Case: Lakshmana Nadar And Others Vs. R. Ramier

One Lakshminarayana Iyer, a Hindu Brahmin, who owned considerable properties in the Tirunelveli district, died on 13th December, 1924, leaving him surviving a widow Ranganayaki, and a married daughter Ramalakshmi. Ramalakshmi had married the plaintiff and had a number of children from him. They were all alive in December, 1924, when Lakshminarayana died. Before his death he executed a will on 16th November, 1924, the construction of which is in controversy in this appeal. By this will he gave the following directionsmy lifetime, you, the aforesaid Ranganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime, enjoy the aforesaid entire properties, the outstandings due to me, the debts payable by me, and the chit amounts payable by me. After your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village, and her heirs shall enjoy them with a absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations. As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to Chinnammal alias Lakshmi Ammal, wife of my late son Hariharamayyan, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases, and obtain a releaseentered into possession of the properties on the death of her husband. On 21st February, 1928, she settled the maintenance claim of Lakshmi Ammal and obtained a deed of release from her by paying her a sum of Rs. 3, 350 in cash and by executing in her favour an agreement stipulating to pay her a sum of Rs. 240 perdied on 25th April, 1938 during the lifetime of the widow. None of her children survived her. On the 24th July, 1945, the widow describing herself as an absolute owner of the properties of her husband sold one of the items of the property to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 500. On the 18th September, 1945, the suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff, the husband and the sole heir of Ramalakshmi, for a declaration that the said sale would not be binding on him beyond the lifetime of the widow. A prayer was made that the widow be restrained from alienating the other properties in her possession. On the 19th September, 1945, an ad interim injunction was issued by the High Court restraining the widow from alienating the properties in her possession and forming part of her husbands estate. In spite of this injunction, on the 27th September, 1945, she executed two deeds of settlement in favour of the other defendants comprising a number of properties. The plaintiff was allowed to amend his plaint and include therein a prayer for a declaration in respect of the invalidity of these alienations as well. It was averred in the plaint that Ramalakshmi obtained a vested interest in the suit properties under the will of her father and plaintiff was thus entitled to maintain the suit.The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had no title to maintain the suit, that the widow was entitled under the will to an absolute estate or at least to an estate analogous to and not less than a widows estate, that the estate given to Ramalakshmi under the will was but a contingent one and she having predeceased the widow, no interest in the suit properties devolved on the plaintiff. The main issue in the suit was whether the widow took under the will an absolute estate or an estate like the Hindu widows estate and whether the daughters interest therein was in the nature of a contingent remainder, or whether she got in the properties a vestedsubordinate judge held that the widow took under the will a limited life interest, and not an absolute estate or even a widows estate under Hindu law, and that the daughter got thereunder a vested interest in the properties to which the plaintiff succeeded on her death. In view of this finding he granted the plaintiff a declaratory decree to the effect that the first defendant had only an estate for life in the suit properties and that the alienations made by her would not enure beyond her lifetime. The question as to the validity of the alienations was left undetermined. The unsuccessful defendants preferred an appeal against this decree to the High Court of Judicature at Madras. During the pendency of the appeal the widow died on 14th February, 1948. The High Court by its judgment under appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge and maintained his view on the construction of the will. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted and the appeal was admitted on the 27th November, 1951.

Court's reasoning:
At one time it was a moot point whether a Hindu widows estate could be created by will, it being an estate created by law, but it is now settled that a Hindu can confer by means of a will on his widow the same estate which she would get by inheritance. The widow in such a case takes as a demisee and not as an heir. The courts primary duty in such cases is to ascertain from the language employed by the testator "what were his intentions", keeping in view the surrounding circumstances, his ordinary notions as a Hindu in respect to devolution of his property, his family relationships etc.; in other words, to ascertain his wishes by putting itself, so to say, in his armchair.Considering the will in the light of these principles, it seems to us that Lakshminarayana Iyer intended by his will to direct that his entire properties should be enjoyed by his widow during her lifetime but her interest in these properties should come to an end on her death, that all these properties in their entirety should thereafter be enjoyed as absolute owners by his daughter and her heirs with powers of alienation, gift, exchange and sale from generation to generation. He wished to make his daughter a fresh stock of descent so that her issue, male or female, may have the benefit of his property. They were the real persons whom he earmarked with certainty as the ultimate recipients of his bounty. In express terms he conferred on his daughter powers of alienation by way of gift, exchange, sale, but in sharp contrast to this, on his widow he conferred no such powers. The direction to her was that she should enjoy the entire properties including the outstandings etc. and these shall thereafter pass to her daughters. Though no restraint in express terms was put on her powers of alienation in case of necessity, even that limited power was not given to her in express terms. If the testator had before his minds eye his daughter and her heirs as the ultimate beneficiaries of his bounty, that intention could only be achieved by giving to the widow a limited estate, because by conferring a full Hindu widows estate on her the daughter will, only have a mere spas successions under the Hindu law which may or may not mature and under the will her interest would only be a contingent one in what was left indisposed of by the widow. It is significant that the testator did not say in the will that the daughter will enjoy only the properties left undisposed of by the widow. The extent of the grant, so far as the properties mentioned in the schedule are concerned, to the daughter and the widow is the same. Just as the widow was directed to enjoy the entire properties mentioned in the schedule during her lifetime in like manner the daughter and her heirs were also directed to enjoy the same properties with absolute rights from generation to generation. They could not enjoy the same properties in the manner directed if the widow had a full Hindu widows estate and had the power for any purpose to dispose of them and did so. If that was the intention, the testator would clearly have said that the daughter would only take the properties remaining after the death of thewas held that Suraj took only a life estate under the will, with remainder over to Mahalaxmi after her death and the bequest to Mahalaxmi was not contingent on her surviving Suraj, but that she took a vested remainder which upon her death passed to herconsidering the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds have been made out for disturbing the unanimous opinion of the two courts below on the construction of this will. Both the learned counsel eventually conceded that the language used in the will was consistent with the testators intention of conferring a life estate in the English sense as well as with the intention of conferring a Hindu widows estate. It was, however, urged by Mr. Rajah Iyer that as no express or implied power of alienation for purposes of all legal necessities was conferred on the widow, that circumstance negatived the view that the testator intended to confer upon his widow a Hindu widows estate as she would get in case of intestacy. He also emphasized that the words of the gift over to the daughter as supporting his construction which was further reinforced by the words of the will limiting the widows estate "till your lifetime" and of the omission from therein of words such as malik etc., while describing the widows estate. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar, on the other hand, contended that the absence of any words in the will restricting her powers of alienation and putting a restraint on them, suggested a contrary intention and that the daughters estate was described as coming into being after the estate of the widow and was not conferred on her simultaneously with the widow, and this connoted according to the notions of Hindus a full Hindu widows estate.