Case: State Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney

The Facts6. One of the two employees involved in these appeals has been re-absorbed in service and his case is, therefore, of lesser import, but the other is still out in the cold and his legal fate falls for examination in the matrix of facts which we proceed to state. This respondent was appointed as cashier, off and on, by the State Bank of India between July 4, 1970 and November 18, 1972. The intermittent breaks notwithstanding, his total number of days of employment answered the test of "deemed" continuous service within S. 25B (2) and both sides accept that fact situation. But the order of appointment, which bears in its bosom the "good bye" to the employee after a few days, calls for construction in the light of S. 2(oo) and S. 25F and we may as well read it hereThe appointment is purely a temporary one for a period of 9 days but may be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefore at the Banks discretion;(2) The employment, unless terminated earlier, will automatically cease at the expiry of the period, i.e.nine days employment tacked on to what has gone before, has ripened to a continuous service for a year on the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days of broken bite of service.

Court's reasoning:
In the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent shall be put back where he left off, but his new salary will be what he would draw where he to be appointed in the same post today de novo. As for benefits, if any, flowing from service he will be ranked below all permanent employees in that cadre and will be deemed to be a temporary hand upto now. He will not be allowed to claim any advantages in the matter of seniority or other priority inter se among temporary employees on the ground that his retrenchment is being declared invalid by this Court. Not that we are laying down any general proposition of law, but make this direction in the special circumstances of the case. As for the respondents emoluments, he will have to pursue other remedies, if any.12. We substantially dismiss the appeal (C.A. 934 of 1975) subject to the slight modification made above. There was some intervening suggestion for settlement of the dispute but it fell through. We are persuaded to make the observation based on that circumstance that social justice has two sides and, occasionally, one party or the other makes myopic mistakes resulting in further litigation.The certificate issued by the High Court under Art. 133(1) is bad on its face, according to counsel for the respondent and the appeal consequently incompetent. We are inclined to agree that the grant of a constitutional passport to the Supreme Court by the High Court is not a matter of easy insouciance but anxious advertence to the dual vital requirements built into Art. 133(1) by specific amendment. Failure here stultifies the scheme of the Article and floods this Court with cases of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry. A substantial question of law of general importance is a sine qua non to certify fitness for hearing by the apex Court. Nay, more, the question, however important andmust be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Courts judgment it is imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest bench. The crux of the matter has been correctly set out in a decision Union of India v. Hafiz Mohd, Said, I.L.R. (1973) 2 Del. 673, 676, of the Delhi High Court in words, which find our approval."