Exploring Education Policies and their Socioeconomic Implications: Evidence and Insights from Juvenile Crime, College Admissions, and Gender Bias

This dissertation examines the different aspects of education policies and their socioeconomic implications through three distinct research papers. The first chapter investigates the causal impact of grade retention in primary school on juvenile crime in Chile and it was written jointly with Juan Diaz, Nicolas Grau, and Jorge Rivera. Utilizing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, the study finds that repeating an early grade in primary school reduces the probability of committing a crime as a juvenile by 14.5 percentage points. By employing a dynamic model, the research demonstrates that the observed result is primarily driven by two mechanisms associated with the timing of grade retention. First, grade retention in early grades decreases the likelihood of subsequent retention in later grades. Second, late grade retention in primary education exerts a stronger positive effect on crime reduction compared to direct effects in early grades. The findings suggest that, if grade retention remains an ongoing policy, its optimal implementation at the margin should involve retaining students in early grades to prevent retention in later ones./nThe second chapter explores the equity and efficiency effects of a 2013 reform in the Chilean college admissions system. This reform aimed to increase equity by introducing a third component based on the student's GPA relative to the historical average at their high school. By simulating the admission mechanism with and without the relative GPA boost, the study categorizes applicants into three groups: those who gained access to more selective programs (pulled-up), those who lost access to more selective programs (pushed-down), and those whose admission was unaffected. Employing a difference-in-differences design, the research estimates the impacts of the reform on enrollment, persistence, and graduation. Pulled-up students were able to persist in their newly accessed programs, leading to more selective degree attainment without significant effects on overall BA completion. Pushed-down students, predominantly from better-educated/higher-income families, experienced comparable reductions in the probability of graduating from selective programs, offset by gains in graduation from less selective programs. The study concludes that the reform improved equity with minimal or no loss in efficiency./nThe third chapter estimates gender bias in a college admissions system based on standardized test scores and was jointly written with Matias Grau, Nicolas Grau, and Damian Vergara. This research applies standard discrimination literature tools in the context of the Chilean centralized admission system. We show that marginally enrolled female applicants exhibit higher first-year grades and are more likely to graduate on time compared to marginally enrolled male applicants. By employing an outcome test model, the research translates outcome differences into disparities in selection thresholds. We interpret this result as gender bias against females who, being "equally qualified" - based on their latent college performance - are not admitted into the program. Approximately 10% of enrolled male students would not have been admitted to their programs under the female effective selection thresholds. A counterfactual exercise simulating the college assignment algorithm with gender-targeted test-score inflation to correct for estimated bias suggests that such a policy would enable an improvement for 2% of female applicants in their preferred options relative to the observed assignment. Similar size effects are found with a decrease in the test score weight assigned to the application score formula./nCollectively, these research papers shed light on the complex relationships between education policies, socioeconomic outcomes, and student trajectories, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based policy recommendations to promote equitable educational systems.

Advisor: Card, David E