Incentives and Information in Multiagent Settings

This dissertation comprises three papers, each of which analyzes a mechanism design issue that arises in a setting with multiple agents that need to either acquire or aggregate information for use in a decision. The decision affects all agents as well as a principal, who also plays the role of mechanism designer. The theoretical models that I develop in these papers can be applied to a wide range of diverse settings, but I emphasize applications in the areas of organizational economics and political economics./nThe first paper, titled ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses,'' presents a novel view of the role of middle managers in organizations. Conventional wisdom regarding middle management suggests that a principal that can administer her organization independently has no reason to hire a manager, and that a principal that can benefit from a manager's services should hire one with aligned interests. The paper highlights a channel through which virtually any principal can benefit from the services of a manager, particularly of one whose interests differ. Specifically, when a principal relies on a worker to acquire information for an organizational decision, she can strengthen the worker's incentives by delegating the decision to a ``biased'' manager. Although casual observation of the game suggests that the manager's position is redundant, delegation benefits the principal. Thus, the paper helps to reconcile the prevalence of middle management with its widespread lamentation. It also illustrates how discord between a manager and a worker can improve an organization's performance. The results are consistent with outcomes from various knowledge-based organizations./nThe second paper, titled ``Communication and Preference (Mis)alignment in Organizations,'' conveys insights that are similar to the ones from ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses.'' Like the previous paper, this one explains the benefits of biased agents (both workers and managers) in organizations. However, unlike the previous paper, this one assumes that an organization's principal---whose time, technical expertise, and attention are limited---relies upon division managers to produce reports, which summarize information acquired by workers, to inform her decisions. Given this assumption, a pressing question for the principal is not whether to appoint a manager, but rather which type of manager to appoint. Note that two types of agency problems can arise in the setting described above. First, workers that bear private costs for their information acquisition efforts may not exert as much effort as the principal would like. Second, managers that do not share the principal's preferences over decisions can produce false reports. The paper shows that, although preference alignment within the organization may be expected to minimize the principal's losses from agency, the principal may benefit from intraorganizational conflict. In particular, the principal can use a manager's bias to strengthen a worker's incentives to acquire information. Since a manager's incentive to mislead the principal vanishes if the acquired information is of sufficiently high quality, the principal realizes an unambiguous welfare gain by hiring a biased manager. The principal can further enhance her welfare by also hiring a biased worker, whose bias clashes with the manager's./nThe third paper, titled ``Efficient Electorates,'' analyzes a social choice setting with pure common values, private noisy information about an unobservable payoff-relevant state of the world, and costless voting. In such a setting, an economic argument in favor of direct democracy is essentially one about information aggregation: if all citizens vote according to their private information---which, on average, is correct---then, in large majority-rule elections, the probability that the welfare-maximizing outcome is implemented is close to one. This argument, formalized first by the Marquis de Condorcet in his celebrated ``jury theorem'' and later extended to cover more general environments, is an asymptotic result that requires voters' information to be sufficiently uncorrelated. The paper shows that, for a fixed number of sincere voters with shared information sources, direct democracy is often suboptimal. It then considers the problem of appointing an optimal electorate given the allocation of information. In special cases of this framework, the problem can be viewed as the choice of an electorate from a set of individuals that communicate with each other via a social network before the election. It provides a characterization of the optimal electorate for certain classes of networks. Because the optimal electorate is often a proper subset of the full set of agents, representative democracy---even in the absence of voting costs---is often more efficient than direct democracy. As the paper illustrates through various examples, though, the solution to the problem of optimal elector appointment is unstable, and so a general characterization of the optimal electorate is elusive.

Advisor: Ahn, David S