Case: State Of Maharashtra  Vs. Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke

2. This appeal has been filed on behalf of the State of Maharashtra and others against the judgment of the High Court holding that the appellant-State shall be vicariously liable for payment of compensation to the heirs of the deceased, who was the victim of the accident3. On 31-3-1980 at about 10.00 p.m. an accident took place opposite S. T. Divisional Office, Ratnagiri in which one Vijay Singh died. At that time the said Vijay Singh was driving the scooter and the jeep which belonged to the State Government dashed against the scooter because of which the victim sustained serious injuries and he ultimately succumbed to those injuries in the hospital. Appellant 3 was the driver of the said jeep, but at the time of accident Respondent 4 (hereinafter referred to as respondent) who was then a clerk in Engineering Fishing Project Division, Ratnagiri, was driving the jeep4. Respondents 1 to 3 filed their claim before the Motor Vehicles Tribunal, claiming Rs. 4, 00, 000 as the compensation for the death of Vijay Singh. It was alleged that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and was driving the jeep in a rash and negligent manner which resulted in the accident and death of Vijay Singh. It was also alleged that the said respondent was driving the jeep with the knowledge and consent of Appellant 3, the driver of the jeep, as such the appellants and respondent were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation for the accident. Vijay Singh, the deceased was than aged about 35 years and was earning Rs. 1400 to Rs. 2000 per month5. In the written statement filed on behalf of the appellants, it was admitted that the respondent was driving the jeep although he had no license to drive the same. It was also admitted that he was under the influence of liquor. However, it was pleaded on behalf of the appellants that the said respondent had snatched the keys of the jeep from the driver, Appellant 3, and started driving the jeep from the office premises. It was asserted that in that background the appellants including the State could not be held to be vicariously liable for the compensation to be paid to the claimants. The respondent filed a separate written statement and denied that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and claimed that he was sitting by the side of the driver, Appellant 3, who was driving the jeep6. The Tribunal on materials on record came to the conclusion that it was the respondent who was driving the vehicle at the relevant time and he caused the accident because of his rash and negligent driving. It was also held that he was having no licence to drive the jeep in question. But the Tribunal accepted the case of the appellants that the said respondent had snatched the keys of the jeep from the driver and was driving the vehicle unauthorisedly. In this background only the respondent could be held to be liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The Tribunal directed the respondent to pay Rs. 1, 50, 000 as compensation to the claimants7. The High Court affirmed the finding of the Tribunal that it was the respondent who was driving the jeep at the time of accident. After referring several materials on records including the first information report which was lodged after the accident, the High Court came to the conclusion that the case put forward on behalf of the appellants that the respondent had snatched the keys forcibly from the driver was not correct. The High Court pointed out that the pleadings and evidence on record clearly indicate that it was the year ending day, i.e. 31-3-1980 and the clerks and officers were required to work during night time. This was at the instance of Appellant 2, who was the incharge of the office. The evidence further disclosed that after normal working hours of the office, the employees had one to their homes and were required to come back after taking dinner. The jeep was used for bringing the employees to the office. The High Court said that on the materials on record it was not possible to conclude that the respondent had taken the jeep for his own private purpose; on the other hand, it had been established that the jeep was on official duty although being driven by the respondent, who had taken the charge of the vehicle under the authority of the driver of the vehicle. The High Court pointed out from the records including the medical examination of the driver that he had consumed liquor on that day and because of that he permitted the respondent to drive the vehicle that night. In this background, the State has to be held to be vicariously liable for the accident. Thereafter the High Court directed payment of Rs. 2, 06, 600 as the compensation along with 12% interest per annum payable from the date of the application till the date of deposit/realisation. The State Government, the driver and the respondent were jointly and severally held liable to pay the same

Court's reasoning:
18. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion, on basis of the pleadings and evidence on record, that it was the year ending day i.e. 31-3-1980 and the clerks and officers were required to work during night time. This direction had been given by Appellant 2 who was in charge of the office. It further appears that after normal working hours of the office, the employees had gone to their homes and were required to come back after taking dinner. The jeep was used for bringing such employees to the office. In this background, there is no escape from the conclusion that the jeep was being used in connection with the affairs of the State and for official purpose. The High Court has also found that the respondent who was the clerk in the office of Appellant 2 was driving the vehicle under the authority of the driver who was in charge of the said vehicle and as the driver had consumed more liquor on that day he permitted the respondent to drive the vehicle that night. The facts of the present case disclose and demonstrate that an authorised act was being done in an unauthorised manner. The accident took place when the act authorised was being performed in a mode which may not be proper but nonetheless it was directly connected with "in the course of employment" - it was not an independent act for a purpose or business which had no nexus or connection with the business of the State Government so as to absolve the appellant-State from the liability19. The crucial test is whether the initial act of the employee was expressly authorised and lawful. The employer, as in the present case the State Government, shall nevertheless be responsible for the manner in which the employee, that is, the driver and the respondent executed the authority. This is necessary to ensure so that the injured third parties who are not directly involved or consumed with the nature of authority vested by the master to his servant are not deprived from getting compensation. If the dispute revolves around the mode or manner of execution of the authority of the master by the servant, the master cannot escape the liability so far third parties are concerned on the ground that he had not actually authorised the particular manner in which the act was done. In the present case, it has been established beyond doubt that the driver of the vehicle had been fully authorised to drive the jeep for a purpose connected with the affairs of the State and the dispute is only in respect of the manner and the mode in which the said driver performed his duties by allowing another employee of the State Government, who was also going on an official duty, to drive the jeep, when the accident took place. Once it is established that negligent act of the driver and respondent was "in the course of employment", the appellant-State shall be liable for the