Case: Maharashtra State Road Transportcorporation Vs. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service.Amravati &amp; Ors

2. The appellant is the State Road Transport Corporation of the State of Maharashtra constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act (64 of 1950), Respondent No. 1 who is a private stage carriage operator, along with other such private operators, had applied for renewal of stage carriage permits which they were holding and which permits were to expire on March 31, 1961. The Provincial Transport Services (the predecessor of the appellant) had been also operating the stage carriage service in the adjoining and nearby areas and had made applications sometime in January, 1961 for grant of substantive permits for the same routes. The Provincial Transport Services had published a scheme under S. 68-D ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) under which it proposed to take over several routes in the region including the routes in respect of which renewal applications were made by the appellant and the private operators. The scheme was approved by the Chief Minister of the then Bombay State. The approval was, however, challenged by private operators in Special Civil Application No.86 of 1962 in the High Court. By its order dated 29th/30th August, 1963 passed in that case, the High Court quashed the scheme with the direction that the matter should be reconsidered by the approving authority. The scheme was thereafter not pursued.3. By a notification dated June 10, 1961 under S. 47-A of the Road Transport Corporation Act of 1950 the Central Government provided for the amalgamation of the Bombay Road Transport Corporation with the Commercial Undertaking of the State Government, namely, the Provincial Transport Services. It was also provided in the notification that any application for permit made by the Provincial Transport services would be deemed to be an application made by the Bombay Road Transport Corporation. In other words, the Provincial Transport Services was substituted by the State Road Transport Corporation which is now known as Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the appellant).4. The applications for renewal of permits and applications for substantive permits were considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Nagpur (hereinafter called the R. T. A. ) on October 9 and 10, 1964 and the R. T. A. passed a common order by which all the applications for renewal made by private operators were rejected and the permits were granted to the appellant. This order of the R. T. A. was challenged by the private operators in Special Civil Application No. 603 of 1964. One of the grounds on which the order was challenge was that the R. T. A. was not validly constituted. By its order dated January 14, 1965, the High Court quashed the order passed by the R. T. A., holding that it was not properly constituted on October 13, 1964 when it passed the common order. Thereafter the applications for renewal of permits and for fresh grant of permits were again considered by the R. T. A. at its meeting held on May 10, 1965. By its order on the same date, the R. T. A. dismissed all the applications for renewal made by the private operators and directed that substantive permits for these routes should be granted to the appellant. The order of the R. T. A. dated May 10, 1965 was challenged by the private operators in different Civil Applications. One of the applications was Special Civil Application No. 488 of 1965. In this application, one of the prayer was to the effect that pending the decision of the application the R. T. A. should be directed to maintain status quo. Clause 3 of the prayer was to the followingpending the decision of this application the R. T. A. Nagpur be directed to maintain status quo viz., to grant temporary permit to the petitioner as it has been done upto now on the routes Chikhli - Buldana and Chikchli - Deulgaonraja on which the petitioner is operating hisJune 4, 1965 Paranjpe, J, ordered asExpedite hearing at Nagpur on 21st June, 1965. In the meantime R. T. A. Nagpur to maintain status quo in terms of Clauseinterim order was subsequently confirmed by the High Court and all the petitions were directed to be heard together.5. During the pendency of the Special Civil Applications in the High Court an application was made by the R. T. A. jointly on behalf of the appellant and the private operators. A copy of that application is included as document No. 17 in Special Civil Application No. 575 of 1967. The joint application stated that the appellant and the private operators, with a view to end all litigation, had agreed to settle the matter on certain terms. One of the terms was that the Special Civil applications filed were to be withdrawn. The application for compromise was considered by the R. T. A, at its meeting held on September 10 and 11, 1966. The private operators including respondent No. 1 assured the R. T. A. that they would withdraw the petitions pendhig in the High Court. Upon such assurance the R. T. A. considered the matter at the meeting and after hearing the parties decided that the appellant who wits granted substantial permits by its order dated May 10, 1965, would commence operation on the routes described in Sch.A from November 1, 1965. In regard to the routes mentioned in Sch. B for which also the appellant had been granted substantive permits by the order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965, the appellant was to be permitted to commence operation from July 1, 1965 and the private operators including respondent No.1 were to be allowed to operate on these routes on temporary permits uptill June 30, 1967. This interval of time was given to the private operators apparently to help them to wind up their business without having to incur any loss and to assure certainty of better transport to the public. With regard to the third category of routes covered by Sch C of the order of the R.T. A., the private operators were operating on substantive permits which they agreed to surrender in favour of the appellant. The appellant, however, had not made any application till then for these routes. The R.T.A. decided that it had to consider these routes on merits by inviting applications as provided under the Act since the private operators holding substantive permits in respect of these routes were voluntarily surrendering them. Subsequently, the Secretary, R.T.A. on applications made by the parties, granted temporary permits to the appellant in respect of 20 of these routes and to the private operators in respects of 22 other routes. The decisions were actually reached by the R.T.A. in presence of all the parties and subject to the condition that the private operators would withdraw their petitions pending in the High Court. It appears that on October 8, 1967 the private operators including respondent No. 1 withdrew the petitions from the High Court and informed the R. T. A. of such withdrawal. The R. T. A. thereupon on October 15, 1965, announced its decisions which it had taken on September 10/11, 1965. Thereafter the R. T. A. invited applications in respect of Sch. C routes but the private operators including respondent No- 1 made applications not only in respect of Sch. C routes including those which were being operated by the appellant, but in respect of Sch. B routes as well. These applications were made during the month of February, 1967. The appellant had also made applications in respect of Sch. C routes in January, 1967 in response to a notification of the R. T. A. On April 5, 1967, the Secretary, R. T. A. issued permits to the appellant for a period of five years, commencing from July 1, 1967 in respect of Sch. B routes, acting upon the order of R. T. A. dated May 10, 1965 granting permits to the appellant and the subsequent order of the R. T. A. dated September 10,/11, 1965 allowing the appellant to commence operations from July 1, 1967.6. The applications of the parties for substantive permits in respect of sch. C routes and the applications made by the private operators in respect of Sch. B routes, were considered by the R. T. A. in its meeting held on June 28./29, 1967. After considering each case on merits, the R. T. A. granted substantive permits in respect of Sch. C routes to the appellant and rejected the applications of the private operators for the same. With regard to the applications of the private operators in respect of Sch. B routes, and in respect of some routes of Sch. C for which they had applied after expiry of the date prescribed for making of such applications, the R. T. A. expressed the view that such applications could not be maintained in respect of Sch. B routes since substantive permits for those routes had already been granted by the R.T.A. in favour of the appellant on May 10,1965 As regards Sch C routes, the applications of the private operators were held to be not maintainable as they were filed late. Thereafter the private operators including respondent No.1 voluntarily converted their applications into applications for additional timings or trips on those routes The R.T.A. thereupon decided to postpone consideration of these applications for additional timings in order to enquire and satisfy itself out the existence of the additional need. This order of the R. T. A, dated June 28/29, 1967 was challenged by the private operators including respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Applications which are the subject-matter of these appeals. By its judgment dated October 20, 1967, the Bombay High Court allowed the Special Civil Applications and granted a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the R. T. A. date September 10/11, 1965 and June 28/29, 1967 and the permits issued by the Secretary, R. T. A. to appellant on April 5, 1967. With regard to the order of the R. T. A. dated May 10, 1965 granting substantive permits to the appellant in respect of Sch. A and Sch. B routes, the High Court held that the said order had become "unworkable" in respect of Sch. B routes and hence to that extent quashed that order.

Court's reasoning:
8.It is true that S. 58 (1) (a) provides that the duration of the permit should be not less than three years and not more than five years as the R. T. A. may specify in the permit. But there is nothing in S. 48 (1) of the Act which states that the R. T. A. is required to specify expressly in the order of the grant of the permit as to for what period the permit is to be effective. It is manifest, however, in the present case that the period of validity of the permit should be deemed to be five years because the order of the R. T. A. should be construed as an order of grant of a stage carriage permit " in accordance with the application under S. 48 (l) of the Act.In other words, the order of the R. T. A. dated May 10, 1965 should be construed in the context of the language of S. 48 (1) of the Act which empowers the R. T. A. to grant a stage carriage permit "in accordance with the application" or "with such modifications as it deems fit or to refuse to grant such a permit." In the present case, the R. T. A. did not make any modification and it must therefore be deemed that the grant of the permit was made in accordance with the application of the appellant which expressly declares the period of validity of the permit applied for to be of five years (See the application of the appellant printed at page 205 of Vol. II of the Paper Book).Reference may be made in this connection to Rule 80 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules which provides for the forms of application for permits and to Form P. St. S. A. prescribed under that Rule which requires the application to mention for what period the stage carriage permit is to be granted. We are accordingly of the opinion that the order of the R.T. A. dated May 10, 1965 cannot be held to be illegal merely because the period of validity of the permit has not been expressly mentioned therein.It was, however, argued by Mr. Phadke on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the period of commencement of the permit should have been mentioned by the R. T. A. in its order of May 10, 1965 and the omission of the R. T. A. to do so invalidated the order. It was pointed out by Mr. Phadke that the order of the grant of permit was made on May 10, 1965 by the R. T. A. but the permits were actually issued to the appellant on April 5, 1967 to be effective for five years from at date.There is, however, nothing in the Act or in the Rules to suggest that the R. T. A. is under an obligation to mention in the order of grant of permit the actual date from which the permit as to be effective.Phadke, referred to S. 48 (3) (i) of the Act which states that the R. T. A., if it decides to grant a permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriage of a specified description and may subject to any rules that may be made under the Act, attach to the permit a condition that the service or any specified part thereof shall be commenced with effect from a specified date.It is manifest that this statutory provision is merely permissive and it does not apply to the order of grant of a permit which is dealt with in S. 48 (1) of the Act. In the absence of any express statutory provision it must be taken that the date of the commencement of the period of the permit would be the date from which the permit is actually issued which is April 5, 1967 in the present case.The view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shree Laxmi Bus Transport Co. v. R. T. A., Rajkot, (1960) 62 Bom LR 958   in which it was said that when an application for renewal of a stage carriage permit is granted under S. 58 of the Act, subsequent to the date on which the period of the permit expires, the period specified in the renewal cannot be made to commence retrospectively from the date of expiry of the permit sought to be renewed but will commence from the date on which it is actually renewed. Hence it is not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Phadke that the order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965 is illegal merely because the date of commencement of the operation of the permit is not specified therein. In our opinion, the High court was in error in holding that the order of the R. T. A. dated May 10, 1965 was legally invalid either because the period of validity of the permit or the date of commencement was not mentioned therein.9. The next contention put forward by Mr. Phadke is that the order of the R.T.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 fixing the date of the commencement of the service was an order which was tantamount to a review of the previous order of the R. T. A. dated May, 10, 1965 and as no express power of review is conferred on the R. T. A. by any prevision of the Act, the order of September 10/11, 1965 was illegal and ultra vires. In thisHigh Court has taken the view that the order of the R. T. A. dated September 10/11, 1965 was invalid because it was made on a compromise reached by the parties during the operation of the stay order of the High Court in Civil Application No. 488 of 1965. In our opinion, the High Court was not right in taking the view that the R. T. A. had violated the stay order. The parties had themselves approached the R. T. A. on the basis of the compromise which was meant to put an end to a long protracted litigation and which allowed time to the private operators to wind up their business. On a perusal of the order of the R. T. A. dated September 10/11, 1965 if is manifest that the R.. T. A. was careful to say that the compromise will come into effect only after the withdrawal of the writ petitions by the private operators. To put it differently, the order made by the R. T. A. on September 10/11, 1965 was a conditional order, namely, an order which was intended to come into effect only after the writ petitions in the High Court were withdrawn by the private operators.It is not disputed that the roder of the R. T. A., though dated September 10/11, 1965 was formally announced on October 16, 1965 after the private operators had withdrawn the writ petitions on October 8, 1965. In these circumstances we hold that there is no violation of the stay order of the High Court and the order of the R. T. A. dated September 10/11, 1965 which was formally announced on October 16,1965 is not in any way invalid.11. In any event, we are satisfied that it is not open to the private operators including respondent No. 1 to apply for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order of the R. T. A. date September 10/11, 1965 in view of then conduct. It is not disputed that the private operators including respondent No. 1 were present in the meeting of the R. T. A. held on September 10/11, 1965 either personally or through duly appointed Counsel. Respondent No. 1 and the other private operators assured the R. T. A. at the hearing that they would withdraw the writ petitions pending in the High Court On such assurances and subject to the actual withdrawal of the writ petitions in terms of the assurance, the R. T. A. considered the mattered in the said meeting and after hearing the parties, made an order giving effect to the compromise. It is obvious that the private operators including respondent No. 1 were parties to the order dated September 10/11, 1965, had accepted that order, acted upon it and derive benefits and advantages from it for nearly one year and 9 months. But for the sat order which suspended the operation of the permit of the appellant till July 1, 1967 the private operators including respondent No. 1 could not have got temporary permits to operate on the same routes as no stage carriage permits could be issued under Section 62 of the Act during the subsistence of substantive permits. In these circumstances we consider that there was such acquiescence in the R. T. A.s order dated September 10/11, 1965 on the part of respondent No. 1 and other private operators as to disentitle them to a grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.It is well established that the writ of certiorari will not be granted in a case where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, similar to though not identical with, the exercise of discretion in the Court ofour opinion, the principle of this decision applies to the present case and since respondent No. 1 and the other private operators had not even pleaded any circumstances justifying the delay or their conduct, the High Court was in error in granting a writ of certiorari in theirsignificant fact in the present case is that the decision of the R. T. A. on June 28/ 29, 1967 was given after hearing respondent No, 1 and the other private operators who were present at the meeting of the R. T. A, either personally or through Counsel and reasons for the decision were also communicated to respondent No. 1 and other private operators by a registered letter dated July 20, 1967. The principle of the decisions of this Court in (1967) 3 SCR 302   = (AIR 1967 SC 1606  ) and in Civil App. No. 657 of 1967, D/-17-8-l967 (SC) as therefore no bearing upon the determination of the question involved in the present case. Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rules either expressly or by necessary implication we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Phadke that there is any general principle that a statutory tribunal should always give its judgment in writing and should always give reasons thereof immediately with the pronouncement of the judgment.We are therefore of the opinion that in the absence of any statutory provision there is noting wrong in principle if an administrative tribunal gives a decision orally and subsequently reduces to writing the reasons thereof and communicates it to the parties. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Phadke on this aspect of the case.