Case 1:14-cv-00091-L-LDA Document 1 Filed 02/19/14 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 1
,.···-·Ftl ED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLANftl~ fEB I q A 10: 25

Karen Davidson, Debbie Flitman, Eugene Perry, Sylvia Weber, and American Civil Liberties Union ofRhode Island, Inc.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
City of Cranston, Rhode Island
Defendant.

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U S. DIS TR\CT COURT

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OIS1i\ICT OF RHODE ISLAND

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CA. 14-

91

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Civil Action No. - - - -

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. This lawsuit challenges the redistricting plan adopted by the City of

Cranston, Rhode Island in 2012 for election of members of the Cranston City Council

and of the School Committee (hereafter, "2012 Redistricting Plan" or "Plan") on the

grounds that it violates the rights of Plaintiffs to equal representation under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 2012 Redistricting Plan

creates serious and unconstitutional inequalities in the voting strength of persons residing

in Wards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the City of Cranston, as compared to the voting strength of

persons residing in Ward 6. This inequality results from the fact that, in creating the

Plan, Defendants failed to account for the fact that Rhode Island's sole state prison

complex, the Adult Correctional Institutions ("ACI"), is located in Ward 6. The Plan

treats the approximately 3,433 persons incarcerated at the ACI as if they were "residents"

of Ward 6, even though the overwhelming majority of these individuals are not true

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residents of the district, but instead remain residents of their pre-incarceration community for virtually all legal purposes, including voting. Because the incarcerated population constitutes a full 25% of the people who make up Ward 6, that ward has significantly fewer actual residents than any of the other five wards. As a result, every three actual residents of that ward have as much say about city and school affairs as four residents in any other ward. The voting strength of persons residing in Ward 6 is artificially inflated and the voting strength of persons residing in all other wards is consequently diluted, in violation of the one person, one vote principle established by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce their right to equal protection under the law pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. This suit is authorized by 42
u.s.c. § 1983.
3. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). THE PARTIES
4. Plaintiff Karen Davidson resides at 56 Marion Avenue in the City of Cranston, has resided at that address for more than 30 days, is over the age of 18, and is a registered voter in Cranston City Council Ward 1. She regularly votes in Cranston elections. She is a member of the American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island ("ACLU RI").
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5. Plaintiff Debbie Flitman resides at 51 Lindsay Lane in the City of Cranston, has resided at that address for more than 30 days, is over the age of 18, and is a registered voter in Cranston .City Council Ward 4. She regularly votes in Cranston elections. She is a member of ACLU RI.
6. Plaintiff Eugene Perry resides at 4 Bayamo Lane in the City of Cranston, has resided at that address for more than 30 days, is over the age of 18, and is a registered voter in Cranston City Council Ward 1. He regularly votes in Cranston elections. He is a member of ACLU RI.
7. Plaintiff Sylvia Weber resides at 84 Shaw Avenue in the City of Cranston, has resided at that address for more than 30 days, is over the age of 18, and is a registered voter in Cranston City Council Ward 1. She regularly votes in Cranston elections. She is a member of ACLU RI.
8. Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc. ("ACLU RI") is a duly organized non-profit, non-partisan corporation with over 1,800 members, including approximately 100 members residing in Cranston, Rhode Island who are adversely affected by the unequal population of the wards created by the 2012 Redistricting Plan. ACLU RI is dedicated to vindicating the principles of liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution and the right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, and submitted testimony to the Cranston City Council on the issue that is the subject of this complaint. ACLU RI brings this action in its representative capacity on behalf of its members who are adversely affected by the unequal population of the wards created by the 2012 Redistricting Plan.
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9. Defendant City of Cranston, Rhode Island is a municipal corporation organized under Rhode Island law. It is responsible for establishing voting districts for the City Council of Cranston and for the School Committee. It is also responsible for overseeing the conduct of elections for the City Council of Cranston and for the School Committee, which occur every two years in even-numbered years. The next regular election will be held in September 2014. With respect to the matters complained of herein, the City of Cranston has acted and refused to act under color of state law.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 10. The City Council of Cranston has nine members, six of whom are elected by individual wards and three of whom are elected city-wide. 11. The six individual wards each elect one representative to the City Council of Cranston. 12. The School Committee has seven members, six of whom are elected by individual wards and one of whom is elected city-wide. 13. Each of the six individual wards elects one representative to the School Committee. 14. Rhode Island has only one state correctional complex for the entire state's correctional facilities, known as the Adult Correctional Institutions ("ACI"). It is located in the City of Cranston, in Ward 6. 15. According to 2010 Census data, the ACI houses an estimated 3,433 inmates. A significant majority of those inmates are ineligible to vote in City or School Committee elections because they are incarcerated for a felony conviction. R.I. Const. art. II, § 1. Those incarcerated persons who remain eligible to vote are not permitted to
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claim the ACI as their domicile for voting purposes, but must instead vote by absentee ballot from their pre-incarceration domicile. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 17-1-3.1(a) ("[a] person can have only one domicile, and the domicile shall not be considered lost solely by reason of absence for ... [c]on:finement in a correctional facility.")
16. Upon information and belief, the overwhelming majority of the persons incarcerated at the ACI are not residents of Cranston, much less of Ward 6 of Cranston. Instead, they remain residents of the communities where they lived prior to their incarceration. R.I. Gen. Laws§ 17-1-3.1(a).
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17. Upon information and belief, persons incarcerated at the ACI do not have a choice as to where they will serve their prison sentences.
18. Upon information and belief, incarcerated persons at the ACI cannot voluntarily visit or patronize public or private establishments in Cranston such as restaurants, hotels, grocery stores, gas stations, schools, movie theaters, museums, musical performances, shops, parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, theatres, churches, businesses, recreational centers, or public transportation.
19. Upon information and belief, the children of persons incarcerated at the ACI are not allowed to attend public schools in Cranston by claiming residence of the parent at the ACI.
20. For purposes of municipal and school committee redistricting, the City of Cranston includes incarcerated persons at the ACI as "residents" of the city's Ward 6. These "residents" make up 25% of Ward 6's population, according to Census Bureau data.
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21. According to Census Bureau data, without the incarcerated population, Ward 6 has only 10,209 true constituents. Yet those constituents now wield the same political power as the roughly 13-14,000 constituents in each of the other wards.
22. According to the population distribution that the City published with its redistricting plan, the total population deviation of the 2012 Redistricting Plan is listed as approximately 5%. But without crediting Ward 6 with the entire state's incarcerated population at the ACI, the total population deviation between the districts with the lowest and highest populations is over 28%, far outside the constitutional limits on population deviation under the one person, one vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
23. As a result of the 2012 Redistricting Plan, the voting strength of individual residents living in Cranston Ward 6 is inflated and the voting strength of plaintiffs in Wards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 is diluted.
24. Plaintiff ACLU RI presented testimony to the City Council during the redistricting process which pointed out the severe population discrepancies that would result from including the incarcerated population of the ACI in the population base for redistricting, and urged the City Council to account for the fact that the incarcerated population in Ward 6 cannot properly be considered residents of Ward 6. The City Council nevertheless adopted a redistricting plan that relies on the ACI to make up 25% of the population in Ward 6, seriously undermining the central redistricting goal of population equality among districts.
25. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' actions complained of herein, and that harm will continue unless defendants' current practice of
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counting prison populations for the purpose of apportionment is declared unlawful and enjoined.
26. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law other than this action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of Equal Protection) 27. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 28. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 29. The "one person, one vote" principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that each person's vote shall be equal to that of his or her fellow citizens. 30. The reliance on the incarcerated population of the ACI to help make up Ward 6 in the City of Cranston for purposes of drawing municipal districts inflates the voting strength and political influence of the residents in Ward 6 and dilutes the voting strength and political influence of Plaintiffs and other persons residing outside of Ward 6, in violation of the Equal Protection requirements of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to: (1) Exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims brought under the United States Constitution;
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(2) Declare that the 2012 Redistricting Plan adopted by the City of Cranston violates Plaintiffs' right to equal protection under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(3) Enjoin Defendants and their agents, employees, and representatives from conducting elections for the City Council of Cranston and the School Committee under the 2012 Redistricting Plan;
(4) In the event Defendants fail or are unable to implement a redistricting plan that comports with the Constitution of the United States, enforce a court ordered redistricting plan;
(5) Award Plaintiffs the expenses, costs, fees, and other disbursements associated with the filing and maintenance of this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
(6) Exercise continuing jurisdiction over this action during the enforcement of its judgment; and
(7) Award any other and further relief this Court deems proper and just.
DATED this 13._ day of~2014.
Plaintiffs,
Lynette abinger #1645 RONEY & LABINGER LLP 344 Wickenden St. Providence, RI 02903 (401) 421-9794 (401) 421-0132 (fax) labinger@roney-labinger. com Cooperating counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of RI
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w" Ew-"b
Brenda Wright*

\~ f:6~

Demos 1710 Rhode Island Avenue NW, 1i 11 Floor

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 559-1543x13

bwright@demos.org

ACLU Voting Rights Project 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 284-7359 syoung@aclu.org
Attorneys for Plaintifft
Of Counsel:
Aleks Kajstura Prison Policy Initiative 69 Garfield Avenue, Floor 1 Easthampton, MA 01027 (413) 527-0845 akaj stura@prisonpolicy.org
AdamLioz Demos 1710 Rhode Island Avenue NW, li11 Floor Washington, DC 20036 (202) 559-1543xl12 alioz@demos.org

*subject to pro hac vice admission 9

 
 Case 1:14-cv-00091-L-LDA Document 35 Filed 05/24/16 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 766

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

KAREN DAVIDSON, DEBBIE FLITMAN, EUGENE PERRY, SYLVIA WEBER and AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF RHODE ISLAND, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CRANSTON, RHODE ISLAND,
Defendant.

C.A. No. 14-91L

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RONALD R. LAGUEUX, Senior United States District Judge. This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The Complaint was brought by four named plaintiffs, all residents and registered voters from Cranston, Rhode Island, along with The American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc., on behalf of its members who reside in Cranston (henceforth collectively identified as “Plaintiffs”). Defendant is the City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Plaintiffs allege that the Redistricting Plan adopted by Cranston in 2012 violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the inclusion of the State’s entire prison population in a single city ward operates to dilute the voting strength and political influence of the residents of the other

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wards. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; instead granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
Background Cranston’s 2012 Redistricting Plan is based on population numbers generated by the United States Census Bureau as part of its every-ten-year census count, most recently undertaken in 2010. As this Court explained in its earlier decision (denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, at 42 F. Supp.3d 325, 326 (D.R.I. 2014)), the Census Bureau has historically counted prison inmates as residents of the district where their prison is located. In 2010, the Census Bureau counted 3,433 prisoners at Rhode Island’s only state prison, the Adult Correctional Institutions (the “ACI”), and included the prisoners as Cranston residents. When Cranston drew its city ward boundaries in 2012, it included the entire prison population in Ward Six, where the ACI is geographically located. According to the Census, as of April 2010, Cranston had a total population of 80,387, with Ward Six’s population at 13,642. Cranston has a total of six wards, each made up of approximately 13,500 residents.1 According to Defendant, the total maximum deviation among the population of the six wards is less than ten percent. However, if, as Plaintiffs advocate, the prisoners are
1 The largest ward, Five, has a population of 13,817. -2-

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subtracted from Ward Six’s population, its total population is reduced to 10,209. Without the prison population, the deviation between the largest ward and Ward Six is approximately 35%.2
Each ward elects one representative to the City Council and one to the School Committee. Additionally, three at-large city councilors and one at-large school committee member are selected by voters from all six wards. Although the City includes ACI’s prison inmates in Ward Six, the majority of inmates cannot vote in the Ward. Rhode Island’s Constitution states that no one who has been convicted of a felony may vote while incarcerated. R.I. Const. Art. II, § 1. Prisoners at the ACI for reasons other than a felony conviction may vote only by absentee ballot at their pre-incarceration domiciles. Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 17-13.1(a)(2). According to the demographic experts retained by the parties, 153 or 155 prisoners came from Cranston at the time of the Census. Eighteen of those had pre-incarceration addresses located in Ward Six.
The population of the ACI is transient. Inmates may be serving sentences or awaiting trial. According to Plaintiffs’ demographic expert, the median length of stay for those serving a sentence at the ACI is 99 days. The median stay for those awaiting trial is three days. The ACI’s principal research
2 Plaintiffs state that the total maximum deviation among all the wards (with the prison population omitted) is 28.12%.
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technician Caitlin O’Connor stated that approximately 37% of the population is serving a felony sentence. Applying that percentage to the eighteen inmates with pre-incarceration addresses in Ward Six leaves between six and seven inmates who could be eligible to vote in Ward Six.
The ACI inmate population does not participate in the civic life of Cranston or Ward Six. Inmates are only rarely permitted to leave the facility. Approximately 15-25 inmates from minimum security check out on a daily basis to participate in work release programs. A slightly larger number, 60-100, leave the prison for work details, but are prohibited from interacting with the public. Similarly, some inmates may be furloughed for family or health emergencies, at which time they are accompanied by correctional officers and are not permitted to interact with the public. Inmates may not leave the prison to visit in the community, make use of parks or other municipal recreational facilities, use the roads or ride on public transportation. In addition, they are not able to send their children to Cranston public schools based on their ACI address.
The City provides only minimal services to the ACI, which is located on a state-operated campus. Although the Cranston police occasionally deliver a prospective inmate to the prison, most requests for police services are handled by the State Police, which maintains an office at the ACI. The Cranston Fire
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Department does provide services to the ACI, although calls to the ACI represent only a negligible percentage of the Department’s total calls per year.
Cranston’s elected officials do not campaign or endeavor to represent their ACI constituents. Nor do they enact regulations or ordinances that bear on conditions at the ACI. Ward Six city councilor Michael Favicchio is in his third term and campaigned actively in the Ward in 2010, 2012 and 2014. However, his only trips to the ACI have been made in connection with his law practice. The school committee member from Ward Six, along with the four at-large elected officials, report that they have had no contact with anyone incarcerated at the ACI. Similarly, Mayor Allan Fung, who has served as Cranston’s mayor since his election in 2008, reports that he has only visited the ACI once during his mayoral tenure, for a tour of the facility. He recalls no contact with any inmates during this visit. Mayor Fung remembers receiving a letter from an inmate complaining about her medical care, but he doesn’t think that he responded to the letter. There is no record of the City Council discussing any issues relating to the welfare of ACI’s inmates, or of any city councilor being contacted by family members on behalf of any ACI inmate. As might be expected, in deposition testimony, these officials all reported expending much time and effort in canvassing and outreach to other Cranston residents during their
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campaigns, and in constituent services following their elections. Plaintiffs’ Complaint states one cause of action: that
Defendant’s Redistricting Plan violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, causing them ongoing and irreparable harm by diluting their votes in municipal elections. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Redistricting Plan is unconstitutional, and they seek to enjoin future elections in Cranston until an acceptable plan is developed.
Standard of Review When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must look to the record and view all the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Continental Cas. Co. v, Canadian Univ. Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991). Once this is done, Rule 56(c) requires that summary judgment be granted if there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is one affecting the lawsuit’s outcome. URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Board of Governors for Higher Education, 915 F.Supp. 1267, 1279 (D.R.I. 1996). The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the moving party to show that the undisputed facts entitle it to summary judgment as a matter of law. Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1989). The analysis required for cross motions for summary judgment is the same. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Torres, 561 F.3d 74, 77 (1st
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Cir. 2009) (“The presence of cross-motions neither dilutes nor distorts this standard of review.”). In evaluating crossmotions, the court must determine whether or not either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the undisputed facts. Id. In the present case, the parties disagreed about some of the population figures and some of the mathematical calculations. Where possible, the Court relied on the Census figures and other uncontested figures. At any rate, the discrepancies noted by the parties were not material to the outcome of the dispute.
Analysis In ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, this Court reviewed Supreme Court voting-rights jurisprudence and the notion of “One Man, One Vote.” 42 F. Supp. 3d at 327-31. The right to vote and the right to have one’s vote counted are fundamental tenets of our democracy. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that it was constitutionally unsustainable to draw district lines so that “the votes of citizens in one region would be multiplied by two, five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value.” 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964). The right to petition elected officials, a right not limited to voters, is also fundamental to representative government, and is equally
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vulnerable to unconstitutional dilution if an official in one district represents more people than those represented by the official the next district over. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
The Supreme Court has historically urged that voting districts be drawn so as to equalize population. This was in part based upon a not-unreasonable assumption that equal population groups would naturally include substantially equal numbers of voters. At times, however, the Court has skirted around instances where districts with equal population have yielded disparate numbers of voters. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534 (1969), Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966), see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). However, since this Court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court addressed and resolved some of the tension and confusion between representational equality and electoral equality, in Evenwel et al. v. Abbott, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1120 (2016).
Evenwel In Evenwel,3 voters sued Texas’ governor and secretary of state, objecting to the district lines drawn for state senate
3 Evenwel was issued by an eight-member Supreme Court, with two judges filing concurring opinions.
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elections. Texas had drawn its lines according to population data, dividing the population into districts with a total population deviation of 8.04%. 136 S.Ct. at 1125. (In Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a maximum deviation between the largest and smallest district of under 10% is presumptively constitutional.) The problem, according to the Evenwel appellants was that the numbers of eligible voters in each district varied by a much wider margin – over 40%. 136 S.Ct. at 1125. The solution urged by appellants was to redraw the districts using citizen-voting-age-population (CVAP) data generated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Id. at 1126. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, siding with the United States:
Equalizing total population, the United States maintains, vindicates the principle of representational equality by “ensur[ing] that the voters in each district have the power to elect a representative who represents the same number of constituents as all other representatives.”
Id. at 1126. Following a review of history back to the Founding Fathers,
the Court concluded that “representatives serve all residents, not just those eligible or registered to vote.” Id. at 1132. The Court continued:
Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy debates – children, their parents, even their grandparents, for example, have a stake in a strong public-education system – and in receiving constituent
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services, such as help navigating public-benefits bureaucracies. By ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same number of constituents, total-population apportionment promotes equitable and effective representation.
Id.
Defendant in the present case argues that Evenwel stands
simply for the constitutional propriety of drawing district lines
based on Census population data. But to stop at that holding is
to overlook the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the conceptual basis
of representational equality. In its review of the drafting
history of the Constitution and later the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court repeatedly stresses the prevailing view that
women, children, slaves, tax-paying Indians and non-land-holding
men (in some areas) all deserved representation – though none of
these groups could vote.
In other words, the basis of representation in the House was to include all inhabitants – although slaves were counted as only three-fifths of a person – even though States remained free to deny many of those inhabitants the right to participate in the selection of their representatives. Endorsing apportionment based on total population, Alexander Hamilton declared: “There can be no truer principle than this – that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of the government.”
Id. at 1126 (emphasis in the original).
The inmates at the ACI share none of the characteristics of
the constituencies described by the Supreme Court. They don’t
have a stake in the Cranston public school system and they are
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not receiving constituent services, such as help with publicbenefits bureaucracies. They are not making requests of and suggestions to Cranston elected officials (or if they are, they are receiving no response), nor are they receiving “the protection of government,” at least not from Cranston elected officials. Nonetheless, their numerical presence in the Ward is unfairly inflating the voice of the Ward’s other inhabitants.
ACI’s inmates are different from other groups of non-voting residents of Cranston, such as the students at Johnson & Wales University mentioned by Defendant. The Supreme Court has previously upheld the inclusion of groups such as college students and military personnel in voting districts, based on principles of representational equality. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530. College students, for example, may register to vote from their campus addresses, and, whether they vote or not, they are free to contact local elected officials to voice their viewpoints. They are most certainly affected by municipal regulations.4 In contrast, were the Cranston City Council to enact any ordinance bearing on the treatment of inmates or other
4 Just last year, Providence’s City Council contemplated enacting a three-student tenancy limit for single family houses in response to rowdy parties near the campus of Providence College. And students at the University of Rhode Island protested the Town of Narragansett’s practice of placing offcampus houses on a Nuisance House List and marking them with big orange stickers, notifying local police of which places to monitor.
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conditions at the ACI, it would no doubt be preempted by state law and therefore unenforceable. Because of these distinctions, the Court cannot stretch the holding of Evenwel to cover the inmate population at ACI.
Calvin v. Jefferson County A federal court in Florida recently issued a ruling in a voting rights case with facts almost identical to the facts before this Court. Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, Case No. 4:15CV131-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 1122884 (N.D. Florida). Florida’s Jefferson County is divided into five districts, with each district electing a county commissioner and a school board member. With a total population of 14,761 in the county (based on 2010 U.S. Census figures), each district has a total population of approximately 3,000. The Jefferson Correctional Institution, a state facility operated by the Florida Department of Corrections, is located in District 3. The prison population tallies 1,157 inmates, with only nine of those convicted in Jefferson County. Based upon opinions issued by the Florida Attorney General interpreting state statute, Jefferson County officials were advised that they were required to include the population of the prison when drawing district lines with substantially equal populations. 2016 WL 1122884, at *5. Nonetheless, Judge Mark Walker held that the inclusion of the prison population in the County’s districting plan was
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unconstitutional. Id., at *24.
Judge Walker’s opinion is well-reasoned and extensive. This
Court, feeling the time pressure of Cranston’s redistricting task
ahead, focuses only on its most salient points. Analyzing the
civic and political roles of elected representatives and
community members, or “denizens,” Judge Walker concluded that the
“JCI” inmates lack a fundamental and necessary “representational
nexus” with the County district. Id., at *22. In coming to this
conclusion, Judge Walker developed a test:
An apportionment base for a given legislative body cannot be chosen so that a large number of nonvoters who also lack a meaningful representational nexus with that body are packed into a small subset of legislative districts. Doing so impermissibly dilutes the voting and representational strength of denizens in other districts and violates the Equal Protection clause.5
For Plaintiffs to prevail in this case, they have to show that the JCI inmates comprise a (1) large number of (2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational nexus with the Boards, and that they’re (4) packed into a small subset of legislative districts.
Id., at *18.
The harm of malapportionment, Judge Walker concluded, is not
a structural harm, but is instead harm to the individual.
The constitutional infirmity in a set of malapportioned legislative districts lies not in the failure to equalize some population measure, but in the infringement of some peoples’ rights to participate in
5 Judge Walker also based his ruling on a separate Equal Protection analysis which addresses the arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of particular groups from voting districts. Id., at *16.
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our form of representative democracy. Put another way, when a suit challenging a districting scheme reaches federal court, the court does not sit as a superlegislature to question the districting choices of the legislative body from a policy standpoint. Rather, the court functions in its traditional role as a vindicator of individual rights.
Id., at *8. Like the inmates in at the Jefferson County prison, the
ACI’s inmates lack a ‘representational nexus’ with the Cranston City Council and School Committee, as demonstrated by the facts set forth above. And, as in Jefferson County, the district lines for Cranston’s wards serve to dilute the voting strength and political influence of the residents of wards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, thereby causing an infringement of the individual constitutional rights of the residents of those wards. For every vote that ten residents of those wards casts to elect a city councillor or school committee member, the officials in Ward Six need only get seven votes to prevail. Likewise, when campaigning in Ward Six, a candidate need only knock on seven doors, rather than ten doors in the other wards. And, when serving on behalf of Ward Six, its officials are only held accountable to approximately 7/10 the number of constituents compared with the other wards. This is constitutionally untenable. Consequently, the Cranston City Council is hereby ordered to create a new districting plan. The inmate population of the ACI must be subtracted from the total population, and the lines must be drawn with substantially equal
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numbers of people in each ward. For purposes of this ruling, the inmate population of the ACI is 3,433.
Conclusion For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and grants Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Declaratory judgment is hereby entered on behalf of Plaintiffs on their Complaint. The City of Cranston, the Cranston City Council and the City’s Board of Canvassers are enjoined from holding further elections under the current ward districting plan. The Cranston City Council shall have thirty days from the entry of this Order to propose a districting plan that complies with this Order, and with all other applicable federal and state laws to the extent those state laws are compatible with federal law. It is so ordered.
/s/Ronald R. Lagueux Ronald R. Lagueux Senior United States District Judge May 24 , 2016
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

KAREN DAVIDSON, DEBBIE FLITMAN, EUGENE PERRY, SYLVIA WEBER and AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF RHODE ISLAND, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CRANSTON, RHODE ISLAND,
Defendant.

C.A. No. 14-91L

MEMORANDUM AND DECISION RONALD R. LAGUEUX, Senior United States District Judge. This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant City of Cranston, Rhode Island (“the City”), to dismiss the Complaint against it in its entirety. The Complaint alleges that the municipal ward Redistricting Plan adopted by the City in 2012 violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs Karen Davidson, Debbie Flitman, Eugene Perry and Sylvia Weber are City residents. The American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc. (hereinafter, together with the named plaintiffs, designated as “Plaintiffs”), joins the suit in order to represent its approximately 100 members who reside in the City, and who are,

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allegedly, adversely affected by the Redistricting Plan. For the reasons explained below, this Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Background The 2012 Redistricting Plan is based on population numbers tallied by the United States Census Bureau as part of its decennial census count undertaken in 2010. The United States Census Bureau is required by the Constitution to count every person residing in the United States every ten years, in order that the information may be used to allocate representation to the United States House of Representatives. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Census Bureau undertakes to count each person according to their ‘usual residence,’ and has historically counted prisoners as residents of the district where their prison is located. In 2010, the Census Bureau counted the 3,433 prisoners incarcerated in Rhode Island’s only state prison complex, the Adult Correctional Institutions (“ACI”), as residents of Cranston. When the City drew its ward boundaries for the 2012 Redistricting Plan, the entire prison population was situated within one ward. Each of Cranston’s six wards elects one representative to the City Council. An additional three city councilors are elected at-large. The City’s school committee is made up of seven members – one from each ward and one at-large. According
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to Plaintiffs, each city ward has approximately 13,000-14,000 residents.
According to Plaintiffs, the 3,433 prisoners housed at the ACI, and included as part of the population of Ward Six, cannot vote in the ward. Indeed, Rhode Island’s Constitution provides that no one who has been convicted of a felony may vote until his or her sentence is completed. R.I. Const. Art. II, § 1. Those prisoners who are able to vote, who are at the ACI for reasons other than a felony conviction, are required to vote by absentee ballot at their pre-incarceration domicile – considered by State statute to be their “residence for voting purposes.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-1-3.1(a)(2).1
According to Plaintiffs, “the overwhelming majority” of prisoners are not residents of Cranston, let alone its Ward Six. Assuming this to be true, as the Court must on a motion to dismiss, the number of prisoners who are able to vote in Ward Six likely is negligible. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege, in addition to not voting in Ward Six, the prison population is unable to participate in, benefit from or contribute to any other aspect of civic life in Cranston.
1 R.I.G.L. § 17-1-3.1 provides in pertinent part: (a) A person’s residence for voting purposes is his or her fixed and established domicile. ... A person can have only one domicile, and the domicile shall not be considered lost solely by reason of absence for any of the following reasons: ... (2) Confinement in a correctional facility;...
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According to Plaintiffs’ calculations, the prison population makes up 25% of the total population of Ward Six. As a result, the voting power of the remaining 75% of the Ward’s residents2 is strengthened; while at the same time, the voting power of residents of the other five wards is diluted. Plaintiffs assert in the Complaint, “[E]very three actual residents of that ward [Six] have as much say about city and school affairs as four residents in any other ward.” According to the City, the population deviations amongst the wards is around 5%. However, according to Plaintiffs, if the prison population were subtracted from the count, the deviation is over 28%.
Plaintiffs assert that they attended City Council meetings during the redistricting process to object to the inclusion of the ACI population in Ward Six. Nonetheless, the City ultimately adopted the plan, causing Plaintiffs ongoing and irreparable harm. Plaintiffs claim one cause of action, for violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. They seek a declaration that the 2012 Redistricting Plan is unconstitutional and seek to enjoin further elections in Cranston until a constitutionally-acceptable plan is developed.
Standard of Review Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule
2 The remaining residents in Ward Six number 10,209. Complaint ¶ 21.
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12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all allegations
in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1996). The United States Supreme Court has recently stated the
standard as follows: “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately,
it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with
the allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). The Supreme Court further
refined its requirements in Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
Analysis
The right to vote, be counted and be represented
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that the right to vote and to have one’s vote counted is a
fundamental tenet of our democracy. In Wesberry v. Sanders, a
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case involving allegations of racial gerrymandering in Georgia’s
congressional districts, the Court wrote:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). Wesberry held that inherent in the right
to vote was the right to have that vote counted, meaning “that as
nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another’s.” Id. at 7-8. The
Court extended this notion of ‘one man, one vote’ to state
legislative bodies in Reynolds v. Sims, an Alabama racial
gerrymandering case:
[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. ... The resulting discrimination against those individual votes living in disfavored areas is easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. Two, five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to that of their favored neighbor.
377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964). Correlated to the right to vote is
the right of a citizen to petition his or her elected official,
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which right of access is similarly diluted if the official represents more people than the official in the neighboring district represents. U.S. Const. amend. I; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
To avoid vote dilution, the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims mandated that state legislative voting districts be based on population:
We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.
377 U.S. at 568. The Court went on to require that “a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Id. at 577.
While Wesberry required strict population equality in congressional voting districts, 376 U.S. at 8-9, the Reynolds Court allowed that States might be permitted some leeway in their legislative districts, in order to allow for other possible legitimate considerations, such as existing political subdivisions. 377 U.S. at 578. The Reynolds Court left the crafting of this standard to the lower courts, as long as its
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primary directive was followed: Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.
Id. at 579. By 1983, the Supreme Court was willing to tolerate voting districts with significantly disparate populations for Wyoming’s state legislature in Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). While districting plans which allocated disproportionately more representation to less-populated rural areas in comparison with higher-populated urban areas were found to have racially-discriminatory intent in the Southern states in the civil-rights-era cases, this kind of arrangement met with Supreme Court approval in Brown, because allowing each county to have its own representative, regardless of population, was deemed a rational state policy. Id. at 848. The Court also stressed that Wyoming’s plan was applied neutrally and consistently, and had no taint of discriminatory intent. Id. at 846.
In Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968), the Supreme Court extended its holding in Reynolds v. Sims to intrastate districting. (“We hold today only that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic
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area served by the body.”)
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of voting
rights embodies, and frequently merges, two distinct concepts.
First is the idea represented by the oft-repeated phrase: “One
Man, One Vote.” The Supreme Court could not be more adamant
about the importance of each voter’s vote carrying the same
weight as his neighbor’s vote:
The personal right to vote is a value in itself, and a citizen is, without more and without mathematically calculating his power to determine the outcome of an election, shortchanged if he may vote for only one representative when citizens in a neighboring district, of equal population, vote for two; or to put it another way, if he may vote for one representative and the voters in another district half the size also elect one representative.
Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688,
698 (1989). The second requirement clearly articulated by the
Supreme Court is that the first goal should be achieved by
drawing political boundaries in such a way so as to achieve
districts with equal populations, as precisely as is practicable:
Therefore, the command of Art. I § 2, that States create congressional districts which provide equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). The subject
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of extensive litigation since the landmark voting rights cases of the 1960s has been the murky area where population parity fails to achieve the goal of voting equality.
The rights of non-voters In every voting district, there are residents who can’t vote. In the past, this group included women and slaves. Currently, the group includes, inter alia, children, non-citizens and prisoners. In addition, there are groups who can vote but may choose to vote in other districts, such as college students, members of the military assigned to temporary bases, and federal employees at federal installations. All of these groups have been the subject of federal voting rights litigation. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)(personnel “home-ported” at the U.S. Naval Station in Virginia); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (federal employees living at the National Institute of Health in Maryland); Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530 (“military personnel, college students, and other nonvoters”); Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000)(noncitizens and minors); Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp.2d 887 (D.Md. 2011)(prisoners) aff’d 133 S.Ct. 29 (2012); Perez v. Texas, 2011 WL 9160142 (W.D.Tex.) (prisoners in a context of claims of racial gerrymandering); Travis v. King, 552 F.Supp. 554 (D. Haw. 1982)(military personnel). Frequently, the Supreme Court implicitly assumes that districts with equal populations will
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include an even distribution of members of non-voting groups, with the result being a neat coincidence of voter and population equality. However, this assumption does not prove to be consistently reliable.
The suitability of Census figures The Supreme Court has recognized the shortcomings of relying on Census figures to establish intrastate voting districts, and has never held that reliance on Census figures is constitutionally required. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 331; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966). For one thing, while States and municipalities rely on U.S. Census figures to draw intrastate districts, the federal enumeration is undertaken specifically to allocate seats in the United States Congress. The Supreme Court has noted that the political disproportion that may be caused by counting non-voting residents, which tends to be more evenly distributed in large districts, is magnified in smaller districts. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 737 (1983). Consequently, the Supreme Court has approved efforts to adjust Census figures to achieve districts with greater voting parity, as long as those efforts are employed consistently. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 535; Burns, 384 U.S. at 92 (“Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has this Court suggested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of
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a crime in the apportionment base by which their legislators are
distributed and against which compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause is to be measured.”); Fletcher, 831 F.Supp.2d
887 (approving Maryland’s law that required state and federal
prisoners to be counted at their pre-incarceration domiciles for
purposes of generating local, state and federal legislative
districts).
Equal representation
When Census-driven voter disproportion is tolerated, it is
justified by the notion of providing “equal representation for
equal numbers of people” – a notion inherent and implicit in the
Supreme Court’s insistence on districts of strict population
equality, and embodied in the Constitution’s “right to petition”
clause. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 391. The Ninth Circuit
addressed the importance of representational equality in Garza v.
County of Los Angeles:
The framers were aware that this apportionment and representation base would include categories of persons who were ineligible to vote – women, children, bound servants, convicts, the insane, and, at a later time, aliens. Nevertheless, they declared that government should represent all the people. In applying this principle, the Reynolds Court recognized that the people, including those who are ineligible to vote, form the basis for representative government. Thus population is an appropriate basis for state legislative appointment.
918 F.2d 763, 774 (9th Cir. 1990)(citations omitted)(emphasis in
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original). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the rights of noncitizens, minors and other similar groups to express themselves politically and otherwise participate in civic life. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
In a noteworthy concurrence and dissent in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski elucidated the distinction between ‘electoral equality’ and ‘representational equality’– a distinction frequently elided by the Supreme Court.
How does one choose between these two apparently conflicting principles? It seems to me that reliance on verbal formulations is not enough; we must try to distill the theory underlying the principle of one person one vote and, on the basis of that theory, select the philosophy embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Coming up with the correct theory is made no easier by the fact that the Court has been less than consistent in its choice of language...
918 F.2d at 781. Following an extensive parsing of the Supreme Court’s dictates in the area of voting rights, Judge Kozinski concluded that electoral equality is the paramount goal of the Constitution, writing: “It is very difficult in my view, to read the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in this area without concluding that what lies at the core of one person one vote is the principle of electoral equality, not that of equality of representation.” Id. at 782.
Cranston’s prison population
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While Judge Kozinski’s concurrence is clarifying and
compelling, the case now before this Court presents an alleged
set of circumstances that appears to be justified by neither the
principle of electoral equality nor of representational equality.
Clearly, the inclusion of the ACI prison population is not
advancing the principle of electoral equality because the
majority of prisoners, pursuant to the State’s Constitution,
cannot vote, and those who can vote are required by State law to
vote by absentee ballot from their pre-incarceration address.
Consequently, according to Plaintiffs, a full 25% of the
population of Ward Six cannot vote in the Ward. The Fifth
Circuit has indicated that, in its view, this kind of arrangement
may not be constitutionally acceptable:
...[G]enerally, the ineligible to vote or to register to do so (whether felons, minors, or noncitizens) can be assumed to be evenly distributed throughout the area to be districted, and the usage of total population is thus an acceptable surrogate for measuring potential voters. When, however, a districting body knows that large numbers of those ineligible to vote are disproportionately concentrated in certain areas, it can no longer in good faith use total population as a proxy for potential voters. Instead, it is obligated to deploy a more sophisticated measurement...
Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d at 524 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, if Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, the
prisoners’ inclusion in Ward Six does nothing to advance the
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principle of representational equality. Nonvoting residents
generally have a right to petition elected officials, even if
they were not able to vote for them; and they may generally be
presumed to have a great interest in the management of their
municipalities. This is true of minors, noncitizens, college
students, and military and naval personnel. The Supreme Court
pointed this out in discussing the inclusion of National
Institute of Health personnel living in a federal enclave in
Maryland:
Thus, if elected representatives enact new state criminal laws or sanctions or make changes in those presently in effect, the changes apply equally to persons on NIH grounds.... Further, appellees are as concerned with state spending and taxing decisions as other Maryland residents, for Congress has permitted the States to levy and collect their income, gasoline, sales, and use taxes – the major sources of state revenues – on federal enclaves. State unemployment laws and workmen’s compensation laws likewise apply to persons who live and work in federal areas. Appellees are required to register their automobiles in Maryland and obtain drivers’ permits and license plates from the State; they are subject to the process and jurisdiction of state courts; they themselves can resort to those courts in divorce and child adoption proceedings; and they send their children to Maryland public schools.
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. at 424.
But does any of this apply to prisoners at the ACI? Based
on Plaintiffs’ allegations, it appears to the Court that the ACI
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population does not participate in any aspect of the City’s civic life. According to Plaintiffs, they cannot send their children to school in Cranston; they cannot visit the City’s parks; they do not pay taxes to the City; they do not drive on the City’s roads. It is not clear from the information available to the Court at this juncture of the litigation that the prisoners at the ACI’s inclusion in Ward Six furthers the Constitutional goals of either representational or electoral equality. Consequently, because the Court cannot say that the City’s 2012 Redistricting Plan is constitutional as a matter of law, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is denied.
Conclusion For the reasons explained above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint hereby is denied. In due time and after consultation with counsel, the Court will issue a pretrial scheduling order to bring this matter to a bench trial where the precise facts can be determined. In the meantime, the status quo in this matter will be maintained.
/s/Ronald R. Lagueux Ronald R. Lagueux Senior United States District Judge September 8 , 2014
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 Case: 1C6a-1se6912:14-Dcvo-c0u0m09e1n-tL: -0L0D1A170D5o7c7u7m8 entP5a0geF: 1iled 0D9a/2te1/F1i6ledP: a0g9e/211/o2f02136 PagEenIDtry#I:D8:460034449
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1692 KAREN L. DAVIDSON; DEBBIE FLITMAN; EUGENE PERRY; SYLVIA WEBER; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF RHODE ISLAND, INC., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. CITY OF CRANSTON, RHODE ISLAND, Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
Before Howard, Chief Judge, Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Normand G. Benoit, with whom David J. Pellegrino, Robert K. Taylor, and Partridge Snow & Hahn LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Adam Lioz, with whom Brenda Wright, Dēmos, Dale Ho, Sean J. Young, American Civil Liberties Union, Lynette J. Labinger, and Roney & Labinger, LLP were on brief, for appellees.
Christina Swarns, Sherrilyn Ifill, Janai Nelson, Leah C. Aden, Coty Montag, Juan Cartagena, Jose L. Perez, Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, Rebecca R. Ramaswamy, Danielle C. Gray, Samantha M. Goldstein, and O'Melveny & Myers LLP on brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Direct Action for Rights and Equality, and Voice of the Ex-Offender, amici curiae.
Patrick Llewellyn, Aderson B. Francois, Yael Bromberg, and Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law

Case: 1C6a-1se6912:14-Dcvo-c0u0m09e1n-tL: -0L0D1A170D5o7c7u7m8 entP5a0geF: 2iled 0D9a/2te1/F1i6ledP: a0g9e/221/o2f02136 PagEenIDtry#I:D8:461034449
Center on brief for Former Directors of the U.S. Census Bureau, amici curiae.
September 21, 2016

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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The City of Cranston appeals from an injunction, entered by the district court, forbidding the City from holding elections based on its 2012 Redistricting Plan and ordering it to prepare a new redistricting plan within thirty days. The district court held that the inclusion in the Redistricting Plan of 3,433 inmates of the Adult Correctional Institutions ("ACI") in the population count of the City's Ward Six, the ward in which the ACI is physically located, dilutes the votes of voters in the City's other five wards in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question presented is whether the Constitution permits Cranston to count the ACI prisoners as residents of Ward Six.
We issued a stay to preserve the status quo ante in anticipation of the September 13, 2016 primaries and the November 8, 2016 general election. We now hold that the methodology and logic of the Supreme Court's decision in Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016), require us to reverse the district court and instruct it to enter summary judgment in favor of the City.
I. The Rhode Island Constitution specifies that state legislative districts "shall be constituted on the basis of population and . . . shall be as nearly equal in population . . . as possible." R.I. Const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VIII, § 1. Similarly, Cranston's charter, ratified by the Rhode Island
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General Assembly in 1963, see 1963 R.I. Pub. Laws 550, "divide[s Cranston] into six wards in such a manner that . . . all wards shall contain as nearly as possible an equal number of inhabitants as determined by the most recent federal decennial census," Cranston, R.I., City Charter § 2.03(b). "Each ward elects one representative to the City Council and one to the School Committee," and all six wards collectively elect "three at-large city councilors and one at-large school committee member." Davidson v. City of Cranston, No. 14-91L, 2016 WL 3008194, at *1 (D.R.I. May 24, 2016).
The U.S. Census "serves as a linchpin of the federal statistical system." Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 341 (1999) (citation omitted). Since 1790, the Census has produced its total-population counts by counting each person where he or she "usually resides," see Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 101, 103, and from 1850 to the present the Census has continually refined its "usual residence" rule for determining where to count persons. Currently, "usual residence" is defined as "the place where [persons] live and sleep most of the time." 2020 Decennial Census Residence Rule and Residence Situations, 80 Fed. Reg. 28950 (May 20, 2015).
The 2010 Census data used by Cranston in its 2012 Redistricting Plan, the most recent such plan, included in its population count for the City 3,433 inmates of the ACI. The ACI,
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"which is located on a state-operated campus," Davidson, 2016 WL

3008194, at *2, is Rhode Island's sole state prison. Although the

ACI makes "most requests for police services [to] the State Police,

which maintains an office at the ACI," "the Cranston police

occasionally deliver a prospective inmate to the prison." Id. at

*2. The ACI also depends on Cranston's roads and sewage system,

as well as on the City's fire department for emergency services.

The City's population in the 2010 Census was 80,387, and

each of the City's six wards includes approximately 13,500 persons,

with a "total maximum deviation among the population of the six

wards [of] less than ten percent." Id. at *1. The 3,433 ACI

inmates were counted by the City as part of the 13,642 members of

Ward Six. If the inmates were not included, Ward Six would contain

only 10,209 persons, and the maximum deviation among the population

of the wards would be approximately thirty-five percent.

"[D]emographic experts retained by the parties"

testified that "153 or 155 [ACI] prisoners came from Cranston at

the time of the Census," and that "[e]ighteen of those had pre-

incarceration addresses located in Ward Six."

Id.

The

plaintiffs' demographic expert also testified that "the median

length of stay for those serving a sentence at the ACI is 99 days,"

and that "[t]he median stay for those awaiting trial is three

days." Id. at *2.

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Those inmates at the ACI not imprisoned for felonies may vote by absentee ballot in their pre-incarceration communities, provided that they meet that community's absentee-ballot requirements. The Rhode Island Constitution forbids felons to vote while incarcerated, R.I. Const. art. II, § 1, but under Rhode Island law, non-felon inmates may vote at their "fixed and established domicile," the location of which is unaffected by their incarceration, 17 R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-1-3.1(a), (a)(2). Taking into account testimony that "approximately 37% of the [ACI] population is serving a felony sentence," the district court estimated that only "six [or] seven inmates . . . could be eligible to vote in Ward Six." 1 Davidson, 2016 WL 3008194, at *2.

1

To be clear, this case is not about the right of the ACI

inmates to vote. Cranston argues that the district court "reached

the erroneous legal conclusion that [state law] forbids ACI inmates

from registering to vote in Cranston." The City contends that,

like other persons, the ACI inmates may "establish a new voting

domicile" in Cranston under the general standards set by Rhode

Island law. See R.I. Const. art. II, § 1 ("Every citizen of the

United States of the age of eighteen years or over who has had

residence and home in this state for thirty days next preceding

the time of voting, who has resided thirty days in the town or

city from which such citizen desires to vote, and whose name shall

be registered at least thirty days next preceding the time of

voting as provided by law, shall have the right to vote for all

offices to be elected . . . ."); 17 R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-1-3.1(a)

("The determinant of one's domicile is that person's factual

physical presence in the voting district on a regular basis

incorporating an intention to reside for an indefinite period.");

In re Op. of the Justices, 16 A.2d 331, 332 (R.I. 1940). This

contention, if true, would in turn cast doubt on the district

court's low estimate of eligible voters.

We need not resolve this issue. Even assuming that the district court's estimate of voter-eligible ACI inmates is

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In February 2014, four residents of Cranston and the American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island filed a complaint against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that Cranston's 2012 Redistricting Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the inclusion of the ACI inmates in Ward 6 "inflates the voting strength and political influence of the residents in Ward 6 and dilutes the voting strength and political influence of Plaintiffs and other persons residing outside of Ward 6," thereby violating the equal protection principle of "one person, one vote."2 The City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in March 2014, which the district court denied in September 2014. Davidson v. City of Cranston, 42 F.

accurate, its conclusion that the Constitution requires Cranston to exclude the ACI inmates still does not follow.

2

The plaintiffs' vote-dilution claim is distinct from a

different claim advanced by amici curiae NAACP et al., who have

argued that Cranston's inclusion of the ACI prisoners in Ward Six

is an example of "prison-based gerrymandering, which . . .

significantly and impermissibly weakens the political power of

communities of color" elsewhere in the state. This hypothetical

claim is that the inclusion of minority ACI inmates in the

Redistricting Plan dilutes the political power of the communities

of color where the prisoners resided pre-incarceration. The claim

is simply not advanced by the plaintiffs in this case, and we will

not hear new claims from amici. See González-Droz v. González-

Colón, 660 F.3d 1, 12 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011). To the degree amici

advance a policy argument, such an argument should be addressed to

the Rhode Island legislature.

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Supp. 3d 325 (D.R.I. 2014). The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment in July and August of 2015.
In May 2016, the district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. It held that the City's inclusion of the ACI inmates in its Redistricting Plan violated the principle of "one person, one vote" as consistently articulated by the Supreme Court, notwithstanding its recent decision in Evenwel v. Abbott. Davidson, 2016 WL 3008194, at *3–4. Rejecting the City's argument "that Evenwel stands simply for the constitutional propriety of drawing district lines based on Census population data," the district court instead stressed "the Supreme Court's emphasis on the conceptual basis of representational equality." Id. at *4.
The district court concluded that "[t]he inmates at the ACI share none of the characteristics of the [historically nonvoting] constituencies [such as women, children, slaves, taxpaying Indians, and non-landholding men] described by the Supreme Court" and found by the Court to deserve representation in apportionment. Id. The district court found that the inmates have no interest in Cranston's public schools, receive few services from the City, and have no contact with Cranston's elected officials. Id. The court further emphasized that the "inmates are different from other groups of non-voting residents of Cranston," including "college students and military personnel."
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Id. Unlike those non-voting residents, many of the inmates are forbidden by law from voting in Cranston.
And though college students "are most certainly affected by municipal regulations," the court concluded that the ACI inmates have no stake in the local political process. Id. The court noted that, "were the Cranston City Council to enact any ordinance bearing on the treatment of inmates or other conditions at the ACI, it would no doubt be preempted by state law and therefore unenforceable." Id. These distinctions, the court reasoned, rendered Evenwel's general approval of districting based on Census data inapplicable to the inclusion of prisoners in redistricting population counts. Id.
The district court found support for its holding in Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, No. 4:15CV131MW/CAS, 2016 WL 1122884 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2016), a case decided shortly before Evenwel. Davidson, 2016 WL 3008194, at *5. In Calvin, the court held that the Equal Protection Clause barred Jefferson County from including prisoners from the Jefferson Correctional Institution, a state prison, in its redistricting population count. 2016 WL 1122884, at *28. The Calvin court reached this conclusion because the prisoners "comprise a (1) large number of (2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational nexus with the [County] Boards, and . . . [are] (4) packed into a small subset of legislative districts." Id. at *19. As a result,
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the inclusion of the prisoners unconstitutionally diluted the voting power of those in other County districts. Id. at *26.
The district court found that Calvin's reasoning applied with full force to Cranston's similar inclusion of the ACI prisoners in its Redistricting Plan. Davidson, 2016 WL 3008194, at *5. It granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs; entered declaratory judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs; enjoined the City, the City Council, and the City's Board of Canvassers "from holding further elections under the current ward districting plan"; and ordered the City Council to "propose a [new] districting plan that complies with this Order" within thirty days. Id. at *6. The court vacated its declaratory judgment in a separate order. Cranston then filed this timely appeal.
II. Before addressing the merits of the City's appeal, we must ask whether we have jurisdiction to hear it. The parties agree that we have jurisdiction, but partly dispute its source and the resulting standard of review. The City argues that we have jurisdiction pursuant both to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants us jurisdiction over "appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States," and to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which grants us jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying,
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refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." The City argues that the district court's "order was final for all practical purposes because, based on the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the City's apportionment was deemed unconstitutional," and that accordingly the proper standard is the de novo review we give to "cross motions for summary judgment." See Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (standard of review for appeal from summary judgment is de novo).
The plaintiffs argue that because "the district court entered but then vacated a judgment in a separate document . . . there is no final judgment allowing appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). Instead, the plaintiffs contend that our only avenue for review is our jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under § 1292. The plaintiffs contend that review under § 1292 triggers a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
This disagreement is less significant than it seems. Whether or not the district court's judgment could be treated as "final" for purposes of § 1291, we are satisfied that the injunctive relief the district court granted allows us to review Cranston's appeal under § 1292. See Small v. Wageman, 291 F.2d 734, 735 n.1 (1st Cir. 1961) ("Since the appeal is from an order
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of the District Court granting an injunction, this court clearly has appellate jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)."). While the plaintiffs take the position that "[a]n appeal from interlocutory relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion," this statement is overbroad. The cited cases actually stand for the narrower proposition that the abuse of discretion standard applies to a district court's decision on a request for a preliminary injunction.
This appeal arises from a permanent injunction that necessarily rests upon an actual adjudication of the merits. That adjudication, in turn, was entered summarily under Rule 56, rather than after a trial. Cranston's challenge is to the merits of the district court's summary judgment ruling. 3 Accordingly, our review is de novo. See Domínguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 428 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Our review of the entry of summary judgment is de novo."); Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668, 678 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating, in an interlocutory appeal, that a permanent injunction could "stand only if the court properly awarded summary judgment," and applying a de novo standard of review). Further, the issue presented is

3

Cranston also challenges the district court's factual

findings concerning the ACI inmates' "representational nexus" to

the City. Because we find Cranston's challenge to the district

court's legal analysis dispositive, we do not reach its challenge

to the district court's factual findings.

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one of law, engendering de novo review. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2008).
III. It is true that Evenwel did not decide the precise question before us. Nevertheless, we hold that its methodology and logic compel us to hold in favor of Cranston. Evenwel dictates that we look at constitutional history, precedent, and settled practice. 136 S. Ct. at 1126. Doing so leads us to find the inclusion of the ACI prisoners in Ward Six constitutionally permissible. In particular, Evenwel did not disturb Supreme Court precedent that apportionment claims involving only minor deviations normally require a showing of invidious discrimination, which has not even been alleged here. Without such a showing of discrimination, Evenwel reinforces that federal courts must give deference to decisions by local election authorities related to apportionment. Finally, the Evenwel Court gave general approval to the use of total-population data from the Census in apportionment, which is what Cranston used here. Application of these principles requires us to uphold the constitutionality of Cranston's decision to include the ACI inmates in Ward Six. Evenwel rejected an equal protection challenge to the use of total-population data from the 2010 Census to redraw Texas's State Senate districts. Id. at 1125. The resulting districting map's "maximum total-population deviation [among districts was]
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8.04%, safely within the presumptively permissible 10% range."

Id.; see also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983)

(establishing ten-percent range). "But measured by a voter-

population baseline -- eligible voters or registered voters -- the

map's maximum population deviation exceed[ed] 40%." Evenwel, 136

S. Ct. at 1125. Plaintiffs from "Texas Senate districts . . .

with particularly large eligible- and registered-voter

populations" sued, "[c]ontending that basing apportionment on

total population dilute[d] their votes in relation to voters in

other Senate districts, in violation of the one-person, one-vote

principle of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. The basic theory

of their complaint was that the Constitution's one-person, one-

vote principle, first announced and applied to state governments

in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964), and later applied

to local governments in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,

484–86 (1968), requires that political bodies use voter

population, rather than total population, in apportionment.

Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1125–26. A three-judge district-court

panel had dismissed the complaint, holding that "[d]ecisions of

[the Supreme] Court . . . permit jurisdictions to use any neutral,

nondiscriminatory population baseline, including total population,

when drawing state and local legislative districts." Id. at 1126.

The Supreme Court affirmed.

The Court examined

"constitutional history," id. at 1127–30, precedent, id. at 1130–

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32, and "settled practice," id. at 1132. After reviewing

historical materials, the Court concluded that "it remains beyond

doubt that the principle of representational equality figured

prominently in the decision to count people, whether or not they

qualify as voters." Id. at 1129. Likewise, the Court's

precedents "suggested[] repeatedly[] that districting based on

total population serves both the State's interest in preventing

vote dilution and its interest in ensuring equality of

representation."

Id. at 1131.

The Court observed that

"[a]dopting voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional command

would upset a well-functioning approach to districting that all 50

States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for

decades, even centuries." Id. at 1132. Moreover, the Court

rejected the more general notion that nonvoters are not a

significant population for apportionment:

Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy debates -- children, their parents, even their grandparents, for example, have a stake in a strong public-education system -- and in receiving constituent services, such as help navigating public-benefits bureaucracies. By ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same number of constituents, total-population apportionment promotes equitable and effective representation.

Id.

Several principles emerge from Evenwel. First, the

Court did not disturb precedents holding that, where Reynolds's

requirements of population-based apportionment are met, a

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plaintiff usually must show invidious discrimination to make out an apportionment claim under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has made it clear elsewhere that:
Where the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims are met, apportionment schemes . . . will constitute an invidious discrimination only if it can be shown that "designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) ("As we have indicated, for example, multimember districts may be vulnerable [to constitutional challenge], if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized."). Here, there is no showing, nor even a claim, that either racial or political groups have been fenced out of the process in Cranston.
The Court has further emphasized in the context of statelevel apportionment that "minor deviations from mathematical equality among . . . districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination," Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745), and that "as a general matter, . . . an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations," id.
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Again, the plaintiffs have made no claim that Cranston's redistricting works any invidious discrimination.
Second, Evenwel reinforced the principle established by earlier Supreme Court decisions that courts should give wide latitude to political decisions related to apportionment that work no invidious discrimination. It has long been constitutionally acceptable, but by no means required, to exclude non-voting persons such as "aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime [from] the apportionment base," Burns, 384 U.S. at 92, so long as the apportionment scheme does not involve invidious discrimination, id. at 89. The Court has repeatedly cautioned that such decisions, absent any showing of discrimination, "involve[] choices about the nature of representation with which we have been shown no constitutionally founded reason to interfere." Id. at 92; see also Brown, 462 U.S. at 847–48 ("Particularly where there is no 'taint of arbitrariness or discrimination,' substantial deference is to be accorded the political decisions of the people of a State acting through their elected representatives." (citation omitted) (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964))). Cranston's Redistricting Plan, accordingly, is entitled to deference.
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Third, Evenwel approved the status quo of using total population from the Census for apportionment. 4 The Court underlined that point when it observed that "in the overwhelming majority of cases, jurisdictions have equalized total population, as measured by the decennial census. Today, all States use totalpopulation numbers from the census when designing congressional and state-legislative districts, and only seven States adjust those census numbers in any meaningful way." 136 S. Ct. at 1124. The Court further noted that only four states (California, Delaware, Maryland, and New York) "exclude inmates who were domiciled out-of-state prior to incarceration." Id. at 1124 n.3 (citing Cal. Elec. Code § 21003(a)(5); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 804A; Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 2–2A–01; and N.Y. Legis. Law § 83–m(13)(b)).
It is implausible that the Court would have observed that the majority of states use unadjusted total population (including prisoners) from the Census for apportionment, upheld the constitutionality of apportionment by total population as a

4

Several past directors of the United States Census

Bureau have submitted an amicus brief arguing that "the usual

residence rule and the Census Bureau's determination of where to

count persons for census purposes are not designed to answer the

question of where those persons should be counted for redistricting

purposes," particularly in the case of incarcerated individuals.

That may well be the case. But it does not follow that a town

errs in itself relying on census data to determine population in

the absence of any unusual circumstances not presented here.

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general proposition, and yet implied that the inclusion of prisoners in total population for apportionment, without any showing of discrimination, is constitutionally suspect. The more natural reading of Evenwel is that the use of total population from the Census for apportionment is the constitutional default, but certain deviations are permissible, such as the exclusion of non-permanent residents, inmates, or non-citizen immigrants. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 n.3, 1132–33; see also Burns, 384 U.S. at 92 (recognizing that these decisions belong to state legislatures). Those permissible deviations are just that -optional, but not the norm. The norm, as practiced by the large majority of states, is to district based on total-population data from the Census, which includes prisoners. Evenwel held this approach to be "plainly permissible." 136 S. Ct. at 1126. For the past half-century, Cranston has chosen to use this "plainly permissible" method for its districting.
We also note the risks inherent in the plaintiffs' theory. The district court's reading of Evenwel would turn one of the arguably permissible adjustments to total-population data Evenwel described briefly in a footnote -- the exclusion of prisoners with domiciles out of state -- into a constitutional requirement even for in-state prisoners. Plaintiffs' analysis invites federal courts to engage in what have long been recognized as paradigmatically political decisions, best left to local
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officials, about the inclusion of various categories of residents in the apportionment process.
We decline that invitation. The decision whether to include or exclude the ACI prisoners in Cranston's apportionment is one for the political process. This conclusion becomes more obvious when one considers the unusual nature of the plaintiffs' vote-dilution claim. The plaintiffs claim that the overwhelming majority of Cranston's population (more than 66,000 of its approximately 80,000 residents) has incrementally diluted its own voting power by inflating the voting power of voters in Ward Six. That majority, which controls at least five of Cranston's nine city councilors, may reverse its own decision if it sees fit.
Under the logic of Evenwel and the Supreme Court's earlier apportionment jurisprudence, Cranston's 2012 Redistricting Plan easily passes constitutional muster. As mandated by the City's charter, which mirrors the total-population apportionment required by Rhode Island's constitution, the Redistricting Plan is based on total population from the Census. It contains a maximum population deviation of less than ten percent. And there is no evidence that the plan works any invidious discrimination. Cranston's longstanding tradition of districting by total
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population based on the Census aligns with the practice of the large majority of states, which Evenwel endorsed.5
The plaintiffs advance other arguments in support of affirmance, but they fare no better than the district court's reading of Evenwel. The plaintiffs contend that the City's Redistricting Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause because "Supreme Court precedent establishes that jurisdictions may not blindly or conclusively rely upon Census numbers when drawing their districts, but rather must look to the realities on the ground when seeking to achieve representational equality." But the cases they cite for this proposition involve facts easily distinguishable from those of this appeal.
Plaintiffs cite to Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), which involved an unconstitutional exclusion from Maryland's voting rolls of persons who lived on a federal enclave in Maryland. The case does not speak to a city's inclusion of inmates residing in a state-operated prison facility located within the city.
In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, modified in part, 411 U.S. 922 (1973), the Virginia state legislature divided the cities of Virginia Beach and Norfolk into three districts each calculated to have an equal population and a single senatorial representative. In calculating the supposedly equal districts, however, the state

5

To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never adopted a

"representational nexus" analysis.

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relied on Census data to assign to one district roughly 18,000 military personnel who lived in the adjoining districts, thereby diluting the votes of the military personnel.6 In those "unusual, if not unique, circumstances," the Court affirmed a decision requiring reapportionment in order to eliminate "discriminatory treatment" of the military personnel. Id. at 331–32. Here, plaintiffs advance no claim that the state legislature has diluted their votes in a manner that implicates a comparable consideration of discriminatory treatment.
There has been no allegation that the Census has mistakenly assigned the ACI inmates to a place that was not their residence at the time the Census was conducted, nor has there been any allegation that the assignment resulted in "discriminatory treatment" of the inmates or any other party.7 The inclusion of the prisoners in the 2010 Census data for the City affords a

6

The Census data assigned all personnel to the location

of their ship berths. Id. at 330 n.11.

7

Likewise, in Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972, 986–87

(Or. 2001) (en banc), the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon

Secretary of State had incorrectly relied on Census data that

assigned the inmates of a federal prison to the wrong Census block

after the inaccuracy had been brought to his attention. The

court's holding on this challenge was articulated primarily on

state-law grounds, and the court "stress[ed] that this holding is

limited to the particular circumstances of this case. We do not

suggest that the Secretary of State always must question census

data or that the Secretary of State must investigate simply on the

allegation that the Census Bureau made an error." Id. at 987

n.26.

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Case: 1C6a-1se6912:14-Dcvo-c0u0m09e1n-tL: -0L0D1A170D5o7c7u7m8 entP5a0geF: 2ile3d 09D/2a1te/1F6ilePda: g0e9/2231/o2f02136 PagEenIDtry#I:D8:662034449
presumptively valid reason for including them in the City's Redistricting Plan. Nothing argued by the plaintiffs or found by the district court casts doubt on that presumptive validity.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs' arguments and the reasoning of the district court are hard to distinguish from the "voter population" argument rejected in Evenwel. This is most obvious when the plaintiffs and the district court emphasize that although the maximum deviation of total population in Cranston's wards is less than ten percent when one includes the ACI inmates in Ward Six, that figure leaps to thirty-five percent if one excludes the ACI prisoners in Ward Six. See Davidson, 2016 WL 3008194, at *1. Like the disparities in voter population complained of by the Evenwel plaintiffs, this argument begs the question. The Constitution does not require Cranston to exclude the ACI inmates from its apportionment process, and it gives the federal courts no power to interfere with Cranston's decision to include them.
IV. The order of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the City of Cranston.
- 23 -

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 1 of 8
U.S. District Court District of Rhode Island (Providence) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14−cv−00091−L−LDA

CLOSED

Davidson et al v. City of Cranston, Rhode Island Assigned to: Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux Referred to: Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond Case in other court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
CCA16−1692 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/19/2014 Date Terminated: 09/26/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Karen Davidson

represented by Lynette J. Labinger Roney & Labinger LLP 344 Wickenden Street Providence, RI 02903 401−421−9794 Fax: 401−421−0132 Email: Labinger@roney−labinger.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam Lioz Demos 1029 Vermont Avenue NW Suite 505 Washington, DC 20036 202−638−0190 Email: alioz@demos.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brenda Wright Demos 358 Chestnut Hill Ave. Suite 303 Brighton, MA 02459 617−232−5885 Email: bwright@demos.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean J Young ACLU 125 Broad St., 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−284−7359 Fax: 212−549−2651 Email: syoung@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Debbie Flitman

represented by Lynette J. Labinger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam Lioz (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 2 of 8

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brenda Wright (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean J Young (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eugene Perry

represented by Lynette J. Labinger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam Lioz (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brenda Wright (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean J Young (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sylvia Weber

represented by Lynette J. Labinger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam Lioz (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brenda Wright (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean J Young (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc.

represented by Lynette J. Labinger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Adam Lioz (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 3 of 8
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brenda Wright (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Cranston, Rhode Island

represented by Christopher M. Rawson Lovett Schefrin Harnett 155 South Main Street Providence, RI 02903 863−8800 Fax: 863−8938 Email: crawson@lovettlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Normand G. Benoit Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP 40 Westminster Street Suite 1100 Providence, RI 02903 401−861−8200 Fax: 401−861−8210 Email: ngb@psh.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert K. Taylor Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP 40 Westminster Street Suite 1100 Providence, RI 02903 401−861−8200 Fax: 401−861−8210 Email: rkt@psh.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David J. Pellegrino Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP 40 Westminster Street Suite 1100 Providence, RI 02903 401−861−8200 Fax: 401−861−8210 Email: djp@psh.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/19/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT ( filing fee paid $ 400.00 receipt number 14670012913 ), filed by Karen Davidson, Debbie Flitman, Sylvia Weber, American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc., Eugene Perry. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 02/19/2014)

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 4 of 8

02/19/2014 02/23/2014
02/23/2014 02/26/2014 02/26/2014 03/02/2014
03/03/2014 03/04/2014 03/13/2014 03/13/2014 03/31/2014 03/31/2014 04/02/2014 04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/07/2014 04/23/2014
09/08/2014

Summons Issued as to City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
2 MOTION for to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( filing fee paid $ 50.00, receipt number 0103−711898 )for admission pro hac vice of Brenda Wright filed by All Plaintiffs. (Labinger, Lynette) Docket Text Modified on 2/24/2014 (Farrell Pletcher, Paula). (Entered: 02/23/2014)
3 MOTION for Sean J. Young to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( filing fee paid $ 50.00, receipt number 0103−711899 ) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 02/23/2014)
TEXT ORDER granting 3 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Sean J Young. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 2/26/14. (Cavaco, Janice) Modified on 2/26/2014 (Cavaco, Janice). (Entered: 02/26/2014)
TEXT ORDER granting 2 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Brenda Wright. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 2/26/14. (Cavaco, Janice) Modified on 2/27/2014 (Cavaco, Janice). (Entered: 02/26/2014)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Karen Davidson, Debbie Flitman, Sylvia Weber, American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc., Eugene Perry. City of Cranston, Rhode Island served on 2/20/2014, answer due 3/13/2014. (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 03/02/2014)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by David J. Pellegrino on behalf of City of Cranston, Rhode Island (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 03/03/2014)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Normand G. Benoit on behalf of City of Cranston, Rhode Island (Benoit, Normand) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
7 MOTION to Dismiss filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Responses due by 3/31/2014 (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
8 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by City of Cranston, Rhode Island in support of 7 MOTION to Dismiss . (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
9 MOTION for Adam Lioz to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( filing fee paid $ 50.00, receipt number 0103−724035 ) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
10 RESPONSE in Opposition re 7 MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint With Supporting Memo filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss)(Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
TEXT ORDER granting 9 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Adam Lioz. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 4/2/14. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 7 MOTION to Dismiss : Motion Hearing set for 4/23/2014 02:00 PM in Courtroom 4 before Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: TIME CHANGE ONLY Motion Hearing originally set for 4/23/2014 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 4 before Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux is CHANGED to 4/23/14 at 2:30 PM. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
11 REPLY MEMORANDUM re 10 Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux: Motion Hearing held on 4/23/2014 re 7 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Lynette Labinger, Esq., Brenda Wright, Esq., Adam Lioz, Esq., for Plaintiffs; Norman Benoit, Esq., David Pellegrino, Esq. for Defendant) Attorneys argue motion. Court takes motion under advisement for issuance of a written opinion. (Court Reporter Karen Wischnowsky in Courtroom 4 at 2:30 p.m.) (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
12 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Re: 7 Motion to Dismiss filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island DENIED. The Court will issue a pretrial scheduling order. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 9/8/14. (Cavaco, Janice) (Main Document 12

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 5 of 8

09/08/2014 09/09/2014 09/09/2014 09/22/2014 10/01/2014 10/08/2014 10/08/2014
07/09/2015 07/14/2015 07/14/2015 07/15/2015
07/15/2015 08/06/2015
08/06/2015
08/06/2015 08/06/2015

replaced on 9/8/2014) (Cavaco, Janice). (Entered: 09/08/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: Rule 16 Conference set for 9/17/2014 02:00 PM in Senior Judge Lagueux Chambers − Room 225 before Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
HEARING CANCELLED: Rule 16 conference set for 9/17/14 at 2:00 PM is CANCELLED. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
NOTICE of Hearing: Rule 16 Conference set for 10/8/2014 03:00 PM in Senior Judge Lagueux Chambers − Room 225 before Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
13 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by City of Cranston, Rhode Island.(Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
14 RULE 16 STATEMENT by All Plaintiffs. (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux: Rule 16 Conference held on 10/8/2014. Pretrial Order entered. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
15 PRETRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER: Factual Discovery due by 3/31/2015. Expert Discovery due by 6/30/2015. Plaintiffs' expert disclosures due by 4/30/15. Defendant's expert disclosures due by 5/30/15. Pretrial Memorandum due by 9/30/2015. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 10/8/14. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
16 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Responses due by 7/27/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E)(Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
17 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment to August 7, 2015 filed by All Plaintiffs. Responses due by 7/31/2015 (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
18 MOTION for an Extension of Time and for Leave to File Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment on or before August 7, 2015 filed by All Plaintiffs. Responses due by 7/31/2015 (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
TEXT ORDER granting 17 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment ( Responses due by 8/7/2015, Replies due by 8/17/2015.); granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to File Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; Set/Reset Deadlines: ( Responses due by 8/7/2015, Replies due by 8/17/2015.). So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 7/15/2015. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
19 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS by City of Cranston, Rhode Island re 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 07/15/2015)
20 RESPONSE in Opposition re 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Defendant WITH SUPPORTING MEMO filed by All Plaintiffs. Replies due by 8/17/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum Jointly Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection and Plaintiffs' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment)(Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
21 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs WITH SUPPORTING MEMO filed by All Plaintiffs. Responses due by 8/24/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum Jointly Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection and Plaintiffs' Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment)(Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
22 STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS by All Plaintiffs re 20 Response in Opposition to Motion, 21 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs. (Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
23 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS by All Plaintiffs re 20 Response in Opposition to Motion, 21 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs.

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 6 of 8

08/06/2015
08/12/2015 08/12/2015 08/17/2015 08/17/2015 08/31/2015
08/31/2015 08/31/2015 09/03/2015 09/08/2015
09/18/2015 09/22/2015 04/07/2016

(Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
24 DECLARATION re 20 Response in Opposition to Motion, 21 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs of Sean J. Young with Exhibits 1−26 by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25−part 1, # 26 Exhibit 25−part 2, # 27 Exhibit 26)(Labinger, Lynette) (Entered: 08/06/2015)
25 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to Oppose Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Responses due by 8/31/2015 (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
26 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 Response in Opposition to Motion, for Summary Judgment filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Responses due by 8/31/2015 (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
TEXT ORDER granting 25 Motion for Extension of Time for Defendant to respond to 21 Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment ; Set/Reset Deadlines: ( Responses due by 8/31/2015). So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 8/17/2015. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
TEXT ORDER granting 26 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's 20 Response in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ; Set/Reset Deadlines: Replies due by 8/31/2015. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 8/17/2015. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
27 RESPONSE in Opposition re 21 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Replies due by 9/10/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Pellegrino, David) (Main Document 27 replaced on 9/2/2015) (Farrell Pletcher, Paula). (Entered: 08/31/2015)
28 REPLY to Response to Motion re 20 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
29 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION by City of Cranston, Rhode Island re 23 Statement of Undisputed Facts, 22 Statement of Disputed Facts . Replies due by 9/8/2015. (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 08/31/2015)
30 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 29 Response in Opposition, 27 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by All Plaintiffs. Responses due by 9/21/2015 (Lioz, Adam) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
TEXT ORDER granting 30 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 30 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 29 Response in Opposition, 27 Response in Opposition to Motion, Responses due by 9/18/2015. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 9/8/2015. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
31 REPLY to Response to Motion re 27 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Affidavit)(Lioz, Adam) (Entered: 09/18/2015)
HEARING CANCELLED: Hearing on cross motions for summary judgment before Senior Judge Lagueux on 10/14/15 at 2:30 PM is CANCELLED. No future hearing date is set at this time. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
32 ORDER: In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Evenwel, et al vs. Abbott, decided on April 4, 2016, the parties are provided thirty days to submit supplemental memoranda addressing the impact of Evenwel on this litigation. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 4/7/2016. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 04/07/2016)

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 7 of 8

04/13/2016 05/05/2016 05/24/2016
05/27/2016 05/27/2016 05/31/2016

33 RESPONSE in Support re 21 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs filed by All Plaintiffs. (Lioz, Adam) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
34 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by City of Cranston, Rhode Island in support of 29 Response in Opposition . (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
35 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Re: 21 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc., Debbie Flitman, Karen Davidson, Sylvia Weber, Eugene Perry, 16 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted. The City of Cranston, Cranston City Council and the City's Board of Canvassers are enjoined from holding further elections under the current ward districting plan. The Cranston City Council shall have thirty days from the entry of this Order to propose a districting plan that complies with this Order.. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 5/24/2016. (Cavaco, Janice) (Main Document 35 replaced on 5/24/2016) (Cavaco, Janice). (Entered: 05/24/2016)
36 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ENTERED in favor of American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc., Debbie Flitman, Eugene Perry, Karen Davidson, Sylvia Weber against City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
TEXT ORDER VACATING 36 Declaratory Judgment. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 5/27/2016. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
37 NOTICE OF APPEAL by City of Cranston, Rhode Island ( filing fee paid $ 505.00, receipt number 0103−974419 )

05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/01/2016
06/01/2016 06/01/2016 06/03/2016 06/03/2016 06/07/2016 06/07/2016

NOTICE TO COUNSEL: Counsel should register for a First Circuit CM/ECF Appellate Filer Account at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cmecf/. Counsel should also review the First Circuit requirements for electronic filing by visiting the CM/ECF Information section at http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cmecf Appeal Record due by 6/7/2016. (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
38 MOTION to Stay re 35 Memorandum and Order,,, filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Responses due by 6/17/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
39 MOTION to Expedite filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Responses due by 6/17/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum)(Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
40 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE AND APPELLATE COVER SHEET: Abbreviated record on appeal consisting of notice of appeal, order(s) being appealed, and a certified copy of the district court docket report transmitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in accordance with 1st Cir. R. 11.0(b). 37 Notice of Appeal. Documents Sent: 35, 37, 38, 39, 40. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
USCA Case Number CCA16−1692 for 37 Notice of Appeal filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
41 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert K. Taylor on behalf of City of Cranston, Rhode Island (Taylor, Robert) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
42 RESPONSE in Opposition re 39 MOTION to Expedite WITH SUPPORTING MEMO filed by All Plaintiffs. Replies due by 6/13/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum)(Lioz, Adam) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
43 REPLY to Response to Motion re 42 Response in Opposition to Motion filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Pellegrino, David) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
44 ORDER denying 38 Motion to Stay. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 6/7/2016. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
45 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to U.S. Court of Appeals for The First Circuit. 37 Notice of Appeal. Unrestricted Documents Sent: Document #44. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 06/07/2016)

Case: 1:14-cv-91 As of: 10/21/2017 05:55 PM EDT 8 of 8

06/07/2016 06/08/2016 06/13/2016
06/28/2016 09/21/2016 09/21/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016 10/31/2016

46 Assented MOTION for an Extension of Time to Apply by Motion for Attorneys Fees filed by All Plaintiffs. Responses due by 6/24/2016 (Lioz, Adam) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
TEXT ORDER granting 46 Assented To Motion for Extension of Time To Apply By Motion for Attorneys Fees. The time for filing fee applications is extended to 21 days after the Court enters a final declaratory judgment. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 6/8/2016. (Cavaco, Janice) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
47 ORDER of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered as to 37 Notice of Appeal, filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. Appellant's motion to replace Exhibit I in its motion for a stay is granted. Appellant's motion for a stay pending appeal and for expedited consideration of the appeal is granted. The appeal will proceed as follows: appellant's brief shall be filed by July 5, 2016; appellees' brief shall be filed by July 26, 2016; and any reply brief shall be filed by August 2, 2016. In light of the abbreviated briefing schedule, the paper copies of the briefs shall be put in the mail for overnight delivery on the same date the briefs are electronically filed. It is anticipated that the appeal will be scheduled for oral argument during the Court's September 2016 sitting. (Smith, Rana) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
48 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to U.S. Court of Appeals for The First Circuit. 37 Notice of Appeal. Unrestricted Documents Sent: #46 and Text Order granting motion. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
49 JUDGMENT of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered as to 37 Notice of Appeal, filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. The order of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the City of Cranston. (Smith, Rana) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
50 OPINION of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit entered as to 37 Notice of Appeal, filed by City of Cranston, Rhode Island. (Smith, Rana) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
TEXT ORDER: Pursuant to the September 21, 2016 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the Clerk is hereby ordered to enter Summary Judgment in favor of the City of Cranston. Related to 49 Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. So Ordered by Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux on 9/26/2016. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
51 CLERK'S JUDGMENT: Summary Judgment entered in favor of City of Cranston against American The Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, Inc., Debbie Flitman, Eugene Perry, Karen Davidson, Sylvia Weber. So Ordered by Deputy Clerk: on 9/26/2016. (Farrell Pletcher, Paula) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
52 MANDATE of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued as to and in accordance with 49 Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. (Smith, Rana) (Entered: 10/31/2016)