Politics and reflection

In public discussion and political philosophy alike, there are frequent calls for citizens and politicians to be more “reflective”. However, it is not always clear what this means. This thesis investigates what the political practice of reflection entails and why we should engage in it. After setting out the wide range of contemporary political problems reflection is thought to solve, I outline the broad definitional contours of the concept as I understand it, distinguishing it from other such related terms as ‘deliberation’ in the first chapter.
Following this, I examine the idea of reflection in accounts from ancient, early-modern, and modern writers. I show how the metaphor of the mirror was used to illustrate reflective thought in the political ideas of Socrates, Plato, stoicism, and Augustine. I identify three different aspects of reflection: epistemic reflection, which emphasises gaining knowledge through reflection, self-reflection, which emphasises self-correction through self-understanding (strictly speaking a sub-type of epistemic reflection focused on knowledge of the self), and finally ethical reflection, the idea that even if human intellectual powers are limited, reflection can nevertheless open an inner space for cultivating ethical virtue. In the ancient world, we also find a counter-tradition: the mirror has also been associated with deception and confusion in fable and myth. The realist histories of Herodotus and Thucydides were alert to the costs and dangers of reflection—most importantly, the idea that emphasising reflection risks becoming quietist, intellectualist, and inimical to political engagement.
Following this, I turn to examining reflection as a theme in the thought of Thomas Hobbes. His call for readers to reflect is fascinating since it combines all three aspects of reflection together. He seeks both to adjust and expand citizens’ political vision whilst inculcating distinctly Hobbesian ethics of obedience and subservience to authority. It can thus be called a ‘composite’ account. Whilst his account benefits from the integration of the three aspects, its authoritarian and deliberately anti-political character makes it a poor example to uphold for reflection today.
Next, I turn to two modern interpreters of Kant; Hannah Arendt and John Rawls. Both rightly interpret Kant, like Hobbes, as seeing reflection as vital to politics. However, their interpretations are markedly different. Rawls’s call for citizens to aim for ‘reflective equilibrium’ emphasises the epistemic aspects of reflection—the goal of reaching a highly coherent philosophical theory of justice which could command agreement and produce political stability. Arendt, by contrast, was sceptical that reflection could ever produce such epistemic outputs, but nonetheless emphasised the ethical importance of withdrawing from the world into an inner, reflective space—such as the cultivation of conscience and engaging of judgement.
Finally, using these conceptual resources, I ask what role reflection might play in contemporary politics. I argue that reflection must be rescued from both opponents and proponents. Opponents—such as realists and certain deliberative democrats—are sceptical that reflection has much to offer politics. I argue that their concerns can be met, partly because they tend to misconceive reflection as a primarily epistemic in purpose. Proponents, on the other hand, focus too much on one or another particular aspect of reflection such that they, too, produce theories with anti-political implications. For example, a heavily epistemic theory risks intellectualism, whilst theories calling for self-reflection along narrow identitarian lines risk closing down open political thought and engagement.
By way of conclusion, I sketch a theory of political reflection which is both composite and political. That is, it aims to promote political engagement by combining all three elements. Furthermore, I argue a degree of emphasis must be placed on the ethical aspect of reflection. In a contemporary world of often rapid and confusing political turmoil, reflection can provide refuge and orientation. Far from being intellectualist or an escape from reality, this model of political reflectiveness offers the opportunity to remember what truly matters to us, to step into others’ shoes—even when we disagree—and cultivate moral conscience and courage when conducting ourselves as citizens.

Advisor: Bejan, T