Whose voice matters? Conformists, non-conformists, and responsiveness in China

Despite lacking electoral incentives, officials in non-democracies provide numerous deliberation channels that respond to citizen grievances. What motivates government responsiveness under dictatorship? What type of responses do governments give and how do these responses shape citizen expression and political participation? This dissertation develops a theoretical framework for understanding the sources, types, and effects of public deliberation in authoritarian settings, and then tests the theory through a detailed empirical inquiry into the deliberative institutions in China. Previous studies on authoritarian responsiveness largely contend that dictators prioritize the appeals of potential dissidents. Yet, I show in this dissertation that the Chinese regime deliberately provides substantive response--response that resolves the appealed problems--to citizens who show higher conformity to the regime. In contrast, the regime selectively provides symbolic responses--responses that are rhetorical without solving the problems--to citizen appeals that are more likely to elicit collective action. I argue that rewarding conformists is a calculated signal to the public that political obedience is rewarded with real benefits. I also take a further step by showing that obtaining a substantive response motivates citizens to speak more positively of the regime and increase engagement with government institutions. Receiving a symbolic response also motivates citizens to speak more positively of the regime and over three months after the time of the response, these citizens reduce their politically dissenting expressions to a level even lower than that before the appeal despite that their problems are not resolved by the government. This suggests that the regime's selective responsiveness does induce more conformist behaviors among citizens. That said, the failure to get substantive response also motivates citizens to reduce appeals through government-run channels and seek more coordination with other societal actors for political petitions, which has the potential to destabilize the regime over time. To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first study that follows how citizens react to government responses of varying qualities over time, which is crucial for us to understand the implications of state-run deliberative institutions for authoritarian stability. I support my arguments using a mixed-method approach. My qualitative data are gathered over 12 months of fieldwork in China, including interviews with local officials, analysis of internal and published government documents, and direct observation in government's offices and online petition channels. My quantitative data include two original datasets I scraped from China's deliberation channels on social media. The first includes over 156,000 citizen appeals and government responses to these appeals; The second includes over 1 million citizen posts before and after they petition on government-run e-channels. Overall, my findings suggest the need to re-conceptualize accountability under autocracy not only as a reactive approach to appease opposition, but also as a proactive strategy to cultivate conformity. My findings also suggest that deliberative institutions designed to encourage participation through state-sanctioned channels may backfire and instead, encourage more coordination between societal actors for political petitions

Keywords: Political Science.
Advisor: Oi Jean C. (Jean Chun)
Blaydes Lisa
Grimmer Justin
Pan Jennifer