Case: Stock Exchange, Bombay Vs. V.S. Kandalgaonkar

By a notice dated 29th June 1994, the Stock Exchange, Bombay declared Shri Suresh Damji Shah as a defaulter with immediate effect as he had failed to meet his obligations and discharge his liabilities. By a notice dated 5th October 1995 issued under Section 226 (3) of the Income Tax Act, the Income Tax Department wrote to the Stock Exchange and told them that Shrimembership card being liable to be auctioned, the amount realized at such auction should be paid towards Income Tax dues of Assessment Year 1989-90 and 1990-91 amounting to Rs.25.43 Lakhs. The Stock Exchange, Bombay by its letter dated 11th October 1995 replied to the said notice and stated that under Rules 5 and 6 of the Stock Exchange the membership right is a personal privilege and is inalienable. Further, under Rule 9 on death or default of a member his right of nomination shall cease and vest in the Exchange and accordingly the membership right of Shri Shah has vested with the Exchange on his being declared a defaulter. This being the case, since the Exchange is now and has always been the owner of the membership card, no amount of tax arrears of Shri Shah are payable by it. By a prohibitory order dated 10th May 1996, the Income Tax Department prohibited and restrained the Stock Exchange from making any payment relating to Shri Shah to any person whomsoever otherwise than to the Income Tax Department. The amount claimed in the prohibitory order was stated to be Rs. 37.48 Lakh plus interest. On 18th July 1996, the Solicitors of the Stock Exchange, Bombay wrote to the Income Tax Department calling upon them to withdraw the prohibitory order dated 10th May 1996 in view of the fact that the membership right of the Exchange is a personal privilege and is inalienable. By a letter dated 27th December 1996, the Tax Department wrote back to the Bombay Stock Exchange refusing to recall its prohibitory order. Meanwhile, Shri Shah applied to be re-admitted to the Stock Exchange which application was rejected by the Stock Exchange on 13th February, 1997.3. The Stock Exchange then filed a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No.220 of 1997 dated 24th December 1996 in which the following reliefs were claimed:that thisCourt may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India calling for the records in relation to the recovery proceedings initiated by the Respondents against Mr. Suresh D. Shah and after going through the same and examining the legality and validity thereof to quash and set aside the impugned notice dated 5th October, 1995 and the impugned order dated 10th May 1996, Impugned Notice/ letter dated 27th December 1996 being Exhibitshereto;that thisCourt may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordering and directing the Respondents to withdraw forthwith the recovery proceedings initiated against in respect of the dues of Mr Suresh D. Shah and ordering and directing the Respondents to withdraw forthwith the impugned notice dated 5th October, 1995 and the impugned notice dated 5th October, 1995 and the impugned prohibitory Order dated 10th May, 1996, Impugned Notice/letter dated 27th December 1996 being Exhibitst thisCourt be pleased to permit the Petitioner to exercise the right of nomination in respect of the membership right of Suresh D. Shah in favour of such person as the petitioner may decide and to apply the consideration received therefore and also appropriate all other securities placed with the Petitioner by Suresh d. Shah and which have vested in the Petitioner in accordance with the Rules, Bye-laws and regulations of the Petitioner;4. The Writ Petition was finally heard and by a judgment dated 27th March 2003, most of the contentions of the Stock Exchange were rejected and the Writ Petition was dismissed.5. A Special Leave Petition was filed against the said judgment being SLP(Civil) No. 8245 of 2003 in which, by an order dated 7th May 2003, the operation of the judgment was not stayed to the extent that it specifically directed the petitioner to make certain payments and handover securities to the Income Tax Department. However, in so far as the judgment declared law, the operation of such declaration of law was stayed.6. As this Civil Appeal raises important questions of law both from the point of view of the Bombay Stock Exchange and the Income Tax Department, we are going into the matter in some detail.

Court's reasoning:
In the present case, the first and paramount lien given to the Stock Exchange is by Rule 43 of the Rules made under Section 8 of the Securities Contract Act. Sections 7A, 8 and 30 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 deal with the power of recognized Stock Exchanges making rules restricting voting rights; rules relating to Stock Exchanges generally including membership thereof; and rules to carry out the purposes of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act respectively. Whereas, the rules made under Section 7A and Section 8 are made by recognized Stock Exchanges with the approval of the Central Government and published in the Official Gazette, rules made under Section 30 are made by the Central Government itself for purposes of carrying into effect the objects of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 30 is material.It will be seen that whether a rule is made under section 7-A, Section 8 or Section 30, all rules made under the Act are to be laid before Parliament, making it clear thereby that rules made under each of these provisions are statutory in nature. The fact that the Stock Exchange makes these rules under Sections 7A and 8 as opposed to the Central Government making them under Section 30 does not take the matter very much further. Section 3(51) of the General Clauses Act definesa rule made in exercise of power conferred by law and shall include a Regulation made as a rule under anyIt is clear from this definition ofalso that Stock Exchanges who make rules in exercise of powers conferred by the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act are equallyand therefore subordinate legislation. This makes it amply clear that the lien spoken of by Rule 43 is a lien, conferred by Rules under afirst thing to be noticed is that the Income Tax Act does not provide for any paramountcy of dues by way of income tax. This is why the Court in Denacase (supra) held that Government dues only have priority over unsecured debts and in so holding the Court referred to a judgment in Giles vs. Grover (1832) (131) English Reports 563 in which it has been held that the Crown has no precedence over a pledgee of goods. In the present case, the common law of England qua Crown debts became applicable by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution which states that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue in force until altered or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority. In fact, in Collector of Aurangabad and Anr. vs. Central Bank of India and Anr. 1967 (3) SCR 855  after referring to various authorities held that the claim of the Government to priority for arrears of income tax dues stems from the English common law doctrine of priority of Crown debts and has been given judicial recognition in British India prior to 1950 and was thereforein the territory of India before the Constitution and was continued by Article 372 of the Constitution (at page 861,the present case, as has been noted above, the lien possessed by the Stock Exchange makes it a secured creditor. That being the case, it is clear that whether the lien under Rule 43 is a statutory lien or is a lien arising out of agreement does not make much of a difference as the Stock Exchange, being a secured creditor, would have priority over Government dues.