Case: S. Pratap Singh Vs. The State Of Punjab

2. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 140 of 1962 is the Patrani Saheba of Keonjhar and is in possession and enjoyment of eight villages, viz., Managalpur Barigan; Nua Rampas; Nilung Ghutru; Mohadijora; Patang and Anara in the district of Keonjhar. These villages were granted to her for maintenance a long time ago and as such, they have been recorded in the village papers as Khoraki Posaki (Maintenance Grant) Lands since the last settlement of 1918. She has held these lands without paying assessment; and her case is that the relevant provisions of the Act which authorise the levy of assessment in respect of her lands are unconstitutional and invalid. In her petition, she referred to the fact that time to time, the Government of the day had refrained from levying any assessment in respect of her lands and thereby recognised her right to hold the said villages on assessment-free basis. The Revenue Officer of Keonjhar levied an assessment in respect of the said villages purporting to act under the Rules framed under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner then preferred appeals to the Board of Revenue against the said assessment orders but these appeals were dismissed. The assessment levied against the petitioner in respect of these lands is of the order of Rs. 9000 and odd and it has to be paid by her from 1938 retrospectively.3. The petitioner is W. P. No. 79 of 1963 is Smt. Rani Ratan Prova Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo Mohindra Bhadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa. At the time when the State of Dhenkanal merged with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in facie villages as a proprietor. In respect of these lands, assessment had never been levied; but purporting to give effect to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Revenue Officer, Dhenkanal assessed rent in respect of all the lands which are in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner. The appeals preferred by the petitioner against the said order of assessment failed; and so, the petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the Act as well as the validity of the assessment order.4. The petitioner in W. P. No. 80 of 1963 is the ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal. On the date of merger, he held and was in possession of 89 acres 18 dec and 5 kadis of land in Nizgarh Town as his private lands. These lands were never subjected to the payment of rent and yet the Revenue Officers assessed rent and respect of these lands under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner failed in persuading the Appellant Authority it set aside the order of assessment, and so, has filed the preset writ petition challenging the validity of the Act and the order of assessment. Thus, the facts on which the three petitions claim relief are substantially similar and they have raised common points of law for our decision. That is why the three petitions have been heard together and would be disposed of by a common judgment.

Court's reasoning:
only in regard to the private lands of Rulers. That is one relevant and historical fact which cannot be ignored.9. Proceeding to deal with the private lands of Rulers on this basis the legislature has to prescribed the method of determining the rent payable by the said lands; and the relevant factors specified by S. 6 appear to be just and substantially similar to the considerations which are generally taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on Ryotwari lands. There has been some argument at the Bar before us as to whether the market value of the land which has been prescribed as a relevant consideration by S. 6 was also treated as relevant on the occasion of the earlier settlement. No material has, however, been placed before us in that behalf, and so it is not possible to decide whether this consideration was taken into account on the earlier occasion or not, and if it was not, what the effect of the said circumstances would be on the validity of the impugned statute. Having regard to the relevant factors prescribed by S. 6, it would, however, not be unreasonable to take the view that fair and equitable tests have been laid down for determining the rent which should be assessed in respect of the private lands of the rulers, and in the absence of any proof that there has been a material departure in that behalf, we find it difficult to uphold the plea that S. 6 can be attacked on the ground that it has contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution.The allegations made by the petitioners in challenging the validity of the Act are somewhat vague and the materials placed by them in support of their challenge are insufficient, inadequate and unsatisfactory. The reply made by the State is also not very helpful or satisfactory. It is precisely where a challenge to the validity of a statute is made by a party under Article 14 and he fails to adduce satisfactory evidence in support of his challenge that the task of the Court to decide the issue becomes very difficult. In considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14, we cannot ignore the well-established principle that the legislature can make class legislation, provided the classification on which it purports to be based is rational and has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it and so, on the failure of the party to show that the said classification is irrational, or has no nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the impugned Act, the initial presumption of constitutionality would help the State to urge that the failure of the party challenging the validity to rebut the initial presumption goes against his claim that the Act is invalid. In all cases where the material adduced before the Court in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the Court may have to allow the State to lean on the doctrine of initial presumption of constitutionality, and that is precisely what has happened in these cases. On the whole, therefore, we must hold that the petitioners have failed to show that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 14 of theis no doubt that the definition of the word "Ruler" prescribed by S. 2(h) of the Act is wider than that prescribed by Art. 366(22). The dependants of the Ruler and his relatives are not included in the latter definition, though they are expressly included in the former. But it must be remembered that the definitions prescribed by Art. 366 are intended for the purpose of interpreting the articles in the Constitution itself, unless the context otherwise requires, and so the argument that the definition of the word "Ruler" prescribed by the Act is inconsistent with the definition prescribed by Art. 366 (22), has really no substance or meaning. Besides, it is fallacious to assume that the Act has made any provisions in respect of Rulers as such; what the Act has purported to do is to authorise the levy of assessment and rent in respect of lands situated in Orissa; these lands are the private lands of the Rulers as defined by S. 2 (h), and so, there is no doubt that the whole object of defining the word "Ruler" is to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the operative provisions of the Act would come into play. The subject-matter of the levy consists of the private lands and the compendious way adopted by the Legislature in describing the said lands is that they are the private lands of the Rulers. It is in that connection that the word "Ruler" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner. If the legislature had said that the private lands of the dependants and relatives of Rulers were liable to the levy permitted under S. 3 the petitioners would not have been able to raise any objection because, then, it would have been unnecessary to define the word "Ruler" in a comprehensive way. Once it is conceded as it must be, that the Orissa Legislature was competent to pass the Act under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, it is idle to suggest that the method adopted by the Act in describing the lands which are made liable to pay assessment, introduces any infirmity in the Act itself. Therefore, we are satisfied that the contention that the definition of the word "Ruler" is inconsistent with Art. 366(22) and that makes the whole Act void, is without anyargument is wholly misconceived. Article 31(1) deals with the deprivation of property save by authority of law, and cannot obviously be invoked against any of the provisions of Act; and Art. 31 (2) deals with compulsory acquisition or requisition which also is entirely inapplicable to the present Act. What the Act has purported to do is to authorise the levy of assessment in respect of lands which till then had been exempted from the said levy, and as Art. 31(5) (b) (i) provides nothing contained in clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any law which the State may make for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty. If the Orissa Legislature has imposed a tax in the form of the assessment of the private lands of Rulers, clearly it has not purported either to deprive the Rules of their property, or to acquire or requisition the said property; it is a simple measure authorising the levy of a tax in respect of agricultural lands and as such, it is entirely outside the purview of Art. 31. It appears that in Pratap Kesari Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 Orissa 131 the validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High Court, and the said High Court has repelled challenge and upheld the validity of the Act. In our opinion, the view taken by the Orissa High Court is right.