to cause their court-

houses to conform to the ADA.

(e) That there are thousands

of individuals

who

reside in the State of Tennessee and have a need, as well

as a right, to participate

in the judicial processes of this

State without the obstructions

associated with the physi-

cal condition of the States Courthouses.

In the year 1998,

the State of Tennessee had issued over 200,000 handi-

capped placards for people with physical handicaps.

App. 23
Despite the fact that the regulations andlaw of the United States dictates [sic] that these Obstructionsbe eliminated, the State of Tennesseeand its subordinatepolitical bodies have failed to bring these buildings into compliance.

CAUSES

VIo
OF ACTION

(a) That the State of Tennessee and Polk County

have discriminated

against the plaintiff, George Lane in

that they have excluded him from participation

in, or

denied him the benefits of, the services of its court systems in violation of 42 U.S.C. 12132.

(b) That the State of Tennessee, Trousdale County,

Jackson County, Clay County, and Pickett Counties

specifically,

and the other defendants

generally, have

discriminated

against the plaintiff Beverly Jones in that

they have excluded her from participating

in the services

offered by the courthouses

and access to the Court pro-

ceedings of this State by failing to eliminate physical

obstacles to her participation

in the judicial processes of

this State in violation of 42 U.S.C. 12132.

(c) That the State of Tennessee and Bledsoe County,

Cannon County, Chester County, Claiborne County, Clay

County, Cocke County, Decatur County, Fayette County,

Grainger County, Hancock County, Hawkins County,

Hickman County, Jackson County, Jefferson County, John-

son County, Lake County, Lewis County, Meigs County,

Moore County, Perry County, Pickett County, Trousdale

County, and Van Buren County knowingly and intention-

ally Continue to discriminate

against George Lane, Beverly

Jones and all other individuals

similarly situated who

App. 24

have a need, responsibility,

or desire to attend the judicial

process of this state as it is conducted in the Courthouses

of this State in that they conduct their judicial proceedings

in facilities that are not in conformance with the require-

ments of the ADA. Further, there may be other counties of

this State that have failed to fully comply with the re-

quirement of the ADA.

(d) That the actions of the State of Tennessee and

Polk Country, Trousdale,

Jackson, Clay and Pickett

Counties and the other named defendants were conscious,

deliberate, and intentional

in their active discrimination

against the plaintiffs, George Lane and Beverly Jones, and

all other similarly situated handicapped individuals of this

State. That Polk County's consistent insistence in continu-

ing the prosecution

of Lane's case, without delay and

despite plaintiffs inability to gain access to the courtroom,

was with full knowledge of his disability and their knowl-

edge of the requirement to conform to the ADA.

(e) That the actions of the State of Tennessee,

Trousdale County, Jackson County, Clay County, and Pickett County were conscious, deliberate, and intentional

in their active discrimination

against the plaintiffs,

George Lane and Beverly Jones and all other similarly

situated handicapped

individuals of this State. That their

persistent

presentation

of the actions of the judicial

process was with full knowledge of plaintiffs' disability

and with their knowledge to the ADA.

of the requirements

to conform

(f) That the actions of the State of Tennessee and the

other defendant counties were conscious, deliberate, and

intentional in their active discrimination

against all other

similarly situated handicapped

individuals of this State.

App. 25

That their persistent presentation

of the actions of the

judicial process, knowing that handicapped

individuals

were unable to gain access to the courtrooms, was with full

knowledge of their disabilities and their knowing failure to

meet the requirements

to conform to the ADA.

(g) Tennessee from the

That in the and said
defendants'

alternative, the actions counties were knowing negligence in complying

of the State of and resulted with the law.

(h) That as a result of the defendants' actions, the

plaintiff Lane has suffered damages in the form of extreme

embarrassment,

and humiliation and anxiety of the delays

associated with this case. In addition, he has incurred

attorney fees and expenses including court costs in excess of $600 assessed by the State of Tennessee for his asking

the appellate courts of the State of Tennessee to delay his

prosecution

until the Polk County Courthouse

was

brought into compliance with the ADA.

(i) That as a result of the defendants' actions, the

plaintiff Jones has suffered damages in the form of extreme

embarrassment,

and humiliation

in attempting

to gain

access to the services provided by the State of Tennessee and

Trousdale, Jackson, Clay and Pickett Counties and not being

able to be accommodated. In addition, plaintiff has suffered

lost wages and earnings associated with her inability to

conduct her profession in said counties' courtrooms.

VII.

REQUEST

FOR CERTIFICATION

AS CLASS ACTION

(a) Now come the plaintiffs,who in addition to bringing this action on behalf of themselves, would request

App. 26

this court to certify them as class representatives

pursu-

ant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, on behalf of all individuals residing in the

State of Tennessee who are qualified individuals with a

physical disability that prevent them from climbing stairs

or walking up steep inclines in the courthouses

of the

named defendants. These individuals have been subjected

to discrimination

like the plaintiffs and continue to experi-

ence this discrimination

and the denial of services. Each of

these individuals

have [sic] the right to attend judicial

proceedings in the courthouses of this state and specifi-

cally the named defendant counties and would currently

not have access to the judicial processes in the named

defendant counties without going through the humiliation

and embarrassment

that the plaintiffs George Lane and

Beverly Jones have been forced to endure. In addition,

these individuals may be called or have cause to partici-

pate in those proceedings as parties, witnesses or jurors.

(b) Plaintiffs would show that the certification of this

class is proper in that (1) the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable,

(2) there are

questions of fact and law that are common to the class, (3)

the claims and defenses of the representative

party is [sic]

typical of the claims and defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative

party will fairly and adequately

interest of the class.

protect the

(c) Plaintiffs would further show that the defendants

have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally appli-

cable to the class, thereby making appropriate

final

injunctive relief or corresponding

declaratory

relief with

respect to the class as a whole. Further, that the questions

of fact and fact common to the members of the class

predominate

over any questions affecting only individual

App. 27
members. A class action is supe_or to other available methods for the fair and efficient a_udication of the controversy.

VIII.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff would hereby request this

Honorable Court to:

1. Render judgment against the State of Tennessee

and Polk County for damages for the plaintiff Lane's

humiliation and embarrassment

during the course of these

proceedings in an amount not to exceed $100,000 as well

as his attorney fees, cost and expenses pursuant to the

provisions of 42 U.S.C. 12133 and 29 U.S.C. 794a. for

defending him in the grievance procedure, his vindication

of his rights in the state court, and for bringing this action.

2. Render judgment against the State of Tennessee,

Trousdale; Jackson, Clay and Pickett Counties for damages

for the plaintiff Jones' humiliation

and embarrassment

associated with her attempting to gain access to the defen-

dants' courthouses and for her damages associated with her

lost earnings associated with her inability to work in said

courthouses in an amount not to exceed $250,000 as well as

her attorney fees, cost and expenses pursuant to the provi-

sions of 42 U.S.C. 12133 and 29 U.S.C. 794a. for bringing this action.

3. That this court certify this as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that proper notice be given to all individuals in the class in order that they may make the proper elections.

App. 28

4. That this court take such actions necessaryand

proper through declaratoryjudgment and injunctive relief

to compel the State of Tennesseeand other defendantsto

comply with the provisions of the Americans with Disabil-

ity Act, and further award such damages to the class

representatives

as are fair and proper. Further that this

court award damages to each member of the class for said

humiliation

and embarrassment

associated

with the

defendants failure to comply with the ADA. Further that the court compel the State of Tennessee to do a survey of all counties of the State of Tennessee to determine if they

in fact fully comply with the provisions of the State of

Tennessee, and if they fail to do so join them as party

defendants and compel them to comply with the ADA.

5. That this court grant general relief to the plaintiff and all other persons that are members of the class.

By:/s/

Respectfully Submitted, George Lane, and Beverly Jones, Plaintiffs
William Brown William J. Brown, Attorney 23 N. Ocoee, P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 (423) 476-4515 TBPR # OO545O

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, )

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

)

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

1

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions,POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY ) COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER ) COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

)

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

)

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

)

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - BLEDSOE COUNTY
a. This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 3 day of
F ~ b r v ~ r l / , 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann
Marie ~appcka,Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and Defendant Bledsoe County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structuresat the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY'as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
\
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse andlor other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Bledsoe County Courthouse or the Bledsoe County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Bledsoe County Courthouse or the Bledsoe County Judicial Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONASSSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissai Order.
16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thrty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph la), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Bledsoe County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Bledsoe County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia,that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

i

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioiled action have caused this Agreemei~to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and

William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Gary D. ~ o u s e ~(BiPiR # 6f68) Tenuessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21StAve South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Wac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDNUVW 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

/ Attorneys for Plaiqtiffs
4 Date:

4

For Defendant Bledsoe)&pnty, Tennessee:
Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: /-d,d-

For Defendant County:

- c Date: L- t 0

BLEDSOE COUNTY Plaintiff:
A
Date

BLEDSOE COUNTY
Plaintiff:
cq -2.3ffj?/Jfl
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff
Date: a . / ~ / !-C~ e
/'

A. Russel1Larson, Plaintiff
Date: d+/c~ c r

AGREED SETTLEMENT
BLEDSOE COUNTY

1. Parking Area for the Courthouse

A.

There are (61) parking spaces around the perimeter of the building. The ADA requires

that (4) spaces be designated as handicapped accessible. The (2) existing designated

parking spaces on the Main Street side are non-com~liantsince they do not have any

designated aisles located on the side of the parking space. {4.6.6] {Page 26, Fig. 1O]

6. The width of these parking spaces is a non-compliant 116" from the curb. (4.6.3 & 4.3.3)

C. The curb length of these two spaces is a compliant length of 240" and 244".

D. There is a compliant asphalt ramp from the street level to the curb and sidewalk with a complisnf slope of 10%.

E.

The (2) handicap parking spaces have a non-compliant average running slope of 1.95%

and non-com~lianct ross slopes up to 6%. 14.6.3 & 4.7.2)

F.

There was no siqnaae for these handicap parking spaces except the symbol that is

painted on the street in the cenfer of each. {4.6.4}

G. A van accessible space has not been designated with the required compliant signage.
14.6.4)

AGREED SOLUTION: No action as all parking spaces and sidewalks belong to the City of Pikeville.

2. Accessible Path of Travel from Parkinq Area to Entrance Door of First Floor of Courthouse

A.

There is a 60" sidewalk parallel to the street and a 35'-3" long by 72" wide compliant

walkway to the ramp area at the front entrance to the building.

0. The average slope from the curb to the handicap ramp area at the entrance for the building is a compliant 2.2%.

C. The landing area at the bottom of the handicap ramp fo the entrance of the building is a
non-com~lian4t 7" by 53". {4.8.4(2)]

D. The ramp length is 10'-3". The width between the handrails is a compliant 47-1/4".

E.

The handrail varies between a compliant height of 36-1/4" and 37-3/4".

F.

There is no reauired edae on fhe ramp, to protect against the 10" vertical drop. 14.8.71

AGREED SOLUTION: County will modify the landing area at the bottom of the handicap ramp (Item 2(C)) and the edge on
the ramp (Item 2(F)) in accordance with the ADA.
3. Entrance Door to the First Floor of the Courthouse
D. There is a non-compliant large door mat that encumbers the inside floor at the doorway.
Agreed Solution: No action required.

4. First Floor Chancery Court Clerk Office

B.

The room identification signage is completely non-com~lianfbased on C4.1.3, 16, (a)] &

(4.30).

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a)).

F.

The push force to open the door is a non-compliant 6 Ibs. {4.113.lI(b)] and the closure

time is a compliant 4.9 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.1 3.1 I.I(b)}.

5. First Floor Chancery Courtroom Door

A.

The room identification signage is completely non-compliant based on (4. I .3, 16, (a)] &

c4.30).

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage i n accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

D. The push pressure to open this door is a non-compliant 7 Ibs. (4.13.lI(b)) and the swing time is a compliant 6.8 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet the requirements of (4.13.1 I.I(b)}.

6. First Floor Chancery Courtroom

A.

The visitor seating has (24) fixed seats and 13) movable chairs. There is compliant area

for the required wheelchair positions. This courtroom is 26'4" by 30'-3" or approximately

806 square feet. The ADA requires (4) compliant wheel chair locations to be provided.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

7. First Floor Chancery Courtroom Witness Stand

5. There is a handrail on only one side of this ramp and the ADA reauires a handrail to be located on both sides. {4.8.5(1)] The handrail does not extend beyond the ends of the ramp extensions which is non-compliant. {4.8.5(2) & Page 31, Fig. 17)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C. The distance from the floor to the top of the handrail is a non-com~lian3t 3-1/2". {4.8.5(5), Page 31, Fig. I 7)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. The space between the wall and the handrail becomes non-compliant as one proceeds up the ramp because of finished woodwork that comes behind it near the top end reducing the handrail clearance space to almost zero..{4.8.5(3) & Page 51, Fig. 39)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

8. First Floor Men's Public Restroom

5. The signage on the door is non-compliant {4.30.1) and is a non-compliant height of 63" from the floor. {4.30.6)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.16(a)).

C. The door to this toilet is a compliant 36" wide and equipped with a closer. It has non-
latching push/pull hardware, a compliant closure time of 17.8 seconds, and a noncom~lianpt ush pressure of 7 Ibs. {4.13.I l(b)) The inside pull side clearance is a non-
compliant 7-3/4". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)) The outside push side clearance is a compliant
1 I".

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet the requirements of C4.13.11 .I(b)).

E. There is a sink counter with (3) sinks. The counterfop is a non-comaliant height of 357/8"
from the floor. {4.19.2) The clear access width for the underside of the first sink is a non-
com~liant28". 14.19.3) The other (2) sinks have a compliant underside access width of
30-3/4".

Agreed Solution: Lower countertop to 34".

F.

The plumbing under these sinks is non-compliant since it is not insulated. C4.19.4)

Agreed Solution: Insulate exposed under-lavatory pipes at all three sinks in accordance with (4.19.4).

G. The paper towel dispenser over the sink counter is a non-compliant 52-7/8" from the floor
since a forward reach is required. {Page 19, Fig. 6(a))

Agreed Solution: Lower dispenser to meet requirements of (Fig. 6(a)Y page 191.

J.

The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant distance from the floor of 40-1/2". 14.19.6)

Agreed Solution: Lower mirror to 40".

N. The toilet is a non-compliant 19" to center from the wall. C4.16.5 & Page 43, Fig. 30(a)] The seat height is a compliant 17-1/4".

Agreed Solution: No action required.

P.

The grab bar is a non-compliant height of 36-1/4" from floor. {Page 42, Fig. 29) This is an

"L" shaped grab bar that is non-compliant because the front edge of the sidewall grab bar

is 50" from the back wall. {Page 42, Fig. 29)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

Q. The urinal is a non-compliant height of 18-3/4" from the floor f4.18.2) and a compliant 14" from the back wall. The center of the urinal from the side wall is a non-compliant 13".
14.18.3) The flush valve is a compliant 39-3/8" from the floor and has a compliant pull pressure of 5 Ibs.

Agreed Solution: Urinal shall be lowered to 17".

9. First Floor Women's Public Restroom

6.

The signage on the door is non-compliant {4.30], and in a non-compliant location and a

non-compliant height of 63" from the f l o o ~C4.30.6)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.16(a)).

C. The door to this toilet is a compliant 36" wide and equipped with a closer. It has a non-
latching push/pull hardware, a complianf closure time of 8.15 seconds, and a noncompliant push pressure of 7 Ibs. 14.13.I 1(2)(b)] The inside pull side clearance is a non-
compliant 7-3/4". {Page 39, Fig. 25(a)) The outside push side clearance is a compliant
7 -"I.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet the requirements of (4.13.1 I.I(b)).

D. The inside area for the door is a non-compliant alcove measuring 4 8 wide by 60" long. {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

There is a sink counter with (3) sinks. The countertop is a non-compliant height of 36-118"

from the floor. (4.19.2 8 Page 44, Fig. 31) The clear access width for the underside of the

first sink is a non-com~liant27-1/4". {4.19.3} The other (2) sinks have a compliant underside access width of 31" and 32".

Agreed Solution: Lower countertop to 34".

F.

The plumbing under these sinks is non-compliant since it is not insulated. 14.19.4)

Agreed Solution: Insulate exposed under-lavatory pipes at all three sinks in accordance with (4.19.4).

G. The paper towel dispenser over the sink counter is a non-compliant 52-7/8 front reach
from the floor since a forward reach is required. {Page 18, Fig. 5)

Agreed Solution: Lower dispenser to meet requirements of (Fig. 6(a), page 19).

J.

The boftom of the mirror is a non-compliant distance from the floor of 4 I-3/8. (4.I 9.6)

Agreed Solution: Lower mirror to 40".

L.

The door has compliant hardware and a non-compliant coat hook at 56" from the floor.

{Page 18, Fig. 5(a)} & {Page 19, Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Lower coat hook to meet requirements of {Fig. 5(a), Page 18 and Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

P.

The grab bar is a compliant height of 34-5/8" from floor. This is an "L" shaped grab bar

that is non-compliant because the end of the side wall grab bar is only 49-5/8" from the

back wall. {Page 42, Fig. 29)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

10. First Floor Public Telephone

A.

The public telephone protrudes a non-compliant 7-1/8" from the wall. {4.4.1)

Agreed Solution: County will contact telephone company to determine if phone can be relocated. If it cannot, County will remove the phone.

D. There is no compliant volume control. {4.31.5(2))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

11. First Floor Public Drinking Fountain

6. The lower fountain spout is a non-compliant 34" from the floor since the mounting
locafion does not permit the required clearance below the front of the unit. {4.75.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.
C. The water flow height is non-compliant at less than 2". 14.15.31

Agreed Solution: Adjust water flow height in accordance with (4.1 5.3).

5, The under side of the fountain is a non-compliant height of 26-1/2" from the floor. {4.15.5(1) & Page 4 1, Fig. 271

Agreed Solution: Raise water fountain so that bottom of apron is at least 27" from the floor.

E.

The base of the fountain protrudes a non-comgliant 6-3/4" from the wad {4.15.5 & Page

41, Fig. 271 and is a compliant 8 %"horizontal clearance from the front and 10 %" vertical

clearance from the floor.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

12. First Floor Fire Extinguisher

A.

On the First Floor in the main hallway there is a fire extinguisher mounted at a non-

comoliant height of 80" above the floor. {Page 18, Fig. 5(a)} & {Page 19, Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Lower fire extinguisher to meet requirements of {Fig. 5(b), Page 18 and Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

13. Elevator

B.

The height of the center line of the call buffon was a non-com~liant40-3/8" on the First

Floor and a non-comoliant center height of 41-3/4" on the Second Floor. {4.10.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C. The emergency phone system was not well designated, had no calling instructions, had no volume control and no Braille and is non-compliant. {4.10)

Agreed Solution: County will add instructional signage which complies with ADAAG 4.10.

14. Second Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office

B.

The room identification signage is complefely non-compliant based on f4.1.3, 16, (a)] &

{4.30).

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.4.3.1 6(a)).

15. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom Door

B.

The signage for this courtroom is non-compliant because of height, character size and

the lack of Braille. {4.30)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

C. The entrance to this court is through a non-compliant double acting swinging (2) leaf door, each being 30" wide. {4.13.4} The push force for both doors is a compliant 1.5 Ibs.

Agreed Solution: Provide kick plates on doors.

16. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom

B.

The visitor's section has (154) fixed seats. In front of the bar, there are (6) movable chairs

and (2) benches that will seat (3) people each. There are no designated locations for

handicapped. There should be a minimum of (4) handicap spaces. 14.I .3(f 9)(a)} & {4.33}

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that there is sufficient floor space to accommodate five wheelchairs at the front of the courtroom. County will ensure that no wheelchair is placed in any path of travel. County will also install appropriate signage designating these spaces as handicapped seating.

17. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom's Witness StandIJuw Box Access

B.

The railings for the ramp are at a non-compliant height from fhe floor of 33-1/2" and

33-3/8". {4.8.5(5)) Both handrails are non-compliant since they do not extend beyond the

length of the ramp. {4.8.5(2),! {Page 31, Fig. 17) & {Page 51, Fig. 39)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C.
c

The space from the top end of the ramp to the wall is a non-compliant 47-1/2" x 49". {4.8.4(3)]
Agreed Solution: No action required.

18. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom Jury Box

A.

The non-compliant entrance to the front row in the jury box is by way of one 6-3/4" step

C4.5.2). The front row jury box entrance is a compliant width of 39-1/2" and has (6)

movable chairs.

B.

The non-compliant entrance to the back row in the jury box is by two 6-3/4" steps up to

that level {4.5.2). The back row jury box entrance is a compliant width of 42-1/2" and has

(6) movable chairs.

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location of the jury are part of the state judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

19. Second Floor Circuit Court Jury Room

A.

The signage for the room is non-compliant because of height {4.30.6), character size

{4.30.3} and the lack of Braille. 14.30.41

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a))..

D. The push pressure to open the door is a non-compliant 9 Ibs., {4.13.1?(b)} and the closure time is a compliant 8 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet the requirementsof (4.13.1I.I(b)).

E.

The Jury Room is a large room with a refreshment cabinet at a non-compliant height of

34". There is a sink mounted at a non-compliant height of 36" with compliant wrist blades.

{Page 19, Fig. 5(b)} & {Page 19, Fig. 6(~)}{4.32.4){5.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

Second Floor Men's Toilet for Circuit Court Jurv Room

A.

The entrance area to the men's restroom is compliant.

B.

The signage on the door is non-compliant {4.1.3(16)(a)) and is in a non-compliant

location and located a non-compliant height of 61-7/8" from the floor. {4.30.6}

C. The door to this toilet is a compliant 36" wide door. It has compliant lever hardware and a compliant closure time of 7.2 seconds. The push pressure to open the door is compliant 8 Ibs. since it is a rated door. The threshold is smooth and compliant.

D. The inside area of this restroom is non-compliant, primarily because the door opens to the inside and encroaches on the clear floor space. {4.22.2){4.22.3}

E.

The top of the sink is 33-1/2" from fhe floor making the underside non-compliant. {Page

44, Fig. 31) The plumbing piping is non-complianf since the piping is not insulated.

{4.19.4} The distance from the sink center line to the side wall is a non-compliant 12".

C4.19.3)

F.

The paper towel dispenser with a front approach only is a non-compliant 53-1/2" from the

floor. {Page 18, Fig. 5) & {Page 19, Fig. 6)

G. The soap dispenser is a compliant height of 40-3/4" from the floor.

H. The bottom of the mirror is a compliant distance from the floor of 40".

1.

The accessible foilet is a non-compliant 22" to center from the wall. {Page 42, Fig. 28)

The seat height is a compliant 17-1/2".

J.

The toilet paper dispenser is compliant with (2) rolls at 21" from the floor and an overall

distance from the back wall of 36".

K.

The grab bar is a compliant height of 34-1/4" from floor to center. This is an "L" shaped

grab bar that is non-com~liantbecause the side wall grab bar front edge is 50" from the

back wall. 14.17.6 & Page 42, Fig. 29)

Agreed Solution: No action required. Modify room identification from Men's to Unisex (symbol of accessibility is not to be provided). Signage will comply with (4.30.6).

21. Second Floor Women's Toilet for Circuit Court Jurv Room

A.

The entrance area to the women's restroom is compliant.

B.

The signage on the door is non-comoliant {4.30.1] and is located a non-compliant height

of 62-3/4" from the floor. {4.30.6)

C. The door to this toilet is a compliant 36" wide door. It has compliant lever hardware and a compliant closure time of 5.5 seconds. The push pressure to open the door is compliant 7 Ibs. since it is a rated door. The threshold is smoofh and compliant.

D.

The inside area of this restroom is non-compliant, primarily because the door opens to

the inside and encroaches on the clear floor space. {4.22.2]{4.22.3)

E.

The top of the sink is 33-1/2" from the floor making the underside non-compliant. {4.19.2)

& {Page 44, Fig. 31). The plumbing piping is non-compliant since the piping is not

insulated. 14.19.4) The disfance from the sink center line to the side wall is a

compliant 13 %". {4.19.3} & {Page 44, Fig. 32)

F.

The paper towel dispenser with front only access is a non-compliant 54" from the floor.

{Page 18, Fig. 5(a)) & {Page 19, Fig. 6(b))

G. The soap dispenser is a compliant height of 41" from the floor

H. The bottom of the mirror is a compliant distance from the floor of 39-1/2".

1.

The accessible toilet is a non-compliant 2 0 to center from the wall. {Page 42, Fig. 28)

The seat height is a compliant 17-1/2".

J.

The toilet paper dispenser is compliant with (2) rolls at 21" from the floor and an overall

distance from the back wall of 36".

K.

The grab bar is a compliant height of 34" from floor to center. This is an 2"shaped grab

bar that is non-compliant because the side grab bar front edge is 5 0 from the back wall.

{4.17.6] & {Page 42, Fig. 29)

Agreed Solution: Make this a unisex accessible restroom in accordance with (4.22). Reverse door swing and provide Unisex accessible room identification signage.

22. Directional Si~nage

A. Non-compliant exterior directional signage. C4.1.2,(7),(c)} If all entrances are not
accessible fhen directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with {4.1.2(7)(~)).

23. Area of Rescue Assistance

A.

The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue assistance for

all levels above grade. See affachment "C"for details.

Agreed Solution: Provide an area of rescue assistance in accordance with (4.3.1 1).

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TEMVESSEE AT NASFMLLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

)

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

1

Plain tiffs,

) v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )
- COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLMBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, C0CK.E COUNTY, DECATIlR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAIV COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUN1I"Y, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEZGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKlETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

f

Defendants.

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin
JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - CANNON COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreementyy)is entered into this 13 dayof

Ft?bcdd r r/

, 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly .Jones, Ann

Marie ~ a ~ ~ o l a , ' D e n nCiasntrel, Raiph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. RusseIl Larson (Izereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Cannon County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGrUEEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals wit11 disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.$12131(2).
2. Cannon County is a Public Entity as that t e ~ mis defined in 42 U.S.C.§12131(1). Cannon County is subject to Title 11 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Cannon County, and the AOC ("Administrative Offxce of the Courts").
4. Unless otf~erwisespecified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in
this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained.in42 U.S.C.$ 12131et sea. and 28
C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUB.IECTFACILITIES.
b, "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Cannon County.
c. 'XFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party,
d. "SUBJECT FACKXTlES'refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judiciaI program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County,
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Cannon County Courthouse, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its oacials, employees, agents, whetller current or former, in aII of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of' and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Cannon County Courthouse whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not Iimited to, any and all matters asserted in the
case, or which may have been asserted.

8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal:

9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute Ihe entire consideration, both monetary and othexwise, for the comylete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The pmties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration?and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of considerationor inadequate consideration.

OBLIGATIONSASSUMEDBY THE DEFENDANCTOUNTY

10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's .judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the AIterYationsdelineated in Appendix A. A11 of the Alterations deIineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective
Date.

13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the

Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action

that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in

Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judiclaf program,

334731

3

service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compfimce with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County liereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilitiesat all times, except for isolated ar
-. temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMEANNTD MONITORING

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obfigations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall altempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraplt.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any fudiciai proceeding relating to paragraph I6 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent
allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set
forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alternations
delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set foorth
in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement

because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant

County's designated representative will promptly noti@ Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for

Plaintiffs set forth in Paragxaph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support

33473 1

4

their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by
Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not talce effect. Tf the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.

20. By entering into this Agreement, no party sl1aX1 be deemed to have waived any
claim or defense not otllenvise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no
longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.

21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs have ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.

22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.

23. The 'epresentatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein, Each signatory to tlis Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection wit11 the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees
that its terms are fair and reasonable.

24, This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement sl~allbe effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth hexain.

25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent lo the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and otfier correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to tile office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.

26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.

33473 1

5

28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee approving the Compromise and Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and the State of Tennessee which provides, inter alin, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17, 2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of $2,680.00 which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of' the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued by through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. In the event that the Memorandum of Understanding is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the dismissal shall be set aside and the case s11all be placed back on the active docket for disposition and all defenses, otherwise available, would continue to be available included but nut limited to standing and are not waived by this Agreement.
TN WITNFiSS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned
action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Arm Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown, Esq. William J. Brown & Associates
P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, Tlf37.364
Martha M. Lafferty @PR# 19817) Gary D. Housepian (BPR # 6969) Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21' Ave South, Suite I00
Nashville, TN 37212

i

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice

Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice

GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN

300 Lalceside Drive, Suite 1000

Oakland, CA 94612-3534

(510) 763-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Date: 2/)5/&7~5

JRN-27-2085 18:51

MRNIER HEROD

For Defendant County:
i
Cannon Couniy, Tennessee

Date

CANNON COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

CANNON COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

Plaintiff:
9-~7&,,2!7
Dennis Cantrel

Date / /

/
/

CANNON COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES
JUDICIAL SERVICES FOR
CANNON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section I. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 3:98CV 0731.
Issue Date: June 18, 2004 Site Visit Date: June 15, 2004
Revised: August 24,2004
211 Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500 Fax: 615-255-6572

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................... P a 2
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With DisabilitiesAct
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND........................................................ Page 3 111. FSTARCAILTIETGYIEEVS/AOLPUINAITOIONSN.S../.C...O...M....P...L...I.A...N...C...E....................... Page 3 - 9
A. Accessible Parking B. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door C. Accessible Path of Travel, First Floor D. Accessible Path of Travel to Second Floor Courtroom E. Second Floor Courtroom Door F. Second Floor Courtroom G. Second Floor Courtroom Jury Box H. Second Floor Courtroom Witness Stand I. Second Floor Courtroom Jury Room J. Accessible Toilet Room K. Second Floor Clerk and Master Office L. Basement Circuit Court Clerk's Office M. First Floor Drinking Fountain N. Fire Extinguishers 0. Interior Signage P. Area of Rescue Assistance ATTACHMENTS A. Site

LOCATION: Cannon County Courthouse West Main Street, Public Square Woodbury, TN 37190
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Sumner & Cannon, Inc. (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Cannon County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated April 6,2004. Data for this report was obtained in a field investigationby BWSC on June 15,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of ths report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register / Vol. 56, no. 144I Friday, July 26, 1991,Rules q d Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibilitymay trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterations to the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title II State and Local Government Title 111Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities
Title IV Telecommunications
Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law
The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title II.
The following excerpts fiom "The Americans with Disabilities Act Title II.Technical
Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

''Title 11 of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities from discriminationon the basis of disability in the services,programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals with disabilities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number of methods. In many ' situations, providing access to facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternativesto structuralchanges in order to acheve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title 111, public entities are not required to remove barriers from each facility, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structural member would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The Cannon County Courthouse is a two-story structure with a basement located on the Public Square on West Main Street in Woodbury, Tennessee. It was built in 1935. There have been some interior alterations since that time, some of these in an attempt to make the building more accessible. An interior platform lift between the First and Second Floors and an accessible Unisex Toilet Room on the Second Floor were installed in 1998.
111. FACILITY EVALUATIONSICOMPLIANCE STRATEGIESIOPINIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE FOLLOWED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC Report) While six spaces are designated handicap spaces, only five are required at the Courthouse. The existing spaces are non-compliant because of slopes and because of failure to be located along an accessible route.
RECOMMENDATION: To remedy this situation, the handicap spaces are proposed to be moved into one location along the accessible route. The most suitable location for these spaces is at the east side of the parking area south of the courthouse. These spaces have a general cross slope of 0.4% and running slopes ranging from 0.8% to 2.5%. This paving is inconsistent in slope and these inconsistencies create very small areas of slopes which may be non-compliant. While this is permissible at other locations in the parking lot, the handicap parking area should be resurfaced to achieve more consistent slopes. Five handicap spaces should then be striped to meet ADA requirements. The spaces must be 8'-0" wide with a 5'-0" aisle between spaces. These spaces may share an aisle in such a way that two spaces abut each other with an aisle between them and additional spaces. Van spaces should be 11'-0" wide. ADA compliant curb cuts must also be provided at the north end of the aisles into the accessible route (see below). Signage indicating the handicap spaces should also be installed and the handicap symbol should be painted within the spaces, in accordance with ADA reqiire~ents.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC Report) The existing ramp fiom the East parking area to the East entry doors is not compliant. The landing at the top of the ramp is not large enough, and further, BWSC proposes that the level of this landing be raised about 7 ?h" to match the main First Floor level of the building. There are other non-compliant aspects to this route, but they need not be enumerated here since altering the size and elevation of the top landing will require rebuilding the entire ramp.
RECOMMENDATION: Beginning fkom the East doors, the handicap ramp should be modified to include a landing at least 5'-0" by the width of the ramp. From the landing, the ramp may slope down at a max slope of 8.3%. The ramp should travel for approximately 20'4" where another landing at least 5'4" by the width of the ramp should be constructed. At the landing, the ramp should then depart from the path of the existing ramp and trim south toward the new accessible parking spaces. This ramp should also slope down at a max slope of 8.3% and should not run more than 30'-0" without another landing of minimum 5'4" by the width of the ramp. The path of this ramp may require the demolition or relocation of the planter beds in the courthouse lawn. The entire ramp should have ADA compliant rails including the required 1'-0" handrail extensions. Two sets of stairs that intersect the ramp should be relocated or removed. Stairs may intersect the ramp at landings, if necessary, but they may not intersect the ramp in sloped areas as these slopes are required to have handrails for their entire length.
From the base of the ramp, the accessible route should extend to the south toward the handicap spaces and must be 3'4" wide minimum. Finally, the accessible route should include a 3'4" wide minimum route along the north edge of the handicap spaces. In this fashion, an uninterrupted accessible route is established from the handicap parking to the building.
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

C. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL, FIRST F'LOOR
ISSUES: (Ref: Sec. 3, FDC Report) The entrance through the East entrance doors is through exterior doors of a non-compliant width, and immediately up a ramp of 8" rise to the main First Floor level.
RECOMMENDATION: In order to make this entrance accessible, the floor immediately inside the exterior doors should be raised to the main First Floor level. Since the exterior door now has a transom light above, the existing masonry opening could still be used with the new floor level. At the same time, new doors should be installed with at least one leaf having the required 32" clear opening. The required 48" deep maneuvering room would be available in front of at least one leaf of the door. This alteration will add one more step down toward one of the existing Toilet Rooms and the stairs to the Basement.
PER 1/24/05:LOOSE MAT - NO ACTION REQUIRED AS VENDOR HAS
INDICATED IT IS COMPLIANTWITH THE ADA.
D. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 5, FDC Report) The accessible path of travel is by way of the platform lift near the East Entrance. The force required to open the lift door, the closing speed of the door, and the relationship of the platform floor to the threshold and ramp are all non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The Platform lift manufacturer andforinstaller should make adjustments andlor alterations in the device in order to correct these deficiencies.
The hinges currently on the First Floor lift door are spring hinges. They should be replaced and a closer installed.
E. SECOND RLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 11, FDC Report) The active door leaf has a non-compliant push pressure and has a small view window at a non-compliant height.
RECOMMENDATION: The active door leaf closer should be adjusted to a compliant push pressure of 5 lbs. The window deficiency should be corrected by installing a larger window useable by both standing and seated persons.
PER 1/24/05: NO ACTION REQUIRED FOR THE GLASS.
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

F. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 12, FDC Report) The fixed seats in the visitors' section allow no wheelchair locations. The rear row of seats is too close to the wall in places. The exit door in the fi-ont of the room has a closer requiring too much force to open and has a closing period 0.03 seconds too fast.
RECOMMENDATION: Some of the fixed seats should be removed to provide the required 4 wheelchair locations, with companion seating as required. Some of the seats in the back row should be removed to provide a compliant path into the courtroom. The closer on the exit door should be adjusted to require a compliant opening force and provide a compliant closing period.
G. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM JURY BOX
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 13, FDC Report) The Jwy Box has three levels, the lowest 8" above the Courtroom Floor.
RECOMMENDATION: At present there is no access into the Jury Box for a person in a wheelchair. The jury box is surrounded by a metal railing. 42" beyond the end of the Jury Box is another rail, which forms part of the Bar separatingthe judicial area fi-omthe visitors' section. The least difficult modification would be to modifL the railing surroundingthe jury box to allow a space at floor level within the enclosure, between the present Jury box and the Bar. The railings should be designed so that a person sitting at floor level has a clear view of the Bench and the Witness Stand. An accessible ramp to the lowest level of the Jury Box would take 8 feet of run,a 5 foot by 5 foot landing and a 60" diameter maneuvering area in the Jury Box. Within the present configuration of the Courtroom, this would take up a large amount of space (at least 74 square feet).
The A D M G regulations for Justice Facilities, which have been proposed but not yet adopted, allow wheelchair spaces to be located outside the defined area of raised jury boxes or witness stands "where ramp or lift access poses a hazard by restricting or projecting into a means of egress required by the appropriate administrative authority." In order to avoid projection into aisles required for exits, a significantpart of the visitors' section of the Courtroom would be lost to that use.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Part of the metal railing around the Jury Box, on the side toward the Visitor's Section, should be removed. A juror in a wheelchair can then
sit atfloor level in the space between the Jury Box platform and the metal Bar rail. If
necessary, the metal railing along thefront of the J u v Box should be modiJ;edto avoid blocking the sight lines of ajuror in a wheelchair.
PER 1/24/05: NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO THE JURY BOX. INSTEAD, STATE PROTOCOL WITH REGARD TO JURY BOX WILL BE FOLLOWED.
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

H. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 14, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is inaccessible to a person in a wheelchair because it is 16 '/z" above the Courtroom Floor.
RECOMMENDATION: There is not enough room to install either a compliant ramp or a lift to access the Witness Stand. A ramp would require 16'-6" of sloped surface, not including landings and maneuvering space. A lift would require approximately a 5 foot by 5 foot space for the lift plus an equal maneuvering space at the Witness Stand level. The County should provide an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb steps to an elevated Witness Stand. Such a witness could sit at floor level near the Witness Stand and use a hand-held microphone.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The County should make a rule that in a proceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the Witness Stand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level infront ofthe Witness Stand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
I. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 15, FDC Report) The Jury Room is accessed through a door ffom the courtroom which has a closer with a non-compliant push pressure and closing period. The jury room door has non-compliant hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: The closer should be adjusted to have compliant push pressure and closing period. The hardware on the Jury Room door should be replaced with a compliant model.
J. ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 8,9, 17, 18,25 & 26, FDC Report) The Building is required to have a minimum of one accessible Unisex Toilet Room. The room now designated as the Jury Room Unisex Toilet Room is the most nearly compliant and on the most compliant path of travel of all the Toilet Rooms in the building. Its deficiencies are:
The closer requires too much push pressure and closes too fast. The signage is non-compliant, in design and location. The sink is located too close to the side wall. The drain-pipe sticks into the required clear space under the sink. The sidewall grab bar is located incorrectly. The toilet paper dispenser is located incorrectly. Because it opens off the Jury Room, it is not available when the Jury is deliberating.
RECOMMEDATION: This Toilet Room should be separated fiom the Jury Room by a partition in the location of the previous wall. This would create a corridor space between the Jury Room and the Unisex Toilet Room, where the accessible drinking fountain is
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

now located. Signage throughout the building should give directions to this as the Accessible Toilet Room. The deficiencies should be corrected. The drinking fountain should be moved over to give a compliant pull side clearance of 18". The sink, sidewall grab bar and toilet paper dispenser should all be relocated.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: No change to the drinkingfountain location is required. Signage should be installed at the First Floor Toilet Rooms giving directions to the Accessible Toilet Room.
K. SECOND FLOOR CLERK & MASTER OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 19, FDC Report) Room identification signage and door hardware are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage and door hardware should be installed.
L. BASEMENT CIRCUIT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 21,22,23 & 24, FDC Report) The Circuit Court Clerk's Office is located in the Basement of the Courthouse. It is accessed by an exterior door reached by stairs from grade, interior stairs from the First Floor, and a non-compliant ramp fiom the exterior. Inside the basement level, there is a 4" change of level between the West door (at the ramp) and the Circuit Court Clerk's Office and a 3" level change between the Circuit Court Clerk's Office and a Toilet Room. Both of these level changes are now accomplished with non-compliant ramps.
RECOMMENDATION: Significant re-building of the existing exterior ramp would be required to bring it into compliance with ADAAG regulations. Only one of the required alterations would be the rebuilding of the stone exterior stairs to the West First Floor entrance in order to create a large enough flat landing outside the West Basement door under these stairs. Because the ramp slopes and landings are non-compliant, the entire ramp would have to be rebuilt if it were to meet accessibility requirements.
Title I1 allows government entities to use alternative means in order to provide access to its programs and services. The public conducts business with the Circuit Court Clerk's Office by submitting documents or requesting information at the counterjust inside the office door. It may possible to provide these same services to persons unable to climb stairs by having an employee come up to the First Floor and transact that business. Some means of direct communication between the First Floor Level and the Circuit Court Clerk's Office, such as a buzzer or telephone could be set up.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Persons unable to climb stairs who have business with the Circuit Court Clerk's Ofice should be directed to the Second Floor Clerk & Master OfJice. They will arrangefor contact with the Circuit Court Clerk's Ofice. Signage giving these directions should be installed on the First Floor and on the Exterior at the steps down to the entrance to the Basement.
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

M. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 7, FDC Report) The drinking fountain is mounted so that the spout height is too high. Since a drinking fountain is provided on this floor, it must be accessible.
RECOMMENDATION: Re-install the unit at a compliant height, or install a second, accessible drinking fountain on the First Floor.
N. FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 4 & 20, FDC Report) Fire extinguishers in the First and Second Floor corridors are mounted too high.
RECOMMENDATION: Remount the fire extinguishers at a compliant height of 54".
0 . INTERIOR SIGNAGE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 27 and throughout FDC Report) There is a lack of compliant room identification and directional signage both inside and outside the building.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage should be installed to designate permanent rooms and spaces throughout the building, and to provide directions to, or information about functional spaces of the building. On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified, and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance.
P. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE:
ISSUE: ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fire if there is not an accessible means of egress from that part of the building. There is no Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of this building.
RECOMMENDATION: The Jury Room could be altered to make it an Area of Rescue Assistance. The stair nearest to the Jury Room is 41" wide along its narrowest run. The requirement for 48" wide stairs appears in a section of the ADAAG regulations fi-om which existingbuildings are exempt.
Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

Cannon County Courthouse
335388.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, )

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

)

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

1

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

1

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE ) COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY ) COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR ) COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER ) COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

)

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

1

Defendants.

)

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLElMENT AGREEMENT - CHESTER COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this

day of

~~bfw)'

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann ~ a r i ~e apholaD, ennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Chester County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term ' is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS .,
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same d e f ~ t i o nass are contained in 42 U.S.C. §12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE D A T E means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENTAND MONITORING
10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Jones, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Zappola's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Jones, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Zappola if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Larson has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement a h s that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
Troy Kilzer Chester County Mayor P. 0.Box 296 Henderson, TN 38340
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant Corillty in the above-captioned action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaii~tiffsGeorge Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola,

Ralph E. Ranlse-CantreI,

and A. Russell Larson:

William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Gary D. Housepian (BPR # 69@) Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 24 16 21StAve South, Suite 100 Nasllville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800
, Attorneys for Plain$ffs
Date:

- For Defendant ChesterSeynty, Tennessee:
LI K .
I
Thomas M. Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & Donne11 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date:

For Defendant County:
Chester County, Tennessee By: Name: Title: Date:

on, r,
George Lane, P1
Date: b\-0<

CHESTER COUNTY
i
Plaintiff:
Date

CHESTER COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

-
Dennis Cantrel, ~ l a k t i f f

Date:

/d4,8

Date: J -/x-fls/

AGREED SETTLEMENT CHESTER COUNTY

I. Parking

A.

The adjacent parking is on the street around the Old Courthouse and the Courthouse

Annex Building. There are a total of (63) marked parking places of which (3) are

designated, complying with {4.1.2(5)}. These (3) designated parking spaces shall be titled

DP-1 on Court Street at the Old Courthouse, DP-2 on Court Street at the Annex Building,

and DP-3 on Crook Avenue at the Annex Building Lower Level.

6. The configuration of these buildings and the paking places require that all (3) designated
parking spaces be van accessible. There are no van accessible soaces provided.
{4.1.2(5) (b))

Agreed Solution: Relocate Jury Room from lower level sf Annex building such that this area does not provide judicial services. Lower level parking (DP-3) would then not be required to be accessible. Provide two accessible spaces at upper level of Annex (DP-2) and one to old courthouse (DP-2). At least one van accessible space with accessible route to both entrances to be provided (including cross-walk, if only one space provided). Attempt van space at old courthouse near current ramp at rear door. These spaces are to be provided in accordance with (4.6).

2. Parking Space DP-I on Court Street at the Old Courthouse and the Entrance Ramp

A.

There was no com~lianct urb sign designating this parking space. (4.6.4)

C. The designated parking space DP-1 has non-compliant running slopes varying between
2.47% and 3.13%.

D.

The access aisle for the DP-1 space is a non-compliant 48" wide {Page 26, Fig, 9)

E.

The van accessible access aisle route along the front of the car of 42" does not permif a

3 6 clear space between the concrete waN and the bumper of the vehicle from the wheel

stop, making a non-comoliant condition. {Page 26, Fig. 9) The front overhang of the

vehicle varies from 12" to 24" and fhe rear overhang of the vehicle varies from 32" to 42".

F.

The access aisle for the DP-1 space has a non-compliant running slope of 2.47% toward

the street. (4.6.6)

H.

The access aisle is a non-compliant 36" wide access aisle between the wheel stop at DP-

1 and the ramp wall {Page 26, Fig. 91, a person in a wheelchair is forced to travel in the

street from the apparent access aisle around the back of the designated DP-1 space and

to the landing at the base of the ramp.

J.

The landing at the bottom of the ramp is compliant in width and length but is non-

com~liandf ue to the fact that it has non-comoliant running slopes up to 0.9% and cross

slopes up to 0.64%. This landing is required to be level. 14.8.4)

L.

The ramp has non-compliant running slopes that vary between 7.5% and 12.2%. 14.8.2)

0. The ramp has vertical side drop ofis up to 13" wifh no protective curbs, thereby making it
non-comoliant. 14.8.7)

P.

The landing at the top of this ramp at the Old Courthouse entrance door is in an alcove

fhat is a non-compliant 48" wide {4.8.4(1)} by a compliant 60" deep and a door that

swings info the non-compliant path of travel. {4.8.4(4)}.

Q. The landing at the fop of this ramp is non-compliant because it is required to be level, yet it has a compliant running slope but non-compliant crass slopes up to 0.5%. (4.8.4)

Agreed Solution: Refer to solution at # I above for parking issues. Entrance solution: provide new accessible entrance at doors at the rear of old courthouse to meet requirements of {4.3,4.8 and 4.13).

3. Parking Space DP-2 on Court Street at the Annex Building and Path of Travel to the Upper Level Entrance Ramp and Building Entry on Court Street

B.

The designafed parking space DP-2 was non-compliant because there was no curb sign

designating this parking space. {4.6.4)

D.

The designated parking space DP-2 has non-compliant cross slopes valying between

3.21% to 5.38%. 14.6.3)

E.

The access aisle for DP-2 is a non-compliant triangular shape. {Page 26, Fig. 9)

F.

The curb ramp is non-com~liantdue to lack of detectable warnings. (4.7.7)

G. The curb ramp has a non-compliant running slope of 12.4%. {4.7.2 & 4.8.2)

H. The curb ramp has one non-compliant flared side with a 29.6% slope. (4.7.5)

1.

The curb ramp has one non-compliant side with no flaring with a vertical drop off

measuring up fo 4-1/2" at the top. {4.7.5)

K.

The path of travel from fhe top of the built-up curb ramp, at DP-2, to the low end of the

accessible ramp into the Upper Level along Court Street has varying running slopes

between 0.6% and 4.5% with a secfion of this walk sloping at a non-compliant 7.0%.

This 19'-9" section of wa/kis actually a ramp due to its non-compliant running slope. This

walk is non-compliant due fo the lack of handrails on both sides (4.8.51, due to the lack of

level landings at each end 14.8.41, due to the lack of edge protection C4.8.71, and due fo

the excessive cross slope of 2.3%. C4.8.6).

L.

The landing at the low end of the ramp is actually a section of sidewalk that is non-

compliant because if has both cross slopes and running slopes. The cross slopes vary

between 4.35% to 5.1% and the running slopes vary between 0.00% and 1.00%. This

landing is required to be level. C4.8.4)

M. Forpurposes of discussion within this reporf, each of the (3) ramp sections of the access
ramp have been separately labeled as R l , R2, and R3.

N.

This non-compliant ramp has no landings befween sections R l and R2 or between

sections R2 and R3 where this ramp changes directions. f4.8.4)

0. The continuous handrail that runs along each side of all (3) sections, is at non-compliant heights as high as 42-7/8" from the ramp surfaces. {4.8.5(5)) At the high end of this ramp, adjacent to the stair landing, the height of the ramp is in excess of 30" above the finish grade below which requires, in addition to the handrail at that point, there also be a guardrail per fhe [2000 Edition of NFPA 101 7.2.2.4.I.] The guardrail shall comply in all respects with the 12000 Edition of NFPA 101 7.2.2.4.6.1

P.

The non-compliant ramp has approximately 36" vertical side drop offs on both sides

without the required protecfive curbs. 14.8.7)

Q. The non-compliant handrails have no extensions. {4.8.5(2))

R. Ramp section R l has a non-compliant entrance cross slope of 5.1%. {4.8.6)

S. Ramp section R1 has a non-compliant running slopes varying between 18.8 % and 23.8%. 14.8.2)

T. Ramp section R2 has non-com~lianrtunning slopes varying between 13.38% and 20%. (4.8.2)

U. Ramp section R2 has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 4.3% and 4.9%. 14.8.6)

V. Ramp section R3 has non-compliant running slopes varying between 14.39% and 18.7%. 14.8.2)

W. Ramp section R3 has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 4.3% and 2.6%. c4.8.6)

X.

The landing at the top of this ramp and in front of the door is compliant in size but non-

compliant because it has both cross slopes and running slopes. The cross slopes vary

between 1.20% and 2.60% and the running slopes vary between 0.00% and 0.40%. This

landing is required to be level 14.8.4)

Agreed Solution: Refer to Solution #aIbove for parking issues. Ramp issues: provide an accessible ramp to the upper level of Annex building in accordance with (4.7) or provide platform lift to an accessible entrance (modifications at the landing in front of the entrance door are not recommended).

4. Parking Space DP-3 on Crook Avenue at the Annex Lower Level and the Entrance Ramp

A.

There was no curb sign designating this parking space. C4.6.4)

6. The designated parking space DP-3 has nun-complianf running slopes varying between 1.95% and 3.3. C4.6.3)

C. The designated parking space DP-3 has non-com~liantcross slopes varying between
1.89% and3.1%. 14.8.2)
The access aisle for the designated parking space DP-3 is a non-compliant shape. {Page 26, Fig. 9)
The access aisle has non-com~liantrunning slopes varying between 2.0% and 2.7%. (4.8.2 & 4.6.3)
The built-up curb ramp for designated parking space DP-3 has a non-compliant running slope of 15.2%. 14.7.2)
The sides on this curb ramp have non-com~lianst lopes of 38.3% and 51.6%. 14.7.5)
The curb ramp is non-compliant due to the lack of a detectable warning. 14.7.7)
The end of the sidewalk at the top of and to the left of the built-up curb ramp bordering a vehicular way is non-compliant because it does not have the required detectable warning. 14.29.5)
The path of travel along the sidewalk that leads from the built-up curb ramp to the upper most landing of the ramp that accesses the basement level has a non-compliant cross slope of 3.3% 14.3.7)at the top of the built-up curb ramp. If also has compliant and varying cross slopes between 1.0% and 2.0% for the balance of the path of travel to the main building ramp. This path of travel also has compliant running slopes up to 1.9%.
The landing at the upper end of the ramp to the lower level is non-com~liantbecause it has both cross slopes and running slopes and is required to be level 14.8.4). The cross slope is 0.75% and the running slope is 0.48%.
The cross slope at the upper section of the ramp is a compliant 0.75%; but the cross slope in the center is a non-compliant 3.4% 14.8.6) and a non-com~liant3.0%. at the lower end of the ramp. {4.8.6)
The running slopes on this ramp are non-compliant varying between 16.26% and 19.0%. 14.8.23
The landing at the lower end of the ramp extending to the lower level is non-comoliant because it has both cross slopes and running slopes and is required to be level 14.8.4). The landing cross slopes vary between 3.00% and 3.50% and the running slopes vary between 0.40% and 0.80%.
The non-compliant handrails on each side this ramp are 39-3/4" to 42" high {4.8.5(5)) and the clearance between the two is 39-1/2". One side has a non-compliant drop off from 0" to 27" with no edge protection C4.8.7). The rail next to the wall is floor mounted approximately 1-i/2" from the wall and is non-compliant because it was found to not be structurally sound, being easily moved, so as to potentially pinch a hand between the wall and the rail. {4.26.3) These two handrails are non-compliant because there are no extensions at the top and bottom. (4.8.5(2))
There was a non-compliant 1-1/16" vertical drop-off at the boftom of the ramp between the ramp concrete and the lower landing concrete. 14.3.8)
The path of travel is from the landing at the lower end of the ramp to the ramp landing at the doorway. There is a depressed area drain that.& 4'-3"from the wall and If-0" from the bottom end of the door ramp. This creates non-compliant cross slopes of 4.23% from the

wall and 5.0% from the end of the bottom of the ramp at the Lower Level entrance door. 14.3.7 and 4.8.4, and Page 38, Fig. 25)

V. The ramp at the entrance door into the Lower Level is non-compliant because it has no upper landing 14.8.4) and the area outside the door must be level. {4.13.6}

W. The ramp at fhe entrance door into the Lower Level is non-compliant because it has an excessive side slope of 36.1%.14.8.2)

X.

non- The landing at the bottom of the ramp into the Lower Level entrance door is

compliant because it slopes and is required to be level. 14.8.4) It has a cross slope of

3.1% and a running slope of 1.14%.

Y. The ramp to the entrance door is 2'-5" long and 3'4" wide and has non-com~lianrtunning
non- slopes varying between 12.42% and 16.14% C4.8.A Page 38, Fig. 25) and a
com~lianctross slope of 3.14% at the bottom. 14.8.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

5. Annex Buildins Lower Level Path of Travel to the Entrance Door

A.

The Annex Building Lower Level Entrance Door path of travel begins (a) either down

Court Street, continuing along Crook Street, up a non-compliant curb ramp, along a

sidewalk to and down a non-compliant exterior ramp, and on fo the entrance door; (b) or

up a non-compliant parking curb ramp and down the non-com~lianst idewalk, continuing

along the Crook Street sidewalk to and down the non-com~liantexterior ramp, and up a

non-compliant entrance door ramp.

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

6. Annex Building Lower Level Entrance Door

E.

There is a non-compliant loose mat on the interior side of this door. 14.5.31

F.

This door is in a compliant 48-1/2" wide corridor that narrows down to 38-1/2" at the door

jamb. This door has a compliant 7-3/4"push side clearance.

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

7. Annex Building Lower Level Path of Travel to the Jurv Room

B.

The Old Courthouse Large Courtroom, Jury Room path of travel begins at the Second

Floor courtroom doors, down a non-compliant interior ramp, down the elevator, through a

hall and fhe non-compliant exterior door, outside and down the non-compliant exterior

ramp, across Court Street, (a) either down Court Street, continuing along Crook Street,

up a non-compliant curb ramp, along a sidewalk to and down a non-compliant exterior

ramp, and up a non-compliant door ramp to the non-com~lianet ntrance door and through

a corridor; or (b) travel across Court Street and up a non-compliant parking curb ramp

adjacent to parking space DP-2 and down the non-compliant sidewalk, continuing along

the Crook Street sidewalk to and down the non-som~liantexterior ramp, and on to the

non-com~liantentrance door and through a corridor.

C. The Annex Building Courtroom, Jury Room path of travel begins at the Main Level Large Courfroom doors, through a non-compliant corridor door to the entry lobby, outside and down the non-compliant exterior ramp, along the non-compliant Court Street sidewalk, (a) either down a non-compliant parking curb ramp to Court Street, continuing down Court Street to and along Crook Street, up a non-compliant curb ramp, along a sidewalk to and down a non-compliant exterior ramp, and on to the non-com~liantentrance door and through a corridor; or (b) down and along the non-compliant sidewalk, to and down the non-compliant exterior ramp, and up a non-compliant door ramp on to the non-complianf entrance door and through a corridor.

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

8. Annex Building Lower Level Juw Room

A.

There was no signage inside the building to identify this space. The County Mayor

informed the report team as to its location.

C. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. C4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

9. Annex Building Lower Level Path of Travel to the Women's Public Toilet Room

A.

This toilet is accessed by following the non-compliant sidewalk on the side of the Annex

Building facing Court Street, to the sidewalk along Crook Street, to and down the non-

com~lianet xterior ramp that leads down to the Lower Level and up a non-compliant door

ramp through a non-compliant entrance door and through the corridor.

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

10. Annex Building Lower Level Women's Public Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this restroom is at a non-compliant location, a non-com~liantheight of

65-1/4" and of a non-compliant type.(4.30.6)

D. The clear passageway through the door into the entrance alcove is a non-com~liant311/4". (4.13.5)

E.

The non-compliant interior alcove is 40-3/4" long by 38-3/8" wide.{4.13.7}

H. The clear passageway through this door is a non-compliant 31". (4.13.5)

1.

The non-compliant toilet room does not have the required 60" clear floor space. {Page

43, Fig. 30(a) and 4.22.3)

K.

The sink has a non-compliant height of 34-3/8" {4.19.2) and a non-compliant underside

clearances if the counter top is lowered to 34" above the floor as required.{4.19.3}

L.

The plumbing for the sink is non-compliant because it has no protective insulation.

{4.19.4)

M. The sink has non-compliant pinching and grasping faucet handles. 14.19.5)

N.

The paper towel dispenser is a non-compliant 60-3/4" from the floor. {Page 16, Fig.

6(b))and 14.2.6)

0. The soap dispenser is a non-compliant height of 54-3/8" from the floor.{4.2.5)

P. The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant 48-5/8" from the floor. 14.19.6)

R.

The non-compliant path of travel to the toilet stalls is 41". 14.17.5)

S.

The stall door opening is a non-compliant 22". {Page 43, Fig. 30 and 4.13.51

T.

The stall size is a non-compliant 53-3/4" by 29-U4". {Page 43, Fig. 30(b))

U. There are no grab bars in this non-compliant stall. 14.16.4)

V.

The toilet seat is a non-compliant 15-1/2" above the floor. {Page 42, Fig. 29(b)]

W. The center of the toilet fixture from the side wall is a non-compliant 14-1/2". {Page 42, Fig. 28)

X.

The toilet flush valve pressure is a non-com~lian6t Ibs. 14.27.4)

Y.

The toilet paper dispenser is a non-compliant distance of 36-1/2" from the back wall

14.16.6)and a compliant 41-7/8 from the floor.

AA. The shower entry is a non-compliant 30" wide. C4.21.2)

85. The shower drying area is a non-compliant 35-3/8" wide. 14.21.2)

CC. The shower is a non-compliant 35-1/2" by 35". {4.21.2)
DD. The shower controls are non-compliant cylindrical knobs (4.27.4) mounted at a non-
com~lianht eight of 49" above the stall floor. 14.21.5)

EE. The fixed shower head is a non-compliant type and mounted at a non-compliant height of 73-1/2" above the floor. 14.21.6)

FF. The non-compliant shower curb is 3-I/#" high. C4.21.7)

GG. There was no seat provided in the non-com~liansthower. {4.21.3)

HH. There were no grab bars in this non-compliant shower. 14.21.4)

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

II. Annex Buildinn Lower Level Path of Travel to the Men's Public Toilet Room

A.

This toilet is accessed by following the non-compliant sidewalk on the side of the Annex

Building that faces Court Street, to the sidewalk along Crook Street, to and down the non-

compliant exterior ramp that leads down to the lower level and up a non-compliant door

ramp through a non-compliant entrance door and through the corridor.

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

12. Annex Building Lower Level Men's Public Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this restroom is at a non-com~liantlocation {4.30.6}, a non-compliant

height of 68-3/8" and is of a non-compliant type. (4.30.1)

E.

The clear passageway through this door is a non-com~lianf31". (4.13.5)

F.

The non-compliant inferior alcove is 41-3/8" long by 38478" wide. 14.13.71

The clear passageway through this door is a non-compliant 31". {4.13.5}

The non-compliant toilet room does not have the required 60" clear floor space. 14.22.3)

The non-compliant sink alcove access width is 19-3/4" at the urinal partition and 23-5/8" deep from the partition to the sink counter. 14.19.3)

The sink is a non-compliant height of 34-1/8". {4.19.2)

The sink is non-com~lianbt ecause if has no protective plumbing insulation. (4.19.4)

The paper towel dispenser is a non-compliant 66-5/8" from the floor. C4.2.6) and {Page 19, Fig. 6(b)}

The soap dispenser is a non-compliant height of 50-7/8" from the floor.{4.2.5)

The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant 48" from the floor. {4.19.6)

The non-compliant urinal is 22-3/4" above the floor. 14.18.2)
non- The distance from the face of the urinal screen to the face of the sink counter is a
compliant 23-5/8". 14.18.3)

U. The non-compliant urinal flush valve is 49" above the floor. {4.18.4)

w. The non-compliant path of travel to the toilet sfalls is 31" wide. 14.17.5)

x.

The stall door opening is a non-compliant 22". {Page 43, Fig. 30 and 4.13.5)

Y, The stall size is a non-compliant 53-3/4" by 30-5/8: {Page 43, Fig. 30(b)]

z.

There are no grab bars in this non-com~lianst tall. (4.16.4)

AA. The toilet seat is a non-compliant 15-3/4" above the floor. {Page 42 Fig. 29(b)}

BB. The center of the toilet fixture from the side wall is a non-compliant 14-1/2". {Page 42, Fig. 28)

CC. The toilet flush valve pressure is a non-compliant 5-1/2 lbs. {4.27.4)

DD. The toilet paper dispenser is a non-compliant distance of 36-3/8" from the back wall 14.16.6) and a compliant height of 45" above the floor.

EE. The shower at the rear of this room is non-compliant due to the 30-3/8" wide non-
compliant path of travel. 14.21.23

FF. The shower drying area is a non-compliant 35-1/8" by 30-3/8". {4.21.2}

GG. The shower is a non-compliant 35-1/8" by 35-U2". 14.21.2)

HH. The shower controls are non-compliant cylindrical knobs (4.27.4) mounted at a noncompliant height of 49-1/4" above the shower floor. 14.21.5)

11.

The fixed shower head is a non-compliant type and is mounted a non-compliantheight of

73-1/2" above the floor. 14.21.6)

JJ. The non-com~lianst hower curb is 3-1/2" high. 14.21.7)

KK. There is no seat in the non-compliant shower. 14.21.3)

LL. There were no grab bars in this non-comoliant shower. (4.21.4)

Agreed Solution: No action required if lower level jury room relocated.

14. Annex Buildinq Main Level path of Travel to the Entrance Door

A.

The Annex Building Main Level Entrance Door path of travel begins on Court Street at

the Designated Parking Space DP-2, up a non-comoliant curb ramp, along a non-

compliant sidewalk to and up a non-compliant exterior ramp, and onto the non-compliant

ramp/entrance door landing.

Agreed Solution: Refer to solution at Item #3 above. 15. Annex Building Main Level Entrance Door

6.

There is a non-compliant loose mat on the interior side of this door. (4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D.

The threshold for this door is non-compliant due to the 13/16" interior height, I " exterior

height and 7/16" vertical height at the saddle stop. (4.13.8)

Agreed Solution: Provide compliant threshold in accordance with (4.1 3.8).

16. Annex Building Main Level Path of Travel to the Courtroom Entrance Door

6. There is a non-comoliant loose mat on the interior side of this door. {4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

17. Annex Building Main Level Courtroom Entrance Door

A.

The double 36" wide wooden doors, when viewed from the corridor side of the doors, has

a non-compliant 27-578" clear opening for the right door and 20-5/8" for the leff door due

to the fixed wooden pews on the interior that extends into the door openings. (4.13.5)

Agreed Solution: Move benches from in front of door.

C. The push/pull pressure is a non-compliant 6.5 Ibs for the right door and a compliant 4 Ibs for the lefi door when viewed from the corridor side of the door. 14.13.1I )

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 l(b)).

18. Annex Building Main Level Large Courtroom

A.

The Large Courtroom will seat approximately (167) people in the fixed wooden pews and

an additional ( I I ) in the movable chairs around the courtroom. The size of the courtroom

is 48'-1I-1/2" by 30'-10': or approximately 1,510 square feet. The ADA requires (4)

designated wheelchair spaces. There were no compliant spaces provided. {4.1.3(19)(a))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

20. The Annex Building Main Level Courtroom Witness Stand

A.

The Witness Stand is non-compliant due to the presence of (1) step measuring 6-3/8" to

access the raised platform. (4.5.2)

C.

The Witness Stand entrance has a clear and compliant width of 67-1/2" with a non-

compliant interior space of 67-1/2" deep by 42" wide to maneuver a wheelchair within

(4.2.3). There is a movable chair within this area.

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and location of the witness are part of the state judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

22. Annex Building Main Level Courtroom Jurv Box

A.

The non-compliant Jury Box entrance width is 24-3/4" 14.3.3) with a non-compliant 6"

step. (4.5.2) The first landing is 4 8 clear with (6) movable chairs.

6.

The second level width is 42-1/2", with (7) movable chairs and a non-compliant 5-3/4"

step. 14'5.2).

C. The Jury Box is non-compliant because there is not adequate maneuvering room for a wheelchair within the box. (4.2.3)

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location of the jury are part of the state judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

23. Annex Building Main Level Path of Travel to the Men's Toilet Room

D. Thepush/pull pressure is a non-compliant 6.5 Ibs. (4.13.1l(b)}

Agreed Solution: No action required if one unisex accessible restroom is constructed along with jury room addition (or relocation). If no unisex accessible restroom is constructed, adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of {4.13.11.l(b)).

24. Annex Building Main Level Men's Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this restroom is at a non-compliant location, a non-compliant height of

65-3/8" and is of a non-compliant type. (4.30.6)

E.

The clear passageway through this door is a non-compliant 31". C4.13.5)

F.

The non-compliant interior alcove is 48-1/2" long and 39-1/4" wide. C4.13.7)

1.

The clear passageway through this door is a non-compliant 31". C4.13.5)

J.

The non-compliant toilet room does not have the required 60" clear floor space due to the

entrance door swinging into this required area. f4.22.3)

M

The sink is non-compliant because it has no protective plumbing insulation. {4.19.4}

N. The paper fowel dispenser is a non-comuliant 77" above the floor. {Page 19, Fig. 6(b)) and C4.2.6)

0. The soap dispenser is a non-compliantheight of 53-5/8 above the floor.{4.2.5)

P.

The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant 49-1/4" above the floor. {4.19.6)

R. The non-compliant urinal is 19-3/4" above the floor. C4.18.2)

U. The urinal flush acfivation pressure is a non-compliant 6-1/2 lbs. 14.27.4)
V. The non-compliant urinal clear floor space is 28-1/4" wide and the centerline is 15-1/2" and 12-1/4" from the leff and right side panel.{4.18.3)

W. The non-compliant path of travel to the foilet stalls is 30-1/2" wide. {4,17.5)

X.

The stall door opening is a non-compliant 24". {Page 43, Fig. 30 and 4.13.5)

Y. The stall size is a non-compliant 86-1/2" by 39-1/4". {Page 43 Fig. 30(b)]

Z.

The non-compliant side wall grab bar is 25-1/4" long mounted 22" from the rear wall.

14.16.4)

AA. There is no rear wall arab bar in this stall. (4.17.6)
CC. The center of the toilet fixture from the side wall is a non-compliant 20". {Page 42, Fig. 28)
DD. The toilet flush valve pressure is a non-compliant 8 lbs. C4.27.4)

Agreed Solution: No action required if one unisex accessible restroom is constructed along with jury room addition (or

relocation). If no unisex accessible restroom is constructed, renovate to comply with (4.22).

25. Annex Building Main Level Path of Travel to the Drinking Fountain

A.

The Annex Building Main Level Drinking Fountain path of travel begins at the entrance

doors of the Annex Building on Court Street and through the non-compliant entrance

lobby door.

Agreed Solution: Add directional signage to compliant unit in accordance with {4.1.3(16)(b)).

26. Annex Building Main Level Drinking Fountain

A.

The Drinking Fountain has a non-compliant spout height of 45-1/4". 14.15.2)

C. This fountain has non-compliant pinching and grasping controls. C4.15.4)

D.

The fountain has non-compliant control location. 14.15.4)

Agreed Solution: Add compliant unit in accordance with (4.15).

27. Annex Building Main Level Path of Travel to the Women's Public Toilet Room

A.

The Annex Building Main Level Women's Toilet Room path of travel begins at the

entrance doors of the Annex Building on Court Street and through the non-compliant

entrance lobby door.

Agreed Solution: No action required if one unisex accessible restroorn is constructed along with jury room addition (or relocation). If no unisex accessible restroom is constructed, adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of {4.13.11.1(b)).

28. Annex Buiidina Main Level Women's Public Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this restroom is at a non-comoliant location, a non-compliant height of

65-1/2" and is of a non-compliant type. 14.30.6)

C. The clearpassageway through this door is a non-compliant 31-1/4". 14.13.5)

D. The non-compliant interior alcove is 49" long and 38" wide. 14.13.7)

E.

The second interior door has a push/pull pressure that is a compliant 4-1/2 Ibs. The

closing period for this door is a non-comoliant 2.63 seconds. {4.13.10)

F. The clear passageway through this door is a non-compliant 31". 14.13.5)

G. The non-compliant toilet room does not have the required 60" clear floor space due to the toilet door swinging into the required clear floor space. f4.22.3)

H.

The sink has a non-compliant height of 34-1/8" 14.j9.2)

1.

The plumbing for the sink is non-compliant because it has no protective insulation.

{4.19.4}

The sink has non-com~lianpt inching and grasping faucet handles. {4.19.5}

The paper towel dispenser is a non-compliant 64-3/8 above the floor. {Page 19, Fig. 6(b)} and {4.2.6}

The soap dispenser is a non-com~lianht eight of 48-3/4" above the floor. 14.2.5)

The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant 49-1/4" above the floor. {4.19.6)
The second paper towel dispenser is a wall recessed paper towel dispenser is a non-
comp/iant 54-3/4" above the floor. 14.2.61

The non-compliant path of travel to the toilet stalls is 31-V8". 14.-17.51

The stall door opening is a non-compliant 24". {Page 43, Fig. 30 and 4.13.51

The stall size is a non-com~liant85-1/2" by 35-1/2". {Page 43 Fig. 30(b)}

The non-compliant side wall grab bar is 24" long and is mounted 21" from the rear wall. (4.16.41

The center of the toilet fixture from the side walls is a non-compliant 19-1E" and 19" from the right and leff walls, respectively, {Page 42, Fig. 28)

The toilet flush valve pressure is a non-compliant 7 Ibs. 14.27.4)

The toilet paper dispenser is a non-compliant distance of 37" from the back wall {4.16.6) and a complianf 42-1/2" from the floor.

W. The toilet seat cover dispenser is at the non-complianf height of 53" above the floor for a forward reach. C4.2.5)

Agreed Solution: No action required if one unisex accessible restroom is constructed along with jury room addition (or relocation). If no unisex accessible restroom is constructed, renovate to comply with (4.22).

29. Annex Building Main Level Path of Travel to the Circuit Court Clerk Office

A.

The Annex Building Main Level Court Clerk Office path of travel begins at the entrance

doors of the Annex Building on Court Street and through the non-cornuliant entrance

bbby door.

Agreed Solution: Refer to solution at Item #3 above.

30. Annex Building Main Level Circuit Court Clerk Office

A.

The signage for this room is at non-com~lianltocations {4.30.6), non-comc~lianht eights of

43-3/4" and 63" {4.30.6) and non-compliant types. T4.30.I }

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

D.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. {4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

31. Annex Buildinq Main Level Path of Travel to the Clerk and Master Office

A.

The Annex Building Main Level Clerk and Master Office path of travel begins at the

entrance doors of the Annex Building on Court Street, through the non-compliant

entrance lobby door and down the main compliant corridor.

Agreed Solution: Refer to solution at Item #3 above.

32. Annex Building Main Level Clerk and Master Office

6. The signage for this room is at a non-com~lianltocation 14.30.61, a non-compliant height of 64-7/8" above the floor {4.30.6) and is of a non-compliant type. 14.30.1)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

D.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. (4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

34. Old Courthouse First Floor Path of Travel to the Entrance Door

A.

The Old Courthouse Firsf Floor Entrance Door path of travel begins oufside and up the

non-compliant exterior ramp from the designated parking space DP-1 on Court Street up

the non-com~lianet xterior ramp to the non-compliant entrance door.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

35. Old Courthouse First Floor Entrance Door

D.

The 36" wide door has a compliant 33" clear opening.

E. The non-compliant exterior pull side clearance is 6-1/2". The non-com~liantinterior push
side clearance is 6". {4.13.6 Page 38, Fig. 25(a))

F.

The threshold for this door is non-compliant due to the 3/4" interior heighf, 1" exterior

height and 5/16" vertical height at the threshold stop. 14.13.8)

G. There is a non-compliant loose mat on the interior side of this door. C4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

36. Old Courthouse First Floor Fire Extinquisher

A.

The non-compliant Fire Extinguisher cabinet is located near the elevator in a surface

mounted cabinet on the corridor wall.

B.

The bottom of the cabinet was 32-5/8" above the floor and it projected a non-compliant 6-

1/2" from the wall into the path of travel. 14.4.1)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C.

The door required a non-com~lian9t Ibs. of pressure tb open. 14.27.4)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

37. Old Courthouse First Floor Path of Travel to the Drinking Fountain

A.

The Old Courthouse First Floor Drinking Fountain path of travel begins at the entrance

door on Court Street, up the non-com~liantexterior ramp through the non-compliant

entrance corridor door to the main corridor.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

38. Old Courthouse First Floor Drinking Fountain

A.

Water spout height is a non-compliant 36-3/4". 14.15.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

H.

The drinking fountain alcove is a compliant 31-3/4" by 7" with the fountain projecting

approximately a non-compliant 12" beyond the corridor wall. 14.4.I]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

39. Old Courthouse First Floor Path of Travel to the Men's Toilet Room

A.

The Old Courthouse First Floor Men's Toilet Room path of travel begins at the entrance

door on Court Street, up the non-com~liantexterior ramp through the non-compliant

entrance corridor door to the main corridor.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

40. Old Courthouse First Floor Men's Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this Men's Toilet Room is at a non-compliant location 14.30.61, a non-

compliant height of 62-1/8 14.30.6) and is of a non-compliant type. {4.30.1} The

character is a non-compliant 2-3/4" high f4.30.31, the letters are a compliant 7 / 8 high but

and the letters and graphics are non-com~liantbecause they are not raised above the face of the sign {4.30.4}.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C, The push/pull pressure for this door is a non-compliant 9 Ibs.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

L.

The soap dispenser is non-compliant height of 52-5/8" above the floor. 14.2.5)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

M. The botfom of the mirror is a non-compliant 46" above the floor. {4.19.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

T. The stall door hook is a non-compliant 65-1/2" above the floor. (4.2.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

U. The stall size is a non-compliant 108" by 35-1/2". {Page 43, Figure 30(b)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

X.

The toilet centerline is a compliant 18" of7 of the leff wall and a non-compliant 17-3/8" off

of the right wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(b))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

41. Old Courthouse First Floor Path of Travel to the Women's Toilet Room

A.

The Old Courthouse First Floor Women's Toilef path of travel begins at the entrance door

on Court Street, up the non-compliant exterior ramp through the non-complianf entrance

corridor door to the main corridor.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

42. Old Courthouse First Floor Women's Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this restroom is at a non-compliant location C4.30.61, a non-compliant

height of 62-1/2" C4.30.6) and a non-compliant type. C4.30.I } The character is a non-

compliant 2-3/4" high f4.30.31, the letters are a compliant 7/8" high but and the lefters and

graphics are non-comoliant because they are not raised above the face of the sign

14.30.4).

Agreed Solution: No action required.

L.

The soap dispenser is non-compliant height of 56-1/4" above the floor.{4.2.5}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

M. The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant 46-3/4" above the floor. {4,19.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

P.

The stall door hook is a non-compliant 60-1/2" above the floor. 14.2.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

R. The side wall grab bars are a compliant 49-3/8" long, are at a non-compliant 12-3/8" from the rear wall and are at the compliant heights of 33-5/8"and 33-31'4" above the floor.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

T.

The center of the toilet fixture from the side walls is a non-compliant 18-1/4" and 77-1/2".

{Page 43, Figure 30(b))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

V.

The toilet paper dispenser is a compliant distance of 31" from the back wall, a compliant

23" above the floor, but has a non-compliant controlled delivery feature. C4.16.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

W. The toilet seat cover dispenser is at the non-compliant height of 55" above the floor. {4.2.6)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

43. Old Courthouse Second Floor Fire Extinquisher

A.

The non-compliant Fire Extinguisher cabinet is located near the elevator in a surface

mounted cabinet on the corridor wall. The botfom of the cabinet was 32-1/2" above the

floor and it projected a non-compliant 6-98" from the wail into the path of travel. C4.4. I)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

44. Old Courthouse Second Floor Path of Travel to the Larqe Courtroom and Interior Ramp

A.

The Old Courthouse Second Floor Coutfroom path of travel begins at the entrance door

on Court Street, up the non-compliant exterior ramp through the non-compliant entrance

corridor door to the main corridor and up the Elevator.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F.

The elevation befween the two landings was measured wifh the fransif and found to be

2.02 feet. The ramp is 17'-6" long and has a non-compliant running slope of 11.6%.

c4.8.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

H.

The (2) handrails are a non-comdiant 2-1/4"wide. 14.26.21, {Page 51, Fig.39)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

1.

The handrails are non-com~liantbecause the ends are cut square and not rounded or

returned fo the floor or wall. {4.8.5(6)}

Agreed Solution: No action required. .

45. Old Courthouse Second Floor Courtroom Entrance Door

F.

There is a non-com~lianfloose mat on fhe exterior side of this door. C4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

46. Old Courthouse Second Floor Large Courtroom

D. The entrance onto fhe judiciary platform at the bar opening is non-com~lianfdue to (2) risers. {4.5.2) The risers are non-uniform risers measuring 5-3/4" and 7-1/4". 14.9.21 The compliant tread is I 1" wide.

E.

The non-compliant nosings are 7/8" from fhe face of the riser and do not have the

required sloped underside surface. C4.9.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

47. Old Courthouse Second Floor Large Courtroom Path of Travel to the Witness Stand

A.

The front judicial plafform at the bar opening is non-complianf with two steps. {4.9.2 and

4.9.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

48. Old Courthouse Second Floor Large Courtroom Witness Stand

A.

The Witness Stand is non-compliant due to the presence of ( I ) step measuring 7-1/2" to

access the raised platform. C4.5.2)

5.

The Witness Stand is non-com~lianifn size being 38-7/8" by 36-5/8" due to the inability to

maneuver a wheelchair within {4.2.3). There is a movable chair wifhin this area.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

49. Old Courthouse Second Floor Large Courtroom Path of Travel to the Jun, Box

A.

The front judicial platform at the bar opening is non-compliant with two steps. {4.9.2 and

4.9.3,'

Agreed Solution: No action required.

51. Third Floor Balconv Railing

A.

The balcony railing is 24-3/8" high and does not meet the requiremenfs for a 42" high

guardrail, possibly allowing a child who has wandered up onto the balcony area to fa//

over the railing to the courtroom floor below. The Life Safety Code requires a minimum of

42" of guardrail/wall.12000 Edition of NFPA 101, 7.2.2.4.6(21J

8. It is the recommendation of the investigative team to keep the balcony door locked at all times to prevent anyone from entering this space.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

52. Old Courthouse Elevator

A.

The following items were checked and found to be non-com~liant:

1.

The clearance between the car platform sill and the landing for the First Floor is a _non-

com~liatn1-5/16" wide. 14.10.9)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

2.

The heights of the cenferline of the hall call butfons for the First Floor level is _non-

non- compliant at 38-3/8" above the floor and the Second Floor hall call button is

compliant at 43" above the floor. 14.10.31

Agreed Solution: No action required.

3.

non- The height of fhe centerline of the jamb character signage for the Second Floor is

compliant at 60-3/8" above the floor. 14.70.5)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

54. Directional Signage

A. Non-compliant exterior directional signage. 14.f .2,(7),(clf If all entrances are not
accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest accessible entrance.
Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with {4.1.2\(7)(c).}
55. Area of Rescue Assistance

A.

The Old Courfhouse building is non-compliant since if does not provide an area of rescue

assistance for all levels above grade. See atfachment "C" for details.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

 
 l[N TKE UMTED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TEIYNESSBE
AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AMV MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

1 )

RALPH E.RAMSEY,Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

1

Plaintiffs,

)

1

V.

)

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions,POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBOFUW COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAltNGER )

COUNTY, HAl'?COCK COUNTY, HAWMNS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTOP )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

)

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No.3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin
JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT - CLAIBORNE COUNTY

2 This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 3 day of

~(U&(Y

, 2005, by and between Plaintiff.. George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie Zappota, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Claiborne County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.3 12131(2).
2. Claiborne County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
§12131(1). Claiborne County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 5 12132, and its
impleinenting regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer colfectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, a11 Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Claiborne County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shail be the same definitions as are contained.in42 U.S,C. § 12131 et sea. and 28
C.F.R.Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes,
appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERA'ZIQN" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY"as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes
any official agency of Claibomc County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Pam"
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES' refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned
and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant ta the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the faciiities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs clairns against the Defendant Couilty, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Claiborne County Courthouse, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, iilcluding but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Claibome County Courthouse whether asserted in tliis case or othenvise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal..

9, Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Afternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon inutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.

OBLIGATIC~NSASSUMEDBY THE DLEENDANCTOUNTY

10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) whicl~reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County wilI have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title 11of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective
Date.

1 Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

334733

3

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or
temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMEANNTD MONITORING

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement ( h e "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the 'Wotice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party sltall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice illeluding any issues of attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration ofthe time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O.
Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-montl~lyreport (no less fi-equentlythan every sixty
(60)days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alternations delineated in Appendix A during each sixv (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement

because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant

County's designated representative will promptly noti3 Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for

Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to ,justify

335733

4

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. h t i l there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take eeect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged Iack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs have eves attempted to access judicid proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
23. Tlie representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and tl~aht e or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. Tlis Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes a11 prior oral and witten agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other co~respondencesent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. Ail notices and other
correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the ofice of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J,
Browtl.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. l h i s Agreement shall become effective once signed by a11 parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee approving the Compromise and Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and the State of Tennessee which provides, inter aZia, that Defendant County wiII not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs througlr December 17, 2004, including those relating to Defendant County, wit11 the exception of the ainount of $2,680.00 wlzich reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and casts accrued by tl~ough December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. In the event that the Memorandum of Understanding is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition -and all defenses, otherwise available, would continue to be available included but not limited to standing and are not waived by this Agreement.
IN WImESS WEJFEOF, Plaintiffs a d Defendant County in &e above-captioned
action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E.Rainsey, Sr.,
Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown, Esq. William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001
Martha M. LafTerty @PR# 19817) Gary D. Housepian (BPR # 6969) Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21%'Ave South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oal{land, CA 94612-3534 (5 10) 763-9800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Date: a/)5/a005

For Defendant County: Date: /D L/O L / Q ~

Date

CLAIBORNE COUNTY
i
Plaintiff:

CLAIBORNE COUNTY PlaintifT
Date

Plaintiff:
Q-0-dB
Dennis Cantrel

CLAIBORNE COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

Plaintiff: Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES JUDICIAL SERVICES FOR
CLAIBORNE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section I. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 3:98CV 0731.
Issue Date: July 1, 2004 Site Visit Date: June 29, 2004
Revised: August 24, 2004
211 Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500 Fax: 615-255-6572

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... Page 3
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With DisabilitiesAct
II. FACILITY BACKGROUND........................................................Page 4 111. FSTARCAILTIETGYIEEVSIAOLPUINAITOINOSN.S..I..C...O...M....P...L..I..A...N...C...E...................... Page 5-11
A. Accessible Parlung B. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door C. Elevator D. Second Floor General Sessions Courtroom Door E. Second Floor General Sessions Courtroom F. Second Floor General Sessions Courtroom Jury Box G. Second Floor General Sessions Courtroom Witness Stand H. Accessible Path of Travel from General Sessions Courtroom to the
Jury Deliberation Room I. Jury Deliberation Room on Eppes Street J. Path of Travel to Jury Toilet Room K. Jury Toilet Room L. Second Floor Chancery Courtroom M. Second Floor Chancery Courtroom Witness Stand N. Second Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office 0 . Second Floor Clerk and Master Office P. Accessible Toilet Rooms Q. Drinking Fountains

R. Fire Extinguisher
S. Directional Signage
T. Area of Rescue Assistance ATTACHMENTS
A. Site
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

LOCATION: Claiborne County Courthouse 1740 Main Street Tazewell, TN 37879-5118
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Surnner & Cannon, Inc. (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Claiborne County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated March 15,2004. Data for this report was obtained in a field investigation by BWSC on June 29,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of this report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register / Vol. 56, no. 144 / Friday, July 26, 1991, Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterationsto the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title 11State and Local Government Title 111Public Accommodations and CommercialFacilities
Title N Telecommunications
Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law
The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title II.
The following excerpts from "The Americanswith Disabilities Act Title 11Technical Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

"Title I1 of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local govements."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals with disabilities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number of methods. In many situations, providing access to facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title 111,public entities are not required to remove barriers from each facility, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible.', "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structuralmember would have to be moved or because an existingphysical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The Claiborne County Courthouse was built in 1932 and appears to have had few changes since it was built. It qualified for listing on the National Register of Historic Places until the windows were replaced with insulated units that do not maintain the appearance of the original windows. It is a three story structure, with the First Floor primarily used for County offices, the Second Floor for judicial functions and the Third Floor for the jail. Behind the Courthouse, there is a small building across Eppes Street which is used for jury deliberations.
The County has recently passed a bond issue allocating $10.3 million for a new Jail Facility which will include an accessible courtroom and ADA improvements to the existing Courthouse. The new Jail Facility is scheduled to be completed in January of 2006. $365,000 is budgeted for Courthouse ADA. Proposed improvements to the Courthouse include the installation of an elevator, replacement of the ramp to the Second
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

Floor rear entrance, and remodeling of the First Floor Men's and Women's Toilet Rooms.
111. FACILITY EVALUATIONS/COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES/OPINIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE FOLLOWED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC Report) The FDC report details a number of problems with the accessible Parking for the Courthouse including an insufficient number of spaces (there is one and there should be two) and other issues with the existing space.
RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that two -completely new spaces be constructed near the east entrance to the Courthouse which will be closest to the proposed location of the elevator. There is space near the East entrance for a standard accessible space and a van accessible space. Grading of this area will be required.
As an alternative, parking could be located near the west entrance on the first floor. This alternative would require significant re-grading of the parking lot and the possible construction of a significant retaining wall. The alternative appears to be more costly and difficultthan providing accessible parking near the East entrance.
Another alternative would involve the construction of two new parking spaces just off Eppes Street. This is the existing Accessible route which utilizes a noncompliant metal ramp to get into the building. This ramp must be replaced (see section titled "accessible route from north entrance to jury deliberation room"). If this location is selected, it is suggested that two new spaces be constructed along the south side of the street just east of the existing ramp. These spaces would be built on an area of fill and would be angled, head-in spaces pointing toward the building. This solution would require the installation of a large retaining wall and would be costly and difficult. In the future it is noted that this entrance is not planned to be used as a public entrance to the building.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC Report) The current accessible entrance is by way of a noncompliant ramp on the north side of the building.
RECOMMENDATION: Because of the planned installation of an accessible elevator in the building, access from the new accessible spaces to the East entrance to the First Floor will provide access to the entire building.
C. ELEVATOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 22,23,34 & 35, FDC Report) There is currently no elevator in the building. Nor is there an accessible path of travel between the First and Second Floors.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

RECOMMENDATION: Installation of an elevator is included in the planned Courthouse improvements now being designed for the County. There is an existing elevator shaft adjacent to the main corridor and the Sheriffs Office on the First Floor and the Circuit Court courtroom on the Second Floor. This shaft should be modified to provide elevator access to the main corridor on both floors.
D. SECOND F'LOOR CIRCUIT COURT (MAIN) COURTROOM DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 5, FDC Report) The Circuit Court courtroom is entered through two pairs of doors, both of which have non-compliant 30" wide door leafs. The doors have view windows cited as being at a non-compliant height. The door closer has a closing period that is too fast. Signage is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: One entrance should be provided with a minimum 32" clear opening. This could be accomplished by installing a power operating device, activated by push pads, on one pair of doors.
The rule cited by FDC for the required height of the view glass is in the Appendix to the ADAAG regulations. The Appendix contains material of an advisory nature. The ADAAG regulations themselves do not make reference to view glass in doors and sidelights. While it would be very helpful to wheelchair users to have view glass at a lower height in the door, it is not required in the ADAAG regulations.
Compliant signage should be installed.
E. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT (MAIN) COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 6, FDC Report) There are no compliant wheelchair locations in the Courtroom visitors' area.
RECOMMENDATION: The ADA requires 6 wheelchair locations for a seating capacity of 301-500. Since the seating capacity of this courtroom is more than 300, the wheelchair locations must be provided in more than one location. Wheelchair locations should be provided by removing or shortening existing pews, both at the front and rear of the visitors' section.
F. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT (MAIN) COURTROOM JURY BOX
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 7 & 8, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Jury Box narrows to a non-compliant width between the bar rail and the Jury Box entrance. The Jury Box has two seating levels; the lowest is 7 314" above the Courtroom floor. The entrance is too narrow, and there is not room to maneuver a wheelchair within the jury seating area.
RECOMMENDATION: The County is planning to build a new Jail Facility with at least one accessible courtroom for jury trials. The new Facility is scheduled to be completed in less than 2 years. The courtrooms in the existing building date to the original construction of the building, and are pax$ of the historic fabric of the building. When the new Courtroom is available, the County should use that space as an alternative location for
Claibome County Courthouse
335389.

trials in which a person unable to climb stairs is a jury member. Until that time, as a temporary measure, there would be room for a jury member in a wheelchair to be seated between the bar rail and the Jury Box if that section of the bar rail were moved. The section of the bar rail beside the Jury Box should be moved to allow 60" between the rail and the Jury Box.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: It will not be necessary to move the section of the Bar rail next to the Jury Box.
PER 1/24/05: NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO THE JURY BOX. INSTEAD, STATE PROTOCOL WITH REGARD TO JURY BOX WILL BE FOLLOWED.
G. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT (MAIN) COU.RTROOMWITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 9, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is raised up two steps (13 1 / 2 7 above the Courtroom floor. The entrance to the 'flitness Stand is too narrow.
RECOMMENDATION: As noted above, the County is planning to build new accessible courtroom space within the next two years. When the new Courtroom is available, the County could use that space as an alternative location for trials in which a person unable to climb stairs appears as a witness.
Until that time, as a temporary measure, there is room available for a wheelchair space in fiont of the Witness Stand, within good view of the Jury box, the Judge's Bench and the Attorneys' tables. The County could provide this as an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb stairs. Such a witness could use a portable or hand-held microphone.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The Countyshould make a rule that in aproceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the WitnessStand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level infront of the Witness Stand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
H. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM CIRCUIT COURT (MAIN) COURTROOM TO THE JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 2 & 10, FDC Report) The jurors exit fiom the Courtroom through a door with non-compliant hardware. FDC cites the space inside the courtroom as noncompliant, but there is no need or requirement for a turning space at that location. They then pass through an exterior door (the North Entrance), with a non-compliant push-side clearance of 9". The door threshold is too high. The door closer has a slightly too fast closing time. A loose mat is on the interior of the door. The jury then travels along a non-compliant ramp, across Eppes Street, up a 6" curb to the Jury Building entrance door.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed on the jurors' door in the courtroom. It is technically infeasible to enlarge the push-side clearance at the North Entrance Door. The intersecting wall next to the door is the common wall with the Circuit Court Courtroom. The total required 48" width of clear space is available in fkont of the door, but not in the required relationship to the door opening.
An accessible exterior route to the Jury Room (in the building north of the courthouse) should be provided. Outside the North entrance, a 5'4" level landing must be constructed and the door threshold modified to be compliant. From the landing, the ramp should slope down toward Eppes Street at a maximum slope of 8.3%. Once the ramp arrives at the street, another level landing of 5'4" should be built and the ramp should turn east until it reaches existing grade. This ramp should have an ADA compliant railing with the required 1'-0" extensions. This rail should be continuous for the length ofthe ramp.
At the base of the ramp, there should be another landing and an ADA compliant curb ramp down to the street. A painted crosswalk should then cross the street to another curb ramp onto the sidewalk north of the street. The sidewalk should be realigned so that there is an ample walking space around the curb ramp. From this ramp, an accessible route should reach all the way to the entrance of the Jury Room. Slopes should be verified to assure that additional improvementsto the walkway are not necessary.
I. JURY ROOM ON EPPES STREET
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.10 & 11, FDC Report) The entrance door threshold is too high. The threshold of the door between the lobby and the Jury Room is also too high.
RECOMMENDATION: Both thresholds should be replaced with compliant models. The sidewalk outside the exterior door should be raised as necessary to provide a compliant condition.
J. PATH OF TRAVEL TO JURY TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.12, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Jury Toilet Room passes through an intervening door with non-compliant hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed.
K. JURY TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 13, FDC Report) There are non-compliant features of the Jury Toilet Room.
RECOMMENDATION: An accessible Toilet Room should be available to the Jury. The following modifications to the existing Jury Toilet Room should be made:
Compliant hardware should be installed on the entrance door. The sink should be raised, compliant piping installed, and the piping insulated.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed on the jurors' door in the courtroom. It is technically infeasible to enlarge the push-side clearance at the North Entrance Door. The intersecting wall next to the door is the common wall with the Circuit Court Courtroom. The total required 48" width of clear space is available in front of the door, but not in the required relationship to the door opening.
An accessible exterior route to the Jury Room (in the building north of the courthouse) should be provided. Outside the North entrance, a 5'4" level landing must be constructed and the door threshold modified to be compliant. From the landing, the ramp should slope down toward Eppes Street at a maximum slope of 8.3%. Once the ramp arrives at the street, another level landing of 5'-0" should be built and the ramp should tusn east until it reaches existing grade. This ramp should have an ADA compliant railing with the required 1'-0" extensions. This rail should be continuous for the length of the ramp.
At the base of the ramp, there should be another landing and an ADA compliant curb ramp down to the street. A painted crosswalk should then cross the street to another curb r m p onto the sidewalk north of the street. The sidewalk should be realigned so that there is an ample walking space around the curb ramp. From this ramp, an accessible route should reach all the way to the entrance of the Jury Room. Slopes should be verified to assure that additional improvements to the walkway are not necessary.
I. JURY ROOM ON EPPES STREET
ISSUE: Wef: Sec.10 & 11, FDC Report) The entrance door threshold is too high. The threshold of the door between the lobby and the Jury Room is also too high.
RECOMMENDATION: Both thresholds should be replaced with compliant models. The sidewalk outside the exterior door should be raised as necessary to provide a compliant condition.
J. PATH OF TRAVEL TO JURY TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.12, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Jury Toilet Room passes through an intervening door with non-compliant hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed.
K. JURY TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 13, FDC Report) There are non-compliant features of the Jury Toilet Room.
RECOMMENDATION: An accessible Toilet Room should be available to the Jury. The following modifications to the existing Jury Toilet Room should be made:
Compliant hardware should be installed on the entrance door. The sink should be raised, compliant piping installed, and the piping insulated.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

The water heater should be moved to another location, so it does not obstruct the required clear space under the sink. The mirror should be lowered to a complaint height. The paper towel dispenser is mounted slightly too high. It should be moved to a location that does not obstruct the path of travel. The toilet paper dispenser should be moved to a position a complaint 36" fkom the back wall. The toilet is located 3/4" too close to the side wall. However, this location is within the limits (16" - 18") set in the proposed New ADAAG standards. Although this standard has not been adopted, it signals that the Access Board thinks this toilet is accessible in its current location. The wing wall in fi-ont of the toilet should be removed. The flush valve should be changed to the compliant side of the toilet. Both side and rear wall grab bars should be replaced'with grab bars of the compliant length mounted in the complaint location.
E. SECOND FLOOR CHANCERY (SMALL) COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 18 & 19, FDC Report) The Courtroom entrance is a pair of doors, neither of which allow a compliant 32" clear width. The view window is cited as being too high. There is a pew which intrudes into the required clear area inside the door. The aisle fiom the door along the bar rail is too narrow. The passage through the bar rail is
1 34" too narrow. There are no locations for wheelchair spaces in the visitors' section.
RECOMMENDATION: The entrance should be provided with a minimum 32" clear opening. This could be accomplished by installing a power operating device, activated by push pads.
The rule cited by FDC for the required height of the view glass is in the Appendix to the ADAAG regulations. The Appendix contains material of an advisory nature. The ADAAG regulations themselves do not make a reference to view glass in doors and sidelights. While it would be very helpful to wheelchair users to have view glass at a lower height in the door, it is not required in the ADAAG regulations.
The required clear space at the door and for the front aisle should be provided. This could be done by removing the first pew. A wheelchair accessible passage of 32" should be provided through the bar rail. Care should be taken to preserve the existing millwork as much as possible.
The ADA requires 4 wheelchair spaces in the visitors7section of this courtroom. These spaces should be provided by either removing or shortening some of the wooden pews.
M. SECOND FLOOR CHANCERY (SMALL) COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 9, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is raised up two steps (13 1/2") above the main Courtroom Floor. The entrance to the Witness Stand is too narrow and there is not room for wheelchair maneuveringwithin. Claiborne County Courthouse
33.5389.

RECOMMENDATION: As noted above, the County is planning to build new accessible courtroom space within the next two years. When the new Courtroom is available, the County could use that space as an alternativelocation for trials in which a person unable to climb stairs appears as a witness.
Until that time, as a temporary measure, there is room available for a wheelchair space in front of the Witness Stand, within good view of the Jury box, the Judge's Bench and the Attorneys' tables. The county could provide this as an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb stairs. Such a witness could use a portable or hand-held microphone.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The County should make a rule that in a proceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the WitnessStand, all witnesses will sit atJloor
level inpant of the WitnessStand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
N. SECOND F'LQQW CIRCUIT COURT CLExPK OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 14, FDC Report) The door into the Circuit Court Clerk's Office has a deep frame and non-compliant latch side clearances on both the inside and outside. The door has non-compliant hardware and a closer with a non-compliant push-force.
RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended due to the technical infeasibility of remodeling the existing space that a buzzer at the door be installed. Remodeling is technically infeasible for a number of reasons. It is technically infeasible to enlarge the latch side clearance on the corridor side of the door. The wall on the hinge side is the comrnon wall with the Circuit Cowt Courtroom. The intersectingwall on the latch side is the guardrail at the stair opening. On the inside of the door it may be possible to move part of the storage room wall, whch intersects at the latch side of the entrance door. However, there is an HVAC unit in the storage room which may make modification to that room infeasible. The door closer should be adjusted to a compliant push pressure.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The only required modifications at this door are installation of lever hardware and adjustment of the door closer.
0 . SECOND FLOOR CLERK AND MASTER OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 16, FDC Report) The signage is non-compliant. The door has noncompliant hardware. The floor space inside the door is too small by 4".
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed on the door. The counter inside the door should be moved the necessary 4" to allow 60" clear space in fiont of the door. Compliant signage should be installed.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: the counter inside the door does not need to be moved.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

P. ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOMS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 31, 32, AND 33, FDC Report) There are currently three public Toilet Rooms in the Courthouse: inaccessible Men's and Women's Toilets and a designated accessible Unisex Toilet, all on the First Floor. There are several non-compliant features to the Accessible Unisex Toilet.
RECOMMENDATION: As part of the proposed Courthouse improvements, the County plans to completelyremodel the existing inaccessible Men's and Women's Toilet Rooms, making them accessible and taking the current accessibleUnisex Toilet Room out of public use.
PER 1/24/05: UNTIL THE EXISTING INACCESSIBLE MEN'S AND WOMXN9S TOILET ROOMS ARE REMODELED, DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE WILL BE INSTALLED DIRECTING THEM TO THE ACCESSIBLE UNISEX TOILET.
Q. DRINKING FOUNTAINS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 25 & 29, FDC Report) The drinking fountains on both the First and Second Floor are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The County should install a compliant model on each floor on which they wish to maintain a drinking fountain. They could keep the non-compliant models for the convenience of those who have trouble bending over.
R. FIRE EXTINGUISHER
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 27, FDC Report) There is a fire extinguisher on the Second Floor mounted too high.
RECOMMENDATION: The fire extinguisher should be mounted at a compliant height.
S. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 36) On the exterior of the building, there is a lack of signage at nonaccessible entrances giving direction to the accessible entrances.
RECOMMENDATION: On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified, and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance.
T. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE:
ISSUE: Currently the building lacks an accessible egress from the Second Floor and therefore is required to have an Area of Rescue Assistance. Claibome County Courthouse
335389.

RECOMMENDATION: As part of the proposed Courthouse improvements, the County should provide an accessible egress at the North Entrance ramp.
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

ATTACHMENT A SITE (Not to Scale)
Claiborne County Courthouse
335389.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENIYE;SSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )
MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, 1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

)

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY,CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COZTNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FA-TTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKMS 1

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

1

Defendants.

f

No. 398 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin
JURY DEMAND

- SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT CLAY COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 2 3 day of

Ft h l ~ ~ , ~ d

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie ~ $ ~ ~ oDlenan,is Cantrel, Ralph E-Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Clay County (hereinafter "Defendant County"),

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs,

PARTIES TO THXS AGREEMENT

1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals wit11 disabilities as &at term is defined by 42 IJ.S.C.$1213l(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
- DEFINITIONS
4. Unless otl~erwisespecified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in
this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C.512131 et seq. and 28
C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompmying expianatioils as may be contained in the statutes,
appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. ''ALTERATICN" refers to any modification,improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a P W .
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to my courthouse and/or other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andor county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of tile State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the faciiities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliancewith Title I1 of the ADA and its implementingregulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County wifl complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within Eve ( 5 ) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact tlze Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain fiom taking any action that will diminish the level of physicaI accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in
Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program,
service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities far reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless sucl~action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptionsdue to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon tile Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement sl~albl e made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for tl~eMiddle District of Tennessee shall have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce tlzis Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. A11 claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obiigations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thim (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs, No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent alIowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forfh in Paragrap11 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an
appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have
been completed.
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notie Plaintiffs in writing fat the address for Plaintiffs set fort11 in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to .]usti@ modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed znodificatian will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson's aIleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County,
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access judicial proceedings that arc offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Jones has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22, A11 notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
Mr. Luke Collins, County Executive 145 Cordell HuIf Drive Celina, Tennessee 38551
William Herscl~eLi acy, Esq. County Attorney P.O. Box 386 Celina, Tennessee 38551
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN ,37364-1001
23. Tllis Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement sha1I become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Comproinise and Settlement Agreement which pravides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those reIaling to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty DoIlars ($2,680-00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata

share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein,

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, PlaintiEs and Defendant County in the above-captioned action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly f ones, Ann Marie Zappola,

R a l ~ hE. Ramsey, Sr.,-antrel,

and A. Russell ~ a G b n :

Wifliam J. Brown & ~ssociates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box IOU1
Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Gary D.Housepian (BPR # 6969) Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21 Ave South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615 ) 298-1080
Linda M. Dardarian, admiaed Pro iiac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARt)ARIAN 300 Lakeside D~xive,Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (5 10) 763-9800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

For Defendant County:
Clay County, Tennessee
-
Luke Collins. C ~ L I MI Ia~yo~r Date: /-R8-a5

Plaintiff:

n

a-I1-05
Date

CLAY COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

CLAY COUNTY
i Plaintiff:

, 2,l 1 '?/. '/

' v
Date

/

Plaintiff:

CLAY COUNTY Plaintiff:
3.23 -'S.9i
Date

Plaintiff:
d -/-5-==@3Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES JUDICIAL SERVICES FOR
CLAY COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Sedion I. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 338 CV 0731.
Issue Date: June 18,2004 Site Visit Date: June 11, 2004 Site Visit Date: October 29, 2004
Revised: January 17, 2005
211 Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashvilfe, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500
Fax: 6 15-255-6572

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................... Page 4 .5
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
TT. FACILITY BACKGROUND: COURTHOUSE.........................Page 5

HI.

..................... FACILITY EVALUAI?ONSICOMPLIANCE
STRATEGIESIOPINIONS: COURTHOUSE

Page 6 - 10

A. Accessible Parking

B. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door

C. Accessible Entrance

D. Accessible Path of Travel to Second Floor Courtroo~n

E. First Floor Clerlc and Master OEce

F. First Floor Circuit Court Clerk's Office

G. Second Floor Courtroom Door

H. Second Floor Courtroom

I. Accessible Toilet Room

J. First Floor Drinking Fountain

K. Fire Extinguisl~ers

L. Signage

M. Area of Rescue Assistance

n7.

.......... FACILITY BACKGROUND: WOMEN'S PAVILION Page 10

Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

V.

AWCOCMEESNSI'SBIPLAITMYLEIOVANL..U...A..T...I.O...N.../.R..E...C...O..M....M....E..N...D..A...T..L"....OP.aNgSe:10 - 14

A. Accessible Parking

B. Accessible Entrance

C. Pat13 of Travel to Restrooms

D. Women's Restroom

E. Men's Restroom

F. Small Meeting Room

G. Fire Extinguisher

Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

LOCATION: Clay County Coutl~ouse 100 Courthouse Square
Celina, TN 38551.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Sumner & Cannon, Inc, (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance
Report, Judicial Services, on the Clay County, TN,Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated March 19,2004. Data for this report was obtained in a field investigation
by BWSC on June 11,2004. Illis report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report
by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabted to
,judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of &is report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and
Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register / Vol. 56,
no. 144/ Friday, July 26, 1991, Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance,Any alterationsto the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority havingjurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American wit11 Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discriminationagainst people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title 11 State and Local Government Title Iff Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities
Title IV Telecommunications
Title V Miscellaneouspxovisians of the law
The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title 11. Tlle following excerpts from "The Americans witli Disabilities Act Title I1 Technical Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
Clay County Courthouse Rev.January 17,2005

"Title I1 of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. SubtitleA is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilitiesfiom discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals
with disabiiities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or
activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing
faciiities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarilyrequired to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number of methods. In many situations, providing accessto facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or. construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstnzctural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"TJnlil<e private entities under Title 111, public entities are not required to remove barriers from each faciIity, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessibIe."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little lilteli'hoodof being done because a major structuralmember would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compiiance.
XI. FACILITY BACKGROUND: COURTHOUSE
The Clay County Courthouse is a two-story structure located at 100 Courthouse Square in the center of Celina, Tennessee. It was built in 1873 and is listed on theNational Register of Historic Places. The building appears to have been changed very little since it was constructed. The exterior walls and First Floor interior walls are 16" thick load-bearing brick masonry. In the 19307s,basement-level space was excavated to construct Toilet Rooms. These rooms are accessed by a pair of stairs which are entered fiorn the exterior of the building.
Clay County Courthouse Rev January 17,2005

111. FACILITY EVALUATIONSlCOMPLIANCESTRATEGIES/OPINIONS: COURTHOUSE
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE FOLLOWED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. I , FDC Report) One van accessible parking space is required for this
building.
RECCIMMENDATION: Title II of the ADA requires that all persons have access to the judicial
services currently provided in this building. Title U allows government entities to use alternative
means in order to provide program accessibility. The County has identified the Senior Citizens' Center, at 145 Cordell Mula Drive as a possible alternate location for the services offered in the Clerk & Master's Office and the Circuit Court Clerlc's Office.
There are at present a number of non-compliant aspectsto this location, which would have to be corrected before it would be acceptable as an accessible location for services, The parking area in front of the building where the accessible parking spaces are located sl~ouldbe paved, with the paving flush to the sidewalk paving at walkways. The drinking fountain should be made accessible, compliant door hardware installed on the Auxiliary Office door, and a new, accessiblethisex Toilet Room constructed in the building. Correctingdeficienciesat the Senior Citizens' Center is much more readily achievablethan making the Courthouse accessibleto persons with mobility disabilities.
A sign should be posted at sidewallcalongside the existing handicap parlcing space at the southwest corner of the courthouse square reading "Persons with mobility disabilities are directed to the Senior Citizen's Center, 145 Cordell Hull Drive, for assistance with alljudicial services. PIease call 243-2557 for assistance h r n the Circuit Court Clerk's Ofice or 243-3145 for assistance from the Cleric and Master's Office."
Since persons with mobility disabilitieswill be directed to an alternativelocation for access to ,judicial services and programs, no accessible parking will be required at this building.
PER 1/25/05: LANGUAGE FOR THE SIGN: "Personswith mobility disabilitieshave the
option of going to the accessible Community Center, 145 CordellHull Drive, for assistance with all judicial services, or calling the 243-2557 for assistance from the Circuit Court Clerk's Office or 243-3145 for assistance from the Clerk and Master's Office."
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISS'tIE: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC Report) The existing ramp from the parking space to the plaza is noncompliant.
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

RECOMMENDATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that all persons with mobility disabilities will be directed to an alternative location for access to judicial services and programs. Therefore no accessible route is required fiom the street to the Courthouse entrance.
C. ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 3, FDC Report) The west entrance is currently used as the accessible entrance. The ramp approaching the door is non-compliant, the clear entrance through one leaf of the door is too narrow, and the closing time of the door is too short.
RECOMMENDATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that all persons with mobility disabilities will be directed to an alternative location for access to judicial services and programs.
The door closer should be adjusted or replaced to meet the required closing time of 3 seconds.
D. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref. Sec 12 & 19, FDC Report) The only access to the Second Floor of the building is an unenclosed monumental wooden staircase, consisting of a double run up to an intermediate landing above the south entry door, and fram there a single run up to a small landing in front of the Courtroom dooxs. The stair treads are worn, particularly in the center and therefore the height of rise and width of tread varies slightly between steps. The handrails are non-compliant.
RECOMMENnATION: The addition of an elevator on the exterior of this building would seriously compromise tile historic character which has been so carefully preserved. ArchitecturaIly and functionaIly, the location of an elevator inside the existing building envelope presents a high level of diEculty. There is not room to insert an elevator or lift into the First Floor entry hall area without either destroyingthe stair or cutting a good deal of space out of the courtroom above, or both. Any location that would preserve the entry hall and stair would intrude into the Courtroom space, which occupies all of the main Second Floor level of the building. Clearly, the installation of an elevator would be expensive, since it would involve not only the elevator and sl~aftb,ut also rebuilding the stair and some part of the Courtroom as well. The staircase and entry hall are an important part of the historic character of the building, which would be destroyed by installation of an elevator in this area.
Title I1of the ADA requires that all persons have access to the judicial se~vicescurrently provided in this building. Title I1 allows government entities to use alternative means in order to provide program accessibility. The County has identified the Women's Pavilion, at 2021 Arcott Road, as an alternative location for court proceedings when persons with mobility disabilities are participants in those proceedings. A report on accessibility modifications required for that building is included at the end of this document.
PER 1/25/05: THE STATE PROTOCOL FOR ALTERNATE SITES WILL BE FOLLOWED.
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

Persons with mobility disabilities who are not participants in court proceedings but who wish to view the proceedings held in the Second Floor Courtroom, should be accommodated by a closedcircuit TV system. Such a system would allow viewing from the Auxiliary Offlee in the Senior Citizens7Center.
The non-compliant handrail condition at the courthouse should be corrected, either by replacing the existing one, or by installing a second handrail that meets ADAAG requirements. A handrail should be installed at both sides of the stair.
E. FIRST FLOOR CLERK & MASTER OFFICE
ISSUE: (ReE Sec. 8 & 18, FDC Report) The door hardware is non-cpmpliant. There is a noncompliant loose mat on the floor just inside the door, and a 518" vertical step-up inside the door. NOTE: This is now the only location for the Clerk & Master's Office. The former location on the Second Floor, off the Courtroom, is no longer used for this function.
RECOMMF,NDATION: New door hardware with a compIiant handle and loclcing mechanism sliould be installed. The loose mat should either be removed or fastened to the floor in a compliant manner. A sloping transition piece, with slope not to exceed 1:8, should be installed at the 5/8" step up to the new wood floor.
It should be noted that an Auxiliary Office will be located in the Senior Citizens' Center, offering the services of the Clerk & Master's Office to persons with mobility disabilities.
F. FIRST FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERKySOFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 7, FDC Report) The door hardware is non-compliant. There is a non-
compliant loose mat on the floor just inside the door.
lU2COMMENDATION: New door hardware with a compliant handle and locking mechanism should be installed. The loose mat should either be removed or fastened to the floor in a compliant manner.
It should be noted that an Auxiliary Ofice will be located in the Senior Citizens' Center, offering the services of the Circuit Court Clerk's OEce to persons with mobility disabilities.
G . SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 13, FDC Report) The landing at the top of the stairs has a short, non-
compliant ramp with a rise of 1 W near the doorway. Access to the Courtroom is through a pair of daors, with an opening at the active leafa non-compliant 30". The door hardware is noncompliant..
RECOMMENDATION: Tt is the general recommendationof this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternate location for persons who cannot climb stairs. As a xesult, the Second Floor Courtroom would not be made accessibleto persons in
Clay County Courthouse Rev..January 17,2005

wheelchairs. The ADAAG requirements related to the small mrnp and to the clear door opening seem to be based on wheelchair accessibility requirements, and should not apply if no persons in wheelchairs will be in this area. The door hardware sl~ouldbe changed to a compliantdesign.
H. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 14, 15& 16, FDC Report) The courtroom has no wheelchair locations in the
visitors' section of the room. Access to the judicial area of the courtroom is up an 8" step. Similarly, access to both the Witness Stand and the Jury Box is up at least one step.
RECOMMENDATION: It is the general recommendation af'this report that the County has the
option of providing programs and services at an alternate location far persons who cannot climb stairs. As a result, the Second Floor Courtroom would not be made accessible to persons in wheeichairs; no wheelchair locations would be needed in the visitors section and the steps up to and within the judicial area would not require alteration.
PER 1/25/05: THE STATE PROTOCOL FOR ALTERNATE SITES WILL BE
FOLLOWED.
I. ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 9, 10& 11, FDC Report) There is no accessible toilet in this building, The
ADA requires that a minimum of one unisex accessible toilet be provided. The existing toiIets are at the Basement level and are reached by stairs -&omthe exterior of the building. These Toilet Rooms were added at a later date than the original canstructionand are the only spaces at the Basement level
RXCOMMENnATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternate location for persons who cannot climb stairs. Tl~eCounty proposes to make availablethe services now offered at the Circuit Court Clerk's OEce and the Clerk and Master's Office at an Auxiliary Ofice in the Senior Citizens' Center. The County proposes to hold any court proceedings in which a person with mobility disabilities is a participant at an alternate location at the Women's Pavilion. Therefore there is no need for a Toilet Room accessible to persons with mobility disabilities.
J. FIRST FLOOR DWBKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 4, FDC Report) The First Floor drinking fountain is a non-compliant type.
RECOMMENDATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that persons in wheelchairs will not be using this building for judicial services. Thus, there is no reason to install a low drinking fountain.
K.FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

ISSUE: (Reg Sec. 6 & 17) The fire extinguishers on the First Floor and in the Second Floor Courtroom are both mounted too high.
RECOMMENDATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that persons in wheelchairs will not be using this building forjudicial services. Thus, there is no reason to Iower the fire extinguishers.
ISSUE:(ReE Sec. 20 and tkougl~ouFt DC Report) There is a lack of compliant signage on the
interior and exterior of this building.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage should be installed to designate permanent rooms and spaces tI.lroughout the building, and to provide directions to or information about functional spaces of the building. On the exterior of the building, signage sl~oulddirect persons with
mobility disabilities to the Auxiliary Office in the Senior Citizen's Center.
M. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE
ISSUE: The ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fire if there is riot an accessible means of egress fiom that part of the building. There is no Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of this building.
RECQMMEmATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternate location for persons who c m o t climb stairs. In i%at case, the Second Floor would not be made accessibleto persons who cannot climb stairs, and therefore no area of rescue assistance would be required..
IV. FACILITYBACKGROUND:WOMEN'S PAVILION
The Women's Pavilion is a one story structure located at 2021 Arcott Road. It consists of one large space, accessed directly from tlle exterior; Men's and Women's Restrooms, accessed from both the interior and exterior of the building; and an accessory space subdivided into a small meeting room and a storage area.
V. ACCESSIBILITY EVALUATION/RECOMMENDATIONS: WOMEN'S PAVILION
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: The unfinished nature of the site at the women's pavilion allows for a very clean and simple ADA accessible parlcing solution. As existing, the tlueshold into the building is a sixinch step up fiom the surrounding gravel parking lot.
Clay County Courthouse Rev..January 17,2005

RECOMMENDATION: This condition can be handled in several ways, but the simplest and most cost effective solution would be to build a platform at roughly the height of the building entrance. This would eliminate any need for ramps and handrails. This option requires a level, ADA compliant landing at the building entrance. This level should be set 0.1" below the building entrance (the maximum allowed under ADA guidelines) to help keep any precipitation from running into the building. From the landing, the concrete parking area should slope away fiom the landing so that water drains away from the building, Slopes should be suscient to create positive drainage (0.5% min.) but must meet all ADA guidelines for slope (slopes of 1.O1.5% are appropriate goals and are within ADA tolerances). The parking area should be 36'-0" wide by 21 '-0" deep. The width will accommodate two handicap spaces to be laid out as follows (see attached ADA parking sheet) a 3'-0" outside walking lane, an 11'-0" van accessible space, an 8'-0" van accessible aiste, a standard 8'-0" handicap space and another 3'-0" outside walking lane. The depth accommodatesa standard 18'-0" parking space and a 3'4" walking lane. These spaces should have ADA compliant signage (outside of the walking lanes) denoting that they are Handicap Spaces and both the spaces and the aisles should be painted per ADA guidelines.
B, ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE
ISSUE: The main entrance is through a pair of 48" leaf doors. The active leaf allows the required 32" clear opening. The Ioclcset is operated with a non-compliant knob. Tl~erequired clear space is available on the interior of the door.
RECOMMENDATION: Install a compliant lockset or lever conversion kit on the active door leaf-
C. PATH OF TRAVEL TO RESTROOMS:
The path of travel to the Restrooms is across the main room of the building. It is accessible.
D. WOMEN'S RESTROOM:
ISSUE: The door to the Women's Restroom is a 36" leaf which provides the required 32" clear opening. The lockset is operated with a nan-compliant knob. The door has a closer. Required clear floor space is available on botll the inside and outside of the door. The room identification signage mounted on the door is non-compliant,
The handicap toilet stall measures 56" deep x 67 V wide, which does not meet the requirement
for 60" of depth. There is no door on the stall. All of the toilet stalls in the room have shower curtains in lieu of doors. The toilet is located a non-compliant 24" fiom the side wall. The toilet seat is a non-compliant 15" above the floor. There are two 36" grab bars, one on each side wall. They are both non-compliant for size and/or location. There is no toilet paper dispenser in the stall. The handicap stall was being used for storage because the toilet does not operate properly.
There are two Iavatories, the one on the right is 36 %" to the rim, the one on the left, 35" to the rim. Neither is at a compliant height. The piping under the sinks protrudes into the required
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

clear space and is not insulated. Faucet controls require grasping, which makes them noncompliant. There is a plywood box covering piping at the floor level under the lavatories. The box is 8 !h"talI and protrudes 9 %" from the wall. This is a non-compliant intrusion into the required clear space under the lavatory.
There are no mirrors, no towel dispensers and no soap dispensers in &is Restroom.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Install either a lever-type lockset or a lever retrofit kit on the door locltset. Install compliant room identificationsignage. r Remove stored items from the handicap toilet stall. Repair the toilet. Extend the side wall of the handicap stall to allow 60" clear depth inside. Move either the toilet or the wall to get the required 18" from the side wall to the centerline of the toilet. r Install a toilet paper dispenser next to the toilet at the required mounting height of 19" minimum above the floor. r Install a 42" grab bar on the wall next to the toilet, mounted with the end 12" from the
back: wall and the centerline 33 - 36" above the floor.
Install a 36" long grab bar behind the toilet, with tlle end 12" from the near side wall and
the centerhe 33 - 36" above the floor. Modify (or replace) the toilet, raising the seat to 17- 19'' above the floor.
r Reinstall one of the lavatories with the rim at no more than 34" above the floor. Reconfigure piping to provide the required clearance under the accessible lavatory. J3e existing piping does not meet Plumbing Code requirements. We recoinmend building a false wall in front of the existing wall in order to conceal the piping, and to allow room to get the piping out of the required knee clearance. Piping should be installed with code compliant traps and vent. The lavatories should be mounted on the false wall, which will probably ~equirenew carriers. Install insulation on hot water and drain pipes under the lavatory. Instal1compliant faucet controls at the accessible lavatory.
E. MEN'S RESTROOM
ISSUE: The door to the Men's Restroom is a 36" leaf which provides the required 32" clear opening. ?he lockset is operated with a non-compliant lurob. The door has a closer. Required clear floor space is available on both the inside and outside of the door. The room identification signage mounted on the door is non-compliant.
The handicap stall measures 4'-9" wide x 7'-5" deep. Entry is diagonally at the comer in front of the toilet. There is no door on the stall. All of the toilet stalls in the room have shower curtains in lieu of doors. The toilet is located a non-compliant 23 !A "from the side wall. The toilet seat is a non-compliant 15" above the floor. The required 36" grab bar is mounted on the side wall nearest the toilet, a non-compliant 9" from the rear wall and at a compliant height of
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

35". A 42" grab bar is mounted on the other side wall. There is no toilet paper dispenser in the stall.
There are two lavatories in the room, both at a compliant height. Faucet controls on both are non-compliant because they require grasping. The piping under both lavatories intrudes into the required clear space and does not have insulation. Piping along the floor under the lavatories is protected by a plywood box which, is 10 95 "high and extends 11" &om the wall. There are no mirrors, soap dispensers, or towel dispensers.
There are two urinals located in an alcove toward the back of the room. The urinal on the left is centered 12" from the left-hand wall, and is mounted with the rim 27 ?4"from the floor. The urinal on the right is centered 1 ' 4 %" from the right hand wall and is mounted with the rim 27 %" fiom the floor,
RECOMMENDATIONS :
Install either a lever-type loclcset or a lever retrofit kit on the door lockset. Install compliant room identification signage. Relocate the toilet to a compIiant 18" fkom the side wall. Install a toilet paper dispenser next to the toilet at the required mounting height of 19" minimum above the floor. Relocate the 42" grab bar on the wall next to the toilet, mounted with the end 12" from
the back wall and the centerline 33 - 36" above the floor.
Relocate the 36" long grab bar to the wall behind the toilet, with the end 12" from the
near side wall and the centerline 33 - 36" above the floor.
Modify (ox replace) the toilet, raising the seat to 17- 19" above the floor.
Reconfigure piping to provide the required clearance under the accessible lavatory. The existing piping does not meet Plumbing Code requirements. We recommend building a false wall in fkont of the existing wall in order to conceal the piping, and to allow room to get the piping out of the required knee clearance. Piping should be installed with code compliant traps and vent. The lavatories should be mounted on the false wall, which will probably require new carriers. Install insulation on hot water and drain pipes under the lavatory. Install compliant faucet controls at the accessible lavatory. Lower the right urinal so that the riin is 17" above the floor,
F. SMALL MEETING ROOM
ISSUE:The small Meeting Room directly off the main meeting space could be used as a Jury
Room. The door is a 36" leaf, providing a compliant 32" clear opening. The I~ardwareis noncompliant. There is no closer on the door. The tlxeshold at the door is a non-compliant height. The clear space on both sides of the door is compliant.
RECCIMMENf,ATIONS: Install either a lever-type fockset or a lever retrofit kit on the door, Replace the existing threshold with one that is of compIiant design, no more than %" rise above the floor.
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

G. FlXUE EXTINGUISHER ISSUE;The fire extinguisher, mounted on the wall near the entry door, is at a non-compliant
height of 57" to the handle. RECOMMENDATIONS:Remount the fire extinguisher at a maximum compliant height of 54" above the floor.
Clay County Courthouse Rev. January 17,2005

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )
MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, 1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

plaintiffs,

1

)

v.

1

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE 1

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCK33 COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY,HOUSTON

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFIi%RSON)

COUNTY, J'OHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

)

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COTITVTY, PERRY

COUNTY, PICMETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COITNTY,

1

1

Defendants.

1

No.3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magisirate Judge Griffin JWIY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - COCKE COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 2 3 day of

<6b/

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie ~appofaD, ennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr,, and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Raintiffs") and Defendant Cocke County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTES TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individualswith disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §12f31(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12132, and its implementingregulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3.. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, ail Tennessee Courts exercising
jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS
4, Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C.$12131 et seq, and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanarions as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES,
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and incIudes any official agency of Defendant County.
c, "EFFECTIVE DATE" means 1:lzefast date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party-
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned
andor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constithion of the State of'Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of .the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County,
OBLIGATIONSASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliancewith Title 11of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7, Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to male all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain fkom talcing any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved though the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailinent of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access featuresthat are provided for in this agreement shdl be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with p~ejudiceas to Plaintiffs' claiins for injunctive ~eliefagainst Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which sl~allbe governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and tl~eState of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement*
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the 'Tomplaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the 'Wotice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sougl~tby the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days fo1Iowing the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period, When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed,
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promplly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested inodification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of sucll need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragrap11 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otl~erwisespecifically reIeased in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entexing into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Cantrel, Larson, Zappola, Lane, and .Jonesyalleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these PIaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Cantrel, Larson, Zappola, Lane, and Jones if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 3 19), entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access ,judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Ramsey has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein, Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in coimection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth tl~entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect tci the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shalf be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other paxty to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. A11 notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
Iliff McMahan, Jr., County Mayor Courthouse Annex 360 East Main Street, Suite 146 Newport, Tennessee ,37821
- and -
Fletcher L. Ervin, Esq. County Attorney 3 19 East Broadway Newport, Tennessee 37821-3105
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
. 24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by a11 parties and the
effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Comprornise and Settlement Agreement which provides, infer alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Piaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, inciuding those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two

Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned action have
caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola,

Ralph E. Rmsey-s

Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:

23 North Ocoee Street P+O.Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
Martha M*Lafferty @PR# 1981$/ /
Gary D.~ o u s e ~ i(aBnPR # 6 9 6 $ 1
Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21' Ave South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Wac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Date: 2 / ) f )3id

For Defe~dantCounty:

Date

COCKE COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

COCKE COUNTY

t,

Plaintiff:

$7/o.,H Date

8 ,J&;d
/
Dennis Cantrel

COCKE COUNTY Plaintiff:
a -as.DL
Date

Plaintiff: A. Russell Larson Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES
JUDICIAL SERVICES
FOR
COCKE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section I. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 3:98CV 0731.
Issue Date: July 1, 2004 Site Visit Date: June 28, 2004
Revised: August 23,2004
Bwscl BARGE WAGGONER SUMNER & CANNON, INC. 211Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500 Fax: 615-255-6572 .

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... Page 3

A. Work Statement

B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND.......................................................Page 4

111.

............ FACILITY EVALUATIONSICOMPLIANCE
STRATEGIESIOPINIONS OLD COURTHOUSE

Page 5 - 10

A. Accessible Parking

B. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door

C. Accessible Entrance Door

D. Elevator (Courthouse Addition)

E. Second Floor Circuit Court Entrance Door

F. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom

G. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom Witness Stand

H. Second Floor Circuit Courtroom Jury Box

I. Path of Travel to Second Floor Circuit Courtroom Jury Room

J. Second Floor General Sessions and Juvenile Courtroom

K. Second Floor General Sessions Office

L. Second Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office

M. First Floor Women's Toilet Room (Courthouse Addition)

N. First Floor Men's Toilet Room (Courthouse Addition)

0 . Second Floor Unisex Toilet Room (Courthouse Addition)

P. Drinking Fountains

Q. Fire Extinguishers

R. Area of Rescue Assistance

IV.

FACILITY EVALUATIONSICOMPLIANCE

STRATEGIES/OPINIONS COURTHOUSE ANNEX ......lo-14

A. Accessible Parking

B. Accessible Route fkom Parking to Entrance Door

C. Entrance Door

D. Chancery Court Clerk's Office

E. Chancery Deputy Chief Office

F. Clerk and Master Office

G. Chancery Courtroom

H. Men's Accessible Toilet

I. Women's Accessible Toilet

J. Water Fountain

K. Fire Extinguisher

L. Signage

ATTACHMENTS

A. Courthouse Site

B. Annex Site

Cocke County Courthouse
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LOCATION: Cocke County Courthouse 360 E. Main Street Newport, TN 37621
I. INTRODUCTION
%
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Surnner & Cannon, Inc. (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Cocke County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated March 19,2004. Data for this report was obtained in a field investigationby BWSC on June 28,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial servicesnow provided withn the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of this report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register 1 Vol. 56, no. 144/ Friday, July 26, 1991,Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designatedbuilding in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterations to the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title I1 State and Local Government Title 111Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities
Title IV Telecommunications
Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law
The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title 11.
The following excerpts fiom "The Americans with Disabilities Act Title II Technical
Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
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"Title 11of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities from discriminationon the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals with disabilities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibilityby a number of methods. In many situations, providing access to facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternativesto structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title III, public entities are not required to remove barriers from each facility, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structural member would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
- . *
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The Cocke County Courthouse was built in 1930. The building is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. A new three story addition of about 1,300 square feet per floor was completed in the spring of 2004 on the west side of the old courthouse. This addition includes accessible toilets on each floor, an elevator, and a new fire rated exit stair. Great care was taken to match the exterior appearance of the original building in both design and materials. The Courthouse Annex, which houses some judicial functions, is located across the street from the main courthouse.
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111. FACILITY EVALUATIONSICOMPLIANCESTFUTEGIES/OPINIONS OLD COURTHOUSE
&COMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE FOLLOWED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC Report) The two designated spaces represent a compliant number of handicap accessible spaces, but the spaces are non-compliant for running slope, connection to the accessible route and for signage.
RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the existing handicap accessible spaces be amended to meet compliance. Due to the non-compliant slope of the spaces, it may be necessary to backfill the south edge of the spaces (nearest the building). This backfilling and the subsequent leveling of the space to no more than a 2.0% running slope, will accomplish two things. First, it will bring the space to a compliant running slope and second it will bring the space to level with the curb (making up the existing 2.5" drop) and will provide a connection to the accessible route. The entire parking area will likely need to be re-striped to allow for a van accessible aisle space between the two spaces. Additionally, signage, including a sign indicating the required van space, should be installed per ADA specifications.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC Report) The existing accessible ramp is slightly out of compliance for slope and lacks the required edge protection. The existing handrails are also non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The ramp should be extended as far as is necessary to lower the slope to a maximum of 8.3%. The ramp should not run for more than 30'4" without a 5 ' 4 " by the width of the ramp level landing. The ramp should also have ADA compliant edge protection. The railing should be modified or replaced to include the required 1'-0" handrail extensions.
C. ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 3, FDC Report) The main entrance is a pair of doors, neither leaf of which is wide enough. The aluminum entrance doors are set in a deep decorative masonry frame with no sidelights. A loose mat is on the interior of the door.
RECOMMENDATION: A clear opening of at least 32" should be provided at the entrance doors. The most feasible way to achieve this may be the installation of an automatic door opening device activated by push pads. The opening device would open both leaves of the door together. To the extent that it would not alter its Historic Register standing, another option would be the installation of a single 36" or wider door with fixed sidelights. The mat should be removed or attached to the floor in a compliant manner.
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PER 1/24/05: LOOSE MAT -NO ACTION REQUIRED AS VENDOR HAS INDICATED IT IS COMPLIANT WITH THE ADA.
D. ELEVATOR (COURTHOUSE ADDITION)
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 5, FDC Report) The elevator is in the recent addition to the Courthouse. It serves three floors, including the third floor jail, which is not covered in this report. The heights of the hall call buttons on all floors are not at the 42" height called for in the regulations. The jamb floor identification signage on the First and Third floors is located at a non-compliant height. The elevator door does not remain open long enough at the Third Floor. The threshold at the Third Floor elevator door is too tall.
RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG regulations give a single dimension for the centerline mounting heights of the hall call buttons and floor designations. ADAAG allows for the small errors that typically occur in the course of building construction. While these items are technically non-compliant, no functional advantage would be gained by repositioning them.
Even though the third floor (jail) is not a component of this lawsuit, the elevator door opening time should be adjusted to a compliant time. Likewise, the threshold height should be changed to a compliant height by the responsible contractor.
E. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 13, FDC Report) The entrance is through a pair of 30" doors, neither of which give the required 32" clear opening. The pushlpull pressure on the active (left) leaf is too great and the closing period is too short. The clearance at the interior side of the door is too narrow between the door and the pews. The threshold has too sharp an incline. The view glass is higher than recommended, and the signage is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: A clear entrance of 32" should be provided. This can be done by changing the door to a pair of unequal size, or by enlarging the frame to accommodate two leaves of compliant size. The pews should be modified to allow 48" clear space on the interior of the doors. The threshold should be replaced or modified to have a maximum of 50% incline at the beveled edge. Compliant signage should be installed.
The rule cited by FDC for the required height of the view glass is in the Appendix to the ADAAG regulations. The Appendix contains material of an advisory nature. The ADAAG regulations themselves do not make reference to view glass in doors and sidelights. While it would be very helpful to wheelchair users to have view glass at a lower height in the door, it is not required in the ADAAG regulations.
PER 1/24/05: WHEN NEW DOORS ARE INSTALLED, EFFORTS MUST BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE CLOSING PERIOD OF THE DOORS AND THE PUSH/PULL PRESSURE ON THE DOORS IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADA.
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F. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 14, FDC Report) There are no compliant wheelchair spaces in the visitors' section of the courtroom. The aisle between the front pew and the bar rail is too narrow.
RECOMMENDATION: Four compliant wheelchair spaces are required in the visitors' section of h s room. These spaces are most easily created by removing one or more of the pews. An aisle 36" wide, plus leg space for those seated in the front pew, should be created along the path from the entrance door to the passage through the bar rail. This may require removal of the front pew.
G. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 15, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is raised 15 Y4" above the courtroom floor. The space within the Witness Stand is too small for a wheelchair to maneuver.
RECOMMENDATION: There is not room within the current configuration of the judicial area to install a ramp or lift to access the Witness Stand. Even if that were possible, the space available in the Witness Stand is too small. There is clear space on the floor in front of the Court Reporter's desk. A person unable to climb stairs could sit there as a witness and use a hand-held microphone.
As an alternative, Title 11allows government entities to use alternativemeans in order to provide program accessibility. The County has a building across the street with Courtroom space. The Chancery Courtroom has its Witness Box at floor level. The County could use the Chancery Courtroom as an alternative location for proceedings in which a person unable to climb stairs appears as a witness. It would be more feasible for the County to use this courtroom as an alternative location than to make the Witness Stand in the Circuit Courtroom accessible.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The County should make a rule that in a proceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the WitnessStand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level infront of the WitnessStand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
H. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURTROOMJURY BOX
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.16, FDC Report) The Jury Box is raised on two levels, the lowest is 6 ?4" above the courtroom floor. Within the Jury Box, there is no compliant space to maneuver a wheelchair.
RECOMMENDATION: There is no space available in the current configuration of the judicial area to install a ramp or lift to access the Jury Box. Making both the Witness Stand and Jury Box accessible to wheelchairs would require rebuilding both the Witness
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StandCourt Reporter's Desk and the Jury box, and would block the door from the Corridor in that area.
Title I1 allows government entities to use alternativemeans in order to provide program accessibility. The County has a building across the street with Courtroom space. The Chancery Courtroom in the Courthouse Annex is not currently set up to accommodate jury trials. Making it useable for a jury trial would require considerable remodeling of the rnillwork furnishings now in the room. However, it would be more feasible for the County to outfit this courtroom as an altemative location for use when a person unable to climb stairs is a jury member, than to make the Jury Box in the Circuit Courtroom accessible.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: the Jury Box should be modified by removal ofthe solid side rail closest to the Vitness Stand. Withthis mod$catio~ajuror in a wheelchair may participate by sitting on thefloor beside the Jury Box seatingplatform.
PER 1/24/05: NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO THE JURY BOX. INSTEAD, STATE PROTOCOL WITH REGAIiD TO JURY BOX W E E BE FOLLOWED.
I. PATH OF TRAVEL TO SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURTROOM JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 17 & 18, FDC Report) The exit door out of the Circuit Courtroom used by the jury when going to the Jury Room has non-compliant hardware, a closer with a non-compliant pusWpull force and a threshold with too steep an angle at the beveled edge. The door into the jury room itself has 12" rather than the required 18" clear at the latch side on the pull side of the door. It also lacks the required 60" deep clear space on the pull side. The hardware on this door also is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The exit door out of the Circuit Courtroom should have compliant hardware. The closer should be adjusted to a compliant push/pull pressure of 5 lbs. maximum. The threshold should be replaced with a compliant model.
The general recommendation of this report is that an altemative location be provided for court proceedings in which a wheelchair user appears as a juror. In that case, the cleasances at the door to the Jury Room need not be altered. Compliant hardware should be installed.
Per FDC in meeting 8/6/04: Because the Jury Box will be modi$ed, no alternative location will be requiredforju ry trials. No mod$cation is required to the Jury Room Toilets ifthey are no longer availableforjury use and have signage installed labeling them "Private. "
PER 1/24/05: NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WTLL BE MADE TO THE JURY BOX. INSTEAD, STATE PROTOCOL WITHREGARD TO JURY BOX WIZLBE FOLLOWED.
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J. SECOND F'LOOR GENERAL SESSIONS AND JUVENILE COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 20 & 21, FDC Report) The entrance door has non-compliant hardware and the closer requires too great a pusWpull force. The view window in the door is identified as being too high above the floor. Room identification signage is noncompliant. Inside the entrance door, the clear space in eont of the door is not deep enough.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed on the door. The closer should be adjusted to a compliant push/pull pressure of 5 lbs. maximum. Compliant signage should be installed. The pew seats inside the door should be shortened or replaced with other seating to allow 54" depth of clear space in fi-ont of the door.
The rule cited by FDC for the required height of the view glass is in the Appendix to the ADAAG regulations. The Appendix contains material of an advisory nature. The aDAAG regulations themselves do not make reference to view glass in doors and sidelights. While it would be very helpfkl to wheelchair users to have view glass at a lower height in the door, it is not required in the ADAAG regulations.
K. SECOND FLOOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT CLERK OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 22, FDC Report) The door has non-compliant hardware. A file cabinet blocks the required 18" latch side clear space on the pull side of the door.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed on the door. The file cabinet should be moved in order to maintain required clearances.
L. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 23, FDC Report) The door has non-compliant hardware and the closer requires too great a pusWpull force. The view window is cited as being too high above the floor.
RECOMMEDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed on the door. The closer should be adjusted to a compliant pusWpull pressure of 5 lbs. maximum.
The rule cited by FDC for the required height of the view glass is in the Appendix to the ADAAG regulations. The Appendix contains material of an advisory nature. The ADAAG regulations themselves do not make reference to view glass in doors and sidelights. While it would be very helpful to wheelchair users to have view glass at a lower height in the door, it is not required in the ADAAG regulations.
M. FIRST FLOOR WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM (COURTHOUSE ADDITION)
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ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 7, FDC Report) The door signage is in a non-compliant location. The distance .from the floor to the bottom of the sink is too short. The drain piping encroaches into the required space under the srak. The toilet is 318" too far from the side wall. The flush valve is located on the wrong side of the toilet.
RECOMMENDATION: The architect for the Courthouse Addition has identified all of the above listed items in the First Floor Women's Toilet Room as needing correction and has directed that they be corrected.
N. FIRST FLOOR MEN'S TOILET ROOM (COURTHOUSE ADDITION)
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 8, FDC Report) The door signage is in a non-compliant location. The push force on the door is too great. The drain piping encroaches into the required space under the sink. The mirror is ?4" too high. The toilet is located W too far from the side wall.
RECOMMENDATION: The architect for the Courthouse Addition has identified all of the above listed items in the First Floor Men's Toilet Room as needing correction and has directed that they be corrected.
0 . SECOND FJLOOR UNISEX TOILET ROOM (COURTHOUSEADDITION)
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 9, FDC Report) The door signage is in a non-compliant location. The closer requires too much pusWpul1 force, and has too short a closing time. The sink is hung ?4" too low. The drain piping encroaches into the required space under the sink. The mirror is '/2" too low. The flush valve is located on the wrong side of the toilet.
RECOMMENDATION: The architect for the Courthouse Addition has identified all of the above listed items in the First Floor Women's Toilet Room as needing correction and has directed that they be corrected.
PER 1/24/05: COUNTYIS NOT REQUIRED TO REPOSITION SINK %".
P. DRINKING FOUNTAINS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 4 & 12, FDC Report) The drinking fountains on both the First and Second Floors are of a type and height that is not useable by persons in wheelchairs.
RECOMMENDATION: The existing models should be replaced or supplemented with one which is compliant.
Q. FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 6, FDC Report) The fire extinguisher cabinets in the Courthouse Addition protrude too far into the corridor space, and are mounted too high.
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RECOMMENDATION: The non-compliant protrusion into the corridor space should be corrected. The cabinets could be replaced with fire-rated semi-recessedmodels, or the fire extinguishers could be wall-mounted with brackets.
R. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE
ISSUE: There is no Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of the Courthouse. The stairs in the Addition do not have the required 48" between handrails for rescue of a person in a wheelchair. ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fire if there is no accessible means of egress fiom that part of the building.
RECOMMENDATION: An Area of Rescue Assistance should be provided on the Second Floor, preferably in the Addition. It will require some effort to create such an Area now that construction is completed. However, examination of the Construction Documents shows a space labeled Closet, adjacent to the elevator shaft that might be incorporated into the stair landing. The stairs in the Addition do not have the required clearance between handrails. However, it is possible to rescue a person unable to climb stairs without carrying them down the stairs in a wheelchair.
Per FDC in meeting of 8/6/04: instead of using the Closet, the bathrooms in the Addition can be used as areas of rescue. No action is required concerning the clearance between the handrails.
IV. FACILITY EVALUATIONSICOMPLIANCESTRATEGIESIOPIMONS COURTHOUSE ANNEX
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 24, FDC Report) Parking at the annex building has a compliant number of parking spaces (2). One of the spaces is compliant for both width and length. The other space is of compliant width, but not length.
RECOMMENDATION: These parking spaces should be re-striped to meet ADA specifications for size. This appears possible by simply reducing the size of the shared aisle between the two spaces. One of the two spaces should also be made into a van space, as required. This space should have the required van aisle. Signage should be brought into compliance as well, including the addition of the indication of the van accessible space.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 25, FDC Report) The ramp at the main entrance to the annex is at a non-compliant slope of 8.4%.
RECOMMENDATION: It should be noted that standard concrete construction tolerances allow for 0.25" of inconsistency over a 10'-0". The existing slope only differs by 0.08" of rise over 10'-0" of run. It is recommended that this difference be considered within
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conventional building industry tolerances. If required, this ramp could be extended to make up the 0.07% slope difference. Regardless of whether the ramp must be changed, the handrails must be fixed or replaced and brought into compliance with ADA standards including the required 1'-0" handrail extensions. A level landing at the base of the ramp should also be installed. This landing should be 5'4" by 5'-0" and will likely need to be offset from the curb ramp due to space restrictions. The curb ramp could be located in such a way as to center on the aisle between the two handicap spaces and should have a level landing at its top. The main accessible route along the sidewalk should go around the curb ramp.
Additionally, it should be noted that access is provided to the building by another ramp at the southwest entrance to the building. The slope of this ramp is a compliant 8.0%.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: No mod$cation is required to the slope of the ramp to the main entrance. A level landing at the bottom of the ramp and compliant handrails should be installed.
C. E N T W C E DOORS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 26, FDC Report) The hardware for the active leaf is non-compliant. There are loose mats on the floor both inside and outside the door.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed. The loose mats should be removed or fastened to the floor in a compliant manner.
PER 1/25/05: LOOSE MAT - NO ACTION REQUIRED AS VENDOR HAS
INDICATED IT IS COMPLIANT WITH THE ADA.
D. CHANCERY COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 27, FDC Report) Signage is non-compliant. The latch-side clearance on the inside of the room is too small.
RECOMMENDATION: This is not an office to which the public needs access to conduct business with judicial services. Persons needing access to this office can inquire at the window for the Chancery Court Clerk & Master. Compliant signage should be installed.
E. CHANCERY DEPUTY CHIEF OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 28, FDC Report) Signage is non-compliant. The latch-side clearance on the inside of the room is too small.
RECOMMENDATION: This is not an office to which the public needs access to conduct business with judicial services. Persons needing access to this office can inquire at the window for the Chancery Court Clerk & Master. Compliant signage should be installed.
F. CLERK AND MASTER OFF'ICE
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ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 29, FDC Report) Signage is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The Chancery Court Clerk's Office has a counter which opens onto the corridor. Persons doing business with the Office so not have to enter the Office through a door. Compliant signage should be installed.
G. CHANCERY COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 30, FDC Report) The door hardware is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant hardware should be installed.
NOTE: In Section 111H above, it was recommended that this Courtroom be renovated for use as an alternative location for jury trials in which a person unable to climb stairs is to serve as a juror. Considerable remodeling of the millwork furnishingsnow in the room would be required, but that may be more feasible in the County's estimation than the considerable rebuilding required to make the C h i t Courtroom Jury Box in the Courthouse accessible. In order to have a private space for jury deliberations in the Annex, a Jury Room could be created in the current open meeting area across the corridor from the Chancery Courtroom by installing a partition and door.
Per FDC in meeting 8/6/04: Because the Jury Box in the Circuit Court Courtroom will be modified to accommodate ajuror in a wheelchair, no modificationfor jury trial use will be required in the Chancery Courtroom.
H. MEN'S ACCESSIBLE TOILET
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 34, FDC Report) The alcove is cited as non-compliant at 39 34" wide. The signage is installed in a non-compliant location. The push force for the door is too great. The distance from the floor to the top of the sink counter is 518" too high. The pipes under the sink are not fully insulated. The urinal is mounted too high. The flush valve for the toilet requires too much pressure to operate.
RECOMMENDATION: Because the combined depth of the alcove at the outside of the door and the door frame is less than 24" and the door does not have a latch, the condition is compliant.
The closer should be adjusted to a compliant push pressure. Other than the 5/8" extra height, the sink counter is compliant. Lowering the counter by such a small amount would be a great deal of effort for a very small increase in accessibility. It is recommended that the counter remain as it is. The urinal should be lowered to a compliant height. The toilet should be moved to a compliant distance of 18" from the side wall, and the flush valve adjusted to a compliant operating pressure. Insulation should be added to the uninsulated pipes under the sink. The signage should be moved to a compliant location.
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Per FDC in meeting 8/6/04: No modzJicationis required to the location of the toilet.
PER 1/24/05: ADDITIONAL DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE DIRECTING PERSONS TO THE ACCESSIBLE TOILET WILL BE PLACED BY THE MEN'S TOILET CLOSEST TO THE COURTROOM.
I. WOMEN'S ACCESSIBLE TOILET
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 35, FDC Report) The alcove is cited as non-compliant at 39 3/4" wide. The signage is installed in a non-compliant location. The push force for the door is too great. The distance from the floor to the top of the sink counter is 112" too high. The pipes under the sink are not hlly insulated. The toilet is located ?4" too close to the side wall. The flush valve is on the wrong side of the toilet. The flush valve for the toilet requires too much pressure to operate.
RECOMMENDATION: Because the combined depth of the alcove at the outside of the door and the door fkame is less than 24" and the door does not have a latch, the condition is compliant. The closer should be adjusted to a compliant push pressure. Other than the 518" extra height, the sink counter is compliant. Lowering the counter by such a small amount would be a great deal of effort for a very small increase in accessibility. It is recommended that the counter remain as it is. Insulation should be added to the uninsulated pipes under the sink. Although the distance fiom the wall to the centerline of the toilet is non-compliant by the standards of the 1991 ADAAG, it is within the proposed guidelines of the New ADAAG, now under review. Such a small difference in location would not functionally improve accessibility. The toilet should stay as it is. The flush valve should be changed to the compliant side and adjusted to a compliant operating pressure.
PER 1/24/05: ADDITIONAL DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE DIRECTING PERSONS TO THE ACCESSIBLE TOILET WILL BE PLACED BY THE WOMEN'S TOILET CLOSEST TO THE COURTROOM.
J. WATER FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 3 1, FDC Report) The accessible drinking fountain outside the Chancery Courtroom is mounted 54" too low and the water flow height is too low.
RECOMMENDATION: The water fountain should be raised by '/z " and the water flow adjusted to a compliant height.
K. FIRE EXTINGUISHER
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 32, FDC Report) The fire extinguisher mounted on the wall outside the Chancery Courtroom is too high.
Cocke County Courthouse
335390.

RECOMMENDTION: The fire extinguisher should be remounted at a compliant height. L. SIGNAGE ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 37, and throughout FDC Report) There is a lack of compliant signage on both the interior and exterior of this building. RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage should be installed to designate permanent rooms and spaces throughout the building, and to provide directions and information about functional spaces of the building. On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified, and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance. M. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE ISSUE: ANNEX BUILDING IS NON-COMPLIANT SINCE IT DOES NOT
PROVIDE AN AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE FOR ALE LEVEES ABOVE
GRADE. RECOMMENDATION: NO ACTION REQUIRED AS ALL JUDICIAL PROGRAMS OFFERED IN THIS BUILDING ARE LOCATED ON THE GROUND LEVEL.
Cocke (
335390.

ATTACHMENT A COURTHOUSE SITE (Not to Scale)
Cocke Coullty Courthouse August 23,2004, rev*

ATTACHMENT J3
ANNEX SfTE
(Not to Soale)
Cocke County Courthouse August 23,2004, rev.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

1

Plaintiffs,

)

v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER ) COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY ) COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER' ) COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS ) COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON ) COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON) COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE ) COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

1

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - DECATUR COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this a3 day of

J=kb[ O @ - C v

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Decatur County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explmations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse a d o r other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5 . Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance wit11 the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to inake good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Jones, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Zappola's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Jones, Lane, Cantrel, Rarnsey and Zappola if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Larson has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the fbture:
For Defendant County:
Kenneth Broadway Decatur County Mayor P. 0. Box 488 Decaturville, TN 38329
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs7attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintil'fs and Defenda~ltCounty in the above-captioned action have
caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Am1 Marie Zappola, Ralph E. R a m s e m Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 Noit11 Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 A
Cmry D. Housepian (BPR # @&)
l'eimessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21st Ave Soutl~S, uite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080
-
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Ha-c V Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEW, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (5 1.0)763-9500
Attorneys for Plaintifff /
Date:

For Defendant Decatur Cn ounty, Tennessee:
Stewart, Estes & Donne11 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 372 19
Date: 2 - 1 - 0 5

For Defendant County:

a e,.
George Lane, plaintie

Date:

\-\ --<

2, Date:

DECATUR COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

DECATUR COUNTY PlaintifF:
Date

& A,)/,

-

- A . ? '

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff

Date:

.>c 2@<7 -c

/

Date: &/& &f

AGREED SETTLEMENT DECATUR COUNTY
The Decatur County is currently undergoing a $1.5 million addition to
the Zecatur County Courthouse. At the time of this Agreement, the
construction documents are i n the bidding process. The construction project is expected to take 12 months to complete once it begins. The construction of the courthouse addition will make the judicial program offered in Decatur County and the facilities therein accessible to individuals with mobility disabilities. The parties agree that the courthouse addition will resolve the ADA issues relative to Decatur County as addressed in the Plaintiffs' expert report concerning Decatur County.
Plaintiffs agree that Decatur County is not required make renovations or modifications to the portion of the Decatur County Courthouse not affected by the constraas;tien djscussed herein to address ADA compliance issues pending completion of the courthouse addition.
Plaintiffs recognize and agree that the proposed completion date may be de!ayed fer unf~reseenreasons. Becatur County, through counsel,
:'I!! provide the Plaintiffs with a progress report sf the construction of
the courthouse addition within 90 days of this Agreement and every 90 days thereafter until the courthouse addition is complete.

 
 TN THE UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARUE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, 1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LAXISON,

)

1

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v1

)

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )
COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORME COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAlNGER )

COUNTY, WNCOCK COUNTY, HAWKZNS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY,LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BURXN COUNTY,

1

)

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT -FAYETTE COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter LcAgreemed')is entered into this 23 day of

F&btr/a/q

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie zapPola: Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Fayette County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive r'elief against Defendant Comty. It does not resolve PIaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. Pfaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12132(2).

2, Defendant County is a Public Entity as that tern is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title Ii of the ADA, 42 U,S.C.$12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC! ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terns used in this Agreement sllall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained ia the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a, "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or
repair to ANY buildings or structures at the StJB.ECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County,
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any ~ourk1~ousaend/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial p r o m in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State, Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will malce the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of' Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title 11of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date,
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to campliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disabiIity access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon the EEfective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal wit11 prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claiins for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11, The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shaU have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which sl1all be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee,
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given t l ~ i m(30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to tlGs Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to t l ~extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bimonthly repo1.t (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to male good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed-
16. If at any time Defendant County wisiles to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance i~npossibleor impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for PlaintiEs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may pxoceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph f 3 of tlte Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party sl~allbe deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until sucl~time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Jones, and Ramsey's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Jones, and Ramsey if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docltet Entry No. 319), entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiff's standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access judicial praceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiffs Cantref and Larson have standingto enfo~cethis Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection wit11 the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No otlier statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of thein has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22, All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement sllall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties inay designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
Rhea Taylor, County Mayor P.O. Box 218 Somerville, Tennessee 38068-0218
- and -
Richard G. Rosser, Esq. County Attorney I02 Court Square East Somerville, Tennessee 38068-1436
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates
23 North Ocoee Street P.0, Box I001
Cleveland, M 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on Ihe parties, and their elected or appainted successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter nlin, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs tlmugh December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, withthe exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680,00) which reflects Defendant Counq's pro rata

share of the m o u l t of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not: paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out
therein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned action have
caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola,

Ralph E. Ramsey,

Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:

William y ~ r o w &n Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, M 37364-1001

Gary D. Hausepian (BPR# 6969) /
Tennessee Protection & Aclvbcacy, Inc.

J

2416 21' Ave South, Suite 100

Nashville, TN 37212

(615) 298-1080

.
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARnARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

#

C

Date:

For Defendant County:

Fayette County, Tennessee
/Ld-z

I

By:

./.' .*

Rhea Taylor, County Mayor

Date: a / P&

Plaintiff:

1

a -i\ - D S
Date

FAYETTE COUNTY Plaintiff:

FAYETTE COUNTY
i
Plaintiff:
Date

Dennis Cantre1 L.1

/ Date

/

FAYETTE COUNTY
PlaintifE
2 -9 3 -04
Date

Plaintiff
A. Russell Larson &?-/$+A-
Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES
JUDICIAL SERVICES
FOR
FAYETTE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section I. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 3:98 CV 0731.
Issue Date: June 25, 2004 Site Visit Date: June 21, 2004
Revised: August 23,2004 Site Visit Date: January 21, 2005
Revised: January 31,2005
Bwscl BARGE WAGGUNER SUMNER& CANNON,I N C . 211Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500

Fax: 615-255-6572
Cannon County Courthouse June 18,2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................... Page 2-3
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
n. FACILITY BACKGROUND.......................................................Page 3 111. FSTARCAILTIETGYIEEVSAfOLPUIANTIOIONNS.S..I.C...O...M....P..L...L...A...N..C...E.....................Page 3 - 15
A. Accessible Parking B. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door C. Accessible Entrance D. First Floor Courtroom Entrance Door E. First Floor Small Courtroom F. First Floor Small Courtroom Witness Stand G. First Floor Clerk and Master Office H. Path of Travel to the Second Floor I. Second Floor Large Courtroom Entrance Door J. Second Floor Large Courtroom K. Second Floor Courtroom Witness Stand L. Second Floor Large Courhoom Jury Box M. Path of Travel to the Second Floor Large Courtroom Jury Room N. Jury Room 0 . Jury Room Break Room P. Path of Travel to the Second Floor Circuit court Clerk's Office Q. Accessible Toilet Room R. First Floor Drinking Fountain

S. Second Floor Drinking Fountain T. Fire Extinguishers U. Interior Signage V. Area of Rescue Assistance
TV. ABULTILEDRINNAGT(I1V/3E1/L05O)C..A...T...I..O...N...-....A...M...B...U...L...A...N...C...E...S..E...R...V...I..CEPage 15-17
A. Accessible Parking B. Accessible Route from Parlung to Entrance Door C. Accessible Entrance D. Women's Toilet Room E. Men's Toilet Room F. Drinking Fountain G. Fire Extinguisher ATTACHMENTS A. Site
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

LOCATION: Fayette County Courthouse 16750 Highway 64 Somerville, TN 38065
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Sumner & Cannon, Inc. (I3WSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Fayette County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated April 19,2004. Data for this report was obtained in a field investigationby BWSC on June 21,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of this report means compliancewith ADAAG regulations (Americans with DisabilitiesAct Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and
Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register /
Vol. 56, no. 1441Friday, July 26, 1991,Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterations to the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title 11State and Local Government Title III Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities Title IV Telecornmunications Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law
The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title II. The following excerpts from "The Americans with Disabilities Act Title 11Technical Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005rev.

"Title 11 of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities £komdiscriminationon the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals with disabilities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number of methods. In many situations, providing access to facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title 111,public entities are not required to remove barriers £kom each facility, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structural member would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The current Fayette County Courthousewas erected in 1925 and appears to have had few changes since that time. A plaque in the Lobby commemorates its listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Great care has been taken to preserve the historic character of both the interior and exterior of the building. Some years ago, a concrete ramp was added to the rear (north) entrance. Two small Toilet Rooms on the First Floor were designated as accessible for Men and Women. A new wall-hung drinking fountain was installed on the First Floor. A conferencing system was installed to allow a person in the First Floor Small Courtroom to see the judicial area and, for Council Meetings, verbally and visually interact with participants in the Second Floor Large Courtroom.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

111. FACILITY EVALUATIONS/COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES/OPINIONS
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC Report) The FDC report indicates that the parking is noncompliant for the number of spaces provided. The curb ramp is non-compliant for slope and lack of a detectable warning strip.
RECOMMENDATION: Within the parking area there are two spaces specifically used for police / sheriff parking and not available to the general public. Removing these two spaces fiom the total count would bring the number to 24 and would change the number of required spaces fiom two to one, meaning the number of spaces provided is compliant. A van accessible space and the required 8'-0" aisle should be provided. This aisle may be shared with the additional handicap space (if this additional space is retained). This space may require a small amount of asphalt fill near the curb to level the space and to bring running slopes into compliance. Additionally, these spaces should have ADA compliant signage including signs for the van space and signage indicating the location of the accessible route to the building. This aisle should also end in an ADA compliant curb ramp (meeting requirements for width, slope and for clear landing space beyond the ramp) between the parking lot and the accessible route. This ramp should also have a detectable warning strip before the ramp slopes into the parking lot.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC Report) The entrance ramp is non-compliant for slopes and handrail location.
RECOMMENDATION: The ramp to the doorway should be repaired and brought into compliance. Beginning at the doorway into the building, the landing is sloped and should be brought to level. From there, the ramp should generally follow the path of the existing ramp, but at a slightly gentler slope (no greater than 8.3%) in compliance with ADA.
The cross slope of the ramp should also be flattened. This ramp should have no run of
greater than 30'4" without a level landing of at least 5'4" in length by the width of the ramp. The ramp should also have ADA compliant handrails, with the required handrail extensions, and edge protection.
C. ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE
ISSUES: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC Report) The Rear Entrance Door has non-compliant loose mats both inside and outside the door, and the door closers for both leaves have too fast a closing period.
RECOMMENDATION: The loose mats should either be removed or fastened to the floor in a compliant manner. The closers should be adjusted to a slower, compliant closing period.
PER 2/4/05: LOOSE MAT - NO ACTION REQUIRED AS VENDOR HAS
INDICATED IT IS COMPLIANTWITH THE ADA.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

D. FIRST FLOOR COURTROOM ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 16, FDC Report) The signage is non-compliant. A single leaf of the double door gives too narrow a door opening. The door handle is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: A clear opening of 32" through the doorway should be provided. This could be accomplished in a number of ways. The pair of doors could be operated by an automatic door opener. The existingdoors could be replaced with a pair of doors of unequal size. The pair of doors could be replaced by a door and fixed sidelight. In any case, the door hardware should be replaced with a compliant lever handle. Compliant signage should be installed.
Another option,preferred by the County, is installation of a buzzer which would sound in the Clerk & Master Office summoning assistance to open both leaves of the door. Aper the new Justice Center is completed, this room will not longer be neededfor judicial services.
1/31/05: Following construction of the new Justice Center, this room may be used as an alternate locationfor Chancery Court non-jury trials in which aparticipant has a mobility disability.
E. FIRST FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 17, FDC Report) There is a raised platform at the fi-ontof the room with a desk, presumably for the Judge's use.
RECOMMENDATION: It does not appear, from a review of other FDC reports, that Judge's Benches are an issue at this time in this case; therefore BWSC has not addressed this area.
F. FIRST FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (ReE Sec. 18 & 19, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Witness Stand is by way of a narrow space between the platform and the Witness Stand. The Witness Stand itself is inaccessible because of being raised one step above the main floor and the space within being too small.
RECOMMENDATION: The Witness Stand is not permanently attached to the courtroom floor. It is possible to move it out of the way. The Witness Stand itself is valued as part of the historic fabric of the building. The ADAAG regulations for Justice Facilities, which have been proposed but not yet adopted, allow, in existing facilities, an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb steps to an elevated Witness Stand. Such a witness could sit at floor level near the Witness Stand and use a hand-held microphone.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The County should make a rule that in any proceeding where a witness is unable to climb into the WitnessStand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level outside the Witness Stand.
1/31/05: Alternatively, County has the option offollowing State protocol.
G. FIRST E O O R CLERK AND MASTER OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 8, FDC Report) A single leaf of the double door leading into the office gives too narrow a door opening. The door handle is non-compliant. There is a loose mat on the floor outside the door. The signage is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: A compliant 32" wide door opening should be provided. The County has a choice of several methods of acheving this. This office opens onto the main hallway of the building, a formal space whose historic character has been carefully preserved in consultationwith the Tennessee Historic Commission. The doors to this office are part of that character. Since there is always a clerk on duty in the office during business hours, a solution could be to install a buzzer to s m x o n someone to open both leaves of the door, providing a passageway of over 4 feet.
Compliant hardware should be installed on the doors. The loose mat should be removed. Compliant signage should be installed.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: required modiJications are installation o f a buzzer and compliant signage.
PER 2/4/05: LOOSE MAT - NO ACTION REQUIRED AS VENDOR HAS
INDICATED IT IS COMPLIANT WITH THE ADA.
H. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 20, FDC Report) The only access to the Second Floor is by way of the central, divided monumental stair. FDC notes some non-compliant features of the stairs and handrails.
RECOMMENDATION: Access to the Second Floor should be provided for persons who cannot climb stairs. The County is proposing to install an inclined platform lift along the run of the monumental stair. ADAAG allows the use of platform lifts in alterations of existing buildings. The Appendix to the ADAAG rules and Regulations specifically mentions inclined platform lifts as available. The model chosen should comply with ADAAG regulations and be equally suitable for wheelchair users and semi-ambulatory individuals.
The Fayette County Board of Commissioners has approved the construction of a new Justice Center which would include hlly accessible courtrooms and related spaces. Construction of such a Center could allow moving a majority of the courtroom proceedings out of the existing Second Floor Courtroom, in particular those proceedings where a person unable to climb stairs is a participant.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

The Appendix to the ADAAG regulations states that stairs connecting levels also connected by an elevator or other accessible means of vertical access are not required to meet the standards for stair and handrail design.
The County will install either an elevator or a lift between thefirst and secondfloors.
1/31/05: Noting that Fayette County will construct a new Justice Center, Fayette County will not install an elevator or a chair lzft in the existing Courthouse. Following construction of the Justice Center, Circuit Court and General Sessions cases will be heard in the new Justice Center. Chancery Court will move upstairs to the existing Second Floor Large Courtroom.
TitleII of the ADA requires that allpersons have access to thejudicial services currently provided in this building. Title 11allows government entities to use alternative means in order toprovide program accessibility.For the estimated two year period while the new Justice Center is being designed and built, the County has identzjied the Ambulance Service Building, at 102 East Latta Lane, as an alternative locationfor courtproceedings when persons with mobility disabilities areparticipants in thoseproceedings. An evaluation of accessibility issues at that location is at the end of this report. After construction of the new Justice Center, Chancery Court non-juy trials involvingpersons with mobility disabilities will be held in the First Floor Small Courtroom. Chancery Courtjury trials involvingpersons with mobility disabilitieswill be held at the new Justice Center in accordance with State Protocol.
Non-compliantfeatures of the monumental stairs and handrails and recommendationsfor modz~5cationare asfollows:
The rounded % " nosings on the stair treads are cited as non-compliant. In fact,
the regulation cited, 14.9.31, callsfor a "radius of curvatureJ'not more than ?4 ".
The radius of the nosing is 3/8" and is compliant. The handrail height is between 29 ?4" and 30 '/t " above the nosings. ADAAG requires a height of 34" to 38". The handrails lack required extensions at the top and bottom of the stairs. A handrail of compliant height should be provided along the open side of the stairs. The County should consult with a historic preservation specialist and with the State Historic Commission to arrive at a design solution which preserves the historic character of the building while providing access to the Second Floor. There are no handrails on the wall side of the stairs. Fully compliant handrails should be installed along the wall side of the stairs. The County should consult with a historicpreservation specialist and with the State Historic Commission to arrive at a design solution which preserves the historic character of the building whileproviding access to the Second Floor. The risers in the topflight vary in height, being 5 7/8", 6 1/8" and 6 %". It is recommended that the existing, historic stairs not be modzfied. The ADAAG regulations do not make any allowancefor small variations caused by the limitations of construction conditions. The 1999 edition of the Standard Building Code, currently adopted by the State of Tennessee, {1007.3.4) allows a variance
Fayette County Courthouse January 3 1,2005 rev.

of up to 3/23' between the tallest and shortest riser heights in aflight of stairs. The variance in the existing risersfalls within that range. The top guardrail does not comply with Life Safety Code requirements. It is not within the scope of this review to address Life Safety issues. The handrail is 2" wide, wider than the required maximum of 1 % " I t is recommended that the existing, historic handrail not be modified. In the new ADA and ABA Accessibility Guidelinesfor Buildings and Facilities, published in the Federal Register July 23, 2005, C505.7) allows a width of up to 2" for round handrails and 2 % "for oval handrails. Although these new guidelines have not been adopted into law, they demonstrate that the Access Board thinks the older regulations are overly restrictive.
I. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 21, FDC Report) There are three pairs of doors leading into the Large Courtroom. Only one leaf of one pair is used at present. That door has a closer that requires too great a push/pull pressure and closes the door too quickly.
RECOMMENDATION: The door closer for the active leaf should be adjusted or replaced in order to provide a compliant push/pull pressure and closing period.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: These doors have spring hinges. The active leaf should have a closer installed and the hinges replaced.
J. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 22, FDC Report) The space at the left front of the visitors' section which is presumably intended for wheelchair spaces is not compliant. The space from the front pew to the bar is not large enough.
RECOMMENDATION: Four compliant wheelchair spaces should be provided in the visitors' section. This could be accomplished by removing the next pew, or part of the next pew, at the left front of the visitors' section.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providingpvograms and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently, the Second Floor Large Courtroom will not be made accessible to persons in wheelchairs and no wheelchair locations will be needed in the visitors' section.
K. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 24, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is inaccessible to a person in a wheelchair because it is raised two steps above the Courtroom Floor and the space w i t h is too confined. In addition the path of travel to the Witness Stand past the Judge's Bench is too narrow.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

RECOMMENDATION: The existing Witness Stand cannot be made compliant without both rebuilding the structure and adding either a ramp or platform lift. The Witness Stand is valued as part of the historic fabric of the building. A ramp to the existing height would be 10'4" long and 3' wide, with a maneuvering space at the top 5 feet square. A lift would take up an area about 54" square and would require a similar maneuvering space in the Witness Stand. There is not room to add either option without blocking access to the Jury Box and the path to the Jury Room. The ADAAG regulations for Justice Facilities, which have been proposed but not yet adopted, allow, in existing facilities, an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb steps to an elevated Witness Stand. Such a witness could sit at floor level near the Witness Stand and use a hand-held microphone.
Title 11 allows government entities to use alternative means in order to provide program accessibility.The proposed new Justice Center could be designated as an alternate location for court proceedings when a person unable to climb stairs is scheduled to appear as a witness.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The Countyshould make a rule that in any proceeding where a witness is unable to climb into the Witness Stand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level outside the Witness Stand.
1/31/05: I t is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently, the Second Floor Large Courtroom will not be made accessible topersons with mobility disabilities in accordance with State Protocol..
L. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 25 & 26, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Jury Box is very narrow at the front wall of the room, where the path is obstructed by both the step up to the Jury Box and a heating radiator. The Jury Box itself is at two levels, both raised above main floor level. There is not a compliant maneuvering space for a wheelchair at either level.
RECOMMENDATION: The existing Jury Box cannot be made compliant without rebuilding the structure and adding either a ramp or platform lift. A ramp to the existing lower level would be 6 feet long and 3 feet wide, with a minimum maneuvering space at the top 5 feet square. A lift would take up an area about 54" square and would require a similar maneuvering space in the Witness Stand. There is not room to add either option without blocking access to the Jury Box and the path to the Jury Room. The ADAAG regulations for Justice Facilities, which have been proposed but not yet adopted, allow, in existing facilities, an alternative location for jurors who cannot climb steps to an elevated Jury Box. In such a case, a wheelchair space may be located outside the defined area of a raised Jury Box.
Title II allows government entities to use alternativemeans in order to provide program
accessibility.The proposed new Justice Center could be designated as an alternate
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

location for court proceedings when a person unable to climb stairs is scheduled to appear as a juror.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Modification of the Jury Box in order to enable a person in a wheelchair to participate from a location inside the Jury Box enclosure is required. It was suggested that a 36" long section of the solidfiont rail be removed, and a section of the lowerplatform be cut out and replaced with a removableplatform. This would enable a person in a wheelchair to sit atfloor level,yet be within the Jury Box enclosure. Provision of a 60" x 60" maneuvering space within the Jury Box is not required.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently,the Second Floor Large Courtroom and thejury box will not be made accessible to persons in wheelchairs.
M. PATH OF TFUVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 27, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Jury Room passes through the narrow, inaccessible area between the Jwy Box and the Eront wall of the Courtroom. The door leading out of the Courtroom has non-compliant hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: Title I1allows government entitiesto use alternativemeans in order to provide program accessibility. As an immediate measure, in jury trials where a wheelchair user is a member of the jury, the jury could be escorted to the Jury Room through the public entrance doors, through the main Second Floor hallway, through the corridor behind the Courtroom and to the Jury Room. This path is accessible.
The long term solution should be construction of the proposed Justice Center which could be designated as an alternate location for court proceedings when a person unable to climb stairs is scheduled to appear as a juror.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providingprograms and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently, the Second Floor Large Courtroom will not be made accessible topersons in wheelchairs and no accessible route will be required to the Jury Room.
N. JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 27, FDC Report) There is no compliant room identification signage and the door hardware is non-compliant.
RECOMMEDATION: Compliant hardware and room identification signage should be installed.
0 . JURY ROOM BREAK ROOM
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005rev.

ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 30, FDC Report) Opening off the Jury Room and also opening into an adjacent meeting room is a small space with a sink and counter. This room is not accessible.
RECOMMEDATION: The "Break Room" was not identified by any signage. Within the Jury Room and in an accessible location BWSC saw a coffee maker and refreshment supplies, implying that the "Break Room" is not used directly by jurors. Refi-eshments for jurors should be made available in a location accessible to all.
P. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 31 & 32, FDC Report) There are two entrances to the Circuit Cowt Clerk's Office. One is directly fiom the back of the Courtroom through a pair of doors, neither leaf of which is a compliant width. The more public entrance is fi-om the Stair Lobby through a door with non-compliant hardware, down a compliant corridor and into the Office through another pair of doors. This pair of doors does not have a compliant opening through either leaf. All three doors identified here lack compliant hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: The Circuit Court Clerk's Office must have one accessible entrance. The entrance off the corridor should be identified as the accessible entrance and made compliant. As for other pairs of door in this building, there are several possible modifications. Since there is always a clerk on duty in the office during business hours, a buzzer could be installed to summon someone to open both leaves of the doors, providing a passageway of over 4 feet. Compliant hardware should be installed on both doors along the path to the accessible entrance, and compliant directional and room identification signage installed.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providingprogrnms and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Noting that Fayette county will construct a new Justice Center, the Second Floor of the Courthouse will not be made accessible topersons with mobility disabilities.
A sign should be installed on the First Floor directingpersons unable to climb stairs who have business with the Circuit Court Clerk's ofice to the Chancery Court Clerk's ofice.
Q. ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 10, 11 & 29, FDC Report) There are two small Toilet Rooms on the First Floor, for Men and Women, identified as accessible. Neither of these is compliant with ADAAG regulations.
RECOMMEDATION: At least one compliant accessible Toilet Room should be provided on the First Floor. The most minimal modification would be to make the current Women's Accessible Toilet Room compliant and identify it as a Unisex Toilet Room. As an alternative, by moving the plumbing wall 6" further into the Women's Toilet Room,
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

the required 60" clear floor space could be provided in the Men's Toilet Room and the Courthouse could have two accessible Toilet Rooms on the First Floor.
For compliance in the current Women's Toilet Room: Compliant room identification signage should be installed. The door opening should be widened to accommodate a 36" door with compliant hardware. The closer should be adjusted to a compliant closing period. A threshold with beveled edges should be installed. The sink should be reinstalled at a compliant height and distance &om the wall. Compliant insulation should be installed on the exposed drain piping under the sink. The paper towel dispenser should be relocated outside the required path of travel. The bottom of the mirror should be lowered %". The toilet should be reinstalled with the centerline at a compliant distance of 18" fiom the side wall.
e The side wall grab bar should be replaced with a 42" long model mounted in a compliant location. The rear wall grab bar should be re installed at a compliant height. The toilet seat should be lowered %" to a compliant height, possibly by installing a different seat. The toilet seat cover dispenser should be reinstalled at a compliant height of 48" above the floor.
The FDC report identifies a small Toilet Room on the Second Floor as a Jury Toilet Room. BWSC was told that this unlabeled Toilet Room is not used by the jury, but by Courthouse staff. ADAAG does not require provision of an accessible toilet room specifically for jury use.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The small ToiletRoom on the Second Floor is used by jurors. (This was confirmed in subsequent conversationswith Courthousestafl) FDC requested that the Jury Toilet Room be made as accessible as possible without moving any walls. However, even that level ofmodlfication would be expensive and would not produce a room with a 60"x60 " maneuvering space. ModiJication of this ToiletRoom will not be required ifthe County makes a rule that when a member of thejury is in a wheelchair this ToiletRoom will be locked and will be unavailablefor use byjurors.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently,the Second Floor of the Courthousewill not be made accessible topersons in wheelchairs and no accessible Toilet Room is required on the Second Floor.
R. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 7, FDC Report) The drinking fountain projects more than the allowed
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

4" into the corridor space.
RECOMMENDATION: A railing or other banier should be installed on either side of the drinking fountain, leaving not less than 30" clear width under the fountain.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: No modiJicationrequired.
S. SECOND F'LOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 34, FDC Report) The drinking fountain is mounted too high and projects more than the allowed 4" into the corridor space. There is a loose mat on the floor under it.
RECOMMENDATION: The drinlung fountain should be reinstalled at a compliant height. A railing or other barrier should be installed on either side of the drinking fountain, leaving not less than 30" clear width under the fountain. The loose mat should be removed or fastened to the floor in a compliant manner.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Railing or barrier on either side of the drinkingfountain is not required.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providingprograms and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently, the Second Floor of the Courthouse will not be made accessible topersons in wheelchairs. Since the lower mounting height is solely to allow accessibilityfor persons in wheelchairs, no change of height is required.
T. FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 6, 14,36 & 37, FDC Report) Fire extinguishers in the First and Second Floor corridors are mounted too high. Fire extinguishers on the First Floor project further than the allowed 4" into the path of travel.
RECOMMENDATION: Remount the fire extinguishers at a compliant height of 54". Replace the First Floor Fire extinguisherswith a model that projects a maximum of 4" from the wall.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently, the Second Floor of the Courthouse will not be made accessible topersons in wheelchairs and no change to the height of the Second FloorJive extinguisher is required.
U. INTERIOR SIGNAGE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 40 and throughout FDC Report) There is a lack of compliant room identification and directional signage both inside and outside the building.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage should be installed to designate permanent rooms and spaces throughout the building, and to provide directions to, or information about functional spaces of the building. On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified,and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance.
V. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE:
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 41, FDC Report) ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fue if there is not an accessible means of egress fiom that part of the building. There is no Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of this building.
RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG exempts existing buildings fiom the requirement for an Area of Rescue Assistance. This building is of non-combustible construction, and has only one, unenclosed stair. While not required by ADAAG regulations, the county should work with a design professional to determine a feasible location and design requirements for construction of an Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor.
1/31/05: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providingprograms and services at an alternative locationfor persons with mobility disabilities. Consequently,the Second Floor of the Courthouse will not be made accessible to persons in wheelchairs and no Area of Rescue Assistance will be required.
- IV. ALTERNATIVE LOCATION AMBULANCE SERVICE BUILDING
(113 1/05)
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: The parking lot is currently striped for 20 parking spaces, with two noncompliant spaces designated with the symbol for accessibilitypainted on the pavement. Slopes in the parking area are compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The parking area should be restriped to include one compliant van-accessible space (min. 8' wide) and passenger access aisle (min. 8' wide.) A pole mounted sign should identify the accessible space.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: The accessible route includes a curb ramp, with a non-compliant slope of lo%, up to a compliant sidewalk.
RECOMMENDATION: The curb ramp should be removed and rebuilt at a compliant slope of not more than 8.3% (1:12).
PER 2/4/05: NO ACTION REQUIRED.
C. ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

ISSUE: The entrance door is a compliant 36" wide door with compliant lever hardware on the exterior, a panic device on the interior and a closer. The closing speed is too fast. The threshold is non-compliant with a total height of 1 318". There is a compliant 5'-3" deep clear space on the exterior side of the door.
RECOMMENDATION: The closer should be adjusted to a minimum closing time of 3 seconds. The threshold should be replaced with a compliant design with a height of no more than %".
D. WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: The following non-compliant items were observed: Signage is mounted in a non-compliant location on the door. The drain piping protrudes slightly into the required clear space under the sink. The dimension from the back wall to the fiont of the sidewall grab bar is a noncompliant 47.5" The mirror is mounted at a non-compliant height of 46.5 " to the bottom of the glass. The toilet is a non-compliant 21" from the side wall.
RECOMMENDATION: Relocate signage to a compliant location on the wall at the latch side of the door, with the center of the sign 60" above the floor. Install an offset trap assembly on the sink drain piping.
a Relocate the sidewall grab bar to be 54" fkom the back wall to the front mounting. Relocate mirror to 40" maximum from floor to bottom of glass. Given the difficulty of relocating the floor-mounted toilet, the 21" distance fi-om the side wall is a useable dimension.
E. MEN'S TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: The following non-compliant items were observed: Signage is mounted in a non-compliant location on the door. The clearance at the pull side of the door is a non-compliant 12". The grab bar behind the toilet is a non-compliant 24" long. The toilet is installed a non-compliant 21.5" fkom the sidewall. The drain piping protrudes slightly into the required clear space under the sink. The sidewall grab bar is mounted with the front edge at a non-compliant 47.5" from the back wall. The minor is mounted at a non-compliant 47" to the bottom of the glass. The paper towel dispenser is mounted at a non-compliant 55" to the bottom.
RECOMMENDATION: Relocate signage to a compliant location on the wall at the latch side of the door, with the center of the sign 60" above the floor.
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The door clearance is limited by the drinking fountain. If the drinking fountain is moved, it will intrude on the required clearanceat the Women's Toilet Room door. Therefore no change should be made. The toilet is set in a 12" deep, 36" wide alcove, which meets the requirements for clear space in (4.16.2). A 36" long grab bar should be installed behind the toilet. This may require widening the alcove by a few inches. Given the difficulty of relocating the floor-mounted toilet, the 21.5" distance from the side wall is a useable dimension. Install an offset trap assembly on the sink drain piping. Relocate the sidewall grab bar to be 54" from the back wall to the front mounting. Relocate mirror to 40" maximum from floor to bottom of glass. Relocate the paper towel dispenser to 54" maximum fiom the floor. PER 2/4/05: THE ALCOVE NEED NOT BE WIDENED. THE GRAB BAR BEHIND THE TOILET SHALL EXTEND THE WIDTH (OR SLIGHTLY LESS THAN THE WIDTH) OF THE ALCOVE. F. DRINKING FOUNTAIN The drinking fountain is compliant. G . FIRE EXTINGUISHER The fire extinguisher is mounted at a compliant height.
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005 rev.

ATTACHMENT A SITE
Fayette County Courthouse January 31,2005rev.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSQN,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

V.

)

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, RLEDSOE 1

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, PAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEBFERSBN)

COUNTY, JOHTSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

CBTJNTY, LEWS COUNTY, MEIGS

)

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

b

COUNTY, COUNTY,

PanICd KVEAT-NTBCUORUENNTCYO,UTNRTOYU- ;-S--D-A- L- E-- -1))-

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DENAND
- -

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - GRAINGER COUNTY

a2 This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this

day of

~ekPl(?l

, 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, RaIph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Grainger County (hereinafter "Defendant Coui~ty")).

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is definedby 42 U.S.C.8 1213l(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant Cotlnty is subject to Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its inlpie~nentingregulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law ia the courtl~ouseand any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Admi~listrativeOffice of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the defklitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as inay be coiltaii~edin the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with tl~osestatutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildiilgs or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County aid includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed
by a party -
d.- - "SUBJECT FAeILITIES" refers to any-courthouse-and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county conlmission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial progriliil is coii&~ictediii ihe Ccfezdant Cwtity.
PLAINTIFFS' Rl3LEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement coilstitutes a settlen~enot f all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Grainger County Courthouse or the Cjrainger County Judicial Center, includi~~bgu,t not Iirnited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees,

costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.
7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attonleys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, de~na~ldasc,tions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Grainger County Courtl~ouseor the Grainger County Judicid Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not Iimited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have bee11 asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the coniplete release provided for herein. The teims set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be inade by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon lnutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
10. Defendant Comiy will pay Plaintiffs in total- the amount of Two Thousand Six Haidred Eiglity-Dollars ($2,680.00) wl~icllr-eflects Defendant County's- pro-rata share--ofthe amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies m d procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is ill comnpliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its iinplenlenting regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the coinpletion of the Alteratiorls delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five ( 5 ) years of the EiYective Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain froin taking any action ihat will diminish ale level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in

Defendant County's subject facilities as acl~ievedtlxough the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragsaph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasoils uilrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
14. Defendant Couniy agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement sllall be iilspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary intemptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENATND MONITORING.
15. The United States Dislrict Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreenlent shall be made an exhibit to the Disnlissal Order.
16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arise11 under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), Illen the Con~plainingParty shall give written detailed notice (the 'Wotice") to the other p a . (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Cornplaini~igand Responding Parties shall attempt within the next tlzirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to thjs Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be souglzt in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreenlent by the prevailing party tobtfieextent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following tlte Effective Date) that sets fort11 its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance wit11 the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendaut County agrees to make good fixith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by a11appropriaterepresentativeof the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
19. If at any tiine Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance in~possibleor impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will pronlptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for

Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph IS), setting forth the facts and circumstances tllought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such niodification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs lo the proposed niodification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Coinplaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.

20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claini or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, .until such time as the Court no loi~gehr as jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreenient, Defendant Counly does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attenipted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Grainger County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of co~npetentjurisdiction reverses Judge Canipbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7, 2004, relating
to a Plaintiff's standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Grainger Co~lity.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement a~!fm~t~hsat l ~ eor she has consulted with and been advised by~6iii-sZ;lla coni~ectiori~~~et'xeecution of thisA-greeinent-andthat he or-she-agrees illat its tenns are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth t l e entire agreen~enbt etween Plaintiffs and Defendant County wit11 respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and witten agreements aid discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statenlent of any other party to this Agreement except those stzieiiiezts set f ~ r t hcrein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

- - -

27. This Agreement shal beconle effective once signed by all parties and the efkctive date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Conlpromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, infer alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs througl~December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the anount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through Deceinber 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. I11 the event that the Coinpromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned

i

action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and -@son:

William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Sheet P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Gary D. Housepian (BPR Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc.

"

2416 21StAve South, Suite 100

Nashville, TN 37212

(615) 298-1080

- .--- ..

. .

..- -

- -

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

For Defendant Grainger County, Tennessee: n
~tew'artE, stes & Donne11 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: ~ J / - o b

FEB 17 2005 12:20PM HP LflSERJET 3200

DATE: d-/f-oS

On behaif of erai n q e r County, Defendant

- On this the kg day a f 4 2 8 b 4 ,2005, gersondlyappearedbefore me the above

Page 22 of 43

GRAINGER COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

1 Date:

GRAINGER COUNTY
PlaintiE
Date

GRAINGER COUNTY Plaintiff:
cf) - 3 3- ~ 5 ~
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff ,

A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff
Date: do/s'*&K

AGREED SETTLEMENT GRAINGER COUNTY
Grainger County is spending over $6 million on a new single story justice center. The Grainger County Justice Center is scheduled to be completed in approximately September 2005. At that time, all judicial services currently housed in the Grainger County Courthouse will be moved to the Grainger County Justice Center. Once completed, the judicial services offered in Grainger County will be readily accessible to individuals with mobility disabilities. The parties agree that the courthouse addition will resolve the ADA issues relative to Grainger County as addressed in the Plaintiffs' expert report concerning Grainger County.
Plaintiffs agree that Grainger County is not required to make renovations or modifications to the Grainger County Courthouse pending completion sf the Grainger County Justice Center. While the justice center is being constructed, Grainger County will move any court proceeding to the first floor courtroom in the event a person with a mobility disability needs to access the judicial program offered in Grainger County. Grainger County will convert the restroom on the first floor to a unisex restroom.
Plaintiffs recognize and agree that the proposed completion date may be delayed for unforeseen reasons. Grainger County agrees to provide Plaintiffs with a progress report of the Grainger County Justice Center's construction within 90 days after the signing of this Agreement and every 90 days thereafter until the construction is complete.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE 1

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

Defendants.

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - HANCOCK COUNTY
This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 2 3 day of
2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie ~ a ~ ~ o Dl ;e,nnis Cantrel, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter "Plaintiffs7') and Defendant Hancock County (hereinafter "Defendant Countyy').

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementingregulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the sarne definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with-thosestatutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse andlor other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Hancock County Courthouse or the Hancock County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and fkom any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Hancock County Courthouse whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONASSSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no M h e r liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs. This agreement in no way affects the obligation of the Defendant County to pay for the services of Falconnier Design Company for the review of the plans for the renovations for Hancock County as agreed to in the parties Memorandum of Understanding.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.

13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENATND MONITORING
15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.
16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next h r t y (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notifjr Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justi@ modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.

20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.

21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Hancock County.

22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction

reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 3 19) entered on December 7,2004, relating

i

to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these

Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Hancock County.

23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.

24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.

25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.

26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned
action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street . P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
Gary D. Housepian (BPR # 6989) Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 2lStAve South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & D A R D M A N 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Date:

For Defendant County:
Name: G.GREG ~ A R I O N Title: HANCOCK COUNTY MAYOR Date: 02/11/2005

HANCOCK COUNTY Plaintiff:
- y- 05
w
Date

HANCOCK COUNTY
Date 2-11-05

HANCOCK COUNTY
i
Plaintiff:
Date I

HANCOCK COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

HANCOCK COUNTY

Dennis Cantrel

Date

/

HANCOCK COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS IN THE CASE OF GEORGE LANE, et. al. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, et. al. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
DOCKET # 3:98-0731 AND HANCOCK COUNTY
This Memorandum of Understanding entered into between Plaintiffs in the action described in the caption of this agreement and Hancock County, Tennessee is done for the purpose of facilitatingthe compliance of the courthousefor Hancock County, Tennesseelocated in Sneedville, Tennessee with the provisions of the American's with Disability Act and to enhance the potential for settlement of this case with reference to these parties. In furtherance of that intent, the parties enter into the following stipulations:
1. This is an interim agreement between the parties. It is part of the mediation process previously required by order of the District Court. As such, all information, positions, and exchanges made pursuant to this process shall be subject to the rules of mediation including those stipulationsthat all statements,positions, andconclusions are for settlementpurposes only and shall not be used by either party as a part of the litigation of this case except for the limited purpose of advisingthe courtofthe status of their discussionsandto provided furtherinformationto a mediator should one be appointed in this case. It is understood that the entry of this agreement is not to be construed as a final resolution or limitation of any remedies that may be sought by the plaintiffs as a part of the District Court proceeding.
2. The report made by the plaintiffs expert, Damon Falconnier, on March 15,2004during the discoveryprocess shall be considered the plaintiffs requirement for the standard of compliance with the American's with Disability Act (42 U.S.C. 12101 et. seq) (ADA). The report is the official and exclusive position of the plaintiffs, all other discussions or exchanges during the process undertakenpursuant to this understandingnotwithstanding. Until suchtime asthe parties announce an agreement to the contrary, it shall remain the plaintiffs position. All proposals and alternatives to this position suggestedor proposedby plaintiffs expert duringthe process undertakenunder this understanding shall have no force or effect until such time as they are approved by counsel for the plaintiffs.

3. At all times and for all purposes, Damon Falconnier and any of his employees, agents or assigns are the exclusive agents of the plaintiffs and owe no fiduciary or other duty to Hancock County. At no time shall Falconnier, his employees, agents, or assigns be considered an agent, employee, or assign of the defendant or any of its employees, agents or assigns. Any suggestions, comments, revisions, or improvements made by him are to be considered advisory only. Any decisions to undertake those advisory comments or recommendations shall be the exclusive responsibility of Hancock County, its agents, employees or assigns. Any liabilities associated with those decisions shall be the exclusive responsibility of Hancock County, except as it may be liabilities owed to the plaintiffs in the case noted above.

3. subject to the provisions contained herein, plaintiffs expert Damon Falconnier, shall participate in and assist the architect employed by Hancock County, Tennessee with the design, modification, and construction of the Hancock County Courthouse and its compliance with the provisions of the ADA and its regulations. His role shall be advisory only and he has no authority to require or enforce any stipulationsthat may be made.

4. Hancock County shall be responsible to the plaintiffs counsel for the services and

expenses of Falconnier pursuant to the attached schedule. In addition, Hancock County shall be

responsible for the expenses of plaintiffs counsel for the preparation of the report dated March 15,

2004 in the amount of $2,L

,which sum shall be paid within thirty (30) days of the signing

of this agreement. Credit shall be given for all sums paid under this agreement that may be taxed

as a part of the final resolution of the case now pending in the District Court.

5. Either party may withdrawfiomthis agreement onten (10) daysnotice to the otherparties legal counsel. Any and all expenses incurred prior to that announcement of withdrawal shall still be the responsibility of the party incurring same.

6. All parties shall approach this process in good faith and with the specific intent and purpose of facilitating the compliance of the Hancock County Courthouse with the ADA and its regulations.

ENTERED into this the */day

of May, 2004.

Attorney for the Plaintiffs 23 N. Ocoee, P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 (423) 476-45 15

Attorney for Hancock County 200 Court St., P.O. Box 84 Sneedville, TN 37869-084 (423) 733-2274

i
FALCONNIER DESIGN CO.

August 27,2003

Mr. William J. Brown Attorney at Law 23 N. Ocoee Street Cleveland, TN 37312

RE: REQUESTED ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES

Dear Mr. Brown,

We have listed below the scope of services that we understand is being requested and our hourly fee for your approval.

Scope:

1. Provide architectural consulting services as requested 2. kitend meetings as requeslea.

Fee:

We propose to prepare the above requested scope of services on an hourly basis as outlined below:

Principal Architect Senior Draftsman Draftsman

$85.00 per hour $75.00 per hour $65.00 per hour $55.00 per hour $40.00 per hour

Invoicing: 1.

such as mileage, printing, mailings, charges, photography, etc. will be irect cost and will be identified separately on each month's billing.

2. Payments are due and payable upon recei

e.

Should any amounts remain unpaid after

d

amounts shall bear interest at a rate of 1-1/2% per month.

3. The Architect reserves the right to suspend work in that invoices remain unpaid for more than thirty

4. The fees charged herein are not contingent on a favorable outcome or judgment and are payable when work has been completed.

Proposal Submitted $2,

/ Chambliss Avenue
Fax 865.584.3139 Email faldeco@bellsouth.net

ADA COMPLIANCE REPORT
JUDICIAL SERVICES
FOR
HANCOCK COUNTY COURTHOUSE
Prepared by Falconnier Design Co. 4622 Chambliss Ave. Knoxville, TN 37919 Phone (865) 584-7868 March 15,2004

The information contained in this report is based on the Architect's expert opinion of the requirements of

the Americans with Disabilities Act and where specified, the requirements of the law of the State of

Tennessee with reference to disability access. This report should not be considered a comprehensive

review of accessibilityissues associated with the particular building identified. The scope of this report is

limited to architectural issues associated with an individual, with a physical disability, having access to

the court proceedings conducted in the facility, and their life comfort needs by being present in the

building. The information contained in this document may only be used by parties associated with

litigationin the case of Lane et-al.v. the State of Tennessee et.al. pending in the Federal District Court for

the Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 398 CV 0731. This informationis copyrighted information

( -

and may not be used for any other purpose.

ADA COMPLIANCE REPORT - JUDICIAL SERVICES
ATTACHMENT A (SKETCHES OF EXISTING CONDITIONS) ATTACHMENT B (DRAWINGS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW) ATTACHMENT C (AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE) SITE PHOTOGRAPHS SITE VIDEO

Pg. 3-9 Pg. 10-11 Pg. 12 Pg. 13-14 Available on CD Available on DVD

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Hancock County Courthouse

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~OCATIOH~

Hancock County Courthouse
1237Main Street Sneedville, TN 37869

DATEOF SlTEVISE* February 16 & 19,2004

~CESSIBILITYCOMPLIANCE CO&W]IENTS(
All regulations noted in brackets are ADAAG (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility
Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36.- Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register I Vo1.56, No. 144I Friday, July 26, 1991, Rules and Regulations)unless noted otherwise.
1. PARKING
A. The parking is on the.streetaround the building. There appears to be no on-site parking for the courthouse. The side street has (6) parallel parking spaces. A designated yellow painted non-compliant curb ramp has slopes up to 14.5% located adjacent to the sidewalk entrance. (4.7.2)
B. No passenger loading zone on access aisle exists. (4.6.6) C. The existing parking space adjacent to the curb ramp has compliant slopes under the
maximum allowable slope. D. There was no accessible signage, marker or stripping.(4.6.4) E. A van accessible space has not been provided or designated with the required signage.
(4.6.4)
2. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM STREET TO ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The accessible route from the parking area onto the 5'-4" wide street sidewalk has a sloping yellow painted non-compliant gutterlcurb ramp that slopes 14.5% in 24" width (4.7.2). The curb r a p suface slopes downward to a non-compliant 2-lI2" vertical offset. The vertical drop of 1-114" &omthe pavement to the gutter is non-compliant. (4.3.8) The sidewalk along the street has an average compliant cross-slope of 0.73% at the curb ramp.
B. The accessible route from the street sidewalk to the rear entrance of the building has a non-comuliant 85'4" long x 47" wide sloping sidewalkthat rises 4'-3-3/4"(4.8.2) with non-compliant cross slopesup to 11.75%( 4.8 -6). Because the maximum rise and runof the walk have been exceeded, an intermediate landing will be required. (4.8.2) The running slopes along the path are non-compliant based on the running slopes varying from 3.3% to 7.0% which exceed the required maximum slope without handrails. (4.8.5) The ramp daes not have the required handrails with extensions on each end of the ramp (4.8.5(1)) (4.8.5(2)).
C. The above mentioned sidewalk terminates onto a 7 foot wide ramp to the rear entrance. This 7 foot wide ramp slopes up at a non-compliant 5.9% in 14'-11" length. (4.8.4)

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2 . ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM STREET TO ENTRANCE DOOR -- CONTINtTED
D. The non-compliant ramp does not have the required handrails on both sides (4.8.5), including extensions (4.8.5(2)), nor the required edge protection on the open sides where drop-offs range &om 3" on one side to 10" on the other side (4.8.7).
E. The 41" deep exterior landing area at the door is non-compliant due to its slope of 5.9%.{4.8.4) (4.13.6).
3. ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The entrance door has a non-compliant acce.ssible area outside the door {Page 38, Figure
25(a)) with a compliant post mounted push-pad autom.atic door operator. A non-
compliant loose mat also encumbers the interior accessible door space (4.5.3). The interior push-pad automatic door operator is mounted a compliant height of 38". B. The non-compliant threshold installationhas a 2-318" total elevation change. On the exterior there is a 5" wide, I-%" high, rounded concrete threshold section in combination with a sloping ?4" aluminum threshold that is angled and a has a total height of 718" high.(4.13.8)
C. The compliarit aluminum fi-me glass door and fuli glass sidelight is equipped with panic
hardware and bottom edge of door glass located at the compliant height of 8" above the floor.
4. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE FIRST FLOOR CLERK & MASTER
A. The accessiblepath is non-compliant due to the presence of a loosemat at the interior building entrance door. (4.5.3)
5. FIRST FLOOR CLERK & MASTER DOOR
A. The entrance door is a single 36" wide compliant door.
B. The exterior floor space of the door is compliant with a 12 114" side clearance.
C. The interior floor space has a non-compliant 4" pull side clearance dimension {Page 38, Figure 25(a))
D. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob at 36" above floor (4.13.9) and a closer with a non-com~lianct losing force of 6 pounds (4.13.1 l(2) (b)) and a compliant closing period of 11 seconds.
E. The bottom of the compliant door glass is 40" above finished floor. F. The room identification signage is not compliant based on (4.1.3,16,(a))
6. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE FIRST FLOOR COURT CLERK OFFICE
A. The accessiblepath is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the interior building entrance door. (4.5.3)

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7. FIRST FLOOR COURT CLERK DOOR
A. The entrance door is a single door with a compliant 36" door leaf. B. The exterior floor space of the door is compliant. C. The interior floor space has a non-com~liandt imension of 46 ?4". {Page 38, Figure
25(a)) D. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob (4.13.9) with an inactive
pinching and grasping latch. (4.13.9) E. The bottom of the compliant glass is 39 3/4" above finished floor. F. The room identification signage is not compliant based on {4.1.3,16,(a))
8. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
A. The accessiblepath is encumberedby a non-compliantloose mat at the building's entrance door. (4.5.3)
9. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
A. The drinking fountain is a non-compliant model with the height of the spout being 42" above finished floor (4.15.2). The control location is on the spout (4.15.41, and the water stream is at a compliant height of 5 %".
10. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
A. The path of travel to the second floor is accomplished by a non-compliant stair and a loose laid mat (4.5.3) at the building entrance door. See Item 18below.
11. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
A. The entrance door is a double door with each compliant door leaf being 36 inches. B. The left door is equipped with a compliant push/pull at 38" above finished floor and a
closer with a non-compliant closing force of 7 pounds (4.13.1 l(2) (b) and a non-
compliant closing period of 2.88 seconds. (4.13.10) C. The right door is equipped with a compliant pushlpull at 38" above finished floor and a
closer with a non-compliant closing force of 7 pounds (4.13.1 1(2) (b) and a non-
compliant closing period of 2.65 seconds (4.13.10). D. The exterior floor space of the courtroom door is compliant. The interior floor space is
non-compliant due to the 35" width at the fixed wooden pews (Page 38, Figure 25(b)) E. The door access is also encumbered with a non-compliant carpet edge strip with a vertical
slope greater than 1to 2. (4.5.2) F. The room identification signage is not compliantbased on (4.1.3,16,(a))

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12. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM
A. The assembly room size is 42'-4" x 35'-9" or a 1,513 square feet area and will seat approximately (101)people in the wooden pew area and additionalpeople in the moveable chairs in fkont of the bar rail. The ADA requires (4) compliant locations to be provided. {4.1.3(19)(a))
B. The non-compliant side aisle is 35" wide and narrows to 31' at a column obstruction (4.2.1) The center aisle is compliant at 44 %" wide and the front aisleha opening width is compliant at 36".
13. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL IN THE COURTROOM ON THE SECOND FLOOR TO THE WITNESS STAND
A. The non-compliant passageway width begins at 35" and narrows to 31". (4.2.1) B. The compliant passageway thru the bar rail opening is 36" wide. C. The witness stand entrance access width is non-com~liantat 22 54". (4.2.1)
14. WITNESS STAND ON THE SECOND FLOOR - .
A. The witness stand is non-compliant due to the presence of two 6" steps with 1" nosings (4.5.21, to access the raised level as well as a non-compliant 23 W opening. (4.2.1)
B. The witness stand is non-compliant due to the 47 5/8" x 64-114" area which is inadequate space to maneuver a wheelchair within. (4.2.3)
\ 15. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM COURTROOM ON THE SECOND FLOOR TO THE JURY BOX
A. The non-compliant passageway width begins at 35" and narrows to 31". (4.2.1) B. The compliant passageway thru the b a rail opening is 36" wide. C. The jury box entrance width is a non-compliant 22 ?4" clear. (4.2.1)
16. JURY BOX ON THE SECOND FLOOR
A. The jury box is non-compliant due to the presence of a 6" step to get to the first level(4.3.8) and a second 6" step to get to the second level (4.5.2)of the jurybox. Each level is also non-compliant due to it's 39 '/2" width.(4.2.3)
B. Thejurybox is non-compliant due to spacebeing inadequate to maneuver a wheelchair within (4.2.3). There are (17) moveable chairs.
17. SECOND FLOOR PUBLIC TOILET
A. There was no public toilet on the second floor. B. The proposed future singlehandicap toilet may be where the existing small toilet room is
in the present Probation Officer's Office on the second floor. This toilet has a wall mounted sink in the right comer, a toilet fixture on a 6" raised concrete base, and a roof access waJ.1ladder between the door and sink.

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18. STAIRS TO THE SECOND FLOOR .

A. The only stair is a non-compliant means of access and egress. Each side stair is 44" wide leading up to a common landing that is 58 1/2"deep. A wide common stair section then continues to the second floor. See below for detailed non-compliance issues.
B. The risers are compliant at 7-118" high. The treads are compliant at 11-112" wide. The
non-compliant squarenosings are 1". (4.9.3)
C. The railing along the open side is non-compliant due to the fact that it is a handrail mounted at 29" and 30" above the stair nosings. (2000 Edition of NFPA 101,7.2.4.6(1)) The wall rail is non-compliant due to the absence of extensions at each end {4.9.4(2)).
D. The top guardrail is 33 1/2" high. (2000 Edition ofNFPA 101,7.2.2.4.6(2))

19. STAIR TO THE BASEMENT LEVEL

A. The only stair is a non-compliant means of access and egress. The top landing is 58 ?4" deep. The stair is a compliant 48 112" wide leading down to a common hallway that is approximately 48" wide.
B. The risers are non-compliant at 7-7/8". (2000 Edition of NFPA 101, Page 79, Table 52.2.2.1 (b))The treads are non-compliant at 9"+/-. (4.9.2) The compliant nosings are sloped and project approximately 1" fiom the face of the stair riser.
C. The wall handrail is at a non-compliant height of 30" above the tread nosing. (4.9.4(5)}
The absence of any level handrail extensions makes the handrail non-
I com-pliant.(4.9.4(2)) The rail is non-compliant also due to a 1-518" width (4.26.2) and a 2-318" clearance from the face of the supporting wall to the face of the rail. {4.9.4(3))
D. The guardrail on the main floor around the stairs to the basement is non-compliant due to the top being at 34" above the finish floor. (2000 Edition of NFPA 101,7.2.2.4.6(2))

20. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE MEN'S TOILET ON THE BASEMENT LEVEL

A. The path of travel to the second floor is accomplishedby a non-compliant steep stair and a loose laid mat at the building entrance door. (4.5.3) See item 19 above.

21. MEN'S TOILET BASEMENT LEVEL
A. The entrance door is a single door with a compliant 36 inches wide door leaf. B. There is a broken floor drain grate that is a tripping hazard. (4.5.1) C . The toilet has a compliant 60" clear floor space. D. The signage on the door is non-compliant.(4.30.21, (4.30.31, (4.30.41, (4.30.51,
(4.30.61, (4.30.7) E. The door hardware is compliant and is equipped with push/pull hardware, no latch, and a
non-functioning closer.
F. The sink is non-compliant due to the location of the drain piping (4.19.2) and the
absence of insulation on the drainpipe. (4.19.4) G. The sink is non-compliant due to its top surface (rim) being located at a height of 35 %"
above finished floor (4.19.2) and due to its double knob handle faucet (4.1 9.5). The sink is has a compliant location of 21" &omthe side wall. There are no mirrors.

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21. MEN'S TOILET BASEMENT LEVEL --CONTINUED
H. The paper towel dispenser is located at a non-comvliant height of 60". {Page 19, Figure 6@)) I. The soap dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 58". {Page 19, Figure 6@)) J. The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 33". K. The urinal is non-compliant due to the lip being located at a height of 24 112" above
finished floor (4.18.2) and the use of a flush valve requiring pinching/twisting (4.27.4). The urinal has a compliant elongated bowl and the flush valve mounted at a compliant height of 43" above finish floorL L. The three toilets are located on a non-compliant 9" raised concrete platform area (4.5.2). The stall widths are all non-compliant and measure 28", 28 %" and 34 %" (4.17.3). One toilet fixture was leaning. M. Toilet stalls are also non-compliant due to the absence of any grab bars. (4.17.6)
22. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE WOMEN'S TOILET ON THE BASEMENT LEVEL
A. The path of travel to the second floor is accomplishedby a non-compliant steep stair and a loose laid mat at the building entrance door (4.5.3). See item 19 above.
23. WOMEN'S TOILET BASEMENT LEVEL
A. The entrance door is a single door with a compliant 36 inches door leaf. B. The signage on the door is non-compliant.{4.30.2), (4.30.31, (4.30.41, (4.30.5),
{4.30.6), {4:30.7) C. There is an irregular floor drain grate that is a tripping hazard. (4.5.1 ) D. The required accessible floor space at the exterior and interior side of the door are
compliant but the 17-314" side clearance on the pull side of the door is non-compliant {Page 38, Figure 25) E. Thedoor is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware and a non-fimctioning closer. This door also has a non-compliant slide bolt that requires pinching and grasping (4.13.9). F. The toilet is non-compliant due to the. lack of the required 60" diameter clear floor space. (4.22.3) G. The sink is non-compliant due to the location of the drain piping (4.19.2); however the drain piping is equipped with the required insulation. H. The sink is non-compliant due to its top surface (rim) being located at a height of 32-518" above finished floor {4.19.2), its underside clearance of 28" above finished floor(4.19.2), and its pinching/grasping double handle faucet (4.19.5). The centerline of the sink is located at a compliant 47" fiom the adjacent wall.
I. The paper towel dispenser is located at the non-comvliant height of 61 V.{Page 19,
Figme 6Co)I J. The soap dispenser is located the non-compliant height of 52". (Page 19, Figure 6(b)) K. The two toilets are located on a non-compliant 9" raised concrete platform area (4.5.2).
The inside clear stall widths are non-comvliant and measure 31" and 33" (4.5.2) with non-compliant clear access of 27" and 28", respectively (Page 43, Figure 30(a)) L. Toilet stalls are non-com~liandt ue to the absence of any grab bars. (4.17.6)

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24. ELEVATOR
A. There is no elevator in this building. (4.14 & 4.5.2) B. The proposed future elevator location was reported to be located in an elevator addition
connected to the present Probation Officer's Office on the second floor and the School Director's Office on the first floor. These offices are in the front right side of the building.
PUBLIC PHONE
A. There is no public phone in this building. If installed at a later date, it must meet all applicable codes and regulations.
26. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE
A. Non-compliant exterior directional signage. (4.4. .2,(7),(c)) If all entrances are not accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest accessible entrance.
27. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE
A. The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue assistance for all levels above grade. See attachment "C" for details.
28. SPECIAL NOTES
A. There are some masonry maintenance issues that should be addressed as soon as possible on this building. Roof parapet brick walls are decaying, cracking, and bricks area in misalignment and in question as to their soundness and strength. Several bricks appear loose and could fall to the ground during severe fieezelthaw cycles.
B. The front brick steps are non-compliant and have 4", 6", 5 3/8", 6",6", and 8" risers. (4.9.2) The treads are approximately 12" with vertical square edged nosings. (4.9.3) The center handrail is approximately 30" above the nosings. (4.9.4) This riser irregularity creates a tripping hazard.
C. This report should not be considered a comprehensivereview of the designated building as to the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, North Carolina Handicap Code, the Standard Building Code, and the Life Safety Code. Any modifications undertaken by parties associated with said building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed by the State of Tennessee who is competent in accessibility compliance. Prior to the undertaking of modifications those plans should be submitted to the Tennessee State Fire Marshall's office for review.

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~TTACHMERT No drawings or project manuals were received for review.

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AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE (AREA OF REFUGE1 IN AN ACCESSIBLE MEANS OF EGRESS
I. SUMMARY
Where Accessible Means of Egress are required by either the Federal Register Vol. 56, No.144 (hereafter refxred to as ADA), Standard Building Code 1999 Edition (hereafter referred to as SBC), or the Life Safety Code NFPA 101 1997 Edition (hereafter referred to as LSC), then such means must be so designed to accommodate the egress of disabled persons in the event of an emergency {ADA 4.3.10) ,(SBC 1004.3.1, LSC 5-5.4.1). If the Accessible Route cannot lead one out of the building, it must lead to an Area of Refuge (Area of Rescue Assistance){ADA4.3.10). An Area of Rehge is merely a component of the Accessible Means of Egress, a part of the path a disabled person takes to exit the building. An Area of Refuge is provided as a place where disabled people can wait for assistance in a protected space. Areas of Refuge are required in an Accessible Means of Egress if the Accessible Route cannot be directly maintained by exiting on grade due to level change, a multi-story building, etc. (ADA 4.3.10) (SBC Chapter 2, Definition, "Area of Refuge7')(LSC 5-5.4.1). While the LSC does exempt some existing buildings from the accessible route requirement (LSC 5-5.4.I), such cannot be the case if the existingbuilding has been so modified to accommodatethose requiring accessiblemeans of egress (LSC 9-2.2.12).

A. Buildings with an Elevator If a building is equipped with an elevator so that the spaces on upper floors are made accessible to the physically disabled, then an area of refuge must be provided along the accessible means of egress. An elevator can be used as one of two required means of egress, but the other means of egress (a stair) must have an area of refuge to allow disable persons to be protected from the effects of fire until they can be rescued from the upper floor via the stairs.

B. Buildings with a Wheelchair Lift Buildings equipped with a wheelchair lift must also provide accessible means of egress. A lift cannot be used as part of such a means of egress (SBC 1004.3.4), so Areas of Refuge must be provided at the stairs or immediately adjacent thereto.

C. Buildings without an Elevator If a building is not equipped with an elevator, and assuming the spaces on the upper floors are required to be accessible or have been modified sincetheir constructionto accommodate disabled persons, then an area of refuge must be provided along the accessible means of egress to allow such persons to be protected from the effects of fire until they canbe rescued from the upper floor via the stairs.

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A. An Area of Refuge must be protected fiom the rest of the building by a smoke barrier with 1-hour rating and no less than a 20-minute door. (ADA 4.3.11.1) (LSC 5-2.12.3.4)(SBC 1004.3.5.4 & 1004.3.5.9)
B. Area of Refuge must be large enough to accommodate (1) 3OWx48"wheel chair for each 200 (or portion thereof) people in the occupancy of the space served by the means of egress. (ADA 4.3.1 1.2) (SBC 1004.3.5.2)(LSC 5-2.12.3.1). The access to any of the required spaces shall not be obstructed by more than one adjacent space. (SBC 1004.3.5.4)(LSC 5-2.12.3 -3). Wheelchair spaces shall not reduce the egress width. (SBC 1004.3.5.3)(LSC5-2.12.3.l)
C. Areas of Refuge must have a 2-way communication system with visible and audible instructions (ADA 4.3.1 1.4)(LSC5-2.12.2.5). The SBC allows an exception for buildings under 4 stories, but this would be superseded by the LSC and ADA.
D. Areas of Refuge must be labeled with illuminated signage, and all other means of egress must include directions to Areas of Refuge. {ADA 4.3.1 1.4)(SBC 1004.3.5.7 & 1004.3.5,8)(LSC5-2.12.3.5)
E. Areas of Refuge can be an enlarged landing in a stair enclosure,provided certain criteria are met by the Rehge area and the Stairs themselves. (ADA 4.3.1 1. ~ ( ~ ) ) ( s B1c004.3.2.1)
F. Areas of Refuge may be served by a stair of no less than 48" clear between handrails. (ADA 4.3.11.3) (SBC 1004.3-2.1) The ADA disallows any stairs less than 48" wide.
G. Areas of Refuge can also include an elevator lobby provided that certain criteria are met by the Refuge Area and the elevator itself. {ADA4.3.11.1(7)) (SBC 1003.4, 1004.3.2.2) (LSC 5-2.12.2.4)
H. An elevator can be used as part of the accessible means of egress if it is approved for fire fighter service with a separate power supply and smoke protected shaft. (ADA 4.3.1 1.1(7)) (SBC 1004.3.2.2)(LSC 5-2.12.2.4). This could preclude operation by the disabled person and thus necessitate the Area of Refuge.
I. A wheelchair lift cannot be used as a component in an accessible means of egress (SBC 1004.3.4)
J. An Area of Refuge must have a way out to the public way that is not the same as the way in. (LSC 5-2.12.2.2)

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

(

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

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RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

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A. RUSSELL LARSON,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

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subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, mCKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

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COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

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COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

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COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE)

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

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Defendants.

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No. 3:98 CV 0731 . Judge Campbell
Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - HAWKINS COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this .;; 3 day of

(O?/Va. (y

, 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie Zappoli: Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Hawkins County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

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2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that tenn is defined in 42 U.S.C.

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§12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12132, and its

implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.

ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").

DEFINITIONS

4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of tenns used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. §12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.

a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.

b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
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c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party.

d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.

PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY

6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Hawkins County Courthouse or the Hawkins County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

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7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Hawkins County Courthouse or the Hawkins County Judicial Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.

8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.

9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.

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OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED By THE DEFENDANT COUNTY

10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.

13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action
that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in
Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in (

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Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its

obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the

"Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the

''Notice'') to the other party (the "Responding Party"). TIle Responding Party shall be given

thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding

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Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the

issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No

action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee

relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

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modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support

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their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by

Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the

requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification

of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions

of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.

21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Hawkins County.

22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Hawkins County.

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23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County

represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon

herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees

that its terms are fair and reasonable.

24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.

25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.

26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

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27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the

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effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.

28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception ofthe amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned

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action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lan Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, an . Russe Larson:

William . Brown, Esq. William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
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Martha M. Lafferty (BPR# 19817)

Gary D. Housepian (BPR # 6969)

Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21 st Ave South, Suite 100

Nashville, TN 37212

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(615) 298-1080

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARlAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800
Date:

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Date: -1-/__'_"l,.,_~_-_O_ _~ ___
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For Defendant County:
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Hawkins County, Tennessee
By: G~X:;:
Name: __=CR=O~C=K=ET=T~L=E=E_____________ Title: COUNTY MAYOR Date: JANUARY 24, 2005
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George Lane, Plaintiff
Date: \,- \ -0<"
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Date: ~J )-'DS
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HAWKINS COUNTY
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Plaintiff:
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HAWKINS COUNTY (
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Plaintiff:
Date
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Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff

Date:

dL-S/~uO--C

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A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff

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AGREED SETTLEMENT

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HAWKINS COUNTY

1. Parking

B.

One of the two existing accessible parking spaces is non-compliant. It has a cross slope

of 2.SS%. This exceeds the maximum allowable slope of 1" rise in SO" of run, or 2%

maximum in all directions. {4.6.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C.

The auto and van accessible spaces have been provided and designated with the

required signage, but they are mounted at non-compliant heights that can be obstructed

by a parked vehicle. {4.6.S}

Agreed Solution: Reinstall signage to meet requirements of {4.6.4}.

D.

The van accessible access aisle route along the front of the spaces is 71". There are no

wheel stops to ensure a 36" clear space between the brick wall and the bumper of the

vehicle. {4.6.3}

Agreed Solution: Provide wheel stops to maintain required 36" clear space in accordance with {4.6.3}.
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2. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door

A.

The accessible route frgf!l Jhe. p'ark[ng area to the connector rear entrance of the building

is non-compliant. It has an approximately 66 foot long sidewalk sloping up 1.42 feet in

elevation along the path with non-compliant running slopes varying up to 5.58%. {4.3.7 &

4.8.S} It has non-compliant cross slopes up to a non-compliant 2.8% slope. {4.3.7}The

maximum running slope on a sidewalk without handrails is 5% and the maximum cross

slope is 2%. The maximum ramp slope shall be 1" rise in 20" run or 5%. The non-

compliant sloping sidewalk includes an 'L' shaped ramp with low brick seating/wall edge

protection.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

3. Connector Rear Entrance Door

E.

A non-compliant loose mat encumbers the interior accessible door space. {4.S.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

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4. Accessible Path of Travel to the Unisex Public Toilet on the First Floor Connector
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A.

The acce.ssible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance oloor. {4.5.3}
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Agreed !Solution: No action required.

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6. First Floor Unis,ex Public Toilet Room in the Connector

C.

The signafle is mounted at the non-compliant location on the door instead of on the wall

{4.30.6} and is mounted at the non-compliant height of 62" above the floor {4.30.6}. The

3-~" height of the figure is compliant. The %" letter is compliant and it does have Braille.
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D.

The door ;s equipped with a compliant lever handle and a closer with a non-compliant

opening f(~rce of 6-112 pounds (4.13.11(2)(b)} and a compliant closing period of 3.47

seconds. {4.13.11)

E.

The toilet ~oes not have the required 60" clear interior floor space and therefore is non-

compliant. {4.2.3}

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F.

The sink has the compliant piping protection but the piping encroaches on the required

clear arel below by approximately %" and the sink bowl bottom encroaches by

approximdtely'%". Therefore, the sink is non-compliant. {4.19.2} & {Page 44, Fig.31}

I.

The mirroff is located at a non-compliant height of 40-W' from the floor to the bottom edge

of the refld,ctive surface. {4.19.6}

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M.

The flush: valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toHet {4. 16. 5} and has a

compliant flush valve pressure of 4 Ibs.

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P.

The non-c'ompliant rear wall grab bar is 24" long {4. 16. 4}. It is located a compliant height

of 33-112"!above the floor and a compliant 5_%" from the back wall.

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Q.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 19" above the floor. The

front edge' is located at the non-compliant position of 38 ~" from the rear wall. (Page 43,

Figure 30)

Agreed 'Solution: Convert adjacent private toilet into accessible toilet Onl first floor.

6. Accessible Path of Travel to the Private Toilet Room on the First Floor Connector

A.

The acce:ssible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance c,jJoor. {4.5.3}

Agreed :Solution: No action required.

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7. First Floor Private Toilet Room in the Connector
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D.

The signage is non-compliantly located on the door instead of the wall. {4.30.6} The

signage is mounted at the non-compliant height of 62" above the floor. {4.30.6}. The 3-~"

height of the figure is compliant. The %" letter is compliant and it does have Braille.

E.

The door is equipped with a compliant lever handle and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 7 Ibs. {4. 13. 11(2)(b)}. This door has a compliant cloSing period of 3.85

seconds. There is a non-compliant slide bolt lock on the door that requires pinching and

grasping. {4.13.9}

G.

The sink has the compliant piping protection but it encroaches on the required clear area

approximately 1/2". The sink bowl bottom also encroaches the clear area by

approximately 1/8" {4.19.2}, {Page 44, Figure 31}. Therefore, the sink is non-compliant.

H.

The sink is located at the non-compliant height of 34-1/8" {4.19.2} and has a compliant

single handle faucet.

I.

The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 40-~" above the floor to the bottom

edge of the reflective surface. {4.19.6}

L.

The toilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 18-W' from the side wall. {Page

42, Figure 28}

O.

There are no compliant grab bars. {4.17.6}

P.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 18-Yz" {Page 42,

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Figure 28} The front edge is located at the non-compliant position of 38-Yz" from the rear wail. {Page 43, Fig. 30 (d)}

Agreed Solution: Adapt this toilet to be the accessible Unisex toilet on first floor. Provide new unisex accessible signage {4.30}, except signage may remain on door; adjust closer to 6 Ibs. or provide new closer to meet reqUirements of {4.13.11.1(b}}; remove slide bolt lock on door; and add compliant grab bars in accordance with {4.16.4}.

8. Accessible Path of Travel to the Public Toilet Room on the Second Floor of the Connector

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.S.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

9. Second Floor Public Toilet Room in the Connector

c.

The signage is at a non-compliant location because it is located on the door instead of

the wall {4.30.6}. [t is also mounted at the non-compliant height of 62" above the floor

{4. 30. 6}. The 3 W' height of the figure is compliant. The %" letters are compliant and it

does have Braille.

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D.

The door is equipped with a compliant lever handle and a closer with a non-compliant

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opening force of 7 Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a compliant closing period of 4.25

seconds.

E.

The toilet room does not have the required 60" clear floor space. {4. 2.3}

F.

The sink has the compliant piping protection but is non-compliant since it encroaches on

the required clear area approximately 1". The sink also is non-compliant since it

encroaches on the clear area by approximately 112". {Page 44, Figure 31}, {4.19.2}

I.

The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 41-W' above the floor to the bottom

edge of the reflective surface. {4.19.6}

L.

The toilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 17" from the side wall. {Page 42,

Figure 28}

M.

The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet {4. 16. 5} and has a

compliant flush valve pressure of 3 Ibs.

o.

The sidewall grab bar is a compliant 42" long. It is located at the non-compliant height of

32-112" above the floor (Page 42, Figure 29(b)} and a compliant 11-112"from the back

wall.

P.

The non-compliant rear wall grab bar is 24" long {4.16.4}. It is located at the non-

compliant height of 32-112" above the floor (Page 42, Figure 29(b)} and a compliant 5

~"from the back wall.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 18" above the floor.

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(Page 42, Figure 29(b)} The front edge is located a non-compliant 38" from the rear wall.

(Page 43, Figure 30(d)}

Agreed Solution: Change signage on the door to indicate non-accessible. Convert adjacent private toilet into accessible toilet on second floor.

11. Accessible Path of Travel to the Private Toilet Room on the Second Floor of the
Connector

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

12. Second Floor Private Toilet Room in the Connector

D.

The signage is located non-compliantly on the door instead of the wall {4.30.6} and is

mounted at a non-compliant height of 62" above the floor {4.30.6}. The 3-Yz" height of the

figure is compliant. The 'X" letter is compliant and it does have Braille.

E.

The door is equipped with a compliant lever handle and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 7 lbs. {Page 4.13.11 (2)(b)} The door has a compliant closing period of

4.41 seconds. There is a non-compliant slide bolt lock on the door that requires pinching

and grasping. {4.13.9}

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G.

The sink has the compliant piping insulation but is non-compliant because it encroaches

approximately 112" on the required clear area. The bottom of the sink bowl also

encroaches approximately 1/8" {4.19.2}, {Page 44, Figure 31}.

I.

The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 40-Yz" above the floor to the bottom

edge of the reflective surface. {4. 19. 6}

O.

There are no grab bars. {4.17.6}

P.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at a non-compliant height of 18" (Page 42, Figure

29(b)}. The dispenser's front edge is located a non-compliant 38-3/8" from the rear wall.

{Fig 43, Figure (30)(d)}

Agreed Solution: Adapt this toilet to be accessible unisex on sec:ond floor. Provide new unisex accessible signage {4.30}, except sigllage may remain on the door; adjust closer to 6 Ibs.; remove slide bolt lock on door; and add compliant grab bars in accordance with {4.16.4}.

13. Accessible Path of Travel from Entrance Door to the First Floor Old Courthouse Chancery Courtroom Door

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. (4.5.3)

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Agreed Solution: No action required.

14. First Floor Old Courthouse Chancery Courtroom Door

A.

The entrance door is a double door with compliant 36" wide door leafs. The d,oor is

equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob {4. 13. 9} and no closer.

B.

The exterior and inferior space of the courtroom door is compliant, but encumbered by

non-compliant wrinkles {4.5.3} in the carpet flooring adjacent to the threshold.' The

interior loose laid carpet rolls up / wrinkles under the light weight of our cart. This

condition will also encumber a wheelchair {4.5.3}. There are also loose carpet seams that

are tripping hazards too. {4.5.1}, {4.5.3}

C.

The threshold is too high and therefore non-compliant. {4.13.8}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

15. First Floor Old Courthouse Chancery Courtroom

A.

The courtroom is approximately 680 square feet and will seat approximately (40) P?eople

in the fixed seating area and an additional (13) in the moveable chairs in front. In places

of assembly with fixed seating of this size, a minimum of (2) wheelchair locations are

required by ADA. There are no handicap locations provided. (4.1.3,(19)(a)}

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Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the

old courthouse.

16. Accessible Path of Travel to the Witness Stand in First Floor Old Courthouse Chancery Courtroom

B.

The box entrance access width is a compliant 44~" at the non-compliant step. {4.S.2}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

17. First Floor Witness Stand in the Old Courthouse Chancery Courtroom

A.

The witness stand is non-compliant due to the 9-~" step to the raised platform. {4.S.2}

B.

The witness stand is non-compliant due to the inadequate space of 69" x 41 ~" to

maneuver a wheelchair within. (4.2.3)

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

18. Accessible Path of Travel to the First Floor Drinking Fountain in the Old

Courthouse

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A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.S.3}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

19. First Floor Drinking Fountain in the Old Courthouse

D.

The front edge clearance is non-compliant at 25-~" (4.15.S(1)}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse. 20. Accessible Path of Travel to the Chancery Clerk & Master Door in the First Floor of the Old Courthouse

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.S.3}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

21. First Floor Chancery Clerk & Master Door in the Old Courthouse

c.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. {4. 13. 9}

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Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the

old courthouse.

22. Accessible Path of Travel to the Second Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office in the Old Courthouse

A.

The path of travel to the Second Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office is accomplished by a

non-compliant stair. {4.5.2}, {4.14}

B.

The non-compliant path of travel to the Second Floor is accomplished by going thru the

connector entrance, up the new elevator, through a non-compliant 36" door that is

equipped with non-compliant cylindrical hardware {4. 13. 9} and no cfoser, thru the two

non-compliant 30" circuit courtroom doors {4.13.5}·and finally through the courtroom

where there is a two step level change at the judicial platform. {4.5.2}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

23. Circuit Court Clerk Door on Second Floor of Old Courthouse

B.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob {4.13. 9} and a closer with a

compliant opening force' of 4 Ibs. The door has a compliant closing period of 4.25

seconds. There is a non-compliant chain bolt on the door above the knob. {4.13.9}

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C.

The non-compliant threshold has a 23.9% slope in 12" to make the 2 !4" level change

transition from the courtroom to the office. {4.8.2}

F.

The 36" entrance door from the corridor/stair lobby is equipped with a non-compliant

cylindrical knob {4.13.9} and a closer with a non-compliant opening force of 7-112 Ibs.

(4.13.11(2)(b)}. The door has a non-compliant clOSing period of 2.5 seconds. {4.13.10}

G.

The interior floor space of the door is non-compliant due to the filing cabinets that only

allow a cfear door opening of 28-%". {4.13.5}

H.

The exterior floor space of the door is non-compliant due to the 6" push side clearance.

(Page 38, Figure 25(a)}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

24. Accessible Path of Travel to the Second Floor Circuit Court in the Old Courthouse

A.

The non-compliant path of travel to the Second Floor is accomplished by entering thru

the connector entrance, up the new elevator, thru a 36" door that is equipped with non-

compliant cylindrical hardware {4.13. 9} and no closer, and thru the (2) non-compliant 30"

doors {4. 13.5} of the circuit courtroom.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

259019

7

25. Circuit Court Courtroom Door on the Second Floor of the Old Courthouse

A.

The entrance door is a double door with (2) non-compliant 30"door leafs. {4.13.4}

B.

The left door is equipped with a push/pull mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

closing force of 10 Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a non-compliant closing period of

2.19 seconds. {4. 13. 10}

C.

The right door is equipped with a push/pull mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

closing force of 8-1/2Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a compliant closing period of 3.22

seconds.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

26. Second Floor Circuit Court Courtroom in Old Courthouse

A.

The courtroom is more than 2,100 square feet in size and will seat approximately (200)

people in the fixed wooden seating area and an additional (32) in the moveable chairs in

front of the bar rail. In places of assembly with fixed seating of this size, a minimum of (4)

handicap locations are required. There are no handicap locations provided. {4.1.3 (19)

(a)}

B.

The center aisle is a compliant width of 63". The front aisle width is 36" and reduces to

26" at the 10" step which makes the aisle non-compliant {4.3.3}. The side aisle is non-

(

compliant at 20" wide {4.3.3}. The rear aisle is non-compliant at 32 Yz" wide. {4.3.3}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

27. Accessible Path of Travel to the Witness Stand in the Second Floor Circuit Court Courtroom of the Old Courthouse

A.

The passageway thru the bar rail opening is a compliant 59" but the total passage is non-

compliant due to 7-1/2" and 6" high steps which occur within the passage. {4.5.2}

B.

The loose laid carpet between the bar and the judge rolls up / wrinkles under the light

weight of our cart and will encumber a wheelchair as well {4.S.3}. There are loose cords

under the carpet that are a tripping hazard. {4.S.3}

C.

The witness box entrance access width is a non-compliant 31" at the (2) steps. {4.3.3}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

28. Second Floor Witness Stand in the Circuit Court Courtroom of the Old Courthouse

A.

The witness stand is non-compliant due to (2) 6" steps to the raised level {4.S.2} and a

non-comp/iantopening of31". {4.3.3}

259019

8

(

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the

old courthouse.

29. Accessible Path of Travel to the JUry Box in the Second Floor Courtroom of the Old Courthouse

A.

The passageway thru the bar rail opening is a compliant 59". The passageway is non-

compliant due to 7-112" and 6" high non-compliant steps. {4.5.2}

B.

The loose laid carpet between the bar and the judge rolls up 1 wrinkles under the light

weight of our cart and will encumber a wheelchair as well {4.5.3}. There are loose carpet

seams {4.5.3} that are tripping hazards.

C.

The narrowing passageway begins at a non-compliant width of 33" between the wall and

the box. {4.3.3}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

30. Second Floor JUry Box in the Courtroom of the Old Courthouse

A.

The Jury Box is non-compliant and inadequate to maneuver a wheelchair within. {4.2.3}

B.

The opening into the box is a non-compliant 30 74" width {4.3.3}. At the non-compliant 7

(

:%" step into the first level {4.5.2}, the opening reduces to 23 :%" with 12 :%" clear in front of the fixed seats. At the non-compliant 7" step into the second level, the opening

reduces to a non-compliant 23 :%" {4.3. 3} with 12 :%" clear in front of the fixed seats.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

31. The Path of Travel to the JUry Room Door from the Second Floor Courtroom of the Old Courthouse

A.

The passageway opening at the rear of the jury box is a non-compliant 23" wide. {4.3.3)

B.

The jurors' exit door from the courtroom is a compliant 36" door. The door is equipped

with non-compliant cylindrical hardware {4.13.9} and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 12 Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a non-compliant closing period of

2.28 seconds. {4.13.10} The interior door floor space is non-compliant due to the

threshold that has a 24.5% slope in 9" of width to make the 2" transition from the

courtroom to the Jury Room alcove. {4.13.8},{4.8.1}

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

32. Second Floor Old Courthouse JUry Room Number One

A.

The entrance door is a compliant 36" door with compliant floor space on the outside and

(

a compliant push side clearance of 18 U". There is a non-compliant interior clear floor

259019

9

space of 24" due to a chair back extension since the arm chair can not slide under the

(

table (4.3.3}{Page 25, Figure 25(a)} The is no additional room to spare since the

remaining room is only 46" from the conference table that is pushed against the wall on

the far side of the room.

c.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob {4.13.9} and no closer.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

33. Second Floor Old Courthouse Jury Room Number Two

C.

The floor space on the outside is non-compliant due to a drinking fountain that

creates a 14-;12" push side ciearance (Page 3.8, Figure 25(c)}.

D.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob {4.13.9} and has no

closer. The door glass is at a compliant height of 37 :;4" above the floor.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

34. Second Floor Old Courthouse Men's Toilet in the Jury Area

A.

The entrance door is a compliant 36" door with push/pull hardware and a closer with a

compliant closing force of 3-7f pounds and a non-compliant clOSing period of 2.3

(

seconds. {4. 13. 10}

B.

The non-compliant signage on the door is below the glass panel {4.30.1}. The glass is at

the compliant height of 37 :;4" above the floor.

C.

The exterior push side floor clearance area is compliant. The interior floor area is non-

compliant due to the 64" waif to wall width and the interior pull side clearance of 13 ;12".

{Page 38, Figure 25}

D.

The non-compliant marble threshold is 3/8" high on the interior and :;4" high on the

exterior alcove side. {4. 13. 8}

E.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant slide bolt lock that requires pinching and

grasping {4.13.9}. This slide bolt is located a non-compliant 52-X" above the floor.

{4.13.9}

F.

The toilet does not have a compliant clear floor space of 60". {4.2.3}

G.

The sink is located at the non-compliant height of 32" {4.19.2}. It has a non-compliant

double handled faucet that requires pinching and grasping {4. 19. 5}. The bottom of the

non-compliant sink is 27-5/8" above the floor {4.19.2}. The sink does not have the

required compliant piping insulation. {4.19.4}

H.

The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 54" to the bottom edge of the reflective

surface. {4. 19.6 }

I.

The paper towel dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 58" above the floor

{4.27.3}.

259019

10

J.

The hand dryer is located at the non-compliant height of 54" above the floor. {4.27:3}

(

L.

The urinal alcove is a compliant 34-;4" wide. The rim is mounted at the non-compliant

height of 21" above the floor{4.18.2). The elongated bowl length is a non-compliant 20-

W' {4.18.2}. The flush valve height is a compliant 37-1/2" above the floor.

M.

The non-compliant path of travel to the toilet is 23-1/8" wide. {4.3.3}

N.

The toi/et stall did not have a door.

O.

The stall was a non-compliant size of 32-3/8" x 64". (Page 43, Figure 30(b)}

P.

The toilet is located a non-compliant dimension of 15" from the side wall. (Page 43,

Figure 30(b)}

Q.

The toilet seat is located at the non-compliant height of 16". {4.16.3}

R.

There were no grab bars. {4. 17. 6}

S.

There was no toilet paper dispenser.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

35. Second Floor Old Courthouse Drinking Fountain in the JUry Area

B.

The control location is non-compliant and located on the spout {4. 15.4} and the controls

(

are non-compliant requiring pinching, grasping, and twisting {4. 15.4} & {4.27.4}.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

36. Second Floor Old Courthouse Women's Toilet in the JUry Area

A.

The entrance door is a door leaf being 36" with a non-compliant 5-;4" pull side clearance.

(Page 38, Figure 25(a)}

B.

The signage on the door is non-compliant and the wall signage ;s non-compliant,

mounted on the top right side. {4.30.1}

c.

The non-compliant marble threshold is 3/8" high on the interior and 1-1/8" high on the

exterior side. (4. 13. 8)

D.

The interior floor space of the door is non-compliant. {Page 38, Fig. 25}

E.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and without a closer. {4.13.9}

F.

The door is equipped with a non-compliant slide bolt lock that requires pinching and

grasping at 52 W' above the floor. {4.13.9}

G.

The toilet does not have a compliant floor space of 60" clear {4.2.3}. The non-compliant

interior room total area is 63" wide x 64" deep.

259019

11

H.

The sink is located at the compliant height of 30-%" {4.19.2} and has non-compliant

double handled faucet that requires pinching and grasping {4.19.5}. The bottom of the

non-compliant sink has a non-compliant clearance of 26-~" above the floor. The sink

does not have the required compliant piping protection. {4.19.4}

I.

The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 54" to the bottom edge of the reflective

surface above the floor. {4.19.6}

L.

The toilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 13-1/2" from the side wall. {Page

42, Figure 28}

M.

The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet. {4.16.5}

N.

The toilet seat is located at the non-compliant height of 16". {4. 16. 3}

O.

There were no grab bars. {4.16.4}

P.

There was no toilet paper dispenser.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

37. Accessible Path of Travel to the Men's Toilet Room in the Annex on the First Floor

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

(

entrance door. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

38. Annex First Floor Men's Toilet Room

A.

The entrance door is a compliant 36" single door with a compliant 12-3/4" push side

clearance. The non-compliant pull side clearance is 12-%". {Page 38, Fig 25} The

compliant interior floor area is 56 ;4" wide.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

B.

The door signage is compliant in design with a 4" high compliant figure, %" high

compliant lettering and Braille but is non-compliant due to its mounting location {4.30.6}

and mounting height of 62" above the floor {4.30.6}.

Agreed Solution: No action required

C.

The door is equipped with a push/pufl mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 9lbs. {4. 13.11(2)(b)} and a compliant closing period of 3.9 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer to 6 Ibs.

E.

The sink has a non-compliant drain piping protection panel located 8" above the floor

{4.19.2}. The sink has less than 8" minimum knee clearance near the top of the

259019

12

protection panel {4. 19.2}. The protection panel encroaches 5" into the required clearance

(

below the skirt. {4.19.2}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

J.

The compliant urinal alcove is 34". The sidewall center line dimensions are compliant at

16" and 18". The urinals are mounted at the non-compliant height of 17-%" above the

floor {4.19.2} and have a compliant elongated bowl length of 7". The flush valve is a

compliant height of 34-Yz" and has a compliant flush valve pressure of 4 Ibs. {4. 18. 2}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

L.

The accessible stall latch is compliant. The coat hooks are located at non-compliant

heights of 63-Yz" and 66-Yz" above the floor {4.2. 5}. {4.2.6}. The accessible stall door

clearance is a compliant 34-5/8".

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper height.

N.

The toilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 17-3/4" from the side wall. (Page

43, Figure 30(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

Q.

The sidewall grab bar is compliant at 42" long. It is located at the non-compliant height of

(

32-3/4" above the floor (Page 43, Figure 30(c)} and a compliant 11-1/2" from the back wall. {4. 17. 6}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

R.

The rear wall grab bar is a compliant 36" long. It is located at the non-compliant height of

32-3/4" above the floor {Page 43, Figure 30(d)}and a compliant 5 Yz" from the back wall.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

S.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 18 Yz" (Page 43,

Figure 30(d)} with the front edge located a non-compliant 38 Yz" from the rear wall. (Page

43, Figure 30(d)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

39. Accessible Path of Travel to the Women's Toilet in the Annex on the First Floor

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

40. Annex First Floor Women's Toilet Room

259019

13

A.

The entrance door is a compliant 36" single door with a non-compliant 12-1/2" push side

(

clearance (Page 38, Figure 26(c)}. The pull side clearance is a non-compliant 12 :%"

(Page 38, Figure 2S(a)}.

Agreed Solution: No actjon required.

B.

The door signage is compliant in design with a 4" high compliant figure, %" high

compliant lettering and Braille but is non-compliant due to its door location {4.30.6} and

mounting height of 62" above the floor {4.30. 6}.

Agreed Solution: No act:ion required.

,

C.

The door is equipped with a push/pull mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 8-112 Ibs. {4.13. 11 (2)(b)} and a· compliant cloSing period of 3.82

seconds. {4.13.11}

,

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer to 6 Ibs.

E.

The sink has a non-compliant drain piping protection panel located 8" above the floor

{4.19.4}{Page 44, Figure 31}. There is less than 8" minimum knee clearance near the top

of the protection panel. {4.19.2j{Page 44, Figure 31}

Agreed Solution: No act;ion required.

F.

The sink is located at the non-compliant height of 34-;4" {4.19.2} and has a compliant

(

single handle faucet. The sink bowls are at a compliant location of 15" and 16 %" from the

counter ends.

'

Agreed Solution: No ac~ion required.

L.

The accessible stall latch is compliant. The coat hooks are located at non-compliant

heights of 63" and 66" above the floor. (Page 18, Figure 5(a)}{Page 19, Figure 6(b)}
I

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper

height.

'

Q.

The sidewall grab bar is a comJ?liant 42" long and is located a non-compliant height of 32-

1/2" above the floor (Page 43, Figure 30(c)}. The grab bar is located a compliant 11-1/2"

from the back wall.

Agreed Solution: No action required.
I

R.

The rear wall grab bar is a compliant length of 36". It is located a non-compliant height of

32-112" above the floor (Page 43, Figure 30(d)} and a compliant 5-Yz" from the side wall. I

Agreed Solution: No action required.
I

s.

The toifet paper dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 18-%" (Page 43,

Figure 30(d)} with the front edge located a non-compliant 38" from the rear wall. (Page

43, Figure 30(d)}

r

259019

14

Agreed Solution: No action required.

41. Accessible Path of Travel to the Drinking Fountain in the First Floor of the Annex

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

42. First Floor Drinking Fountain in the Annex

A.

The drinking fountain floor space is non.:compliant due to the 28-3/4" wide by 18" deep

alcove (Page 31. Figure 37(b)}.

B.

The bottom clearance is a compliant 27". The underneath clearance is a compliant 10".

C.

The height to the spout is a non-compliant 36-X" {4. 15. 2}

D.

The control locations are compliant on the front and side.

E.

The water stream height is a non-compliant 3-~". (4.15.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

43. Accessible Path of Travel to the Men's Toilet Room in the Second Floor of the

(

Annex

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

44. Second Floor Men's Toilet Room in the Annex

B.

The door signage is compliant in design with a 4" high compliant figure. %" high

compliant lettering and Braille but is non-compliant due to its door location {4.30.6} and

mounting height of 62" above the floor {4.30.6}.

Agreed Solution: Relocate existing signage to meet requirements of {4.30.6}.

C.

The door is equipped with a push/pulf mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 10 Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a compliant cloSing period of 4.07

seconds.

Agreed solution: Adjust closer to 6 Ibs.

E.

The sink has a non-compliant drain piping protection panel located 8" above the floor

{4.19.4). The protection panel has less than 8" minimum non-compliant knee clearance

near the top of the panel. {4. 19. 2}

259019

15

Agreed Solution: No action required.

(

K.

The urinal is located at the non-compliant height of 18-W' {4.18.2}. The flush valve is

located a compliant height of 34" and has a compliant flush valve pressure of 4 Ibs.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

M.

The accessible stall latch is compliant. The coat hooks are mounted at non-compliant

heights of 63" and 66" above the floor. {Page 18, Figure 5(a)} {Page 19, Figure 6(b)}

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper height.

O.

The toilet is located a non-compliant 19" from the side wall. (Page 43, Figure 30(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

T.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 20" with the front edge

located a non-compliant 38 Yz" from the rear wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(d)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

·45. Accessible Path of Travel to the Second Floor Drinking Fountain in the Annex

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

(

entrance door. {4.S.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

46. Second Floor Drinking Fountain in the Annex

C.

The height to the bottom of the unit is a non-compliant 25 W'. {4. 15.5(1)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F.

The non-compliant water stream height is 3-112". {4. 15. 3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

47. Accessible Path of Travel to the Women's Toilet Room in the Second Floor of the Annex

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

(

2:59019

16

48. Second Floor Women's Toilet Room in the Annex

(

c.

The door signage is compliant in design with a 4" high compliant figure, :;4" high

compliant lettering and Braille but is non-compliant due to its door location {4.30.6} and

mounting height of 62" above the floor {4.30. 6}.

I
Agreed Solution: Relocate existing signage to meet require:ments of
{4.30.6}.

E.

The door is equipped with a push/pull mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

opening force of 10 Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a compliant closing period of 4.53

seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer to 6lbs. .

G.

The sink has a non-compliant drain piping protection panel located 8" abo~'e the floor.

{4.19.4} {Page 44, Figure 31} The protection panel has less than 8" minimum knee

clearance near the top of the panel. {4.19.2} {Page 44, Figure 31}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

[

M.

The accessible stall latch is compliant and is 40-;4" above the floor. The coa:t hooks are

mounted at non-compliant heights of 63" and 66" above the floor. (Page 18, Figure 5(a)},

(Page 19, Figure 6(b)}

(

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper

height.

o.

The toi/et is located a non-compliant dimension of 17-1/2" from the stall side wall. (Page

43, Figure 30(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

R.

The sidewall grab bar is a compliant 42" long. It is located a non-compliant height of 32-

112" above the floor (Page 43, Figure 30(c)} and a compliant 11-112" from the back wall.
,

Agreed Solution: No action required.

S.

The rear wall grab bar is a compliant 36" long, located at the non-compliant height of 32-

112" (Page 43, Figure 30(d)} and is located at the compliant dimension from the back wall

d~W

I

Agreed Solution: No action required.

T.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 18-~t (Page 43,

Figure 30(d)} and the front edge is located at the non-compliant position of 88" from the

rear wall. (Page 43, Figure 30(d)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

259019

17

49. Accessible Path of Travel to the Second Floor Courtroom Door in the Annex

(

A.

The accessible path is encumbered by a non-compliant loose mat at the building

entrance door. {4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

50. Second Floor Courtroom Door in the Annex

B.

The right door is equipped with a push/pull mechanism and a closer with a non-compliant

closing force of 6 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b)} The door has a compliant closing period of 5.15

seconds.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

54. Elevator in the Connector

A.

There is a non-compliant loose mat at the C1 and A21evel of discharge. {4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

B.

The C2 level of discharge in the connector does not have the required 60" clear floor

area. It is encumbered on one comer by the curb and guard railing, allowing only 43"

clear floor area. (4.2. 3)

(

Agreed Solution: No action required.

C.

The following components were checked and found to be non-compliant:

1.

Clearance between car platform and landing at 1 ;4" max. (A2 @ 1-5/16")

{4.10.2},

Agreed Solution: No action required.

2.

Height of centerline of hall call button required at 42" (e1 @ 43-1/8", A1 @ 41 %",

C2 @ 41 ~", A2 @ 42 ~'J {4.10.3},

Agreed Solution: No action required.

3.

Centerline ofjamb raised character at 60" above the floor (C1 @ 60" & 59 %", C2

@ 60 ;4" & 60 ;4", A2 @ 60 & 60 WJ {Page 33, Figure 20},

Agreed Solution: No action required.

4.

Car control buttons are not lighted (4. 10. 12(2)},

Proposed Solution: No action required.

5.

Center line of emergency controls at 35" minimum above the floor (29" with the

emergency push alarm at 34 W' above the floor) (Page 35, Figure 23(b)}.

259019

18

(

Proposed Solution: No action required.

56. Directional Signage

A.

Non-compliant exterior directional signage. (4.1.2,(7),(c)} If all entrances are not

accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest

accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with {4.1.2(7)(c)}.

57. Area of Rescue Assistance

A.

The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue assistance for

all levels above grade. See attachment "e" for details.

Agreed Solution: This item will be resolved in the renovation of the old courthouse.

(

259019

19

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT O F TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVEFKLY JONES, ANN ) MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and A. RUSSELL LARSON,
1
Plaintiffs,

v.

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY,COCKECOUNTY,DECATUR 1

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

Defendants.

)

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS TO HICKMAN COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this E d a y of Ff'ebru~fY ,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and Defendant Hickrnan County (hereinafter "Defendant County'').

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.5 12131(2).
2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
fj1213l(1). Defendant County is subject to Title XI of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 5 12132, and
Page 1 of 14

its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectivelyto the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercisingjurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C.
12131 et seq, and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and
regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling,
renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY' as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse andlor other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial proggam is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Hickman County Courthouse or the Hickman County Justice Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory, damages, injuries to person and
Page 2 of 14

property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys' fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.
7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and fkom any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every hnd and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Hickrnan County Courthouse or the Hickman Justice Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not-limitedto, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. T?lisAgreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the h l l and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that ths Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONASSSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00), which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the mount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 1712004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A.
Page 3 of 14

All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effecthe Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibilityof the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at a14 times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMEANNTD MONITORING
15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordancewith the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Compla~ningParty"), then the ComplainingParty shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice">to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Respondiilg Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of t h s Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiff attorney, William J. Brown at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001, a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the
Page 4 of 14

obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs' attorney in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into t h s Agreement, Hickman County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Hickman County since none of these Plaintiffs have ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Hickman County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiff's standing to seek injunctive relief against Hickman Coimty since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Hickman County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement a ~ thdat he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement
Page 5 of 14

concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Br,~wn.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise <andSettlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of $2,680.00 which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17,2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set
out herein. Irr the event that the Compromise and SettlementAgreement is rejected by
the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.
IN W.TNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the abovecaptioned action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
Page 6 of 14

HICKMAN COUNTY Plaintiff:

Date
STATE OF COUNTY 0
Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, personally appeared George Lane, with whom I am personally acquainted, and who ac&owledged
d the foregoing instrument for the purposes herein contained.
hand and seal on this the

Si-a on Expires:

4 -

-

7% d~b- On ths the

day of

,2005, personally appeared before me the

above named known to me personali~or made known to me by satisfactoryproof, who

was duly sworn and an oath executed the above verification. -

,--'-,'

My commission expires:-

Page 8 of 14

HICKMAN COUNTY Plaintiff:

Date
STATEOF F19vj.Lf ~t
COUNTY OF kt. (A/ S
Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, personally appeared Ralph Ramsey, Sr., with whom I am personally acquainted, and who acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes herein contained.
9 k - 4
Witness my hand and seal on this t h A 3 &iy 0 f i k . b ~ ~200~5.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public

AMY L. ~ o ~ e s d o Wty CommissionDO262377
B*,, ,,a,,,

i

HICKMAN COUNTY

Plaintiff:

7 STATE OF
COUNTY OF >kk.(&"-

Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, personally appeared Ann Marie Zappola, with whom I am personally acquainted, and who acknowledged that she executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes *ein contained.

jd:
Witness my hand and seal on this the day of

2005.

Notary Public My Commission Expires:

DATE: - 2- /&-Hz"

/
Russell Larson Plaintiff

On this the l5 day of

personally appeared before me the

above named known to me

to me by satisfactoryproof, who

was duly sworn and an oath executed the above verification.

Notary Public

'?-a d My commission expires:

0-d

Page 11 of 14

~ e n n iCs&ell Plaintiff

On this the 15 day

2005, personally appeared before me the

P+%. above named known to me
was dl~ l syworn and an oathexecuted

the

above

to me verification.

by
-

satisfactor-yp- roof&,\$\,\,,whqt'JtIt##,,,
t&sA A. &,e+

4$*

'm.9 5

i,

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C 5 E

Notary Public

My commission expires: 7-20-4 Y

Page 12 of 14

DATE:

Attorneys for Plaintiff

2 DATE: /O ?-/a o f

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATE: qb/k-

Linda Dardarian Attorneys for Plaintiff

Page 13 of 14

Date: 1- 25-05-

z5 On this the

day

2005, personally appeared

before me the above named

or made known to me by

satisfactoryp~oofw, ho was duly sworn and an oath executedhe above

verification.

My commissisn expires

Notary Public

Page 14 of 14

i

APPENDIX A TO ADA COMPLIANCE

AGREEMENT

AS TO

JUDICIAL SERVICES

FOR

HICKMAN COUNTY COURTHOUSE

This document reflects the modifications that will be made to the Hickman County Justice Center per the agreement of the parties. It is the understanding of the parties that the corrections identified by this agreement shall be executed and completed as per the Settlement Agreement.
Page 1 of 26

1. JUSTICE CENTER DESIGNATED PARIUNG
A. There are (4) designated parking spaces (DP-1, DP-2, DP-3, and DP-4) around the front of the building adjacent to the main entrance and (1) space @P-5) on the East side of the building adjacent to a side entrance designated for employees only. The (4) spaces located at the main entrance are evenly split with (2) spaces located on each side of the main entrance to the building, each pair sharing a common access aisle. Both access aisles were non-compliant in width for van accessible parking {4.1.2(5)(b)) although one of the parhng spaces, DP-2, being 16'-8" wide, was wide enough to accommodate van parking. There is a compliant quantity of designated parking spaces. Out of a total of (92) marked parking spaces there were (5) spaces designated as handicap parking spaces.
Agreed Solution: Provide 4 compliant spaces.
B. There was handicap parking designationspainted on each of the (5) parking space surfaces, but no compliant post or building mounted parking signs were present at any of the spaces. I4.6.4)
Agreed Solution:Provide either post or building mounted parking signs.
C. The designated parking space DP-1 is compliant in size being 12'-5" wide by 19'- 10" long. This parking space has compliant cross slopes varying between 0.00% and 1.45% and compliant running slopes varying between 1.1% and 1.79%.
Agreed Solution: See 1A.
D. The designated parking space DP-2 is compliant in size being 16-8" wide by 19'10" long. T h s parking space has non-com~lianctross slopes varying between 0.59% and 2.1% (4.6.3) and non-compliant running slopes varying between 2.0% and 3.4%. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: See 1A.
E. The common access aisle between designated parking spaces DP-1 and DP-2 is compliant in size for a non van accessible space being 5'-0" wide. This access
aisle has compliant cross slopes varying between 0.00% and 1.60% and non-
compliant running slopes varying between 1.66% and 2.24%. (4.6.3)
Page 2 of 26

Agreed Solution: See 1A.
F. The designated parking space DP-3 is compliant in size being 11'4 wide by 20'0" long. This parlung space has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 3.09% and 4.04% (4.6.3) and non-compliant running slopes varying between 5.95% and 6.00%. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: See 1A.
G. The designated parking space DP-4 is compliant in size being 12'-2" wide by 20'0" long. This parking space has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 2.05% and 2.62% (4.6.3) and non-compliant running slopes varying between 5.95% and 6.00%. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: See 1A.
H. The common access aisle between designated parking spaces DP-3 and DP-4 is 7'-7" wide which is a non-compliant size for van accessibility. {Page26, Fig 9) This aisle has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 2.11% and 3.60% (4.6.3) and non-compliant running slopes varying between 4.57% and 5.60%. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: See 1A.
I. The designated parlung space DP-5 is compliant in size being 9'-0" wide by 20'0" long. This parking space has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 4.89% and 6.17% (4.6.3) and non-compliant running slopes varying between 2.85% and 3.20%. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: Remove designation of parking space as handicapped accessible.
J. The access aisle for designated parking space DP-5 is compliant in size being 5'0" wide. This aisle has non-com~lianct ross slopes varying between 4.0% and 5.O% (4.6.3) and non-com~limrtunning slopes varying between 2.36% and 2.71%. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: Remove designation of parking space as handicapped accessible.
2. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM THE DESIGNATED PARKING SPACES TO THE MAIN FRONT ENTRANCE
Page 3 of 26

A. The built-up curb ramp at parking spaces DP-1 and DP-2 is a compliant 3'-11" wide and has compliant cross slopes between 0.00% and 0.80% and compliant running slopes varying between 7.0% and 8.5%. This curb ramp however has non-compliant flared sides of 10.8% and 12.3%. (4.7.5) The built-up curb ramp is also non-compliant because it does not have the required detectable warnings. (4.7.7)
Agreed Solution: See 1A; however, no detectable warnings required.
B. The following items are for parking spaces DP- 1 and DP-2. C. The landing area at the top of the built-up curb ramp is compliant in size. D. The path of travel along the sidewalk from the built-up curb ramp landing to the
right hand entrance ingress doors that open into the building has a compliant slope of 0.30%. E. The built-up curb ramp at parking spaces DP-3 and DP-4 is a compliant 3'-11" wide and has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 3.04% and 4.09% (4.7.2) and non-compliant running slopes varying between 14.5% and 15.7%. (4.7.2) This ramp also has non-compliant flared sides of 10.2% and 24.3%. (4.7.5) The built-up curb ramp is non-compliant because it does not have the required detectable warnings. (4.7.7)
Agreed Solution: See 1A; however, no detectable warnings required.
F. The following items are for parking spaces DP-3 and DP-4. G. The landing area at the top of the built-up curb ramp is compliant in size. H. The path of travel along the sidewalk fiom the top of the built-up curb ramp
landing at parking spaces DP-3 and DP-4 to the left hand entrance doors has a non-compliant slope of 5.93% (4.3.7) and does not have the required handrails. (4.8.5)
Agreed Solution: See 1A.
I. The built-up curb ramp at parking space DP-5 is a compliant 4'-0" wide and has non-compliant cross slopes between 4.25% and 5.0% and non-com~lianrtunning slopes varying between 10.19% and 10.69%. This curb ramp has non-compliant
flared sides of 11.2% and 24.9%. (4.7.5) The built-up curb ramp is also non-
comuliant because it does not have the required detectable warnings. (4.7.7)
Agreed Solution: Remove designation of parking space as handicapped accessible.
Page 4 of 26

J. The following items are for parking space DP-5. K. The landing area at the top of the built-up curb ramp is compliant in size. L. The path of travel along the sidewalk from the top of the built-up curb ramp
landing to the entrance door has a compliant slope of 3.89%.
3. FRONT AND SIDE ENTRANCE
A. The Front Entrance into the building is by way of two sets of double leaf 36" aluminum doors with compliant clear openings of 34" at each leaf. The right hand most set of doors swing into the building and the left hand most set of doors swing out of the building.
B. The right hand leaf of the right hand most set of doors has a compliant closing period of 4.16 seconds and a smooth and compliant threshold. The left hand leaf on this set of doors was locked. These doors do however have a non-compliant loose mat just inside the building encumbering traffic (4.5.3) and a non-compliant ground area in fiont of the doors on the exterior of the building due to cross slopes varying up to 0.17% and running slopes varying up to 2.00%. (4.13.6)
C. The lee hand leaf of the left hand most set of doors (tested from the inside of the building - locked from the exterior) has a compliant closing period of 3.25 seconds and the right hand leaf of the same set of doors (tested from the inside of the building - locked from the exterior) has a compliant closing period of 3.34 seconds and a smooth and compliant threshold. These doors do however have a non-compliant loose mat just inside the building encumbering traffic (4.5.3) and a non-compliantground area in front of the doors on the exterior of the building due to cross slopes varying 0.17% and running slopes varying up to 2.60%. (4.13.6)
D. The Side Entrance into the building is by way of a double leaf 36" aluminum door with compliant clear openings of 34" at each leaf. The door has a smooth and compliant threshold. This door does however have a non-compliant loose mat just inside the building encumbering traffic (4.5.3) and a non-compliant ground area in front of the door on the exterior of the building due to cross slopes varying up to 0.17% and running slopes varying up to 2.40%. (4.13.6)
Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mats; otherwise no action required.
4. PATH OF TR4VELFROM THE MAZN ENTRANCE TO THE COURTROOMS
A. The path of travel from the main building entrance to Courtrooms "A", "B", and "C", Court Clerk's Office, Witness Rooms, public telephone and toilets, and Clerk and Master's Office is accomplished by traveling through the main entrance lobby, which is clear and unencumbered, then through a set of compliant double 36" wide doors into a clear and unencumberedmain corridor whch leads to the judicial spaces.
Page 5 of 26

Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
5. COURTROOM "A" ENTRRNCE
A. Courtroom "A" is accessed off the main corridor through a pair of compliant, fire rated 36" doors which open out into the corridor. The right hand leaf, viewed fkom the corridor side, has a compliant closing period of 5.87 seconds. The left hand leaf has a compliant closing period also. There is not a pushlpull force requirement for these doors since they are fire rated. These doors have compliant lever handle hardware, and a closer.
B. The threshold at these doors is smooth and compliant. C. This door had compliant signage mounted at the compliant location adjacent to
the entrance door to Courtroom "A" and mounted a compliant 60" above the floor. It has compliant 518' high letters and Braille.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
6. COURTROOM "A"
A. Courtroom "A" will seat approximately(103) people in the wooden pew area and an additional (14) in the movable chairs in the judicial area for a total of approximately (117). The ADA requires (4) compliant wheelchair locations to be provided. The assembly room size is 34'-4" by 53'-1" or approximately 1,823 square feet.
B. There are (2) areas within the courtroom visitors seating area where a total of (2) wheelchairs can be parked, one in each area, both being compliant in access and size. One area is at the rear of the courtroom on the right just as one enters the courtroom. This area measures a compliant 54" wide by 84" long and the second location is at the fi-ont of the courtroom and is a compliant 36" wide by 48" long. This courtroom is non-com~liantin providing only (2) of the (4) required wheelchair locations. {4.1.3(19)(a))
Agreed Solution: County has two 30 inch wide removable sections of bench in courtroom which will be utilized when needed to provide 2 additional wheelchair locations.
7. PATH OF TRAVEL TO COURTROOM "A" WICTNESSSTRND RND JURY BOX
A. The Jury Box and Witness Stand are both located at the front of the Courtroom in the judicial area and are accessed by traversing down the main center aisle which is a compliant 5'-3" wide, which leads to the bar rail. At this point one must pass through a gate in the bar rail which measures a compliant 33" clear and has a compliant (1) lb pusWpull pressure and leads into a clear and compliant area which leads directly to the Jury Box and Witness Stand.
Page 6 of 26

Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
8. COURTROOM "A" WTNESS STRND
A. Entrance into the Witness Stand is through a compliant clear opening width of 41114".
B. There is (1) 6" non-compliant step up into the Witness Stand. (4.5.2) At the toe of this riser is a covered cable that could be considered a tripping hazard.
C. The Witness Stand is compliant in size being 68" by 70". D. The counter height is a compliant 29" high with a compliant clearance underneath
the apron of 27-112" to the floot.
Agreed Solution: County agrees to comply with state ADA Protocol as to witness stands.
9. COURTROOM "A" JURY BOX
A. The Jury Box is accessed through a compliant gate which measures 33" clear. B. The Jury Box leads to a clear and unencumbered space measuring a compliant
89" by 111" with ample room for wheelchair maneuvering. There is a movable table and chairs in this area that could be relocated, allowing a person in a wheelchair to be located immediately adjacent to the jurors who are seated on a raised platform.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
10.PATH OF TRAVEL FROM COURTROOM "A"JURY BOX TO JURY ROOM
A. The path of travel fkom the Jury Box is through a 36" wide compliant door directly out of the Jury Box that leads into a compliant unencumbered private access corridor, which leads directly to the Jury Room.
B. The Jury Box door is a compliant 36" wide with compliant lever hardware. C. The Jury Box door has a compliant closing period of 7.03 and a compliant clear
floor space on the push and pull side of the door. D. This door had compliant signage mounted at the compliant location and distance
above the floor. It has compliant 518" high letters and Braille.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
A. The signage at the Jury Room door was a compliant 60" above the floor and was
Page 7 of 26

mounted at the compliant location. It had lettering that was a compliant 518" high and Braille. B. The Jury Room is entered through a 36" compliant fire rated door with compliant lever handle hardware and a closer. There is not a push/pull force requirement for these doors since they are fire rated. C. The closing period was a compliant 3.34 seconds. D. The threshold was smooth and compliant. E. The Jury Room door has a compliant pull side clearance of 25" and a compliant push side clearance.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
A. The floor area within the Jury Room was clear and unencumbered. B. The coat rod within the Jury Room was at the non-compliant height of 66-718"
above the floor. (4.2.6)
Agreed Solution: Coat rod will be moved to the appropriate height.
C. The shelf above the coat rod is at the non-compliant height of 71-5/8" above the floor. (4.2.6)
Agreed Solution: Shelf above coat rod will be moved to the appropriate height.
D. The countertop at the kitchenette was at a compliant 34" above the floor. E. The sink within the kitchenette countertop had non-compliant handles which
require pinching, grasping, and twisting. (4.19.5) The center line of the sink was located a compliant 15-112" fiom the face of the adjacent wall.
Agreed Solution: Replace handles with compliant hardware.
13.MEN'S TOILET ROOMENTRANCE IN THE JURY ROOM
A. The Men's Jury Room Toilet Room is accessed directly fiom within the Jury Room and has a clear and unencumbered path of travel.
B. The signage at the Men's Toilet Room door was a compliant 60" above the floor and was mounted at the compliant location. It had lettering that was a compliant 518" high, a complaint figure that was 3-112" high, and Braille.
C. The door was a fully compliant 36" wide door with lever handle hardware and no
Page 8 of 26

closer. D. The push and pull side clearances were compliant.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
14.JURY ROOM MEN'S TOILET ROOM
A. The path of travel within the toilet room was encumbered by a wall mounted towel dispenser that protrudes a non-compliant 9-518" fi-om the face of the
wall. (4.4.1) The paper towel dispenser handle was a compliant 50-1/2" above the floor. B. The toilet room size was 67" by 63" and was non-compliant by approximately 12", since it did not have the required 60" diameter maneuvering space. (4.2.3) C. The sink was fully compliant in all respects. The center line of the sink was a compliant 16" from the face of the adjoining wall. D. The soap dispenser was at a compliant 44-114" above the floor. E. The bottom edge of the reflective surface of the mirror was a non-com~lian4t 0314" above the floor. (4.19.6) F. The toilet seat was a compliant 17-112" above the floor and the centerline of the toilet was a compliant 18" from the face of the adjoining wall. G. The flush valve pressure was a compliant 4 lbs. and was located on the compliant side of the toilet room. H. The toilet paper dispenser was a non-compliant 37-718" fkom the back wall (Page 43, Figure 30(d)) and a compliant 19" from the floor. I. The side grab bar was a compliant 54-518" long and was continuous to the back wall. It is a compliant 33-518" above the floor.
J. The rear wall grab bar was a non-compliant 25" long (4.16.4) and a non-
compliant 7-318" from the side wall. (Page 43, Figure 30 (a)) The grab bar was a compliant 33-112" above the floor.
Agreed Solution: County will provide one accessible unisex toilet room with proper signage.
15. WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM ENTRANCE RV THE JURY ROOM
A. The Women's Jwy Room Toilet Room is accessed directly from within the Jury Room and has a clear and unencumbered path of travel.
B. The signage at the Women's Toilet Room door was a compliant 60" above the floor and was mounted at the compliant location. It had lettering that was a compliant 518" high, a complaint figure that was 3-1/2" high, and Braille.
C. The door was a fully compliant 36" door with lever handle hardware and no closer.
D. The push and pull side clearances were compliant.
Page 9 of 26

Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
16.JURY R O W WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM A. The path of travel within the toilet room was encumbered by a wall mounted paper towel dispenser that protruded a non-compliant 9-518" from the face of the wall. (4.4.1) The paper towel dispenser handle was at a compliant 51" above the floor. B. The t~ilertoom size was 62-518'' by 66" and was non-compliant by approximately lo", since it did not have the required 60" diameter maneuvering space. (4.2.3) C. The center line of the sink was a non-compliant 12" fiom the face of the adjoining wall. (4.19.3 and Page 44, Fig. 32) However, the sink was compliant in all other respects. D. The soap dispenser was at a compliant 45-114" above the floor. E. The bottom edge of the reflective surface of the mirror was a non-compliant 40314" above the floor. (4.19.6) F. The toilet seat was a compliant 17-314" above the floor. G. The centerline of the toilet was a non-compliant 17" from the face of the adjoining wall (Page 42, Figure 28). H. The flbsh valve was located on the compliant side of the toilet room and had a compliant activation pressure of 4-112 lbs. I. The toilet paper dispenser was a non-compliant 37-518'' fiom the back wall (Page 43, Figure 30(d)) and a non-compliant 18-518" above the floor. (Page 42, Figure 29@)) J. The side grab bar was a compliant 54-112" long and was continuous to the back wall. It is a compliant 33-114" above the floor.
K. The rear wall grab bar was a non-compliant 25" long (4.16.4) and was a non-
compliant 7-114" fiom the side wall. (Page 43, Figure 30 (a)) The grab bar was a compliant 33-114" above the floor.
Agreed Solution: As identified in item 14 above, County will provide one accessible unisex restroom with proper signage.
17. COURTROOM "B"ENTRANCE
A. Courtroom "B" is accessed off of the main corridor through a pair of compliant fire rated 36" doors which open out into the corridor. The right hand leaf, viewed fiom the corridor side, has a compliant closing period of 4.03 seconds, and the left hand door's closing period is a compliant 5.63 seconds. There is not a push/Fjull force requirement for these doors since they are fire rated. These doors have compliant lever handle hardware, and a closer.
B. The threshold at these doors is smooth and compliant. C. Adjacent to the entrance door to Courtroom "B" is a compliant room designation
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sign that is 60" above the floor with compliant 518' letter and Braille.
Agre'ed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
18. COURTROOM " B "
A. Courtroom "B" will seat approximately(72) people in the wooden pew area, an additional (19) in the movable chairs, (6) at the rear and (13) at the fiont of the courtroom, for a total of approximately(91). The ADA requires (4) compliant wheelchair locations to be provided. The assembly room size is 28'-7" by 47'-8" or approximately 1,362 square feet.
B. There are (2) areas within the courtroom visitors' seating area where a total of (2) wheelchairs can be parked, both being a compliant 36" wide by 48" long and fully accessible. One area is at the rear of the courtroom on the right just as one enters and the second location is at the &ont of the courtroom. This Courtroom is non-compliant in providing only (2) of the (4) required wheelchair locations. {4.1.3(19)(a)}
Agreed Solution: County has a 30 inch wide removable section of bench in courtroom which will be utilized when needed to provide additional wheelchair location.
19.PATH OF TRAVEL TO COURTROOM ' B" W m E S S STAND AND JURY BOX
A. The Jury Box and Witness Stand are both located at the fiont of the courtroom in the judicial area and are accessed by traversing down the main center aisle which is a compliant 49" wide, which leads to the bar rail. At this point one must pass through a gate in the bar rail which measures a compliant 33-114" clear and has a compliant (1) lb pushlpull pressure. Once in the judicial area one has a clear and unobstructed path of travel to the Witness Stand and Jury Box having to pass through a compliant 47-114" passageway.
Agrebd Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
20. COURTROOM "B" W W E S S STAND
A. Entrance into the Witness Stand is through a compliant clear opening width of 42112".
B. There is (1) 6-1/4" non-compliant step up into the Witness Stand. (4.5.2) At the toe of this riser is a covered cable that could be considered a tripping hazard.
C. The Witness Stand is anon-compliant size of 59" by71". (4.2.3) D. There is a movable table on the Witness Stand with the top at a non-compliant
height of 27-3/4" above the floor (4.32.4) and the underside knee clearance at a non-compliant 26-112" above the floor. (4.32.3)
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Agreed Solution: County agrees to comply with State ADA Policy regarding witness stands.
COURTROOM "BJ'JURYBOX
A. The Jury Box is accessed through a compliant gate which measures 33-114" clear. B. This gate leads to a clear and unencumbered space measuring a compliant 89" by
74" with ample room for wheelchair maneuvering. C. There is a movable table and chairs in this area that could be relocated, allowing a
person in a wheelchair to be located immediately adjacent to the jurors who are seated on a raised platform.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
22. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM COURTROOM "B" JURY BOX TO JURY ROOM
A. The path of travel fiom the Courtroom to the Jury Box is through a 36" wide compliant door directly out of the Jury Box that leads into a compliant unencumbered private access corridor which leads directly to the Jury Room.
B. The Jury Box door is a compliant 36" wide door with compliant lever hardware. C. The Jury Box door has a compliant clear floor space on the push and pull side of
the door. D. This door had compliant signage mounted at the compliant location and distance
above the floor. It had compliant 518' high letter and Braille.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
23. ENTRANCE INTO COURTROOM "C "
A. Cou.rtroom "C"is accessed off of the main corridor through a pair of compliant
fire rated 36" doors which open out into the corridor. The left hand leaf, viewed fkom the corridor side, is the active leaf and has a closing period of 3.81 seconds. B. The right hand leaf is inactive. There is not a push/pull force requirement for this door since it is fire rated. Ths door has a compliant lever handle and a closer. The threshold at this door is smooth and compliant. C. Adjacent to the entrance door to Courtroom "C" is a compliant room designation sign that is 60" above the floor with compliant 518" letter and Braille.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
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24. COURTROOM "C"
A. Courtroom "C" has all movable furnishings throughout including benches, chairs and tables. This courtroom will seat approximately (24) people in the wooden bench area and an additional (8) in the movable chairs for a total of approximately (32). The ADA requires (2) compliant wheelchair locations to be provided. The assembly room size is 25'-3" by 34'-7" or approximately 873 square feet.
B. Since this courtroom is comprised wholly of movable furnishings, there is ample room for the (2) required spaces with the flexibilityto rearrange the furnishings to accommodate wheelchairs positions as required.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
25. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE IN THE MAD? CORRIDOR
A. The path of travel to the public telephone is along the clear and unencumbered main corridor. It is easily accessed by Courtroom "A", "B", and "C", Witness Rooms No. 1 through No. 6, and all offices located on the main corridor.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
26. PUBLIC TELEPHONEIN THE MARV CORRIDOR
A. The public telephone is accessed off of the main corridor in the vicinity of
Courtrooms "B" and "C" and is located in a short dedicated corridor with a non-
com~lianctlear entrance width of 33" (4.3.3) at one end and a compliant clear entrance width of 38-114" at the opposite end of the dedicated corridor. B. The corridor in which the telephone is located is a compliant 36" clear in width. C. The telephone's coin slot and volume control are located at the non-compliant height of 55-112" above the floor. (4.2.6) {Page 19, Figure 6@)) D. The phone chord length is a compliant 32". E. The identifjmg signage for the telephone is mounted at the compliant height of 60" above the floor and has compliant 5/8" letters and Braille. The sign is mounted at the compliant location.
Agreed Solution: No action required.
27. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE DRlNKING FOUNTAIN LN THE MAIN CORRIDOR
A. The path of travel to the drinking fountain is along the clear and unencumbered
main corridor. It is easily accessed by Courtroom "A", "B", and "C",Witness
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Rooms No. 1 through No. 6, and all offices located on the main corridor.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
28. DRINKING F O U N T m I N THEMAIN CORRIDOR
A. The drinking fountain is located in an alcove in the main corridor wall. This alcove is a compliant 19-118" deep.
B. The drinking fountain's center line is located a non-compliant 14-112" from the side wall. (4.15.5 & Page 41, Figure 27(b))
C. The overall depth of the unit from the face of the wall at the top is a compliant 18-1/4".
D. The spout height is located a compliant 36" above the floor. E. The unit has the control buttons located at the compliant fiont and side locations. F. The unit has the spout located at the compliant location at the front of the unit. G. The flow of water f7om the spout is a compliant 5" high. H. The clearance below the apron to the floor is a non-compliant 26-34". {Page 41,
Figure 27(a)) I. The horizontal depth of the apron is a compliant 9-314". J. The unit projects horizontally fiom the face of the wall just above the floor a
compliant 6-518". K. The clearance at the bottom of the unit above the floor is a compliant 10-318".
Agreed Solution: No action required.
29. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE FIRE EXT12VGUISHER IN THE MARV CORRTDOR
A. The fire extinguisher in the main corridor is located in close proximity to the double doors between the entrance lobby and the main corridor and is clear and unencumbered.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
30. FIRE EXTNGUISHER IN THE MAAT CORRIDOR
A. The fire extinguisher cabinet handle is located at a compliant 53" above the floor. B. The fire extinguisher is located a non-compliant 60-112" above the floor. (Page
19, Figure 6@)) C. The fire extinguisher cabinet door opening force is a non-com~liant8 lbs.
pressure to open. (4.13.11)
Agreed Solution: An additional fire extinguisherwill be placed on the wall adjacent to the existing fire extinguisher cabinet;
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otherwise no action required.
31.PATH OF TRAVEL TO Wli'lVESSROOMS NO. 1 , 2 , 3 .4.5, AND 6
A. The path of travel to Witness Rooms No. 1,2,3,4,5, and 6 from the main front entrance doors, entrance lobby, and fiom Courtrooms "A", "B", and "C" is by way of the clear and unencumbered main corridor. Witness Rooms No. 2,3, and 4 are located off of the main corridor in a secondary clear and compliant corridor.
B. Since only three of the six Witness Rooms, Rooms 172,and 3, are compliant in size and maneuvering clearances, these rooms should be identified with compliant accessible signage. (4.30.7)
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
32. WlIIVESSROOM NO. I ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The identifylng signage for this room was located at compliant 60" above the floor, complaint location, and had compliant 518" high letters and Braille.
B. Entrance into Witness Room No. 1 is through a fire rated compliant 36" door with compliant lever hardware.
C. The closing period for this door is a compliant 6.19 seconds. Since this door is fire rated it does not have a required pushlpull opening pressure.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
A. This room is a compliant 60-112" wide although encumbered with movable fixnitwe.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
34. WlIIVESSROOMNO. 2 ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The identifylng signage for this room was located a compliant 60" above the floor, at a compliant location, and had compliant 518" high letters and Braille.
B. Entrance into Witness Room No. 2 is through a fire rated compliant 36" door with compliant lever hardware and 33" clear opening.
C. Since this door is fire rated it does not have a required pusWpul1 opening pressure.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
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A. This room is a compliant 73-314" wide by 89" long and has the required maneuvering space therein.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
36. W W E S S ROOM NO. 3 ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The identifylng signage for t h s room was located at a compliant 60" above the floor, at a compliant location, and had compliant 5/23'' high letters and Braille.
B. Entrance into Witness Room No. 3 is through a fire rated compliant 36" door with compliant lever hardware.
C. The closing period for this door is a compliant 5.09 seconds. Since this door is fire rated it does not have a required pushlpull opening pressure.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
37. n?WESS ROOMNO. 3
A. This room is a compliant 73-314" wide by 89" long and has the required maneuvering space therein.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
38. n?lWESS,ROOM NO. 4 ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The identifylng signage for this room was located at a compliant 60" above the floor, at a compliant location, and had compliant 518" high letters and Braille.
B. Entrance into Witness Room No. 4 is through a fire rated compliant 36" door with compliant lever hardware.
C. The closing period for this door was not taken because this room was not being used as a Witness Room.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
39. WITiYESSROOM NO. 4
A. This room, while compliant in size, was not being used as a Witness Room but rather a storage room, completely encumbered with stored materials.
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Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
40. WITNESSROOM NO. 5 ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The identifying signage for this room was located at a compliant 60" above the floor, at a compliant location, and had compliant 518" high letters and Braille.
B. Entrance into Witness Room No. 5 is through a fire rated compliant 36" door with compliant lever hardware with 33" clear opening.
C. The closing period for this door is a compliant 3.66 seconds. Since t h s door is f r e rated it does not have a required pushlpull opening pressure.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
41. WITNESSROOM NO. 5
A. This room is a compliant 64" wide by 101-112" long but has a non-compliant 42" deep entrance alcove on the pull side of the door. {Page 38, Figure 25(c))
Agreed Solution: No action required
42. WITNESSROOM NO. 6 ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The identifjmg signage for this room was located at a compliant 60" above the floor, at a compliant location, and had compliant 518" high letters and Braille.
B. Entrance into Witness Room No. 6 is through a fire rated compliant 36" door with compliant lever hardware.
C. This door has a non-compliant pull side clearance of 5-112". (4.13.6) D. The closing period for this door is a compliant 6.03 seconds. Since this door is
fire rated it does not have a required pushlpull opening pressure.
Agreed Solution: No action required.
A. This room has a non-comvliant entrance alcove space on the pull side of the door measuring 45" wide by 47" deep that one must pass through to get to the room. {Page 38, Figure 25(a))
B. This room is a non-comvliant 54-112" wide by 67" deep. (4.2.3)
Agreed Solution: No action required.
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44. PATH OF TRAVEL TOMEN'S PUBLIC TOILETROOMIN THE MAi?V CORRIDOR
A. The Men's Public Toilet Room is accessed directly off of the main entrance corridor and has a clear and unencumbered path of travel to the Courtrooms and Witness Rooms along that corridor.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
45. MEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The signage at the Men's Public Toilet entrance door was installed at the compliant 60" height and at the compliant location. The character was the compliant height of 3-1/2", the letters were the compliant height of 5/8", it had Braille, and it included the international handicap symbol.
B. Entrance into the Men's Public Toilet is through a compliant 36" f ~raeted door with compliant lever hardware and a closer with a compliant closing period of 5.03 seconds.
Since ibis door is fire rated it does not have a required pushipull opening pressure.
C. The threshold at this door was smooth and compliant.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA,
46. MEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM
A. The door opens into a compliant access way that measures 49-112" wide leading to the sink counter and urinals. The floor space on the inside of the door is clear and unencumbered.
B. The accessible floor area in front of the sink was com-pliant but the surk was not marked as a compliant fixture. Since there was only one handicap sink with compliant insulated pipes grouped with multiple sinks, it becomes non-compliant. This one slnk should be identified with a compliant sign designating it as the compliant fixture so that someone in a wheelchair would be less likely use a sink without insulated pipes. (4.22.6)
C. The bottom of the electric hand dryer is mounted at the compliant height of 443/4" above the floor.
D. The height of the sink counter above the floor is a compliant 33-318". E. The under side clearance at the sink counter is a non-compliant 28-318" above the
floor. 14.19.2) F. The sink had a compliant single lever valve. G. The height of the bottom edge of the reflective surface of the mirror is 4-718"
above the sink counter which adds up to be a compliant 38-114" above the floor.
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H. The sink counter had soap dispensers mounted in and sitting on top of the counter, both of which were compliant.
Agreed Solution: Will insulate all sinks rather than provide signage; Otherwise no action required.
46. MEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM - CONTRWED
I. The clear access opening to the urinal, between the toilet partition pilaster and the wall, is a non-compliant 28-5/8", (4.18.3) less the end face width projection and the fixture is 13-112'' from the wall. T h s results in a non-compliant. clear floor space in front of the urinal. (4.18.3) There is 54-112" clear fiom the urinal screen to the sink counter face.
J. The urinal had a compliant elongated bowl. K. The rim of the urinal was a compliant 17" above the floor. L. The urinal valve was mounted at the non-compliant height of 45" above the floor.
(4.18.4) M. The urinal valve activation force is a compliant 4 lbs. N. The room has the required clear floor area. 0. The path of travel to the accessible toilet stall area is a compliant 47-112". P. The toilet stall measures a non-compliant 58-112" wide by 60-112" deep. {Page
43, Figure 30(a)) Q. The clear toilet stall opening width is a compliant 34". R. The toilet stall door hardware is compliant but the coat hook on the door is at the
non-compliant height of 62" above the floor. {Page 19, Figure 5(b)) S. The toilet paper dispenser is a double roll dispenser with the leading edge of the
roll closest to the back wall at a non-compliant 38-518" from the back wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(d)) T. The center line of the toilet paper dispenser is a non-compliant 18-314" above the floor. {Page 42, Figure 29(b)). U. The side wall grab bar is a compliant 54-314" long which is continuous to the back wall and is located a compliant 33" from the floor. V. The rear wall grab bar is a non-compliant 25" long {4.16.4), is a non-compliant
6-314'' clear from the side wall {Page42, Figure 29(a)), and is located a non-
compliant 32-314" fiom the floor. {Page 43, Figure 30 (d)) W. The toilet seat is a compliant 18" above the floor. X. The center line of the toilet is a compliant 18" from the side wall. Y. The flush valve activation force is a compliant 4 lbs. and is on the wide side of the
stall.
Agreed Solution: Relocate urinal and urinal valve; lower coat hook on the toilet stall door; move the toilet paper dispenser to appropriate ADA level; provide a 36 inch long grab bar at the
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rear of the toilet and place it appropriately; otherwise no action required.
47. PATH OF TMVEL TO WOMEN'SPUBLIC TOILET ROOM LN THE Mr,.tlN
CORIUDOR
A. The Women's Public Toilet Room is accessed directly off of the main entrance corridor and has a clear and unencumbered path of travel to the Courtrooms and Witness Rooms along that corridor.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
48. WOMEN'SPUBLIC TOILETROOM ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The signage at the Women's Public Toilet entrance door was installed at the compliant 60" height and at the compliant location. The character was the compliant height of 3-1/2", the letters were the compliant height of 5/8", it had Braille, and it included the international handicap symbol.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
48. WOMEN'SPUBLIC TOILETROOM ENTRANCE -- CONTNUED
B. Entrance into the Women's Public Toilet Room is through a compliant 36" fire rated door with compliant lever hardware and a closer with a compliant closing period of 6.75 seconds.
C. Since this door is fire rated it does not have a required push/pull opening pressure. D. The threshold at t h s door was smooth and compliant.
Agrekd Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
49. WOMEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM
A. The door opens into a compliant alcove that measures 69" deep by 74-3/4". The floor space on the inside of the door is clear and unencumbered.
B. Passage from the alcove into the sink area is through a compliant 36" wide opening.
C. The accessible floor area in front of the sink was compliant but the sink was not marked as a compliant fixture. Since there was only one handicap sink with compliant insulated pipes ganged with multiple sinks, it becomes non-compliant.
Page 20 of 26

This one sink should be identified with a compliant sign designating it as the compliant fixture so that someone in a wheelchair would be less likely use a sink without insulated pipes. (4.22.6) D. The height of the sink counter above the floor is a compliant 33-718". E. The under side clearance at the sink counter is a non-compliant 28-314" above the floor. ${4.19.2) F. The sink had a compliant single lever valve. G. The height of the bottom edge of the reflective surface of the mirror is 4-314" above the sink counter which adds up to a compliant 38-5/23' above the floor. H. The sink counter had soap dispensers mounted in and sitting on top of the counter, both of which were compliant. I. The room has the required clear floor area. J. The path of travel to the accessible toilet stall area is a compliant 57-114". K. The toilet stall measures a non-com~liant58-114" wide by 60-112" deep. (Page 43, Figure 30(a)) L. The clear toilet stall opening width is a compliant 34-114". M. The toilet stall door hardware is compliant but the coat hook on the door is at the non-compliant height of 62" above the floor. {Page 19, Figure 5(b)) N. The toilet paper dispenser is a double roll dispenser with the leading edge of the roll clbsest to the back wall at a non-compliant 37-314" fiom the back wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(d)) 0. The center line of the toilet paper dispenser is a compliant 19-114" above the floor. P. The side wall grab bar is a compliant 54-112" long which is continuous to the back wall and is located at a compliant 33-118" from the floor.
Q. The b ~ c wk all grab bar is a non-comuliant 25-112" long {4.16.4),is a non-
compliant 7-114" clear fiom the side wall {Page42, Figure 29(a)), and is located a compliant 33-112" above the floor. (Page 43, Figure 30(d)) R. The toilet seat is a compliant 18" above the floor. S. The center line of the toilet is a non-compliant 18-314" fiom the side wall. T. The flush valve activation force is a compliant 3 lbs. and the valve is on the compliant, wide, side of the toilet stall.
Agreed Solution: Insulate all sinks rather than provide signage, relocate coat hook on the toilet stall door to an appropriate height, relocate toliet paper dispenser to make ADA compliant; replace the present back wall grab bar with a 36 inch long grab bar at the rear of the toilet; otherwise no action require.
50.PATH OF T M VEL TO CLERK AND MASTER OFFICEAND CIRCUIT COURT CLERK OFFICE
A. Path of travel to the Clerk and Master and the Circuit Court Clerks office is along the main unobstructed and compliant corridor leading to the main entrance to the
Page 21 of 26

building.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
51. CLERKAND MASTER OFFICEENTRWCE DOOR
A. The Clerk and Master Office is entered through a 36" fire rated door with a compliant 33" clear opening, lever handle hardware and a door hold open device connected to the fne alarm system.
B. The signage for this office is a compliant 60" above the floor, located in a compliant location, with compliant 518" letters, and Braille.
C. The entrance door had a clear and unencumbered floor area on the push and the pull side the door.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
52. CIRCUIT COURT CLERK OFFICE ENTRANCE
A. The Circuit Court Clerk Office is entered through a 36" fire rated door with a compliant 33" clear opening, lever handle hardware and a closer.
B. The signage for this office is a compliant 60" above the floor, located in a compliant location, with compliant 518" letters, and Braille.
C. The closing period for the door was a compliant 3.34 seconds. D. The entrance door had a clear and unencumbered floor area on the push and the
pull side the door.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
53. PATH Of,'TRAVEL TO THE P W A T E CORRIDORFROM THE PUBLIC CORRIDOR
A. The path of travel &om the public corridor to the private corridor where the Jufy Room is located is through a compliant 36" door with compliant lever handle h a r d w ~ aend a closer with a compliant closing period of 5.46 seconds. This door is equipped with a push button combination lockset.
B. The bottom of the door glass is a compliant 39-718" above the floor. C. The pull side clearance is a compliant 26" and the push side clearance is
compliant. D. The threshold is smooth and compliant.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
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54. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER IN THE PRIVATE CORRIDOR
A. The path of travel to the fire extinguisher is clear and unencumbered along the private corridor.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
55. FIRE EATINGUISHER IN THE PRTVATE CORRIDOR
A. The &re extinguisher cabinet handle is located at a compliant 53-1/2" above the floor. The fire extinguisher is located at a non-com~liant60-3/4" above the floor. {Page 19,Figure 6 @ ) )
Agreed Solution: An additional fire extinguisher will be placed on the wall adjacent to the existing fire extinguisher cabinet.
56. PATH OF TRAVEL TO WOMEN'S TOILETROOM OFF OF PRNATE CORRIDOR
A. The Women's Toilet Room is accessed directly off of the private conidor behind Courtrooms "A" and "B" and has a clear and unencumbered path of travel.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM ENTRANCE DOOR FROM THE PRTVATE CORRLDOR
A. The signage at the Women's Toilet Room door was a compliant 60" above the floor and was mounted at the compliant location. It had lettering that was a compliant 5/8" high, complaint figure that was 3-1/2" high, Braille, and the handicap symbol.
B. The door was a fully compliant 36" fire rated door with lever handle hardware and closer. Since this door is fire rated it does not have a required pushlpull opening pressure.
C. The push and pull side clearances were compliant.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
58. WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM IN THE PRIVATE CORRIDOR
A. The path of travel within the toilet room was encumbered by a wall mounted paper towel dispenser that protruded a non-compliant 9-5/8" fkom the face of the wall. (4.4.1) The paper towel dispenser handle was a compliant 51" above the floor.
Page 23 of 26

B. The toilet room size was 63-112'' by 66-112" and was non-compliant by approximately 12", since it did not have the required 60" diameter maneuvering space.' (4.2.3)
C. The center line of the sink was at a non-compliant 13-314" from the face of the adjoining wall. (4.19.3 and Page 44, Fig. 32) The sink was compliant in all other respects.
D. The soap dispenser was at a compliant 46-314" above the floor. E. The bottom edge of the reflective surface of the mirror was a non-com~lian4t 0-
314" above the floor. (4.19.6) F. The toilet seat was a compliant 18-314" above the floor and the centerline of the
toilet was a non-com~liant19-314" from the face of the adjoining wall. {Page42, Figure 28) G. The flush valve pressure was a compliant 4 lbs. and was located on the compliant side of the toilet room. H. The toilet paper was a non-compliant 37-518" from the back wall {Page 43, Figure 30(d)) and was a compliant 19" above the floor. I. The side grab bar was a compliant 54-112" long and was continuous to the back wall &d is a non-comvliant 32-518" above the floor. {Page 42, Figure 29)
J. The rear wall grab bar was a non-compliant 25" long (4.16.4) and was a non-
compliant 6-118" fiorn the side wall. {Page43, Figure 30 (a)) The grab bar was a non-compliant 32-718" above the floor. {Page42, Figure 29)
Agreed Solution: Provide signage directing persons with disabilities to a public compliant restroom; otherwise no action required.
59. PATH OF TRAVEL TO MEN'S TOILETROOM FROM THE PRIVATE CORRIDOR
A. The Men's toilet room is accessed directly off of the private corridor behnd Courtrooms "A" and "B" and has a clear and unencumbered path of travel.
Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
60. MEN'S TOILET ROOM E N T W C E DOOR FROM THE PRIVATE CORRIDOR A. The sipnage at the Men's toilet room door was a compliant 60" above the floor and was mounted at the compliant location. It had lettering that was a compliant 518" high, complaint figure that was 3-112" high, Braille, and the handicap symbol. B. The door was a h l l y compliant 36" fire rated door with lever handle hardware and closer. Since this door is fire rated it does not have a required pushlpull opening pressure. C. The push and pull side clearances were compliant.
Page 24 of 26

Agreed Solution: No action required; Compliant with ADA.
61. MEN'S TOILETROOMIN THE PRIVATE CORRIDOR
A. The path of travel within the toilet room was encumbered by a wall mounted paper towel dispenser that protruded a non-compliant 9-518" from the face of the wall. (4.4.1) The towel cabinet handle was at a compliant 50-314" above the floor.
B. The tcilet room was non-compliant since it did not have the required 60" diameter maneuvering space. (4.2.3)
C. The center line of the sink was at a non-compliant 13-114" from the face of the adjoining wall. (4.19.3 and Page 44, Fig. 32) The sink was compliant in all other respects.
D. The soap dispenser was at a compliant 46-1/8" above the floor. E. The bottom edge of the reflective surface of the mirror was a non-com~liant40-
314" above the floor. (4.19.6) F. The toilet seat was a compliant 18" above the floor and the centerline of the toilet
was a non-com~liant18-114" from the face of the adjoining wall. {Page42, Figure 28) G. The flush valve pull pressure was a compliant 4 lbs. and was located on the compliant side of the toilet room. H. The to'ilet paper dispenser was a non-compliant 38-114" fiom the back wall (Page 43, Figure 30(d)) and a compliant 19" above the floor. I. The side grab bar was a compliant 54-3/8" long and was continuous to the back wall. It is a compliant 33-118'' above the floor.
J. The rear wall grab bar was a non-compliant 25" long (4.16.4) and was a non-
compliant 6-518" from the side wall. {Page 43, Figure 30 (a)) The grab bar was a compliant 33-118" above the floor.
Agreed Solution: Provide signage directing persons with a disabilityto a public compliant restroom; otherwise no action required.
62. D R T N m G FOUNTAINlN THE PRIVATE CORRTDOR
A. The drinking fountain's projection into the corridor without an alcove is non-
compliant. (4.4.1) B. The o~~eradlelpth of the unit from the face of the wall at the top is a compliant
18-114". C. The spout height is located at a compliant 36" above the floor. D. The urlit has the buttons located at the compliant front and side locations.
Page 25 of 26

E. The unit has the spout located at the compliant location at the front of the unit. F. The flow of water from the spout is a compliant 4-1/2" high. G. The clearance below the apron to the floor is a non-compliant 26-718". (Page 41,
Figure 27(a)) H. The horizontal depth of the apron is a compliant 9-314". I. The unit projects from the face of the wall just above the floor a compliant 6-314". J. The clearance at the bottom of the unit above the floor is a compliant 10-318".
Agreed Solution: No action required.
Page 26 of 26

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

1

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY,COCKECOUNTY,DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, Jl3FFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

)

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - HOUSTON COUNTY

~ ( i 2' This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreementy7)is entered into this

day of

f%b(~

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") &d Defendant Houston County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.tj1213 l(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that terrn is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $ 12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explailations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county commission meetings are held.
FACTUALBACKGROUND
5 . Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County-~illc~operatweith the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementingregulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Jones, Lane, Cantrel, Rarnsey and Larson's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Jones, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Zappola has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
George Clark Houston County Mayor P. 0.Box 366 Erin, TN 37061
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

lN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned action havc
caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E R a m s e y m Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box ZOO1 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Gary D. Housepian (BPR # @@)
Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 2lStAve South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080

Linda M. Darda~iana, dmitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro I-Iac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, RORGEN & DARUAlUAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oaklai~dC, A 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

Attorneys for Plaintif@

/

n For Defendant Houston County, Tennessee:
Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: 2 - 1 - 0 5

For Defendant County:
Name: George E. Clark Title: County Mayor Date: January 2 8 , 2005

-~ ~ ~ cL. rLec ate
George Lane, ~lahtiff
Date: \-\ -o<

,'

HOUSTON COUNTY

Plaintiff:

HOUSTON COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff

Date: ,a(/+bp

-c

-
A. ~ G s e lLlarson, Plaintiff
Date: J*ycCQ-~

AGREED SETTLEMENT HOUSTON COUNTY

1. Parking

5.

no There is signage indicatjng the location of the accessible entrance to this Courfhouse.

14.I.2(7)(c)} There are (2) Elevator signs.

C.

The designated parking space was 15' wide and non-compliant because if was not

designated for van accessibility. ADA requires that there be a minimum of (I) designated

for van parking. {4.1.2(5)(b)}

I
D. The signage for this designated parking space is a non-compliant 5 0 4 4 " above the ground and cannot be seen over a vehicle from the street. (4.6.41

F.

The desigriated parking space has non-compliant running slopes varying befween 2.1%

and 4.42%.{4.6.3)

i

G. There is no desisnafed access aisle for this parking space. (4.6.3)

I

H. There is a 48"wide curb ramp for this designatedparking space with non-t;om~lianfcross

slopes varying between 1.09%and 2.4%.{4.8.6}

I

1.

The curb ramp has compliantrunning slopes vatying befween 5.2%and 6.0%.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage in accordance with {4.1.2(5)). Reconfigure parking space to be 16' wide in accordance with {4.1.27)(c)). Relocate accessible parking signage in accordance with (4.6.4). Provide marking to indicate a designated access aisle in accordance with (4.6.3). Replace curb ramp to comply with (4.7).

2. Path of Travel to the Exterior Entrance Door and Elevator Lobby

5. The non-compliant landing in fronf of fhe entrance door has slopes varying between 0.0%

and 2.0%{.4.13.6/

I

Agreed Solution: No action required.

4. Elevator

A.

The height of the Second Floor call button is a non-compliant 42-1/2"abo

Agreed Solution: No action required.

5. First Floor Fire Extinguisher

A.

The tire extinguisher cabinet in the Elevator Lobby is located at a compli~m3t 9-3/8"from

the bottom fo the floor and projecfs a non-compliant 6"from the wall. {4.4:?}

B.

This fire extinguisher is a non-com~liant56-3/4" above the floor. {Page 19, Fig. 6(b)}

non- C. The second fire extinguisher on the First Floor in the main corridor is waN hung at a
compliant 55"above the floor. {Page 19, Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Lower fire extinguishers to meet the requirements

of (4.4.1 and Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

!

6. First Floor Exit Stair

:

B.

The glass in this door is at a non-compliant heighf of 57" from the floor. {Page A3, Figure

A31

Agreed Solution: Provide 450-degree temperature rise-rating door. If glass is provided in new door, use glass in accordance with {Fig. A3, Page A3).
I
C. LIFE SAFETY ISSUE: There is a lawn mower, weed eafer, and blower and befween (2) and (4) gallons of gas in (2) gasoline cans stored under the First Floor rated stair. {SBC 1006.1.4)

Agreed Solution: Relocate lawn mower, weed eater and gasolin,e cans from the stairwell.

D. The non-compliant exit stairs has irregular risers that vaty in height between 6-1/2 to 7". 14.9.2)
Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

The handrails on the sides of the exit stair were a non-compliant 36-3/4" apart to supparf

the required area of rescue assistance on the floors above the exit discharge. C4.3.11.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required. I

F.

The guardrail for the side of these stairs has non-compliant picket spaces; some spacing

would allow fhe passage of a 4" sphere. 12000 Edition NFPA 101 7.2.2.4.1)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

G. The exit discharge level to the outside is up a flight of stairs on the first landing, being the
Second Floor. However, there is no exit sign at the exterior door and no barrier that would restrain people from continuing down to the First Floor during a fire. 12000 Edition Life Safety Code NFPA 101 7.7.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

H.

This exit stair has no indicated areas of refuge at any of the landings. The Fourfh Floor

landing has a 55" by 59" area that may qualify for one wheelchair position with additional

criteria provided. {4.3.1O)and 11997 Edition Life Safety Code NFPA 101 5-5.43

Agreed Solution: No action required.

7. Path of Travel to the First Floor

D. The pull side clearance is a non-compliant 12". {Page 38, Fig. 25(c)]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

G. The exit door is required to have an exit sign 11997 Edition Life Safety Code NFPA 101
7.10.1.2)

Agreed Solution: Add exit sign.

9. Third Floor Fire Extinquisher

6. The fire extinguisher is mounted in a recessed wall cabinet. This fire extinguisher door is non-ccm~/isnbtecause it requires 8 !bs. lo turn the levsr handle hardware. {4.27.d]

Agreed Solution: Adjust operating mechanism to meet requirements of (4.27.4).

C. The f i e extinguisher is mounted ai a non-com~liaiitheighf of 56U4''.{Page 19, Figure
6(b)l
Agreed Solution: Lower fire extinguisher to meet requirements of (Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

10. Third Floor Drinking Fountain

A.

The drinking fountain is mounted at a projection distance of 18-1/2" from the wall. If the

drinking fountain was mounted at the compliant underside heighf if would be a non-

compliant projection hazard {4.4.I ]

Agreed Solution: Raise drinking fountain to meet requirements of (4. I5).

C. The fountain has a non-com~liantop underside vertical clearance of 26-1/2". (Page 41,
Figure 27(b)}

Agreed Solution: Raise drinking fountain to meet requirements of (4.1 5).

12. Third Floor Public Unisex Toilet Room

A.

The signage for this toilet is in a non-compliant location on the door (4.30.6)and is non-

compliant in fype without the symbol of accessibility (4.30.7)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a)).

C. The closing period is a non-compliant 2.47 seconds. {4.13.5)

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.1 3.5).

D. The push/pull pressure is a non-compliant 9 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b))

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet
requirements sf i4.13.14.Ijb)).

F.

The threshold has non-comwliant vertical edges of 5/16" on the outside of the room and

3/8" on the inside of the room with non-compliant slopes on the edges. C4.13.8 & 4.5.2)

Agreed Solution: Modify threshold or provide new threshold in accordance with (4.13.8 and 4.5.2).

H.

The changing platform is at a non-compliant heighf of 38-11'2" from the floor. {Page 19,

Fig. 6(c)] It is in a compliant location with 42-3/4" clear floor area in front.

Agreed Solution: Lower changing p!atfor-rn to meet requirements of
{Fig. 6(c), Page 19).

1.

The center of the toilet fixture is a non-comwliant 18-1/4" from the side wall. {Page 42,

Fig. 28)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

L.

The side grab bar is a compliant 43-3/8" long and a non-compliant distance of 3-3/4" from

the back wall. {Page 43, Fig. 30(a)] The side grab bar is a compliant 34-1/2" above the

floor. The rear wall grab bar is a compliant 3 7 4 8 " length and a non-compliant I 1-5/8"

from the side wall. {Page 43, Fig. 30(a)] The side grab bar is a compliant 34-1/2" above

the floor.

Agreed Solution: Relocate side bar to meet requirements of (4.16.4).

M. The sink is a non-compliant 14-3/4" from the side wall. {Page 44, Fig. 32)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

0. The sink is a non-compliant 30-3/4" above the floor to the top of the rim. The sink has a non-compliant underside clearance of 27-1/4" with a bowl projection on the bottom of the sink.{Page 44, Fig. 31)

Agreed Solution: Adjust sink height to meet requirements of (4.19).

R. The bottom of the mirror is a non-com~lian4t 0-3/4" above the floor. 14.19.6)

Agreed Solution: Adjust mirror height to meet requirements of
(4. I9).

T, The toilet paper dispenser is a non-compliant 43-3/8" from the back wall, {Page 43, Fig. 30(d)] It is mounted at the compliant heighf of 29-3/8 above the floor.

Agreed Solution: Modify or replace and relocate the toilet paper dispenser to meet requirements of (4.16.6).

U. This is a non-com~lianftoilet paper dispenser because it restricts the paper flow. {4.16.6]

Agreed Solution: Modify or replace toilet paper dispenser to meet requirements of l4.16.6).

14. Third Floor Public Telephone

A.

This wall mounted phone protrudes 10" into the path of fravel af 36-7/8" above the floor

causing a non-comolianf condition. {4.4.i )

Agreed Solution: Provide shelf or furr cut underneath to meet requirements of (4.4.1).

6. The coin slot on the phone is a non-com~lianht eight of 56-7/8" above the floor. {Page 19, Fig 6(b)l

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. This phone is non-compliant because it has no volume control. {4.1.3(17)(b)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

18. Third Floor Drinkina Fountain

A.

The drinking fountain is in an alcove and lacks the required siqnaae to indicate the

location of the compliant drinking fountain. 14-30]

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage to accessible drinking fountain i n accordance with (4.1.3(16)(b)).

B.

This alcove is 25-3/4" deep and a non-ctomplianf 23-3/4" wide. {Page 41, Fig. 27(b)}

Agreed Solution: No action relquired.

C. The spout height of this fountain is a non-compliant 36-1/4" above fhe floor. {Page 41, Fig. 27(a))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F.

The distance from the floor to the bottom of the fountain is a non-compliant 7-1/2*'. {Page

41, Fig. 27(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

G. The botfom horizontal projection from the wall is a non-com~lianf6-3/8". {Page 41, Fig.
27(a)}
Agreed Solution: No action required.

20. Third Floor Public Toilet Rooms

A.

The signage for the Men's and Women'stoilets is non-com~lianf.C4.30) though these are

not accessible restrooms, there should be a sign to direct the disabled to the compliant

resfroom.

Agreed Solution: Provide dirscticna! signage In accordacce with {4.1.3(16)(b)}.

21. Path of Travel to the Fourth Floor I
D. There was no indication of the Elevator and the accessible path to the Fourth Floor. Eventually as one passes through the corridor indicated by the small exit sign, there is an
non- elevator sign that is at a non-compliant height of 64-1/4" above the floor. It is a
compliant sign. 14.30)
I
Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage in accordance with {4.1.3(16)(b)}.

23. Fourth Floor Fire Extin~uishear nd Drinking Fountain

5. The Fire Extinguisher is in a recessed cabinet and is located a non-compliant height of 57" above the floor, {Page 19, Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Lower fire: extinguisher to meet requirements of

{Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

,

C. The drinking fountain is mounted at a projection distance of 18-3/8" from the wall. If the
drinking fountain was mounted at the compliant underside height it would be a non-
compliant projection hazard {4,*4I. }

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

This fountain has a non-compI,&t underside clearance of 26-7/8". (Page 41, Fig. 27(b)]

I
Agreed Soiution: No acttion required.

25. FOURTH FLOOR ACCESSIBLq UNISEX TOILET

A.

The signage for this toilet is in a non-compliant location on the door {4.30.6}and is non-

compliant in type without the symbol of accessibility (4.30.7)

Agreed Solution: provide new room identification signage in accordance with <4.1.3.$6(a)].

B.

The push side clearance for fh,is door is a non-compliant 10". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)}

Agreed Soiution: No action required.
!
D. The door closing period is a non-com~lian2t .5 seconds. {4.13.5}

Agreed Soiution: prodosed Soiution: Adjust cioser or provide new closer to meet requirerr~entsof (4.1 3.51.

F.

The door push/pull pressure iS a non-com~lian5t .5 Ibs. (4.13.11(2)(b)}

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requiremenis of (4.13.11.1 (b)}.

G. The threshold has non-comptiant verfical edges of 5/8" on the outside and 7/16" on the
inside with non-compliant slopes on the edges. 14.13.8 & 4.5.2)

Agreed Solution: Modify threshold or provide new threshold in accordance with (4.13.8 and 4.5.2).
TrrLre changi~~iipglatforin is at 4 EGG-zomol~anhteight zf 38?/2" h r n f i e floor. {Page l 9 ,
Fig. 6(c)] The changing platform is in a compliant location.

Agreed Solution: Lower changing platform to meet requirements of {Fig. 6(c), Page 19). 1

J.

The center of fhe toilet fixturb is a non-complianf 18-1/2" from the side wall. {Page 42,

Fig. 28)

!

I

Agreed Solution: No aktion required.

M. The side grab bar is a compliant 43-1/4" long and a non-compliant disfance of 5-1/4" from
the back wall. {Page 43, Fig. 30(a)) The height above the floor is a compliant 35".

Agreed Solution: Relocate side bar to meet requirements of (4.16.4).

Q. The sink is a non-comolianf 30-1/2" above the floor to the top of the rim. The sink has a non-compliant underside clearance of 27" with a bowl projection on the bottom. {Page 44, Fig. 311

Agreed Solution: Adjust sink height to meet requirements of (4.19).

T.

The bottom of the mirror is a non-compliant 40-3/8" above the floor. {4.19.6}

Agreed Solution: Adjust mirror height to meet requirements of (4.1 9).

V.

The toilet paper dispenser is a non-comoljanf 42" from the back wall. {Page 43,

Fig. 30(d)} The height above fhe flooris a compliant 29-1/2".

Agreed Solution: Replace and relocate toilet paper dispenser to fie& requirements of (4.3 6.6).

W. This is a non-com~liantoilet paper dispenser because if restricts the paper flow. {4.16.6)

Agreed Ssiuiisn: Replace and relscate t ~ i l e tpaper dispe~se: k meet requirements of i4.16.6).

27. FOURTH FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM ENTRANCE DOORS

C. When the left door is fully open, the path of travel from the Courtroom stair landing leading to the Elevator Lobby and Exit Stair is reduced to a non-compliant 29- 1/4". {4.13.5] and [SBC 1012.1.5.]

Agreed Solution: Provide compliant signage (4.301, including one door "in" and other door "out." Signs to be attached to doors (not to wall beside doors). Adjust doors so that they will open only in one direction.

E.

EI!e glsss i.;r!this rJonr is a! a non-co.m~lianht eight of 57-1/2" above the floor. {Page A3,

Fig. A3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F.

The left door has a non-compliant closing period of 1.37 seconds {4.13.10} and a non-

compliant push pressure of 10 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b)}.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 I.l(b)).

G. The right door has a non-compliant closing period of 1.47 seconds {4.13.10) and a non-
com~lianptush pressure of 8 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b8.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 I.l(b)).

J.

The glass in these doors is at a non-compliant height of 57-3/8 above the floor. {Page

A3, Fig. A3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

K.

The left door has a non-compliant closing period of 1.31 seconds {4.13.10) and a non-

compliant push pressure of 8.5 Ibs. {4.13. I I (2)(b)).

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.11 .l(b)}.

L.

The right door has a non-complianf closing period of 1.44 seconds {4.13.10} and a non-

compliant push pressure of 6 lbs. {4.13.11(2)(b)).

Agrsed SoZuticn: Adjust croser or provide new daser to meet requirements of (4.13.4 l.i(b)).

28. Fourth Floor Larae Courtroom

D.

The gafe through tne bar to tne judicial section of the Large Courirooiii has (2) leaves

that are mounted on spring hinges. The clear passage clearance through the right gate is

a non-compliant 26-11'2': and the clear passage through the left gate is a non-compliant

27" 14.13.5). The push/pu/l pressure for these gates is a compliant 4 Ibs. and 4.5 Ibs.

respectively.

Agreed Solution: Barrier and security issues are part of the State's judicial program. This item will be addressed by the State of Tennessee.

29. Fourth Floor Large Courtroom Jury Box

A.

The path of travel to the Jury Box leads through (2) jury box entrances, both having a

non-compliant clear passage opening of 24". {4.13.5} The approach to the first entrance

is clear. The approach to the second entrance reduces from 47-Ii2" to 39-11'2'' and

crosses a loose cord protector at the Witness Stand.

5.

The Jury Box has (12) fixed seats. The first row has a 12" clearance and the second row

has an 8" clearance. These are accessed by 6" high steps, which are non-compliant for

wheelchair access. {4.5.2 & 4.3.8) The first plaiform is 37" deep. The second platform is

3 8 deep and neither platform is wide enough for maneuvering a wheelchair within.

Agreed Solution: The jury box and location of jurors are part of the State's judicial program. This item will be addressed by the State of Tennessee.

i

30. Fourth Floor Courtroom Witness Stand

A.

The path of travel to the Witness Stand between the Jury Box is a compliant 47-1/2" wide

space. The loose cord protector is considered to be a potential tripping hazard and a non-

com~liancthange of level. f4.5.2)

0. The entrance is through a non-comoliant 26-3/8" wide passageway. {4.13.5) There is a non-com~liant6 step to the raised platform. {4.5.2)

C. The inside dimensions are 37-1/2 wide by 39" long and non-com~lantfor wheelchair access. {4.2.3)

Agreed Solution: The witness stand and location of witnesses are part of the State's judicial program. This item will be addressed by the State of Tennessee.

32. Fourth Floor Clerk and Master Office

A.

The signage is mounted on the door a non-com~liant46-1/8" above the floor. {4.30.6)

and non-compliant in type. (4.30)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.16(a)).

C, The glass in this door is a non-compliantheight of 51- 1/8" above the floor. {Page A3, Fig. A31
Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. This door has a closer and non-com~lianct ylindrical hardware. {4.13.9)
Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware
in accordance with (4.13.9)or install ADA lever kit.

E.

The closing period for this door is a non-compliant 2.28 seconds. (4.13.10)

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet
requirements of C4.13.1 I.I(b)}.

F.

The push/pull pressure for this door is a non-comuliant 7 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b))

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet
requirements of (4.43.11.l(b)).

G. The threshold has a non-compliant vertical edge of 3/8". 14.5.2)

Agreed Solution: Modify threshold or provide new threshold in
accordancewith (4.13.8and 4.5.2).

H. The push side clearance for this door is a non-comoliant 6". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

34. Fourth Floor Drinking Fountain Near the Clerk and Master Office

A.

The spouf is a non-com~lianf38-l/Z"'above the floor. {Page 41, Fig. 27(a))

Agreed Solution: Lower unit or provide directional signage to accessible drinking fountain in accordance with {4.1.3(16)(b)).

35. Fourth Floor Fire Alarm Near the Clerk and Master Office Door

A

This fire alarm is mounted at a non-compliant height of 61-1/4" from the floor. {Page 19,

Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Relocate fire alarm to meet requirements of {Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

37. Fourth Floor Jurv Room

A.

The signage is mounted on the door at non-com~lianht eight above the floor. C4.30.6) and

non-comolianl in type. (4.3iij

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.16(a)).

6. The push side clearance for this door is a non-compliant 7-1/2". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware. 14.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

38. Fourth Floor Fire Alarm Near the Circuit Court Clerk Door

A.

This fire a[arm is mounted at a non-compliant height of 61-1/4" from the floor. {Page 19,

Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Relocate fire alarm to meet requirements of {Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

Fourth Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office

A.

The signage is in a non-compliant location on the door at 46-1/8" above the floor 14.30.61

and non-com~lianitn type. (4.30)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

D.

This door has a closer and non-compliant cylindrical hardware. {4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

F.

The closing period for this door is a non-compliant 1.5 seconds. {4.13.10)

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 I.l(b!).

G. Thepush/pull pressure for fhis door is a rion-compliant 6 Ibs. C4.13.I 1(2)(b)]

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.1 3.1I.l(b)).

41. Directionai Siqnaqe

A.

No comwlianf exterior directional signage exists on fhe South side. {4.1.2,(7),(~)}If all

entrances are not accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to

the nearest accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with {4.1.2(7)(~)).

42. Area of RescueAssistance

A.

The building is non-compliant since if does not provide an area of rescue assistance for

all levels above grade. See Attachment "C" for details.

Agreed Solution: One hour corridorslelevator lobbies are already provided on the second fioor and main iioor. A 20-minute rated corridor door is already provided on the second floor. County will add one 20-minute rated corridor door on the main floor, as well as communication equipment and area of refuge signage.

5. This alcove is 25-3/4" deep and a non-dorn~lian2t3-3/4" wide. {Page 4-1, Fig. 27(b)]
I
Agreed Solution: No action required.
C. The spout heighf of this founfainis a non-complianf 36-1/4" above fhe floor. {Page 4-1,
Fig. 27(a}]
Agreed Solution: No action required.
F. The distance from the floor to the bottom o f the founfainis a non-compliant 7-1/2". page 41, Fig. 27(a)]
Agreed Solution: No action required.
G. The boffomhorizontal projection from the wall is a non-compliant 6-3/8". {Page 41, Fig. 27m
Agreed Solution: No action required.
I
20. Third Floor Public Toilet Rooms
A. The signage for fhe Men's and Women's toilets is non-compliant. C4.30)though these are not accessible resfrooms,there should be a sign to direcf the disabled to the compliant restrooin.

21. _Pathof Travel to the Fourth Floor I
D. There was no indication o f the Elevator and the accessible pafh to fhe Fourth Floor. Eventually as one passes fhrough the eorritjor indicafedby the small exif sign, there is an
elevaforsign that is af a non-com~liantheight of 64-f/4"above fhe floor. I f is a non-
compliant sign. 14.30)
i
Agreed Solution: Provide d-irectionai signage in accordance with {4.1.3(16)(b)}.

Fourth Floor Fire Extinguisher and Drinking Fountain

B. The Fire Extinguisher is in a recessed cabinet and is located a non-compliant heighf o f 57" above the floor. {Page 19, Fig. 6(b)]

Agreed Solution: Lower fire:extinguisher to meet requirements of

{Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

I

C.

The drinking founfain is moun.ted af a projection disfance of 18-3/8 from the wall. If the

drinking fountain was mounted at the compliant underside heighf it would be a

compliantprojection hazard {4:4 I ]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

This fountain has a non-comp1.iant underside clearance of 26-7/8. (Page 4 1, Fig. 27(b))

i-

I

Agreed Soiutisii: No acltifoii rzquired.

25. FOURTH FLOOR ACCESSIBLE; UNISEX TOILET

!

A.

non- The signage for this toilet is ii? a non-comoliant location on the door (4.30.6)and is

compliant in type wifhout the symbol of accessibility (4.30.7)

Agreed Solution: Prpvide new room identification signage in a c c o r d a n c e with {4.1.3.j6(a)).

5.

The push side clearance for this door is a m-compliant 10". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)]

Agreed Solution: i\Coaciion required.

D.

The door closing period is a non-compliant 2.5 seconds. {4.13.5]

Agreed Soiution: ~ r o f i o s e aSoiution: Acijusi c i o s e r o r provide new c l o s e r to m e e t requirerrbenis of $4.13.5).

F.

The door push/pu/f pressure iS a non-complianf 5.5 Ibs. {4 13.11(2)(bJ

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer o r provide new c l ~ s e sto meet requirements of (4.13.1 I.I(b)).

G.

The threshold has non-compliant vertical edges of 5/8" on the outside and 7/16" on the

inside with non-compliant slopes on fhe edges. {4.13.8 & 4.5.21

Agreed Solution: Modify threshold o r provide new threshold in a c c o r d a n c e with (4.13.8 a n d 4.5.2).

1.

T'ie diaiigi,iig plafform k a: $ iion-complianf heighf of 38-1/2" f r c z ?hefleer. p ~ a ?~I,a,e

Fig. 6(c)} The changing platfiofm is in a compliant location.

Agreed Solution: Lower changing platform to m e e t requirements of (Fig. 6(c), P a g e 19). :

J.

The center of the foilef fixfur& is a non-comolianf 18-1/2" from fhe side wall. {Page 42,

Fig. 281

I

Agreed Solution: No akiion required.

M. The side grab bar is a compliant 43-f/4" long and a non-compliant distance of 5-f/4" from
the hack wall. {Page 43, Fig 30(a)) The heighf above the floor is a compliant 35".

Agreed Solution: Relocate side bar to meet requirements of (4.16.4).

Q. The sink is a non-compliant 30-1/2" above the floor to tbe fop of the rim. The sink has a non-compliant underside clearance of 27" with a bowl projecfion on fhe bottom. {Page 44,
Fig. 3 1)

Agreed Solution: Adjust sink height to meet requirements of (4.19).

T.

The bottom of fhe mirror is a non-compliant 40-3/8 above the floor. {4.19.6)

Agreed Solution: Adjust mirror heighi to meet requirements of (4.19).

V.

The toilet paper dispenser is a non-compliant 42" from the back wall. {Page 43,

Fig. 3G(d)) The heighf above the iloor is a compliant 29-1/2:.

Agreed Solution: Replace and relocate toilet: paper dispenser to
meet requirements aof {4.?6.6).

W. This is a non-compliant toilet paper dispenser because it resfricts the paper flow. {4.16.6)

-- So;iiiiiin: Agreed

I X P ~ L L ~ n--

--A QIIU

-I =-Ir-v-b-'a-r = "r-:vI-&tn~w. eym c a..-p.. = x

IC , u . *Iae;pmu+,a .o ,+ ; E l vhm, .

meet requisemeri?~of <4.46.6j.

27. FOURTH Fl-OOR LARGE COURTROOM ENTRANCE DOORS

C.

When the left door is fully open, fhe path of fravel from the Courfroom stair landing

leading fo the Elevator Lobby and Exit Sfair is reduced to a non-compliant 29-1/4".

14.13.51 and [SBC 1012.1.5.1

Agreed Solution: Provide compliant signage (4.301, including one door "in" and other door "out." Signs to be attached to doors (not to wall beside doors). Adjust doors so that they will open only in one direction.

-I=.

The $!SSS fi fhk door is zaf a nc)-cn.mnliant height of 57-1/2" above the floor. {Page A3.

Fig. A3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F.

The I& door has a non-compliant closing period of 1.37 seconds {4.13.10) and a m-

compliantpush pressure of 10lbs. 14.73.1?(2)(b)).

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of {4.13.1 I.I(b)}.

G.

The right door has a non-com~liantclosing period of 1.47seconds C4.13. $0)and a non-

compliant push pressure of 8 Ibs. 14.13.11(2)(b)).

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet
requirements of (4.13.1 I.I(b)).

J.

The glass in fhese doors is at a non-complianf height of 57-3/8 above the floor. {Page

A3, Fig. A3J

Agreed Solution: No action required.

K.

m- The leff door has a non-compliant closing period of 1-31seconds (4.13.1C1) and a

compliant push pressure of 8.5 Ibs..{4.13.11(2)(b)J.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of C4.13.1I.I(b)).

L.

non- The right door has a non-compliant closing period of 1.44seconds {4.43.7'0) and a

compliant push pressure of 6 lbs. .I.f.13.,I 1(2)(b)).

Agrsed Solution: Adji;'ust cIsser c r prsvirie new cEnser to rr?eef_ requirements of (4.13.1 l.l(b)}.

28. Fourth Floor Lame Courtroom

D.

-/ h e gate rhrough fne bar io the judiciai secfjon of the iaige C ~ u r i i ~ ohi iai s (2) k s v ~ s

fhaf are mounted on spring hinges. The clear passage clearance through the right gate is

a non-compliant 26- 1/2: and the clear passage through the letl gate is a non-compliant

27" f4.13.5). The push/pull pressure for fhese gates is a compliant 4 lbs. and 4.5 lbs.

respectively.

Agreed Solution: Barrier and security issues are part of the State's judicial program. This item will be addressed by the State of
Tennessee.

29. Fourth Floor Large Courtroom Jury Box

A.

The path of travel to the Jury Box leads through (2) jury box entrances, both having a

non-compliant clear passage opening of 24". 14.13.5) The approach to the first entrance

is clear. The approach to the second entrance reduces from 47-7Z" to 3 ~ - 7 E "and

crosses a loose cord profector at the Witness Stand.

5. The Jury Box has (12) fixed seats. The first row has a 12" cfearance and the second row has an 8" clearance. These are accessed by 6" high steps, which are non-compliant for wheelchair access. {4-5.2 & 4.3.8) The.first plafform is 37" deep. The second plaffom is 3 8 deep and neither pfafform is wide enough for maneuvering a wheelchair within.

Agreed Solution: The jury box and location of jurors are part of the
State's judicial program. This item will be addressed by the State of
Tennessee.

30. Fourth Floor Courtroom Witness Stand

A.

The path of travel to the Witness Stand between fhe Jury Box is a compliant 47--1/2" wide

space. The loose cord profecfor is considered to be a potenfial tripping hazard and a non-

compliant change of level. 14-52]

6.

The enfrance is through a non-compliant 26-3/8" wide passageway. {4.13.5) There is a

non-como!ianf 6" step to the raised pfafform. (4.5.2)

C.

The inside dimensions are 37-1/2 wide by 39" long and non-compliant for wheelchair

access. 14.2-31

Agreed Solution: The witness stand and location of witnesses a r e part of the State's judicial program. This item will[ b e addressed by the State of Tennessee.

32. Fourth Floor,Clerk and Master Office

A. The signage is mounted on the door a non-compliant 46-118 above the floor 14.30.6)
and non-compliant in type. (4301

Agreed Soiution: Provide new room identification s i g n a g e in accordance with (4.1.3.l6(a)].

C.

The glass in fhis door is a on-comoliant height of 51-1/8" above fhe floor. {Page A3, Fig.

A31

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D.

This door has a closer and noncompliant cylindrical hardware. {4- 13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in a c c o r d a n c e with (4.13.9) o r install ADA lever kit.

E.

The closing period for this door is a non-compliant 2.28 seconds. (4.13. 10)

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer o r provide new closer to m e e t requirements of (4.13.f I.l(b)).

F.

The push/pull pressure for fhis door is a non-compliant 7 Ibs. 14.13.11(2)(b}]

Agreed Solution: Adjust c l o s e r o r provide n e w c l o s e r to m e e t requirements of (4.1 3.1I.I(b)).

G. 'The threshold has a non-complianf verfical edge of 3/8". {4.5.2)

Agreed Solution: Modify threshold o r provide n e w threshold in a c c o r d a n c e with (4.13.8 and 4.5.21,

H. Thepush side ciearance for this door is a non-compliant 6". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)]

Agreed Solution: N o action required.

34. Fourth Floor Drinkinq Fountain Near the Clerk and Master Office

A.

The spout is a non-compliant 38-1/2" above the floor. {Page 41, Fig. 27(a)]

Agreed Solution: Lower unit or provide directional signage to accessible drinking fountain in accordance with {4.1.3(16)(b)}.

35. Fourth Floor Fire Alarm Near the Clerk and Master Office Door

A

This fire alarm is mounted at a noncompliant height of 61--1/4" from the floor. {Page -19,

Fig. 6(b)]

Agreed Solution: Relocate fire alarm to meet requirements of {Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

37. Fourth Floor Jury Room

A.

The signage is mounted on the door af non-compliant height above the floor. {4.30.6) and

non-compiiani in iype. (4.361

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1 -3.16(a)).

B.

The push side clearance for this door is a non-compliant 7-71'2". {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D.

This door has non-comoliant cylindrical hardware. C4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.1 3-91o r install ADA lever kit.

38. Fourth Floor Fire Alarm Near the Circuit Court Clerk Door

A.

This fire alarm is mounted at a non-compliant height of 61-1/4" from the floor. {Page 19,

Fig. 6(b))

Agreed Solution: Relocate fire alarm to meet requirements of {Fig. 6(b),Page 19).

40. Fourth Floor Circuit Court Clerk Office

A.

The signage is in a non-compliant location on the door at 46-7/8" above the floor 14.30.6)

and non-compliant in type. (4.30)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

a.

-/ his door has a closer and non-compliant cyiinaricai hardware. 14.f 3.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware
i n accordance with (4.1 3.9) or install ADA lever kit

F.

The closing period for this door is a non-compliant 1.5 seconds. {4.13.10}

Agreed So!ution: Adjarst cEoser or provide new closer to meet
requirements of (4.13.1 ?.l(b)).

G.

Thepush/pull pressure for this door is a rion--complianf6 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b]]

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of {4.13.12 .I(b)).

4 1. Directionai Sianaae

A.

No complianf exterior directional signage exisfs on the South side. {4.1.2,(7),(c)] If all

entrances are not accessible fhen directional signage is required to indicate the route to

the nearest accessible enfrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directionall signage at all non-accessible entrances i n accordance with {4."12(i)(c)).

42. Area of Rescue Assistance

A.

The buiiding is #on-compliant since if does not provide an area of rescue assisfance for

all levels above grade. See Aftachment "C" for defails.

Agreed Solution: One hour corridorsielevator lobbies are already
provided on the second floor and main floor. A 20-minute raied
corridor door is already provided on the second floor. County will add one 20-minute rated corridor door on the main floor, as well as communication equipment and area of refuge signage.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, @LAIEOm COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

)

1

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffm JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - JACKSON COUNTY

0, T .s Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 2 day of

&;i?(V b

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Jackson County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
i
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $1213l(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 mi 35 and any accompanying ex2laratio~s2s n z y be contained in the staeates, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE D A T E means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse andlor other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees thzt zlzll disabiiiiy access featwes that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thlrty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintifrs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Jones has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
Charlie Hix Jackson County Mayor Jackson County Courthouse P. 0.Box 617 Gainesboro, TN 38562-0617
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia,that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

i

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned action have

caused h i s Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs

e, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:

William J. Brown & Associates 23 Norlh Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
/

Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21St Ave South, Suite 100 Nashville, 1 '37212 (615) 298-1080
<
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEM, DEMCHAK, RALLER BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

For Defendant Jackson County, Tennessee:
/1
.
Thorn& M. Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & ~o'nnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date:

For Defendant County: Jackson County, Tennessee
Date: ! - Z Y - P Q ~ ~ /

L~~\rc Iio & , %L.
George Lane, ~la&tiff
< Date: \-\-0

Date:

4

JACKSON COUNTY Plaintiff:

Date

' J

JACKSON COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

Date:

A / ~ / J- -/ I ? ~
-/

A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff
Date: d ~ / 5 d r

AGREED SETTLEMENT JACKSON COUNTY

1. SOUTH PARKING AREA

I

A.

The parking for this courthouse is adjacent to the street around the building: Out of (37)

marked parking spaces there !yere (4) designated spaces. The ADA /-equires (2)

compliant accessible spaces. {4.1.2(5)(a))

B.

The (2) handicap parking space near the South entrance to the courthouse have non-

compliant signage at a non-compliant height of 16" above the surface. (4.6.4)

Agreed Solution: Provide compliant signage at south parking area (two spaces) to meet requirements of (4.6.4).

C. These parking spaces were not marked, painted or designated on the pavehent. {Page

26, Fig. 9)

I

Agreed Solution: Pr~videaccessibility markings on pajlement to comply with {Fig. 9, Page 26).

D. Portions of these parking spaces had non-compliant running slopes as high as 13% and cross slopes as high as 3.8% (see c!rawi,ygs). C4.6.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

The sidewalk from these parking spaces to the South courthouse door is non-compliant

because it has drop-o#s_of3s much as 8 without the required edge profectior?. 14.8.7)

Agreed Solution: Re-grade and re-seed areas adjacent to sidewalk to

comply with (4.8.7).

I

2. SOUTH ENTRANCE DOOR TO THE COURTHOUSE

A.

The threshold has a non-compliant edge of 7/8" on the outside and 74' on the inside

f4.5.2 & 4.13.8) with a compliant sloping threshold of 4 1.6% and 50.5%.

Agreed Soitition: Modify existing threshold or repiace threshold t~
meet requirements of (4.5.2 & 4.13.8). I

E.

The inside area to this door is encumbered by a non-compliant loose carpet f4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

3. WEST PARKING AREA

A.

The (2) handicap parking spaces near the wesf,entrance to the courthouse have non-

compliant signage at a non-compliant height of 30-1/2" above the surface. f4.6.4)

Agreed Solution: Remove all signage, accessible pavement markings and relocate two required accessible parking spaces south parking area.

B.

These parking spaces had non-compliant running slopes as high as 9.7% and cross

slopes as high as 6.7% (see drawings). 14.6.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required if accessible parking provided at south parking area.

C. The curb ramp from these parking spaces to fhe courfhouse door is non-compliant because it has vertical drop-offs of as much as 9-1/2" without curbs or handrails. (4.8.7)

Agreed Solution: No action required if accessible parking provided at south parking area.

D, The curb ramp has non-compliant running slopes up to 16.1% and non-compliant cross
slopes up fo 4.9%. The flared sides have non-compliant slopes up to 30%. {4.7.5)

Agreed Solution: No action required if accessible parking provided at south parking area.

E.

The path of trzvel to the West Er?trancedoor is along a 7-8" sidewa!k with a cemplianf

cross slope of 2%. The complaint sidewalk terminates at the base of a sloping buiit up

concrefe ramp that connecfs fo the West entrance door with a non-compliant slope of

11.4%. C4.8.2) The ramp is non-compliant also since it is not equipped with complaint

handrails/extensions 14.8.5) and compliant edge protection where there are 4- 1/2" vertical

drops on each side. (4.8.7)

Agreed Solution: No action required if accessible parking provided at south parking area.

4. WEST ENTRANCE DOOR TO THE COURTHOUSE

B. There is a non-compliant loose mat encumbering the inside area of this entrance. (4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

5. FIRST FLOOR CLERK AND MASTER

A.

The room identification signage is completely non-compliant based on C4.1.3, 16, (a)]

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.16(a)).

E.

The door to this office has non-complianf cylindrical hardware. 14.93.9) with no closer.

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

6. FIRST FLOOR FIRE EXTINGUISHER

A.

The fire extinguisher near the door of the Clerk and Master is at a non-compliant height of

60-1/2" from the floor. {Page 18, Fig. 5(a)} & {Page 19, Fig. 6(b)}

Agreed Solution: Adjust fire extinguisher height to meet requirements of (Fig. 5(a), Page 18 and Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

7. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN NEAR THE CLERK AND MASTER

A.

The water fountain near the ofice of the Clerk and Master is at a non-compliant height of

38" from the floor to the water spout. {4.15.2 & Page 41, Fig. 27(a)) and the boffom mosf

projection from the wall is a non-compliant 6-7/8". {Page 41, Fig. 27(a)}

6. Note: It appears that this fountain might be compliant excepf for its height boffom clearance off of the wall.

Agreed Soiutisn: No action required.

8. PATH OF TRAVEL TO DESIGNATED UNISEX TOILET ROOM

8. Thepush/pull opening pressure of this door was a non-compliant i O ibs. (4.13. i i(;?)('~)j

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 1.2(b)).

9. DESIGNATED UNISEX TOILET ROOM DOOR

A.

The signage for this toilet is non-compliant in design (4.30.4}, at a non-compliant location

on the door C4.30.61, and at a non-compliant height of 65". (4.30.61

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage.

C. Thepull pressure on this door is a non-compliant 6.5 Ibs. C4.13.1I }

Agreed Ssiiiiion: Adjust tlsser or provide nevi closer to meet requirements of €4.13.1I.2(b)).

D. The closing sweep period for this door was a non-compliant 2.29 seconds. {4.13.10}

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.10).

E. The threshold for this door slopes out at a non-compliant slope of 11.3%. f4.5.2 & 4.8.2)

Agreed Solution: County will re-tile restroom floor and ramp-up the corridor outside the restroom door.

F.

The threshold for this door has a non-compliant edge of 5/8" on the entrance side. {4.5.2)

Agreed Solution: County will re-tile restroom floor and ramp-up the corridor outside the restroom door.

G. The bathroom floor is a non-compliant I-1/4" above the outside corridor floor level. {4.3.8
& 4.5.2))

Agreed Solution: County will re-tile restroom floor and ramp-up the corridor outside the restroom door.

H. The door push pressure for this restroom is a non-compliant 8 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b)}

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.1 3.1 I.2(b)).

1.

The closing period for this restroom door is a non-compliant 2.22 seconds. {4.13.10)

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 1.1(b)).

J.

There is a non-compliant lock requiring pinching/grasping on the inferior of this restroom

door. 14.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace lock mechanism to meet requirements of (4.-I 3.9).

10. DESIGNATED UNISEX TOILET ROOM

B. The sink piping is non-compliant because of the lack of insulation. {4.19.4)

Agreed Solution: Add appropriate pipe insulation to meet requirements of (4.1 9.4).

E.

The soap dispenser is a non-compliant 49" from the floor for forward reach access. {Page

18, Fig. 5)

Agreed Solution:

Adjust soap dispenser height to meet

requirements of {Fig. 5, Page 18).

F.

The flush valve is located on the non-compliant narrow-side of the toilef. 14.16.5)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

G. The toilet fixture is a non-compliant distance of 19-1/2" from the side wall. {Page 42, Fig.
28)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

1.

The grab bars are non-compliant. f4.17.6; 4.26; Page 42, Fig. 28 & Fig. 29) There is no

back grab bar. The side grab bar is foo short and located a non-compliant height of 33-

1/8* from the floor. C4.17.6; 4.26; Page 42, Fig. 28 & Fig. 29)

Agreed Solution: Adjust existing grab bars to meet the height requirements of {4.17.6,4.26, Fig. 28 and 29, Page 42).

J.

The toilet paper dispenser was mounted at the compliant height of 28-7/2" off of the finish

floor {Page 42, Figure 29(b)). The front edge was located a non-compliant 3 3 off of the

back wall {Page 43, Figure 30(d)).

Agreed Solution: Relocate toilet paper dispenser to meet requirements of {Fig. 30(d), Page 43).

K. Adjacent lo this unisex toilet was an existing toilet room farmer; and another for women. The directional signage on the men's restroom was non-compliant. {4.7.3(16)(a)}

Agreed Solution: Provide ccrnpliaint directional sIg;nage to zeet
requirements of {4.1.3(16)(a)).

L.

The directional signage for the women's toilet was non-compliant. {4.1.3(16)(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

11. PLATFORM LIFT TO THE SECOND FLOOR

B. The pull side clearance for the entrance door of the lifi on fhe first floor was noncompliant due to its close proximity to a staircase. {Page 38, Fig. 25(a)]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. The phone in this plafform lift is non-compliant because it has no Braille, no instructions, and requires voice communication. {4.10.14)

Agreed Solution: County will install instructions concerning use of the emergency telephone.

G. Both the First and Second Floor doors have non-compliant closing periods (less that one second), and close very fast and with a strong force. {4.13.10) This is also a safety issue.

Agreed Solution: Add closers andlor adjust existing closers to meet requirements of (4.13.10).

1.

The entrance ramp to the lift floor on the Second Floor had a non-compliant slope of

70.9%. {4.8.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

J.

On the First and Second Floor there was a non-compliant difference between the /iff

piatform and the entrance ramp of 7/16". {4. I 1 & 4.5.2) (Note: For lifts 1/4" is the

maximum)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

K.

LIFE SAFETY ISSUE: . The corridor on the Second Floor is 57" wide. On the Second

Floor, when the Platform Lift door is open to the 90 degree position, a non-compliant 21"

of free space remains as clearance. [See SBC 1012.I.5.1 This lifi door when open blocks

more than one-half of the egress path for the occupants of the SmaN and Large

Courtroom. The platform lift door also opens into the flow of traffic of persons in the stair

landing creating a life safety condition in the event of an emergency. The double doors

from the Large Courtroom are double swinging and could totally block the egress path for

the Large Courtroom from the exit stairway since the platform lift door can only open just

over 90 degrees.

Agreed Solution: i90 action required.

12. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM DOOR

6. Note: The door to this courtroom is a double door with non-complianf 29" leaves.

Agreed So!utier.: Cout?ty ~ i I lprovide direcffona! signage to
accessible side door.

C. The accessible clearance through the door is a non-compliant 27-1/4". {4.13.5)

Agreed Solution: County will . provide dire-ctional signage to accessible side door.

D. These are double acting spring loaded doors. The closing swing time on the door is a non-compliant 1.28 seconds. {4.13.10} with a compliant 2 Ibs. opening push pressure.

Agreed Solution: County will provide directional signage to accessible side door.

13. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM

A.

The visitor seating capacity for this courtroom is (124). The ADA requires that there be

(4) designated handicap spaces and there were none. {4.1.3(19)(a)}

Agreed Solution: Provide appropriate number of accessible spaces to meet requirements of (4.1.3(19)(a)).

14. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM WITNESS STAND

A. As an individual approaches the witness stand and jury box areas, there is a narrow noncompliant passageway that is 30-1/2" wide. {4.2.1).

B,

Off of this passageway there is a non-compliant 6-'1/2" step up to the witness stand.

14.5.2)

I

I

C. The entrance to the witness stand is through a non-compliant opening of 23-7/8". 14.3.3)

D.

The floor area of fhe witness stand is a non-compliant ;31-11'2' by 51-3/4". 14.2.3)

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and the

location of witnesses is part of the state's judicial program and will

be addressed by the state.

I

15. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY B ~ X

A.

The jury box is accessed off of the same narrow pasgageway as the witness stand. The

entrance access from thejury box is through a non-compliant 24-I/#" opening. 14.3.3)

B.

The non-compiiant enfrance to tnejury box is accessed by way s fa 6-3;4" step to the iir~i

level 14.5.2) and 7" high steps to the second and third Yevels. 14.5.2)

C. Thejury box is non-compliant because them .is no maneuvering space within fhe jury box for a wheelchair 14.2.3).

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and the location
of the j ~ r yIS part ef the state's judicla! program and will he
addressed by the state.
I

16. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM TO JURY

ROOM

.

--

.

-

- --

. .

-

C. The door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware. {4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating deviiee with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADAilever kit.

D. Beyond this door, the jurors must pass through a nan-complianf corridor that is 30-3/8" wide and 38-112" long. (4.3.3) (Passage is through a n,arrowmetal detector.)

Agreed Solution: When necessary, jurors will pass from the courtroom to the jury room through the dguble doors located outside the court clerk's office and jury room. ' A court officer will assist jurors in entering and exiting through the double doors.

E. At the end of the non-compliant corridor is a comp1iar)tdoor opening that is 35-1/4" clear befween the stops, with a non-compliant 14.1% slope (1-3/8 in 1.13 from the corridor floor and the alcove floor. (4.5.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

I
17. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM

A.

The room identification signage i.s complefely non-compliant based on 14.1.3, 16, (a)]

Agreed Solution: The cburt officer that accompanies the jury will direct the jury to the apprppriate room.

5. The door to the jury room has non-compliant cylindrical hardware. 14.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordancewith (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

E.

The team was informed that if !here were a handicapped person in a wheelchair they

would not be required to pass thpugh the narrow com'dor but could exit through a narrow

double door info the stair that leads to the Court Clerk and the Jury Room. This is a

restricted use door for court officials. It has a non-compliant access width of 27': {4.13.5)

The closing period for this door v((asa non-compliant 1.07 seconds. {4.13.10]

Agreed Solution: No actibn required.

18. SECOND FLOOR COURT C L E R ~OFFICE
I
C. The room identification signage itscompletely non-compliant based on 14.1.3, 16, (a}]
i
Agreed Soiution: Bro\ride new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 61(a)).

19. MAIN DOOR TO SECOND FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM
1
D. This door has a non-compliantpQshpressure of 7 Ibs. {{4.13.11(2)(b)}

G. The Small Courtroom door's inte;riorfloor space is sloped with non-compliant slopes up to

15.7%. {4.5.2]

I

Agreed Solution: This cQurtroom will not be used if a person with a

mobility disability is participating in proceedings. The county will

establish a protocol to mbve the proceedings to the large courtroom

when a person with $ mobility disability participates in the

proceedings.

I

20. SECOND 1 REAR DOOR TO S E ~ O N DFLOOR SMALL COURTROOM
I
5. The 36" door at this SmaN ~o@roomhad non-compliant cylindrical hardware 14.13.9)
and no closer.

C. The entrance door threshold ha,s a non-compliant edge height of I-3/8" on the outside
and 7/16" on the courtroom side.\{4.5.2]

Agreed Solution: This courtroom will not be used if a person with a mobility disability is participating in proceedings. The county wiil establish a protocol to move the proceedings to the large courtroom when a person with a mobility disability participates in the proceedings.

21. SECOND FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM

A.

This courtroom seats (67) visitors. The ADA requires that there be (4) designated

accessible spaces, and there were none. {4.1.3(19)(a)]

6. This small courtroom was originally the rear section of the main courtroom. If has noncompliant slopes of approximately 6.1%, front to back over the entire room and noncompliant cross slopes of as much as 4.6%. C4.8.6) There were no level areas for a wheelchair to park anywhere in this room. {4.8.1 & 4.3.8)

Agreed Solution: This courtroom will not be used if a person with a mobility disability is participating in proceedings. The coe;nty will establish a protocol to move the proceedings to the large courtroom when a person with a mobility disability participates in the proceedings.

22. SECOND FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM WITNESS STAND

A.

The witness stand is non-compliant with (2) raisers that are 6" and 6-1/2". {4.5.2)

B. The floor area of the witness stand was a non-compliant 25" by 25-1/2" C4.2.3)

Agreed Sol-ution: This courtroom will n-otbe used-if a person with a mobility disability is participating in proceedings. The county will establish a protocol to move the proceedings to the large courtroom when a person with a mobility disability participates in the proceedings.

23. PUBLIC PHONE

A.

There is no public phone in this building. If installed at a later dafe, it must meet all

applicable codes and regulations.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

24. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE

A.

Non-compliant exterior directional signage. {4.7.2,(7),(c)) If all entrances are not

accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest

accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide exterior directional signage in accordance with (4.1.3.16).

i

25. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE

A.

The building is non-complianf since if does not provide an area of rescue assisfance for

all levels above grade. See atfacbmenf "C" for defails.

Agreed Solution: Provide an area of rescue assistance in accordance with (4.3.1 1).

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT O F TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

1

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )
COUNTY, C L M B O W E COUNTY, CLAY 1

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell
Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS TO JEFFIZRSON COUNTY

Tbs Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this>?day of ,@h r v d q ,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter "Plaintiffsy')and Defendant Jefferson County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT 1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§ 1213l(2).
2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
91213l(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 4 12132, and
its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
Page 1 of 14

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectivelyto the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercisingjurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts9,).
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms
used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. 5
12131 et sea. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling,
renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andfor county commission meetings are held.
5 . Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibilityof the Jefferson County Courthouse including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory, damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys'

fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.
7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attomeys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Jefferson County Courthouse whether asserted in t h s case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acimowledgethat the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMEBDYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00), which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17,2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
Page 3 of 14

13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refi-ain fi-omtalung any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibilityof the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. T h s paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMEANNTD MONITORING
15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
16. If anyparty to t h s Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Respondmg Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiff attorney, William J. Brown at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001, a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is acheved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A,
Page 4 of 14

said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs' attorney in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the
proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. Lf the requested
modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Jefferson County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Jefferson Co~ntysince none of these Plaintiffs have ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Jefferson County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Jefferson County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Jefferson County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement,promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of
Page 5 of 14

them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and SettlementAgreement which provides, inter alia,that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Piaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of $2,680.00 which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17,2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out herein. In the event that the Compromise and SettlementAgreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the abovecaptioned action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
Page 6 of 14

JEFFERSON COUNTY PlaintifE

Date
STATE OF COUNTY 0
Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, peared George Lane, with whom I am personally acquainted, and who acknowledged ed the foregoing instrument for the purposes
/CC my hand and seal on this the +cday

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public

A DATE: . 7-05

7% 6. On this the

day of (3~2 ,2005, personally appeared before me the

above named known to me personally or made h o w n to me by satisfactoryproof, who

was duly sworn and an oath executed the above verification.

My commission expires:

Page 8 of 14

JEFFERSON COUNTY
Plaintiff

Date

n-0 STATE OF

l.1 d b

COUNTY OF &I+v tc5

Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, personally appeared Ralph Ramsey, Sr., with whom I am personally acquainted, and who acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes herein contained.

~ d y Witness my hand and seal on this the'&

of ~ Y L L C ~ V ZOOS.

/.A

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public

d jmy ~ l ~ a. sc cia

i

JEFFERSON COUNTY

Plaintiff:

0m1'/-k STATE OF ?/!.

COUNTY

con

Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid,

personally appeared Ann Marie Zappola, with whom I am personally acquainted, and who acknowledged

that she executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes herein contained.

i

Witness my hand and seal on this the

#6 day of

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,2005.

Notary Public

0

My Commission Expires:

7

DATE: J - / & Q ~

~ussefLi arson Plaintiff

&&, On this the / 5 day of

2005, personally appeared before me the

above named known to me personally or ma& known to me by satisfactoryproof, who

was dulv sworn and an oath executed the above verification.

Notary Public .

d - 7- My commission expires:

20 U

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Page 11 of 14

DATE:

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Dennis Cantrell Plaintiff

On this the iS_ day of above named known to me was duly sworn and an oath executed the above verification.

7- My commission expires:

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Page 12 of 14

DATE:

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATE: 2 / 0 3 / 2 ~ 6 3
Attorneys for Plainti

Linda Dardarian Attorneys for Plaintiff

Page 13of 14

Date:

personally appeared

before me the above

made known to me by

satisfactor.y.proof, who was duly sworn and an oath executed the above verification.

My commission expires:

Page 14 of 14

APPENDIX A TO ADA COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT AS TO
JUDICIAL SERVICES FOR
JEFFERSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE

This document reflects the modifications that will be made to the Jefferson County Courthouse per the agreement of the parties. It is the additional understanding of the parties that Jefferson County will be constructing a new Justice Center which is expected to be completed by Fall of 2006. Following the completion of this facility, all judicial proceedings will be moved to the first floor of the existing courthouse.
Page 1 of 15

AGREED MODIFICATIONS JEFFERSON COUNTY
A. The parking lot adjacent to the rear of the building across the alley has (76) spaces. The ADA requires (4) spaces to be designated as handicapped accessible. {4.1.2,(5),(a)I
B. The (2) existing accessible parking spaces and designated aisles have non-
compliant slopes in both directions that exceed the maximum allowable slope of 1" rise in 50" run or 2% maximum in all directions. (4.6.3)
Agreed Solution: No Action Required.
C. The van accessible space was non-compliant because it has not been designated with the required compliant signage. {4.1.2,(5),(b) & 4.6.4)
Agreed Solution: Install appropriate signage.
D. The van accessible access aisle route along the front of the car of 58" does not permit a 36" clear space between the concrete wall and the bumper of the vehicle from the wheel stop, making a non-compliant condition. (Page 26, Fig. 9) The front overhang of the vehicle varies from 12" to 24" and the rear overhang of the vehicle varies from 32" to 42".
Agreed Solution: Remove wheelstops and restripe.
2. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The accessible route from the parking area to the second entrance of the building has an 82' long sidewalk with a compliant running slope of 3.8%; however this sidewalk has non-compliant cross slopes as great as 3.8% along the path. (4.3.7)
Agreed Solution: Remove concrete from that portion of the sidewalk which has non-compliant slope and re-pour.
B. The maximum running slope without handrails is 5% and the maximum sidewalk cross slope is 2%.
Agreed Solution: Provide appropriate handrail.
Page 2 of 15

C. The switchback ramp has a single non-compliant handrail due to the 33" height and the 2-3/8" diameter of the rail. The rail height shall be 34" to 38" and the diameter shall be between 1-1/4"to 1-1/2". {4.8.5,(1),(5)),(4.26.2)
Agreed Solution: Provide appropriate handrail.
D. The ramp does not have the required handrails or the re~uiredhandrail extensions on both sides of the ramp. {4.8.5,(1),(2)) The ramp also does not have the minimum 2" high edge protection required on the drop off side of the ramp. (4.8.7)
Agreed Solution: Provide appropriate handrails and edge protection.
E. The average slope of the first section of the ramp is a non-complaint 8.6% in lieu of the required maximian of 8.33%. The maximum ramp slope shall be 1" rise in 12" run or 8.33% or 4.76 degrees. (4.8.2)
Agreed Solution: No Action Required.
3. ENTRANCE DOOR
A. The entrance door has an accessible area outside the door but the inside accessible area is non-compliant due to a movable pew. {Page 38, Figure 25(a))
Agreed Solution: Remove pew.
B. The door is equipped with compliant lever hardware and a compliant door glass bottom edge located at 40" above the floor.
C. The pulVpush force to operate the door is 11 lbs. and has a compliant sweep period of 12 seconds.
D. A loose mat encumbers the interior accessible door space creating a non-
compliant condition.(4.5-3)
Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mat.
4. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM ENTRANCE DOOR TO THE FIRST FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
A. The accessible path is encumberedby many loose mats creating a m-
compliant condition. (4.5.3)
Page 3 of 15

Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mats.
B. A non-comuliant floor transition offset of 5/16" exists between the wood floor and the terrazzo floor. (4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: Shave 1/16" from the terrazzo floor at the place of transition.
5. FIRST FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
A. The signage was non-compliant because of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. (4.1.3,16,(a)) & (4.30)
Agreed Solution: County will add appropriate signage.
B. The entrance door is a double door with non-compliant 28 inch door leafs. (4.13.4) The bottom edge of the door glass is a non-compliant 59 3/4" above the floor in lieu of the 43"-5 1" minimum height required for a person seated in a wheelchair,(Figure A3)
Agreed Solution: County will provide compliant door leafs; otherwise no action required.
C. The pushlpull force is a non-compliant 6.5 lbs for the non-rated interior door in lieu of the 5 lbs maximum force.(4.13.11(b))
Agreed Solution: Adjust or replace closure.
D. The compliant sweep period is 5 seconds. E. The exterior space of the courtroom door is compliant but the interior space has a
non-compliant threshold of 1-5/23' (4.5.2) and a steep non-comuliant 16.2%
sloping floor. The 11" wide adjacent interior floor area has a 12.6%non-
compliant slope. (4.8.2)
Agreed Solution: Modify or replace existing threshold.
F. The door is equipped with compliant pusWpull hardware and non-functioning pinchingllatching type hardware.
Page 4 of 15

6. FIRST FLOOR COURTROOM
A. The courtroom will seat approximately(124) people in the wooden pew area and an additional (20) in the rolling chairs in fiont of the bar rail. The ADA re~uires (4) compliant wheel chair locations to be provided. (4.1.3(19)(a)) The assembly room size is 43'-1" by 47'-7" or 2,050 square feet.
Agreed Solution: County will remove existing pew(s) to provide 4 compliant wheel chair locations.
B. The fiont aislehar width is 69", which will not allow for a 30" x 48" space wherein a wheel chair to be located behind the bar q d allow a code compliant exit passageway behind the wheelchair. (Page 17, Figure 4(b))
Agreed Solution: No Action Required.
7. FIRST FLOOR JURY ROOM
A. The signage was non-compliant because of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. (4.1.3,(16),(a)) & (4.30)
Agreed Solution: Add appropriate signage.
B. The entrance door is 334" wide with a non-com~lian3t1%" clear opening in lieu of the 32" clear width required. (4.13.5 & Fig. 24)
Agreed Solution: Add appropriate signage.
C. The entrance door has a compliant floor space on the outside with moveable elements.
D. The entrance door has a compliant floor space of 51-112" on the interior due to a movable conference table.
E. The entrance door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob. (4.13.9)
Agreed Solution: Replace cylindrical knob with compliant hardware.
8. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM COURTROOM ON THE FIRST FLOOR TO THE JURY ROOM DOOR
A. The jurors' exit door fiom the courtroom has a non-compliant floor space on the inside due to a 35-112" wide passageway. (4.3.3 & (Fig. 25)
Page 5 of 15

B. The jurors' exit door &om the courtroom has a non-compliant 32" door leaf size.(4.13.5) & (Fig. 24)
C. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob. (4.13.9)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
9. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM COURTROOM ON THE FIRST FLOOR TO THE JURY BOX
A. The opening t h the bar rail is a non-compliant 33". (4.3.3) B. The narrowing non-compliant passageway width is 26%" to 23-W. (4.3.3) C. Thejury box entrance width is a non-compliant 224". (Page 15; Fig. 2 &
Fig. 24)
Agreed Solution: The passage through the bar rail will be made accessible. The access to the jury box will be as provided by the State's ADA Policy.
10. JURY BOX ON THE FIRST FLOOR
A. The jury box is non-compliant due to the presence of one step to get to the first level and a second step to reach to the second level of the jury box. (4.5.2)
B. The jury box is non-compliant due to space being inadequate to maneuver a wheelchair within.(4.2.3)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
11. WITNESS STAND ON THE FIRST FLOOR
A. The witness stand is non-compliant due to the presence of (2) 7" steps to access
the raised level. .(4.5.2)
B. The witness stand is non-compliant due to an opening of 29". (4.2.1 ) C. The witness stand has a non-compliant maneuvering space of 44" x 43". (4.2.3)
Agreed Solution: The location of a disabled witness will be as provided by the State's ADA Policy.
Page 6 of 15

12. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE MEN'S TOILET
A. The accessible path is non-compliant due to the presence of many loose mats. (4.5.3)
Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mats.
B. A non-compliant floor transition offset of 5/16" exists between the wood floor and the terrazzo floor.(4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: Shave 1/16" from the terrazzo floor at the place of transition.
13. MEN'S TOILET DOOR
A. The entrance door is a complimt 30" wide single door. However there is a m com~lian7t" push side clearance in lieu of the required 12" minimum. (Page 38, Fig. 25a)
B.. The signage on the door is non-compliant but the wall signage is compliant and mounted at a non-compliant height of 49" above the floor in lieu of the 60" to the center of the sign. (4.30.6)
C. The interior floor space has a non-compliant dimension of 38". The interior floor space is required to be 48" minimum.{Page38, Figure 2%)
D. The door is equipped with a compliant lever handle (4.13.91, a closer with a non-
compliant closing force of 9-112 pounds (4.13.1l(b)), and a compliant closing period of 4.3 seconds.
Agreed Solution: Construct an ADA compliant unisex restroom on first floor.
14. MEN'S TOILET
A. The toilet has a compliant 60" clear floor space. B. The sink is non-compliant due to the drain piping encroaching on the clear space
below the sink (4.19.2 & Fig. 31} and the lack of insulation on the plumbing pipes (4.19.4). The sink is located at the compliant height with a compliant single handle faucet; C. The mirror is located at a compliant height of 39 %" fiom finished floor to the bottom edge of the reflective surface. The paper towel dispenser is located the non-compliant height of 54 W .{Page 19,
Figure 6(b)1
D. The soap dispenser is located at the non-compliantheight of 51 W .(Page 18, Figure 5(a))
Page 7 of 15

E. The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 19"; however, the front edge is located at the non-compliant position of 37 W from the rear wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(d))
F. The urinal is located at the compliant height of 17", compliant elongatedbowl
length of 7",compliant flush valve height of 42" and the compliant flush valve
control operation force of 5 pounds. G. The toilet is located at the non-com~liantdimension of 21" from the
sidewall.{Page42, Figure 28) H. The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet (4.16.51, with a
non-compliant flush valve activation force of 7 pounds. (4.27.4). I. The height of the toilet seat is located at the compliant height of 1844". J. The sidewall grab bar is 42" long, located at the compliant height of 34", and is
positioned at the non-compliant dimension of 11" from the back wall. {Page 42, Fig. 26) K. The rear wall grab bar is 36" long, located at the compliant height of 34", and is positioned at the compliant dimension of 6" from the back wall.
Agreed Solution: Construct an ADA compliant unisex restroom on first floor.
15. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE DRINKING FOUNTAIN
A. The accessible path is non-comvliant due to the presence of many loose mats. (4.5.3)
Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mats.
B. A non-compliant floor transition offset of 5/16" inches exist between the wood floor and the terrazzo floor.{4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: Shave 1116" from the terrazzo floor at the place of transition.
16. DRINKING FOUNTAIN
A. The compliant drinking fountain has the compliant floor space, height to the spout, control location, and water stream height.
17. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE WOMEN'S TOILET
A. The accessiblepath is non-comvliant due to the presence of many loose mats. (4.5.3)
Page 8 of 15

Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mats.
B. A non-comuliant floor transition offset of 5/16" exists between the wood floor and the terrazzo floor. (4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: Shave 1/16" from the terrazzo floor at the place of transition.
18. WOMIEN'S TOILET
A. The entrance door is a compliant 36" wide single door. B. The signage on the door is located at the non-compliint location (4.30.6) and the
wall signage is mounted at the non-comuliant height of 49" above the floor on the hinge side of the door. The ADA requires the sign to be mounted on the latch side ofthe door at 60" to the center of the sig-n.(-4.30.6) C. The exterior floor space of the door is non-compliant due to the presence of a movable candy machine. (Page 38, Figure 25(a)) The interior floor space has a non-compliant alcove dimension of 44- ?4" on the inside of the door. The required minimum alcove width is 54". (Page 38, Figure 25(c)) D. The door is equipped with a compliant lever handle and a closer with a noncompliant closing force of 10pounds instead of 5 lbs maximum. (4.13.1 1(b)) E. The door has a compliant closing period of 4.3 seconds. F. This door also has a non-compliant slide bolt at 63 ?h" above the floor even though the lever locking mechanism appears to be functioning correctly.(4.13.9) 6. The door has a non-compliantpull side clearance of 7" in lieu of the required 18" minimum. {Page 38, Figure 25(a)) H. The toilet has a compliant 60" clear floor space. I. The sink has non-comt~liandt rain piping encroaching 2-1/2" into the clear accessible space under the sink (4.19.2, & Fig. 31);however, it is equipped with the compliant insulation. J. The si& is equipped with a compliant single handle faucet and is located at the non-compliant height of 35" instead of the required 34". (4.19.2 & Fig. 31) K. The mirror is located at a compliant heig-ht of 37 %" fiom the finished floor to the bottom edge of the reflective surface. L. The papertowel dispenser is located at the non-com~lianht eight of 59 ?4" instead of 48" maximum. (Page 18, Figure 5(a)) & (4.27.3) M. The soap dispenser is located at the compliant height of 43". N. The toilet paper dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 18 V .(Page 42, Figure 29(b)), and the fiont edge is located at the non-compliant position of 38 114" &om the rear wall. (Page 43, Figure 30(d)) The fiont edge of the toilet paper has to be 36" maximum &omthe back wall and 19" minimum to the centerline. 0. The toilet is located at the non-com~liantdimensionof 18-31'4" fkom the sidewall

{Page42, figure 28). The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet i4.16.5). The height of the toilet seat is located at the compliant height of
18 V.The toilet has a non-compliant flush valve activation force of 9 Ibs.
(4.27.4) P. The si.dewal1grab bar is 42" long, located at the compliant height of 34", and
positioned at the non-compliant dimension of 11" fi-omthe back wall. {Page42, Fig 29) Q. The rear wall grab bar is 36" long located at the compliant height of 34", and positioned at the compliant dimension of 5%'f'rom the back wall. R. A chmging station is located at a non-compliant height of 344" (4.32.4)and a non-compliant location not allowing the required 30" x 48" access space in front of the changing station. The space between the sink and the changing station is 27-3/4. (4.2.4.1, & Fig. 4@))
Agreed Solution: Construct an ADA compliant unisex restroom on the first floor.
19. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE COURT CLERK OFFICE
A. The accessible path is non-compliant due to the presence of many loose mats. 84.5.3)
Agreed Solution: Remove or secure mats.
B. A non-compliant floor transition offset of 5/16" exists between the wood floor and the terrazzo floor. (4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: Shave 1/16" from the terrazzo floor at the place of transition.
20. CIRCUITISESSIONS COURT CLERK OFFICE
A. The siiqage was non-com~lianbt ecause of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. {4.1.3,(16),(a)) & (4.30)
Agreed Solution: Add appropriate signage.
B. The entrance door is a compliant 36" wide single door. C. The push side clearance of the door is a compliant 8". D. The kterior floor space has a non-compliant dimension of 44-1/2" clear.
(Page 38, Figure 25 (a))
Agreed Solution: Bookcase encroaching on the pull side
Page 10 of 15

clearance to be relocated.
E. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob. (4.13.9)
Agreed Solution: Replace cylindrical knob with compliant hardware.
F. The bottom of the door glass is located at a compliant 43" above .finished floor.
21. JURY CHECK-IN OFFICE
A. The signage was non-comuliant because of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. (4.1.3,(16),(a)) &(4.30)
Agreed Solution: Will add appropriate signage.
B. The entrance door is a compliant 36" wide single door. C. The push side clearance of the door is compliant. D. The interior floor space is compliant. E. The door is equipped with a non-com~liantcylindrical knob. (4.13.9)
Agreed Solution: Replace cylindrical knob with compliant hardware.
F. The bcittom of the door glass is located a compliant 43" above finished floor.
22. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT
A. The sipage was non-compliant because of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. (4.1.3,(16),(a)) & (4.30)
B. The path of travel to the second floor is accomplishedby a non-comuliant stair and the non-compliant presence of many loose mats along the way. (4.5.3) See Item 3.1 below.
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
23. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR CLERK & MASTER
A. The path of travel to the second floor is accomplished by a non-compliant stair
Page 11 of 15

and the non-compliant presence of many loose mats along the way. (4.5.3) See Item 31 below.
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
24. SECOND FLOOR CLERK & MASTER DOOR
A. The signage was non-compliant because of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. {4.1.3,(16),(a)) & (4.30)
B. The entrance door is a single door with a non-compliant 33 inch door leaf.(4.13.5 & Fig. 24)
C. The push side clearance of the door is non-compliant due to the 5 %I" side clearance.(Page 38, Figure 25(a))
D. The interior floor space has a non-compliant dimension of 46 W .(Page 38, Figure 25(a))
E. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob (4.13.9) and a closer with a compliant closing force of 5 pounds. The door has a compliant closing period of 4.7 seconds.
F. The bottom of the door glass is located a compliant 39" above finished floor.
Agreed Solution:No action required due to new Judicial Building.
25. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
A. The path of travel to the second floor is accomplished by a non-compliant stair and the non-compliant presence of many loose mats along the way. (4.5.3) See Item 31below.
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
26. SECOND FLOOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURTROOM DOOR
A. The signage was non-compliant because of the location, size of characters and the lack of Braille. {4.1.3,(16),(a)) & (4.30)
B. The entrance door is a compliant double door with two 36" door leafs. C. The left door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware located at 38" above
the floor and a closer with a non-compliant closing force of 7 pounds (4.13.1 1(2),
(b)). The door has a non-com~liantclosingperiod of 2.88 seconds(4.13.10)
Page 12 of 15

D. The bottom of the door glass is located a non-compliant 58" above finished floor. (Figure A3)
E. The right door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware located at 38" above the finished floor. The door has a closer with a non-compliant closing force of 7 pounds {4.13.11(2), (b)) and a non-compliant closing period of 2.65 seconds. (4.13.10)
F. The exterior and interior floor space of the courtroom door is compliant. G. The door access is non-compliant due to a carpet edge strip that exceeds the
1 to 2 maximum slope. (4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
27. SECOND FLOOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURTROOM
A. The courtroom will seat approximately (56)people in the wooden pew area and an additional (12) in the rolling chairs in fkont of the bar rail. There are no wheel chair locations provided. The ADA requires (2) compliant wheel chair locations to be provided. (4.1.3(19)(a))
B. The front aislebar width is a compliant 76-3/4". C. The side aisle is a non-compliant width of 34". (4.2.1)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
28. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL IN THE SECOND F'LOOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURTROOM TO THE WITNESS STAND
A. The compliant passageway thru the bar rail opening is 36".
B. The narrowing non-compliant passageway width is 32-5/8" to 33-5/8". (4.3.3) C. The entrance to the witness box is a non-compliant width of 25 W .(4.2.1) D. The witness stand is also non-compliant due to the presence of (1) 9"step and an
additional 8-1/2" step. (4.3.8)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
29. WITNESS STAND ON THE SECOND FLOOR
A. The witness stand is non-comwliant due to the presence of one 9"step and an additional 8 ?4" step to access the raised level. A sign has been placed stating "Caution High Steps". (4.5.2)
B. The witness stand has a compliant opening of 40 1/4" and a non-compliant
Page 13 of 15

maneuvering space within the witness stand of 34-112" x 54". (4.2.3)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
30. DRINKING FOUNTAIN
A. The drinking fountain is a non-compliant type, the height to the spout is a noncompliant 43" above the floor, (4.15.2) the non-compliant control location is on the spout, (4.15.4) and water stream is a compliant height of 6 4 " .
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
31. STAIR TO THE SECOND FLOOR
A. This stair is a non-compliant means of egress. B. The &ads are 12". C. The risers are 6 %". D. The square nosings are a non-com~liant1-54",(4.9.3) E. The wall handrails are a compliant 1%" fiom the wall and a non-compliant 2-318"
wide and 1-32' thick. {There are no handrail extensions. {4.9.4(3), (4.26.21, {4.9.4(2)) F. The open side rail is 29" above the nosings. (4.9.4 (5)) & (2000 Edition of NFPA 101, 7.2.4.6(1)) G. The non-compliance landing head clearance of the hghest landing is 69", (4.4.2) H. The pardrail/wall on the second floor is 28-34' high and a safety hazard. The Life Safety Code requires a minimum of 42" of guardraillwall.(2000 Edition of NFPA 101, 7,2.2.4.6(2)) I. There is unlawfbl unprotected chemical storage under the stair.
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
32. ELEVATOR
A. There is no elevator in this building. (4.14 & 4.5.2)
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
Page 14 of 15

33. PUBLIC PHONE A. There is no public phone in this building. If installed at a later date, it must meet all applicable codes and regulations.
Agreed Solution: No action required due to new Judicial Building.
34. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE A. Non-compliant exterior directional signage. (4.1.2,(7),(c)) If all entrances are not accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest accessible entrance.
Agreed Solution: Will add appropriate signage.
B. Non-compliant directional signage for accessible toilet. {4.1.2,(7),(d))
~ ~ r h Seodlution:Will add appropriatesignage.
35. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE A. The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue assistance for all levels above grade. See attachment "C" for details.
Agreed Solution: No action required.
Page 15 of 15

 
 M TNE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN
MARIE ZAPPOLA, nmms CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A, RUSSELL LARSON,

)

PIaintiffs,

1

1

v.

1

STATE OF TEMlVESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAUETTE COUNTY, GRATNGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKTNS )

COUNTY, KICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

I

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

Defendants.

)

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell
Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - LAKE COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this L3 day of
2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, BeverIy Jones, Ann Marie Zappala, Deimis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larsan (hereinafter "Plaintiffs7? and Defendant Lake County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1,. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§ 12131(2).
2. Lake County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1).
Lake County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.SC. 5 12132, and its implementing
regulations, 28 C.F.R.Part 35.

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Lalce County, and the AOC C'AdministrativeOfice of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these ~ef&tions,the definitions of terms used in
this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C.3 12131et seq. and 28
C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying expIanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutesand regulations.
a. ''AL'iE,RATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes
my official agency of Lake County.
c, "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed
by a party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Consijtution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing tfie facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Lake County Courthouse, including, but not limited to, a11 claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. PlaintiEs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and Erom any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, lcnown or udcnown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Lake County Courthouse whether asserted in this case or oti1envise, inchding, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal..

9. Plaintiffs further agree and aclcnowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement sllall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of considerationor inadequate consideration

OBLXGATIONS ASSUMEDBY THE DEFENDANCTOUNTY

10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no fbther liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

XI. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate wit11 the State af Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in
compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.

13. Notwitllstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact: the

Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action

that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicia1 program conducted in

Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

334734

3

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14, Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafier to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at ail times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMEANNTD MONITOMNG

15. The United States District Court for the Middle ~ i s k i cotf Tennessee shall have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee, This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agrecment believes that another party is violating its obligations under t l h Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Partyy'), then the Complaining Party shall. give written detaiIed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given t l i ~ t y(30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffsyattorney, William J. Brown, at P.D.
Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets fort11 its progress in making the AIterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specifled therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alternations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of tl~eCounty stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19, If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement

because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant

County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for

Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

334734

4

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUPRSOVISIONS
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs have ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 3 19) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement afirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable,
24. fhis Agreement sets fort11 the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective, Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J, Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. 116s Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee approving the Compromise and Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and the State of Tennessee which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17, 2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of $2,680.00 which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued by through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. In the event that the Memorandum of Understanding is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition and all defenses, otherwise available, wouId continue to be available included but not limited to standing and are not waived by this Agreement.
TN WITNESS WHEREOF, PlaintiEs 2nd Defendant: County in the above-captioned action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown, Esq. Willian J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001
Martlta M. Lafferty @PR# 19817) Gary D.Housepian (BPR # 6969)
Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21' Ave South,Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Date: a/)5 / m 5

For Defendant County:

Lalce County, Tennessee

n

d- Date: ,/-

D~y,

Date

LAKE COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

LAKE COUNTY
(
Plaintiff:
Date

Plaintiff:
d//5/d
Date .

LAKE COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

Plaintiff:
-7-w-8~ Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES
JUDICIAL SERVICES
FOR LAKE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section 1. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 398 CV 0731.
Issue Date: June 25,2004 Site Visit Date: June 22, 2004
Revised: August 19,2004
Bwscl BARGE WAGGONER SUMNER & CANNON, INC. 21ICommerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500 Fax: 615-255-6572

i.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................Page 2 - 3
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND........................................................Page 3 111. FSTARCAILTIETGYIEEVSIAOLPUIAMTOIONSN.S..I..C...O...M....P..L...I.A...N...C...E..................... Page 4 - 9
A. Accessible Parking B. Accessible Path of Travel to the Main Entrance Door C. Accessible Entrance D. Accessible Path of Travel to the Second Floor E. First Floor Clerk and Master Office F. Second Floor Circuit Court Clerk's Office G. Second Floor Courtroom Door H. Second Floor Courtroom Jury Box I. Second Floor Courtroom Witness Stand J. Second Floor Courtroom Jury Room IS. Second Floor Jury Room Drinking Fountain L. First Floor Accessible Toilet Room M. Accessible First Floor Drinking Fountain N. Accessible Second Floor Toilet Room 0. Fire Extinguisher P. Interior Signage Q. Area of Rescue Assistance
ATTACHMENTS
Lake County Courthouse
335386.

LOCATION: Lake County Courthouse 229 Church Street Tiptonville, TN 38079
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Sumner & Cannon, Inc. (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Lake County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated April 15,2004. Data for t h s report was obtained in a field investigation by BWSC on June 22,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report prepared by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of this report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with DisabilitiesAct Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register 1 Vol. 56, no. 144 / Friday, July 26, 1991, Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code complianceor Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterations to the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title 11State and Local Government Title 111Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities
Title lV Telecommunications
Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law.
Lake County Courthouse
335386.

The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title II. The following excerpts &om"The Americans with DisabilitiesAct Title 11Technical Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
"Title I1 of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities fkom discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals with disabilities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This standardjknown as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number of methods. In many situations, providing access to facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title 111, public entities are not required to remove barriers fkom each facility, even if removal is readily achevable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structural member would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The Lake County Courthouse is a two-story structure erected in 1908. In the 1960's a one story addition was constructed at the rear of the building. Following a fire in 1990, some repairs and renovations were made; however, the original interior plan does not appear to have been changed. The building retains its historic character on both the interior and exterior. In the recent past an accessible Toilet Room was designated on the First Floor, an automatic opening device was added to the pair of fkont doors, and a platform lift was added to access the Second Floor.
Lake County Courthouse
335386.

111. FACILITY EVALUATIONSICOMPLIANCESTRATEGIESIOPINIONS
RECOMMENDATIOANRSE TO BE FOLLOWED UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1 , 2 & 4, FDC Report) There are three designated accessibleparking spaces on the street around the courthouse. Only one accessible space is required.
RECOMMENDATION: The number of parking spaces is in compliance with ADA, however, BWSC recommends that two of the three handicap spaces be converted into standard spaces, leaving only the one required space.
Designated Parking on Court Street, DP-1 and DP-2
It is recommended that both existing spaces be converted to standard spaces. The 5thor 6thspace fiom Church Street (if the existing designated spaces are the 1' and 2ndspaces) should be the new accessible space. This space should be leveled out by building up (back filling) the middle of the space to flatten out inconsistencies and make both the running slope and the cross slope compliant. This space should be a van accessible space (11'-0" wide) with a van accessible aisle (8'-0"). An ADA compliant sign indicating the van accessible space should also be provided. This aisle should end in an ADA compliant curb ramp.
Designated Parking DP-3 on Church Street and Accessible Path of Travel to the Main Entrance Doors
It is recommended that this space be converted to a standard space, thereby eliminating the need to provide an accessible route to this parking area.
B. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE MAIN ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 3, FDC Report) The existing ramp from the sidewalk up to the porch and entrance doors is non-compliant. The slope of the ramp is too steep in places, the intermediate landing is too small and the handrail is not continuous. There is no level landing in front of the doors.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The sidewalk should be repaved due to the condition of the existing walk (cracks and general degradation of the walk) and to account for the new curb ramp (whch must be out of the path of travel). A level landing should also be provided at the base of the Handicap Ramp that goes fkom the accessible path to the fiont door. The Handicap Ramp must also be improved.
Beginning at the entrance to the building, a noncompliant ramp slopes up to the doorway. The area outside the door should be level, which may require the construction of a level landing from the door threshold. At least 5'4" of clear space (exclusive of any architectural elements which protrude into the landing area) at this level landing should
Lake County Courthouse
335386.

be preserved before the ramp begins to slope down toward ground level. The ramp should have ADA compliant slopes of no more than 8.3% for a run of less than 30'-0" before arriving at a level landing. It is recommended that this landing be roughly at the same place as the existing landing (though it will be built up from that landing). This landing will also be larger than the existing landing and should be 5 ' 4 " by 5'-0". The path should then turn south (instead of north along the existing ramp), again at a slope of no more than 8.3%. It is anticipated that the ramp will reach ground level within 30'4" of run, but if not, another landing may be required. The ramp should end at a level landing along the accessible route, as described in the paragraph above. This ramp should also have ADA accessible rails with the required 1'-0" rail extensions and should have all required edge protection. The railing must be continuous for the length of the ramp. This may require that railing be attached to the building for some portion of the ramp. The lower run of the existing ramp should be removed.
C. ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 5, FDC Report) The accessible entrance is though a pair of doors equipped with an automatic operator. The operator buttons on both the interior and exterior of the building lack raised characters or Braille on the pad surface. Each single door leaf has a non-compliant clear opening. There are loose mats at both the interior and exterior sides of the doors. There are loose floor tiles on the interior floor surface.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The automatic door operator allows both leaves to open together and thus provide a compliant clear opening. If they are available, the County should install push pads with raised characters and Braille. Current industry standard for this item is recessed characters and accessibility symbol. The loose mats should either be removed or fastened down in a compliant manner. Loose floor tiles should be securely reinstalled or replaced.
PER 1/25/05: LOOSE MAT - NO ACTION REQUIRED AS VENDOR HAS
INDICATED IT IS COMPLIANT WITH THE ADA.
D. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND PLOOR
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 9, FDC Report) The accessible route to the Second Floor is by a Platform Lift located in the main entrance corridor. There are a number of non-compliant items related to the Lift and its access ramps.
RECOMMENDATION: The First Floor ramp to the lift should be replaced so that the slope is a maximum of 1:12 and there is no vertical drop greater than W .The warped platform floor should be adjusted to make it more level. This will help eliminate the noncompliant drop between the lift platform and the ramps. The handrail inside the lift should be shimmed out to give a space of 1 112" between the rail and the wall. The door closer at the First Floor should be adjusted to have a compliant pusWpull pressure and closing time. The seat should be removed from inside the cab. The loft operation should be adjusted to stop the platform w i t h W of the door threshold at the Second Floor. The
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Second Floor Ramp should be modifiedto have a compliant beveled edge where it meets the floor.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: No change to the handrail is required.
E. FIRST FLOOR CLERK & MASTER OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.11, FDC Report) This space is compliant except for the signage and door hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant room identification signage should be installed. As the door is always open when the Office is open for business, there is no need for a compliant door handle within the scope of the current lawsuit.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Compliant door handles are required at this office.
P. SECOND IFLOOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 19, FDC Report) There are two doors to the Circuit Court Clerk's Office,both opening off the same corridor. The room identification signage and door hardware on each are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant room identification signage should be installed and the lockset replaced with a compliant design. As one of the doors is always open when the Office is open for business, there is no need for a compliant door handle within the scope of the current lawsuit.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Compliant door handles are required at this office.
G. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 23, FDC Report) The door has non-compliant identification signage and the door hardware on the pair of doors is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Compliant hardware and signage should be installed.
H. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM JURY BOX
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 26, FDC Report) The Jury Box is located on two levels, one step and two steps above the main Courtroom floor. Neither level has an adequate maneuvering space for a wheelchair.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Making the current Jury Box accessible would require installation of a ramp or lift plus a minimum 5 foot square maneuvering space at the level of the Jury Box floor. Such an installation would require reworking the existing access to the Jury Box and would take up a large amount of floor space (50 to 75 square feet plus
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an access aisle at floor level.) There is sufficient room on the floor level beside the entrance to the Jury Box for a wheelchair space with good sightlinesto the Witness Box, the Judge's Bench and the Attorney's tables. The lectern and tables in the judicial area are moveable and could easily be rearranged if necessary.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: ModiJication of the Juy Box in order to enable aperson in a wheelchair toparticipate Pom a location inside the Juy Box enclosure is required. As a general guideline, it was suggested thatpart ofthe solid rail enclosure be removed, andpart of the lower seating level (about 36" x 48'7 be replaced with a removable platform. This would enable a person in a wheelchair to sit atfloor level,yet be within the Juy Box enclosure. Provision of a 60" by 60" maneuvering space within the Jury Box is not required. The County should work with a designprofessional to arrive at a functional solutionfor thisparticular Courtroom. .
PER 1/25/05: NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO THE JURY BOX. INSTEAD, STATE PROTOCOL WITH REGARD TO JURY BOX WILL BE FOLLOWED.
I. SECOND F'LOOR COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 27 & 28, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is inaccessible for wheelchair users due to a narrow passage to the entrance beside the Jury Box, two steps up to the seating level and a lack of maneuvering room within the Witness Stand.
RECOMMENDATION: The floor of the Witness Stand is 14" above the Courtroom floor. Installation of a ramp or lift to access this area would require rebuilding the Jury Box, the Witness Stand and the Judge's Bench. Such an installation would also take up a minimum of 50 square feet of area unavailable in the existing plan of the judicial area of the Courtroom. There is area available for a wheelchair space in front of the Witness Stand, within good view of the Jury Box, the Judge's Bench and the Attorney's tables. The County could provide this as an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb stairs. Such a witness could use a hand-held or portable microphone.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The County should make a rule that in a proceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the Witness Stand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level infiont of the WitnessStand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
J. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 30, FDC Report) The door has non-compliant hardware. The room identification signage is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant door hardware and signage should be installed.
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K. SECOND FLOOR JURY ROOM DRINKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 31, FDC Report) The spout height is 3'4" too tall, the water height is 34''
too low and the control is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: A drinking fountain is not required in this location. The County has advised BWSC that the water fountain will be removed and not replaced. If the County wishes to maintain this amenity, a new compliant fixture, designed for a side approach by a wheelchair, should be installed.
L. FIRST FLOOR ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 15, 16, FDC Report) The Unisex Toilet Room on the First Floor is designated as accessible; however it has a number of non-compliant features.
RECOMMENDATION: The ADA requires a minimum of one unisex, accessible Toilet Room on the First Floor. In order to mike the UrLisex Toilet Room compliant the following alterations should be made:
Compliant signage should be installed. Compliant door hardware should be installed. A new, wall-mounted sink should be installed, compliant with ADAAG regulations. New compliant faucet handles should be installed. The paper towel dispenser should be installed at a compliant height. The toilet should be moved so that the centerline of the fixture is a compliant 18" from the side wall. The toilet seat should be raised to a complaint height of 17" to 19". o New side and rear wall grab bars of a compliant length should be mounted at a compliant location. The toilet paper dispenser should be relocated to a compliant location, The coat hook should be relocated to a compliant height.
PER 1/25/05: CHAIN LATCH SHOULDBE MADE COMPLIANT BY
REPLACING WITH SLIDING LATCH
M. ACCESSIBLE FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.13, FDC Report) The accessible First Floor Drinking Fountain is mounted too high.
RECOMMENDATION: Reinstall the drinking fountain at a compliant height.
N. ACCESSIBLE SECOND FLOOR TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 20,21,32, 33,34 & 35, FDC Report) There are three Toilet Rooms on the Second Floor: a public Unisex Toilet Room at the head of the stairs, and both a
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Men's Toilet Room and a Women's Toilet Room opening off the Jury Room. None of these are accessible.
RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG requires at least one accessible Toilet Room on the Second Floor. Extensive renovation will be required to create an accessible Toilet Room on this floor. The County should identify the most feasible location for either modification of an existing Toilet Room or installation of a new one.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04:No modiJicationof the Second Floor Toilet Rooms is required ifthe County creates and enforces a rule banning use of the Jury Toilet Rooms whenever ajury includes a member unable to climb stairs. In such a case, the Jury Toilet Rooms shall be locked and alljury members will be required to use the First Floor UnisexAccessible ToiletRoom.
0 . FIRE EXTINGUISHER
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 7 & 36, FDC Report) Fire exting-~;isheorsn both the First and Second Floors are mounted at a non-compliant height.
RECOMMENDATION: The existing fire extinguishers should be re-mounted at a compliant height of 54" for side reach or 48" if forwardreach is required.
P. INTERIOR SIGNAGE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 38, and throughout FDC Report) There is no compliant signage in this building.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage should be installed to designate pennanent rooms and spaces throughout the building, and to provide directions to or information about functional spaces of the building. On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified, and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance.
Q. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 39, FDC Report) The ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fire if there is not an accessible means of egress from that part of the building. There is no Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of this building.
RECOMMENDATION: It should be noted that ADAAG exempts existing buildings fiom the requirement for an Area of Rescue Assistance. However, it is recommended that the County work with a design professional to identify requirements and the most feasible location for an Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of this Building.
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ATTACHMENT A SITE
Lake County Courthouse
335386.

 
 M THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRfCT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LAME, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )
MA= ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, j

RALPH E.RAMSEY, Sr., and

A, RUSSELL LARSON,

1

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )
COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER 1

COUNTY, CLAIBQruYE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, C O W COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAiNGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWIUNS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

No. 3 9 8 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JllJRY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - LEWIS COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter ccAgreemeni")is entered into this 23 day of

F%b(va W

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly .Jones, Ann

Marie Zappola, ' ~ e n n i sCantrel, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffsy') and Defendant Lewis County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.$ 12131(2).
2. Lewis County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.§1213l(1).
Lewis County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U-S,C. 5 12132, and its implementing
regulations, 28 C.F.R.Part 35.

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the cuurt11ouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Lewis County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. TJnless otherwise specified in these Dehitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitionsas are contained in 42 1J.S.C. $ 12131et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or
repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECTFACILITIES.
b, "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Lewis County.
c. "EFFECTIVEDATE" means the Iast date upon which this Agreement was executed
a Party,
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned
and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Lewis County Courtl~ouse, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. . Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely reIease and discharge Defendant
County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, Icnown or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Lewis County Courthouse whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prqjudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal..

9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, far the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of considerationor inadequate considerition.

OBLIGATIONASSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY

10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no m e r liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in
compliance with Title IX of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately, Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the-Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.

13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

334735

3

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of ajudicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMENATND MONITORING

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"), The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to tile expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alternations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has coinpleted the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22)' setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

334735

4

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph f 6 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer hasjurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs have ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent Jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
23. T l ~ erepresentatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement a f f m s that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection wit11 the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24- This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions, No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the off~ceof Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, arid their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee approving the Coinpromise and Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and the State of Tennessee which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17, 2004, including those reIating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of $2,680.00which reflects Defendant County's pro ~ a t ashare of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued by througll December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. In the event that the Memorandum of Understanding is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition .and all defenses, otherwise available, would continue to be available included but not limited to standing and are not waived by this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned
action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ransey, Sr,, Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown, Esq. William J. Brown & Associates
Ma~thaM. Laffei-ty (BPR#19817) Gary D.Housepian (BPR # 6969)
Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21 Ave South, Suite 100
Nashville, JX37212

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice
Roberta L Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDS'EM, DEMCHAK,BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARfAN
300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510)763-9800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Date:

For Defendant County: Lewis County,Tennessee
/-'-
Date:

Plaintiff: Date

LEWIS COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

LEWIS COUNTY PlaintifE

Date

/

Plaintiff:

Date '/

/

LEWIS COUNTY Plaintiff:
cnd -qo.--3-l):?,-
Date

Plaintiff: A. Russell Larson Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES JUDICIAL SERVICES FOR
LEWIS COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section I. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 3:98 CV 0731.
Issue Date: June 22, 2004 Site Visit Date: June 18, 2004
Revised: August 23, 2004
211 Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500 Fax: 615-255-6572

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................Page 2
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
11. FACILITYBACKGROUND.......................................................Page 3 111. FSTARCAILTIETGYIEESVIAOLPUINAITOINOSN.S..I..C...O...M....P..L...I..A...N...C...E...................... Page 3 - 8
A. Accessible Parking B. Accessible Route from Parking to Entrance Door C. Accessible Path of Travel, Elevator Lobby D. Elevator E. Path of Travel to Second Floor Small Courtroom F. Second Floor Courtroom Witness Stand G. Path of Travel to the Second Floor Large Courtroom H. Second Floor Large Courtroom Door I. Second Floor Large Courtroom Witness Stand J. Second Floor Large Courtroom Jury Box K. Accessible Toilet Room L. Drinking Fountains M. Fire Extinguishers N. Interior Signage 0. Area of Rescue Assistance
ATTACHMENTS A. Site

LOCATION: Lewis County Courthouse 110 North Park Street Hohenwald, TN 38462
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Sumner & Cannon, Inc. (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Lewis County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated April 19,2004. Data for this report was obtained in a field investigation by BWSC on June 18,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of this report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register / Vol. 56, no. 144/ Friday, July 26, 1991,Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterations to the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title I1 State and Local Government Title III Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities
Title IVTelecommunications
Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law
The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title II.
The following excerpts from "The Americans with Disabilities Act Title 11Technical Assistance Manual'' explain some of these requirements.
Lewis County Courthouse
335391.

"Title 11of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles, Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities fi-omdiscriminationon the basis of disability in the services,programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to inhviduals with disabilities because its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities, when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number of methods. In many situations, providing access to facilities through structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternativesto structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesip of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title 111,public entities are not required to remove barriers fi-om each facility, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is "technically infeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structural member would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The Lewis County Courthouse is a two-story building with a basement, constructed in 1939. The construction is load-bearing masonry walls with concrete slab floors supported on steel bar joists. Interior walls are masonry finished with plaster or wood paneling.
Some alterations have been made in the recent past with the goal of providing greater accessibility. These include the addition of an elevator serving the two floors, the basement, and a new at-grade EntranceIElevator Lobby. An accessible Unisex Toilet Room was also added on the First Floor.
In. FACILITY EVALUATIONS/COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES/OPINIONS
NOTE: The FDC Report contains sections discussing rooms and paths of travel which are acknowledged by FDC to be completely compliant with ADAAG regulations. For
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clarity, this report will respond only to areas and items of non-compliance identified in the FDC Report.
RECOMMENDATIOAN&S TO BE FOLLOWEDUNLESS OTHERWISENOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC Report) The primary deficiencies in accessible parking for this building are the number of handicap spaces and the height of signage designating those spaces.
RECOMMENDATION: Due to the generous aisle provided between the two existing spaces, it is possible to add a handicap space by simply re-striping the area without losing any other spaces. The two spaces should be striped in such a way as to allow two standard handicap spaces and one van space with two required access aisles. Additionally, all signage, including the two existing "elevator" signs at the east and west entrances to the building, the two existing handicap parking signs and one new handicap van parking sign, should be placed into appropriate new locations and raised to meet ADA requirements.
B. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC Report) The existing path in general is an accessible walkway, but curb cuts and sidewalks will be needed to connect the parking spaces to the accessible route.
RECOMMENDATION: Sidewalks and curb cuts connecting the aisles between handicap spaces to the existing sidewalk should be installed where necessary. These new sidewalk connectors should meet ADA requirements.
C. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL, ELEVATOR LOBBY
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 3, FDC Report). The floor space in the Elevator Lobby is smaller in one direction than the required maneuvering room. The exterior door threshold is too high and does not have the required beveled edge.
RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG regulations require a 60" diameter clear floor space for wheelchair turning. If the short dimension of this Lobby was ?4" larger, the 60" clear space would be available (including the 11" recess to the elevator door). The existing design would be unacceptable as proposed new construction. However, the condition is existing; the walls are masonry construction and there is additional floor space within the Lobby, but outside the required turning circle. Although the space does not meet the letter of the requirements, the path of travel is accessible.
The exterior door threshold should be replaced with a compliant model.
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At the exterior door to the Elevator Lobby, the door closer should be adjusted to a compliant closingperiod and the threshold replaced with one having a total height ofno
more than '/z ".
D. ELEVATOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 4, FDC Report) The height of the hall call buttons on all floors, the height of the floor identification numbers on the elevator door jambs on all floors ,and the height of the door reopening device are all non-compliant by less than an inch. The in-cab lanterns that point up or down illuminate in a sequence that is non-compliant. The star on the car control buttons is next to the wrong floor designation. The elevator was marked incorrectly as an exit.
RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG regulations give a single dimension for the centerline mounting heights of the hall call buttons and floor designations rather than identifying an acceptable range of heights. ADAAG also makes no allowance for the small errors that typically occur in the course of building construction. While these items are technically non-compliant, no functional advantagewould be gained by repositioningthem. At the time of BWSC's site visit, the star designation for main entry floor on the control buttons had been moved to identify the correct floor, and the signage identifying the elevator as an exit had been removed.
The in-cab lantern functions should be corrected by building management as a maintenance issue.
E. PATH OF TRAVEL TO SECOND n O O R SMALL COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 11, FDC Report) The path of travel to the Second Floor Small Courtroom passes through a short corridor,just outside the Small Courtroom door, which is too narrow to provide the required 48" clear space in ii-ont of the door.
RECOMMENDATION: The corridor is enclosed with masonry walls. BWSC was told by the County Executive that this room is used as a courtroom at most 5 times per year. It functions as an "overflow" location used for court proceedings involving few participants at times when the schedule for the Large Courtroom is crowded. The county should arrange for another, accessible space to be used when a participant in the proceedings is in a wheelchair.
F. SECOND FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 14, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is accessed by a 6 ?h" step.
RECOMMENDATION: Since it is recommended that the Second Floor Small Courtroom not be used for proceedings in which a person in a wheelchair is a participant, there is no need to alter the access to the Witness Stand.
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Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The County should make a rule that in a proceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the WitnessStand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level infront of the Witness Stand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
G. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 22, FDC Report) FDC calls the design of the guardrail at the stair non-compliant. The mounting height of signage is too high.
RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG regulations do not cover the design of guardrails.
Signage should be re-mounted at a compliant 60".
Per FDC at meeting on 8/6/04: Signage shall be remounted immediately below the wood trim rail piece which is existing at 60" above thefloor in all corridors of the building.
H. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM DOOR
ISSUE: (ReE Sec. 23, FDC Report) The closer on the Large Courtroom door requires ?4 lb. too much push/pull force.
RECOMMENDATION: The door closer should be adjusted to require less force.
I. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM WITNESS STAND
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 25 & 26, FDC Report) The Witness Stand is accessed by a 6" step. The floor area in the Witness Stand is smaller than the required 60" diameter maneuvering room. In addition, the Path of Travel to the Witness Stand is slightlytoo narrow as it passes by the step up to the Jury Box.
RECOMMENDATION: There is not enough room available to install either a compliant ramp or a lift to access the Witness Stand. Lowering the Witness Stand to floor level would require rebuilding the entire structure which is the Witness Stand, Judge's Bench and Clerk's Desk. The ADAAG regulations for Justice Facilities, which have been proposed but not yet adopted, allow, in existing facilities, an alternative location for witnesses who cannot climb steps to an elevated Witness Stand. Such a witness could sit at floor level near the Witness Stand and use a hand-held microphone.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The Countyshould make a rule that in a proceeding where any witness is unable to climb into the Witness Stand, all witnesses will sit atfloor level infvont of the Witness Stand.
TO FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL.
J. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX Lewis County Courthouse
335391.

ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 28, FDC Report) The Jury Box has two seating levels; the lowest is 6" above the Courtroom floor. The lowest level of the Jury Box does not have a compliant wheelchair maneuvering space.
RECOMMENDATION: BWSC was told that the Jury Box is constructed of wood platforms set on the concrete floor slab. As such, it would be feasible to remove the existing Jury Box platforms and rebuild with the lowest level at Courtroom floor level. The existing rail in front of the Jury Box could be retained with minor modifications.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: In the Jury Box, part of the lower seating platform nearest the WitnessStand should be removed to create a minimum 30" x 48" spacefor a wheelchair atfloor level. The rest of the Jury Box may remain as it is.
PER 1/25/05: NO PHYSICAL CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO THE JURY BOX. INSTEAD, STATE PROTOCOL WITH REGARD TO JURY BOX WILL BE FOLLOWED.
K. ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 10 & 32, FDC Report) Within the First Floor designated accessible Unisex Toilet Room, the sink is non-compliant because of the design of the fixture, location of the drain piping, and lack of insulation on the piping. The mirror is mounted too high. The room identification signage is mounted too high, and is of a non-compliant design because the International Symbol of Accessibility is too small (less than 6" dimension for the border of the symbol.)
There is a non-accessible Toilet Room adjacent to the Second Floor Jury Room.
RECOMMEDATION: The Building is required to have a minimum of one accessible Unisex Toilet Room. The First Floor Unisex Toilet Room fulfills that requirement. Therefore the Second Floor Jury Room Juror's Toilet Room is not required to be accessible.
Per FDC in meeting 8/6/04: No modiJicationof the Second Floor Jury Room Jurors ' ToiletRoom is required ifthe County creates and enforces a rule banning use of the Jurors ' Toilet Room whenever ajury includes a person in a wheelchair. In such a case the, the Jurors ' Toilet Room shall be locked.
The sink in the First Floor Unisex Toilet Room should be made compliant. It may be possible to accomplish this by re-installing the existing sink at a different height and reconfiguring the drain piping. It may be necessary to install a new fixture of a type specifically designed to meet ADAAG requirements. Piping below the sink should be covered with insulation. The mirror should be lowered so that the bottom of the reflective surface is at a height of 40" above the floor. Room identification signage should be replaced with a sign that is compliant in design and mounting height.
Lewis County Courthouse
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Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: The sink must be replaced with a compliant model. Signage may be mounted below the wood trim that runs along the corridor walls at 60" above thefloor.
L. DRINKING FOUNTAINS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 6 & 16, FDC Report) Both the First Floor and Second Floor Drinking Fountains are non-compliant. The non-compliance is due to the units being mounted slightly too low and protruding too far into the corridor.
RECOMMENDATION: The drinking fountains'should be made compliant or replaced with an accessible system. BWSC was told that the County.prefersremoving the existing drinking fountains and installing bottled water fountains, and was shown an example of the proposed compliant installation.
M. FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 8 & 17, FDC Report) Fire extinguishers in the First and Second Floor corridors are enclosed in cabinets flush with the corridor wall. The cabinets are located at a non-compliant height and require more than the allowable pull force to open.
RECOMMENDATION: The fire extinguishers should be made accessible. The County may choose whether to relocate the existing cabinets and adjust the required door opening force, or it may install extinguishers in wall brackets at a compliant height.
N. INTERIOR SIGNAGE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 34 and throughout FDC Report) Room identification and directional signage inside the building is generally of a compliant design. However, it is generally not mounted at the required height of 60" to the centerline.
RECOMMENDATION: Interior signage should be re-installed at a compliant height. On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified, and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance.
Per FDC in meeting on 8/6/04: Signage may be mounted immediately below the wood trim rail that runs along the cowidor walls at 60" above thefloor.
0 . AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE:
ISSUE: ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fire if there is no accessible means of egress from that part of the building. There is no Area of Rescue Assistance in this building. None of the three floors has an exit at grade.
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RECOMMENDATION: ADAAG regulations exempt alterations to existing buildings fkom the requirement for Area of Rescue Assistance. This building is of non-combustible construction, and has only one, unenclosed stair. While not required by ADAAG regulations, the county should work with a design professional to determine feasible locations and design requirements for construction of an Area of Rescue Assistance on each of the three floors.
Lewis County Courthouse
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Lewis County Courthouse
335391.

ATTACHMENT A SITE
Lewis County Courthouse
335391.

 
 a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

1

Plaintiffs,

)

1

v.

1

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR' ) COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

)

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

)

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffm JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - MEIGS COUNTY

v This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreementyyi)s entered into this 2 day of

Fibcur f

, 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie ~appola,/~enniCsantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Meigs County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 512132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in
this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. 512131 et seq. and 28
C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Meigs County Courthouse or the Meigs County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Meigs County Courthouse or the Meigs County Judicial Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIOAKSSSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOCNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen fbture contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMENANTD MONITORING

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its

obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the

"Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the

'Wotice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given

thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding

(

Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the

issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No

action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee

relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth
in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Meigs County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 3 19) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Meigs County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant Cou11ty in the above-captioned

i

action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs

Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ransey, Sr.,

William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-100 1

Gary D. Housepiai~(BPR # 69697 Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21StAve South, Suite 100 Nasl~villeT, N 37212 (615) 298-1080

Linda M. Dardasian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

~ , / / P S * AttorneysforPlaintiff?

/

Date:

For Defendant M e i g s e t y , Tennessee:
~ho$asM. Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: 2-d - 0 5

For Defendant County: Meigs County, >eyessee
I

A a G G . lGd.l.e
George Lane, tainti iff
Date: 2- \.-s<

MEIGS COUNTY
i Plaintiff: Date

MEIGS COUNTY Plaintiff:
2-93
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff

Date:

,'

A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff Date: 2-/fl@flfl

AGREED SETTLEMENT
MEIGS COUNTY

EAST ACCESSIBLE PARKING - (EXISTING1

A.

There are (44) existing parking spaces wifhin the propetty lines around fhe perimeter of

the building. The ADA requires that (2) spaces be designated as handicapped

accessible. The construction drawings indicate a total of (61) proposed parking spaces

which would require (3) spaces to be accessible. {4.1.2(5)(a)]

D. A van accessible space has not been designated with the required compliant signage. C4.6.4)

E. Neither of fhe (2) existing accessible spaces has the required signage. 14.6.4)

F.

The non-compliant 58" accessible access aisle sidewalk along the front of the car does

not permit a 36" clear space befween the edge of sidewalk and the bumper of the vehicle

since no wheel stop exists. {Page 26, Figure 91, i4.6.3) The front overhang of the vehicle

varies from 12" to 24" and the rear overhang of the vehicle varies from 3 2 to 42".

Agreed Solution: All accessibte parking to be moved to f r ~ n tof courthouse in accordance with (4.6).

ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM EAST PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR

C. A handrail exists on only one side of the 60" wide ramp. A second handrail is required on the adjacent side, but does not exist and is not on the construction drawings. {4.8.5(7)jHandrails are required on both sides {4.8.5(1)]. The handrail is locafed at a compliant height of 34': above the surface. This one handrail has a non-compliant handrail extension of 2.5"at the top of fhe ramp in lieu of the required 12" {4.8.5(2)}. The ramp-cross-slop~5r6m7KmZl and within compliance at-the-top and bottom the iamp. - -

E.

The non-com~liant60" x 60" area at fhe fop of the ramp slopes at 3.5% in lieu of the

required level area. {4.8.4)

F.

The compliant plaza slopes an average 1.56% in the 37-0"East to Wesf direction. The

new ornamental guard railing has circular elements in the design that has openings of up
to 4-1M6" depending on how much paint was applied to the railing. The opening is non-

compliant with the NFPA Life Safety Code which requires that the rail be designed so that

a 4" sphere cannot pass through. 12000 Edition of NFPA 101,A. 7.2.2.4.6(3)]

Agreed Solution: The plaza is not the handicap accessible entrance. Rather, the accessible entrance is on the main street side or east side of the courthouse. This entrance is the entrance to the old courthouse. Meigs County has modified this entrance to add automatic door openers, the appropriate accessibility ramp, and the appropriate signage.
SOUTH ACCESSIBLE PARKING - (RECENTLY STRIPED)

A.

There are (44) existing parking spaces within the properfy lines around the perimeter of

the building. The ADA requires that (2) spaces be designated as handicapped

accessible. The drawings indicate the total proposed parking spaces to be (61) which would require (3) to be accessible. {4.1.2(5)(a)}

5. The ( I ) existing striped accessible parking space and corresponding designated aisle on the South side have slopes in the EasWest directions of 4.6% which exceed the maximum allowable slope of ?"risein 50" run or 2% maximum in all directions. 14.6.3)

C. No compliant accessible aisle of any size exists adjacent to the parking space. 14.6.3)

D.

The accessible parking space signage is located at the non-compliant height of 34" to the

bottom of the sign. 14.6.4)

E.

The van accessible space has not been designated with the required compliant signage.

14.6.4)

Agreed Solution: All accessible parking to be moved to front of courthouse in accordance with (4.6). .

ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM SOUTH PARKING TO ENTRANCE DOOR

A.

The accessible route from the curb ramp at the street corner is in Highway 30 appears to

be a safety concern. The 31'-6" route along the street to the curb ramp has a compliant

average slope of 1.4%.

6. Theproposed route has complianf running slopes no greater that 3.86% average and has non-compliant cross slopes up to 4.47% (4.3.7)to access the pafh to the basement door.

C. The 40'-2" sidewalk befween the masonry walls has an average slope of 4.1% therefore,
the existing handrail is not reqiiireii ri?either side. The cress s l p e a: the beginnA7iig of the
wall/sloping sidewalk is 1.6% b ~ tht e bottom end of the sloping sidewalk has a noncompliant 2.9% cross slope 14.3.7). The concrete area outside the 48" x 94" basement door has a non-compliant slope as great as 6.9% away from fhe door in the accessible space outside the door. 14.13.6)
- -
Agreed Solution: A11 accessible parking to be moved to front of courthouse in accordance with (4.6).

5. ENTRANCE DOOR ON EAST SIDE - PLAZA LEVEL FIRST FLOOR
non- 6. The leff hand door (active leaf) - The pull/push force to operate the door is a
compliant 12.5 Ibs. 14.13.1l(2) (b)}. The door has a non-compliant sweep period of 1.8 seconds {4.13.10}.
Agreed Stlutioii: Adjust elsser or provide new closer to meet
requirements of (4.13.1I.I(b)).

D.

The threshold has an exterior non-com~liantvertical height of 3/8" from the concrete to

the bottom of the threshold. A compliant threshold section has been installed at a non-

compliant height. (4.13.8)

Agreed Solution: Modify threshold or provide new threshold in accordance with (4.13.8 and 4.5.2).

E. Boftom edge of door glass is located at a non-compliant 45-1/4". {Figure A3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F. A 38-3/8" x 10" mechanical unit resting on the floor is located in the push side clearance area of the active leaf with the closest side located 43" from the door. The face of the door frame is located 6" from the side wall. Therefore the presence of the mechanical unit creates a non-compliant condition since if encroaches into the clear floor space leaving a non-compliant dimensioned area of 4" x 17" or a total area of 68" square inches. {Page 38, Figure 25aJ

Agreed Solution: The plaza is not the handicap accessible entrance. Rather, the accessible entrance is on the main street side or east side of the courthouse. This entrance is the entrance to the old courthouse. Meigs County has modified this entrance to add automatic door openers, the appropriate accessibility ramp, and the appropriate signage.

6. ENTRANCE DOOR ON SOUTH SIDE - BASEMENT LEVEL ELEVATOR
ACCESS

A.

The 48" entrance door has a 107" wide clear accessible area outside the door. The

outside concrete surface slopes away from the door wifh non-compliant siopes as high as

6.9% and non-compliant cross slopes up to 4.I %.{4.13.6)

D. The pulVpush force to operate the door is 7.5 Ibs. {4.13.1I (2) (a) does not specify for external doors) and has a non-compliant sweep period of 2.9 seconds {4.13.10).

E. The door giass boftom edge is located at a non-compliant 57-5/3" above the floor and is not within the 43" to 51" seated wheeichair range. {Page 61, Figure A3J

F. The threshold has an exterior vertical height up to 1/2" from the concrete to the bottom of
the threshold. A compliant threshold section has been installed at a non-compliant height. C4.13.81

Agreed Solution: No action required.

SECOND FLOOR WEST COURTROOM DOOR

' B.

The left door is equipped with a lever and a closer wifh a non-compliant closing force of 6.5 pounds 14.13.7 l(2) (b)) and a compliant closing period of 3.5 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 1.1(b)).

C. The non-compliant puN side clearance is 14-1/2" {Page 38, Fig 25(a)Jand the compliant
alcove width is 56"

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. The bottom of the non-compliant left entrance door glass is 45-1/2" above finished floor. {Figure A3J

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

The right door is equipped with a lever and a closer with a non-compliant closing force of

7.0 pounds 14.13.11(2) (b)] and a compliant closingperiod of 4.0 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1I.l(b)).

G. The bottom of the right entrance door glass is located a non-compiiant 45-3/4" above
finished floor. {Figure A3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

16. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE WITNESS STANDJJURY PLATFORM IN THE WEST COURTROOM (206)

A.

A ramp has been installed to the right of the raised platform that was not included on the

construction drawings. The 74-f/2" long 7.5% sloping ramp to access the 6" raised

plafform on the right side is 38" wide and does not have complianf handrails on any side

of the ramp C4.8.5). The ramp has a compliant upper landing area of 89-3/4" and the 3

compliant botfom landing has an encumbered 56-3/4" floor space {4.8.4(2)}.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

22. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TPAVEL TO THE MEN'S TOILET ON EASEMENT FLOOR

A.

The accessible path is unencumbered. The exterior required clear floor space is

unencumbered.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

23. MEN'S TOILET ON BASEMENT FLOOR

B.

The non-compliant interior pull side clearance is 14-1/2" {Page 38, Figure 25(a)}. The

compliant marble threshold height is f/4" high.

C. The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware and a closer with a non-
compliant closing force of 10 pounds f4.13.1l(2) (b)} and a compliant closing period of 5.39 seconds.

F.

The sink has compliant drain piping location but is non-compliant due to the absence of

pipe insulation {4.19.4}. The sink is located at the compliant height with a compliant

single handle faucet.

H. The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 41" to the bottom edge of the reflective
surface. {4.19.6)

J.

The hand dryer is located the compliant height of 48" and an acfivation height of 46-1/2".

The unit has a total non-compliant protrusion into the path of travel of 8-3/8". 14.4.7)

K.

The urinal is locafed at the non-compliant height of 17-1/2" 14.-18.21, elongated bowl

compliant length of 14-1/2: non-compliant ffush valve height of 54" C4.18.4) and a

compliant flush valve control operation force of 4 pounds.

L.

The toilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 16-1/2" from the sidewall. {Page

43, Figure 30(a)}

M. The toilet paper dispenser is located the compliant height of 20-1/4" with the front edge located at the non-compliant position of 45-3/8" from the rear wall {Page 43, Figure 30(d)l.
R. The accessible stall is 60-1/2"x 60-1/2". The coat hook is at the non-compliant height of 59-3/8" above the floor {Page 19, Figure 6(b)). The clear opening at the stall door is 321/2" and is equipped with accessible hardware.
T. The height of changing table is a non-compliant 38-1/2". 14.32.4) The unit protrudes a non-compliant 4-1/4" from the face of the wall 14.4.11; however, does have the 30"x 48" accessible area while in the down position.
Agreed Solution: No action required.
25. WOMEN'S TOILET ON BASEMENT FLOOR
The non-compliant interior pull side clearance is 14-1/2" {Page 38, Figure 25(a)).
The non-compliant marble threshold height is greater than 1/4" high. {4.5.2)
The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware and a closer with a noncompliant closing force of 13pounds 13.13.1?(l)(b)] and a complianf closing period of 3.6 seconds.
The sink is located at the non-compliant height of 34-1/2" {4.19.2) and has a noncompliant skid clear distance of 28-1/2" below C4.19.2). The sink has compliant drain piping location but is non-compliant due to the lack of required pipe insulation {4.19.4). The sink is eguipped with a compliant single handle faucet.
The hand dryer is located at the compliant height of 49" and has an activation height of 44". The unit has a non-compliant 8-3/8"pmtrusion into the path of travel (4.4.I).
The toilet paper dispenser is located the compliant height of 20-1/4". The front edge is located at the- non~compliantpcsition of 39:3/4" from the -rear wall {Page 43, Figure 3O(d)).
The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet C4.16.5) with a compliant flush valve activation force of 3.5 pounds.
The toilet seat is located at the non-compliantheight of 19-3/8. {4.16.3)
The sidewall grab bar is a compliant 43" long, located at the non-compliant height of 327/8" {Page 43, Figure 30(c)) and is positioned at the compliant dimension from the back wall of 11-3/8.
The rear wall grab bar has a compliant length of 37': is located at the non-compliant height of 32-5/8" {Page 43, Figure 30(d)] and is positioned at the compliant dimension of 5-3/8" from the back wall.
The accessible stall is 60" x 60-3/8". The coat hook is a non-compliant 60-1/2"above the floor {Page 19, Figure 6(b)]. The clear opening at the stall door is 33-1/8" and is equipped with accessible hardware.
The height of changing table is a non-compliant height of 37-3/4" above the floor. {4.32.4] The unit is loose and protrudes a non-compliant 5" from the wall 14.4.11. It has a noncompliant 27-3/4" x 48" clear floor space while in the down position. {4.2.4.1)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

27. MEN'S TOILET ON FIRST FLOOR

D.

The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware and a closer with a non-

compliant closing force of 6.5 pounds {4.13.I l(2) (b)] and a compliant closing period of

3.6 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of C4.13.1I.l(b)).

H. The mirror is located at a non-com~lianfheight of 40-7/8" to the bottom edge of the reflective surface. {4.19.6)

Agreed Solution: Adjust mirror height to meet requirements of (4.4 9.6).

L.

The urinal is located at the compliant height of 1 7 , compliant elongated bowl length of

14-l/ZJ',non-compliant flush va/veheight of 45-3/4" {4.18.4) and the compliant flush valve

control operation force of 4 pounds. The compliant alcove width is 36".

Agreed Solution: County will install an automatic flush valve.

M. The toilet paper dispenser is located the compliant height of 20-1/4" and the front edge is located at the non-compliant position of 47-5/8" from the rear wall {Page 43, Figure 30(d)I.
Agreed Soiution: Adjust dispenser position to meei requirements of
(Fig. 30(d), Page 43).

N.

The toilet is located 43, Figuk 307a))

at

the

non-compliant

dimension

of

17-3-/4- "- from

the

sidewall.
-

{Page -

Agreed Solution: No action required.

Q. The sidewall grab bar is a compliant 43-1/4" long, located at the non-compliant height of 32-7/8" {Page 43, Figure 30(c)] and is positioned at the compliant dimension from the
back wall of I 1-3/8".

Agreed Solution: Adjust grab bar height to meet requirements of
(Fig. 30(c), Page 43).

S.

The accessible stall is 60-1/2" x 60-1/4". The non-com~liantcoat hook is 63-1/8 above

the floor {Page 19, Figure 6(b)]. The clear opening at the stall door is 33-3/4" and is

equipped with accessible hardware.

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper height.

U. The height of changing fable is a non-compliant height of 38-7/8" above floor f4.32.4) and has the 30" x 48" clear floor space while in the down position. The unit protrudes a
compliant 4" from the wall.

Agreed Solution: Adjust table height to meet requirements of (4.32.4).

29. WOMEN'S TOILET ON FIRST FLOOR

C.

The door is equipped with compliant push/puli hardware and a closer with a non-

compliant closing force of 7.5 pounds 4.13. I l(2) (b}} and a non-compliant closing period

of 2.4 seconds. f4.13. I O}

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.1 1.I(b)).
F. The sink is located at the compliant height of 33-112". The skid clear disfance is a m-
compliant 27-5/8" {4.19.2}. The sink has compliant drain piping location and is equipped with the required pipe insulation. The sink has a compliant single handle faucet.

Agreed Solution: Adjust skirt clearance to meet requirements of (4.1 9.2).

G. The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 40-1/8" to the bottom edge of the
reflective surface. {4.19.6}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

IK,.

The toilet paper dispenser is !ocafed the complimt height of 22-34" and the front edge k

located at the non-compliant position of 3 8 4 4 " tiom the rear wall {Page 43, Figure

3WY.

Agreed Solution: Adjust dispenser position to meet requirements of

{F-ig..30(d- )-, pa-g-e- 4-3-).-

-.

L.

The foilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 18-1/4" from fhe sidewall.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

M. The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet {4.16.5) and has a
compliant flush valve activation force of 3.5 pounds.

Agreed Solution: County will replace the flush valve with an aukmatic f!ushing mechanism.

Q. The accessible stall is 60-1/4" x 60-3/B1'. The non-compliant coat hook is at 64-3/4"
above the floor {Page 19, Figure 6(b)}. The clear opening at the stall door is 34" and is
equipped with accessible hardware.

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper height.

S.

The non-compliant height of changing table is 38-1/4" above the floor. {4.32.4) The unit

protrudes a non-compliant 4-1/8" from the wall C4.4.I } and has a non-compliant 26"x 48"

clear floor space while in the down position. {4.2.4. I }

-- -

Agreed Solution: Tighten unit and adjust table height to meet requirements of (4.32.4).

31. MEN'S TOILET ON SECOND FLOOR

C. The door is equipped with a compliant push/pull and a closer with a non-compliant
closing force of 7 pounds 14.13.1f(2) (b)) and a non-com~liantclosing period of 2.7 seconds. {4.13.10)
Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.13.11.I(b)).

F.

The sink has compliant drain piping location but is non-compliant since it is not equipped

with the required pipe insulation. {4.19.4]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

G. The sink is located at the non-com~liantheight of 34-3/4" {4.19.2] with a compliant single
handle faucet. The sink alcove width is a complianf 38" wide.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

H.

The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 41-11'2" to the bottom edge of the

reflective surface. {4.19.6)

Agreed Soiution: Adjust mirror height to meet requirements iii (4.1 9.6).

L.

The urinal is located at the compliant height of 16-3/4", compliant elongated bowl length

of 14-1/2", non-compliant flush valve height of 44-3/8" f4.18.4) and the compliant flush

valve corif~l-operationforce of 4 poundS:The-compliant alcove wide is 35-1/4"

Agreed Solution: No action required.

M. The toilet is located at the non-com~liantdimension of 17-1/2" from the sidewall. {Page 43, Figure 30(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

N. The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 19-I/." and the front edge is located at the non-com~liantposition of 45-3/8" from the rear wall {Page 43, ~ i ~ i r e 30(aN-
Agreed Solution: Adjust dispenser position to meet requirements of {Fig. 30(d), Page 43).

S.

The accessible stall is 61" x 60-f/8". The non-com~liantcoat hook is 63-5/8" above the

floor {Page 19, Figure 6(b)). The clear opening at the stall door is a compliant 34" and is

equipped with accessible hardware.

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper height.

U. The con-compliant height of changing table is 38-1/2" above floor C4.32.4) and the unit
protrudes a non-comoliant distance from the wall of 4-1/4" {4.4.1} and has a non-
compliant 28" x 48" clear floor space while in the down position. {4.2.4.1]

Agreed Solution: Tighten unit and adjust table height to meet requirements of (4.32.41..

33. WOMEN'S TOILET ON SECOND FLOOR

C. The door is equipped with a compliant push/pull and a closer with a non-compliant
closing force of 7 pounds 14.13.I l(2) (b)} and a compliant closing period of 3.35 seconds.

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of (4.1 3.1I.I(b)).

F.

The sink is locafed af the complianf height of 33-1/2" and has a non-complianf skirt clear

distance of 27-3/4" C4.19.2). The sink has compliant drain piping location, non-compliant

clear space below the sink skirt 14.19.2) and is equipped with the required pipe insulation.

The sink has a compliant single handle faucet.

Agreed Solution: Correct underside clearance to meet requirements of (4.1 9.2).

L.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 20" and the front edge is

locafed at the non-compliant position of 42" from the rear wall {Page 43, Figure 30(d).

Agreed Solution: Adjust dispenser position to meet requirements of

_ {Fig, _3P(cl), Page 431.

. .

N.

The sidewall grab bar is a complianf 43-I/#" long, locafed at the non-com~liantheight of

32-5/8" {Page 43, Figure 30(c)} and is positioned at the compliant dimension from the

back wall of 11-1/4".

Agreed Solution: Adjust bar height to meet requirements of {Fig. 30(c), Page 43).

P.

The accessible stall is 60-1/4" x 60-V4". The coat hook is located a non-comolianf 63-

1/2" from finished floor {Page 19, Figure 6(b)}. The clear opening at the stall door is 34"

and is equipped with accessible hardware.

Agreed Solution: County will add a second coat hook at the proper height.

R.

The height of changing table is a non-compliant 3 8 above the floor {4.32.4) and

protrudes a non-complianf distance of 4-1/4" from the face of the wall (4.4.11 and has a

non-compliant 27-3/4" x 4 8 clear floor space while in the down position. {4.2.4.1}

Agreed Solution: Tighten unit and adjust table height to meet requirements of (4.32.4).

36. ELEVATOR

5. The compliant signage has been located at the non-compliant height of 62" to the centerline on the exterior Basement level elevator door frame in lieu of the required 60" dimension. 14.10.5)

C. The compliant signage has been located at the non-compliant height of 61" to the centerline on the exterior Second level elevator door frame in lieu of the 60" required dimension. 14.10.5)

D. The in-car lantern has been located at the non-compliant height of 71-1/2" to the centerline above the floor in lieu of the 72" minimum required. 14.10.4(1))

E.

The emergency call button has been located at the non-compliant height if 30-1/2" above

the floor in lieu of the required 35" minimum. {4.10.12(3)]

Agreed Solution: All issues to be corrected in accordance with (4.10).

38. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE

A.

Non-com~liant exterior directional signage. 14.1.2,(7), (c)) If all entrances are not

accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest

accessible entrance.

Agreed So!utlon: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with C4.i .2(7)jcjj.

39. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE
-.
_ A. _ The building/additio~i-s non-com~liant~~sice-d_oites-d--p~vide_an area of . resc.ue- - .- - .
assistance for all levels above grade. See attachment "C"for details.

Agreed Solution: Provide an area of rescue assistance with appropriate signage in accordance with (4.3.11).

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTIUCT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASFMLLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )
MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL, 1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LAflSON,

1

1

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

1

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE 1

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY,CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY,CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COVNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, G W N G E R

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, RICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

)

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

)

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin
JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT-MOORE COUNTY

2 This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreementy')is entered into this 3 day of

FfLh/ L l A r \ /

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie Zappola, bennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A* Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Moore County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
2 . Plaintiffs have alIeged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.$ 12131(2).
2. Moore County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.$12131(1). Moore County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 1) 12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.

3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courtl~ouseand any other owned or operated facility of the Moore County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in
this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. 9 12131 et sea. and 28
C.F.R.Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes,
appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or
repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECTFACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Moore County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse andor other buildings owned
and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Cox~stitutionof the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's .judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . This Agreement constitutes a settfement of all of the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Moore County Courthouse, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, Iost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of poclcet expenses, p11ysical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had 01' may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Moore County Courthouse whether asserted in tlis case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal..

9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire co~~siderationb,oth monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case, No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by tile Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.

OBLIGATIONSASSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY

10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs,

11. Defendant CounQ will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately, Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.

13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

334736

3

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, sewice, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary intemptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMEANNTD MONITORING

15, The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusivejurisdiction and venue to canstrue and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to tllis Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance wit11 the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party sl~allgive written detailed notice (the 'Wotice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). Tile Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. ReasollabXe attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O.
Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty
(60) days following the Effective Date) that sets fo~thits progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance wit11 the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alternations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modifj any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 221, setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to ,justify

334736

4

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of' Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otlienvise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has,jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs have ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses .Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 3 19) entered on December 7,2504, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of'these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted wit11 and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonabfe-
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to tlie office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become eRective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee approving the Compromise and Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and the State of Tennessee which provides, inter nlicl, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs througl~December 17, 2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of $2,680.00 which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued by through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. In the event that the Memorandum of Understanding is rqjected by the State of Tennessee then the dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active doclcet for disposition .and all defenses, otherwise available, would continue to be available incfuded but not limited to standing and are not waived by this Agreement-
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned
action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Canfxel, and A. Russell Larson:
William J. Brown, Esq. William ,I. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street
P.O.Box 1001
Martha M. Lafferty (BPR# 19817)
Gary D.Housepian (BPR # 6969)
Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc.
2416 2IS' Ave Soutl~S, uite 100 Nashville, TN 37212

Linda M.Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice
Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lalceside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (5 10) 763-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

a/]$ Date:

/ d o05

For Defendant County:

Moore County, Tennessee
/1
@J&G, By: @444A gy&&s, County Mayor

Date:

I-28-05

1

Plaintiff:

17

2 -1 k06'
Date

MOORE COUNTY PlaintiE
Date

MOORE COUNTY
i
Plaintiff:
&$..
Dat

Dennis Cantrel

MOORE COUNTY Plaintiff:
2 -23- 0 3 ~
Date

A. Russell Larson Date

REVIEW OF ADA ISSUES JUDICIAL SERVICES FOR
MOORE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
The information contained in this Review is described in the Work Statement contained in Section 1. The information contained in this Review is copyrighted and may be used only by the parties associated with litigation in the case of Lane et.al v. the State of Tennessee et.al that is pending in the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee Docket No. 3:98CV 0731.
Issue Date: June 15,2004 Site Visit Date: June 9, 2004
Bwscl BARGE WAGGUNER SUMNER & CANNaN, INC. 211 Commerce Street, Suite 600 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Phone: 615-254-1500 Fax: 615-255-6572

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................Page 2 - 3
A. Work Statement B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND........................................................Page 3 111. FSTARCAILTIETGYIEEVSIAOLPUIANTIOIONNS.S..I..C...O...M...P...L...I.A...N...C...E...................... Page 4 - 9
A. Accessible Parking B. Accessible Entrance C. Accessible Path of Travel, First Floor D. Accessible Path of Travel, Second Floor
Courtroom and Court Clerk E. First Floor Clerk and Master Office F. Second Floor Circuit Clerk's Office G. Second Floor Courtroom Door H. Second Floor Courtroom I. Second Floor Courtroom Jury Room J. Accessible Toilet Room K. First Floor Drinking Fountain L. First Floor Fire Extinguisher M. Interior Signage N. Area of Rescue Assistance ATTACHMENTS A. Site
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

LOCATION: Moore County Courthouse 196 Main Street Lynchburg, TN 37352
I. INTRODUCTION
A. WORK STATEMENT
This report is prepared by Barge Waggoner Surnner & Cannon, Inc. (BWSC) at the request of Manier & Herod. The information contained herein is a response to the ADA Compliance Report, Judicial Services, on the Moore County, TN, Courthouse, prepared by Falconnier Design Co. (FDC) and dated March 19,2004..Data for this report was obtained in a field investigationby BWSC on June 9,2004. This report responds to items noted and issues raised in the report prepared by FDC. Recommendations are made with the goal of providing access for the disabled to judicial services now provided within the building.
Accessibility Compliance for the purposes of this report means compliance with ADAAG regulations (Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities Appendix A to Part 36 - Standards for Accessible Design Federal Register / Vol. 56, no. 1441Friday, July 26, 1991, Rules and Regulations.)
This report is not intended to be a complete review of the designated building in relation to requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It addresses only accessibility issues relative to the judicial services provided in the building. It does not address Building Code compliance or Life Safety issues. Alterations undertaken to provide greater accessibility may trigger requirements for Building Code compliance. Any alterations to the building should be designed and reviewed on site by a design professional licensed in the State of Tennessee and must be approved by any Building Authority having jurisdiction.
B. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal civil rights act enacted in 1990 prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities. There are five sections, or "titles," which cover different aspects of discrimination:
Title I Employment Title 11State and Local Government Title LII Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities
Title IV Telecommunications
Title V Miscellaneous provisions of the law.
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

The judicial services provided in this courthouse fall under the requirements of Title II. The following excerpts from "The Americans with Disabilities Act Title II Technical
Assistance Manual" explain some of these requirements.
"Title I1of ADA covers programs, activities, and services of public entities. It is divided into two subtitles. Subtitle A is intended to protect qualified individuals with disabilities fiom discrimination on the basis of disability in the services, programs, or activities of all State and local governments."
"A public entity may not deny the benefits of its programs, activities, and services to individuals with disabilitiesbecause its facilities are inaccessible. A public entity's services, programs, or activities,when viewed in their entirety, must be readily accessible to and usable by individualswith disabilities. This standard, known as "program accessibility," applies to all existing facilities of a public entity. Public entities, however, are not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities accessible."
"Public entities may achieve program accessibility by a number s f methods. In many situations,providing access to facilitiesthrough structural methods, such as alteration of existing facilities and acquisition or construction of additional facilities, may be the most efficient method of providing program accessibility. The public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to structural changes in order to achieve program accessibility. Nonstructural methods include acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and provision of services at alternate accessible sites."
"Unlike private entities under Title 111, public entities are not required to remove barriers from each facility, even if removal is readily achievable. A public entity must make its "programs" accessible. Physical changes to a building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program accessible."
In altering facilities in order to make them accessible, government entities must comply with the ADA Standards (ADAAG) unless it is b'technicallymfeasible" to do so. If technically infeasible, the alteration must comply "to the maximum extent feasible." "Technically infeasible" is defined as having little likelihood of being done because a major structural member would have to be moved or because an existing physical or site constraint prohibits compliance.
11. FACILITY BACKGROUND
The Moore County Courthouse is a two-story structure located at 196 Main Street in the center of Lynchburg, Tennessee. It was built in 1885 and is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The exterior retains its historic character, despite an addition in 1968. Parts of the interior were significantly remodeled at that time. No documents related to the remodeling of the building are available for review.
Moore County Courthouse
June 15,2004

111. FACILITY EVALUATIONS/COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES/OPINIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE FOLLOWED UNLESS OTFLERWISE NOTED HEREIN
A. ACCESSIBLE PARKING
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 1, FDC's Report) Two accessible spaces are required for this building. One of the two existing accessible spaces is not along the accessible route and the other has running slopes and cross slopes in excess of those allowed.
RECOMMENDATION: The proposed solution to these issues is, instead of regrading and trying to fix the existing handicap spaces, to move those spaces to a more suitable location on the site. Two new accessible parking spaces shauld be provided in the northeast parking lot to either side of the existing walk (which exits from the north door and splits to the east). These two spaces would have a 2.0% running slope and a 1.7% cross slope (for the space north of the walkway) and a 1.8%running slope and a 1.3% cross slope (for the space south of the walkway). The two spaces should be 8'-0" wide at a minimum and the area exiting the walkway would be used as the 5'-0" min. striped area between the two spaces. New handicap parhng signage at a compliant height, should then be installed at each space. These spaces would both be along the new accessible route (see B. below).
B. ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 2, FDC's Report) FDC's report details the problems with what is referred to as "the existing west ramped entrance." This ramp is actually on the east side of the building. The existing ramp is too steep, the landing at the top of the ramp is too small, and the handrails do not meet ADA requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS: While it is possible to fix this ramp and to have the accessible route to the building continue to be through the east entrance, this accessible route into the building would still have to pass through a doorway which is noncompliant and structurally difficult to alter.
A more feasible accessible route could be created through the north entrance. As such, it is proposed that a landing be constructed at the north entrance. This landing would extend out approximately 10'-0" and would meet all requirements at the door threshold. The landing would step down to the walkays heading west and north and also would ramp down to the walk heading east. This new ramp would be constructed at no more than 8.3% slope and the approximate 18" of drop to ground level would require a minimum of 18'-0" length of ramp. An ADA compliant railing would also be installed including the 1'-0" minimum railing extensions which return to the rail. The north entry doors should then be brought into compliance for door hardware, push pressure and closing sweep. A fixed entry mat should then be installed inside the building at the north entrance.
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

C. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL, FIRST FLOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 4, FDCYsreport) The existing accessible route is from the East entrance, past the "back" stairs, through a door into a corridor leading to the main northsouth hall of the building. The door by the back stairs appears to be a fire rated assembly, but has no closer. Both the push-side and pull side clearances are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATIONS: This route could be made compliant by removing the door fi-omthe frame, but this may to be a life-safetyviolation. Because of the stairs and mechanical equipment in an adjacent room, it is infeasible to increase the clearances at the side of the door.
If the North entrance is made accessible as suggested above, the accessible route is directly into the main hall, which is compliant, and off of which opens the First Floor Clerk and Master Office.
D. ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND F'LOOR COURTROOM AND COURT CLERK
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 9, FDC Report) The Second Floor is accessed by a staircase rising from the main hall on the First Floor. There is no elevator in this building. The handrails of the existing stair are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The addition of an elevator on the exterior of this building would seriously compromise the historic character which has been so carefully preserved. Installation of an elevator inside the existingbuilding envelope, while possible, would require extensive alteration of the building and would reduce the already limited useable floor space. In addition, the Second Floor Courtroom is not accessible to persons in wheelchairs due to a sloping floor (Ref: Sec. 12, FDC Report), and it is structurally impracticable to correct this condition.
Title II allows government entities to use alternative means in order to provide program
accessibility. At present, persons unable to climb stairs may be assisted in their business with the Circuit Court Clerk's Office by having an employee come down to the First Floor and transact that business. Some means of direct communication between the First Floor level and the Circuit Court Clerk's Office, such as a buzzer or telephone could be set up.
INSTEAD OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FIRST FLOOR LEVEL AND THE CIRCUIT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE, SIGNAGE IS IN PLACE FOR INDIVIDUALS TO SEEK ASSISTANCE IN THE CLERK & MASTER'S OFFICE.
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

At present, the County uses the meeting room on the lower level of the County Building at 241 Main Street for County Commission meetings. This space could be used as an alternate location for court proceedings when persons unable to climb stairs are participants in those proceedings. There are at present a number of non-compliant aspects to this location, including toilet rooms, parking spaces, and door widths. However, correction of these deficiencies would be more readily achievable than making the Second Floor of the Courthouse fully accessible.
Persons who desire to view the proceedings held in the Second Floor courtroom, but who are unable to climb stairs, could be accommodatedby a closed circuit TV system. Such a system would allow viewing &om one of the First Floor offices by visitors who would not in any case be participants in the proceedings.
The stairs should be brought into compliance by installation of new handrails at the required height and diameter. The new handrails should extend the required distances beyond the stair to the extent possible due to plan configuration.
E. FIRST FLOOR CLERK & MASTER OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec.8, FDC Report) This space is compliant except for the signage and door hardware.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant room identification signage should be installed and the lockset replaced with a compliant design.
F. SECOND FLOOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 10, FDC Report) The room identification signage and door hardware are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant room identification signage should be installed and the lockset replaced with a compliant design.
G. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM DOOR
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 11, FDC Report) The door area has no compliant identification signage, clearances are non-compliant, and the door hardware is non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Compliant hardware and signage should be installed. The door clearances are based on requirements for wheelchair access. Since the general recommendation of this report is that the Second Floor of this building will remain inaccessibleto persons in wheelchairs, the clearances at the door need not be changed.
H. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 12,13, 14 & 15, FDC Report) The items cited as non-compliant are all related to requirements for wheelchair accessibilityin the room. These include the sloping floor of the visitors section of the room, the elevation of the witness stand, and the width of passage to the witness stand and jury box.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Since the general recommendation of this report is that the Second Floor of this building will remain inaccessible to persons in wheelchairs, it is also the recommendation that these items do not require correction.
WILL FOLLOW STATE PROTOCOL REGARDING USE OF ALTERNATE SITES.
I. SECOND F'LOOR COURTROOM JURY ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 16, FDC Report) The doors have non-compliant hardware. In addition the passageways into and out of the room are non-compliant.
RECOMMENDATION: The door hardware should be replaced with a compliant design. Since the general recommendation of this report is that the Second Floor of this building will remain inaccessible to persons in wheelchairs, it is recommended that the width of the passageways remain as they are.
J. ACCESSIBLE TOILET ROOM
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 6,7,17 & 18, FDC Report) The First Floor Men's and Women's Toilet Rooms are generally non-compliant in their design. In addition, the floor space outside each Toilet Room door is non-compliant. The Second Floor Jury Toilet is also generally non-compliant. This building is required to have a minimum of one accessible Toilet Room.
RECOMMENDATION: By Building Code, this building should have a minimum of 5 water closets: 3 for women and 2 for men. Currently there are 2 water closets in the First Floor Women's Toilet Room, 2 water closets and 1 urinal in the First Floor Men's Toilet Room, and 1 water closet in the unisex Jury Toilet room on the Second Floor. The First Floor Men's Toilet Room is large enough that it could be remodeled into two small rooms: an Accessible Unisex Toilet Room and an inaccessible Men's Toilet Room with a minimum of one water closet. The wall at the Unisex Toilet Room would be recessed to give the required 48" clear in the corridor in front of the door. This arrangement would meet the code minimum for fixture counts.
K. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN
ISSUE: (Ref: Sec. 3, FDC Report) The existing drinking fountain at the East end of the First Floor is non-compliant.
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

RECOMMENDATION: The drinking fountain should be replaced with an accessible model. If the accessible entrance is moved to the north doors, the drinking fountain should be installed in the main hall. Design and installation should be compliant with ADAAG requirements.
L. FZRST FLOOR FIRE EXTINGUISHER
ISSUE: (Ref Sec.5, FDC Report) The fire extinguisher on the First Floor is mounted at a non-compliant height. RECOMMENDATION: The existing fire extinguisher should be re-mounted at a compliant height of 54" for side reach or 48" if forward reach is required.
M. INTERIOR SIGNAGE ISSUE: (Ref Sec. 21, and throughout FDC Report) There is no compliant signage in this building.
RECOMMENDATION: Compliant signage should be installed to designate permanent rooms and spaces throughout the building, and to provide directions to or information about functional spaces of the building. On the exterior of the building, the accessible entrance should be identified, and signage at other entrances should indicate the route to the accessible entrance.
N. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE ISSUE: ADA and Building Codes require an Area of Rescue Assistance where disabled persons can await rescue in the event of a fire if there is not an accessiblemeans of egress from that part of the building. There is no Area of Rescue Assistance on the Second Floor of this building. RECOMMENDATION: It is the general recommendation of this report that the County has the option of providing programs and services at an alternate location for persons who cannot climb stairs. In that case, the Second Floor would not be made accessible to persons who cannot climb stairs, and therefore no area of rescue assistance would be required.
Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

Moore County Courthouse June 15,2004

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE 1

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLATRORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAmTTE COUNTY, G M G E R )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWIWS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOKNSON COUNTY, LAKX

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

)

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUXiEN COUNTY,

1

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffim JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - PERRY COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this

day of

Fbb~tl&(Y,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie ZappoYa, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffsy7a)nd Defendant Perry County (hereinafter"Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGFtEEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.$12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 512132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("AdministrativeOffice of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
. 5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6 . This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Perry County Courthouse or the Perry County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Perry County Courthouse or the Perry County Judicial Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONASSSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementingregulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

<

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to

compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program,

service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.
16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the 'T\Jotice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to mod@ any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 1 9 , setting forth the facts q d circumstances thought to justifj

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support

i

their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by

Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the

requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification

of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions

of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.

20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Perry County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Perry County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680,00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Pfailltiff's and Defendant County in tlie above-captio~~ed

\

action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Joi~esA, nn Marie Zappola, Rdpk E. Ransey, Sr.,

Dennis Cantrel,In-a

Larson:

William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 2416 21StAve South, Suite 100 Nasl~villeT, N 37212 (615) 298-1080
/
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800
Attorneys for Plaint
Date:

For Defendant Perry Cn ounty, Tennessee:

hoda as M. Donnell, Jr.

w

stewart, Estes & Donnell

424 Church Street, Suite 1401

Nashville, Tennessee 37219

Date:

For Defendant County:

$;{! By:
Name:

L-$~~~L

a Title:
Date: /

-0s

E W k O Lo.A~:.

George Lane, pyaintiff

> - - Date:

\- Q

Date:

PERRY COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

PERRY COUNTY
(' Plaintiff;
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff
4
Date: d / s / J d ~ s
/ /

A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff
Date: &-/xF QC

AGREED SETTLEMENT
PERRY COUNTY

1. PARKING

A.

The adjacent parking is on the street around the courthouse. There are a total of

(35) marked parking places of which there are (3) designated spaces in

compliance with ADA{#. 1.215)) which requires (2). In this report, the (2) spaces

on the North side of the courthouse will be titled DP-I and DP-2, and the single

space on the East side will be titled DP-3. .

5. There is no van accessible space provided. A minimum of (Ii)s required by ADA {4.1.2(5) (b)).

Agreed Solution: Use north parking area to meet requirements for
accessible parking (twospaces required) as enumerated below.

2. DESIGNATED DP-1 AND DP-2 PARKING SPACES LOCATED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COURTHOUSE

A.

Space DP-I does not have the required curb sign. {4.6..Ij

Agreed Solution: Provide signage in accordance with (4.6.4).

5. Space DP-1 has-a non-compliant cross slope of 2.6% at fhe curb {4.8.6). The

. cross slope attbe street is a compliant 1.3%.

- -

--

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E. Space DP-2 has a curb sign but the bottom of fhe sign is mounted at a noncompliant height of 5 0 above the ground. {4.6.5)

Agreed Solution: Provide signage in accordance with (4.6.4).

G. Space DP-2 has a non-compliant cross slope of 2.2% at fhe curb. The cross
slope at the street is a cco?qe!iant Q.2%.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

J.

Spaces DP-I and DP-2 have a generous aisle between them measuring 23'4" in

width. However, this aisle is non-compliant as if has not been so designated or

striped as an access aisle. 14.6.3)

Agreed Solution: Stripe aisle appropriately.

L.

The 42" wide built-up curb ramp leading from the common access aisle has

compliant running slopes varying between 5.43% and 7.43% and compliant cross

slopes of 0.96% and 0.12%. However, it is non-compliant due to its irregular and

rough surface where it meets the paved aisle, due to its abrupt level change

g between the low point of ramp and the paved aisle 14.5.I}, and due to numero s
loose gravel in this area which encumber the path of travel. {4.5. 1) This built- p

curb ramp is also non-compliant because it has no detectable warning on its

surface. 14.7.7)

!

1

Agreed Solution: Repair surface in accordance with (4.5.1).

I

3. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM DESIGNATED SPACES DP-1 AND DP-2 TO TI-IE ACCESSIBLE ENTRANCE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE BUILDING I

B.

Segment PT-I has a compliant width of 100"with compliant cross slopes varying

between 0.96% and 0.3% and non-compliant running slopes varying between

4.89% and 5.11%. This requires fhe sidewalk to be classified as a ramp. 14.3.I

and 4.3.71 This section of ramp is non-compliant because it has no handrails

14.8.5) and does not have the required landings at each end. C4.8.4)

i

Agreed Solution: No action required.

LC. DESIGNATED PARKING SPACE DP-3 LOCATED ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE COURTHOUSE

A.

The curb signage for designated parking space DP-3 on the East side of the

courthouse is a non-compliant height of 60" from the ground making it difficult.to

see from fhe street behind a park vehicle. 14.6.5)

I

C. Space DP-3 has compliant cross slopes of 0.31% and 0.63% and compli$nt running slopes of 0.38% and 0.96%.

D. Space DP-3 has an access aisle that is a compliant 9'-0" wide but is non-

compliant because it is not adequately marked as such. {Page , Figure 9) The

access aisle has a compliant cross slope of 0.5% and compliant running s l o p s

varying between 0.13% and 0.38%.

I

E.

The built-up curb ramp leading from the access aisle at DP-3 to the sidewalk

leading to the accessible ramp at the Easf side entrance has compliant cross

slopes of 0.59% and 1.9% but has non-compliant running slopes varyfng

between 6.6% and 10.67%. 14.8.2) This built-up curb ramp is non-compliant due

to its irregular and rough surface where it meets the paved aisle, due to the

abrupt level change between the low point of ramp and the paved aisle {4.5.il),

and due to numerous loose gravel in this area which encumber the pafh of travel.

C4.5.1) This built-up curb ramp is also non-compliant because it has no

detectable warning on its surface. {4.7.7} The built-up curb ramp also has non-

compliant flared sides with excessive slopes. (4.7.5)

F.

The upper landing for this built-up curb ramp has non-compliant slopes varying

between 7.9% and 7.4%. (4.8.4)

I

G. The 17'-4" walkway leading from the curb ramp to the descending ramp to the

accessible entrance has compliant cross slopes varying between 0.1% and

1.9%. This walkway has running slopes as high as 7.5%, thus requiring

handrails. {4.3.7}

I

Agreed Solution: No action required.

I

I

5. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM DESIGNATED SPACE DP-3 TO THE ACCESSIBL-E

ENTRANCE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE BUILDING

I I

A.

The path of travel from the accessible aisle at space DP-3 to the accessil)le

entrance on the east side of the building is by way of a sidewalk with a comp1it)nt

width of 4 I ".

B.

Thepath of travel has compliant cross slopes varying between 0.1% and 1.9%.:

C. The path of travel has running slopes which vary between 1.6% and 7.5% requiring it to be classified as a ramp. 14.3.1 and 4.3.7) The ramp is ncjncomplianf because it has no handrails C4.8.5) and no compliant landings at each end. {4.8.4}

D. Note fhat this sidewalkkamp terminates at the entrance to the accessible ramp

on the East side of the building and at the end of the sidewalk leading to the

accessible parking spaces DP-1 and DP-2.

!

Agreed Solution: No action required.

I

6. PATH OF TRAVEL ALONG THE RAMP TO THE EAST ENTRANCE

BASEMENT LEVEL DOOR

- -

. .-

-- -

-

-

-.

- - .-

.-

- - ..

A.

The paths of travel from parking spaces DP-I, DP-2, and DP-3 all lead ta a

descending ramp fhat has (2) landings; ( I ) at the top and ( I ) at the bottom of the

ramp, (3) ramped sections and (2) intermediate landings. For discussion

purposes in this report, the ramp runs will be designated as R-1 (upper ramp), R-

2 (middle ramp), and R-3 (lower ramp), and the landings will be designated as L-

I (top landing at sidewalk), L-2 (first infermediafe landing), L-3 (second

intermediate landing), and 1-4 (lower landing at stair and ramp).

Agreed Solution: Fix deteriorating concrete at lower landing; fix drain.

B.

There is a non-compliant 1/2" vertical offset at an expansionjoint at the top of the

ramp between landing slab L-I and ramp slab R-I. {4.3.8}

Agreed Solution: Repair vertical offset to meet requirements of

(4.3.8).

I I

I

C. All handrail gripping surfaces were non-compliant due to their I-7/8" diameler.

14.26.21

I

Agreed Solution: No action required.

D. The ramp R-1 and landing L-I open edges were non-compliant due to the lack of edge profection. 14.8.7)
Agreed Solution: No action required.

1.

The ramp R-2 open edge is non-compliant due to the lack of edge protection.

c4.8.7)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

J.

Ramp R-3 has a handrail on just one side and is non-compliant. {4.8.5(1)) This

rail is at the compliant height of 35-3/4" above the ramp and landing surface.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

L.

These handrails are non-compliant because fhey do not have the required 12"

extensions. {4.8.5(2))

Agreed Sojution: No action required.

N. Landing L-I is non-compliant because if is not level. li has varying slopes
between 1.0% and I .1%. (4.8.4)
Agreed Solution: No action required.

0. Samp R-7 has non-compliant cross slopes that vary between 0.39% and 2.8%.
14.8.6)

-Agreed Solution: No action required.

- - .-

-- . . -.

- ---

R. Landing L-2 is non-compliant because it is not level but has varying slopes

between 0.48% and I.3%. (4.8.4)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

T. Ramp R-2 has non-compliant running slopes varying between 8.76% and 9.2%. (4.8.2)
Agreed S~lution:No action required.
V. Landing L-3 is non-compliant because it is not level but has varying slopes between 0.0% and 3.8% and because the floor drain elevation and location impedes access. (4.8.4)
Agreed Solution: No action required.
W. Ramp R-3 has non-compliant cross slopes varying between 0.2% and 2.4%. 14-8.6)
Agreed Solution: No action required.

X.

Ramp R-3 has non-compliant running slopes varying between 10.14% and

12.0%. C4.8.2)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

Z.

Landing L-4 and the entrance door is non-compliant because it has a drain that

recesses below the concrete surface 14.3.8) and non-compliant slopes varying

between 1.0% and 2.4%. 14.8.4)

Agreed Solution: Repair landing, to the maximum extent possible, to meet requirements of (4.3.8 and 4.8.4).

7. ACCESSIBLE BASEMENT LEVEL ENTRANCE DOOR

A.

The concrete slab adjacent to the aluminum threshold just outside this door is

non-compliant due to deteriorating and rough concrete. 14.5.I ]

Agreed Solution: Repair landing, to the maximum extent possible, to meet requirements of (4.3.8 and 4.8.4).

F.

The aluminum threshold is a non-compliant 5 / 8 high. 14.13.8)

Agreed Solution: Provide new threshold to meet requirements of i4.13.8 j.

9. ACCESSIBLE ENTWNCE INTO THE BASEMENT LEVEL OVERFLOW JURY ROOM

C. - The door had a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no-closer. (4.13.9)
Agreed Solution: Replace hardware with compliant hardware in accordance with C4.13.9).

D. The clear door opening was a non-compliant 29-1/2". 1'4.13.53
Agreed Solution: No action required.

12. ENTRANCE INTO BASEMENT LEVEL MEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM

A.

The door signage was non-complianf in its location on the door. 14.30.6)

Agreed Solution: Relocate room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

13. BASEMENT LEVEL MEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM

E.

The boffom edge of mirror was at a non-compliant 41-1/2" above the floor.

{4.19.6)

Agreed Solution: Lower mirror to meet the requirements of (4.19.6).

F.

The paper towel dispenser was a non-compliant 58"above the floor {4.2.6) and

protruded a non-compliant 9-1/2" from the face of the wall in the path of travel to

the sink. {4.4.I].

Agreed Solution: Lower dispenser to meet requirements of (4.2.6 and 4.4.1).

G. The bottom of the wall mounted trash can is located 10" above the floor. Its
leading edge protrudes 11-3/4" from the face of fhe wall and results in a noncompliant encumbered path of travel to the sink. {4.3.3]
Agreed Solution: Relocate trash can so that the path of travel to the sink is not encumbered (4.3.3).

H. The clear opening between the privacy screen and the side wall is a noncomplianf 29-7/%.14.18.3)
Agreed Solution: No action required.

1.

The non-compliant path of travel required for a front approach to the urinal is

encumbered by a foilet partition that protrudes 3" past the face of the foilet wall.

{4.3.3].

Agreed Soiertisn: his action required.

J.

The urinal has a compliant elongated bowl with the rim at a non-compliant 17-

3/4" above the floor. {4.18.2]

-Agreed Solution:- No action required.

Q. The coat hook on the toilet stall door is a non-compliant 62-3/4" above the floor
C4.2.6)

Agreed Solution: Lower coat hook to meet requirements of (4.2.6).

S. The center line of the toilet is located at a non-compliant 2 0 from the face of the
side wall. {Page 43, Figure 30 (a)]
Agreed So!ut!on: No action required.

T.

The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the room. {4.16.5]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

W. The side wad grab bar is a compliant 43-3/8 long, but the leading edge is a noncompliant 3-1/4" from the back wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(a)]

Agreed Solution: No action required.

17. ENTRANCE INTO BASEMENT LEVEL PUBS-IC WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM
i

A.

The door signage was non-compliant r;n its location on the door. 14.30.6)

I

Agreed Solution: Relocate rbom identification signage in

accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a)).

1

B.

The door signage was installed at the non-compliant height of 61" above the

floor. 14.30.6)

I

Agreed Solution: Relocate room identification signage in

accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

I

G. The door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware {4.13.9) and no closer.

Agreed Solution: Replace operatinlg device with compliant hardware
in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

18. BASEMENT LEVEL WOMEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM

A.

The sink was at the compliant height of 32-i/8" above the floor and the underside

was at the non-compliant height of 27-5/8 above the floor. {Page 44, Figure 31).

Agreed Solution: Relocate sink 90 meet requirements of {Fig. 31, Page 44).

C. The soap dispenser was mounted at the non-compliant height of 48-1/2" above
the floor. 14.2.5)
Agreed -Solution: Lower dispenser to- meet requirements of {4;2-.6 and 4.4.1).

D.

The bottom edge of the mirror was gt a non-compliant 41-1/8" above the floor.

(4.19.6)

Agreed Solution: Lower mirror to nieet requirements of (4.19.6).

F.

The factory supplied latching rnecharbsrn for the toilet stall door was broken and

the replacement mechanism was non-compliant due to the requirement of

pi~~chifilsigfid grasphg. (4.1 7.5) I

Agreed Solution: Replace latch to meet requirements of (4.17.5).

H. The coat hook was mounted a nail-compliant height of 6 0 above the floor.
14.2.6)
Agreed Solution: Lower coat hookko meet requirements of (4.2.6).

1.

The toilet stall had a non-compliant h e of 6 0 wide by 58-1/4" deep. {Page 43,

Figure 30(a))

1.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

J.

The cdnferline of the foilef fixture was located at the non-compliant dimension of

20" froln the face of the side wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(a)}

K.

The toilet fixture seat is a compliant 17-3/8" from the floor.

I

L.

The toilet valve is on the compliant side of the sfall.

M. The ce'nterline of the foilef paper dispenser was located a compliant 30" from the back wad and a compliant 20-3/4" above the floor.

N. The r e k wall grab bar was a compliant 37" long with fhe end located a compliant 3-1/2" ikom the side wall.

0. The side wall grab bar is a complianf 43-1/4" long, but the leading edge is a non-
complihnt 5-1/4" from the back wall. {Page 43, Figure 30(a)}

Agreed Solution: No action required. I

P.

There :was a non-compliant floor cleanout cap on the left side of the toilet that

projected above the floor surface creating a tripping hazard to anyone using the

toilet horn. (4.3.83

Agreed sohution: Adjust deanout cap to be at finished floor elevation to' meet requirements of (4.3.8).

21. BASEMENT, FIRST AND SECOND FLOOR ELEVATORS

- -

- B.

The_ ciearance-befween..the car-plafform-sill and -edg-e .of e@va_to_.rhoi.sj -way -

threshbld was a non-compliant 1-5/16" at the Basement Level and 1-5/16" on the

Second Noor. The maximum clearance permitted is ?-I/#".{4.10.9}

I

Agreed solution: No action required.

I
C. The hall call buffon was located a non-compliant 41-1/4" above the floor on the Basedent Level, a non-compliant 40-1/2" above the floor on the First Floor, and
a non~complian4t 2-1/2" above the floor on the Second Floor. {4.10.33
I Agreed solbtion: No action required.

D.

The rdised characters on the elevator jamb were a non-compliant height from

cenfedine to floor of 59-1/2" at leff jamb and 59-3/4" at right jamb on the

Basedent Level, 59-3/4" at left jamb and 59-3/4" at righf jamb on the First Floor,

and 59-3/4" at leff jamb and 59-5/8" at right jamb on Second Floor. {4.10.5}

I

Agreed Solution: No action required.

i

E. The id-cab emergency communicafion system was not operational at this time. {4.10.?4} The County Executive was informed fhat the emergency comm~nicafionsdid not work and he found that the sheriffs phone number had

been changed about a year ago and the elevatorphone dialing operation was not corrected at that time.

F.

The visual indicator light on the in-cab emergency communication system was

not working. C4.10.74)

G. The in cab controls call buffon marked with a star, indicating the main entry floor,
was incorrectly marked as First Floor 1 rather than Basement Level of Exit Discharge. {4.10. 12(2))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

23. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN

A.

The First Floor Drinking Fountain is located in the main corridor jusf outside the

elevator lobby.

6. This drinking fountain is an older, non-compliant freestanding floor model with the spout at a non-complianf height of 42-1/2" above the floor. 14.15.2)

C. The drinking fountain has non-compliant controls mounted on the back of the unit
C4.15.4) which require tight grasping, pinching, and twisting. 14.27.4)

D. The water flow is a compliant 5-1/2" high.

Agreed Solution: County will bring drinking fountain into compiiance.

24. FIRST FLOOR FIRE EXTINGUISHER

A. -T-h-e Fire Edinguis&r is iocafed a non-compliant 6 0 above the floor on the First Floor main corridor just outside the ~fusteekofice and is supbort&d on a-wall bracket. {4.2.5)

Agreed Solution: Adjust fire extinguisher height to meet requirements of (4.2.5).

25. FIRST FLOOR ELEVATOR LOBBY

A.

The identifying signage at the First Floor Elevator Lobby is non-compliant in

location, size, and design. 14.30.I )

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.30.1).

27. ENTRANCE INTO THE SECOND FLOOR GENERAL SESSIONS1 JUVENILE COURT CLERKlClRCUlT COURT CLERK OFFICE SUITE

6. This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware {4.13.9) and no closer.
Agreed Solution: Door will remain open during business hours.

D.

Thepull side clearance is a non-complianf 5".{Page 38, Figure 25(alf

Agreed Solution: No action required.

29. ENTRANCE INTO THE SECOND FLOOR CLERK AND MASTER'S OFFICE

6. This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware {4.13.9} and no closer. Agreed Solution: Door will remain open during business hours.

30. SECOND FLOOR FIRE EXTINGUISHER

6. The Fire Extinguisher is wall mounted on a bracket at the non-compliant height of 58-3/4" above the floor. 14.2.6)

Agreed Solution: Lower fire extinguisher to meet requirements of (4.2.6).

31. ACCESS TO THE SECOND FLOOR ELEVATOR LOBBY

A.

The identifying signage af the Second Level Elevator Lobby is non-compliant in

location, size, and design. (4.30.I}

Agreed Sslution: Provide n e w rsom Identificaticn signage In accordance with (4.30.1).

34. ENTRANCE INTO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM

A.

The exteriorsignage on fhTs-rockf k non-compliant in moOnling heigiic lo3afion,

and design. 14.30.I}

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.30.1).

6. Entrance into the Second Floor Courtroom from the main com'dor is through a pair of double acting, spring hinge loaded doors. The clear opening of the right hand leaf, viewed from the corridor side of the doors, measures a non-complianf 27". {4.f3.4 and 4.13.51
Agreed Solution: Provide kick plates on both doors.
C. The push/pull pressure of these doors was very light and compliant and the
closing period was a non-compliant (I) second. {4.13.10)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

35. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM

A.

The Courfroom is 40'-8" wide by 36'-3" deep or approximafely 1,474 square feet1I

This Courfroom will seat (100) people in the fixed seats in the visiforsJarea.

There are no compliant wheelchair positions provided. The ADA requires (4)

compliant wheelchair positions to be provided {4,1.3(19(a)).

I

B.

The main center aisle was a complianf 39-1/8 wide.

C. The bar rail opening aligns wifh fhe main center aisle and its clear opening is a

complianf 78-3/4':

j

D. The floor on each side of the bar rail is on the same elevafion with no sfep.

Agreed Solution: Remove existing seating to provide two wheelchaii spaces near the bar or remove filing cabinets in the rear of the courtroom to provide wheelchair seating that is not 1 the path of travel.

36. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOMI VISITOR'S SEATING AREA TO THE SECOND FLOOR WITNESS STAND

A.

The path of travel is by way of the compliant main cenfer aisle fhrough the ba?

rail opening info the judiciary area and along a compliant and unencumbered

pafh of travel to the Witness Stand.

!

B. At the Wifness Sfand fhere is a compliant passage widfh of 40-5/8 between the

Wifness Stand raised platform and an aqoining rail befween the Jury Box ancf

the Wifness Stand.

I

Agreed Solution: No action required. 37. SEGOND FLOOR-LARGE COURTROOM WITNESS-STAND

!

I

- -

A.

The Wifness Stand is located on a non-compliant raised platform wifh a single

riser measuring 7-3/4"high. C4.5.21

I

B.

The Witness Sfand plafform opening is a compliant 33-1/4" wide.

C. The platform itself is a non-compliant 33-1/4" wide by 50" deep which is

insufficient space to maneuver a wheelchair within. {4.2.3)

j

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and

location of witnesses are part of the state program and will be

addressed by the state.

I
I

I 38. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM

VISITOR'S SEATING AREA TO THE SECOND FLOOR JURY BOX

A. The pafh of fravel is by way of the compliant main center aisle, through the bqr rail opening info fhe judicial area, and along a compliant and unencumbered path of travel along the bar rail fo the Witness Stand.
I

B. At the Jury Box there is a compliant passage width of 49" between the Witness Stand raised plafform and the adjacent bar rail at the main entrance into the Jury Box.
Agreed Solution: No action required.

39. ENTRANCE INTO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX

A.

One enters the Jury Box from the 49" wide passageway between the Jury Box

and the front bar rail and through a non-compliant 33-1/4" wide opening C4.3.3) in

the Jury Box rail.

6.

There is a non-compliant 8" step up at the Jury Box entrance opening from the

passage wayjust outside the Jury Box. 14.5.2)

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location of the jurors are part sf the state program and will be addressed by the state.

40. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX

A.

The Jury Box consists of (3) non-compliant raised platforms each accessed by a

single step up from the previous plafform. The second and third raised platform

is raised a non-compliant 8-?/2 and 8-1/4" respectively above the previous

ieveis. (4.5.2)

6. The first raised platform is a non-compliant 35-1/4" wide. The second raised

platform is a non-compliant 35-1/2" wide. The third raised plafform is a non-

compliant 37" wide. {4.2.3)

- - - - - - .- . - - -- -

-

------

---

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location

of the jurors are part of the state program and will be addressed

by the state.

41. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX TO THE JURY ROOM

A.

Path of travel from the Second Floor Large Courtroom Jury Box to the Jury Room

is by way of the compliant passageway between the Jury Box and the bar rail

lsadifig a: the Jury Room daor.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

42. ENTRANCE INTO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM

A.

Entrance into the Second Floor Large Courtroom Jury Room is by way of a door

with a non-compliant 27-3/8"clear opening. {4.f3.5)

B.

This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware C4.13.9) and no closer.

Agreed Solution: Jury will be relocated when there is a juror with a mobility disability. Relocating the jury is part of the state program and will be addressed by the state.

43. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM

A.

The Second Floor Courtroom Jury Room has a clear and unencumbered floor

area consisting of mo-vable furniture and storage cabinets.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

44. ENTRANCE INTO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM UNISEX TOILET ROOM

A.

This toilet room is accessed directly off of the Jury Room through a non-

compliant door whose opening is encumbered by storage cabinets located in the

Jury Room. This door can only be partially opened to a clear width of 24".

c4.13.5)

5. This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware {4.13.9) and no closer.

Agreed Solution: Jury will be relocatedwhen there is a juror with a mobility disability. Relocating the jury is part of the state program and will be addressed by the state.

45. SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM UNISEX TOILET ROOM

A.

The room size is a non-compliant 48-1/4" deep by 60-1/4" wide and does not-

have the required 60Wiameter maneuvering space.-{4.2.3)

0. The sink is mounted in a vanity cabinet top which is at the compliant height of 31"
above the floor.

C. Since the sink is located in a vanity top, there is no clearance underneath to accommodate a wheelchair and is therefore non-compliant. 14.19.21

D. The centerline of the sink is located a non-compliant 14-5/8" off the side wall.
{Page 44, Figure 32)

E

The shk has non-cc?mplianf fsuset kncnobs tfi~hichreqcrirg fight grasping and

twisting. c4.19.5)

F.

The soap dispenser is a compliant 42-1/2" above the floor.

G. The boftom edge of the mirror is a non-compliant 52-7/8 above the floor. 14.19.6)

H. The paper towel dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 62" above the floor. {4.2.6

1.

The centerline of the toilet is located a non-compliant 14" off fhe side wall. (Page

42, Figure 28 )

J.

The toilet seat is located at the non-compliant height of 15" from the floor. {Page

42, Fig, 26)

K.

The toilet flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet. {4.16.5}

L.

The toilet paper dispenser is non-compliant due to it's location on the front wall of

the toilet rather than the side wall. {Page 42, Figure 29(b)}

M. This toilet is non-compliant because it has neither sidewall nor back wad grab bars. 14.17.6)

Agreed Solution: Jury will be relocatedwhen there is a juror with a mobility disability. Relocating the jury is part of the state program and will be addressed by the state.

48. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE

A.

No compliant exterior directional signage exists on the South side. {4.1.2,(7),(~))

If all entrances are not accessible then directional signage is required to indicate

the route to the nearest accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible
entrances in accordancewith {4.1.2(7)(c)).

49. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE

A.

The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue

assistance for ali levels above grade. See attachment "C"for details.

- - Agreed Solution: Provide an area of rescue assistance in- - - accordance-with (43.-Id-)- if possible-within the- existing- structure,- - - - -
County will confer with its architect on this issue.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

Plaintiffs,

1

v.

1

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - PICKETT COUNTY

a This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this

day of

Febcu U Y

, 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann

Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Pickett County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.$12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE D A T E means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county commission meetings are held.
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Pickett County Courthouse or the Pickett County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, coinpensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Pickett County Courthouse or the Pickett County Judicial Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs further agree and acknowledgethat the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONASSSUMEBDYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensue that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program,

,

i

service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to

compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program,

service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMENATND MONITORING

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.

16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another pslrty is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Partyy7),then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.

18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modifjr any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Pickett County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Pickett County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs7 attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

IN THE TJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

)

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY ) COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COTJNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COTJNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

)

)

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT -PICKETT COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreementy') is entered into this

day of

2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly ~olles,Ann

Marie Zappola, Dennis Cailtrel, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Pickett County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT
I. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned
action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ra~nsey,Sr.,

Dennis Cantrel, a-sel

Larson:

William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

2416 21St Ave South, Stile 100 Nasllville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (5 10) 763-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiff$

/

Date: -

For Defendant Pickett Conunty, Tennessee:
~ h o r n aMi . Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: / - ~ L - Q5'

For Defendant County:

Picketf,County, Tennessee

By:

I

4

Name: ~~~%~~ ,%;/bfd/ Title: 6 4d - b € A er be
Date: I - 2 1 ~ 0 7 2 3

6 L-L
George Lane, lasti iff
Date: bVT)c

Date: 3-1-09u

PICKETT COUNTY

i

Plaintiff:

Date

PICKETT COUNTY Plaintiff:
3-23-03i
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff
Date: d/ykaa

s

Date: /*/&

AGREED SETTLEMENT PICKETT COUNTY
When a person with a mobility disability needs to access the judicial program offered in Pickett County, the judicial proceeding will be moved to an accessible location for the entire day, not just for the particular ljroceeding involving that individual.
Pickett County will pass a resolution concerning use of an accessible public building for judicial proceedings when necessary. Only one location will be chosen by Pickett County and will be designated the permanent alternate site for the judicial services offered in Pickett County. The site chosen by Pickett County will be the most accessible public building in Pickett County suitable for the relocation of judicial services. Further, a protocol will be established regarding the steps necessary for an individual with a mobility disability to gain access to the judicial program offered in Pickett County. The protocol will be established by Pickett County or in cooperation with the State of Tennessee.

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

)

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

1

)

v.

)

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

1

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE )

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR 1

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWJaNS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

1

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

1

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731
Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

Defendants.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - POLK COUNTY

This Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this 2 3 day of

<[hNd#

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Polk County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.5 1213l(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.

i

§12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 812132, and its

implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.

ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the

i

Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good

faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant

County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the

Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective

Date.

8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING

10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Party"). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.
15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.
16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Zappola, Jones, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Zappola, Jones, Cantrel, Rarnsey and Larson if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Lane has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the future:
For Defendant County:
Hoyt Firestone Polk County Mayor P. 0.Box 128 Benton, TN 37307-0128
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

i

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Plaintiffs and Defendallt County in the above-captioned action have caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, S r m Cantrel, and A. Russell Lason:

William J.' Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

I
Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTETN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800
Attorneys for PlainlYEfs /
Date: &'/,$/d-~

79 For Defendant Polk Cou Tennessee:
~ h o m dMs . Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: / , ~ d - 05

For Defendant County:

Polk County, Tennessee

By:
Name: Title: Date:

t!

i-r P fi d

T : j - p -~ti-8.1..1y-

,8:fL. .r.p ?.

/"%@-j/b /-

- 1- d,3.dif f 3- /

Date: 1-1 -0'6

I Date: d 4l~6,Ct

POLK COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

POLK COUNTY
i
Plaintiff
2-23-o:,'@
Date

Dennis Cantrel, Plaintiff

A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff
Date: z ~ / J r @ ~

AGREED SETTLEMENT POLK COUNTY

1. SOUTH ACCESSIBLE PARKING

B. The (2) existing accessible parkiflg spaces on the South side are non-compliant for a number of reasons including the spaces do not have designated aisles located on the side of the parking space {4.6.6} and have a non-compliant 17'-6"long by 8'-2" wide aisle space on the adjoining ends of the spaces. {4.6.6)

C. The (2) designated parking spaces have non-compliant running and cross slopes up to 4.69%. 14.6.3)

D. The 98" wide access aisle has non-compliant running and cross slopes up to 4.51% 14.6.3). The maximum allowable slope is a I " rise in 5 0 run or 2% maximum in all directions.

E.

The curb ramp has non-compliant cross slopes up to 6.7% and has non-compliant flared

sides of the curb ramp up to 90.7%. 14.7.51

F.

Neither of the (2) accessible spaces have a required van accessible sign located at a

height that is not obscured by a parked van or other vehicle. 14.6.4)

Agreed Solution: Convert side entrancelpull-in area which is

currently used by police on occasion, including curb configuration,

to make this the accessible parking space (including van accessible

. . access aisle and -p-alti-of-travel to entrance door) in accordance with

- -

-.

2. ACCESSIBLE ROUTE FROM SOUTH PARKING TO EAST ENTFWNCE DOOR

A.

The path of travel from the sidewalk to the east accessible entrance is on a 42" wide non-

compliant sloping sidewalk {4.3.7) that is approximately 94' long with non-compliant

running slopes up to 5.2% and non-compliant cross slopes up to 2.9%. 14.3.71 The

ramped sidewalk portion shall comply with all provisions of Section 4.8, Ramps.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

8. The double 36" entrance door has a non-compliant clear accessible area outside the door where the concrete slopes up to the threshold at a non-compliant 4.2% running slope. f4.13.6)

Agreed Solution: Re-pour apron, keeping some slope to avoid icing in inclement weather, and adjust connecting sidewalk to comply with (4.13.6).

3. FIRST FLOOR EAST ENTRANCE DOOR

4.
. .

E.

The loose carpet mat at the door,isnon-compliant. 14.5.3)

I
Agreed Solution: No actipn required.

FIRST FLOOR FWMP INSIDE THE EAST ENTRANCE DOOR

A.

The inferior ramp length is 12'-5" with varying non-compliant slopes from 7.8% at the

bottom section, 8.4% at the center section, and 9.1% at the fop section. 14.8.2)

B.

The ramp is non-compliant due io a maximum side drop off of 10 W without the required

2" high edge protection. 14.8.7)

I

The ramp handrail diameter is a non-compliant 1-5/8" f4.26.2) and is located at the noncompliant height of 33-7/4" abows the ramp surface. {4.8.5(5))

Each of the iwo handrails at this;ramp is non-compliant. One rail is continuous along the full length of the ramp but is noa-compliant due to a number of reasons. One reason is the missing edge protection curb required by the drop off along the open side. {#. 8.7) The railing along the opposite (wall side) is non-compliant because if is not continuous, stopping at a point 46" from the;bottom of the ramp {4.8.5(4)}. Neither handrail has the required level extension at the boffom of the ramp {4.8.5(2)} or a handrail extsnsion parallel to the floor surface at the top of the ramp {4.8.5(2)).

E.

The width of the ramp measureb at the low end between the handral and the wall is 38-

3A" and red~cesfc z non-com~lian3t 5-34'' st the o!c! v/ood frame mounted on the wall.

f4.8.31, {Page 31, Figure 17) The width between the two rails is a complianf 38".

Note: Due to the absence of apy wall handrail at the end of the ramp and at the wood

frame,-the ramp widths at those points are non-compliant because the ramp width is less

- - - .than the-required cl-earwidth between-handrails,.{Page-3_?,-Fiqu~e-~7} - - - .

-

- -

Agreed Solution: Provide handrails (with the exception of the bottom extension) which'meetthe requirements of (4.8.5).

6. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN

A.

The location of the accessible drinking fountain on the Third Floor of the building has not

been identified by compliant directional signage. {4.1.3(16)(b)}

B.

The non-compliant type drinking fountain has a non-compliant waterspout height of 39-

3/4". {4.15.2)

I

C. The non-compliant push bufton control is on the top. {4.15.4}

Agreed Solution: Add hccessibi~its~ignage at first floor fountain directing to third floor fountain in accordance with {4.13(16)(b)).

8. FIRST FLOOR NON-DESIGNPJED ACCESSIBLE MEN'S TOILET ROOM DOOR

A.

The entrance door is a single door with a compliant 36" door leaf.

5. The entrance door is recessed in a complaint passageway that is 51-?/4" long and 371/2" wide.

C. The non-compliant interior pull side clearance is 2-I/.". The compliant threshold height is
smooth. {Page 38, Figure 25(a))

D. The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware and no closer.

E.

The signage on the wall is non-compliant without a wheelchair symbol 14.30.7) and is

mounted at a non-compliant location and non-complianf height of 61-I/#" to the center of

the sign {4.30.6). The compliant height of the letter is 5/8", the compliant figure is 4-1/2"

and compliant Braille is provided.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

9. FIRST FLOOR NON-DESIGNATED ACCESSIBLE MEN'S TOILET ROOM

A.

The interior floor space has a compliant 60" diameter circle.

5. The sink has compliant drain piping location but is non-compliant due to the lack of pipe insulation f4.19.4). The sink is located at the non-compliant height of 34-51'8' above the floor f4.19.2) wifh a compliant single handle faucet.

C. The soap dispenser is located at fhe compliant height of 47-3/8" above the floor.

D. The mirror is located at a non-compliant height of 47-3/8" to the boftom edge of the

- - reflectiv- e- surface. 14.19.6)

- -

- E.- - The papertowel-dispenser is-locatedat the non-compliant-heighf-of56-1/2: {4,27.3} -- -

F.

The paper towel dispenser unit protrudes a non-complianf 1 0 from the face of the wall

into the path of travel of 14.4.I }

G. The urinals are located at the compliant height on the floor, wifh a compliant elongafed
bowl length of 14-1/2" on the surface of the floor, compliant flush valve height of 43-5/8", and a non-compliant flush valve control operation force of 8.5 Ibs. {4.27.4}.

H. The path of travel alcove width to the urinal is a non-compliant 40-I/#" wide {4.19.3).

i.

The loiiei in the accessible stdl is bcsted at :he coi)7p1iant dimensicn cf 18" from the

sidewall.

J.

The toilet paper dispenser is located at the compliant height of 23-5/8" and the front edge

is located at the non-compliant position of 37 37 from the rear wall. {Page 43, Fig. 301

K.

The flush valve is located on the compliant side of the toilet. The flush valve activation

force of 6 pounds is non-compliant. (4.27.41

L.

The height of the toilet seat is located at the compliant height of 19".

M. The sidewall grab bar is 43" long, located at the compliant height of 36" and is positioned at the non-compliant dimension of 4-1/2" from the back wall {Page 43, Figure 30(d))

N. The rear wall grab bar is 37" long, located at the compliant heighf of 36" and is positioned
at the compliant dimension of 4-5'8" from the back wall.

0. The accessible stall is 60" by 61-5/8". The coat hook is at the non-compliant heighf of 72" {4.2.6). The clear opening at the stall door is a complaint 34-5/8". The stall door is equipped with non-compliant hardware fhat requires pinching and grasping 14.13.91.

P.

The path of travel to the accessible stall is a compliant 42-1/2 wide.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

11. FIRST FLOOR NON-DESIGNATED ACCESSIBLE WOMEN'S TOILET ROOM
DOOR

A.

The entrance door is a single door with a compliant 36" door leaf

B.

The entrance door, with a side approach, is recessed in a compliant exterior alcove that

is 56" deep and 58-1/2" wide. The compliant inferior alcove is 72" deep and 71" wide. It is

formed by the metal partition and door. A coat hook is mounted on the door at the non-

compliant height of 67-1/2". 14.2.6)

C. The compliant interior pull side clearance is 25". The compliant threshold heighf is smooth.

D. The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware and no closer. There is a noncompliant slide bolt fhat requires pinching and grasping on the inferior side. {4.13.9)

- E,

The signage on the wall-is non-compliant without a wheel chair symbol 14.30.7) and is

- -

.mounfed at .the_compliant locafion- and. height o f 6 0 Y o the- center- o_ff h e -sign_.m- e

compliant height of the letfer is 5/8",the complianf figure is 4-1/2" and Braille is provided.

Agreed Solution: Convert this location into one unisex accessible toilet to meet the requirements of (4.22). Provide new room identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

12. FIRST FLOOR NON-DESIGNATED ACCESSIBLE W O M E N ' S TOILET ROOM

A.

The inferior floor space has a compliant 60" diameter circle.

5.

The sink is non-compliant due to drain piping location {4.19.2) and lack of piping

insulation {4.19.4). The sink is located at the non-compliant height of 36-1/2" {4.19.2) with

non-compliant knob handle faucets 14.19.5). The non-compliant water heater projects 9-

3/4" from the rear wall under the sink encumbering the clear area below the sink. {4.19.3)

C. There was no mirror.

D.

The soap dispenser is located at the compliant height of 44" above the floor.

E.

The paper towel dispenser is located at the non-compliant height of 54-1/2". 14.27.3)

F.

The paper towel unit protrudes a non-compliant 10" from the face of the wall info the path

of travel to the sink. 14.4.11

G. The toilet is located at the non-compliant dimension of 17-3/4" from the sidewall. {Page
42, Figure 28)

H. The toilet paper dispenser is located the complianf height of 22-1/2" and the front edge is locafed at the compliant position of 33-5/8" from the rear wall.

1.

The flush valve is located on the compliant side of the toilet with a non-compliant flush

valve activation force of 6 pounds. {4.16.5)

J.

The height of the toilet seat is located at the non-compliant height of 16-3/8. {4.16.3}

K.

The sidewall grab bar is a non-compliant 37" long,. {Page 43, Fig. 302 located at the

complianf height of 3 6 and positioned at the non-compliant dimension of 4-1/2" from the

back wall. {Page 42, Figure 29(a))

L.

The rear wall grab bar is a non-compliant 2 5 long 14.16.41, located at the compliant

height of 36" and is positioned at the complianf dimension of 6-1/4" from the back wall.

Agreed Solution: Convert this location into one unisex accessible
toilet ta meet the requirements sf (4.22). Provide new room
identification signage in accordance with {4.1.3.16(a)).

14. ELEVATOR

8. The non-compliant height for the ha1 call button on the First Floor is 42-7/8" above the floor {4.10.3) and 41-1/2" above the floor on the Second Floor.{4.10.3}

Agreed Solution:
- - - -- -- - - - --- - - -

No-action
- - - -- - - -

r-eq.- u--ir-e- d.

-

-. - -

- -- -- .

C. The compliant signage has been located at the non-compliant height of 59-1/2" to fhe
centerline {4.10.5) on the exterior elevator door frame on the First Floor in lieu of the 6 0 required dimension.

Agreed Solution: Relocate signage to meet requirements of (4.10.5).

D. The compliant signage has been located at the non-compliant height of 59-3/4" to the centerline C4.10.5) on the exterior elevator door frame on the Third Floor in lieu of the 60" required dimension.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

The in-car lantern does not operate when the elevator is operated from the cab controls.

However the in-car lantern does operate when the car is called from the ha1 call button.

This is a maintenance issue which should be corrected.

Agreed Solution: The in-car lantern will be fixed.

F.

The emergency caN system is non-compliant and does not operate correctly. There are

no complianf instructions to operate the phone. There is no light that glows red or blinks

when the emergency call is answered. When the emergency phone operator was dialed, guessing maybe to dial 911, the phone would not work. Our findings indicate the phone is a local extension line and fhe person in the elevator must have knowledge to dial a three digit extension, since no signage was present. We asked the County Executive Secretary how the phone worked and who does it contact, she said you must dial a local extension, #527, to get the County Executive's office during working hours and a second local extension number, #540, to dial the Sheriff's Deparfmenf at any time. When the call was tried again, per the verbal instructions from the County Executive Secretary, we were able to contact fhe Executive's Office and the Sheriff's Deparfmenf. This entire operation was nof noted in any of the elevator in-cab instructions. C4.10.14)

Agreed Solution: The emergency call system will be fixed to comply with ADAAG 4.10.14.

THIRD FLOOR WEST CHANCERY COURTROOM' DOOR

6. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. {4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with C4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

E. The non-compliant vertical marble edge threshold is 3/8" on the inside and 1/2" outside.
{4.13.8)

Agreed Sc!utl~n:Bevel Izr replace thresk?e!d+,a meet requirements of (4.1 3.8).

THIRD FLOOR WEST CHANCERY COURTROOM

A. - -The coud~~oomwi-ll seat-approximately (40) people-in-wooden-peewWand.awnnadditiz,_(1na1l)-_ _
in the movable chairs around the courtroom. The approximate size of the courtroom is 35'-7" x 18'-6" or approximately 658 square feet. The ADA requires (2) compliant wheel chair locations to be provided. {4.1.3(19)(a))

B.

The side aisles are non-compliant at 32-3/8". C4.3.3)

Agreed Solution: County will add appropriate signage directing traffic to accessible side door. The first pew located behind counsel tables will be removed and replaced with removable chairs. The removable chairs will be relocated when a wheelchair space is needed. Wheelchairs will not be placed in the path of travel.

THIRD FLOOR CIRCUIT COURTROOM (EAST) DOOR

A.

The non-compliant side entrance door is a double 3 0 door with fhe right leaf in a locked

position. {4.13.4) If is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and closers. {4.13.9

and 10)

6. The non-compliant pulUpush force to operate the leff door is 6.5 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b)} The
left door has a compliant sweep period of 19.0 seconds. The non-compliant pull/push

force to operate the right door is 7 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b)}. The right door has a compliant sweep period of 6.5 seconds.
D. The non-compliant vertical marble threshold is 3/16" on the inside and 3/8" outside. 14.13.8)
Agreed Solution: County will adjust push/pull force and marble threshold and will unlock second entry door. When court is i n session, there is always a security officer a t the entrance doors to provide assistance.

19. THIRD FLOOR CIRCUIT COURTROOM (EAST)

A.

The courtroom will seat approximately (182) people in the fixed wooden pews and an

additional (14) in the movable chairs. There is no bar in this courtroom. There are no

wheelchair locations provided within the fixed seating area. The ADA requires (4)

wheelchair locations scattered throughout the (f82) seats of the fixed wooden pew area.

{#.I.3(19)(a))

Agreed Solution: No action required.

20. THIRD FLOOR ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL IN THE COURTROOM (EAST) TO THE WITNESS STAND
5. The wifness stand entrznce has =r c!ear width of 42-1/2" at the non-compliant steps. 14.5.2)
Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and location of -the witness are-part of the state j u d i ~ i apl rogram and - . . - --willbe-addressedby-thestater - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - .- - - - . .

21. THIRD FLOOR WITNESS STAND COURTROOM (EAST)

A.

The witness stand is non-compliant due to the presence of (3) three steps of 6-3/4", 6

and 6-3/4" to access the raised plafform. 14.5.21

B.

The witness stand is non-compliant due to an interior clearance area of 43-1/2" wide by

76" deep which is insufficient space to maneuver a wheelchair within 14.2.3). There is a

movable chair within this area.

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and location of the witness are part of the state judicial program and
will be addressed by the state.

23. THIRD FLOOR COURTROOM (EAST) JURY BOX

A.

The compliant jury box entrance width is 36-3/8" with two non-compliant steps, one 8-

3/4" step and one 7" step. C4.5.2)

B.

The non-compliant lower landing is 41 %" clear with (6) movable chairs and 38 N" clear

on the upper level with (6) movable chairs.

C. Thejury box is non-compliant due to space being inadequate to maneuver a wheelchair within. 14.2.3)

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location of the jury are part of the state judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

24. THIRD FLOOR ACCESSIBLE PATH OF TRAVEL FROM COURTROOM (EAST) TO THE JURY ROOM DOOR

A.

Path of travel is along the compliant 59-1/2" center aisle and along the non-compliant 26-

1/2"rear aisle. 14.3.3)

B.

The rear courtroom door to access the jury room alcove is a compliant 36" door,

equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and a closer with a compliant 5 Ibs.

closing force and a non-compliant sweep period of 2.9 seconds. {4.13.9}{4.13.10)

C. The compliant Jury Room alcove hallway size is a 53" x I l l nleading to thejury room.

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location of the jury are part of the state judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

25. THIRD FLOOR JURY ROOM COURTROOM (EAST)

B.

The entrance door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob, without a closer.

(4.13.9)- - - -

- ._ -- - - - - - -

-- - - _ ._ - _

- _

_

_ - _ . .

- --

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

26. THIRD FLOOR JURY TOILET IN THE JURY ROOM

A.

The entrance door is a single non-complianf 28" wide door. f4.13.5)

6. The non-compliant interior push side clearance is 2-1/2". {Page 38, Figure 25) The non-
compiianf threshold is a 5 X"step up into fhis room. (4.73.8)

C. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. 14.13.9)

D.

There was no signage. f4.30.7)

E.

The interior floor space is non-compliant since if does not provide a clear 6 0 diameter

circle. (4.1 6.2)

F.

The corner sink is non-compliant due to the drain piping location, lack of piping insulation

14.79.41, height above the floor {4.19.2), single handle twisting faucet 14.19.5) and the

side clearance (4. f9.3).

G. There was no soap dispenser, mirror, toilet paper dispenser, and grab bars.

H.

The toilef and paper dispenser were not measured.

Agreed Solution: Handicappedjurors needing to use the restroom will be accompanied to the first floor unisex restroom by a security officer or other court personnel.

27. THIRD FLOOR JURY TOILET OFF THE JURY ROOM ALCOVE HALLWAY

A.

The entrance door is a single door with a compliant 36" door leaf.

5.

The compliant threshold height is smooth,

C. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and no closer. {4.13.9)

D.

The interior floor space is non-compliant since if does not provide a clear 60" diameter

circle. 14.16.2)

E.

There was no sink, soap dispenser, mirror, paper towel dispenser, toilet paper dispenser

and grab bars.

F.

The toilet was nof measured. It was on a small, 6" high raised plafform and enclosed with

a non-complianf partition. 14.5.21,{4.76.2}, {Page 43, Fig. 30)

Agreed Sosution: Handicapped jurors needing to use tine resiroorn will; be accompanied to the first floor unisex restroom by a security officer or other court personnel.

-

--2-9-. -

THIRD FLOOR CLERK & MASTER OFFICE-DOOR

--

- . - - - - -- - ---- - -

.- ----

D. The door is equipped with a non-compliant cylindrical knob and has no closer. {4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

F.

The non-compliant vertical marble threshold is flush on the inside and 7/16" on the

outside. 14.13.8)

Agreed Solution: Modify existing threshold or replace threshold to meet requirements of (4.3.8).

31. THIRD FLOOR CIRCUIT CLERK DOOR

C. The interior floor space is a non-compliant 53 X"clear. {4.13.6(b)}

D.

The door is equipped with a non-complianf cylindrical knob and has no closer. 14.13.91

F. The non-compliant vertical marble fhreshold is 5/76" on the inside and oufside. (4.13.8)

Agreed Solution: Modify existing threshold or replace threshold to meet requirements of (4.3.8).

35. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE

A.

Non-compliant exterior directional signage. {4.1.2,(7),(~)) If all entrances are not

accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route fo the nearest

accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with (4.1.2(7)(c)).

36. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE

A.

The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue assistance for

all levels above grade. See attachment "C" for details.

Agreed Solution: Provide an area of rescue assistance in accordancewith (4.3.1 I).

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

1

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

1

Plaintiffs,

)

1

v.

)

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political

)

subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE 1

COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER )

COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )

COUNTY, COCKE COUNTY, DECATUR )

COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRAINGER )

COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS )

COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON )

COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON)

COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE

)

COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS

1

COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY

)

COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE )

COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,

1

1

Defendants.

1

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - TROUSDALE COUNTY

FeThis Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") is entered into this a day of

h/vfi/V

,2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones,

Ann Marie Zappola, Dennis Cantrel, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter

"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Trousdale County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

This Agreement resolves all of Plaintiffs7claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. It does not resolve Plaintiffs' claims for damages or attorneys' fees and costs.

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§1213 l(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
DEFINITIONS :
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying e ~ p 2 ~ a t i o anssmay be contained in the statutes, appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "'ALTERATION" refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned and/or operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services andlor county commission meetings are held.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.

7. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. Defendant County will complete as soon as practicable the items delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
8. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program, service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program, service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.
9. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to insure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.
ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING
10. Upon the Effective Date, the parties agree to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendant County. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the dismissal order.
11. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee.
12. All claims resolved by this Agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Agreement.
13. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Partyy'). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expirationof the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.

14. Reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses may be sought by the prevailing

i

party in any judicial proceeding relating to this Agreement to the extent allowed by law.

15. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22) a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts at completing the Alterations delineated in Appendix during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed making the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix A have been completed.

16. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modifj any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 22), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Agreement.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. By entering into this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
18. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson's alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to accessjudicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County.
19. This Agreement will be null and void as to Plaintiffs Zappola, Lane, Cantrel, Ramsey and Larson if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319), entered on December 7, 2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County although that Plaintiff allegedly has never attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Defendant County. Defendant County does not dispute that Plaintiff Jones has standing to enforce this Agreement.
20. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been

advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
21. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
22. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs and Defendant County to one another relating to this Agreement shall be sent to the following addresses or at such other address as the parties may designate in writing in the hture:
For Defendant County:
Jerry Clift Trousdale County Mayor 210 Broadway, Room #5 Hartsville, TN 37074
For Plaintiffs:
William J. Brown & Associates 23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
23. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.
24. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature affixed hereto.
25. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein.

IN WITNESS WHEFEOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County ill tl~eabove-captioned action have

i

caused this Agreeinent to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.

For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. R a m s e y m ~ m i Cs antrel, and A. Russell Larson:

William J. Brown & Associates 23 Nol-tl~Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001
fld

' Gary D. Housepian (BPR # 6969)

1

Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Ti~c.

24 16 21 Ave South, Suite 100

Nasl~ville,TN 37212

(615 ) 298-1080

L

--

Linda M. Dardarim, admitted Pro Hac Vice

Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice

GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDAEUAN

300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000

Oakland, CA 94612-3534

(510) 763-9800

Attorneys for Plainti@

/'

Date:

For Defendant Trousdale County, Tennessee:
n
Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Date: / d4d"

For Defendant County:

Trousdale County, Tennessee

By:
Name: Title: Date:

# #

I

~~~~-f h w &3(&cy~fi'ir& ~q ~Jt

George Lane, ~ l a i d f f
Date: \-- \-0 5

Date: a- I-ohU

TROUSDALE COUNTY
Plaintiff:
Date

TROUSDALE COUNTY
f
i
Plaintiff:
6-23- 04
Date

Dennis Cantrel, plaintiff
Date: q / u ~ / L & d ~

A. us sell karson, ~iaintiff
Date: J ' - / 6 f l ~

AGREED SETTLEMENT TROUSDALE COUNTY

PARKING AREA

C. This West space is non-compliant because it is not located near the accessible entrance.
(4.6.2)

D.

The West space is non-compliant because it measures 92" by 2lO". (4.6.31, (Page 26,

Fig. 10)

E.

The West space is non-compliant because it has no above ground signage. f4.6.41

F,

The West space is non-compliantbecause it has no adjacent curb ramp. (4.7. I ]

G. The West space is non-compliant because it has excessive cross slopes up to 3.3%.
(4.6.31

H.

The West space is non-compliant because it has excessive running slopes up to 2.5%.

(4.6.3)

1.

The West space is non-compliant because it has no designated accessible aisle. (4.6.3)

J.

The West space is non-compliant because a passenger loading zone is not provided.

(4.6.6)

L.

This South space is non-compliant because the size is 92" by 2l2". (4.6.31 (Page 26, Fig

1 01

M, This South space is non-compliant because it has no above ground signage. (4.6.41

N.

This South space is non-compliant because it has no curb ramp. (4.7. I }

0. This South space is non-compliant because it has excessive cross slopes up to 5.7%.
(4.6.3)

P.

This South space is non-compliant because it has no designated accessible aisle. (4.6.3)

Q. A van accessible space has not been provided with the designated signage and stripping. 14-1.2(5)(b)I

Agreed Solution: Move handicapped parking to front of the courthouse to meet all applicable requirements and provide one handicap parking space that is van accessible and that complies with ADAAG 4.6.

No action required with regard to the west parking area.

2. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM THE SOUTH DESIGNATED PARKING SPACE TO THE REAR ENTRANCE OF THE BUILDING

A.

The path of travel from the handicap parking space in the street on the South or rear side

of the building is adjacent to the sidewalk with no compliant curb cut (4.7.I] One must

travel along a public sidewalk to a non-compliant ramp that leads to a pair of double

doors at the top of the ramp. See non-compliant regulations below for ramp deficiencies.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

3. REAR ENTRANCE RAMP AND REAR ENTRANCE DOOR

B.

The access ramp has non-compliant landings at both the top (61J'x45 %314.8.4) and

bottom of the ramp. {4.5.2}

Agreed Solution: Fix landing at the bottom of ramp to meet requirements of (4.5.2). No action required at top landing.

C. The entrance ramp has a non-compliant running slope of II.8%.C4.8.2)

Agreed Solution: Replace or modify ramp to meet requirements of (4.8.2).

D. This ramp has no protective curb for the 22 %" drop. (4.8.71

Agreed Solution: Provide edge protection to meet requirements of (4.8.7).
E. This non-compliant ramp has a handrail on one side only {4.8.5(1)} located at non-
compliant heights of 20-%"and 34"above the surface. {4.8.4(5)}

Agreed Solution: Provide handrails to meet requirements of (4.8.5).

F. At the top landing of this ramp, one turns 900 to enter a non-compliant entrance alcove that is 52"wide by 58"deep 14.8.3) leading to the non-compliant 5 6 wide double door entrance. {4.13.4)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

G. The entrance door has (2) non-compliant 28" wide leaves. The active leaf has a non-
compliant passage access of 25-I/2".14.13.5)

Agreed Solution: County will replace with a 36" compliant door.

H. The glass in these doors is a non-compliant height of 45"from the floor. {Page A3, Fig. A31
Agreed Solution: County will replace with a 36" compliant door.

M. There was a non-compliant loose laid mat encumbering the interior accessible door space. 14.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

4. FIRST FLOOR DRINKING FOUNTAIN

A.

Note: The drinking fountain is near the south door in the corridor. This fountain was not

functioning at the time of the site visit.

B.

The fountain spout was a non-complianf height of 41-1/2" from fhe floor. 14.15.2)

C. This was a non-compliant drinking fountain with a top control. 14.15)

Agreed Solution: County will replace current water fountain with a bottled water cooler.

5. FIRST FLOOR MEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM

A.

The signage is located on the door at a non-compliant height of 65" above the floor,

14.30.6)

5. The signage for this toilet is non-compliant as to location 14.30.61, letter and figure size
and lack of Braille. 14.30.3 & 4.30.4)
C. The door is a non-compliant 30" wide and opens into an alcove. The clear accessible
passage space fhrough this door is a non-compliant 27". C4.13.5)

D.

The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware with a non-compliant pressure of

7Ibs. (4.13.7 l(2)(b)}

E.

The closing period for this door was a compliant 3.07 seconds.

F.

The threshold has a non-compliant vertical edge of %" on the inside. (4.5.2)

G. The door enters into a non-compliant alcove that is 41" wide by 65-1/2" long. {Page 38,
Fig. 25(a)}

H.

The non-compliant pull side clearance is 6-%".C4.13.6) & {Page 38, Fig 25(a)}

1.

The passage from the alcove to the toilet and sink area is through a non-compliant 35-

1/2" access route. f4.3.3)

J.

The signage for the designated handicap stall is non-compliant and located 65 N"above

the floor. C4.30)

K. The handicap designated stall is a non-compliant 33" wide and 53-1/2" deep. C4.17.3) &
{Page 43, Fig. 30(b)}

L.

The grab bars were a non-compliant length of 33" and a non-compliant distance of 14 %"

from the back wall. {Page 43, Fig. 30(b)}

M. The toilet fixture had a non-compliant seat height of 15-3/4" from the floor. {4.16.3) & {Page 43, Fig. 30(d))

N.

The toilet flush valve activation pressure was a non-compliant 9.5 Ibs. {4.27.4)

0. The toilet fixture was a non-compliant 19 ZJaJnd 15" from the side walls. {4.16.2} & {Page
43, Fig. 30(b))

P.

The toilet paper dispenser was a compliant 22" high and a non-compliant distance of 37-

1/2" from the back wall. (Page 43, Fig. 30(d))

Q.

The paper towel dispenser is a non-compliant height of 56" above the floor. {Page 19,

Fig. 6(bJ

R. The mirrors are a non-compliant height of 52" above the floor to the bottom edge. {4,19.6)

S.

The soap dispenser is at a compliant height of 46 %".

T.

The sinks are non-compliant due to a low sink height of 29-71'8' {4.19.2), the lack of

required knee clearance below C4.19.21, the lack of required piping insulation (4.19.4),

and the use of hardware which requires pinching/grasping {4.19.5})

U. The urinal edge is a non-compliant height of 26" above the floor. {4.18.2)

V. The urinal flush valve is located a compliant 39 %" above the floor and has a compliant flush valve activation pressure of 4 Ibs.

W. The inside floor space of this toilet is compliant and large enough for a 60" diameter turning space.

Agreed Solution: Renovate restroom to comply with ADAA 4.22.

6. FIRST FLOOR WOMEN'S PUBLIC TOILET ROOM

A.

The signage is located on the door at a non-compliant height of 65-1/4" above the floor.

(4.30.6)

B.

The signage for this toilet is non-compliant as to location C4.30.61, letter and figure size

and lack of Braille. {4,30.2; 4.30.3; & 4.30.4)

C. The door is a non-compliant 30" door with a non-compliant clear accessible passage
space through the door of 27". {4.13.5)

D.

The door is equipped with compliant push/pull hardware. The push/pull pressure is a non-

compliant I I Ibs. {4.13.1 l(2)(b))

E.

The closing period for this door was a non-compliant 2.87 seconds. {4.13.10)

F. The threshold is compliant with 3/16" and 1/4" edges.

G. The door enters into a compliant alcove that is 51-1/4" wide and 61"long.

H.

The passageway from the alcove to the toilet and sink area is through a non-compliant

29-3/8" wide access route. C4.3.3)

1.

The paper towel dispenser is at a non-compliant height of 52" above the floor. p a g e 19,

Fig. 6(b))

J.

The mirrors are a non-compliant height of 49-1/2" above the floor. {4.19.6)

K.

The soap dispenser is a non-compliant height of 49-1/2" above the floor, {Page 18, Fig.

5(a),'

L.

The sinks are totally non-compliant due to sink height {4.19.2), the lack of required knee

clearance below {4.19.2), the lack of required piping insulation {4.19.4), the use of

handles that requiring pinching/grasping. C4.19.5)

M. There is a compliant interior clear path of travel to the handicap designated stall.

PI. The signage for the designated handicap stall is a non-compliant 57 %" above the floor, 14.30.6)

0. The passageway through the door of this stall is compliant at 37" wide and the path of travel to the accessible stall is 58-%".

P.

The handicap designated stall was a compliant 68" wide and 77-3/4" deep.

Q.

The grab bar requirements are non-compliant since there is only one side grab bar in this

stall. {4.16.4)The grab bar .is a non-compliant length of 33" {Page 43, Fig. 30(a)) and a

non-compliant distance of 10-3/4" from the back wall. {Page 43, Fig. 30(alJ

R. The toilet fixture has a non-compliant distance of 19-1/4" from the side wall. {Page 43,
Fig. 30(a))

S. The toilet paper dispenser was a compliant 28" above the floor and a non-compliant
distance of 36-1/2" from the back wall. {Page 43, Fig. 30(d))

T.

The toilet seat was a non-compliant 15" above the floor. {4.16.3) & {Page, 43, Fig. 30(d)}

U. The flush valve is located on the non-compliant side of the toilet. {4.16.5)

V.

The flush valve activation pressure was a compliant 5 Ibs.

W. The door to this stall has non-compliant pinching and grasping hardware. 14.17.5)

Agreed Solution: Renovate restroom to comply with ADAAG 4.22.

7. PATH OF TRAVEL TO FIRST FLOOR COURTROOM AND CLERK OFFICES

A.

The path of travel to the Courtroom and the First Floor Clerk Offices is accomplished by

continuing down the first floor corridor, going through a compliant dootway (no doors),

and over a non-compliant loose rug adjacent to the doorway. {4.5.3}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

8. FIRST FLOOR COURT CLERK OFFICE

6. The signage for this office is non-compliant in type, location, and height. 14.30)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a)}.

F.

The door swings to the inside of this ofice. The counter is 42" from fhe inside of the door

creating a non-compliant inside clear area to the counter. {Page 38, Fig, 25(c)}

Agreed Solution: No action required.

9. FIRST FLOOR FIRE EXTINGUISHER NEAR THE COURT CLERK

A.

This fire extinguisher is a non-compliant height of 78-1/2" from the floor. {Page 19, Fig.

6(b))

Agreed Solution: Adjust height of fire extinguisher to meet requirements of (Fig. 6(b), Page 19).

10. FIRST FLOOR CLERK AND MASTER OFFICE

A.

The signage for this office is non-compliant in type, size, and location. 14.30)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a)).

11. FIRST FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM DOOR

6. The sign for this courtroom is a non-compliant height of 48-1/2" above the floor in the corridor. 14.30.6) The signage for fhis room is non-compliant in type, size, and location. 14.30.6)

Agreed Solution: Provide new room identification signage in accordance with (4.1.3.1 6(a)).

0. The door is equipped with non-compliant cylindrical hardware. C4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

E.

The door glass is a non-compliant heighf of 52" above the floor. {Page A3, Fig. A3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

1.

These double doors have non-compliant cylindrical hardware. 14.13.9)

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

J.

Each door leaf is a non-compliant 24" wide. The accessible passageway through the

active door leaf is non-compliant. {4.13.4 & 4.13.5)

Agreed Solution: Keep both doors open while court is in session. Provide signage stating that doors are to be left open while court is in session.

13. FIRST FLOOR SMALL COURTROOM WITNESS STAND

A.

The witness stand is accessed by a non-compliant 6-1/4"step. C4.5.2)

5. The accessible passageway opening into the witness stand is a non-compliant 21-3/8" 14.3.3) which narrows down to a non-compliant 15-7/44 14.3.3)

C. The witness stand is a non-compliant size of 47" x 65-1/2" since it is insufficient space to
maneuver a wheelchair within. 14.2.3)

Agreed Solution: The Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and the location of witnesses is part of the state's judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

15. NON-AUTOMATIC ELEVATOR

A.

The non-compliant non-automatic elevator {4.10.2) for the handicapped is in the corridor

near the North entrance doors. This elevator is also non-compliant as a platform lift in

section since an assistant is required to operate the gates on each end of the platform.

{4.71.3) It is our understanding that the key for this elevator is stored in the Clerk and

Master's Office and a courthouse employee is required to assist a person with a disability

to operate the elevator. The lighting fixtures in the elevator were not working at the time

of the inspection but the elevator company had been called to find and repair the

problem. Lighting measurement could not be preformed by the research team because

of this problem.

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

5. In front of the North entrance doors is a non-compliant loose mat on the floor, {4.5.3)

Agreed Solution: No action required.

E.

The inside floor of the elevator was a non-compliant 42" by 58". {Page 34, Fig. 22)

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

F.

The accessible entrance into this elevator was a non-compliant 33" {measured from the

strike jamb to the edge of the retracted accordion gate which protrudes past the edge of

the opened door on the hinge side of the door. {Page 34, Fig. 22)

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

G. In order to call the elevator while at another floor, a key must be inserted into the switch
and turned and the button held in the on position. This is non-compliant operation requires pinching and grasping, f4.13.9)

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

H.

The haN call button measuring a compliant 3/4" by 3/4"must be depressed and held until

the elevator arrives at that requested floor positions. The elevator cab internal controls

were compliant in size and height.

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

1.

The area on the external wall with the switch, floor number and key stop is compliant.

The centerline of fhe hall call indicator number is a non-compliant 46" above the floor

{4.10.5} and the centerline of the hall call button is a non-compliant 41-1/2" above the

floor. {4.10.3) The digital hall call number is a compliant 1-1/4" high.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

J.

This elevator door has a hinged door which provided a non-compliant opening of

33",{Page 34, Fig. 22) This door opens automatically when fhe elevator arrives at the

floor and remains open for 18.9 seconds before it closes automatically. This fire rated

door has a compliant closing force of 11pounds.

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

K. Once the hinged door is open, both at the First and Second Floors, there is an accordion
metal gate which must be manually opened by sliding it to one side of the opening. The opening force at each level on this gate was a compliant 4 Ibs. The problem with this elevator is the elevators enters on one side on the First Floor and discharges on the Second Floor from the opposite end of the elevator. This opposite door configuration and the non-compliant size of the cab without a 60\' turning radius would require the person in the wheelchair to turn around in their chair backwards to open the gate to exit the elevator on the Second Floor if the person backed on to the elevator platform on the First Floor.
Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

L.

The external non-compliant type floor indicator signage, {Page 33, Fig 201 for this

elevator on the First Floor consisted of a square floor indicator sign on fhe non-complianf

wall (4.30.6) just outside the elevator at the non-compliant height of 62" (4.30.6) above

the floor and one on the inside face of the door at 64" above the floor with non-compliant

Braille and raised character. {4,10.5) The elevator door has a handicap sign on the

exterior of the door at the non-compliant height of 57-1/2" above the floor. f4.30.6) The

sign is non-compliant due to the lack of Braille f4.30.4) and lack of raised characters

14.30). The handicap symbol was a compliant 4" high and the letters a non-compliant 1/2" tall c4.30.4).
Agreed Solution: Replace or modify signage to meet requirements of (4.30.6,4.10.5, and 4.30.4).

S.

There was a non-compliant phone in this elevator due to the lack of Braille instructions,

lack of a volume confro/, and the presence of equipment that would only function with

audible communication. {4.10.14} Thephone number posted in the elevator, 9-374-2114,

is not an emergency response phone number. The report team called the number and

got the county jail. The team member asked "If this was an emergency, would this

number be the one to call?" and the person said "No, fhis is the county jail." It was asked

"If I had an emergency, what number should be called?" and the person said to "Call 9-

374-3994 for an emergency." This emergency number was not noted in the elevator.

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

U.

The grab bar heights within the cab were a non-compliant 32-1/2" above the floor.

14.26.2)

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

V. The clear width to exit the elevator at the Second Floor is a non-compliant 32-1/2". {Page 34, Fig. 221

Agreed Solution: County will bring elevator into compliance with the ADA.

W. The area on the external wall at the Second Floor below the switch, floor number and key stop is clear and compliant. The centerline of fhe hall call indicator number is a noncompliant 46-3/8" above the floor 14.70.5) and the centerline of the hall call button is a compliant 42" above the floor. The digital hall call number is a compliant I-1/4" high.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

X.

The elevator door at the Second Floor also has a hinged door with a non-compliant 32"

clear opening between the door jamb and the accordion gate edge. {Page 34, Fig. 221

This door opens automatically when the elevator arrives at the floor and will remain open

21.25 seconds before if closes automatically and has a closing period of 3.88 seconds. If

the rated door on the Second Floor was to close on someone it would take a compliant

12 Ibs. to hold this door in the open position.

Proposed Solution: County to check with elevator manufacturer to determine if gates can be reconfigured, eliminated or controlled electronically to provide for operation without the use of assistance.

Y. The external non-compliant type floor indicator signage, {Page 33, Fig 201, for this elevator on the Second Floor consisted of a square floor indicator sign on the noncompliant wall 14.30.6) just outside the elevator at the non-compliant height of 6 6 above

the floor. 14.30.61 The internal non-compliant type floor indicator signage on the inside face of the door is located 64" above the floor 14.30.6) with non-compliant Braille and raised character.{4.10.5} The elevator door has a handicap sign on the exterior of the door at the non-compliant height of 57-1/2" above the floor. The sign is non-compliant due to the lack of Braille 14.30.41 and lack of raised characters 14.70.5). The sign location is non-compliant. {4.10.5} The handicap symbol was a compliant 4" high and fhe letters a non-compliant %" high 14.30.4).

Agreed Solution: Provide signage to meet requirements of (4.30.6, 4.10.5, and 4.30.4).

AA. The Second Floor area on the external wall with the switch, floor number and key stop is compliant. The centerline of the hall call indicator number is a non-compliant 46" above the floor. {4.10.5} The digital hall call number is a compliant 1-1/4" high. The centerline of the hall call button is a compliant 42" above the floor.'
Agreed Solution: No action required.

17. SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM ENTRANCE

B.

This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware. {4.13.9} There are (2) non-compliant

locking devices located above the door knob that require grasping and turning. (4.13.9)

The top latch is located at the non-compliant height of 52-1/4" above the floor, 14.13.91

The middle latch is located at a compliant height of 45-11'2" above the floor.

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with (4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit. Remove locking devices located above the operating mechanism or adjust their height to meet requirements of (4.13.9).

18. PATH OF TRAVEL FROM THE SECOND FLOOR COURTROOM ENTRANCE TO THE LARGE COURTROOM

A.

The path of travel from the Second Floor courtroom entrance to the Large Courtroom is

through an alcove encumbered by a loose bench forcing a person's path of travel through

a non-compliant area that tapers from 36" to 49" in width. {Page 38, Figure 25(c)} A

person must then proceed through a compliant 36" width opening to the main courtroom

aisle.

Agreed Solution: Remove bench to provide path of travel.

5. The sheet vinyl flooring at the threshold on the courtroom side of the main entrance door
was non-compliant due to the fact that if was coming loose and could possible become a tripping hazard. l4.5. I }

Agreed Solution: Repair vinyl.

20. PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM WITNESS STAND AND JURY BOX

A.

There are (2) paths of travel from the visitor's area to the Witness Stand and Jury Box,

both paths are non-compliant.

6. The first path is down the main right side aisle, leading from the elevator lobby. This aisle is a compliant 43" clear. A person must then proceed through a 34-1/2" non-compliant opening 14.3.3) in the bar rail. At this point there is a single non-compliant 6-3/4"step up 14.5.2) to the bar area at the bar rail. Once inside the bar area, one has a clear and unobstructed path of travel to the witness stand and the jury box.

C. The second path of travel is likewise down the right side aisle and then along the front
aisle between the front bench and the bar rail which narrows down at one point to a noncompliant 32-1/2" clear. 14.3.3) One must then follow a series of non-compliant ramps on the extreme lefi side of the courtroom. These ramps lead to the bar area where the path
of travel to the Witness Stand and Jury Box is then clear and unobstructed. See Item No. 21 below for description of ramps at bar area. .

Agreed Solution: Provide path of travel to Bar area that allows for a 34" minimum clear opening without the use of a step to meet requirements of (4.3.3 and 4.5.2).

SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM WITNESS STAND

A.

The Witness Stand is accessed by a non-compliant 6" high step. 14.5.2)

6. The passageway to the Witness Stand is through a non-compliant 30" wide opening. 14.3.3)

C. The floor area of the Witness Stand is a non-compliant 28-1/4 by 42-1/2" which is
insufficient space to maneuver a wheelchair within. 14.2.3)

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the witness stand and location of witnesses are part of the state's judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX

A.

Thejury box has (3) levels all accessed by non-compliant steps varying in height from 6

to 6- 1/4'y4.5.2)

6. Thejury box landings vary in width from 32" to 54" and are non-compliant due to lack of maneuvering room 14.2.3)

Agreed Solution: Plaintiffs agree that the jury box and location of jurors are part of the state's judicial program and will be addressed by the state.

PATH OF TRAVEL TO THE SECOND FLOOR JURY ROOM FROM THE LARGE COURTROOM JURY BOX

B. At this access point, the floor begins to slope a non-compliant running slope of 9.6% for 28" in length 14.8.2) down to a non-compliant landing measuring 50" by 44-1/2" {4.8.4(3)].

This landing has a mild, non-compliant cross slope of 0.3% in the direction of travel. 14.8.4) From this mid-level landing the floor slopes in (2) directions, one down to the courtroom floor and one down to the Jury Room floor.

C. The ramp toward the courtroom visitor area is 48" in length with a compliant running
slope of 6.9% at the low end of the ramp to the courtroom floor. Where the ramp meets the courtroom floor there is a non-compliant carpet strip with a slope of 78.5 % with a total rise of 1". 14.3.8) At the bottom of the ramp to the courtroom, there is a noncompliant 40" deep landing area {4.8.4(2) encumbered by a mechanical unit. The clear path of travel to the ramp at this point is a compliant 54-3/4".

D. The section of ramp toward the jury room is 48" in length with a compliant running slope of 6.0%. This section of ramp is non-compliant because there is no landing at the Jury Room door {4.8.4(4)} and the mid-level landing at the top of the 48" ramp is noncompliant due to size. {4.8.4(2)}

Agreed Solution: Provide path of travel to Bar area that allows for a 34" minimum clear opening without the use of a step to meet requirements sf (4.3.3 and 4.5.2). No action required regarding level landing in front of jury room door.

24. ENTRANCE TO THE SECOND FLOOR LARGE COURTROOM JURY ROOM

A.

The carpet strip at the low end of the ramp near the alcove opening to the Jury Room

access door, has a non-compliant slope of 65.4% 14.8.21 and a non-compliant 5/8jroffset

from the end of the ramp to the adjoining floor area at the entrance alcove. 14.3.81

Agreed Solution: Replace edge strip to meet requirements of C4.8.2 and 4.3.8) as enumerated in Item No. 20 above.

C.

This door has non-compliant cylindrical hardware. {4.13.9}

Agreed Solution: Replace operating device with compliant hardware in accordance with {4.13.9) or install ADA lever kit.

D.

The height of the door glass is a non-compliant 51-3/4" above the floor {Page A3, Fig.

A3) but the glass has been painted so it is nonfunctional.

Agreed Solution: No action required.

F.

This door has a non-compliant push/pull force of 7.5 Ibs. {4.13.11(2)(b)}

Agreed Solution: Adjust closer or provide new closer to meet requirements of t4.13.11.I(b)).

25. INTERIOR DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE

A.

There was no compliant directional signage inside this building. {4.1.3(16)(b)}

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage to meet requirements of {4.1.316)(b)}.

26. DIRECTIONAL SIGNAGE

A.

Non-compliant exterior directional signage. 14.I.2, (71,(c)] If all entrances are not

accessible then directional signage is required to indicate the route to the nearest

accessible entrance.

Agreed Solution: Provide directional signage at all non-accessible entrances in accordance with {4.1.2(7)(c)).

27. AREA OF RESCUE ASSISTANCE

A.

The building is non-compliant since it does not provide an area of rescue assistance for

all levels above grade. See attachment "CJfJor details.

Agreed Solution: Provide area of rescue assistance in accordance with {4.3.11).

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, ANN )

MARIE ZAPPOLA, DENNIS CANTREL,

)

RALPH E. RAMSEY, Sr., and

1

A. RUSSELL LARSON,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE and its political subdivisions, POLK COUNTY, BLEDSOE ) COUNTY, CANNON COUNTY, CHESTER ) COUNTY, CLAIBORNE COUNTY, CLAY )
COUNTY,COCKECOUNTY,DECATUR
COUNTY, FAYETTE COUNTY, GRATNGER ) COUNTY, HANCOCK COUNTY, HAWKINS ) COUNTY, HICKMAN COUNTY, HOUSTON ) COUNTY, JACKSON COUNTY, JEFFERSON) COUNTY, JOHNSON COUNTY, LAKE COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, MEIGS COUNTY, MOORE COUNTY, PERRY COUNTY, PICKETT COUNTY, TROUSDALE ) COUNTY, and VAN BUREN COUNTY,
)
Defendants.

No. 3:98 CV 0731 Judge Campbell Magistrate Judge Griffin JURY DEMAND

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT -VAN BUREN COUNTY
Tfis Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement7?)is entered into this 2 3 day of
R b r m ~ ~, 2005, by and between Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Ann
Marie Zappola, dermis Cantrel, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson (hereinafter
"Plaintiffs") and Defendant Van Buren County (hereinafter "Defendant County").

PARTIES T O THIS AGREEMENT
1. Plaintiffs have alleged they are qualified individuals with disabilities as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C.§12131(2).

2. Defendant County is a Public Entity as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. $12131(1). Defendant County is subject to Title I1 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. $12132, and its
implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part35.
3. As used herein, the State of Tennessee shall refer collectively to the defendant designated as the State of Tennessee in this litigation, all Tennessee Courts exercising jurisdiction under Tennessee law in the courthouse and any other owned or operated facility of the Defendant County, and the AOC ("Administrative Office of the Courts").
4. Unless otherwise specified in these Definitions, the definitions of terms used in this Agreement shall be the same definitions as are contained in 42 U.S.C. $12131 et seq. and 28
C.F.R. Part 35 and 36 and any accompanying explanations as may be contained in the statutes,
appendices or regulations associated with those statutes and regulations.
a. "ALTERATION refers to any modification, improvement, remodeling, renovation or repair to ANY buildings or structures at the SUBJECT FACILITIES.
b. "DEFENDANT COUNTY" as used herein refers to Defendant County and includes any official agency of Defendant County.
c. "EFFECTIVE DATE" means the last date upon which this Agreement was executed by a Party.
d. "SUBJECT FACILITIES" refers to any courthouse and/or other buildings owned andlor operated by Defendant County in which judicial programs and services and/or county commission meetings are held.
5 . Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and state statutes, the State of Tennessee conducts its judicial program in the county courthouses and other facilities of the State. Defendant County is responsible for providing the facilities in which the State's judicial program is conducted in the Defendant County.
PLAINTIFFS' RELEASE OF DEFENDANT COUNTY
6. This Agreement constitutes a settlement of all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant County, arising out of the alleged inaccessibility of the Van Buren County Courthouse or the Van Buren County Judicial Center, including, but not limited to, all claims for back pay, lost wages, compensatory damages, injuries to person and property, reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, physical or emotional injury and stress, any punitive type damages, attorneys fees, costs, experts' witness fees and any and all other damages.

7. Plaintiffs agree to, and hereby do, completely release and discharge Defendant County, including but not limited to, its officials, employees, agents, whether current or former, in all of their official and individual capacities, including, but not limited to, their successors, assigns, servants, agents, attorneys, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, and representatives, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, and causes of action of any and every kind and character, known or unknown, that Plaintiffs may have had or may now have against them regarding the alleged inaccessibility of the Van Buren County Courthouse or the Van Buren County Judicial Center whether asserted in this case or otherwise, including, but not limited to, any and all matters asserted in the case, or which may have been asserted.
8. Plaintiffs agree to execute the attached Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. This Agreement shall be made an Exhibit to the Order of Dismissal.
9. Plaintiffs fiirther agree and acknowledge that the payment described in Paragraph 10 and the Alterations delineated in Appendix A, attached hereto, constitute the entire consideration, both monetary and otherwise, for the complete release provided for herein. The terms set forth herein are intended to be the full and complete settlement of this case. No additional compensation is to be paid and no additional Alternations are to be made by the Defendant County. The parties agree that this Agreement is based upon mutually adequate consideration, and that this Agreement shall not be subject to attack by any party on the grounds of lack of consideration or inadequate consideration.
OBLIGATIONASSSUMEDBYTHE DEFENDANCTOUNTY
10. Defendant County will pay Plaintiffs in total the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State. Defendant County will have no further liability for any additional monetary damages or attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.
11. Defendant County will make the Alterations as enumerated in Appendix A, attached hereto. Defendant County will cooperate with the State of Tennessee to implement the State of Tennessee's policies and procedures to ensure that the State's judicial program is in compliance with Title I1 of the ADA and its implementing regulations.
12. Defendant County has represented that it is not possible to make all the Alterations delineated in Appendix A immediately. Defendant County agrees to make good faith progress toward the completion of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A. All of the Alterations delineated in Appendix A shall be completed within five (5) years of the Effective Date.
13. Notwithstanding any unforeseen future contingencies that might impact the Alterations set forth in Appendix A, Defendant County agrees to refrain from taking any action that will diminish the level of physical accessibility of the judicial program conducted in Defendant County's subject facilities as achieved through the Alterations enumerated in

Appendix A. This paragraph shall not be read to prohibit the curtailment of a judicial program,

i

service, or activity at any of Defendant County's subject facilities for reasons unrelated to

compliance with the ADA unless such action eliminates the only such accessible program,

service, or activity in Defendant County's subject facilities.

14. Defendant County agrees that all disability access features that are provided for in this Agreement shall be inspected and maintained by the Defendant County hereafter to ensure the accessibility of the judicial program in the subject facilities at all times, except for isolated or temporary interruptions due to necessary maintenance or repairs.

15. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee shall have exclusive jurisdiction and venue to construe and enforce this Agreement, and to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and the State of Tennessee. This Agreement shall be made an exhibit to the Dismissal Order.
16. If any party to this Agreement believes that another party is violating its obligations under this Agreement, or believes a dispute has arisen under the Agreement (the "Complaining Party"), then the Complaining Party shall give written detailed notice (the "Notice") to the other party (the "Responding Partyyy). The Responding Party shall be given thirty (30) days to provide a written response to the Notice. The Complaining and Responding Parties shall attempt within the next thirty (30) days to resolve their differences regarding the issue(s) addressed in the Notice including any issues of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. No action may be instituted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relating to this Agreement prior to the expiration of the time periods addressed in this Paragraph.
17. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses may be sought in any judicial proceeding relating to paragraph 16 of this Agreement by the prevailing party to the extent allowed by law.
18. Defendant County shall provide to Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown, at P.O. Box 1001, Cleveland, TN 37364-1001 a bi-monthly report (no less frequently than every sixty (60) days following the Effective Date) that sets forth its progress in making the Alterations set forth in Appendix A until such time as compliance with the obligations specified therein is achieved. Defendant County agrees to make good faith efforts to complete the Alterations delineated in Appendix A during each sixty (60) day time period. When the Defendant County has completed the alterations in Appendix A, said Defendant County shall submit a certified report, signed by an appropriate representative of the County stating that the Alterations set forth in Appendix .A have been completed.
19. If at any time Defendant County wishes to modify any portion of this Agreement because of changed conditions making performance impossible or impractical, Defendant County's designated representative will promptly notify Plaintiffs in writing (at the address for Plaintiffs set forth in Paragraph 18), setting forth the facts and circumstances thought to justify

modification and the substance of the proposed modification, and provide evidence to support their position that such modification is necessary. Until there is written assent or agreement by Plaintiffs to the proposed modification, the proposed modification will not take effect. If the requested modification is not approved within thirty (30) days of the date of written notification of such need, then Defendant County may proceed as a Complaining Party under the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.
20. By+enteringinto this Agreement, no party shall be deemed to have waived any claim or defense not otherwise specifically released in writing, until such time as the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matters raised in this action.
21. By entering into this Agreement, Defendant County does not waive its defense based on Plaintiffs' alleged lack of standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Van Buren County.
22. This Agreement will be null and void if any court of competent jurisdiction reverses Judge Campbell's Order (Docket Entry No. 319) entered on December 7,2004, relating to a Plaintiffs standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendant County since none of these Plaintiffs has ever attempted to access judicial proceedings that are offered in Van Buren County.
23. The representatives signing this Agreement on behalf of Defendant County represent that they are authorized to bind Defendant County to the provisions agreed upon herein. Each signatory to this Agreement affirms that he or she has consulted with and been advised by counsel in connection with the execution of this Agreement and that he or she agrees that its terms are fair and reasonable.
24. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant County with respect to the subject matters herein, and supersedes all prior oral and written agreements and discussions. No other statement, promise, or agreement concerning the subject matters herein, either written or oral, made by any party or the agents of any party that is not contained in this written Agreement shall be effective. Plaintiffs and Defendant County represent that in entering into this Agreement, none of them has relied upon any statement of any other party to this Agreement except those statements set forth herein.
25. All notices and other correspondence sent by Plaintiffs to the Defendant County shall be sent to the County Mayor and the County Attorney. All notices and other correspondence sent by Defendants shall be sent to the office of Plaintiffs' attorney, William J. Brown.
26. This Agreement shall be binding on the parties, and their elected or appointed successors in interest.

27. This Agreement shall become effective once signed by all parties and the effective date will be the date of the last signature aftixed hereto.
28. This Agreement is contingent on the State of Tennessee executing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement which provides, inter alia, that Defendant County will not be responsible for any of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, expenses and costs through December 17,2004, including those relating to Defendant County, with the exception of the amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($2,680.00) which reflects Defendant County's pro rata share of the amount of Plaintiffs' expenses and costs accrued through December 17, 2004 and not paid by the State, and the State approving the payments to be made by the State as set out therein. In the event that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is rejected by the State of Tennessee then the Dismissal shall be set aside and the case shall be placed back on the active docket for disposition.

IN WITNESS WHEFEOF, Plaintiffs and Defendant County in the above-captioned
actio~hiave caused this Agreement to be executed as of the dates subscribed below.
For Plaintiffs George Lane, Beverly Jones, Am Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Rarnsey, Sr.,

23 North Ocoee Street P.O. Box 1001 Cleveland, TN 37364-1001

Gary D. Housepian ( B P R6~969) Texmessee Protection & Advocacy' , Inc. 24 16 21 Ave South, Suite 100 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 298-1080

Linda M. Dardarian, admitted Pro Hac Vice Roberta L. Steele, admitted Pro Hac Vice GOLDSTEIN, DEMCHAK, BALLER, BORGEN & DARDARIAN 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000 Oakland, CA 94612-3534 (510) 763-9800

-aj7//. Attorneys for PlaiFffs

ate:

GT

For Defendant Van Buren Countv, Tennessee:
yv.t,G+c.
Thomas M. Donnell, Jr. Stewart, Estes & Donnell 424 Church Street, Suite 1401 Nashville, Tennessee 37219
- Date: 2 1-05

For Defendant County:
Name: Carolyn D. Houston ~ i ~ lVa~n :Buren County Mayor Date: J a n u a r y 2 7 , 2 0 0 5

Date: L\-Of %

Date: J - I-\&

VAN BUREN COUNTY
i
PlaintifE

VAN BUREN COUNTY Plaintiff:
Date

~ e n n iCs antrel, Plaintiff
Date: & - 5 - d ~o f

A. Russell Larson, Plaintiff Date: bqc/d 4

AGREED SETTLEMENT VAN BUREN COUNTY
When a person with a mobility disability needs to access the judicial program offered in Van Buren County, the judicial proceeding will be moved to an accessib!e location for the entire day, not just for the particular proceeding involving that individual.
Van Buren County will pass a resolution concerning use of an accessible public building for judicial proceedings when necessary. Only one location will be chosen by Van Buren County and will be designated the permanent alternate site for the judicial services offered in Van Buren County. The site chosen by Van Buren County will be the most accessible public building in Van Buren County suitable for the relocation of judicial services. Further, a protocol will be established regarding the steps necessary for an individual with a mobility disability to gain access to the judicial program offered in Van Buren County. The protocoi will be established by Van Buren County or in cooperation with the State of Tennessee.

 
 No. 02-1667
IN THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, Petitioner,
v.
GEORGE LANE, ET AL., Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS
DENNIS W. ARCHER Counsel of Record
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON DAVID W. BOWKER JENNIFER M. ROCKOFF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 750 North Lake Shore Drive Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 988-5215

QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, is a proper exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby constituting a valid exercise of congressional power to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................................i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................vi
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ............................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................3
ARGUMENT................................................................................ 5
I. THE COURTS MUST BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL, INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, TO ENSURE THE LEGITIMACY OF AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. ................................................................ 5
A. The Judicial System Must Be Accessible to Individuals With Disabilities in Order to Maintain Fairness, Legitimacy, and Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice. .................................................................................5
1. To be fair, and to be perceived as fair, the judicial system must be accessible to individuals with disabilities with business before the courts. .................................5
2. To be fair, and to be perceived as fair, the judicial system also must be accessible to individuals with disabilities acting in other capacities, such as judges, jurors, and court personnel. ..................7
B. The Lack of Equal and Effective Access to the Judicial System for Persons with Disabilities Harms Not Only Those Persons, But Also the Courts, Which Are Deprived of the Benefits of These Individuals’ Participation and Contributions. .....................................9
(iii)

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
II. PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES HISTORICALLY HAVE FACED AND CONTINUE TO FACE EXCLUSION FROM STATES’ JUDICIAL PROGRAMS, SERVICES, AND ACTIVITIES. .......................................... 10
A. Before Enactment Of The ADA, States Denied Persons With Disabilities Access To Judicial Programs, Services, And Activities. .........................................................................10
B. Access To Judicial Programs, Services, And Activities Remains Inadequate Or Nonexistent For Many Individuals With Disabilities. .................................................................12
III. TITLE II OF THE ADA IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURING THAT INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES HAVE EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. ............................................. 16
A. The Right Of Equal And Effective Access To The Courts Is A Core Aspect Of Constitutional Guarantees And Is Essential To Ensuring The Proper Administration Of Justice. .........................................................................16
B. Because Fundamental Rights Are At Stake When Access To The Judicial System Is Denied, More Than A Rational Basis Is Necessary To Justify Exclusion. ...................19
C. Under Any Level Of Scrutiny, The Denial Of Meaningful Access To The Courts For Individuals With Disabilities Who Are Capable, With Or Without Reasonable Accommodations, Should Be Impermissible Under The Fourteenth Amendment. .....................21

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page D. Title II Of The ADA’s Requirement Of Af-
firmative Conduct On The Part Of States Is Essential To Ensuring That Individuals With Disabilities Obtain Real, Not Merely Theoretical, Access To The Judicial System. ..............................................................................23
CONCLUSION .........................................................................25

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)...............................24 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)..........................8 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ....................................9 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) ........................................................................10, 19, 22 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ................... passim Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp.
1221 (D. Neb. 1995)...............................................................6 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) .....................................17 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) ....................................18, 22 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).........................................16 Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) ....................8 Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
207 U.S. 142 (1907) .........................................................6, 16 DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa.
1989) .....................................................................................11 Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark.
1978) .....................................................................................11 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)................................6 Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985) ................12 Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12
(D.D.C. 1993) .......................................................................11 Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982) ....................................................................................19 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ................................16, 18 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ............................................20 Hill v. Shelby County, 599 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ala.
1984) .....................................................................................11 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971)..................................25 Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) ..............................................................................11 Lewinson v. Crews, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div.
1967), aff’d, 236 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1968) ..........................12 Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1972) ....................................18, 20

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) .................................18, 20 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..............................20 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) ....................................22 McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983 .................................9 People v. Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198 (Cal. 1984)..........................18 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979) ....................................................................................23 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)...........................................8 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980) ...........................................................16, 17, 19, 20 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966)....................................18 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) .......................................................20 State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1985).............................12 Talamini v. Allstate Insurance Co., 470 U.S. 1067
(1985) ......................................................................................6 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)..............................8, 9 United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d
386 (2d Cir. 1970) ................................................................18 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ................................17
STATUTES
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ....................................................2 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).........................................................5
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
2 Staff of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans With Disabilities Act, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1990) ............................................................10
ARTICLES
Edwards, Hon. Harry T., Race and the Judiciary, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 325 (2002).....................................9

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Jones, Maryann, And Access for All: Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 75 (1997) .....................13
Loth, Renee, State Auditor Criticizes Courthouse Conditions, Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1990, at 100............11
O’Connor, Hon. Sandra Day, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217 (1992) .............................................................................9
MISCELLANEOUS
American Bar Association, ABA Policy and Procedures Handbook (2002)........................................................2
American Bar Association Committee on Legal Problems of the Elderly and the Committee on Mental & Physical Disability Law Recommendation, Report No. 115 (Aug. 1991)....................................3
American Bar Association Committee on Mental & Physical Disability Law Recommendation, Report No. 112 (Feb. 2002) ......................................................3
American Bar Association Goals, available at http:// www.abanet.org/about/goals.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2003) ..........................................................................2
American Bar Association Section on Individual Rights & Responsibilities and the Young Lawyers Division, Recommendation, Report No. 128 (Aug. 1989)......................................................................2
Attorney General’s Commission on Disability, Final Report (Dec. 1989) .......................................................11
Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).........................................7
Complaint in Curtin v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Dec. 19, 2002).................................................................14, 15

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Complaint in Dia Xiong v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Mar. 6, 2003) ..............................................................14
Complaint in Fietek v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Jan. 17, 2003) .......................................................................14
Complaint in Losing v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Feb. 18, 2003) ......................................................................14
Complaint in Vatne v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Mar. 6, 2003) ........................................................................14
Complaint in Zacharias v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Apr. 3, 2002) ..............................................................14
Consent Decree and Order, Salmond v. County of Teton, No. CV-97-130-GF-LBE (D. Mont. 2000) ...........15
DOJ Status Report on Enforcing the ADA, Jan.Mar. 2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ crt/ada/statrpt.htm ............................................................. 15
Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report from the Department of Justice, available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/crt/enforce.htm#anchor2010570 (last visited Nov. 6, 2003). .................................................12
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Armstrong v. Davis, C94-2307 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1999) .....................................................................................13
Governor’s Committee on Disability Issues and Employment: Civil and Legal Rights Subcommittee, Interim Court and Courthouse Access Project (Sept. 5, 2000) ........................................................13

x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Judicial Council of California, Subcommittee on Access for Persons with Disabilities, Access to the California State Courts: A Survey of Court Users, Attorneys and Court Personnel (Jan. 1997), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ programs/access/documents/dis_surv.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2003) ...........................................................13
Letter from Michael J. Swanson, Esq., to Deborah L. Cochelin, Chair of the Court Improvement Committee of the Washington State Bar Ass’n, re “Court Improvement Committee WSBA” (Sept. 3, 1998) ......................................................................13
New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled & the New York State Bar Ass’n Committee on Mental and Physical Disability, Survey of Access to New York State Courts for Individuals with Disabilities (Feb. 1994) .....................................................................................14
Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the County of Essex, New Jersey, DOJ # 204-48-78 (Dec. 9, 2002)..................................15
Settlement Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, No Barriers, Inc. v. Cornelius, Civ. No. 3:97CV-2330-R (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2002)..............15
Speech by Hon. Sandra Day O’Connor to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (Aug. 6, 1992), in The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745 (1994) ................6
Supreme Court of Minnesota, Notice To Deaf Community (Aug. 12, 2003) ..............................................15
Texas Civil Rights Project, Courts Closed to Justice: A Survey of Courthouse Accessibility in Texas for People with Disabilities (Nov. 1996)..............14

xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s) U.S. Census Bureau, Disability Status: 2000, avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/ disabstat2k/disabstat2ktxt.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) .........................................................................5 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983)...................11

No. 02-1667
STATE OF TENNESSEE, Petitioner,
v.
GEORGE LANE, ET AL., Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1 The American Bar Association (“ABA”), with more than 405,000 members, is the leading national membership organization of the legal profession. Its mission “is to be the national representative of the legal profession, serving the
1 This brief has not been authored in whole or in part by counsel for a party and no person or entity, other than amicus, its members, or its counsel, has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Petitioner and respondents have consented to the filing of this brief.
Neither this brief, nor the decision to file it, should be interpreted to reflect the views of any judicial member of the American Bar Association. No inference should be drawn that any member of the Judicial Division Council has participated in the adoption or endorsement of the positions in this brief. This brief was not circulated to any member of the Judicial Division Council prior to filing.

2
public and the profession by promoting justice, professional excellence and respect for law.”2
The ABA has a particularly strong interest in ensuring that all persons, including individuals with disabilities, enjoy equal and effective access to federal, state, and local courts. The official goals of the ABA include promoting “full and equal participation in the legal profession by minorities, women, and persons with disabilities.”3 Many ABA members who have disabilities4 have a direct interest in the continued viability of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), as a measure to ensure equal and effective access to the services, programs, and activities of state and local governments, especially their judicial systems.
The ABA has a long history of advocacy in support of the full participation of individuals with disabilities in the legal system.5 In 1989, the ABA resolved to support “federal legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disabilities.”6 In 1991, the ABA adopted a policy that calls for affirmative conduct on the part of local judicial districts to create a judicial system that is “barrier-free” to individu-
2 American Bar Association, ABA Policy and Procedures Handbook 1 (2002).
3 ABA Goal IX; see also ABA Goal I (to promote improvements in the American justice system), and ABA Goal II (to promote meaningful access to the American justice system for all persons), available at http://www.abanet.org/about/goals.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
4 More than 1,500 ABA members have returned questionnaires to the ABA stating that they have one or more disabilities.
5 Since 1945, the ABA has had a standing committee or commission dedicated to the rights of individuals with disabilities. For years, the ABA has supported initiatives to ensure access to public buildings and transportation for people with physical disabilities, and since 1976, it has published what is now called the Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter, the most exhaustive periodical available on disability law.
6 ABA Section on Individual Rights & Responsibilities and the Young Lawyers Division, Recommendation, Report No. 128 (Aug. 1989).

3
als with disabilities.7 In 2002, the ABA adopted a resolution specifically urging “all federal, state, territorial, and municipal courts to help ensure equal access to justice by making courthouses and court proceedings accessible to individuals with disabilities, including lawyers, judges, jurors, litigants, court employees, witnesses, and observers.”8 The resolution recommends that courts make reasonable accommodations to “meet the needs of the individual, including, where appropriate, removal of architectural barriers, modification of rules and practices, and provision of auxiliary aids and services.”9 In light of the ABA’s nationwide membership and its longstanding commitment to the cause of equal access to justice for individuals with disabilities, the ABA has a special perspective to provide and a strong interest in the matter before the Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case raises issues central to the ABA’s mission of promoting meaningful access to the American system of justice for all persons. The issues in this case are also fundamental to the American conception of a system of justice, for the Constitution guarantees to all persons the right of access to the judicial system.
The courts—as guardians of individual rights—have a special responsibility to protect and enforce the right of equal access to the judicial system because this right is the baseline for all other rights. First and foremost, the courts must ensure that their doors remain open to all individuals. In the case of individuals with disabilities, this obligation means providing accommodations and removing barriers
7 ABA Committee on Legal Problems of the Elderly and the Committee on Mental & Physical Disability Law, Recommendation, Report No. 115 (Aug. 1991).
8 ABA Committee on Mental & Physical Disability Law, Recommendation, Report No. 112 (Feb. 2002).
9 Id.

4
that otherwise have the effect of excluding people with disabilities from the judicial system. In short, the courts must be a model of accessibility.
That courts be barrier free—and thus open to all—is vital to the legitimacy of and public confidence in the administration of justice. A lack of equal access to the courts harms not only those persons who are excluded, but also the system itself, which is deprived of the benefits of their inclusion. In addition, the exclusion from the justice system of any segment of society undermines public confidence in the system. It therefore is imperative that the courts ensure that individuals with disabilities are not excluded from participation in any capacity—as litigants, witnesses, attorneys, judges, jurors, courthouse staff, or observers.
Despite the importance of such access to the judicial system, however, individuals with disabilities continue to face the effects of discrimination in state courts and state judicial services and activities. Although the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) has significantly reduced barriers to the justice system encountered by individuals with disabilities, such individuals continue to be excluded from state judicial systems throughout the nation because of the failures of state courts to remove barriers to those individuals’ participation. Countless lawsuits and enforcement actions continue to demonstrate that, in 2003, access to state courts still is anything but equal for individuals with disabilities.
In light of the barriers that still exist, Title II of the ADA remains essential to ensuring continued improvement in equal and effective access to the courts for individuals with disabilities because it requires the States to act affirmatively to ensure the accomplishment of that goal. Enforcement of Title II, in turn, is essential to ensuring that the right of access to the States’ courts is real—and not merely theoretical—for individuals with disabilities.

5
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURTS MUST BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL, INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, TO ENSURE THE LEGITIMACY OF AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
More than 49,700,000 Americans—roughly one in five of the 257,200,000 million people in the United States age five or older—have mental or physical disabilities or other long lasting impairments. U.S. Census Bureau, Disability Status: 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/ disabstat2k/disabstat2ktxt.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). Prior to the enactment of the ADA, these individuals faced the discriminatory effects of “restrictions and limitations, . . . purposeful unequal treatment, and . . . political powerlessness in our society.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Although there have been incremental improvements in the way individuals with disabilities are treated since the ADA’s enactment in 1990, individuals with disabilities continue to encounter architectural, communication, and attitudinal barriers to vital public services, programs, and activities including most notably courts of law and the judicial system as a whole.
A. The Judicial System Must Be Accessible To Individuals With Disabilities In Order To Maintain Fairness, Legitimacy, And Public Confidence In The Administration Of Justice.
Public confidence in the judicial system rests largely upon courts’ ability to advance—and to be seen as advancing—fairness, justice, and equal treatment before the law. In order to achieve these goals, the courts must afford all individuals, including those with disabilities, the right and opportunity to participate fully in the justice system.
1. To be fair, and to be perceived as fair, the judicial system must be accessible to individuals with disabilities with business before the courts.
That all individuals should enjoy equal access to the courts is a basic tenet of our democratic society. It is en-

6
shrined in our Constitution and recognized by this Court. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause guarantees an accused the right to be present at all stages of trial); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (except in extraordinary circumstances, all civil litigants must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Justice Stevens thus stated:
Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in our democratic society. . . . The courts provide the mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes that might otherwise give rise to attempts at self-help. There is, and should be, the strongest presumption of open access to all levels of the judicial system. . . . This Court, above all, should uphold the principle of open access.
Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-1071 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Unreasonable exclusion of individuals from the proceedings and activities of courts undermines the legitimacy of the courts and decreases public trust in the judicial system as a whole. See, e.g., Speech by Hon. Sandra Day O’Connor to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (Aug. 6, 1992), in The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 760 (1994) (“When people perceive gender bias in a legal system, whether they suffer from it or not, they lose respect for that system, as well as for the law.”); Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221, 1230 (D. Neb. 1995) (“[T]he reduction of governmental resources to provide legal services to the poor is, for them, a removal of the civil justice system’s accessibility (and thus, its legitimacy).”). To be perceived as fair, courts at a minimum must open their doors to individual litigants and defendants, including those who require accommodations for disabilities.

7
2. To be fair, and to be perceived as fair, the judicial system also must be accessible to individuals with disabilities acting in other capacities, such as judges, jurors, and court personnel.
The rights of individuals with disabilities to have equal access to the courts and to participate in the administration of justice are consistent with our democratic heritage and critical to public confidence in the administration of justice. Only by increasing the participation of individuals from traditionally disadvantaged communities as judges, jurors, and court employees can we hope to increase the legitimacy of and respect for the courts and the judicial system as a whole within these communities. See, e.g., Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 10, 19, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (“The compelling public interest in minority participation in the institutions of our democratic government is beyond dispute. . . . Without effective participation by all segments of society, the legitimacy of our legal system will be imperiled. Our nation’s founders recognized that a legitimate government depends upon the participation of all the people.”) (citation omitted).
Conversely, exclusion of individuals based upon a characteristic such as race or disability generates distrust and a lack of public confidence in the judicial system. See, e.g., id. at 19-22. For this reason, the Court long has held that juries must be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community:
Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.

8
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-531 (1975) (citing Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-407 (1991); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
Similarly, in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946), this Court reversed a conviction on the ground that the “purposeful and systematic exclusion of women from the [jury] panel” violates the fundamental tenet that one’s fitness to participate in the judicial system must rest on an individualized determination based upon competence, rather than a generalized group determination based upon presumed common characteristics. This Court stated:
‘[P]rospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any . . . groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.’
Ballard, 329 U.S. at 192-193 (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220).
Although this Court’s decisions regarding access to and participation in the judicial system have dealt primarily with race and gender, the principles underlying those decisions apply with equal force in the case of individuals with disabilities. Just as equal access must be available to individuals without regard to their race or gender, so too must it be available to individuals without regard to their physical abilities or disabilities, so long as they are competent to serve or participate, given reasonable accommodations.

9
B. The Lack Of Equal And Effective Access To The Judicial System For Persons With Disabilities Harms Not Only Those Persons, But Also The Courts, Which Are Deprived Of The Benefits Of These Individuals’ Participation And Contributions.
The arbitrary exclusion of any minority or traditionally disadvantaged group, including individuals with disabilities, does as much harm to the judicial system as to the individuals who are excluded.10 In Justice Marshall’s words, “[t]he effect of excluding minorities goes beyond the individual defendant, for such exclusion produces injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.” McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (dissenting from denial of certiorari) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195.
Common sense, as well as historical experience, strongly suggests that participation by a diverse group of individuals is beneficial to the administration of justice. See, e.g., Hon. Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 325, 329 (2002) (“[R]acial diversity on the bench can enhance judicial decision making by broadening the variety of voices and perspectives in the deliberative process.”); cf. Hon. Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217, 1217 (1992) (“Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, constantly pushing and prodding [his colleagues] to respond not only to the persua-
10 The exclusion of individuals with disabilities harms not only the excluded individual and the judicial system at large, but also the rights of other participants, including, for example, criminal defendants who have a Sixth Amendment right to be tried not only by a fair “cross section of the community,” Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526, but also “by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86 (citations omitted).

10
siveness of legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.”). To exclude individuals with disabilities from the courtroom is thus not only to deny individual litigants their right but also to deprive the bench or jury of viewpoints or ideas that may be unique to individuals who have experienced life with a disability or disabilities.
II. PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES HISTORICALLY HAVE FACED AND CONTINUE TO FACE EXCLUSION FROM STATES’ JUDICIAL PROGRAMS, SERVICES, AND ACTIVITIES.
A. Before Enactment Of The ADA, States Denied Persons With Disabilities Access To Judicial Programs, Services, And Activities.
Title II of the ADA was enacted against the background of a history and pattern of discrimination by the States against the disabled in which “[t]he courthouse door” was literally “still closed to Americans with disabilities.” 2 Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Congress, 2d Sess., Legis. Hist. of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans With Disabilities Act, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 936 (Comm. Print 1990) (Sen. Harkin). The legislative record of the ADA contains numerous references to state failure to make courts and courthouses accessible to individuals with disabilities. In one notable instance, a witness at a congressional hearing testified that she “went to the courtroom one day and . . . could not get into the building because there were about 500 steps to get in there.” Id. at 1070-1071 (Emeka Nwojke). And as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377-382 (2001), the legislative record of the ADA sets forth numerous other instances of States’ failures to make courthouses accessible—including failures to provide interpreter services for people who are deaf, to accord adult victims of abuse with developmental disabilities their equal right to testify in court, to provide amplified sound systems in courtrooms, to install access ramps and curb cuts in courthouse areas, and to enable an

11
individual using a wheelchair to obtain a marriage license when the courthouse was not wheelchair accessible.
This evidence in the legislative record is confirmed by reports documenting States’ failures to make courthouses accessible. A 1989 survey conducted by the Attorney General’s Commission on Disability for the State of California found that “[m]any court rooms, jail visiting rooms and jails have architectural barriers that make them inaccessible to people who use wheelchairs.”11 In Massachusetts in 1990, 60% of the State’s 97 courthouses were found to lack ramps or accessible toilets.12 A comprehensive report issued by the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1983 describes the types of discrimination that people with disabilities have encountered nationwide, including the per se “[d]isqualification of many handicapped persons from jury service” and the “[a]bsence of accommodations to permit handicapped persons to serve as jurors.”13
11 Attorney General’s Comm’n on Disability, Final Report 102 ¶ c (Dec. 1989).
12 Renee Loth, State Auditor Criticizes Courthouse Conditions, Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1990, at 100; see also Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding Missouri county in contempt for failing to make courthouse accessible despite 1989 consent decree requiring structural changes).
13 See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 168 (1983). Those who were able to gain physical access to the courthouse nonetheless often were flatly excluded from jury service. Before the ADA, blanket exclusion of blind persons, deaf persons, and individuals with mobility difficulties was routine. See Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 1993) (enjoining, in 1993, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia from excluding all blind persons from jury service); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding violative of the Rehabilitation Act the exclusion of individual who is deaf and who reported for jury service accompanied by ASL interpreter); Hill v. Shelby County, 599 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (concerning exclusion of persons with disabilities from jury service, including exclusion of the individual because he could not reach second floor courtroom); Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (ruling that “[i]mpairment of the senses, particularly the senses of

12
B. Access To Judicial Programs, Services, And Activities Remains Inadequate Or Nonexistent For Many Individuals With Disabilities.
Since 1990, as localities have begun to comply with Title II of the ADA, courthouse and courtroom access has improved, but lack of access to courthouses and courtrooms remains a serious problem for individuals with disabilities in many communities. Virtually every quarterly status report issued since 1994 by the U.S. Department of Justice regarding ADA enforcement identifies numerous cases and settlements involving States’ failures to provide adequate access to judicial services for persons with disabilities.14
sight and hearing, vitiates a person’s ability to serve effectively as a juror”); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985) (noting that persons with disabilities were excluded from lists for jury service); Lewinson v. Crews, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1967) (excluding a blind college professor from serving as a juror by applying a New York law that excludes from jury service any individual “not in possession of his natural faculties” or otherwise “infirm and decrepit”), aff’d, 236 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1968); State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Mo. 1985) (rejecting the argument that exclusion of individual who is deaf from jury service violated constitutional rights of defendant who is deaf on ground that “public interest” supported exclusion).
14 Just in 2001, for example, (1) a small Ohio city agreed to make its courtroom accessible; (2) Ben Hill County, Georgia, reached an agreement with the Department of Justice to install an accessible ramp, construct accessible toilet rooms, and install an elevator to the second floor, within nine months of settlement; (3) a California county small claims court agreed to modify its courthouse for people with mobility impairments and reschedule cases to accessible locations when requested; (4) an Iowa district court and a South Carolina court agreed to provide sign language interpreter services; (5) Saguache County, Colorado, agreed to make physical modifications to its entrances and restrooms and install an elevator to provide access to services on the second and third floors; (6) a county superior court judge agreed to provide an individual who is deaf with a real time court reporter at a civil trial and to train all court judges on the requirements of the ADA; (7) an Arkansas county agreed to install an elevator so that individuals with disabilities could gain access to the third floor courtroom; and (8) a New York town agreed to remodel its town hall to make accessible the courthouse and clerk’s offices housed within the building. See Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report from the

13
A 1997 survey by the Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee of the California Judicial Council’s Access and Fairness Advisory Committee listed an array of failures in accommodations for individuals with disabilities in the California state court system.15 In seven public hearings conducted by Subcommittee on Access for Persons with Disabilities of the Judicial Council Access and Fairness Advisory Committee, 59% of the 148 speakers testified to problems with physical access to California courts.16
In a report on the issue of access to courts and courthouses in the State of Washington, a subcommittee of the Governor’s Committee on Disability Issues and Employment noted that approximately 20 courts (nearly 20% of those responding to its questionnaire) identified access problems under the ADA and other failures to comply with the ADA.17
Department of Justice, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/enforce.htm #anchor2010570 (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
15 Judicial Council of California, Subcomm. on Access for Persons with Disabilities, Access to the California State Courts: A Survey of Court Users, Attorneys and Court Personnel (Jan. 1997), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access/documents/dis_surv.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2003); see also Maryann Jones, And Access for All: Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 75, 88-97 (1997).
16 The lack of suitable access also affects parole hearings. For example, in a California class action suit for injunctive relief under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the district court found that “[s]ome prisoners who use wheelchairs have had to crawl up stairs to get to their hearings; mentally retarded prisoners who cannot even spell their names have waived their right to hearings and have spent years in prison without the benefit of any assistance; a blind witness was denied access to information at his hearings because he could not see the documents; and hearing impaired prisoners who normally express themselves by using sign language had their hands shackled at their hearings making such communication impossible.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Armstrong v. Davis, C94-2307 CW, at 5:10-19 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 22, 1999).
17 Governor’s Committee on Disability Issues and Employment: Civil and Legal Rights Subcommittee, Interim Court and Courthouse Access Project 3 (Sept. 5, 2000); see also Letter from Michael J. Swanson,

14
A 1996 survey of Texas state courts conducted by the Texas Civil Rights Project found the “accessibility of courtrooms for jurors, litigants, members of the public, and attorneys with disabilities [to be] abysmal and unjustifiable.”18 The New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled found that only 8% of all courtrooms were fully accessible, more than 80% of the state courts had no assistive listening systems or TDDs available, and 65% of the courts did not provide accessible parking spaces.19
Since April 2002, at least seven individuals who are deaf have filed suit against the Minnesota state court system for its failure to provide interpreter services, or for providing unqualified interpreters, for the individuals’ court appearances.20 One of the plaintiffs alleged that he went to the courthouse seven times to resolve a traffic ticket dispute, and each time the court failed to provide an interpreter or
Esq., to Deborah L. Cochelin, Chair of the Court Improvement Committee of the Washington State Bar Ass’n, re “Court Improvement Committee WSBA” (Sept. 3, 1998) (detailing accessibility problems in several courthouses throughout the state, including, for example, the lack of ramps and elevators at the Garfield County Courthouse where sheriff deputies, if available, had to carry individuals who use wheelchairs into the courthouse and up the stairs).
18 Texas Civil Rights Project, Courts Closed to Justice: A Survey of Courthouse Accessibility in Texas for People with Disabilities 4 (Nov. 1996).
19 New York State Comm’n on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled & the New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Mental & Physical Disability, Survey of Access to New York State Courts for Individuals with Disabilities 13 (Feb. 1994).
20 See Zacharias v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Apr. 3, 2002); Dia Xiong v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Mar. 6, 2003); Losing v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Feb. 18, 2003); Fietek v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Jan. 17, 2003); Curtin v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Dec. 19, 2002); Vatne v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Mar. 6, 2003).

15
provided one who did not know how to sign legal terms and concepts.21 All seven cases arose after the Minnesota court system purportedly had “[taken] steps” in 2002 to resolve its “difficulties with providing sign language interpreter services in the period from November 2001 to May 2002.”22
As these examples clearly illustrate, thirteen years after passage of the ADA, many court systems remain seriously in default on even their most basic obligations under the law. The ADA therefore remains essential to efforts to ensure that States and localities do not deprive persons with disabilities of access to the justice system.
21 Curtin v. Minnesota Supreme Court, District Court Second Judicial District (filed Dec. 19, 2002).
22 See Supreme Court of Minn., Notice To Deaf Community (Aug. 12, 2003); see also Settlement Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, No Barriers, Inc. v. Cornelius, Civ. No. 3:97CV-2330-R ¶ 4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2002) (agreeing to correct all violations so that each facility would be accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals in wheelchairs); Consent Decree and Order, Salmond v. County of Teton, No. CV-97-130-GF-LBE (D. Mont. 2000) (involving enforcement action to obtain accessible entrance and elevators or other means to reach upper floors of courthouse); Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the County of Essex, New Jersey, DOJ # 204-48-78 (Dec. 9, 2002) (agreeing to improve access through structural improvements, including providing accessible parking, elevators, and courtroom seating). Numerous other cases and settlements are listed in the DOJ Status Report on Enforcing the ADA, Jan.-Mar. 2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/janmar03.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003), including: United States v. Massachusetts (involving inaccessibility of courtrooms and offices located up flights of stairs in buildings without ramps or elevators); settlement in Lucas County, Ohio (involving inaccessibility of courthouses for individual with impaired mobility); settlement in Ohio (involving county probate and juvenile court in Ohio that did not provide qualified sign language interpreters); settlement in Texas county (involving sheriff’s department that did not use sign language interpreter to communicate with parent of juvenile being questioned); settlement (involving failure to provide assistive device to hard of hearing defendant); settlement in Mississippi (involving court’s failure to provide a sign language interpreter to defendant who is deaf).

16
III. TITLE II OF THE ADA IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURING THAT INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES HAVE EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
This Court has found a right of access inherent in numerous constitutional provisions, including the Due Process Clauses, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the First Amendment.23 Moreover, the Court has made clear that this right of access is a right of equal access. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (plurality opinion). Persons with disabilities are entitled to the benefit of this right of access no less than any other persons. Title II of the ADA is a constitutionally appropriate implementation of that constitutional guarantee.
A. The Right Of Equal And Effective Access To The Courts Is A Core Aspect Of Constitutional Guarantees And Is Essential To Ensuring The Proper Administration Of Justice.
This Court has articulated at least four distinct ways in which the Constitution protects a right of access to the courts. First, under the First Amendment, the public has the right to attend and observe judicial proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Openness to all the public, which this Court has called “one of the essential qualities of a court of justice,” id. at 567 (citation omitted), ensures that the judicial system is perceived to be fair and deserving of public confidence. “[T]he means used to achieve justice must have
23 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377 (Due Process Clause “requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard”); Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148 (“[t]he right to sue and defend in the courts is . . . one of the highest and most essential [Art. IV] privileges of citizenship”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (right to petition gives rise to a right of access to the justice system).

17
the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and its results.” Id. at 571.
Second, the Due Process Clause secures the right to initiate proceedings in court to seek judicial relief from unlawful treatment at the hands of the government. This issue has arisen most frequently in the context of prisoner access to the courts, but this Court has recognized that the right of prisoner access is simply one part of a more general “right of access to the courts, . . . [which] is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-822 (1977).
Third, the Due Process Clause prevents the States from obstructing any individual’s “[r]esort to the judicial process” when that process is central to “interests of basic importance in our society.” Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376. In Boddie, the Court invalidated a requirement that litigants pay filing fees and costs, when that requirement effectively prevented indigent persons from bringing an action for divorce. See id. at 374. In finding that access to the courts was a central aspect of due process, the Court explained the central role of the courts in securing individuals’ rights and duties:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner. . . . It is to the courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.
Id. at 374-375.
Finally, when important interests are at stake in judicial proceedings, the Due Process Clause requires more than a theoretical right of access to the courts; it requires meaningful access. “[P]ersons forced to settle their claims of right

18
and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377. To ensure meaningful access, particularly when an individual faces the prospect of coercive State deprivation through the judicial process of life, liberty, or property, due process often requires the State to give a litigant affirmative assistance so that he may participate in the proceedings if he effectively would be unable to participate otherwise. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 125 (1996); id. at 128-129 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Even when due process does not obligate the State to establish an avenue of judicial redress (such as an appeal), once the State does so, “these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
Thus, the State may not insist on court fees and costs when to do so would prevent an indigent person from defending against a “devastatingly adverse action” in court, such as a possible deprivation of parental rights or loss of liberty. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 125; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. Similarly, when an indigent man is confronted with a paternity action and cannot pay for blood tests that would dispel a presumption that he is the father, due process requires the State to shoulder the cost of the tests. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1972). And it has long been understood that, as a matter of due process, the State must provide assistance, such as an interpreter, to one who could not otherwise understand the proceedings in his criminal trial. See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389-390 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1203-1204 (Cal. 1984).
The principle that the State must provide equal access to the courts is equally applicable to persons with disabilities. A person with a disability who faces the loss of his freedom, children, or property in a judicial proceeding similarly must have meaningful access to the courts. He cannot be said to enjoy equal and effective access to the courts unless he can actually attend, follow, and participate in the

19
proceeding. Meaningful, not merely theoretical, access to the courts is required by the Constitution. If someone who uses a wheelchair cannot even enter the courtroom where his liberty is at stake, he has no more access to justice than does the indigent person who cannot pursue an appeal because he lacks the funds for the filing fee.
B. Because Fundamental Rights Are At Stake When Access To The Judicial System Is Denied, More Than A Rational Basis Is Necessary To Justify Exclusion.
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, where this Court held that States may not be made subject to private suits for money damages under Title I of the ADA, the Court emphasized that that case involved only claims of discrimination in employment of persons with disabilities. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The employment context was crucial in Garrett because employment decisions by governmental entities ordinarily do not implicate any kind of heightened scrutiny. Had the plaintiffs in Garrett sought to pursue employment discrimination claims against Alabama state entities under the Equal Protection Clause, they would have faced the hurdle that “States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Id. at 367.
Title II of the ADA is quite different, however, because it often implicates constitutionally protected rights—e.g., the right to vote, the right to marry, the right to raise one’s children, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and, as in this case, the right of access to the courts— that are entitled to greater protection than the rational basis test provides. First, as noted above, the First Amendment right to attend judicial proceedings is a protected right for all members of the public that may not be restricted absent an “overriding consideration.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564; Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Although there may be practical limitations, such as space and expense, that might limit the number of

20
attendees a court can accommodate, see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18, this Court never has suggested that mere administrative inconvenience or even budgetary considerations would be sufficient to deny a member of the public the right to enter a courthouse and attend a proceeding there.
Second, this Court’s numerous other right-of-access cases discussed above are solidly grounded in the Due Process Clause (although they also may rely upon the Equal Protection Clause) and frequently rely upon the Court’s balancing approach in decisions such as Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Notably, these due process decisions do not exhibit the deference to the State that is characteristic of rational basis decisions such as Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993). To the contrary, as the Court explained in M.L.B., when an individual faces the deprivation of a cherished right through the state machinery of justice, that individual’s interest in securing equal and effective access to the courts often outweighs state concerns about inconvenience and cost. See 519 U.S. at 124-125; id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Little, 452 U.S. at 16-17 (relying on Mathews test to conclude that “the State's monetary interest is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a State may be required to offer financial assistance to one seeking to pursue judicial proceedings; at a minimum, the State may not deny access to those proceedings to one who is unable to pay the State’s customary court fees, id., even though the State has no general obligation to ensure that the burdens and benefits of government do not fall unequally based upon the relative wealth of its citizens, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51-54 (1973).
Third, due process may require the State to make accommodations or exceptions for particular individuals in order to safeguard their right of access to the courts, even if the State’s general rule would be rational and constitutionally valid as applied to most other individuals. Thus, in Bod-

21
die, the Court held that the State’s requirement of payment of costs for a divorce action implicated the “right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of practicality,” which “must be protected against denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals.” 401 U.S. at 379-380. The Court made clear that even a “generally valid” approach or procedure “may fail to satisfy due process because of the circumstances” of a particular litigant if it “operates to foreclose [that] particular party’s opportunity to be heard.” Id.
These decisions make clear that a rational basis such as administrative convenience or cost concerns will not justify the State’s failure to ensure within reason that persons with disabilities are able to enter courthouses, attend judicial proceedings, or participate fully in matters to which they are parties.
C. Under Any Level Of Scrutiny, The Denial Of Meaningful Access To The Courts For Individuals With Disabilities Who Are Capable, With Or Without Reasonable Accommodations, Should Be Impermissible Under The Fourteenth Amendment.
Although denying persons with disabilities meaningful access to the judicial system requires application of a more rigorous standard of review than a “rational basis,” this Court need not decide this case on that particular ground, for this Court’s precedents also establish the principle that denying persons with disabilities meaningful access to the courts fails any standard of review and therefore is impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
That the “rational basis” test cannot justify a State’s effectively excluding persons from the justice system altogether has been made clear in this Court’s precedents involving access to the courts for indigent persons. In those cases, this Court has held that a State’s refusal to open the courthouse door to persons who cannot pay an otherwise generally applicable filing fee is irrational and invidious and

22
therefore violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), this Court invalidated an Illinois Supreme Court practice under which only indigent persons convicted of felony offenses, and not indigent persons convicted of nonfelony offenses, could obtain free transcripts of their criminal trials for their appeals. Although the State argued that it had legitimate interests in saving money and in not burdening the court system with appeals in minor cases, this Court held that “[t]he invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State’s fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.” Id. at 197.
Similarly, in Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), this Court invalidated an Ohio Supreme Court practice under which indigent persons had no opportunity to file a petition for discretionary leave to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court without prepayment of filing fees (after having had review in an intermediate appellate court). Stressing that the Ohio Supreme Court had “effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of [criminal appeals] solely because of [individuals’] indigency,” this Court found “no rational basis for assuming that indigents’ motions for leave to appeal will be less meritorious than those of other defendants.” Id. at 257.
A central feature of these decisions is that there is no suggestion that either the Illinois or the Ohio Supreme Court was attempting to bar the door to indigent persons’ appeals because they were indigent. That is, the practices did not result from a “bare desire . . . to harm a politically unpopular group,” or “negative attitudes” toward indigent people. Cf. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 381. Moreover, these practices of denying assistance to indigent persons were not intentional exclusions, but the result of a failure to take notice of the needs of particular litigants. The Court found that these practices were “irrational” and “invidious,” however, because they effectively excluded indigent persons from the avenues of justice.

23
So too here, a State that effectively denies persons with disabilities access to its court system by failing to accommodate the unique needs of each individual engages in invidious and irrational practices in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. No “rational basis” can justify a State’s ignoring the fully foreseeable fact that persons who (for example) use wheelchairs or have hearing impairments or are blind frequently have business in our nation’s courts and courthouses and can neither enter the building nor understand the proceedings without reasonable accommodations.
D. Title II Of The ADA’s Requirement Of Affirmative Conduct On The Part Of States Is Essential To Ensuring That Individuals With Disabilities Obtain Real, Not Merely Theoretical, Access To The Judicial System.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, it is normally sufficient if a State does not take cognizance of the status of any of its individual citizens. A violation of equal protection is ordinarily established only when the decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Thus, the evenhanded application of a formally neutral law usually will satisfy equal protection principles.
But as this Court’s access cases make clear, the requirement of equal treatment is not satisfied where the obvious result is the denial of an individual’s due process rights. Rather, a different analysis is required when the State attempts to deprive an individual of his liberty and that individual cannot meaningfully participate in judicial proceedings without reasonable accommodations where appropriate, such as the removal of architectural barriers, modification of rules and practices, or provision of auxiliary aids and services. Just as a non-English-speaking individual is denied due process when proceedings against him are conducted in a language he cannot understand with no provision for making them intelligible to him, and just as an in-

24
digent individual is denied due process if he lacks the means to pursue an appeal from his criminal conviction with no provision for assistance, a person with a disability is denied due process if the State fails to provide him with any accommodation and thereby effectively denies him meaningful access to the courts. As the Court explained in Boddie, “[t]he State’s obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; rather, the State owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due.” 401 U.S. at 380. Thus, due process may require affirmative conduct on the part of the State to ensure that individuals with disabilities can participate meaningfully in judicial proceedings.
This Court has recognized this very point in its prior disability cases. For example, in a case involving Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, on which Title II of the ADA was modeled, this Court noted that “a refusal to modify an existing program,” even if neutrally framed, “might become unreasonable and discriminatory.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access . . . . The benefit itself, of course, cannot be denied in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to ensure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the . . . program or benefit may have to be made.” Id. at 301.
There are numerous situations in which individuals with disabilities may be deprived of meaningful access to the judicial system, and therefore denied due process, because of a State’s failure to act affirmatively to make reasonable accommodations. As dramatically illustrated by the present case, a State cannot plausibly be said to afford an individual due process in judicial proceedings if that individual cannot even enter the courthouse where his liberty is at stake. Similarly, sign language interpreters, Computer Aided RealTime Transcription services (for persons who are deaf and do not understand sign language), “induction loop” systems

25
in courtrooms (for individuals who use hearing aids), Braille signage, and other accommodations may be necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities can participate meaningfully in judicial proceedings. In such circumstances, it is no answer for the State to excuse its failure to provide lifts, sign language interpreters, Braille documents, and other accommodations by saying that it formally treats all individuals alike. As countless examples have shown, “the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.” Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
* * * * * States’ persistent and continuing failure to provide equal and effective access to the judicial system for individuals with disabilities should itself be constitutionally impermissible. By providing in Title II of the ADA a legal remedy against such violations, Congress has acted appropriately to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DENNIS W. ARCHER Counsel of Record
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON DAVID W. BOWKER JENNIFER M. ROCKOFF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 750 North Lake Shore Drive Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 988-5215
NOVEMBER 2003

 
 No. 02-1667 IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
________________________________
STATE OF TENNESSEE, Petitioner, v. GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents.
_____________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
___________________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ALABAMA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NORTH DAKOTA, OKLAHOMA, UTAH, AND WYOMING IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
___________
WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL GENE C. SCHAERR* RICHARD H. SINKFIELD, III NATHAN A. FORRESTER RYAN D. NELSON SOLICITOR GENERAL KATHRYN R. HAUN STATE OF ALABAMA RICHARD H. MENARD JR. Office of the Attorney General SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & 11 South Union Street WOOD LLP Montgomery, AL 36130-0152 1501 K Street, N.W. (334) 242-7401 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 736-8000 Counsel for Amici Curiae September 8, 2003 * Counsel of Record [Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover] JON BRUNING ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEBRASKA 2115 State Capitol Lincoln, NE 68509 BRIAN SANDOVAL ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEVADA 100 North Capitol Street Carson City, NV 89701 WAYNE STENEHJEM ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA State Capitol 600 E. Boulevard Ave. Bismarck, ND 58505-0040 W.A. DREW EDMONDSON ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF OKLAHOMA 2300 North Lincoln Boulevard, Suite 112 Oklahoma City, OK 73105 PATRICK J. CRANK ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF WYOMING 123 State Capitol Cheyenne, WY 82002 MARK L. SHURTLEFF ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF UTAH 236 State Capitol Salt Lake City, UT 84114 (i) QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2002), to the extent it applies to the accessibility of public buildings, exceeds Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby failing validly to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from private damages claims. (iii) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTION PRESENTED.............................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................... vi INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ..................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................ 3 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................... 3 ARGUMENT................................................................... 6 I. CONGRESS ACTED BEYOND ITS SECTION 5 POWER WHEN IT PURPORTED TO ABROGATE THE STATES’ SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING A FAILURE TO MAKE PUBLIC BUILDINGS ACCESSIBLE......................................................... 6 A. This Court Can Appropriately Resolve The Constitutionality Of Title II’s Abrogation Of Sovereign Immunity As Applied Only To The

Accessibility Of Public Buildings, And Leave For Another Day The Constitutionality Of Abrogating Sovereign Immunity From Suits For Other Alleged Violations Of Title II............ 7 B. While Unfortunate, The Failure To Outfit Courthouses And Other Public Buildings So That Persons Of All Disabilities May Access Them Without Assistance Violates Neither Due Process Nor Equal Protection ..................... 11 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS – continued Page 1. A State’s Rational, if Unfortunate, Decision Not to Make Public Buildings Fully Accessible to Persons of All Disabilities Does Not Constitute an Equal Protection Violation ........................................................ 11 2. A State Does Not Offend Due Process by Failing to Provide Unassisted Access to Courthouses, Because There Is No Absolute Right to Unassisted Attendance at Court Proceedings.................................................... 13 C. Neither The Statutory Text Nor The Legislative Record Of Title II Contains The Requisite Findings Or Evidence Of Past Unconstitutional Conduct By The States With Respect To The Accessibility Of Public Buildings............................................................. 16 1. Congress Failed to Identify Any History or Pattern of Equal Protection or Due Process Violations....................................................... 16 2. Congress Did Not Identify a Pattern of Discriminatory Conduct Attributable to the States Themselves.......................................... 19 II. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE IS NO GOOD REASON TO ALLOW PRIVATE FEDERAL DAMAGE ACTIONS BASED ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS OWNED OR USED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS................................................... 22 A. Virtually Every State Already Has Statutes Or Regulations Requiring That Public Buildings Be Accessible To The Disabled.......................... 22 v TABLE OF CONTENTS – continued Page

B. The Potential Availability Of Injunctions And Federal Enforcement Actions To Require Compliance With Title II Provides Ample Additional Assurances Of Accessibility............. 25 CONCLUSION................................................................ 27 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) ............................................................. 10 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)................................................................... 24 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)................................................................. passim Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)........... 14 Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) ............................... 10 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ..... 4, 5, 6 16 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).................................................... 11 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980)................................................................... 9 Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) ........................ 1 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)...4, 6, 9 Gaston County, N.C. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).......................................................... 9 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ................ 12, 18, 19 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) ..................... 14 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) ......... 8, 9 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)................................................................. 16, 17 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) .............. 14, 15 Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003)..................................................... 8, 9, 11 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)............................................................ 13 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)....... 9 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)......... 14 vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continuted Page South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)................................................................... 8, 9

Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944)................................................................... 10 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)..................... 2 STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ............................... 16, 17, 18, 20, 24 § 12102(2)............................................... 24 §§ 12131-12134...................................... 2 § 12133 ................................................... 25 § 12142 ................................................... 7 § 12143 ................................................... 7 § 12162 ................................................... 7 § 2000e-5(i) .......................................... 25, 26 Ark. Code § 19-4-1415............................................ 24 Fla. Stat. ch. 553.501-553.513................................. 24 Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-3 .......................................... 24 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 103-50 ........................................ 24 Ind. Code § 22-13-4-1.5 .......................................... 24 La. Rev. Stat. tit. 40 § 1734..................................... 24 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.065......................................... 24 Neb. Rev. Stat § 20-127 .......................................... 24 N.H. Rev. Stat § 155-A:5 ........................................ 24 N.Y. Pub. Bldgs. Law § 51...................................... 24 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-2 ........................................... 24 N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19.................................... 24 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3781.111 ........................... 24 Or. Rev. Stat. § 447.220 .......................................... 24 R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-8-15 ........................................ 24 S.D. Codified Laws § 5-14-13................................. 24 Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-204 (2003) ................... 3 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 273....................................... 24 Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-1159....................................... 24 viii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continuted Page Wash. Rev. Code § 70.92.110 ................................. 24 Wis. Stat. § 101.13. ................................................. 24 RULE Fed. R. Crim. P. 43.................................................. 14 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989) .................................... 21 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512 ....................................... 21 136 Cong. Rec. H2614 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) ... 21 IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
___________

No. 02-1667 ___________ STATE OF TENNESSEE, Petitioner, v. GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents.
___________
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
___________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ALABAMA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NORTH DAKOTA, OKLAHOMA, UTAH, AND WYOMING IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
___________
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE The States of Alabama, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioner urging reversal of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As sovereign States, amici have a strong interest in preserving the principles of dual sovereignty that are “a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint.” Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002). Accordingly, amici have a powerful interest in ensuring that Congress’s power to abrogate their sovereign immunity remains within the bounds 2 set by the Constitution, and is therefore circumscribed in a manner that recognizes the extraordinary nature of such an abrogation. On a more practical level, amici have a strong interest in avoiding the litigation of private damage claims based upon Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (“ADA”). This is particularly true of claims that seek damages for a State’s alleged failure to make a public building sufficiently “accessible” to satisfy the legitimate desires of all disabled citizens to get themselves into and out of public spaces. As detailed below, virtually all of the States, including these amici, have undertaken significant efforts in the past several years to make their public buildings more accessible. However, as a matter of policy, amici believe that private federal damage actions against the States, with their attendant costs and risks to state taxpayers, are not warranted. That is particularly true given

the absence of any evidence that the States’ management of public buildings routinely violated the constitutional rights of the disabled prior to the ADA’s passage, or that it does so today. That is not to say that any State is, or should be, allowed to discriminate against the disabled with impunity. When States violate Title II or the Constitution, federal courts may issue declaratory and injunctive relief. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Nor do amici contend that they should never be liable for money damages for violations of Title II of the ADA. Sovereign immunity does not apply to suits brought by the United States. And a State, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, may waive its sovereign immunity to private suits for damages under the ADA. But the abrogation of sovereign immunity at issue here–particularly with respect to claims challenging the accessibility of State-owned or operated buildings–is neither within Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment nor necessary as a matter of policy. 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE To avoid burdening the Court with another recitation of the facts, amici adopt the statement in Petitioner’s brief. However, two points deserve particular emphasis. First, nothing in Respondents’ allegations–which of course must be accepted as true given the posture of this case– suggests that they were ever denied access to any Tennessee courthouses altogether. To the contrary, Respondent Lane’s complaint confirms that, when he was unable to access particular rooms in a court building on his own, he was offered alternative means of access. These included the option of being carried up the stairs by security personnel and the option of having the hearing relocated to a more accessible room or building. See Pet. App. 15 & 16. There is no allegation that any of these options would have prevented him from participating fully in the pertinent proceedings, or would have placed him in any danger. Second, like virtually all other States, the State of Tennessee voluntarily requires, as a matter of state law, that courthouses and other public buildings be made accessible to disabled persons. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-204 (2003). Indeed, the record reflects that one of the courthouses at issue in this dispute was retrofitted with an elevator after some of the events of which Respondents complain, but before the filing of the present lawsuit. Pet. App. 17. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Under certain narrow circumstances, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to abrogate a State’s immunity from liability for violation of federal remedial legislation. Although amici support Petitioner’s request that Title II’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity be invalidated in its entirety, the Court need not go that far here. The only question the Court need address in this 4 case is whether Congress validly acted within its Section 5 authority in attempting to abrogate States’ immunity for alleged violations of Subtitle A of Title II, and only insofar as those provisions apply to the physical accessibility of public buildings. Of course, the mere invocation of Section 5 does not effect compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637-39 (1999). A court must determine whether Congress acted within its Section 5 authority by examining for itself whether the attempt to abrogate satisfies the requirements announced in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (plurality op.); see also Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). Here, Congress’s attempt to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity for alleged violations of Title II, Subtitle A, is invalid, at least as to claims challenging the accessibility of public buildings, for two fundamental reasons. First, looking to the “metes and bounds” of the “constitutional right in question,” id. at 368, there is no general constitutional right to public buildings that are physically “accessible” to the disabled, however desirable such accessibility is as a matter of policy. A government’s failure to make a public building satisfy modern standards of accessibility does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as long as that failure has a rational basis – which cost considerations alone will almost always provide. And a government’s failure to make a public courthouse accessible (in the modern sense) does not violate the Due Process Clause as long as the government is willing, as it was here, to provide alternative means for a disabled person to participate meaningfully in any proceedings in which he is involved. Second, in addition to the “proportionality” concerns addressed in Petitioner’s brief, there simply is no “congruence” between Congress’s findings and the alleged 5 constitutional violations that the accessibility features of Title

II are designed to remedy. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20. Neither the statutory text nor the legislative record reflects any congressional finding of a history or pattern of constitutional violations on the part of States. And even had Congress identified such a pattern, Title II’s remedies fail the “congruence” requirement because they are not linked to, or justified by, any identifiable course of unconstitutional State conduct. Because these considerations compel the conclusion that Congress did not act within its authority in abrogating the States’ sovereign immunity with respect to accessibility claims under Title II, that immunity (as reflected in the Eleventh Amendment) precludes private suits for damages under that statute. II. Constitutional considerations aside, Title II’s purported abrogation of State sovereign immunity from suits involving access to public buildings is unnecessary as a practical matter. First, virtually every State in the Union already guarantees disabled persons access to public buildings. Moreover, private damages actions to enforce the federal guarantee would more likely undermine than advance the ADA’s goals. It would divert scarce resources from affirmative remedial measures to defensive litigation, and it would tend to eliminate the States’ incentives to provide even stronger protections for the disabled under state law. Second, to the extent State guarantees of access are thought insufficient, the other remedies afforded by Title II (assuming it is a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I power) provide more than adequate reinforcement. The principal remedy, injunctive relief, is ideally suited to right the wrongs at issue. In virtually all imaginable cases, restricted access to public buildings can be alleviated by a stroke of the judicial pen. Title II’s other enforcement provisions, including federal administrative enforcement with the possibility of civil 6 penalties, are also better suited to promoting Title II’s goals than the prospect of potentially devastating civil liability. ARGUMENT I. CONGRESS ACTED BEYOND ITS SECTION 5 POWER WHEN IT PURPORTED TO ABROGATE THE STATES’ SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING A FAILURE TO MAKE PUBLIC BUILDINGS ACCESSIBLE. To determine whether Section 5 legislation validly abrogates the States’ sovereign immunity from damage actions, this Court applies the tripartite test announced in City

of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. First, a court must “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Id. Second, once a court determines the “metes and bounds” of that right, it examines “whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional . . . discrimination by the States.” Id. at 368. Third, if (and only if) there is a pattern of identified unconstitutional conduct on the part of the state, a court determines whether there is “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639.1 Although Title II covers a wide range of qualitatively different activities, this case involves only one category of covered issues, namely, the accessibility of public buildings. Accordingly, as explained below, the Court can choose to address the constitutionality of Congress’s attempt to
1 Because the Petitioner’s brief discussed the proportionality issue at some length, this brief will focus principally on the “congruence” requirement, and on the implications of that requirement for the kind of legislative record that Congress must have to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from private damage suits.
7 abrogate sovereign immunity only for that type of claim. It can thereby leave for another day the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of sovereign immunity for such things as the accessibility of transportation equipment and the statute’s more general prohibition on discrimination against the disabled. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12142, 12143 (mandating that public transit systems be made accessible to disabled persons), 12162 (mandating that intercity rail transportation be made accessible to disabled persons). Such an approach would be in keeping with the Court’s decision in Garrett to address only the constitutionality of the statute’s abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to claims under Title I, rather than addressing the constitutionality of that abrogation with respect to the entire statute. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1. A. This Court Can Appropriately Resolve The Constitutionality Of Title II’s Abrogation Of Sovereign Immunity As Applied Only To The Accessibility Of Public Buildings, And Leave For Another Day The Constitutionality Of Abrogating Sovereign Immunity From Suits For Other Alleged Violations Of Title II. Although Petitioner makes a compelling case that Title II’s

abrogation of sovereign immunity is invalid in its entirety, several considerations support a category-by-category approach to addressing the constitutionality of Title II’s various abrogations of sovereign immunity. Whereas Title I deals exclusively with a single activity – employment – Title II encompasses a broad spectrum of distinct activities, ranging from providing transportation services to making public buildings accessible. Because the activities at issue in Title II differ qualitatively from one another, it is conceivable that Congress could have made findings that are adequate to support an abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to one activity but not others. Conversely, congressional findings with respect to one activity cannot support the 8 abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to another, qualitatively different activity. Indeed, allowing Congress to leverage a proper finding of unconstitutional conduct in one area into a justification for abrogating sovereign immunity in another area would be flatly contrary to this Court’s requirement that there be a “congruence” between valid congressional findings and the abrogation of sovereign immunity. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (to be congruent, a law must be “aimed at areas where [the constitutional violation] has been most flagrant”); Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1993 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For example, Congress might (theoretically) find a pattern of unconstitutional activity in the provision of public transportation services, which is governed by Subtitle B, but not with respect to access to public buildings, which is governed by Subtitle A. Then, even though these two classes of activity have no apparent ground in common, Congress could – by the mere expedient of drafting a statute broad enough to embrace them both – effect an abrogation of sovereign immunity that reaches well beyond the predicate pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Such a result would plainly violate this Court’s congruence requirement. Moreover, if this Court were to indicate that it will review such overly inclusive statutes in toto for purposes of Eleventh Amendment analysis, Congress would have an incentive to use legitimate findings of unconstitutional behavior by the States as springboards for sweeping eliminations of sovereign immunity. That is why the Court has traditionally resisted allowing Congress broadly to abrogate sovereign immunity. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),

Justice Harlan distinguished his vote to strike down a New York state literacy test from his previous vote to uphold a similar law in South Carolina. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 199394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing Justice Harlan’s 9 voting justifications). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-23, based on “‘voluminous legislative history’” with respect to voting rights, Justice Harlan had upheld strong remedial measures, including the suspension of literacy tests. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Morgan, however, Justice Harlan voted to invalidate a similar federal ban on New York state literacy tests based on a lack of a showing that “there ha[d] in fact been an infringement of [a] constitutional command.” Id. Thus, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and in Morgan, Justice Harlan reached different conclusions about the constitutionality of related voting activities based solely on the “congruence” between congressional findings of unconstitutionality and the activity at issue. Such a specific inquiry is necessary here as well, regardless of whether the Court addresses the entirety of Title II or limits its inquiry to the accessibility of public buildings. This Court, moreover, has never addressed, much less upheld, the abrogation of the States’ sovereign immunity for a statute as broad as Title II of the ADA. In previous cases the Court has addressed the abrogation issue in limited activities, such as voting preclearance (City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Gatson County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); South Carolia v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)), religious exemptions (City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)), employment discrimination (Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)), Indian gaming (Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)), patent infringement (Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640), and employment family leave (Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003)). As in these previous cases, an activity-by-activity review under Title II makes sense because it allows an appropriately particularized examination of the Congressional record for each activity. Otherwise, Congress would be able to abrogate sovereign immunity for actions lacking any pattern of discrimination simply by including 10 them in same legislation as unrelated activities for which a pattern of discrimination exists. Finally, category-by-category review of Title II’s various abrogations of sovereign immunity also furthers the doctrines of constitutional avoidance and separation of powers. “If

there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). But broad-brush review of the entire Title II scheme would require courts to ratify (or not to ratify) the constitutionality of all of the immunity-abrogating provisions in the Title, thereby addressing a broader range of constitutional questions than necessary to resolve a particular case.2 To be sure, the Court is free to take the contrary approach and to decide, once and for all, whether Title II validly abrogates the States’ sovereign immunity as to any and all of the activities that fall within the statute’s scope. Indeed, the reasons why Title II does not validly abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity as to the accessibility of public buildings may also compel the conclusion that Congress exceeded its authority in abrogating sovereign immunity as to other categories of activities. But the Court is not compelled to reach that question in this case, any more than it was compelled in Garrett to address the abrogation of sovereign
2 For these reasons, at least two circuits have examined the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of sovereign immunity on a category-by-category basis, rather than examining the entire statutory scheme in toto. See Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 703-04 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that an examination of Title II’s provisions separately advances doctrine of constitutional avoidance and examination of the entire Title in toto is “fundamentally at odds with separation of powers values”); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 1999) (declining to examine statute as whole for Section 5 inquiry based on doctrine of constitutional avoidance).
11 immunity with respect to claims other than those arising under Title I. B. While Unfortunate, The Failure To Outfit Courthouses And Other Public Buildings So That Persons Of All Disabilities May Access Them Without Assistance Violates Neither Due Process Nor Equal Protection. Category-specific analysis of Title II’s abrogations of sovereign immunity also facilitates analysis of the first inquiry required by Boerne and Garrett, namely, to “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. This analysis, moreover, must reflect the reality that “[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.” Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. at 1977 (quoting

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81). Here, the plaintiffs have alleged two constitutional rights: the right to be free from invidious discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, and a due process right to attend court proceedings. As shown below, under this Court’s decisions, neither of these theories creates a general constitutional right to unassisted access to public buildings or to specific portions of public buildings. 1. A State’s Rational, if Unfortunate, Decision Not to Make Public Buildings Fully Accessible to Persons of All Disabilities Does Not Constitute an Equal Protection Violation. In the equal protection context, this Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985), rejected the argument that classifications based on disability are subject to heightened scrutiny. Instead, regulations concerning the disabled as a class are entitled only to rationality review. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. Accordingly, they “cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there 12 is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). But that, of course, means that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to make special accommodations for the disabled, provided their actions toward the disabled are rational. See Garrett, 531 at 364. Thus, as the Court observed in Garrett, “[i]f special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 368. In other words, a State does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause by failing to accommodate the disabled, so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Id. at 367. It follows from this analysis that the real constitutional right at issue here is the right to be free from a failure by the States, without a rational basis, to make special accommodation for the disabled with respect to accessibility of public buildings. But a State might have numerous rational reasons for failing to make public buildings fully accessible to persons of all disabilities. Chief among these is that, faced with limited resources, a State may rationally choose to fund other priorities, such as college scholarships for the disabled, or even compliance with other requirements imposed by the ADA. Whether these decisions are right or wrong as a matter of policy, they plainly would not constitute a constitutional

violation under the deferential rational basis standard. This conclusion is illustrated by the facts of this case. Neither of the plaintiffs has alleged, much less demonstrated, that the State of Tennessee lacked a rational basis in failing to make the public buildings at issue here accessible. Nor could such a showing be made: The buildings at issue were constructed before the Second World War, at a time when wheelchair ramps were virtually unknown and elevators were uncommon in small buildings. And even after this technology became more widely available and cost-efficient, 13 the State would have been required to spend substantial sums to retrofit the old buildings. Given other budgetary needs, the State’s decision not to spend these sums was surely rational, even if most would agree it was bad policy. 2. A State Does Not Offend Due Process by Failing to Provide Unassisted Access to Courthouses, Because There Is No Absolute Right to Unassisted Attendance at Court Proceedings. Respondents also claim that the alleged denial of ready access to the courthouse violates their due process rights. Thus, Respondents may argue that – at least as applied to public courthouses – Title II’s abrogation of sovereign immunity is justified under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Determining whether that is true requires the Court to locate the contours of the due process right to be present at court proceedings. First, there is no due process right to be present at a court proceeding in which one may have a pecuniary interest but to which one is not a party. This Court has never recognized such a broad right, and amici are aware of no lower federal court to have done so.3 Thus, the abrogation of the States’ sovereign immunity cannot be justified on the theory that a
3 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), in which this Court held that the general public had a right to access a criminal trial, is inapplicable here. First, that case concerned only the guarantee (derived from the Free Speech Clause) of a “public trial” in general; it did not recognize an individualized personal right to attend trial. Id. at 571-74; see also id. at 584-85 (Brennan, J., concurring). Second, even as to that generalized public “right,” Richmond Newspapers conferred only rational basis scrutiny. See id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring) (First Amendment prohibits “arbitrary interference with access to important information”); id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). Finally, Richmond Newspapers involved only the State’s power to close criminal trials to the public, and did not address civil trials. See id. at 580 n.17.
14 State’s failure to make a public courthouse or other public

building accessible to the disabled will violate due process by denying people like Respondent Jones an opportunity to ply their trade as court reporters. See Pet. App. 19-20. Second, even as to parties in legal proceedings, there is no absolute right to attendance. To be sure, a criminal defendant generally has a due process right (stemming from the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause) to be present in a criminal proceeding against him. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)). And indigent citizens have a due process right to be free of filing fees and other costs that would otherwise preclude their access to the courts. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971). It is well settled, however, that even these limited rights of access are subject to numerous exceptions. For example, as this Court has made clear, the notion that a “trial can never continue in the defendant’s absence [has] been expressly rejected.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 342 (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)); see, e.g., id. at 343-44 (recognizing at least three constitutionally permissible ways to exclude the defendant from the courtroom without violating his due process right to be present); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 118-20 (1934) (the right to be present may be lost); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382 (right to judicial access is limited); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b) (providing numerous instances in which presence of a defendant in criminal proceeding not required). Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), is illustrative. There, the Court held that denial of the opportunity to confront a witness did not violate a criminal defendant’s due process rights where the State afforded him an alternate means to see the witness. Id. at 849-50. In so holding, the Court weighed public interest considerations against a defendant’s right to be present. It concluded that the right to confront may be satisfied without a face-to-face confrontation 15 where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and where the testimony’s reliability is otherwise assured. Id. at 850. As Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court, “our precedents establish that ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.’” Id. at 849 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)). Thus, where the State has an important policy interest, the preference for a defendant’s face-to-face confrontation at trial can be overridden so long as alternate means exist to satisfy a

defendant’s right to confrontation. Third, even if there were an absolute right to be present in a court proceeding, that is not the same thing as a right to be present without assistance. In this case, for example, the State afforded Respondent Lane two alternatives reasonably calculated to facilitate his presence. It offered to hold one of the proceedings in another facility that was accessible (the courthouse library, for example), and, if necessary, to have courthouse employees assist him upstairs to the courtroom. See Pet. App. 15 & 16. Either alternative would have allowed him to attend the proceedings in question. Given these alternatives, the fact (if it is so) that the State did not afford Mr. Lane unassisted access to the courthouse had no effect on his ability to confront witnesses, refute claims against him or offer evidence in his behalf. To the contrary, the State attempted conscientiously to reconcile Mr. Lane’s right to be present at the proceedings and the State’s need to administer those proceedings in a cost-effective manner. Tennessee, in short, did not deprive Mr. Lane of due process. Because the Due Process Clause does not require a State to provide unassisted access to public buildings, the Clause provides no basis for abrogating the States’ sovereign immunity for alleged failure to make public buildings physically “accessible” to citizens with disabilities that prevent them from doing such things as climbing stairs. At a 16 minimum, that is certainly true where, as here, States provide alternative means by which these citizens can attend legal proceedings in which they are parties. C. Neither The Statutory Text Nor The Legislative Record Of Title II Contains The Requisite Findings Or Evidence Of Past Unconstitutional Conduct By The States With Respect To The Accessibility Of Public Buildings. Even if the failure to make public buildings accessible could be a constitutional violation, neither the text of Title II nor its supporting record is adequate to support the use of Section 5 to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity for the kinds of claims at issue here. As explained above, to satisfy the congruence requirement, Congress must identify a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by the States with respect to the activity covered by the statute. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. And it cannot impute conduct by private actors to the States. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (plurality op.).

Here, a review of the text and legislative record reveals no support for a history or pattern of purposeful discrimination against the disabled as to the accessibility of public buildings. Nor does the record support a finding that the disabled have suffered a pattern of due process violations at the hands of the States themselves. 1. Congress Failed to Identify Any History or Pattern of Equal Protection or Due Process Violations. a. Much of the evidence cited in support of Congress’s use of its Section 5 authority in the ADA consists of findings of “discrimination” against the disabled. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101. However, Congress’s use of that term encompasses much conduct that is perfectly constitutional. There is no indication that the invocations of that term in (or in support of) Subtitle A of Title II referred to conduct that is 17 arbitrary or irrational conduct – a necessary condition for an equal protection violation. As discussed above, discrimination may be unenlightened but still minimally rational. It is beyond dispute that Congress’s authority to enact general remedial legislation under Section 5 is limited to rectifying conduct that is unconstitutional, not merely undesirable. Moreover, the mere fact that Congress states that particular conduct is unconstitutional does not make it so. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80. More specifically, as discussed above, Cleburne compels the conclusion that a State may take account of disabilities, or refuse to accommodate them, as long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Thus, the fact that Subtitle A of Title II refers to “discrimination” against the disabled does not mean that Congress actually found a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. There is no congruence between that finding and Title II’s abrogation of sovereign immunity for claims challenging the failure to make public buildings accessible. b. The Act’s text also contains a series of “Findings” explaining why it was enacted. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. These findings generally express concern with discrimination on the basis of disability across a broad range of services and activities, including, inter alia, access to public services. See id. § 12101(a)(3); see also id. § 12101(a)(5) (“individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers . . . failure to make modifications to existing facilities and

practices . . .”). Here, the findings’ sweeping language reveals a congressional intent to address not only discrimination that is purposeful or irrational, and therefore unconstitutional, but also discrimination that is entirely constitutional. For example, in Title II Congress has determined that 18 “discrimination” shall include differentiating on the basis of “race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age” and disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4). Yet each of these forms of discrimination is reviewed differently under the Constitution, and most of these groups – unlike the disabled – receive strict scrutiny review as suspect classifications. Again, discrimination on the basis of disability is subject to rationality review. And there are a host of rational, if debatable, reasons a State may choose not to take such actions. Thus, in asking this Court to treat Congress’s finding of “discrimination” as a finding of unconstitutional conduct, then, respondents are effectively asking this Court to overrule Cleburne and treat disability as a suspect classification. Once again, there is no congruence between the findings and the abrogation of sovereign immunity to accessibility claims. c. Nor does the legislative record otherwise indicate a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. To be sure, the Garrett dissent attached a list of 300 instances of alleged discriminatory treatment by state officials. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370. But fewer than 20 percent of these anecdotes involve access to public buildings. And they consist entirely of such broad and nondescript statements as “inaccessible public buildings and services,” “inaccessible courthouse,” “inaccessible government buildings in Seward,” and “inaccessible new performing arts center,” Id. at 391-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (App. C). None provides sufficient factual detail to establish that the alleged denial of accessibility (if it occurred) was irrational, and therefore unconstitutional. This is especially true in light of the fact that, where rationality review applies, “the burden is on the one attacking” the government action” to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 19 In short, these examples are not even legislative findings, and are “so general and brief that no firm conclusion can be drawn” from them. Id. at 371 n.7. d. udicial decisions likewise provide no support for a

finding of widespread unconstitutional conduct. As some members of this Court have observed, evidence of a history or pattern of unconstitutional conduct on the part of the States may be found “in decisions of the courts of the States and also the courts of the United States.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy and O’Connor, J.J., concurring) (noting that “one would have expected to find . . . extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations”). Here, however, there is a remarkable absence of judicial documentation of constitutional violations by the States against the disabled. The dearth of lawsuits alleging unconstitutional conduct in the years immediately before Title II’s enactment bolsters the conclusion that Congress did not have support for a finding of a history or pattern of unconstitutional conduct by the States. Stated differently, there is no congruence between the evidence and findings on which Congress relied, and its decision to abrogate sovereign immunity as to accessibility claims. 2. Congress Did Not Identify a Pattern of Discriminatory Conduct Attributable to the States Themselves. In all events, it is well established that Section 5 legislation based on the unconstitutional conduct of local entities or private actors is insufficient to justify the extraordinary remedy of abrogating a State’s sovereign immunity. “Just as § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions committed ‘under color of state law,’ Congress’ § 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (citing Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640). Neither the text nor the legislative history of Title II supports the notion that the States 20 themselves engaged in any pattern of unconstitutional conduct. a. As a threshold matter, the text is devoid of any mention of unconstitutional conduct attributable to the States. Instead, the statute alleges discrimination without mention of the culpable entities, instead naming “society” as being responsible for the conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”) (emphasis added). The text thus invites the conclusion that any pattern of unconstitutional conduct is a result of actions taken by private actors or local entities, not by the States.

b. Nor does the legislative record provide any support for a pattern of discriminatory conduct by the States, a fact that this Court observed in Garrett. See 531 U.S. at 369 (noting that “great majority of these incidents do not deal with the activities of States”). The legislative record suffers from the same shortcoming as the text in this regard: no nexus between the conduct that Subtitle A of Title II appears to treat as unconstitutional and any action on the part of the State. Indeed, of the alleged instances of failure to make reasonable accommodations in public buildings, only a few isolated instances are even arguably attributable to the States. And those do not establish a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. For example, in Alaska there were allegedly “inaccessible areas at [a] new Alaska Performing Arts Center.” Id. at 392 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (App. C). But this brief description gives no information as to what areas were inaccessible, how they were inaccessible, what percentage of disabled persons could not gain access, or, most important, whether any rational reason existed for such inaccessibility. 21 Similarly, the record contains evidence that, in Georgia, the “University of Georgia located its office of handicapped services in inaccessible second floor office.” Id. at 401. And in Mississippi there were allegedly “inaccessible classrooms and library at Mississippi School for the Deaf.” Id. at 411. But again, these anecdotes provide no indication of the extent of the inaccessibility, or whether the inaccessibility lacked a rational basis and was therefore unconstitutional. As the concurrence in Garrett put it, “[t]he failure of a State to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 375 (Kennedy and O’Connor, JJ., concurring). c. No other legislative findings support any unconstitutional pattern of conduct by the States themselves. The House and the Senate Reports, for example, do not mention a widespread pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on the part of the States. See S. Rep. No. 101116, at 44 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 24-25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 513-25. To the contrary, the House Report emphasized that the legislation was needed, not to address the conduct of the States, but because existing disability laws “do[] not apply to private sector entities that do not receive Federal funds.” H.R. Rep.

No. 101-485, pt. 4. at 24), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 513 (emphasis added). Indeed, many legislators congratulated the States on their leadership in protecting the rights of disabled individuals. See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 92, 96 (Statement of Sen. Hatch). And others confirmed that, as described at greater length below, that many States’ protection of the disabled was equal to, if not greater than, the ADA’s. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2614 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (Rep. Berman). Thus, the legislative findings suggest that, if anything, the States have 22 proactively protected the disabled, rather than unconstitutionally disregarded them. * * * * Because the legislative record neither attributes any history or pattern of unconstitutional conduct to the States themselves nor establishes support for the existence of such a history or pattern, Congress has exceeded its Section 5 authority to the extent it attempted to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity for failure to make public buildings accessible. There is, in short, no “congruence” between the findings and evidence in the legislative record and Congress’s decision to abrogate the States’ immunity as to that class of claims. II. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE IS NO GOOD REASON TO ALLOW PRIVATE FEDERAL DAMAGE ACTIONS BASED ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS OWNED OR USED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS. Abrogating the States’ sovereign immunity with respect to accessibility claims is also unnecessary from a practical standpoint. As shown below, virtually every State in the nation already ensures, as a matter of State law, that the disabled have ample access to public buildings. And the ADA’s provisions for injunctive relief and federal enforcement actions – assuming Title II is valid Commerce Clause legislation – afford more than adequate reinforcement. A. Virtually Every State Already Has Statutes Or Regulations Requiring That Public Buildings Be Accessible To The Disabled. As this Court observed in Garrett, “by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted” measures proscribing discrimination against the disabled. 531 U.S. at 368 n.5. This beneficent trend has continued since the ADA’s passage, with a number of States adding new protections and strengthened existing remedies. 23

As to the accessibility of public buildings, as shown in the Appendix, virtually all States now specifically guarantee access to disabled persons. 1. Indeed, by the time the ADA was enacted, the States had already been voluntarily traveling “the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society.” Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As the Court has observed, the States may be said largely to have charted the course. See id. at 368 n.5 (quoting statement of a congressional witness that the States prior to the ADA were “far out in front of the Federal Government”). Congress, then, in effect leapfrogged many State governments – and caught up with others – in creating the protections secured by the ADA. To be sure, Congress’s efforts in this regard are commendable. The ADA is, as Justices Kennedy and O’Connor termed it, “a milestone” on the road to a better society. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring). But Congress’s awakening to the values embodied in the ADA – as to which the States, as noted, had led the way – is no warrant for the quantum step of exposing the States to private federal damages suits with respect to accessibility claims. 2. Further, such exposure would be more likely to undermine than to advance the salutary goals of both the ADA and corresponding State laws and rules. For one thing, enforcement of federal anti-discrimination law by way of private damages actions naturally tends to remove, or displace, the States’ incentives to create their own such protections for their citizens. It is not advisable, in this important area of social policy, to shutter the laboratories of democracy – at least not without a strong indication that they are not doing the job. As noted above, the indications are distinctly to the contrary. Equally important, the prospect (and before long the reality) of widespread and enormously costly damages suits 24 would necessarily divert the States’ resources from remedial to defensive ends. Especially in view of the budget crises with which so many States are now struggling, it should go without saying that those resources are limited, indeed scarce. As this Court is well aware, there are few more voracious consumers of resources than private civil litigation.4 None of this is to say that existing State laws and rules fully eradicate the difficulties faced by disabled persons, or that further legislation in this area is not to be desired as a policy matter. But, as shown in the above discussion and in the

attached appendix, existing State laws are sufficient to address the vast majority of accessibility problems. Moreover, they do so in a way that is tailored to meet the specific circumstances of each State's public buildings and facilities, as well as the requirements of each State's licensing and enforcement authorities. Indeed, since the ADA’s passage, several States have enacted new protections for the disabled or strengthened existing protections.5
4 Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1997) (discussing the “‘objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation,’” as recounted by the ad hoc committee appointed by the Chief Justice to investigate the asbestos litigation crisis). In this regard, the magnitude of the pool of potential ADA plaintiffs should be kept in mind. The Act’s definition of disability is extremely broad, embracing nearly 20 percent of Americans by Congress’s own reckoning. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2) (defining “disability” within the meaning of the ADA), 12101(a)(1) (finding that “some 43,000,000 Americans,” nearly 20 percent of the 1990 U.S. population, were disabled at the time of the ADA’s passage). 5 See, e.g., Ark. Code § 19-4-1415; Fla. Stat. ch. 553.501-553.513; Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-3; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 103-50; Ind. Code § 22-13-4-1.5; La. Rev. Stat. tit. 40 § 1734; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.065; Neb. Rev. Stat § 20-127; N.H. Rev. Stat § 155-A:5; N.Y. Pub. Bldgs. Law § 51; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-2; N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3781.111; Or. Rev. Stat. § 447.220; R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-8-15; S.D. Codified Laws § 5-14-13; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 273; Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-1159; Wash. Rev. Code § 70.92.110; Wis. Stat. § 101.13.
25 In short, a federal right of action for private damages against the States would not further, and could well hinder, the goals embodied in Title II of the ADA. B. The Potential Availability Of Injunctions And Federal Enforcement Actions To Require Compliance With Title II Provides Ample Additional Assurances Of Accessibility. Nor must disabled persons rely solely upon State law to ensure the accessibility of public buildings. To be sure, this Court has not yet had occasion to decide whether the other provisions of Title II are a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I power as applied to the States. Assuming they are, however, the Court’s evaluation of the practical necessity of a federal right of action for damages must take account of the other remedies provided by the statute. In view of those other remedies, it is clear that private damages actions are not the optimal means – indeed, are not necessary – to further the Act’s goals. 1. The principal remedy, of course, is injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)) (providing for injunctions to enforce

compliance with Title II). And injunctive relief, in virtually all conceivable circumstances, is exactly tailored to remedy the evil at which Title II is aimed: the denial or unreasonable restriction to disabled persons of access to public services and accommodations. This case is a good example. The most natural and reasonable remedy for the discrimination that the plaintiffs claim to have suffered – denial of ready entry to public buildings – would be a court order compelling the responsible State officials to make the necessary modifications or other accommodation. Furthermore, any such order would be backed by the threat of federal enforcement to compel compliance. See id. § 2000e-5(i). 26 2. If for some reason injunctive relief were inadequate to remedy a given instance of discrimination – or if it were thought to offer insufficient incentive for compliance – the ADA also provides for federal civil enforcement actions. See id. § 2000e-5(f). Without offending the Eleventh Amendment, such an action could result in (among other remedies) civil penalties, as well as costs and fees. Thus, even assuming the policies embodied in the ADA cannot be properly advanced without the threat of monetary exaction, that threat can be wielded and carried out without the drastic step of abrogating the States’ sovereign immunity. Moreover, federal civil enforcement of the ADA, coupled with case-by-case injunctive enforcement, is much surer to advance the Act’s policy goals in a targeted and effective manner than the cudgel of private tort suits. 27 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, and in Petitioner’s brief, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR. ATTORNEY GENERAL GENE C. SCHAERR* RICHARD H. SINKFIELD, III NATHAN A. FORRESTER RYAN D. NELSON SOLICITOR GENERAL KATHRYN R. HAUN STATE OF ALABAMA RICHARD H. MENARD JR. Office of the Attorney General SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & 11 South Union Street WOOD LLP Montgomery, AL 36130-0152 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005

JON BRUNING ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEBRASKA 2115 State Capitol Lincoln, NE 68509 BRIAN SANDOVAL ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEVADA 100 North Capitol Street Carson City, NV 89701 WAYNE STENEHJEM, ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA State Capitol 600 E. Boulevard Ave. Bismarck, ND 58505-0040 W.A. DREW EDMONDSON ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF OKLAHOMA 2300 North Lincoln Boulevard, Suite 112 Oklahoma City, OK 73105 28 PATRICK J. CRANK ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF WYOMING 123 State Capitol Cheyenne, WY 82002 MARK L. SHURTLEFF ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF UTAH 236 State Capitol Salt Lake City, UT 84114 Counsel for Amici Curiae September 8, 2003 * Counsel of Record 1a APPENDIX STATE ACCOMMODATION OF THE DISABLED IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES6 STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION Alabama Ala. Code § 21-4-4 (2001) Requires all public buildings and facilities under construction as of, or constructed after,

October 10, 1975 to comply with accessibility standards as promulgated by the State Fire Marshal in conformity with the American National Standards Institute guidelines; granted accessibility waivers for projects in progress where compliance was impractical in light of the stage of completion. Alaska Alaska Stat. § 35.10.015 (2002) Compels the Alaska Department of Public Works to adopt and enforce codes governing the construction of public buildings and facilities to ensure that they “are accessible to, and usable by, the physically handicapped ....”; after June 25, 1976, no public building or facility can be
6 Descriptions of the statutory provisions reflect their current effective status. References to the legislative history of such provisions are meant to illustrate the duration of state legislative efforts in increasing accessibility of public buildings.
2a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION designed or constructed in a manner that does not comply with the accessibility standards; requires the Department to maintain an inventory list of public buildings with respect to compliance and to develop cost estimates for retrofitting in order to establish a priority list. Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411492.01 (2003) Requires that “all buildings and facilities that are used by public entities and that are

leased or constructed in whole or in part with the use of state or local monies” comply with Title II of the ADA; as enacted by 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 224 § 4. Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 19-41415, § 20-14-303 (1987) Establishes that it is the right of “[v]isually handicapped, hearing impaired, and other physically handicapped persons” to have the full use and enjoyment of “public streets, ... public buildings, public facilities, and other public places”, subject to certain statutory limitations concerning feasibility; enacted by 2001 Ark. Acts 1626 § 1, as amended in 2003. California Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 4450Requires all public buildings, subject to certain exceptions, designed and constructed after 3a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION 4461 (2003) November 13, 1968, to meet the state building code accessibility standards; requires the renovated sections of buildings built prior to the effective date to comply with the accessibility standards. Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 9-5-102 to -103 (2003) Requires public and private buildings subject to these

sections to comply with the most current design criteria found in the “American National Standard for Buildings and Facilities Providing Accessibility and Usability for Physically Handicapped People”; requires public buildings designed after July 1, 1975, to comply with the standards with exceptions granted on an individual basis; applies standards to buildings under construction prior to July 1, 1976, when such buildings come under renovation or remodeling. Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-269 (2002) Requires that the State Building Inspector promulgate design and construction accessibility standards in “substantial compliance” with the ADA and that all public buildings “constructed or substantially renovated on or after October 4a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION 1, 1977,” with certain exceptions, comply with such standards; allows the State Building Inspector to approve compliance waivers. Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 § 9502; tit. 29 § 7301, § 7303 § 7306 (2003) Establishes that it is the right

of the “blind, the visually handicapped and otherwise physically disabled” to have the same rights “as able-bodied persons to use ... public buildings, public facilities and other public places”; establishes architectural standards for accessibility to the disabled for buildings (built by or on behalf of the State, leased fully or partially by the State or financed wholly or partially by State bonds) which, after July 13, 1979, have been constructed or altered. Florida Fla. Stat. ch. 553.501553.513 (2002) Florida Americans With Disabilities Accessibility Implementation Act, passed in 1993, adopted the ADAAG as the law of the state with respect to the minimum standards of the state building code, for the construction and renovation of public buildings. Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-3 Requires “all government buildings, public buildings, and facilities” subject to reno5a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION (2002) vation or construction permits after July 1, 1979 to comply with the ADAAG; required such public buildings subject to renovation or construction between July 1, 1984 and July 1, 1995 to comply with the specified version of the American National Standard

for Buildings and Facilities Providing Accessibility and Usability for Physically Handicapped People; allows for case-by-case exceptions based on a showing of impracticability. Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 103-50 (2002) Requires construction and design of “public buildings, facilities, and sites” to be accessible to the disabled, in conformance with the ADAAG; first enacted by 1965 Haw. Sess. Laws 3 § 2, as amended in 1969, 1989, 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002. Idaho Idaho Code 56-702 to -703 (2003) Requires all local building codes to comply with the ADA and ADAAG. Illinois 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 25 et seq. (2002) Requires the Capital Development Board to promulgate accessibility standards for all public buildings; stipulated that standards would apply to 6a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION all newly constructed buildings and certain renovations; first enacted by 1984 Ill. Laws 948 § 1, as amended in 1991. Indiana Ind. Code § 22-13-41.5 (2003) By act of 1994 Ind. Act 118 § 3, required the state buildings

commission to adopt accessibility standards consistent with the ADAAG. Iowa Iowa Code § 104A.1 et seq. (2003) Requires all public buildings under construction or to be constructed after July 4, 1965, to comply with state accessibility standards to accommodate the disabled. Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann § 58-1301 (2002) Establishes that all existing (as of 1978) and future public buildings and facilities must comply with minimum accessibility standards, subject to certain exceptions. Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198B.260 (2002) Effective July 15, 1994, requires the Kentucky Board of Housing, Buildings and Construction to promulgate revised accessibility regulations consistent with the ADA and the ADAAG covering the renovation and construction of all buildings with certain limited exemptions (e.g. historical structures where the historical significance would be destroyed by compliance); 7a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION application of earlier state accessibility standards were effective July 15, 1980. Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 40:1731 et seq. (2003) Declares the legislature’s intent to remove architectural barriers to the ability of the physically disabled to exercise their rights freely, as established by 1977 La. Acts 625 § 1; requires newly constructed or altered public facilities to comply with the ADAAG, as established by 1990 La. Acts 459, § 1 and 1995 La. Acts 880 § 1. Maine Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5 § 4553, § 4593 (2003) Defines buildings or establishments of the State, municipality or other local government as places of public accommodation; required such places that were constructed between Sept. 1, 1974 and Jan. 1, 1982 or that met certain remodeling cost thresholds to meet statutory accessibility standards that concerned walkways, entrances, lavatories, doors and parking. Maryland Md. Code Ann art. 83B § 6-102 as replaced by Md. Code Mandates Department of Housing and Community Development to promulgate statewide building codes to allow for accessibility by “individuals with disabilities”; such 8a

STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION Ann. Public Safety § 12-202 (2003) codes are enforceable by the permitting authority; accessibility provisions were first enacted in 1974 and subsequently amended in 1979, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1991. Massachusetts Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 22 § 13A (2003) Establishes an architectural access board charged with the promulgation of rules to make public buildings accessible to the handicapped; mandates that no “construction, reconstruction, alteration or remodeling of a public building,” subject to certain exceptions, can occur unless it occurs in conformity with such accessibility rules; first enacted by 1967 Mass. Legis. Serv. 724 § 1, as amended in 1971, 1974, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1990 and 2002. Michigan Mich. Comp. laws § 125.1352 (2003) Requires public facilities, for which construction was contracted after July 2, 1974 and public facilities for which the renovation surpasses certain load requirements, to comply with the “barrier free design requirements contained in the state construction code.”

Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 16B.61, § 256c.02 Mandates that the Dept. of Administration implement a building code that provides for 9a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION (2003) all “public buildings constructed or remodeled after July 1, 1963, to be accessible to and usable by physically handicapped persons”; establishes the right of the physically disabled to the same use and enjoyment as able-bodied persons to “public buildings, public facilities, and other public places.” Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-103 (2003) Required all existing public buildings, contracted-for and under construction, as of July 1, 1972, to have access ramps; requires all public buildings contracted-for thereafter to comply with the state building accessibility codes. Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.065 (2003) Makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to withhold from the disabled any of the “advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available” in any public facility owned or operated by or on behalf of the state or a public corporation and any facility supported by public funds; first enacted by 1986 Mo. Laws 513, as amended in 1992 and

1998. Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 50-60-201 Establishes a state-wide building code for “newly constructed public buildings and “cer10a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION (2002) tain altered public buildings” to ensure uniformity in access to persons with disabilities; first enacted by 1969 Mont. Laws 366 § 7. Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat § 81-5147 (2003) Establishes the right of the physically disabled to the same use and enjoyment as ablebodied persons to public buildings and public facilities; requires promulgation of building code regulations for newly constructed or renovated buildings that are consistent with the “guidelines and standards” of the ADA; enacted by 1998 Neb. Laws 1073, effective April 1, 1998, operative October 1, 1998. Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. § 338.180 (2003) Declares the intent of the Legislature to make public buildings designed after July 1, 1973, accessible to the disabled; requires all plans, designs and construction of public buildings after July 1, 1973, to comply with the applicable requirements of the ADA and the ADAAG;

provides for a non-compliance remedy to private individuals through the attorney general, who may bring suit against the offending state entity. 11a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat Ann. § 155-A:5 (2002) Requires all new buildings constructed by the State to accommodate persons with disabilities with respect to egress and ingress to public areas of such buildings; effective September 14, 2002, as enacted by 2002 N.H. Laws 8:3. New Jersey N.J. Rev. Stat. § 52:32-4, 5 (2003) Requires that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all plans and specifications for the construction or remodeling of any public building” in New Jersey shall provide facilities for the disabled; mandates promulgation of regulation that prescribe the types of facilities and stipulates that such facilities shall differentiate between “small public buildings” and “large public buildings” as determined by certain square footage thresholds; the earliest version of these provisions was enacted in 1971. New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-7-3 (2003)

Establishes the right of the physically disabled to the same use and enjoyment as ablebodied persons to “public buildings, public facilities, and other public places”; first enacted by 1967 N.M. Laws 232 § 3. New York N.Y. Pub. Requires that the construction, 12a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION Bldgs. Law § 51 (2003) renovation or alteration of all public buildings conform to the state building codes pertinent to access for the disabled; first enacted by 1972 N.Y. Laws 656, as amended in 1974, 1984 and 1994. North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168-2, § 168A-7 (2003) Establishes the right of the physically disabled to the same use and enjoyment as ablebodied persons to “public buildings, public facilities, and all other buildings and facilities”; makes it unlawful for a state agency “to refuse to provide reasonable aids and adaptations necessary for a known qualified person with a disability to use or benefit from existing public services operated by such entity; provided that the aids and adaptations do not impose an undue hardship on the entity involved”; first enacted by

1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 493 § 1, as amended in 1991 and 1997. North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19 (2003) Requires a certificate of compliance with the ADAAG to accompany designs of public buildings; first enacted by 1973 N.D. Laws 376, as amended in 1975, 1977, 1979, 1983, 1989, 1991, and 1993. 13a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3781.111 (2003) Requires that the board of building standards adopt accessibility standards for all buildings, including public buildings, that are consistent with the ADA; the earliest version of these provisions was enacted in 1965. Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 61 § 11 (2002) Requires all plans for the construction of public buildings, after May 24, 1973, to provide facilities for the “handicapped” in compliance with state building code; requires all existing public buildings that surpass certain renovation or addition thresholds to comply with the same accessibility standards. Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 447.210 et seq. (2001)

Establishes minimum accessibility standards for the disabled in public buildings and places, consistent with the ADA; first enacted by 1971 Or. Laws 230 § 2, as amended in 1973, 1975, 1979, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995. Pennsylvania 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1455.1 (2003) Requires all newly constructed public buildings to be “accessible to and usable by persons with physical handicaps”; provides that as public buildings are renovated, they shall also comply with the same stan14a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION dards, subject to variances based on practicability; first enacted by 71 Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 1455.3b (1965). Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-8-15 (2002) Requires that the design of all public buildings be made accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities in compliance with Title 23, Ch. 27.3 of the Rhode Island Building Code; first enacted by 1964 R.I. Pub. Laws 189 § 1, as amended in 1978 and 1997. South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 10-5-210 et seq. (2002) Establishes the legislature’s

intent that persons with disabilities participate fully in society, including the enjoyment of public facilities and buildings; requires the construction and design of public buildings to comply with revised state building codes (compliant with the American National Standards Institute guidelines), except to the extent that such buildings are exempted under federal law; first enacted by 1962 Code § 1-49, as amended in 1974 and 2000. South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 5-14-13 Establishes the ADAAG as the minimum standards for construction to accommodate the physically disabled in public 15a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION (2003) buildings; first enacted by 1965 S.D. Laws 312 § 2, as amended in 1988 and 1994. Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120204 (2003) Requires any public building “which is constructed, enlarged, or substantially altered or repaired after July 1, 1983” to be designed and constructed in a manner that meets the minimum standards set forth by ANSI. Texas Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 9102 (2003)

Requires the state Department of Licensing and Regulation to adopt accessibility standards consistent with ANSI guidelines; mandates that all public buildings, “constructed, or renovated, modified, or altered, in whole or in part on or after January 1, 1970” with the use of public funds, must comply with the revised accessibility codes; allows waivers based on impracticability. Utah Utah Code Ann. § 26-29-1 et seq. (2003) Establishes minimum accessibility standards for all public buildings and facilities that are newly constructed or remodeled with state funds, provided that the extent of compliance in the entire building may vary according to whether most or part of it is subject to renovation; first enacted by 1981 16a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION Utah Laws 126 § 28, as amended in 2001. Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 273 (2003) Requires the construction and alteration of all public buildings, including private buildings to be used as public buildings, to conform with the standards of the ADAAG, unless modified by Vermont law; effective June 21, 1988, pursuant to Vt. Acts & Resolves 268 § 5, as amended in 1989 and

1995. Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-1159 (2003) Requires the Department of General Services to establish accessibility standards for buildings that are constructed in whole or in part with public funds; except that local authorities are charged with establishing standards for buildings constructed in whole or in part with local funds; first enacted by 1970 Va. Acts. ch. 539, as amended in 1972, 1977, 1993 and 2001. Washington Wash. Rev. Code § 19.27.031, § 70.92.110 (2003) Requires all public buildings, with certain exceptions, that are constructed or remodeled after July 1, 1976, to comply with minimum accessibility standards, as now defined in the 1994 Uniform Building Code; allowed buildings con17a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION tracted-for, prior to July 1, 1976 to be exempt from compliance, subject to subsequent renovation. West Virginia W. Va. Code § 5-15-4 (2003) Establishes the right of the disabled to the same use and enjoyment as able-bodied persons

to “public buildings, public facilities, and other public places”; the earliest version of these provisions was enacted in 1969. Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 13.48(25t) § 101.13 et seq. (2003) Establishes a program to fund the repair and renovation of state-owned buildings, including disability access retrofitting; requires the establishment of minimum standards to “facilitate the use of public buildings ... by physically disabled persons”; requires design and construction standards consistent with the American Standard Specifications for Making Buildings and Facilities Accessible to and Usable by the Physically Handicapped; first enacted by 1971 Wis. Laws 228 §§ 17, 42, 44, as amended in 1973, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1993 and 1995. Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. Requires the design and new construction or additions to 18a STATE AUTHORITY ACCOMMODATION § 16-6-501, § 16-6-502 (2003) “all buildings for general public use built by the state” to comply with standards set forth in the American Standard Specifications for Making Buildings and Facilities Accessible to and Usable by the

Physically Handicapped; mandates the state fire marshal to review all such plans for approval; first enacted by 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws 30 § 1, as amended in 1975, 1977 and 1982

 
 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Blanche Fischer Foundation is a private, nonprofit 501(c)(3) charitable organization founded in 1981 from a trust established by the late Blanche Fischer, a native of Long Creek, Oregon. It makes direct grants on behalf of individuals with physical disabilities. The aid may relate directly to the disability or may less directly foster independence. In its first 21 years, the Blanche Fischer Foundation awarded nearly $1.2 million to over 2,100 individual Oregonians with physical disabilities. It is one of a few foundations in the United States that makes grants on behalf of individuals.
The Executive Director, John P. Dziennik has governor's appointments to the Oregon State Rehabilitation Council and to the State Independent Living Council and was elected vice chair of that organization in late summer 2002. At the national level, he is treasurer of Disability Funders Network, which is committed to disability advocacy and rights. It has been the personal experience of the Foundation's staff, board, and grantees that use of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") fosters physical and financial independence for those previously excluded or marginalized due to discrimination on the basis of their

disability. The Foundation supports the position of Mr. Lane, Ms. Jones, and the United States Solicitor General in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ("Garrett"), this Court noted that the record before it at that time failed to show a history of invidious discrimination against the disabled. The purpose of the Blanche Fisher Foundation in submitting this brief is to assist in fleshing out the record before this Court as to the existence of state support for discrimination against the disabled in the years prior to passing of the ADA. Same shows that the record absent in Garret, supra, does in fact exist, and in abundance.
There is a long and sordid history of discrimination against the disabled in this country. Action by governmental entities to discriminate against the disabled is apparent from decades of case law and continues through both subtle and vulgarly open means. To find for the state of Tennessee in this matter would necessitate a finding that Congress desired to permit this conduct to continue unabated. But the findings of Congress preceding the adoption of the ADA as reflected in its record on the ADA and prior statutes designed to remedy
1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and no person or entity other than amici, their members, and their counsel have made monetary

discrimination against the disabled show a far, far different intent. It is the purpose of this brief to highlight the record of discrimination existing at the time Congress passed the ADA, which it recognized was one of the most significant pieces of civil rights legislation in the history of this country.

ARGUMENT

1.

BIPARTISAN RECOGNITION OF HISTORICAL DISCRIMINATION

AND THE EXTRAORDINARY NATURE OF THE ADA

In passing the ADA, Congress specifically found that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities . . . ," "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion . . ." (emphasis added), "[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Such findings are amply supported by instances cited below, showing of exclusion of the disabled from the courtroom, or restrictions on their appearance therein. Such exclusions are sadly common as dirt in the history of this country.

contributions to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2.

EXCLUSION OF THE DISABLED FROM THE COURTROOM

The idea that even viewing a disabled person might be too much for some is the usual ground for exclusion of disabled persons from their own trials, and such exclusion occurs in state and federal courts. California has ignored the ADA and still permits its courts to bar the disabled from their own trials where their appearance might be unpleasant to a jury. In Province v. Center for Women's Health and Family Birth, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1673; 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667 (Cal. 1993) rev. denied (1994 Cal. LEXIS 1190), the Court held that a "physically disfigured" plaintiff was properly barred from entering the courtroom for her own trial because disability might upset jury members. Accord Whitfield v. Roth 10 Cal.3d 874, 896; 112 Cal. Rptr. 540 (Cal. 1974), footnote 27 - upholding bar of paralyzed plaintiff from jury's presence for more than ten minutes merely because plaintiff was in a wheelchair.

In Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 A.D.2d 15; 505 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1978) a trial court barred a paralyzed plaintiff on the same basis, although the Court of Appeal reversed. In Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334, 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964), a Minnesota Court of Appeal upheld complete exclusion of the disabled plaintiff from the court during trial. In Gage v. Bozarth, 505 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987) exclusion of the disabled plaintiff during the liability phase of trial was upheld because the sight of disability might influence the jury. This case was overruled

in Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002), which recognized that exclusion of the disabled from the courtroom was questionable after the ADA's passage, but ultimately relying on Indiana's constitutional right to be present at trial. Oregon, a state which regards emotional trauma as a grounds for sterilization (see below), continued to allow its courts to exclude the disabled from the courtroom at certain stages of trial, even after the ADA passed. Bremner v. Charles, 312 Ore. 274; 821 P.2d 1080 (Ore. 1991).
Federal courts also practice discrimination against allowing the disabled to be in court prior to the passage of the ADA. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Bendectin Products, 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985) – sight of the disabled might so upset a jury the members would lose ability for rational thought. Accord Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985), relied upon by the overruled Gage v. Bozarth court, supra.
Such discrimination was cited by members of Congress on the record when adopting the ADA: "[F]amilies with a member who is mentally retarded have been refused service in a restaurant because the owner fears that other customers might be offended or uncomfortable eating near that family. Yet, such a practice is not only common, it is perfectly legal." 136 Cong Rec S9684, S9692 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement by Mr. Chafee).

The idea that the disabled were distasteful or frightful to view, and should hide themselves away to make life more pleasant for "normal" people was one of the ideas that Congress wanted to smash by passing the ADA. Exclusion of the disabled from jobs and even courtrooms was seen as a cause of discrimination in and of itself. A society that was used to seeing the disabled going about their business, at work, at courts, or at play, was far more likely to find their inclusion in trials and on juries as part of the normal course of life.

Exclusion of Mr. Lane and Ms. Jones from the second floor of the Tennessee courthouse, unless subjected to the humiliation of being carried like a sack of potatoes, continues this dreadful legacy. Unless the disabled can go about their business as usual, and avoid being arrested merely because they demand a modicum of dignity, Congress' intent that the ADA foster the realization that the disabled were perfectly "normal" will be thwarted. It is the attitude that the disabled are somehow fundamentally "different" and therefore unworthy of inclusion, or to be forced into outright exclusion, that characterizes much case law in the past century. Such judicial opinion reflects the attitudes that Congress was insistent be corrected, as well as the strength with which prejudice against the disabled has held sway over our national conscience, even in the halls of justice.

3.

JUDICIALLY-APPROVED GOVERNMENTAL

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE DISABLED.
The disabled in the United States have been subjected to horrifying instances of the most vile discrimination by private and public entities. Discrimination against the disabled has also been approved even by the judiciary in days past. In Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978), four of the Court's justices cited Buck and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as showing the difficulty the judicial system has had in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment where it collides with socially acceptable forms of discrimination against those perceived to be "others" "unlike us."
The Court is no doubt aware of the unfortunate history of the eugenics movement in the United States. Persons with disabilities have been so reviled that their right to exist or to have children, and consequently the right of those children to exist themselves, have not only been put into question by public debate, but actual sterilization forced upon them by government itself. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), upholding state law coercing sterilization of epileptics and other "undesirable" Americans with disabilities, as a constitutional means of improving the population of our country. This is part and parcel of the "blatant and sometimes barbaric discrimination against individuals with disabilities" found by Congress to exist and persist at the time the ADA was

adopted. 136 Cong Rec S9684, S9690 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement by Mr. Metzenbaum). Strong words, but cruelly true words.
As of 1972, thirty-five states in the U.S. had statutes promoting sterilization of those with disabilities. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Penn. 1972). Eighteen years before the ADA was adopted, an Oregon Court of Appeals found there existed a permissible rational government interest in forced sterilization to prevent the birth of perfectly normal children just because they might require state assistance due to parental difficulties arising from disability. Cook v. State, 9 Ore. App. 224 (Or. 1972). The person to be sterilized there was a seventeen year old girl who suffered emotional problems due to a history of physical and sexual abuse, and was to be sterilized solely because of that abuse and its effect on her.
See also In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 103 (1976), finding that the state's interest in limiting money for foster care and the like is sufficient justification to make a child a 'wrongful life' merely due potential state savings by avoiding its birth: "The people of North Carolina also have a right to prevent the procreation of children who will become a burden on the State." Disability discrimination as a mere cost savings measure was alive and well when the ADA was passed.

Unfortunately, the belief that we can and should "breed" a "better" American and that the disabled are better off dead or never born in the first place is supported by surprising segments of our population. The use of government power, personnel, and public funds to foster this view is a far from uncommon circumstance today. For example, there is an organization in California affiliated with British eugenicist Christopher Brand2 that advocates, and will pay a "reward" to, any current or recovered drug or alcohol addict who agrees to be sterilized, as ""We don't allow dogs to breed. We spay them. We neuter them." Celia M. Vega, "Sterilization Offer to Addicts Reopens Ethics Issue," New York Times, January 3, 2003. This group (going by the acronym "CRACK") happily refers to assistance it receives from state government entities to further its eugenics program, such as parole officers, government-funded treatment programs, social workers, foster parent agencies, and hospitals. (Id.)
If successful, CRACK would have prevented two of our last four Presidents from being born, and regards our current President and other highly prominent Americans as "manifestly unfit to continue their kind" (Buck, supra, 274 U.S. at 207) due solely to the fact of their disability. Eugenicists fail to recognize the truth in the state motto of ADA-author and Kansan Robert Dole, "Ad Astra Per Aspera,” Latin for “To the stars through Adversity." As a disabled
2 Mr. Brand is the author of The G Factor, a book that espouses the eugenics cause and describes persons whose ancestry is more recently from the African

veteran, Senator Dole is a prominent personal example of how disability can actually foster excellence, rather than hinder it.
Case law recognizes that those recovering from alcohol and drug problems are persons with disabilities under the ADA. But there is at least one law review article referring favorably to Chief Justice Holmes' words in Buck to support eugenics for the disabled. The article urges judicial enforcement of contracts for sterilization of the disabled, apparently through judicial orders of specific performance, as a cheaper method of dealing with disabilities than providing assistance to live a productive life. See Jennifer Mott Johnson, Reproductive Ability for Sale, Do I Hear $200?" 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 205 (Spring, 2001). One hopes that public policy against such things as organ selling, baby selling, or contracts in restraint of marriage also displays a public policy against contracts for sterilization and will prevent Ms. Johnson's vision of eugenic contract enforcement from becoming law.
But the fact remains that state employees continue to cooperate in coercing the disabled to undergo sterilization merely because future children might experience a possibility of disability or merely of disadvantageous parenting. See Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2001). That case denied immunity to the state employee involved: "The fundamental right involved
continent as possessing the lowest IQs.

must be safeguarded to assure that sterilization is not a subterfuge for convenience and relief from the responsibility of supervision." (Id. at 1131).
In 1985, this Court held state action discriminating against the developmentally disabled in zoning laws was permissible so long as there was a rational government interest involved. The Court found that the disabled were not entitled to "quasi-suspect classification" status requiring more rigorous review of state action. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The record in the trial court showed a long and sorry history of discrimination: "Mental retardates have been segregated in remote, stigmatizing institutions . . . and when permitted in society, they have often been subjected to ridicule." Cleburne Living Ctr. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (1984). Only five years later, Congress decided such discrimination was in fact so odious that it passed the ADA.
Those disabled who were successfully put away from public view were found to be subjected to unconstitutional discrimination in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979). The Court relied on governmental investigative reports showing that the functioning of the developmentally disabled could be greatly improved in their condition by treating them as normally as possible given their individual levels of disability, citing B. Nirje, The Normalization Principle, Changing Patterns in Residential

Services for the Mentally Retarded, President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 231 (Rev.ed.1976).
Rather than treating the disabled with the same level of regard as for "normal" children, the state of Pennsylvania ensured that "the environment at Pennhurst is not merely inconsistent with normalization principles, but is actually hazardous to residents. Because of the inadequacies in programming attributable to staff shortages, residents were found to have lost skills already learned. Organized programs of appropriate education and training were found to be inadequate or unavailable." (Id. at 93.) Again, the short term cost figures were used as justification by the state, although the long-term cost of complete institutionalization (to segregate the disabled from society's view) is far greater.
In reaching its decision that such treatment was unconstitutional, the Court in Halderman was guided by Congress' findings of state discrimination and ill treatment of the disabled when it enacted the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act in 1975, a full fifteen years before the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081. The legislative record for that Act notes that "Congress should reaffirm its belief in equal rights for all citizens including the developmentally disabled. Congress should provide the leadership to change the tragic warehousing of human beings that has been the product of insensitive

Federal support of facilities providing inhumane care and treatment of the mentally retarded." (Halderman, supra, 612 F.2d at 96.)

Further, "Over the past few years, the horrifying conditions which exist in most of the public residential institutions for the mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled persons have provided shocking testimony to the inhuman way we care for such persons." (Id. 105.) The finding that Congress intended to create substantive rights of action in favor of the disabled by the Act was reversed by this Court in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). With the ADA, however, Congress specifically provided for such remedies.

While disability is not a "suspect class," courts are not reluctant to find, in the face of reality, the immutable fact of discrimination against the disabled: "Although this court does not grant "suspect class" status to the plaintiffs, it is acutely aware, from the evidence received at trial, of the extent to which the mentally retarded still suffer from some discrimination that is not related to actual disabilities." Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (D.N.D. 1982). Congress also so found, for all disabled persons, as shown below.

4.

THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SHOWS KNOWLEDGE OF THE LEGACY

OF FEAR AND PREJUDICE- AND A RESOLVE TO STOP IT

"Unfortunately, the findings that Congress made during the extensive hearings held on this bill have not changed for generations. People with disabilities have encountered various forms of discrimination -- from outright exclusion to overprotective rules to attitudinal, architectural, transportation, and communications barriers. People with disabilities have experienced a history of unequal treatment and have formed insular groups, segregated from the rest of society."
136 Cong Rec E 1913, E1913 (ext. of remarks, June 13, 1990) (statement by Rep. Hoyer.)3
A national history of discrimination against the developmentally disabled, and against those with cancer, based on irrational fears that such might be "contagious" resulted in segregation and shunning of afflicted individuals. 136 Cong. Rec. S 7422, S7441 - S7442 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (Letter from Affiliated Leadership League of and for the Blind and nearly 80 other organizations).
3 Relying on Louis Harris & Associates, "The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (1986): "Implications for Federal Policy for the 1986 Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities" (1988).

Shortly after the ADA was adopted, then President Bush wrote to Congress advising of his position on that act: "Discrimination, whether on the basis of race, national origin, sex, religion, or disability, is worse than wrong. It is a fundamental evil that tears at the fabric of our society, and one that all Americans should and must oppose. That requires rigorous enforcement of existing antidiscrimination laws. It also requires vigorously promoting new measures such as this year's Americans with Disabilities Act, which for the first time adequately protects person with disabilities against invidious discrimination." 136 Cong. Rec. S16562, at S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (Letter from Pres. George W. Bush).
The President placed the ADA among past civil rights legislation which abrogated 11th Amendment immunity, and stressed that such legislation had always been the product of admirable and broad bi-partisan efforts in Congress: "The Civil Rights Restoration Act, the Fair Housing Amendments Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act -- none would be law today if it were not for the leadership of Republican as well as Democratic Senators." (Id. at S16563.)
The extraordinary rate of unemployment and discrimination against the disabled was reviewed through outside studies when Congress decided on means to implement the ADA. 136 Cong. Rec. S18123, S18127 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon). The existence of entrenched discriminatory

attitudes, by private parties and by government entities, was recognized by Congress as the primary reason the ADA was needed:
"For generations, society has viewed people with disabilities as citizens in need of charity. Through ignorance, we tolerated discrimination and succumbed to fear and prejudice. But our paternalistic approach did no more to improve the lives of people with disabilities than labor laws restricting women in the workplace did to protect women. Today we are shedding these condescending and suffocating attitudes -- and widening the door of opportunity for people with disabilities." . . . "{E]qual justice under the law" is not a privilege -- but a fundamental birthright in America."
136 Cong. Rec. S9680 at S9680 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (ADA Conference Report, statement of Sen. Kennedy).
House members were swayed by the pervasiveness of discrimination against the disabled to vote in favor of the ADA. Representative Owens spoke extensively and eloquently of studies showing discrimination against those with HIV infections and sickle cell anemia, as well as the growing use of genetic testing, as a basis for his vote in favor of the ADA: "This Legislation will enable

us to begin to make significant inroads in the legacy of disability discrimination
in our country." 136 Cong Rec H 4614, H4622-H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement by Rep. Owens.) One such study, "Epidemic of Fear," published in
1990 by the ACLU AIDS Project, was also cited by Rep. Edwards as showing the
need for a law barring discrimination against those disabled or perceived to be
medically or otherwise "unfit" when they were not. (Id. at H4624.)4
Senator Kennedy noted the genesis of the ADA in President Reagan's
National Council on Disability and its 1988 report, "Towards Independence."
That report, in turn, specifically discussed the depth of discrimination faced by the disabled, noting that that international studies showed the disabled were
faced with both the "physical barriers" to entry into public and business facilities
as well as "social barriers," disregard for their abilities or needs, as faced by Mr.
Lane and Ms. Jones in this matter. (Id. at p. 8.) For this reason, the Council urged that a broad anti-discrimination law be passed, which "should also include an
4 Astoundingly, a House member speaking just prior insisted that AIDS is spread by food and voiced outrage that "homosexuals" or others with HIV infections were not omitted from the definition of "disabled." The Secretary of Health and Human Services noted there was no such risk. See 136 Cong Rec S 9519, at S9519 - S9520. (Daily Op. July 11, 1990) (Letter from Louis Sullivan.) The Congressman's comments are proof that prejudice continues to overcome science where disability is concerned. Other members of Congress pointed out such problems as the very reason the ADA was needed: "it does much to deal with the mental concepts that have captured the minds of too many people in our society. As a result of ignorance, such mindsets have brought about the kind of disability related discrimination that has limited people with disabilities in so

obligation to remove architectural, transportation, and communication barriers . . ." for the disabled. (Id. at p. 19.) The ADA was the result.
"Based on testimony and comments from hundreds of people with disabilities, parents, and others, the most pervasive and recurrent problem faced by disabled persons appeared to be unfair and unnecessary discrimination." 135 Cong. Rec. S10765, S10792 (daily op. Sept. 7, 1989) (Statement by Sen. Biden.) Further, "The severity and pervasiveness of discrimination against people with disabilities is well-documented." 134 Cong. Rec. H2894, at H2894 (daily op. May 3, 1988) (statement by Rep. Owens.)
"Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream," a nationwide poll conducted in 1986 by Louis Harris and Associates, underscores the conclusion that discrimination is a problem that people with disabilities frequently experience. Persons polled identified a variety of types of discrimination they had experienced, including workplace discrimination, denials of life and health insurance, denials of educational opportunities, lack of access to public buildings and public bathrooms, the absence of accessible transportation, and various forms of social rejection (others shying away or feeling sorry for them). This
many ways and has prevented them from realizing their true potential. 136 Cong Rec S 9527, S9530 (Daily Op. July 11, 1990.) (Statement by Mr. Kennedy.)

report was cited by Congress in deciding to adopt the ADA. 135 Cong. Rec. S4984, S4985 (daily op. May 9, 1989) (statement by Sen. Harkin).

Senator Hatch pointed to the history of discrimination as justification for the ADA: "For too long the valuable resources available to this Nation from individuals with disabilities have been wasted needlessly. Why? Because of senseless discrimination, intended or not, which subjected persons with disabilities to isolation and robbed America of the minds, the spirit, and the dedication we need to remain a competitive force in worldwide economy." 136 Cong. Rec. S9684, S9685 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement by Sen. Hatch).

The historical and Congressional record demonstrates a lengthy history of discrimination, and a Congress unified across party lines to bring to a complete halt, where ever it might occur, including where it was perpetrated by a state governmental entity.

5.

CONCLUSION

The ADA is nothing more than Congress' continued and fully factually supported findings over the course of decades that the disabled are the subject of egregious discrimination by state entities. Its decision to afford private individuals the substantive rights was made in the face of continuing

discrimination despite its past findings and acts addressing specific groups of disabled people.

Thus, the question in this case is not whether or not there exists a record of discrimination against the disabled. Rather, the question is whether or not we will honor Congress' desire that the disabled be given full civil rights and the ability to enforce them against recalcitrant government entities that continue to bar them from full participation in American life. For the reasons stated herein, the Blanche Fischer Foundation submits that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should be affirmed.

Dated:

November 11, 2003

Respectfully submitted,
Sherril Nell Babcock Counsel of Record
Sherril Nell Babcock Gianelli & Morris 880 West First Street, Suite 215 Los Angeles, California 90012 (213) 620-7272
Counsel for Amici Curiae Blanche Fischer Foundation

 
 No. 02-1667
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

State of Tennessee, Petitioner,
v.
George Lane, Beverly Jones, and United States of America.
_____________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit ____________

BRIEF FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ____________

Samuel R. Bagenstos 1545 Massachusetts Ave. Cambridge, MA 02138
Thomas C. Goldstein Goldstein & Howe, P.C. 4607 Asbury Pl., NW Washington, DC 20016

William J. Brown (Counsel of Record) William J. Brown & Assocs. 23 North Ocoee St. Cleveland, TN 37364 (423)476-4515

November 12, 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..........................................iii STATEMENT ................................................................. 1
I. The Statutory Scheme .......................................... 1 II. The Facts.............................................................. 3 III. Proceedings Below .............................................. 6 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................... 7 ARGUMENT................................................................... 9 I. Title II’s Requirement That State Courts Be Accessible To People With Disabilities Reasonably Protects Against Violations Of Disabled Citizens’ Rights Of Access To The Courts........................................................................ 12 A. Inaccessible Courts Threaten An Array Of Constitutional Rights ................................................ 13 B. There Is A Significant Pattern Of Inaccessible Courts Throughout The States .................................. 20 C. Title II’s Program Accessibility Requirement Is A Proportional Response To The Constitutional Violations Threatened By Inaccessible Courts......... 28 II. Title II As A Whole Reasonably Responds To The History And Threat Of Unconstitutional Exclusion Of Citizens With Disabilities From A Wide Range Of State Activities................................ 34 A. Because Congress Had Power To Mandate Accessible State Court Systems, The Court Need Not Consider Whether Title II May Be Upheld More Broadly.......................................................... 134 B. Title II Responds To A Widespread Record Of Actual And Threatened Constitutional Violations .... 20

ii
C. Title II Is A Proportional Response To This Widespread Pattern Of Unconstitutional Exclusion................................................................... 28 CONCLUSION ............................................................. 50

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) .............................. 33 BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002)............... 14 Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)...... 48 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ........................................ 33 Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668
(1996)................................................................................ 19 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ....... passim Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ........................ 16 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)................ 21 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)................................ 44 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).............. 15, 46 Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668 (3d Cir.
2000) ................................................................................. 20 Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Ariz. 1993) ............. 48 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).............. passim City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).......................................................................... 43, 49 Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ................................................................................. 48 Davis v. Tuolumne County, No. CV-F-97-5516-SMS
(E.D. Cal.)......................................................................... 24 Doe v. Regier, No. 03-2794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)................. 11 Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001).................. 43 Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 828 (1997).......................................................... 20 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) .......................... 16 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)............................ 32 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) .......................... 36 Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995)........... 20

iv
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)................................................................................ 33
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)................................................................................ 18
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) .............. 9, 37, 38 Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ........... 43, 44 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)................................... 16 Jernigan v. Superior Court, No. C03-2530WHA(PR),
2003 WL 21640489 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2003) .................. 20 Jonas v. General Services Comm’n, No. A-95-CV-468-
JN (W.D. Tex.) ................................................................. 24 Kelly v. Municipal Courts, 97 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1996)....... 20 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).... passim Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) ......................................................................... 24 LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987) .................... 49 Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1999) ..................... 24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ........... 33 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)................. 15, 16, 18, 35 Manhattan State Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Bass, 524 F.
Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)............................................. 43 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).............................. 16 Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark.
1998) ................................................................................. 24 McCarthy v. Hale, No. 03-50608 (5th Cir.) ......................... 11 Meyers v. Texas, No. 02-50452 (5th Cir.) ............................ 11 Miles v. County of Los Angeles, No. 02-CV-3932 DT
(JTLx) (C.D. Cal.) ............................................................ 24 Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct.
1972 (2003)................................................................ passim No Barriers, Inc. v. Cornelius, No. 3:97CV-2330-R
(N.D. Tex.)........................................................................ 24 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) .................... 18, 47, 50 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) ........... 33

v
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ............................. 10 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ...................................... 45 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002)................................................................... 7 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)................................... 18 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)................................................................................ 18 Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1237 (1994)........................ 20 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) .......................... 15, 43 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)................................................................................ 19 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) ........................... passim Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) ............................. 9, 10, 42 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) ............. 9, 34, 39 Salmond v. County of Teton, No. CV-97-130-GF-LBE (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 2000).................................................. 24 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)................................................................................ 45 Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001).................... 24 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).......................... 46 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ...................... 16 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) ........... 27 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).......................... 46, 49 State v. Rendon, 832 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), rvw. denied, 851 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2003) ............... 11 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) ............................ 17 Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002)................................... 11 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)............................... 46 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995)........................................................... 38, 39 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) .............. 9, 37, 38

vi
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)..................... 36 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) ...................... 5, 18, 29 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) ............................ 20 Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1993)............... 48 Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2002)............ 39 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) ....................... 17 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) .................... 47, 49 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) ............................ 46
Statutes 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) ................................................ 35, 39 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(C) .................................................... 46 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)........................................................ 47 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)...................................... 41, 42, 43, 47 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)........................................................ 42 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) ............................................................ 39 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) ............................................................ 39 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) ............................................................ 39 42 U.S.C. § 12131................................................................. 49 42 U.S.C. § 12132....................................................... 1, 39, 49 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) .............................................................. 1 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) ............................................................ 41 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) .............................................. 1 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1).......................................................... 1 42 U.S.C. § 12202................................................................. 39 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) .............................................................. 37 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) .............................................................. 37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) ............................................................ 39 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq............... 37 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 12134...................... 1
Other Authorities 56 Fed. Reg. 35694 (1991) ..................................................... 1

vii

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Labor & Subcom. on the Handicapped (1989) ....................................... 22, 26, 44, 45

Attorney General’s Comm’n on Disability, Final Report

(1989)................................................................................ 14

Br. for the United States, Medical Board of California

v. Hason, No. 02-479........................................................ 42

Burton D. Dunlop & Marisa E. Collett, Jury Service Accessibility for Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities in Florida, available at http://www.fiu.edu/~coa/research/jury.htm...................... 23

Civil and Legal Rights Subcomm., Governor’s Comm. on Disability Issues & Employment, Interim Court

and Courthouse Access Project (2000)............................. 23

Comm’n on the Future of the Tenn. Judicial Sys., Final

Report

(1996),

available

at

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/publications/future

s.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) ........................................ 4

D. Michailakis, Government Action on Disability Policy: A Global Survey (1997) ....................................... 11

Disability Discrimination Act of 1992 (Austl.) .................... 11

House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Legislative History of

Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with

Disabilities Act (1990)............................................... passim

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/enforce.htm ........................... 25

Judicial Council of California, Public Hearings Report:

Access for Persons with Disabilities (1996)..................... 23

N.Y. State Comm’n on Qual. of Care for the Mentally

Disabled & N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Mental

& Physical Disability, Survey of Access to N.Y.

State Courts for Individuals with Disabilities (1994) ....... 23

Phyllis S. Launius, Removing Public Access Barriers to the Courts in the New Millennium: A Sampling and Analysis of Missouri’s Trial Courts (2000)...................... 23

viii
Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075, 1083 (2002)......... 26
Task Force Submission, Cal. ................................................ 22 Task Force Submission, Col. ................................................ 22 Task Force Submission, Ga. ................................................. 22 Task Force Submission, Haw. .............................................. 22 Task Force Submission, Mass. ............................................. 22 Task Force Submission, Mo. ................................................ 22 Task Force Submission, Pa................................................... 22 Task Force Submission, S.D................................................. 22 Task Force Submission, W. Va. ........................................... 22 Task Force Submission, Wash.............................................. 22 Task Force Submission, Wis. ............................................... 22 Task Force Submission, Wyo. .............................................. 22 Task Force Submissions, Ala................................................ 22 Task Force Submissions, Idaho ............................................ 22 Task Force Submissions, Miss.............................................. 22 Task Force Submissions, Va................................................. 22 Texas Civil Rights Project, Courts Closed to Justice: A
Survey of Courthouse Accessibility in Texas for People with Disabilities (1996) ........................................ 23 Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative, and Regional Disability Law Reform, in Disability Rights Law and Policy: International and National Perspectives (Mary Lou Breslin et al. eds., 2002) ................................................... 11 U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983).................... passim United Kingdom Disability Discrimination Act 1995.......... 11
Regulations 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c) ............................................................. 2 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) ........................................................... 39

ix
28 C.F.R. § 35.150................................................................ 39 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) .................................................... passim 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(2)....................................................... 31 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3)................................................... 3, 31 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b) ....................................................... 2, 31 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1)............................................... 2, 8, 31 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(7)................................................. 39, 49 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(c) ....................................................... 3, 31 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d)(1)......................................................... 3 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a) ....................................................... 2, 31 28 C.F.R. § 39.150 (1989) ...................................................... 2 28 C.F.R. § 41.58 (1989) ........................................................ 2
Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const., amend. I ..................................................... passim U.S. Const., amend. VI ........................................................... 8 U.S. Const., amend. XI ......................................................... 32 U.S. Const., amend. XIV ............................................... passim U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 5 ........................................ passim

1
STATEMENT
I. The Statutory Scheme
This case involves disabled citizens’ basic civil right of access to the state courts of justice. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) generally prohibits any “public entity”—including state governments—from “subject[ing]” any “qualified individual with a disability” to “discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Rather than adopt more detailed statutory provisions to give content to that general prohibition (as it did in Titles I and III of the ADA), Congress directed the Attorney General to flesh out that prohibition by adopting regulations that would incorporate various requirements previously applied under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See id. § 12134. The Attorney General duly promulgated those regulations, which became effective January 26, 1992, eighteen months after the statute’s enactment. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35694 (1991). The basic obligations Title II imposes on states stem from those regulations.
The regulations, as relevant here, impose a requirement of accessibility on state activities. Like the earlier regulations that implemented the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Title II regulations governing physical accessibility sharply distinguish between new and existing facilities.1 For
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (directing the Attorney General to follow the Rehabilitation Act regulations in this regard). Title III of the ADA, which covers private places of public accommodation, draws a similar distinction between new construction and existing facilities for accessibility purposes. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (imposing “readily accessible” standard on new construction) with id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (requiring removal of structural barriers in existing facilities only when doing so is “readily achievable”). Cf. 1 House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 357 (1990) (hereinafter “Leg. Hist.”) (House

2
facilities on which “construction was commenced after January 26, 1992,” a stringent standard of accessibility applies: Each such facility must be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a), and generally must satisfy a detailed set of accessibility guidelines, see id. § 35.151(c). The strict standard applied to new construction draws from the relevant Rehabilitation Act regulations, see 28 C.F.R. § 41.58 (1989), and rests on the premise that accessibility features are exceptionally inexpensive when incorporated in a facility’s initial design. See 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 187 (Senate comm. report).
For facilities already in existence in 1992, the Title II regulations follow the earlier Rehabilitation Act regulations, see 28 C.F.R. § 39.150 (1989), in taking a more lenient approach. Instead of demanding that each building in the state be readily accessible, the existing-facility provisions require only that a state “operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (emphasis added). The regulations emphasize that public entities need not “make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in achieving compliance” with the program accessibility mandate. Id. § 35.150(b)(1). Rather, states have a variety of ways of complying with that mandate, including:
such means as redesign of equipment, reassignment of services to accessible buildings, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, home visits, delivery of services at alternate accessible sites, alteration of existing facilities and construction of new facilities, use of accessible rolling stock or other conveyances, or any
committee report) (prohibitions imposed by Title II regulations should track those imposed by Titles I and III).

3
other methods that result in making its services, programs, or activities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. Id. States need not take any action that “would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” Id. § 35.150(a)(3). See also id. (“action that would threaten or destroy the historic significance of an historic property” not required). In recognition of the fact that Title II’s mandate might nonetheless require states to make physical alterations to some existing buildings (as we contend were required here), states may take advantage of several provisions that address the need for an orderly transition to compliance. Each public entity, by January 26, 1993, was to “evaluate its current services, policies, and practices, and the effects thereof, that do not or may not meet the requirements of this part and . . . proceed to make the necessary modifications.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(a). Where “structural changes to facilities” were necessary to achieve compliance, states were to “develop, within six months of January 26, 1992, a transition plan setting forth the steps necessary to complete such changes.” Id. § 35.150(d)(1). And “[w]here structural changes in facilities are undertaken to comply” with the accessibility requirement, the regulations provided that “such changes shall be made within three years of January 26, 1992, but in any event as expeditiously as possible.” Id. § 35.150(c). The events that form the basis for this case all occurred more than four years after that January 1992 effective date. See Pet. App. 15-17, 19-20.
II. The Facts The six named plaintiffs2 were denied the opportunity
to participate effectively in Tennessee court proceedings
2 Two of these plaintiffs, George Lane and Beverly Jones, were named in the original complaint and are Respondents here.

4
because the state’s courthouses were not physically accessible to individuals with disabilities. In 1996, at roughly the same time as the events underlying this case, the Commission on the Future of the Tennessee Judicial System reported that “[f]or persons with significant physical or mental impairment, the system can be quite literally inaccessible.” Comm’n on the Future of the Tenn. Judicial Sys., Final Report 31 (1996). When the original complaint was filed in 1998, plaintiffs identified courthouses in 23 Tennessee counties that were not physically accessible to individuals with mobility disabilities. Pet. App. 22. The experience of the plaintiffs—one of whom was arrested for failure to appear when he refused to crawl up the steps of an inaccessible courthouse to attend a hearing in the criminal case in which he was a defendant—illustrates the consequences of that inaccessibility.
1. George Lane—In September 1996, Respondent George Lane was compelled to appear at the Polk County courthouse to answer a set of criminal charges the state had filed against him. Pet. App. 15. Due to extensive injuries he had suffered in an automobile accident, Lane used a wheelchair for mobility; he could neither walk nor climb stairs. Id. 13. Because all proceedings in that courthouse occurred on the second floor, and the building had no elevator, Lane was required to abandon his wheelchair and literally crawl up the steps in order to appear in court. Id. at 15. Following his arraignment, Lane was summoned to appear at an October hearing in the same courtroom. Id. Lane duly arrived at the courthouse but sent word to the trial
See Pet. App. 12. After the state took its interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss, the district court granted two separate motions to join the others—Dennis Cantrel, Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., and A. Russell Larson—as party plaintiffs. (Respondents have moved for leave to lodge the motions and court orders.) Because this case arises on a motion to dismiss, allegations in the complaint must of course be taken as true and read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

5
judge that he refused to go through the humiliation of crawling up the courthouse steps again, nor would he put his safety at risk by allowing court employees to carry him. Id. On the order of the trial judge, Lane was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. Id.
Subsequent proceedings in Lane’s criminal case occurred in the same inaccessible courthouse. At those proceedings, Lane typically waited at the bottom of the stairs while his attorney shuttled back and forth to the courtroom. Pet. App. 16. As a result, the court conducted proceedings, including discussing the course of future proceedings and the possibility of a change of venue, out of Lane’s presence.3 When an arraignment hearing was called in the second-floor courtroom after a new misdemeanor indictment was returned in March 1997, Lane’s attorney requested that the court dismiss or at least stay proceedings until accessible facilities could be provided. Pet. App. 16. The trial court denied the motion; the judge suggested that Lane might have a right to bring an independent civil suit to make the courthouse accessible, but that inaccessibility was no basis for delaying or dismissing the pending criminal case. See 3/17/97 Tr. 5. The Tennessee appellate courts declined to accept jurisdiction over Lane’s request for extraordinary relief. Pet. App. 16-17. Proceedings were subsequently stayed in Lane’s criminal case, id. at 17, and Lane ultimately pleaded guilty to a single charge of driving on a revoked license.
2. Beverly Jones—Respondent Beverly Jones has paraplegia and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Pet. App. 19. She works for parties to judicial proceedings as a certified court reporter, but because courthouses in many Tennessee counties are inaccessible, her opportunity to perform her work
3 The court held one proceeding (the preliminary hearing) in a location (the ground-floor library) that was accessible to Lane but generally inaccessible to the public. Pet. App. 16; cf. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (criminal defendant has constitutional right to public suppression hearing).

6
has been significantly impeded. Id. at 19-20. She has specifically requested modifications to the courthouses in four Tennessee counties, but none has been made accessible to her. Id. 20.
3. Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson—Plaintiffs Ann Marie Zappola, Ralph E. Ramsey, Sr., Dennis Cantrel, and A. Russell Larson similarly were excluded from core state programs held at inaccessible Tennessee courthouses. Zappola has a spinal cord injury that makes it extremely painful if not impossible for her to climb stairs. Motion for Permissive Joinder of Cantrell et al. 6. In two cases in 1997 and 1998 (a civil proceeding in which she was a defendant, and a juvenile proceeding in which she was the complainant), Zappola was forced to climb the steps to the third floor of the Houston County Courthouse to attend proceedings. Id. at 6-7. Ramsey, who has a venous condition that makes him unable to climb stairs, was likewise a defendant in a civil proceeding. Id. at 8-9. When he arrived at the Cocke County Courthouse for a hearing on that case in 1995, Ramsey discovered that the courtroom was located on the second floor, up a flight of stairs; although Ramsey sent word that he was in the courthouse but could not get to the courtroom, the trial court entered judgment against him for failure to appear. Id. at 9. Cantrel, who has paraplegia, was forced to crawl up the stairs of the Fayette County Courthouse to attend a County Commission meeting. Id. at 3. And Larson, an attorney with a condition that makes it “difficult to impossible to climb stairs,” Motion for Permissive Joinder of Larson 2, was required to provide pretrial representation to his clients in first-floor courthouse hallways and was unable to provide effective representation to clients whose cases went to trial, id. at 2-3.
III. Proceedings Below
Respondents filed this suit on August 10, 1998, against the State of Tennessee and a number of counties. Pet.

7
App. 12. Suing on their own behalf and as representatives of a class of persons denied access to the state’s courthouses because of their disabilities, id. 25-27, respondents alleged that the defendants had violated Title II of the ADA by maintaining inaccessible courthouses, id. 23-25. They sought both damages and injunctive relief. Id. 27-28.
The state moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the district court denied the motion, Pet. App. 7, and the state took an interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the basis of Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002), which held that Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in cases in which the statute enforces due process principles. As amended on rehearing, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion here explained that respondents were “seeking to vindicate” their due process “right of access to the courts in Tennessee.” Pet. App. 5. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Unlike Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—the employment discrimination title that was at issue in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)—Title II of the statute directly implicates the core rights of citizenship. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). In the courthouse access context of this case, the constitutional concerns are particularly powerful, for courts that are inaccessible to people with disabilities threaten to violate an array of constitutional rights.
Because the court of appeals limited its analysis to the courthouse access context, and this Court can resolve this case without going further, we begin by focusing on the clear Section 5 justification for applying Title II to demand access to the state’s court system. But the constitutional concerns addressed by the statute extend well beyond the narrow context of this case. Title II protects people with disabilities

8
against violations of constitutional rights in numerous areas of state government. Whether considered in its application to courthouse access or more broadly, Title II is a congruent and proportional response to actual and threatened violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
I. Congress clearly had power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to require the State of Tennessee to assure that its court system, “when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). When a state maintains courts that are not accessible to people with disabilities, the state’s actions threaten an array of constitutional rights under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments that impose far more than rational-basis scrutiny on states. Both at the time the ADA was enacted and today, inaccessible courts have threatened to violate these rights of individuals with disabilities throughout the Nation. A variety of sources— legislative testimony, published studies, litigation records, and the Department of Justice’s enforcement reports— demonstrate that the problem was and remains widespread.
Title II responds directly to the threat inaccessible courts pose to constitutional rights. It requires that court programs be accessible, a standard that can often be satisfied without making structural changes to existing facilities. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a), (b)(1). If, as here, the lack of accessible court programs in a given county renders the state’s court system not “readily accessible to and usable by” disabled citizens in that county, 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1) [please confirm], that is precisely the circumstance in which individuals with disabilities are most likely to experience violations of their constitutional rights. To the limited extent that this “program accessibility” requirement imposes obligations that go beyond those imposed by the Constitution itself, that additional margin is fully justified as a reasonably prophylactic measure given the substantial record of widespread courthouse inaccessibility.

9
II. Because Congress clearly had power to impose the “program accessibility” requirement on states in the courthouse access context of this case, this Court need go no further to uphold the statute as applied here. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1997); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1960). But even when considered more broadly, ADA Title II is proper Section 5 legislation. Unlike Title I of the statute—which equally barred employment discrimination in the public and private sectors—Title II focuses specifically on governmental conduct and was enacted on the basis of a weighty record of actual and threatened constitutional violations by states in a wide range of nonemployment areas. In many of these areas, the state is subject to constitutional constraints that impose more than rational-basis scrutiny. Even in instances where the state’s conduct is ordinarily subject only to rational-basis scrutiny, Congress had ample reason to believe that applying Title II was necessary both to dismantle the widespread exclusion of people with disabilities that has effectively marked them as second-class citizens, cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506-07 (1999), and to stop the “mutually reinforcing stereotypes” that have “created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination.” Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003).
ARGUMENT
Unlike Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which deals exclusively with employment discrimination, Title II of the ADA responds to a widespread denial of core rights and obligations of citizenship protected by the Constitution. By guaranteeing that people with disabilities will not be systematically shut out of the opportunity to participate in, influence, and seek redress from their state governments, the statute enforces a principle that this Court has deemed “[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal

10
protection”—“the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). Unlike ADA Title I, which implicates no fundamental rights and therefore involves conduct that triggers only rationalbasis scrutiny, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-68, Title II affects an array of conduct in which states have heightened constitutional obligations. Congress thus had broader latitude to craft a remedy than in Title I’s employment context. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982.
The courthouse access context implicates these fundamental constitutional rights in an especially powerful way. Courthouses are the locations in which individual citizens often have their most important and extensive contacts with the government. In rural communities like the ones in which this case arose, the local courthouse is often the focal point of civic life. Wherever located, courthouses sit at the nexus of an array of rights and obligations of citizenship, including the opportunity to seek redress as litigants, to testify as witnesses, to participate as jurors, and to observe proceedings as members of the interested public. When a state’s courthouses are inaccessible to individuals with disabilities, the state’s actions effectively create a class of persons who are denied access to core privileges of citizenship. Such a result is intolerable under a Constitution that “‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); cf. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07 (Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses do not allow for degrees of citizenship or a hierarchy among citizens).
Both the state and its amici reassure the Court that their position does not call into question the ultimate constitutionality of Title II; all that supposedly is at issue is whether Congress can properly impose a damages remedy on states that have violated the statute. See Pet. Br. 15-16; Ala. Br. 25-26. But the reassurances of the state and its amici ring

11
hollow. If this Court rules that Title II cannot be supported by a sufficient Fourteenth Amendment predicate, the statute will provide no basis for any relief—damages or an injunction—unless it can be upheld under Congress’s Article I commerce power. In their brief before this Court, the State’s amici pointedly refuse to concede that the commerce power supports Title II. See Ala. Br. 5 (noting that an injunctive remedy exists for Title II violations only “assuming [Title II] is a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I power”); id. 22, 25 (same). And a number of states have recently challenged the Commerce Clause basis for the statute. See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002); State v. Rendon, 832 So. 2d 141, 146 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), rvw. denied, 851 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2003); Meyers v. Texas, No. 0250452 (5th Cir.) (pending); Doe v. Regier, No. 03-2794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (pending); McCarthy v. Hale, No. 03-50608 (5th Cir.) (pending). Of particular importance, the applications of Title II that come closest to the core of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power—those guaranteeing participation in such quintessential activities of self-government as voting, jury service, and the like—are precisely those that are least likely to be sustained under the Commerce Clause. For all intents and purposes, then, petitioner is mounting a facial challenge to the basic constitutionality of Title II.
A ruling that Title II exceeds Congress’s authority would invalidate the very “‘milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society’” that the State purports to endorse.4 Pet. Br. 15-16 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375
4 Since passage of the ADA, laws requiring accessibility have become common outside the United States according to a study undertaken by the United Nations in 1996, more than 60 of the 85 respondents had some sort of legislation in place to ensure accessibility of public places to the disabled. D. Michailakis, Government Action on Disability Policy: A Global Survey (1997).

12
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). Fortunately, Title II fully meets the state’s constitutional challenge. The statute directly enforces core Fourteenth Amendment rights—particularly where, as here, plaintiffs seek nothing more than access to the state’s courts. This Court should thus uphold Title II as proper Section 5 legislation. Because the court of appeals focused its analysis on the courthouse access context, and this Court can resolve this case without going beyond that context, we begin by showing that Congress plainly had Section 5 power to require states to make their court systems accessible. As we demonstrate, however, Title II as a whole is a proper exercise of Section 5 authority as well.
I. Title II’s Requirement That State Courts Be Accessible To People With Disabilities Reasonably Protects Against Violations Of Disabled Citizens’ Rights Of Access To The Courts
This Court has held that Congress has power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact “reasonably prophylactic legislation” that responds to actual or threatened constitutional violations, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000), so long as there is “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. Applying that test, Congress had ample authority to impose Title II’s requirement of program accessibility on state court systems. Inaccessible courts threaten an array of constitutional rights, and the program
Australia, for example, requires that facilities be accessible to the disabled, unless doing so would cause an undue hardship. See Disability Discrimination Act of 1992, § 23; see also United Kingdom Disability Discrimination Act 1995, §§ 19-21. See generally Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative, and Regional Disability Law Reform, in Disability Rights Law and Policy: International and National Perspectives 3, 19, 20, 29-34 (Mary Lou Breslin et al. eds., 2002).

13
accessibility requirement, when considered in the light of the nationwide problem of inaccessible courthouses, is reasonably calculated to prevent the constitutional harm without unduly impinging on state interests.
A. Inaccessible Courts Threaten An Array Of Constitutional Rights
In determining whether Congress has properly exercised its Section 5 authority, the “first step” is to identify the constitutional rights Congress has sought to enforce. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. Where Congress regulates state conduct that implicates ordinary rational-basis scrutiny, this Court accords the legislature comparatively little latitude to craft prophylactic legislation. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86. Where, by contrast, Congress seeks to regulate state conduct that implicates heightened constitutional obligations, this Court has recognized that the legislature must have a substantially wider area in which to act. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982 (according Congress greater leeway because “the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test”).
The statutory obligation at issue in this case implicates a variety of fundamental constitutional rights that impose far more than a rational-basis requirement on states. Plaintiffs here seek to enforce the requirement that the state operate a court system that, “when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). When a state violates that requirement by conducting its judicial proceedings in courthouses that are inaccessible, the state threatens an array of constitutional rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to both its disabled and its nondisabled citizens. Where, as here, disabled citizens in a number of counties lack ready access to the state’s courts because judicial proceedings are held in inaccessible courthouses, and people with disabilities are compelled to appear as litigants in inaccessible courtrooms,

14
the state’s actions threaten to shut out an entire class of citizens from a range of civic rights and obligations simply because those citizens have disabilities.
At the most basic level, such inaccessible courts threaten the core right of individuals with disabilities to seek the “protection of the laws” by invoking the proceedings of courts for redress. Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (equal protection requires “that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance”) (emphasis added). And they threaten the related First Amendment right “to petition the Government for redress of grievances,” which includes a “right of access to the courts.” BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (Section 5 gives Congress power to enforce incorporated Bill of Rights protections).
Inaccessible courthouses prevent individuals with disabilities from invoking protections of the law that are available only in court. The experience of plaintiff Zappola provides an example. In order to initiate legal proceedings by swearing out a juvenile-court complaint, she was required to bring herself to a third-floor courtroom in an inaccessible courthouse. See p. 6, supra. Zappola’s experience is hardly unusual. Individuals with disabilities who seek to obtain restraining orders against those who threaten violence against them will also be unable to obtain the protection of the laws if the court system is inaccessible, as will those individuals with disabilities who seek to testify as victim-witnesses in criminal trials. As the California Attorney General’s Commission on Disability noted in 1989, the inability to testify and seek redress is a particularly salient issue for many individuals with disabilities, whose impairments make them especially vulnerable targets of abuse or predation. See Attorney General’s Comm’n on Disability, Final Report 101-02 (1989) (finding that victims and witnesses with disabilities encounter “significant barriers to due process and just treatment” because, inter alia, many courtrooms are inaccessible). One

15
witness in the congressional hearings on the proposed ADA, a woman with quadriplegia who had “experienced many crimes,” described the constitutional harm she experienced because of her inability to obtain the law’s protection: “I live in fear of crime because equal protection under law is not seen as a right of Americans with disabilities because Americans with disabilities are seen as natural victims rather than equal citizens.” 2 Leg. Hist., supra, at 1196-97 (Cynthia Miller).
The opportunity to testify and seek redress in the courts was a primary aspect of the “protection of the laws” that the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters sought to guarantee to all persons. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 597 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Thaddeus Stevens’s speech opening debate on the Fourteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives). The shutting out of an entire class of citizens from such a core means of obtaining legal protection makes that class, in a real sense, “a stranger to [the state’s] laws.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.5
Inaccessible courts also threaten the rights of litigants with disabilities, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, to be present at and participate meaningfully in a range of court proceedings. This Court has
5 It is irrelevant that the denial of the protection of the laws in such circumstances may be unintentional. Discriminatory purpose is not required to make out an equal protection violation in fundamental rights contexts. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 10506 (2000) (per curiam) (requirement that election officials discern intent of the voter violates equal protection because of lack of safeguards to assure that ballots are counted in a uniform manner, even absent any indication of purpose that the requirement be applied in a disuniform manner). In the access to courts context specifically, this Court has recognized both that no purposeful discrimination requirement applies and that states may be required to shoulder some financial burden to guarantee access. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 125-27 (1996).

16
held, for example, that both the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the due process guarantee of a fair trial give criminal defendants the “right to be present at all stages of the trial where [their] absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975).6 Under this Court’s line of cases running from Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), through M.L.B., supra, moreover, states have an obligation to facilitate the presence of litigants who are compelled to participate in many civil proceedings—at least where such presence is necessary to provide a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379. In many cases, this constitutional obligation requires states to bear some cost to facilitate access, at least where doing so imposes no “undue burden on the State.” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 122; see id. at 124 (state must waive fee requirement for obtaining appellate transcript in termination of parental rights proceeding);
6 The state’s amici note that this right is not absolute. Ala. Br. 14-15. They cite cases that hold that “‘the privilege [of personally confronting witnesses] may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct,’” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934)), and that courts may override the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of face-to-face confrontation “where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990); see id. at 857 (finding that standard satisfied by the state’s interest in “protect[ing] a child witness from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate”). But these narrow, case-by-case exceptions to the general right of courtroom presence are a far cry from the broad inability to attend court proceedings imposed by an inaccessible court system—a denial of the right to presence that is imposed, not because of any fault of the defendant or overriding public policy, but simply because of the constitutionally irrelevant fact that the defendant has a disability.

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Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380-81 (state must waive filing fee requirement for divorce proceeding).
When courts are inaccessible, criminal defendants and participants in important civil proceedings face a serious risk that they will be unable effectively to protect their interests in the litigation simply because of their disabilities.7 The experience of respondent Lane, who was arrested for failure to appear when he could not ascend the stairs to attend his pretrial hearing, provides a particularly dramatic example. See p. 4-5, supra. But Lane’s experience is not atypical. Plaintiff Ramsey had a similar experience when he was a defendant in a civil proceeding: a default judgment was entered against him when he could not ascend the stairs to the courtroom in which the case was being heard. See p. 6, supra.
And inaccessible courts do not simply exclude individuals with disabilities from participation as litigants; they also operate to bar such individuals from the civic right and obligation of jury service. Although individuals with disabilities might be properly excused from the jury pool on a case-by-case basis, a court system that broadly excludes people with a class of impairments from jury service violates core Sixth Amendment principles. This Court has held that “excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
It is not just criminal defendants who suffer when inaccessible courts deny people with disabilities the opportunity to participate as jurors; disabled would-be jurors experience constitutional harm as well. “Jury service is an exercise of responsible citizenship by all members of the
7 As plaintiff Larson’s experience demonstrates, inaccessible courts can also deny criminal defendants who choose to be represented by attorneys with disabilities their Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of their choice. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).

18
community, including those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991). “Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity for participation in the democratic process.” Id. at 407. By denying them the opportunity to participate in such a core aspect of citizenship, the exclusion of people with disabilities from jury service “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.” Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999). No more than a state could deny individuals with disabilities the right to vote by refusing to provide accessible polling places, a state may not deny individuals with disabilities the right to jury service by refusing to provide accessible courthouses. Cf. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123-24 (stating that the right to vote or run for office cannot be limited by the ability to pay for a license, even if the fee provides the state needed revenue).
Finally, inaccessible courts also prevent a large class of individuals with disabilities from attending court proceedings as members of the interested public. This Court’s cases make clear both that members of the public have a First Amendment right to attend criminal proceedings, and that criminal defendants themselves have a Sixth Amendment right to public access to the proceedings in which they participate. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1986) (First Amendment right of public to access proceedings); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 46 (Sixth Amendment right of defendant to public access). The state’s amici assert that these guarantees are satisfied so long as members of the public are generally allowed to attend proceedings; there is, in amici’s words, no “individualized personal right to attend trial.” Ala Br. 13 n.3.8 That assertion
8 Amici also assert that the First Amendment right of public access triggers only rational basis scrutiny. Ala. Br. 13 n.3. To the

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is doubly flawed. First, amici ignore this Court’s explanation that the First Amendment right of access to court proceedings “serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added). Second, the exclusion of a broad class of individuals from a broad array of judicial proceedings simply because of those individuals’ disabilities—the inevitable consequence of an inaccessible court system—goes much farther than the isolated denial of an individual’s chance to attend a particular hearing. Citizens with disabilities, like those without them, have a “fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done,” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)—one that cannot be satisfied if they are categorically unable to attend court proceedings.
From the foregoing, it should be clear that the maintenance of courts that are inaccessible to individuals with disabilities operates to exclude a large class of persons from the exercise of many core rights and obligations of citizenship and puts an array of constitutional rights at risk. This case is therefore decisively unlike Garrett, which involved ADA Title I. Title I applies to state governments only when they act in their capacity as employers—a context in which the state’s decisions are judged only by the deferential rationalbasis test. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-68; cf. Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 676 (1996) (“‘[T]he government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a
contrary, this Court has made clear that the right of public access to court proceedings “may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest,” Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted)—a standard the Court has expressly labeled “strict scrutiny,” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.17 (1982).

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relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.’”) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion)). Here, by contrast, plaintiffs invoke Title II in a context in which the states have heightened constitutional obligations to their citizens.
B. There Is A Significant Pattern Of Inaccessible Courts Throughout The States
The threat to constitutional rights posed by inaccessible courts is not merely theoretical. At the time Congress adopted the ADA, inaccessible courthouses were a major problem across the Nation—and significant problems remain even today. There is thus a substantial “history and pattern” of state constitutional violations. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. Particularly given the heightened constitutional interests at stake, see Hibbs 123 S. Ct. at 1982, that pattern is more than sufficient to support Title II’s requirement that court systems be accessible to individuals with disabilities.
1. The record Congress compiled in developing the ADA makes clear that courthouses throughout the country were inaccessible at the time of the statute’s enactment. A Civil Rights Commission report that provided much of the basis for Congress’s consideration of the statute declared that seventy-six percent of all state buildings open to the general public were inaccessible to people with disabilities. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 39 (1983). Congress had every reason to conclude that courthouses were no exception.9 Hearings held
9 Many of the examples Respondents cite involve courts that are designated “local” or “county” courts. But although Garrett declined to attribute localities’ acts of employment discrimination to the states for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment abrogation analysis, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69, the inaccessibility of proceedings at nominally “local” courts is properly attributed to the states for those purposes. “County,” “City,” and “Municipal” courts are frequently held to be arms of the state entitled to

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by congressional committees and by the congressionally designated Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities10 discussed inaccessible
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 670-74 (3d Cir. 2000) (Pennsylvania Municipal Courts are arms of the state); Kelly v. Municipal Courts, 97 F.3d 902, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1996) (Marion County, Indiana, Municipal Court is arm of the state); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (California Municipal Courts are arms of the state); Jernigan v. Superior Court, No. C032530WHA(PR), 2003 WL 21640489 at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2003) (“The Superior Court for Santa Clara County is an arm of the state and thus under the Eleventh Amendment cannot be sued in federal court.”). Even when such courts are not in and of themselves arms of the state, their failure to provide access to proceedings that adjudicate rights established by state law—and that frequently result in confinement in a state prison—is surely attributable to the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Cf. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 352-53 (3d Cir. 1999) (county prosecutors are state agents for Eleventh Amendment purposes when they bring prosecutions to enforce state law, although they are county agents when they manage their own offices), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir.) (in Texas, “when acting in the prosecutorial capacity to enforce state penal law, a district attorney is an agent of the state [for § 1983 purposes], not of the county in which the criminal case happens to be prosecuted,” though district attorney is a county agent for other purposes), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 828 (1997); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993) (local prosecutor, though a city employee, “acts as a state agent [for § 1983 purposes] when prosecuting state criminal charges”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1237 (1994).
10 Although the Garrett Court noted, 531 U.S. at 370, that testimony submitted to the Task Force was not submitted “directly to Congress,” it did not disregard that evidence. See id. at 371 n.7 (considering evidence before Task Force and discounting it because, inter alia, nearly all of it related to discrimination by states outside of the employment context). Nor could the Court properly have done so, for the Task Force was a body specifically

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courthouses and court proceedings in at least eighteen states—including Tennessee.11
Even today, thirteen years after enactment of the ADA, there is ample evidence that the problem of inaccessible courthouses persists in every corner of the Nation. Published studies have identified serious and pervasive denials of accessibility in a number of state court systems. In Tennessee, the state’s own commission on the future of its judicial system warned in 1996 that “[f]or persons with physical or mental impairment, the system can be quite literally inaccessible.” Comm’n on the Future of the
appointed by the chair of a congressional subcommittee of jurisdiction to gather facts regarding the proposed legislation. See 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 300. The determination of the means by which Congress will inform itself regarding pending legislation is a core legislative prerogative under our Constitution’s separation of powers. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-38 (1976) (per curiam). See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32 (“As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it will reach a decision.”).
11 See 2 Leg. Hist., supra, at 1070-71 (Massachusetts); id. at 1078-79 (Connecticut); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Labor & Subcom. on the Handicapped 663-664 (1989) [hereinafter May 1989 Hearings] (Mary Lynn Fletcher) (Tennessee); Task Force Submissions, Ala. 0005, 0006, 0015; Task Force Submission, Cal. 0254; Task Force Submission, Col. 0273; Task Force Submission, Ga. 0374; Task Force Submission, Haw. 0496; Task Force Submissions, Idaho 0506, 0528; Task Force Submission, Mass. 0812; Task Force Submissions, Miss. 0990, 0998; Task Force Submission, Mo. 1015; Task Force Submission, Pa. 1394; Task Force Submission, S.D. 1475; Task Force Submissions, Va. 1663, 1668, 1674, 1676, 1678, 1679, 1680; Task Force Submission, Wash. 1690; Task Force Submission, W. Va. 1745; Task Force Submission, Wis. 1771; Task Force Submission, Wyo. 1786; see also 2 Leg. Hist., supra, at 1993 (reprinting New York Times article in which a lawyer with a disability described courtrooms as “often inaccessible”).

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Tenn. Judicial Sys., supra, at 31. Similar reports addressing courthouse accessibility in California, Florida, Missouri, New York, Texas, and Washington State have echoed that warning; those reports have often provided detailed accounts of the barriers faced by people with disabilities who seek to participate in court proceedings.12
12 See Judicial Council of California, Public Hearings Report: Access for Persons with Disabilities at 5-68 to 5-79 (1996) (detailing numerous problems of physical accessibility throughout the state’s courts); N.Y. State Comm’n on Qual. of Care for the Mentally Disabled & N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Mental & Physical Disability, Survey of Access to N.Y. State Courts for Individuals with Disabilities 13 (1994) (finding based on a stratified, random sample of 275 New York courts that “only 8% of all courtrooms were fully accessible”; “only 30% of the courts provided accessible rest rooms”; and well over half lacked accessible parking spaces, proper signage, and accessible elevators); Burton D. Dunlop & Marisa E. Collett, Jury Service Accessibility for Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities in Florida, (study by Florida International University’s Center on Aging concluding that “some of Florida’s courts remain clearly out of compliance with some of the basic requirements for accommodating persons with disabilities”—inter alia, more than 40% of sampled courts did not have even a single accessible jury box); Phyllis S. Launius, Removing Public Access Barriers to the Courts in the New Millennium: A Sampling and Analysis of Missouri’s Trial Courts 3-4 (2000) (study for the Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator finding “many barriers limiting access to those individuals with physical disabilities” and observing that “only 26 percent of this sample’s accessed areas are compliant with ADA standards”); Texas Civil Rights Project, Courts Closed to Justice: A Survey of Courthouse Accessibility in Texas for People with Disabilities 4-5 (1996) (concluding that “the accessibility of courtrooms for jurors, litigants, members of the public, and attorneys with disabilities is abysmal and unjustifiable” in Texas courts, and discussing several widespread courthouse accessibility problems); Civil and Legal Rights Subcomm., Governor’s Comm. on Disability Issues & Employment, Interim Court and Courthouse

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In addition, there has been “extensive litigation,” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J, concurring), challenging the lack of accessibility at courthouses across the country. In a number of these cases, plaintiffs have received final adjudications in their favor. See, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1999) (directing entry of injunction against inaccessible courthouse); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533-34 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff); Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744, 752 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (concluding that inaccessible courthouse violated the Rehabilitation Act). Others have resulted in favorable settlements for plaintiffs, and still others remain at an earlier procedural stage.13
Because complaints filed by individual plaintiffs are not collected in any readily accessible centralized database, the cases cited above presumably represent only a fraction of the courthouse-access suits that have been brought since the effective date of the ADA. A richer picture comes from the
Access Project 1 (2000) (observing “that there are some serious access problems in the courts and courthouses in Washington” and that those problems “appeared to extend to all courts: Superior, Municipal, District, and Juvenile”).
13 See, e.g., Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (11th Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs stated claim for Title II violation based on inaccessible courthouse); Salmond v. County of Teton, No. CV-97130-GF-LBE (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 2000) (consent decree in litigation regarding accessibility of Teton County Courthouse); Davis v. Tuolumne County, No. CV-F-97-5516-SMS (E.D. Cal.) (consent decree in litigation regarding accessibility of Tuolumne County Courthouse); No Barriers, Inc. v. Cornelius, No. 3:97CV-2330-R (N.D. Tex.) (settlement in litigation regarding accessibility of Ellis County Courthouse); Jonas v. General Services Comm’n, No. A95-CV-468-JN (W.D. Tex.) (settlement in litigation regarding accessibility of building housing state Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals); Miles v. County of Los Angeles, No. 02-CV3932 DT (JTLx) (C.D. Cal.) (complaint challenging several inaccessible courthouses in Los Angeles County).

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United States Department of Justice’s published enforcement records. Those records demonstrate that the inaccessibility of courthouses is a nationwide problem. On its website, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/enforce.htm, the Department posts periodic status reports that provide a snapshot of its enforcement activities; it also posts the full text of selected settlement agreements. A review of the posted reports and agreements reveals over 120 instances in forty-one states (including at least six in Tennessee) in which state courts and court proceedings were inaccessible, and the court system agreed to make its facilities and proceedings more accessible only after the federal government intervened (typically in response to a citizen complaint). See App., infra. Given the limitations on the federal government’s enforcement resources (and the fact that the Department of Justice’s published status reports do not purport to be comprehensive), these enforcement actions likely represent only the tip of the iceberg. But they demonstrate in any event that courthouse inaccessibility is a problem of nationwide scope.
Particularly in light of the fundamental constitutional interests at stake in the denial of access to court proceedings, the widespread record of inaccessible courthouses across the country is more than “weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981. Through a variety of sources—legislative testimony, published studies, litigation records, and the Department of Justice’s enforcement reports—the public record describes significant limitations in courthouse accessibility in nearly every state. Those limitations threaten the constitutional rights of disabled litigants, jurors, and members of the interested public. This is hardly a case in which Congress has sought to impose on states “an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; cf. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-70 (half-dozen incidents “fall far short of even suggesting” a “pattern of unconstitutional discrimination” against people with disabilities in state employment). Rather, Title II’s requirement that court

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programs be accessible to individuals with disabilities responds to the potent threat that inaccessible proceedings have posed and continue to pose to the constitutional rights of individuals with disabilities.
2. The continuing record of inaccessible courthouses throughout the country puts the lie to the assertion, made by both the state and its amici, that the existence of state laws requiring accessible construction made the ADA unnecessary. See Pet. Br. 16 n.2, 22; Ala Br. 22-24. To the contrary, Congress enacted the ADA based on the conclusion, given its own heading in the House Education and Labor Committee report on the bill, that “CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS ARE INADEQUATE.” 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 320. The Civil Rights Commission had determined that “[d]espite . . . the fact that nearly every state has a statute prohibiting architectural barriers, such barriers continue to be a serious problem.” U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 38. And Congress even heard specific testimony regarding the failure of Tennessee’s own law to guarantee access. See May 1989 Hearings, supra, at 663-64 (Mary Lynn Fletcher).
A recent, comprehensive study of state laws that purport to guarantee the accessibility of state facilities demonstrates that Congress had ample basis for finding those laws inadequate. The authors found that only twenty-three states had laws that “provided clear statutory language with protection comparable to ADA Title II,” Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075, 1083 (2002)—even after (as petitioner’s amici emphasize) twenty states responded to the ADA’s passage by “enact[ing] new protections for the disabled or strengthen[ing] existing protections.” Ala. Br. 24 & n.5. Cf. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980 (discounting state family leave policies because “it was only since Federal family leave legislation was first introduced that the States had even begun

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to consider similar family leave initiatives”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).14 Most important here, the procedures for enforcing these accessibility laws against the states often range from the uncertain to the nonexistent. See Colker & Milani, supra, at 1087-92, 110218 (cataloging state statutes). Given these significant limitations in coverage and enforcement, it is no surprise that the statutes cited by the state and its amici have failed to solve the problem of courthouse inaccessibility, in Tennessee and throughout the country. Just as the “important shortcomings of some state policies” supported Congress’s decision to impose a uniform requirement of family and medical leave, Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980, the many shortcomings of existing state accessibility laws gave Congress ample reason to believe that a uniform federal guarantee was necessary.
This Court has recognized that Congress may properly attend to the ways in which states’ actual practices diverge from their formal policies. See id. (“evidence that, even where state laws and policies were not facially discriminatory, they were applied in discriminatory ways,” supports Congress’s adoption of a universal guarantee of family and medical leave); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
14 In their haste to sing the praises of states’ “beneficen[ce],” Ala. Br. 22, the state’s amici fall into self-contradiction. Amici first contend that Title II will stifle state enactment of broader protections for individuals with disabilities, because “enforcement of federal anti-discrimination law by way of private damages actions naturally tends to remove, or displace, the States’ incentives to create their own such protections for their citizens.” Ala. Br. 23. But on the very next page they tout the fact that “since the ADA’s passage several States have enacted new protections for the disabled or strengthened existing protections.” Ala. Br. 24 (citing 20 such states). Even if it were the province of the Court to consider such policy questions, it should be obvious from amici’s own argument that the enforcement of Title II has not displaced state protections for people with disabilities; it has spurred them into existence.

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383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966) (Congress could properly prohibit state literacy tests, constitutional on their face, based on evidence that they had been discriminatorily administered). Tennessee and its amici therefore may not hide behind the formal guarantees of accessibility that appear on their statute books. Whatever Tennessee law may declare regarding the accessibility of public buildings, the simple fact remains that at the time this lawsuit was filed more than twenty county courts in the state remained inaccessible. As the evidence discussed above indicates, similar statements could be made about states throughout the Nation. Congress was entitled to conclude that the proof of any accessibility legislation lies in actual access, and that the widespread inaccessibility of state courts required a federal remedy.
C. Title II’s Program Accessibility Requirement Is A Proportional Response To The Constitutional Violations
Threatened By Inaccessible Courts
From the foregoing, it should be evident that Title II’s requirement of accessibility in court proceedings is a “reasonably prophylactic” measure, Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88, that permissibly serves “to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct,” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977. Although any given instance in which an individual is denied access to court proceedings might not violate the Constitution, cf. Ala. Br. 11-16 (arguing that inaccessible court proceedings are not always unconstitutional), a judicial system marked by inaccessible courthouses will likely violate the constitutional rights of litigants, witnesses, jurors, and the general public in a large number of cases. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (preventive measures satisfy Section 5 when “there is reason to believe” that much of the conduct they target has “a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional”). And the nationwide phenomenon of inaccessible courthouses—a phenomenon that persisted long after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—demonstrates that Congress faced a “[d]ifficult and intractable problem[]” that “require[s] powerful remedies.”

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Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88. As the Senate committee report on the ADA noted, the Rehabilitation Act’s requirement that the defendant program receive federal funds had proved burdensome and confusing to plaintiffs, thus limiting the statute’s effectiveness. See 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 110 (quoting Neil Hartigan). Contrary to the state’s argument, Pet. Br. 35-36, this is quite clearly an area “where previous legislative attempts had failed” and “added prophylactic measures” were justified. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982.
1. Title II’s requirement of program accessibility is precisely targeted at those situations that are most likely to violate constitutional rights. That requirement is clearly violated when, as here, litigants with disabilities are compelled to attend proceedings in inaccessible courthouses, and the lack of accessible facilities in a given county renders the state’s courts not “readily accessible to and usable by” disabled citizens in that county. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). Such core violations of the program accessibility requirement are precisely the circumstances in which individuals with disabilities are most likely to be deprived of their constitutional rights of access to the courts. To the limited extent that this requirement imposes obligations that go beyond those imposed by the Constitution itself, its additional margin of protection is fully justified by the widespread record of inaccessible courthouses we discuss above. That requirement is “congruent and proportional to its remedial object, and can ‘be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1984 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
Amici appear to contend that Title II cannot be congruent and proportional unless each individual plaintiff who invokes the statute can show that the state actually violated his or her constitutional rights. See Ala. Br. 13-14 (denying that Jones’s constitutional rights were violated); id.

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15 (denying that Lane’s constitutional rights were violated).15 This Court has made clear, however, that “Congress ‘is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ but may prohibit ‘a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.’” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81). The proper question is whether inaccessible courts sufficiently threaten constitutional rights that a requirement of accessibility in court programs operates as a “reasonably prophylactic” response. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88. That standard is amply satisfied here.
15 In any event, amici are simply incorrect about the facts of Respondents’ cases. Amici emphasize the state judge’s offer to hold Lane’s trial in a different, accessible location. Ala. Br. 15. But the state offered Lane no alternative means of access before arresting him for failure to appear at a pretrial hearing (other than the unsafe and humiliating suggestion that they might carry him up the stairs). In those circumstances, his arrest constituted a due process violation that was independent of any right Lane had to appear personally at later proceedings. The lower-court judge held a subsequent preliminary hearing in the accessible law library. In later proceedings, a trial-level judge offered to hold the trial in the same library or in an accessible courthouse in a different county (although he made this offer at a hearing that was inaccessible to Lane), but neither option fully preserved Lane’s constitutional rights: The library was not generally accessible to the public, thereby impinging on Lane’s right to public proceedings, see Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-48; and a change of venue would have been burdensome and denied Lane’s state constitutional right to trial in the county in which he was charged. As to Jones, amici urge the lack of any constitutional right to obtain courthouse access for the specific purpose of plying one’s trade. Ala. Br. 13-14. But whether or not such a specific right exists, Jones was denied her more general right as a member of the public to attend court proceedings.

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2. Title II also includes a number of limitations that permit flexibility and cushion the burden on states. Contrary to amici’s suggestion, the program accessibility requirement can be satisfied—like the constitutional requirements amici discusses—by “provid[ing] alternative means by which [disabled] citizens can attend legal proceedings.” Ala. Br. 1516. The relevant regulations offer an array of means states can take, short of physical alterations to their facilities, to comply with the statute. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b).16 These alternatives to physical alteration specifically include such relatively simple actions as “reassignment of services to accessible buildings,” “delivery of services at alternate accessible sites,” the use of aides to provide services to individuals who cannot obtain physical access to the places where those services are offered, and “any other methods that result in making [the state’s] services, programs, or activities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 35.150(b)(1). In no event is a state required to make any change—to physical structures or otherwise—that would effect a fundamental alteration, impose an undue burden, or threaten historic preservation interests. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(2) & (3).
Where, as here, existing facilities were insufficient to provide access at the time Title II became effective, the ADA’s imposition of its program accessibility requirement did effectively compel states to make structural changes to their facilities. But even in such circumstances, the law offered states a fair amount of leeway. Not only could states invoke the fundamental alteration and undue burden defenses, see id. § 35.150(a)(2); they also enjoyed a substantial grace
16 Title II imposes a strict requirement of accessibility only on facilities that were the subject of new construction after the ADA’s effective date. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a). That requirement, too, is proportional given the minimal costs involved in incorporating accessibility features in new construction. See 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 187 (Senate comm. report).

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period of three years from the statute’s effective date (four and a half years from the statute’s enactment) in which to make the required modifications. See id. § 35.150(c). Title II’s requirement that court systems be accessible thus targets precisely the sort of conduct that is likely to violate constitutional rights, while carefully limiting the scope of any intrusion on state prerogatives.
3. The state and its amici suggest that Congress must do more than show that the substantive program accessibility requirement satisfies the congruence and proportionality test. In their view, Congress must make an independent showing that the imposition of a damages remedy was congruent and proportional. See Pet. Br. 33-34; Ala. Br. 5-6, 25-26. Amici go so far as to ask this Court to second-guess Congress’s policy judgment that damages are an effective way of achieving compliance with Title II’s requirements. See Ala. Br. 5, 25 (arguing that “private damages actions to enforce the federal guarantee would more likely undermine than advance the ADA’s goals” and are accordingly “not the optimal means” of implementing the statute). The state and its amici profoundly misapprehend the law.
The “congruence and proportionality” test is a means of determining whether Congress has exceeded its remedial power and instead sought “to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (emphasis added). It does not limit Congress’s unquestioned power to determine the remedies for violation of an otherwise constitutional law. Where the substantive obligations Congress has imposed on the states satisfy the congruence and proportionality test, nothing in Section 5 demands an additional showing to justify a damages remedy to enforce those obligations. Nor does anything in the Eleventh Amendment demand such a showing. This Court’s decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), makes clear that, so long as Congress has Section 5 power to impose a given substantive rule on the states, the Eleventh Amendment does not limit the power of

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Congress to impose any remedy, damages or otherwise, for a violation of that rule. See id. at 456 (Eleventh Amendment no obstacle “[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5”).
These points hold particularly true where the remedy authorized by Congress consists merely of compensatory damages. Damages are “a traditional form of compensation for invasion of a legally protected interest.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 408 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, compensatory damages are generally presumed to be available when Congress authorizes a right of action without specifying the remedy. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66-71 (1992). And for many Title II plaintiffs, any claim for injunctive relief is moot; “it is damages or nothing.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).17 Having properly adopted a substantive rule of law to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress was surely entitled to authorize the most basic of damages remedies for violating that rule. That is particularly true here, where prior enactments had failed to achieve the constitutionally demanded access, and Congress could reasonably believe that only damages and not a mere prospective injunctive remedy would provide the necessary incentive for states to comply. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980) (noting deterrent function of damages). The State of Tennessee’s own conduct in this case—mouthing support for the ADA while at the same time failing even to come up with the required self-evaluation and transition plan as a necessary first step to compliance—provides powerful testimony to the
17 For example, an individual might be excluded from a particular court proceeding that is of great importance to his life but have no interest in ever attending another court proceeding in the future; once the initial proceeding is concluded, that individual may well lack standing to seek purely prospective relief. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).

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need for a damages remedy in this context. Both Title II’s program accessibility requirement and the damages remedy attached to it thus represent proper exercises of Congress’s Section 5 authority to enforce disabled citizens’ constitutional rights to accessible court proceedings.
II. Title II As A Whole Reasonably Responds To The History And Threat Of Unconstitutional Exclusion Of Citizens With Disabilities From A Wide Range Of State Activities
The courthouse access context offers a particularly important example of the widespread exclusion of people with disabilities from civic life and political participation. But it is far from the only example. As the ADA’s statutory findings and the supporting record before Congress demonstrated, people with disabilities have frequently been excluded from the opportunity to participate in an array of state activities. In many of these areas, the exclusion has operated to deny people with disabilities rights secured by constitutional provisions that impose far more than a rationalbasis obligation on states. Considered in the aggregate, this widespread exclusion of people with disabilities from state institutions and services has effectively created a second class of citizens who lack the full and equal opportunity to participate in civic life. Title II’s general requirements are directly aimed at eliminating that second-class status. Although the Court need look no further than the courthouse access context to decide this case, Title II is proper Section 5 legislation even when considered as a whole.
A. Because Congress Had Power To Mandate Accessible State Court Systems, The Court Need Not Consider Whether
Title II May Be Upheld More Broadly As we showed in Part I of this brief, Congress plainly had Section 5 power to impose on states the Title II requirements at issue in this case—specifically, the requirement that state court systems, viewed in their entirety, be accessible to individuals with disabilities. Like the court

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of appeals, this Court need go no further to uphold the statute as applied here. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 60-61 (rejecting defendant’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) exceeded Congress’s spending power because “[w]hatever might be said about § 666(a)(1)(B)’s application in other cases, the application of § 666(a)(1)(B) to Salinas did not extend federal power beyond its proper bounds”).18
The state suggests that it is not enough that Congress plainly intended and had the Section 5 power to regulate state conduct like that alleged in the complaint. In the state’s view, the Court should hold that Title II is incongruent and disproportional because Congress also sought to reach other state conduct, not at issue in this case, that assertedly lies outside of the legislature’s Section 5 authority. See Pet. Br. 29-30 (discussing Title II’s application to “parking space
18 The court of appeals properly focused on the courthouse access context of this case in affirming the denial of the state’s motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 3-5. But by stating that Title II could be upheld only to the extent that it enforced the Due Process Clause, id. 3—and suggesting that the district court on remand could consider only due process and not equal protection bases for the statute, id. 5—the discussion in the court’s opinion was unduly formalistic. As Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982, makes clear, the crucial dividing line for Section 5 purposes is not between due process and equal protection but between state conduct that triggers heightened constitutional obligations and state conduct that implicates ordinary rational-basis scrutiny. We take the court of appeals’ references to “due process” and “equal protection” as recognizing that, after Garrett, Title II cannot be justified simply as enforcing ordinary protected-class-based equal protection guarantees. But there is no reason to believe that a similar analysis applies to other aspects of equal protection law such as the fundamental rights doctrine, which were not at issue, and therefore not affected by the discussion of equal protection scrutiny, in Garrett. Indeed, this Court has noted that in the access-to-courts context “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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availability at museums,” “concert seating priorities at state performing arts centers,” “recreational offerings at state parks,” and “configuration of bathroom stalls at highway rest areas”). That analysis misapprehends the governing law.
Under this Court’s precedents, a statute should be sustained so long as Congress had the power to reach the particular factual context before the Court. The Court has emphasized that a “facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Salerno “no set of circumstances” test governs states’ claims that statutes facially exceed Congress’s Section 5 authority). The state’s own amici agree that principles of “constitutional avoidance and separation of powers” dictate a focus on the courthouse access context of this case. Ala. Br. 10.
Although it has not expressly confronted the issue in any of its post-Boerne cases,19 this Court has previously
19 None of the post-Boerne cases has called on the Court to address the question whether a Section 5 statute may be upheld as applied to a case Congress had the power and intended to reach, even if other applications of the statute would exceed the legislature’s enforcement power. The Court came closest to confronting the issue in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). There, the Court supported its conclusion that the Patent Remedy Act lacked congruence and proportionality by noting that the statute did not require a showing of intent to infringe the plaintiff’s patent, see id. at 645, although the case before the Court involved an allegation of intentional deprivation, see id. at 653-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority opinion did not expressly address Justice Stevens’s argument for an as-applied analysis, but it did note that intentional infringement of patents by a state could not violate the Due Process Clause unless “the State provides no

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applied these principles in resolving the very type of question presented here: Whether Congress had exceeded its authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. The leading example is United States v. Raines, supra. Raines involved the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which authorized the United States to bring an injunctive action against “any person” who interfered with protected voting rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c). The federal government had brought such an action against state election officials, who argued that the statute exceeded Congress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. The lower court read the statute’s “any person” language as “allow[ing] the United States to enjoin purely private action designed to deprive citizens of the right to vote on account of race or color.” Raines, 362 U.S. at 20. And it concluded that the statute, as so construed, extended beyond Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment power because it exceeded that Amendment’s limitation to state action. See id. This Court reversed: “if the complaint here called for an application of the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should have been an end to the question of constitutionality.” Id. at 24-25. Because the complaint alleged conduct Congress clearly had power to reach—race discrimination by state actors—the lower court should “have gone no further and should have upheld the Act as applied in the present action.” Id. at 26. See also Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104, 107 (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) on the facts before the Court, even though the statute’s terms might extend to private conspiracies that lie beyond Congress’s power to regulate, because the Court’s inquiry “need go only to
remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners” and that “the State of Florida provides remedies to patent owners for alleged infringement on the part of the State.” Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642-44 & n.9. Accordingly, there was no plausible argument that Congress had Section 5 power to apply the Patent Remedy Act to the facts of the case before the Court.

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identifying a source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged by the complaint in this case”).
This case is in an identical posture. Congress’s authority to enforce the array of Fourteenth Amendment rights threatened by an inaccessible court system plainly constitutes “a source of congressional power to reach the [facts] alleged by the complaint in this case.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104. Whether or not the state’s conduct actually violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs here,20 Congress had the prophylactic authority to require that Tennessee make its courthouses accessible. Because “the complaint here called for an application of the statute clearly constitutional under the [Fourteenth] Amendment,” that should be the “end to the question of constitutionality.” Raines, 362 U.S. at 24-25. The Court need not consider whether Congress had power to extend Title II outside of the courthouse access context.
Indeed, as the state’s own amici suggest, the variety of applications of Title II almost compels such a context-specific inquiry into the Section 5 basis for the statute. Title II applies to an array of “qualitatively different” state activities. Ala. Br. 7. The constitutional predicate for the statute is likely to vary widely across those different activities. Cf. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995) (NTEU) (refusing in First Amendment case brought by lower-level executive branch employees to consider constitutionality of the statutory honoraria ban as it would apply to senior executive branch officials, because such an application would “presen[t] a different constitutional question than the one we decide today”). Application of Title
20 To the extent that the court of appeals’ opinion may be read as suggesting that the as-applied validity of Title II turns on a factspecific inquiry into whether the plaintiffs’ own constitutional rights were violated, see Pet. App. 5, such a suggestion is inconsistent with this Court’s recognition of Congress’s prophylactic power. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983.

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II to demand courthouse access, we have shown, implicates an array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. As we demonstrate infra, the statute’s application to areas of state conduct such as voting, unnecessary institutionalization, and the treatment of prisoners with disabilities raises quite distinct sets of constitutional issues.
Not only will the underlying constitutional principles differ in each of these contexts, but the actual substantive obligations imposed by the statute are likely to differ as well. While demands for accessible courthouses and polling places would invoke the “program accessibility” regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, a demand for accommodation to a prisoner’s medical needs would invoke the “reasonable modifications” regulation, id. § 35.130(b)(7) (requiring “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures” except when such modifications “fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity”), and a demand for freedom from unnecessary institutionalization would invoke the “integration” regulation, id. § 35.130(d) (“A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”). A doctrine that sought in one fell swoop to resolve all of the issues raised by these diverse applications would be nonsensical and is not required by this Court’s Section 5 precedents—none of which involved a statute that, like Title II, implicated such different statutory and constitutional questions in its different applications.
Where, as here, application of Title II involves a state activity in which the statute permissibly responds to a realistic threat of constitutional violations on a documented record, it should make no difference that other applications of the statutory language might extend beyond the sweep of Congress’s enforcement power.21 Because the strong
21 It is irrelevant that Title II’s operative section is a textually unitary provision that applies equally to any “public entity” without

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predicate of past and threatened constitutional violations in the courthouse context plainly gave Congress power to reach state action like that alleged in this case, and Congress plainly intended to reach such action, the state may not challenge Title II as it might apply to other conduct not at issue here. B. Title II Responds To A Widespread Record Of Actual And
Threatened Constitutional Violations
distinguishing among different public entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; cf. Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203, 208 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “absent judicial redrafting of the statute, there is no narrower constitutional question to address” than the Section 5 basis for Title II as a whole). Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Wessel, “this Court has on several occasions declared a statute invalid as to a particular application without striking the entire provision that appears to encompass it.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 487 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). For examples of cases other than Raines, supra, and Griffin, supra, in which the Court has limited its constitutional analysis to particular applications of undifferentiated statutory language, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69 (limiting Section 5 analysis to ADA Title I’s application to state as opposed to local governments, even though Title I by its terms applies equally to all “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (incorporated by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5), (7))); id. at 360 n.1 (holding ADA’s abrogation provision unconstitutional only as it applied to Title I, even though that provision appears in a single section of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 12202, that applies to all titles of the ADA in an undifferentiated manner); Salinas, 522 U.S. at 60-61 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) at least as applied to cases in which bribes threaten “the integrity and proper operation of the federal program,” although the statutory text contained no such limitation); NTEU, 513 U.S. at 477-78 (holding statutory honoraria ban invalid only as applied to “Executive Branch employees below grade GS16,” although the relevant statute applied in an undifferentiated manner to any “Member, officer, or employee” of the federal government).

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Should the Court go further and consider Title II as a whole, it should conclude that the statute is proper Section 5 legislation. ADA Title II is fundamentally unlike the statute’s Title I—which the Garrett Court held not to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. Title I adopted a general rule of nondiscrimination in employment, based almost entirely on evidence of discrimination in the private sector. Because the Constitution prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities only when that discrimination takes the form of irrational state action, and Congress adduced virtually no record of such discrimination in public sector employment, the Court held that Congress lacked Section 5 power to apply the statutory nondiscrimination rule to states. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-72.
But Title II is specifically directed at governmental conduct, and it is supported by extensive findings of governmental discrimination in such important nonemployment areas as “education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). As this Court noted in Garrett, the “overwhelming majority” of incidents of potentially unconstitutional state conduct discussed in the ADA’s legislative history involved not employment discrimination but the discrimination in public services that is addressed by Title II of the statute. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7.22 In many areas of state government, the uniquely governmental discrimination attacked by Title II threatens constitutional rights secured by doctrines that impose far more than rational
22 The Court suggested that the record of state constitutional violations might also have related to matters covered by Title III, the ADA’s public accommodations title. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7. But Title III by its terms covers only “private entities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). To the extent that states violate the constitutional rights of individuals with disabilities outside of the employment context, it is Title II that addresses those violations.

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basis scrutiny on states. Unlike in the employment context, there is often “confirming judicial documentation” of the pattern of unconstitutionality in the areas covered by Title II, in the form of “extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations” in judicial opinions. Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see generally Br. for the United States, Med. Br. of California v. Hason, No. 02-479, at 1a-8a (listing more than 60 “[c]ases [e]videncing [u]nconstitutional [t]reatment of [i]ndividuals with [d]isabilities”). That extensive record of state discrimination fully justifies Title II as remedial and prophylactic legislation. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981-83.
But the constitutional problem addressed by Title II goes beyond even the discrete categories of state action that in and of themselves implicate heightened constitutional obligations. The exclusion of a specific class of persons from a wide range of state activities creates a constitutional harm that is greater than the sum of its individual parts. The statutory findings state that people with disabilities have experienced discrimination in an array of government activities, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)—discrimination that has “relegated people with disabilities to a position of political powerlessness in our society,” id. § 12101(a)(7). Although not all of the state practices that exclude people with disabilities from specific public services trigger heightened scrutiny, the aggregate impact of that exclusion raises independent constitutional concerns, for it imposes “general hardships” on “a certain class of citizens.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. As such, it effectively relegates people with disabilities to a second class of citizenship—a result that is abhorrent to the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 623; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07.
The number of specific contexts in which the conduct addressed by Title II implicates heightened constitutional scrutiny is nonetheless significant. States’ denial of disabled citizens’ core rights of democratic participation, for example, has extended far beyond the problem of inaccessible

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courthouses. As the statutory findings explicitly noted, see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), states have frequently denied individuals with disabilities their fundamental right to vote. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that the right to vote “is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society” because it is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights”). For people with mental disabilities and others, the problem has been outright exclusion. States have frequently disenfranchised classes of people with disabilities categorically, without engaging in the individualized determination of competence the Constitution requires.23
For people with physical disabilities, the denial of the right to vote has more frequently resulted from the denial of a place to vote. Just as a voter’s wealth “is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process,” Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966), so too is a voter’s ability to climb stairs or overcome other physical obstacles irrelevant to legitimate voting qualifications. Yet, as Congress was well aware when it enacted the ADA, inaccessible polling places remained a
23 See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51-56 (D. Me. 2001) (state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons under guardianship by reason of mental illness violates Fourteenth Amendment because not narrowly tailored to incompetent voters); Manhattan State Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (state statute disenfranchising, inter alia, people involuntarily committed to hospitals or mental institutions violates Fourteenth Amendment as applied to those who had not been adjudged incompetent); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“As of 1979, most States still categorically disqualified ‘idiots’ from voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion to exclude left in the hands of low-level election officials.”); 2 Leg. Hist., supra, at 1220 (Nancy Husted-Jensen) (“[P]eople with disabilities have been turned away from the polling places after they have been registered to vote because they did not look competent”).

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widespread problem throughout the Nation. See, e.g., 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 110 (Senate committee report); 2 id. at 1767 (Rick Edwards); 3 id. at 1984 (Laura Cooper); 3 id. at 2068 (Stephen Fawcett and Barbara Bradford); May 1989 Hearings, supra, at 663 (Mary Lynn Fletcher); 135 CONG. REC. S10793 (1989) (Sen. Biden).24
Although removing physical barriers to polling place access might cost money, that fact does not diminish the unconstitutionality of denying a wide class of people with disabilities an effective franchise because they have no place to vote. Poll taxes, for example, may be a source of revenue that finances elections, see Harper, 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting), but states may not condition the franchise on the payment of those taxes, for the ability to pay one’s way is irrelevant to legitimate voting qualifications. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1972) (though candidate filing fees “serve to relieve the State treasury of the cost of conducting the primary elections,” candidates may not be excluded on the basis of inability to pay such a fee, because “legitimate costs of the democratic process” should be borne by “the taxpayers generally”). To deny an individual with a disability the opportunity to vote because of the cost of retrofitting polling places built in an inaccessible manner similarly “introduce[s] a capricious or irrelevant factor” into the democratic process. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. Yet that is precisely what states were doing throughout the Nation at the time the ADA was enacted.
24 Congress was also aware that the opportunity to cast an absentee ballot was no solution to this problem. Because absentee ballots typically must be cast well in advance of election day, an absentee option does nothing for the individual who discovers for the first time when he goes to vote that his polling place is inaccessible. It also requires an individual with a disability to cast a ballot before the candidates have had a full opportunity to make their case to the voters. See 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 110 (Senate committee report).

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In addition to being denied the right to vote, many people with disabilities have also been denied the opportunity “to seek aid from the government,” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, because they have been unable to obtain access to government buildings and offices. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 39 (76% of state buildings inaccessible). The ADA’s legislative history contains numerous examples of individuals who could not attend important government proceedings, file claims in government offices, or meet with their elected representatives due to the inaccessibility of state facilities. See May 1989 Hearings, supra, at 488 (Neil Hartigan); id. at 663 (Mary Lynn Fletcher). This broad denial of access to a large class of citizens with disabilities threatens both the right to equal protection of the laws articulated in Romer and the First Amendment right to “to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” 517 U.S. at 633-34.
People with disabilities have also frequently been denied important educational opportunities. “[E]ducation has a fundamental role in the fabric of our society,” and “denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982). To be sure, education is not a “fundamental right” such that a state must “justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population.” Id. at 223 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-39 (1973)). But when outright exclusion from educational opportunities “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for that disabling status,” id., it is judged against a heightened constitutional standard. See id. at 224 (such exclusion “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial”—and not merely legitimate—“goal of the State”).
Title II responded to precisely that sort of exclusion. Congress expressly found that before the enactment of the

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Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975, “1,000,000 of the children with disabilities in the United States were excluded entirely from the public school system.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(C). Yet the EAHCA did not solve the problem. In 1983, the Civil Rights Commission concluded that “[a]lmost a decade after the enactment of this law, a great many handicapped children continue to be excluded from the public schools.” U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 28. And a House committee report on the ADA, quoting then-President Bush, reaffirmed that, 15 years after enactment of the EAHCA, people with disabilities remained “the poorest, least educated, and largest minority in America.” 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 107.
People with disabilities have also frequently been denied another set of fundamental rights protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses—the rights to marry and to have and raise children.25 Beginning in the eugenics era, many states engaged in a widespread practice of sterilizing individuals with disabilities. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 36-37. That practice, “although steadily dwindling,” was far from a thing of the past at the time the ADA was adopted. Id. at 37. The Civil Rights Commission found that “involuntary sterilizations of
25 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (endorsing that principle); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (restrictions on right to marry subject to heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require individualized determination of parental unfitness before depriving unwed father of custody of his children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (state sterilization statute for habitual criminals triggers, and fails, “strict scrutiny” under Equal Protection Clause).

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handicapped persons, both pursuant to State statutes and in the absence of statutory authority, continue to be performed.” In 1983, 15 states still had statutes authorizing compulsory sterilization of people with mental disabilities and 4 states still had statutes authorizing compulsory sterilization of people with epilepsy. Id. Of no less constitutional importance, the Commission found that “[m]any States restrict the rights of physically and mentally handicapped people to marry,” and that people with disabilities have “had custody of their children challenged in proceedings to terminate parental rights and in proceedings growing out of divorce.” Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). And Congress heard testimony that “child-custody suits almost always have ended with custody being awarded to the non-disabled parent.” 2 Leg. Hist., supra, at 1611 n.10 (Arlene Mayerson).
Yet another significant way in which states have long denied people with disabilities the full rights of citizenship is by the practice of unnecessary institutionalization. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600. Unnecessary institutionalization threatens the due process right to freedom from unnecessary restraint, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982), and was a widespread problem at the time Title II was enacted. The ADA’s statutory findings state that segregation of individuals with disabilities is “a serious and pervasive social problem” and that discrimination “persists in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3). Supporting those findings, the Civil Rights Commission’s report described “the systematic placement of handicapped people in substandard residential facilities”; noted the evolving professional consensus that “most training, treatment, and habilitation services can be better provided to handicapped people in small, communitybased facilities”; yet concluded that “a great many handicapped persons remain in segregative facilities.” U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 32-35.
Finally, the record before Congress demonstrated that people with disabilities had frequently been denied rights

48
guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments in dealings with law enforcement. The House Judiciary Report on the ADA observed that “persons who have epilepsy, and a variety of other disabilities, are frequently inappropriately arrested and jailed” and often “deprived of medications while in jail.” 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 490. The legislative history also contains examples of people abused by police officers because of their disabilities. See, e.g., 2 id. at 1196-1197 (Cynthia Miller). And a large body of case law found violations of disabled prisoners’ Eighth Amendment right to accommodation of their medical needs.26
C. Title II Is A Proportional Response To This Widespread Pattern Of Unconstitutional Exclusion
Given the extent of unconstitutional exclusion of people with disabilities from important civic and governmental activities, Title II’s requirements are clearly “responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. Just as in Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981-82, Congress responded to discriminatory state practices that trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny. And Congress has done so in a measured way, by prohibiting
26 See, e.g., Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993) (denial of wheelchair to inmate with paralysis, resulting in inmate’s inability to shower himself or leave his cell, violated Eighth Amendment); Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 170, 180 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (Eighth Amendment violation existed where plaintiff “was regularly deprived use of his wheelchair for extended periods of time, plaintiff was unable to shower, and . . . he was not allowed to use a cup in order to try to bathe by taking water out of his cell toilet or drinking fountain”); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denial of interpretive services and assistive devices to deaf inmates during medical treatment violated Eighth Amendment where “communication between the patient and medical personnel [was] essential to the treatment in question”); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569, 1582 (D. Ariz. 1993) (failure to provide accessible bathrooms, showers, and cells violated Eighth Amendment).

49
discrimination only when it is targeted at “qualified individual[s] with a disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added), and by requiring modifications of existing practices only when those modifications are “reasonable,” id. § 12131, and would not “fundamentally alter” the state’s programs, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
In many contexts addressed by Title II, the statute’s coverage overlaps substantially with the requirements of the Constitution. In those cases in which the statute forbids irrational discrimination, see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S., at 450, or discrimination that affects a fundamental right such as the right to vote, Title II goes no further than the Constitution. Even the requirement of reasonable modifications goes no further than does the Constitution in the many areas of state government in which the Constitution itself imposes a requirement of individualized accommodation. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321, 324 (Due Process Clause requires individualized professional judgment in decisions to restrain individuals with disabilities); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (Due Process Clause requires individualized inquiry into parent’s fitness); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (Powell, J., sitting by designation) (Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires individualized accommodation of prisoner’s medical needs); Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 51-56 (Equal Protection Clause requires individualized determination of voting competency).
To be sure, not all applications of Title II involve state conduct that in and of itself violates the Constitution. But Congress had ample reason to believe that it was necessary here to “proscribe[] facially constitutional conduct in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977. As we have shown, the cumulative impact of exclusion from an array of government activities creates an independent constitutional harm of second-class citizenship, even if none of the component parts of that exclusion would, considered in isolation, violate the Constitution. See p. 42, supra. Moreover, as the Civil Rights Commission concluded

50
in its report that spurred the drafting and consideration of the ADA, “[d]iscrimination in some areas tends to foster discrimination in other areas.” U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 42. When broad-scale discrimination operates to exclude people with disabilities from a range of important opportunities in the community, that exclusion feeds the societal prejudice and stereotyping that leads to further discrimination. See id. at 21-22; see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (explaining how unnecessary institutionalization feeds societal stereotypes and prejudice in this way). Just as in the medical leave context, Congress had ample reason to believe that these “mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a selffulfilling cycle of discrimination,” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982, that could not be stopped with piecemeal efforts. Cf. id. at 1979 n.5 (evidence of state discrimination in parenting leave policies justified prophylactic statute mandating family caretaking leave because policies regarding both forms of leave “implicate the same stereotypes”).
In its exercise of remedial power “to eliminate so far as possible the discriminatory effects of the past and to bar like discrimination in the future,” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996), Congress had authority to attack all of the forms of state discrimination that contributed to that self-fulfilling cycle, even if not all of the targeted acts of discrimination themselves would violate the Constitution. The need for a broad remedy was amply demonstrated by the failure of numerous earlier enactments, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 390-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing pre-ADA disability discrimination laws), to stanch the widespread violations of disabled citizens’ constitutional rights. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982 (failure of prior legislation justifies “added prophylactic measures”). Title II, considered as a whole, is clearly a proportional response to that “difficult and intractable problem.” Id. (internal alterations omitted).
CONCLUSION
The judgment should be affirmed.

51

Samuel R. Bagenstos 1545 Massachusetts Ave. Cambridge, MA 02138
Thomas C. Goldstein Goldstein & Howe, P.C. 4607 Asbury Pl., NW Washington, DC 20016

Respectfully submitted,
William J. Brown (Counsel of Record) William J. Brown & Assocs. 23 North Ocoee St. Cleveland, TN 37364 (423)476-4515

November 12, 2003

1a Appendix

Courthouse Access Enforcement by the Department of Justice
(source: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/enforce.htm)

Alabama
• Physical accessibility, Robertsdale Municipal Court (Oct. 31, 2001, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/roberal.htm)
• Physical accessibility, Georgiana Magistrate’s Court (Formal Settlement, April-June 1999 Status Report)

Arizona

• Physical accessibility, Flagstaff Municipal Court

(June

25,

2002,

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/flagstaf.htm)

• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court

house (Informal Settlement, April-June 2002

Status Report)

• Communications accessibility, unidentified state

court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1997 Status

Report)

Arkansas
• Services on inaccessible third floor, unidentified county court house (Mediation, Oct.-Dec. 2001 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Chicot County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Jan.-March 1998 Status Report)

2a
• Inaccessible site, Van Buren County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, April 1994 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Scott County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, April 1994 Status Report)
California
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 2001 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Mendocino County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1998 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, April-June 1997 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, Santa Clara County Superior Court (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1996 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified Municipal Court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1996 Status Report)
Colorado
• Physical accessibility, Saguache County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2001 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Boulder County Municipal Courthouse (Oct. 2, 2000, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/boulderc.htm)
• Accessible parking, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1999 Status Report)

3a
• Communications accessibility, unidentified judicial district (Informal Settlement, Jan.-March 1997 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1994 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, Apr.-June 1994 Status Report)

Connecticut
• Physical and communications accessibility in courtroom, Windham, CT (July 19, 2000, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/windhact.htm)

Florida • • • • •

Physical and communications accessibility, Citrus County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1998 Status Report) Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1997 Status Report) Communications accessibility, Florida state courts (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1996 Status Report) Physical accessibility, Madison County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report) Communications accessibility, Sixth Judicial District (Formal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report)

4a
Georgia
• Inaccessible restrooms, Chatham County Courthouse (Jan. 30, 2002, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/savannah.htm)
• Physical accessibility, Ben Hill County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 2001 Status Report)

Hawaii •

Communications accessibility, Hawaii state courts (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1998 Status Report)

Idaho •

Communications accessibility, Fifth Judicial District (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1997 Status Report)

Illinois •
•
•

Communications accessibility, unidentified county

court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2002 Status

Report)

Physical accessibility, Warren County Courthouse

(Nov.

26,

2001,

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/warrenil.htm)

Communications accessibility, Nineteenth Judicial

Circuit (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1999 Status

Report)

Indiana •

Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1998 Status Report)

5a
• Communications accessibility, Boone County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1997 Status Report)

Iowa •

Communications accessibility, unidentified district court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 2001 Status Report)

Kentucky

• Physical accessibility, Perry County Courthouse

(Sept.

25,

2001,

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/perryky.htm)

• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court

(Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1994 Status

Report)

• Physical accessibility, Hickman County

Courthouse (Formal Settlement, April 1994 Status

Report)

Louisiana
• Communications accessibility, unidentified court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 2002 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, New Orleans civil courts and traffic court buildings (Jan. 30, 2002, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/newola.htm)
• Physical accessibility, Beauregard Parish Courthouse (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1999 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, Alexandria City Court (Formal Settlement, April-June 1994 Status Report)

6a
Maryland
• Physical accessibility, Worcester County courthouse (July 28, 2003, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/worceste.htm)
Massachusetts
• Physical accessibility, Bristol County courts (New Lawsuits, Jan.-Mar. 2003 Status Report)
Michigan
• Communications accessibility, unidentified district court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1999 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified juvenile court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1998 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, Apr.-June 1998 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1997 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified court (Mediation, July-Sept. 1997 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, Apr.-June 1997 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified county courts (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1997 Status Report)

7a
• Inaccessible restrooms, Genesee County probate court (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1994 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified district court (Informal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report)
Mississippi
• Physical accessibility, various Madison County courts (July 25, 2003, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/madison.htm)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified municipal court (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2003 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified local courthouse (Mediation, Oct.-Dec. 2002 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, Gulfport Municipal Court (Formal Settlement, Apr.-Sept. 2000 Status Report)
• Exclusion of deaf jurors, Hancock and Harrison County courts (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1997 Status Report)
Missouri
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Mediation, Jan.-Mar. 2003 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Springfield Municipal Court (Sept. 19, 2001, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/sprfldmo.htm)
• Communications accessibility, City of Fulton Municipal Court (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1994 Status Report)

8a
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report)
Nebraska
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2002 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified courthouse (Mediation, Jan.-Mar. 2002 Status Report)
New Jersey
• Physical accessibility, Essex County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2002 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, South Orange Village Police Headquarters and Court (Oct. 2, 2000, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/soorang.htm)
New Mexico
• Physical and communications accessibility, Santa Fe Municipal Court (Apr. 23, 2001, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/santafe.htm)
• Communications accessibility, Roswell Municipal Court (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1997 Status Report)
New York
• Physical accessibility, Columbia County Courthouse (May 19, 2003, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/columbia.htm)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified town court (Mediation, Oct.-Dec. 2001 Status Report)

9a
• Physical accessibility, Rome City Court (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1997 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, Lloyd Town Justice Court (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1996 Status Report)

North Carolina
• Physical access, unidentified trial court (Litigation: Decisions, Oct. 1995-Mar. 1996 Status Report)

North Dakota
• Physical accessibility, Burleigh County Detention Center and Courthouse (Oct. 16, 2002, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/bismknd.htm)
• Physical accessibility, Dickinson Municipal Court (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1998 Status Report)

Ohio • •
•
•
•

Physical accessibility, Lucas County courthouses (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2003 Status Report) Communications accessibility, unidentified county probate and juvenile court (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2003 Status Report) Physical accessibility, Guernsey County courthouse (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2002 Status Report) Communications accessibility, Mason Municipal Court (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2002 Status Report) Physical and communications accessibility, Warren municipal justice building (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 2002 Status Report)

10a

• Physical accessibility, Cambridge Municipal Court

(Jan.

11,

2001,

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/cambroh.htm)

• Physical accessibility, unidentified city court

(Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2001 Status

Report)

• Physical accessibility, unidentified municipal

court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1998 Status

Report)

• Physical accessibility, Wadsworth City Court

(Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1994 Status

Report)

• Physical accessibility, Paulding County courtroom

(Formal Settlement, June 1994 Status Report)

Oklahoma
• Physical accessibility, Adair County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2000 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1999 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Oklahoma County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1999 Status Report)

Oregon •

Physical and communications accessibility, Ashland Municipal Court (Jan. 11, 2001, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ashlndor.htm)

11a
Pennyslvania
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1999 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified city court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1999 Status Report)
• Accommodation of jurors with disabilities, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1997 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1995 Status Report)

South Carolina
• Communications accessibility, unidentified county court (Mediation, July-Sept. 2001 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, Pickens County Court (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1994 Status Report)

South Dakota

• Physical accessibility, Butte County Courthouse

(2001

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/buttesd.htm)

Tennessee
• Physical and communication accessibility, county courthouse, courthouse annex, and justice center in Loudon County (July 25, 2003, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/loudon.htm)

12a
• Communications accessibility, Shelby County Court of General Sessions (Formal Settlement, Apr.-Sept. 2000 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified courthouse (Mediation, Jan.-Mar. 2000 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Van Buren County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1998 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Johnson County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1998 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified county circuit court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1997 Status Report)

Texas •
•
• •
•
• •

Physical accessibility, San Antonio Municipal Courthouse (Jan. 30, 2002, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/sananton.htm) Communications accessibility, unidentified county (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 2001 Status Report) Communications accessibility, Houston courts (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2000 Status Report) Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 1999 Status Report) Communications accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1999 Status Report) Physical accessibility, unidentified courthouse (Mediation, Jan.-Mar. 1999 Status Report) Physical accessibility, Harris County court facilities (Formal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report)

13a

Utah •
•

Communications accessibility, courtroom in Logan City Hall (Aug. 31, 2001, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/loganut.htm) Communications accessibility and exclusion of deaf jurors, district court in Salt Lake City (Formal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report)

Vermont
• Communications accessibility, Windsor County Superior Court (Formal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2002 Status Report)

Virginia

• Physical accessibility, Craig County Courthouse

(Jan.

30,

2002,

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/craigco.htm)

Washington

• Physical accessibility, courtroom portions of Mt.

Vernon municipal police/justice complex (July 19,

2000,

Settlement:

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/mtvernwa.htm)

West Virginia
• Physical accessibility, Summers County Courthouse (July 19, 2000, Settlement: http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/summerwv.htm)
• Physical accessibility, McDowell County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, July-Sept. 1998 Status Report)

14a
• Physical accessibility, Wetzel County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1998 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county court (Informal Settlement, July-Sept. 1996 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, Mercer County Courthouse (Formal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1995 Status Report)
Wisconsin
• Physical accessibility, Outagamie County Justice Center (Formal Settlement, Apr.-June 1997 Status Report)
Wyoming
• Physical accessibility, unidentified county courthouse (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1997 Status Report)
Unidentified States
• Communications accessibility, unidentified court (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 2003 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, a “New England State court system” (Informal Settlement, Jan.Mar. 2002 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, unidentified county superior court (Informal Settlement, Oct.-Dec. 2001 Status Report)
• Communications accessibility, “a southern state” (Informal Settlement, Jan.-Mar. 1997 Status Report)
• Physical accessibility, courthouses in “various cities and towns in the East and Midwest” (Informal Settlement, Apr. 1994 Status Report)

 
 No. 02-1667
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATE OF TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v.
GEORGE LANE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
THEODORE B. OLSON Solicitor General Counsel of Record
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA Assistant Attorney General
PAUL D. CLEMENT Deputy Solicitor General
PATRICIA A. MILLETT Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER SARAH E. HARRINGTON KEVIN RUSSELL
Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 (202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12131 to 12165, exceeds Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(I)

1 OPINIONS BELOW The court of appeals’ amended opinion on rehearing (Pet. App. 1-5) is reported at 315 F.3d 680. The original opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 10-11) and the order of the district court (Pet. App. 6-7) are unreported.
JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered its original judgment on July 16, 2002, and its amended opinion on rehearing on January 10, 2003. On March 4, 2003, Justice Stevens extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to May 12, 2003, and the petition was filed on that date. The petition was granted, limited to Question 1, on June 23, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT 1. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Disabilities Act), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., established a "comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. 12101(b)(1). Congress found that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,” and that “such forms of discrimination * * * continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(2). Congress specifically found that discrimination against persons with disabilities “persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,

2
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services.” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3). In addition, Congress found
that persons with disabilities
continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.
42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(5). Congress concluded that persons with
disabilities
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7). Based on those findings, Congress
“invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment" to enact the
Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. 12101(b)(4).
The Disabilities Act targets three particular areas of
discrimination against persons with disabilities. Title I, 42
U.S.C. 12111-12117, addresses discrimination by employers affecting
interstate commerce; Title II, 42 U.S.C. 12131-12165, addresses
discrimination by governmental entities in the operation of public
services, programs, and activities, including transportation; and

3 Title III, 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189, addresses discrimination in public accommodations operated by private entities. This case arises under Title II of the Disabilities Act, which provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. 12132. A "public entity" is defined to include "any State or local government" and its components. 42 U.S.C. 12131(1)(A) and (B). Title II may be enforced through private suits against public entities. 42 U.S.C. 12133. Congress expressly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to private suits in federal court. 42 U.S.C. 12202.
Title II prohibits governments from, among other things, denying a benefit to a qualified individual with a disability because of his disability, providing him with a lesser benefit than is given to others, or limiting his enjoyment of the rights and benefits provided to the public at large. See 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(1)(i), (iii), (vii).1 In addition, a public entity must make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or procedures if necessary to avoid the exclusion of individuals with disabilities, unless the accommodation would impose an undue
1 Congress instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations to implement Title II, based on regulations previously promulgated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. See 42 U.S.C. 12134.

4

financial or administrative burden on the government, or would

fundamentally alter the nature of the service. See 28 C.F.R.

35.130(b)(7). The Disabilities Act does not normally require a

public entity to make its existing physical facilities accessible.

28 C.F.R. 35.150(a)(1). Public entities need only ensure that

“each service, program or activity, * * * when viewed in its

entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities.”

28 C.F.R. 35.150(a).

However, building

construction or alterations undertaken after Title II’s effective

date must be designed to provide accessibility. 28 C.F.R. 35.151.

2. Respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones have paraplegia

and use wheelchairs to ambulate. Pet. App. 13. In 1996,

petitioner charged Lane with two misdemeanor offenses and summoned

him to appear in the Polk County Courthouse to answer the charges.

Id. at 15-16. All court proceedings in that courthouse take place

on the second floor of a building that, at that time, had no

elevator. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of

stairs to get to the courtroom. On his second visit, he was

arrested after he “sent word to the court that he would not crawl

to the courtroom again” and further declined to be carried by

officers. Id. at 15. The court conducted subsequent proceedings

with Lane waiting on the ground floor while his attorney shuttled

back and forth between Lane and the second-floor courtroom. Id. at

15-16. The trial court later held the criminal case in abeyance

while an elevator was constructed. Id. at 17.

5 Respondent Jones is a certified court reporter who must attend court proceedings to perform her job. Because many courtrooms in Tennessee are inaccessible to people in wheelchairs, she has been unable to complete a number of assignments, has not been able “to participate in the judicial process,” and has otherwise been denied “access[]” to “the services of the judiciary.” Pet. App. 19-20. Respondents filed suit against petitioner and 25 Tennessee counties alleging past and ongoing violations of Title II based on the physical inaccessibility of courthouses within the State. Pet. App. 12-28. Respondents also seek to represent a class of persons who, because of their physical disabilities, cannot climb stairs or ascend steep inclines in Tennessee courthouses. Id. at 26. Respondents seek injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 27-28. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the district court denied. Id. at 11. 3. Petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal, see Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993), and the United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of Congress’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see 28 U.S.C. 2403. While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued its en banc opinion in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002), which held that the Disabilities Act’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is valid for claims based on due process principles, but not for

6 claims based on equal protection principles.

The court then

affirmed the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground

that respondents’ claims are based on due process principles. Pet. App. 10-11. On rehearing, the panel issued an amended opinion (id.

at 1-5) explaining that plaintiffs’ claims are based on due process principles because “physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had

the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access

vital services and to exercise fundamental rights.” Id. at 4.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Application of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

to States and their subdivisions falls squarely within Congress’s

comprehensive legislative power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit, remedy, and prevent violations of the rights secured by that Amendment. In enacting Title II, Congress focused

its legislative attention on the specific problem of discriminatory

access to state and local government services; it did not simply

extend a policy focused on the private sector to the government. After decades of study, Congress determined that persons with

disabilities had suffered from a virulent history of official

governmental discrimination, isolation, and segregation. Congress

found, moreover, that such discrimination and segregation, like race and gender discrimination, have repercussions that have persisted over the years and that continue to be manifested in

decisionmaking by state and local officials across the span of

7 governmental operations. That official discrimination results not just in the denial of the equal protection of the laws and equal access to governmental benefits, but also in the deprivation of fundamental rights, such as the rights of access the courts, to vote, to substantive and procedural due process, to petition government officials, and to other protections of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.
In Title II, Congress formulated a statute that, much like federal laws combating racial and gender discrimination, is carefully designed to root out present instances of unconstitutional discrimination, to undo the effects of past discrimination, and to prevent future unconstitutional treatment by prohibiting discrimination and promoting integration where reasonable. At the same time, the Disabilities Act preserves the latitude and flexibility that States legitimately require in the administration of their programs and services. The Disabilities Act accomplishes those objectives by requiring States to afford persons with disabilities genuinely equal access to services and programs, while at the same time confining the statute’s protections to qualified individuals who, by definition, meet all of the States’ legitimate and essential eligibility requirements. The Act only requires reasonable modifications for individuals with disabilities that do not impose an undue burden and do not fundamentally alter the nature or character of the governmental program. The statute is thus carefully tailored to prohibit state

8 conduct that presents a substantial risk of violating the Constitution or that unreasonably perpetuates the exclusionary effects of prior unconstitutional treatment and exclusion.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE IT BOTH REMEDIES THE CONTINUING EFFECTS OF PAST CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS AND COMBATS AN ENDURING PROBLEM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL MISTREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 IS VALID SECTION 5 LEGISLATION Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an affirmative grant of legislative power, see Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000), that gives Congress the “authority both to remedy and to deter violation of [Fourteenth Amendment] rights * * * by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text,” Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (quoting Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001)). Section 5 thus “gives Congress broad power indeed,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999), including the power to remedy past violations of constitutional rights, to enact “prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct,” and to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977. Such legislation, however, must demonstrate a “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). Title II of the Disabilities Act is

9 appropriate Section 5 legislation because it is reasonably designed to remedy a history of pervasive discrimination and deprivation of constitutional rights by States, to prevent continuing denials of constitutional rights, and to eradicate enduring false stereotypes that would otherwise freeze into place the effects of past unconstitutional treatment.
A. Title II Of The Disabilities Act Targets Distinctly Governmental Activities That Often Burden The Exercise Of Fundamental Rights
In Garrett, supra, this Court held that Title I of the Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111 to 12117, which prohibits public and private employers from discriminating in employment, was not valid Section 5 legislation. 531 U.S. at 365-374. Title II, however, is fundamentally different from Title I in four constitutionally determinative respects.
First, in enacting Title I, Congress addressed issues that affect all employers -- private or public sector -- and simply included States within a general ban on employment discrimination, without considering sufficiently whether there was a distinctive problem of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-371. While Title I regulates States qua employers, Title II, by contrast, was enacted specifically and deliberately to regulate state and local governments qua governments. Congress thus legislated with both an appreciation for the unique status of state and local governments and a singular focus on the historic and enduring problem of

10
official discrimination and unconstitutional treatment on the basis
of disability by “any State or local government,” 42 U.S.C. 12131(1)(A) and (B).2
For that reason, as Garrett acknowledged, Title II is
predicated on a more substantial legislative record pertaining to
“discrimination by the States in the provision of public services.”
531 U.S. at 371 n.7; see Section B(2), infra. That legislative
record, in turn, led Congress to make specific findings about the
historic and enduring problem of discrimination by States and their
subdivisions. In particular, Congress found that “discrimination
against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as * * * education, transportation, * * *
institutionalization, * * * voting, and access to public services.”
42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3). Those are areas for which States and their
subdivisions are either exclusively or predominantly responsible.
Contrast Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 (no findings about state
employment discrimination). In addition, the same committee
2 In a number of other cases, Congress likewise invoked its Section 5 power simply to “place States on the same footing as private parties.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82; see Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 631-632 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). While congressional efforts to regulate States qua employers could have been understood by Members of Congress (prior to this Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)) to depend critically on Congress’s ability to abrogate States’ immunity under the Commerce Clause, Congress’s regulation in Title II of the States’ provision of public services perforce accounted for the States’ governmental character and thus necessarily implicated the Section 5 power.

11 reports that the Court in Garrett found lacking with regard to public employment, 531 U.S. at 371-372, are directly on point here, declaring that “there exists a compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the area[] of * * * public services.” H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 28 (1990); see also S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (“Discrimination still persists in such critical areas as * * * public services.”). Congress thus specifically concluded, on the basis of a weighty legislative record, that States were contributors to the “history of purposeful unequal treatment” and participants in “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice” against individuals with disabilities, 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7) and (9) -- and those “conclusions are entitled to much deference.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
Second, because Title I pertains to employment, decisions made by state employers concerning individuals with disabilities implicate only the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee against irrational employment decisions. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-368. Like Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83, Title I thus addressed state conduct in an area where the States, as sovereigns, are given an extraordinarily wide berth and constitutional violations are infrequently found. See, e.g., Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981-1982; Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 676 (1996).

12 Title II, by contrast, enforces not only the Equal Protection Clause, but also a wide array of fundamental constitutional rights -- the right to petition the government, the right of access to the courts, the right to vote, Fourth and Eighth Amendment protections, and procedural and substantive due process. Indeed, Title I dealt only with the States’ denial of an opportunity -- employment -that individuals equally could pursue in the private sector. Title II, by contrast, regulates state and local governments when they intervene in and regulate the activities of private citizens, or deprive them of their liberty, property, or parental rights, often in contexts in which there is no private-sector alternative and the citizen has no ability to opt out. Title II also regulates a State’s ability to deny a class of citizens access to government services upon which all citizens must rely for basic opportunities (and sometimes the necessities) of modern life. The private sector cannot provide for binding judicial process, or the ability to cast a ballot, serve as a juror, adopt children, secure the protection of the police, or seek the enactment of legislation. Title II thus legislates in an area where the States’ conduct often “triggers a heightened level of scrutiny,” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982, and where its ability to infringe those rights generally, let alone to deny them disparately to one particular segment of the population, is constitutionally curtailed. For that reason, it “was easier for Congress” to identify and “to show a pattern of state constitutional violations” in enacting Title II. Ibid.

13 Third, unlike Kimel and Garrett, this case implicates concerns beyond abrogation and the ability of individuals to sue the States for money damages. Because both Kimel and Garrett targeted employment discrimination, those decisions only invalidated the statutes’ abrogation provisions; the substantive prohibitions of those laws remain applicable to the States pursuant to Congress’s undoubted power to regulate employment under its Commerce Clause authority, and they can be enforced against state officials under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9; EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 235-243 (1983). While petitioner concedes (Br. 16) that Title II’s substantive provisions are valid Commerce Clause legislation, its state amici (Br. 22, 25) and a number of other States pointedly do not.3 Accordingly, unless Title II is appropriate Commerce Clause legislation, the issue presented here draws into question the power of Congress to require both States and local governments, whether through private damages actions, private injunctive actions, or suits by the United States itself, to make their buildings, programs, and public life accessible to a historically marginalized population.
3 See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002); State Dep’t of Highway Safety v. Rendon, 832 So.2d 141, 146 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 851 So.2d 729 (Fla. 2003), petition for cert. pending, No. 03-559 (filed Oct. 13, 2003) ; Meyers v. Texas, No. 02-50452 (5th Cir. argued Mar. 12, 2003) (pending); McCarthy v. Hale, No. 03-50608 (5th Cir.); Doe v. Regier, No. 03-2794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (pending).

14 Fourth, for all of the foregoing reasons, and especially because this case may implicate the constitutional authority for enactment of Title II’s substantive prohibitions as applied to all levels of government, this Court is not constrained, as it was in Garrett, to consider only the legislative evidence of unconstitutional conduct directly by the States. When Congress specifically focuses the substantive provisions of Section 5 legislation jointly on the operations of state and local governments qua governments, its enforcement powers under Section 5, like the substantive protections of Section 1, can charge the States with some responsibility for the unconstitutional conduct of the subdivisions of government that the States themselves create and empower to act.4 That is, in part, because the line between state and local government is much harder to discern in the context of public services than it is in employment. While employment decisions can be made independently, the operations of state and local governments in the provision of government services, such as voting, education, welfare benefits, zoning, licensing, and the administration of justice are often closely intertwined. Indeed, in this case, the State uses county courthouses for the conduct of its own judicial business. Pet. App. 14-15; see generally Anderson
4 See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220-221 (1903); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 270-271 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

15 County Quarterly Court v. Judges of the 28th Judicial Circuit, 579 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). Likewise, with respect to education, States play a substantial role in directing, supervising, and limiting the discretion of local agencies, either by administrative supervision or by statutory direction. The complexity of the relationship between state and local governments in the administration of public services often raises difficult, state-by-state questions regarding whether a particular entity is operating as an “arm of the state.” The record of historic and pervasive discrimination and unconstitutional treatment by all levels of government further blurs the line between state and local governmental action, because the conduct of local officials often may be traceable, at least in part, to the rules of state-mandated discrimination and segregation under which they operated for years.
Indeed, under similar circumstances, this Court has recognized the relevance of local governmental conduct in assessing the validity of Section 5 legislation as applied to the States. In both Garrett and Hibbs, the Court cited the substantive provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973, which were upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), as “appropriate” Section 5 legislation because that Act is predicated upon a documented “problem of racial discrimination in voting.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373; see Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. Much of the evidence of unconstitutional conduct described on the referenced pages of South Carolina (383 U.S. at 308-313), however,

16
involved the conduct of county and city officials.5 In fact,
almost all of the evidence of specific instances of discrimination
underlying the Voting Rights Act of 1965 concerned local officials
rather than state officials; the rest of the evidence was either
statistical evidence or lists of state laws.6 See also Flores, 521
U.S. at 530-531 (in analyzing Section 5 as a source of power for
the substantive provisions of a law, the Court did not distinguish
between evidence of state and local governmental conduct). Thus,
while Congress compiled ample evidence of unconstitutional conduct
by the States themselves in enacting Title II, the constitutional
question presented here, unlike Garrett, compels consideration of
the evidence of local government discrimination as well.
5 See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 312 n.12 (discrimination by Montgomery County Registrar); id. at 312 n.13 (Panola County and Forrest County registrars); id. at 313 n.14 (Dallas County Board of Registrars); id. at 313 n.15 (Walker County registrar); id. at 314 (“certain local officials have defied and evaded court orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls”); id. at 314-315 (Selma, Alabama, and Dallas County).
6 See, e.g., Voting Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1965) (voting discrimination by local officials in Selma, Alabama, and Dallas County); id. at 8 (abuses by local sheriff and deputy sheriff in Mississippi); id. at 36 (21 of 22 voting discrimination lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice in Mississippi were against counties); Voting Rights: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965) (discrimination in Clarke County, Mississippi, and Wilcox County, Alabama); H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1965) (parish registrars); S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 3, at 7-9 (1965) (discrimination and litigation in Dallas County, Alabama); id. at 12 (counties’ discriminatory use of “good moral character” test); id. at 33 (county officials’ discriminatory use of poll tax).

17
B. Title II Responds To A Long History And A Continuing Problem Of Unconstitutional Treatment Of Individuals With Disabilities
1. Congress Exhaustively Investigated Disability Discrimination
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), this Court acknowledged the superior expertise of legislatures in addressing the “difficult” problem of discrimination against and mistreatment of individuals with disabilities. Id. at 443. “In identifying past evils,” for which Section 5 legislation is appropriate, moreover, “Congress obviously may avail itself of information from any probative source,” South
Carolina, 383 U.S. at 330, including the information and expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers action in that area.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
The Congress that enacted Title II of the Disabilities Act brought to that legislative process more than forty years of experience studying the scope and nature of discrimination against persons with disabilities and testing incremental legislative steps to combat that discrimination. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 390-391 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing prior legislation). Building on that expertise, Congress commissioned two reports from the National Council on the Handicapped to report on the adequacy of existing

18
federal laws and programs addressing discrimination against persons
with disabilities.7 Those studies revealed that “the most
pervasive and recurrent problem faced by disabled persons appeared
to be unfair and unnecessary discrimination.” National Council on
the Handicapped, On the Threshold of Independence 2 (1988)
(Threshold); see National Council on the Handicapped, Toward
Independence: An Assessment of Federal Laws and Programs Affecting
Persons with Disabilities (1986). Persons with disabilities
reported “denials of educational opportunities, lack of access to
public buildings and public bathrooms, [and] the absence of
accessible transportation.” Threshold 20-21, 41. Congress also
learned of an “alarming rate of poverty,” a dramatic educational
gap, and a life of social “isolat[ion]” for persons with
disabilities. Id. at 14.8
7 See Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221, Title I, § 141(a), 98 Stat. 26; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, Title V, § 502(b), 100 Stat. 1829.
8 Twenty percent of persons with disabilities -- more than twice the percentage for the general population -- lived below the poverty line, and 15% of disabled persons had incomes of $15,000 or less. Threshold 13-14. Forty percent of persons with disabilities -- triple the rate for the general population -- did not finish high school. Only 29% of persons with disabilities had some college education, compared with 48% for the general population. Id. at 14. Two-thirds of all working-age persons with disabilities were unemployed; only one in four worked full-time. Ibid. Twothirds of persons with disabilities had not attended a movie or sporting event in the past year; three-fourths had not seen live theater or music performances; persons with disabilities were three times more likely not to eat in restaurants; and 13% of persons with disabilities never went to grocery stores. Id. at 16-17.

19 Congress itself engaged in extensive study and fact-finding concerning the problem of unconstitutional treatment of individuals with disabilities, holding 13 hearings devoted specifically to consideration of the Disabilities Act. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389-390 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing hearings). In addition, a congressionally designated Task Force held 63 public forums across the country that were attended by more than 30,000 individuals. Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment 16 (1990) (Task Force Report). The Task Force also presented to Congress evidence submitted by nearly 5,000 individuals documenting the problems with discrimination and invidious stereotypes that persons with disabilities faced daily -- often at the hands of state and local governments. See 2 Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 1040 (Comm. Print 1990) (Leg. Hist.).9 Congress also considered several reports and surveys.
9 See also Task Force Report 16. Those “several thousand documents” evidencing “massive discrimination and segregation in all aspects of life,” 2 Leg. Hist. 1324-1325, are part of the official legislative history of the Disabilities Act, id. at 1336, 1389. Those submissions were lodged with the Court in Garrett, see 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Those submissions are cited herein by reference to the State and Bates stamp number, which is how they were lodged in Garrett.

20 See S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 28; Task Force Report 16.10
2. Congress Amassed Voluminous Evidence Of Historic And Enduring Discrimination And Deprivation Of Fundamental Rights By States
a. Historic Discrimination: The “propriety of any § 5 legislation ‘must be judged with reference to the historical experience . . . it reflects.’” Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 525). While petitioner and its seven amici States ignore it, Congress and this Court have long acknowledged the Nation’s “history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment’” of persons with disabilities. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]f course, persons with mental disabilities have been subject to historic mistreatment, indifference, and hostility.”); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (“Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious.”); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985)
10 Those included the United States Civil Rights Commission, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983); two polls conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (1986), and The ICD Survey II: Employing Disabled Americans (1987); a report by the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (1988); and eleven interim reports submitted by the Task Force.

21 ("well-cataloged instances of invidious discrimination against the handicapped do exist").
“[T]orture, imprisonment, and execution of handicapped people throughout history are not uncommon.” United States Civil Rights Comm’n, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 18 n.5 (1983) (Spectrum). More often, “societal practices of isolation and segregation have been the rule.” Ibid. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the eugenics movement labeled persons with mental and physical disabilities as “sub-human creatures” and “waste products” responsible for poverty and crime. Id. at 20. Every single State, by law, provided for the segregation of persons with mental disabilities and, frequently, epilepsy, and excluded them from public schools and other state services and privileges of citizenship.11 States also fueled the fear and isolation of persons with disabilities by requiring public officials and parents to report and segregate into institutions the “feebleminded.”12
Almost every State accompanied forced segregation with compulsory sterilization and prohibitions on marriage. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world, if * * * society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
11 See People First Amicus Br., App. A, Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, No. 99-423 (Compendium of State Laws); see also Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 Yale L.J. 1644 (1979). 12 Spectrum 20, 33-34; Compendium of State Laws A5, A21-A22, A25, A28-A29, A40, A44, A46-A49, A50-A51, A56, A61-A63, A65-A66, A71, A74-A75.

22
continuing their kind. * * * Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.”); 3 Leg. Hist. 2242; M. Burgdorf & R. Burgdorf, A History
of Unequal Treatment (Unequal Treatment), 15 Santa Clara Lawyer
855, 887-888 (1975). Children with mental disabilities “were
excluded completely from any form of public education.” Board of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191 (1982). Numerous States also
restricted the rights of the physically disabled to enter into
contracts, Spectrum 40, while a number of large cities enacted
“ugly laws,” which prohibited the physically disabled from
appearing in public. Chicago’s law provided:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or improper person to be allowed in or on the public ways or other public places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose himself to public view, under a penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each offense.
Unequal Treatment 863 (quoting ordinance). Such laws were enforced
as recently as 1974. Id. at 864.13
b. Enduring Unconstitutional Treatment: “Prejudice, once
let loose, is not easily cabined.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 464
(Marshall, J., concurring); see Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979 (noting
the “persistence” of gender discrimination and the “firmly rooted”
stereotypes that accompany it). Indeed, Congress found that “our
13 See also State v. Board of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 153 (Wis. 1919) (approving exclusion of a boy with cerebral palsy from public school because he “produces a depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children”) (noted at 2 Leg. Hist. 2243); see generally T. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temple L. Rev. 393, 399-407 (1991).

23 society is still infected by the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully human and therefore are not fully eligible for the opportunities, services, and support systems which are available to other people as a matter of right,” and “[t]he result is massive, society-wide discrimination.” S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 8-9.
That is because a concerted process of changing discriminatory laws, policies, practices, and stereotypical conceptions and prejudices did not even begin until the 1970s and 1980s. Cf. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978. Even then, “out-dated statutes [were] still on the books, and irrational fears or ignorance, traceable to the prolonged social and cultural isolation” of those with disabilities “continue to stymie recognition of the[ir] dignity and individuality.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 467 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The involuntary sterilization of the disabled is not distant history; it continued into the 1970s, and occasionally even into the 1980s -- well within the lifetime of many current governmental decisionmakers. P. Reilly, The Surgical Solution 2, 148 (1991); Look Back at Oregon’s History of Sterilizing Residents of State Institutions (National Pub. Radio broadcast Dec. 2, 2002). As recently as 1983, fifteen States continued to have compulsory sterilization laws on the books. Spectrum 37; see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978) (state judge ordered the sterilization of a “somewhat retarded” 15-yearold girl); Reilly, supra, at 148-160; contrast Skinner v. Oklahoma,

24

316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (strict scrutiny governs sterilization

classifications). Until the late 1970s, “peonage was a common

practice in [Oregon] institutions.”

Gov. J. Kitzhaber,

Proclamation of Human Rights Day, and apology for Oregon’s forced

sterilization of institutionalized persons (Dec. 2, 2002). As of

1979, “most States still categorically disqualified ‘idiots’ from

voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion

to exclude left in the hands of low-level election officials.”

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring).

Based on the evidence it amassed, Congress found, as a matter

of present reality and historical fact, that persons with

disabilities have confronted “widespread and persisting deprivation

of [their] constitutional rights” with respect to a broad array of

public services. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645; see 42 U.S.C.

12101(a)(2) and (3).

(i) Access to the courts: “Few places are a more real

expression of the constitutional authority of the government than

a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds.” Edmonson v. Leesville

Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). The Fourteenth Amendment

protects the rights of civil litigants, criminal defendants, and

members of the public to have access to the courts. E.g., Richmond

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For individuals

charged with crimes, like respondent Lane, the Due Process Clause

and the Sixth Amendment afford the accused “a right to be present

at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the

25
fairness of the proceedings,” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819 & n.15 (1975), a right that criminal proceedings generally be
open to the public, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984), and
a right to be tried by a jury of their peers, U.S. Const. Amend.
VI. Yet Congress learned -- as the present case well illustrates
-- that “[t]he courthouse door is still closed to Americans with
disabilities” -- literally. 2 Leg. Hist. 936 (Sen. Harkin).
I went to the courtroom one day and * * * I could not get into the building because there were about 500 steps to get in there. Then I called for the security guard to help me, who * * * told me there was an entrance at the back door for the handicapped people. * * * I went to the back door and there were three more stairs for me to get over to be able to ring a bell to announce my arrival so that somebody would come and open the door and maybe let me in.* * * This is the court system that is supposed to give me a fair hearing. It took me 2 hours to get in. * * * And when [the judge] finally saw me in the courtroom, he could not look at me because of my wheelchair. * * * The employees of the courtroom came back to me and told me, “You are not the norm. You are not the normal person we see every day.”
Id. at 1071 (Emeka Nwojke).
That was not an isolated incident. A report before Congress
showed that 76% of state-owned buildings offering services and
programs for the general public were inaccessible and unusable for
persons with disabilities. Spectrum 39. State officials
themselves “pointed to negative attitudes and misconceptions as
potent impediments to [their own] barrier removal policies.”14 In
14 Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental Relations, Disability Rights Mandates: Federal and State Compliance with Employment Protections and Architectural Barrier Removal 87 (Apr. 1989). See also Texas Civil Rights Project, Courts Closed to Justice: A

26
addition, the Department of Justice’s quarterly reports on its
enforcement efforts under the Disabilities Act document numerous
investigations into jurisdictions (including in Tennessee), whose
courthouses and courtroom facilities are totally inaccessible to
persons who use wheelchairs, have inaccessible jury boxes, witness
stands, attorneys’ areas, or spectator seats, do not provide sign
language interpreters or other assistive listening devices to
litigants, spectators, or other courtroom participants, or do not
contain any accessible bathroom facilities.15 Such findings
properly inform the Court’s evaluation of the propriety of Section
5 legislation. See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 312. Further, that
Survey of Courthouse Accessibility in Texas for People with Disabilities 10 (Nov. 1996) (Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, Austin Court of Appeals, Office of the Attorney General, and state law library remained inaccessible until suit filed under Title II); AL 15 (“A man, called to testify in court, had to get out of his wheelchair and physically pull himself up three flights of stairs to reach the courtroom.”); WV 1745 (witness in court case had to be carried up two flights of stairs because the sheriff would not let him use the elevator); WY 1786 (individual unable to get a marriage license because the courthouse was not accessible); MA 812; CA 254; CO 273; ID 528; PA 1394; WA 1690; MS 990, 998; SD 1475; NC 1161-1164; AL 5; DE 345; GA 374; HI 455; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 See, e.g., Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report from the Dep’t of Justice (ADA Report), Oct.-Dec. 2002, at 7 (criminal defendant with hearing disability had difficultly obtaining interpreter); id., Apr.-June, 2002, at 7-8 (inaccessible jury boxes); id., Apr.June, 2001, at 7 (inaccessible hearing rooms); id., Apr.-Sept., 2000, at 8; id., Apr.-June, 1999, at 8 (inaccessible courtroom entrance, seating areas, witness stand, jury box, jury room, and jury rest room); id., Apr.-June, 1998, at 10; id., Apr.-June, 1997, at 6. Appendix B to this brief contains a Table summarizing the Justice Department’s enforcement efforts in this area.

27

pattern of inaccessibility, marginalization, and constructive

exclusion of defendants and civil litigants with disabilities

denies those individuals “‘the feeling of just treatment by the

government’” that the Due Process Clause guarantees. Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 261 (1978). It is “[c]entral both to the

idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of

equal protection * * * that government and each of its parts remain

open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” Romer v.

Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).

(ii) Participation in the judicial process:

“Equal

opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is

fundamental to our democratic system.” J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.

127, 145 (1994). But differential treatment of individuals with

disabilities affects their ability to be heard, to observe, and to

participate meaningfully in judicial proceedings. See, e.g., ID

506 (adult victims of abuse with developmental disabilities denied

equal rights to testify in court). Furthermore, “excluding

identifiable segments playing major roles in the community” from

jury service “cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of

jury service.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).

Yet, to this day, petitioner continues to prohibit the “physically

disabled” from serving as jurors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-2-304(c)

and(d)(3) (1994); see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 729.204 (West 2002)

(board compiling jury list “shall select only the names of persons

who are * * * not infirm or decrepit”); id. §§ 730.254, 730.404.

28
Arkansas and Louisiana similarly prohibited the physically disabled
from serving as jurors at the time of Title II’s enactment.16 When
States categorically exclude individuals from jury service because
of their disability, without regard to their ability to perform as
jurors, the Constitution’s “promise of equality dims, and the
integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized.” J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 146; see Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
(iii) Education: “[E]ducation is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments” because “it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education.” Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Indeed, “classifications
involving the complete denial of education are in a sense unique,
for they strike at the heart of equal protection values by
involving the State in the creation of permanent class
distinctions.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Blackmun,
16 See Ark. Code. Ann., Title 16, ch. 31 note (Michie 1999) (until 1994, state law prohibited “any person whose sense of hearing or seeing is substantially impaired” from serving as a juror); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3041 (Hist. & Stat. Notes) (1996 amendment removed provision permitting judges to “hold prospective jurors incompetent because of physical infirmities”); Appendix B; State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 814-815 (Mo. 1985) (upholding the exclusion of deaf persons from the jury wheel); ADA Report, Jan.-Mar., 1997, at 5 (two jurisdictions disqualify prospective jurors because of deafness); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 40.01 (2003), Hist. & Stat. Notes (until 1979, the “physically or mentally infirm” were ineligible for jury service); Guthrie v. State, 194 P.2d 895, 902 (Okla. Crim. App. 1948) (Oklahoma law “pertaining to the qualifications of a juror prevents a person serving on the jury who is afflicted with a bodily infirmity amounting to a disability”).

29

J., concurring). Accordingly, where the State provides a public

education, that right “must be made available to all on equal

terms.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.

But Congress learned that irrational prejudices, fears, and

animus still operate to deny persons with disabilities an equal

opportunity for public education.

As recently as 1975,

approximately 1 million disabled students were “excluded entirely

from the public school system.” 42 U.S.C. 1400(c)(2)(C). A

quadriplegic woman with cerebral palsy and a high intellect was

branded “retarded” by educators, denied placement in a regular

school setting, and placed with emotionally disturbed children,

where she was told she was “not college material.” VT 1635. Other

school districts also simply labeled as mentally retarded a blind

child and a child with cerebral palsy. NB 1031; AK 38 (child with

cerebral palsy subsequently obtained a Masters Degree). “When I

was 5,” another witness testified, “my mother proudly pushed my

wheelchair to our local public school, where I was promptly refused

admission because the principal ruled that I was a fire hazard.”

S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 7.17

17 See also Cal. Att’y Gen., Commission on Disability: Final Report 17, 81 (Dec. 1989) (Cal. Report) (“A bright child with cerebral palsy is assigned to a class with mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled children solely because of her physical disability”; in one town, all children with disabilities are grouped into a single classroom regardless of individual ability.); 136 Cong. Rec. 10,913 (1990) (Rep. McDermott) (school board excluded Ryan White, who had AIDS, not because the board “thought Ryan would infect the others” but because “some parents were afraid he would”); NY 1123 (three elementary schools locked

30
State institutions of higher education acted on the same
stereotypes and prejudices. Indeed, the “higher one goes on the
education scale, the lower the proportion of handicapped people one
finds.” Spectrum 28; see Threshold 14. A person with epilepsy was
asked to leave a state college because her seizures were
“disrupt[ive]” and, officials said, created a risk of liability. 2
Leg. Hist. 1162 (Barbara Waters). A doctor with multiple sclerosis
was denied admission to a psychiatric residency program because the
state admissions committee “feared the negative reactions of
patients to his disability.” Id. at 1617 (Arlene Mayerson).
Another witness explained that, “when I was first injured, my
college refused to readmit me” because “it would be ‘disgusting’ to
my roommates to have to live with a woman with a disability.” WA
1733. Similarly, a student was denied a teaching assignment
because administrators thought the students would react badly to
her appearance. OR 1384.18
mentally disabled children in a box for punishment); Education for All Handicapped Children, 1973-1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at 793 (1973) (Christine Griffith) (firstgrade student “was spanked every day” because her deafness prevented her from following instructions); id., Pt. 1, at 400 (Mrs. R. Walbridge) (student with spina bifida barred from the school library “because her braces and crutches made too much noise”); id. at 384; 2 Leg. Hist. 989; Spectrum 28, 29; UT 1556; PA 1432; NM 1090; OR 1375; AL 32; SD 1481; MO 1014; NC 1144; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18 See also 2 Leg. Hist. 1224 (Denise Karuth) (state university forced blind student to drop music class because “you can’t see”); id. at 1225 (state commission refused to sponsor legally blind student for masters degree in rehabilitation counseling because

31
For both good and ill, “the law can be a teacher.” Garrett,
531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As with race
discrimination, few governmental messages more profoundly affect
individuals and their communities than segregation in education:
Segregation in education impacts on segregation throughout the community. Generations of citizens attend school with no opportunity to be a friend with persons with disabilities, to grow together, to develop an awareness of capabilities * * *[.] Awareness deficits in our young people who become our community leaders and employers perpetuate the discrimination fostered in the segregated educational system.
MO 1007 (Pat Jones).
(iv) Voting: Because “the right to exercise the franchise in
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562 (1964). Congress found,
however, that persons with disabilities have been “relegated to a
position of political powerlessness,” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(7), and
continue to be subjected to discrimination in voting, 42 U.S.C.
12101(a)(3). Congress made that finding after hearing that “people
with disabilities have been turned away from the polling places
after they have been registered to vote because they did not look
“the State would not hire blind rehabilitation counselors, ‘[s]ince,’ and this is a quote: ‘they could not drive to see their clients’”); J. Shapiro, No Pity 45 (1993) (Dean of the University of California at Berkeley told a prospective student that “[w]e’ve tried cripples before and it didn’t work”); SD 1476; LA 999; MO 1010; WIS 1757; CO 283; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Cal. Report 138; Appendix A, infra.

32
competent.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1220 (Nancy Husted-Jensen) (emphasis
added). A deaf voter was told that “you still have to be able to
use your voice” to vote. Equal Access to Voting for Elderly and
Disabled Persons: Hearings Before the Task Force on Elections of
the House Comm. on House Admin., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1984)
(Equal Voting Hearings).19
The legislative record also documented that many persons with
disabilities “cannot exercise one of your most basic rights as an
American” because polling places or voting machines are
inaccessible. S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 12. As a consequence,
persons with disabilities “were forced to vote by absentee ballot
before key debates by the candidates were held.” Ibid.; see also
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res. and the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1989) (May 1989 Hearings)
(Ill. Att’y Gen. Hartigan). Voting by absentee ballot also
“deprives the disabled voter of an option available to other
19 One voter was “told to go home once when I came to the poll and found the voting machines down a flight of stairs with no paper ballots available”; on another occasion that voter “had to shout my choice of candidates over the noise of a crowd to a precinct judge who pushed the levers of the machine for me, feeling all the while as if I had to offer an explanation for my decisions.” Equal Voting Hearings 45; AL 16; Help America Vote Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (2001) (“Twice in Massachusetts and once in California, while relying on a poll worker to cast my ballot, the poll worker attempted to change my mind about whom I was voting for. * * * [T]o this day I really do not know if they cast my ballot according to my wishes.”); id. at 13; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

33 absentee voters, the right to change their vote by appearing personally at the polls on election day.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1745 (Nanette Bowling). “How can disabled people have clout with our elected officials when they are aware that many of us are prevented from voting?” ARK 155.20
(v) Access to government officials and proceedings: “The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to * * * petition for a redress of grievances,” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-554 (1875), and that right cannot be denied to an entire class of citizens without compelling justification, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). State governments must “act as neutral entities, ready to take instruction and to enact laws when their citizens so demand.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But government cannot take instruction from those whom it cannot see or hear. The Illinois Attorney General testified that he “had innumerable complaints regarding lack of access to public services -- people unable to meet with their elected representatives because their district office buildings were not accessible or unable to attend public meetings because they are held in an inaccessible building.” May 1989 Hearings 488,
20 See Equal Voting Hearings 17, 461; 2 Leg. Hist. 1767; WS 1756; MT 1024, 1026-1027; MI 922; ND 1185; DE 307; AL 16; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 395-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting); FEC, Polling Place Accessibility in the 1988 General Election 7 (1989) (21% of polling places inaccessible; 27% were inaccessible in 1986).

34
491. Another individual, “who has been in a wheelchair for 12
years, tried three times last year to testify before state
legislative committees. And three times, he was thwarted by a
narrow set of Statehouse stairs, the only route to the small
hearing room.” IN 626. The Constitution prohibits laws “declaring
that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government,”
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; governmental actions that have that same
practical effect are equally pernicious.21
(vi) Law Enforcement: Persons with disabilities have also
been victimized in their dealings with law enforcement, in
violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. When police in
Kentucky learned that a man they arrested had AIDS, “[i]nstead of
putting the man in jail, the officers locked him inside his car to
21 See also H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 40 (1990) (town hall and public schools inaccessible); May 1989 Hearings 663 (Dr. Mary Lynn Fletcher) (to attend town meetings, “I (or anyone with a severe mobility impairment) must crawl up three flights of circular stairs to the * * * room [where] all public business is conducted by the county government”); id. at 76; AK 73 (in response to complaints about lack of access to city and State buildings, City Manager responded that “[H]e runs this town * * * and no one is going to tell him what to do.”); ADA Report, Oct.Dec. 2001, at 9 (candidate for city council unable to access a city council platform to address constituents); id., July-Sept. 1997, at 7-9 (State general assembly inaccessible); id., Oct.-Dec. 1994, at 4-6 (access to town hall and polling places); Dep’t of Justice, Enforcing the ADA: Looking Back on a Decade of Progress 4-8 (July 2000) (lack of access to public meetings, offices, and court proceedings); AL 17; IN 651; WS 1758; NY 1119; Cal. Report 70; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

35
spend the night.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1005 (Belinda Mason). Police
refused to accept a rape complaint from a blind woman because she
could not make a visual identification. NM 1081. A person in a
wheelchair was given a ticket and six-months’ probation for
obstructing traffic on the street, even though the person could not
use the sidewalk because it lacked curb cuts. VA 1684. Persons
with hearing impairments “have been arrested and held in jail over
night without ever knowing their rights nor what they are being
held for.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1331 (Justin Dart). In addition, persons
with disabilities like epilepsy are “frequently inappropriately
arrested and jailed” and “deprived of medications while in jail.”
H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 3, at 50.22
(vii) Child Custody: The Constitution protects and respects
the sanctity of the parent-child relationship, e.g., Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), and the Due Process Clause requires States to afford
22 See Cal. Report 103 (parole agent “sent a man who uses a wheelchair back to prison since he did not show up for his appointments even though * * * he could not make the appointments because he was unable to get accessible transportation”); 2 Leg. Hist. 1115 (Paul Zapun) (sheriff threatens persons with disabilities who stop in town); id. at 1197 (police officer taunted witness by putting a gun to her head and pulling the trigger on an empty barrel, “because he thought it would be ‘funny’ since I have quadraparesis and couldn’t flee or fight”); Task Force Report 21 (six wheelchair users arrested for failing to leave restaurant after manager complained that “they took up too much space”); ADA Report, Apr.-June 1997, at 5-7 (unreasonable treatment during traffic stop of deaf motorist); AL 6, DE 345, KS 673, WV 1746, IL 572 (all: lack of interpreter for deaf arrestee); 2 Leg. Hist. 1196; IL 569-570, 583; TX 1541; LA 748; Cal. Report 101-104; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

36
individuals with disabilities fair child custody proceedings,
including the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner,” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
But Congress heard that “clients whose children have been taken
away from them a[re] told to get parent information, but have no
place to go because the services are not accessible. What chance
do they ever have to get their children back?” 2 Leg. Hist. 1331
(Justin Dart). Another government agency refused to authorize a
couple’s adoption of a child solely because the woman had muscular
dystrophy. MA 829.23
(viii) Institutionalization: The Constitution protects
individuals with disabilities from unjustified institutionalization
and from unduly severe treatment while institutionalized.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 322 (1982); O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
738 (1972). Yet unconstitutional denials of appropriate treatment
and unreasonable institutionalization of persons in state mental
hospitals were commonplace. See 2 Leg. Hist. 1203 (Lelia Batten)
23 See H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 3, at 25; id., Pt. 2, at 41 (“[B]eing paralyzed has meant far more than being unable to walk -it has meant being * * * deemed an ‘unfit parent’” in custody proceedings.); 2 Leg. Hist. 1611 n.10 (Arlene Mayerson) (“Historically, child-custody suits almost always have ended with custody being awarded to the non-disabled parent.”); Spectrum 40; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting); No Pity, supra, at 26 (woman with cerebral palsy denied custody of her two sons); In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979) (lower court “stereotype[d] William as a person deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply because he is physically handicapped”); Appendix A, infra.

37
(state hospitals are “notorious for using medication for
controlling the behavior of clients and not for treatment alone.
Seclusion rooms and restraints are used to punish clients.”); id.
at 1262-1263 (Eleanor C. Blake) (detailing the “minimal, custodial,
neglectful, abusive” care received at state mental hospital, and
willful indifference resulting in rape); Spectrum 34-35.24
Indeed, in the years immediately preceding the enactment of
Title II, the Department of Justice found unconstitutional
treatment in state institutions for the mentally retarded or
mentally ill in more than half of the States. One facility
punished mentally retarded residents by forcing them to inhale
ammonia fumes. See Department of Justice, Notice of Findings
24 See Oregon Gov. Kitzhaber, supra (admitting the use of “inhumane devices to restrain and control patients” until “the mid 1980’s”); Cal. Report 114; 132 Cong. Rec. 10,589 (1986) (Sen. Kerry) (“appalling” findings in investigation of State-run mental health facilities; “The extent of neglect and abuse uncovered in their facilities was beyond belief.”); Civil Rights of Instit. Persons: Hearings on S. 1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977) (Michael D. McGuire, M.D.) ("the personnel regarded patients as animals, * * * [and] group kicking and beatings were part of the program"); id. at 191-192; Civil Rights for Instit. Persons: Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 239 (1977) (Stanley C. Van Ness) (describing "pattern and practice of physical assaults and mental abuse of patients, and of unhealthy, unsanitary, and anti-therapeutic living conditions" in New Jersey institutions); Civil Rights of Instit. Persons: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979) (Paul Friedman) (“[A] number of the residents were literally kept in cages”; patients “had regressed because of these shockingly inhumane conditions of confinement"); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

38 Regarding Los Lunas Hosp. & Training Sch. 2 (1988). Residents in other facilities lacked adequate food, clothing, and sanitation. Many state facilities failed to provide basic safety to individuals, resulting in serious physical injuries, sexual assaults, and deaths. See Appendix C, infra.
(ix) Zoning: Congress knew that Cleburne, where this Court found unconstitutional disability discrimination in a zoning decision, was not an isolated incident. In Wyoming, a zoning board refused to authorize a group home because of “local residents’ unfounded fears that the residents would be a danger to the children in a nearby school.” WY 1781. In New Jersey, a group home for those who had suffered head injuries was barred because the public perceived such persons as “totally incompetent, sexual deviants, and that they needed ‘room to roam.’ * * * Officially, the application was turned down due to lack of parking spaces, even though it was early established that the residents would not have automobiles.” NJ 1068.25
(x) Licensing: Licensing decisions by state and local officials evidenced yet another form of discriminatory treatment. The House Report discussed a woman who was denied a teaching credential, not because of her substantive teaching skills, but because of her paralysis. H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 29;
25 See also 2 Leg. Hist. 1230 (Larry Urban); People First Amicus Br. 20 n.94; AL 2, 31; CO 283; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Appendix A, infra.

39

see 2 Leg Hist. 1611 n.9 (Arlene Mayerson) (teaching license denied

“on the grounds that being confined to a wheelchair as a result of

polio, she was physically and medically unsuited for teaching”).26

(xi) Public Transportation:

Individuals reported

discriminatory treatment on public transportation that lacked any

rational basis and that “made no sense in light of how the

[government] treated other groups similarly situated in relevant

respects.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 n.4. One student testified:

Some of the drivers are very rude and get mad if I want to take the bus. Can you believe that? I work and part of my taxes pay for public buses and then they get mad just because I am using a wheelchair.* * * It is hard for people to feel good about themselves if they have to crawl up the stairs of a bus, or if the driver passes by without stopping.

2 Leg. Hist. 993 (Jade Calegory); MA 831 (“Blacks wanted to ride in

the front of the bus. Disabled people just want[] on.”). A high-

level Connecticut transportation official responded to requests for

accessibility by asking “Why can’t all the handicapped people live

in one place and work in one place? It would make it easier for

us.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1085; see also id. at 1097, 1190; WA 1716;

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

(xii) Prison conditions: The Eighth Amendment protects

inmates with disabilities against treatment that is deliberately

indifferent to their serious medical needs and safety or imposes

26 See TX 1549 (state licensing requirements for teaching deaf students require the ability to hear); CA 261; HI 479; TX 1528, 1542-1543; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

40 wanton suffering. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). But Congress heard that
“jailers rational[ize] taking away their wheelchairs as a form of
punishment as if that is different than punishing prisoners by
breaking their legs.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1190 (Cindy Miller). Another
prison guard repeatedly assaulted paraplegic inmates with a knife,
forced them to sit in their own feces, and taunted them with
remarks like “crippled bastard” and “[you] should be dead.” Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603, 605 (6th Cir. 1986).27
(xiii) Other Public Services: The scope of the testimony
offered to Congress regarding unconstitutional treatment touched
virtually every aspect of individuals’ encounters with their
government, sweeping so broadly as to defy isolation into select
categories of state action. Services and programs as varied as the
operation of public libraries, public swimming pools and park
programs, homeless shelters, and benefit programs exposed the discriminatory attitudes of officials.28
27 See Spectrum 168; NM 1091 (prisoners with developmental disabilities subjected to longer prison terms); ADA Report, Apr.June 1998, at 8-10 (longer pre-trial detention for detainees with disabilities; medical treatment and communications with family denied); Appendices A & C, infra. Individuals awaiting placement in State mental institutions in Mississippi were held in a county jail and routinely left for days shackled in a “drunk tank” without any mental health treatment or supervision. Dep’t of Justice, Notice of Findings Regarding Hinds County Detention Ctr. 3 (1986).
28 A paraplegic Vietnam veteran was forbidden to use a public pool; the park commissioner explained that “[i]t’s not my fault you went to Vietnam and got crippled.” 3 Leg. Hist. 1872 (Peter Addesso);

41
3. Other Evidence Confirms the Problem
In Garrett, Justice Kennedy suggested that, if a widespread
problem of disability discrimination existed, “one would have
expected to find * * * extensive litigation and discussion of the
constitutional violations.” 531 U.S. at 968. Appendix A to this
brief provides a non-exhaustive list of cases in which courts have
found discrimination and the deprivation of fundamental rights on
the basis of disability. Many of the cases specifically found
constitutional violations. In others, the facts support that
conclusion, but the existence of statutory relief allowed the court
to avoid the constitutional question. Federal efforts to enforce
the rights of individuals with disabilities offer still more
evidence. See Appendix B. The Department of Justice has found
unconstitutional treatment of individuals with disabilities in
institutions or prisons in more than 30 States. See Appendix C.
see also id. at 1995 (Rev. Scott Allen) (woman with AIDS and her children denied entry to a public swimming pool); 2 Leg. Hist. 1100, 1078, 1116; WIS 1752 (deaf child denied swimming lessons); NC 1156 (mentally retarded child not allowed in pool); CA 166; MS 855; May 1989 Hearings 76 (Ill. Att’y Gen. Hartigan) (visually impaired children with guide dogs “cannot participate in park district programs when the park has a ‘no dogs’ rule”); NC 1155; PA 1391 (limiting library cards for “those having physical as well as mental disabilities”); CA 216 (wheelchair users not allowed in homeless shelter); CA 223 (same); DE 322 (same for mentally ill); KS 713 (discrimination in state job training program); IL 533 (female disability workshop participants advised to get sterilized); IA 664; AK 72, 145; OH 1218; AZ 116; AZ 127; HI 456; ID 541; see generally Spectrum App. A (identifying 20 broad categories of state-provided or supported services and programs in which discrimination against persons with disabilities arises).

42 4. The Constitutional Significance of Unfair
Treatment in Government Services The foregoing record of extensive state and local discrimination in the provision of government services provides the necessary predicate for exercise of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power, for three reasons. First, much of the identified state conduct interferes with or threatens the fundamental rights of individuals with disabilities, or occurs where the right to equal protection intersects with other constitutional rights, see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). A particular class of individuals cannot be excluded from voting, participating in court proceedings, accessing public meetings and services, or raising their children based on nothing more than administrative convenience. Such infringements are unconstitutional “unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499; see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. State laws, like petitioner’s, that exclude individuals with disabilities from jury service, see pages 28-29, supra, plainly fail such scrutiny and evidence the kind of lingering unconstitutional state action and “state-sanctioned stereotype[s]” that provide a valid predicate for Section 5 legislation. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983. Second, much of the identified conduct fails even rational basis scrutiny. Even that low constitutional threshold cannot justify beating a deaf student for failure to follow spoken

43 instructions, refusing to let the disabled on buses, excluding a paralyzed veteran from a public swimming pool, or denying a disabled student a college education either because “it would be ‘disgusting’ to [her] roommates to have to live with a woman with a disability,” or because of groundless stereotypes that individuals with disabilities cannot teach, provide competent rehabilitation counseling, or succeed in a music course. See pages 30-31, 39-41 & nn. 17-18, 26, 28, supra. “[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear” alone cannot justify disparate treatment of those with disabilities, Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
Moreover, a purported rational basis for treatment of the disabled will fail if the State does not accord the same treatment to other groups similarly situated, Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 n.4; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-450, if it is based on “animosity” towards the disabled, Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, or if it gives effect to private biases, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). It accordingly is not enough that the State can offer a rational basis -- such as finances -- for failing to offer benefit information or services in handicap-accessible formats if the State is already accommodating the special communication needs of other (e.g., nonEnglish speaking) constituents. Police may not refuse to take complaints from blind individuals (see page 35, supra), while taking them from victims who were blindfolded or unconscious. Moreover, many of the instances of discriminatory treatment reported to Congress arose in contexts, like education,

44 institutionalization, and zoning, where state actors already make accommodations for other groups, but are selectively resistant to doing so for those with disabilities.
Third, and most importantly, the aggregate effect of consistently excluding individuals with disabilities from a broad range of important government services causes a constitutional problem that is greater than the sum of its parts. The persistent “imposition of inequalities,” on a single class, Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, and the chronic distribution of benefits and services, whether through legislation or executive action, in a way that “impos[es] special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish,” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct 2472, 2487 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Indeed, the combined effect of such governmental decisionmaking has denied individuals with disabilities the Constitution’s most basic guarantees. An individual denied the ability to file a criminal complaint with the police, see page 35, supra, to participate at trial as a witness or juror, to petition the legislature or agencies to lift or modify exclusions, and to vote into office more responsive governmental officials, see pages 25-29, 32-35, supra, is denied those core rights that form the essence of democratic government, rights that others often take for granted. Thus Congress, in Title II, targeted not isolated and unrelated

45 instances of unfair treatment, but an “across the board” pattern of governmental decisionmaking that time and again has left individuals with disabilities “exclu[ded] from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 633; see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886).
5. Title II Is Constitutional In Its Entirety Petitioner’s State amici argue (Br. 7-11) that this Court should focus not on Title II’s overall propriety as Section 5 legislation, but instead should independently analyze whether Congress’s regulation of access to public buildings in Title II was appropriate. The legislative record provides an ample predicate for Congress’s inclusion of public-access requirements in Title II. See Sections B(2)(b)(i), (iv), (v), and (xiii); Appendix B. Beyond that, amici’s piecemeal mode of analyzing Congress’s exercise of its Section 5 power is fundamentally flawed. First, amici’s context-specific approach is not the model this Court has applied. In the past, this Court has analyzed whether Congress has the authority to apply to the States a statute as a whole, Flores, supra, a specific Title of a statute, Garrett, supra, or a specific Section of a statute, South Carolina, supra. But in no case has this Court required Congress to justify the application of an intentionally comprehensive statutory provision to every potential factual setting. In fact, the Court took a different tack in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156

46 (1980), in upholding the application of voting preclearance requirements to cities where no discriminatory purpose underlay their adoption of an electoral system. Id. at 172; see also Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). Likewise, this Court rejected in Hibbs the dissent’s emphasis on Nevada’s specific leave policies. Instead, the Court focused on the broader “backdrop of limited state leave policies,” and found that “Congress was justified in enacting the [Family and Medical Leave Act] as remedial legislation,” “no matter how generous” Nevada’s own policies might have been. 123 S. Ct. at 1981.
Second, amici’s approach is at odds with this Court’s congruence and proportionality test for evaluating Section 5 legislation. Congruence and proportionality analysis necessarily entails looking at a statutory provision’s overall operation and coverage, and measuring it against the predicate for congressional action as a whole. Where the necessary predicate for Section 5 legislation lies, Congress “must have wide latitude in determining” the proper means of enforcing the right. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519520; see generally Hibbs, supra; South Carolina, supra. Congress thus may legislate based on commonsense conclusions about the scope of a problem and may enact prophylactic legislation designed to remedy the continuing effects of past discrimination, to root out

47
difficult-to-detect discrimination and stereotyping, and to prevent
the expansion of unconstitutional treatment into new areas.29
Thus, contrary to amici’s argument, the congruence and
proportionality test is not a license for judicial micromanagement
of every potential application of a law. Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq., for example, prohibits sex and race discrimination
in the administration of any and all employment terms, conditions,
and benefits; yet, this Court has never insisted that Congress
justify its prohibitions application-by-application with a lengthy,
documented record of particularized state discrimination. That is
for the commonsense reason that discrimination, by its nature, does
not operate in isolated compartments. The same mindset that has
presumed that persons with disabilities cannot be educated, should
not be parents, need not vote, and are too much trouble to
transport, has also traditionally excluded individuals with
disabilities from its conception of the community served by public
programs and benefits. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980 n.5.30
29 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (Congress's Section 5 power "include[s] the power to define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations"); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding a nationwide ban on literacy tests and residency requirements despite the geographically limited evidence of abuse). 30 Prior to the Court’s adoption of the congruence and proportionality test in Flores, supra, the Court did rely upon an as-applied analysis to sustain the constitutionality of legislation enacted under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-26 (1960); cf. Griffin v.

48 In that regard, amici’s balkanized approach to Title II fundamentally misapprehends the nature and scope of the constitutional problem addressed by Congress. The legislative record before Congress revealed an interconnected pattern in the distribution of government services through which State actors continue to exclude and isolate individuals with disabilities, perpetuate false stereotypes, and persistently deny the disabled the same types of reasonable accommodations and adjustments that are routinely afforded other members of the public. Congress enacted a comprehensive and unitary remedy because it confronted a comprehensive and unitary problem. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981 (“Congress did not create a particular leave policy for its own sake,” but rather addressed leave policy as part of a broader effort to “dismantle persisting gender-based barriers to the hiring, retention, and promotion of women in the workplace”). 6. State Laws Provide Insufficient Protection Petitioner and its amici argue (Pet. Br. 21-22; Ala. Br. 2225) that the existence of state laws prohibiting some forms of disability discrimination made congressional action unnecessary. But, as the facts of this case well illustrate, that argument confuses the existence of laws with their effectiveness, and Hibbs made clear that effectiveness is what matters. 123 S. Ct. at 1980-
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-106 (1971) (sustaining the constitutionality of a law enacted under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment both facially and as applied).

49

1981 (addressing “important shortcomings” of laws cited by the

dissenters). Congress specifically found that state laws were

“inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination

that people with disabilities are facing.” S. Rep. No. 116, supra,

at 18; see also ibid. (section of report entitled “CURRENT FEDERAL

AND STATE LAWS ARE INADEQUATE”); H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2,

at 47 (same).31 State officials themselves broadly agreed with that

assessment. The 50 State Governors’ Committees “report[ed] that

existing State laws do not adequately counter * * *

discrimination.” S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 18; H.R. Rep. No. 485,

supra, Pt. 2, at 47; Cal. Report 22-23 (noting “contradictions” and

“gaps” in state law). The Illinois Attorney General testified that

“[p]eople with disabilities should not have to win these rights on

a State-by-State basis,” and that “[i]t is long past time * * *

[for] a national policy that puts persons with disabilities on

equal footing with other Americans.” May 1989 Hearings 77.32

In addition, petitioner exaggerates the coverage of state

laws.

See generally J. Flaccus, Handicap Discrimination

31 See 136 Cong. Rec. 11,455 (1990) (Rep. Wolpe), id. at 11,461 (Rep. Levine); 134 Cong. Rec. 9384-9385 (1988) (Sen. Simon); 2 Leg. Hist. 963, 967, 1642-1643; 3 Leg. Hist. 2245; AL 24; AK 52.
32 See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Visions of: Independence, Productivity, Integration for People with Developmental Disabilities 29 (1990) (19 States strongly recommended passage of the Disabilities Act); 2 Leg. Hist. 1050 (Mass. Rehab. Comm’n); id. at 1455-1456 (Treas., Harris Co., Tex.); id. at 1473-1474 (Chair, Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Co., Tex.); id. at 1506 (Texas State Sen. Brooks); id. at 1508; May 1989 Hearings 778 (Ohio Governor).

50 Legislation: With Such Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State Legislation Be of any Help?, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 261 (1986) (detailing gaps in coverage of state laws). Prior to 1990, nearly half of the States did not protect persons with mental illness and/or mental disabilities. See id. at 278-280. New Hampshire excluded disabilities caused by illness, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:3(XIII) (1984), while Arizona excluded disabilities which were first manifested after the age of 18, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36551(11)(b) (1986). Flaccus, supra, at 285. Few States protected against discrimination based on either a perceived disability or a history of illness such as cancer. See B. Hoffman, Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer History, 1986 Temple L. Q. 1 (1986). Many States failed to provide for private rights of action and compensatory damages, effectively leaving victims of discrimination without enforceable remedies. Id. at App. B; Flaccus, supra, at 300-310, 317-321.33 Even today, less than half of the States provide statutory protection comparable to Title II. R. Colker & A. Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075, 1076, 1083 (Summer 2002). In fact, petitioner’s and amicus Wyoming’s public
33 See May 1989 Hearings 386-394; 3 Leg. Hist. 2245; Employment Discrim. Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opp. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1985) (Rep. Moakley) (“[O]nefourth of the states have no protection for the handicapped. Additionally, even those states with laws differ greatly in their regulations.”) (ten-state survey showing gaps in coverage of laws).

51 accommodation laws do not cover discrimination in the provision of governmental services based on disability at all, and the laws of petitioner and four of its amici lack any enforcement mechanism against the State. Id. at 1093, 1102. Thus, just as state laws against gender discrimination have neither eradicated the problem nor undermined the basis for subjecting States to federal prohibitions, see Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978-1982, Congress was equally justified in concluding that state laws against disability discrimination had generally been ineffective in combating the lingering effects of prior official discrimination and exclusionary laws and policies and, more importantly, in changing the behavior of individual state actors.
C. The Americans With Disabilities Act Of 1990 Is Reasonably Tailored To Remedying And Preventing Constitutional Violations
While Congress “must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the unconstitutional conduct it has identified, Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639, “the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies,” Flores, 521 U.S. at 519-520. Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether Title II “prohibit[s] a somewhat broader swath of conduct,” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, than would the courts. “Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.” Ibid. The question is

52 whether, in light of the scope of the problem identified by Congress, the enactment “is so out of proportion to the supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86. Title II is not.
1. Title II’s Terms are Tailored To The Constitutional Problems It Remedies
Title II targets exclusively governmental action that is itself directly limited by the Constitution, rather than targeting public and private employment policies as a single, undifferentiated whole. Title II also focuses on discrimination that threatens fundamental rights or that is unreasonable. For those reasons, much of Title II’s operation targets conduct outlawed by the Constitution itself. As applied to discrimination in voting, child custody proceedings, criminal cases, institutionalization, conditions of confinement, interactions with law enforcement, judicial proceedings, access to public officials and offices, and other areas implicating fundamental rights, Title II tracks the Fourteenth Amendment when it prevents the disparate deprivation of those rights for invidious or insubstantial reasons.
Furthermore, Title II targets discrimination that is unreasonable and, in so doing, ensures (as this Court did in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-450), that the government’s articulated rationale for differential treatment does not mask impermissible animus and does not result in the differential treatment of

53 similarly situated groups. The States retain their discretion to exclude persons from programs, services, or benefits for any lawful reason unconnected with their disability or for no reason at all. The Disabilities Act does not require preferences and permits the denial of benefits or services if a person cannot “meet[] the essential eligibility requirements” of the governmental program or service, 42 U.S.C. 12131(2). But once an individual proves that he can meet all the essential eligibility requirements of a program or service, especially those programs and services that implicate fundamental rights, the government’s interest in excluding that qualified individual solely “by reason of such disability,” 42 U.S.C. 12132, is both minimal and, in light of history, constitutionally circumscribed. At the same time, permitting the States to retain and enforce their essential eligibility requirements protects their legitimate interests in structuring governmental activities. The Disabilities Act thus balances a State’s legitimate operational interests against the right of a person with a disability to be judged “by his or her own merit and essential qualities.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000).
As petitioner notes (Br. 31), the Disabilities Act requires "reasonable modifications" in public services, 42 U.S.C. 12131(2). But, as Hibbs makes clear, once Congress identifies a predicate of unconstitutional conduct that it seeks to remedy, Congress has flexibility in fashioning the remedy. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981 n.10, 1982-1984. The requirement of reasonable modifications,

54 moreover, is precisely tailored to the unique features of disability discrimination in two ways.
First, given the history of segregation and isolation and the resulting entrenched stereotypes, fear, prejudices, and ignorance about persons with disabilities, Congress reasonably determined that a simple ban on overt discrimination would be insufficient. It would do little to combat the “stereotypes [that have] created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination” against individuals with disabilities, and which, in turn, lead “to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. Given the record of discrimination against and unconstitutional treatment of the disabled, government’s failure to make reasonable accommodations to the rigid enforcement of seemingly neutral criteria can often mask just such invidious, but difficult to prove, discrimination. Congress’ Section 5 power includes the ability to ensure that constitutional violations are not left unremedied because of difficulties of proof. See, e.g., Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982; South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 314-315.
In addition, a simple ban on discrimination would freeze in place the effects of States’ prior official exclusion and isolation of individuals with disabilities, which had the effect of rendering the disabled invisible to government planners, thereby creating a self-perpetuating spiral of segregation, stigma, and neglect. See Gaston County, supra (constitutionally administered literacy test banned because it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination).

55 By reducing stereotypes and misconceptions, integration reduces the likelihood that constitutional violations will recur. Cf. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (segregation “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life”).
Second, the Constitution itself already requires individualized consideration and modification of practices or programs, when necessary to avoid infringing on fundamental rights.34 Beyond that, States may not justify infringement on fundamental rights by pointing to the administrative convenience or cost savings achieved by maintaining barriers to the enjoyment of those rights.35 Title II, moreover, requires modifications only where “reasonable,” 42 U.S.C. 12131(2). Governments need not make modifications that “impose an undue hardship” or require “fundamental alterations in the nature of a service, program, or activity,” in light of their nature or cost, agency resources, and the operational practices and structure of the program. 42 U.S.C. 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A); 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7), 35.150(a)(3), 35.164; Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16 (plurality opinion). Furthermore, based on the consistent testimony of witnesses and expert studies, Congress determined that the vast majority of
34 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121-122 (1996); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-658. 35 See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1981); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965).

56 modifications entail little or no cost. One local government official stressed that “[t]his bill will not impose great hardships on our county governments” because “the majority of accommodations for employees with disabilities are less than $50" and “[t]he cost of making new or renovated structures accessible is less than 1 percent of the total cost of construction.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1443 (Treasurer, Harris Co., Tex.).36
Title II thus goes further than the Constitution itself only to the extent that some disability discrimination in the realm of public services may have no impact on fundamental rights and may be rational for constitutional purposes, but still be unreasonable under the standards of the Disabilities Act. But that margin of statutory protection does not exceed Congress’ authority. Like Title VII on which it was modeled, that level of statutory protection is necessary both to reach unconstitutional conduct that would otherwise escape detection in court and to deter future constitutional violations.
Furthermore, “[a] proper remedy for an unconstitutional exclusion * * * aims to eliminate so far as possible the discriminatory effects of the past and to bar like discrimination in the future.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547
36 See also S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 10-12, 89, 92; H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 34; 2 Leg. Hist. 1552, 1077, 1388-1389, 14561457, 1560; 3 Leg. Hist. 2190-2191; Task Force Report 27; Spectrum 2, 30, 70; GAO, Briefing Report on Costs of Accommodations, Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1990).

57 (1996). Section 5 thus empowers Congress to do more than simply prohibit the creation of new barriers to equality; it can require States to tear down the walls they erected during decades of discrimination and exclusion. See id. at 550 n.19 (Equal Protection Clause itself can require modification of facilities and programs to ensure equal access); see also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981 n.10. Title II’s accommodation requirements eliminate the effects of past discrimination by ensuring that persons previously invisible to program and building designers are now considered part of the government’s service constituency. “Just as it is unthinkable to design a building with a bathroom only for use by men, it ought to be just as unacceptable to design a building that can only be used by able-bodied persons.” 3 Leg. Hist. 1987 n.4 (Laura Cooper). That is because “[i]t is exclusive designs, and not any inevitable consequence of a disability that results in the isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities in our society.” Ibid. In short, Title II is appropriate legislation because the remedy for segregation is integration, not inertia.37
2. Title II Is As Broad As Necessary Lastly, petitioner objects (Br. 29-31) to the scope of Title II’s coverage. But the operative question is not whether Title II
37 Likewise, child-size and adult-size water fountains routinely appear in buildings; requiring accessible fountains just expands that routine design process. 2 Leg. Hist. 993-994 (Jade Calegory) (“Black people had to use separate drinking fountains and those of us using wheelchairs cannot even reach some drinking fountains. We get thirsty, too.”).

58 is broad, but whether it is broader than necessary. It is not. Congress found that the history of unconstitutional treatment and the risk of future discrimination found by Congress pertain to all aspects of governmental operations. It determined that only a comprehensive effort to integrate persons with disabilities would end the cycle of isolation, segregation, and second-class citizenship, and deter further discrimination. Integration in education alone, for example, would not suffice if there were not going to be jobs and professional licenses for those who received the education. Integration in employment and licensing would not suffice if persons with disabilities lacked transportation. Integration in transportation is insufficient unless persons with disabilities can get into the facilities to which they are traveling. Ending unnecessary institutionalization is of little gain if neither government services nor the social activities of public life (libraries, museums, parks, and recreational services) are accessible to bring persons with disabilities into the life of the community. And none of those efforts would suffice if persons with disabilities continued to lack equivalent access to government officials, courthouses, and polling places.
In short, Congress chose a comprehensive remedy because it confronted an all-encompassing, inter-connected problem. To do less would be as ineffectual as “throwing an 11-foot rope to a drowning man 20 feet offshore and then proclaiming you are going more than halfway,” S. Rep. No. 116, supra, at 13.

59
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE B. OLSON Solicitor General
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA Assistant Attorney General
PAUL D. CLEMENT Deputy Solicitor General
PATRICIA A. MILLETT Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER SARAH E. HARRINGTON KEVIN RUSSELL
Attorneys
NOVEMBER 2003

APPENDIX C Findings of Investigations Under the Civil Rights
Of Institutionalized Persons Act 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq.
Between 1980 and the enactment of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, Department of Justice investigations under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq., found unconstitutional treatment of individuals with disabilities in institutions in more than twenty-five States. From 1980 until the present, unconstitutional conditions have been found in more than 200 institutions in more than thirty States throughout the Country. The Tables below describe some of the findings issued by the Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997b(a)(1). Copies of the complete findings letters will be provided to the Court upon request, and have been served upon counsel for the petitioner and the private respondents.
(1c)

2c
I. Investigations Prior to Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Name of Facility
Rosewood Center

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

MD 1982 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Many residents sustained injuries during “low staffing periods” (p. 4).
One resident left the facility unobserved and died of exposure. A profoundly retarded resident drowned when staff left him unattended in a bathtub. Another died after being pushed down a flight of stairs (pp. 4-5).

On another occasion, “six severely handicapped female residents * * * were allegedly raped by an outside intruder. There was only one staff person on duty to supervise the 32 residents * * * and only one security officer on duty to cover the entire Rosewood facility. While the inability of the residents to communicate apparently prevented state officials from confirming the rapes * * * several of the

Name of Facility

3c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

residents had positive tests for gonorrhea of the throat right after the incident” (p. 4).

Abuse of residents Unsanitary conditions
Inadequate training

Several male patients “show[ed] the presence of venereal disease” and “nonconsensual sexual contact occurred between one resident and at least one and possibly three residents” (p. 4).
An employee sexually abused a resident (p. 4).
Facilities are deteriorating; the “stench of urine is prevalent in a number of buildings.” Plumbing problems left overflowing toilets unrepaired for days; heating problems subjected patients to “sub-freezing temperature in the buildings themselves” at times (p. 5).
“Over 900 of the 1125 residents receive less than 50% of the services

Name of Facility

4c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

called for in their program plans” (p. 2).

East Louisiana State Hospital

LA 1982 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Enid & Paul’s OK 1983 Inadequate

Valley State

medical and

Schools

mental health

care

Inadequate training

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

pp. 2-4
“Insufficient licensed physician coverage has resulted in serious harms to residents,” contributing to patient deaths (p. 2-3).
Lack of training “contributes to and manifests itself in residents’ aggressive and stereotypic behaviors * * * [such as] incessant disordered physical movements, headbanging, biting, hyperactivity, and assaultive behavior” (p. 5).
“For example, a group of 21 naked residents were observed being led to a shower area, where two staff sprayed the residents down with a large garden type hose” (p. 5).

Name of Facility

5c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

p. 5

Details

Abuse of residents

Unsanitary conditions

Wheat Ridge Regional Center

CO 1984 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Staff found “slapping, kicking, hitting, or spanking residents” while records also “reflect many instances of unexplained resident injuries” (p. 6).
Lack of sanitation practices contributed to parasitic and bacterial infections requiring quarantine of entire living areas (p. 6).
“Due to lack of staff, residents suffer neglect and numerous accidents and injuries. * * * [N]umerous residents have sustained injuries where the cause remains unknown. Resident on resident assaults are common; residents engaging in self-abusive behaviors are frequently unsupervised and unattended. Residents have been

Name of Facility

6c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

found with unexplained broken bones and burns to the body. For example, one resident was found with a femur segment protruding through the skin” (p. 2).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

During tour, staff came upon “approximately 20 adult women being cared for by one person amid great disorder and confusion. Many of these women were partially undressed, one was urinating on the floor of the living area and several were engaging in selfabusive behavior” (p. 2).
“A large number of Wheat Ridge residents suffer from severe contractures of their limbs and other body deformities due to the absence of necessary physical and occupational therapy” (p. 3). “One troublesome secondary effect of these immobilizing contractures due to lack of physical

Name of Facility
Logansport State Hospital

7c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

therapy is the dysfunctioning of the digestive system,” which has apparently caused an “abnormally high percentage of Wheat Ridge residents to require pureed diets or gastroatomies for tube feeding” (p. 4).

IN 1984 Inadequate medical and mental health care

pp. 1-2

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“Patients are not being adequately monitored and supervised to prevent suicidal behavior or patienton-patient violence, to notice and correctly diagnose symptoms of serious, physical or psychiatric dysfunctions, to monitor treatment responses and drug reactions, or to determine appropriate and reasonably safe modes of treatment for each patient” (pp. 2-3).

8c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Manteno and Eglin Mental Health Centers

IL 1984 Inadequate medical and mental health care; Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Lack of professional staff lead to “inappropriate uses of drugs and serious treatment errors which have resulted in physical danger to, or unnecessary physical or chemical restraint of, the involved patients” (p. 3). Patients are further “endangered by inadequate medical care relating to serious and sometimes debilitating or life-threatening drug side-effects” (p. 4).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“Units in the facilities are overcrowded to a point that makes it virtually impossible for staff to maintain control without regular and extensive use of physical and chemical restraints” (p. 4).

Unsanitary conditions

“Sanitation and maintenance in portions of the facilities are so inadequate as to present serious risks to patients of poisoning,

9c

Name of Facility
Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

infection, or disease” (pp. 4-5).

MI 1984 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Abuse of residents

Large number of patient deaths under unusual circumstances, some associated with restraint practices (p. 3).

A patient died after “a stranglehold was applied to him while he was being subdued. He reportedly lay on the seclusion room floor from 15-20 minutes before efforts were made to resuscitate him” (pp. 2-3).

“Another patient also died due to strangulation, and his body showed signs of a beating” (p. 3).

“A third patient allegedly died from injuries suffered in a beating. Still another patient, who had expressed her fear for her safety to her psychologist on a Friday, died over the weekend. Her body allegedly was bruised and battered” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Fairview Training Center

10c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Police found that another patient who had died in a seclusion cell “had contusions on his face and the back of his head” (p. 3).

There have also been “numerous incidents of rape, assault and threat of assault, broken bones and bruises” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
OR 1985 Inadequate training

A staff member was found to have had “sexual relations with three different patients in one night.” Other patients were beaten by staff, “including one who was stripped, placed in seclusion and severely beaten by several attendants” (p. 3).
Inadequate medical care contributed to several deaths and preventable suicides (pp. 3-4).
Training “is virtually nonexistent” and “results in a serious level of self-injurious and aggressive behaviors” (p. 3).

Name of Facility

11c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“[R]estraints are used at Fairview in lieu of training and for the convenience of staff,” and were employed more than 2,000 times per month (p. 4).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Records showed “an alarmingly high number of injuries,” such as 197 incidents of injuries in one month resulting from self-abuse or aggression. In one two-month period, there were 27 incidents of sexual abuse (p. 3 n.1).

“[W]e observed numerous residents with open wounds, gashes, abrasions, contusions, and fresh bite marks. Many other residents had deep scars and scabs from a long history of selfabuse or victimization” (p. 3).

Due to inadequate supervision of residents with pica behavior (ingesting inedible objects), “[r]esidents have had to undergo

Name of Facility

12c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

surgery, sometimes on a repeated basis, to remove foreign objects or to relieve bowel and other obstructions caused by pica. Physicians at Fairview have indicated that some residents have had surgery so frequently that any more operations resulting from pica would jeopardize their lives” (p. 8).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Dangerous psychotropic medication practices (p. 7-8).

Unsanitary conditions

“Seventy percent of residents institution-wide have gum disease” (p. 8).
“Many of the cottages we toured smelled of urine and waste. Sewage backup in cottage basements, up to three feet high on the walls, is permitted to remain for days. * * * [A]n August 1983 random sample of Fairview residents revealed

13c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

that 35% had pinworm infection, a parasite which is spread by fecal and oral routes in unclean environments” (p. 9).

Fort Stanton Hospital & Training School

NM 1985 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facilities’ sole physician wrote institution-wide prescriptions for prescription medications and powerful psychotropic medications, authorizing their use when nursing staff believes it necessary, in contravention of professional standards and creating substantial risk to patients (p. 2).

Unreasonable use of chemical restraints

Psychotropic drugs being used to restrain patients without any physician assessment for the need for such measures (p. 2.)

Inadequate mental health care

“Many residents are subjected to potentially dangerous” prescriptions of multiple psychotropic drugs

Name of Facility

14c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“without any medical justification” (p. 2)

Southbury Training School

CT 1985 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety
Inadequate medical and mental health care

Low staffing levels lead to inadequate supervision, which permitted one resident to leave the facility and die of exposure; another was able to remove and hide a large knife (p. 10).
In one cottage, staff compensate for low staffing level by placing “at least one resident in restraints for up to 12 hours a day due to the staff’s inability to monitor his activities” (p. 10).
Investigation found “dangerous medication interactions and errors, and found that acute medical problems, such as fractures and infections, frequently do not receive critically necessary follow-up treatment” (p. 3).

15c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Use of psychotropic medications substantially departed from professional standards, creating substantial health risks for patients (pp. 3-6).

Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Facility’s failure to provide adequate training program resulted in “a dangerous reliance on the use of both physical and chemical restraint” (p. 6).

Hinds County Detention Center

MS 1986 Inadequate medical and mental health care

County Jail was being used to house mentally ill persons awaiting civil commitment hearings or placement in a mental hospital for up to eleven days. At time of investigation, jail held 42 mentally-ill detainees (pp. 1-2).

No mental health treatment was provided during period of confinement (p. 3).

“Male mentally-ill detainees were confined * * * in a small cell designed to serve as the

Name of Facility
Westboro State Hospital

16c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

‘drunk tank.’ Some of the detainees were placed in hand and leg irons” (p. 3).

MA 1986 Unsanitary conditions

“The smell and sight of urine and feces pervade not only the toilet areas, but ward floors and walls as well” (p. 3).

“Bathrooms and showers were filthy. Living areas are infested with vermin. There are consistent shortages of clean bed sheets, face cloths, towels and underwear. Open commodes with human waste in them were often found in rooms to which many patients in unclean geri-chairs are confined all day, including meal times” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“[N]on-sterile techniques are used when changing patients’ dressings and feeding tubes” (p. 3).
Patients’ physical illnesses are often misdiagnosed as psychological

Name of Facility

17c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

problems, resulting in “increased dosages of potentially dangerous antipsychotic drugs” (p. 5).

“Acutely life threatening illnesses * * * are also not detected appropriately or on a timely basis.* * *

[I]nappropriate and inadequate medical care preceded many of the[] deaths” reviewed during the investigation (p. 5).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Patients also frequently do not receive prescribed medications because the ward or pharmacy lacks adequate supplies” (p. 4).
Facility used sedating drugs on elderly patients for no medically justifiable reason, but instead to control residents’ behavior “subjecting vulnerable geriatric patients to the dangerous effects of

18c

Name of Facility
Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hospital

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

inappropriate drug usage and overmedication” (p. 7).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training

pp. 7-8

MI 1986 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Inadequate staffing prevents the facility from providing treatment that could “reduce or eliminate unreasonable risks to [patients’] personal safety and the undue use of bodily restraint” (p. 2).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility fails to adequately monitor efficacy and side effects of potentially dangerous drugs, creating unjustifiable risk of “deleterious side effects, tardive dyskinesia, involuntary, abnormal muscle movements, akathisia, and parkinsonism” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Napa State Hospital

19c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

CA 1986 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Severe staffing shortages “result in patient management, in lieu of treatment, through the inappropriate use of seclusion, chemical restraint, and physical restraint” (p. 2).

Inadequate medical and mental health care; Inadequate training

Restraint practices “pose significant hazards to the personal safety of NSH patients” (p. 4).
Certain medication practices at facility “violated all known standards of medical practice” resulting in great danger to patient safety (p. 2).

There was no monitoring of drug side effects and several patients exhibited an “antipsychotic druginduced side effect, potentially irreversible, that may result in permanent physiological damage” (p. 3).

20c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Facility failed to provide training programs adequate to protect patient safety and avoid need for restraint and seclusion (p. 5).

Metropolitan LA 1986 Inadequate

Developmental

medical and

Center

mental health

care

“MDC employs antipsychotic medication primarily as a means of controlling behavior without proper [medical] justification.” As a result, “[n]umerous residents demonstrated serious neurological side effects from sustained exposure to high doses of antipsychotic drugs” (p. 2). Facility had no program to monitor for serious, potentially irreversible side effects of these medications (pp. 23).

Other residents “have been exposed to an extreme risk of drug-induced toxic poisoning by the absence of preliminary and periodic drug-level testing” (p. 3).

21c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Belle Chasse State School

LA 1986 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Administration of psychotropic drugs substantially departed from professional standards. There was no program to detect “Tardive Dyskinesia” which is “an antipsychotic drug induced side effect, potentially irreversible, that may result in permanent physiological damage” (p. 2).

Broadview,

OH 1987 Inadequate

Cleveland &

training;

Warrensville

Unreasonable

Developmental Centers

use of chemical restraints

In the absence of adequate training programs, “staff overuse psychotropic medication to control the behavior of residents” (p. 1).

Inadequate mental health care

p. 2

Montgomery

OH 1987 Inadequate

Developmental

medical and

Center

mental health care; Failure

to provide

reasonable

supervision

and safety

pp. 2-3

22c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Los Lunas Hospital and Training School

NM 1988 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of chemical restraints

“[S]traightjackets and ammonia inhalants are used as a consequence for antisocial behavior. Restrained individuals are in some cases isolated in a room with a closed door out of sight of staff. This practice, absent adequate surveillance, places severely handicapped residents at great risk of injury and is not professionally justifiable” (p. 2).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety
Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Los Lunas staff are using physical restraints, isolation and punishment * * * to control the behavior of residents in lieu of necessary training programs” (p. 2).
Due to lack of supervision, a woman was raped, developed peritonitis, and died (p. 3).
Facility provides almost no physical therapy to the large number of patients with body deformities who need

23c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

therapy “to prevent muscular or skeletal breakdown” (p. 3).

W.A. Howe

IL 1989 Inadequate

Developmental

training;

Center

Unreasonable use of

physical and

chemical

restraints

“To control resident behavior, in lieu of professionally designed training programs, staff resort to chemical and physical restraints” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Due to the lack of adequate medical supervision of patients, early signs of illness and disease go undetected and/or untreated” (p. 5).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Patient was dead on the floor of her room for some time before staff discovered her, after staff failed to perform scheduled room checks.

A patient strangled to death while left unsupervised in improperly-applied restraints.

A resident who was left unsupervised ran out the front door and into traffic, where she was killed (pp. 67).

Name of Facility
Great Oaks Center

24c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

MD 1990 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training

Investigation found that inadequate supervision contributed to “an alarmingly high frequency of resident injuries” (p. 5).

Inadequate training program “fails to reduce self-abusive, aggressive, and other maladaptive and inappropriate behaviors.” “As a result of these problems, rocking, pacing, and aimlessly wandering residents were seen throughout the institution. Instances of selfabuse were not an uncommon sight; observed attempts to intervene appropriately were rare. Many residents were observed to have cuts, bruises and scrapes. Clearly, many of the injuries may have been preventable with more effective programming and if more trained staff were available” (p. 3).

25c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Staff resort to chemical and physical restraints to control residents’ behavior, in lieu of professionally designed training programs” (p. 3).

Inadequate mental health care

p. 4

Abuse of residents

A number of staff had been disciplined or criminally charged for abusing patients (p. 5 n.1).

Hawaii State Hospital

HI 1990 Inadequate

Staff at facility

food, clothing confirmed that there

and shelter

was often

insufficient food;

“Staff reported that

patients are often

wrapped in blankets

and sheets due to

the absence of

adequate clothing”;

inadequate items for

basic personal

hygiene (p. 2).

Unsanitary conditions

“[S]anitation is grossly inadequate. During a tour of [one unit] our consultants had to walk around numerous puddles of urine. * * * * Kitchen facilities exhibited signs of serious cockroach

Name of Facility

26c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

infestation and other unsanitary practices” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints; Inadequate training

“[D]rug practices at HSH are seriously deficient and represent significant departures from generally accepted medical standards” (p. 3).
“In view of serious, chronic and facility-wide staffing shortages, HSH staff employ bodily restraints –physical restraints, seclusion, and chemical restraints –- at an unjustifiably high level solely for their own convenience or in lieu of professionally designed treatment programs” (p. 5).

27c
II. Investigations Subsequent To Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Arlington

VA 1991 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety;

unsanitary

conditions

“In many units, there was a pervasive smell of urine. Residents in diapers were wet; often their clothes were soaked through with urine” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical care

“[W]e observed young children, some as young as two, whose limbs were severely contracted” from lack of physical therapy. “Many residents were left unattended in cribs, with no efforts being made to move their limbs, position them, or to provide any real physical therapy services” (p. 3).

“The penis of another resident, a paraplegic with an in-dwelling Foley catheter, was eroded throughout its entire length due to inadequate care and monitoring” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Northern Virginia Training Center

28c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical care contributed to deaths of five residents in past six months (p. 4).

Abuse of residents

pp. 3-4

Inadequate training

pp. 8-9

VA 1991 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

In part because of inadequate training programs, use of restraints was pervasive: “restraint is used so frequently that it appears to be the treatment of choice rather than a technique of last resort” (p. 4).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Serious medical conditions and marked functional deterioration are not comprehensively evaluated or effectively treated” due to inadequate medical system (p. 5).

29c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Boswell Retardation Center

MS 1991 Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Boswell’s staff are using restraints, isolation and punishment to control the behavior of residents in lieu of necessary training programs” (p. 2).

Inadequate mental health care

pp. 3-4

Unsanitary conditions

p. 5

Embreeville Center

PA 1991 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Delays in emergency medical care contributed to patient death (p. 2).

Abuse of residents

Undercover agent observed repeated instances of abuse over nine-week period (p. 3).

Inadequate training programs

p. 2

Agnews

CA 1991 Unsanitary

Developmental

conditions

Center

“Clients and residents smelled of urine and feces” (p. 2).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Bodily restraint and medication used in lieu of training programs or adequate staff supervision (pp. 4-5).

Name of Facility

30c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical care

Investigation found “resident after resident whose legs had lost all muscle tone and whose hip, knee and ankle joints had become permanently fixed or cemented in place in a deformed frog-leg or windswept position due to months and even years of inactivity” (p. 2).

Abuse of residents

“[I]nordinate delays in diagnosing and responding to serious resident illness” placed large population of medically fragile patients at substantial risk (pp. 5-6)
Administrators “confirmed to us that staff abuse of residents is a serious problem” (p. 2).

31c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Memphis

TN 1992 Inadequate

Mental Health

medical and

Institute

mental health

care

Deficiencies in the facility’s medical care system contributed to two recent deaths (pp. 5-6). Lack of psychiatrists leads to serious errors in diagnosis and medication prescription (pp. 78).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Patients at MMHI are subjected to both an undue amount of bodily restraint and dangerous restraint practices” (p. 9).

Fircrest Residential Habilitation Center

WA 1992 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“[S]taff members are placing patients inappropriately in physical restraints simply because they are confused or disoriented.” Patients are also restrained while sedated, “a substantial departure from accepted standards of psychiatric care” (pp. 9-10).
“[R]esidents suffer needless serious injuries” due to lack of supervision, including an average of “410 incidents per month for some

Name of Facility

32c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

440 residents” (p. 1).

“Numerous residents were seen with fresh wounds and lacerations, including shaved spots on heads revealing stitches and healing injuries; red marks and significant bruises; multiple scabs and scars, and large bandages or casts” (pp. 1-2).

“Our consultants observed residents engaged in selfinjurious behavior, having seizures, masturbating in open view -– all without staff intervention of any kind” (p. 2).

“[O]ne resident was found dead in the day room of a living unit; the resident had been dead for up to three hours before her body was discovered by staff” (p. 2).

Dangerous positioning and feeding practices put residents’ lives at risk (p. 2).

Name of Facility

33c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate training

“Due to a lack of human interaction and care, residents have developed significant stereotypic, maladaptive or antisocial behaviors” including “headbanging, eating foreign objects and pulling hair, to waving arms, flicking fingers and other selfstimulatory activities” (p. 1).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Much of the antisocial, maladaptive behavior, injuries and use of restraints is attributable, in significant part, to the lack of * * * training programs” (p. 5).
Physical restraints, including “staff incapacitating residents by holding them down involuntarily on the floor or elsewhere for a period of ‘enforced relaxation’” were pervasively “used as punishment, for the convenience of staff and in lieu of training programs” (p. 4-5).

34c

Name of Facility
Forrest County Jail

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

MS 1993 Inadequate mental health care

“There are no mental health services available at the jail and the holding cells into which disturbed or mentally-ill * * * prisoners are placed pose a direct threat to their health and safety” (p. 2).

Arizona State AZ 1993 Unreasonable

Hospital

use of

physical and

chemical

restraints

“During the course of our tour of the jail, our consultants observed a severely mentally ill inmate, clad only in an undershirt, housed in the general population” where he had been waiting for several weeks for a transfer to a mental health facility. “He had allegedly eaten some glass and was prone to defecate on the floor of the cell” (pp. 2-3).
Patients “are routinely put into five-point restraints (a practice where a patient is restrained on a bed and bound by the ankles, by the wrists with the arms to the side, and by

35c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

a strap across the abdomen) and placed into a locked seclusion room” for convenience of staff. Leaving a restrained patient unsupervised creates “great risk of harm from choking and asphyxiation” (p. 2).

Jones County Jail

MS 1993 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Mentally ill inmates, and mentally ill persons detained pending civil commitment proceedings, housed in five-by-six foot steel cage, sometimes for months (p. 4).

Chicago-Read IL 1993 Inadequate

Mental Health

mental health

Center

care; Inadequate

training

pp. 1-2

Unreasonable use of physical restraints

p. 2-3

Sonoma

CA 1994 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety

“As a result of inadequate supervision, residents have been subjected to numerous, serious, unnecessary injuries” (p. 2).

Name of Facility

36c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

In one incident, a resident drowned in a bathtub while unattended (p. 2).

Inadequate training
Inadequate medical care

In another, one resident was attacked by another with a knife (p. 2).
Training programs are inadequate and lead to harm from unaddressed behaviors and to the unnecessary and unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints (pp. 4-6).
Improper feeding practices for severely disabled residents “subject them to severe risk of choking, aspiration and aspiration pneumonia” (p. 3).

“The lack of physical therapists and physical therapy services has led to the development of undue contractures, muscle atrophy, inappropriate body growth, and physical degeneration” (p. 3).

37c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“The failure of staff to properly maintain [tracheostomy] tubes subjects residents to the risk of death from suffocation and presents other significant health risks, including infection” (p. 3).

Southern &

WI 1994 Failure to

Central

provide

Wisconsin

reasonable

Developmental Centers

supervision and safety

Inadequate supervision has led to serious resident injuries. For example, one elderly resident with a condition that creates a great risk of falling was taken to the hospital for an injury caused by a fall, whereupon hospital staff noted that she had fallen 62 times that day (p. 10).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

While facility has over 300 residents with seizure disorders, management practices are dangerously deficient; some patients kept on medications with strong and dangerous side effects for years after they are no longer necessary; some are kept on potentially

Name of Facility

38c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

dangerous drugs even though they are not helping. For example, one patient who had been seizure free for six years, was kept on medication even though lab results showed that dosage was too low to be having any effect and even though patient appeared to be suffering from dementia as a side effect of the drug (p. 3-4).

Inadequate training; Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Facility’s use of psychotropic medications substantially departs from professional standards, exposing patients to unnecessary risks of dangerous side effects (pp.7-9).
pp. 10-13

39c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Eastern State VA 1994 Inadequate

Hospital and

mental health

Hancock Geriatric Center

care; Inadequate training; Unreasonable

use of

physical and

chemical

restraints

pp. 1-6

Clover Bottom TN 1995 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety

Many injuries linked to lack of supervision; “in one seven month period, a resident received injuries on twentysix occasions,” half of which required stitches (pp. 3-4).

Inadequate training programs

pp. 5-8

Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Residents languish in carts and illfitting wheelchairs, which exacerbate or allow physical deformities to progress –- in some cases to a point that the deformity may preclude a person from sitting upright in a wheelchair” (p.12).

40c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Nat T.

TN 1995 Inadequate

Winston

training;

Developmental Center

Unreasonable use of physical and

chemical

restraints

“NTWDC, because of the ineffectiveness of its behavioral programs, relies on physical and chemical restraints to control residents’ behavior” (p. 3).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unsanitary conditions

Lack of training programs and supervision contribute to high incidence of injuries, including “multiple bites, lacerations, broken bones, bruises and abrasions. One individual was injured 25 times * * * in an eightmonth period. * * * Several residents were found attempting to cut themselves with knives or razorblades” (p. 4).
pp. 4-5
“Sanitary conditions were very poor at the food facility”; “Mold and mildew were prevalent throughout the refrigerators and

41c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

coolers” because of plumbing leaks (pp. 5-6).

Greene Valley TN 1995 Inadequate

Developmental

medical and

Center

mental health care

“Due to an inadequate medical care delivery system * * * residents are subjected to needless fractures, recurrent aspiration, preventable weight loss, recurring seizures, avoidable injuries, and other direct threats to their health” (p. 2).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Psychiatrists prescribing dangerous combinations of drugs “absent any rational justification in violation of medical standards” (p. 3).
Due to lack of supervision, residents “are repeatedly ‘found with blood’ on them from injuries that occur outside of staff supervision. On other occasions, residents’ severe injuries are discovered only during bathing or at bedtime” (p. 5).

Name of Facility

42c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“[O]ne eleven year old boy apparently lost the sight in one eye from repeated headslapping which resulted in a detached retina. Other residents were noted with swollen, disfigured features resulting from years of self-injury. Still others had permanent scars from continual selfmutilation of their faces and arms” (p. 6).

Inadequate training

Many residents’ “destructive behaviors remain unaddressed” by training programs. “For example, one resident had large scratches on her face that had been self-inflicted; our consultant psychologist was informed that there was no program to modify or eliminate this unsafe behavior.” The same was true for a patient who repeatedly reopened a face wound and one who had a history of pica for almost 20 years (p. 7).

43c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Northern

VA 1995 Inadequate

Virginia

medical and

Mental Health

mental health

Institute

care

“[P]sychiatric care is grossly inadequate” and “poses direct threats to the health and safety of patients” (p. 3).

“A county hospital is located only a few hundred yards [away], yet there have been a number of well-publicized deaths which are linked to substantial delays in providing adequate medical care” (p. 4).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“[O]ne patient died partly because of a toxic buildup of antidepressants in her body. Another patient died from meningitis after a psychiatrist requested that she be seen by an internist who failed to appear to assess her life-threatening condition” (p. 4).
“Due to inadequate staffing, NVMHI is unable to provide one-on-one monitoring for many residents who are suicidal or are in restraints or

44c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

seclusion and require such close supervision. Patients have been injured while being restrained and are then left unattended by medical personnel” (p. 5).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“[T]he lack of supervision and care is so grave that patients have been subjected to severe harm, including death” (p. 5).

Landmark Learning Center

FL 1996 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

pp. 3-4

Inadequate training and mental health care

pp. 4-10

Harold Jordan TN 1996 Inadequate

Habilitation

training and

Center

mental health

care

pp. 3-4

45c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Northern

VA 1996 Failure to

Virginia

provide

Mental Health

reasonable

Institute

supervision and safety

Problems with supervision persist: in the past year, there were 70 incidents of patients escaping from the facility, and an average of 27 incidents of patient self-injury and another 17 incidents of patient-onpatient violence each month (p. 7).

Patients repeatedly injured themselves even when “supposedly under careful supervision.” “One patient committed approximately 12 such acts of selfinjury while on ‘special observation’ status.”

Inadequate training

“One patient somehow managed to obtain a knife while in the seclusion room” (p. 7).
“[S]taff have resorted to calling the police and having patients arrested rather than addressing the underlying psychological issues” (p. 8).

46c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Central State VA 1997 Failure to

Hospital

provide

reasonable

supervision

and safety

Lack of staffing and failure to supervise patients leads to repeated incidents of preventable injury and suicide attempts (pp. 3-5).

Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

One patient supposedly under 24hour surveillance was found with 42 bruises over his body from unwitnessed incidents (p. 4).
pp. 5-7, 9-11
Facility’s use of restraints substantially departs from professional standards (pp. 7-9).

Patient died after being left in fivepoint restraint on bed as punishment; her psychiatrist had warned facility staff not to restrain her because of seizure risk. Nonetheless, the “patient had spent over 300 hours of the last two months of her life in restraints” (p. 8).

47c

Name of Facility
Los Angeles County Jail

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

CA 1997 Inadequate mental health care

Jail system housing approximately 1,700 mentally ill inmates provides virtually no treatment to most inmates other than medication (p. 8).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Centro de Reeducacion para Adultos

PR 1997 Unsanitary conditions/ inadequate shelter

Jail exacerbates many inmates’ illness by placing them in solitary confinement for 23 hours or more per day (p. 12).
Jail places many mentally ill inmates in general population, but requires them to wear uniforms that designate them as mentally ill. As a result, many inmates suffered from beatings and sexual assaults (pp. 14, 17).
“Many of the buildings are dilapidated, decaying, and lack adequate plumbing and lighting.” At one facility, “the showers do not work, the faucets do not work, and the toilets do not flush properly. In order to bathe the clients, staff dump

Name of Facility

48c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

water from water tanks into large movable garbage cans from which the staff manually extract water using smaller buckets to pour it on the residents.” Lack of water means that staff cannot wash hands after changing some patients’ diapers (p. 3).

Inadequate training and mental health care; Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Investigators found patient “sitting on the floor * * * moaning to himself. We noticed a stream of blood trickling down his helmet. * * * * When the nurse removed his helmet, we discovered that [the patient’s] head had been severely damaged due to years of self-abuse and head banging. [He] had butted and rammed his head into walls and post corners so often that he had pushed back completely his hair and skin on the front half of his head.” Nonetheless, “the Commonwealth has failed to provide [the patient] with

Name of Facility

49c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

professional psychological or behavioral services.”

Investigation found many other such individuals not receiving adequate care (p. 6).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“Restraints are prevalent at many of the institutions * * * and are related lack of behavioral programming, training, and professional mental health intervention. * * * * [S]taff use a bed sheet to tie [a client’s] waist and torso to a bench and to one of the iron bars at the facility to keep her from walking around the building and engaging in aggressive, maladaptive behaviors such as biting and hitting other clients. Staff tie [another client] up in fourpoint restraints to her bed for the entire time she is menstruating” (p. 7)

Name of Facility
Center for Integral Services

50c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

PR 1997 Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

“On our tour of CIS, we generally found a dangerous environment for the clients. We noticed many CIS residents with fresh injuries, including lacerations and bruises, as well as historical remnants of past injuries suffered at CIS, such as disfiguring scars. Many clients had suffered facial injuries or severe injuries on the back of their heads with resulting deep scars and hair loss” (p. 3).

Parents of clients showed pictures of “son with a very swollen, bulbous, purple and black eye. The father told us that his son has suffered a host of other injuries at CIS including a broken nose, a severe knee injury * * * and various head injuries, some requiring sutures.” Another picture showed a client with a black eye, “a bloody left eye socket, bloody swollen lips, and a

Name of Facility

51c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

face marked with fresh lacerations. The mother reported that her son has also suffered a fractured arm, numerous lacerations, bites, broken teeth” and “is now limited in the use of his hands to one index finger and thumb on each hand” (p. 4).

Inadequate food, shelter and sanitation

“[T]he facility runs out of food monthly” and “is in a state of disrepair.” “Residents have to sleep on beds with old, worn mattresses that are dirty and often wet.” Toilets do not flush. As a result, “virtually all of the toilets on the men’s side had urine and/or feces in them, producing a health hazard and an unpleasant, malodorous environment” (pp. 56).

“Staff admitted to us that they routinely bathe the male clients by lining them up naked and hosing them down

Name of Facility

52c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

in groups * * * with a garden hose” (pp. 6-7).

Abuse of residents

Facility administrator acknowledged problems with protecting clients from staff abuse and stated that “one CIS staff member had recently been convicted for sodomizing a client” (p. 3).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“CIS frequently uses restraints as a substitute for meaningful activity during the day or for appropriate programs to address maladaptive behaviors * * * to control residents they routinely use mechanical restraints, such as leather cuff belts (which are tied to the heavy metal beds around the limbs of the clients), restraint vests and straight jackets, and restraint nets” (p. 8).

53c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility “routinely runs out of certain critical drugs” such as anti-convulsant medications for epileptic patients, who suffered repeated untreated seizures as a result (pp. 5, 10).

Inadequate training programs

Hammond

LA 1997 Failure to

Developmental Center and Pinecrest Developmental

provide reasonable supervision and safety

Center

Abuse of residents

“Most of the residents are put on psychotropic medication simply to control their behaviors without appropriate psychiatric assessments, diagnoses, treatment and monitoring” (p. 9).
pp. 7-9
Client went for weeks with an undetected fractured shoulder, even though obviously in pain and bruised (p. 6).
Four staff members recently indicted for abusing residents, many other incidents of abuse documented by facility (pp. 4-5, 15-16).

Name of Facility

54c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

“A staff member left a client in full mechanical restraints unattended for hours in a room with a known aggressor” while staff watched television (p. 5).

Failure to provide adequate training programs leads to some patients being in restraints virtually non-stop (p. 12).

Inadequate training

Failure to monitor clients in restraints led to injuries (p. 12-13).
As a result of insufficient training programs, “residents’ aberrant behaviors continue unabated, often get worse, and lead frequently to other destructive behaviors” (p. 10).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Staff in one unit withheld food from clients if they misbehaved (p. 10).
pp. 13-15

55c

Name of Facility
Holly Center

State Year MD 1998

Categories of Constitutional Violations
Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate medical care

Details
Improper feeding techniques for severely disabled residents contributed to a constant rate of hospitalization and several deaths from choking and severe respiratory problems (pp. 3-5).

Inadequate training

Davies County KY 1998 Inadequate

Detention

mental health

Center

care

Systemic inadequacies in medical care contributed to the recent death of a severely handicapped and retarded resident (pp. 7-8).
pp. 8-13
No mental health services provided. “During our tour, we observed several acutely mentally ill individuals at the main jail, obviously in need of psychiatric evaluation and treatment, being left for days at a time in ‘observation’ –i.e., in a cell by themselves. One inmate was observed singing for hours on end, and eating his own feces” (p. 11).

56c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

As a result of inadequate mental health and suicide prevention system, a 15-year-old boy killed himself (p. 12).

New Castle

IN 1998 Failure to

Developmental

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety;

Inadequate

training

“Injuries are pervasive throughout the campus. With a census of 164 individuals, New Castle averaged over 1,000 resident injuries/incidents on a monthly basis”; over a four-month period, “88 percent of New Castle residents sustained injuries; 82 percent of the residents were injured more than one time during this period” (pp. 23).

In a single month, one resident was assaulted 20 times and another was assaulted 19 times (p. 3).
“Other injuries are unwitnessed by staff, including bone fractures, bloodied noses and body bruises” (p. 3).

Name of Facility
Georgia Juvenile Facilities

57c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“[W]e witnessed instances in which residents engaged in aggressive and selfinjurious behaviors (including head slapping, hand biting, eye gouging and table banging) without appropriate and timely staff intervention (p. 4).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

While half of residents have epilepsy, facility’s seizure management practices dangerously depart from accepted medical practices, increasing risk of liver and permanent brain damage (pp. 56). Insufficient levels of nursing staff lead to failures to identify and treat serious medical problems (pp. 6-7).

GA 1998 Inadequate mental health care

Inadequate mental health care provided throughout State’s juvenile detention facilities and training schools (pp. 9-11, 19-22).

Many mentally ill youth “end up locked in security units where they spend

58c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

large portions of their days isolated in small rooms with few activities. In these units, and elsewhere, they are often restrained, hit, shackled, put in restraint chairs for hours, and sprayed with [pepper spray] by staff who lack the training and resources to respond appropriately to the manifestations of mental illness” (p. 20).

Western State VA 1999 Inadequate

Hospital

medical and

mental health

care

Facility fails to identify and address mental health needs, leading to inadequate treatment and risk of harm. In one case, patient identified as suicidal was given no treatment to address suicidal urges and subsequently hanged himself in his room (pp. 3-4).

Physicians are not permitted to prescribe some medically-indicated drugs for budget reasons (pp. 5-6).

59c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inadequate medical care contributed to several recent deaths (p. 8).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Facility uses excessive and dangerous restraint techniques (p. 7).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training

Combination of inadequate staffing and training for patients results in high level of violence and injuries. Within one 90-day period, the facility of 370 patients “recorded 169 altercations, 81 instances of selfinjurious behavior, and 128 falls” as well as 8 suicide attempts and 13 escapes. In the recent past, one patient committed suicide and was dead for an hour before being discovered (p. 9).

Rainier

WA 1999 Unreasonable

School &

use of

Frances Haddon Morgan Center

physical and chemical restraints

“In 1998, Rainier logged many thousands of hours of restraint use, without demonstrating that less restrictive interventions were tried or that

Name of Facility

60c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

underlying behavioral support plans and services were adequate.” For example, the facility’s response to patients attempting to eat inedible objects (pica) or digging at their eyes or rectums was to place patients in nearly constant restraints: one patient with pica behavior spent 2,000 hours in a restraint suit over a six-month period; another averaged 600 hours per month for pica and rectal digging; another averaged 22 hours per day in the suit for rectal digging (pp. 2-3).

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety; Inadequate training; Inadequate medical and mental health care

“Without the necessary specialized treatment, * * * residents have suffered serious harm. Residents * * * have blinded themselves from chronic behaviors, such as eye poking and head banging, that the facilities have not addressed in accordance with

61c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

accepted professional standards” (p. 7).

Numerous incidents of unaddressed, dangerous behaviors, such as pica, headbanging, and eyepoking (pp. 7-8).

Clark County Detention Center

NV 1999 Inadequate mental health care

In one facility, “approximately 20 percent of all Morgan residents were admitted to the emergency room or hospital, some on more than one occasion, for treatment of injuries” in a oneyear period; during same year residents in another facility “suffered approximately 77 lacerations requiring sutures (32 involving the head), 37 bone fractures, 8 dislocated shoulders, and 2 incidents of finger amputation” (p. 10).
Jail failed adequately to identify mentally ill inmates and provide appropriate

62c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

treatment, resulting in serious harm and suicides (pp. 5-6).

Mercer County NJ 2002 Failure to

Geriatric

provide

Center

reasonable supervision

and safety

Staff fail to supervise geriatric patients. In one case “a family member used to visit at odd hours, only to find her unattended relative lying in urine, with parts of her naked body exposed” and with “unexplained skin bruises” (p. 3).

More than a third of patients need assistance with eating and drinking, but poor nutrition and hydration practices result in substantial weight losses, hospitalization for dehydration, and even death. In one case, a resident with “an improperly positioned feeding tube” “slowly starved without adequate MCGC staff intervention.” In another case, “staff fed a resident so quickly, she aspirated and died” (p. 6).

63c

Name of Facility
BanksJacksonCommerce Medical Center and Nursing Home

State Year GA 2002

Categories of Constitutional Violations Inadequate medical and mental health care
Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety, and unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Details
Staff “fail to assess and treat residents properly for potentially serious medical and mental health problems,” including failure to prevent and treat “residents with deep, bleeding bedsores, infections, and other potentially life-threatening conditions” (p. 4).
“Staff routinely restrain residents while the staff engage in various tasks” (p. 5).
Staff failed to take adequate measures to prevent serious falls, other than to restrain patients to chairs and beds (p.3). Other patients are injured by staff when transferred to and from bed, due to inadequate staff available or improper staff training (p. 4). Recently, one unsupervised resident wandered out of the facility in a wheelchair “crashed into a sidewalk curb,

Name of Facility

64c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

overturned” and was seriously injured (p. 4).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility fails to provide physical therapy that could “prevent contractures (i.e., permanent muscular contraction)” due to lack of adequate staff to implement physical therapy orders (p. 6).

Failure to move and reposition patients led to development of pressure sores, some of which became infected and require hospitalization (pp. 6-7).

“[T]here is insufficient psychiatric consultation and oversight of medication use” at the facility; a psychiatrist visits the facility only 4 times per year. As a result, many patients have been on inappropriate doses or types of powerful psychiatric medications for years (pp. 9-10).

Name of Facility

65c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

“Approximately 60 residents at BJC have a diagnosis of depression, yet the facility fails to provide group or individual counseling, or other activities designed to treat depression” (p. 10).

Inadequate food, clothing and shelter

While facility provided ample food and drink, it frequently failed to assist patients who needed feeding and drinking assistance. As a result, “numerous residents were hospitalized for conditions related to lack of adequate hydration” (p. 9).

Oakwood

KY 2002 Abuse of

Developmental

residents

Center

Numerous incidents of staff abuse, leading to arrests of staff, including one incident in which “an Oakwood staff member stomped on a resident’s head and rendered the resident unconscious” (p. 3).

Name of Facility

66c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Failure to provide reasonable supervision and safety

Very high incidence of harm to residents at facility. During one 3 month period, one patient “had 30 reported incidents of harm” (p. 4).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Even though treating professionals ordered close supervision of resident with pica, lax supervision permitted resident to engage in “at least 70 more attempted and/or actual incidents of pica behavior involving paper, trash, toilet paper, shoestrings, a washcloth, an ink pen, a sock, and fecal material.” In another case, failure to supervise resulted in surgery to remove five plastic gloves staff had not observed the resident eating (p. 5).
Lack of adequate behavior management leads to “increased use of physical and chemical restraints even though all of the Oakwood psychologists interviewed stated

Name of Facility

67c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

that restraints and other aversive or restrictive procedures such as helmets and mittens are unnecessary and unwarranted” (p. 7).

Inadequate medical and mental health care

More than half of the psychiatric diagnoses for patients are incorrect (p. 9).

Many residents receive powerful psychotropic medications with potentially serious side effects “in place of adequate behavioral treatment plans” (p. 9).

Facility does not adequately monitor those on psychotropic medications for serious, potentially irreversible side effects (p. 10).

Although facility has more than 200 residents with seizure disorders, it provided neurology consultations for only 10-15 residents per month. As a result, many residents are simply

Name of Facility

68c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

put on powerful anti-convulsant medications that might not be necessary, if treated properly, and which have serious side effects. One patient had been on such medications daily for 25 years, even though he had not had a seizure since 1976 and there was no indication that he had been seen by a neurologist until 2001 (p. 14).

Failure to provide adequate medical monitoring and care had contributed to preventable resident deaths (p. 11).

On numerous occasions, nurses gave medication to wrong patient, and pills are found lying on floors of living areas (p. 16).

Alexander Youth Services Center

AK 2002 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Inadequate mental health care systems contributed to preventable suicides (pp. 4-6).

69c

Name of Facility
Nevada Youth Training Center
Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center

State Year NV 2002 NM 2003

Categories of Constitutional Violations
Inadequate medical and mental health care
Inadequate medical and mental health care

Details
Facility provided no professional individualized treatment, other than medication, to seriously mentally ill residents (p. 7).
When mentally ill youth are receiving psychotropic medications at the time of entry into the facility, those “medications are automatically and permanently discontinued upon the youths’ arrival” without individualized review by a medical professional (p. 9).
Facility provides no qualified medical staff to treat inmates with serious mental illness, permitting counselors to make medical decisions about psychotropic medications (pp. 1617).

Nim Henson Geriatric Center

NM 2003 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Facility medication practices substantially depart from professional

70c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

standards, placing patients at risk (pp. 3-6)

Numerous patients put on feeding tubes unnecessarily, apparently for the convenience of staff (p. 11).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

New Lisbon

NJ 2003 Failure to

Developmental

protect from

Center

physical harm

Inadequate medical and mental health care

Mentally ill patients “either are untreated or treated incorrectly” (p. 15).
Facility sedates elderly patients for convenience of staff (pp. 8-9).
Residents subjected to frequent physical harm by other residents as well as by facility’s staff (pp. 3-6).
Inadequate medical care provided to residents with bowel obstructions and seizure disorders, placing residents at risk of serious complications (pp. 17-18).

Program to deal with behavioral problems does not comport with generally

71c

Name of Facility
Los Angeles County Juvenile Halls

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

accepted practice and staff are inadequately trained (pp. 7-9).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Unnecessary use of mechanical restraints (pp. 910).
Use of psychotropic drugs to control residents’ behavior does not comport with generally accepted practices (pp. 10-11).

CA 2003 Inadequate medical and mental health care

Failure to treat an estimated 75% of juveniles in need of mental health care (p. 7).

Failure to comport with professional standards regarding psychological counseling (pp. 1214).

Failure to administer psychotropic medications safely and effectively (pp. 14-16).

Failure to effectively treat youths on suicide watch (pp. 17-18).

72c

Name of Facility

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Excessive use of force

Unjustified use of Oleoresin Capsicum spray, including against juveniles with respiratory problems (pp. 2022).

Failure to protect from physical harm

Juveniles frequently subjected to violence from other juveniles, resulting in “significant injury” (pp. 22-23).

Garfield

OK 2003 Inadequate

County Jail & Garfield County Work

medical and mental health care

Center

Provision of medical services to inmates “is seriously deficient and places inmates at risk of harm” (p. 10).

Metropolitan State Hospital

CA 2003 Inadequate mental health care

Provision of mental health care inadequate, particularly in regard to suicide prevention (pp. 1415).
Psychiatric services “substantially depart from generally accepted professional standards of care and expose the children and adolescents [in the facility] to a significant risk of harm and to actual harm” (p. 3).

Name of Facility

73c

State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Inappropriate use of psychotropic medications (pp. 911).

Unreasonable use of physical and chemical restraints

Reginald P.

MS 2003 Inadequate

White Nursing

mental health

Facility

care

Claudette Box AL 2003 Inadequate

Nursing Home

medical and

mental health

care

Oakley & Columbia Training Schools

MS 2003 Unreasonable use of physical restraints

Use of physical and chemical restraints “substantially departs” from standards of care and exposes children to “excessive and unnecessary restrictive interventions” (p. 25).
“[I]nappropriate use of multiple medications” and “excessive reliance on psychotropic medications (chemical restraints)” (p. 8).
Facility administers “excessive or unnecessary doses of psychotropics” (p. 3).
Use of physical restraints such as “[h]og-tying and [p]ole-shackling” despite lack of “penological justification or therapeutic or rehabilitative benefit” of such disciplinary methods (pp. 5-9).

Name of Facility

74c
State Year Categories of Constitutional Violations

Details

Excessive use of force
Inadequate mental health care

Facility staff “use excessive force with impunity” (pp. 911).
“Many youth on psychiatric medications are not allowed to continue to receive those medications when they are admitted” (p. 15).
Facilities “fail to employ adequate suicide prevention measures” (p. 16).

No. 02-1667
In the Supreme Court of the United States
TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v.
GEORGE LANE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO THE BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
THEODORE B. OLSON Solicitor General
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA Assistant Attorney General
PAUL D. CLEMENT Deputy Solicitor General
PATRICIA A. MILLETT Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER SARAH E. HARRINGTON KEVIN RUSSELL
Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 (202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Appendix A (Cases Evidencing Unconstitutional Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities) ............ 1a
Appendix B (Disabilities Act Enforcement Reports) ......................................................................... 1b
Appendix C (Findings of Investigations Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act) ................................................................................. 1c
Appendix D (Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions) .................................................. 1d
(I)

APPENDIX A
Cases Evidencing Unconstitutional Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities:
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (Louisiana statute allowing continued confinement of the mentally ill, who were acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity, resulted in unconstitutional confinement, in violation of the Due Process Clause, where the hospital review committee had reported no evidence of mental illness and recommended conditional discharge); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (unconstitutional zoning discrimination); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 322 (1982) (institutionalized persons have due process “right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care,” “safe conditions,” and freedom from unreasonable physical restraint, as well as to “such training as may be reasonable in light of [the resident’s] liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (unconstitutional confinement); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 575-576 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming a jury verdict that included evidence of a police officer giving a sobriety test and Miranda warnings to a deaf plaintiff who could not understand him, and then arresting the plaintiff), cert. denied, No. 02-1223, 2003 WL 545392 (Oct. 6, 2003); Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corrs., 301 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2002) (disabled inmate stated Eighth Amendment claims for denial of accommodations needed to protect his health and safety due to his degenerative nerve disease), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 332 F.3d 29 (2003) (en banc); MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2002) (“blanket prohibition of all metha-
(1)

2a
done clinics from the entire city is discriminatory on its face”); Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct. of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (deaf parent denied communication assistance in child custody proceeding), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to conduct parole and parole revocation proceedings in a manner that disabled inmates can understand and in which they can participate), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (seventh-grader suffering from clinical depression prohibited from singing in school choir); Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999) (deaf inmate denied access to sex offender program required as precondition for parole), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1120 (2000); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025-1026 (5th Cir. 1998) (failure for several months to provide means for amputee inmate to bathe led to infection); Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 742 (8th Cir. 2001) (paraplegic arrested for trespass improperly restrained in non-wheelchair-accessible police van, causing his urine bag to burst, “soaking him with his own urine” and resulting in serious medical problems), judgment rev’d in part on grounds not relevant, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 470-472 (8th Cir. 1998) (mobility-impaired veterans’ exclusion from a session of county quorum court and from courtroom due to their inability to access the second floor of the county courthouse); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1997) (building permit denied for drug and alcohol treatment center “based on stereotypes and unsupported fears”); Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 558, 560-561 (7th Cir. 1996) (quadriplegic inmate “was unable to participate in substance abuse, education, church, work, or transition pro-

3a
grams available to members of the general inmate population” due to “intentional discrimination”); Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996) (Eighth Amendment violated when inmate with serious vision problem denied glasses and treatment); Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993) (“squalor in which [prisoner] was forced to live as a result of being denied a wheelchair” violated the Eighth Amendment); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.) (unconstitutional confinement when appropriate community placement available), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 (1990); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1243-1244 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of paraplegic inmates; evidence showed that, “[d]espite his medical need for cleanliness, [an inmate] was not bathed for several days,” “was forced to remain for long periods of time in his own urine due to inadequate catheter supplies and was given inadequate aid for his bowel training needs despite his repeated requests for help”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (certified teacher barred from teaching after diagnosis of AIDS); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987) (Powell, J.) (failure to provide paraplegic inmate with an accessible toilet is cruel and unusual punishment); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603, 605 (6th Cir. 1986) (prison guard repeatedly assaulted paraplegic inmates with a knife, forced them to sit in their own feces, and taunted them with remarks like “crippled bastard” and “[you] should be dead”); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.) (unconstitutional confinement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1985) (failure to provide medications for epilepsy, which caused prisoner’s death,

4a
violated Eighth Amendment); Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984) (State subjected individuals awaiting civil commitment proceedings to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in county jails); Pomerantz v. Los Angeles County, 674 F.2d 1288, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (“undisputed facts show that the Los Angeles County Jury Commissioner, and other employees directly involved in the jury selection process for the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles had, prior to January 1, 1978, excluded all blind persons from jury service solely because they were blind”); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (doctor with multiple sclerosis unconstitutionally denied residency out of concern about patients’ reactions); Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir.) (deaf habeas petitioner’s “rights were reduced below the constitutional minimum” because he could not understand his trial), withdrawn due to death of petitioner, 573 F.2d 867 (1978); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding unconstitutional an irrebuttable presumption that blind teacher cannot instruct sighted students); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (unconstitutional conditions of confinement for the mentally ill); Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp. 2d 772, 791-792 (D. Md. 2001) (denying summary judgment for defendants on claim that town officials violated Equal Protection Clause through zoning decisions that excluded a home for individuals with mental retardation), after judgment, 223 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704-705 (2002) (jury found constitutional violation, and motion for new trial was denied); McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1279-1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (police officer had “not articulated any specific facts upon which suspicion reasonably could be founded” other than “the com-

5a
munication gap between a deaf man and herself ”), aff ’d in part & rev’d in part, No. 01-15756, 2003 WL 21067092 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2003) (Table); M.H. v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., 169 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24-25 (D. Conn. 2001) (possible substantive due process violation where school employees spat water in disabled student’s face and restrained him so forcibly as to result in bruising); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) (unconstitutional restriction on voting by those with mental disabilities); Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (D. Md. 2001) (unlawful rejection of permit for drug treatment facility based on “community prejudices”), aff ’d, No. 01-1754, 2002 WL 2012545 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002); Salcido ex rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (granting summary judgment for mentally ill plaintiff on claim that he was denied due process by State’s denial of an appropriate institutional placement without notice or hearing); New York v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp. 2d 19 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (inaccessible polling places); New York v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (inaccessible polling places); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan. 1999) (amputee forced to crawl around jail, resulting in injury and infection, in violation of Eighth Amendment); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (paraplegic litigant had to be carried up stairs to court room for all-day hearing at which he could not leave to get food or use the restroom to empty catheter, resulting in infection; eventually had to crawl down steps to get out after everyone left the courthouse without him); Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff ’s Dep’t, 991 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-1062 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (possible constitutional violation where deaf arrestee was denied the opportunity to post bond and make a telephone call because

6a
the police department failed to provide, despite his requests, alternatives to the conventional telephone, and that denial resulted in much longer detention than other, similarly situated arrestees); Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (Fourth Amendment prohibits use of force against an individual, whom officers know to be deaf, for not complying with officers’ spoken commands); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 739 (D.V.I. 1997) (“The abominable treatment of the mentally ill inmates shows overwhelmingly that defendants subject inmates to dehumanizing conditions punishable under the Eighth Amendment.”); Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (amputee hospitalized after fall in inaccessible jail shower); Bullock v. Gomez, 929 F. Supp. 1299, 1301, 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (possible constitutional violation where California Department of Corrections’ family visiting program precluded HIV-positive inmates from having the same overnight visits with spouses afforded other inmates, even where spouse was also HIV positive and incapable of bearing children); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding, inter alia, that state prison officials’ failure to provide interpreters or other assistive services to deaf and hearing impaired inmates during medical treatment violated the Eighth Amendment, as at least two such inmates experienced improper and possibly harmful treatment through provision of medical treatment in absence of qualified interpreters); Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 872 F. Supp. 682, 688 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that the Board of Police Commissioners’ licensing scheme violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it irrebuttably presumes that an individual with only one hand is unqualified for the position of armed security guard); Harrelson v.

7a
Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (paraplegic prisoner denied use of a wheelchair and forced to crawl around his cell); Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 306, 308 (D.N.H. 1994) (possible constitutional violation where children with disabilities in foster care alleged that the State failed “to take the required measures to maintain the integrity of plaintiffs’ families where possible, to reunite removed children with their families as soon as possible, or to place them in secure, permanent homes within an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner,” as well as failed “to provide services necessary to protect children in the class from harm”); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993) (statute prohibiting and voiding marriages between individuals with AIDS); Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F. Supp. 476, 480-482 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (possible constitutional violation where semi-quadriplegic inmate confined to a wheelchair was confined to secluded padded cell for months, denied sufficient water to maintain kidney functioning or to permit sanitary handling of colostomy and urostomy bag, forcing him to “eat many meals with the human waste still on his hands,” and was unable to sleep in bed because his wheelchair could not fit through the doorway, all resulting in adverse medical conditions); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569, 1582-1583 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that prison’s failure to provide accessible bathrooms, showers, and cells to mobility-impaired inmates, as well as a consistent pattern of delays in prisoner receipt of hearing aids, violated the Eighth Amendment); Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993) (blind individuals categorically excluded from jury service); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J. 1991) (predominant motivation underlying city’s efforts to exclude group home

8a
for the handicapped “was discriminatory animus”), aff ’d, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992) (Table); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (Constitution violated where inmate with HIV was housed in the part of a prison reserved for inmates who are mentally disturbed, suicidal, or a danger to themselves, and was denied access to prison library and religious services); Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744, 744-751 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (courthouse and government buildings broadly inaccessible to individuals with mobility impairments); Bonner v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrs., 714 F. Supp. 420 (D. Az. 1989) (deaf, mute, and vision-impaired inmate denied communication assistance, including during disciplinary proceedings, counseling sessions, and medical treatment); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399, 405 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (decision to exclude deaf individual from jury was “unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”); Doe v. Dolton Elem. Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (elementary student with AIDS excluded from attending regular classes or extracurricular activities); Robertson v. Granite City Comm. Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (seven-year old student with AIDS confined to a modular classroom where he was the only student); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (kindergarten student with AIDS excluded from class and forced to take home tutoring); Thompson v. City of Portland, 620 F. Supp. 482, 485-487 (D. Me. 1985) (police violated the constitutional rights of a blind diabetic who was in insulin shock by arresting him, transporting him on floor of police cruiser, jailing him, and ignoring his explanation that he was in insulin shock, despite fact that he wore a Medic-Alert necklace and carried a white cane); Ass’n for

9a
Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 491-492 (D.N.D. 1982) (finding violations of mentally retarded residents’ constitutional rights to privacy, private property, and free association, as (1) many of the mentally retarded residents “are left fully naked in front of each other and assistants and such residents are not provided places where they can be in private” and “are denied the opportunity to decide for themselves how to dress”; (2) the State did not “adequately provide for an accounting of [each] resident’s personal property and for a safe place of storage”; and (3) the State did not “provide residents who are capable of communicating, reasonable opportunities to communicate with others both inside and outside the institution where they reside”), aff ’d, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 214 (D.N.H. 1981) (“blanket discrimination against the handicapped * * * is unfortunately firmly rooted in the history of our country”); New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (mentally retarded students excluded from public school system); Hairston v. Drosnick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (school refused to admit child with spina bifida without the daily presence of her mother, even though student was of normal mental competence and capable of performing easily in a classroom situation); Smith v. Fletcher, 393 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (government assigned paraplegic, who had a Master’s degree in physiology, to menial clerical tasks based on “arbitrary and unfounded decision as to her physical capabilities”), aff ’d as modified, 559 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1977); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (mentally retarded students excluded from public school system); Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp.

10a
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (mentally retarded students excluded from public school system); Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876, 880, 885 (Conn. 1993) (holding that the commissioner’s exercise of his “statutory authority to condition a motor vehicle operator’s license on the licensee’s reporting his or her medical status” violated the state constitution’s equal protection provision because the record “contained no evidence that th[e] reporting requirement was narrowly tailored either to the plaintiff ’s condition at the time of its issuance or to his probable future condition for the designated time period”); State v. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d 661, 672 (Ohio 1992) (under the Confrontation Clause, “[a] defendant who cannot hear is analogous to a defendant who cannot understand English, and a severely hearing-impaired defendant cannot be tried without adopting reasonable measures to accommodate his or her disability”); Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981) (holding that, while a parent’s physical condition is a valid consideration in the “best interests” approach to determining the issue of a child’s custody, the trial court’s overemphasis on the mother’s epilepsy rendered the custody award to the father an abuse of discretion); State v. Staples, 437 A.2d 266, 268 (N.H. 1981) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to secure assistance for hearing-impaired defendant whose disability made him “unable to assist effectively in the preparation of his defense”); In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979) (lower court “stereotype[d] William as a person deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply because he is physically handicapped”); Connecticut Inst. for the Blind v. Connecticut Comm’n on Human Rights & Opps., 405 A.2d 618, 621 (Conn. 1978) (blanket exclusion from state jobs of persons with visual impairments); State v. Board of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 153

11a
(Wis. 1919) (excluding a boy with cerebral palsy from public school because he “produces a depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children”); State v. Barber, 617 So. 2d 974, 976 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he Constitution requires that a defendant sufficiently understand the proceedings against him to be able to assist in his own defense. Clearly, a defendant who has a severe hearing impairment, without an interpreter, cannot understand the testimony of witnesses against him so as to be able to assist in his own defense.”); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (County Ct. 1990) (holding that prosecutor’s peremptorily striking a juror solely because she was hearing impaired, and not because of any doubt of the juror’s ability to communicate, violated the juror’s right to equal protection); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 965-966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that father’s visitation rights were improperly terminated because of evidence that he was infected with the AIDS virus); Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687, 690-691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to request an interpreter, where the hearing-impaired defendant was “probably unable to understand what was being said at trial”); District 27 Comm. Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (two school boards sought to prevent attendance of any student with AIDS in any school in the city, unless all of the students at that school had AIDS); Bednarski v. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a mother’s deafness was inappropriately weighed against her in a custody dispute over her two minor children); People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because the deaf defendant had no interpreter and did not understand his trial); In re

12a
Marriage of Paula R., 102 Cal. App. 3d 981, 988-989 (Ct. App. 1980) (reversing the trial court’s award of permanent custody of child to father because mother was confined to a wheelchair, as the trial court did not use the proper standard in determining who should receive custody: “whether the handicapped parent’s condition will in fact have a substantial and lasting adverse effect on the best interests of the child”); Bevan v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 345 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (statute allowing forced retirement of teacher who became blind), modified, 355 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1974); In re Adoption of Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 222, 239 (1967) (trial court “stated, in effect, he will systematically strike any and all deaf-mute petitioners from any list of prospective adopting parents”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 119 A.2d 620, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (holding that the fact that a father suing for custody of his son suffers from epilepsy is a factor that should be considered in determining whether to award custody).

APPENDIX B
The Justice Department publishes quarterly status reports, which include information from a sampling of the Department’s Disabilities Act enforcement efforts under 42 U.S.C. 12133. The status reports can be found at http:// www.ada.gov/enforce. htm. The 34 reports published to date list 110 matters concerning courthouse accessibility or effective access to judicial proceedings. The following is a list of those matters. One case (against the State of Massachusetts alleging problems with physical accessibility) resulted in a lawsuit (that remains pending), which was reported in the January 2003 status report. The Table includes the jurisdiction in which the courthouses are located, the type of problem reported by persons with disabilities, and the date of the status report in which the matter appears. There are 50 cases that resulted in formal settlement agreements, 51 cases that resulted in informal settlement agreements, and 8 cases that resulted in formal mediation. In cases resulting in informal settlements or mediation, the Justice Department does not identify the covered jurisdiction by name:
Complaints Resulting In Formal Settlement Agreements:

Jurisdiction Lucas County, OH Guernsey County, OH Essex County, NJ Windsor County, VT
Warren, OH Ben Hill County, GA Gulfport, MS

Type of Problem physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter

Status Report Jan. - Mar. 2003 Oct. - Dec. 2002 Oct. - Dec. 2002 Oct. - Dec. 2002
Apr. - June 2002 Apr. - June 2001 Apr. - June 2000

(1b)

2b

Shelby County, TN Adair County, OK Houston, TX Toledo, OH
Lake County, IL Oklahoma County, OK
Georgiana, AL State of Hawaii
McDowell County, WV Mendocino County, CA Johnson County, TN Citrus County, FL Chico County, AR Dickinson, ND Wetzel County, WV Twin Falls, ID
Philadelphia, PA

lack of assistive listening devices physical access lack of assistive listening devices physical access and lack of communication assistance lack of sign language interpreter physical access and lack of communication assistance physical access lack of sign language interpreter and assistive listening devices physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter and communication assistance lack of procedures for jurors to request accommodations

Apr. - June 2000 Jan. - Mar. 2000 Jan. - Mar. 2000 July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999 Apr. - June 1999
Apr. - June 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1998
July - Sep. 1998 July - Sep. 1998 July - Sep. 1998 Apr. - June 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998 Oct. - Dec. 1997
Oct. - Dec. 1997

3b

Boone County, IN Grand Rapids, MI Outagamie County, WI
Rome, NY Hancock County, MS
Harrison County, MS
Roswell, NM Santa Clara County, CA Jones County, CA Town of Lloyd, NY Tallahassee, FL Pickens County, SC Fulton, MO Wadsworth, OH

lack of assistive listening devices lack of assistive listening devices physical access and lack of assistive listening devices physical access assistive listening (deaf individual excluded from jury service) assistive listening (deaf individual excluded from jury service) lack of assistive listening devices lack of assistive listening devices physical access lack of communication assistance lack of communication assistance lack of assistive listening devices lack of communication assistance physical access

July - Sep. 1997 July - Sep. 1997 Apr. - June 1997
Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997
Jan. - Mar. 1997
Jan. - Mar. 1997 Oct. - Dec. 1996 Oct. - Dec. 1996 July - Sep. 1996 Apr. - June 1996 Oct. - Dec. 1994 Apr. - June 1994 Apr. - June 1994

4b

Alexandria, LA
Genesee County, MI Hickman County, KY Van Buren County, AR Harris County, TX
Scott County, AR Madison County, FL Pinellas County, FL Salt Lake City, UT
Paulding County, OH

lack of communication assistance and sign language interpreter physical access physical access physical access physical access and lack of communication assistance physical access physical access lack of communication assistance lack of communication assistance (deaf individual excluded from jury) physical access

Apr. - June 1994
Apr. - June 1994 April 1994 April 1994 April 1994
April 1994 April 1994 April 1994 April 1994
April 1994

Complaints Resulting In Informal Settlement Agreements:

Jurisdiction county in Ohio unnamed jurisdiction county in Mississippi county in Illinois county in Louisiana

Type of Problem lack of sign language interpreter lack of assistive listening devices lack of sign language interpreter lack of sign language interpreter lack of sign language interpreter

Status Report Jan. - Mar. 2003 Jan. - Mar. 2003 Jan. - Mar. 2003 Oct. - Dec. 2002 July - Sep. 2002

5b

county in Pennsylvania
county in Arizona county in Nebraska New England state court system
county in Arizona
county in Texas
county in California Iowa court
county in Texas county in Oklahoma county in Pennsylvania county in Texas
county in Colorado
Michigan court
city in Pennsylvania town in Ohio county in Michigan Louisiana parish county in Michigan county in Illinois
county in Michigan

lack of accessible parking physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter and assistive listening devices lack of assistive listening devices lack of sign language interpreter physical access lack of sign language interpreter physical access physical access physical access lack of assistive listening devices lack of accessible parking lack of communication assistance physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access lack of communication assistance lack of assistive listening devices

Apr. - June 2002
Apr. - June 2002 Jan. - Mar. 2002 Jan. - Mar. 2002
Oct. - Dec. 2001
July - Sep. 2001
July - Sep. 2001 July - Sep. 2001
Oct. - Dec. 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1999 July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999
July - Sep. 1999 Oct. - Dec. 1998 Oct. - Dec. 1998 Apr. - June 1998 Apr. - June 1998 Jan. - Mar. 1998
Oct. - Dec. 1997

6b

county in Arizona
county in Florida Tennessee circuit court
county in California
county in Michigan
supreme court of a “southern state” Colorado judicial district county in Wyoming county in Michigan county in Virginia
city in California
county in West Virginia county in Washington
county in California
county in Pennsylvania “western state court”
Ohio court
county in Kentucky county in Colorado county in Colorado

lack of communication aids physical access lack of communication aids lack of assistive listening devices lack of auxiliary aids lack of auxiliary aids lack of auxiliary aids physical access physical access lack of auxiliary aids lack of auxiliary aids physical access
lack of visual communication assistance lack of accessible parking physical access lack of assistive listening devices lack of communication assistance physical access physical access physical access

Oct. - Dec. 1997 July - Sep. 1997 July - Sep. 1997 Apr. - June 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Jan. - Mar. 1997 Oct. - Dec. 1996 Oct. - Dec. 1996 July - Sep. 1996 July - Sep. 1996 Apr. - June 1996
Apr. - June 1996 Jan. - Mar. 1995 Oct. - Dec. 1994 Oct. - Dec. 1994 July - Sep. 1994 July - Sep. 1994 Apr. - June 1994

7b

county in Missouri “various cities and towns in East and Midwest” county in Washington Michigan court
Pennsylvania county court

physical access physical access
physical access lack of assistive listening devices lack of accommodation for person with learning disability

April 1994 April 1994
April 1994 April 1994 April 1994

Complaints Resulting In Mediation:

Jurisdiction county in Illinois county in Arkansas town in New York county in South Carolina county in California county in Tennessee county in Nebraska Michigan court

Type of Problem physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter physical access physical access physical access lack of sign language interpreter

Status Report Oct. - Dec. 2002 Oct. - Dec. 2001 Oct. - Dec. 2001 July - Sep. 2001
Apr. - June 2001 Jan. - Mar. 2000 Jan. - Mar. 2000 July - Sep. 1997

8b

In addition to the settlement agreements reported in the published status reports, there are several additional formal settlement agreements entered into between the Justice Department and various jurisdictions in cases dealing with courthouses. Although they are not reported in the status reports, they are available on the website: http://www. ada.gov

Jurisdiction
Summers County, WV
Craig County, VA Allendale County, SC Butte County, SD Boulder County, CO Warren County, IL Perry County, KY City of Cambridge, OH City of San Antonio, TX City of Savannah, GA City of Bismarck, ND Columbia County, NY Loudon County, TN
Madison County, MS Worcester County, MD

Problem
physical access and lack of assistive listening devices physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access physical access
physical access
physical access physical access physical access physical access and lack of assistive listening devices physical access physical access

Date of Agreement 5/11/00
1/30/02 8/13/01 7/31/01 10/2/00 9/6/01 9/25/01 11/1/01
1/30/02
1/30/02 10/16/02 5/19/03 7/25/03
7/25/03 7/28/03

APPENDIX D CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XI The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XIV SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
* * * * * SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
(1d)

2d
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
§ 12101. Findings and purpose
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that—
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards

3d
and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter—
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

4d
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.

5d
Title II, Part A, of The Americans With Disabilities Act
§ 12131. Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
(1) Public entity
The term “public entity” means— (A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose dis-
trict, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 2410(4) of title 49).
(2) Qualified individual with a disability The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
§ 12132. Discrimination Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

6d
§ 12133. Enforcement
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.
§ 12134. Regulations
(a) In general
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement this part. Such regulations shall not include any matter within the scope of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation under section 12143, 12149, or 12164 of this title.
(b) Relationship to other regulations
Except for “program accessibility, existing facilities”, and “communications”, regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (as promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on January 13, 1978), applicable to recipients of Federal financial assistance under section 794 of title 29. With respect to “program accessibility, existing facilities”, and “communications”, such regulations shall be consistent with regulations and analysis as in part 39 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, applicable to federally conducted activities under such section 794 of title 29.

7d
(c) Standards
Regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall include standards applicable to facilities and vehicles covered by this part, other than facilities, stations, rail passenger cars, and vehicles covered by part B of this subchapter. Such standards shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board in accordance with section 12204(a) of this title.
* * * * *

8d
Title II, Part B, of The Americans With Disabilities Act
§ 12141. Definitions
As used in this subpart:
(1) Demand responsive system
The term “demand responsive system” means any system of providing designated public transportation which is not a fixed route system.
(2) Designated public transportation
The term “designated public transportation” means transportation (other than public school transportation) by bus, rail, or any other conveyance (other than transportation by aircraft or intercity or commuter rail transportation (as defined in section 12161 of this title)) that provides the general public with general or special service (including charter service) on a regular and continuing basis.
(3) Fixed route system
The term “fixed route system” means a system of providing designated public transportation on which a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed schedule.
(4) Operates
The term “operates”, as used with respect to a fixed route system or demand responsive system, includes operation of such system by a person under a contractual or other arrangement or relationship with a public entity.
(5) Public school transportation
The term “public school transportation” means transportation by schoolbus vehicles of schoolchildren, per-

9d
sonnel, and equipment to and from a public elementary or secondary school and school-related activities.
(6) Secretary
The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Transportation.
§ 12142. Public entities operating fixed route systems
(a) Purchase and lease of new vehicles
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system to purchase or lease a new bus, a new rapid rail vehicle, a new light rail vehicle, or any other new vehicle to be used on such system, if the solicitation for such purchase or lease is made after the 30th day following July 26, 1990, and if such bus, rail vehicle, or other vehicle is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
(b) Purchase and lease of used vehicles
Subject to subsection (c)(1) of this section, it shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system to purchase or lease, after the 30th day following July 26, 1990, a used vehicle for use on such system unless such entity makes demonstrated good faith efforts to purchase or lease a used vehicle for use on such system that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.

10d
(c) Remanufactured vehicles
(1) General rule
Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system—
(A) to remanufacture a vehicle for use on such system so as to extend its usable life for 5 years or more, which remanufacture begins (or for which the solicitation is made) after the 30th day following July 26, 1990; or
(B) to purchase or lease for use on such system a remanufactured vehicle which has been remanufactured so as to extend its usable life for 5 years or more, which purchase or lease occurs after such 30th day and during the period in which the usable life is extended;
unless, after remanufacture, the vehicle is, to the maximum extent feasible, readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
(2) Exception for historic vehicles
(A) General rule
If a public entity operates a fixed route system any segment of which is included on the National Register of Historic Places and if making a vehicle of historic character to be used solely on such segment readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities would significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle, the public entity only has to make (or to purchase or lease a remanufactured vehicle with) those modifications which are necessary to

11d
meet the requirements of paragraph (1) and which do not significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle.
(B) Vehicles of historic character defined by regulations
For purposes of this paragraph and section 12148(b) of this title, a vehicle of historic character shall be defined by the regulations issued by the Secretary to carry out this subsection.
§ 12143. Paratransit as a complement to fixed route service
(a) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route system (other than a system which provides solely commuter bus service) to fail to provide with respect to the operations of its fixed route system, in accordance with this section, paratransit and other special transportation services to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, that are sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system; or (2) in the case of response time, which is comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system.
(b) Issuance of regulations
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Secretary shall issue final regulations to carry out this section.

12d
(c) Required contents of regulations
(1) Eligible recipients of service
The regulations issued under this section shall require each public entity which operates a fixed route system to provide the paratransit and other special transportation services required under this section—
(A)(i) to any individual with a disability who is unable, as a result of a physical or mental impairment (including a vision impairment) and without the assistance of another individual (except an operator of a wheelchair lift or other boarding assistance device), to board, ride, or disembark from any vehicle on the system which is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
(ii) to any individual with a disability who needs the assistance of a wheelchair lift or other boarding assistance device (and is able with such assistance) to board, ride, and disembark from any vehicle which is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if the individual wants to travel on a route on the system during the hours of operation of the system at a time (or within a reasonable period of such time) when such a vehicle is not being used to provide designated public transportation on the route; and
(iii) to any individual with a disability who has a specific impairment-related condition which prevents such individual from traveling to a boarding location or from a disembarking location on such system;
(B) to one other individual accompanying the individual with the disability; and
(C) to other individuals, in addition to the one individual described in subparagraph (B), accompanying

13d
the individual with a disability provided that space for these additional individuals is available on the paratransit vehicle carrying the individual with a disability and that the transportation of such additional individuals will not result in a denial of service to individuals with disabilities.
For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), boarding or disembarking from a vehicle does not include travel to the boarding location or from the disembarking location.
(2) Service area
The regulations issued under this section shall require the provision of paratransit and special transportation services required under this section in the service area of each public entity which operates a fixed route system, other than any portion of the service area in which the public entity solely provides commuter bus service.
(3) Service criteria
Subject to paragraphs (1) and (2), the regulations issued under this section shall establish minimum service criteria for determining the level of services to be required under this section.
(4) Undue financial burden limitation
The regulations issued under this section shall provide that, if the public entity is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the provision of paratransit and other special transportation services otherwise required under this section would impose an undue financial burden on the public entity, the public entity, notwithstanding any other provision of this section (other than paragraph (5)), shall only be required to pro-

14d
vide such services to the extent that providing such services would not impose such a burden.
(5) Additional services
The regulations issued under this section shall establish circumstances under which the Secretary may require a public entity to provide, notwithstanding paragraph (4), paratransit and other special transportation services under this section beyond the level of paratransit and other special transportation services which would otherwise be required under paragraph (4).
(6) Public participation
The regulations issued under this section shall require that each public entity which operates a fixed route system hold a public hearing, provide an opportunity for public comment, and consult with individuals with disabilities in preparing its plan under paragraph (7).
(7) Plans
The regulations issued under this section shall require that each public entity which operates a fixed route system—
(A) within 18 months after July 26, 1990, submit to the Secretary, and commence implementation of, a plan for providing paratransit and other special transportation services which meets the requirements of this section; and
(B) on an annual basis thereafter, submit to the Secretary, and commence implementation of, a plan for providing such services.
(8) Provision of services by others
The regulations issued under this section shall—

15d
(A) require that a public entity submitting a plan to the Secretary under this section identify in the plan any person or other public entity which is providing a paratransit or other special transportation service for individuals with disabilities in the service area to which the plan applies; and
(B) provide that the public entity submitting the plan does not have to provide under the plan such service for individuals with disabilities.
(9) Other provisions
The regulations issued under this section shall include such other provisions and requirements as the Secretary determines are necessary to carry out the objectives of this section.
(d) Review of plan
(1) General rule
The Secretary shall review a plan submitted under this section for the purpose of determining whether or not such plan meets the requirements of this section, including the regulations issued under this section.
(2) Disapproval
If the Secretary determines that a plan reviewed under this subsection fails to meet the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall disapprove the plan and notify the public entity which submitted the plan of such disapproval and the reasons therefor.
(3) Modification of disapproved plan
Not later than 90 days after the date of disapproval of a plan under this subsection, the public entity which submitted the plan shall modify the plan to meet the requirements of this section and shall submit to the Secre-

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tary, and commence implementation of, such modified plan.
(e) “Discrimination” defined
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term “discrimination” includes—
(1) a failure of a public entity to which the regulations issued under this section apply to submit, or commence implementation of, a plan in accordance with subsections (c)(6) and (c)(7) of this section;
(2) a failure of such entity to submit, or commence implementation of, a modified plan in accordance with subsection (d)(3) of this section;
(3) submission to the Secretary of a modified plan under subsection (d)(3) of this section which does not meet the requirements of this section; or
(4) a failure of such entity to provide paratransit or other special transportation services in accordance with the plan or modified plan the public entity submitted to the Secretary under this section.
(f) Statutory construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a public entity—
(1) from providing paratransit or other special transportation services at a level which is greater than the level of such services which are required by this section,
(2) from providing paratransit or other special transportation services in addition to those paratransit and special transportation services required by this section, or
(3) from providing such services to individuals in addition to those individuals to whom such services are required to be provided by this section.

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§ 12144. Public entity operating a demand responsive system
If a public entity operates a demand responsive system, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for such entity to purchase or lease a new vehicle for use on such system, for which a solicitation is made after the 30th day following July 26, 1990, that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless such system, when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to the level of service such system provides to individuals without disabilities.
§ 12145. Temporary relief where lifts are unavailable
(a) Granting
With respect to the purchase of new buses, a public entity may apply for, and the Secretary may temporarily relieve such public entity from the obligation under section 12142(a) or 12144 of this title to purchase new buses that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if such public entity demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary—
(1) that the initial solicitation for new buses made by the public entity specified that all new buses were to be lift-equipped and were to be otherwise accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
(2) the unavailability from any qualified manufacturer of hydraulic, electromechanical, or other lifts for such new buses;
(3) that the public entity seeking temporary relief has made good faith efforts to locate a qualified manufac-

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turer to supply the lifts to the manufacturer of such buses in sufficient time to comply with such solicitation; and
(4) that any further delay in purchasing new buses necessary to obtain such lifts would significantly impair transportation services in the community served by the public entity.
(b) Duration and notice to Congress
Any relief granted under subsection (a) of this section shall be limited in duration by a specified date, and the appropriate committees of Congress shall be notified of any such relief granted.
(c) Fraudulent application
If, at any time, the Secretary has reasonable cause to believe that any relief granted under subsection (a) of this section was fraudulently applied for, the Secretary shall—
(1) cancel such relief if such relief is still in effect; and
(2) take such other action as the Secretary considers appropriate.
§ 12146. New facilities
For purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity to construct a new facility to be used in the provision of designated public transportation services unless such facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
§ 12147. Alterations of existing facilities
(a) General rule
With respect to alterations of an existing facility or part thereof used in the provision of designated public transportation services that affect or could affect the usability of the

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facility or part thereof, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a public entity to fail to make such alterations (or to ensure that the alterations are made) in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon the completion of such alterations. Where the public entity is undertaking an alteration that affects or could affect usability of or access to an area of the facility containing a primary function, the entity shall also make the alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area and the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon completion of such alterations, where such alterations to the path of travel or the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area are not disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope (as determined under criteria established by the Attorney General).
(b) Special rule for stations
(1) General rule
For purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity that provides designated public transportation to fail, in accordance with the provisions of this subsection, to make key stations (as determined under criteria established by the Secretary by regulation) in rapid rail and light rail systems readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.

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(2) Rapid rail and light rail key stations
(A) Accessibility
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, all key stations (as determined under criteria established by the Secretary by regulation) in rapid rail and light rail systems shall be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable but in no event later than the last day of the 3-year period beginning on July 26, 1990.
(B) Extension for extraordinarily expensive structural changes
The Secretary may extend the 3-year period under subparagraph (A) up to a 30-year period for key stations in a rapid rail or light rail system which stations need extraordinarily expensive structural changes to, or replacement of, existing facilities; except that by the last day of the 20th year following July 26, 1990, at least 2/3 of such key stations must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
(3) Plans and milestones
The Secretary shall require the appropriate public entity to develop and submit to the Secretary a plan for compliance with this subsection—
(A) that reflects consultation with individuals with disabilities affected by such plan and the results of a public hearing and public comments on such plan, and
(B) that establishes milestones for achievement of the requirements of this subsection.

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§ 12148. Public transportation programs and activities in existing facilities and one car per train rule
(a) Public transportation programs and activities in existing facilities
(1) In general
With respect to existing facilities used in the provision of designated public transportation services, it shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public transportation program or activity conducted in such facilities so that, when viewed in the entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
(2) Exception
Paragraph (1) shall not require a public entity to make structural changes to existing facilities in order to make such facilities accessible to individuals who use wheelchairs, unless and to the extent required by section 12147(a) of this title (relating to alterations) or section 12147(b) of this title (relating to key stations).
(3) Utilization
Paragraph (1) shall not require a public entity to which paragraph (2) applies, to provide to individuals who use wheelchairs services made available to the general public at such facilities when such individuals could not utilize or benefit from such services provided at such facilities.
(b) One car per train rule
(1) General rule
Subject to paragraph (2), with respect to 2 or more vehicles operated as a train by a light or rapid rail system,

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for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity to fail to have at least 1 vehicle per train that is accessible to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable but in no event later than the last day of the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of this section.
(2) Historic trains
In order to comply with paragraph (1) with respect to the remanufacture of a vehicle of historic character which is to be used on a segment of a light or rapid rail system which is included on the National Register of Historic Places, if making such vehicle readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities would significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle, the public entity which operates such system only has to make (or to purchase or lease a remanufactured vehicle with) those modifications which are necessary to meet the requirements of section 12142(c)(1) of this title and which do not significantly alter the historic character of such vehicle.
§ 12149. Regulations
(a) In general
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations, in an accessible format, necessary for carrying out this subpart (other than section 12143 of this title).
(b) Standards
The regulations issued under this section and section 12143 of this title shall include standards applicable to facilities and vehicles covered by this part. The standards shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers

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Compliance Board in accordance with section 12204 of this title.
§ 12150. Interim accessibility requirements
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to section 12149 of this title, for new construction or alterations for which a valid and appropriate State or local building permit is obtained prior to the issuance of final regulations under such section, and for which the construction or alteration authorized by such permit begins within one year of the receipt of such permit and is completed under the terms of such permit, compliance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards in effect at the time the building permit is issued shall suffice to satisfy the requirement that facilities be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities as required under sections 12146 and 12147 of this title, except that, if such final regulations have not been issued one year after the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board has issued the supplemental minimum guidelines required under section 12204(a) of this title, compliance with such supplemental minimum guidelines shall be necessary to satisfy the requirement that facilities be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities prior to issuance of the final regulations.
* * * * *
§ 12161. Definitions
As used in this subpart:
(1) Commuter authority
The term “commuter authority” has the meaning given such term in section 502(8) of Title 45.

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(2) Commuter rail transportation
The term “commuter rail transportation” has the meaning given the term “commuter rail passenger transportation” in section 502(9) of Title 45.
(3) Intercity rail transportation
The term “intercity rail transportation” means transportation provided by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
(4) Rail passenger car
The term “rail passenger car” means, with respect to intercity rail transportation, single-level and bi-level coach cars, single-level and bi-level dining cars, singlelevel and bi-level sleeping cars, single-level and bi-level lounge cars, and food service cars.
(5) Responsible person
The term “responsible person” means—
(A) in the case of a station more than 50 percent of which is owned by a public entity, such public entity;
(B) in the case of a station more than 50 percent of which is owned by a private party, the persons providing intercity or commuter rail transportation to such station, as allocated on an equitable basis by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation; and
(C) in a case where no party owns more than 50 percent of a station, the persons providing intercity or commuter rail transportation to such station and the owners of the station, other than private party owners, as allocated on an equitable basis by regulation by the Secretary of Transportation.

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(6) Station
The term “station” means the portion of a property located appurtenant to a right-of-way on which intercity or commuter rail transportation is operated, where such portion is used by the general public and is related to the provision of such transportation, including passenger platforms, designated waiting areas, ticketing areas, restrooms, and, where a public entity providing rail transportation owns the property, concession areas, to the extent that such public entity exercises control over the selection, design, construction, or alteration of the property, but such term does not include flag stops.
§ 12162. Intercity and commuter rail actions considered discriminatory
(a) Intercity rail transportation
(1) One car per train rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person who provides intercity rail transportation to fail to have at least one passenger car per train that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, in accordance with regulations issued under section 12164 of this title, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 5 years after July 26, 1990.
(2) New intercity cars
(A) General rule
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection with respect to individuals who use wheelchairs, it shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a

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person to purchase or lease any new rail passenger cars for use in intercity rail transportation, and for which a solicitation is made later than 30 days after July 26, 1990, unless all such rail cars are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(B) Special rule for single-level passenger coaches for individuals who use wheelchairs
Single-level passenger coaches shall be required to—
(i) be able to be entered by an individual who uses a wheelchair;
(ii) have space to park and secure a wheelchair;
(iii) have a seat to which a passenger in a wheelchair can transfer, and a space to fold and store such passenger’s wheelchair; and
(iv) have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair,
only to the extent provided in paragraph (3).
(C) Special rule for single-level dining cars for individuals who use wheelchairs
Single-level dining cars shall not be required to—
(i) be able to be entered from the station platform by an individual who uses a wheelchair; or
(ii) have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair if no restroom is provided in such car for any passenger.

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(D) Special rule for bi-level dining cars for individuals who use wheelchairs
Bi-level dining cars shall not be required to—
(i) be able to be entered by an individual who uses a wheelchair;
(ii) have space to park and secure a wheelchair;
(iii) have a seat to which a passenger in a wheelchair can transfer, or a space to fold and store such passenger’s wheelchair; or
(iv) have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair.
(3) Accessibility of single-level coaches
(A) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person who provides intercity rail transportation to fail to have on each train which includes one or more single-level rail passenger coaches—
(i) a number of spaces—
(I) to park and secure wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to remain in their wheelchairs) equal to not less than one-half of the number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train; and
(II) to fold and store wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to transfer to coach seats) equal to not less than one-half of the number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train,

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as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 5 years after July 26, 1990; and
(ii) a number of spaces—
(I) to park and secure wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to remain in their wheelchairs) equal to not less than the total number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train; and
(II) to fold and store wheelchairs (to accommodate individuals who wish to transfer to coach seats) equal to not less than the total number of single-level rail passenger coaches in such train,
as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 10 years after July 26, 1990.
(B) Location
Spaces required by subparagraph (A) shall be located in single-level rail passenger coaches or food service cars.
(C) Limitation
Of the number of spaces required on a train by subparagraph (A), not more than two spaces to park and secure wheelchairs nor more than two spaces to fold and store wheelchairs shall be located in any one coach or food service car.
(D) Other accessibility features
Single-level rail passenger coaches and food service cars on which the spaces required by subparagraph (A) are located shall have a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair and shall be able to

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be entered from the station platform by an individual who uses a wheelchair.
(4) Food service
(A) Single-level dining cars
On any train in which a single-level dining car is used to provide food service—
(i) if such single-level dining car was purchased after July 26, 1990, table service in such car shall be provided to a passenger who uses a wheelchair if—
(I) the car adjacent to the end of the dining car through which a wheelchair may enter is itself accessible to a wheelchair;
(II) such passenger can exit to the platform from the car such passenger occupies, move down the platform, and enter the adjacent accessible car described in subclause (I) without the necessity of the train being moved within the station; and
(III) space to park and secure a wheelchair is available in the dining car at the time such passenger wishes to eat (if such passenger wishes to remain in a wheelchair), or space to store and fold a wheelchair is available in the dining car at the time such passenger wishes to eat (if such passenger wishes to transfer to a dining car seat); and
(ii) appropriate auxiliary aids and services, including a hard surface on which to eat, shall be provided to ensure that other equivalent food service is available to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, and to passengers traveling with such individuals.

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Unless not practicable, a person providing intercity rail transportation shall place an accessible car adjacent to the end of a dining car described in clause (i) through which an individual who uses a wheelchair may enter.
(B) Bi-level dining cars
On any train in which a bi-level dining car is used to provide food service—
(i) if such train includes a bi-level lounge car purchased after July 26, 1990, table service in such lounge car shall be provided to individuals who use wheelchairs and to other passengers; and
(ii) appropriate auxiliary aids and services, including a hard surface on which to eat, shall be provided to ensure that other equivalent food service is available to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, and to passengers traveling with such individuals.
(b) Commuter rail transportation
(1) One car per train rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person who provides commuter rail transportation to fail to have at least one passenger car per train that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, in accordance with regulations issued under section 12164 of this title, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 5 years after July 26, 1990.

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(2) New commuter rail cars
(A) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to purchase or lease any new rail passenger cars for use in commuter rail transportation, and for which a solicitation is made later than 30 days after July 26, 1990, unless all such rail cars are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(B) Accessibility
For purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, a requirement that a rail passenger car used in commuter rail transportation be accessible to or readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, shall not be construed to require—
(i) a restroom usable by an individual who uses a wheelchair if no restroom is provided in such car for any passenger;
(ii) space to fold and store a wheelchair; or
(iii) a seat to which a passenger who uses a wheelchair can transfer.
(c) Used rail cars
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, for a person to purchase or lease a used rail passenger car for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation, unless such person makes demonstrated good faith efforts to purchase or lease a

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used rail car that is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(d) Remanufactured rail cars
(1) Remanufacturing
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to remanufacture a rail passenger car for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation so as to extend its usable life for 10 years or more, unless the rail car, to the maximum extent feasible, is made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(2) Purchase or lease
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to purchase or lease a remanufactured rail passenger car for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation unless such car was remanufactured in accordance with paragraph (1).
(e) Stations
(1) New stations
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a person to build a new station for use in intercity or commuter rail transportation that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secre-

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tary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(2) Existing stations
(A) Failure to make readily accessible
(i) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for a responsible person to fail to make existing stations in the intercity rail transportation system, and existing key stations in commuter rail transportation systems, readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation in regulations issued under section 12164 of this title.
(ii) Period for compliance
(I) Intercity rail
All stations in the intercity rail transportation system shall be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 20 years after July 26, 1990.
(II) Commuter rail
Key stations in commuter rail transportation systems shall be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, as soon as practicable but in no event later than 3 years after July 26, 1990, except that the time limit may be extended by the Secretary of

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Transportation up to 20 years after July 26, 1990, in a case where the raising of the entire passenger platform is the only means available of attaining accessibility or where other extraordinarily expensive structural changes are necessary to attain accessibility.
(iii) Designation of key stations
Each commuter authority shall designate the key stations in its commuter rail transportation system, in consultation with individuals with disabilities and organizations representing such individuals, taking into consideration such factors as high ridership and whether such station serves as a transfer or feeder station. Before the final designation of key stations under this clause, a commuter authority shall hold a public hearing.
(iv) Plans and milestones
The Secretary of Transportation shall require the appropriate person to develop a plan for carrying out this subparagraph that reflects consultation with individuals with disabilities affected by such plan and that establishes milestones for achievement of the requirements of this subparagraph.
(B) Requirement when making alterations
(i) General rule
It shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, with respect to alterations of an existing station or part thereof in the intercity or commuter rail transportation systems that affect or could affect the usability of the station or part

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thereof, for the responsible person, owner, or person in control of the station to fail to make the alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the station are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon completion of such alterations.
(ii) Alterations to a primary function area
It shall be considered discrimination, for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29, with respect to alterations that affect or could affect the usability of or access to an area of the station containing a primary function, for the responsible person, owner, or person in control of the station to fail to make the alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area, and the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, upon completion of such alterations, where such alterations to the path of travel or the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area are not disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope (as determined under criteria established by the Attorney General).
(C) Required cooperation
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of this title and section 794 of Title 29 for an owner, or person in control, of a station governed by subparagraph (A) or (B) to fail to provide reasonable cooperation to a responsible person with

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respect to such station in that responsible person’s efforts to comply with such subparagraph. An owner, or person in control, of a station shall be liable to a responsible person for any failure to provide reasonable cooperation as required by this subparagraph. Failure to receive reasonable cooperation required by this subparagraph shall not be a defense to a claim of discrimination under this chapter.
§ 12163. Conformance of accessibility standards
Accessibility standards included in regulations issued under this subpart shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board under section 12204(a) of this title.
§ 12164. Regulations
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations, in an accessible format, necessary for carrying out this subpart.
§ 12165. Interim accessibility requirements
(a) Stations
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to section 12164 of this title, for new construction or alterations for which a valid and appropriate State or local building permit is obtained prior to the issuance of final regulations under such section, and for which the construction or alteration authorized by such permit begins within one year of the receipt of such permit and is completed under the terms of such permit, compliance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards in effect at the time the building permit is issued shall suffice to satisfy the requirement that stations be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabili-

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ties as required under section 12162(e) of this title, except that, if such final regulations have not been issued one year after the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board has issued the supplemental minimum guidelines required under section 12204(a) of this title, compliance with such supplemental minimum guidelines shall be necessary to satisfy the requirement that stations be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities prior to issuance of the final regulations.
(b) Rail passenger cars
If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to section 12164 of this title, a person shall be considered to have complied with the requirements of section 12162(a) through (d) of this title that a rail passenger car be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the design for such car complies with the laws and regulations (including the Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design and such supplemental minimum guidelines as are issued under section 12204(a) of this title) governing accessibility of such cars, to the extent that such laws and regulations are not inconsistent with this subpart and are in effect at the time such design is substantially completed.

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Title IV of The Americans With Disabilities Act
§ 12201. Construction
(a) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.
(b) Relationship to other laws
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude the prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of employment covered by subchapter I of this chapter, in transportation covered by subchapter II or III of this chapter, or in places of public accommodation covered by subchapter III of this chapter.
(c) Insurance
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict—
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or

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(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter2 I and III of this chapter.
(d) Accommodations and services
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit which such individual chooses not to accept.
§ 12202. State immunity
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in3 Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.
2 So in original. Probably should be “subchapters”. 3 So in original. Probably should be “in a”.

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§ 12203. Prohibition against retaliation and coercion
(a) Retaliation
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
(c) Remedies and procedures
The remedies and procedures available under sections 12117, 12133, and 12188 of this title shall be available to aggrieved persons for violations of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, with respect to subchapter I, subchapter II and subchapter III of this chapter, respectively.
§ 12204. Regulations by Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
(a) Issuance of guidelines
Not later than 9 months after July 26, 1990, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board shall issue minimum guidelines that shall supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible

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Design for purposes of subchapters II and III of this chapter.
(b) Contents of guidelines
The supplemental guidelines issued under subsection (a) of this section shall establish additional requirements, consistent with this chapter, to ensure that buildings, facilities, rail passenger cars, and vehicles are accessible, in terms of architecture and design, transportation, and communication, to individuals with disabilities.
(c) Qualified historic properties
(1) In general
The supplemental guidelines issued under subsection (a) of this section shall include procedures and requirements for alterations that will threaten or destroy the historic significance of qualified historic buildings and facilities as defined in 4.1.7(1)(a) of the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards.
(2) Sites eligible for listing in National Register
With respect to alterations of buildings or facilities that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.), the guidelines described in paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, maintain the procedures and requirements established in 4.1.7(1) and (2) of the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards.

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(3) Other sites
With respect to alterations of buildings or facilities designated as historic under State or local law, the guidelines described in paragraph (1) shall establish procedures equivalent to those established by 4.1.7(1)(b) and (c) of the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, and shall require, at a minimum, compliance with the requirements established in 4.1.7(2) of such standards.
§ 12205. Attorney’s fees
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.
§ 12206. Technical assistance
(c) Plan for assistance
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after July 26, 1990, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chair of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall develop a plan to assist entities covered under this chapter, and other Federal agencies, in understanding the responsibility of such entities and agencies under this chapter.

43d
(2) Publication of plan
The Attorney General shall publish the plan referred to in paragraph (1) for public comment in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 (commonly known as the Administrative Procedure Act).
(b) Agency and public assistance
The Attorney General may obtain the assistance of other Federal agencies in carrying out subsection (a) of this section, including the National Council on Disability, the President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, the Small Business Administration, and the Department of Commerce.
(c) Implementation
(1) Rendering assistance
Each Federal agency that has responsibility under paragraph (2) for implementing this chapter may render technical assistance to individuals and institutions that have rights or duties under the respective subchapter or subchapters of this chapter for which such agency has responsibility.
(2) Implementation of subchapters
(A) Subchapter I
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Attorney General shall implement the plan for assistance developed under subsection (a) of this section, for subchapter I of this chapter.

44d
(B) Subchapter II
(i) Part A
The Attorney General shall implement such plan for assistance for part A of subchapter II of this chapter.
(ii) Part B
The Secretary of Transportation shall implement such plan for assistance for part B subchapter II of this chapter.
(C) Subchapter III
The Attorney General, in coordination with Secretary of Transportation and the Chair of the Architectural Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, shall implement such plan for assistance for subchapter III of this chapter, except for section 12184 of this title, the plan for assistance for which shall be implemented by the Secretary of Transportation.
(D) Title IV
The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, in coordinate with the Attorney General, shall implement such plan for assistance for title IV.
(3) Technical assistance manuals
Each Federal agency that has responsibility under paragraph (2) for implementing this chapter shall, as part of its implementation responsibilities, ensure the availability and provision of appropriate technical assistance manuals to individuals or entities with rights or duties under this chapter no later than six months after applica-

45d
ble final regulations are published under subchapters I, II, and III of this chapter and title IV.
(d) Grants and contracts
(1) In general
Each Federal agency that has responsibility under subsection (c)(2) of this section for implementing this chapter may make grants or award contracts to effectuate the purposes of this section, subject to the availability of appropriations. Such grants and contracts may be awarded to individuals, institutions not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit or any private shareholder or individual (including educational institutions), and associations representing individuals who have rights or duties under this chapter. Contracts may be awarded to entities organized for profit, but such entities may not be the recipients or1grants described in this paragraph.
(2) Dissemination of information
Such grants and contracts, among other uses, may be designed to ensure wide dissemination of information about the rights and duties established by this chapter and to provide information and technical assistance about techniques for effective compliance with this chapter.
(e) Failure to receive assistance
An employer, public accommodation, or other entity covered under this chapter shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this chapter because of any failure to receive technical assistance under this section,
1 So in original. Probably should be “of ”.

46d
including any failure in the development or dissemination of any technical assistance manual authorized by this section.
§ 12207. Federal wilderness areas
(a) Study
The National Council on Disability shall conduct a study and report on the effect that wilderness designations and wilderness land management practices have on the ability of individuals with disabilities to use and enjoy the National Wilderness Preservation System as established under the
Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.).
(b) Submission of report
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the National Council on Disability shall submit the report required under subsection (a) of this section to Congress.
(c) Specific wilderness access
(1) In general
Congress reaffirms that nothing in the Wilderness Act [16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.] is to be construed as prohibiting the use of a wheelchair in a wilderness area by an individual whose disability requires use of a wheelchair, and consistent with the Wilderness Act no agency is required to provide any form of special treatment or accommodation, or to construct any facilities or modify any conditions of lands within a wilderness area in order to facilitate such use.
(2) “Wheelchair” defined
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “wheelchair” means a device designed solely for use by a mobility-

47d
impaired person for locomotion, that is suitable for use in an indoor pedestrian area.
§ 12208. Transvestites
For the purposes of this chapter, the term “disabled” or “disability” shall not apply to an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite.
§ 12209. Instrumentalities of the Congress
The General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress shall be covered as follows:
(1) In general
The rights and protections under this chapter shall, subject to paragraph (2), apply with respect to the conduct of each instrumentality of the Congress.
(2) Establishment of remedies and procedures by instrumentalities
The chief official of each instrumentality of the Congress shall establish remedies and procedures to be utilized with respect to the rights and protections provided pursuant to paragraph (1).
(3) Report to Congress
The chief official of each instrumentality of the Congress shall, after establishing remedies and procedures for purposes of paragraph (2), submit to the Congress a report describing the remedies and procedures.

48d
(4) Definition of instrumentality
For purposes of this section, the term “instrumentality of the Congress” means the following:,1 the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of Congress,.1
(5) Enforcement of employment rights
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title shall be available to any employee of an instrumentality of the Congress who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12112 through 12114 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.
(6) Enforcement of rights to public services and accommodations
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title shall be available to any qualified person with a disability who is a visitor, guest, or patron of an instrumentality of Congress and who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12131 through 12150 or section 12182 or 12183 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.
1 So in original. The comma probably should not appear.

49d
(7) Construction
Nothing in this section shall alter the enforcement procedures for individuals with disabilities provided in the General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980 and regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act.
§ 12210. Illegal use of drugs
(a) In general
For purposes of this chapter, the term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.
(b) Rules of construction
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as an individual with a disability an individual who—
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use; except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs; however, nothing in

50d
this section shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conducting of testing for the illegal use of drugs.
(c) Health and other services
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and section 12211(b)(3) of this title, an individual shall not be denied health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, on the basis of the current illegal use of drugs if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services.
(d) “Illegal use of drugs” defined
(1) In general
The term “illegal use of drugs” means the use of drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.]. Such term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.] or other provisions of Federal law. (2) Drugs
The term “drug” means a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 812].
§ 12211. Definitions
(a) Homosexuality and bisexuality
For purposes of the definition of “disability” in section 12102(2) of this title, homosexuality and bisexuality are not

51d
impairments and as such are not disabilities under this chapter.
(b) Certain conditions
Under this chapter, the term “disability” shall not include—
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.
§ 12212. Alternative means of dispute resolution
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter.
§ 12213. Severability
Should any provision in this chapter be found to be unconstitutional by a court of law, such provision shall be severed from the remainder of this chapter and such action shall not affect the enforceability of the remaining provisions of this chapter.

 
 No. 02-1667 ================================================================

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------

STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Petitioner, v.

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents. --------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------

BRIEF OF THE STATES OF KANSAS AND DELAWARE AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------

STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF DELAWARE

Office of the Attorney General Office of the Attorney General

Memorial Bldg., 2nd Floor 820 N. French Street

120 SW 10th Avenue

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597 (302) 577-8400

(785) 296-2215

PHILL KLINE Kansas Attorney General

M. JANE BRADY Delaware Attorney General

RALPH JAMES DEZAGO Assistant Attorney General Counsel of Record

DAVID W. DAVIES Deputy Attorney General

HARRY KENNEDY Assistant Attorney General

================================================================
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE STATES ......... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4
I. Fundamental Rights Under The Due Process Clause Are Distinguishable From Equal Protection-Based Concerns And Are Entitled To Greater Protections From Interference By Government, Including A Protection Against Application Of Eleventh Amendment Immunity. .................................................................. 4
II. Congress Found Ample Evidence Of A Problem Of Unconstitutional Treatment Of Individuals With Disabilities, Specifically As To The Exercise Of Fundamental Rights, And, Therefore, When Enacting Title II Of The ADA, Validly Abrogated The States’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity As To Fundamental Rights............................................................... 6
A. Historic and Enduring Discrimination of Fundamental Rights ................................. 7
B. Access to the Courts.................................. 9
C. Voting ........................................................ 10
D. Fourth Amendment Rights ....................... 12
E. Parenting Rights....................................... 13
F. Licensing ................................................... 14
G. Eighth Amendment Violations ................. 14
III. Congress Validly Abrogated The States’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity In Terms Of Violations Of Fundamental Rights. ................ 15

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued Page
A. Congress Made its Intention Clear in the Language of the Act .................................. 15
B. Congress Acted in Accordance with its Enforcement Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. .................... 16
C. Abrogation of States’ Immunity Is Congruent and Proportional ........................... 16
CONCLUSION............................................................ 18

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712 (1985) ................................................................................ 2
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001)...........passim
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct 780 (1971) ............................................................................ 5, 9
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) ................................................................. 5, 16
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) ............................................................. 2, 8
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S.Ct. 1910 (1998).......... 17
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 90 S.Ct. 1752 (1970) .............................................................................. 10
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) .............................................................................. 14
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970) .............................................................................. 13
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000) ....................................................................... 15
Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003)............................................................ 2, 9, 10, 17, 18
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076 (1974) ................................................. 5
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932 (1977) .............................................................. 2
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1986) ............. 15

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982) ............. 4
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002) ........... 2, 3, 16, 17, 18
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 1439 (1993) ........... 4
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (1964) .......................................................................... 5, 10
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981) .............................................................................. 14
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (1980) ............................................... 9
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973) ...................................... 5
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987) ............................................... 2
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996)............................................................. 15
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (1969) .............................................................................. 17
Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942) ......................................... 5
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972) .............................................................................. 13
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978) ................................................................................ 8
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) .................................................................... 4, 13, 17

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued Page
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997)............ 5 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct.
2258 (1997) ................................................................... 2, 4 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064
(1886) .............................................................................. 10 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673
(1978) ................................................................................ 5
STATUTES/OTHER AUTHORITIES 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) ...................................................... 10 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) ...................................................... 10 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 .................................................... 1 42 U.S.C. § 12202 ............................................................... 15 K.S.A. 25-1234 ...................................................................... 7 K.S.A. 23-120 ........................................................................ 7 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings
on S. 933 before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped and the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1989) (May 1989 Hearings) ................................................................11 California Att’y Gen., Comm’n on Disability: Final Report 17 (Dec. 1989) ..................................................... 13 Equal Access to Voting for Elderly & Disabled Persons: Hearings Before the Task Force on Elections of the House Comm. on House Admin., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1984) ...............................................11

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
M. Burgdorf & R. Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment, 15 Santa Clara lawyer 855, 863 (1974) ................................................................................ 7
Governor J. Kitzhaber, Proclamation of Human Rights Day and Apology for Oregon’s Forced Sterilization (Dec. 2, 2002)............................................... 8
New Mexico, Official 2002 General Election Results by Office (Dec. 2002)......................................................... 8
P. Reilly, The Surgical Solution 2, 148 (1991) ..................... 8
National Public Radio, Look Back at Oregon’s History of Sterilizing Residents of State Institutions (Dec. 2, 2002) ........................................................... 8
2 Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 1040 (Comm. Print 1990) .................................passim
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment 16 (1990)...................................... 6, 12, 13, 14
H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 2 ..................................................... 14
S. Rep. No. 116 ....................................................................11

1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE STATES
This amici curiae brief is submitted on behalf of the amici curiae States of Kansas and Delaware. The amici curiae States support a finding by the United States Supreme Court in favor of Respondents on a limited basis.
In this brief, the amici curiae advocate that Congress validly abrogated the various states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when it enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213112165 (“ADA”). However, the amici curiae also advocate that Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity protection relative to Title II of the ADA only to the extent said immunity obstructs the pursuit or enforcement of fundamental due process rights. Moreover, the amici curiae advocate that Congress did not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity protection as to equal protection-based claims under Title II because doing so would not have been a “congruent and proportional” remedy, would have overstepped Congress’ enforcement powers, and would have been in direct conflict with longstanding constitutional mandates.
The amici curiae recognize that fundamental due process-based rights such as access to the courts, voting, and privacy issues, represent crucial and historically significant rights. The amici curiae also recognize that the states should be leading the fight to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities as to the exercise of their fundamental rights. Therefore, in order to encourage full pursuit and protection of fundamental rights, the states should not be immune from damage claims brought

2
by individuals under Title II of the ADA for violations that implicate a citizen’s fundamental due process rights.
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court has recognized that people with disabilities suffer discrimination resulting from irrational fears, prejudices and ignorance. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712 (1985); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987). Unfortunately, people with disabilities have suffered discrimination in areas that directly affect fundamental due process rights. See Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002) and the instant case Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003). These fundamental rights are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938 (1977)). As such, it is imperative that the states strive to eliminate discrimination that affects these fundamental rights. One way of doing so is to recognize the fact that Congress validly abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, in terms of these fundamental rights, when it enacted Title II of the ADA.
It is clear that Congress, when enacting the ADA, held numerous hearings and documented the past history of discrimination against disabled persons, including significant testimony in the legislative record regarding infringement of fundamental rights. It is also clear that, in addition to hearing testimony and gathering evidence

3
related to infringement of fundamental rights, Congress also heard testimony and gathered evidence related to equal protection-based concerns.
While any discrimination exhibited against a class of persons is abhorrent, Congress does not have the authority, as Respondents and certain amici suggest, to create new suspect or quasi-suspect classes in order to address equal protection-based concerns like those reviewed and documented in the legislative record during passage of the ADA. However, Congress does have the authority to address barriers or discrimination affecting fundamental rights due to the heightened scrutiny attributed to fundamental rights.
In enacting Title II, Congress provided for a congruent and proportional remedy for widespread constitutional violations by the states in terms of fundamental rights. It is clear that Congress initiated Title II legislation to remedy and deter continued discrimination against people with disabilities with respect to governmental functions in the area of fundamental rights. Accordingly, as limited to these fundamental rights, Title II was a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power.
In enacting Title II, Congress did not go so far as enacting the same congruent and proportional legislative remedies when equal protection-based purposes are concerned. This is so, because any attempt to do so would have exceeded Congress’ enforcement powers – essentially carving out a new protected class of persons – and would have been in direct violation of the Constitution. See Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002).
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------

4
ARGUMENT
I. Fundamental Rights Under The Due Process Clause Are Distinguishable From Equal Protection-Based Concerns And Are Entitled To Greater Protections From Interference By Government, Including A Protection Against Application Of Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
Fundamental rights under the Due Process clause, as documented in the legislative record during passage of the ADA, are distinguishable from equal protection-based concerns documented in the same record.
This Court has “long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, ‘guarantees more than fair process.’ ” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997)). The Due Process Clause also includes a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Id.; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993). Statutes affecting fundamental constitutional rights must be drawn with precision and must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives; if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a state must choose the least restrictive means. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982), reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
In determining whether a particular state law infringes on a fundamental right or interest so as to require strict judicial scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court

5
does not pick out particular human activities or conduct, characterize them as “fundamental,” and give them added protection, rather, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296 (1973), reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973). The equal protection clause “creates no substantive rights,” but rather, “it embodies general rule that states must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly.” Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997). This Court has also confirmed “the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of the Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees.” Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 121 S.Ct. 955, 963 (2001) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 51924, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2163-67 (1997)).
The amici curiae advocate that fundamental rights that must be protected by eliminating the States’ application of Eleventh Amendment Immunity include: the right to vote Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381 (1964); access to the courts Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79, 91 S.Ct 780, 786-87 (1971); certain privacy rights, including the right of procreation Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942), and the right to marry Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673 (1978); and interstate travel Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076 (1974).
Violations of these fundamental rights, including acts of discrimination affecting these fundamental rights, must be eliminated. That is exactly what Congress attempted to

6
do when it enacted Title II of the ADA and validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity as to fundamental rights.
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
II. Congress Found Ample Evidence Of A Problem Of Unconstitutional Treatment Of Individuals With Disabilities, Specifically As To The Exercise Of Fundamental Rights, And, Therefore, When Enacting Title II Of The ADA, Validly Abrogated The States’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity As To Fundamental Rights.
Congress engaged in extensive study and fact-finding concerning the problem of discrimination against persons with disabilities and set forth in the legislative record a history of discrimination against disabled persons as to their fundamental rights.1
1 Congress held 13 hearings devoted specifically to consideration of the Disabilities Act. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing hearings). In addition, a congressionally designated Task Force held 63 public forums across the country that were attended by more than 30,000 individuals. See Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment 16 (1990) (Task Force Report). The Task Force presented evidence to Congress submitted by nearly 5,000 individuals documenting the problems with discrimination persons with disabilities face daily – often at the hands of state and local governments. See 2 Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 1040 (Comm. Print 1990) (Leg. Hist.). See also Task Force Report 16. The Task Force submitted those “several thousand documents” evidencing “massive discrimination and segregation in all aspects of life” to Congress, 2 Leg. Hist. 1324-25, as part of the official legislative history of the Disabilities Act. See id. at 1336, 1389. In Garrett, the United
(Continued on following page)

7
A. Historic and Enduring Discrimination of Fundamental Rights
Numerous States have restricted the rights of physically disabled people to enter into contracts. United States Civil Rights Comm’n Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (Spectrum) 40. Until 1977, the State of Kansas prevented marriage between developmentally disabled persons. See K.S.A. 23-120.
Amazingly, some cities enacted “ugly laws,” that prohibited the physically disabled from appearing in public. M. Burgdorf & R. Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment, 15 Santa Clara lawyer 855, 863 (1974). Chicago’s law provided:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or improper person to be allowed in or on the public ways or other public places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose himself to public view, under a penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each offense.
Id. (quoting ordinance).
Additionally, until 1968, the State of Kansas required a disabled person to provide a doctor’s note or statement if that person could not register to vote in person. See K.S.A. 25-1234.
States lodged with the Clerk a complete set of those submissions. See 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

8
The involuntary sterilization of the disabled is not distant history; it continued into the 1970s, and occasionally even into the 1980s – well within the lifetime of many current governmental decision makers. P. Reilly, The Surgical Solution 2, 148 (1991) (Reilly); National Public Radio, Look Back at Oregon’s History of Sterilizing Residents of State Institutions (Dec. 2, 2002). As recently as 1983, fifteen States continued to have compulsory sterilization laws on the books. Spectrum 37; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978) (Indiana judge ordered the sterilization of a “somewhat retarded” 15 year old girl); Reilly at 148-60.
Until the late 1970s, “peonage was a common practice in [Oregon] institutions.” Governor J. Kitzhaber, Proclamation of Human Rights Day and Apology for Oregon’s Forced Sterilization (Dec. 2, 2002). As of 1979, “most States still categorically disqualified ‘idiots’ from voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion to exclude left in the hands of low-level election officials.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring). New Mexico recently reaffirmed its unqualified exclusion of “idiots [and] insane persons” from voting. New Mexico, Official 2002 General Election Results by Office (Dec. 2002).
It is evident from the legislative record that Congress discerned a substantial risk that persons with disabilities will be unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to exercise fundamental rights. Therefore, the amici curiae advocate that the enactment of Title II abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity regarding fundamental rights.

9
B. Access to the Courts
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of civil litigants, criminal defendants, and members of the public to have access to the courts. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (1980); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 37879, 91 S.Ct 780, 786-87 (1971). Yet Congress learned that “[t]he courthouse door is still closed to Americans with disabilities” – literally. 2 Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Leg. Hist.) 936 (Sen. Harkin).
“I went to the courtroom one day and *** I could not get into the building because there were about 500 steps to get in there. Then I called for the security guard to help me, who *** told me there was an entrance at the back door for the handicapped people. *** I went to the back door and there were three more stairs for me to get over to be able to ring a bell to announce my arrival so that somebody would come and open the door and maybe let me in. *** This is the court system that is supposed to give me a fair hearing. It took me 2 hours to get in. *** And when [the judge] finally saw me in the courtroom, he could not look at me because of my wheelchair. *** The employees of the courtroom came back to me and told me, ‘You are not the norm. You are not the normal person we see every day.’ ”
Id. at 1070-1071 (Emeka Nwojke).
Such differential treatment affects not only the ability to get into the courthouse, but also the ability to be heard and participate effectively and meaningfully in judicial proceedings. For instance, in this case, Respondent Lane was summoned to appear at the Polk County Courthouse in Benton, Tennessee. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th

10
Cir. 2003) (No. 98-6730). All court proceedings in that courthouse took place on the second floor. Id. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up the stairs to the courtroom where he was arraigned and ordered to appear at a later date for his hearing. Id. Lane returned for the hearing, but refused to climb to the courtroom and refused to be carried by officers. Id. The court then ordered Lane’s arrest and he was jailed. Id. Such egregious intrusion on a person’s fundamental rights should not be protected under the guise of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
C. Voting
This Court has stated that “[u]ndoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56162, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381 (1964); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755 (1970) (“moreover, the right to vote, as the citizen’s link to his laws and government, is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges” citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071 (1886)).
However, in making its findings relative to enactment of the ADA, Congress found that persons with disabilities have been “relegated to a position of political powerlessness,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), and continue to be subjected to discrimination in voting. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). Congress made such findings after hearing testimony that “people with disabilities have been turned away from the

11
polling places after they have been registered to vote because they did not look competent.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1220 (Nancy Husted-Jensen).
Furthermore, Congress learned that when one witness turned in the registration card of a voter who has cerebral palsy and was blind, the “clerk of the board of canvassers looked aghast and said to me, ‘Is that person competent? Look at that signature,’ ” and then invented a reason to reject the registration. Id. at 1219. Additionally, one deaf voter was told that “you still have to be able to use your voice” to vote. Equal Access to Voting for Elderly & Disabled Persons: Hearings Before the Task Force on Elections of the House Comm. on House Admin., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1984) (Equal Voting Hearings).
Another voter with a disability was “told to go home once when I came to the poll and found the voting machines down a flight of stairs with no paper ballots available;” on another occasion that voter “had to shout my choice of candidates over the noise of a crowd to a precinct judge who pushed the levers of the machine for me, feeling all the while as if I had to offer an explanation for my decisions.” Equal Voting Hearings 45. See also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing additional examples).
The legislative record also documented that many persons with disabilities “cannot exercise one of your most basic rights as an American” because polling places or voting machines are inaccessible. See S. Rep. No. 116 at 12. As a consequence, persons with disabilities “were forced to vote by absentee ballot before key debates by the candidates were held.” Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 before the Subcomm. on

12
the Handicapped and the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1989) (May 1989 Hearings). Voting by absentee ballot also “deprives the disabled voter of an option available to other absentee voters, the right to change their vote by appearing personally at the polls on election day.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1745 (Nanette Bowling).
D. Fourth Amendment Rights
The legislative history of the passage of the ADA, demonstrated that persons with disabilities have been victimized in their dealings with law enforcement, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.
When police in Kentucky learned that a man they arrested had AIDS, “[i]nstead of putting the man in jail, the officers locked him inside his car to spend the night.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1005 (Belinda Mason). Police also refused to accept a rape complaint from a blind woman because she could not make a visual identification. Task Force Report (NM 1081).2 A person in a wheelchair was given a ticket and six months probation for obstructing traffic on the street, even though the person could not use the sidewalk because it lacked curb cuts. Id. (VA 1684).
2 See supra footnote 1, describing Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment (Task Force Report). In Garrett, the complete set of Task Force submissions were cited by state and bates stamp number. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424.

13
Task Force Chairman Justin Dart testified, moreover, that persons with hearing impairments “have been arrested and held in jail over night without ever knowing their rights nor what they are being held for.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1331. A parole agent “sent a man who uses a wheelchair back to prison since he did not show up for his appointments even though *** he could not make the appointments because he was unable to get accessible transportation.” California Att’y Gen., Comm’n on Disability: Final Report 17, 81 (Dec. 1989). Other instances of discrimination revealed in the legislative record included situations where 1) a sheriff threatened persons with disabilities who stop in town due to car trouble, 2 Leg. Hist. 1115 (Paul Zapun); 2) a police officer taunted witness by putting a gun to her head and pulling the trigger on an empty barrel, “because he thought it would be ‘funny’ since I have quadraparesis and couldn’t flee or fight;” Id. at 1197 and 3) six wheelchair users arrested for failing to leave restaurant after manager complained that “they took up too much space.” Task Force Report 21.
E. Parenting Rights
This Court has long recognized that the Constitution protects and respects the sanctity of the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972). In addition, the Due Process Clause requires States to afford individuals with disabilities fair child custody proceedings, including the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970). Another government agency refused to authorize a couple’s adoption of a child solely because the woman had

14
muscular dystrophy. Task Force Report (MA 829). “[B]eing paralyzed has meant far more than being unable to walk – it has meant being *** deemed an ‘unfit parent’ ” in custody proceedings. H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 2, at 41. “Historically, child-custody suits almost always have ended with custody being awarded to the non-disabled parent.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1611 n.10 (Arlene Mayerson).
F. Licensing
The hearings on the ADA documented evidence of a woman who was denied a teaching credential, not because of her substantive teaching skills, but because of her paralysis. H.R. Rep. No. 485, supra, Pt. 2, at 29. See also 2 Leg. Hist. 1611 n.9 (Arlene Mayerson) (teaching license denied “on the grounds that being confined to a wheelchair as a result of polio, she was physically and medically unsuited for teaching”); Task Force Report (CA 261) (discrimination in licensing teachers); Id. (TX 1549) (state licensing requirements for teaching deaf students include the ability to hear); Id. (TX 1528 & 1542) (interpreters and readers not allowed for licensing exams); Id. (TX 1543) (blind applicant not allowed to take state chiropractor’s exam because she could not read x-ray without assistance).
G. Eighth Amendment Violations
The Eighth Amendment protects inmates with disabilities against treatment that is deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs and safety or imposes wanton suffering. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). But Congress heard that “their jailers rational[ize] taking away their wheelchairs as a

15
form of punishment as if that is different than punishing prisoners by breaking their legs.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1190 (Cindy Miller). Another prison guard repeatedly assaulted paraplegic inmates with a knife, forced them to sit in their own feces, and taunted them with remarks like “crippled bastard” and “[you] should be dead.” Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603, 605 (6th Cir. 1986).
III. Congress Validly Abrogated The States’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity In Terms Of Violations Of Fundamental Rights.
Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in Title II with regard to the fundamental rights discussed above. Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if two requirements are met. First, Congress must make its intention to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000) (citations omitted). Second, Congress must act in accordance with its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
A. Congress Made its Intention Clear in the Language of the ADA.
In adopting Title II, Congress clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity: “A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202.

16
Therefore, the remaining issue before the Court is whether Title II of the ADA constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power.
B. Congress Acted in Accordance with its Enforcement Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To be valid under Section 5, Congressional enactments “must exhibit ‘congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’ ” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). As discussed, Congress, in enacting Title II of the ADA, identified the history of discrimination as to fundamental rights. Congress then sought to remedy discrimination against those fundamental rights by enacting legislation that was “congruent and proportional” in light of the heightened standard of scrutiny attributed to those fundamental rights.
C. Abrogation of States’ Immunity Is Congruent and Proportional.
In Garrett, this Court found that Title I is not congruent with the Equal Protection Clause because it greatly expands “discrimination” liability by creating a very large new suspect class of plaintiffs. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 812. Further, in the Garrett decision the majority of this Court established that disability discrimination deserves a rational basis review and that Congress may not go beyond this standard in applying the Equal Protection Clause by imposing new liabilities on the States by creating a new

17
suspect class. Id. This rationale should apply equally to Title I and Title II of the ADA.
The constitutional balance under Title II, however, is quite different. Title II, unlike Title I, encompasses various due process type claims with varying standards and is not limited to Equal Protection. Much of the identified state conduct interferes with or threatens the fundamental rights of individuals with disabilities. Such violations are subject to a more intense scrutiny and persons, regardless of class status, cannot be excluded from voting, participating in court proceedings or raising their children “unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (1974); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910 (1988). Congress is well within its express authority under Section 5 to require states to accommodate disabilities as Congress is enforcing the Due Process right rather than expanding it. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815.
In the present case before the Court, Respondent Lane, who is a person with quadriplegia and uses a wheelchair for mobility, found himself in the Polk County Courthouse. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680. The court room in which Respondent was to appear was located on the second floor, with no elevators to provide access to the upper floors of the Courthouse. Id. The Respondent at a previous hearing faced with this circumstance was forced to drag himself up two flights of stairs. Id. On the occasion, which led to this cause of action, the Respondent, when given the choice to either again drag himself to the second floor or endure the prospect of being carried, refused and was subsequently arrested and jailed upon the

18
court’s order. Id. Respondent was denied the opportunity to meaningfully participate in an adversary court proceeding. Id. Consequently, as evidenced in the instant case, a state’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff ’s disability may greatly increase the risk of error in proceeding, precluding one side from responding to charges made by the opposing party, an essential element of our adversary proceeding. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815.
Congress properly abrogated States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for citizens’ fundamental rights. Such an abrogation would be congruent and proportional as Congress was not creating a new suspect class as cited in Garrett; or creating new liabilities for the states. Rather, it was merely enforcing rights that already exist for all citizens, due to the heightened scrutiny associated the those rights, that are expressly contained within or implicitly implied in the text of the Constitution.
The Petitioner’s action should be barred by the Eleventh Amendment insofar as the action relied on Congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, however, it should not be barred insofar as any abrogation would rely upon the congressional enforcement for the Due Process Clause. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 812.
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
CONCLUSION
Faced with well-documented incidents of state discrimination against people with disabilities affecting fundamental Due Process rights, Congress enacted a comprehensive and legislative response that recognized the States’ central role in the provision of fundamental government functions, such as access to the courts, voting, and the ability to petition government officials.

19

Title II involves, in part, an area of regulation for which people with disabilities have no options. That is, governments have a central role in providing fundamental government functions, and should strive to ensure that those functions are performed in a manner that does not impede the fundamental rights of its citizens.

Because of the states’ central role, a limitation on the ability of people with disabilities to enforce Title II against the States, in terms of pursuing the enforcement and protection of fundamental rights, may substantially diminish Title II’s effectiveness. In this limited situation, the Court should grant Congress reasonable latitude in crafting remedies that people with disabilities can use without restriction.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find in favor of the Respondents and hold that Congress, pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in enacting Title II of the ADA, validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity as to issues affecting fundamental due process rights.

Dated: November 12, 2003

Respectfully submitted,

PHILL KLINE Kansas Attorney General

M. JANE BRADY Delaware Attorney General

RALPH JAMES DEZAGO Assistant Attorney General Counsel of Record

DAVID W. DAVIES Deputy Attorney General

HARRY KENNEDY Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Amici Curiae States Kansas and Delaware

 
 No. 02-1667
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 2003
STATE OF TENNESSEE, PETITIONER, v.
GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
AND 23 OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS (Additional Amici Listed on Inside Cover)

Of Counsel: Ira A. Burnim Jennifer Mathis JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON
CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1101 Fifteenth St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 467-5730

Timothy K. Armstrong* Elizabeth B. McCallum Andrew P. Tower Kristien Carbonez Thomas Dillickrath Richard Groseclose Kristen McAhren HOWREY SIMON ARNOLD
& WHITE, LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2402 (202) 783-0800

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amici Curiae

AMICI CURIAE JOINING THIS BRIEF
AARP American Association on Mental Retardation American Council of the Blind American Diabetes Association American Occupational Therapy Association American Psychiatric Association The Arc of the United States Association on Higher Education and Disability Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law Alexander Graham Bell Association
for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance Easter Seals The Epilepsy Foundation® Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. National Alliance for the Mentally Ill National Association for Rights Protection and Advocacy National Association of Councils
on Developmental Disabilities National Council on Independent Living National Health Law Program National Mental Health Association National Mental Health Consumers’
Self-Help Clearinghouse National Multiple Sclerosis Society Paralyzed Veterans of America Tennessee Disability Coalition United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Interest of the Amici Curiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Summary of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 I. Title II Of The ADA Protects A
Signiﬁcantly Broader Range Of Constitutional Rights Than Does Title I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 II. The Legislative Record Conﬁrms Congress’ Speciﬁc Findings of Unconstitutional Discrimination By The States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 III. The States Have Historically Deprived Americans With Disabilities Of Their Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State
Interference With Equal and Effective Access To The Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. States Exclude People With
Disabilities From The Judicial Process As Litigants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. States Exclude People With Disabilities From The Judicial Process As Jurors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Conduct Involving The Fundamental Right To Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1. States Disenfranchise People With Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2. States Deny Access To Voting Equipment And Polling Places . . . . . . 13
i

C. Patterns Of State Interference With The Fundamental Right To Marry And Form Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1. States Sterilize Persons With Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2. States Prohibit The Marriage Of People With Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . 16 3. States Discriminate Against Parents With Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . . 18
D. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Discrimination In Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
E. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Treatment Of People With Disabilities In Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1. States Institutionalize People With Disabilities Without Necessity And Treat Them Deplorably While They Are In Civil Institutions . . . . . . . 21 2. States Ignore The Medical Needs Of Prisoners With Disabilities And Otherwise Violate Their Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
F. Patterns Of Irrational State Segregation Of People With Disabilities From The Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
ii

APPENDICES The Amici Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a Non-Current Statutes Cited in Brief as Examples of States Imposing Restrictions on Jury Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10a Non-Current Statutes Cited in Brief as Examples of States Excluding Students With Disabilities from Public Education . . . . . . . . . . . 11a Non-Current Statutes Cited in Brief as Examples of States Restricting Right to Marry and Form Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11a
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A.W., In re, 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16
Adoption of Richardson, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
American Association of People with Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Association of Relatives and Friends of Aids Patients v. Regulations and Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff’d, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bednarski v. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
iv

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12, 17, 23, 27
Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Cook v. State, 495 P.2d 768 (Or. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
v

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Epicenter, Inc. v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Ohio 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Eric L. ex rel. Schierberl v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303 (D.N.H. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Gary W. v. Louisiana, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1746 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
H.J.B. v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev’d, 451 U.S. 1 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Hill v. New York State Board of Elections, 503 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Hill v. Shelby County, 599 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ala. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Interest of T.N.V., In re, 855 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993) . . 19
vi

Jackson v. Ft. Stanton Hospital & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990), rev’d, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Jones v. New York City Transit Authority, 483 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Kiman v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections, 301 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2002), aff’d, 332 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Larkin v. Michigan, 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1994), aff ’d, 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 673 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Tex. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Lewinson v. Crews, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Manhattan State Citizens’ Group Inc. v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Marriage of Carney, In re, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Marriage of R.R., In re, 575 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
McKinney v. McKinney, 805 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
vii

Motes v. Hall County Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799 (Idaho 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
National Organization on Disability v. Tartaglione, 2001 WL 1231717 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2001) . . . . . . . . . 13
Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wis. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Poe v. Lynchburg Training Sch. & Hospital, 518 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Va. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
viii

Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000), aff ’d, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2574 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 745 F. Supp. 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Sterilization of Moore, In re, 221 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Turner Broad. System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 6
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
ix

Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff ’d, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Yarbaugh v. Roach, 736 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 11, 21, 21 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 21 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 42 U.S.C. § 12132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5 ALA. CODE § 12-16-60 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102 (1987), amended,
1994 Ark. Acts No. 4, § 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 5 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 ARK. CONST. amend. 51 § 11(a)(6) (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4201 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
x

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3f (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-103 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-403 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 309 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 DEL. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (Supp. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 HAW. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 IND. CODE § 22-1601 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.3 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 KY. CONST. § 145(3) (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 KY. REV. STAT. § 116.025(1) (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 KY. REV. STAT. § 387.590 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207 (2002) . . . 11 MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. § 3-102(b)(2) (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . .12 MD. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 MASS. ANN. LAWS CONST. AMEND. art. 3 (2002) . . . . . . . 12 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.6 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-45 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-9 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-111(3) (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
xi

MONT. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 N.J. CONST. art. 2, § 6 (Supp. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:201 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(1) (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 N.M. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-4 (Michie 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 NEB. CONST. Art. 6, § 2 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-313(1) (Michie 2000) . . . . . . . 12 NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 OHIO CONST. art. 5, § 6 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (West 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 R.I. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-5 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 42 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 514 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(f) (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-2 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 WYO. STAT. § 1-11-101 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Other Authorities
Council of State Governments, Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project (June 2002), at http://consensusproject.org . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Sharon P. Davis, A Status Report to the Nation on People with Mental Retardation Waiting for Community Services (1997), at http://www.thearc.org/misc/WaitPage.html . . . . . . . . . 24
xii

Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness (Oct. 2003), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/ . . . . . . . . . . 26
Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, DOJ, to The Honorable Thomas J. Vilsack, Governor of Iowa (July 9, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/ ia ﬁndings wsrc gsrc.htm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
N.Y. State Comm’n on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Survey of Access to New York State Courts For Individuals With Disabilities (June 1994), at http://www.cqc.state.ny.us/publications/ pubcourt.htm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Price & Burt, Sterilization, State Action and the Concept of Consent, 1 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 57 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Phillip R. Reilly, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Bruce Dennis Sales, et al., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES (Plenum Press 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
D. Schein, At Home Among Strangers (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Kay Schriner, et al., Democratic Dilemmas:
Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437 (2000) . . . . . . . 12
xiii

Summary of Survey and Public Hearing Reports of the Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee of the California Judicial Council’s Access and Fairness Advisory Committee (Jan. 1997), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/ summarydisabilities.htm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 23
U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce, Mental Health: Improper Restraint or Seclusion Use Places People at Risk (Sept. 1999), at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99176.pdf . . . . . . 22
xiv

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are twenty-ﬁve associations of people with disabilities, public interest groups, professional organizations, and other organizations that advocate for the rights of people with disabilities, including AARP, American Association on Mental Retardation, American Council of the Blind, American Diabetes Association, American Occupational Therapy Association, American Psychiatric Association, The Arc of the United States, Association on Higher Education and Disability, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance, Easter Seals, The Epilepsy Foundation®, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National Association for Rights Protection and Advocacy, National Association of Councils on Developmental Disabilities, National Council on Independent Living, National Health Law Program, National Mental Health Association, National Mental Health Consumers’ Self-Help Clearinghouse, National Multiple Sclerosis Society, Paralyzed Veterans of America, Tennessee Disability Coalition, and United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Inc. These organizations, the interests of which are described in greater detail in the Appendix, wish to ensure that the Court is fully apprised of the extensive evidence of the States’ patterns of unconstitutional treatment of people with disabilities supporting Congress’ abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).1
1. The parties have consented to the ﬁling of this brief under S. Ct. R. 37.2, and their letters of consent have been lodged with the Clerk of the Court. Pursuant to S. Ct. R. 37.6, amici state that counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in part and that no one other than amici, their members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
1

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
State governments have compiled a reprehensible, decades-long record of unconstitutional treatment, including deprivations of fundamental rights, of Americans with a broad range of physical or mental disabilities—a record that Petitioner and its supporting amici do not seriously contest. To redress such treatment, Congress expressly invoked the full “sweep of Congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment[,]” when it enacted the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). Congress enacted Title II of the ADA against a backdrop that included ample evidence that States were unconstitutionally excluding people with disabilities from voting and from accessing the judicial system, prohibiting them from marrying and raising families, warehousing them in institutions in deplorable conditions, and otherwise systematically, irrationally, and intentionally depriving them of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, regular instances of such unconstitutional State behavior persist even today.
Undersigned amici anticipate that Respondents and the United States will detail the extensive evidence of Statesponsored unconstitutional treatment of people with disabilities contained in Congress’ legislative record. This brief, therefore, describes the compelling history of State unconstitutional conduct found in judicial decisions and the public record. The examples in this brief, although necessarily limited by space constraints, conﬁrm what is also plain in Congress’ speciﬁc statutory ﬁndings and in the legislative history: Congress properly exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of Title II of the ADA, and Title II represents a congruent and proportional response to the longstanding pattern of State constitutional violations.

3
ARGUMENT
I. TITLE II OF THE ADA PROTECTS A SIGNIFICANTLY
BROADER RANGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THAN DOES TITLE I
The “ﬁrst step” in analyzing the constitutionality of Congress’ abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity “is to identify with some precision” the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Board of Trustees of the University of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). Title II of the ADA protects a different, and signiﬁcantly broader, range of constitutional rights than the Title I provisions that this Court analyzed in Garrett. Title I encompasses only discrimination in employment. Title II, in contrast, applies directly and explicitly to States, and encompasses a broad range ofState conduct in the provision of public services and beneﬁts.2
Garrett found that State discrimination against people with disabilities in employment matters is constitutional unless the State’s action lacks a rational basis. Id. at 365– 367 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). The Court recognized, however, that a separate analysis of the scope of the constitutional right at issue would be appropriate under Title II. Id. at 360 n.1 (“Title II * * * has somewhat different remedial provisions” from Title I; declining to address applicability of Title II to issue before the Court).
As is evident from Congress’ statutory ﬁndings, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a), the sphere of conduct regulated under Title II implicates a number of constitutional rights with heightened substantive protection—the rights to vote, to marry, to access the courts, and the like. Accordingly, in addition to the type of equal protection/rational basis claims
2. Title II provides that “no qualiﬁed individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the beneﬁts of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “[P]ublic entit[ies]” include States and State instrumentalities and agencies. Id. § 12131(1)(A).

4
at issue in Garrett and City of Cleburne, the “history and pattern” of State-sponsored unconstitutional behavior that Congress examined in enacting Title II properly “encompasse[d] various due process-type claims with varying standards of liability.” Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 813 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002).
Assessment of many of the due process and equal protection-type violations encompassed within Title II requires heightened scrutiny because, in contrast to the discriminatory employment practices at issue in Garrett, many Title II violations involve the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. When a due process claim involves a right that this Court has deemed fundamental, it is well settled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause includes “a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301– 302 (1993); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (heightened scrutiny justiﬁed “when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution”). It is equally well settled that when differential State treatment challenged under the equal protection clause impinges on a fundamental constitutional right, the discrimination is assessed under a strict scrutiny, not a rational basis, standard. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
Accordingly, the “history and pattern” of Statesponsored discrimination underlying Title II includes not only irrational differential treatment of people with disabilities—although there is plenty of such conduct to be found—but also unconstitutional State conduct with respect to people with disabilities and their fundamental constitutional rights. As this Court concluded in Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003), legislation is more readily sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment when it serves to secure constitutional rights warranting heightened scrutiny, because Congress can more readily ﬁnd a pattern of conduct that fails the more

5
demanding constitutional standards.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD CONFIRMS CONGRESS’
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION BY THE STATES
The second part of Garrett’s analysis asks whether Congress enacted Title II in response to “a history and pattern” of unconstitutional discrimination by the States. 531 U.S. at 368. In Garrett, the Court noted “strong evidence” that Congress’ “failure to mention States in its legislative ﬁndings addressing discrimination in employment reﬂects that body’s judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented.” Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
Here, exactly the opposite is true: Congress’ statutory ﬁndings are “strong evidence” that Congress could, and did, identify a pattern of unconstitutional State action in the areas that it addressed in Title II. Thus, Congress’ ﬁndings explicitly and unambiguously encompass discrimination in public areas that are largely or entirely within the purview of the States, as well as multiple areas that indisputably include State conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (ﬁnding persistent discrimination against individuals with disabilities in such “critical areas” as “education,transportation, * * * institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services”). Congress also speciﬁcally found that the discrimination at issue was irrational, noting a “history of purposeful unequal treatment * * *resulting from stereotypic assumptions.” Id. § 12101(a)(7). Based on these ﬁndings, Congress aimed Title II directly at State conduct. Id. § 12132.
Congress’ ﬁndings command substantial deference. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress and the courts are coequal actors with separate and different roles in our tripartite system of government. Congress is uniquely suited to make determinations based on a wider and different set of information than that available to courts adjudicating speciﬁc cases. Judicial deference to Congress’ determinations recognizes Congress’ skill in per-

6 forming its speciﬁcally legislative function. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“We owe Congress’ ﬁndings deference in part because the institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.”) (citations omitted).
Congress’ ﬁndings of State discrimination in areas encompassed by Title II are also amply supported by the ADA’s legislative history—as amici anticipate will be detailed in the briefs for Respondents and the United States— and by the extensive examples from the judicial and public record described in Section III below. The Court need not limit its review to the speciﬁc legislative record, although that record is replete with examples of unconstitutional State conduct in the areas encompassed by Title II. Turner, 520 U.S. at 200, 209, 211–213 (examining evidence outside the legislative record to evaluate Congress’ exercise of legislative power). This brief provides a sampling of the judicial decisions and other public materials that demonstrate that States regularly deprived people with disabilities of their constitutional rights. The Court can, and should, presume that Congress was aware of such decisions when it enacted Title II. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (courts should presume that Congress is aware of relevant legal precedents).3 The record reveals, furthermore, that such unconstitutional behavior continues to the present day.
3. Moreover, even the numerous published decisions ﬁnding unconstitutional State behavior do not fully reﬂect the pervasive extent of such conduct, in light of Congress’ ﬁndings of invidious and persistent social and political segregation and isolation, and the resulting powerlessness, of people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (5), (6), (7).

7
III. THE STATES HAVE HISTORICALLY DEPRIVED
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Interference With Equal And Effective Access To The Courts
1. States Exclude People With Disabilities From The Judicial Process As Litigants
States have historically denied persons with disabilities an equal opportunity to use the State courts as litigants by not providing interpreters or other necessities for effective communication, or by imposing architectural barriers that exclude persons with mobility or sensory impairments from using the court system. Such inaccessibility violates due process principles when people with disabilities are unable effectively to access the judicial system, either in the criminal or civil context. For criminal defendants, the due process clause guarantees that an “accused has a right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975). Parties in civil litigation have an analogous due process right to be present in the courtroom and to participate meaningfully in the process unless their exclusion furthers an important governmental interest. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“[t]he Court traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (except in extraordinary circumstances, state must provide all civil litigants a meaningful opportunity to be heard).
Examples of exclusion from the judicial process in the civil arena are common. In Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002), for instance, a person who was partially deaf alleged that the State court failed to provide

8
him with adequate hearing assistance in his child custody case in violation of his equal protection and due process rights. The Sixth Circuit noted the fundamental nature of the rights at stake in parental custody hearings, and the procedural safeguards that this Court has repeatedly held are necessary in such hearings, including counsel for indigent defendants and free access to the trial records. Id. at 813–814 (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981); Santowsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–770 (1982); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996)). The court explained that “a state’s failure to accommodate plaintiff’s deafness may greatly increase the risk of error in the proceeding, precluding one side from responding to charges made by the opposing party, an essential element of our adversary system.” Id. at 815. Concluding that the suit raised “obvious due process problems,” the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for retrial on the unreasonable exclusion claim.4 Because the Due Process Clause itself required the State to accommodate the parent’s disability in the custody proceedings, Title II of the ADA plainly represents a congruent and proportional legislative response as applied in such circumstances. See ibid.
State criminal justice systems have also maintained barriers that effectively exclude persons with disabilities from participating meaningfully in judicial and related administrative proceedings, even when their own liberty is at stake. In Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002), for instance, a class of prisoners with disabilities alleged that California failed to provide them adequate access to, and a meaningful opportunity to participate in, their parole hearings. The process depended “to a great extent” on written forms; prisoners and parolees with disabilities were “provided with inade-
4. The court below applied Popovich when ruling on the cases now before this Court for review. See also, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998) (ﬁnding state courts physically inaccessible to quadriplegic civil litigant); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (ﬁnding material facts in dispute over whether county court proceedings were effectively inaccessible to hearing-impaired litigant).

9
quate accommodations to help them understand the content of those forms, and as a consequence some plaintiffs waived their rights to a hearing and others failed to invoke their rights on appeal.” Id. at 857 (footnote omitted). The system did not provide American Sign Language interpretation services, Braille copies of documents, qualiﬁed readers, or staff capable of effectively communicating with prisoners and parolees with mental retardation or mental disabilities. Id. at 858 n.10. Afﬁrming a lower court decision on ADA grounds, the Ninth Circuit held that the “minimal due process measures taken [by the defendant parole board] were insufﬁcient to comply with the ADA or to enable plaintiffs properly to invoke or assert their rights.” Id. at 862. Furthermore, there was no reasonable relation to any legitimate penological interest that could justify the impingement on the prisoners’, and parolees’, constitutional rights. Id. at 873–874.5
These kinds of problems, which prevent people with disabilities from effectively accessing the judicial system and vindicating their rights, are all too common. In 1997, for instance, the California Judicial Council concluded that many California courts conducted their proceedings in buildings that were not accessible to persons with disabilities, lacked proper communications equipment, provided too few interpreters, and otherwise denied equal access to persons with disabilities.6
5. See also People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (deprivation of due process where defendant with hearing impairment was sentenced as two time offender, and in earlier convictions, had been denied services of an interpreter); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (failure to provide interpreters for inmates with hearing impairments for parole and disciplinary hearing violates due process).
6. Summary of Survey and Public Hearing Reports of the Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee of the California Judicial Council’s Access and Fairness Advisory Committee 8–12 (Jan. 1997), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/summarydisabilities.htm; see also N.Y. State Comm’n on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Survey of Access to New York State Courts For Individuals With Disabilities (June 1994) (only 8% of New York courts fully accessible to people with disabilities; “signiﬁcant barriers” to access remain), at http://www.cqc.state.ny.us/publications/pubcourt.htm.

10
2. States Exclude People With Disabilities From The Judicial Process As Jurors
“Whether jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to others * * * than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering * * * of the elective franchise.” Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970). “The harm from discriminatory jury selection * * * touch[es] the entire community.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). There is no compelling interest in, nor any rational basis for, excluding people with physical and mental disabilities from jury service without regard to their individual ability to function effectively as jurors. Nonetheless, when Congress passed the ADA, it was relatively common for State courts categorically to refuse to allow people with certain disabilities to sit on juries. See, e.g., Hill v. Shelby County, 599 F. Supp. 303, 304 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (noting that state courts “routinely excuse” from service “jurors who have severe physical disabilities”).
For example, the State of New York barred persons with disabilities from jury service for more than 150 years, a practice which ended only upon the enactment of the ADA.7 Until 1994, Arkansas barred people with “substantial impairments” to hearing or sight from participating as jurors. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102 (1987), amended, 1994 Ark. Acts No. 4, § 6 (1994);8 see also Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (ﬁnding hearingor vision-impaired jurors unﬁt to serve). The District of
7. Lewinson v. Crews, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84–86 (App. Div. 1967) (excluding a blind college professor as a juror); id. at 87–88 (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (law in force since 1829), aff ’d, 236 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1968). New York courts continued to exclude all blind persons from jury service until the 1980s. E.g., Jones v. New York City Transit Auth., 483 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625–626 (Civ. Ct. 1984). Only upon the passage of the ADA did the New York state courts cease excluding disabled persons solely because of their status and without regard to their individual abilities. People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259, 261 (N.Y. 1990).
8. Copies of all non-current statutes cited in this brief are reproduced in the Appendix. The cited statutes are offered only as exemplars, and do not purport to represent all the discriminatory statutes in a particular area.

11
Columbia Superior Court continued to exclude all blind persons from jury service through 1993. Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 16–17 (D.D.C. 1993) (the “conclusion that blind jurors are not qualiﬁed appears based on exactly the archaic attitudes and unsubstantiated prejudices Congress wished to eradicate” with ADA). In DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399, 406 (W.D. Pa. 1989), a judge serving on Pennsylvania’s superior court testiﬁed that “he would disqualify a deaf person under all circumstances.” In 1985, the Missouri Supreme Court permitted the categorical exclusion of “deaf, mute, deaf-mute, and blind persons, from inclusion in the jury pool.” State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 813–814 (Mo. 1985) (“We doubt that deaf persons have a community of attitudes or ideas.”). Even today, a number of States have statutes that limit jury service to those who can “read,” “write,” or “speak” English, with no statutory exception for people who use American Sign Language or Braille—the same statutes that supported categorical exclusion of deaf and blind jurors in Spivey and DeLong. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-60 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:201 (2002); cf. also WYO. STAT. § 1-11-101 (2002) (jurors “in possession of * * * natural facilities”).
B. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Conduct Involving The Fundamental Right To Vote
When it passed the ADA, Congress found persistent discrimination in the “critical” area of “voting.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). The fundamental right to vote is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Classiﬁcations infringing the ability to exercise the right to vote must be examined under strict scrutiny. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
1. States Disenfranchise People With Disabilities
States have historically prevented Americans with mental disabilities from exercising their fundamental right to vote through a host of laws, many of which are still on the books. Forty-two States currently have laws disenfranchis-

12
ing Americans with mental disabilities in a variety of contexts.9 See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 n.2 (D. Me. 2001). Similar and more egregious laws were on the books when Congress enacted the ADA. Indeed, the concurring opinion in City of Cleburne had described them just ﬁve years before. 473 U.S. at 464 (citing 1979 article ﬁnding that “most states still categorically disqualiﬁed ‘idiots’ from voting”) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).10
Such laws are unconstitutional when, facially or as applied, they categorically exclude people with disabilities from voting, without reference to individual competence.
9. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (2000) (persons of unsound mind); ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 5 (1987); id. amend. 51 § 11(a)(6) (2001) (idiots or insane; adjudicated mentally incompetent); DEL. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 1701 (1999) (idiot or insane); HAW. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (1997) (non compos mentis); IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5 (2000) (idiot or insane); KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (1988) (mental illness); KY. CONST. § 145(3) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 116.025(1) (1993), 387.590 (1984); MD. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (1981); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. § 3-102(b)(2) (2002) (under care or guardianship for mental disability); MASS. ANN. LAWS CONST. AMEND. art. 3 (2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (1991) (under guardianship); MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11 (1999) (idiots and insane); MONT. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-111(3) (1999) (adjudicated unsound mind unless ﬁnding reversed); NEB. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-313(1) (Michie 2000) (non compos mentis); NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (1998) (idiot or insane); N.J. CONST. art. 2, § 6 (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(1) (2001) (idiot or insane); N.M. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-4 (Michie 1995) (idiots or insane); OHIO CONST. art. 5, § 6 (1994) (idiots or insane); R.I. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (2002) (adjudicated non compos mentis); VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 42 (1996) (not quiet and peaceable). See Kay Schriner, et al., Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437, 456 tbl. 2 (2000), for a chart describing these statutes. Many of the referenced statutory provisions continue to use what are now recognized as archaic, inexact, and pejorative terms, such as “lunatic” and “idiot,” to describe the class of persons whose exercise of democratic rights are to be denied. Such imprecise categorization is itself suggestive of arbitrariness and discriminatory animus rather than legislative rationality, much less a compelling legislative interest or narrow tailoring.
10. When Congress enacted the ADA, the American Bar Association had opined that most of these statutes were unconstitutional. Schriner, supra note 9, at 451.

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Such categorical exclusions serve no compelling State interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, much less provide the least restrictive means of doing so. Indeed, it is difﬁcult to articulate how such laws meet even minimal standards of due process. One recent case overturning a fairly typical State disenfranchisement provision aptly illustrates the defects in such laws. In Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001), a Maine statute prohibiting individuals under guardianship for reason of “mental illness” from registering to vote or voting failed to pass constitutional muster on due process and equal protection grounds. The court applied strict scrutiny, and found that the State had “disenfranchised a subset of mentally ill citizens based on a stereotype rather than any actual relevant incapacity.” Id. at 52. The court also found the statute facially unconstitutional under the equal protection clause, because the State’s insistence on looking to archaic categories such as “idiotic,” “lunatic,” and “unsoundness of mind” to determine who was excluded from voting based on mental illness permitted improper classiﬁcations and disenfranchised an overbroad class of individuals. Id. at 54–55; see also, e.g., Manhattan State Citizens’ Group Inc. v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (New York statute prohibiting individuals involuntarily committed to mental institution from voting was unconstitutional as applied).
2. States Deny Access To Voting Equipment and Polling Places
States have also discriminated by denying individuals with disabilities physical access to both polling places and voting machines. Although the cases in the area generally have been decided on statutory rather than constitutionalgrounds, it is hard to imagine a compelling State interest in making it difﬁcult or impossible for people with disabilities to exercise their fundamental right to vote, particularly when necessary modiﬁcations often come at a minimal cost. For example, in National Organization on Disability v. Tartaglione, 2001 WL 1231717 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2001), a group of plaintiffs with visual and mobility impairments brought suit against, among others, the Secretary

14
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, because the Secretary could, but had not, approved voting machines that would allow plaintiffs with visual impairments to participate fully in the voting process. See also American Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (declining to dismiss a suit against Florida ofﬁcials where State ofﬁcials certiﬁed machines which did not provide equal access to voters with disabilities); Hill v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 503 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (State board of elections had continually permitted local entities to locate polling places in sites inaccessible to people with disabilities). Because the States’ categorical disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities and interference with such persons’ rights to vote are themselves unconstitutional, there is no basis for concluding that the reasonable accommodation requirements of Title II do not represent a congruent and proportional legislative response in such circumstances.
C. Patterns Of State Interference With The Fundamental Right To Marry And Form Families
1. States Sterilize Persons With Disabilities
Every individual enjoys a fundamental right to control his or her ability to procreate “free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). This Court has also recognized a fundamental right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). Limitations on these fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–686 (1977).
The States share a long and shameful pattern of depriving Americans with disabilities of the right and ability to procreate. Early in the last century, most States had laws authorizing involuntary sterilization of persons with disabilities.11 Some of those laws were still in force when Con-
11. See generally Phillip R. Reilly, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 45–55 (1991).

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gress enacted the ADA, although commentators generally had long concluded that “compulsory sterilization laws, no matter what their rationale, [we]re unconstitutional in the absence of evidence that compulsory sterilization [wa]s the only remedy available to further a compelling governmental interest.”12 In 1991, for instance, an Arkansas court overturned, as violative of due process, a State statute authorizing sterilization of “mentally deﬁcient persons” without provision for notice, right of representation, right of hearing, or judicial oversight of the sterilization decision. McKinney v. McKinney, 805 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1991); see also Motes v. Hall County Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260, 261–262 (Ga. 1983) (Georgia statute authorizing sterilization on “legal preponderance” of evidence did not meet constitutional requirements, because due process requires “ ‘clear and convincing’ evidence”).13 In 1981, former patients of Virginia institutions who were involuntarily sterilized under a 1924 statute articulated a continuing constitutional violation, based on the State’s continuing failure to notify them that they had been involuntarily sterilized—causing them to suffer “medical, emotional, and mental problems, arising in large part from unsuccessful and uninformed attempts to deal with their infertility.” Poe v. Lynchburg Training Sch. & Hosp., 518 F. Supp. 789, 793 (W.D. Va. 1981).
Even after compulsory sterilization statutes were repealed, some States enacted statutes that allowed sterilization on the consent of the superintendent of a custodial care institution or a guardian.14 Sterilization on the ba-
12. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368–369 (Colo. 1981) (citing Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 (1977), and others).
13. Moreover, in the decades immediately before the ADA, State courts still were upholding sterilization statutes, citing the infamous decision in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See, e.g., In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. 1976); Cook v. State, 495 P.2d 768 (Or. 1972).
14. Price & Burt, Sterilization, State Action and the Concept of Consent, 1 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 57 (1978). E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 4145-1, 41-45-9 (1999) (sterilization of “insane, idiotic, imbecile or feeble-

16
sis of the legal ﬁction of “substituted consent” still involves State action threatening the fundamental right of procreation. Relying on substituted consent, courts have permitted third persons to consent to sterilizations in circumstances in which the facts indicate that no compelling interest was at stake. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (15-year-old girl with mild retardation sterilized involuntarily after judge approved, ex parte, her mother’s petition, without notice to the daughter or appointment of a guardian ad litem, although the daughter attended public school and had been promoted each year with her class); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1978) (21-yearold woman who was deaf and mute sterilized with consent of her guardian based on doctor’s report recommending the operation “ ‘based 90% on this girl’s low mentality involving poor judgment and her lack of restraint on sex appetite and its consequences’ ”) (citation omitted).15 Because such unconsented-to State-approved sterilization is itself a violation of the constitutional rights of the sterilized individual, there is no support for the contention that Title II of the ADA fails the requirements of congruence and proportionality in this context.
2. States Prohibit The Marriage Of People With Disabilities
Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), so the right to marry has long been considered fundamental, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). State laws restricting the
minded” person who “by the laws of heredity is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afﬂicted,” upon petition of director of State institution after hearing); IND. CODE § 22-1601 (1950).
15. See also, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 370 (“[c]onsent by parents to the sterilization of their mentally retarded offspring has a history of abuse which indicates that parents, at least in this limited context, cannot be presumed to have an identity of interest with their children. The inconvenience of caring for the incompetent child coupled with fears of sexual promiscuity or exploitation may lead parents to seek a solution which infringes their offspring’s fundamental procreative rights.”) (footnotes omitted).

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right of a class of persons to marry are unconstitutional unless the State can show a compelling interest. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978).
Nevertheless, numerous State statutes historically and categorically restricted the right of persons with disabilities to marry, without a determination of individual capacity, in a manner that cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Many States maintained such restrictive statutes through the enactment of the ADA.16 Just ﬁve years before Congress enacted Title II, for instance, this Court noted in City of Cleburne that it was still a criminal offense in several states for people with mental retardation to marry. 473 U.S. at 463 & n.12.
Some statutes discriminating against the right of persons with disabilities to marry are still on the books. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (2001), for instance, forbids the issuance of a marriage license “when it appears that the applicants or either of them is at the time drunk, insane or an imbecile.” See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (1999) (same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-403 (2001) (marriage of “an idiot or of a person adjudged to be a lunatic” is illegal and void). In 1987, Utah declared that marriage with “a person afﬂicted with acquired immune deﬁciency syndrome” is “prohibited” and “void.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (1987) (declared “void and invalid” on statutory grounds in T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993)). Such statutes provide States with the authority to deny marriage licenses to people on the basis of disabilities with-
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4201 (1987) (“imbecile”; “insane”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-103 (1981) (“idiot”; “lunatic”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.3 (1990) (“a mental retardate”; “mentally ill”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.6 (1988) (“feebleminded”; “imbecile”; “insane”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 4121-45 (1990) (unlawful to cohabit with “feebleminded” female); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (West 1990) (“weak-minded”; “insane”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-5 (1988) (“idiot”; “lunatic”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 514 (1989) (“idiot”; “lunatic”); id. tit. 15, § 512 (1989) (“physically incapable”); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-2 (1990) (“insane”; “idiot”; “imbecile”) (copies included in Appendix). See Bruce Dennis Sales, et al., DISABLED PERSONS AND THE LAW: STATE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 16–20 (Plenum Press 1982) (as of 1980, forty-two States and the District of Columbia had statutes restricting marriage for persons with disabilities).

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out any compelling interest or, indeed, any rational basis. Such denials are themselves unconstitutional, and for that reason, the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA must be viewed as a congruent and proportional legislative response in such and similar circumstances.
3. States Discriminate Against Parents With Disabilities
The right to raise one’s children is protected by the Constitution. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Balanced against this right is the state’s interest in the welfare of the child. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–234 (1972). The Court has repeatedly “recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
Yet, in matters involving the parent-child relationship, States historically have treated parents with mental retardation and mental or physical disabilities quite differently from other parents. “[D]iscrimination begins with the initial decision to intervene, ends in the decision to terminate the relationship, and is manifest in nearly every signiﬁcant decision along the way.”17 That discrimination often relies on stereotypes, rather than real individual differences in capacities.
Such stereotyping is evident, for example, in State custody determinations involving parents with mental or physical disabilities, even in cases citing the “best interest of the child” standard. In Bednarski v. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), a Michigan trial court terminated a deaf woman’s custody of her “[t]wo normal children,” citing her deafness, forcing the appellate court to reverse. In another example, a trial judge ordered that a blind father— a successful CEO of a computer company—must be accompanied at all times by a “responsible adult” while caring for his daughter, simply because of his disability. Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (revers-
17. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1227 (1990).

19
ing trial court). In H.J.B. v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753, 756 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), an Alabama court afﬁrmed a father’s loss of custody primarily because he was HIV-positive.18
State agencies have also classiﬁed children with disabilities as “unadoptable” in violation of their constitutional rights. In Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1993), for instance, the court permitted due process claims to proceed on behalf of two children classiﬁed as “unadoptable” by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services, one because he was tested positive for AIDS, the other because he was “handicapped.” Again, because the underlying State conduct at issue in each of these cases was itself unconstitutional, there is no plausible basis for concluding that Title II fails to serve as a congruent and proportional legislative response.
D. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Discrimination In Education
“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In view of the importance of the issue, the categorical exclusion of any class of children from the educational system would pose serious equal protection concerns. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
18. See also In re Interest of T.N.V., 855 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 1993) (describing trial court’s decision to allow HIVpositive father visitation with his daughter only if both father and child remained “fully robed and fully clothed with gloves, sterile gown and face masks” and ordering that “[t]here shall be no ‘skin to skin’ contact at any time during the visit”); In re Marriage of R.R., 575 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing order of trial judge awarding custody to “immoral” and “dishonest” mother because of unsubstantiated fear that the children would be “emotionally damaged because of [the father’s] handicap,” multiple sclerosis); In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1979) (condemning trial court’s conclusion that father was “deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply because he is physically handicapped” because “[l]ike most stereotypes, this is both false and demeaning”); Adoption of Richardson, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329– 330 (Ct. App. 1967) (reversing trial court refusal to permit a deaf couple to adopt a child; “[t]here can be no doubt that the judge was biased and prejudiced” against the parents “solely because they were deaf-mutes.”); Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799 (Idaho 1981) (epilepsy).

20
411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (distinguishing “absolute denial” of education from inequalities in funding). States nevertheless have historically discriminated against people with disabilities by excluding them from educational opportunities, and this pattern continues to the present day.
Earlier in the last century, a number of States categorically excluded children with disabilities from public education. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1975) (establishing free public schools for all children except those who were “physically or mentally disabled”). When Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (“EAHCA”) in 1975, it compiled an extensive record that States simply did not educate children with disabilities. Based on this record, Congress found that one million children were “excluded entirely” from the public school system, and “more than one-half” of the 8 million children with disabilities did not receive appropriate educational services. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Judicial decisions conﬁrm Congress’ conclusion. In Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), for instance, students with mental retardation charged that Pennsylvania statutes excluded them from schools. The court found that the plaintiffs had articulated equal protection and due process claims under the rational basis test. See also Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (due process violation when defendant excluded students with disabilities from public education). Congress considered these cases and others like them when it enacted the EAHCA. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988) (“by the time of the EHA’s enactment, parents had brought legal challenges to similar exclusionary practices in 27 other States”). Even when unconstitutional statutory schemes were remedied, States continued to violate the equal protection clause by excluding students with disabilities from educational opportunities. See, e.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
These constitutional violations continued when Congress enacted the ADA, ﬁfteen years later. In fact, Congress relied upon a Civil Rights Commission Report ﬁnding that,

21
notwithstanding the EAHCA, “a great many handicapped children continue to be excluded from the public schools.”19 Congress found, therefore, that States still were discriminating against children with disabilities in the “critical area” of “education.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). Unfortunately, instances of unconstitutional State exclusion persist even today. See, e.g., Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000) (students with disabilities stated actionable due process and equal protection claims alleging inadequate school funding), aff’d, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2574 (2003).
E. Patterns Of Unconstitutional State Treatment Of People With Disabilities In Institutions
In enacting the ADA, Congress found continuing Statesponsored discrimination in the “critical” area of “institutionalization,” and noted as well pervasive discrimination against people with disabilities through “segregation.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (5). The record before Congress when it passed Title II was replete with examples of unconstitutional State-sponsored discrimination in both civil and penal institutions. Such discrimination continues today.
1. States Institutionalize People With Disabilities Without Necessity And Treat Them Deplorably While They Are In Civil Institutions
Just eight years before Congress enacted the ADA, this Court decided Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–319 (1982), conﬁrming that people in civil institutions are constitutionally entitled to safe conditions, freedom from unnecessary bodily restraints, and the training necessary to assist them in securing those rights. Nonetheless, the States when the ADA was enacted and today have proven resistant to improving the deplorable unconstitutional conditions in some civil institutions.
A case brought by a class of children with mental re-
19. United States Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 29 (1983) (“Accommodating the Spectrum”).

22
tardation, emotional disturbances, and physical disabilities against the State of Louisiana is a prime example of a State’s continuing unconstitutional behavior. In 1976, the plaintiffs established unnecessary physical abuse, neglect, and unnecessary restraint of its wards, and the judge ordered remedial action. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219, 1213 (E.D. La. 1976). In 1990, twenty-ﬁve years later, and notwithstanding the judge’s efforts “to facilitate, cajole, and even coerce compliance,” the State institutions still were unable to prevent outright abuse of patients, or to provide minimally adequate treatment, consistent with constitutional standards. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1746, at *81 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1990).20
Other egregious examples abound. A federal judge recently described Alabama’s institutions as “essentially warehousing patients in an inhumane environment.” Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356, 1361–1362 (M.D. Ala. 1997). The same institutions were the subjects of similar ﬁndings, of unconstitutional conduct as early as 1971 for “grossly substandard” instances including examples of residents being scalded to death and restrained in a straitjacket for nine years, among others. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff ’d in relevant part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The year that Congress passed Title II, the staff at a New York facility for people with mental retardation regularly left the children in their care lying half-naked and unattended in their own urine
20. Just four years ago, the General Accounting Ofﬁce documented the continuing practice of unnecessary physical restraint among State institutions. GAO, Mental Health: Improper Restraint or Seclusion Use Places People at Risk (Sept. 1999), at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99176.pdf. The Department of Justice likewise has settled, with consent orders, several recent egregious cases involving unnecessary physical restraints. See, e.g., Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, DOJ, to The Honorable Thomas J. Vilsack, Governor of Iowa (July 9, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/ia ﬁndings wsrc gsrc.htm (residents in Iowa institution spent an average of 18 hours a month in mechanical restraints, some for as long as 300 hours a month, and many residents were injured by the use of such restraints). Many similar samples are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ﬁndsettle.htm.

23
and feces on cold ﬂoors while the staff watched television. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 745 F. Supp. 879, 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).21
In addition to treating people with disabilities deplorably while they are in institutions, the States have a long history of institutionalizing people unnecessarily. The Constitution protects individuals from unnecessary conﬁnement in institutions. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–575 (1975) (if the basis for commitment ceases to exist, continued conﬁnement unconstitutionally deprives the individual of a signiﬁcant liberty interest).
Historically, the States institutionalized individuals with mental retardation or deafness as a matter of course, based on false stereotypes, the “science” of eugenics, and pure xenophobia. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461–462 (describing a pattern of State-mandated institutionalization that “paralleled the worst excesses of Jim Crow”) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although the laws that mandated institutionalization have largely been repealed, there still is ample evidence of unnecessary and unconstitutional civil commitment. Congress was aware of such evidence when it passed the ADA,22 and the judicial record amply conﬁrms that it exists. For example, in Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 85–86 (3d
21. See also, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1306–1309 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (unconstitutional, deplorable, and hazardous conditions, including widespread inappropriate use of restraints and incidents of direct abuse from staff persons; the walls of the institution were covered in feces and urine and the residents were subject to outbreaks of infectious disease), rev’d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D.N.D. 1982) (constitutional violations in North Dakota institutions; drugs were administered casually, often to the wrong individual; residents were regularly left naked in front of other residents; individuals’ health worsened rather than improved), aff ’d in relevant part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 673 F. Supp. 828, 844–848 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (systemic understafﬁng and communications failures led to inappropriate medication and deaths; behavior modiﬁcation techniques were “state of the art 1950’s”) (internal quotations omitted).
22. See Accommodating the Spectrum, supra note 19, at 34 (noting that “segregationist purpose” of institutions continued; institutions still “lack rational admitting criteria,” among other defects).

24
Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit documented a ten-year effort by staff at a Pennsylvania institution to secure the release of a woman with mild retardation. At age ﬁfteen, in 1956, she was labeled as “severely defective” and committed without a hearing. Id. at 85. Even after the statute under which she was committed was repealed, and despite her doctors’ recommendations that she be released, State ofﬁcials never reviewed her case. Ibid. In the end, Pennsylvania did not dispute that forty years of unnecessary institutionalization had deprived the plaintiff of any hope of living the rest of her life without supervised care. Id. at 83. The court of appeals found that this conduct violated the plaintiff ’s substantive due process rights. Id. at 87. In Eric L. ex rel. Schierberl v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303 (D.N.H. 1994), the court found that the State violated procedural due process, equal protection, and the ADA when it segregated children with disabilities in institutions which isolated them and denied them services and placement opportunities comparable to those available to children without disabilities.23
2. States Ignore The Medical Needs Of Prisoners With Disabilities And Otherwise Violate Their Constitutional Rights
The Eighth Amendment prohibits disproportionate punishments, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366–367
23. See also Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 369–373 (4th Cir. 1986) (North Carolina violated constitutional rights of man with mild retardation when it moved him from State hospital to a detox center rather than providing non-residential support services as hospital recommended); Jackson v. Ft. Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1294–1296 (D.N.M. 1990) (New Mexico deprived a class of individuals with developmental disabilities who were unnecessarily committed of substantive due process rights in numerous instances), rev’d in part on other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992); D. Schein, At Home Among Strangers (1989) (describing numerous deaf individuals committed under repealed statutes allowing for commitment solely by reason of deafness or erroneously considered to have mental disabilities; continued commitment had not been reviewed). Unfortunately, the problem of unnecessary institutionalization remains pervasive. See Sharon P. Davis, A Status Report to the Nation on People with Mental Retardation Waiting for Community Services (1997), at http://www.thearc.org/misc/WaitPage.html.

25
(1910), and the “unnecessary and wanton inﬂiction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Constitution also forbids State prisons to act with deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners with disabilities. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).24 This practice subjects prisoners with disabilities to multiple punishments: in addition to their sentence, they suffer unnecessary pain, loss of dignity, and, in some cases, a shortened lifespan.
At the time Title II was enacted, however, State prisons nevertheless continued to abuse prisoners with disabilities, denying them these fundamental constitutional protections. For example, a Michigan prison routinely forced two paraplegic inmates to sit in their own feces for hours at a time, causing them medical complications. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 602–603 (6th Cir. 1986). Staff habitually refused to relay the prisoners’ requests for aid to nurses, and deliberately placed their food trays in inaccessible positions. Moreover, prison ofﬁcials did nothing to stop a guard who on several occasions assaulted the inmates with a knife and frequently called one inmate a “crippled bastard who should be dead.” Id. at 603. The State’s conduct furthered “[n]o legitimate penological or institutional objective.” Id. at 605.
In Kiman v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections, 301 F.3d 13, 25 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002), aff’d, 332 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc), for instance, an inmate with Lou Gehrig’s Disease sued New Hampshire under the ADA and State laws. 301 F.3d at 14–15. During his conﬁnement, Mr. Kiman gradually lost the ability to control his voluntary muscles. Id. at 15. Despite his repeated requests, the State refused to provide him with a cane to walk or a chair to use in the shower; cuffed his hands behind his back rather than in front despite his pleas of pain; refused to move his cell from the third tier despite his inability to climb stairs; and refused to provide him a special toilet, requiring him to rely on the goodwill of his cellmates to engage in personal hy-
24. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998), conﬁrmed that prisoners with disabilities can sue State prisons under Title II for discrimination in the provision of medical services.

26
giene. Id. at 16. The First Circuit held that the complaint fairly could be read to allege a violation of both the Eighth Amendment and equal protection. Id. at 24 & 25 n.9. Because the State’s refusal to accommodate Mr. Kiman’s disability was itself a constitutional violation, the ADA represents a congruent and proportional response as applied to the type of violations alleged in that case. See id. at 25 & n.9.
The suffering endured by inmates with disabilities is reaching crisis proportions. Prisoners with disabilities are over-represented in the criminal justice system and are swelling the ranks of penal institutions.25 A recent class action in California illustrated State-wide systemic and unconstitutional abuse of prisoners with mental disabilities. In Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1305–1323 (E.D. Cal. 1995), the record revealed that California failed to: screen inmates for medical needs; maintain basic medical records and medication policies; maintain adequate and competent stafﬁng; appropriately use mechanical restraints; and prevent inappropriate disciplinary and behavior control measures on prisoners with mental disabilities, including use of isolation and taser guns. Ibid. Each one of these practices violated the prisoners’ constitutional rights. Id. at 1305–1325.26
25. See Council of State Governments, Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus Project (June 2002), at http://consensusproject.org; Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness ch. III (Oct. 2003), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/. Once incarcerated, inmates with disabilities are far more likely to be victimized, exploited, and injured than other inmates. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in relevant part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
26. See also, e.g., Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1274–1391 (126-page opinion describing Texas’ unconstitutional treatment of prisoners with disabilities, including among many other examples routinely denying prescribed treatments for prisoners who use asthmatic inhalers and wheelchairs and disciplining prisoners with mental retardation for infractions of rules they did not understand); Yarbaugh v. Roach, 736 F. Supp. 318, 320 (D.D.C. 1990) (prisoner with multiple sclerosis was incarcerated for over a year before he was seen by a physician and did not receive assistance in daily activities; as a consequence, he had not showered in over a year and had fallen repeatedly attempting to move

27
F. Patterns Of Irrational State Segregation Of People With Disabilities From The Community
Even outside the walls of State-run institutions, the States have historically segregated Americans with disabilities from the community at large through discriminatory zoning laws. Such laws lack a rational basis when they treat people with disabilities differently than other groups without justiﬁcation. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (ordinance requiring a group home for people with mental retardation to obtain a special use permit but not requiring other groups to obtain similar permits violated equal protection).
Over the past decades, many individuals with disabilities have moved from institutional settings into more integrated community settings. Unfortunately, States and municipalities reacting to pressure based on stigma and prejudice responded by enacting dispersion laws that prevent the concentration of community residences for individuals with disabilities in one area. Epicenter, Inc. v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp. 845, 849 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (cities “reacted to the deinstitutionalization movement” like “postbellum Southern state governments that passed Jim Crow laws”).
When Congress enacted Title II, this form of discrimination was extensive, and involved State as well as local/municipal action. In Larkin v. Michigan, 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1994), for instance, the court considered a Michigan law forbidding the licensing of a group home for people with disabilities if the group home was to be located within 1500 feet of another group home. Id. Finding that the dispersion requirements placed quotas on the people with disabilities who could live in a residential neighborhood, the court struck the law as without rational basis and thus violative of equal protection guarantees. Id. at 179– 180;27 see also Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491,
from his wheelchair to his bed). 27. The Sixth Circuit afﬁrmed on statutory grounds without reaching
the constitutional issue. 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996). Other States have similar dispersion requirements. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3f

28
1503 n.20 (10th Cir. 1995) (statutory claim involving Utah law mandating that community housing for people with “handicap[s]” provide 24-hour supervision; “if this case had been brought as an equal protection claim, there is no evidence that the zoning restrictions were rationally related to legitimate government concerns and not based on unsubstantiated fears or irrational prejudices”); Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations and Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 103–106 (D.P.R. 1990) (ﬁnding intentional discrimination against people with AIDS in zoning decision).
CONCLUSION
Congress’ speciﬁc ﬁndings, the materials cited in this brief, and the legislative history detailed in other briefs all provide extensive and compelling evidence that States perpetuated a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination. In view of this long-standing pattern, Congress was acting well within its constitutional authority when it abrogated the States’ immunity from suit under Title II. Accordingly, this Court should afﬁrm the judgments below.

Respectfully submitted.

Of Counsel: Ira A. Burnim Jennifer Mathis JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON
CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1101 Fifteenth St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 467-5730

Timothy K. Armstrong* Elizabeth B. McCallum Andrew P. Tower Kristien Carbonez Thomas Dillickrath Richard Groseclose Kristen McAhren HOWREY SIMON ARNOLD
& WHITE, LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2402 (202) 783-0800

Counsel for Amici Curiae

NOVEMBER 2003

* Counsel of Record

(2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 309 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(f) (2002).

1a
THE AMICI ORGANIZATIONS
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonproﬁt membership organization with more than thirty-ﬁve million persons age 50 and older that is dedicated to addressing the needs and interests of older Americans. Countless AARP members with disabilities rely on Title II of the ADA to assure access to public programs and services, including those provided by States and State entities, in a manner free from discrimination. These protections are especially important to AARP members because older persons have a higher incidence of disabilities than other populations.
The American Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) is the nation’s oldest and largest interdisciplinary organization of professional and other persons who work exclusively in the ﬁeld of mental retardation. AAMR promotes progressive policies, sound research, effective practices, and human rights for people with intellectual disabilities.
The American Council of the Blind (“ACB”) is a national nonproﬁt, consumer organization of the blind, with seventy afﬁliates and members in all ﬁfty states. Its mission is to improve the quality of life, equality of opportunity, and independence for all persons who are blind. To that end, ACB seeks to educate policy makers about the needs and capabilities of people who are blind, and to assist individuals and organizations wishing to advocate for programs and policies that meet the needs of people who are blind, or visually impaired. ACB members were very involved in the efforts that led to the passage of the ADA. Therefore, we are very disturbed about the legal challenges to its constitutionality which have been raised in recent years. We are especially concerned that state governments are increasingly taking up the cause of those who would weaken the ADA’s effectiveness. We urge this Court to give careful consideration to the implications of such challenges for the rights and welfare of people with disabilities who live and work within those states.
The American Diabetes Association is the nation’s leading nonproﬁt health organization providing diabetes

2a
research, information, and advocacy. Founded in 1940, the Association conducts programs in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, providing services to hundreds of communities across the country. The mission of the organization is to prevent and cure diabetes, and to improve the lives of all people affected by diabetes. To fulﬁll this mission, the Association funds research, publishes scientiﬁc ﬁndings, provides information and other services to people with diabetes, their families, health care professionals and the public, and advocates for scientiﬁc research and for the rights of people with diabetes.
The American Occupational Therapy Association (“AOTA”) is the national professional association of over 40,000 occupational therapists and occupational therapy assistants as well as students of the profession. The AOTA mission is to support the contributions of occupational therapy to health, wellbeing, productivity and quality of life. Occupational therapists provide treatment and intervention for people with physical and mental disabilities to promote full participation in society and maximum achievement of human potential. Occupational therapy can assist individuals with disabilities in identifying work limitations and potential. AOTA advocates on behalf of the profession and the public through support of positive public policy such as that contained in the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The American Psychiatric Association, with approximately 40,000 members, is the Nation’s largest organization of physicians specializing in psychiatry. It has participated in numerous cases in this Court, including Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Its members have a strong interest in the constitutionality of the Americans with Disabilities Act as it bars government entities’ discrimination against persons with disabilities, including persons with mental illnesses or disabilities.
The Arc of the United States (“The Arc”), through its nearly 900 state and local chapters, is the largest national voluntary organization in the United States devoted solely to the welfare of the more than seven million children and adults with mental retardation and related disabilities and

3a
their families. Since its inception, The Arc has vigorously challenged attitudes and public policy, based on false stereotypes, which have authorized or encouraged segregation of people with mental retardation in virtually all areas of life. The Arc was one of the leaders in framing and supporting passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The Association on Higher Education And Disability (“AHEAD”) is a non-proﬁt organization committed to full participation in higher education and equal access to all opportunities for persons with disabilities, including professional licensing and employment. Its membership includes approximately 2,000 institutions including colleges, universities, not-for-proﬁt service providers, and standardized testing organizations, professionals, and college and graduate students planning to enter the ﬁeld of disability practice. Many of its members are actively engaged in assuring ADA compliance and in providing reasonable accommodations to both students and employees at institutions of higher education and in high-stakes standardized testing. In addition, AHEAD members actively work with students in establishing vocational plans and job readiness. AHEAD publishes numerous resources on the implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by post-secondary educational institutions.
The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law is a national public interest organization founded in 1972 to advocate for the rights of individuals with mental disabilities. The Bazelon Center has engaged in litigation, administrative advocacy, and public education to promote equal opportunities for individuals with mental disabilities. Much of the Center’s work involves efforts to remedy disability-based discrimination through enforcement of the ADA.
The Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing (“AG Bell”) is a non-proﬁt organization with chapters throughout the United States, and has international afﬁliates throughout the world. AG Bell advocates for spoken language in children and adults. AG Bell is deemed to be the preeminent organization in deafness. AG Bell provides advocacy, resources and leadership

4a
for parents, professionals, and individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing.
The Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance (“DBSA”) is the leading patient-directed national organization focusing on the most prevalent mental illnesses—depression and bipolar disorder. Studies indicate that there may be 20 to 35 million persons with depression and 2.5 million to 10 million people with bipolar disorder. DBSA was founded in 1985 and is based in Chicago. DBSA’s mission is to improve the lives of people living with mood disorders. This not-for-proﬁt organization fosters an environment of understanding about the impact and management of these life threatening illnesses by providing up-to-date, scientiﬁcally based tools and information, written in easy to understand language. DBSA has more than 1,000 peer-run support groups across the country. Assisted by a Scientiﬁc Advisory Board, comprised of the leading researchers and clinicians in the ﬁeld of mood disorders, DBSA supports research to promote more timely diagnosis, to develop more effective and tolerable treatments and to discover a cure. The DBSA organization works to ensure that people living with mood disorders are treated equitably. In that regard, we believe that the Americans With Disabilities Act should be given a strong and vigorous construction, including coverage for the unlawful discriminatory acts of State units of government.
Easter Seals has been providing services that help individuals with disabilities and special needs, and their families, live better lives for more than 80 years. Easter Seals promotes the passage and enforcement of federal legislation, including the ADA, that enables people with disabilities to achieve greater independence. Our primary services—medical rehabilitation, job training and employment, inclusive child care, adult day services, and camping and recreation—beneﬁt more than 1 million individuals and their families each year through one of 450 centers nationwide.
The Epilepsy Foundation® is the sole national, charitable voluntary health organization dedicated to advancing the interests of the more than two million people with

5a
epilepsy and seizure disorders. The term “epilepsy” evokes stereotyped images and fears in others that affect persons with this medical condition in all aspects of life, including the delivery of public services and participation in public programs. Since its inception, the Foundation has worked to dispel the stigma associated with seizures and has supported the development of laws, such as the ADA, that protect individuals from discrimination based on these stereotypes and fears.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (“Lambda Legal”) is a national non-proﬁt public interest organization committed to achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, the transgendered and people with HIV or AIDS through impact litigation, education and public policy work. Founded in 1973, Lambda Legal is the oldest and largest legal organization addressing these concerns. Since 1983, when it ﬁled the nation’s ﬁrst AIDS discrimination case, Lambda Legal has appeared as counsel or amicus curiae in scores of cases in state and federal courts on behalf of people living with HIV or with other disabilities.
As The Nation’s Voice on Mental Illness, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (“NAMI”) leads a national grassroots effort to transform America’s mental health care system, eliminate stigma, support research, and attain adequate health insurance, housing, rehabilitation, jobs and family support for millions of Americans living with mental illnesses. Since its creation in 1979, NAMI’s members have worked tirelessly at national, state and local levels to combat pervasive discrimination against people with mental illnesses that impose barriers to recovery and prevent these individuals from enjoying fundamental rights accorded other Americans.
The National Association for Rights Protection and Advocacy (“NARPA”) includes recipients of mental health and developmental disabilities services; lay, professional, and self-advocates; family members; service providers; disability rights attorneys; and teachers at schools of law, social work, and public policy. It is dedicated to promoting the preferred options of people who have been labeled mentally

6a
disabled. The National Association of Councils on Developmental
Disabilities (“NACDD”) is a national organization for Developmental Disabilities Councils that advocates and works for change on behalf of people with developmental, as well as other disabilities, and their families. NACDD was established in 2003 to bring together the two organizations that supported Developmental Disabilities (“DD”) Councils, CDDC and NADDC. NADDC was established by DD Councils in 1974 to support them in carrying out their mandated responsibilities under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance & Bill of Rights Act, and to be their national voice. Members are nationwide State and Territorial DD Councils. State Councils undertake advocacy, capacity building, and systemic change activities that are consistent with the purpose of the DD Act, that contribute to a coordinated, consumer and family-centered, consumer and family-directed, comprehensive system of community services, individualized supports and other forms of assistance that enable individuals with developmental disabilities to exercise self-determination, be independent, be productive and be integrated and included in all facets of community life.
The National Council on Independent Living (“NCIL”) is the oldest cross-disability, national grassroots organization run by and for people with disabilities. NCIL’s membership is comprised of centers for independent living, statewide independent living councils, people with disabilities and other disability rights organizations. NCIL’s mission is to advance the independent living philosophy and to advocate for the human rights of, and services for, people with disabilities to further their full integration and participation in society.
For over thirty years, the National Health Law Program (“NheLP”) has engaged in legal and policy analysis on behalf of low income and working poor people, people with disabilities, the elderly, and children. NheLP has provided legal representation and conducted research and policy analysis on issues affecting the health status and health access of these groups. As such, NheLP has worked with

7a
the ADA, and the program’s work and our clients will be signiﬁcantly affected by the Court’s decision in this case.
Established in 1909, the National Mental Health Association, with its more than 340 afﬁliates, is dedicated to promoting mental health, preventing mental disorders, and achieving victory over mental illness through advocacy, education, re-search, and services. NMHA envisions a just, humane and healthy society in which all people are accorded respect, dignity, and the opportunity to achieve their full potential free from stigma and prejudice.
The National Mental Health Consumers’ Self-Help Clearinghouse is a national technical assistance center established in 1986. It is run by and for people who are consumers of mental health services and survivors of psychiatric illness (known as consumers/survivors). Its mission is to promote consumer/survivor participation in planning, providing and evaluating mental health and community support services, to provide technical assistance and information to consumers/survivors interested in developing self-help services, and advocating to make traditional services more consumer/survivor-oriented. The Clearinghouse has an interest in helping people with mental illness live to their full potential as active members of the community.
The National Multiple Sclerosis Society is dedicated to ending the devastating effects of multiple sclerosis. The National MS Society is the only national voluntary MS organization that meets the standards of all major agencies that rate nonproﬁt groups. The Society supports more MS research and serves more people with MS than any national voluntary MS organization in the world. Through its 50-state network of chapters, the Society funds research, furthers education, advocates for people with disabilities, and provides a variety of empowering programs for the third of a million Americans who have MS and their families. The Society believes that every individual has the fundamental right to lead a full, productive life via the support of laws that promote equality of opportunity for all citizens. The ADA has proven to be a major advancement in the public awareness of disability rights and has prompted sub-

8a
stantial improvements in local disability regulations. Our expression of interest and support in the present case reﬂects our commitment to the right of every American to be free from any discrimination and lack of independence under law.
The Paralyzed Veterans of America (“PVA”) is a congressionally chartered veterans service organization founded in 1946 with over 20,000 members, all of whom are veterans of the armed forces with spinal cord injury or dysfunction. PVA has developed a unique expertise on a wide variety of issues involving the special needs of its members and uses that expertise to be the leading advocate for civil rights and opportunities which maximize the independence of our members. Virtually all PVA members use wheelchairs for mobility and have a signiﬁcant interest in the broadest possible implementation and enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
The Tennessee Disability Coalition is an alliance of 42 groups and organizations in Tennessee that have joined to promote the full and equal participation of men, women and children with disabilities in all aspects of life. Our member groups are predominately organizations operated by individuals with disabilities or their families. Member agencies represent people of all ages with a wide range of disabilities. Some are disability speciﬁc groups, such as paralyzed veterans, cerebral palsy, autism, the Deaf and hard of hearing. Others are directed across disability, but focus on speciﬁc issues such as civil rights, independent living, or employment. The Coalition and its member agencies advocate for public policies that ensure self-determination, independence, empowerment, integration and inclusion of individuals with disabilities in all aspects of society. The issues in the Lane case are fundamental to protecting the rights of people with disabilities and are therefore central to the Coalition’s mission and that of its member agencies.
United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Inc. (“United Cerebral Palsy”) is one of the oldest and largest national health organizations dedicated to improving services for people with disabilities. Founded in 1949, the organization advances the independence, productivity and full citizenship

9a
of people with disabilities through a nationwide network of more than 100 afﬁliates in 37 States and the District of Columbia. United Cerebral Palsy was one of the major leaders in supporting enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act and has a strong interest in ensuring its applicability to States.

10a NON-CURRENT STATUTES CITED IN
BRIEF AS EXAMPLES OF STATES IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS ON JURY
SERVICE
(Emphasis added throughout.)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102 (1987): Disqualiﬁcations.
(a) The following are disqualiﬁed to act as grand or petit jurors: ***
(2) Mentally retarded or insane persons; ***
(6) Persons whose senses of hearing or seeing are substantially impaired; ***
1994 Ark. Acts No. 4, § 6: It is hereby found and determined by the General As-
sembly that Arkansas Code 16-31-102 disqualiﬁes from acting as a juror any person who is mentally retarded or insane, and any person whose sense of hearing or seeing is substantially impaired; this act eliminates those disqualiﬁcations and in their place disqualiﬁes from jury service persons who by reason of a physical or mental disability are unable to render jury services with the exception that no person may be disqualiﬁed solely on the basis of loss of hearing or sight; this modiﬁcation to Arkansas Code 16-31102 will bring Arkansas law into compliance with federal law; and this act should go into effect immediately in order to allow those persons to begin serving as grand or petit jurors as soon as possible * * * .

11a NON-CURRENT STATUTES CITED IN
BRIEF AS EXAMPLES OF STATES EXCLUDING STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES FROM PUBLIC EDUCATION
(Emphasis added throughout.)
DEL. CONST. Art. X, § 1 (1999): Establishment and maintenance of free public schools; attendance.
Section 1. The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and efﬁcient system of free public schools, and may require by law that every child, not physically or mentally disabled, shall attend the public school, unless educated by other means.
NON-CURRENT STATUTES CITED IN BRIEF AS EXAMPLES OF STATES
RESTRICTING RIGHT TO MARRY AND FORM FAMILIES
(Emphasis added throughout.)
IND. CODE § 22-1601 (1950): Whenever the superintendent of any hospital or other
institution of this state, or of any county in this state, which has the care or custody of insane, feeble-minded or epileptic persons, shall be of the opinion that it is for the best interests of the patient and of society that any inmate of the institution under his care should be sexually sterilized, such superintendent, if a lawfully licensed physician and surgeon, is hereby authorized to perform, or cause to be performed by some capable physician or surgeon, an operation or treatment of sterilization on any such patient conﬁned in such institution afﬂicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, epilepsy, or incurable primary or secondary types of feeble-mindedness: Provided, That

12a
such superintendent shall have ﬁrst complied with the requirements of this act.
***
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4201 (1987): License; necessity; contents; denial; under age applicants; forms; afﬁdavit.
All persons about to be joined in marriage must ﬁrst obtain a license therefor, from a county clerk, which license must show all of the following:
*** No license shall be granted when either of the parties, applicants therefore, is an imbecile, is insane, or is, at the time of making the application for the license, under the inﬂuence of any intoxicating liquor, or narcotic drug.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-103 (1981): Marriages void from date of decree; age of consent.
The following marriages in said District shall be illegal, and shall be void from the time when their nullity shall be declared by decree, namely: (1) The marriage of an idiot or of a person adjudged to be a lunatic; * * *
***
IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.3 (West 1988): License.
Previous to the solemnization of any marriage, a license for that purpose must be obtained from the clerk of the district court. Such license must not be granted in any case:
*** 5. Where either party is mentally ill or retarded, a mental retardate, or under guardianship as an incompetent.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.6 (1990): Mental or venereal disease; incapacity; validation of white-African marriages; penalty; competency of witness.
*** Section 6. No insane person, idiot, or person who has been afﬂicted with syphilis or gonorrhea and has not been

13a
cured of the same, shall be capable of contracting marriage * * * . No person who has been conﬁned in any public institution or asylum as a feeble-minded, imbecile or insane patient, or who has been adjudged insane, feeble-minded or an imbecile by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be capable of contracting marriage without, before the issuance by the county clerk of the license to marry, ﬁling in the ofﬁce of the county clerk a veriﬁed certiﬁcate from 2 regularly licensed physicians of this state that such person has been completely cured of such insanity, imbecility or feeblemindedness and that there is no probability that such person will transmit any of such defects or disabilities to the issue of such marriage. Any person of sound mind who shall intermarry with such insane person or idiot or person who has been so conﬁned as feeble-minded, imbecile or insane patient, or who has been so adjudged insane, feeble-minded or an imbecile, except upon the ﬁling of certiﬁcate as herein provided, with knowledge of the disability of such person, or who shall advise, aid, abet, cause, procure or assist in procuring any such marriage contrary to the provisions of this section, is guilty of a felony and on conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a ﬁne of not more than $1,000.00 or by imprisonment in the state prison not less than 1 year nor more than 5 years, or by both such ﬁne and imprisonment.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.1 (1990):
Invalidity of marriages; relationship of parties, bigamy, insanity, idiocy; legitimacy of issue.
Section 1. All marriages, which are prohibited by law on account of consanguinity or afﬁnity between the parties, or on account of either of them having a wife or husband then living, and all marriages solemnized when either of the parties was insane or an idiot, shall, if solemnized within this state, be absolutely void. The issue of such marriage shall be deemed legitimate.
***

14a
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-45 (1990):
Unlawful to cohabit with feeble-minded. It shall be unlawful for any person to cohabit with or at-
tempt sexual intercourse with a female who is feebleminded, as deﬁned in section 41-19-101, after adjudication of such feeblemindedness.
Anyone convicted of either of these crimes, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a ﬁne of not less than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment of not less than one year in the penitentiary, or by both such ﬁne and imprisonment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (West 1965):
Restrictions on the issue of marriage license. No license to marry shall be issued by any clerk of the
orphans’ court. ***
(e) If either of the applicants is or has been, within ﬁve years preceding the time of the application, an inmate of an institution for weak-minded, insane, or persons of unsound mind, unless a judge of the orphans’ court shall decide that it is for the best interest of such applicant and the general public to issue the license, and shall authorize the clerk of the orphans’ court to issue the license.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-5 (1988):
Bigamous marriages void — marriage of lunatics and idiots.
Any marriage when either of the parties thereto, at the time of the marriage, has a former wife or husband living who has not been, by ﬁnal decree, divorced from such party, and any marriage where either of the parties thereto is an idiot or a lunatic at the time of the marriage, shall be absolutely void, and no life estate created by chapter 25 of title 33 shall be assigned to any widow in consequence of the marriage, and the issue of the marriage shall be deemed illegitimate and subject to all the disabilities of illegitimate issue.

15a
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1990):
Voidable marriages — Grounds for annulment generally.
The marriage contract may be annulled when, at the time of marriage, either party had not attained the age of sixteen years or was an idiot or lunatic or physically incapable of entering into the marriage state or when the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 514 (1990):
Party an idiot or lunatic. (a) When a marriage is sought to be annulled on the
ground of the idiocy of one of the parties, it may be declared void on the complaint of a relative of such idiot at any time during the life of either of the parties.
(b) When a marriage is sought to be annulled on the ground of the lunacy of one of the parties, on the complaint of a relative of the lunatic, such marriage may be declared void during the continuance of such lunacy, or after the death of the lunatic in that condition and during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage.
(c) The marriage of a lunatic may be declared void upon the complaint of a lunatic after restoration to reason, but a decree of nullity shall not be pronounced if the parties freely cohabited as husband and wife after the lunatic was restored to sound mind.
(d) If an action is not prosecuted by a relative, the marriage of an idiot or a lunatic may be annulled during the lifetime of both the parties to the marriage, on the complaint of a person admitted by the court to prosecute as the next friend of such idiot or lunatic.
(e) The word “lunatic” as used in sections 511–514 of this title shall extend to persons of unsound mind other than idiots.

16a W. VA. CODE § 48-2-2 (1990): For what and when marriages void; afﬁrmation of annulment of marriage.
(a) The following marriages are voidable and shall be void from the time they are so declared by a judgment order of nullity:
***
(3) Marriages solemnized when either of the parties:
(A) Was an insane person, idiot or imbecile;

 
 No. 02-1667
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF TENNESSEE, v.

Petitioner,

GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________________________ Respondents.
ON WRIT O F CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, THE NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION F OR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED P EOPLE, THE PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION F UND, PEOPLE FO R THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION , AND THE ANTI- DEFAMATION
LEAGUE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

BARBARA R. ARNWINE
THOMAS J. HENDERSON
MICHAEL L. FOREMAN KRISTIN M. DADEY
THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 1401 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662-8600

CHARLES LESTER, JR.
Counsel of Record
TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH DEBORAH M. DANZIG
JENNIFER N. IDE
ANDREW W. BROY NICOLE D. LAWSON
SUTHERLAND ASBILL
& BRENNAN LLP 999 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309
(404) 853-8000

Counsel for Amici Curiae (Other counsel listed on inside cover)

VINCENT A. ENG NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL CONSORTIUM 1140 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 296-2300
DENNIS C. HAYES General Counsel
THE NATION ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE
4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-3297 (410) 580-5777
FOSTER MAER PUERT O RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.
99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013
ELLIOT MINCBERG DEBORAH LIU PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION
2000 M Street, N.W., Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 467-4999
ABBEY GANS MICHAEL LIEBERMAN ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
823 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017 (212) 885-5885

i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Congress validly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to enable private individuals to bring damages suits to protect the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights by individuals with disabilities and to insure to these individuals the equal protection of the law under Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2002).

ii
TABCLiEtedOAFuCthOoNriTtiEesNTS Page
Question Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Table of Cited Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i v
Interest of Amici Curiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Summary of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. Title II Of The ADA Guarantees The Fundamental Rights And Liberties Of Individuals With Disabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II. For Legislation Intended To Protect Against Constitutional Violations Invoking Heightened Scrutiny, Courts Should Apply The Rational Means Test Enunciated In M’Culloch v. Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
III. Even Under The Analysis Set Forth In Garrett, Title II Is Appropriate Legislation Under § 5 Of The Fourteenth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

iii

CiteCd oAnuttehnotrsities

Page

A. Title II Is Intended to Guarantee Individuals with Disabilities Equal Opportunity to Obtain Vital Services and to Exercise Fundamental Rights and Liberties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

B. Congress Supported Title II With
Specific Findings Concerning the Pervasiveness of State Discrimination
Against Individuals with Disabilities in
the Provision of Programs and Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

C. The Substantive and Remedial
Provisions of Title II are Proportional and Congruent to the Rights Protected
by the Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

IV. The Rigorous Standard Of Review Recently
Applied To § 5 Legislation Unduly Compromises Congressional Power. . . . . . . 23

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

iv

TABLE OCFitCeIdTAEuDthAorUitTieHsORITIES CASES

Page

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Brown & Williamson v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165 (CA6 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Burroughs v.United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) . . 29

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) . . . passim

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) . . . . . . . 7

Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) . . . . . . . 9
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) . . . . . . . . 28

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

v
Cited Authorities Page
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) . . . . . 27
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 8
Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratoriess, 766 F.2d 208 (CA6 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) . . . . . 5
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) . . . 1
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Medical Bd. Of California v. Hason, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002), cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 1779 (2003) ........................................ 1
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) . . . 10
Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) . . . . . . . 8, 21
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court, 276 F.3d 808 (CA6 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002) . . . . 4, 21-22

vi
Cited Authorities Page
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . 10
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) . . . . 14
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) . . . . . . . 8
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) . . . . . . . 8
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . 8 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S.1 (1892) . . . . . . . . 27
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) . . . 12
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) . . . . . . . . . . 29
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) . . . . . . . . 8

vii

Cited Authorities UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Page

art. I, § 5, cls. 2, 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-27

art. I, § 6, cl. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10

Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Fifth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Sixth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9

Eighth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Eleventh Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Fourteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Fifteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 16, 17

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17

viii Cited Authorities
Page 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(5)-(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 42 U.S.C. § 12131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 42 U.S.C. § 12132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 7, 13 42 U.S.C. § 12202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

ix

Cited Authorities LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

Page

135 Cong. Rec. 8,712 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18, 19

S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

2 Staff of the House Comm. Of Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legis. Hist. Of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 936 (Comm. Print 1990) ........................................ 8

Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with
Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Select Educ. Of the House Comm. On Educ. & Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1998) . . . . 9, 18

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 21

28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

28 C.F.R. § 35.164 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

x

Cited Authorities OTHER AUTHORITIES

Page

Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s
New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of
Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 328 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 27

Nat’l Council on Disability, Tennessee v. Lane: The
Legal Issues and the Implications for People with Disabilities (2003), at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/publications/legalissues.html . . . . . . . 22

Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review,
The Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Yale L.J.
1707 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26

John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation’s Power:
The Supreme Court Sides with the States 93 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection
by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441
(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (the “Lawyers’ Committee”), the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (“NAPALC”), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (“PRLDEF”), People For the American Way Foundation (“People For”), and the Anti-Defamation League (“ADL”) submit this Brief as amici curiae with the consent of the Parties,1 in support of Respondents’ argument that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213112132, Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, was validly enacted pursuant to the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Lawyers’ Committee was formed in 1963 at the request of President Kennedy to involve private attorneys in the effort to insure the civil rights of all Americans. The Lawyers’ Committee has been involved as amicus curiae or counsel in several cases before the Court involving the scope of Congress’ legislative power. See, e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); Medical Bd. of California v. Hason, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002), cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 1779 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
NAPALC is a national non-profit, non-partisan organization whose mission is to advance the legal and civil rights of Asian Americans. NAPALC and its affiliates have a long-standing
1. Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in its entirety. No person or entity other than amici curiae, their staff, or their counsel made monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Letters of consent to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

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interest in addressing matters of discrimination that have an impact on the Asian American community, and this interest has resulted in NAPALC’s participation in a number of amicus briefs before the courts.
The NAACP is a non-profit membership corporation that traces its roots to 1909 and was chartered by the State of New York. The NAACP supports the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress’s power under § 5 of that Amendment to pass legislation that in certain circumstances abrogates the state sovereignty immunity.
PRLDEF is a national non-profit civil rights organization founded in 1972, dedicated to protecting and furthering the civil rights of Puerto Ricans and other Latinos through litigation and policy advocacy. Since its inception, PRLDEF has participated both as direct counsel and as amicus curiae in numerous cases throughout the country concerning the proper interpretation of the civil rights laws.
People For is a nonpartisan citizens’ organization established to promote and protect civil and constitutional rights. People For has supported the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and joins this brief to help vindicate Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its ability to protect individuals with disabilities against discrimination by states and state agencies.
ADL was founded in 1913 to advance good will and mutual understanding among Americans of all creeds and races, and to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike. ADL has filed amicus briefs in this Court cases defending government enactments designed to prevent or punish discrimination and hate. ADL has supported Congress’s broad authority under the

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Fourteenth Amendment to remedy constitutional deprivations caused by States, and Congress’s authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in cases of clear civil rights violations.
The Court’s interpretation of the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through its § 5 powers will directly impact the communities represented by this amici. Therefore, amici present their views on this extremely important issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
George Lane and Beverly Jones are individuals with paraplegia. Both were unable to participate in court proceedings in the State of Tennessee because the State failed to make its courts accessible to individuals with disabilities. Pet. App. 13, 19. Respondent George Lane was denied access to the General Sessions Court of Polk County. After refusing to crawl up the stairs of the courthouse and declining to be carried by a Sheriff’s deputy to reach the second floor courtroom where misdemeanor charges against him were pending, Lane was arrested for failure to appear and taken to jail. Pet. App. 15. Respondent Beverly Jones, a certified court reporter, also was denied access to courthouses in the State of Tennessee. Pet. App. 19-20. Jones’ income is dependent on her ability to participate in court proceedings; however, Jones was unable to participate in court proceedings in several Tennessee counties because the courthouses in those counties were inaccessible to individuals with disabilities. Id.
Respondents filed separate actions for money damages that were consolidated into this action under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. (“Title II”). Petitioner moved to

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dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, but the District Court denied this motion. Pet. App. 6-7. The State of Tennessee subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal. While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court, 276 F.3d 808 (CA6 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002). The Popovich court held that Congress validly abrogated states’ sovereign immunity by enacting Title II to the extent due process violations were at issue. Applying Popovich, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the State of Tennessee’s motion to dismiss. On rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 5. Thereafter, this Court granted Petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to its power to enforce § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress purposefully abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted Title II. Congress recognized and sought to address the pervasive and widespread violations of the due process and equal protection rights of individuals with disabilities by the states, including their right to vote, to participate in judicial proceedings, and to access public buildings and facilities. Title II also operates to enable individuals with disabilities to exercise their right to travel, to protect them from cruel and unusual punishment, and to enable them to participate fully in educational and other government programs. Because these important constitutional rights were at stake, Congress had wide latitude to construct legislation to remedy existing state discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to prevent further discrimination.

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Unlike state conduct affecting the rights protected by Title I of the ADA, state classifications and conduct affecting the exercise of the rights underlying Title II invoke heightened scrutiny. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). When Congress acts to protect such fundamental rights as the right to vote or to access courthouses and other public buildings, the rational basis review applied in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), and the “congruence and proportionality” test employed in those cases are inappropriate tests of whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority. Cf. Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982-83 (2003) (acknowledging that Congress has broad discretion to legislate to enforce constitutional principles that invoke a heightened level of scrutiny of state conduct). Instead, as it historically has done with legislation enacted to remedy the effects of discrimination invoking heightened scrutiny, the Court should apply the deferential rational means test first enunciated in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act of 1965).
Title II is a rational means of effectuating the protection of individuals’ with disabilities constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. That alone requires rejection of Tennessee’s claim of immunity.
Even if the Court were to apply the congruence and proportionality test implemented in Garrett, however, Title II’s abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity would survive. First, the legislative history behind Title II is compelling, well-defined, and explicit. It shows that Congress became

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informed of a nationwide pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services and access to public accommodations, including specifically access to courts. Indeed, as both the majority and dissenting opinions in Garrett noted, the bulk of the legislative history supporting the Act pertained to this type of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1, 372 n.7. Not surprisingly given the testimony before Congress, Title II is aimed directly at preventing and remedying discrimination in the provision of public services and access to public accommodations.
Second, the scope of Title II is no broader than necessary to achieve its critical purposes. As the Court instructed in City of Boerne, “[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.” 521 U.S. at 530. Because the discrimination Congress addressed affects the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties and is subject to heightened review, the scope of the remedial measures permitted under § 5 is broad — broader than that permitted under § 5 when Congress acts to affect classifications invoking only rational basis review. Congress acted in response to a widespread pattern of discrimination by states against individuals with disabilities and tailored Title II to remedy these specific constitutional violations. Title II therefore meets the congruence and proportionality test laid down in Garrett.
Finally, although Title II meets the congruence and proportionality test set out in Garrett, amici do not wish to endorse this standard as proper for review of any legislation. For the reasons discussed in dissenting opinions in Garrett and Kimel, amici respectfully submit that this standard is premised on an unworkable view of the legislative process, effectively requires Congress to dramatically alter the way in which it

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legislates, and threatens to violate separation of powers principles by imposing judicial requirements upon Congress’s legislative procedure. Amici, therefore, respectfully urge the Court to return to its prior rational means standard enunciated in M’Culloch.
ARGUMENT
I. TITLE II OF THE ADA GUARANTEES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.
Congress enacted Title II of the ADA to protect individuals with disabilities from violations of their fundamental rights and liberties by state and local governments. Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003). Congress sought in Title II to address its explicit finding that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). Within these areas, individuals with disabilities have constitutional rights arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause incorporates most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and encompasses state conduct subject to constitutional limitations embodied in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth Amendments. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Where fundamental rights and liberties such as the ones guaranteed by these Amendments are involved, state

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discrimination is subjected to strict scrutiny, see Harper, 383 U.S. at 670, and must be justified with a compelling state interest. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (right to be free from unreasonable confinement); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to custody of one’s children); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper, 383 U.S. at 663 (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate); cf. Garrett 531 U.S. at 373 (describing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment). Congress’s power to legislate to protect citizens from such state discrimination is at the core of § 5.
The legislative record confirms that Congress was concerned with due process violations, such as inaccessible courthouses and the infringement of individuals’ with disabilities right to participate in judicial proceedings, when it enacted Title II. Congress heard an abundance of testimony and reviewed a number of reports concerning the inability of individuals with disabilities to participate in judicial proceedings in courthouses throughout the nation. 2 Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legis. Hist. of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 936 (Comm. Print 1990) (Sen. Harkin) (Leg. Hist.). One individual shared the following illustrative account:
I went to the courtroom one day . . . I could not get into the building because there were about 500 steps to get in there. [T]he security guard . . . told me there was an entrance at the back door for the handicapped. . . . I went to the back door and there were three more stairs for me to get over to be able to ring a bell to announce my arrival so that

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somebody would come and open the door and maybe let me in. . . . This is the court system that is supposed to give me a fair hearing. It took me 2 hours to get in. . . .
Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. On Educ. & Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988) (Emeka Mwojke).
Other disturbing examples of discrimination brought to Congress’s attention through the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities highlighted a multitude of instances where courts were not accessible or did not have services needed by individuals with disabilities. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (App. C to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting). The summaries repeatedly referenced individuals with disabilities who faced “inaccessible public buildings,” “inaccessible state buildings,” and “inaccessible government buildings.” Id.
Many courts, including this Court, have held that the Due Process Clause guarantees access to judicial proceedings. Inaccessible courtrooms and courtrooms closed to the public potentially violate the rights of both individuals with disabilities and the general public. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, a criminal defendant has “a right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975). Mr. Lane’s exclusion from the courtroom plainly compromised the fairness of the proceedings against him. Criminal defendants also have the right to have their trials open to the public. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). Likewise, civil litigants have a due process right to be present

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in the courtroom unless their exclusion furthers important government interests. Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (CA6 1985). Even non-parties have a First Amendment right to view public proceedings in court. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574 (1980); Brown & Williamson v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (CA6 1983). Title II serves to prevent these constitutional violations.
Concern about the exercise of other fundamental rights by individuals with disabilities also motivated Title II’s enactment. For example, Congress was concerned with the ability of individuals with disabilities to exercise their right to vote. This Court has acknowledged several times that the right to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Evidence abounds throughout the legislative record of the ADA that Congress sought to address violations of this fundamental right by enacting Title II. Recounting testimony from Neil Hartigan, then Attorney General from Illinois, the Senate Report specifically mentions the need to ensure access to polling places. S. REP . NO. 101-116, at 12 (1989). Hartigan testified: “‘You cannot exercise one of your most basic rights as an American if the polling places are not accessible.’” Id. Congress was likewise aware that some individuals with disabilities had been forced to vote by absentee ballot before the candidates had participated in key debates. Id. Furthermore, like inaccessible courthouses, examples of inaccessible polling places and other procedural deficiencies related to voting flooded the report submitted to Congress by the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424 (App. C to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting).

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Given Congress’s recognition of and intent to remedy longstanding state discrimination infringing on individuals’ with disabilities due process rights, Congress was constitutionally authorized to use great latitude in enacting Title II. Unlike Title I of the ADA, which was enacted to enforce persons’ with disabilities equal protection rights to employment only, Title II was drafted to enable individuals with disabilities to exercise fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. In that respect, Title II is less similar to Title I and more like the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which was reviewed by this Court in Hibbs. State classifications affecting fundamental rights and state gender discrimination both trigger a heightened level of scrutiny. Furthermore, like Congress’s previous efforts to remedy the gender discrimination targeted by the FMLA, previous efforts to remedy discrimination against individuals with disabilities in exercising fundamental rights were also unsuccessful. There is an explicit acknowledgement in the ADA’s legislative history that “Federal and State laws [were] inadequate to address the discrimination faced by people with disabilities.” S. REP. 101-116, at 6 (1989). As recognized by the Hibbs Court, “[s]uch problems may justify added prophylactic measures in response.” 123 S. Ct. at 1982. While amici respectfully disagree with the application of the “congruence and proportionality” test, which was applied in Hibbs, the ultimate conclusion reached by the Hibbs Court is similarly justified in this case. Because fundamental rights and liberties were at stake when Congress enacted Title II, there should be no doubt that Congress validly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.

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II. FOR LEGISLATION INTENDED TO PROTECT AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS INVOKING HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY, COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE RATIONAL MEANS TEST ENUNCIATED IN M’CULLOCH v. MARYLAND.
Where fundamental rights and liberties are at issue, this Court has not held that the congruence and proportionality test is appropriate. Indeed, prior to City of Boerne, when reviewing § 5 legislation the Court applied the rational means test enunciated in M’Culloch v. Maryland.2
The M’Culloch standard requires only a rational relationship between the ends of the legislation and Congress’s chosen means. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421. Under this test, the desirability of the legislation as a policy matter, or the extent to which Congress might have chosen other, more narrowly tailored means, is beyond the scope of the Court’s review. All that the Court need determine is whether the legislation is a rational means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive guarantees.
2. Although the Court, in dicta, used the words “congruence” and “proportional” in reviewing the Violence Against Women Act, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the holding in Morrison was that the VAWA was unconstitutional because it was directed not “at any State or state actor, but at individuals who . . . committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.” Id. at 626.

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Title II is a rational means of addressing the documented pattern of discrimination by the states against individuals with disabilities. When Congress passed Title II, it was well aware that individuals with disabilities like George Lane and Beverly Jones were, among other things, burdened by inaccessible courthouses, inaccessible polling places, inaccessible public transportation, and inaccessible government buildings and agencies. Responding to this problem of limited access, Congress enacted Title II to ensure that individuals with disabilities would not continue to be shut out of polling places, public buildings, schoolhouses, and other vital public facilities. In doing so, Congress took steps to mediate the impact on states. For example, rather than mandating that public entities overhaul their buildings and facilities completely, Congress structured Title II to require states to make only “reasonable modifications” that do not “fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). In addition, states are required to make these modifications only for “qualified individual[s] with a disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Although, as discussed below, Title II is also a congruent and proportional means of addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, the Court need not conduct that more exacting analysis. In the context of fundamental rights, state discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional and Congress’s chosen means of addressing that discrimination need only be rational. Title II serves a legitimate end, is consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, and brings to bear means that are plainly and rationally adapted to achieve its purposes. Congress acted well within the scope of its constitutional powers when it enacted Title II.

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III. EVEN UNDER THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN GARRETT, TITLE II IS APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION UNDER § 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Assuming the Court departs from the well-established standards in M’Culloch, Title II is nevertheless a congruent and proportional response to the states’ documented history of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Under the framework set out in Garrett, after determining that Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity, a court turns to whether Congress properly exercised its power to abrogate.3 First, the Court must “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. Second, the Court must ask “whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional .. . discrimination by the states.” Id. at 368. Last, the Court must determine whether the legislation is congruent and proportional to the identified wrong.
3. The first step of this analysis questions whether Congress explicitly expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) There is no dispute in this case that this criterion has been met. Pet’r Br. at 12; 42 U.S.C. § 12202. There is also no dispute that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a valid source for this power to abrogate. Pet’r Br. at 12.

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A. Title II Is Intended to Guarantee Individuals with Disabilities Equal Opportunity to Obtain Vital Services and to Exercise Fundamental Rights and Liberties.
The majority in Garrett instructed that a court must “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue” and define the “metes and bounds” of that right. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-68. As discussed in Parts I and II above, Title II is intended to prohibit and remedy violations of the Due Process Clause and the infringement by the government of the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals with disabilities. These fundamental rights and liberties, which frequently overlap with the right to equal protection, include the right to vote, to access the courts and the government process, to bear children, to have custody of one’s children, to marry, and to be free from unreasonable confinement. Discrimination such as a state’s refusal to provide reasonable access to the courts for individuals with disabilities is presumptively unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
Title II also helps insure that individuals with disabilities have the same equal access to their government as all other citizens, a fundamental principal embodied by the equal protection clause: “Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). Thus, while Congress’s power to enact Title II and to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity was rooted in its authority to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress recognized that Title II would also inevitably protect the Equal Protection rights of individuals with disabilities.

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B. Congress Supported Title II With Specific Findings Concerning the Pervasiveness of State Discrimination Against Individuals with Disabilities in the Provision of Programs and Services.
Congress enacted Title II in light of a history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states against people with disabilities. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. The legislative history of the ADA shows that the vast majority of unconstitutional discrimination by the states related to the states in their role as public entities and providers of government services. In Garrett, the Court acknowledged that the “overwhelming majority of these accounts [of discrimination in the legislative history] pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371-72 & n.7. The strength of this legislative history is evidenced by Congress’s specific findings of persistent discrimination in the provision of public services and accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (5)–(9). The legislative history of the ADA fully supports valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II.
In enacting the ADA, Congress made explicit findings of persistent discrimination by the states in the provision of public services and accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (“discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (“individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion; the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,

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overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices”); id. § 12101(a)(6) (“census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally”); id. § 12101(a)(7) (“individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations .. . and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society”); id. § 12101(a)(8) (“the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency”); id. § 12101(a)(9) (“the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous”).
Congress insured that its legislative response to the invidious and widespread discrimination by the states against individuals with disabilities in the provision of public services and public accommodations was appropriate.4
4. Congress held thirteen hearings and mobilized a special task force to examine whether the ADA would be appropriate legislation. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Moreover, both the House and Senate cited seven substantive studies or reports to support its conclusion that discrimination against individuals with disabilities is a serious, widespread problem. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 a, pt. 2 at 28, U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, 267, 309-310 (1990). The legislative record demonstrates that Congress identified numerous findings of unconstitutional discrimination by states falling under the ambit of Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(a)(3), (a)(5)(a)(6); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22, 30, 42 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310, 311-12, 324. This legislative record goes
(Cont’d)

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The Congressional Committee Reports conclude that state discrimination in the areas of public accommodations and public services reveals a “compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of .. . public accommodations [and] public services.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310; see also S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (1989). Particularly notable because of the facts of this case, one study conducted in 1980 found that 76% of state-owned buildings available to the general public were physically inaccessible and unusable for providing services to individuals with disabilities. See 135 Cong. Rec. 8,712 (1989) (remarks of Rep. Coehlo discussing U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 3839 (1983)); 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1988) (testimony of Emeka Nwojke discussing courthouse access).
In addition, Appendix C of Garrett cites hundreds of allegations of discrimination against individuals with disabilities falling under the ambit of Title II. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 n.7. These submissions enabled Congress to identify an overwhelming number of instances of discriminatory conduct by state actors, ranging from inaccessible courthouses and polling places to an inaccessible “office of handicapped services” at the University of Georgia, which was located on the second floor. Id. at 401. Moreover, these findings evidence a history and pattern of widespread discrimination, as many states were cited numerous times for continually committing similar violations and a substantial number of these violations occurred
(Cont’d)
far beyond the “unexamined, anecdotal accounts” of discrimination criticized by this Court in Garrett. 531 U.S. at 370. Cf. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (relying on testimony in congressional hearings to demonstrate valid abrogation).

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nationwide. The concern expressed by the Court in Garrett about what it found to be a lack of legislative evidence directly supporting Title I is met in the context of Title II. Ample congressional evidence, compiled “after extensive review and analysis over a number of Congressional sessions,” H.R. REP . NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310, reveals a pattern of state discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the area of public services and public accommodations.
Petitioners contend that Congress’ legislative record acknowledged the states as leaders in “safeguarding the rights of the disabled.” Pet’r Br. at 22. While it is true that states such as Tennessee enacted various laws protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities, see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50103, when Congress enacted the ADA, Congress recognized that then “[c]urrent Federal and State laws [were] inadequate to address the discrimination faced by people with disabilities in these critical areas.” S. REP. 101-116, at 6 (1989). Even with the enactment of the ADA, as shown by this case, many states still failed to meaningfully address discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980, the Court should not ignore states’ shortcomings by referencing their efforts to remedy discrimination. Although Tennessee put a formal guarantee of access on its law books, George Lane still had to crawl up stairs to appear at a judicial proceeding that required his presence. It was not until this lawsuit was brought that an elevator was added to the courthouse building. Without the threat of damages suits for ADA violations, states may continue to take a lackadaisical approach to addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

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C. The Substantive and Remedial Provisions of Title II are Proportional and Congruent to the Rights Protected by the Legislation.
Because Congress has “wide latitude” in defining the bounds of § 5 through prophylactic and remedial legislation, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, the congruence and proportionality analysis does not require an exact match between legislative and constitutional prohibitions. Rather, as noted in Kimel, the affirmative grant of legislative power contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to “remedy and deter” unconstitutional acts that violate § 5, as well as “prohibit[ ] a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518). The Court recently affirmed this principle in Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (holding that the abrogation of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by the FMLA was a valid act of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). As the Court noted in Hibbs, as long as Congress does not attempt to redefine the obligations of the states, Congress may exercise its § 5 power to “enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at 1973. “[L]egislation which ‘deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.’” Id. at 1992 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518).
The appropriateness of Title II should be examined in light of the injuries that Congress was seeking to remedy and prevent. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. These injuries included violations of persons’ with disabilities right to access courts, to vote, to travel, and to have custody of one’s children. Thus, the

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evils before Congress involved the infringement of fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Title II is congruent and proportional to the evils identified by Congress because it is tailored to remedy these constitutional violations while placing the least burden possible on states. First, the requirements under Title II are narrowly tailored and sensitive to financial and other burdens the requirements may place on the states. For example, Title II only requires a public entity to ensure that “when viewed in its entirety, [it] is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). It also does not “[n]ecessarily require a public entity to make each of its existing facilities accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 35.150(a)(2). Moreover, except for new construction and alterations, public entities need not take any steps that would “result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” Id. § 35.150(a)(3); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7), 35.164; Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 n.16 (1999).
Second, states retain discretion to exclude persons from programs, services, or benefits for any lawful reasons unrelated to disability. A state is required only to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures” that do not “fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining “qualified individual with a disability” as an individual “who, with or without reasonable modifications . . . , meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services”) (emphasis added). Title II permits discrimination based on disability if a person cannot “meet[] the essential eligibility requirements” of the governmental program or service. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). See also Popovich v. Cuyahoga County

22
Court, 276 F.3d 808, 820 (CA 6 2002) (“Title II requires reasonable modifications only when a disabled individual is otherwise eligible. . . . The states therefore maintain their discretion over the provision of public services so long as they do not arbitrarily discriminate against the disabled.”)
The availability of a damages remedy is critical to the protection of the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals with disabilities. The availability of damages enables Title II plaintiffs to obtain representation more easily from private attorneys and accelerates state compliance. States facing exposure to liability for damages and attorneys’ fees are more likely to comply with the law in advance of litigation. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TENNESSEE V. LANE: THE LEGAL ISSUES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (2003), at http:// www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/legalissues.html. Injunctive relief alone fails to afford these incentives. Moreover, injunctive relief only prevents future misconduct. It does nothing to make whole individuals who have been injured by violation of their fundamental rights. Id.
Title II is proportional and congruent. It is targeted to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals with disabilities. The obligations imposed on the states are limited and sensitive to the financial and other burdens imposed on the states. The private right of action for damages is essential to the effectiveness of Title II. Therefore, Congress acted within its power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states.

23
IV. THE RIGOROUS STANDARD OF REVIEW RECENTLY APPLIED TO § 5 LEGISLATION UNDULY COMPROMISES CONGRESSIONAL POWER.
Although Title II meets the standard of review employed to determine congruence and proportionality in cases like Kimel and Garrett, amici respectfully urge the Court to return to the traditional, deferential standard used in evaluating the validity of all legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s § 5 powers.
In City of Boerne and subsequent cases, the Court has continued to recognize that it should defer to Congress’s judgments because “[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-81 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517). Nevertheless, in applying the congruence and proportionality standard, the Court has closely scrutinized the legislative record for evidence of a “pattern” of unconstitutional state discrimination, has insisted that attempts to deal with such discrimination on a uniform, national basis be supported by evidence in the record, and has questioned the quality of the evidence that is reflected in the record and the inferences that Congress was entitled to draw from it.
Respectfully, we submit that this approach is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers and unduly intrudes on Congress’s legislative function. The Court has noted that
[a] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle . . . is it

24
possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 308, 315 (1993) (citations omitted). Yet, in determining congruence and proportionality in cases such as Kimel and Garrett, the Court has required that Congress indicate the “reasons for [its] action” in the legislative record and support those “reasons” with evidence of the necessity of § 5 legislation. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88. The Court thus appears to have imposed an evidentiary standard more appropriate to an administrative agency than a coordinate branch of the Federal Government. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (dissenting opinion of Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
Moreover, the Court appears to have limited the inferences that Congress may draw through the use of common sense from the information it has received from multiple sources. For example, in Garrett, the Court held that substantial evidence of society-wide stereotypes concerning individuals with disabilities, and even discrimination by government officials, did not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to infer that state officials were as likely to hold the same stereotypes and prejudices that affected or were likely to affect their treatment of individuals with disabilities. See id. at 377-78. And the requirement of a record showing a pattern of discriminatory state action also implies that Congress’s power “to enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to legislation remedying past conduct that can be reflected in a record and precludes it from legislating prophylactically to protect against incipient or potential conduct that threatens to undermine the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 93 (2002).

25
With all respect, we believe that the Court’s standard of review in these cases not only violates the separation of powers by imposing judicial requirements upon Congress’s legislative procedure, but also reflects an unworkable view of the legislative process and, in effect, calls upon Congress to dramatically alter the way in which it legislates.
First, the Court’s apparent requirement that Congress articulate a single, coherent policy rationale and support that rationale with evidence in the legislative record does not accord with the reality of the legislative process. Members of Congress represent constituencies with diverse, often conflicting, interests. Hence, legislation is rarely, if ever, reached through consensus, but rather, through competition and majority vote. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Yale L.J. 1707, 1741-45 (2002). Moreover, legislation is generally the product of a competitive process of bargaining and coalition-building as opposed to the type of deliberation engaged in by judicial and administrative bodies. Accordingly, in many, if not most, cases, no single, identifiable rationale exists. See id. at 1744-45.
In addition, the Court’s requirement of an evidentiary predicate in the legislative record mistakenly assumes that all the information Congress draws upon in enacting legislation is incorporated in that record. Congress is informed through numerous sources that are not reflected in the legislative record. For example, Members of Congress bring to the legislature the views and experiences of the citizens whom they represent. Thus, unlike a trier of fact in a court or an administrative law judge, Congress is not a “tabula rasa until it conducts on-the-record proceedings,” but rather, “grounds its claim to legitimacy on

26
knowledge of and accountability to the citizens it represents.” A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 328, 385-86 (2001). In addition, Congress acquires information from, inter alia, communications with interest groups, information support services such as the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, written materials from party leadership offices, members’ caucuses, legislators’ personal staffs, and communications with the executive branch. See id. at 384-87; Frickey & Smith, supra, at 1734-36.
Among the branches of the Federal Government, Congress is uniquely capable of amassing information from a wide range of sources, both during and outside of its formal proceedings. Reliance on the legislative record alone is therefore an incomplete measure of the basis for Congress’s judgments. More significantly, however, it appears that if Congress were to satisfy the congruence and proportionality test as applied in cases like Kimel and Garrett, it must painstakingly catalogue the information acquired from such extra-record sources in the legislative record. For the reasons discussed above, this would mark a dramatic alteration of Congress’s legislative procedure.
Furthermore, by requiring Congress to adhere to judicially imposed procedural requirements when it legislates, the Court’s application of the congruence and proportionality test conflicts with at least the spirit of a number of constitutional provisions that limit judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere. These include the Rules and Journal Clauses of Article I, which provide, respectively, that “[e]ach House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and “shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 5,

27
cls. 2, 3. The Court has interpreted both of these provisions as giving Congress wide discretion to determine how to report and record its consideration of legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
The more demanding standard of review applied in cases such as Kimel and Garrett also appears to conflict with the Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that “for any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Court has determined that one of the Speech or Debate Clause’s chief purposes is “to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently” and “reinforc[e] the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders.” Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975). See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972) (holding that Speech or Debate Clause prohibited court from inquiring into conduct of, or preparation for, congressional proceeding); Bryant & Simeone, supra, at 376-83.
The Court’s approach, first articulated in City of Boerne and applied in cases like Kimel and Garrett, reflects two concerns: first, that in the absence of a judicially recognized history of state discrimination, Congress actually may be seeking to expand the substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment or may be adopting a remedy that is disproportionate to the number of instances of unconstitutional state conduct; and second, that in such circumstances, there is a need to protect the sovereignty of the states against unwarranted intrusions by Congress in the guise of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. We respectfully submit that neither concern justifies the intrusion into the legislative process that application of the standard of review in cases like Kimel and Garrett has entailed.

28
In the absence of conduct involving a judicially recognized history of unconstitutional state action, this Court has limited itself to rational basis review in evaluating whether state conduct entails arbitrary and purposeful discrimination, in recognition of the Court’s own fact-finding limitations and the deference due to democratically elected legislatures. But it is precisely because Congress, as a democratically elected legislature, is not so limited that it is inappropriate to impose a rigorous standard of judicial review on Congress’s determination of the existence or a threat of unconstitutional state conduct, even if not previously recognized by the Court. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382-85 (opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, JJ.); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441, 46773 (2000). As discussed above, in making legislative judgments, Congress relies on many sources of information and intuition that would not support a judicial or administrative determination, but which are characteristic of a democratic legislative process. The Fourteenth Amendment expressly assigns to Congress the task of enforcing its guarantees and, under the long tradition established by M’Culloch, its judgments that there exists arbitrary and purposeful state discrimination requiring legislation, and what legislation is “appropriate” to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees against such discrimination and its effects, deserve deference and respect.
Concerns that Congress may be unjustifiably intruding on state sovereignty do not support a more rigorous standard of review of Congress’s legislative judgments under § 5. To begin with, as the Court has recognized, the Civil War Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976) (noting that the Amendments

29
effected “the expansion of Congress’ powers with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty”) (discussing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)). Moreover, the states are not an isolated minority requiring heightened judicial protection against a tyrannical majority. To the contrary, the political process and the structure of the Federal Government – in particular, the states’ equal representation in the Senate – were the principal means intended by the Framers to prevent inappropriate intrusions by the federal legislature on the states’ sovereignty. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93-94 (opinion of Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985).
The standard recently applied by the Court to determine congruence and proportionality substitutes the Court’s views of how Congress should conduct its lawmaking processes in carrying out its duty to “enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment],” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, and ultimately substitutes the Court’s judgment for that traditionally left to Congress alone as to the “closeness of the relationship between the means [to be] adopted and the end to be attained.” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934). This is a departure from the Court’s historic recognition of its own institutional limitations and the deference due to the democratically elected legislative branch, except in cases where the Court’s intervention is needed to protect the rights of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution and those “discrete and insular minorities” who do not have access to the democratic process to protect their rights against a dominant majority. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, amici curiae respectfully urge the Court to reconsider the rigorous standard

30

of review it has recently applied to determine congruence and proportionality, even in cases where the Court has not previously recognized a history of purposeful unequal treatment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to affirm
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

VINCENT A. ENG NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LEGAL CONSORTIUM 1140 CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W. Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 296-2300
DENNIS C. HAYES General Counsel THE NATION ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-3297 (410) 580-5777
FOSTER MAER PUERT O RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013

CHARLES LESTER, JR. Counsel of Record TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH DEBORAH M. DANZIG JENNIFER N. IDE ANDREW W. BROY NICOLE D. LAWSON SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP 999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 853-8000
BARBARA R. ARNWINE THOMAS J. HENDERSON MICHAEL L. FOREMAN KRISTIN M. DADEY THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 1401 New York Ave., N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662-8600

31
ELLIOT MINCBERG DEBORAH LIU PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION 2000 M Street, N.W., Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 467-4999
ABBEY GANS MICHAEL LIEBERMAN ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 823 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017 (212) 885-5885
Attorneys for Amici Curiae

 
 No. 02-1667

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF TENNESSEE, Petitioner,
v. GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE TRAINING AND ADVOCACY SUPPORT CENTER OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

SHARON MASLING NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS 900 Second Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 408-9514
November 12, 2003

JOHN TOWNSEND RICH* JAMES CHAD OPPENHEIMER DAVID M. BOOTH SHEA & GARDNER 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington D.C. 20036 (202) 828-2000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
* Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................. ii INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.................................1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ....................................2 ARGUMENT ...........................................................................5
I. The ADA Provides Protection With Respect to Both State Facilities and State Services.......................5
II. When the ADA Was Enacted, Individual State Laws Failed To Ensure Persons with Disabilities Access to State Facilities. ............................................8 A. Remedies With Respect to State Facilities ........... 8 1. Private Right of Action for Damages ............. 9 2. Attorney’s Fees ............................................. 12 B. Coverage of State Facilities ................................ 14
III. When the ADA Was Enacted, Individual State Laws Failed To Protect Persons with Disabilities Against Discrimination in the Provision of State Services. .....................................................................17 A. Coverage of State Services ................................. 17 B. Limitations in Coverage of State Services.......... 20 1. Definition of Persons with Disabilities......... 21 2. Reasonable Modification .............................. 23 3. Remedies....................................................... 25
IV. Invalidating Title II of the ADA Would Severely Undermine the Protections Currently Afforded to Persons with Disabilities in a Majority of States.......27
CONCLUSION......................................................................29

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).......................25 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240 (1975) .....................................................13 Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003)............4 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) ............................7 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) ......................................................................2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur.
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ...............................10 Black v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d
39 (Ct. App. 2000) .................................................10, 18 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) ............................................................21 City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167
(Colo. 2000) .................................................................11 Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D. Ohio
1999) ............................................................................20 Doe v. Div’n of Youth & Family Servs., 148 F. Supp.
2d 462 (D.N.J. 2001)........................................12, 15, 18 Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001)................7 Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority., 911 P.2d 1319
(Wash. 1996) ................................................................19 Johnson v. Tufton Group, Inc., No. CIV. L-99-144,
2001 WL 210046 (D. Md. Feb 28, 2001).....................11 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ..............3 Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993) .............14 Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003) ................................8 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......10 Nev. Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct.
1972 (2003) ..............................................................4, 16

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New York ex. rel. Spitzer v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp. 2d 19 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) ....................................7
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) ..............................................................12–13
Olmstead v. L.C., ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) .............................................................................7
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) .........9 Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) ............7 School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) .......................21 State v. Haskell, 621 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 2001) ................27 Sutherland v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 657 N.E.2d
281 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ......................................13, 14 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)............24 Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 192 F.3d 807
(9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................7
FEDERAL STATUTES:
Americans with Disabilities Act: Section 2(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).......................2 Section 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).......................2 Section 2(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).......................2 Section 2(a)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).......................2 Section 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)........................22, 23 Section 201(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)..........................24 Section 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 .......................2, 4, 6, 24 Section 203, 42 U.S.C. § 12133 .................................7, 9 Section 204(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) ..........................24 Section 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b)............................6 Section 204(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12134(c) ............................6 Section 505, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ...........................7, 9, 13
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.................................................................7
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 ...........13 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601–2654.............................................................3–4

iv
Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ...................................6, 21 Section 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a ...................................6–7
Rev. Stat. § 722(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)..........................13
STATE STATUTES:
Ala. Code § 21-4-4 (1990) ................................................10 Ala. Code § 21-4-7 (1990) ................................................10 Ala. Code § 21-7-3 (1990) ..............................10, 19, 22, 23 Ala. Code § 21-7-5 (1990) ..........................................10, 18 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 34-438 (1990) ..............................10 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1441 (1990) ............................18 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1492 (2003) ............................28 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1492.09[B] (2003)..................27 Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-302 (1990)...........................10, 18 Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-303 (1990).....................19, 22, 23 Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-610 (1990).................................10 Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (1990) .............................10–11, 18, 22 Cal. Gov’t Code § 4458 (1990).........................................10 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926 (1990).......................................23 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926 (2003).......................................28 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12944 (1990).......................................22 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-306 (1990) ............11, 14, 26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-605 (1990) ..................14, 26 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-64 (1990) ............................23 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-99 (1990) ................11, 14, 26 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4501 (1990) ..............18, 19, 22, 23 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4502 (2003) ................................28 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 393.13 (1990)...................................20, 22 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 413.08 (1990).........................................23 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 413.08(1) (1990) ..............................20, 22 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28 (1990).........................................12 Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-1 (1990) ............................19, 22, 23 Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1990) ........................................11 Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-6 (1990) ........................................18

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Ga. Code Ann. § 30-4-3 (1990) ........................................11 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 368-1.5(a) (1990) ........................25 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5 (1990).......................11, 26 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5 (2003).............................28 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5(a)(1) (2003) ...................27 Idaho Code § 39-3201 (1990) ...............................11, 20, 22 Idaho Code § 39-3210 (1990) ...........................................18 Idaho Code § 39-4126 (1990) ...........................................23 Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-2 (1990) ....................................11 Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-2(a) (1990)................................20 Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-3(r) (1990) ................................23 Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-8-1 (2003) ..............................11, 27 Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-8-3 (2003) ....................................27 Ind. Code Ann. § 22-15-2-7 (1990) ..................................11 Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.2 (1990).....................................23 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 (1990).....................................23 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 (2003).....................................28 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005 (1990)...............................14, 26 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005(k) (1990) ..........................12, 26 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(c)(3) (1990)............................22 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.010 (2003)...............................28 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.120 (1990)...............................18 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.120 (2003)...............................28 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.130 (2003)...............................28 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2254 (1990) ...............................25 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Const. Amend. CXIV (1990) ......25 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98 (1990) .............................23 Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 5 (1990) ...........................11, 23 Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 7 (1990) .................................20 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4551 (1990) .........................20 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553 (1990) .........................23 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553 (2003)..........................28 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4592 (2003)..........................28 Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1103 (1990) ...............................23 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03(3)(2) (1991)............................25

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Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03(4)(1) (1991)............................25 Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-5 (1990) .........................20, 22, 23 Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-11 (1990) .............................11, 18 Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-123 (1990) .................................11 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 (1990).......................................23 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 (2003).......................................28 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.010(8) (1990)..................................25 Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-101 (1990) ................................23 Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-101 (2003) ................................28 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-3(10)(b) (1990) ...........................25 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-11(b) (1990)..........................11, 26 N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-14 (2003)...............................28 N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-15 (2003)...............................28 N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-20 (2003)...............................27 N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19 (1991)......................11, 20, 22 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 155:39-b (1990) ...........................18 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:2 (2003) ............................28 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:3 (1990) ......................22, 23 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21 (2003) ..........................27 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:22 (2003) ..........................11 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5 (1990) .........................................18 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-13 (1990) .......................................12 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:32-4 (1990) .......................................15 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-2(A) (1990) .................................17 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(f) (1990)...................................17 N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) (1990) ............................11, 20 N.Y. Pub. Bldgs. Law § 50(1) (1990)...............................11 N.Y. Pub. Bldgs. Law § 51 (1990)....................................11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-127 (1990) ...........................20, 22, 23 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-129 (1990) .................................11, 18 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-1108 (1990) .....................................15 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-1119 (1990) .....................................11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-1122 (1990) .....................................15 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-1124 (1990) .....................................11 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.035 (1991).........................12, 26

vii
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.050 (1990).............................23 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.050 (2003).............................28 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.070 (1991).............................22 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.090(1) (1991) ..................12, 26 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3781.111(A) (2003)....................15 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.01(A)(9) (2003) .................15 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 (2002) ...........................20 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(G) (2003)......................15 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99 (1990) ...........................12 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99 (2000) ...........................14 Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1402 (1990).................................11, 26 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 954 (1990) ...................................23 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 954 (2003) ...................................28 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 962(c.2) (2003) ................13, 26, 27 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-4 (1990) ................................13, 26 S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-520 (1990) .................................22 S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-540 (1990) ...........................12, 26 S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-560 (1990) ...........................22, 23 S.D. Codified Laws § 5-14-14 (1991)...............................11 S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23 (1990).............................26 S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23.7 (1990)..........................25 S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-24 (1991).............................26 S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-35.1 (2003)..............11, 27, 28 Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-501 (1990).................................18 Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-202 (1990)...........................9, 15 Tenn Code Ann. § 68-18-203(2) (1990) ...........................15 Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-205 (1990)...............................9 Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-205(b) (1990) ........................11 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1970, ch. 484, § 2 .....................................9 Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.001 (1990) ..................20 Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.002(4) (1990)..............23 Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.004(b) (1990)..............13 Utah Code Ann. § 26-29-2 (1990) ..............................22, 23 Utah Code Ann. § 26-29-4 (1990) ....................................11 Utah Code Ann. § 26-30-1 (1990) ....................................20

viii
Utah Code Ann. § 26-30-4 (1990) ..............................11, 18 Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-3 (1990).........................................23 Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-40 (1990).......................................25 Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-46(A) (1990) ...........................12, 26 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4501(1) (2003)...............................28 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502 (1990) ...................................20 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(c) (2003) ...............................28 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.040 (1990) ......................19 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.215 (1990) ......................19 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.84.010 (1990) ......................23 W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-11-10 (1991)...........................12, 26 W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-11-13(c) (1991) ......................12, 26 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.13 (1990) .......................................23 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.13(2)(d) (1990) ..............................15 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.13(4) (1990)...................................12 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(1m)(b) (1990) ...........................22 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(1m)(bp) (1990) .........................18 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(9)(a) (1990) ..............................20 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52(c) (2003) ...................................28 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-6-501 (1990) ..................................11 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-201 (1990) ................................20 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-201(a) (1990) ............................23 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-203 (1990) ..........................11, 18
REGULATIONS:
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2003) .......................................25 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2003) ..................................................6
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
American National Standard for Buildings and Facilities § 4.13.8 (1986) .............................................16
American National Standards Association, ANSI— An Historical Overview, http://www.ansi.org/ about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1 (visited Nov. 9, 2003)...................................................16

ix
Colker, Ruth, & Adam Milani The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075 (2002) .................................................................5, 19, 27
Del. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 00-IB09 (May 30, 2000), 2000 WL 1092966 (Del. A.G.) ....................................18
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558 (1976)..........................................13 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990).................................13 S. Rep. No. 94-1011 (1976) ..............................................13 S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989) ........................................3, 6, 8 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating
the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983) ..................8

BRIEF FOR THE TRAINING AND ADVOCACY SUPPORT CENTER OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus Training and Advocacy Support Center of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (“TASC/NAPAS”) provides training and technical assistance to the nationwide system of protection and advocacy (“P&A”) agencies. Located in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the territories (the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands), P&As are mandated under various federal statutes to provide legal representation and related advocacy services on behalf of all people with disabilities in a variety of settings. In fiscal year 2002, P&As served over 65,000 persons with disabilities through individual case representation and systemic advocacy.
The P&A system comprises the nation’s largest provider of legally based advocacy services for persons with disabilities. P&As are particularly active in providing assistance to persons with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Because of its national P&A membership and familiarity with the protections afforded by each state to persons with disabilities, TASC/NAPAS has firsthand knowledge of the state laws and how they operate in practice. TASC/NAPAS is thus uniquely suited to assist the Court in understanding the
1 No counsel for any party authored this brief either in whole or in part, and no persons other than the amicus curiae and their counsel made any monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. The parties’ written consents to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

2
state law backdrop against which Congress enacted the ADA as well as the status of that backdrop today.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) proscribes discrimination in the provision of public “services, programs, or activities.” Section 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. After an exhaustive investigation, Congress determined that such national legislation was required, expressly finding that persons with disabilities “continually encounter * * * [the] failure to make modifications to existing facilities” such as court houses and polling places, and that discrimination against persons with disabilities persists in “access to public services.” Section 2(a)(3), (5), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (5). Congress expressly determined that this discrimination continued in significant measure because persons with disabilities “have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.” Section 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4). As a result, Congress concluded that “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis.” Section 2(a)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
In the face of these express statutory findings, petitioner nevertheless suggests in its opening brief that the legislative history of the ADA demonstrates that when it enacted the ADA, Congress believed that state law was generally sufficient to safeguard against the pervasive discrimination against people with disabilities. Pet. Br. at 21–22 (“[F]ar from indicating concerns about state-sponsored misconduct, the legislative record reflects congressional recognition of the States’ leadership in safeguarding the rights of the disabled,” citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5 (2001)).
Petitioner’s error in this assertion is three-fold. First, petitioner ignores the clear legislative findings quoted above

3
specifically referencing the pervasive discrimination in facilities and services, and noting the inadequacy of existing remedies. Such legislative findings, included in the statutory text, must be given greater weight than isolated statements selected from the vast legislative history. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90-91 (2000) (noting that an examination of the legislative record is not necessary in all circumstances and striking down the ADEA in part because there were no statutory findings regarding state action).
Second, the weight of legislative history is in line with the statutory findings and contrary to petitioner’s position. For example, the Fifty State Governors’ Committees, on whose reports Congress relied, concluded that “existing State laws do not adequately counter such acts of discrimination.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 18 (1989). And petitioner’s suggestion regarding the adequacy of state law conflicts sharply with the conclusion of the Senate Report that “State laws are inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing.” Id.
Third, consistent with the legislative findings noted above, an examination of state laws in existence at the time the ADA was passed shows that they provided inconsistent and inadequate remedies and coverage, seriously limiting the ability of many persons with disabilities to gain redress for egregious discrimination by the states. Indeed, much of the “unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice” that Congress observed can be traced directly to the states’ failure to guarantee persons with disabilities access to state facilities and services.
We demonstrate that when the ADA was enacted, only one state had explicit statutory protection comparable to Title II of the ADA in the areas we discuss below. Thus, contrary to the suggestions of petitioner, Title II was not unnecessary legislation enacted over a landscape of protective state law. Rather, like the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993

4
(“FMLA”) recently upheld in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), Title II was enacted to respond to the inadequate protection provided by an incomplete and porous patchwork of state laws. 123 S. Ct. at 1980–81 (holding that Congress was justified in enacting the FMLA as remedial legislation, relying in part on the fact that the Court had identified fourteen states whose family leave policies had “important shortcomings”).2
Title II ensures that persons with disabilities have consistent protection against discrimination in access to state facilities and services, regardless of the state in which they reside. See Section 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). Although we address state facilities and state services separately in this brief, the two go hand-in-hand because without accessible facilities most of a state’s services will be inaccessible to persons with disabilities. See, e.g., Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003) (“One form of prohibited discrimination [under Title II] is the exclusion from a public entity’s services, programs, or activities because of the inaccessibility of the entity’s facility.”). Similarly, a state facility that complies with Title II does not provide
2 The Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming in Support of Petitioner asserts (at 24) that “existing State laws are sufficient to address the vast majority of accessibility problems” (emphasis added) and includes an appendix of current state statutes. Following Hibbs, we focus initially on the status of state law when Congress passed the ADA. See 123 S. Ct. at 1980–81 (evaluating shortcomings in states’ leave polices in existence at the time the FMLA was enacted). Nevertheless, in Part IV, we demonstrate that the State Amici supporting petitioner are wrong because current state laws do not in fact provide adequate accessibility for persons with disabilities.

5
meaningful access if state services within the facility are denied to persons with disabilities.
In Part I below we briefly describe the coverage of the ADA with respect to state facilities and services. We also explain why the ADA’s remedial scheme is essential to this coverage. In Part II we demonstrate that in 1990, when the ADA was passed, thirty-four states had statutes that did not ensure access to state facilities in a manner equivalent to Title II. Then, in Part III, we shift our focus to state services and demonstrate that all but one of the states failed to provide access to state services in a manner equivalent to Title II.
Finally, we demonstrate in Part IV that state law remains inadequate today. Absent Title II, enforcement of the rights of people with disabilities to access state facilities and services would be greatly diminished. Thus, not only was Congress acting to remedy significant gaps in state anti-discrimination laws when it enacted the ADA, but the continuing vitality of Title II of the ADA is essential to secure the guarantee of equal protection and due process for all persons with disabilities.3
ARGUMENT
I. The ADA Provides Protection With Respect to Both State Facilities and State Services
The ADA’s coverage of state facilities and services has two main components: a general prohibition of discrimination in
3 In this brief, we rely heavily on the work of Professors Ruth Colker and Adam Milani in a recent article in the Alabama Law Review. Ruth Colker and Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075 (2002). This article surveys current state law in detail and concludes that absent the protections of Title II of the ADA, the protection available to persons with disabilities would be greatly diminished in a majority of states. In an appendix to the article, the authors attach a comprehensive state-by-state summary of state disability law as it relates to Title II of the ADA.

6
access to state facilities and services and a remedial scheme that deters such discrimination and provides appropriate relief when such discrimination occurs. Section 202, which prohibits discrimination in services, programs, and activities provides that:
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Public facilities such as public buildings, sidewalks, and recreational facilities are covered in two ways. First, without access to public buildings, sidewalks, and recreational facilities, persons with disabilities are systematically denied the “services, programs, [and] activities” provided by the state. Second, the existing regulations from Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, expressly covered such facilities, and thus Congress ensured that Title II covered such facilities by specifically directing the Attorney General to adopt regulations “consistent with” the Rehabilitation Act regulations to cover “facilities.” See Sections 204(b) and (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(b) & (c).4
Moreover, Congress recognized that without an effective remedial scheme such prohibitions would have little impact on the pervasive discrimination existing at the time and that the “inclusion of penalties and damages i[s] the driving force that facilitates voluntary compliance.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 15 (1989). Title II therefore incorporates by reference the
4 The Attorney General promulgated such regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2003) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”)

7
enforcement provisions under Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (which themselves are based on the remedies applicable to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.). See Section 203, 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Under this remedial scheme plaintiffs may obtain injunctive relief and damages. The ADA also allows a successful plaintiff to receive “a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” Section, 505, 42 U.S.C. § 12205. This set of remedies gives states a strong incentive to provide access to facilities and services and provides adequate redress for a person who encounters discrimination by the state.
Since 1990, persons with disabilities have relied on Title II to challenge numerous discriminatory acts involving core governmental functions. Respondents are among the many persons with disabilities who have used Title II to challenge a state’s unwillingness to make its courts accessible to persons with disabilities. Title II has also been used to challenge discriminatory acts involving voting,5 institutionalization,6 education,7 prisoners’ rights,8 law enforcement,9 and public
5 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Schoharie, 82 F. Supp. 2d 19 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (failure to ensure that polling places were accessible to people with disabilities violated Title II); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) (overbroad exclusion of individuals with mental illness from voting violated Title II).
6 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities violates Title II).
7 See, e.g., Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1999) (student with disability sued to require university to make reasonable modification).
8 See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (Title II applies to state correctional facilities).
9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (plaintiff sued police department for injuries sustained while being transported in a van not equipped to hold a wheelchair).

8 assistance programs.10 By ensuring that individuals with disabilities have access to such basic facilities and services, Title II of the ADA has enabled them to participate as equal citizens in the most fundamental aspects of our society. Before the ADA was enacted, many state laws failed to adequately address the exclusion of people with disabilities from government facilities and services and their resulting isolation from public life and inability to participate fully in the rights and privileges of citizenship. Had Congress not enacted Title II, many people with disabilities would have remained second-class citizens, unable to have their day in court, attend school or state universities, cast a ballot, or receive public assistance benefits.
II. When the ADA Was Enacted, Individual State Laws Failed To Ensure Persons with Disabilities Access to State Facilities.
A. Remedies With Respect to State Facilities
In prohibiting discrimination in access to state facilities Congress recognized that “the rights guaranteed by the ADA are meaningless without effective enforcement provisions” and that “the inclusion of penalties and damages i[s] the driving force that facilitates voluntary compliance.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 15 (1989). Congress was also aware of a report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that found that seventy-six percent of state buildings were not accessible to persons with disabilities even though many states had statutes requiring that such buildings be accessible. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 39 (1983). Thus, as discussed above, Congress guaranteed the enforcement of Title II’s
10 See, e.g., Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003) (exclusion of persons with disabilities from state health insurance program violated Title II).

9
prohibitions by allowing those with the greatest incentive to enforce its prohibitions—persons with disabilities—to recover damages and attorney’s fees when states failed to comply with Title II. See Sections 203 and 505, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12133 & 12205.
As reflected in the Senate report cited above, at the time Congress enacted the ADA most states failed to provide equivalent relief for discrimination in access to state facilities thus depriving their accessibility “requirements” of any real meaning. For example, in 1990 petitioner had a policy requiring accessibility in all “public buildings” that had been in effect since 1970. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-202 (1990) (historical notes indicate statute was enacted in 1970 Pub. Acts, ch. 484, § 2).11 But no fine or penalty was available for state violations of this provision. See id. § 68120-205 (1990). Thus, Tennessee and other states that did not provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms had no incentive to comply with their own accessibility statutes and failed to provide relief to individuals who suffered discrimination.
1. Private Right of Action for Damages
The private right of action for damages provided by Title II serves several important purposes. First, the threat of damages provides states with a strong incentive not to discriminate in providing access to its facilities. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980) (noting the deterrent effect of damage remedies on governmental conduct). Second, a person with a disability who suffers discrimination at the hands of the state should be able to
11 In this brief, all citations to state statutes are taken from the online databases on either Westlaw or Lexis. The citations to historical statutes were taken from the databases on those services for the year identified. Citations to current law are taken from the current statute databases and identified as 2003.

10
receive damages for any compensable harm that is attributable to the discrimination. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Finally, a damage remedy is a particularly important remedy for discrimination in access to state facilities because when an individual is denied access to a state facility to which he may never return, such as a courthouse, he may lack standing to seek injunctive relief under this Court’s precedents. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). Thus, for some persons with disabilities, it may be that “damages is the only possible remedy.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409.
A survey of state accessibility statutes in 1990 reveals that thirty-one states either did not clearly allow a person who was illegally denied access to a facility to sue for damages or significantly restricted such relief. First, nineteen states did not clearly allow a private right of action for facilities discrimination. For example, Alabama’s statute had two provisions requiring state facilities to be accessible. See Ala. Code §§ 21-4-4, 21-7-2 (1990). Section 21-4-4 was enforced by the state fire marshal who could order compliance, see Section 21-4-7, while Section 21-7-2 could only be enforced by a misdemeanor penalty, see Section 21-7-5. Because a state prosecutor cannot bring a criminal action against the state, the misdemeanor penalty does not even apply to state discrimination. Thus, Alabama provided no private right of action against the state for discriminating in providing access to the state’s facilities.12
12 See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 34-438 (1990) (state has enforcement authority); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-302 (1990) (only penalty a misdemeanor) and id. § 20-14-610 (1990) (state has enforcement authority); Cal. Gov’t Code § 4458 (1990) (government can “bring an action to enjoin a violation”) and Black v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Ct. App. 2000) (affirming lower court’s finding that state is not a “business establishment[ ]” covered by Cal. Civ. Code § 51

11
Second, in three additional states an individual could bring a private right of action, but could not recover damages (even for intentional discrimination).13 Six other states failed to
(1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1990) (state has enforcement authority) and id. § 30-4-3 (1990) (only penalty a misdemeanor); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5 (1990) (provision allowing private right of action not effective until 1991); Idaho Code § 39-3201 (1990) (state has enforcement authority); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 22-9-8-1, -3 (2003) (see historical notes) (provisions allowing private right of action under Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-2 (1990) not effective until 1994) and id. § 22-15-2-7 (1990) (state has enforcement authority); Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 5 (1990), and Johnson v. Tufton Group, Inc., No. CIV. L-99-144, 2001 WL 210046, at *4 (D. Md. Feb 28, 2001) (only state agency may enforce art. 49B, § 5); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-11 (1990) (misdemeanor is only penalty specified) and id. § 43-6-123 (1990) (state given limited enforcement authority); N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19 (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database) (no enforcement mechanism for violations); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:22 (2003) (see historical notes in 2003 database) (provision allowing private right of action effective in 1992); N.Y. Pub. Bldgs. Law § 50(1), 51 (1990) (no private right of action specified) and N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) (1990) (does not clearly apply to the state); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-129 (1990) (misdemeanor is only penalty specified) and id. §§ 72-1119, 72-1124 (1990) (state given limited enforcement authority but misdemeanor only penalty specified); Okla. Stat. tit. 25 § 1402 (1990) (no private right of action specified); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-35.1 (2003) (see historical notes in 2003 database) (provision allowing private right of action added in 1991) and id. § 5-1414 (1990) (state enforces building code); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120205(b) (1990) (no penalty may be assessed against the state); Utah Code Ann. § 26-29-4 (1990) (state has limited enforcement authority) and id. 26-30-4 (1990) (misdemeanor is only penalty specified); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-203 (1990) (misdemeanor is only penalty specified) and id. § 166-501 (1990) (state given limited enforcement authority).
13 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-306 (1990) (allowing private right of action) and City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 2000) (holding that Colorado Governmental Immunity Act bars compensatory damages against the state but permits equitable relief for civil rights violations allowed); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-99 (1990) (injunctive relief only); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-11(b) (1990) (allows declaratory and injunctive relief but not damages).

12
provide adequate relief because the states had significant limits on the amount of damages that an individual could recover. In South Carolina, for example, a successful plaintiff’s recovery of actual damages was limited to $5,000. See S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-540 (1990).14 Finally, three states allowed a private right of action for damages against the state but this remedy was not clearly available for discrimination involving all state facilities.15
2. Attorney’s Fees
Attorney’s fees, like damages, play a critical role in the enforcement of facilities accessibility requirements. The enforcement of accessibility requirements, like other civil rights laws, is dependent to a large degree on causes of action filed by plaintiffs acting as “private attorney[s] general.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
14 See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28 (1990) (relief against state capped at $100,000); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005(k) (1990) ($2,000 limit on damages for pain, suffering and humiliation); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.090(1) (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database) (Section 41.035 (1991) imposes a $50,000 limit on tort damages against state and state employees); Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-46(A) (1990) (allows compensatory damages but prohibits damages for pain and suffering); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-13(c), 5-11-10 (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database) (while compensatory damages are available in court, a complainant in an administrative proceeding could only receive incidental compensatory damages, the modern equivalent of $1,000 in 1977).
15 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-13 (1990) (allowing private right of action for violations of public accommodation statute) and Doe v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 496 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that public accommodation statute coverage is limited to the few state facilities listed in the statute); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99 (1990) (private right of action not clearly applicable to facilities other than “public buildings”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.13(4) (1990) (private right of action not clearly applicable to facilities other than “public buildings” and recovery limited to costs, disbursements and attorney’s fees).

13 (1968).16 Without attorney’s fees, however, an individual who has suffered discrimination may not be able to find an attorney willing to file an action on his or her behalf. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (“Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts * * *.”). Furthermore, the threat of paying a successful plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, like the threat of paying damages, gives states an incentive to comply with a prohibition.
Nevertheless, seven of the states that allowed some private right of action against the state did not provide attorney’s fees for a successful plaintiff.17 Three states that covered facilities and allowed a full private right of action against the state for damages did not have an attorney’s fees provision.18 Four other states that allowed only a limited private right of action
16 See generally S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2–6 (1976), part of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, which added what is now Rev. Stat. § 722(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The attorney’s fee provision of the ADA, Section 505, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, was based on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 73 (1990). Thus, the discussion of attorney’s fees in the legislative history of the 1976 statute is relevant to the ADA provision as well.
17 A person with a disability is generally guaranteed attorney’s fees only if the state had an explicit attorney’s fees provision applicable to state discrimination in providing access to facilities. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (generally courts may not award attorney’s fees absent a legislative instruction to do so); Sutherland v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 657 N.E.2d 282–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who sued under an Ohio anti-discrimination law allowing “other appropriate relief” because statute did not explicitly authorize recovery of attorney’s fees).
18 See Pennsylvania (section in current law allowing attorney’s fees, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 962(c.2) (2003), effective in 1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-4 (1990) (relief provision does not include attorney’s fees); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.004(b) (1990) (same).

14
against the state for facilities violations did not allow attorney’s fees.19
B. Coverage of State Facilities
In addition to addressing states’ failure to provide adequate remedies for discrimination in the provision of access to facilities, Title II addressed important shortcomings in the scope of some states’ facilities coverage. Title II prohibits states from discriminating in access to all state facilities, including public buildings, such as court houses and schools, as well as public sidewalks, streets, and recreational facilities. Accessible sidewalks and streets are particularly important rights guaranteed by Title II because, without them, a person with a disability might never get to an accessible building and the accessible services therein:
“Without curb cuts, people with ambulatory disabilities simply cannot navigate the city; activities that are commonplace to those who are fully ambulatory become frustrating and dangerous endeavors. At present, people using wheelchairs must often make the Hobson’s choice between traveling in the streets—with cars and buses and trucks and bicycles—and traveling over uncut curbs which, even when possible, may result in the wheelchair becoming stuck or overturning, with injury to both passenger and chair.” Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1069 (3d Cir. 1993).
19 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-34-605, 24-34-306 (1990) (relief does not include attorney’s fees); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-99 (1990) (relief provision does not include attorney’s fees); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 441005 (1990) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99 (2003) (historical text unavailable) (allowing damages and “other appropriate relief” for some facilities violations) and Sutherland v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 657 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99 does not authorize attorney’s fees).

15
At the time Congress passed the ADA, four states did not have statutes that clearly applied to state facilities other than buildings. For example, as noted above, petitioner had a policy requiring accessibility in all “public buildings.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-202 (1990). The state’s definition of “public buildings” however, did not include other facilities such as streets, sidewalks, and recreational facilities. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-18-203(2) (1990). Three other states had statutes that, like Tennessee’s, covered public buildings but failed to clearly cover such other facilities.20
Furthermore, some state statutes which covered state facilities did not provide sufficient accessibility guidelines or require an agency to promulgate accessibility regulations. For example, Nebraska’s statute contained some specific requirements for facilities accessibility and provided that the “Public Buildings Safety Advisory Committee may promulgate and implement codes pursuant to sections 721101 to 72-1119 consistent with the uniform building codes and standards set by the American Standards Association, Inc.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-1122 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus it was left to the Public Buildings Safety Advisory Committee to decide whether to adopt detailed guidelines to facilitate compliance with vague requirements such as those provided for door thresholds. Id. § 72-1108 (“[A]s much as practicable” door thresholds “shall be flush with the
20 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:32-4 (1990) (public buildings required to “provide facilities for the physically handicapped”) and Doe v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 496 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that some state facilities are not covered by public accommodation statute); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3781.111(A) (2003) (historical text unavailable) (covers public buildings but not facilities), and id. §§ 4112.02(G), 4112.01(A)(9) (2003) (historical text unavailable) (discrimination in public accommodations prohibited, but definition of public accommodation does not explicitly include the state); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.13(2)(d) (1990) (covers public buildings but not facilities).

16 floor.”).21 As recognized in Hibbs, 123 S. Ct at 1981, Congress could “reasonably conclude” that statutes such as Nebraska’s “offered significantly less firm protection” than Title II which mandated compliance with the Attorney General’s detailed accessibility regulations that were to be based on the regulations already promulgated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
* * * * In sum, thirty-four states had facilities accessibility provisions with at least one significant shortcoming in the remedial scheme or coverage of facilities. These shortcomings standing alone provided Congress with sufficient justification for passing Title II. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1980-81 (relying on shortcomings in only fourteen states). But Congress was also concerned with the lack of accessibility in state services and, as demonstrated below, states failed to provide adequate protection in this area as well.
21 The American Standards Association, which published standards referenced in Nebraska’s statute, changed its name to American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) in 1969. See American National Standards Association, ANSI—An Historical Overview, http://www.ansi.org/ about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1 (visited Nov. 9, 2003). The ANSI standard for door thresholds provided: “Thresholds at doorways shall not exceed ¾ inch (19 mm) in height for exterior residential sliding doors or ½ in (13 mm) for other types of doors. Raised thresholds and floor level changes at accessible doorways shall be beveled with a slope no greater than 1:2 (see 4.5.2).” American National Standard for Buildings and Facilities § 4.13.8 (1986).

17
III. When the ADA Was Enacted, Individual State Laws Failed To Protect Persons with Disabilities Against Discrimination in the Provision of State Services.
As demonstrated in Part II above, states failed to provide adequate protection from discrimination in access to state facilities in 1990. In Part III we demonstrate that in 1990 states provided even less protection with respect to state services. Many state laws failed to cover state services at all, and many that did had substantial shortcomings in that coverage. And, as with state facilities, the remedies provided under state law fell well short of those provided under the ADA.
A. Coverage of State Services
When the ADA was enacted, only twenty-four states provided statutory protection against disability discrimination in the provision of public services and programs. In the states which did offer such protection, the statutes often took the form of “public accommodation” laws that could be interpreted to cover state services as well as facilities.22 For example, New Mexico had a statute forbidding any person, specifically including the state, “in any public accommodation” from discriminating in “offering or refusing to offer its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to any individual because of * * * physical or mental handicap.” N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-1-7(f) and 28-1-2(A) (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, we assume that a claimant could sue the state if it were discriminating against that individual with respect state services (or programs or activities) because of his or her disability.
22 The discussion of accessibility requirements for state facilities in Part II included public accommodation statutes, which can apply to both facilities and services, as well as statutes applicable only to buildings and facilities.

18
Twenty-six of the states, however, had no such statutory protection. First, similar statutes in three states—Arizona, Kentucky, and Tennessee—did not cover persons with disabilities at all.23 In these states, the statutes prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin and the like but left persons with disabilities without protection.
Second, in thirteen states, the general public accommodation statute either did not cover or was not enforceable against the state. For example, in Mississippi, the only penalty for a violation of the statute was a misdemeanor which would not be enforceable against the state. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-11 (1990).24 In other states, the types of public accommodations covered by the statute did not expressly include state-run accommodations and services. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (1990) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical disability by “business establishments”) and Black v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 42 n.4 (Ct. App. 2000) (declining to address the lower court’s ruling that the state was not covered by the act).25
23 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1441 (1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.120 (1990); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-501 (1990).
24 See also Ala. Code § 21-7-5 (1990) (only penalty a misdemeanor); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-302 (1990) (same); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-6, (1990) (same); Idaho Code § 39-3210 (1990) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-129 (1990) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 26-30-4 (1990) (same); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-203 (1990) (same).
25 See also Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4501 (1990) and Del. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 00-IB09 (May 30, 2000), 2000 WL 1092966 (Del. A.G.) (state is not covered by statute); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 155:39-b (1990) (providing a narrow definition of “public accommodation” that does not expressly include the state); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5 (1990) (definition of “public accommodation” does not include state under Doe v. Division of Youth & Family Services, 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 496 (D.N.J. 2001)); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(1m)(bp) (1990) (providing definition of public accommodation that does not expressly include the state).

19
Finally, twenty states had statutes prohibiting disability discrimination with respect to general public accommodations, but unlike New Mexico, these statutes did not clearly cover “services.” For example, Washington had a statute prohibiting any person from committing an act which “results in any distinction, restriction, or discrimination * * * in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement” regardless of disability. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.215 (1990). As in New Mexico, the term “person” was defined to include the state. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.040 (1990). But the statute did not prohibit such discrimination in the provision of services or programs or activities. To the contrary, in Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority, 911 P.2d 1319, 1329 (Wash. 1996), the Supreme Court of Washington held that the statute could not be interpreted to cover transportation services offered by the city. The Court held that:
“What must be very clear * * * is that the [state] statutory mandate to provide access to places of public accommodation is not a mandate to provide services. While entitlement to services may be in the ADA, the Legislature has not enacted a counterpart to the ADA in Washington creating such entitlements.” Id.26
Thus, in Washington, state buildings that accommodate the public may be covered by the statute, but none of the services provided by the state would be.
Of the twenty states that failed to cover discrimination in the provision of services, ten also failed to cover the state (and hence have already been counted in the thirteen states listed above).27 Ten additional states, including Washington,
26 See Colker and Milani, 53 Ala. L. Rev. at 1093–94, for discussion of case and similar case in Ohio.
27 See Ala. Code § 21-7-3 (1990); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-303 (1990); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4501 (1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-1 (1990);

20
had statutes that did cover the state, at least with respect to its buildings, but failed to cover services.28
Adding up the three states that had statutes that did not cover disability discrimination, the thirteen states that had statutes that did not cover the state, and the ten additional states that did cover the state but did not cover services, there were twenty-six states that failed to provide statutory protection against disability discrimination with respect to state services.
B. Limitations in Coverage of State Services
Having established that only twenty-four states had any form of statutory protection against disability discrimination in the provision of state services, we now turn to the various limitations in that protection as compared to what Congress deemed necessary in Title II of the ADA. As we demonstrate below, many of the statutes failed to cover critical populations of persons with disabilities. They also by and large failed to require that states make reasonable modifications in such services to ensure that persons with disabilities would not be denied the benefits of public services. Finally, we show that in many of the states, as with facilities, the remedies with respect to discrimination in
Idaho Code § 39-3201 (1990); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-5 (1990); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-127 (1990); Utah Code Ann. § 26-30-1 (1990); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(9)(a) (1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-201 (1990).
28 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 413.08(1) (1990) (public accommodations statute does not cover services), but see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 393.13 (1990) (covering services discrimination with respect to narrowly defined population of “developmentally disabled”); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-2(a) (1990); Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 7 (1990); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4551 (1990); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) (1990); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 (2002) (historical text unavailable), see also Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that statute does not apply to services); N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19 (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.001 (1990); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502 (1990).

21
public services were inadequate to address the problem of discrimination effectively.
1. Definition of Persons with Disabilities
A critical step in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability is to define the protected class with sufficient breadth. Persons with both physical and mental impairments have long suffered discrimination in this country. So too have persons who have a record of impairment or who are regarded as having such an impairment.
Congress recognized that all such persons need protection against discrimination when it enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 1978 amendments thereto. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 and historical notes. Moreover, by 1990, this Court had similarly recognized the importance of these elements. In City of Cleburne, this Court noted that persons with mental disabilities are often the subject of discrimination on the basis of “negative attitudes and fear.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding that the city council’s denial of a special use permit under a zoning ordinance that prevented a home for persons with mental impairments was unconstitutionally discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment).
It is also clear that invidious discrimination can be aimed at persons who, though not currently disabled, have a record of disability or are regarded as having such a disability. Indeed, in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987), this Court recognized that by including both having a “record of” disability and being “regarded as” having a disability in the definition of disability in the Rehabilitation Act, “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”
In light of this history, it is not surprising that Congress incorporated these elements into the definition of “disability”

22
in the ADA. Thus, Section 3(2) of the ADA defines “disability” to mean:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
“(B) a record of such an impairment; or “(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Looking at the landscape of state law in 1990, however, several states failed to incorporate these critical categories. For example, Nevada and Kansas each had statutes that prohibited discrimination in the provision of services, but their coverage of persons with disabilities was limited to those with “physical and visual” impairments (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.070 (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database) or those with a “physical handicap” (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 441009(c)(3) (1990)). Similarly, South Carolina prohibited discrimination against persons because of “handicap” but specifically excluded persons with “mental illness.” See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 43-33-520, 43-33-560 (1990).29
29 The exclusion of persons with mental impairments was also pervasive in states which did not cover discrimination in the provision of state services as listed in Part A above. See Ala. Code § 21-7-3 (1990); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-303 (1990); Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (1990) (only covering physical disability) and Cal. Gov’t Code § 12944 (1990) (specifically relating to licensing boards but only covering “medical conditions or physical handicap” and not “mental handicap”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4501 (1990); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 413.08(1) (1990) and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 393.13 (1990) (covering narrowly defined population of “developmentally disabled”); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-1 (1990); Idaho Code § 39-3201 (1990); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-5 (1990); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-127 (1990); N.D. Cent. Code § 48-02-19 (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:3 (1990) (excluding mental illness from the definition of “physical or mental disability”); Utah Code Ann. § 26-29-2 (1990); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.22(1m)(b) (1990)

23
In addition, eleven of the states that prohibited disability discrimination in the provision of public services failed to include in the protected class persons who are “regarded as” having an impairment and persons who have a “record of” an impairment.30 Desiring to put an end to discrimination based on such “accumulated myths and fears,” Congress drafted the ADA to include protection for both groups. See Section 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
2. Reasonable Modification
Another significant problem with many state statutes was their failure to require that the states make even simple
(covers narrowly defined population of developmentally disabled); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-201(a) (1990).
30 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-64 (1990); Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.2 (1990); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 (1990); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98 (1990); Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1103 (1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 (1990) (definitions do not include “record of”); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-101 (1990) (according to 1991 statute annotation, until 1991 amendment neither group included in definitions); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.050 (1990) (according to 1989 Westlaw database and annotations to current statute, neither group was included in this statute or any others relating to persons with disabilities); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 954 (1990) (neither group included until this statute was amended in 1991); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-560 (1990); Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-3 (1990) (definitions do not include “regarded as”).
Another eighteen states that did not have protection with respect to the state services also failed to include these elements in their definition of disabled with respect to discrimination in public accommodations. See Ala. Code § 21-7-3 (1990); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-14-303 (1990); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926 (1990); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4501 (1990); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 413.08 (1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 30-3-1 (1990); Idaho Code § 39-4126 (1990); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-3(r) (1990); Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 5 (1990); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553 (1990); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-6-5 (1990); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-127 (1990); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:3 (1990); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.002(4) (1990); Utah Code Ann. § 26-29-2 (1990); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.84.010 (1990); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.13 (1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-201(a) (1990).

24
modifications to their services and programs to avoid excluding persons with disabilities from participating in or enjoying the benefits of such services and programs. In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that such a requirement was essential to ensure that discrimination could not persist under false rationales. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002) (recognizing that the ADA “seeks to diminish or to eliminate the stereotypical thought processes, the thoughtless actions, and the hostile reactions that far too often bar those with disabilities from participating fully in the Nation’s life”).
Thus, Title II of the ADA specifies that “qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies]” shall not be “excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of” such services by reason of their disabilities. Section 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In turn, a “qualified individual with a disability” is defined to be a person who,
“with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Section 201(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added).
The Attorney General’s regulations issued pursuant to Section 204(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a), interpret this definition to require a public entity to
“make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of

25
the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2003) (emphasis added).
Thus, Title II requires that public entities, including states, make “reasonable modifications” to their policies, practices, and procedures in order to insure that persons with disabilities can participate in and benefit from public services.
Nevertheless, when Congress enacted Title II, only four of the twenty-four states that had a statutory prohibition against disability discrimination in state services incorporated an express obligation to make such modifications with respect to such services.31
3. Remedies
The remedies available under state law for violations of state accessibility requirements in the provision of state services were, like the states’ remedies for facilities violations, substantially more limited than the remedies available under Title II. First, taking the same twenty-four states that did provide statutory protection against disability discrimination in the provision of state services, six failed to provide for damages as a remedy for violations by the state
31 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03(3)(2), (4)(1) (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database), Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.010(8) (1990), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-3(10)(b) (1990); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23.7 (1990) Four other states had statutes incorporating the “programs and activities” language from the Rehabilitation Act. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3681.5(a) (1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2254 (1990); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Const. Amend. CXIV (1990); Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-40 (1990). We note that courts in these states, like this court, could interpret such language to require reasonable modification, so the lack of a specific statutory requirement may be less troubling in those states. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985) (construing statute to mean that “while a grantee need not be required to make ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make ‘reasonable’ ones”).

26
(even to remedy and deter intentional discrimination),32 and another five significantly limited such damages.33
Second, of the twenty-four states that covered services, eight did not allow successful plaintiffs to obtain attorney’s fees for claims involving services.34 As discussed in more detail in Part II above, without the availability of such an award, enforcement is substantially limited, especially where the relief sought does not otherwise entail damages.
* * * *
The limitations in state laws prohibiting discrimination in access to facilities and services show that only Minnesota had statutory protections in the areas we have discussed at least as
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-34-306, 24-34-605 (1990) (no compensatory relief); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-99 (1990) (no compensatory relief); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5 (1990) (provision allowing private right of action not effective until 1991); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-11(b) (1990) (no damages); Okla. Stat. tit. 25 § 1402 (1990) (no compensatory relief); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23 (1990).
33 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005(k) (1990) (limited damages for pain suffering and humiliation to $2,000); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.090(1) (1991) (see historical notes in the 1991 database) (Section 41.035 (1991) imposes a $50,000 limit on tort damages against state and state employees); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-540 (1990) (limits actual damages to $5,000); Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-46A (1990) (no damages for pain and suffering); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-13(c), 5-11-10 (1991) (see historical notes in 1991 database) (while compensatory damages are available in court, a complainant in an administrative proceeding could only receive incidental compensatory damages, the modern equivalent of $1,000 in 1977).
34 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-34-605; 24-34-306 (1990); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-99 (1990) (relief provision does not include attorney’s fees); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005 (1990) (same); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5 (1990) (provision allowing attorney’s fees not effective until 1991); ); Okla. Stat. tit. 25 § 1402 (1990) (relief provision does not include attorney’s fees); Pennsylvania (section in current law allowing attorney’s fees, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 962(c.2) (2003), was added in 1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-87-4 (1990); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-24 (1990) (no attorney’s fees provision).

27
strong as those Congress deemed adequate to ensure that persons with disabilities be able to enjoy the benefits of critical state services, programs and activities. Thus, it can hardly be said that Congress enacted the ADA, and Title II in particular, against a backdrop of sufficient or effective state laws.
IV. Invalidating Title II of the ADA Would Severely Undermine the Protections Currently Afforded to Persons with Disabilities in a Majority of States.
Unfortunately, since the enactment of the ADA, only a few states have improved their disability statutes with respect to state facilities and services. As a recent study in the University of Alabama Law Review concludes, “Our study confirms * * * [that] only a minority of states actually have statutory protection against disability discrimination * * * similar to that found in ADA Title II.”35
Facilities access statutes remain inadequate in the majority of states. While six states have revised their statutes to allow damage suits against the state for failing to provide access to facilities,36 none of the states that prohibited or limited such damages have abandoned these restrictions. Of the seven states that allowed a private right of action for damages but did not allow attorney’s fees, only Pennsylvania has adopted such a provision.37 Finally, none of the states that failed to
35 Ruth Colker and Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075, 1113 (2002).
36 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1492.09 [B] (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5(a)(1) (2003); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 22-9-8-1, -3 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-20 (2003), and State v. Haskell, 621 N.W.2d 358, 360 (N.D. 2001) (finding damages are available under § 14-02.4-20); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21 (2003); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-1335.1 (2003).
37 See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 962(c.2) (2003).

28
require accessibility to all state facilities in 1990 has added such a requirement.
State laws pertaining to services likewise remain inadequate today. Since 1990 only four states—Kentucky, Maine, North Dakota and Vermont—have added statutes that prohibit the state from discriminating in the provision of its services.38 Of the six states which covered state services but did not provide a private right of action for damages, only Hawaii and South Dakota have revised their statutes to allow such relief.39 Similarly, while eight states broadened their definition of disability to cover at least some persons with mental impairments,40 and ten states have done so to include those with a record of impairment or who are regarded as having an impairment,41 over twenty states still have definitions of disability more limited than the ADA.
Thus, the Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama et al. in Support of petitioner is simply wrong when it asserts (at 24) that “existing State laws are sufficient to address the vast majority of accessibility problems.” In fact, the need for Title II of the ADA is as real now as it was in 1990. There can be no assurance that the state legislatures which have not acted
38 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 344.120, 344.130 (2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 4592, 4553 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-02.4-14, 14-02.4-15 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 4502(c), 4501(1) (2003).
39 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 489-7.5 (2003) (effective in 1991), S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-35.1 (2003).
40 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1492 (2003); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926 (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4502 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.010 (2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:2 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.050 (2003); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52(c) (2003).
41 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1492 (2003); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.010 (2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4553 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 (2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-101 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651.050 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 954 (2003); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 106.52(c) (2003).

29
since 1990 would act now to rectify the deficiencies in their laws if this Court were to strike down Title II as applied to the states. Yet discrimination against persons with disabilities will not simply go away. Accordingly, the comprehensive coverage and remedies available under Title II of the ADA are vital to the protection of persons with disabilities, and many persons with disabilities will be harmed if these protections are taken away.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Briefs for Respondents and above, this Court should affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted,

SHARON MASLING NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS 900 Second Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 408-9514
November 12, 2003

JOHN TOWNSEND RICH* JAMES CHAD OPPENHEIMER DAVID M. BOOTH SHEA & GARDNER 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington D.C. 20036 (202) 828-2000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
* Counsel of Record

 
 No. 02-1667
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ___________________________________________________________
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Petitioner,
v.
GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents. ___________________________________________________________
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ___________________________________________________________ BRIEF OF THE STATES OF MINNESOTA, CONNECTICUT, ILLINOIS, MISSOURI, NEW MEXICO, NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND WISCONSIN AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS ___________________________________________________________
MIKE HATCH Attorney General State of Minnesota Counsel of Record
GARY R. CUNNINGHAM KRISTYN ANDERSON Assistant Attorneys General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128 (651) 282-5700

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL Attorney General State of Connecticut
LISA MADIGAN Attorney General State of Illinois
JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON Attorney General State of Missouri
PATRICIA A. MADRID Attorney General State of New Mexico
ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General State of New York
CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE Attorney General State of Washington
PEGGY A. LAUTENSCHLAGER Attorney General State of Wisconsin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................................iii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE STATES ..................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................................................................. 1

ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................ 3

I.

THIS COURT’S DECISION IN BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

ALABAMA V. GARRETT IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE ISSUE PRESENTLY

BEFORE THE COURT. ........................................................................................................ 3

II. CONGRESS VALIDLY ABROGATED THE STATES ’ SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WHEN IT ENACTED TITLE II OF THE ADA. .................................................................. 4

A. Congress Identified Substantial Evidence Of Irrational State Conduct
Supporting Its Finding Of A History And Pattern Of State Discrimination Against People With Disabilities In The Provision Of
Public Services, Programs And Activities. ....................................................... 4

B. In Adopting Title II, Congress Identified State Discrimination That Violated The Fundamental Constitutional Rights Of People With Disabilities............................................................................................................. 7

C. Congress Made Explicit Findings Of State Discrimination Against People With Disabilities In The Provision Of Public Services, Programs And Activities. .................................................................................. 10

D. Shortcomings In Existing Law Justified The Enactment of Title II. ........... 11

III. GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF STATE-SPONSORED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, TITLE II IS A MEASURED AND BALANCED RESPONSE TO REMEDY AND DETER STATEPERPETUATED DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION.............................................................. 13

A. Title II Reasonably Proscribes Unconstitutional State Conduct. ................. 16

B. Title II’s Reasonable Modification Provision Is Consistent With States’ Responsibilities Under The Constitution............................................ 18

C. Congress Imposed Important Limitations In Title II Which Produce A Congruent And Proportional Remedy. ........................................................ 20

i

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................... 21 APPENDIX
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Page

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) ............................................................................................................ 2

Amadon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 226 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................... 17, 19

Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) .......................................................................................................... 11

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ....................................................................................................passim

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ...................................................................................................... 7, 16

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) .......................................................................................................... 19

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ................................................................................................ 4, 14, 20

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) .................................................................................................. 2, 5, 18

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) ...................................................................................................... 7, 16

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 1066 (1976) ........................................................................................................ 17

Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, (2d Cir. 2001)............................................................................................... 16

Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ............................................................................................................ 8

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) .......................................................................................................... 19

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ........................................................................................................ 4, 14

iii

Nevada Human Resources v. Hibbs, __ U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) .............................................................................passim
Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) .......................................................................................................... 10
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) .................................................................................................... 15, 18
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002) ..................................... 19
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) .......................................................................................................... 11
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) ............................................................................................................ 2
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) .............................................................................................................. 4
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) .......................................................................................................... 20
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) .......................................................................................................... 20
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) .......................................................................................................... 17
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 ............................................................................................................... 15
20 U.S.C. § 1440-1491 ................................................................................................................. 15
29 U.S.C. § 794a ...............................................................................................................................
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) .....................................................................................................................
42 U.S.C. § 12101......................................................................................................................... 10
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) .................................................................................................................... 20
42 U.S.C. § 12131-12165 ............................................................................................................... 1
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) .............................................................................................................. 18, 20
42 U.S.C. § 12133......................................................................................................................... 20
iv

42 U.S.C. § 12202........................................................................................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(3), (5) ................................................................................................. 10, 12
FEDERAL RULES AND R EGULATIONS
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)......................................................................................................... 18, 20
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1)............................................................................................................... 21
MISCELLANEOUS
Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (Report by U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1983) ...............................................................................................................
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4498 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 132-33 (1988) .....................................................................................
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. (1989) ...................................................................................
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. (1989).............
Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 121 (1970)...............
Field Hearing on Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. (1989).............
H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 ........................ 10, 12
Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4498 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 40-41 (1988) .......................................................
S. Rep. No. 101-16 (1989) ...................................................................................................... 10, 15
Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legis. Hist. of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1990)........................................................................................................................................
The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075, 1112 (2002) ................................................................................................ 13
v

135 Cong. Rec. 19,799 (1989) ...................................................................................................... 13 vi

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE STATES This amici curiae brief is submitted on behalf of ____ (__) states: Minnesota, Connecticut, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Washington and Wisconsin. The amici curiae States strongly support a finding in favor of Respondents in this case and the resulting use of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (“ADA”), by state citizens without limitation. Although the states more typically advocate the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity, this case is different. Because of the vital public policy underlying the landmark ADA legislation, in particular Title II, and because of the central role of the states in providing the public services, programs and activities subject to Title II, the amici curiae States, consistent with the obligation of their respective attorneys general to protect the public interest, file this amici curiae brief. Where, as here, a legislative enactment constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the states have a compelling interest in the full implementation of the law. The states should support every effort to eradicate the effects of the documented long-term, pervasive and invidious discrimination against people with disabilities in the provision of public services. Citizens should not have to depend upon a waiver of immunity from the state to pursue the important rights protected by Title II. Rather, Title II’s equal protection and due process-based purposes, and the amici curiae States’ desire to eliminate discrimination against the members of our society with disabilities, mandate that citizens be empowered to enforce their Title II rights without restriction.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This Court has recognized that people with disabilities suffer discrimination resulting from irrational fears, prejudices and ignorance. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
1

(1985); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). In considering Title II, Congress had before it substantial and uncontroverted evidence of state-sponsored invidious discrimination aga inst individuals with disabilities in the provision of public services, programs and activities. Indeed, states engaged in numerous activities that unconstitutionally discriminated against individuals with disabilities. Although this Court in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), found that Title I of the ADA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power, the Garrett Court’s analysis was limited to conduct which is accorded only rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. In contrast, Title II implicates fundamental rights protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, which are subject to heightened scrutiny, including voting and access to the courts. As it relates to Title II, the legislative record identified violations of these and other constitutionally protected rights.
In Title II, Congress provided for a congruent and proportional remedy for widespread constitutional violations by the states. As authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II not only proscribes unconstitutional discrimination, but also seeks to deter such discrimination. In accordance with City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43, where this Court recognized that the legislative branch is in a better position than the judiciary to address disability discrimination, Congress, in enacting Title II, tailored appropriate and balanced legislation to remedy and deter continued discrimination against people with disabilities with respect to government-provided services.
The important limitations on Title II’s remedial scheme provide further evidence of Congress’s congruent and proportionate response to the endemic problem of disability discrimination by the states. By imposing significant restrictions on Title II’s applicability,
2

Congress appropriately balanced the needs of the states with meaningful protection against

disability discrimination in public services, programs and activities. Accordingly, Title II is a

valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power.

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT’S DECISION IN BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

ALABAMA V. GARRETT IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE ISSUE PRESENTLY BEFORE

THE COURT.

Unlike Title I of the ADA, Title II is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power.

This Court determined in Garrett that Congress failed to abrogate state sovereign immunity in

Title I of the ADA because the record did not reflect a pattern of disability discrimination in state

employment sufficient to justify application of the Title to the states, and because Congress

failed to create a statutory remedy that was congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.

Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001). The Court did not

extend this holding, however, to Title II of the ADA, governing the provision of public services,

programs and activities. In footnote 1 of the Garrett opinion, this Court, recognizing Title II’s

distinct remedial scheme, expressly declined to decide whether Title II could survive

constitutional challenge. Id. at 360 n.1. Moreover, while this Court found the legislative record

lacking with respect to evidence of disability discrimination in state employment, it explicitly

noted that the “overwhelming majority” of accounts of disability discrimination in the legislative

record “pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and

public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA.” Id. at 371

n.7. Unlike Title I, Title II passes muster under the Garrett analysis.

3

II. CONGRESS VALIDLY ABROGATED THE STATES’ SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WHEN IT ENACTED TITLE II OF THE ADA. Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in Title II. Congress may abrogate
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if two requirements are met. First, Congress must make its intention to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (citations omitted). Second, Congress must act in accordance with its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
In adopting Title II, Congress clearly stated its intention to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity: “A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction fo r a violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
Thus, the remaining issue before the Court is whether Title II of the ADA constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power. To be valid under Section 5, Congressional enactments “must exhibit ‘congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). In contrast to Garrett, and in accord with Nevada Human Resources v. Hibbs, __ U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), the legislative record supporting Title II sufficiently documents constitutional injuries by the states. Congress made explicit findings to that end. Moreover, shortcomings in existing laws justified Title II’s enactment.
A. Congress Identified Substantial Evidence Of Irrational State Conduct Supporting Its Finding Of A History And Pattern Of State Discrimination Against People With Disabilities In The Provision Of Public Services, Programs And Activities.
4

The legislative record supporting Title II sufficiently documents state actions that were based on irrational stereotypes against people with disabilities and which, even under rational basis scrutiny, violate the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. Reports in the Congressional Record detail a long history of states sterilizing people with disabilities and restricting the rights of people with disabilities to marry, enter into contracts, retain custody of their children and obtain state- issued drivers’ licenses. See Towards Independence (Nat’l Council on the Handicapped, 1986); On the Threshold of Independence (Nat’l Council on the Handicapped, 1988); Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (Report by U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1983). For example, the record before Congress included the United States Commission on Civil Rights’ report, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (1983), which details the history of state institutionalization and other policies that were applied in a discriminatory manner against people with disabilities. Id. at 32-37. These state practices often were unconstitutionally based on “irrational fears or ignorance, traceable to the prolonged social and cultural isolation” of people with disabilities. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 467 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). As Justice Marshall declared: “A regime of state-mandated segregation . . . emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow.” Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
The legislative record includes various examples of state conduct devoid of any rational basis: Congress heard that a blind voter with cerebral palsy was arbitrarily refused the right to register to vote in state elections; it heard that state mental hospitals misused medications to punish and restrain their disabled, institutionalized patients; it heard that such hospitals subjected their patients to abusive treatment and inhumane conditions; it also heard that a blind woman
5

was refused instructions on how to use her state’s voting machines. See Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 Legis. Hist. of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 1220, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1203, 1262-63 (Comm. Print 1990)1; Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, Alabama Submissions 16.2
Bonnie O’Day, of the Independent Center of Hampton, testified to Congress that a wheelchair user plunged fifty feet to his death because he was using a makeshift path at the University of Virginia, which was physically inaccessible, lacking a barrier- free accessible route on which to travel. Legis. Hist. at 1076. Greg Hlibok, the n president of the Student Body Government at Gallaudet University, testified that he and others who are deaf and hard of hearing had been denied medical treatment at hospitals because they could not be understood and the hospital refused to hire a qualified sign language interpreter. Id. at 1006. Judy Heumann, of the World Institute on Disability, was denied entry to her dorm house because of her wheelchair. After college, she was denied her teaching credential because of “paralysis.” Id. at 1002. The record also included a statement of a mother whose deaf son was charged with speeding. The judge chose to dismiss the charges because it was “cheaper” than to provide an interpreter for the court appearance. Task Force, Georgia Submissions 374.
The Congressional Record shows evidence of state action that would not satisfy even rational basis review, justifying application of Title II to the states.
1 Hereinafter referred to as “Legis. Hist.” 2 This task force was appointed by the select chairman of the House Committee on Education and the final report was printed by the Government Printing Office at the behest of the Committee. The Report will be hereinafter referred to as “Task Force.”
6

B. In Adopting Title II, Congress Identified State Discrimination That Violated The Fundamental Constitutional Rights Of People With Disabilities.
More than showing equal protection violations subject to rational basis review, the record supporting Title II shows that discrimination by the states in public services impinged upon fundamental constitutional rights of people with disabilities, including such rights as parental rights, voting rights, access to the courts and prisoners’ rights to humane conditions of confinement. Since a higher standard of scrutiny applies to these rights, Congress was justified in concluding that the record documented constitutional violations by the states.
In Garrett, the Court held that the record of state conduct was insufficient to justify abrogation of sovereign immunity, in part, because of the standard of review applicable to state treatment of people with disabilities, namely the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause.3 The Court determined that the respondents failed to demonstrate that the identified state conduct could never have a rational basis. In contrast to Title I’s regulation of employment, Title II, which governs the provision of public services, programs and activities, addresses state conduct that impinges upon fundamental constitutional rights embodied in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In such a case, a higher standard of scrutiny applies. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that right to vote can be restricted only when purpose of restriction and overriding interests served thereby meet close constitutional scrutiny); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that due process requires state to provide meaningful access to courts absent showing of countervailing state interest of overriding significance); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 3 Because state employment is not a fundamental right and not subject to heightened scrutiny, in evaluating evidence of unconstitutional state action supporting abrogation under Title I, the Garrett court was able to consider only the limitations placed by rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause on state conduct concerning people with disabilities.
7

(1966) (“We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”).
In Hibbs, this Court recognized that where Congress directs its attention to categories that trigger a heightened level of scrutiny, it is “easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.” 123 S. Ct. at 1982.4 Congress succeeded in showing a pattern of state constitutional violations in support of Title II.
The record for Title II shows that people with disabilities were denied access to public facilities, including courthouses, legislative assemblies, and voting places. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 21-22, 38-39; see also Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 662-64 (1989) (testimony of Mary Lynn Fletcher). This lack of access adversely impacted the ability of people with disabilities to effectively participate in the state governmental process, including the ability to exercise their right to vote5 and to utilize the state judicial system.6
4 The Hibbs Court even found significant the record before Congress of private sector leave policies as evidence supporting a pattern of constitutional violations on the part of states in the area of family leave. 123 S. Ct. at 1979 & n.3. 5 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2273, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 41, 45 (1989) (testimony of Nanette Bowling, staff liaison to mayor of Kokomo, Indiana) (describing “devastating disincentives to voting” faced by people with disabilities). 6 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4498 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 40-41 (1988) (statement of Emeka Nwojke) (describing barriers faced by persons with disabilities that impeded their access to courts).
8

Congress heard that a disabled man, called to testify in court, had to get out of his wheelchair and pull himself up three flights of stairs to reach the courtroom. Task Force, Alabama Submissions 15. A disabled man who was to appear as a witness in a criminal trial had to be carried by state troopers up two flights of stairs because he had no other means to access the courtroom. Id., West Virginia Submissions 1745. A disabled woman, to reach the polls to vote in a general election, had to leave her wheelchair, walk with two canes up a flight of steps (taking 30 minutes), walk with her canes to the voting machine (taking 25 minutes), and hold on to the machine and beat on the levers with her cane to move them to cast her vote. Id., Delaware Submissions 307. Dozens of people with disabilities from across the country offered statements describing the ways in which they were denied access to polling places or were otherwise hampered in their ability to cast their votes.
The facts in the present case are an example of just the sort of unconstitutional conduct presented to Congress which prompted the passage of Title II. Here, Mr. Lane, a person with paraplegia, was denied his fundamental right of access to the courts because of the courthouse’s inaccessible courtrooms. Mr. Lane was required to crawl up two flights of stairs in order to satisfy the requirement to appear at his criminal arraignment. At a second court date, when Mr. Lane refused the humiliation of crawling or being carried by officers to the courtroom, he was arrested and jailed.
Like the legislative record supporting the FMLA in Hibbs, the legislative record supporting Title II, including evidence of violations of fundamental constitutional rights by the states, which trigger a heightened level of scrutiny, justifies Congress’s judgment to apply Title II to the states.
9

C. Congress Made Explicit Findings Of State Discrimination Against People With Disabilities In The Provision Of Public Services, Programs And Activities.
Unlike Title I,7 Title II is supported by express legislative findings of disability
discrimination by the states. In the text of the statute itself, as well as in the Senate and House
Committee Reports,8 Congress made explicit findings of a history and pattern of state-sponsored
discrimination in the provision of public services, programs and activities.9 The statute expressly
identifies persistent discrimination against people with disabilities in such areas of traditional
state involvement as education, transportation, institutionalization, 10 health services, voting and
access to public services, as well as “outright intentional exclusion, . . . segregation, and
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(3), (5) (emphasis
added).11
Congress’s finding of a pattern of state discrimination is entitled to great deference by
this Court. “Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts,
courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by
7 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-72. 8 The House and Senate Committee reports both make explicit conclusions with respect to discrimination in “public services.” S. Rep. No. 101-16, p. 6 (1989); H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 28 (1990). 9 “The congressional findings in 42 U.S.C. §12101 also serve as a useful aid for courts to discern the sorts of discrimination with which Congress was concerned.” Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 613 (1999) (Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., concurring). 10 See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608 (Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he States have acknowledged that the care of the mentally disabled is their special obligation.”). 11 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 614 (Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (stating that the findings in the ADA “underscore Congress’ concern that discrimination has been a frequent and pervasive problem in institutional settings and policies and its concern that segregating disabled persons from others can be discriminatory”).
10

the Legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker.” Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924). Moreover, “[g]iven the deference due ‘the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government,’” a court does “not lightly second-guess such legislative judgments.” Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251 (1990).
D. Shortcomings In Existing Law Justified The Enactment of Title II. The Hibbs Court recognized that Congress is justified in enacting added prophylactic measures where previous legislative attempts have failed to resolve discrimination. 123 S. Ct. at 1980-81. Congress received substantial evidence showing that the existing body of laws regarding the rights of people with disabilities to access programs and activities of state governments had failed to redress pervasive discrimination. For example, in a written statement to Congress, former Illinois Attorney General Neil Hartigan stated: “As Attorney General I have had innumerable complaints regarding lack of access to public services–people unable to meet with their elected representatives because their district office buildings were not accessible or unable to attend public meetings because they are held in an inaccessible building.” See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 75-78 (1989). He testified regarding the persistent and widespread discrimination against people with disabilities involving, for example, public transportation, public services, public parks, publicly owned facilities, special education and elections. Id. He testified that “people with disabilities should not have to fight these battles in every state,” urging passage of a uniform national standard to free people with disabilities from having to win their
11

rights on a state-by-state basis. Id. at 77. He further explained that any meaningful legislation to
combat disability discrimination must include a remedial provision. Id. at 80-81.
The patchwork of state laws and confusion that resulted from the limited application of
federal law militated in favor of the federal government acting to “establish uniform minimum
requirements for accessibility.” Sen. Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, Hearings on S. 933 To Establish a Clear and Comprehensive Prohibition of
Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 75-78 (May 10, 1989). At the
time that Congress was debating the ADA, federal law provided people with disabilities only the
Architectural Barriers Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 on which to rely for the physical
and programmatic access that they required to live independently. However, both of these laws
apply exclusively to buildings, programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.
Additionally, the onus was on the individual to distinguish between state, federal and private
funding in every instance. Likewise, where state laws exist, they were and are limited in scope
and application. 12 Even in Illinois, where Attorney General Hartigan boasted the most
12 The legislative record shows that although some states had enacted disability laws, the state statutes varied greatly and many provided little meaningful protection against disability discrimination. See, e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 334-37 (1989) (statement of Arlene Mayerson) (describing limitations and ineffectiveness of existing state statutes); Field Hearing on Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 89 (1989) (statement of Hon. Chet Brooks, Texas State Senate) (“Just as with other major civil rights issues addressed by our nation in the past, basic rights for people with disabilities have to be addressed at a national level. We cannot effectively piece these protections together state by state, person by person.”); see also H. Rep. 101-485, pt. 2, at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 329 (“State laws are inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing. . . . ‘Too many States, for whatever reason, still perpetuate confusion.’”) (quoting testimony of Admiral James Watkins before the House Subcommittee on Select Education and the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped).
12

progressive of state physical accessibility statutes at the time of the hearings on the ADA, the law had no private right of action. Therefore, a person with a disability was and remains wholly dependent upon the state, with its limited staff and resources, to enforce his or her legal rights. The result is inequity and confusion for individuals with disabilities.
Scholarly research confirms that, as recently as 2002, “only twenty- four of fifty-one states have disability discrimination statutes that appear comparable to ADA Title II,” with respect to prohibiting discrimination in access to both facilities and services, providing a private right of action, and making available compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees. See Ruth Colker and Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1075, 1112 (2002). In addition, the authors found that “another sixteen states offer moderate protection from state disability discrimination.” Id. at 1112. Eleven states were determined to have very limited protection against Title II-covered discrimination, with nine of those states having “no enforcement mechanism at all against the state for public access discrimination.” Id. at 1114.
Significantly, while Attorney General Hartigan was a vocal proponent of Title II, the congressional testimony contains no opposition by the states to abrogation of their Eleventh Amendment immunity. In fact, the ADA was affirmatively endorsed by the National Association of Attorneys General. See 135 Cong. Rec. 19,799 (1989).
Based on the foregoing, Congress had compelling and uncontroverted evidence of widespread state discrimination against people with disabilities in the provision of public services, programs and activities, supporting its determination to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Title II. III. GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF STATE-SPONSORED DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES , TITLE II IS A MEASURED AND BALANCED
13

RESPONSE TO REMEDY AND D ETER STATE-PERPETUATED DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION. Title II is both congruent and proportional to the evils found by Congress. This Court has acknowledged that “[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-81 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536). This deference reflects the often complex problems facing the legislative branch. Because “difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,” Section 5 does not preclude Congress from creating congruent and proportional remedies around a core of documented constitutional shortcomings. Id. at 88. In the exercise of its Section 5 power, Congress may do more than simply proscribe conduct that this Court has held unconstitutional. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977. Thus, legislation that deters or remedies constitutional violations may fall within the sweep of Congress’s enforcement power even if, in the process, it prohibits conduct that is not itself unconstitutional. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. Congress is not confined to enacting legislation that merely parrots this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, but rather possesses the power under Section 5 “‘both to remedy and to deter violations of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, inc luding that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.’” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81). Title II’s application to education is a ready example of the wisdom of allowing a degree of latitude to Congress in fashioning appropriate remedies for unconstitutional state conduct.13
13 Because of the states’ pivotal role in the provision of educational services, it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that Title II must include the states within its ambit for its remedial educational goals to be effectuated. The pivotal role of the
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
14

Congressional testimony demonstrated that individuals with disabilities were systematically
denied basic educational opportunities. Although Congress had previously enacted legislation to
promote educational opportunities for people with disabilities,14 the 1983 Civil Rights
Commission report determined that children with disabilities still were being deprived of an
appropriate education. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra, at 28. Many children with
disabilities simply were segregated in separate public educational facilities. Id. at 29. Other
children with disabilities were excluded altogether from public schools for a variety of reasons,
including that the children used wheelchairs, had epilepsy, or had cerebral palsy. 15 Id. at 27.
These widespread practices necessarily had a tremendous adverse impact on the victims of the
discrimination and justify remedies that extend beyond the core of unconstitutional conduct. See
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting the importance of education in maintaining our
civic institutions and “the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child”).16
Title II represents a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity. First, Title II appropriately
proscribes unconstitutional state conduct. Second, Title II’s reasonable modification provision is
________________________________ (Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
states in the provision of educational services is demonstrated in the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq.
14 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (originally enacted as the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 121, 175-188 (1970) and subsequently amended). 15 See S. Rep. No. 101-16, at 7 (1989) (quoting testimony of Judith Heumann, World Institute on Disability); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4498 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 132-33 (1988) (testimony of Barbara Waters). 16 As this Court reasoned in Plyler: “The inestimable toll of that deprivation [of education] on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 222.
15

consistent with states’ constitutional responsibilities. Finally, the limitations Congress designed ensure that constitutional state conduct is not disproportionately proscribed.
A. Title II Reasonably Proscribes Unconstitutional State Conduct. Title II is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power because it directly targets unconstitutional state conduct. Members of this Court have recognized that Title II was designed to address unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause: Section 12132 can be understood to deem as irrational, and so to prohibit, distinctions by which a class of disabled persons, or some within that class, are, by reason of their disability and without adequate justification, exposed by a state entity to more onerous treatment than a comparison group in the provision of services or the administration of existing programs, or indeed entirely excluded from state programs or facilities. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 611, 613 (Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., concurring); see also Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that “a private suit for money damages under Title II of the ADA may only be maintained against a state if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II violation was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability”). Moreover, while the Title I analysis in Garrett was limited to rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, Title II protects constitutional rights subject to heightened review under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, such as the right of people with disabilities to meaningful access to the states’ courts,17 the right of people with disabilities to vote on an equal basis with other state citizens,18 and the right of prisoners and other
17 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 18 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (denying citizens the right to vote deprives them of a “fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all rights.”).
16

involuntarily institutionalized persons with disabilities to humane conditions of confinement.19 State discriminatio n against people with disabilities with respect to these fundamental rights is subject to heightened review, and thus rational state conduct nevertheless could be unconstitutional. This fact was dispositive in this Court’s determination that the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982.
Indeed, the Garrett Court’s determination that Title I was disproportionate was premised on the limited reach of rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. For example, the Court noted that Title I would require an employer to modify existing facilities to accommodate a disabled employee although it would be entirely reasonable, and therefore constitutional, for the employer to instead choose to avoid the costs of providing accommodation by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities. 531 U.S. at 372. In contrast, although it may be reasonable for a state to desire to avoid the cost of providing an interpreter at the trial of a hearing- impaired criminal defendant, as would be required under Title II, this choice would violate the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Amadon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 226 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that incompetent interpreter at deportation hearing deprived asylum applicant of due process right to full and fair hearing). The fundamental nature of the rights at stake justifies the breadth of Title II.
Accordingly, unlike Title I, Title II serves to protect fundamental rights to which heightened scrutiny applies. Title II is therefore a proportional response to unconstitutional state conduct.
19 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (civil commitment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 1066 (1976) (medical care for prisoners).
17

B. Title II’s Reasonable Modification Provision Is Consistent With States’ Responsibilities Under The Constitution.
Given the pervasiveness of past prejudices and inequitable actions by states toward
individuals with disabilities, Congress determined in its legislative judgment that it was not
enough merely to prohibit future unconstitutional discriminatory conduct. Rather, to remedy and
deter state discrimination against people with disabilities and further implement its Section 5 power, Congress required “reasonable modifications”20 for qualified individuals with disabilities.
A national problem of the magnitude documented by Congress and recognized by this Court, see,
e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454, 464-65, demands a solution that affirmatively prevents
state-sponsored disability discrimination, provides meaningful access to public services,
programs and activities, and thus integrates individuals with disabilities into public life. In contrast to the overbreadth of the reasonable accommodation standard of Title I, which
was a central part of the Garrett Court’s analysis, Title II’s analogue, reasonable modification,
appropriately effectuates the states’ constitutional responsibilities. The protection of
fundamental rights often requires a state to do more than simply refrain from discriminating
against its citizens. This and other courts have found that states are constitutionally required “to shoulder affirmative obligations” to ensure meaningful access to public services, as well as abolish barriers preventing such meaningful access.21 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25
20 42 U.S.C. §12131(2) requires reasonable modifications to rules, policies or practices, the removal of architectural, transportation and communication barriers, and the provision of auxiliary aids and services. The entirety of this provision will be referred to herein as the “reasonable modification provision.” Regulations impose significant limitations on these requirements. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 21 This Court, in Plyler v. Doe, recognized that one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause is “the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.” 457 U.S. at 221-22. The reasonable modification provision of Title II directly serves this important goal.
18

(1977) (holding that fundamental right of access to courts required state to provide inmates with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law; while economic factors may be considered in choosing method to provide meaningful access, “the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act ban on voting literacy tests although literacy tests themselves do not violate the Equal Protection Clause; destruction of this barrier enabled individuals to better “obtain ‘perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws’”) (citations omitted); Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002) (finding that state could be required to provide accommodation to hearing- impaired father in child custody proceedings both under Title II and as a matter of due process); Amadon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 226 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that due process right to full and fair deportation hearing required government to provide competent foreign- language interpreter).
In the same fashion as the cases cited above, Title II’s “reasonable modification” provision enables people with disabilities to obtain their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Therefore, this provision is consistent with states’ constitutional responsibilities.
This Court recently forcefully reiterated the importance of effectuating Congress’s remedial purpose when analyzing congruence. See Hibbs, __ U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 1972. The Hibbs Court upheld the FMLA despite its inclusion of a mandatory twelve-week leave provision. The Court recognized that without the mandatory leave, an employer could treat males and females equally by providing for no leave whatsoever, a result “which would not have achieved Congress’s remedial object.” Id. at 1983. Similarly, a simple mandate of equal treatment of the disabled and non-disabled would fail to achieve Congress’ remedial goals here. Thus, just as the
19

twelve-week leave provision in the FMLA met the congruence factor in Hibbs, the reasonable modification requirement in Title II meets the congruence factor here.
C. Congress Imposed Important Limitations In Title II Which Produce A Congruent And Proportional Remedy.
This Court has found that limiting provisions in legislation “tend to ensure Congress’s means are appropriate to ends legitimate under Section 5.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. For example, in Hibbs, this Court found significant the limitations Congress placed on the FMLA, including its definition of covered employee and its limitation of back pay damages to two years. 123 S. Ct. at 1983-84.
Similarly, in crafting Title II, Congress carefully considered the needs of state governments and included important limitations in the law. Title II requires only reasonable modifications that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service.22 In addition, Title II does not apply to all individuals with physical or mental impairments, but, rather, only to those whose impairments substantially limit their major life activities.23 Also, similar to the FMLA, Title II limits back pay awards to two years.24
Title II’s regula tions also serve to shorten the statute’s reach into constitutional conduct. For example, regulations provide that when existing facilities are inaccessible, states are not
22 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 23 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures must be taken into account in determining ADA’s coverage); Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (construing ADA’s definition of “disability” and noting “[t]hat these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and purposes that motivate the Act”). 24 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
20

required to make structural changes so long as the programs are made available to people with disabilities in some other manner. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1).
Moreover, this Court’s interpretation of Title II reinforces the limitations Congress has designed. For example, in Olmstead v. Zimring, this Court recognized that Title II permits the states to rely on the reasonable assessments of their own professionals in determining whether the essential eligibility requirements for habilitation in a community-based program are met. 527 U.S. at 602. In addition, this Court has recognized that Title II’s reasonable modification provision does not impose “boundless” responsibility upon the states. Id. at 603. For example, in the context of deinstitutionalization, this Court has construed the provision to permit states to take into account available resources and the needs of other mentally disabled persons. Id. at 607.
Thus, because Title II’s intrusion into constitutional state conduct is minimal and states maintain substantial discretion over their provision of public services, programs and activities, Title II provides a congruent and proportional response to disability discrimination by the states.
CONCLUSION Faced with well-documented incidents of state discrimination against people with disabilities in public services, Congress designed a comprehensive and integrated response that recognized the states’ central role in the provision of such services. Unlike Title I, Title II of the ADA involves an area of regulation for which people with disabilities have no options. That is, in contrast to employment, governments are the sole suppliers of public services. Because of the states’ central role in the provision of public services, a limitation on the ability of people with disabilities to enforce Title II against the states may substantially diminish Title II’s
21

effectiveness. In this situation, the Court should grant Congress reasonable latitude in crafting remedies that people with disabilities can use without restriction.
22

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find in favor of the Respondents and hold that Congress, in enacting Title II of the ADA, validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dated: _______________________

Respectfully submitted,
MIKE HATCH Attorney General State of Minnesota Counsel of Record
GARY R. CUNNINGHAM KRISTYN M. ANDERSON Assistant Attorneys General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128 (651) 282-5705 (Voice) (651) 296-1410 (TTY)
Attorneys for Amici Curiae States

AG: #945851-v1

23

 
 No. 02-1667
In the Supreme Court of the United States
------------? ------------
STATE OF TENNESSEE, Petitioner, v.
GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents. ------------? ------------
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ------------? ------------
BRIEF OF THE HONORABLE DICK THORNBURGH, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, AND ADA WATCH
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS ------------? ------------
*ARLENE B. MAYERSON, ESQUIRE SILVIA YEE, ESQUIRE DISABILITY R IGHTS EDUCATION AND D EFENSE FUND 2212 SIXTH STREET BERKELEY, CA 94710 TELEPHONE: (510) 644-2555
*COUNSEL OF RECORD CLAUDIA CENTER, ESQUIRE LEWIS BOSSING, ESQUIRE ELIZABETH KRISTEN, ESQUIRE THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY - EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER 600 HARRISON STREET, SUITE 120 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94107 TELEPHONE: (415) 864-8848

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE............................................1
INTRODUCTION..................................................................1
ARGUMENT .........................................................................3
I. TITLE II OF THE ADA IS BEGINNING TO ALLOW PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC LIFE...................................4
A. Accessibility of Courts and Other Government Buildings.....................................................................6
B. Voting Accessibility .................................................11
C. Community Integration ............................................13
D. Public Transportation ...............................................17
II. THE SCOPE OF REMEDIAL RELIEF AVAILABLE FURTHER CONFIRMS THE PROPORTIONALITY OF CONGRESS’S REMEDIES ....................................................................19
III. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE ADA ARE THREATENED BY SOME STATES’ ONGOING AND BROAD-BASED CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ITS VALIDITY.....................................................................22
CONCLUSION ....................................................................14
Appendix - BIOGRAPHIES OF AMICI CURIAE............... 1a

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Page(s)

Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999),
vacated for reh’g en banc, subsequently
dismissed pursuant to settlement, 205 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2000) ...................................................... 23

Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002).................................. 7

Barnes v. Gorman, __ U.S. __, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002) .......................................... 10, 23

Barthelemy v. Louisiana Dept. of Health & Hosp., No. Civ.A. 00-1083, 2003 WL 1733534
(E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2003) ............................................. 16

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .................. 10

Board of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) .......................................... 4, 22, 23

Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668 (3d Cir. 2000) .......................................... 5

Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001) .......................................... 5

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ...................................................... 4

Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, Tex.,

iii 302 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2002) ...................................... 20
Doe v. Roe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 2001) ............................... 11
Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc denied, 285 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2002)..................................... 24
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)......................... 22, 23
Feary v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 685 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. La. 1988) ................................. 5
Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................ 20, 21
Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993)...................................... 8
Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama, 344 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003)................... 24
Garcia v. SUNY Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001) ......... 20, 21, 24
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1989) .................................................... 21
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) ........................................ 23
Hicks v. Armstrong, 116 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Conn. 1999) ......................... 23

iv Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Dep't of Educ. v. Jim C., 533 U.S. 949 (2001)...................... 24
Kelly v. Municipal Courts, 97 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1996)........................................... 5
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ........................................................ 4
Koslow v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002) ........................................ 24
Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1998) .................. 10
Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 95557 (Jan. 13, 2003)............. 24
Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998) ......................... 10
Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986)....................................... 5
Nihiser v. Ohio Env’tl Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001)....................................... 24
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) ...............................................15-17
Pace v. Bogalusa City School Bd., 325 F.3d 609, reh’g en banc granted, 339 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003) ...................................... 24
Panzardi-Santiago v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. P.R. 2002) ............................... 21

v
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) .................................................... 23
Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. N.C. 1996) ............................. 23
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct. of Comm. Pl., 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002) .................. 5, 7
Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1999) .................................. 21
Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) ................................................... 21
Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002)................................... 24
Rolland v. Cellucci, 198 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. Mass. 2002)............................ 16
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) ..........................4-5, 6
Saunders v. Horn, 959 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Penn. 1996)............................ 23
Shepard v. Irving, No. 02-1712, 2003 WL 21977963 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2003) ............ 24
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) .................................................... 24
Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2000)....................................... 24

vi Staples v. Virginia Dep’t of Corrs.,
904 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996).............................. 23
Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001)................................... 23
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)..................... 23
Wood v. President and Trs. of Spring Hill Coll., 978 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) .................................. 21
STATE CASES
People v. Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993).................................................... 8
FEDERAL STATUTES
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504).................. 21, 23, 24
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) .................................................... 13
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) .................................................... 13
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) .................................................... 14
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) .................................................... 25
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134................................................ 20
42 U.S.C. § 12133 ............................................................. 22
42 U.S.C. § 12142(a)-(c) ................................................... 18

vii REGULATIONS 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(a) .......................................................... 8
28 C.F.R. § 35.130............................................................. 20 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) ........................................................ 20 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1) ................................................... 20
28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a) ........................................................ 20 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation on H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. 56 (1989) ......................... 18
135 Cong. Rec. S10753 (1989) ......................................... 12 136 Cong. Rec. 17,296-97 (1990) ...................................... 3 136 Cong. Rec. 17,376 (1990) ...................................... 3, 17
S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989)............................................... 12 STATE STATUTES AND RULES
Cal. R. Ct. 989.3 .................................................................. 9
Cal. R. Ct. 989.3(a).............................................................. 9

viii PLEADINGS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in McCarthy v. Gilbert, Civil Action No. 02-CV-600 (E.D. Tex., Beaumont Division) .................................. 22
Brief of Appellees in Meyers v. State of Texas, Case No. 02-50452 (5th Cir.) ...................................... 22
SECONDARY SOURCES
American Association of People with Disabilities, New GAO Report Shows Disabled are Denied Voting Access (2001) ................................................... 13
American Bar Association & the National Judicial Colle ge, Court-Related Needs of the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, Recommendations of the February 1991 Conference (1991) ......................................................... 7
American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, Disability Law and Policy: A Collective Vision 50 (1999) ............................................................ 9
Center for an Accessible Society, 8 out of 10 Polling Sites have Access Barriers, Says GAO Report (2001) ..................................................... 12
Duren Cheek, Lawmaker Pleads for Home-care Funds for Elderly, Tennessean.com, May 19, 2000 ............................................................... 15
Coalition for Accessible Political Elections (CAPE), Report of the National Voter Independence Project .................................................. 11

ix
Ernest J. Comer, Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the New Jersey Judicial System (National Center for State Courts 2002) ....................... 9
Comm’n on the Future of the Tennessee Judicial System, Final Report (1996) ...................................................... 6
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 393 (1991) ....................................... 3
Sharon Davis, et al., The Arc, A Status Report to the Nation on People with Mental Retardation Waiting for Community Services (1997) ..................... 14
Theresia Degener, Disability Discrimination Law: A Global Comparative Approach, 2 (Paper presented at Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice 25-26 September 2003, University of Leeds) ...................................................... 2
Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional Disability Law Reform, in Disability Rights Law and Policy: International and National Perspectives 3 (M. Breslin & S. Yee, eds., 2002) ........................................................ .1
Jeanne Dooley & Erica Wood, Opening the Courthouse Door: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Impact on the Courts, 76 Judicature 39 (1992) ................................................. 7
Wendy Fox-Grage et al., The States’ Response to the Olmstead Decision: A Work in Progress (2002) ........................................................... 15

x
Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All . . . The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & Health 123 (1994) ............................................................................ 7
Governor’s Comm. on Disability Issues and Employment Civil and Legal Rights Subcomm., Interim Court and Courthouse Access Project (2000) ................................................... 9
James C. Harrington, Pencils Within Reach and A Walkman or Two: Making the Secret Ballot Available to Voters Who are Blind or Have Other Physical Disabilities, 4 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 87 (1999) ............................................12-13
Home and Community- Based Services and Consumer-Directed Care Commission, Working Plan of the Home and CommunityBased Services and Consumer-Directed Care Commission ................................................................. 17
Thomas W. Johnson et al., Ohio Access for People with Disabilities, Final Report to Governor Taft (2001) ................................................. 16
Maryann Jones, And Access For All: Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 75 (1997) ............................. 8
Judicial Council of California’s Advisory Comm. on Access and Fairness in the Courts, Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee, Summary of Survey and Public Hearing Reports of the Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee of the California Judicial Council’s Access and

xi Fairness Advisory Committee (1997)............................ 8
Judicial Council of California, Fact Sheet: Access and Fairness (June 2003) ..................................................... 9
Judicial Council of California, Programs: Access and Fairness (2003) ............................................................. 9
Phyllis S. Launius, Removing Public Access Barriers to the Courts in the New Millennium: A Sampling and Analysis of Missouri’s Trial Courts (2000)............ 9
National Council on Disability, Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1997) ......................................... 26
National Council on Disability, Inclusive Federal Election Reform (March 15, 2001) .............................. 11
National Council on Disability, Olmstead: Reclaiming Institutionalized Lives (2003) .................................................................... 15, 16
National Council on Disability, Voices of Freedom: America Speaks Out on the ADA (1995)................................................. 5, 6, 9
David Pfeiffer & Joan Finn, Survey Shows State, Territorial, Local Public Officials Implementing ADA, 19 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 537 (1995) ................................................................... 20
Kay Schriner et al., Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 437 (2000) ................. 11

xii Rosalyn M. Simon, Status of Transportation Accessibility
in the United States: Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in Proceedings of Seminar Held at the Planning and Transportation Research and Computation European Transport Forum, Brunel University, England § 1.2 (Sept. 2-6, 1996) .................................................... 18, 19
Gary A. Smith, Status Report: Litigation Concerning Medical Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (2002)........ 16
Alexandra Stewart et al., Implementing Community Integration: A review of State Olmstead Plans (2002) ................................................................ 16
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Disability Rights Section, Enforcing the ADA: Looking Back on a Decade of Progress (2000)............................................ 6
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Project Civic Access (2003) ........... 10 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Settlement Agreement
between the U.S. and Hancock County, Mississippi (2003) ....................................................... 10
U.S. Dept’ of Justice, Final Settlement Agreement between the U.S. and Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (2003).... 10
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. and the Santa Clara County Superior Court (2003) ................................................. 10
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 10th Anniversary of the ADA (2000) .......................................................................... 10

xiii Mark Van Bever, Implementing the
Americans with Disabilities Act in a Trial Court (2002) ........................................................................... 9
Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 387 (1991)......................................................... 3
Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director of Center for Medicaid and State Operations at the Health Care Financing Administration & Thomas Perez, Director of the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Health and Human Services to State Medicaid Directors (January 14, 2000) ....................................................... 14
John M. Williams, Making Access to the Ballot Box a Snap for Disabled Voters (1999)....................... 13

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE*
The Amici Curiae joining this brief include former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, a longtime public servant and disability advocate who played an instrumental role in the passage and implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as national organizations that represent the interests of people with disabilities. The amici share a commitment to eradicating the debilitating obstacles faced by persons with disabilities and ensuring that persons with disabilities achieve equal access to state and local government programs and services. The amici have a strong interest in the effective enforcement of the ADA, and bring a unique understanding of the purpose and role of laws barring disability-based discrimination. A full recitation of their interests appears in the Appendix.
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) has begun the process of transforming the American landscape and prevalent negative stereotypes about people with disabilities by promoting the integration of persons with disabilities into all aspects of public life.1 By directly
* The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in part. No person or entity, other than the Amici Curiae, or their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.
1 America’s enactment of the landmark ADA has not only transformed American society, but also has acted as a powerful catalyst for people with disabilities all over the world who have drawn upon the law’s example as they pursue legal equality in their own nations. In an unprecedented survey of international disability anti-discrimination provisions, authors Theresia Degener and Gerard Quinn found that over 40 countries have enacted domestic disability anti-discrimination provisions since the passage of the ADA. Theresia Degener and Gerard

2
addressing the state and local levels at which Americans commonly interact with their government, Title II of the ADA sought to redress exclusionary policies identified by Congress that were all the more invidious for their apparent self-justification: the less people with disabilities were seen, the more they could be assumed to be both unable and unwilling to fully participate in society.
The falseness of this twin burden of inability and disinterest cast upon people with disabilities has become selfevident in the years since the ADA has come into effect. The law’s successes in increasing the accessibility of public transportation, courtrooms, voting, and higher education has begun to remedy years of state-sponsored segregation and exclusion. By allowing people with disabilities to be seen and accepted as participating members of our society, the Act has dispelled prevailing myths, fears and prejudices.
While change is often gradual and there is still much left to be done, persons with disabilities are finally beginning to enjoy their rights as citizens. At the same time, fears of enormous disruption and devastating financial effects have been proven unfounded. In largest measure, this is the result
Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional Disability Law Reform, in Disability Rights Law and Policy: International and National Perspectives 3 (M. Breslin & S. Yee, eds., 2002). Degener has stated that “US law has been instrumental in the evolution of disability discrimination law in many countries. Especially, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, has had such an enormous impact on foreign law development that one might feel inclined to say that the international impact of this law was larger than its domestic effect.” Theresia Degener, Disability Discrimination Law: A Global Comparative Approach, 2 (Paper presented at Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice 25-26 September 2003, University of Leeds). This pronouncement could prove ironically true if legal protections for people with disabilities are now gutted in the very country which first enacted the law that has inspired so much international progress towards equality for people with disabilities.

3

of Congress’s crafting of fair and reasonable provisions after

extensive study and the careful balancing of interests. The

ADA is the culmination of more than twenty years of fact-

finding, study, and incremental legislation to address the

widespread exclusion and segregation of Americans with

disabilities.2

The successes achieved through

implementation of the Act, coupled with the ability of the

states and other covered entities to achieve accessibility over

time and without causing undue administrative or financial

hardship, confirm that Congress indeed fashioned a

proportionate and congruent remedy to deter and remedy

historic disability-based discrimination.

The hard- fought gains recently achieved by the
passage and enforcement of the ADA, and the promise of greater equality and opportunity in the years to come, are
threatened by the states’ ongoing and broad-based challenges
to the constitutional validity of the Act. While this case questions Congress’s authority to enact the ADA under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, other state-
sponsored appeals challenge the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause as authority for federal disability rights
legislation. If the Court does not take this opportunity to
uphold Title II of the ADA under Section 5, federal disability

2 With respect to the ADA alone, Congress held fourteen hearings and
sixty-three field hearings, considered innumerable studies and reports evaluating the discriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities, issued five committee reports, and engaged in prolonged floor debate.
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 393, 393, 414 (1991). The consensus that the ADA was needed to remedy and deter historic discrimination is
reflected in the overwhelming passage of the final bill by 91-6 in the Senate and 377-28 in the House of Representatives. See 136 Cong. Rec. 17,376 (1990) (showing Senate approval of the Conference Committee
Report); 136 Cong. Rec. 17,296-97 (1990) (showing House approval of the Conference Committee Report). See also Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 Temp.
L. Rev. 387, 387-391 (1991).

4
laws that are just beginning to enable disabled persons to participate in critical facets of American life will be undermined before the goal of full integration has been achieved.
ARGUMENT
As this Court has recently reiterated, “Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in § 1 by enacting ‘appropriate legislation.’” Board of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). This power “includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Where legislation reaches beyond the scope of Section 1’s actual guarantees, this Court has held that it must exhibit “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, cited in Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
Accordingly, in this case, the Respondents and their amici have demonstrated a long history and pattern of unconstitutional conduct in the administration of those very activities regulated by Title II – the “services, programs, [and] activities” of the state. As set forth in the briefs submitted, state conduct excluded and, too often, continues to exclude, disabled persons from the judicial system, public education, public transportation, voting, and other basic government services. Congress took care to document the shameful legacy of state-sponsored discrimination in the voluminous legislative history of the ADA, and to craft the congruent and proportional response found in Title II of the Act.

5
I. TITLE II OF THE ADA IS BEGINNING TO ALLOW PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC LIFE.
“Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (Kennedy, J.). Title II is critical to people with disabilities attempting to exercise such fundamental rights of citizenship as access to the courts, service with their peers on juries, the right to vote, the ability to enter and communicate in the halls of city council, and the ability to receive state services in the community, free of institutional segregation. 3
After the ADA’s enactment, the National Council on Disability (NCD) found that “[v]illages, cities, counties, and States are looking at people with disabilities as real citizens. . . . Local and state government programs and facilities have
3 Although the bar of the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to local government agencies, there is no bright line test to determine whether a public entity will be considered an “arm of the state” for immunity purposes. Rather, courts must undertake a fact-specific, multi-factor inquiry based in large part on state law, funding, and structure. For example, county courts may or may not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Compare Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 2001) (county court is not an arm of the state) with Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct. Com. Pl., 276 F.3d 808, 811 (6th Cir.) (court assumes state immunity would apply), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002). See also Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 670-74 (3d Cir. 2000) (municipal courts are arms of the state); Kelly v. Municipal Courts, 97 F.3d 902, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1996) (municipal court is arm of the state). Likewise, transit authorities have and have not been considered arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes . Compare Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (transit authority entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity) with Feary v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 685 F. Supp. 137, 139-142 (E.D. La. 1988) (transit authority not arm of state).

6 become much more accessible.”4 The ADA’s mandate that persons with disabilities have equal access to the basic institutions of state and local governments has resulted in substantially improved integration and inclusion over the past decade.5
While the ADA has been an invaluable stimulus for state self-examination and voluntary compliance, individuals with disabilities must have the right to file complaints and bring lawsuits seeking injunctive relief and damages. In many cases, damages are the only means to remedy the very real injuries caused by the state’s unlawful and willful neglect. Without the right to seek damages where necessary, people with disabilities – already subject to higher rates of unemployment, poverty and social stigma – would have little incentive to bear the financial and personal burdens of initiating change.
A. Accessibility of Courts and Other Government Buildings
Equal participation in the justice system, whether as a party, witness, juror or advocate, is integral to the American way of life. This simple truth notwithstanding, the justice system itself can present tremendous barriers to the American way of life for people with disabilities. The facts of this case demonstrate the many ways that denial of courthouse access
4 National Council on Disability, Voices of Freedom: America Speaks Out on the ADA [hereinafter Voices of Freedom] (1995), at Abstract, at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/voices.pdf. 5 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Disability Rights Section, [DOJ], Enforcing the ADA: Looking Back on a Decade of Progress [hereinafter Enforcing the ADA] 4-8 (2000), at http://www.ada.gov/pubs/10thrpt.pdf; Voices of Freedom, supra note 4.

7
can gravely undermine the fundamental principle of open and impartia l government embraced in Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 6
George Lane, the Respondent in this case, could not appear at his own trial without having to crawl up two flights of steps, and was arrested when he refused to crawl further or be carried. Eventually the problem was “solved” by having Mr. Lane’s lawyer run back and forth between his client and the second floor courtroom, denying Mr. Lane the ability to be present at proceedings critical to his case. Similarly, Plaintiff Ramsey, who is unable to climb stairs, had judgment entered against him for a failure to appear, despite the fact that he was in the courthouse. See Pet. App. 9, 15-16.
The Petitioner could have simply relocated Mr. Lane’s and Mr. Ramsey’s trials to a first floor, accessible courtroom. Instead, the Petitioner chose to exclude these citizens entirely from their day in court, denying them any remnant of due process. Moreover, exclusion from courthouses affect more than those persons directly involved in judicial matters since courthouses also function as centers of government and places of public meeting. Plaintiff Cantrel, who has paraplegia, could not attend a County Commission meeting without suffering the indignity and danger of crawling up the courthouse steps. See Pet. App. 3. The Pla intiffs’ experiences are not unique. People with disabilities experience exclusion in a myriad of ways,7 from
6 Indeed, the State of Tennessee acknowledged years ago that “[f]or persons with significant physical or mental impairment, the system can be quite literally inaccessible.” Comm’n on the Future of the Tennessee Judicial System, Final Report 31 (1996) at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/publications/futures.pdf. 7 See generally American Bar Association & National Judicial College, Court-Related Needs of the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, Recommendations of the February 1991 Conference (1991); Jeanne Dooley & Erica Wood, Opening the Courthouse Door: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Impact on the Courts, 76 Judicature 39 (1992);

8
jury selection procedures that eliminate people with a variety of disabilities to the lack of sign interpreters for parties and witnesses who are deaf. 8
In many instances, the modifications needed by many disabled persons seeking access to the halls of the judiciary and other government buildings are modest.9 Nonetheless, people with disabilities often are refused access not because they need complicated or expensive accommodations, but because they encounter exclusionary policies and attitudes that have never been critically examined. The ADA requires that critical self-examination take place.10
The ADA’s initiation of self-examination is an important part of its effectiveness in starting necessary systemic change in state courthouses. For example, in 1995, the California Judicial Council’s Subcommittee on Access for People with Disabilities began “implementing the Act [ADA] in California’s courts by sponsoring comprehensive research projects and adopting a series of recommendations to increase court accessibility to persons with disabilities.”11
Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All . . . The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & Health 123 (1993/1994). 8 See, e.g., Popovich, 276 F.3d at 811; Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 857 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 72 (2002); Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993) (striking down categorical exclusion of blind persons from jury service). 9 See, e.g., People v. Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993) (juror required seat moved closer to witness box, enlarged print versions of tape transcripts used at trial, and reading documents into the record). 10 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(a) (1993).
11 Maryann Jones, And Access For All: Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 75, 75 (1997); see also Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee, Judicial Council of California, Summary of Survey and Public Hearing Reports of the Access for Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee of the California

9
This research revealed that significant problems persisted: “A majority of the respondents (52 percent) said that they had not received requested accommodations, and nearly half (42 percent) concluded that courts do not meet ADA standards.”12 Based on this review, the Judicial Council took numerous affirmative steps, including statewide training of courthouse ADA coordinators, the development of a nationally circulated video on disability obstacles in the courts, and the adoption of Rule of Court 989.3, which is meant to “assure that qualified individuals with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial system.”13 Numerous courts have undertaken similar efforts, including user surveys, barrier removal, and the institution of complaint procedures.14
Judicial Council’s Access and Fairness Advisory Committee 1 (1997), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/ summarydisabilities.pdf. 12 American Bar Ass’n Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, Disability Law and Policy: A Collective Vision 50 (1999). Other state surveys have also found widespread non-compliance with the ADA. See, e.g., Phyllis S. Launius, Removing Public Access Barriers to the Courts in the New Millennium: A Sampling and Analysis of Missouri’s Trial Courts 3-4 (2000) (study for the Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator observing that “only 26 percent of this sample’s accessed areas are compliant with ADA standards”); Governor’s Comm. on Disability Issues and Employment Civil and Legal Rights Subcomm., Interim Court and Courthouse Access Project 1 (2000) (noting “serious access problems in the courts and courthouses in Washington”). 13 See Judicial Council of California, Fact Sheet: Access and Fairness (June 2003), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/accfair.pdf; Judicial Council of California, Programs: Access and Fairness (2003), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access/activities.htm; Cal. R. Ct. 989.3(a). 14 See, e.g., Ernest J. Comer, Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the New Jersey Judicial System (National Center for State Courts 2002) (discussing New Jersey judiciary’s accessibility plan, begun in 1993), at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/CS_AmeDisActNJPub.pdf; Mark Van Bever, Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act in a

10
Furthermore, federal Department of Justice ADA enforcement efforts have achieved increased access in hundreds of key governmental buildings, from courthouses to city halls to state capitol buildings, throughout the 50 states.15 However, as with other civil rights laws, private suits are a key enforcement tool. 16 In cases of injurious conduct, often the only effective remedy is money damages. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097, 2099-2100
Trial Court (National Center for State Courts 2002) (discussing ADA compliance efforts of Florida’s Eighteenth Judicial Circuit), at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/CS_AmeDisActImpNJPub.p df. The courts self-assessment process has often resulted in voluntary compliance. See Voices of Freedom, supra note 4 (describing access improvements to basic government facilities and public meetings in the five years after the ADA’s enactment in dozens of locations throughout all 50 states). 15 There has been extensive administrative and court activity in this area. The Justice Department has investigated and settled complaints in almost every state in the nation. See, e.g., DOJ, Final Settlement Agreement between the U.S. and Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (2003), at http://www.ada.gov/nashvil2.htm (physical barrier removal); DOJ, Settlement Agreement between the U.S. and Hancock County, Mississippi (2003), at http://www.ada.gov/hancocks.htm (provision of effective communication services for jurors who are deaf or hard of hearing); DOJ, Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. and the Santa Clara County Superior Court (2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/santacl.htm (provision of auxiliary aids and services for persons with hearing impairments). See also DOJ, 10th Anniversary of the ADA Press Page (2000), at http://www.ada.gov/archive/10anpage.htm (providing links to regional reports describing at least 50 examples of cities and states improving city halls and other basic government buildings and programs); DOJ, Project Civic Access (2003), at http://www.ada.gov/civicac.htm (providing links to 56 settlement agreements with cities, counties, and states). 16 See, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1999) (remanding for entry of injunction against inaccessible courthouse); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 233-34 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (ordering summary judgment to plaintiffs after Court scheduled three hearings in inaccessible courtroom for paraplegic who had to be carried and had no access to bathroom).

11
(2002) (describing injuries experienced by paraplegic plaintiff transported in a hazardous manner by police, including shoulder and back injuries, bladder infection, and spasms leaving him unable to work full-time). As this Court recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971), sometimes “it is damages or nothing.”
B. Voting Accessibility
The ability to vote is something most Americans take for granted and associate with membership in a democratic society. The fact that this basic right is still inaccessible to many individuals with disabilities demonstrates the extreme degree to which the needs of disabled citizens have been ignored by state election officials.17 During the 1998 Congressional elections, approximately 20,000 polling places were inaccessible to wheelchair users.18 Of those voters with disabilities who could reach the polling area, fifty-two percent found that the area lacked a designated, appropriately sized voting booth for them to cast their vote.19 Seventythree percent of the polling places in the major urban center of Philadelphia were physically inaccessible to voters with
17 In addition to the barriers to voting access identified above, at least forty-two states totally disenfranchise citizens with mental disabilities in a variety of contexts. See Kay Schriner et al., Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 437, 456 tbl. 2 (2000); see also Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 & n.2 (D. Me. 2001) (noting disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities in Maine and other states). 18 National Council on Disability, Inclusive Federal Election Reform (2001), at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/electionreform.pdf; Coalition for Accessible Political Elections (CAPE), Report of the National Voter Independence Project [hereinafter NVIP Report], at http://www.nhdde.com/publications/PollingFinalReport.pdf. 19 NVIP Report, supra note 18.

12 disabilities.20 Eighty-one percent of voters who are blind or visually impaired had to rely on others to mark their ballots for them.21 Perhaps most disturbing, more than ten years after the ADA was enacted, accessibility is often not even considered a factor in choosing polling sites.22
As with other areas where exclusion and segregation of people with disabilities has resulted in inaccessible public services, Title II provides an important vehicle to promote access and awareness.23 Cases brought under the ADA are challenging inaccessible polling places, and are resulting in greater awareness by state and local voting officials. For example, the disability community in Texas filed lawsuits that resulted in cooperative efforts with election officials. Counsel for plaintiffs, James Harrington, writes that “[t]o their credit, each County showed great willingness to participate in significant negotiations. Local officials were keen on making their voting systems usable by people who are blind. This spirit of negotiation produced great
20 Inclusive Federal Election Reform, supra note 18. 21 Id. 22 Center for an Accessible Society, 8 out of 10 Polling Sites have Access Barriers, Says GAO Report (2001), at http://www.accessiblesociety.org/topics/voting/gaovoterept1101.htm. 23 Voting was plainly one of the concerns addressed in the Senate Report accompanying the Act and debated on the floor. See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 12 (1989) (quoting Illinois Attorney General, who stated that “[y]ou cannot exercise one of your most basic rights as an American if the polling places are not accessible.”). See also 135 Cong. Rec. S10753 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (remarks of Senator Gore: “As a practical matter, many Americans with disabilities find it impossible to vote. Obviously, such a situation is completely unacceptable and unconscionable. We must take strong action to end the tradition of blatant and subtle discrimination that has made people with disability second-class citizens.”).

13
creativity.”24 And, eventually, awareness of the needs of voters with disabilities became a statewide concern. As reported by Harrington, “successive Secretaries of State . . . now facilitate and actively encourage access to the secret ballot for people with disabilities.” 25
These types of lawsuits have shown that solutions are possible, and have been used by other groups to bring suits under the ADA. 26 Because of the ADA, there have also been innovations in technology which foresee a future where the gross inequality in voting access will be a thing of the past. 27
C. Community Integration
Perhaps the most basic, yet profound impact of the ADA is the gradual reversal of a shameful history of unnecessary segregation of people with disabilities in large,
24 James C. Harrington, Pencils Within Reach and A Walkman or Two: Making the Secret Ballot Available to Voters Who are Blind or Have Other Physical Disabilities, 4 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 87, 95 (1999). 25 Id. at 105. 26 For example, a coalition of groups including the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association and the Blinded Veterans of America began classaction lawsuits against Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, using examples like Harris County, Texas, the nation’s third largest county, which had already put accessible voting systems in place. American Association of People with Disabilities, New GAO Report Shows Disabled are Denied Voting Access (2001), at http://www.aapd.com/docs/Gao101601.html . 27 Although the Federal Election Commission estimates that 20,000 of the country’s 27,000 polling sites do not meet ADA requirements, new technology is being developed and tested to achieve compliance. For example, emerging technology allows a visually impaired voter to have the ballot read to him or her, and a hearing impaired voter to utilize a hearing aid compatible headset. John M. Williams, Making Access to the Ballot Box a Snap for Disabled Voters, Bus. Week Online, Sept. 15, 1999, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep1999/nf90915c.htm.

14
state-operated institutions.28 This Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), has spawned a national examination of the extreme harm caused by institutionalization. As this Court stated in Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601, “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.” Accordingly, the court found that under Title II of the ADA, states are required to provide community-based services when it is professionally advisable to do so and when the disabled individual so chooses. Id. at 607.
In response to Olmstead, federal officials with the Department of Health and Human Services issued a set of recommendations to state Medicaid directors, outlining principles for states to consider when developing their Olmstead plans.29 The need for such planning is critical to the thousands of people nationwide who have been recommended for community placement but who remain
28 The connection between segregation and discrimination was highlighted by Congress in three of the findings statements in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination . . . continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem”); id. at § 12101(a)(3) (“[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persist in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization.”); id. at § 12101(a)(5) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . segregation.”). 29 Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Health Ca re Financing Administration, & Thomas Perez, Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, to State Medicaid Directors (January 14, 2000), at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd1140a.asp.

15
waiting in institutions indefinitely.30 A recent NCD report found that a majority of states still fail to plan for identifying and providing community placement for institutionalized persons who meet the Olmstead criteria, and that few plans contain timelines and targets for community placement or provide consistent opportunities for life in the most integrated setting.31
Notably, Tennessee continues the historic practice of segregating persons with disabilities in state institutions.32 A 2002 report found “that Tennessee ranked 45th in the provision of home and community based waiver services,” and that the vast majority of the state’s long-term care dollars went to institutional settings rather than home health care and other services that permit people with disabilities to live in the community.33 According to NCD, the ability of the Tennessee disability coalition “to develop an Olmstead plan was severely curtailed by the refusal of the rele vant state agencies to cooperate in the planning process in any meaningful fashion.”34
30 See Sharon Davis , et al., The Arc, A Status Report to the Nation on People with Mental Retardation Waiting for Community Services (1997), at http://www.thearc.org/misc/WaitPage.html (noting over 5000 persons waiting in state institutions for community placement in 16 states reporting such data). 31 See National Council on Disability, Olmstead: Reclaiming Institutionalized Lives (Full-Length On-Line Version) [hereinafter Reclaiming Institutionalized Lives] (August 19, 2003), at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/reclaimlives.html. 32 Duren Cheek, Lawmaker Pleads for Home-care Funds for Elderly, Tennessean.com, May 19, 2000, at http://www.tennessean.com/sii/00/05/19/gacare19.shtml (noting State Representative John Arriola’s comments that “Tennessee has sunk to dead last in the nation in providing alternatives to nursing home care”). 33 Reclaiming Institutionalized Lives, supra note 31, at ch. V. 34 Id.

16
While change is slow, states are beginning to explore community-based options. As of December 2001, forty states, along with the District of Columbia, had commissions or task forces working to improve their state’s management of long-term care,35 and fourteen states had developed Olmstead plans as of May 2002.36 State agencies are increasingly recognizing the basic principles of integration and community-based care, and are taking steps to follow the Federal mandate to design, deliver and finance community services.37 “Olmstead” lawsuits are bringing pressure to bear, and have resulted in the increased availability of community options.38
35 Wendy Fox-Grage et al., National Conference of State Legislators, The States’ Response to the Olmstead Decision: How Are States Complying? (2003), at http://www.ncsl.org /programs/health/forum/olmsreport.htm. 36 Alexandra Stewart et al., Center for Health Care Strategies, Inc., Implementing Community Integration: A review of State Olmstead Plans 4 (2002), at http://www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/cas/stateOlmsteadplans.pdf. 37 See Reclaiming Institutionalized Lives, supra note 31. For example, Maine has instituted screening by an independent agency before admission to nursing facilities as a means of overcoming a systemic emphasis on institutionalization, while advocates in Colorado and Kansas work to identify individuals in nursing facilities who could move to more integrated settings. Vermont and New Hampshire are beginning to close group homes in favor of individual or companion homes in an effort to provide “the most integrated setting.” Under the influence of the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights, the most recent Olmstead plans are beginning to incorporate critical input from housing agencies. 38 See, e.g., Barthelemy v. Louisiana Dept. o f Health & Hosp., No. Civ.A. 00-1083, 2003 WL 1733534 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2003); Rolland v. Cellucci, 198 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Gary A. Smith, National Ass’n of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Servs., Inc., Status Report: Litigation Concerning Medical Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities 15-19 (2001), at http://www.qualitymall.org/download/litigation.pdf (collecting cases).

17
There can be no doubt that the state initiatives in this area are a direct result of the ADA and this Court’s Olmstead decision. 39 Vigorous enforcement by the federal government and private litigants remains essential to ensure compliance with Olmstead.
D. Public Transportation
Similar to the observation in Olmstead that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,” 527 U.S. at 601, so too does the lack of accessible public transportation “severely diminish” other important life activities. As noted by Senator Dole, “Transportation is the critical link to employment. This bill will result in accessible public transportation to and from the work site. Living independently and with dignity means opportunity to participate fully in every activity of daily life, be it going to the movies, dining in a restaurant, cheering at a baseball game, communicating by phone or going to the doctor.” 136 Cong. Rec. 17,376 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
39 For example, as the Ohio Olmstead plan states, “[s]tate policy makers must continue to be responsive to the Health Care Financing Administration and the federal Office of Civil Rights to assure Ohio’s compliance with the mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (emphasis added) Thomas W. Johnson et al., Office of Budget and Management, Ohio Access for People with Disabilities: Final Report to Governor Taft 3 (2001), at http://www.state.oh.us/age/ohioaccessrpt.pdf (emphasis added). The Introduction to the Missouri plan states that its Home and Community-Based Services and Consumer-Directed Care Commission was established “[t]o address the implications of the Olmstead decision,” and that “[t]he objective of the Commission was to develop a ‘comprehensive, effectively, working plan’ as recommended by the U.S. Supreme Court Olmstead decision.” Home and CommunityBased Servs. and Consumer-Directed Care Comm’n, Working Plan, at http://www.dolir .state.mo.us/gcd/olmstead/olmreport/coverpage.htm (emphasis added). It should be stressed that without Section 5 authority for Title II, this crucial area of progress could be left without other valid constitutional grounding. See infra section III.

18
People with disabilities have historically been denied access to public life by the failure to make public transportation accessible. The accessibility of buildings as well as employment and education opportunities are meaningless when people with disabilities have no way to reliably and inexpensively reach their destinations. It is not possible to overstate the differences that Title II has made for people with disabilities who need to use public transportation. The comprehensiveness of the ADA mandate – cutting across all modes of transportation (from fixed-route buses to light rail transit to cross-country trains) – is critical to the law’s success in actually changing how public transportation is provided across the nation. 40
Prior to the ADA’s enactment, “the provision of accessible transportation in the United States was always varied and uneven. Uniform accessible transportation did not exist until it was required by the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”41
40 The ADA’s comprehensive transportation mandate was thoroughly studied and reviewed during the ADA’s development and enactment. See Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation on H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. 56 (1989) (Testimony of Larry Roffee, Executive Director of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board: “Through conducting public forums around the country and sponsoring research projects and studies, the Access Board has gathered extensive information about the extent and effects of discriminatory barriers experienced by persons with disabilities in public accommodations and public transportation. The Access Board has carefully analyzed the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act which have passed the Senate and believes that they provide a comprehensive solution to removing these barriers.”). 41 Rosalyn M. Simon, Status of Transportation Accessibility in the United States: Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter Status of Transportation Accessibility], in Proceedings of Seminar Held at the Planning and Transportation Research and Computation European Transport Forum § 1.2 (1996).

19
The ADA’s directive to public transit authorities, that vehicles leased or purchased after specified dates be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,”42 initiated significant measurable changes in national transportation accessibility. As Rosalyn M. Simon notes:
In 1989, one-third (36%) of the national bus fleet was accessible. Post-ADA fixed route bus accessibility increased to 39 percent in 1990, 46 percent in 1991, and 52 percent in 1992. . . . [T]he federal government reported the national bus fleet as 55 percent accessible … in 1994 and 60 percent accessible … in 1995. Their projections indicate that by 2002, the national bus fleet will be 100 percent lift/ramp-equipped. In addition, by 2005, all fixed route buses will also be equipped with ADA-compliant communication systems . . . More than 100 public transit systems are now providing 100 percent accessible fixed route bus service during peak hours.43
These dramatic improvements in accessibility are directly attributable to Congress’s establishment of broad national standards for public transportation accessibility, standards which were crafted following years of negotiation with transit authorities. Without the ADA, the interstate mobility of people with disabilities would always be subject to substantive and technical differences in state accessibility requirements. At the same time, the provisions are reasonable and gradual. Based on the turnover of vehicles, a natural consequence of normal wear and tear and technical
42 42 U.S.C. § 12142(a)-(c) (collectively encompassing new, used and remanufactured vehicles). 43 Status of Transportation Accessibility, supra note 41, at § 3.1.

20 obsolescence, the ADA’s transportation rules comprise a flexible and proportionate approach.
II. THE SCOPE OF REMEDIAL RELIEF AVAILABLE FURTHER CONFIRMS THE PROPORTIONALITY OF CONGRESS’S REMEDIES.
Congress took appropriate and reasonable steps to ensure that people with disabilities have access to government programs. Congress did not order immediate physical access, crafting instead a gradual and reasonable program of self-evaluation and transition. 44 In fact, the physical accessibility requirements only apply to construction after the date of the ADA’s enactment, or when “program accessibility” cannot be achieved in another way. 45 Under the flexible “program accessibility” standard, physical alterations are only one of several options that can be taken depending on the circumstances.
44 Courts subject to the ADA were required to perform, within one year of the law’s effective date, a self-assessment of all current services, policies and practices, and their effects. 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(a) (1993). According to a 1994 study conducted by David Pfeiffer and Joan Finn, based on questionnaires sent to local governments around the country as well as state and territorial governments, 85 percent of state and territorial government had conducted accessibility surveys of their courthouses, and 93 percent of municipal courthouses had conducted accessibility surveys. Pfeiffer and Finn posit that “it is not possible to say that these finding are due solely to the ADA, but certainly the ADA would appear to be a significant factor.” David Pfeiffer & Joan Finn, Survey Shows State, Territorial, Local Public Officials Implementing ADA, 19 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 537, 537-540 (1995). 45 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130. Only buildings constructed after the ADA’s effective date are required to meet specific accessibility requirements. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a), (b)(1).

21
In addition, for purposes of Title II, many courts have limited money damages to the most egregious cases.46 This Court could similarly limit the money damages available in Title II cases if necessary to comport with this Court’s prior Section 5 holdings. This result would be far preferable to the more draconian one of finding that Title II is not authorized by Section 5. Such an approach is consistent with established Court doctrine. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989) (courts should avoid interpretations that would render a statute unconstitutional).
As the Second Circuit has noted, “[g]overnment actions based on discriminatory animus or ill will towards the
46 See, e.g., Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n order to receive compensatory damages for violations of [the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act], a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination.”); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold that a private suit for money damages under Title II of the ADA may only be maintained against a state if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II violation was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability.”); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ompensatory damages are not available under Title II or § 504 absent a showing of discriminatory intent.”); see also Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ntitlement to compensatory damages under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires proof that the defendant has intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.”); Wood v. President and Trs. of Spring Hill Coll., 978 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[G]ood faith attempts to pursue legitimate ends are not sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages under section 504. . . . [C]ontrolling precedent on . . . section 504 actions under the Rehabilitation Act, indicates that compensatory damages are precluded in cases of unintentional discrimination, but are permissible on a showing of intentional discrimination.”); PanzardiSantiago v. University of Puerto Rico, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20-21 (D. P.R. 2002) (requiring showing of intentional discrimination for damages under Rehabilitation Act).

22
disabled are generally the same actions that are proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment – i.e. conduct that is based on irrational prejudice or wholly lacking a legitimate government interest.” Garcia v. S.U.N.Y Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2001). Given the “broader swath” of conduct that can be proscribed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a damage remedy certainly falls within constitutional bounds wherever intentional discrimination is found, regardless of whether the discrimination is akin to “deliberate indifference” or “discriminatory animus.” Cf. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1989) (adopting "deliberate indifference" as standard for damages for discrimination prohibited by Title IX, which like Section 504 and Title II of the ADA adopts Title IV remedies, see 42 U.S.C. § 12133); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1998). Permitting damages for violations evidencing deliberate indifference functions to remedy and deter state actions that are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus comports fully with this Court’s prior Section 5 jurisprudence.
III. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE ADA ARE THREATENED BY SOME STATES’ ONGOING AND BROAD-BASED CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ITS VALIDITY.
The question now before this Court is whether Congress had the authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which permits individuals to seek money damages from the state to remedy disability discrimination.
While this case is limited to one relatively circumscribed, albeit critical, aspect of federal disability discrimination law – the availability of private suits for

23
damages against states under Title II – this challenge is but one part of an ongoing effort by some states to be free of disability non-discrimination mandates. States are contesting whether Title II is facially constitutional through challenges to Title II actions against state officials for injunctive remedies.47 States have also challenged specific applications of Title II as being beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.48
47 Such challenges continue despite the recent acknowledgement by this Court of the continued viability of the Ex Parte Young doctrine in the context of Title I of the ADA. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 32 n.9 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in McCarthy v. Gilbert, Civil Action No. 02-CV-600 (E.D. Tex.) (arguing that Ex Parte Young cannot be used to enforce Title II of the ADA or its regulations because Title II exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under Section 5 and the Commerce Clause); Brief of Appellees in Meyers v. Texas, Case No. 02-50452 (5th Cir.) (“Because it offends fundamental notions of federalism to permit Young suits based on statutes Congress lacked authority to enact under Section 5, the Court should hold that there is no Eleventh Amendment exception permitting prospective enforcement of federal laws – like Title II – under which Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity.”); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 287-89 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing state defendant’s various arguments challenging Ex Parte Young relief); Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting state’s challenge to constitutionality of Title II under Commerce Clause after plaintiffs sought leave to amend complaint to add Ex Parte Young claim for injunctive relief). In their brief before this Court, Tennessee’s amici similarly question whether Title II is a valid basis for an award of injunctive relief. See Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama et al., in Support of Petitioner 5. 48 Several states, including Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia, have argued that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority specifically to regulate prisons under the ADA. See Brief for the Petitioners at 23-24, Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (“Neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to regulate the management of state prisoners.”); see also Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Public Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated for rehearing en banc, subsequently dismissed pursuant to

24
States have attempted to minimize the impact of recent Section 5 rulings eliminating damages awards against states by referencing the availability of damages in cases brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.49 At the same time, however, states are continuing to challenge the constitutionality of such Section 504 claims. As the State of Tennessee notes in its brief, states have argued that they have not waived their sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds, an argument which has been correctly rejected by most federal appellate courts.50 The states also continue to argue that the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act are not “reasonably related” to the
settlement, 205 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2000); Hicks v. Armstrong, 116 F. Supp. 2d 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1999); Saunders v. Horn, 959 F. Supp. 689, 696-97 (E.D. Penn. 1997); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 938 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority to regulate prisons under Title II, as prison labor does not substantially affect interstate commerce, citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)); Staples v. Virginia Dept. of Corrs., 904 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D. Va. 1995). 49 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 38, Board of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 02-1667) (noting availability of “comparable injunctive and monetary remedies of the Rehabilitation Act”). This Court reaffirmed the availability of damages remedies under the Rehabilitation Act in Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002). 50 See Brief of Petitioner at 36 n.9. Cf. Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama, 344 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003); Shepard v. Irving, No. 02-1712, 2003 W L 21977963 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2003); Koslow v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002) (Section 504 and Title VI); Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc denied, 285 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2002); Nihiser v. Ohio Envt’l Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ. v. Jim C., 121 S. Ct. 2591 (2001); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2000). But see Pace v. Bogalusa City School Bd., 325 F.3d 609, reh’g en banc granted, 339 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003); Garcia, 280 F.3d 98.

25
purposes of the federal funds disbursed, or that conditioning the funds is somehow unconstitutionally coercive.51
CONCLUSION
The promise of the ADA is just beginning to be realized. States are making the basic vestiges of citizenship available to persons with disabilities for the first time in history. This progress is in keeping with the most fundamental principles of equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. There can be no doubt that the invalidation of Congress’s long and deliberative process in recognizing and remedying “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice”52 toward people with disabilities will impede continuing progress toward a nation where people with disabilities can participate fully in civic life.
When President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act he stated:
And today, America welcomes into the mainstream of life all of our fellow citizens with disabilities. We embrace you for your abilities and for your disabilities, for our similarities and indeed for our differences, for your past courage and your future dreams. Last year, we celebrated a victory of
51 See, e.g., Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); Koslow, 302 F.3d at 173-76; Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081-82 (rejecting state’s argument that Rehabilitation Act requirements upon federal funding were unduly coercive). However, in Jim C., the dissenting four judges used the tests enunciated by this Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), as the basis for opining that Congress lacked authority under the Spending Clause to enact Section 504. Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1082-85 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 52 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).

26
international freedom. Even the strongest person couldn't scale the Berlin Wall to gain the elusive promise of independence that lay just beyond. And so, together we rejoiced when that barrier fell.
And now I sign legislation which takes a sledgehammer to another wall, one which has for too many generations separated Americans with disabilities from the freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp. Once again, we rejoice as this barrier falls for claiming together we will not accept, we will not excuse, we will not tolerate discrimination in America.53
While progress has been great, the ADA is still an indispensable tool to put equal citizenship firmly within the grasp of Americans with disabilities.
Respectfully submitted, November 12, 2003
*ARLENE B. MAYERSON, Esquire SILVIA YEE, Esquire Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
*Counsel of Record
53 Reprinted in National Council on Disability, Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the Americans with Disabilities Act at App. G (1997), at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/equality_2.html#g.

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CLAUDIA CENTER, Esquire LEWIS BOSSING, Esquire ELIZABETH KRISTEN, Esquire The Legal Aid Society – Employment Law Center

- a -
APPENDIX
BIOGRAPHIES OF AMICI CURIAE
Dick Thornburgh served as Governor of Pennsylvania, Attorney General of the United States under Presidents Reagan and Bush, and the highest-ranking American at the United Nations. As Attorney General from 1988 to 1991, Thornburgh oversaw congressional debate and passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He subsequently developed regulations implementing that legislation. Attorney General Thornburgh has often referred to his tireless work to bring the ADA into law as one of his proudest moments. Attorney General Thornburgh is a founding member of the National Organization on Disability (N.O.D.) and currently serves as Vice-Chairman of the World Committee on Disability. He filed a brief amicus curiae regarding the Olmstead case in the United States Supreme Court on behalf of N.O.D., asserting the validity of the integration regulations he issued as Attorney General. It is Attorney General Thornburgh’s view that it is critically important that this Court’s decision in Olmstead, which has provided the needed impetus for states to reverse historic segregation, not be undermined by a holding that Congress lacked Constitutional authority to enact Title II. In 2001 he received the George Bush Medal for his service to persons with disabilities, and in 2003 he and his wife Ginny Thornburgh received the Henry B. Betts award. Together, the Thornburghs have worked in the public eye to maximize opportunities for persons with disabilities in their communities, jobs, schools and congregations. Attorney General Thornburgh is currently counsel to Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, a national law firm, in its Washington, DC office.
The mission of the National Organization on Disability (N.O.D.) is to expand the participation and

- b -
contribution of America’s 54 million men, women and children with disabilities in all aspects of life. For more than 20 years, N.O.D. has built and sustained programs that raise disability awareness, encourage physical and attitudinal accessibility, make America’s communities accessible, and provide opportunities for employment and growth. N.O.D. joined with other disability organizations and advocates in the effort to enact the ADA. Through business, community, association, and advocacy partnerships, including its Community Partnership Program and its CEO Council, N.O.D. strives to eliminate barriers and to improve work opportunities for Americans with disabilities. N.O.D.’s leadership includes Honorary Chairman George H.W. Bush, Chairman Michael R. Deland, Vice Chairman Christopher Reeve, and President Alan Reich, together with a Board of Directors including business leaders and prominent disability advocates.
The American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) is a national non-profit, non-partisan membership organization whose mission is to promote the political and economic power of children and adults with disabilities in the U.S. Founded on the fifth anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), AAPD has a strong interest in full and effective enforcement of that landmark law. With more than 60,000 members, AAPD is the largest cross-disability membership organization in the United States.

- c -
ADA Watch is a project of the National Coalition for Disability Rights (NCDR), a nonprofit alliance of hundreds of organizations united to protect and promote the civil rights of people with physical, mental, developmental, and cognitive disabilities. ADA Watch was founded to counteract threats to the enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and other federal disability rights laws.

 
 No. 02-1667 ================================================================
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Petitioner, v.
GEORGE LANE, BEVERLY JONES, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General & Reporter for the State of Tennessee
MICHAEL E. MOORE* Solicitor General *Counsel of Record
S. ELIZABETH MARTIN MARY MARTELLE COLLIER
Senior Counsel OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
& REPORTER FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207 (615) 741-3226
Attorneys for Petitioner
================================================================
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2002), exceeds Congress’ authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby failing validly to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from private damages claims.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ iv
OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1
JURISDICTION.......................................................... 1
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.......................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 11
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 15
TITLE II OF THE ADA EXCEEDS CONGRESS’ POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO ABROGATE THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE STATES ........ 15
A. Title II was not enacted in response to evidence of a widespread pattern of state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the disabled....................................... 18
1. The legislative record fails to document a pattern of irrational discrimination by the States against the disabled ................ 19
2. The legislative record likewise fails to document a pattern of state action violating the due process rights of the disabled.......................................................... 24

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
B. Title II is not congruent with or proportional to an appropriate remedial objective authorized by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ................................................................. 27
1. Title II’s indiscriminate scope and extraconstitutional remedial scheme are not tailored to cure violations of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the disabled ............... 29
2. Title II is not sustainable as prophylactic legislation needed to deter constitutional violations by the States ............................ 35
CONCLUSION............................................................ 37
Appendix A....................................................................App. 1
Appendix B ...................................................................App. 8
Appendix C ...................................................................App. 9

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page
CASES Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) ................................. 16 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) ......................... 33 Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir.
1999) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000) .............................................................................. 29 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) ....................... 6, 33 Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ...................................passim Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ...................... 25 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) ....................................... 25 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) .............passim The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)......................... 27 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) ....................................... 12, 19, 20, 23, 35 Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 924 (2002) .............................................................................. 36 Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) ............................................. 16 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)......... 17, 18, 30, 31 Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001) ........................................ 32, 36 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ..................................... 19

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ. v. Jim C., 533 U.S. 949 (2001) ............... 36
Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1998)................................................................................ 29
Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) ................................. 25
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ...passim
Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pa., 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1353 (2003) ............. 36
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) ........................ 25
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) ....................................................................... 19
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)............................. 34
Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002) ......... 36
Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) ............................................. 12, 18, 27, 30, 35
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) ......................................... 25
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002) ..........................................................10, 11
Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974 (5th Cir. 2001)................................................................................ 36
Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2574 (2003) ............................... 36
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) .............................................................11, 12, 16, 17

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued Page
Shepard v. Irving, No. 02-1712, 2003 WL 21977963 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2003) .................................................. 36
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)......... 30 Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002) ...................... 31 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938) .............................................................................. 34 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ............... 25 Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2002) .......... 23 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ................................. 16
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. CONST. amend. XI............................................. 9, 10, 12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §§ 1, 5..................................passim
FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)............................................................... 1 29 U.S.C. § 701 ................................................................... 36 29 U.S.C. § 794a ................................................................... 6 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a)........................................................ 33 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)-(9)................................................. 20 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) ...................................................... 26 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) ...................................................... 34 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) ...................................................... 19 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) ...................................................... 17

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued Page
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)............................................................. 3 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)....................................................... 3, 31 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ........................................................passim 42 U.S.C. § 12133 ................................................................. 6 42 U.S.C. § 12134 ......................................................... 2, 3, 4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 ................................................... 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141–12165 ................................................... 3 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) ...................................................... 33 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)........................................................... 33 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)........................................................... 32 42 U.S.C. § 12202 ..................................................... 2, 12, 17 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ................................................................. 6 29 C.F.R. §§ 35.101–.190 (2002)........................................... 4 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii) .................................................. 5 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) .............................................. 5, 32 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(ii) ................................................... 5 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(4)(i) .............................................. 5, 32 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) ........................................................ 5 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) .............................................. 4, 5, 32 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) .............................................. 5, 6, 32 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) ............................................................ 4 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) ............................................................. 5 29 C.F.R. § 35.150................................................................. 4 29 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) ........................................................ 6

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued Page
29 C.F.R. § 35.151(a) ............................................................ 4 29 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)............................................................. 4
STATE STATUTES TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2002 Repl.)......................... 16 TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-104 (2002 Repl.)......................... 16 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-120-201–205 (2001 Repl.) ........... 16
MISCELLANEOUS SUP. CT. R. 32 ....................................................................... 8 FED. R. APP. P. 44(a) ............................................................. 9 136 CONG. REC. H2614 (daily ed. May 22, 1990)
(Statement of Rep. Berman) .......................................... 22 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(IV), 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512 ................. 21 S. REP. NO. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) ................................................................. 21, 22, 26 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act: Title II Technical Assistance Manual (1993) ........................................................................ 29, 30

1

OPINIONS BELOW
The amended opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-5) is reported at 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003). The original opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 10-11) and the order of the district court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss (Pet. App. 6-7) are unreported.
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JURISDICTION
The initial judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 16, 2002. A timely petition for rehearing was filed on August 29, 2002. The petition for rehearing was granted, and the court of appeals entered an amended opinion on January 10, 2003. Justice Stevens extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including May 12, 2003, and on that date petitioner filed its petition. On June 23, 2003, this Court granted the petition, limited to the first question presented. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:

Section 1: . . . No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

*

*

*

2
Section 5: The congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Eleventh Amendment is set out verbatim in the petition. (Pet. 2)
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
The abrogation provision of the ADA provides:
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.
42 U.S.C. § 12202.
Other relevant provisions of Title II, together with relevant portions of the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General to implement Title II, see 42 U.S.C.

3
§ 12134, are reproduced in Appendices A and C of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165, comprehensively regulates all services, programs and activities conducted by a “public entity,” defined to include the States and their departments, agencies and instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The statute defines “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Thus, Title II does not simply prohibit the States from making distinctions based upon disabilities but affirmatively requires that public entities make reasonable modifications for disabled persons who qualify. Title II also prohibits discrimination in public transportation and affirmatively requires public entities to provide handicap access in most such facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141–12165.

4
Pursuant to congressional directive, see 42 U.S.C. § 12134, the Attorney General has promulgated regulations to implement Title II. 29 C.F.R. §§ 35.101–.190 (2002). The implementing regulations require public entities, among other things:
• to locate, design, and construct all new facilities in such a manner that they are “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . ,” 29 C.F.R. § 35.151(a);
• to incorporate curb ramps at all intersections of newly constructed streets, roads, and highways to accommodate disabled persons, 29 C.F.R. § 35.151(e);
• to modify existing buildings and roadways when necessary to insure that programs and services are accessible to individuals with disabilities, 29 C.F.R. § 35.150;
• to “administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of . . .” the disabled, 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(d); and,
• to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability . . . ,” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
The regulations forbid public entities from:
• utilizing criteria, including facility site selection criteria, in the administration of programs and services that “have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination” or of “impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the . . .

5
program with respect to individuals with disabilities . . . ,” 29 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(3)(i)-(ii) & 35.130(b)(4)(i);
• imposing eligibility criteria “that screen out or tend to screen out” disabled persons “from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity . . . ,” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8);
• administering licensing and certification programs “in a manner that subjects . . . [disabled persons] to discrimination . . . ,” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6);
• providing the disabled with “an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others,” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii); and,
• charging disabled persons “to cover the costs of measures . . . required to provide . . . the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the . . . [ADA or implementing regulations].” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(f).
A State may avoid its obligation to modify policies, practices and procedures having discriminatory effects only if it “can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). A State may avoid its obligation to modify existing physical facilities when the modification is necessary to eliminate discriminatory effects only if it can demonstrate that the modification would cause “a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service, program, or activity” conducted there or “undue financial and administrative burdens . . . after

6
considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). A State may avoid its obligation to eliminate screening criteria that have a discriminatory effect only if it can demonstrate that such criteria are “necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.” 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8).
Anyone aggrieved by discrimination in violation of Title II may bring an action against the offending public entity and is entitled to the same “remedies, procedures, and rights” as those allowed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Compensatory damages and injunctive relief are available in such actions; punitive damages are not. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002). A prevailing party may be awarded attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
2. Respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this suit on August 10, 1998, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee (“petitioner”) and several Tennessee counties charging them with violations of Title II and its implementing regulations. Specifically, Lane, a paraplegic, alleged that petitioner and Polk County had “discriminated against [him on account of his disability] . . . in that they . . . excluded him from participation in, or denied him the benefits of, the services of its [sic] court systems in violation of 42 U.S.C. [§] 12132” in connection with criminal charges brought against him in 1996 and 1997. (Pet. App. 23)
According to the Complaint, at his initial appearance on those charges in the General Sessions Court, Lane “was required to crawl up two flights of stairs” to the courtroom

7
on the second floor of the Polk County Courthouse in Benton, Tennessee, because there was no elevator. (Pet. App. 15) The Complaint does not disclose whether Lane requested to have his hearing conducted in an accessible location. Likewise, the Complaint does not state whether he sought assistance from anyone to reach the courtroom on this occasion, nor does it allege that anyone refused him such assistance.
On the day of his next scheduled appearance, Lane sent word to the judge that he would not crawl up the stairs to the courtroom. (Pet. App. 15) When officers were dispatched to the ground floor to help him up the stairs, he refused their assistance and refused to appear in the courtroom. (Pet. App. 15) Accordingly, the court issued an attachment for his arrest. (Pet. App. 15) Upon his release from custody, Lane retained counsel and thereafter “attended court proceedings by waiting downstairs from the courtroom and having his attorney shuttle back and forth with information concerning his case.” (Pet. App. 15-16) On February 24, 1997, the court conducted Lane’s preliminary hearing in the courthouse library, which was fully accessible to handicapped persons, over Lane’s objection that the library was “a location that was not regularly frequented by the public.” (Pet. App. 16) His case was bound over to the grand jury, which indicted him on two misdemeanor charges. (Pet. App. 16)
At his arraignment on these charges on March 17, 1997, Lane’s counsel appeared on his behalf and informed the court that Lane “was on the first floor of the courthouse and could not come to the courtroom because of the requirement to climb the stairs to the courtroom.” (Pet. App. 16) According to the Complaint, counsel then moved to continue the arraignment until such time as the courthouse

8
could be made to conform to the requirements of the ADA. (Pet. App. 16) The court denied the motion and set the case for trial.1 (Pet. App. 16) Lane unsuccessfully prosecuted an extraordinary interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court. (Pet. App. 16-17) Thereafter, Circuit Court Judge Carroll Ross entered an order staying all criminal proceedings in the Polk County Courthouse until an elevator was installed. (Pet. App. 17) Construction of the elevator was completed in June 1998. (Pet. App. 17)
The Complaint further alleged that respondent Beverly Jones, a certified court reporter, is a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair as a result of injuries received in an automobile accident in 1989. (Pet. App. 19) She has an active practice and “is called upon by attorneys and other
1 Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, petitioner has submitted to the Clerk a request to lodge certified copies of the following public documents on file in the Tennessee Supreme Court Clerk’s Office: a verbatim transcript of the March 17, 1997, hearing; Lane’s “Motion to Dismiss Indictment or in the Alternative to Continue Arraignment;” the trial court’s order denying that motion; and the orders of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Tennessee Supreme Court disposing of Lane’s extraordinary interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order. These materials disclose that, before ruling on Lane’s motion, the trial court offered (1) to send two sheriff ’s deputies to the ground floor to help Lane up the stairs to the courtroom and (2) to conduct all further proceedings in the case in a handicappedaccessible room on the first floor of the courthouse in Benton or in a handicapped-accessible courthouse in nearby Ducktown. The trial judge also repeatedly asked for suggestions for accommodations from Lane’s counsel. Lane refused these offers of accommodation and refused to suggest any other reasonable option. These materials further disclose that the relief sought by Lane was not merely a continuance of his arraignment but an outright dismissal of the indictment on account of the architectural deficiencies in the Polk County Courthouse.

9
parties to work all over Middle Tennessee . . . for the purposes of recording proceedings before the state courts . . . .” (Pet. App. 19) Because the courthouses in some of the counties where she offers her services fail to comply with the accessibility requirements of the ADA, she “has lost work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process because of her inability to gain access to . . . [those] courthouses.” (Pet. App. 20) As a consequence, respondent Jones charged that petitioner and these counties have “discriminated against . . . [her] in that they have excluded her from participating in the services offered by the courthouses and access to the Court proceedings . . . by failing to eliminate physical obstacles to her participation” in violation of Title II of the ADA. (Pet. App. 23)
Respondent Lane sought money damages for humiliation and embarrassment in an amount not to exceed $100,000. (Pet. App. 27) Respondent Jones sought money damages for humiliation and embarrassment and lost income in an amount not to exceed $250,000. (Pet. App. 27) Respondents also requested that the district court order petitioner and the counties named as defendants to bring the courthouses in question into compliance with Title II. (Pet. App. 28)
3. Petitioner moved to dismiss the claims against it on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment protects it from private suits for money damages under Title II. (Pet. App. 6) By order entered November 10, 1998, the district court denied the motion without comment (Pet. App. 7), and petitioner appealed that order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (J.A. 1 & 8) On February 10, 1999, pursuant to Rule 44(a), FED. R. APP. P., petitioner notified the clerk that the case involved a constitutional

10
challenge to a federal statute. (J.A. 1) The Sixth Circuit granted the United States leave to intervene to defend the constitutionality of Title II on March 31, 1999. (J.A. 2)
On January 10, 2002, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002), in which the sharply divided court concluded, based on Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), “that congressional authority under section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause is limited and will not sustain the Disabilities Act as an exception to Eleventh Amendment state immunity.” 276 F.3d at 812. The Sixth Circuit, however, distinguished between Title II claims sounding in equal protection principles and those sounding in due process principles and held that the latter category of claims is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 813-16.
On July 16, 2002, a panel of the court of appeals issued a per curiam order affirming the district court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss respondents’ claims. (Pet. App. 10) Concluding, based on Popovich, “that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Title II claims against state entities that are based upon Fourteenth Amendment due process principles,” the panel determined that respondents’ Title II claims were not barred “[b]ecause . . . [they are] based on such due process principles.” (Pet. App. 11) On August 29, 2002, petitioner sought a panel rehearing, arguing that Popovich should not control because the Complaint, properly analyzed, did not allege due process violations. (Pet. App. 8) On January 10, 2003, the panel issued an amended opinion affirming the decision of the district court and remanding the case for

11
further proceedings. (Pet. App. 1) Noting that “[a]mong the rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right of access to the courts” (Pet. App. 3), the court, without citation to authority, asserted that “[t]he evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II of the . . . [ADA] established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” (Pet. App. 3-4) The panel therefore concluded that Congress enacted Title II as an appropriate means “ ‘to guarantee meaningful enforcement’ of the constitutional rights of the disabled,” including “the right of access to the courts.” (Pet. App. 4, quoting Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815-16)
Addressing respondents’ particular claims, the panel decided that both sought to redress “due process-type” violations of Title II: “Jones and Lane are seeking to vindicate their right of access to the courts in Tennessee. Lane alleges that he has been denied the benefit of access to the courts. Jones similarly alleges that she has been excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by an inability to access the physical facilities.” (Pet. App. 5) The panel declined to answer petitioner’s contention that respondents’ allegations, particularly those made by Jones, were based on equal protection principles. (Pet. App. 5)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), this Court held that in order to achieve a valid

12
abrogation of the States’ sovereign immunity from private suits for money damages: (1) Congress must have “unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity . . .”; and (2) Congress must have acted “pursuant to a valid exercise of power.” Id. at 55 (internal quotations and citations omitted). After Seminole Tribe, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only source of congressional power sufficient to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Id. at 59-66. While Congress clearly stated its intent to abrogate in the text of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12202, Title II of the ADA exceeds Congress’ section 5 powers.
A. Title II is first and foremost equal protection legislation designed to eliminate discrimination against disabled persons in the “services, programs, or activities” of state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. State action taken on the basis of disability is presumptively constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and is subjected to minimum rational-basis scrutiny. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). When Congress seeks to invoke its section 5 powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against irrational discrimination, it must base such action on evidence of a “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights” by the States. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997). Accord Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003).
The legislative record developed in connection with the enactment of the ADA wholly fails to demonstrate any persisting pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against disabled persons by the States. The official congressional findings set forth in the text of the ADA make no reference to constitutional violations. Those findings do

13
not even refer to the States. Nor do the House and Senate Reports on the ADA contain the slightest hint that Congress was responding to evidence of widespread equal protection violations by the States against the disabled in their services and programs. Indeed, far from indicating concerns about unconstitutional behavior, the record recognizes the States’ leadership in safeguarding the rights of the disabled. Likewise, the information presented to Congress by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities fails to document a pattern of irrational exclusion of the disabled from participation in state programs and services.
Nor can Title II be sustained on the theory that it was needed to enforce the due process rights of the disabled against state infringement. All citizens enjoy a panoply of fundamental constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. But there is nothing in the legislative record to suggest that Congress was acting to protect due process rights, and no substantial evidence was presented to Congress that the States were engaged in a pattern of violations of the fundamental rights of the disabled.
B. Even if the legislative record had documented instances of unconstitutional treatment of the disabled by the States, Title II’s sweeping provisions, the vast majority of which operate to prohibit entirely constitutional conduct, are “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that . . . [Title II] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. Title II shares all of the incongruent and disproportionate features of Title I of the ADA that led this Court in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356

14
(2001), to decide that Title I exceeded Congress’ section 5 authority. While as a general rule States are not required to make special accommodations for the disabled by the Fourteenth Amendment, the entire thrust of Title II is to require them to do just that. In addition, although the Fourteenth Amendment presumes that a failure to make such accommodations is permissible, Title II presumes the contrary and casts upon the States the burden to justify any such failure to act. And Title II prohibits virtually every state action that has an unintended adverse, disparate effect on disabled persons’ access to state services and programs, without regard to whether the action is rationally related to legitimate goals. All of these features demonstrate that Title II was calculated to accomplish precisely what section 5 forbids – “a substantive redefinition” of the States’ obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
Neither is Title II sustainable as prophylactic legislation, needed to deter future constitutional violations by the States. Because there was no record of a pattern of existing unconstitutional treatment by the States of persons with disabilities, Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field. Moreover, this was not a situation where previous legislative attempts to curb unconstitutional behavior by the States had failed. Indeed, the legislative record indicates that it was the very success of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which addressed the needs of disabled persons in connection with programs and services of recipients of federal funds, that led Congress to expand the Rehabilitation Act’s access requirements through the ADA to all state activities as well as to the private sector. Finally, the sheer

15
breadth of Title II, reaching as it does into every facet of the States’ activities, means that Congress could not reasonably have concluded that any significant proportion of the state laws and policies affected by Title II’s provisions would be unconstitutional. In sum, Title II lacks that “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end” which section 5 demands. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
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ARGUMENT
TITLE II OF THE ADA EXCEEDS CONGRESS’ POWER UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO ABROGATE THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE STATES.
This case presents the second occasion for the Court to address the validity of Congress’ attempt to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suits for money damages brought by private persons under the ADA. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), this Court held the attempt invalid as to damages claims against the States asserted under Title I of the ADA, which forbids discrimination on the basis of disability in employment matters. The Court, however, declined to decide whether Congress had the constitutional authority to subject the States to claims for money damages under Title II of the ADA. Id. at 360 n.1. That question is squarely presented here and, for the reasons stated in this brief, should also be answered in the negative.
Petitioner fully shares the view that the ADA represents “a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant,

16
progressive society,” id. at 375 (Kennedy and O’Connor, J.J., concurring), and does not question its duty to comply with the requirements of Title II in all of its services, programs, and activities.2 Petitioner likewise recognizes that its officials may be held to account for any breach of that obligation in actions by private individuals for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), as well as in enforcement actions by the United States. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. What is at stake here, instead, is the preservation of “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . ,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), namely, their immunity from suit at the hands of private parties without their consent. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
The validity of any attempt by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity turns on the answer to two
2 More than a decade before the passage of the ADA, petitioner enacted various laws protecting the rights of the disabled. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2002 Repl.) (prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in employment matters) (enacted 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-104 (2002 Repl.) (directing state and local government “to give positive emphasis to the recruitment, evaluation, and employment of handicapped persons in the public service . . . .”) (enacted 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-120-201–205 (2001 Repl.) (requiring public building accessibility) (enacted 1970).

17
questions: “first, whether Congress has unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity, . . . and second, whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power.” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In the text of the ADA, Congress has clearly stated its intent to subject the States to suit by private persons for violations of Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
“Whether Congress had the power to compel [the] States to surrender their sovereign immunity for these purposes, however, is another matter.” Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999). Congress sought to rest its adoption of the ADA on “the sweep of . . . [its] authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). The Article I commerce power is not a valid source of authority to override the States’ immunity from suit. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78-79. Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment is the only source of legislative authority sufficient to support abrogation. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-66.
Accordingly, unless Title II constitutes an appropriate exercise of Congress’ power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the rights guaranteed to the disabled by that Amendment, Congress lacked the constitutional authority to abrogate the States’ immunity from suits by private persons under Title II. As was the case with Title I of the ADA, Title II exceeds Congress’ section 5 enforcement authority, because the sweeping prohibitions of Title II do not exhibit the constitutionally required “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be

18
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
A. Title II was not enacted in response to evidence of a widespread pattern of state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the disabled.
“ ‘The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.’ ” Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81)). Thus, the power conferred on Congress by section 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation” is “corrective or preventive, not definitional.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525. A valid exercise of that power against the States requires that Congress at a minimum “identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions” on the part of the States. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639. And when, as in the case of Title II, Congress desires to adopt national enforcement legislation that indiscriminately intrudes upon the sovereignty of all fifty States, it must base its action on evidence of a “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights” by the States, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526, documenting the existence of “a problem of national import.” Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641. Measured against these now wellsettled standards, the record on which Congress sought to justify Title II is fatally deficient.

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1. The legislative record fails to document a pattern of irrational discrimination by the States against the disabled.
To ascertain whether Title II was supported by the requisite evidentiary predicate, “[t]he first step . . . is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue . . . .” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. Like the other titles of the ADA, Title II is first and foremost equal protection legislation. Its core purpose is “the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (emphasis added), in the “services, programs, or activities” of state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, state action that classifies on the basis of disability “incurs only the minimum ‘rational-basis’ review applicable to general social and economic legislation.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 (footnote omitted) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)). “Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Moreover, such classifications are presumptively constitutional: “[T]he State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made,” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366, but, instead, “ ‘the burden is on the one attacking . . . [the classification] to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment thus guarantees to disabled persons the right to be free from wholly arbitrary and irrational discrimination at the hands of the States.

20
Congress failed to identify any “widespread and persisting” pattern of arbitrary and irrational discrimination by the States against individuals with disabilities in connection with its enactment of Title II. The official congressional findings set forth in the text of the ADA make no mention of constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)-(9). Although Congress’ findings refer to the existence of both “discrimination against” and “purposeful unequal treatment of” the disabled in many “critical areas” of our society, including “access to public services,” those findings do not identify the States as the source of the problem, nor do they even indirectly suggest that any such disparate treatment properly attributable to the States is of the irrational sort that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. That is to say, insofar as the findings can be said to refer to the States at all, they merely assert that the States are engaged in presumptively constitutional, although perhaps socially undesirable, behavior. Disability is “a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
Nor do the House and Senate Reports on the ADA contain the slightest hint that Congress was responding to evidence of widespread equal protection violations by the States against persons with disabilities in their services and programs. The Senate Report’s succinct statement of Title II’s purposes does not express any concerns of constitutional dimension:
Title II of the legislation has two purposes. The first purpose is to make applicable the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability, currently set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

21
of 1973, to all programs, activities, and services provided or made available by state and local governments . . . regardless of whether or not such entities receive Federal financial assistance. Currently, section 504 prohibits discrimination only by recipients of Federal financial assistance.
The second purpose is to clarify the requirements of section 504 for public transportation entities that receive Federal aid, and to extend coverage to all public entities that provide public transportation, whether or not such entities receive Federal aid.
S. REP. NO. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1989). Conspicuously absent from this explanation of Title II’s purposes is any allegation that the States had been ignoring the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act in those programs to which that Act had applied for nearly two decades prior to the passage of Title II, or that the States were engaged in wholesale unconstitutional discrimination in those programs and services not yet covered. The House Report similarly cited the need to expand the reach of the antidiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act as a central objective of the ADA but did not allege any pattern or practice of violations of that Act by the States, let alone widespread, irrational discrimination against disabled persons. The House Report emphasized instead that additional legislation was needed because “section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] does not apply to private sector entities that do not receive Federal funds.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(IV), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 513 (emphasis added).
Indeed, far from indicating concerns about statesponsored misconduct, the legislative record reflects

22
congressional recognition of the States’ leadership in safeguarding the rights of the disabled. As this Court observed in Garrett: “It is worth noting that by the time Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least one Member of Congress remarked that ‘this is probably one of the few times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, it’s not funny.’ ” 531 U.S. at 368 n.5. The Senate Report candidly acknowledged that “[a]ll states currently mandate accessibility in newly constructed state-owned public buildings . . . ,” S. REP. NO. 101-116 at 92, and recognized that “[v]irtually all States prohibit unfair discrimination among persons of the same class and equal expectation of life.” Id. at 182. Senator Hatch applauded the “growing array of programs and antidiscrimination provisions at the local, state and federal levels designed to enhance [the opportunities of disabled persons] to lead lives of independence . . . ,” id. at 96 (emphasis added), while others expressed the view that existing state antidiscrimination laws provided a model for federal action. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H2614 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (Statement of Rep. Berman) (“States like California, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Illinois and others have offered models on which many aspects of the ADA are based.”).
Nor did the information presented to Congress by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities (“Task Force Report”), summarized in Appendix C to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391-424, document a pattern of irrational exclusion of the disabled from participation in state services, programs and activities. In the first place, these “unexamined, anecdotal accounts of adverse disparate treatment”

23
of the disabled, id. at 370 (internal quotations omitted), “are so lacking in detail as to make it impossible to determine whether a constitutional violation actually occurred.” Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 203, 213 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, fewer than one-third of the examples listed in Appendix C clearly refer to any conduct by a state actor. Although by far the largest category of examples in the compilation concerns a lack of physical access to government buildings and transportation facilities due to architectural barriers and design deficiencies, as well as the failure to comply with regulations regarding handicap parking spaces, most of these examples do not specify state ownership or control of the facilities in question. And, significantly, merely reciting the failure of a state or local government agency to retrofit its facilities to accommodate the disabled, or to provide more convenient parking for the disabled, does not establish an equal protection violation.
“The failure of a State to revise policies now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy does not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy and O’Connor, J.J., concurring). This Court has recognized since Cleburne that the “States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Id. at 367. While decisions by state officials to allocate limited tax dollars to priorities other than improved handicap access to public buildings and transport may justifiably be criticized as “hardheaded” and even “hardhearted,” id., such choices are not irrational and are therefore presumptively constitutional.

24
“If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 368 (footnote omitted).
Finally, the legislative record contains no discussion of state or federal case law demonstrating the existence of widespread equal protection violations by the States arising from discriminatory exclusion of disabled persons from access to government programs and services. The failure of Congress to cite to any such “confirming judicial documentation” is hardly surprising, since, as Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have already noted in their concurring opinion in Garrett, “it does not exist.” Id. at 376.
2. The legislative record likewise fails to document a pattern of state action violating the due process rights of the disabled.
In this case, the court below asserted that the aim of Title II was not merely to safeguard the rights of the disabled to equal protection of the laws but to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. According to the court of appeals, the specific due process right implicated by respondents’ Complaint was “the right of access to the courts.” (Pet. App. 3) But, in the court’s view, the existence of “physical barriers in government buildings” generally has “had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause,” thereby rendering Title II appropriate section 5 enforcement legislation. (Pet. App. 3-4)
The citizens of the States, including disabled citizens, enjoy a panoply of fundamental constitutional rights

25
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee, among them, the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated through the Due Process Clause, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the States.”); the right of access to the courts, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1971) (Though not guaranteed a trial on the merits, “persons forced to settle claims of right and duty through judicial process must be given meaningful opportunity to be heard.”); the right to vote, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental . . .”); the right to travel, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1981) (The right to travel is a “privilege of national citizenship, and . . . an aspect of liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); and various parenting, procreative, and privacy rights, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (“[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education.”). State action abridging these rights is subject to strict scrutiny and may survive constitutional challenge only if necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
The legislative record fails to support the Sixth Circuit’s claim that Title II was enacted to remedy widespread and persisting due process violations by the States. There is no reference to any of the aforementioned fundamental rights in the findings section of the ADA, save a

26
cursory reference to the existence of “discrimination against individuals with disabilities . . . in . . . voting.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). But that solitary reference neither identifies state actors as the perpetrators of such discrimination nor even remotely suggests that the difficulties encountered by some disabled individuals in gaining physical access to deficiently designed polling places have resulted in widespread, unconstitutional deprivations of the right to vote. Id. Similarly, the findings’ generic statement that the disabled have encountered discrimination in access to “public services,” id., simply cannot be read to allege a systematic pattern of fundamental rights violations by the States.
The Senate and House Reports are no more illuminating. Under the major heading “Nature and Extent of Discrimination on the Basis of Disability” and subheading “Public services,” the Senate Report describes only one problem pertinent here – that the “Committee heard about people with disabilities who were forced to vote by absentee ballot before key debates by the candidates were held.” S. REP. NO. 101-116 at 12. No unconstitutional abridgment of the right to vote is easily discerned from these incidents. The House Report contains no discussion whatsoever of any state action abridging the fundamental rights of the disabled.
In sum, there are no findings either in the ADA itself or in the reports accompanying the legislation to the floor of each house of Congress that Title II was needed to remedy rampant violations of fundamental rights by the States. And the handful of incidents described in the Task Force Report that might conceivably rise to the level of such a violation suffer from the same infirmities as those anecdotes discussed above in connection with the Equal

27
Protection Clause. They are simply too vague in content and too few in number to establish a pattern of state misconduct warranting invocation of Congress’ section 5 powers.
B. Title II is not congruent with or proportional to an appropriate remedial objective authorized by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because the traditional separation of powers assigns “to this Court, not Congress, [the authority] to define the substance of constitutional guarantees,” Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977, Congress’ section 5 power to remedy and deter violations of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States is “not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation,” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, or “to substantively redefine the States’ legal obligations” under section 1. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88. “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. A valid exercise of the section 5 enforcement power is, therefore, one “adapted to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide against.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). To insure proper respect for “the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law,” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, the Constitution demands of section 5 legislation that there “be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id. at 520.
Garrett held that Title I of the ADA unconstitutionally crossed that line in at least three critical respects. First,

28
after examining whether Congress had identified evidence of widespread, irrational mistreatment of the disabled by the States in the employment sphere, the Court concluded that the legislative record of the ADA fell “far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370. The Court also determined that Title I’s core “reasonable accommodation” requirement “far exceed[ed] what is constitutionally required” of the States, (1) because it imposed on state employers a duty to make the workplace accessible to disabled employees, even when it would be rational for employers to save money by hiring only workers able to use existing facilities, and (2) because it placed the burden on state employers to justify a failure to accommodate on grounds of undue hardship, “instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision.” Id. at 372. Finally, the Court focused on provisions of Title I forbidding employment practices “that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis” and found them disproportionate to any legitimate remedial objective. Id. at 372-74.
Petitioner has already exposed the serious inadequacies in the legislative record on which Congress sought to ground Title II. That record provided no more justification for an exercise of Congress’ section 5 enforcement power to remedy alleged discrimination against the disabled by the States in their “services, programs, or activities” than it did to support application of Title I’s employment discrimination ban to the States. In addition, the rights and remedies created by Title II share all of the incongruent and disproportionate features of Title I deemed unconstitutional by this Court in Garrett.

29
1. Title II’s indiscriminate scope and extraconstitutional remedial scheme are not tailored to cure violations of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the disabled.
Title II’s lack of congruence with any constitutional injury that has been inflicted by the States on disabled persons is apparent on the face of the statute. Title II reaches all “services, programs, or activities” of the States, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, a formulation that “encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does.” Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998). Its provisions are not tailored to eradicate discrimination in those programs and services that might impact the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. Instead, “Title II targets every state law, policy or program,” Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000), addressing an unlimited array of subjects ranging from parking space availability at state museums3 and concert seating priorities at state performing arts centers4 to recreational offerings at
3 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical Assistance Manual (1993) (“TAM”) § II-5.4000: “A public entity should provide an adequate number of accessible parking spaces in existing parking lots or garages over which it has jurisdiction.”
4 See, e.g., TAM § II-5.2000, illus. 4 (Supp. 1994): “A municipal performing arts center provides seating at two prices – inexpensive balcony seats and more expensive orchestra seats. All of the accessible seating is located on the higher priced orchestra level. In lieu of providing accessible seating on the balcony level, the city must make a reasonable number of accessible orchestra-level seats available at the lower price of balcony seats.”

30
state parks5 and the configuration of bathroom stalls at highway rest areas.6 Thus, Title II suffers from the same defect that was fatal to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, struck down by this Court in City of Boerne: Title II “cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning,” because its “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter.” 521 U.S. at 532.
Unlike the Voting Rights Act of 1965, approved by this Court as an appropriate exercise of Congress’ power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966), Title II is the very antithesis of “a detailed but limited remedial scheme” crafted to address a clearly “targeted violation” of the constitutional rights of disabled persons. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373-74; see also Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1983 (“[T]he FMLA is narrowly targeted . . . and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship.”). Instead, Title II more closely resembles the Patent Remedy Act, declared unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid: When fashioning Title II’s
5 See, e.g., TAM § II-3.5100, illus. 1: “The director of a county recreation program prohibits persons who use wheelchairs from participating in county-sponsored scuba diving classes because he believes that persons who use wheelchairs probably cannot swim well enough to participate. An unnecessary blanket exclusion of this nature would violate the ADA.”
6 See, e.g., TAM § II-5.1000, illus. 3: “A State provides ten rest areas approximately 50 miles apart along an interstate highway. Program accessibility requires that an accessible toilet room for each sex with at least one accessible stall, or a unisex bathroom, be provided at each rest area.”

31
comprehensive antidiscrimination mandate, “Congress did nothing to limit . . . [its] coverage . . . to cases involving arguable constitutional violations” or to those “States with . . . a high incidence of” such violations. 527 U.S. at 64647. In Title II, as in the Patent Remedy Act, “Congress made all States immediately amenable to suit in federal court” for “[a]n unlimited range of state conduct” and “for an indefinite duration.” Id. Title II’s “indiscriminate scope” alone deprives it of that congruence and proportionality essential to valid section 5 legislation. Id. at 647.
Moreover, in the vast majority of circumstances to which Title II applies, the rights and remedies made available to disabled persons by the statute impose requirements on the States that go well beyond anything demanded of them by the Constitution. While as a general rule the “States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled,” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367, Title II commands that the States must make “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,” remove “architectural, communication, or transportation barriers,” and furnish “auxiliary aids and services,” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), if necessary to allow a “qualified individual with a disability” access to state-sponsored “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In other words, “[i]n contrast to the Equal Protection Clause[’s] prohibition on invidious discrimination against the disabled and irrational distinctions between the disabled and the nondisabled, Title II requires public entities to recognize the unique position of the disabled and to make favorable accommodations on their behalf.” Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002). Similarly, the regulations implementing Title II make clear

32
that the failure of a State to make such “favorable accommodations” is presumptively illegal under Title II, unless it “can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity” involved. 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment presumes that a decision not to undertake such affirmative efforts to assist the disabled is entirely permissible, and it casts the burden upon the party claiming otherwise to demonstrate irrational, disparate treatment on the part of the State. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
Indeed, Title II’s reach is not in the least confined to state decisions made with conscious intent to treat disabled persons differently than other citizens. “Title II focuses on disparate effects divorced from any inquiry into intent.” Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2001). See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (forbidding the use of criteria or methods of administration in state programs “[t]hat have the effect of subjecting [disabled persons] to discrimination”); 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(4)(i) (forbidding the selection of sites for public facilities “[t]hat have the effect of . . . subjecting [the disabled] to discrimination”); 29 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (forbidding the use of program eligibility criteria that “tend to screen out an individual with a disability”).7 But
7 There can be little doubt that these disparate impact regulations accurately interpret Title II’s provisions. Congress directed in Title IV of the ADA that no provision of the statute “shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). The Rehabilitation Act, in turn, authorizes discrimination claims against federal
(Continued on following page)

33
state action for which there exists some rational basis does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it may have an adverse, disparate effect on access of disabled persons to state programs and services. For purposes of establishing a constitutional violation, “evidence [of disparate impact] alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
Title II’s lack of proportionality is further revealed when its remedial provisions are compared with those contained in Title III of the ADA, which imposes access and accommodation duties on the private sector comparable to those placed on public entities by Title II. Whereas Congress chose in Title II to subject the States to suits for money damages, see generally Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002), disabled persons are not entitled to recover such relief in a suit to enforce a private sector entity’s obligations under Title III8 but are instead limited to injunctive relief and recovery of attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). There is certainly nothing in the ADA’s legislative history to support the proposition that individuals with disabilities had experienced less serious or pervasive discrimination in the private sector than at the hands of the States or that stronger measures were needed to insure compliance with the ADA’s access and modification mandates by States
grantees arising from policies and practices that have the effect of denying to handicapped persons “meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
8 Congress limited the availability of money damages under Title III to suits brought by the U.S. Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b).

34
than by private entities. To the contrary, as previously discussed, the House Report cited the urgency of addressing discrimination in the private sector as the primary reason for expanding the reach of the Rehabilitation Act’s access requirements beyond recipients of federal funds through the vehicle of the ADA.
All of these features of Title II’s remedial scheme demonstrate that the legislation was calculated not to remedy or deter violations of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of disabled persons but rather to accomplish precisely the objective that section 5 forbids – “a substantive redefinition” of the States’ obligations under section 1 of the Amendment. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81. Indeed, Congress made no pretense otherwise. In the ADA’s statement of findings and purpose, Congress declared that “individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority . . . relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and . . . not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). These words are, of course, borrowed directly from this Court’s case law defining the content of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive guarantees. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (“discrete and insular minorities”); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (illegitimacy deserves quasi-suspect classification status because that characteristic has “no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society.”). And these words unmistakably reveal Congress’ intent that state policies affecting the disabled should be subjected to the more exacting levels of scrutiny reserved by the Fourteenth Amendment for “suspect” or

35
“quasi-suspect” classifications, despite this Court’s express holding to the contrary only five years earlier in Cleburne. 473 U.S. at 442-48.
2. Title II is not sustainable as prophylactic legislation needed to deter constitutional violations by the States.
Title II prohibits the States from enacting a wide range of entirely constitutional measures affecting the interests of disabled persons and, in addition, requires the States to undertake on their behalf countless affirmative efforts that the Constitution does not command. While Congress’ section 5 enforcement power includes the authority to deter violations of the Fourteenth Amendment “by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct . . . [than is] forbidden by the Amendment’s text,” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81, Title II does not satisfy any of the requirements of constitutionally valid prophylactic legislation.
Most significantly, the paucity of evidence before Congress indicating that the States were engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against individuals with disabilities “confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field.” Id. at 91. Although section 5 prophylactic legislation may be justified by “the extent and specificity of the . . . record of unconstitutional state conduct” presented to Congress, Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981 n.11, it bears repeating that the legislative record of the ADA reveals neither widespread irrational treatment of disabled persons nor persistent denials of their fundamental rights by the States.
Second, during its deliberations leading to the enactment of Title II, Congress did not face a situation “where

36
previous legislative attempts had failed” to turn the States away from unconstitutional practices with respect to the disabled, so as to “justify added prophylactic measures in response.” Id. at 1982. See also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (“Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies . . . ”). Dating back to the adoption of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, all state agencies receiving federal financial assistance had been required to follow most of the same access requirements imposed on the States by Title II.9 Yet Congress made no finding of widespread state violations of the Rehabilitation Act at the time of its passage of the ADA. Indeed, the legislative record suggests that it was the very efficacy of this prior enactment that spurred Congress to expand its requirements through the ADA to all state “services, programs, or activities” as well as to the private sector.
9 Although not at issue in this appeal, petitioner notes that the circuits are split over whether the States have immunity from private suits for money damages under the Rehabilitation Act. Compare Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 983 (5th Cir. 2001) (Congress exceeded its authority in abrogating the States’ immunity under the Rehabilitation Act), and Garcia, 280 F.3d at 114-15 (the acceptance of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act by the State of New York did not constitute a knowing waiver of sovereign immunity), with Shepard v. Irving, No. 02-1712, 2003 WL 21977963 at *8 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2003) (a state’s acceptance of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act constitutes a voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity), and Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pa., 302 F.3d 161, 169-71 (3d Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1353 (2003), and Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2574 (2003), and Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 F.3d 626, 628 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002), and Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2001) (same), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 924 (2002), and Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ. v. Jim C., 533 U.S. 949 (2001).

37
Finally, the sheer breadth of Title II’s coverage, which reaches into every facet of the States’ business, compels the conclusion that there is no “reason to believe that many of the laws affected by . . . [Title II] have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. To the contrary, the vast majority of state action, as well as inaction, made illegal by Title II would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of disabled persons. In sum, Title II “is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Id.
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General & Reporter
for the State of Tennessee
MICHAEL E. MOORE* Solicitor General
*Counsel of Record
S. ELIZABETH MARTIN MARY MARTELLE COLLIER Senior Counsel
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL & REPORTER FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207 (615) 741-3226
Attorneys for Petitioner

App. 1
APPENDIX A
SELECTED PROVISIONS FROM THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
42 U.S.C. § 12101. Findings and purpose
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that –
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure

App. 2
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.

App. 3
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter –
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced dayto-day by people with disabilities.
(Pub.L. 101-336, § 2, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 328)
42 U.S.C. § 12102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) Auxiliary aids and services
The term “auxiliary aids and services” includes –
(A) qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments;
(B) qualified readers, taped texts, or other effective methods of making visually delivered

App. 4
materials available to individuals with visual impairments;
(C) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and
(D) other similar services and actions.
(2) Disability The term “disability” means, with respect to an
individual – (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
(3) State The term “State” means each of the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
(Pub.L. 101-336, § 3, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 329.)
42 U.S.C. § 12131. Definitions
As used in this subchapter:
(1) Public entity The term “public entity” means – (A) any State or local government;

App. 5
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 24102(4) of Title 49).
(2) Qualified individual with a disability
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
(Pub.L. 101-336, Title II, § 201, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 337.)
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Discrimination
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
(Pub.L. 101-336, Title II, § 202, July 26, 1990; 104 Stat. 337.)

App. 6
42 U.S.C. § 12133. Enforcement
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.
(Pub.L. 101-336, Title II, § 203, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 337.)
42 U.S.C. § 12134. Regulations
(a) In general
Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement this part. Such regulations shall not include any matter within the scope of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation under section 12143, 12149, or 12164 of this title.
(b) Relationship to other regulations
Except for “program accessibility, existing facilities”, and “communications”, regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (as promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on January 13, 1978), applicable to recipients of Federal financial assistance under section 794 of Title 29. With respect to “program accessibility, existing facilities”, and “communications”, such regulations shall be consistent with regulations and analysis as in part 39 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, applicable to federally conducted activities under such section 794 of Title 29.

App. 7
(c) Standards
Regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall include standards applicable to facilities and vehicles covered by this part, other than facilities, stations, rail passenger cars, and vehicles covered by part B of this subchapter. Such standards shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board in accordance with section 12204(a) of this title.
(Pub.L. 101-336, Title II, § 204, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 337.)
42 U.S.C. § 12202. State immunity
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in1 Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.
(Pub.L. 101-336, Title V, § 502, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 370.)
1 So in original. Probably should be “in a”.

App. 8
APPENDIX B
SELECTED PROVISIONS FROM THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
29 U.S.C. § 794a. Remedies and attorney fees
(a)(1) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16), including the application of sections 706(f) through 706(k) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) through (k)), shall be available, with respect to any complaint under section 791 of this title, to any employee or applicant for employment aggrieved by the final disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to take final action on such complaint. In fashioning an equitable or affirmative action remedy under such section, a court may take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the availability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy.
(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this title.
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
(Pub.L. 93-112, Title V, § 505, as added Pub.L. 95-602, Title I, § 120(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2982.)

App. 9
APPENDIX C SELECTED REGULATIONS FROM
TITLE 28 CHAPTER 1 PART 35 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 General.
(a) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.
(b)(1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity.
(2) In determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities.
28 C.F.R. § 35.101 Purpose. The purpose of this part is to effectuate subtitle A of
title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130 General prohibitions against discrimination.
(a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in

App. 10
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.
(b)(1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of disability –
(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service;
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others;
(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others;
(iv) Provide different or separate aids, benefits, or services to individuals with disabilities or to any class of individuals with disabilities than is provided to others unless such action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to others;
(v) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability by providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that discriminates on the basis of disability in providing any aid, benefit, or service to beneficiaries of the public entity’s program;

App. 11
(vi) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate as a member of planning or advisory boards;
(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.
(2) A public entity may not deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in services, programs, or activities that are not separate or different, despite the existence of permissibly separate or different programs or activities.
(3) A public entity may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration:
(i) That have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability;
(ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to individuals with disabilities; or
(iii) That perpetuate the discrimination of another public entity if both public entities are subject to common administrative control or are agencies of the same State.
(4) A public entity may not, in determining the site or location of a facility, make selections –

App. 12
(i) That have the effect of excluding individuals with disabilities from, denying them the benefits of, or otherwise subjecting them to discrimination; or
(ii) That have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the service, program, or activity with respect to individuals with disabilities.
(5) A public entity, in the selection of procurement contractors, may not use criteria that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability.
(6) A public entity may not administer a licensing or certification program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, nor may a public entity establish requirements for the programs or activities of licensees or certified entities that subject qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability. The programs or activities of entities that are licensed or certified by a public entity are not, themselves, covered by this part.
(7) A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.
(8) A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service,

App. 13
program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.
(c) Nothing in this part prohibits a public entity from providing benefits, services, or advantages to individuals with disabilities, or to a particular class of individuals with disabilities beyond those required by this part.
(d) A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.
(e)(1) Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit provided under the ADA or this part which such individual chooses not to accept.
(2) Nothing in the Act or this part authorizes the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that individual.
(f) A public entity may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program accessibility, that are required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.
(g) A public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an

App. 14
individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.
28 C.F.R. § 35.149 Discrimination prohibited. Except as otherwise provided in § 35.150, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, because a public entity’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.
28 C.F.R. § 35.150 Existing facilities. (a) General. A public entity shall operate each
service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This paragraph does not –
(1) Necessarily require a public entity to make each of its existing facilities accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
(2) Require a public entity to take any action that would threaten or destroy the historic significance of an historic property; or
(3) Require a public entity to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue

App. 15
financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the public entity believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, a public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with § 35.150(a) of this part would result in such alteration or burdens. The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of a public entity or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity, and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.
(b) Methods –
(1) General. A public entity may comply with the requirements of this section through such means as redesign of equipment, reassignment of services to accessible buildings, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, home visits, delivery of services at alternate accessible sites, alteration of existing facilities and construction of new facilities, use of accessible rolling stock or other conveyances, or any other methods that result in making its services, programs, or activities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. A public entity is not required to make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in achieving compliance with this section. A public entity, in making

App. 16
alterations to existing buildings, shall meet the accessibility requirements of § 35.151. In choosing among available methods for meeting the requirements of this section, a public entity shall give priority to those methods that offer services, programs, and activities to qualified individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate.
(2) Historic preservation programs. In meeting the requirements of § 35.150(a) in historic preservation programs, a public entity shall give priority to methods that provide physical access to individuals with disabilities. In cases where a physical alteration to an historic property is not required because of paragraph (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section, alternative methods of achieving program accessibility include –
(i) Using audio-visual materials and devices to depict those portions of an historic property that cannot otherwise be made accessible;
(ii) Assigning persons to guide individuals with handicaps into or through portions of historic properties that cannot otherwise be made accessible; or
(iii) Adopting other innovative methods.
(c) Time period for compliance. Where structural changes in facilities are undertaken to comply with the obligations established under this section, such changes shall be made within three years of January 26, 1992, but in any event as expeditiously as possible.
(d) Transition plan.
(1) In the event that structural changes to facilities will be undertaken to achieve program accessibility, a

App. 17
public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall develop, within six months of January 26, 1992, a transition plan setting forth the steps necessary to complete such changes. A public entity shall provide an opportunity to interested persons, including individuals with disabilities or organizations representing individuals with disabilities, to participate in the development of the transition plan by submitting comments. A copy of the transition plan shall be made available for public inspection.
(2) If a public entity has responsibility or authority over streets, roads, or walkways, its transition plan shall include a schedule for providing curb ramps or other sloped areas where pedestrian walks cross curbs, giving priority to walkways serving entities covered by the Act, including State and local government offices and facilities, transportation, places of public accommodation, and employers, followed by walkways serving other areas.
(3) The plan shall, at a minimum –
(i) Identify physical obstacles in the public entity’s facilities that limit the accessibility of its programs or activities to individuals with disabilities;
(ii) Describe in detail the methods that will be used to make the facilities accessible;
(iii) Specify the schedule for taking the steps necessary to achieve compliance with this section and, if the time period of the transition plan is longer than one year, identify steps that will be taken during each year of the transition period; and
(iv) Indicate the official responsible for implementation of the plan.

App. 18
(4) If a public entity has already complied with the transition plan requirement of a Federal agency regulation implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, then the requirements of this paragraph (d) shall apply only to those policies and practices that were not included in the previous transition plan.
28 C.F.R. § 35.151 New construction and alterations.
(a) Design and construction. Each facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed and constructed in such manner that the facility or part of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the construction was commenced after January 26, 1992.
(b) Alteration. Each facility or part of a facility altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity in a manner that affects or could affect the usability of the facility or part of the facility shall, to the maximum extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, if the alteration was commenced after January 26, 1992.
(c) Accessibility standards. Design, construction, or alteration of facilities in conformance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) (Appendix A to 41 CFR part 101-19.6) or with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG) (Appendix A to 28 CFR part 36) shall be deemed to comply with the requirements of this section with respect to those facilities, except that the elevator exemption contained at section 4.1.3(5) and section

App. 19
4.1.6(1)(k) of ADAAG shall not apply. Departures from particular requirements of either standard by the use of other methods shall be permitted when it is clearly evident that equivalent access to the facility or part of the facility is thereby provided.
(d) Alterations: Historic properties.
(1) Alterations to historic properties shall comply, to the maximum extent feasible, with section 4.1.7 of UFAS or section 4.1.7 of ADAAG.
(2) If it is not feasible to provide physical access to an historic property in a manner that will not threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building or facility, alternative methods of access shall be provided pursuant to the requirements of § 35.150.
(e) Curb ramps.
(1) Newly constructed or altered streets, roads, and highways must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas at any intersection having curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway.
(2) Newly constructed or altered street level pedestrian walkways must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas at intersections to streets, roads, or highways.
28 C.F.R. § 35.164 Duties. This subpart does not require a public entity to take
any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the

App. 20
public entity believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, a public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with this subpart would result in such alteration or burdens. The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of the public entity or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action required to comply with this subpart would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.

 
 315 F.3d 680 (2003)
George LANE; Beverly Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellees, United States of America, Intervenor, v.
State of TENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellant, Polk County, Tennessee, et al., Defendants.
No. 98-6730.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
January 10, 2003.
681 *681 William J. Brown (briefed), William J. Brown & Associates, Cleveland, TN, for Appellees.
Mary M. Collier (briefed), S. Elizabeth Martin (briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Civil Litigation & Staff Services Div., Nashville, TN, for Appellant.
Sarah E. Harrington (briefed), Seth M. Galanter, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.
Before MARTIN, Chief Circuit Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and SILER, Circuit Judges.
AMENDED OPINION
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Circuit Judge.
This Court initially issued an opinion in this case on July 16, 2002. We held that Lane and Jones stated claims founded in due process violations, and, under Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 682 808 (6th Cir.2002) (en banc) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 72, 154 L.Ed.2d 15 (2002), Tennessee and *682 the other state defendants were not immune from Lane and Jones's damages claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. On September 20, we granted the State of Tennessee's motion for panel rehearing. All parties submitted supplemental briefs. Tennessee argued that Lane and Jones's claims are not based on due process violations and that Tennessee therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit on those claims. On rehearing and for the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Tennessee's motion to dismiss and REMAND this case for further proceedings.
In Popovich, we considered the validity of the abrogation of a state's immunity to suit by private parties under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Guiding our hand through our evaluation was the Supreme Court's recent decision in University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001), in which the Supreme Court affirmed that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states to private damage suits. We held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act based on equal protection violations but Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity as to due process claims.
Among the rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right of access to the courts. For criminal defendants like Lane, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted to provide that "an accused has a right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Parties in civil litigation have an analogous due process right to be present in the courtroom and to meaningfully participate in the process unless their exclusion furthers important governmental interests. See Popovich, 276 F.3d at 813-14; Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 386, 88 L.Ed.2d 339 (1985). Further, those who fail to appear in court may not be sanctioned for failing to appear until they have been

accorded due process. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972). These guarantees are protective of equal justice and fair treatment before the courts.
The evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. In Popovich, we found that Title II was enacted "to guarantee meaningful enforcement" of the constitutional rights of the disabled. 276 F.3d at 815-16. In doing so, Congress may require states to consider the nature of the constitutional right at issue, the often relatively small cost of compliance, and the effect of failure to accommodate those with disabilities. In the context of the case before us, Congress could ask states to weigh the fundamental importance of access to the courts to our justice system, that the perpetuation of the current physical barriers force people with disabilities to either forgo their right to be present in court or be carried into court, and that the remedy is often inexpensive and simple.
Based on the record before Congress in considering the Americans with Disabilities legislation, it was reasonable 683 for Congress to conclude that it needed to enact legislation to prevent states from *683 unduly burdening
constitutional rights, including the right of access to the courts. States have myriad ways to unburden these rights, from the major step of renovating facilities to the relatively minor step of assigning aides to assist in access to the facilities. The record demonstrated that public entities' failure to accommodate the needs of qualified persons with disabilities may result directly from unconstitutional animus and impermissible stereotypes. Title II ensures that the refusal to accommodate an individual with a disability is genuinely based on unreasonable cost or actual inability to accommodate, not on inconvenience or unfounded concerns about costs.
This statutory protection is a preventive measure commensurate to the gravity of precluding access to the courts by those with disabilities. In addition, these requirements are carefully tailored to the unique features of disability discrimination that persists in public services. A simple ban on discrimination against those with disabilities lacks teeth. The continuing legacy of discrimination is too powerful. Title II affirmatively promotes integration of those with disabilities.
Jones and Lane are seeking to vindicate their right of access to the courts in Tennessee. Lane alleges that he has been denied the benefit of access to the courts. Jones similarly alleges that she has been excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by an inability to access the physical facilities. Tennessee responds that the violations alleged are not due process violations. The difficult questions presented by this case cannot be clarified absent a factual record. Because in Popovich we held that Title II is an appropriate means of enforcing the due process rights of individuals, and because this case came to us before any development of the facts, we hold that the district court appropriately denied Tennessee's motion to dismiss this action.
We AFFIRM the decision of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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 Tennessee v. Lane, 540 U.S. 1072 (2003) 124 S.Ct. 951
Supreme Court of the United States TENNESSEE, petitioner, v. George LANE, et al.
No. 02-1667. | Dec. 8, 2003. Opinion Motion of the Solicitor General for divided argument granted. Motion of Alabama, et al., for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument denied. Parallel Citations 124 S.Ct. 951 (Mem), 157 L.Ed.2d 741, 72 USLW 3391
1

 
 Lane v. Tennessee
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit September 20, 2002, Filed No. 98-6730

Reporter: 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20209 GEORGE LANE, et al, Plaintiffs - Appellees; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, Defendant - Appellant; POLK COUNTY, et al., Defendants

Opinion ORDER

Prior History: Lane v. Tennessee, 40 Fed. Appx. 911, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14482 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2002).
Disposition: Rehearing was granted and prior opinion was withdrawn by the court.

Upon the petition of the appellant State of Tennessee for panel rehearing of the court's decision in the appeal noted above, and the court having found the petition to be well taken; it is

Counsel: For George Lane, Beverly Jones. Plaintiffs Appellees: William J. Brown, William J. Brown & Associates, Cleveland, TN.
For State of Tennessee, Defendant - Appellant: Mary M. Collier, Asst. Atty. General, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN. S. Elizabeth Martin, Office of Attorney General, Nashville, TN.
Judges: [*1] Before: MARTIN, Chief Circuit Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and SILER, Circuit Judges.

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is hereby GRANTED. The opinion and judgment of July 16, 2002 are hereby withdrawn, and the case is restored to the court's active docket. The parties are further instructed to file briefs not in excess of 25 pages addressing the issue as outlined in the petition for rehearing, with each side's brief to be filed not later than the close of business on Wednesday, October 23, 2002. Upon the filing of the briefs the court will proceed to dispose of the case.

 
 Tennessee v. Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2003)
123 S.Ct. 2622 Supreme Court of the United States
TENNESSEE, petitioner, v.
George LANE, et al. No. 02-1667. | June 23, 2003.
Case below, 315 F.3d 680.

Opinion
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.
Parallel Citations 123 S.Ct. 2622 (Mem), 156 L.Ed.2d 626, 71 USLW 3736, 71 USLW 3785, 71 USLW 3789
	  

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