Case: Sree Gajanana Motor Transport Co. Ltd Vs. The State Of Karnataka And Ors

This appeal by special leave raises the question whether the State Government could, by a general direction given under Section 43(1) ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) fix the charges to be imposed upon operators of stage carriages for carrying mails as conditions of their48 of the Act lays down the power of the Regional Transport Authority to grant stage carriage permits with conditions annexed thereto. The first stage of exercise of this power is preceded by the quasi-judicial enquiry, under Section 47 of the Act, into the matters affecting the interests of public in general. Section 48, sub.. s. (1), subjecting the power to grant stage carriage permits to provisions of section 47 of the. Act, includes what may be correctly characterised as the "quasi-judicial" power either to grant or refuse to grant a permit after consideration of matters stated in Section 47 of the Act. After that, we come to the power to attach conditions laid down in Section 48(3), and weThe Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriages of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages, and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely: .........of a number of kinds of conditions which may be imposed, the xvth, given below, isthat mails shall be carried on any of the vehicles authorised by the permit subject to such conditions (including conditions as to the time in which mails are to be carried and the charges which may be levied) as may be specified".Now, it is contended on behalf of the appellants, that the power to attach conditions under. Section 48(3) is also quasi-judicial with which the State Government neither has nor ought to have any concern. The conditions of permits are prescribed by statute. It is for the authority, exercising the power quasi-judicially to grant or not to grant permits, to decide what conditions to attach or not to attach to each permit. It is. not, it is submitted, for the State Government to dictate any conditions to be attached. Hence, the challenge to the Government notification dated 30th May, 1968, which directed the State Transport Authority, to impose the charge of certain uniform rates of freight upon operators carrying mails or postal goods in stage carriages owned by operators other than State Transport Undertakings throughout the State. The State Transport Authority had, in its turn, issued a direction to the Regional Transport Authorities all over the State under Section 44 (1 ) of the Act to impose, duty of carrying the postal goods upon rates fixed by the Government as a condition annexed under Section 48(3) (xv) torelevant part of Section 43 (1) of the Act enacts: "43 (1) A State Government having regardthe advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the above development of motor transport, and(b) the desirability of co-ordinating road and rail transport, and( c) the desirability of preventing the deterioration of the road system, and(d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among motor vehicles, may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, issue directions to the State Transport Authority-(i) regarding the fixing of fares and freights for stage carriages, contract carriages and public carriers;"Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the power of the Government to issue directions relating to "freights" does not include imposition of charges for carrying postal goods as conditions permits which the Regional Transport Authority grants in exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The attack on the validity of the Government direction is thus two fold: firstly, that it falls outside the scope of Section 43(1) of the Act as charges for carrying mail are not "freight" on goods carried; and, secondly, that no directions could be given to a quasi-judicial authority as to how it should perform its functions.

Court's reasoning:
A reference to Section 59, sub. s. (3)(c) would show that acceptance of the fixed rates of fares and freights, after their notification under Section 43, becomes a condition which has to be automatically attached to a permit. The Regional Transport Authority has no option on this matter. This is what this Court held in S. Srikantiah &Ors. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur &Ors.([1971] Supp. S.C.R. 816.) In other words, the Regional Transport Authority has to act mainly mechanically after considering matters on which it has to form an opinion and take a decision quasi-judicially. We think that there is no scope for argument that there is any interference here with the quasi-judicial functions of the Regional Transport Authority. The annexation of a condition like this is a part of the purely executive Activities of the Regional Transport Authority.By Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 4023 of 1976, learned Counsel for the appellant sought to add two further grounds of appeal. These were: that, the special provisions of Section 49(3)(xv) over-ride the general provisions of Section 43(I)(d) (i) on the principle of interpretation generalia specialibus non derogant: and, that, in view of the special provision of Section 48(3)(xv), the impugned notification of the State Government was ultra vires. The second ground is what follows if the first is good. But as we have already explained above, the first ground itself is not sound. There is no question of any special provision over-riding the general. The provisions are complementary. Section 48(3)(xv) is really meant to carry out the direction which can legally be given under section 43(1)(d)(i) of the Act. Therefore, although we allow the miscellaneous application and have permitted the grounds to be argued, we reject them as untenable.