The morality of force in asymmetric warfare
Keywords: asymmetric warfare
counterterrorism
just war theory
liability
moral equality of combatants
legitimate authority

This doctoral thesis addresses crucial theoretical and policy questions concerning the morality of force in asymmetric warfare. I argue that asymmetric warfare exposes fundamental flaws with the internal logic of traditionalism, posing a challenge to the theory that arises independently from the revisionist critique. Traditionalists, by their own account, propose different moral paradigms for conventional and asymmetric conflicts, yet they offer no compelling account of what triggers these paradigms. Applying the logic of traditionalism consistently in both types of conflicts leads to conclusions that many traditionalists would reject, such as the suggestion that not all combatants are in fact morally equal. Moving from the realm of analytic philosophy to applied ethics, the asymmetric case further undermines pragmatic morally-directed arguments in support of traditionalism.
Every aspect of this study, which encompasses four independent but interrelated papers and an introduction, reinforces these themes. Following a survey of the literature in the introduction, I present three theoretical papers that illuminate, respectively, problems with the traditionalist position on the exceptionalism of war, legitimate authority, and the moral equality of combatants. The final paper considers the policy implications of the foregoing research as it applies to US direct action in the global “war on terror,” a model case of asymmetric warfare. The papers proceed as follows:
"Between War and Peace." This paper interrogates the exceptionalist claim that being in a state of war triggers a different moral paradigm for defensive harming than in ordinary life. Asymmetric warfare presents a challenge to this view because it does not fall neatly within the war or peace paradigms, prompting some exceptionalists to propose a third moral paradigm referred to as jus ad vim. The jus ad vim framework, however, does not adequately explain how purportedly unique features of asymmetric warfare alter moral norms concerning defensive harming.
"Legitimate Authority Beyond the State." In this paper, I argue that the asymmetric case exposes flaws in the traditionalist argument that only states and state-like groups possess legitimate authority to declare and wage war. Traditionalists uphold the Westphalian presumption that all states possess such authority, yet they claim that non-state groups which lack legitimate authority to rule also lack legitimate authority to go to war, and that their wars automatically are unjust. This position is inconsistent; states which lack legitimate authority to rule but nevertheless engage in war act unjustifiably, and their wars are criminal.
"Moral Equality in an Unequal World." States which lack legitimate authority to declare war, however, cannot direct combatants to wage war justly on their behalf. The traditionalist view of legitimate authority, then, also undermines their position on the moral equality of combatants, or the Equality Thesis. Contractarianism offers the most promising means of saving traditionalism from these implications, yet it also fails to demonstrate why the Equality Thesis holds in all state-directed wars, but not in conflicts involving non-state actors.
"Principles for Asymmetric Warfare." The above arguments constitute a compelling case for rejecting traditionalism in favour of an alternative approach, namely revisionism. Indeed, applying revisionism to asymmetric warfare poses none of the theoretical problems highlighted in the preceding papers. For this reason, the final paper is based loosely on revisionist principles insofar as it prescribes a reductivist and individualist approach to US direct action in the global “war on terror,” that is, kill or capture operations conducted against terrorist targets.
Taken together, the papers represent a sustained challenge to traditionalism that must be addressed if we are to accept that account of morality in war. I conclude by considering the implications of these findings for the theoretical debate between traditionalists and revisionists more broadly, as well as areas for future research.