Essays in behavioral economics and microeconomic theory
Keywords: Humanities and Sciences.
Economics.

Following my research interests, this dissertation covers two fields of economics---behavioral economics (Chapters 1 and 2) and microeconomic theory (Chapters 3 and 4). Behavioral economics. In the first strand of my research, I develop and experimentally test theories to better understand individual-level behavioral phenomena and biases. In the last decades, behavioral economists have documented a variety of behavioral phenomena and biases across a range of economic environments, including information avoidance in health and financial domains, default effects in dynamic choice, belief distortions and probability weighting in choices over lotteries, and time inconsistency in preferences over consumption sequences. Behavioral economists typically explain each of these phenomena with a distinct mechanism. In the first chapter titled ``Emotional Inattention'' (joint with Collin B. Raymond), I develop a model that can simultaneously generate all of these phenomena and more, helping provide a unified account for many observed biases. It is a model of attention allocation, where in addition to its usual instrumental role, attention generates and regulates emotions. This role has been highlighted by psychologists but is rarely formally studied by economists. This second role of attention leads decision-makers to ignore low-payoff situations, leading to the so-called ostrich effect (where individuals ignore poorly performing financial assets), avoidance of potentially negative health tests, and pessimistic defaults in order to account for future inattention. When attention is allocated across possible realizations of an unknown state, the decision-maker has as-if distorted beliefs with additional weight on states that receive high attention. Similarly, when attention is allocated across time, the decision-maker develops preferences over the timing of consumption---they value consumption more in time periods with high attention, leading to as-if discounting. Because my model suggests these biases all emerge from a desire to manage emotions, it comes with many new predictions and implications for policymaking. Many documented deviations from the Bayesian benchmark---e.g., individuals' tendency to neglect correlation when processing information---are traditionally attributed to bounded rationality and hence thought of as cognitive mistakes. In the second chapter, titled ``Motivated Mislearning: The Case of Correlation Neglect'' (with Tony Q. Fan), I show that such cognitive ``mistakes'' can arise because of preferences and may thus not be actual mistakes. We designed an experiment to study the role of motivated reasoning in correlation neglect. In the main treatment, participants receive potentially redundant signals about an ego-relevant state---their IQ test performance. We then ask them how likely the signals are from the same source (and thus contain redundant information). Participants generally underappreciate the extent to which identical signals are more likely to come from the same source, but the bias is stronger for identical ego-favorable signals than for identical ego-unfavorable signals. This suggests that individuals may neglect the correlation between desirable signals to sustain motivated beliefs. Thus, cognitive ``mistakes'' that have traditionally been attributed to bounded rationality may, in fact, be utility maximizing. Microeconomic theory. The second strand of my work uses the tools of applied microeconomic theory to understand equilibrium outcomes when economic agents interact. In the third chapter, titled ``Robust contracting under double moral hazard'' (with Gabriel Carroll; forthcoming at Theoretical Economics), I seek to understand the prevalence of profit-sharing rules in agency relationships between private agents. In franchising partnerships, for instance, the franchisee typically pays an upfront fee and a fixed share of the revenue as royalties to the franchisor. We study a general contracting problem between a principal and an agent where both parties need to exert effort for production to take place. We identify a specific virtue of linear contracts: They are robust to uncertainty about the details of the environment and provide the highest payoff guarantees. We thus offer a tractable general-purpose model of double moral hazard and specifically express the robustness intuition underlying linear contracts. In the fourth chapter, titled ``Interactions across multiple games: cooperation, corruption, and organizational design, '' (with Jonathan B. Bendor, Nicole Immorlica, and Matthew O. Jackson), I built a model to understand how desired cooperation and undesired cooperation (e.g., corruption) are interlinked and how organizations can encourage the former while discouraging the latter. We show that because cooperation in one situation may depend on expectations of cooperation in others, it may be impossible to get desirable types of cooperation without also getting undesirable ones. More generally, we characterize this interdependency and study how the level of cooperation depends on the assignment of workers to teams and teams to tasks. Lastly, we study performance bonuses, occupational safety, and whistle-blowing rewards as possibly effective tools to promote desired and limit undesired cooperation