Kantian social constructivism
Keywords: Philosophy.

This dissertation offers the beginning of a reorientation to Kantian ethics. This reorientation pivots around an overlooked dimension of Kant's thought: namely, the Kantian agent faces the task of realizing the ideal of moral community here in the world of actual human practice. Realization of moral community is a collective task. None of us can accomplish it alone and, yet, it is a task upon which reason requires us to embark. This guiding idea, if we take it seriously, I believe stands to reframe how we think about Kant's account of practical reason, rational autonomy, and even morality itself. The four essays in this dissertation take up various angles on this idea. While two of the chapters offer interpretative suggestions, the aim of this dissertation is not to provide a novel reading of what Kant himself said or thought. The hope, rather, is to expose and excavate underappreciated Kantian resources and to lay the ground for a Kantian ethic that is appropriate for sensible and social beings like us. I call this approach: Kantian Social Constructivism. At the heart of Kantian Social Constructivism is the idea that Kantian rational agency should be understood as a collective and discursive activity by which agents construct, negotiate, and institute shareable ways of life. A shareable way of life is one in which all participants stand as rationally autonomous; each is self-governing in relation to her own actions, in relation to others, and in relation to the principles and ends structuring her shared activity with others. In other words, these ways of life are realizations of the Kingdom of Ends -- the Kantian ideal of moral community -- in actual human thought and practice. Kantian autonomy, on this view, is an irreducibly social concept. It requires standing in a certain relationship not only to one's own actions and to others, but also to the principles and ends structuring one's interactions and associations with others. This means that the realization of autonomy is not the feat of an individual will but a collective endeavor. Morality calls on us to v construct and uphold a world of practice that supports and recognizes the autonomy of all its members. While Kantian morality is often accused of individualism and overlooking the social-embeddedness of human life, Kantian Social Constructivism brings our sociality front and center. An interesting upshot of this reorientation is that moral agents stand in a distinctively moral relationship to the world of practice. Not only are they responsible for its moral upkeep, a responsibility which is called moral stewardship in the dissertation, but they can also be wronged by a practice (apart from any direct action taken by other agents). An agent is wronged by a practice when the principles of that practice fail to fully recognize her autonomy and moral personhood; she is, consequently, unable to participate in that practice as a moral equal. By focusing on the relationship between agents and the world of practice, Kantian Social Constructivism is able to provide both traction on and normative guidance for the moral dimensions of social injustice and oppression, issues that Kantians are often accused of being unable to address.