Case: S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar

. The appellant had filed Civil Suit No. 311 of 1951 on the Original Side of the Madras High Court. In this suit he had claimed partition of the joint family properties and an account in respect of the joint family assets managed by the respondent. The appellant is the son of Subbiah Chettiar. His case was that Subbiah had been adopted by Lakshmi Achi inLakshmi Achi was the widow of the undivided paternal uncle of the respondent. As a result of his adoption Subbiah became a coparcener in his adoptive family and, as Subbiahs son, the appellant claimed to have a share in the joint family properties and in the assets of the joint family and that was the basis on which a claim for partition and accounts was made by the appellant in his suit. In the plaint it had been alleged that Subbiah had filed a suit for partition of his share and had obtained a decree in the trial court. The respondent had taken an appeal against the said decree in the High Court. Pending the appeal the dispute was settled amicably between the parties and in consideration of payment of a specified sum and delivery of possession of certain sites Subbiah agreed to release all his claims and those of his son, the present appellant, in respect of the properties then in suit. According to the appellant, this compromise transaction did not bind the appellant and so he claimed to recover his share ignoring the said transaction between his father and the respondent. The plaint filed by the appellant valued the claim for accounts at Rs. 1,000 under S. 7, (iv) (f) of the Act and a court-fee of Rs. 112-7-0 was paid on the said amount on an ad valorem basis. In regard to the relief for partition the fixed court-fees of Rs. 100 was paid by the appellant under Art. 17-B (Madras) of Schedule II of the Act. For the purposes of jurisdiction, however, the appellant gave Rs. 15,00,000 as the value of his share.It appears that the Registry, on examining the plaint, was inclined to take the view that the plaint should have borne court-fee under S. 7 (v) in respect of the claim for partition. Since the appellant did not accept this view the matter was referred to the Master of the Court who was the taxing officer under the Madras High Court Fees Rules,The Master felt that the issue raised by the Registry was of some importance and so, in his turn, he referred the dispute to the Judge sitting on the Original Side under S. 5 of the Act. This reference was decided by the Chamber Judge Krishnaswamy Nidu J., onThe learned Judge held that the appellant was not bound to set aside the prior compromise decree between his father and the respondent and that the plaint was governed by Art. 17-B of the Schedule II. Accordingly the court-fees paid by the appellant in respect of his claim for partition was held to be order.In due course the respondent was served and he filed a written statement raising several contentions against the appellants claim for partition and accounts. One of the points raised by the respondent was that the compromise and the release deed executed by the appellants father and the decree that was subsequently passed between the parties were fair and bona fide transactions and, since they amounted to a settlement of the disputed claim by the appellants father, the plaintiff was bound by them.Ramaswamy Gounder J., who heard the suit tried the respondents contention about the binding character of the compromise decree as a preliminary issue. The learned judge held that there was a fair and bona fide settlement of the dispute by the appellants father acting as the manager of his branch and so the appellant was bound by the compromise decree. In the result, the appellants suit was dismissed on 22-9-1953.6. Against this decree the appellant presented his memorandum of appeal onThis memorandum bore the same court-fees as the plaint. On examining the memorandum of appeal the Registry again raised the question about the sufficiency of fees paid by the appellant. The Registry took the view that the appellant should have paid court-fees under S. 7 (v) of the Act in respect of his claim for partition as the appellants claim in substance was a claim for recovery of possession based on title within the meaning of S. 7 (v). The matter was then referred to the Master; but, in his turn, the Master again made a reference to the Taxation Judge under S. 12 (2) of the Act. Thereupon the learned Chief Justice constituted a Bench of two judges to deal with this reference.7. The learned judges who heard the reference did not think it necessary to consider whether S. 12 of the Act was applicable to the present appeal. They dealt with the reference as made under S. 5 of the Act. The appellant urged before the Division Bench that the order passed by Krishnaswami Naidu, J., was final since it was an order passed under S. 5 of the Act. The learned judges did not accept this contention. They held that the record did not show that Krishnaswamy Naidu J., had been nominated by the Chief Justice to hear the reference under S. 5 either by a general or a special order and so no finality could be claimed for the said order under S. 5 of the Act. On the merits the learned judges agreed with the view taken by Krishnaswamy Naidu J., and held that S. 7 (v) of the Act was not applicable to the appellants claim for partition. According to the learned judges, neither was Art. 17-B of Schedule II applicable. They held that the provisions of S. 7 (iv) (b) of the Act applied. That is why the appellant was directed to mention his value for the relief of partition under the said section. It may be mentioned at this stage that this order became necessary because in the plaint the plaintiff had not specifically mentioned the value for the relief of partition claimed by him. He had merely stated that for the relief of partition claimed by him he was paying a court-fee of Rs. 100 in accordance with Schedule II, Art. 17-B. All that he had done in the plaint was to value his total claim for jurisdiction at Rs. 15,00,000.In compliance with this order the appellant valued his relief to enforce his right to share in the joint family properties in suit at Rs. 50,000, paid the deficit court-fee Rs. 1,662-7-0 and re-presented his memorandum of appeal in court on 7-5-1954.That, however, was not the end of the present dispute in respect of court-fees. The Registry raised another objection this time. According to the Registry, since the appellant had valued his relief in the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 15,00,000, it was not open to him to value his relief on the memorandum of appeal under S. 7 (iv) (b) without an amendment of the valuation made in the plaint. Since the appellant did not accept this view of the Registry, the matter was again placed before the court for order. The appellant then offered to file an application for formal amendment of his plaint by substituting Rs. 50,000, in place of Rs. 15,00,000, for the jurisdictional value of his relief. Accordingly the appellant made an application onThis application was opposed both by the respondent and the Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of the State. The learned judges who heard this application took the view that if the appellant had given the value in the first instance for purposes of jurisdiction he was precluded from giving a different value at a later stage. Accordingly it was held that Rs. 15,00,000, which had been mentioned in the plaint as the value of the appellants claim for jurisdictional purposes should be treated as the value given by the appellant also for the purposes of court-fees under S. 7 (iv) (b) of the Act. The result was that the application made by the appellant for a formal amendment of the valuation made in the plaint was rejected. The learned judges also purported to exercise their jurisdiction under S. 12 (2) of the Act and directed that the appellant should pay deficit court-fees on the basis of Rs. 15,00,000, not only on his memorandum of appeal but also on his plaint. It is this order which has given rise to the present appeal.

Court's reasoning:
in the present case it has been found by the Division Bench that dealt with this matter subsequently that a search of the record did not show any general or special order which would have justified the exercise of jurisdiction under S. 5 by Krishnaswamy Naidu J.No doubt Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar stated before us that the practice in the Madras High Court always was to refer disputes as to proper court-fee arising between suitors on the Original Side and the Registry to the Chamber Judge and, it was always assumed, says Shri Ayyangar, that the Chamber Judge on the Original Side was appointed generally to deal with such disputes.It is difficult for us to make any such assumption in dealing with the present suit. Unless we are satisfied from the record that Krishnaswamy Naidu J., had, at the material time, been appointed either generally or specially to act under S. 5, it would be difficult to accede to the argument that the order passed by him in the present proceedings is final. It is frankly conceded that the record does not show any general or special order as contemplated by S.That is why we must hold that the learned judges of the Division Bench were right in refusing to attach finality to the order passed by Krishnaswamy Naiduauthority and jurisdiction of the Madras High Court in enacting R. 1 of O. II are not in dispute. What is in dispute before us is the effect of the said rule. The appellants case is that the said rule merely contemplates the levy of certain specified court-fees as indicated in the provisions of the Act which are expressly made applicable to the Original Side. No other provision of the Act, according to the appellant, can be said to have been extended and so the learned judges were in error in purporting to exercise their jurisdiction under S. 12 (2). We are not satisfied that this argument ispower to entertain claims for refund of court-fees has been specifically mentioned. A claim for refund can be validly made, for instance in a case where excess court fee has been paid. That is why the provisions of Ss. 13, 14 and 15 had to be applied in terms. If a litigant is entitled to make a claim for refund of court-fees in cases governed by the relevant provisions of the Act, there appears to be no reason why it should not be open to the court to entertain the question about inadequate payment of court-fees. Logically, if excess court-fees paid should and can be refunded in these proceedings, inadequate or insufficient court-fees paid can and should be dealt with on that footing and orders passed to pay the deficit court-fees in such cases. It is matters of this kind that are clearly covered by the expression "in every other respect" to which we have just referred. We, therefore, hold that the learned judges below were justified in assuming jurisdiction under(1) and (2) of S.order gives the appellant leave to value his claim for the relief of partition and he exercised his option by valuing it at Rs. 50,000. The valuation thus made by the appellant in respect of the value of his relief of partition for the payment of court-fees should and must be taken to be the valuation even for the purposes of jurisdiction and it is on this valuation alone that the appellant can be justly called upon to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal. The learned judges were, therefore, in error in not allowing the appellant leave to make amendment in the plaint so as to bring the plaint in conformity with the provisions of S. 7, sub-s. (iv) of the Act. That in brief is the appellantsthe dispute between the litigant and the Registry in respect of court-fees arises at the initial stage of the presentation of the plaint or the appeal and the defendant or the respondent is usually not interested in such a dispute unless the question of payment of court-fees involves also the question of jurisdiction of the court either to try the suit or to entertain the appeal.There is no doubt that the question about the adequacy of the court-fees leviable on the appellants memorandum of appeal was properly referred by the Master to the learned Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and has been decided by the Division Bench of the said High Court in pursuance of the requisite order made by the Chief Justice in that behalf. In such a case, the decision reached by the Division Bench must be held to be final under S. 5 of the Act.That is why we have not allowed the merits of this order to be questioned in the presentcomputation of court-fees in suits falling under S. 7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa.Incidentally we may point out that according to the appellant it was really not necessary in the present case to mention Rs. 15,00,000 as the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction since on plaints filed on the Original Side of the Madras High Court prior to 1953 there was no need to make any jurisdictional valuation.16. The plaintiffs failure to state the amount at which he values the relief sought is often due to the fact that in suits for partition the plaintiff attempts to obtain the benefit of Art. 17-B of Schedule II in the matter of payment of court-fees. Where the plaintiff seeks to pay the fixed court-fee as required by the said article, he and his advisers are apt to take the view that it is unnecessary to state the amount for which relief is sought to be claimed for the purposes of court-fees and the valuation for jurisdiction purposes alone is, therefore, mentioned. Often enough, it turns out that the plaint does not strictly attract the provisions of Art. 17-B of Schedule II and that the court-fee has to be paid either under S. 7 (iv) (b) or under S. 7 (v) of the Act. If the court comes to the conclusion that the case falls under S. 7 (iv) (b) or S. 7 (iv) (c) ordinarily liberty should be given to the plaintiff to amend his plaint and set out specifically the amount at which he seeks to value his claim for the payment of court-fees. It would not be reasonable or proper in such a case to hold the plaintiff bound by the valuation made by him for the purposes of jurisdiction and to infer that the said valuation should be also taken as the valuation for the payment ofour opinion, therefore, the learned judges of the Madras High Court were in error in holding that the valuation for jurisdiction showed in the plaint should be taken to be the valuation for the payment of court-fees on the plaint as well as the memorandum of appeal. In view of their prior decision that the present case fell under S. 7 (iv) (b), they should have allowed the appellant to amend his valuation for the payment of court-fee not only on the memorandum of appeal but also on the plaint.