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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHOSHANA HEBSHI,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.; JOHN BRAND, in his individual capacity; UNKNOWN FBI AGENT 1, in his individual capacity; UNKNOWN FBI AGENT 2, in his individual capacity; JOHN ETLING, in his individual capacity; MARK DEBEAU, in his individual capacity; JEREMY BOHN, in his individual capacity; CAPTAIN PATRICK DRISCOLL, in his individual capacity; OFFICER GRANT, in his individual capacity; LT. M. WASIUKANIS, in his individual capacity; TOYA PARKER, in her individual capacity; DT. CARMONA, in his or her individual capacity; OFFICER JOHNSON, in his or her individual capacity; CORPORAL BRADLEY, in his or her individual capacity; UNKNOWN CBP OFFICER, in his individual capacity; THOMAS PIPIS, in his individual capacity; DAVID LAKATOS, in his individual capacity; NATHANIEL DEVINS, in his individual capacity; UNKNOWN TSA AGENT 1, in his individual capacity; UNKNOWN TSA AGENT 2, in her individual capacity; ROBERT BALL, in his individual capacity; UNKNOWN ICE OFFICER, in his individual capacity; and PAUL BRUMLEY, in his individual capacity,
Defendants. _______________________________________/

Hon. Case No.
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

COMPLAINT

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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. On September 11, 2011, Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi flew on Frontier Airlines flight 623 from San Francisco, California, to Detroit, Michigan. Upon landing, heavily armed agents forcibly removed Ms. Hebshi from the airplane; handcuffed, pat searched, and strip searched her; and locked her in a cell at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport before interrogating her. Ms. Hebshi was detained for approximately four hours before being released with no charges. 2. An American citizen born in California, Ms. Hebshi was arrested and detained because of her ethnicity and her seat assignment: she has an Arab last name and was seated next to two men of South Asian origin, who each allegedly used the lavatory for ten to twenty minutes during the flight. Ms. Hebshi did not know these men, nor did she speak with them or leave her seat at any time before landing in Detroit. 3. Although Frontier Airlines never suggested that Ms. Hebshi had engaged in any suspicious behavior, Frontier Airlines staff provided her name to federal and state authorities when reporting the allegedly suspicious conduct of the men seated next to her on the plane. 4. Based solely on the information received from Frontier Airlines staff, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), Wayne County Airport Authority Police, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”), working together, arrested and detained Ms. Hebshi for approximately four hours with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. The FBI has publically stated that Ms. Hebshi was not involved in any suspicious activity.
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5. During her several hours in detention, Ms. Hebshi was subjected to an invasive and humiliating strip search, which required her to strip naked, bend over, and cough.
6. Ms. Hebshi, by her attorneys, now challenges the discriminatory conduct of Frontier Airlines, which identified her as a “suspicious” passenger based on her ethnicity, race or national origin, resulting in her arrest and detention, as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a).
7. Ms. Hebshi also brings this action to challenge the unlawful arrest, detention, and strip search she endured at the hands of agents of Wayne County Airport Authority Police, the FBI, the TSA, ICE, and CBP, who violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In arresting and detaining Ms. Hebshi because of her perceived ethnicity, race, or national origin, agents of Wayne County Airport Authority Police, the FBI, the TSA, ICE, and CBP further violated Ms. Hebshi’s right to equal protection of the laws under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
8. In addition, Ms. Hebshi brings claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States of America for false arrest and false imprisonment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. This civil rights action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a); the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. This Court has jurisdiction over Ms. Hebshi’s claims as an action arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; as a suit to redress deprivations
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of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and by federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4); and as an action against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
10. On January 25, 2012, Ms. Hebshi submitted an administrative claim for damages to the TSA, the FBI, CBP and ICE. In a letter dated July 23, 2012, the TSA replied for all named agencies and denied the administrative tort claim. This Complaint is filed within six months of that denial and is therefore timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
11. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred within this district. The events complained of herein happened as Ms. Hebshi was flying to, arrested at, and detained at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, in Romulus, Michigan, within the Eastern District of Michigan.
PARTIES Plaintiff
12. Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi is a U.S. citizen and a freelance journalist. Ms. Hebshi’s first name is of Hebrew origin, as her mother is Jewish. Ms. Hebshi has the same last name as her father, now deceased, who immigrated to the U.S. from Saudi Arabia. Ms. Hebshi lives in Sylvania, Ohio, with her husband and two young sons. She was traveling home after visiting her sister in California when she was arrested, detained, and strip searched at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. Defendant United States of America
13. Defendant United States of America (“United States”) is the proper defendant for Ms. Hebshi’s claims brought under the FTCA.
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Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc. 14. Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc. is incorporated and headquartered in Colorado
and operates throughout the United States, including in the State of Michigan. Employees of Frontier Airlines, acting within the scope of their employment, identified Ms. Hebshi as a suspect to state and federal law enforcement agencies based on her perceived ethnicity, race, or national origin, resulting in her arrest and detention. Upon information and belief, Frontier Airlines receives federal funding including, and not limited to, subsidies under the Essential Air Service program. FBI Defendants
15. Defendant John Brand was, at all times relevant to this action, a Special Agent with the FBI. Defendant Brand participated in the decisions to arrest, detain, strip search, and interrogate Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
16. Defendant Unknown FBI Officer 1 was, at all times relevant in this action, an agent of the FBI. At this time, his identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Upon information and belief, Defendant Unknown FBI Officer 1 ordered FBI agents in Detroit to arrest, detain, and interrogate Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
17. Defendant Unknown FBI Officer 2 was, at all times relevant in this action, an agent of the FBI. At this time, his identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Defendant Unknown FBI Officer 2 participated in both the decision to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi, as well as the actual arrest and detention, with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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18. Defendant John Etling was, at all times relevant in this action, an agent with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, a multi-agency law enforcement unit under the direction of the FBI. At this time, his identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Defendant Etling participated in both the decision to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi and her actual arrest and detention, all without articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity. Wayne County Airport Authority Defendants
19. Defendant Mark DeBeau was, at all times relevant to this action, Vice President of Public Safety at Wayne County Airport Authority. Defendant DeBeau participated in the decision to arrest Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
20. Defendant Jeremy Bohn was, at all times relevant to this action, employed by the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Defendant Bohn was the Officer-in-Charge for the Wayne County Airport Authority Police during and the events described in this complaint. He participated in Ms. Hebshi’s arrest and transportation to the detention site with no articulable facts connecting her to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
21. Defendant Captain Patrick Driscoll was, at all times relevant to this action, a member of the Special Response Unit for the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Defendant Driscoll participated in the decision to arrest, handcuff, and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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22. Defendant Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis was, at all times relevant to this action, an officer of the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Defendant Wasiukanis participated in the arrest, detention, and decision to strip search Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
23. Defendant Toya Parker, at all times relevant to this action, was an officer with the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Officer Parker performed the strip search on Ms. Hebshi during her detention with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. She is sued in her individual capacity.
24. Defendant Officer Grant was, at all times relevant to this action, a member of the Special Response Unit for the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Defendant Grant was part of the team that planned and executed the arrest of Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
25. Defendant Detective Carmona was, at all times relevant to this action, an officer with the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Detective Carmona arrested and handcuffed Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He or she is sued in his or her individual capacity.
26. Defendant K9 Officer Johnson was, at all times relevant to this action, employed by the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Defendant Johnson participated in Ms. Hebshi’s arrest with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He or she is sued in his or her individual capacity.
27. Defendant Corporal Bradley was, at all times relevant to this action, employed by the Wayne County Airport Authority Police. Defendant Bradley arrested and transported Ms.
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Hebshi to a detention facility at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity. CBP Defendants
28. Defendant Unknown CBP Officer was, at all times relevant to this action, an officer of CBP. At this time, his identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Upon information and belief, Defendant Unknown CBP Officer ordered CBP agents at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity
29. Defendant Thomas Pipis was, at all times relevant to this action, an officer with CBP. Upon information and belief, he participated in the decision to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
30. Defendant David Lakatos was, at all times relevant to this action, an officer with CBP. Upon information and belief, he participated in the decision to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
31. Defendant Nathaniel Devins was, at all times relevant to this action, an officer with CBP. Upon information and belief, he participated in the decision to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
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TSA Defendants 32. Defendant Unknown TSA Officer 1 was, at all times relevant to this action, an
employee of the TSA. At this time, his identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Upon information and belief, Defendant Unknown TSA Officer 1 ordered TSA agents at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
33. Defendant Robert Ball was, at all times relevant to this action, the Federal Security Director in Detroit for the TSA. Defendant Ball participated in the decision to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
34. Defendant Unknown TSA Officer 2 was, at all times relevant to this action, an employee of the TSA. At this time, her identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Upon information and belief, Defendant Unknown TSA Officer 2 participated in the detention and interrogation of Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. She is sued in her individual capacity. ICE Defendants
35. Defendant Unknown ICE Officer was, at all times, relevant to this action, an employee of ICE. At this time, his identity is not known to Ms. Hebshi. Defendant Unknown ICE Officer instructed ICE officers at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport to arrest and detain Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
36. Defendant Paul Brumley was, at all times relevant to this action, a Special Agent with ICE. Defendant Brumley participated in Ms. Hebshi’s arrest with no articulable facts
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connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. He is sued in his individual capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Frontier Airlines’ Identification of Ms. Hebshi As A Suspect
37. Shoshana Hebshi is a 36-year-old freelance journalist who lives in Sylvania, Ohio, near Toledo, Ohio, with her husband and sons.
38. Ms. Hebshi was born and raised in California. She studied journalism at California Polytechnic State University-San Luis Obispo and later as a graduate student at Iowa State University. She wrote for several newspapers and then worked for the faculty union at California State University. Since moving to Ohio in June 2011 for her husband’s medical residency, she has been working at home as a freelance journalist so she can help care for their young sons.
39. In September 2011, Ms. Hebshi spent Labor Day weekend with her sister in San Francisco, California. On September 11, 2011, Ms. Hebshi flew home unaccompanied to her family in Sylvania, Ohio. Ms. Hebshi’s destination airport was Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, which is approximately 60 miles from Sylvania. Her car was parked in a lot at the airport in Detroit.
40. Ms. Hebshi cleared airport security at San Francisco International Airport, where she boarded a Frontier Airlines flight to Denver, Colorado.
41. At Denver International Airport, without ever leaving the airport or security zone, Ms. Hebshi boarded a connecting flight, Frontier Airlines flight 623 to Detroit, Michigan.
42. On the flight from Denver to Detroit, Ms. Hebshi sat in seat 12A, a window seat in a row with three seats. At no point during the flight did she leave her seat.
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43. The aisle and middle seats, 12B and 12C, were occupied by two men of South Asian descent.
44. Ms. Hebshi did not know the two men seated beside her, nor did she speak to them before the plane landed in Detroit.
45. During the flight, some flight attendants and passengers noticed that the two men seated in Ms. Hebshi’s row were acting in a way that they considered to be suspicious. Specifically, these flight attendants and passengers alleged that the men went to the restroom around the same time and each spent ten, fifteen or twenty minutes there. Some passengers and flight attendants also reported that the men were standing in the aisle for long periods.
46. None of the passengers or flight attendants either observed or reported anything suspicious about Ms. Hebshi or her conduct during or after the flight.
47. Shortly before 3:00 p.m., flight attendants alerted the pilot, Captain Laurence Pucci, that two men of “possibly Arab descent” had been observed repeatedly going to the bathroom and standing in the aisle for long periods of time.
48. Captain Pucci sent a message to Frontier Airlines dispatch through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (“ACARS”), asking for information about the passengers seated in 12B and 12C, whom he and the flight attendants believed were acting strangely and who were repeatedly using the restroom.
49. Upon receiving Captain Pucci’s message, Mark Fraley, Frontier Airlines Sector Operations Control Shift Manager, forwarded it to several individuals including Frontier staff. He provided the names of the passengers in 12B and 12C, added the name of the passenger in seat 12A (Ms. Hebshi), and commented that she might also be with the two men.
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50. Mr. Fraley’s email suggesting that Ms. Hebshi might be with the two men was not based on any actual facts or credible information. Upon information and belief, Ms. Hebshi’s name and seat assignment were the only facts available to Mr. Fraley. Based on this information, Mr. Fraley assumed Ms. Hebshi knew the two men and might be involved in suspicious activity.
51. Frontier Airlines Manager Tammara Faforke passed along Mr. Fraley’s email to a TSA air marshal and to Officer Duncan, a Wayne County Airport Authority Police Officer, who in turn passed it along to Defendant Grant, a Wayne County Airport Authority Police Officer.
52. Defendant Grant relayed to Defendants Driscoll and Carmona, also officers with Wayne County Airport Authority Police, the information contained in Mr. Fraley’s email, including that Ms. Hebshi may have been traveling with the two men.
53. The TSA also contacted Wayne County Airport Authority and reported suspicious passenger behavior on Frontier Airlines flight 623.
54. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Defendant Jeremy Bohn, the Officer-in-Charge for Wayne County Airport Authority Police during these events, went to wait for the airplane at the designated inspection site, along with Defendants Thomas Pipis, David Lakatos and Nathaniel Devins, all agents with CBP; Defendant Robert Ball of the TSA; Defendant John Etling of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (a multi-agency law enforcement unit under the direction of the FBI); an air marshal; and other Wayne County Airport Authority Police Officers and employees of the TSA, the FBI.
55. At the inspection site, Defendant Officer Johnson of the Wayne County Airport Authority Police spoke via cell phone with Frontier Airlines Captain Pucci, who told Defendant Johnson that a male passenger from row 12 had entered the airplane restroom for a long period
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of time, while the other man from row 12 stood outside. According to Defendant Johnson: “The Captain stated that a third passenger seated in 12A may also be involved in the incident but is seated and compliant at this time.”
56. Upon information and belief, none of the state or federal officers who received information about these passengers requested further information or evidence regarding Ms. Hebshi’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities. Accordingly, they acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Ms. Hebshi’s name, as they had no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to suspicion of criminal activity. The Unlawful Arrest, Detention and Strip Search of Ms. Hebshi
57. Agents and employees of the FBI, the TSA, CBP, and Wayne County Airport Authority Police collaborated and put into place a plan to divert and board the aircraft, arrest Ms. Hebshi and the two men sitting next to her, and remove them to a detention facility at the airport for questioning.
58. Defendant Grant organized the tactical entry of the flight with the assistance and participation of Defendant Johnson and CBP officers.
59. Defendant Driscoll determined that a tactical entry was needed and recommended to Defendant Mark DeBeau, Vice President of Public Safety for the Wayne County Airport Authority, that all three passengers in row 12 be removed from the plane and taken to Building 358, a detention facility at the airport, for further investigation.
60. Defendant DeBeau, also present at the inspection site, authorized this plan of action.
61. Defendant Driscoll then told the agents on site that the suspects, including Ms. Hebshi, were to be handcuffed upon contact.
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62. Based on the information these state and federal officers had at the time, there were no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause to arrest or detain her.
63. When the plane landed, Captain Pucci announced on the loudspeaker that the plane would be diverted to another area of the airport. He warned the passengers that there would be consequences if they left their seats.
64. Ms. Hebshi noticed that there were numerous law enforcement vehicles around the plane and wondered if there was a fugitive on the airplane.
65. She called her husband to let him know the flight would be delayed but that she did not know why or for how long.
66. The aircraft taxied to the inspection site and a van with stairs approached the aircraft.
67. Ms. Hebshi was relieved because she thought this meant that she and the other passengers would be allowed to leave.
68. Instead, at approximately 4:25 p.m., Defendants Carmona, Bohn, Johnson and Defendant ICE Special Agent Brumley, along with other officers, boarded the plane, heavily armed, and ran down the aisle where Ms. Hebshi and the other two men in her row were seated.
69. Several officers shouted at the passengers to keep their heads down and put their hands on the seat in front of them.
70. Ms. Hebshi was stunned when the officers stopped at her row and yelled at her and the two men seated beside her to get up.
71. Ms. Hebshi asked what was happening but received no reply. She asked if she could take her cell phone and was told no.
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72. Defendant Carmona put Ms. Hebshi in handcuffs and put flex-cuffs on the passenger in 12B.
73. Ms. Hebshi and the two men in her row were then forcefully rushed down the aisle and stairs and out of the plane.
74. Ms. Hebshi was shocked, frightened, and humiliated as she was taken off the plane, in front of the other passengers.
75. Once outside the airplane, Ms. Hebshi was pushed roughly against a police car and made to spread her legs while she was pat searched.
76. The officer asked Ms. Hebshi if she was wearing any explosives, to which she said no.
77. Ms. Hebshi asked what was happening but no one would reply. 78. Defendant Bradley of the Wayne County Airport Authority Police then put Ms. Hebshi in the back of a police car with one of the men from her row and drove them to Building 358. 79. This was Ms. Hebshi’s first experience in the back of a police car and she felt deeply embarrassed and scared. 80. Upon arriving at Building 358, Ms. Hebshi, still handcuffed, was taken out of the car and to a cell. 81. The cell was approximately six by ten feet and had a metal cot. A video camera hung above the toilet. 82. A male officer came to the door and asked if she spoke English. Ms. Hebshi said yes, she speaks English and is a U.S. citizen.
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83. The officer told her he would stand by the door to make sure she did not “flush anything” down the toilet.
84. Ms. Hebshi badly needed to use the toilet, but given that she was handcuffed, a male guard was standing at her door, and a video camera hung above the toilet, she did not.
85. At approximately 4:40 p.m., Defendant Wasiukanis of Wayne County Airport Authority Police conferred with Defendant FBI Special Agent John Brand, and they decided that the three passengers, including Ms. Hebshi, should be strip searched.
86. According to the standard operating procedures in effect for the Wayne County Airport Authority, “A person shall not be strip searched unless the person is being lodged into a detention facility, by order of a court or there is reasonable cause to believe that the person is concealing a weapon, controlled substance, or evidence of a crime.”
87. There were no facts suggesting that Ms. Hebshi was concealing a weapon, a controlled substance, or any other evidence of a crime that might justify a strip search. The decision to strip search Ms. Hebshi was made with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause.
88. One hour passed before a female officer came to perform the strip search. During the hour, no evidence emerged to suggest that Ms. Hebshi was involved in criminal activity, carrying contraband, or otherwise had done anything that would provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause justifying a strip search.
89. Once on the scene, Defendant Toya Parker of the Wayne County Airport Authority Police came into Ms. Hebshi’s cell and told her she was going to be strip searched.
90. Ms. Hebshi was afraid and began to cry.
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91. Defendant Parker took off Ms. Hebshi’s handcuffs and told her to remove all clothing, including her underwear and bra, so that she was completely naked. Defendant Parker instructed Ms. Hebshi to stand facing the wall, away from the video camera, so that at least part of her body would be concealed.
92. Ms. Hebshi was instructed to bend over, spread her buttocks, and cough while Officer Parker stood a couple of feet away and watched.
93. Defendant Parker then instructed Ms. Hebshi to take her hair down from its ponytail so Defendant Parker could feel through Ms. Hebshi’s hair.
94. Defendant Parker lifted Ms. Hebshi’s eyelids and looked in her mouth. 95. Finally, Defendant Parker told Ms. Hebshi to put her clothes back on. 96. Ms. Hebshi was shocked and humiliated as a result of this search. 97. Before leaving the cell, Officer Parker put the handcuffs back on Ms. Hebshi’s wrists. 98. Ms. Hebshi asked the male officer at the door to her cell if she could call her husband, who did not know where she was. The officer told her she could use the phone later. 99. After approximately two more hours, an officer came to get Ms. Hebshi and brought her to an interview room where an FBI agent and, upon information and belief, a TSA agent awaited her. 100. Defendant Unknown FBI Officer 2 and Defendant Unknown TSA Officer 2 then proceeded to question Ms. Hebshi about her family, her previous travel, and the two men sitting next to her on the flight. 101. Unknown FBI Officer 2 told Ms. Hebshi that someone had reported her and the two men in her row as being engaged in suspicious activity during the flight.
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102. The interview lasted approximately half an hour. 103. At the close of the interview, Ms. Hebshi, who had been detained for over three hours, asked if she could use a toilet. The agents allowed her to use the officers’ restroom. 104. Before Ms. Hebshi was returned to her cell, her handcuffs were removed, and she was fingerprinted and asked her date and place of birth, weight, and height. 105. Defendant Unknown TSA Officer 2 then came into Ms. Hebshi’s cell with Ms. Hebshi’s phone and required that Ms. Hebshi show the Twitter messages she had sent out from the airplane upon landing, as well as her Facebook profile. 106. At approximately 7:30 p.m., Defendant Brand authorized the release of all three suspects. 107. Ms. Hebshi was finally allowed to call her husband and let him know that she was okay and could leave soon. As soon as she started to speak to her husband, Ms. Hebshi cried. 108. When Ms. Hebshi was finally allowed to leave the detention facility at approximately 8:00 p.m., she saw the two other detained passengers, who had also been released, as they reclaimed their bags. 109. As a result of being arrested, detained, and strip searched, Ms. Hebshi continues to experience anxiety when traveling. She also continues to feel distress and humiliation based on this experience of being singled-out because of her ethnicity, race or national origin.
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CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Discrimination Based on Race or Ethnicity
(Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc.) 110. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 111. Intentional race discrimination in the formation and enforcement of contracts is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 112. Mark Fraley, Sector Operations Control Shift Manager for Frontier Airlines, was an employee of Defendant Frontier Airlines acting within the scope of his employment at all times relevant to this complaint. 113. Mr. Fraley identified Ms. Hebshi as a suspect because of her perceived ethnicity or race. 114. Defendant Frontier Airlines is liable for the unlawful acts of its agents and employees directly and/or under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 115. In reporting Ms. Hebshi to state and federal law enforcement agencies as a security threat, Defendant Frontier Airlines engaged in intentional discrimination on the basis of Ms. Hebshi’s perceived race, color, alienage, or ethnicity. In so doing, Defendant Frontier Airlines discriminated against Ms. Hebshi in the making and enforcement of her contract with Defendant Frontier Airlines, namely the ticket she purchased to travel on Frontier Airlines Flight 623 on September 11, 2011. 116. Defendant acted with reckless or callous indifference to Ms. Hebshi’s right to be free from discrimination in the making and enforcement of her contract with Frontier Airlines, entitling her to punitive damages.
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117. Defendant Frontier Airline’s actions deprived Ms. Hebshi of the right to make and enforce contracts regardless of her race or ethnicity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
118. Ms. Hebshi suffered intentional discrimination from Frontier Airlines, which singled her out as a suspect because of her name. Ms. Hebshi is a member of a protected class under § 1981 who, while receiving Frontier Airlines services as a passenger, was deprived of her right to receive and enjoy those services and treated in a hostile and objectively discriminatory manner.
COUNT II VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Discrimination Based on Race, Ethnicity or National Origin (Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc.)
119. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
120. Title VI and its implementing regulations prohibit recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of, inter alia, race, color, or national origin.
121. Mark Fraley, Sector Operations Control Shift Manager for Frontier Airlines, was an employee of Defendant Frontier Airlines, acting within the scope of his employment at all times relevant to this complaint.
122. Mr. Fraley referred Ms. Hebshi to state and federal law enforcement to be arrested, detained, and investigated because her perceived ethnicity, race or national origin based on her name.
123. Defendant Frontier Airlines is liable for the unlawful acts of its agents and employees directly and/or under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
124. Defendant Frontier Airlines is the recipient of federal funding and is therefore subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
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125. In reporting Ms. Hebshi to state and federal law enforcement agencies as a security threat based on her ethnicity, race or national origin, Defendant Frontier Airlines discriminated against Ms. Hebshi in violation of Title VI and its implementing regulations.
COUNT III VIOLATION OF 49 U.S.C. § 40127(A) Discrimination Based on Race, Ethnicity or National Origin in Air Travel
(Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc.) 126. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 127. Title 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a) prohibits an airline from subjecting a passenger to “discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or ancestry.” 128. Mark Fraley, Sector Operations Control Shift Manager for Frontier Airlines, was an employee of Defendant Frontier Airlines acting within the scope of his employment at all times relevant to this complaint. 129. Mr. Fraley identified Ms. Hebshi as a suspect, and so caused her to be referred to state and federal law enforcement to be arrested, detained, and investigated because of her perceived ethnicity, race, or national origin based on her name. 130. Defendant Frontier Airlines is liable for the unlawful acts of its agents and employees directly and/or under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 131. In reporting Ms. Hebshi to state and federal law enforcement agencies as a security threat based on her ethnicity, race, or national origin, Defendant Frontier Airlines discriminated against Ms. Hebshi in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a).
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COUNT IV VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS—
EQUAL PROTECTION Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (All Defendants Except United States of America, Toya Parker, and Frontier Airlines, Inc.) 132. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 133. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment, guarantees all persons equal protection of the laws. 134. Defendants, who are employees of the Wayne County Airport Authority, the FBI, the TSA, CBP, and ICE, arrested and detained Ms. Hebshi because of her perceived ethnicity, race, or national origin based on her name and/or appearance. Defendants acted intentionally and unlawfully in discriminating against Ms. Hebshi on account of her perceived ethnicity, race, or national origin. 135. Defendants acted under color of law and in the performance of their official duties under federal, state, county, or municipal laws, ordinances, or regulations in arresting and detaining Ms. Hebshi. 136. Defendants’ conduct violated Ms. Hebshi’s clearly established constitutional right to equal protection of the laws of the United States. 137. Defendants acted with reckless indifference or callous disregard for Ms. Hebshi’s right to equal protection of the laws, thus entitling her to punitive damages. 138. These violations, as committed by employees of Wayne County Airport Authority, are redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These violations, as committed by
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employees of the FBI, the TSA, CBP, and ICE, are redressable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
COUNT V VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS—
UNREASONABLE SEIZURE Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (All Defendants Except United States of America, Toya Parker, and Frontier Airlines, Inc.) 139. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 140. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 141. Defendants, who are employees of the Wayne County Airport Authority, the FBI, the TSA, CBP, and ICE collaborated to order and effectuate Ms. Hebshi’s arrest and detention. Defendants acted intentionally and unlawfully in arresting and detaining Ms. Hebshi with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. 142. Defendants acted under color of law and in the performance of their official duties under federal, state, county, or municipal laws, ordinances, or regulations in arresting and detaining Ms. Hebshi. 143. Defendants’ conduct violated Ms. Hebshi’s clearly established constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 144. Defendants acted with reckless indifference or callous disregard for Ms. Hebshi’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures, thus entitling her to punitive damages. 145. These violations, as committed by employees of Wayne County Airport Authority, are redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These violations, as committed by
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employees of the FBI, the TSA, CBP, and ICE, are redressable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
COUNT VI VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS—
UNREASONABLE SEARCH Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (Defendants Parker, Wasiukanis and Brand) 146. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 147. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 148. With no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause, Defendants Wasiukanis and Brand intentionally and unlawfully ordered, and Defendant Parker intentionally and unlawfully performed, a strip search of Ms. Hebshi in violation of her right to be free from unreasonable searches. 149. Defendants acted under color of law and in the performance of their official duties under federal, state, county, or municipal laws, ordinances, or regulations in subjecting Ms. Hebshi to a strip search. 150. Defendants’ conduct violated Ms. Hebshi’s clearly established constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 151. Defendants acted with reckless indifference or callous disregard for Ms. Hebshi’s right to be free from unreasonable searches, thereby entitling her to punitive damages. 152. These violations, as committed by Defendants Parker and Wasiukanis of the Wayne County Airport Authority, are redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These violations, as
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committed by Defendant Brand of the FBI, are redressable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
COUNT VII CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
False Arrest and False Imprisonment (United States of America)
153. Ms. Hebshi re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. At all times relevant to the complaint, Defendants Brand, Brumley, Pipis, Lakatos, and Devins and unknown agents of the FBI, TSA, CBP, and ICE, were employees of the United States, acting in the scope of their employment through their own actions and their directions to employees and agents, under circumstances that would render the United States, if a private person, liable for the damages that their actions caused Ms. Hebshi under Michigan law.
154. Defendants Brand, Brumley, Pipis, Lakatos, and Devins and unknown agents of the FBI, the TSA, CBP, and ICE, individually and as agents of the United States of America, intentionally and unlawfully deprived Ms. Hebshi of her liberty by arresting and detaining her for several hours with no articulable facts connecting Ms. Hebshi to criminal activity or providing probable cause. These actions constitute the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment under Michigan law because defendants acted with the intention of confining Ms. Hebshi; the agents’ actions directly resulted in such confinement; and Ms. Hebshi was conscious of her confinement.
155. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States of America is liable for these actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674.
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi respectfully requests that this Court:
1. Declare that Defendant Frontier Airlines violated Ms. Hebshi’s rights to be free from discrimination as a passenger under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a); 2. Declare that Ms. Hebshi’s constitutional rights to equal protection of the law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment have been violated; 3. Declare that Ms. Hebshi’s constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment have been violated; 4. Award Ms. Hebshi compensatory damages for the injury and distress she endured and continues to endure as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct; 5. Award Ms. Hebshi punitive damages against the individual Defendants and Frontier Airlines for their unlawful conduct; 6. Award Ms. Hebshi reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 7. Grant any other relief the Court deems appropriate.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff respectfully requests a jury trial on all issues triable to a jury.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sarah Mehta Sarah Mehta (P76024) Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6823 smehta@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org kmoss@aclumich.org
/s/ Dennis D. Parker* Dennis D. Parker Rachel E. Goodman* Ayirini Fonseca-Sabune* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 549-2500 (212) 549-2651 dparker@aclu.org rgoodman@aclu.org afonseca-sabune@aclu.org
Dated: January 22, 2013

/s/ William H. Goodman William H. Goodman (P14173) Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720) Kathryn Bruner James (P71374) Goodman & Hurwitz, P.C. Cooperating Attorneys, American Civil
Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 1394 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48207 (313) 567-6170 bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com kjames@goodmanhurwitz.com
/s/ Anna Engh Anna Engh Shelli Calland* Arjun Sethi* Sarah Tremont (P73809) Covington & Burling LLP 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington D.C. 20004 (202) 662-6000 aengh@cov.com scalland@cov.com asethi@cov.com stremont@cov.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
* Application for admission pending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHOSHANA HEBSHI,

Plaintiff, v.
Case No. 13-10253

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.
Defendants. /

HON. TERRENCE G. BERG HON. LAURIE J. MICHELSON

ORDER GRANTING CROSS-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-COMPLAINT

This matter is before the Court on cross-defendant Frontier Airlines’s June 14,

2013 motions to dismiss (Dkts. 73, 74) the cross-complaints brought by cross-

plaintiffs Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis, Captain

Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant, Toya Parker, Detective Carmona,

and Officer Johnson (Dkts. 37-1, 40-2). The motions are brought under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The parties have fully briefed the motions, and oral

argument was heard on February 10, 2014.

For the reasons set forth below, Cross-Defendant’s motions (Dkts. 73, 74) are

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Parties.
Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi is a natural person, a United States citizen, a resident of Ohio, and the daughter of a Jewish mother and a father who immigrated to the United States from Saudi Arabia. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 12.)

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Defendant United States of America is a sovereign state and the employer of Defendants Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, and David Lakatos. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 30, 31, 33, 36.)
Defendant Frontier Airlines is an American airline headquartered in Denver, Colorado, and was the operator of flight 623 from Denver to Detroit on September 11, 2011, upon which Plaintiff was a passenger. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 41.)
Defendants Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, and David Lakatos are all federal agents who allegedly participated in the seizure, detention, and searches of Plaintiff’s person and personal effects as described below. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 30, 31, 33, 36.)
Defendants Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant, Toya Parker, Detective Carmona, and Officer Johnson are all Wayne County Airport Authority (WCAA) agents who allegedly participated in the seizure, detention, and searches of Plaintiff’s person and personal effects as described below. (Id. ¶¶ 19–27.)
Plaintiff has also named six unknown federal agents as Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 28, 32, 34, 35.) Plaintiff had also named federal agents John Etling and Thomas Pipis as defendants, but they have since been voluntarily dismissed from the case. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 29; Dkts. 54, 55.)
B. Allegations Made in the Complaint. On September 11, 2011, Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi flew on Frontier Airlines flight 623 . . . . Upon landing, heavily armed agents forcibly removed [Plaintiff] from the airplane; handcuffed, pat searched, and striped searched her; and locked her in a cell at Detroit Metropolitan
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Wayne County Airport before interrogating her. [She] was detained for approximately four hours before being released with no charges. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi is a United States citizen whose first name is of Hebrew origin and surname is of Saudi Arabian origin. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff, traveling alone, flew on Frontier Airlines flight 623 from Denver to Detroit on September 11, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41–42.) She sat in seat 12A and did not leave her seat at any time during the flight. (Id. ¶ 42.) Seated next to Plaintiff, in seats 12B and 12C, were two men of “South Asian descent.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff did not know these men and did not speak to them at any time. (Id. ¶ 44.) “During the flight, some flight attendants and passengers noticed that the two men seated in [Plaintiff’s] row were acting in a way that they considered to be suspicious.” (Id. ¶ 45.) “Specifically, these flight attendants and passengers alleged that the men went to the restroom around the same time and each spent ten, fifteen[,] or twenty minutes there. Some passengers and flight attendants also reported that the men were standing in the aisle for long periods.” (Id.) None of the passengers or crew observed or reported anything suspicious about Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 46.) “Shortly before 3:00 p.m., flight attendants alerted the pilot . . . that two men of ‘possibly Arab descent’ had been observed repeatedly going to the bathroom and standing in the aisle for long periods . . . .” (Id. ¶ 47.) The pilot then “sent a message through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System . . . asking
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for information about the passengers seated in 12B and 12C, whom he and the flight attendants believed were acting strangely . . . .” (Id. ¶ 48.)
The pilot’s message was received by Mark Fraley, a Frontier Airlines employee, who forwarded the message by e-mail to several people, including other Frontier staff. (Id. ¶ 49.) He provided the names of the passengers in 12B and 12C, and also included Plaintiff’s name as the passenger in 12A, noting that she might also be with them. (Id.)
Tammara Faforke, a Frontier Airlines employee, passed along Fraley’s e-mail to a Transportation Security Administration air marshal and Officer Duncan, a WCAA police officer. (Id. ¶ 51.) Officer Duncan then passed the e-mail along to another WCAA officer, Defendant Grant. (Id.) Defendant Grant relayed the information from the e-mail, including that Plaintiff may be traveling with the two men, to Defendants Driscoll and Carmona, also WCAA officers. (Id. ¶ 52.)
The Transportation Security Administration also contacted Wayne County Airport Authority and reported the suspicious passenger behavior on flight 623. (Id. ¶ 53.)
At approximately 3:00 p.m., Defendants Bohn of WCAA, Lakatos and Ball (federal agents), and other law enforcement officers went to a designated inspection site to wait for the airplane to arrive. (Id. ¶ 54.) “At the inspection site, Defendant WCAA Officer Johnson . . . spoke via cell phone with [the plane’s captain], who told Officer Johnson that a male passenger from row 12 had entered the . . . restroom for a long period . . . while the other man from row 12 stood outside.” (Id. ¶ 55.) “According to Defendant Johnson . . . the captain stated that a third passenger
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seated in 12A may also be involved in the incident but is seated and compliant at this time.” (Id.)
None of the officers requested further evidence regarding Plaintiff’s involvement in suspicious activities. (Id. ¶ 56.)
The responding agencies, which included several federal agencies as well as the WCAA police, collaborated and put in place a plan to divert and board the aircraft, arrest all three passengers, and remove them to a detention facility for questioning. (Id. ¶ 57.)
Defendant WCAA Officer Grant organized the tactical entry of the flight with the assistance of Defendant WCAA Officer Johnson and officers from United States Customs and Border Protection. (Id. ¶ 58.)
Defendant WCAA Captain Driscoll recommended to Defendant DeBeau, WCAA Vice President of Public Safety, that all three passengers be removed and taken to a detention facility for further investigation. Defendant DeBeau authorized the plan. (Id. ¶ 59–60.)
“At approximately 4:25p.m., Defendants [WCAA officers] Carmona, Bohn, Johnson[,] [and] . . . [federal agent] Brumley, along with other officers, boarded the plane, heavily armed, and ran down the aisle . . . .” (Id. ¶ 68.) The officers stopped at Plaintiff’s row and yelled at all three passengers to get up. (Id. ¶ 70.) Defendant WCAA Detective Carmona put Plaintiff in handcuffs, and all three passengers were forcefully rushed down the aisle and off the plane. (Id. ¶¶ 72–73.)
After she was removed from the plane, an unidentified officer pushed Plaintiff roughly against a police car, made her spread her legs while he pat searched her,
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and asked her if she was wearing explosives. (Id. ¶¶ 75–76.) Plaintiff answered that she was not wearing explosives. (Id. ¶ 76.)
By this point, Plaintiff had twice asked the officers for an explanation of what was happening, and was not given a reply. (Id. ¶¶ 71, 77.)
Defendant WCAA Corporal Bradley put Plaintiff in a police car with one of the two men who had also been removed from the plane, and drove them to Building 358. (Id. ¶ 78.) After they reached the building, Plaintiff, still handcuffed, was removed from the car and placed in a cell that was approximately six feet by ten feet with a metal cot and a video camera hanging over the toilet. (Id. ¶¶ 80–81.)
An unidentified male officer came to the door of the cell and asked Plaintiff if she spoke English, to which she said yes and added that she is an American citizen. (Id. ¶ 82.) “The officer told her he would stand by the door to make sure she did not ‘flush anything’ down the toilet.” (Id. ¶ 83.) Plaintiff badly needed to use the toilet, but could not because of the presence of the guard and the camera. (Id. ¶ 84.)
At approximately 4:40 p.m., Defendants WCAA Lieutenant Wasiukanis and federal agent Brand conferred and decided that all three passengers should be strip searched. (Id. ¶ 85.) The “standard operating procedures in effect for the Wayne County Airport Authority” provided that “[a] person shall not be strip searched unless the person is being lodged into a detention facility, by order of a court or there is reasonable cause to believe that the person is concealing a weapon, controlled substance, or evidence of a crime.” (Id. ¶ 86.)
An hour later, Defendant WCAA Officer Parker performed the strip search of Plaintiff, during which Plaintiff’s handcuffs were removed and she was made to
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remove all of her clothing “so that she was completely naked,” told to face the wall, bend over, spread her buttocks, and cough while Defendant WCAA Officer Parker watched. (Id. ¶¶ 88–92.) Defendant Parker then felt through Plaintiff’s hair, lifted Plaintiff’s eyelids, and looked into her mouth. (Id. ¶¶ 93–94.) Plaintiff was then told to dress, after which Defendant Parker put the handcuffs back on Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 97.)
Approximately two hours later, Plaintiff was taken to an interview room where two unidentified federal agents questioned her for approximately 30 minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 99–102.) The agents questioned her about her family, her previous travel, and the two men who were seated next to her. (Id. ¶ 100.)
Before she was permitted to leave, an unknown federal agent “required that [Plaintiff] show the Twitter messages she had sent out from the airplane upon landing, as well as her Facebook profile.” (Id. ¶ 105.)
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Defendant federal agent Brand authorized the release of the three passengers. (Id. ¶ 106.)
C. Plaintiff’s Claims. Counts I, II, and III are brought against Frontier Airlines for violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 49 U.S.C. § 40127(A), respectively. All of these claims involve allegations of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. (Id. ¶¶ 110–31.)
Count IV is brought against the individual federal defendants and all of the WCAA defendants except WCAA Officer Toya Parker for violation of Equal Protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 132–38.)
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Count V is brought against the individual federal defendants and all of the WCAA defendants except WCAA Officer Toya Parker for Unreasonable Seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 139–45.)
Count VI is brought against Defendants federal agent Brand, WCAA Officer Parker, and WCAA Lieutenant Wasiukanis for Unreasonable Search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 146–52.)
Count VII is brought against the United States of America for False Arrest and False Imprisonment under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Id. ¶¶ 153–55.)
D. The WCAA Defendants’ Cross-Complaints. All of the defendants who are employees or agents of the WCAA, that is,
Defendants Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant, Toya Parker, Detective Carmona, and Officer Johnson (“WCAA Defendants”), have made cross-claims against Frontier Airlines. The WCAA Defendants have been proceeding in this case as two sets of individual Defendants with separate counsel. Those two sets are: (1) Defendants DeBeau, Carmona, Grant, Johnson, and Parker, represented by attorney Alan B. Havis (Dkts. 9–11, 41); and (2) Defendants Bohn, Bradley, Driscoll, and Wasiukanis, represented by attorney T. Joseph Seward (Dkts. 39, 41). Mr. Havis’s Defendants’ cross-complaint is document 37-1 on the case docket, while Mr. Seward’s Defendants’ cross-complaint is document 40-2. Aside from the names of the Cross-Plaintiffs, the size of the page margins, and the signatures of the lawyers, the two cross-complaints are identical. Therefore, in the course of this
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order, any reference to a cross-complaint is intended to apply to both cross-
complaints, unless otherwise stated.
The following are the factual allegations made in the cross-complaints that
relate specifically to the WCAA Defendants’ cross-claims:
A. Plaintiff has sued the WCAA Defendants seeking damages (Dkts. 37-1 & 40-2 ¶1.)
B. The acts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint are alleged to have arisen at Detroit Metro Airport. (Id. ¶ 6.)
C. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that her civil rights were violated by the Defendants, “for their activities surrounding and involving Ms. Hebshi’s detainment at Metro Airport.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
D. “On January 1, 2009 Frontier entered into an [sic] four [sic] Non-Signatory Airline Operating Agreement with the WCAA to lease space and operate air carrier services at Metro Airport (hereinafter ‘Frontier/WCAA contract’).” (Id. ¶ 9.)
E. “[Under] the Frontier/WCAA contract, Frontier has agreed to indemnify, defend, and hold the WCAA including its employees harmless from and against all liability to persons related to Frontier’s acts or omissions in its use of the Airport, however [sic] it shall not be liable for any injury caused by the WCAA’s sole negligence.” (Id. ¶ 10.)
F. “This incident arose out of Frontier’s operations at Metro Airport.” (Id. ¶ 11.)
G. “Defendant Cross Plaintiffs . . . are each employees of the WCAA.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
H. The WCAA Defendants “tendered this matter to Frontier seeking indemnification [under] the Frontier/WCAA contract, and Frontier has failed to respond to the tender demand.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
I. “Failure to accept the tender by [WCAA Defendants] violates the indemnification provision of the Frontier/WCAA contract, and as such, Frontier is liable to [WCAA Defendants] for their attorneys [sic] fees and costs in defending this matter, and for other damages including . . . any settlement entered into by the [WCAA Defendants] or judgment rendered against them.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
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J. “[Under] the Frontier/WCAA contract, Frontier was to obtain, in the name of the WCAA as an additional insured, a Comprehensive Airline Liability Insurance policy, in an amount of not less than . . . $500,000,000 per occurrence.” (Id. ¶ 17.)
K. “The WCAA acts through its employees and said policy applies to [WCAA Defendants] as employees of the WCAA.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
L. “A claim on Frontier’s insurance policy was instituted by [WCAA Defendants] and Frontier’s insurer has not responded.” (Id. ¶ 19.)
M. “To the extent that Frontier failed to obtain the insurance specified within the Frontier/WCAA contract, Frontier breached its contract with the Airport Authority and is liable for all natural and foreseeable consequential damages sustained by [WCAA Defendants].” (Id. ¶ 20.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a legally sufficient claim has been pleaded, and provides for dismissal when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When assessing whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the district court must accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true. See Ziegler v IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001). “Mere conclusions,” however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the complaint as well as (1) documents that are referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint or that are central to plaintiff’s claims, (2) matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and (3) documents that are a matter of public record. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); see also Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred to in the complaint and central to the claim are deemed to form a part of the pleadings).
III. ANALYSIS The WCAA Defendants brought two cross-claims against Defendant Frontier Airlines, both for breach of contract. (Dkts. 37-1, 40-2.) In Count I, the WCAA Defendants claim that Frontier has failed to indemnify them and hold them harmless, and, in Count II, they claim that Frontier has failed to obtain specified insurance, both in violation of a contract between Frontier and the WCAA. (Id.) Frontier moves to dismiss the cross-complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that the indemnification and insurance provisions it is accused of breaching are void as against public policy. (Dkts. 73 & 74 at 10–14.)
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Under Michigan law to establish a breach of contract claim . . . a plaintiff must establish both the elements of a contract and the breach of it. The essential elements of a valid contract are: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation. Once the plaintiff establishes the elements of a contract, it must then establish that the contract was breached and damages resulting from the breach. Where performance is due under a contract, nonperformance constitutes a breach.
RSM Richter, Inc. v. Behr Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Here, Frontier argues that the agreement is void because it violates public policy, which is to say that the contract does not cover “a proper subject matter.” See Morris & Doherty, P.C. v. Lockwood, 672 N.W.2d 884, 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (“A proposed contract is concerned with a proper subject matter only if the contract performance requirements are not contrary to public policy.”).
The WCAA Defendants’ allegations are deficient with respect to the alleged breach. For this reason, more fully explained below, the WCAA Defendants’ crosscomplaints fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A. The WCAA Defendants Have Failed to Allege Breach of Contract Sufficiently.
With a breach of contract claim, like the two in the WCAA Defendants’ crosscomplaints, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, the pleader must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that establishes both that the elements of a contract were satisfied and that the contract was breached. “To defeat a motion to dismiss, ‘a
12

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complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’” Thornberry v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 453, 456 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (citing Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993)).
All of the cross-complaints’ allegations possibly relevant to whether the contract was breached are summarized at the end of the Factual Background section above, listed as A through M. Those allegations are plainly insufficient to establish a breach of contract claim.
1. The allegations are insufficient to support Count I. As to Count I of the cross-complaints, the language of the indemnification clause as alleged clearly states that Frontier must defend and indemnify the WCAA Defendants only for claims “related to Frontier’s acts or omissions in its use of the Airport” that are not caused by the WCAA’s sole negligence. (Dkts. 37-1 & 40-2 ¶ 10.) The only allegation the WCAA Defendants make as to whether the Plaintiff’s claims qualify under that clause is this one: “This incident arose out of Frontier’s operations at Metro Airport.” (Id. ¶ 11.) But that allegation is conclusory and not entitled to the assumption of truth—“[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Further, even if it were accepted as true, the alleged fact that the incident “arose out of Frontier’s operations” at the airport is insufficient to trigger the contract’s indemnification
13

4:13-cv-10253-TGB-MKM Doc # 109 Filed 03/18/14 Pg 14 of 24 Pg ID 1279
requirement because that provision applies to claims that are “related to Frontier’s acts or omissions in its use of the Airport.”
The WCAA Defendants have not alleged what it is that Frontier did that made it so Plaintiff’s claims against the WCAA Defendants are the fault or responsibility of Frontier. There is not a single fact alleged that explains what Frontier did to make it such that the WCAA Defendants’ alleged violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights were “related to Frontier’s acts or omissions in its use of the Airport.” Further, there is no allegation that Plaintiff’s alleged damages are not the result of the WCAA’s sole negligence.
Even if the WCAA Defendants were to incorporate the allegations from Plaintiff’s complaint, the cross-complaint would still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based on their response to the motion to dismiss—which contains more facts than are pleaded in the cross-complaints—the WCAA Defendants’ theory of the breach appears to be that their alleged actions against Plaintiff were somehow caused by Frontier’s actions. (Dkt. 80 at 13.) But even if the cross-complaints were to allege that Frontier agents had alerted the WCAA Defendants to the “suspicious activity” occurring on flight 623, or that it was a Frontier agent who communicated to the WCAA Defendants that Plaintiff might be with the two men who were acting suspiciously, that would not be sufficient to establish that Plaintiff’s claims trigger the indemnification clause in the contract. That is to say, such allegations would not be sufficient to fall within the coverage of the indemnification agreement because they do not contend that Plaintiff’s civil rights claims against the WCAA Defendants either actually or allegedly arose from,
14

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were related to, or were caused by, the airline’s “acts or omissions . . . in its use or occupancy of the airport or the conduct of any of its operations or activities at the airport.”
Defendants’ cross-claims fail to allege any facts capable of answering two questions that must be addressed to make a plausible claim that Frontier violated the indemnity clause. First, how is it that Frontier, in having made a report to law enforcement, is responsible for the conduct of the law enforcement officers who react to that report; and second, how could it be the case that Plaintiff’s claims against the WCAA Defendants arose from, related to, or were caused by Frontier’s acts or omissions, or the conduct of any of its operations or activities at the airport? The absence of any facts addressing these questions prevents the cross-claims from stating a cause of action for a breach of the indemnity clause. Whether it may be possible to allege such facts is unknown, but the Court notes that the WCAA Defendants would have had a substantial bar to clear if they had sought leave to amend, particularly when “indemnity contracts are construed most strictly against the party who drafts them and the indemnitee.” Powers v. Apcoa Standard Parking, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
2. The allegations are insufficient to support Count II. As to Count II, the allegations are insufficient there as well. The WCAA Defendants allege that the Non-Signatory Airline Operating Agreement required Frontier to “obtain, in the name of the WCAA as an additional insured, a Comprehensive Airline Liability Insurance Policy, in an amount not less than . . . $500,000,000 per occurrence.” (Dkts. 37-1 & 40-2 ¶ 17.) This allegation sets out
15

4:13-cv-10253-TGB-MKM Doc # 109 Filed 03/18/14 Pg 16 of 24 Pg ID 1281
Frontier’s obligation to obtain insurance, but it does not state that Frontier breached the agreement by failing to obtain insurance. The WCAA Defendants allege that “Frontier’s insurer has not responded” (emphasis added) to the claim they “instituted” with the insurer, and that “to the extent that Frontier failed to obtain insurance . . . Frontier breached its contract.” (Id. ¶¶ 19–20) (emphasis added). This allegation also fails to state any facts showing that Frontier failed to obtain insurance as required. Neither of these are an allegation of a breach of contract. They are allegations that WCAA believes Frontier has breached the contract, which is insufficient to plead a breach.
Because the WCAA Defendants have failed to plead sufficient facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, their cross-complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. If the Indemnification Provision Were Interpreted to Require Indemnification of the Airport Defendants for Plaintiff’s Claims Against Them, it Would Necessarily Be Void as Against Public Policy.
Absent allegations of truly extraordinary facts, the WCAA Defendants cannot redeem Count I of the cross-complaints. As discussed above, it is far from clear that Plaintiff’s claims against the WCAA Defendants are even covered by the plain language of the agreement. But what is clear is that if the indemnification provision were read to cover Plaintiff’s claims against the WCAA Defendants, that provision would be void as against public policy, in which case the WCAA Defendants would be unable to establish either a breach or even a that the contract is one over a “proper subject matter.”
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The parties agree that “this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim requires that it ‘sits as a court of the forum state and is bound to apply its substantive law.’” (Dkt. 80 at 13; Dkts. 73 &74 at 10.)
In its motions to dismiss the cross-complaints, Frontier argues that the motion should be granted because
all the claims made by [Plaintiff] against Cross Plaintiffs . . . seek recovery for alleged intentional and unconstitutional conduct in arresting, detaining, and strip searching [Plaintiff]. To the extent that Frontier allegedly has an obligation under the contract to indemnify and insure the Cross Plaintiffs for such conduct, which is explicitly denied, such an agreement, as applied to these claims, is void and unenforceable under Michigan law. (Dkts. 73 & 74 at 13.) In support of this argument, Frontier offers the following cases as “controlling authority”: Caldwell v. Enyeart, 72 F.3d 129 (Table) (6th Cir. 1995); Wagner v. Regency Inn Corp., 186 Mich. App. 158 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Holmes v. St. Clair County, Michigan, No. 04-73830, 2005 WL 1684136 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2005); and Powers v. Apcoa Standard Parking, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Mich. 2003). The WCAA Defendants argue that the indemnification provision is not void and unenforceable because (1) their conduct was not intentional in that they believed it was proper police activity and to the extent it might have violated Plaintiff’s civil rights that consequence was not intended, and (2) indemnifying them in this matter would not violate Michigan public policy. (Dkt. 80 at 13–22.) In support of their position, the WCAA Defendants offer the following cases and statutes as “controlling or most appropriate authority”: Terrien v. Zwit, 648 N.W.2d 602 (Mich. 2002); Twin City Pipeline Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931);
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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987); 6 U.S.C. § 1404; and Michigan Compiled Laws 691.1407(2).1
Both of the WCAA Defendants’ arguments fail. The complaint alleges intentional constitutional violations, actions which are not appropriate for contractual indemnification under Michigan law. And even if their actions could somehow be classified as something other than intentional torts, indemnification for the civil rights violations alleged in this case would still be void as against public policy.
1. The WCAA Defendants’ alleged actions against Plaintiff were intentional.
Plaintiff’s allegations and claims against the WCAA Defendants’ are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the intentional violation of her civil rights, specifically her rights to equal protection, to be free from unreasonable seizures, and to be free from unreasonable searches. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 132–52.) Section 1983 claims, by their very nature, are not claims of negligence. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 n.16 (1984) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)); Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999). Frontier makes this argument. (Dkts. 73 & 74 at 13; Dkt. 85 at 2.)
In response, the WCAA Defendants argue that, “in the area of insurance and indemnity law,” “intent . . . means more than merely intent to do a specific act. It must also include intent to bring about a result that is itself wrongful.” (Dkt. 80 at
1 WCAA Defendants should please note that the Court’s practice guidelines require that citations “must conform to the latest edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation published by the Harvard Law Review.” http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/Judges/guidelines/topic.cfm?topic_id=459. Few if any of the case citations in the response (Dkt. 80) conform to the Bluebook.
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15–16.) WCAA does not offer a citation to any case or other authority to support that statement. Instead, they offer what they view as the “best exposition of this requirement” by quoting from and citing to a case that discusses the use of “occurrence” and “accident” in the context of insurance coverage. (Id. at 16.) They note that under Michigan law “‘an accident is an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.’” Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters, 595 N.W.2d 832, 838 (1999) (quoting Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168, 173 (1995) abrogated by 595 N.W.2d 832 (1999)). They also claim, again with no supporting citation, that “it is not enough that the person acted intentionally. . . . the actor must also intend to cause the wrongful result.” (Dkt. 80 at 16.) They then offer another quotation from the Frankenmuth case: “. . . a determination must be made whether the consequences of the insured’s intentional act either were intended by the insured or reasonably should have been expected because of the direct risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s actions.” Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 595 N.W.2d at 839.
What this argument, and the holdings of the cited Frankenmuth case, have to do with whether the Plaintiff’s claims against the WCAA Defendants arise from intentional acts or negligence is a mystery. How Michigan courts interpret the undefined term “accident” in an insurance policy tells us nothing about whether the particular actions of the WCAA Defendants were intentional. As this is the WCAA
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Defendants’ only argument, and the Frankenmuth case is the only cited case on this point, their defense against Frontier’s motion fails.
It is clear from the response, however, that the WCAA Defendants’ position is that while the actions were intentional, they did not intend the “harmful result.” (Dkt. 80 at 17.) But that is not the standard. As alleged, the actions of the WCAA Defendants were clearly intentional—they did not accidentally or negligently forcefully remove Plaintiff from the plane, or detain her, or strip search her. Whether those actions were in fact violations of her civil rights, whether they were reasonable and excusable, is a different question. But the answer to that different question does not convert the WCAA Defendants’ actions from intentional acts to negligence.
To the extent the indemnification provision in the agreement (Dkts. 37-1 & 40-2 ¶¶ 9–20; Dkt. 80-2) were to require Frontier to indemnify the WCAA Defendants for Plaintiff’s claims against them, it would be void under Michigan law. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Enyeart, 72 F.3d 129 (Table) (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 629, 633 (W.D. Va. 1988); Klann v. Hess Cartage Co., 214 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Mich. Ct. App.1973); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Universal Gym Equip., Inc. v. Vic Tanny Int’l, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)); see also Mahon v. City of Bethlehem, 902 F. Supp. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“There is even more reason to demand specificity when the indemnitee seeks to be indemnified for his or her own intentional conduct. The clauses at issue make no reference to intentional torts, but rather use terms of general import except on the subject of negligence. The drafters
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could have included terms relating to intentional torts if they had so desired and as they did for negligent torts. They did not and we hold that as a matter of law the clauses do not indemnify Moving Defendants for their own intentional torts.”).2
2. Public Policy prohibits the indemnification of the WCAA Defendants for Plaintiff’s claims against them.
Even if the WCAA Defendants’ actions against Plaintiff could somehow be classified as something other than intentional torts, and thus the indemnification agreement was not void for indemnifying a party for its own intentional misconduct, the indemnification provision would still be void as against public policy. See Federoff v. Ewing, 192 N.W.2d 242, 245–46 (Mich. 1971); see also Caldwell, 72 F.3d 129. All agreements that create a situation that “tends to operate to the detriment of the public interest are against public policy and void.” Federoff, 192 N.W.2d at 245; Caldwell, 72 F.3d 129.
The WCAA Defendants’ sole argument that contractual indemnification for civil rights claims is not void as against public policy is: both Michigan and federal law provide qualified immunity for those claims, including the claims brought against the WCAA Defendants. This argument is specious at best. The same is true as to the fact that one can get insurance coverage for civil rights violations. That both state and federal law, and thus public policy, provide law enforcement officers qualified immunity under some circumstances, including many circumstances where the subject of the actions believe her civil rights have been violated, does not
2 In their response, the WCAA Defendants refer to two distinct agreements (Dkt. 80 at 11), but their cross-complaints are made only on the provisions of one of those agreements, the “Non-Signatory Airline Operating Agreement,” attached as exhibit 1 to the response. (Dkts. 37-1 & 40-2 ¶¶ 9–20.)
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mean that public policy supports contractual indemnification for those claims regardless of whether the officers are protected by qualified immunity. WCAA is seeking indemnification for any kind of conduct, whether protected by qualified immunity (in which case no indemnification would be needed) or whether it amounts to an intentional violation of constitutional rights. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects reasonable police conduct and advances the public interest; the notion that allegedly unreasonable and intentional police misconduct should be indemnified by contract does not.
While a Michigan trial court has held that a contractual indemnification for civil rights violations is void as against public policy, the Court is not aware of a Michigan appellate court that has squarely addressed this question. See Badiee v. Brighton Area Sch., 695 N.W.2d 521, 531 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). Nevertheless, it is clear that the indemnification provision at issue here, if it were read to cover claims such as those the Plaintiff has brought against WCAA Defendants, is contrary to the public policy of both the state of Michigan and the United States. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948) (noting that agreements that tend to injure the public good violate public policy); Caldwell, 72 F.3d 129; L’Orange v. Med. Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that courts should not hesitate to void agreements that tend to injure the public good or contravene an established interest of society); Holmes v. St. Clair County, Mich., No. 04-73830, 2005 WL 1684136, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2005); Federoff, 192 N.W.2d at 245.
If airport law enforcement officers could be indemnified for their alleged civil rights violations, such as those alleged here, it would, in the words of the Michigan
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courts “operate to the detriment of the public interest,” Federoff, 192 N.W.2d at 245, and, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, “tend to injure the public good,” Hurd, 334 U.S. at 35. It is in the public interest to have law enforcement officers who refrain from violating the civil rights of citizens and the human rights of noncitizens. It is further in the public interest that airline employees feel free to alert law enforcement of suspicious activity on aircraft. Both of these would be stymied by contractual indemnification: the officers might feel freer to push the limits of reasonable police action, aware that if they cross the line it will be neither them nor their employer that would suffer the consequences; and the airlines might feel less free to alert law enforcement of suspicious activity, aware that any unreasonable actions or over-reactions by the officers, would be their burden to defend. Such a circumstance would clearly “tend to injure the public good.” Cf. Cramer v. Matish, 924 F.2d 1057 (Table), at *4 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Indemnification clauses in collective bargaining agreements which purport to relieve public employers from liability for violations of federal constitutional and civil rights are void as against public policy.”); Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass’n, 697 F.2d 70, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1982); but cf. Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Fed. Sec., Inc., 161 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1998) (where an indemnification clause required a private security agency to indemnify the Chicago Housing Authority for the consequences of negligence and intentional misconduct committed by the private security agency’s own officers, it is not necessarily contrary to public policy under Illinois state law). For the above reasons, the clause at issue, if construed to require Frontier to indemnify WCAA for their alleged civil rights violations committed against
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Plaintiff, is void as against public policy. Consequently, WCAA’s cross-claim brought under this clause will be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED that Frontier’s motions

to dismiss (Dkts. 73 &74) the WCAA Defendants’ cross-complaints (Dkts. 37-1 & 40-

2) are GRANTED and the cross-complaints are DISMISSED. It is FURTHER

ORDERED that Count I of the cross-complaint cannot be redeemed by amendment

and thus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is FURTHER ORDERED that any

motion for leave to amend the cross-complaint must be made by March 31, 2014, in

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and this Court’s Local Rule

15.1.

Dated: March 18, 2014

s/Terrence G. Berg TERRENCE G. BERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on March 18, 2014, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
By: s/A. Chubb Case Manager

24

 
 4:13-cv-10253-TGB-MKM Doc # 144 Filed 01/16/15 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 1628

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SHOSHANA HEBSHI,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC., JOHN BRAND, in his individual capacity, UNKNOWN FBI AGENT 1, in his individual capacity, UNKOWN FBI AGENT 2, in his individual capacity, JOHN ETLING, in his individual capacity, MARK DEBEAU, in his individual capacity, JEREMY BOHN, in his individual capacity, CAPTAIN PATRICK DRISCOLL, in his individual capacity, OFFICER GRANT, in his individual capacity, LT M. WASIUKANIS, in his individual capacity, TOYA PARKER, in her individual capacity, DT. CARMONA, in his or her individual capacity, OFFICER JOHNSON, in his or her individual capacity, CORPORAL BRADLEY, in his or her individual capacity, UNKNOWN CBP OFFICER, in his individual capacity, THOMAS PIPIS, in his individual capacity, DAVID LAKOTOS, in his individual capacity, NATHANIEL DEVINS, in his individual capacity, UNKNOWN TSA AGENT 1, in his individual capacity, UNKNOWN TSA AGENT 2, in her individual capacity, ROBERT BALL, in his individual capacity, UNKNOWN ICE OFFICER, in his individual capacity, PAUL BRUMLEY, in his individual capacity, and WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY,

No. 4:13-cv-10253 Hon. Terrence G. Berg

Defendants. _____________________________________________________________________________/

1

4:13-cv-10253-TGB-MKM Doc # 144 Filed 01/16/15 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 1629

SARAH MEHTA (P76024)

ALAN B. HAVIS (P36988)

MICHAEL J. STEINBERG (P43085)

LAW OFFICES OF ALAN B. HAVIS ESQ.

KARY L. MOSS (P49759)

Attorney for Mark Debeau, Officer Grant,

ACLU OF MICHIGAN

Toya Parker, Dt. Carmona, Officer

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Johnson and the Wayne County Airport Authority

2966 Woodward Avenue

25505 W. 12 Mile Road, Suite 1000

Detroit, MI 48201

Southfield, MI 48034

(313) 578-6823

(248) 353-3690

smehta@aclumich.org

ahavis@AirportDefender.com

msteinberge@aclumich.org

kmoss@aclumich.org

T. JOSEPH SEWARD (P35095)

CUMMINGS MCCLOREY DAVIS & ACHO

DENNIS D. PARKER

Attorney for Jeremy Bohn, Captain Patrick

RACHEL E. GOODMAN

Driscoll, Lt. M. Wasiukanis, and Corporal

AYIRINI FONSCECA-SABUNE

Bradley

ACLU

33900 Schoolcraft Road

Attorneys for Plaintiff 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

Livonia, MI 48150 (734) 261-2400

New York, NY 10004

tjseward@cmda-law.com

(212) 549-2500

(212) 549-2651

LYNN M. DODGE (P38136)

dparker@aclu.org

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

rgoodman@aclu.org

Attorney for John Brand, John Etling,

afonseca-sabune@aclu.org

Thomas Pipis, David Lakotos, Nathanael

Devins, Robert Ball, Paul Brumley and

WILLIAM H. GOODMAN (P14173)

the United States

JULIE HORWITZ (P34720)

211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001

KATHRYN BRUNER JAMES (P71374)

Detroit, MI 48226

GOODMAN & HURWITZ PC

(313) 226-0205

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Lynn.Dodge@usdoj.gov

1394 E. Jefferson Avenue

Detroit, MI 48207

SARAH E. WHITMAN

(313) 567-6170

UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE

bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com

Attorney for John Brand, John Etling,

jurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com

Thomas Pipis, David Lakotos, Nathanael

kjames@goodmanhurwitz.com

Devins, Robert Ball, Paul Brumley and

the United States

ANNA ENGH

Torts Branch, Civil Division

SHELLI CALLAND

P.O. Box 7146, Ben Franklin Station

ARJUN SETH

Washington, DC 20044

SARAH TREMONT (P73809)

(202) 616-0089

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

Sarah.Whitman@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff

1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

BRIAN T. MAYE

Washington, DC 20004

ADLER MURPHY & McQUILLEN LLP

(202) 662-6000

Attorney for Frontier Airlines, Inc.

aengh@cov.com

20 South Clark Street, Ste. 2500

stremont@cov.com

Chicago, IL 60603-1804

(312) 345-0700

bmaye@amm-law.com

_____________________________________________________________________________/

STIPULATION AND ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS MARK DEBEAU, JEREMY BOHN, CAPTAIN PATRICK DRISCOLL, OFFICER GRANT, LT. M. WASIUKANIS, TOYA PARKER, DT. CARMONA, OFFICER JOHNSON AND CORPORAL BRADLEY

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4:13-cv-10253-TGB-MKM Doc # 144 Filed 01/16/15 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 1630
The parties stipulate to the following terms, and accordingly, it is ORDERED: Defendants Mark Debeau, Jeremy Bohn, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Officer Grant, Lt. M. Wasiukanis, Toya Parker, Dt. Carmona, Officer Johnson and Corporal Bradley are dismissed with prejudice and without costs to any party.

Dated: January 16, 2015

s/Terrence G. Berg_______________________ HON. TERRENCE G. BERG United States District Court Judge

Agreed and stipulated to by:
/s/ T. Joseph Seward_____________________ T. JOSEPH SEWARD (P35095) Attorney for Defendants Cpt. Patrick Driscoll, Cpl. Bradley, Lt. M. Wasiukanis, Sgt. Jeremy Bohn

/s/Alan B. Havis______________________ ALAN B. HAVIS (P36988) Attorney for Defendants Ofc. Grant, Ofc. Johnson, Mark Debeau, Toya Parker, Det. Carmona, and Wayne County Airport Authority

/s/Michael J. Steinberg___________________ MICHAEL J. STEINBERG (P43085) Attorney for Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi

/s/Sarah E. Whitman___________________ SARAH E. WHITMAN Attorney for Defendants United States of America, John Etling, Thomas Pipis, David Lakotos, Nathaniel Devins, Robert Ball, Paul Brumley

/s/Brian T. Maye________________________ BRIAN T. MAYE Attorney for Frontier Airlines, Inc.

3

 
 4:13-cv-10253-TGB-MKM Doc # 148 Filed 04/21/15 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 1641

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHOSHANA HEBSHI,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al, )

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 13-10253
Hon. Terrence G. Berg
Hon. Laurie J. Michelson (Settlement)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL Having considered Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss, this Court finds the Motion should be GRANTED. The above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all defendants, each party to bear its own costs, expenses, and fees.

s/Terrence G. Berg TERRENCE G. BERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated:

April 21, 2015 Flint, Michigan

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on April 21, 2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
By: s/A. Chubb Case Manager

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHOSHANA HEBSHI,

Plaintiff, v.
Case No. 13-10253

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants. /

HON. TERRENCE G. BERG HON. MONA K. MAJZOUB

ORDER DENYING WCAA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO COUNTS V & VI,
AND MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS

This matter is before the Court on a motion for partial judgment on the

pleadings to dismiss Counts V and VI (Dkt. 89) brought by Defendants, law

enforcement officers of the Wayne County Airport Authority (the “WCAA

Defendants”), including Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M.

Wasiukanis, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant, Toya Parker,

Detective Carmona, and Officer Johnson. The motion is brought under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(c), asserting that the WCAA Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s claim that her arrest, detention, and search

were in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights under the United States

Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Having reviewed

the motion and its accompanying exhibits, Plaintiff’s response, and the remainder of

the record, the Court finds that the documents adequately present the issues in the

motion, and that oral argument would not aid the decision. Accordingly, the Court

will decide the WCAA Defendants’ motion (Dkt. 89) without a hearing. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
The WCAA Defendants, and non-parties Thomas J. Naughton and the Wayne County Airport Authority, have also moved for protective orders seeking to stay discovery pending resolution of this motion. (Dkts. 94, 98.)
For the reasons set forth below, the WCAA Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings to dismiss Counts V and VI (Dkt. 89) is DENIED, and their motion and the non-parties’ motion for protective orders (Dkts. 94, 98) are DENIED as moot.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Parties.
Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi is a natural person, a United States citizen, a resident of Ohio, and the daughter of a Jewish mother and a father who emigrated from Saudi Arabia. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 12.)
Defendant United States of America is a sovereign state and the employer of Defendants Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, and David Lakatos. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 30, 31, 33, 36.)
Defendant Frontier Airlines is an airline headquartered in Denver, Colorado, and was the operator of flight 623 from Denver to Detroit on September 11, 2011, upon which Plaintiff was a passenger. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 41.)
Defendants Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, and David Lakatos are federal law enforcement agents who allegedly participated in the
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seizure, detention, and searches of Plaintiff’s person and personal effects as described below. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 30, 31, 33, 36.)
Defendants Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant, Toya Parker, Detective Carmona, and Officer Johnson are Wayne County Airport Authority (WCAA) law enforcement agents who allegedly participated in the seizure, detention, and searches of Plaintiff’s person and personal effects as described below. (Id. ¶¶ 19–27.)
In addition, Plaintiff has also named six unknown federal agents as Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 28, 32, 34, 35.) Plaintiff had also named federal agents John Etling and Thomas Pipis as defendants, but they were voluntarily dismissed from the case. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 29; Dkts. 54, 55.)
B. Allegations Made in the Complaint. Plaintiff’s primary allegations are summarized in the first paragraph of the
Complaint: On September 11, 2011, Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi flew on Frontier Airlines flight 623 . . . . Upon landing, heavily armed agents forcibly removed [Plaintiff] from the airplane; handcuffed, pat searched, and strip searched her; and locked her in a cell at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport before interrogating her. [She] was detained for approximately four hours before being released with no charges.
(Dkt. 1 ¶ 1.) The details follow. Plaintiff Shoshana Hebshi is a United States citizen whose first name is of
Hebrew origin and surname is of Saudi Arabian origin. (Id. ¶ 12.) Traveling alone, Plaintiff flew on Frontier Airlines flight 623 from Denver to Detroit on September
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11, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41–42.) She sat in seat 12A and did not leave her seat at any time during the flight. (Id. ¶ 42.)
Seated next to Plaintiff, in seats 12B and 12C, were two men of “South Asian descent.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff did not know these men and did not speak to them at any time. (Id. ¶ 44.)
“During the flight, some flight attendants and passengers noticed that the two men seated in [Plaintiff’s] row were acting in a way that they considered to be suspicious.” (Id. ¶ 45.) “Specifically, these flight attendants and passengers alleged that the men went to the restroom around the same time and each spent ten, fifteen[,] or twenty minutes there. Some passengers and flight attendants also reported that the men were standing in the aisle for long periods.” (Id.) None of the passengers or crew observed or reported anything suspicious about Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 46.)
“Shortly before 3:00 p.m., flight attendants alerted the pilot . . . that two men of ‘possibly Arab descent’ had been observed repeatedly going to the bathroom and standing in the aisle for long periods . . . .” (Id. ¶ 47.) The pilot then “sent a message through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System . . . asking for information about the passengers seated in 12B and 12C, whom he and the flight attendants believed were acting strangely . . . .” (Id. ¶ 48.) The pilot did not in any way mention, ask questions about, or seek information regarding Plaintiff.
The pilot’s message was received by Mark Fraley, a Frontier Airlines employee, who forwarded the message by e-mail to several people, including other Frontier staff. (Id. ¶ 49.) He provided the names of the passengers in 12B and 12C, and also
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included Plaintiff’s name as the passenger in 12A, adding that she might also be with them. (Id.)
Tammara Faforke, a Frontier Airlines employee, passed Fraley’s e-mail to a Transportation Security Administration air marshal and Officer Duncan, a WCAA police officer. (Id. ¶ 51.) Officer Duncan then passed the e-mail to another WCAA officer, Defendant Grant. (Id.) Defendant Grant relayed the information from the email, including that Plaintiff may be traveling with the two men, to Defendants Driscoll and Carmona, also WCAA officers. (Id. ¶ 52.)
The Transportation Security Administration also contacted the Wayne County Airport Authority and reported the suspicious passenger behavior on flight 623. (Id. ¶ 53.)
At approximately 3:00 p.m., Defendants Bohn of WCAA, Lakatos and Ball (federal agents), and other law enforcement officers went to a designated inspection site to wait for the airplane to arrive. (Id. ¶ 54.) “At the inspection site, Defendant WCAA Officer Johnson . . . spoke via cell phone with [the plane’s captain], who told Officer Johnson that a male passenger from row 12 had entered the . . . restroom for a long period . . . while the other man from row 12 stood outside.” (Id. ¶ 55.) “According to Defendant Johnson . . . the captain stated that a third passenger seated in 12A may also be involved in the incident but is seated and compliant at this time.” (Id.)
None of the officers requested further evidence regarding Plaintiff’s involvement in suspicious activities. (Id. ¶ 56.)
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The responding agencies, which included several federal agencies as well as the WCAA police, collaborated and put in place a plan to divert and board the aircraft, arrest all three passengers, and remove them to a detention facility for questioning. (Id. ¶ 57.)
Defendant WCAA Officer Grant organized the tactical entry of the flight with the assistance of Defendant WCAA Officer Johnson and officers from United States Customs and Border Protection. (Id. ¶ 58.)
Defendant WCAA Captain Driscoll recommended to Defendant DeBeau, WCAA Vice President of Public Safety, that all three passengers be removed and taken to a detention facility for further investigation. Defendant DeBeau authorized the plan. (Id. ¶ 59–60.)
“At approximately 4:25 p.m., Defendants [WCAA officers] Carmona, Bohn, Johnson[,] [and] . . . [federal agent] Brumley, along with other officers, boarded the plane, heavily armed, and ran down the aisle . . . .” (Id. ¶ 68.) The officers stopped at Plaintiff’s row and yelled at all three passengers to get up. (Id. ¶ 70.) Defendant WCAA Detective Carmona put Plaintiff in handcuffs, and all three passengers were forcibly rushed down the aisle and off the plane. (Id. ¶¶ 72–73.)
After she was removed from the plane, an unidentified officer pushed Plaintiff roughly against a police car, made her spread her legs while he pat searched her, and asked her if she was wearing explosives. (Id. ¶¶ 75–76.) Plaintiff answered that she was not wearing explosives. (Id. ¶ 76.)
By this point, Plaintiff had twice asked the officers for an explanation of what was happening, and was not given a reply. (Id. ¶¶ 71, 77.)
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Defendant WCAA Corporal Bradley put Plaintiff in a police car with one of the two men who had also been removed from the plane, and drove them to Building 358. (Id. ¶ 78.) After they reached the building, Plaintiff, still handcuffed, was removed from the car and placed in a cell that was approximately six feet by ten feet with a metal cot and a video camera hanging over the toilet. (Id. ¶¶ 80–81.)
An unidentified male officer came to the door of the cell and asked Plaintiff if she spoke English, to which she said yes and added that she is an American citizen. (Id. ¶ 82.) “The officer told her he would stand by the door to make sure she did not ‘flush anything’ down the toilet.” (Id. ¶ 83.) Plaintiff badly needed to use the toilet, but because she was handcuffed, a male guard was at the door, and there was a video camera above the toilet, she did not. (Id. ¶ 84.)
At approximately 4:40 p.m., Defendants WCAA Lieutenant Wasiukanis and federal agent Brand conferred and decided that all three passengers should be stripsearched. (Id. ¶ 85.) The “standard operating procedures in effect for the Wayne County Airport Authority” provided that “[a] person shall not be strip searched unless the person is being lodged into a detention facility, by order of a court or there is reasonable cause to believe that the person is concealing a weapon, controlled substance, or evidence of a crime.” (Id. ¶ 86.)
An hour later, Defendant WCAA Officer Parker arrived and told Plaintiff she was going to be strip-searched. Plaintiff was afraid and began to cry. WCAA Officer Parker performed the strip-search of Plaintiff, during which Plaintiff’s handcuffs were removed and she was made to remove all of her clothing “so that she was completely naked,” told to face the wall, bend over, spread her buttocks, and cough
7

while Defendant WCAA Officer Parker watched. (Id. ¶¶ 88–92.) Defendant Parker then felt through Plaintiff’s hair, lifted Plaintiff’s eyelids, and looked into her mouth. (Id. ¶¶ 93–94.) Plaintiff was then told to dress, after which Defendant Parker put the handcuffs back on Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 97.)
Approximately two hours later, Plaintiff was taken to an interview room where two unidentified federal agents questioned her for approximately 30 minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 99–102.) The agents questioned her about her family, her previous travel, and the two men who were seated next to her. (Id. ¶ 100.)
Before she was permitted to leave, an unknown federal agent “required that [Plaintiff] show the Twitter messages she had sent out from the airplane upon landing, as well as her Facebook profile.” (Id. ¶ 105.)
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Defendant federal agent Brand authorized the release of the three passengers. (Id. ¶ 106.)
C. Plaintiff’s Claims. Counts I, II, and III are brought against Frontier Airlines for violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 49 U.S.C. § 40127(A), respectively. All of these claims involve allegations of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. (Id. ¶¶ 110–31.)
Count IV is brought against the individual Federal Agent Defendants and all of the WCAA Defendants except WCAA Officer Toya Parker for violation of Equal Protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 132–38.)
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Count V is brought against the individual Federal Agent Defendants and all of the WCAA Defendants except WCAA Officer Toya Parker for Unreasonable Seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 139–45.)
Count VI is brought against Defendants federal agent Brand, WCAA Officer Parker, and WCAA Lieutenant Wasiukanis for Unreasonable Search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 146–52.)
Count VII is brought against the United States of America for False Arrest and False Imprisonment under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Id. ¶¶ 153–55.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD A Rule 12(c) motion tests whether a legally sufficient claim has been pleaded, and provides for dismissal when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); see Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 437 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When assessing whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the district court must accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true. See Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001). “Mere conclusions,” however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556
9

U.S. at 664. A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the complaint as well as (1) documents that are referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint or that are central to plaintiff’s claims, (2) matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and (3) documents that are a matter of public record. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); see also Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred to in the complaint and central to the claim are deemed part of the pleadings).
III. ANALYSIS The WCAA Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure claims in Counts V and VI of the Complaint, asserting that their conduct is protected by qualified immunity, and that Plaintiff’s claims therefore fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. 89.) “The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ An arrest, of course, qualifies as a ‘seizure’ of a ‘person’ under this provision, and so must be reasonable under the circumstances.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1979)). “Fourth
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Amendment reasonableness ‘is predominantly an objective inquiry.’” Id. (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000)).
When a defendant raises a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts that would be sufficient to show that the defendant is not entitled to its protection. See Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2012). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Counts V and VI of the Complaint allege facts that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, would establish that the conduct of the WCAA Defendants violated a constitutional right that was clearly established, namely Plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accepted as true, Counts V and VI state unreasonable search and seizure claims upon which relief can be granted, and WCAA Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 89) as to those Counts must be denied.
A. Plaintiff Adequately Alleges that Defendants Violated a Constitutional Right.
Plaintiff has alleged that each of the WCAA Defendants violated her rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures with both her arrest and detention, but only those claims supported by sufficient factual allegations can survive the
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Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The allegations in the Complaint adequately meet Plaintiff’s burden of pleading that the individual defendants both: (1) arrested her without probable cause, United States v. Jeter, 721 F.3d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 655 (2013) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9 (1979)); and (2) conducted an unreasonable search of her person by means of a “strip-search” vastly more invasive than was justified by the existing need, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
1. The WCAA Defendants’ Argument. The WCAA Defendants make essentially one argument in their motion for partial judgment on the pleadings as to Counts V and VI—that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim under the Fourth Amendment against each of them individually in light of their qualified immunity.2 (Dkt. 89 at 17–30.)
2. The Specific Allegations Against the WCAA Defendants. Plaintiff’s allegations against each of the WCAA Defendants are as follows:
 Jeremy Bohn, the WCAA Police Officer-in-Charge (¶ 20): Participated in Plaintiff’s arrest and transportation to the detention site despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 20); went to wait for the plane at the inspection site (¶ 54); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged
1 Count V is brought against, among others, all the WCAA Defendants except for Toya Parker. Count VI is brought against only WCAA Defendants Parker and Wasiukanis, and Federal Defendant Brand. (Dkt. 1 at 24.) The Federal Defendants have not moved to dismiss Counts V or VI based on qualified immunity. 2 Because the WCAA Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of both Counts V and VI (Dkt. 89 at 3), the Court will assume that this argument is made against both of those Counts despite the fact that the WCAA Defendants advance very little in the way of argument addressing the lawfulness of the search.
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involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); and boarded the plane, heavily armed (¶ 72).  Corporal Bradley, WCAA Police Officer (¶ 27): Arrested and transported Plaintiff to the detention facility despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 27); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); and put Plaintiff in the back of a police car with one of the men from her row, and transported them to the detention facility (¶ 78).  Lieutenant Wasiukanis, WCAA Police Officer (¶ 22): Participated in the arrest, detention, and decision to strip-search Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 22); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); and conferred with Defendant Brand and decided that Plaintiff should be strip-searched (¶ 85).  Captain Patrick Driscoll, WCAA Police Special Response Unit Officer (¶ 21): Participated in the decision to arrest, handcuff, and detain Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 21); received the Fraley message, including Plaintiff’s name, from Defendant Grant (¶ 52); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); and determined that a tactical entry was needed and recommended to Defendant DeBeau that all three passengers in row 12 be removed from the plane and taken to the detention facility for further investigation (¶ 59).
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 Mark DeBeau, WCAA Vice President of Public Safety (¶ 19): Participated in the decision to arrest Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 19); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); was present at the inspection site (¶ 60); and authorized Defendant Driscoll’s plan to remove all three from the plane and take them to the detention facility (¶ 60).
 Toya Parker, WCAA Police Officer (¶ 23): Performed the strip-search of Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 23); “came into [Plaintiff’s] cell and told her she was going to be strip searched” (¶ 89); “took off [Plaintiff’s] handcuffs and told her to remove all clothing, including her underwear and bra, so that she was completely naked,” and “instructed [Plaintiff] to stand facing the wall, away from the video camera, so that at least part of her body would be concealed” (¶ 91); “stood a couple of feet away and watched” as Plaintiff was “instructed to bend over, spread her buttocks, and cough” (¶ 92); “instructed [Plaintiff] to take her hair down from its ponytail so that Defendant Parker could feel through [Plaintiff’s] hair” (¶ 93); “lifted [Plaintiff’s] eyelids and looked into her mouth” (¶ 94); told Plaintiff to get dressed (¶ 95); and “put the handcuffs back on [Plaintiff’s] wrists” (¶ 97).
 Officer Grant, WCAA Police Special Response Unit Officer (¶ 24): Part of the team that planned and executed the arrest of Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 24); received the Fraley message, including Plaintiff’s name, from Officer Duncan (¶ 51); relayed the Fraley message, including Plaintiff’s name, to Defendants Driscoll and Carmona (¶ 52); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived
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ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); and organized the tactical entry of the plane with Defendant Johnson and others (¶ 58).  Detective Carmona, WCAA Police Officer (¶ 25): Participated in the arrest of Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 25); received the Fraley message, including Plaintiff’s name, from Defendant Grant (¶ 52); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); boarded the plane, heavily armed (¶ 72); and placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and the man in 12B in flex-cuffs (¶ 72).  Officer Johnson, WCAA Police K9 Officer (¶ 26): Participated in the arrest of Plaintiff despite a lack of probable cause or articulable facts connecting Plaintiff to criminal activity (¶ 26); was at the inspection site (¶ 55); spoke by phone with pilot, who told him that “a male passenger from row 12 had entered the . . . restroom for a long . . . time, while the other man from row 12 stood outside,” and that “a third passenger seated in 12A may also be involved in the incident but is seated and compliant at this time” (¶ 55); did not request further information or evidence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in suspicious activities, and acted based on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of Plaintiff (¶ 56); assisted Defendant Grant with organizing tactical entry of the plane (¶ 58); and boarded the plane, heavily armed (¶ 72).
When considered with all of the other allegations in the complaint, these allegations
are sufficient to support both Counts V and VI against the identified WCAA
Defendants.3
3 Some of the other specific allegations that provide support for Counts V and VI include: Plaintiff’s name, including that her last name is of Saudi Arabian origin and her first name is “of Hebrew origin” (¶¶ 2, 12); her mother is Jewish and her father immigrated to the United States from Saudi Arabia (¶ 12); she never left her seat during the flight (¶¶ 3, 42); she was traveling alone (¶ 39); she did not know the men seated in 12B and 12C and did not speak with them during the flight (¶ 44);
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3. The Complaint Pleads Plausible Claims of Both Unreasonable Seizure and Unreasonable Search.
The WCAA Defendants’ argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts
as to each individual defendant. (Dkt. 89 at 17–30.) This argument failed when the
WCAA Defendants made their earlier motion for partial judgment on the pleadings
as to Count IV (Dkt. 69), and it fails now as to Counts V and VI for similar reasons.
(See Dkt. 111 at 18–25.)4
The allegations against each of the WCAA Defendants are plainly sufficient at
this early stage of the litigation. (Cf. id. at 18–22.) As to Count V, each of the WCAA
some flight attendants and passengers noticed that the two men in 12B and 12C were acting in a way that they considered to be suspicious by taking long trips to the toilets and standing in the aisles (¶ 45); no one on the flight observed or reported anything suspicious about Plaintiff or her conduct (¶ 46); the pilot sent a message to Frontier Airlines dispatch “asking for information about the passengers seated in 12B and 12C, whom he and the flight attendants believed were acting strangely,” this message did not seek information regarding Plaintiff, who was seated in 12A, or otherwise suggest Plaintiff was acting suspiciously (¶ 48); Frontier Airlines ground employee Mark Fraley forwarded the pilot’s message and included his own message indicating that Plaintiff “might also be with the two men” (¶ 49) (emphasis added); the only information available to Fraley about Plaintiff was her name and seat assignment (¶ 50); WCAA Defendants Grant, Driscoll, and Carmona all received Fraley’s message, which included Plaintiff’s name and the pilot’s initial message that only sought information about the two men in 12B and 12C and in no way identified Plaintiff as a person of concern to the flight crew (¶¶ 49, 51, 52); WCAA Defendant Johnson spoke with the pilot via telephone and, according to the statement of Johnson, the pilot told him that “a male passenger from row 12 had entered the airplane restroom for a long period . . . while the other man from row 12 stood outside” and that “a third passenger seated in 12A may also be involved in the incident but is seated and compliant at this time” (¶ 55) (emphasis added); Plaintiff asked the officers who boarded the plane what was happening and did not receive a reply (¶ 71); Plaintiff was asked if she was wearing explosives (¶ 76); outside the plane, Plaintiff again asked what was happening and did not receive a reply (¶ 77); Plaintiff was asked if she speaks English (¶ 82); and the strip-search was not conducted promptly after it was decided that Plaintiff would be strip-searched (¶¶ 85–88). The Complaint alleges as to each of the Defendants that they did not “request further information or evidence regarding [Plaintiff’s] alleged involvement in suspicious activities.” (¶ 56.) If that is true, as the Court must assume it is at this stage, the only reliable information the officers had about Plaintiff was the proximity of her seat to the other suspects, her name, and how it sounded; the other information, that she “may” be involved, is at worst little more than a wild guess, and at best merely a suspicion expressed in the absence of any factual support. It merits further investigation (“why do you say that?”), but does not approach the threshold of probable cause of criminal activity supporting an arrest or a search.
4 While the WCAA Defendants claim that the allegations made against them are insufficient, they also fail to credit Plaintiff for all of her allegations. (Compare Dkt. 89 at 22–30 with supra III.A.2.)
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Defendants, except for Toya Parker, are alleged to have directly participated in the execution of the unreasonable arrest of Plaintiff, the planning and authorization of the unreasonable arrest of Plaintiff, or both. See supra III.A.2. As to Count VI, Defendants Parker and Wasiukanis are alleged to have directly participated in the execution of the unreasonable search of Plaintiff, the planning and authorization of the unreasonable search of Plaintiff, or both. See id. Each Count of the Complaint is clearly limited to only those Defendants against whom that particular claim can be plausibly made. WCAA Defendants’ contention that this is insufficient is wholly without merit.
Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts that support and make plausible the unreasonableness of both her seizure and her search. There can be no dispute that she has adequately alleged that she was seized, detained, and strip-searched, and that the named WCAA Defendants participated in these actions.
a) The Complaint pleads a de facto arrest made without probable cause.
The facts as alleged establish that the seizure of Plaintiff was a de facto arrest made without probable cause. See supra III.A.2; see also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699–700 (1981); United States v. Jeter,721 F.3d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 2013); Hoover v. Walsh, 682 F.3d 481, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that, with rare exceptions, “. . . the involuntary transportation of a detained suspect to a police station amounts to an arrest.”); Dkt. 111 at 20–22.
The WCAA Defendants do not argue that the seizure was made upon probable cause, likely because doing so would be impossible under the facts alleged in the
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complaint. Instead they argue that the seizure was not an arrest, but rather an investigatory stop made with reasonable suspicion. (Dkt. 89 at 18–19.) They note, citing cases, that the standard requires a balancing of the intrusion against the governmental interest, that officers are often forced to make “split-second decisions in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances,” that investigatory stops are permissible when the officer suspects wrongdoing, that use of handcuffs and weapons does not make a stop necessarily unreasonable, and that “handcuffing a suspect and transporting him across an airport tarmac building is not an arrest.” (Id.)
Defendants’ argument that the conduct alleged in the complaint was an investigative stop is also without merit. Plaintiff was forced off an airplane by armed officers, handcuffed, briefly questioned and pat searched on the tarmac, transported to the jail, locked in a guarded cell under video surveillance, detained for approximately four hours, and then strip-searched, all before she was questioned extensively about whether she was involved in whatever it was that the passengers in 12B and 12C were suspected of doing. See supra III.A.2. This was clearly much more intrusive than a brief investigatory stop which may be justified by reasonable suspicion.5 Such a full-custody detention clearly amounted to a de facto arrest. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815–16 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983); United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 340 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A valid Terry stop must be ‘limited in scope and duration.’ To be limited in scope, ‘the
5 The Court does not conclude whether the facts as alleged were sufficient to meet the lower standard of reasonable suspicion because it has concluded that the circumstances amounted to a fullcustodial arrest requiring probable cause.
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investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.’ To be limited in duration, ‘an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’”); Hoover, 682 F.3d at 498–99. Plaintiff’s Response as to this argument is well stated and well taken. (Dkt. 100 at 19–22.)
b) The Complaint pleads a strip-search performed without justification.
The facts also clearly allege the lack of a sufficient basis for the strip-search of Plaintiff. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The sole argument the WCAA Defendants make in support of the strip-search is that “the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that a person being held in a detention center is subject to a strip-search.” (Dkt. 89 at 28) (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (“Correctional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their bodies.”)).
The WCAA Defendants’ reliance on Florence is misplaced. Contrary to their argument, Florence does not give jailors carte blanche to strip-search anyone in their custody regardless of the circumstances. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522–24. In Florence, the “controversy concern[ed] whether every detainee who will be admitted to the general population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed.” Id. at 1513; see also id. at 1515 (“The case proceeds on the understanding that the officers searched detainees prior to their admission to
19

the general population . . . .”). The Court directly noted that the “case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees.” Id. at 1522–23. Justice Alito wrote separately to “emphasize the limits of [the] holding,” that it applies only to “arrestees who are committed to the general population of a jail . . .” and that the Court did not hold that it was necessarily reasonable “to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population.” Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).6
The Court, therefore, considers the constitutionality of the search under the standard articulated in Bell v. Wolfish: “a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. . . . consider[ing] the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” 441 U.S. at 559.
6 The result in Florence is functionally the same as that previously reached by the Sixth Circuit in Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 823 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Jefferson County’s policy was not a blanket search of all detainees as in the policies held unconstitutional in the above cases, but a more narrowly drawn policy of searching only those detainees who were required, by force of circumstance, to be moved into the general jail population. Dobrowolskyj was not moved until he had been at the jail for several hours. The move was necessitated by the overcrowding in the front holding cell, which had been limited to a capacity of twenty prisoners by the class action consent decree in Tate v. Frey.”), and Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1089 (6th Cir. 1983) (“It is enough here that (a) the arrestee was formally charged with a felony involving violence, (b) that her detention was under circumstances which would subject her potentially to mingle with the jail population as a whole, and (c) that the search actually conducted was visual only, and was carried out discreetly and in privacy.”).
20

Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the strip-search constituted an invasion of Plaintiff’s personal rights that was vastly greater than the need for the particular search. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). Plaintiff claims that the law enforcement officers arrested her, detained her for approximately four hours, and strip-searched her absent probable cause and without justification. The allegations are sufficient to make Plaintiff’s claim plausible. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2, 3, 12, 39, 42, 44–46, 48–52, 55, 71, 76, 77, 82, 85–88.) For example, it is alleged that: she was traveling alone (¶ 39); she did not know and did not speak with the two men seated in 12B and 12C (¶ 44); there were many other passengers on the plane (¶ 45) who were not forcibly removed, arrested, detained, and strip-searched (¶¶ 73, 85); the reports of “suspicious behavior” did not involve any conduct by Plaintiff (¶ 46); it was Frontier ground personnel who provided Plaintiff’s name when it indicated that Plaintiff “might” be with the two men, and it was plain from the message given to WCAA officers that those aboard the aircraft did not identify Plaintiff as a person acting suspiciously (¶¶ 48–52); Defendant WCAA officer Johnson stated that the pilot told him that while Plaintiff “may” be “involved in the incident” with the two men, she was “seated and compliant at [that] time” (¶ 55); no agent or officer made any effort to verify Plaintiff’s identity or corroborate any connection between her and the two men (¶ 56); Plaintiff was handcuffed and pat searched before she was transported to the detention center (¶¶ 72, 75); she was placed in a small cell by herself, the cell was guarded by an officer, and under video surveillance (¶¶ 80–84); the strip-search was not conducted promptly after she was placed in a cell nor after it was decided that Plaintiff would be strip-searched (¶¶ 85–88); and “[t]here were
21

no facts suggesting that [Plaintiff] was concealing a weapon, a controlled substance,
or any other evidence of a crime that might justify a strip search” (¶ 87).7
These allegations, along with the rest of the Complaint, which must be taken as
true, are a sufficient basis on which to conclude, at this pleading stage, that
Plaintiff’s claim of an unreasonable search is plausible. Even if the initial action of
forcibly removing Plaintiff from the plane could be seen as reasonable in response to
a possible emergency, which the Court cannot conclude at this time without further
factual development, the prolonged detention and post-detention searches of
Plaintiff as alleged took place after it was clear that no emergency, and no probable
cause relating to Plaintiff, existed. The WCAA Defendants arrested, detained for
approximately four hours, and strip-searched a woman who, under the allegations
in the complaint: never did anything wrong; was never accused of doing anything
wrong; was compliant and confused when initially seized; was pat searched and
handcuffed before taken to the detention facility; was placed in a cell alone, guarded
by an officer immediately outside her cell, and under video surveillance; and was
compliant and communicative while handcuffed, locked in her cell, guarded, and
under video surveillance for more than an hour before she was strip-searched.8
7 The WCAA Defendants would likely argue that paragraph 87 of the Complaint is conclusory and thus not entitled to the presumption of truth. They would be correct, if that were the only allegation, or only one of a few allegations, in the complaint related to the events of that afternoon. But it is not. Paragraph 87 is not an unsupported or isolated conclusory statement, but is rather the logical summation of a conclusion that follows from all of the alleged facts taken together. 8 No facts are offered by the Defendants that in any way support the need for a strip-search. The defendant had been frisked, presumably quite thoroughly, so there was no reason to suspect that she was carrying a weapon or a bomb. This was not a drug arrest in which there was reason to believe that she was hiding contraband somewhere on her person. What, exactly, the WCAA Defendants thought they might discover by conducting the strip-search—one where Plaintiff was forced to “bend and spread,” and where the officer examined the inside of her mouth, under her eyelids, and within her hair—is a question that may be answered only after discovery.
22

Counts V and VI are brought against only those WCAA officers and agents who are alleged to have been present at the scene of Plaintiff’s arrest and detention, and who were directly involved in either the decision to arrest and detain Plaintiff, or the actual arrest and detention of Plaintiff, or both. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 19–27, 51, 52, 54–56, 58–61, 68–72, 78, 85, 89–97.) Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against each of the WCAA Defendants against whom those claims are made in Counts V and VI.
B. Plaintiff Has Alleged the Violation of a Clearly Established Constitutional Right.
Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were clearly established under the cases cited above, in particular: Summers, Jeter, Hoover, Hayes, and Cochrane as to Count V; and Bell, Florence, Dobrowolskyj, and Dufrin as to Count VI. See supra III.A.3.
The WCAA Defendants do not directly articulate a separate argument regarding whether the alleged violated rights are clearly established, but one pair of facts that they appear to find important to the review of the alleged violations is that “the circumstances involved suspicious activity aboard an aircraft on the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks . . . on a flight bound for the Detroit Metro airport, which had been the intended target of a bombing less than two years earlier.”9
“It is not necessary to have ‘a case directly on point’ for a right to be ‘clearly established.’ It is sufficient that existing precedent place the question ‘beyond
9 A December 2009 flight bound for Detroit had been the target of an unsuccessful bombing attempt. See United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-CR-20005, Dkt. 7 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2010).
23

debate.’” Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLC, 513 F. App’x 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”)).
Under the applicable standard, “conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Plaintiff’s complaint meets this standard.
The fact that the events occurred on the tenth anniversary of September 11th, on a flight bound for a city previously targeted for a terrorist attack, does not absolve the WCAA Defendants, or any law enforcement officers, of their responsibility to conduct their police work in compliance with the United States Constitution. Under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, a full-custodial arrest, and a warrantless strip-search of a person in temporary detention, are unreasonable in the absence of probable cause. As of yet, there is no “suspected terrorist activity exception” to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court declines to sacrifice these principles of liberty to the cause of hyper-vigilance.
Based on the Plaintiff’s allegations, which are assumed to be true for the purpose of deciding this motion, the unlawfulness of the WCAA Defendants’ actions was apparent “in the light of pre-existing law.” Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).
24

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED that the WCAA

Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings to dismiss Counts V and

VI (Dkt. 89) is DENIED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the WCAA Defendants’

and non-parties’ motion for protective orders (Dkts. 94, 98) are DENIED as moot.

Dated: July 18, 2014

s/Terrence G. Berg TERRENCE G. BERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on July 18, 2014, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party.
By: s/A. Chubb Case Manager

25

 
 Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 1 of 19
CLOSED,APPEAL,reassigned
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Flint) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:13−cv−10253−TGB−MKM

Hebshi v. United States of America et al Assigned to: District Judge Terrence G. Berg Referred to: Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub
District Judge Laurie J. Michelson (Settlement)

Case in other court:

U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit, 14−02022

Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/22/2013 Date Terminated: 04/21/2015 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Shoshana Hebshi

represented by Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6823 Fax: 313−578−6811 Email: btucker@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie H. Hurwitz Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C. 1394 E. Jefferson Avenue Detroit, MI 48207 313−567−6170 Fax: 313−567−4827 Email: jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathryn Bruner James Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C. 1394 E. Jefferson Avenue Detroit, MI 48207 313−567−6170 Fax: 313−567−4827 Email: kjames@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Miriam R. Nemeth Goodman & Hurwitz P.C. 1394 E. Jefferson Avenue Detroit, MI 48207 313−567−6170 Fax: 313−567−4827 Email: mnemeth@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel E. Goodman American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St. 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2633 Fax: 212−549−2680 Email: rgoodman@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah L. Mehta American Civil Liberties Union of

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 2 of 19
Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6823 Fax: 313−578−6811 Email: smehta@aclumich.org (Inactive) TERMINATED: 05/03/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah E. Tremont Covington & Burling LLP One CityCenter 850 Tenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001−4956 202−662−6000 Fax: 202−6672−6291 Email: stremont@cov.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman Goodman and Hurwitz 1394 E. Jefferson Avenue Detroit, MI 48207 313−567−6170 Fax: 313−567−4827 Email: bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Steinberg American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6814 Email: msteinberg@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant United States of America

represented by Jean Marie Cunningham US Department of Justice Civil Division, Torts Branch Constitutional Torts Section P.O. Box 7146, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 202−616−4164 Fax: 202−616−4314 Email: jean.cunningham@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 07/01/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsey A. Kaczmarek Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC 210 East 3rd Street Suite 212 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248−733−3580 Fax: 248−733−3633 Email: lpeck@sph−pllc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lynn Marie Dodge U.S. Attorney's Office

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 3 of 19

211 W. Fort Street Suite 2001 Detroit, MI 48226 313−226−9100 Fax: 313−226−2621 Email: lynn.dodge@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman U.S. Department of Justice Torts Branch P.O. Box 7146 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 202−616−0089 Email: sarah.whitman@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc.

represented by Alexander A. Ayar Foster Swift Collins & Smith PC 32300 Northwestern Highway Suite 230 Farmington Hills, MI 48334 248−538−6326 Fax: 248−538−2096 Email: AAyar@FosterSwift.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian T. Maye Adler, Murphy, One N. LaSalle Street Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 312−422−5713 Email: bmaye@amm−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven L. Boldt Adler Murphy & McQuillen LLP 20 South Clark Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60603 312−345−0700 Fax: 312−345−9860 Email: sboldt@amm−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Brand

represented by Jean Marie Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 4 of 19

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Unknown FBI Agent 1

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Unknown FBI Agent 2

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John Etling TERMINATED: 05/16/2013

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Mark DeBeau TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis Law Office of Alan B. Havis, Esq. 25505 W. 12 Mile Road Suite 1000 Southfield, MI 48034 248−353−3690 Fax: 248−948−6677 Email: ahavis@AirportDefender.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC 210 East 3rd Street Suite 212 Royal Oak, MI 48067 248−733−3599 Fax: 248−733−3633 Email: jseward@sph−pllc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jeremy Bohn TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 5 of 19

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Patrick Driscoll Captain TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Grant Officer TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Toya Parker TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Johnson Officer TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Bradley Corporal

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 6 of 19

TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Unknown CBP Officer

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Thomas Pipis TERMINATED: 05/16/2013

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant David Lakatos

represented by Jean Marie Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Nathaniel Devins

represented by Jean Marie Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 7 of 19

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Unknown TSA Agent 1

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Unknown TSA Agent 2

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Ball

represented by Jean Marie Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Unknown ICE Officer

represented by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Paul Brumley

represented by Jean Marie Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lynn Marie Dodge (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah E. Whitman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Wayne County Airport Authority

Defendant
M. Wasiukanis Lieutenant TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 8 of 19

Defendant Carmona Dt. TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Interested Party Thomas J. Naughton
Cross Claimant Grant Officer TERMINATED: 03/18/2014
Cross Claimant Toya Parker TERMINATED: 03/18/2014
Cross Claimant Johnson Officer

Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lindsey A. Kaczmarek (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by John R. Trentacosta Foley & Lardner 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 2700 Detroit, MI 48226 313−234−7100 Email: jtrentacosta@foley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip B. Phillips Foley & Lardner 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 2700 Detroit, MI 48226 313−234−7100 Email: pphillips@foley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 9 of 19

TERMINATED: 03/18/2014

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Cross Defendant Grant Officer TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Cross Defendant Toya Parker TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Cross Defendant Johnson Officer TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Cross Claimant Bradley Corporal TERMINATED: 03/18/2014
Cross Claimant Jeremy Bohn TERMINATED: 03/18/2014
Cross Claimant M. Wasiukanis Lieutenant TERMINATED: 03/18/2014

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 10 of 19

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cross Claimant
Patrick Driscoll Captain TERMINATED: 03/18/2014

represented by Alan B. Havis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/16/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

T. Joseph Seward (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Cross Defendant
Frontier Airlines, Inc. TERMINATED: 03/18/2014

represented by Steven L. Boldt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/22/2013
01/23/2013
01/23/2013 01/23/2013 01/23/2013 02/04/2013 02/04/2013 02/04/2013 02/04/2013 02/27/2013 02/27/2013 02/27/2013 03/11/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants with Jury Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645−3905565 − Fee: &#036 350. County of 1st Plaintiff: Lucas − County Where Action Arose: Wayne − County of 1st Defendant: Wayne. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): None] (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (DPer) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
2 SUMMONS Issued for * All Defendants * (DPer) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
3 SUMMONS Issued for the United States Attorney and the Office of the Attorney General. (DPer) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah L. Mehta on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Mehta, Sarah) (Entered: 01/23/2013)
5 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: William H. Goodman appearing on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi (Goodman, William) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
6 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Julie H. Hurwitz appearing on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi (Hurwitz, Julie) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Kathryn Bruner James appearing on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi (James, Kathryn) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
8 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Miriam R. Nemeth appearing on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi (Nemeth, Miriam) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Alan B. Havis on behalf of Jeremy Bohn, Bradley. (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Alan B. Havis on behalf of Carmona, Mark DeBeau. (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Alan B. Havis on behalf of Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
12 NOTICE of reassignment from District Judge Marianne O. Battani to District Judge Terrance G. Berg pursuant to Administrative Order 13−AO−014. (SSch) (Entered: 03/11/2013)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 11 of 19

03/29/2013 03/29/2013
03/29/2013
03/29/2013 03/29/2013
03/29/2013
03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/29/2013 03/30/2013 03/30/2013
03/30/2013
03/30/2013
03/30/2013
03/30/2013

13 NOTICE of Appearance by Rachel E. Goodman on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Sarah E. Whitman on behalf of Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, John Etling, David Lakatos, Thomas Pipis, United States of America. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Lynn Marie Dodge on behalf of Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, John Etling, David Lakatos, Thomas Pipis, United States of America. (Dodge, Lynn) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
16 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Sarah E. Tremont appearing on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
17 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of United States of America served on 2/11/2013, answer due 4/12/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
18 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of Paul Brumley served on 2/11/2013, answer due 4/12/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
19 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Mark DeBeau waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
20 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Jeremy Bohn waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
21 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Patrick Driscoll waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
22 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Grant waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
23 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. M. Wasiukanis waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
24 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Toya Parker waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
25 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Frontier Airlines, Inc. served on 3/19/2013, answer due 4/9/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
26 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Carmona waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/29/2013)
27 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Johnson waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
28 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed. Bradley waiver sent on 2/13/2013, answer due 4/15/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
29 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of Robert Ball served on 3/7/2013, answer due 5/6/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
30 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of John Brand served on 3/20/2013, answer due 5/20/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
31 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of John Etling served on 3/20/2013, answer due 5/20/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
32 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of Thomas Pipis served on 3/20/2013, answer due 5/20/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
33 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of David Lakatos served on 3/20/2013, answer due 5/20/2013. (Tremont, Sarah)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 12 of 19

03/30/2013 04/01/2013 04/05/2013 04/15/2013 04/15/2013
04/15/2013 04/15/2013
04/15/2013 04/22/2013 04/29/2013 05/01/2013 05/03/2013 05/03/2013 05/03/2013 05/03/2013 05/03/2013 05/15/2013 05/15/2013 05/15/2013

(Entered: 03/30/2013)
34 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. U.S. Attorney on behalf of Nathaniel Devins served on 3/20/2013, answer due 5/20/2013. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 03/30/2013)
35 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending And Consolidating Time To Respond To Complaint. All Responses Due by May 20, 2013. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 04/01/2013)
36 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending Time for Defendant Frontier Airlines to Respond to 1 Complaint. Response due by April 19, 2013. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
37 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by Carmona, Mark DeBeau. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation Cross Claim) (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
38 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand , CROSSCLAIM filed by Grant, Toya Parker, Johnson against Grant, Toya Parker, Johnson by Grant, Toya Parker, Johnson. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation Cross Complaint) (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
39 NOTICE of Appearance by T. Joseph Seward on behalf of Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Patrick Driscoll, M. Wasiukanis. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
40 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses and Reliance Upon Jury Demand, CROSSCLAIM filed by Bradley, Jeremy Bohn, M. Wasiukanis, Patrick Driscoll against Frontier Airlines, Inc. by Bradley, Jeremy Bohn, M. Wasiukanis, Patrick Driscoll. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation Reliance Upon Jury Demand, # 2 Document Continuation Cross Complaint) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
41 ORDER of Attorney Substitution with stipulation. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (KKra) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
42 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending Time to Answer 1 Complaint. Response due by 5/3/2013. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
43 Notice of E−mail Delivery Failure as to attorney Sarah L. Mehta. Bounced NEF for 42 Stipulation and Order. (KCla) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
44 MOTION for Withdrawal of Attorney Sarah L. Mehta by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 05/01/2013)
45 ORDER granting 44 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
46 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Maye, Brian) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
47 NOTICE of Appearance by Brian T. Maye on behalf of Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Maye, Brian) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
48 STATEMENT of DISCLOSURE of CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS and FINANCIAL INTEREST by Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Maye, Brian) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
49 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Alexander A. Ayar appearing on behalf of Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Ayar, Alexander) (Entered: 05/03/2013)
50 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Stipulated Protective Order) (Maye, Brian) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
51 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Steven L. Boldt appearing on behalf of Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Boldt, Steven) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
52 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 40 Answer to Complaint,, Crossclaim, by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Patrick Driscoll, M. Wasiukanis of Cross Complaint on Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 05/15/2013)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 13 of 19

05/16/2013 05/16/2013 05/16/2013 05/17/2013
05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/20/2013 05/21/2013
05/24/2013 05/30/2013 05/30/2013 05/31/2013 06/04/2013 06/06/2013 06/11/2013
06/13/2013 06/14/2013 06/14/2013 06/18/2013

53 NOTICE by Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
54 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Shoshana Hebshi as to John Etling (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
55 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Shoshana Hebshi as to Thomas Pipis (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
56 ORDER granting 50 Joint Motion for Entry of Confidentiality Agreement and Stipulated Protective Order. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 05/17/2013)
57 MOTION to Dismiss Count IV by Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, David Lakatos. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
58 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by United States of America. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
59 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses as to Count V only by Robert Ball. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
60 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses as to Count V only by Paul Brumley. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
61 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses as to Count V only by Nathaniel Devins. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
62 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses as to Count V only by David Lakatos. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
63 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses as to Counts V and VI only by John Brand. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
64 NOTICE TO APPEAR : Case Management and Scheduling Conference set for 6/5/2013 09:00 AM before District Judge Terrence G. Berg **IN DETROIT** (Chubb, A) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
65 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses with Jury Demand by Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Maye, Brian) (Entered: 05/24/2013)
66 MOTION to Stay Discovery by Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, David Lakatos. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
67 DISCOVERY plan jointly filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(f) (Nemeth, Miriam) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
68 NOTICE of Appearance by Lindsey A. Kaczmarek on behalf of M. Wasiukanis. (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 05/31/2013)
69 Joint MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings by Mark DeBeau. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits) (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
70 Joint MOTION Grant Motion to Stay Discovery by Mark DeBeau. (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 06/06/2013)
71 STIPULATION AND ORDER Allowing for Amendment to Affirmative Defenses as to Certain Defendants. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
72 RESPONSE to 70 Joint MOTION Grant Motion to Stay Discovery , 66 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
73 MOTION to Dismiss Bohn et al. Cross Complaint by Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Boldt, Steven) (Entered: 06/14/2013)
74 MOTION to Dismiss Debeau et al Cross Complaint by Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Boldt, Steven) (Entered: 06/14/2013)
75 REPLY to Response re 66 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, David Lakatos. (Attachments: # 1 Index of

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 14 of 19

06/28/2013 07/01/2013
07/01/2013
07/03/2013 07/05/2013 07/12/2013 07/15/2013 07/15/2013 07/18/2013 07/19/2013 08/06/2013 08/06/2013 08/09/2013 09/25/2013 09/27/2013 10/28/2013

Exhibits) (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
76 RESPONSE to 57 MOTION to Dismiss Count IV, 69 Joint MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 06/28/2013)
77 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Patrick Driscoll, M. Wasiukanis (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) Modified on 7/3/2013 (PMil).[DOCUMENT ENTITLED OFFICER BOHN, CAPTION DRISCOLL, LIEUTENANT WASIUKANIS, AND CORPORAL BRADLEY'S AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES] (Entered: 07/01/2013)
78 AMENDED ANSWER to Complaint by Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker. (Havis, Alan) Modified on 7/3/2013 (PMil).[DOCUMENT ENTITLED ARK DEBEAU, OFFICER GRANT, OFFICER PARKER, DETECTIVE CARMONA, AND OFFICER JOHNSON'S AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES] (Entered: 07/01/2013)
79 ORDER REFERRING OTHER MATTERS to Magistrate Judge Michelson: Mediation. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
80 RESPONSE to 74 MOTION to Dismiss Debeau et al Cross Complaint, 73 MOTION to Dismiss Bohn et al. Cross Complaint filed by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Patrick Driscoll, M. Wasiukanis. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 07/05/2013)
81 REPLY to Response re 57 MOTION to Dismiss Count IV filed by Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, David Lakatos. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
82 REPLY to Response re 69 Joint MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings Brief in Support of filed by All Defendants. (Kaczmarek, Lindsey) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
83 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference set for 8/6/2013 AT 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson (JJoh) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
84 STIPULATED ORDER Regarding Confidentiality of Discovery Material, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information, and Privacy Act Disclosure. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 07/18/2013)
85 REPLY to Response re 74 MOTION to Dismiss Debeau et al Cross Complaint, 73 MOTION to Dismiss Bohn et al. Cross Complaint filed by Frontier Airlines, Inc.. (Boldt, Steven) (Entered: 07/19/2013)
86 NOTICE of Appearance by Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Merriweather−Tucker, Brooke) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Settlement Conference held on 8/6/2013. Disposition: Held and Continued to 9/25/2013 at 10:00 a.m. (JJoh) Modified date on 8/9/2013 (JJoh). (Entered: 08/06/2013)
SET DATE: Settlement Conference set for continuation on 9/25/2013 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. Entered by Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 08/09/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Settlement Conference held and continued on 9/25/2013. Disposition: To be continued to a date to be determined. (JJoh) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
RE−SET CONFERENCE: Settlement Conference re−set for 10/31/2013 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. Entered by Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
87 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Continuation of Settlement Conference re−set for 11/18/2013 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 10/28/2013)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 15 of 19

11/08/2013
11/11/2013
11/13/2013 11/15/2013 11/18/2013 11/25/2013
12/02/2013 12/05/2013 12/06/2013 12/06/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/11/2013 12/19/2013 12/23/2013 12/24/2013 01/06/2014 01/14/2014 01/17/2014

88 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set at the request of counsel for all parties for 11/13/2013 01:00 PM before District Judge Terrence G. Berg. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF shall provide and circulate a telephone conference number. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
89 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 11/11/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Terrence G. Berg: Telephonic Status Conference held on 11/13/2013 (Chubb, A) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
RE−SET CONFERENCE: Settlement Conference re−set for 12/11/2013 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson − Entered by Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
90 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE/ORDER of Settlement Conference on 12/11/2013 − signed by Magistate Judge Laurie Michelson (JJoh) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
91 Joint MOTION for Reconsideration by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 11/25/2013)
92 ORDER denying 91 Joint MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Johnson, Bradley, Mark DeBeau, Jeremy Bohn, M. Wasiukanis, Grant, Patrick Driscoll, Carmona, Toya Parker. Signed by Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
93 ORDER EXTENDING TIME to Respond re 89 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings ( Response due by 12/25/2013 Reply due by 1/13/2014) Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
94 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/06/2013)
95 EXHIBIT Corrected Ex. 2 re 94 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis (Seward, T.) (Entered: 12/06/2013)
96 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Philip B. Phillips appearing on behalf of Thomas J. Naughton (Phillips, Philip) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
97 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: John R. Trentacosta appearing on behalf of Thomas J. Naughton (Trentacosta, John) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Settlement Conference held on 12/11/2013 Disposition: Case did not settle. (JJoh) (Entered: 01/03/2014)
98 MOTION for Protective Order by Thomas J. Naughton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Phillips, Philip) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
99 RESPONSE to 94 Joint MOTION for Protective Order filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 12/23/2013)
100 RESPONSE to 89 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 12/24/2013)
101 RESPONSE to 98 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
102 NOTICE of Appearance by Jean Marie Cunningham on behalf of Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, David Lakatos, United States of America. (Cunningham, Jean) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
103 NOTICE OF HEARING on 69 Joint MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings, 73 MOTION to Dismiss Bohn et al. Cross Complaint, 74 MOTION to Dismiss Debeau et al Cross Complaint, 57 MOTION to Dismiss Count IV. Motion

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 16 of 19

01/17/2014 02/10/2014
02/18/2014
02/20/2014
02/21/2014 02/26/2014 03/18/2014 03/31/2014 03/31/2014 04/11/2014 04/14/2014 04/14/2014 04/14/2014 04/14/2014

Hearing set for 2/10/2014 02:30 PM before District Judge Terrence G. Berg. **HEARING WILL BE HELD IN FLINT** (Chubb, A) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
104 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 70 Joint MOTION Grant Motion to Stay Discovery, 66 MOTION to Stay Discovery (Chubb, A) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Terrence G. Berg: Motion Hearing held on 2/10/2014 re 74 MOTION to Dismiss Debeau et al Cross Complaint filed by Frontier Airlines, Inc., 57 MOTION to Dismiss Count IV filed by Paul Brumley, David Lakatos, Nathaniel Devins, John Brand, Robert Ball, 73 MOTION to Dismiss Bohn et al. Cross Complaint filed by Frontier Airlines, Inc., 69 Joint MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Mark DeBeau Disposition: Taken under advisement.(Court Reporter David Yarbrough) (Chubb, A) (Entered: 02/11/2014)
105 TRANSCRIPT of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, et al, held on 2/10/2014. (Court Reporter/Transcriber: David B. Yarbrough) (Number of Pages: 67) The parties have 21 days to file with the court and Court Reporter/Transcriber a Redaction Request of this transcript. If no request is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 days. Redaction Request due 3/11/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/21/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/19/2014. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date, the transcript is publicly available. (Yarbrough, David) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
106 MOTION for Leave to File Late Reply Brief in Support of WCAA Defendants' Joint Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Proposed Reply Brief in Support of WCAA Defendants' Joint Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, # 3 Exhibit Dealer Computer Serv., Inc. v. Dale Spradley Motors, Inc., # 4 Exhibit Smith−Murrey v. Marsh) (Seward, T.) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
107 STIPULATED ORDER ON DISCOVERY FORMAT. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 02/21/2014)
108 ORDER DENYING 106 Airport Authority Defendants' Motion for Leave to File a Late Reply. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
109 ORDER granting 73 Motion to Dismiss; granting 74 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (KKra) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
110 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 89 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings, 94 Joint MOTION for Protective Order , 98 MOTION for Protective Order (Chubb, A) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
111 ORDER DENYING 57 Defendants' Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, 69 to Dismiss Count IV, and 66 , 70 to Stay Discovery. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
112 MOTION for Sanctions Against the WCAA Defendants for Failure to Obey a Court Order by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
113 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by Robert Ball. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
114 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by John Brand. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
115 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by Paul Brumley. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
116 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by Nathaniel Devins. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 04/14/2014)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 17 of 19

04/14/2014 04/25/2014
05/02/2014 05/05/2014 05/16/2014 06/26/2014 07/01/2014 07/03/2014 07/18/2014 08/08/2014
08/08/2014 08/08/2014
08/08/2014
08/11/2014 08/15/2014 09/02/2014 09/05/2014 09/08/2014

117 ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses by David Lakatos. (Whitman, Sarah) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
118 RESPONSE to 112 MOTION for Sanctions Against the WCAA Defendants for Failure to Obey a Court Order filed by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 04/25/2014)
119 REPLY to Response re 112 MOTION for Sanctions Against the WCAA Defendants for Failure to Obey a Court Order filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
120 Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral Argument re 89 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings, 94 Joint MOTION for Protective Order , 98 MOTION for Protective Order (Chubb, A) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
Text−Only Order of reassignment from Magistrate Judge Laurie J. Michelson to Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub pursuant to Administrative Order 14−AO−012. (SSch) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
121 MOTION for Withdrawal of Attorney Jean Marie Cunningham by Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, David Lakatos, United States of America. (Cunningham, Jean) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
122 ORDER granting 121 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
123 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending Deadline for Plaintiff's Response to Certain WCAA Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
124 ORDER DENYING 89 WCAA Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts V & VI; and DENYING 94 , 98 Motions for Protective Order. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
125 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Patrick Driscoll, M. Wasiukanis re 124 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Protective Order,. Receipt No: 0645−4766028 − Fee: $ 505 − Fee Status: Fee Paid. (Seward, T.) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
126 Certificate of Service re 125 Notice of Appeal. (TMcg) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
127 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 8/15/2014 10:30 AM before District Judge Terrence G. Berg. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF shall initiate the call and include the Court when all parties are present by calling 810−341−9760. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
128 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Carmona, Grant, Toya Parker, Johnson, Mark DeBeau re 124 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Order on Motion for Protective Order,. Receipt No: 0645−4767369 − Fee: $ 505 − Fee Status: Fee Paid. (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 08/08/2014)
129 Certificate of Service re 128 Notice of Appeal. (TMcg) (Entered: 08/11/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Terrence G. Berg: Telephonic Status Conference held on 8/15/2014 (Chubb, A) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
130 ORDER REFERRING OTHER MATTERS by Consent to District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Settlement Conference. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
131 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference regarding settlement conference set for 9/8/2014 10:00 AM (EDT) before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. Plaintiff's counsel to initate "call in" number. (JJoh) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/8/2014. Disposition: Parties are in agreement as to who will be in attendance at the Settlement Conference. (JJoh) (Entered: 09/08/2014)

Case: 4:13-cv-10253 As of: 09/20/2015 02:00 PM EDT 18 of 19

09/08/2014 09/16/2014
10/27/2014 10/28/2014
10/30/2014
10/31/2014 11/03/2014
11/03/2014
11/04/2014
11/04/2014 11/05/2014 12/09/2014 12/09/2014 12/11/2014
12/18/2014 01/15/2015 01/16/2015

132 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Settlement Conference set for 9/16/2014 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson (JJoh) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Settlement Conference held on 9/16/2014, and Settlement Conference continued to 11/5/2014 01:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 09/17/2014)
133 MOTION to Compel Defendant Frontier to Attend Settlement Conference With Representative With Full and Complete Authority to Settle by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
134 ORDER as to 133 MOTION to Compel Defendant Frontier to Attend Settlement Conference With Representative With Full and Complete Authority to Settle : Response due by 10/30/2014 − Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
135 NOTICE by Shoshana Hebshi of withdrawal of 133 MOTION to Compel Defendant Frontier to Attend Settlement Conference With Representative With Full and Complete Authority to Settle . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Stipulated Proposed Order) (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
136 STIPULATED ORDER re 133 MOTION to Compel Defendant Frontier to Attend Settlement Conference With Representative With Full and Complete Authority to Settle − Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
137 MOTION to Quash , MOTION to Reassign Case , MOTION for More Definite Statement , Emergency MOTION to Compel plaintiff's attendance at settlement conference by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Havis, Alan) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
138 RESPONSE to 137 MOTION to Quash MOTION to Reassign Case MOTION for More Definite Statement Emergency MOTION to Compel plaintiff's attendance at settlement conference filed by Shoshana Hebshi. (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 11/03/2014)
139 [THIS IS A REPLY] TO 137 MOTION to Compel plaintiff's attendance/settlement conf by Jeremy Bohn, Bradley, Carmona, Mark DeBeau, Patrick Driscoll, Grant, Johnson, Toya Parker, M. Wasiukanis. (Havis, Alan) Modified on 11/4/2014 (JJoh). (Entered: 11/04/2014)
140 ORDER denying 137 Motion to Compel Plaintiff to attend the November 5, 2014 Settlement Conference. Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 11/04/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Settlement Conference held on 11/5/2014 Disposition: Conference was conducted and remains ongoing.(Court Reporter David Yarbrough) (JJoh) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
141 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference regarding settlement issues set for 12/11/2014 03:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
142 NOTICE of Change of Address/Contact Information by Sarah E. Tremont on behalf of Shoshana Hebshi. (Tremont, Sarah) (Entered: 12/09/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Telephonic Status Conference regarding settlement held on 12/11/2014, AND TELEPHONIC Status Conference set for 12/18/2014 01:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. Plaintiff's counsel is to initiate call.) (JJoh) (Entered: 12/11/2014)
TEXT−ONLY NOTICE: Status Conference on 12/18/2014 is Cancelled. (JJoh) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
143 STIPULATION AND ORDER adding Wayne County Airport Authority as a defendant. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (DPer) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
144 STIPULATION AND ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS Mark DeBeau, Jeremy Bohn, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Officer Grant, Lt. M. Wasiukanis, Toya Parker, Dt.

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Carmona, Officer Johnson, and Corporal Bradley. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. (Chubb, A) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
145 ORDER from U.S. Court of Appeals − Sixth Circuit re 128 Notice of Appeal, filed by Johnson, Mark DeBeau, Carmona, Grant, Toya Parker [Appeal Case Number 14−2022] (KCla) (Entered: 02/19/2015)
146 MOTION to Dismiss Voluntarily (Unopposed) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Order of Dismissal) (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
147 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 146 MOTION to Dismiss Voluntarily (Unopposed) by All Plaintiffs (Goodman, Rachel) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
148 ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by District Judge Terrence G. Berg. Motions terminated: 146 MOTION to Dismiss Voluntarily (Unopposed). (Chubb, A) (Entered: 04/21/2015)