This complaint refers to CFPB complaint XXXX in which I first brought unauthorized charges to the attention of InComm and found no resolution. It also builds on complaint XXXX in which I point out fundamental flaws to which Skeet Rolling of InComm/ITCFL offered no rebuke for and just dismissed offhand. I expect subsequent consumer protection to be taken as a result of my complaints and will be following up with the CFPB Ombudsman as well. My unaddressed complaints are as follows : 1. InComm is using a model for determining Victim Assisted Fraud ( VAF ) which knowingly produces false positives, because it allows them to attempt to deny liability for claims against their negligent actions in protecting consumer funds. This is no more clear than in the case of XXXX XXXX, who was identified as a participant in VAF, who met personally with XXXX fraud investigation team and found his cards had not been tampered with nor had his cards had their secure PIN # revealed. The model has obvious logical flaws as a result of this, however is still used and applied in other cases ( such as my own. ) InComm has failed to identify what information caused them to " conclusively '' identify myself as a participant in VAF, information and logic that will have a 0 % chance of holding up to actual scrutiny. 

2. Secure PIN numbers are currently stored in a fatally poor security design for the XXXX XXXX XXXX product ; they are ( a ) unencrypted and ( b ) viewable by many employees. There is no reason for either of these things, but correcting at least XXXX of them would make the product a lot more secure. Proof of this claim can be seen here : XXXX : XXXX? XXXX - in this video I tell you what the PIN # will be, then scratch off silvering to reveal the secure PIN. This has never been communicated out by Skeet or anyone on his team. If XXXX claim is that this claim has no merit, how is he able to explain that I reveal the PIN #? Also shown are internal serial numbers, how did I get them? Why is there no specific response to this point? 

XXXX. Not only have I identified how employees steal above, I have identified the employee that stole my money. Per CFPB complaint XXXX the XXXX account with the email address associated to " gton '' was identified as VAF. The full address for the account my money was loaded to is XXXXXXXXXXXX. This is associated with this babysitting profile in XXXX ( where InComm hq is located ) XXXX XXXX # bio-more - which is also this woman on linkedin XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX? XXXX where she is friends with XXXX XXXX on XXXX : XXXX who XXXX XXXX XXXX was a former XXXX ( database superuser account - not that it required a superuser with their lack of protection ) at InComm. 

So what really happened? It 's rather obvious to anyone but InComm, who was provided all this information in XXXX ; XXXX XXXX stole my PINs and my money internally, then loaded it to accounts he and friends controlled. InComm victim blamed me from what I initially thought was incompetence to what I must now conclude was purposeful obstruction of justice. 

I do not know the size and scope of InComm embezzlement in this flawed system that has been in place for years. I have other victims available who have not filed complaints here but can be reached for comment : XXXX XXXX - {$2500.00} - XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX - {$500.00} - XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX - {$500.00} - XXXXXXXXXXXX Myself - {$1500.00} - XXXXXXXXXXXX