Election timing and the political influence of the organized [electronic resource]
Keywords: Political Science.

The vast majority of elected officials in the United States are elected on days other than national "Election Day." It is well documented that voter turnout in off-cycle elections is far lower than turnout in elections held concurrently with national elections. In this dissertation, I argue that the timing of elections affects not only how many people vote but also who votes, which candidates win, and how elected officials design public policy. I start in chapter 1 by summarizing the rules governing election timing in each of the 50 U.S. states. Then, in chapter 2, I present a theoretical framework for considering the causes and consequences of election timing. In the first part of the chapter, I argue that shifting from on-cycle to off-cycle election timing has the effect of increasing the electoral presence of organized interest groups. Because those who have a large stake in an election outcome turn out to vote at high rates regardless of when the election is held, and because low voter turnout enhances the effectiveness of interest groups' mobilization efforts, the members and mobilized supporters of organized interest groups make up a greater proportion of the active electorate in off-cycle elections than in on-cycle elections. In the second part of the chapter, I explain how the timing of elections shapes election outcomes and policymaking. I argue that organized interest groups that seek policies with concentrated benefits and distributed costs and that face relatively little organized competition should have greater success in securing the policies they favor when elections are held off-cycle rather than on-cycle. However, even when organized groups compete over policy, and even when voters on both sides of an issue are equally motivated to turn out, election timing can still tip the balance of power in favor of one group or its rival, with potential to change the outcomes of elections. In chapter 3, I test whether school boards that hold off-cycle elections make policy that is more responsive to the dominant interest group in school board elections -- teacher unions -- than school boards that hold elections concurrently with state and national elections. In a series of empirical tests, I find that school districts that hold off-cycle elections pay teachers significantly higher salaries than districts that hold on-cycle elections. In chapter 4, I apply this approach to municipal elections in California. I find that firefighters are better compensated in California cities that hold off-cycle elections, and I uncover some evidence that the same is true for police officers. Moreover, relative to cities that hold elections concurrently with state and national elections, cities with off-cycle elections spend more per capita on employee salaries, retirement costs, and health benefits. In chapter 5, I explore the histories of three large American cities, tracing what happened to their election schedules between the 1840s and the dawn of the Progressive Era. I find that prior to the Progressive municipal reform movement, the election timing of large cities changed frequently, and the decisions to change local election dates were politically contentious. The chapter also demonstrates that the timing of city elections has been an important determinant of voter turnout since before the Civil War. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate the politics of election timing choice in state legislatures in the 21st century. Using new data on electoral timing -- both public opinion data and data on the activity of state legislatures -- I find evidence that the politics of election timing choice today involves a struggle among groups for electoral influence.