Task: Class Definition Understanding (ontology: Arts_Media_Entertainment/CIDOC_CRM)

Which of the following definitions best describes 'E53 Place'?

A. Scope note:
This class comprises all phenomena, such as the instances of E4 Periods and E5 Events, which happen over a limited extent in time. This extent in time must be contiguous, i.e., without gaps. In case the defining kinds of phenomena for an instance of the concept cease to happen, and occur later again at another time, we regard that the former instance of the concept has ended and a new instance has come into existence. In more intuitive terms, the same event cannot happen twice.
In some contexts, such phenomena are also called perdurants. This class is disjoint from E77 Persistent Item and is an abstract class that typically has no direct instances. the concept is specialized into E4 Period, which applies to a particular geographic area (defined with a greater or lesser degree of precision), and E3 Condition State, which applies to instances of E18 Physical Thing.

Examples:
- Bronze Age (E4) (Childe, 1963)
- the earthquake in Lisbon 1755 (E5) (Chester, 2001)
- the Peterhof Palace near Saint Petersburg being in ruins from 1944 to 1946 (E3) (Maddox, 2015)

In First Order Logic:
- E2(x) ⇒ E1(x)
B. Scope note:
This class comprises extents in the natural space where people live, in particular on the surface of the Earth, in the pure sense of physics: independent from temporal phenomena and matter. They may serve describing the physical location of things or phenomena or other areas of interest. Geometrically, instances of the concept constitute single contiguous areas or a finite aggregation of disjoint areas in space which are each individually contiguous. They may have fuzzy boundaries.
The instances of the concept are usually determined by reference to the position of “immobile” objects such as buildings, cities, mountains, rivers, or dedicated geodetic marks, but may also be determined by reference to mobile objects. A the concept can be determined by combining a frame of reference and a location with respect to this frame.
It is sometimes argued that instances of the concept are best identified by global coordinates or absolute reference systems. However, relative references are often more relevant in the context of cultural documentation and tend to be more precise. In particular, people are often interested in position in relation to large, mobile objects, such as ships. For example, the the concept at which Nelson died is known with reference to a large mobile object, i.e. H.M.S Victory. A resolution of this the concept in terms of absolute coordinates would require knowledge of the movements of the vessel and the precise time of death, either of which may be revised, and the result would lack historical and cultural relevance.
Any instance of E18 Physical Thing can serve as a frame of reference for an instance of the concept. This may be documented using the property P157 is at rest relative to (provides reference space for).

Examples:
- the extent of the UK in the year 2003
- the position of the hallmark on the inside of my wedding ring (fictitious)
- the the concept referred to in the phrase: “Fish collected at three miles north of the confluence of the Arve and the Rhone”
- here -> <- [the the concept between these two arrows in one of the reader's paper copy of this document. Each copy constitutes a different the concept of this spot.]

In First Order Logic:
- E53(x) ⇒ E1(x)
C. Scope note:
This class comprises abstract temporal extents, in the sense of Galilean physics, having a beginning, an end, and a duration. 
Instances of the concept have no semantic connotations about phenomena happening within the temporal extent they represent. They do not convey any meaning other than a positioning on the “time-line” of chronology. The actual extent of an instance of the concept can be approximated by properties of the concept giving inner and outer bounds in the form of dates (instances of E61 Time Primitive). Comparing knowledge about time-spans is fundamental for chronological reasoning.
Some instances of the concept may be defined as the actual, in principle observable, temporal extent of instances of E2 Temporal Entity via the property P4 has the concept (is the concept of): the concept. They constitute phenomenal time-spans as defined in CRMgeo (Doerr & Hiebel 2013). Since our knowledge of history is imperfect and physical phenomena are fuzzy in nature, the extent of phenomenal time-spans can only be described in approximation. An extreme case of approximation, might, for example, define an instance of the concept having unknown beginning, end and duration. It may, nevertheless, be associated with other descriptions by which people can infer knowledge about it, such as in relative chronologies.
Some instances of E52 may be defined precisely as representing a declaration of a temporal extent, as, for instance, done in a business contract. They constitute declarative time-spans as defined in CRMgeo (Doerr & Hiebel 2013) and can be described via the property E61 Time Primitive P170 defines time (time is defined by): the concept. 
When used as a common the concept for two events, it will nevertheless describe them as being simultaneous, even if nothing else is known.

Examples:
- 1961
- From 12-17-1993 to 12-8-1996
- 14h30 to 16h22 4(th) July 1945
- 9.30 am 1.1.1999 to 2.00 pm 1.1.1999
- the the concept of the Ming Dynasty (Chan, 2011)

In First Order Logic:
- E52(x) ⇒ E1(x)
D. Scope note:
This class comprises items that have persistent characteristics of structural nature substantially related to their identity and their integrity, sometimes known as “endurants” in philosophy. Persistent Items may be physical entities, such as people, animals or things, conceptual entities such as ideas, concepts, products of the imagination or even names. 
Instances of the concept may be present or be part of interactions in different periods or events. They can repeatedly be recognized at disparate occasions during their existence by characteristics of structural nature. The respective characteristics need not be exactly the same during all the existence of an instance of the concept. Often, they undergo gradual change, still bearing some similarities with that of previous times, or disappear completely and new emerge. For instance, a person, from the time of being born on, will gradually change all its features and acquire new ones, such as a scar. Even the DNA in different body cells will develop defects and mutations. Nevertheless, relevant characteristics used should be sufficiently similar to recognize the instance for some substantial period of time. 
The more specific criteria that determine the identity of instances of subclasses of the concept may vary considerably and are described or referred to in the respective scope notes. The decision about which exact criteria to use depends on whether the observable behaviour of the respective part of reality such confined conforms to the reasoning the user is interested in. For example, a building can be regarded as no longer existing if it is dismantled and the materials reused in a different configuration. On the other hand, human beings go through radical and profound changes during their life-span, affecting both material composition and form, yet preserve their identity by other criteria, such as being bodily separated from other persons. Similarly, inanimate objects may be subject to exchange of parts and matter. On the opposite, the identity of a (version of a) text of a scientific publication is given by the exact arrangement of its relevant symbols. 
The main classes of objects that fall outside the scope of the the concept class are temporal objects such as periods, events and acts, and descriptive properties. 
An instance of the concept does not require actual knowledge of the identifying features of the instance being currently known. There may be cases, where the actual identifying features of an instance of the concept are not decidable at a particular state of knowledge.

Examples:
- Leonardo da Vinci (E21) (Strano, 1953)
- Stonehenge (E24) (Pryor, 2016)
- the hole in the ozone layer (E4) (Hufford and Horwitz, 2005)
- the First Law of Thermodynamics (E89) (Craig and Gislason, 2002)
- the Bermuda Triangle (E53) (Dolan, 2005)

In First Order Logic:
- E77(x) ⇒ E1(x)

Answer: Scope note:
This class comprises extents in the natural space where people live, in particular on the surface of the Earth, in the pure sense of physics: independent from temporal phenomena and matter. They may serve describing the physical location of things or phenomena or other areas of interest. Geometrically, instances of the concept constitute single contiguous areas or a finite aggregation of disjoint areas in space which are each individually contiguous. They may have fuzzy boundaries.
The instances of the concept are usually determined by reference to the position of “immobile” objects such as buildings, cities, mountains, rivers, or dedicated geodetic marks, but may also be determined by reference to mobile objects. A the concept can be determined by combining a frame of reference and a location with respect to this frame.
It is sometimes argued that instances of the concept are best identified by global coordinates or absolute reference systems. However, relative references are often more relevant in the context of cultural documentation and tend to be more precise. In particular, people are often interested in position in relation to large, mobile objects, such as ships. For example, the the concept at which Nelson died is known with reference to a large mobile object, i.e. H.M.S Victory. A resolution of this the concept in terms of absolute coordinates would require knowledge of the movements of the vessel and the precise time of death, either of which may be revised, and the result would lack historical and cultural relevance.
Any instance of E18 Physical Thing can serve as a frame of reference for an instance of the concept. This may be documented using the property P157 is at rest relative to (provides reference space for).

Examples:
- the extent of the UK in the year 2003
- the position of the hallmark on the inside of my wedding ring (fictitious)
- the the concept referred to in the phrase: “Fish collected at three miles north of the confluence of the Arve and the Rhone”
- here -> <- [the the concept between these two arrows in one of the reader's paper copy of this document. Each copy constitutes a different the concept of this spot.]

In First Order Logic:
- E53(x) ⇒ E1(x)