Case: Rustamji Nasarvanji Danger Vs. Joram Kunverji Ganatra And Ors

The appellant was elected a councillor of Anjar municipality in Kutch District sometime in 1972, and later, President of the municipality. On June 30, 1973, after he had been elected President, the appellant applied to the chief officer of the municipality for allotting to him a plot of land admeasuring 18 feet x 16 feet situate in the town of Anjar. In his application the appellant stated that he wanted the plot for running a flour mill temporarily until he got a suitable plot from the Government. By his order dated July 5, 1973 the chief officer granted the request permitting the appellant to hold the land on payment of rent on condition, inter alia, that the land should be vacated whenever the municipality so ordered. The first respondent who is a resident of Anjar applied to the Collector of Kutch under section 38 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (referred to as the Act hereinafter) for declaring that appellants office has "become vacant" as he has disabled himself from continuing as a councillor by taking lease of the land from the municipality. The Collector having heard the parties held that the appellant had got the land by misusing his position as President of the municipality incurring thereby the disqualification referred to in section 38(1)(b)(i) of the Act which disabled him from continuing to be a councillor an d declared that his office had become vacant. The appellant before us preferred an appeal under section 38(4) of the Act to the State Government against the Collectors order. The State Government allowed the appeal and dismissed the application of the first respondent. It was held that the land was allotted to the appellant in accordance with the by-laws of the municipality and that there was no evidence of the appellant exerting any influence on the chief officer. The first respondent challenged the order of the State Government by filing a writ petition in the Gujarat High Court. The learned Judge of the High Court who heard the petition allowed the same, quashed the order of the State Government, and restored the order made by the Collector. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court allowing the writ petition.

Court's reasoning:
Section 45 enumerates the functions of the President; one of the functions is to exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all officers and servants of the municipality in matters of executive administration. The High Court after referring to these provisions observed that the chief officer being under the general control of the president in all matters of executive , administration, must have felt himself bound to grant the appellants application. The High Court referred to an earlier application for the plot made by one Karan Kanji which the chief officer had rejected. There is also a finding that by-law 4 did not permit the use of the plot for the purpose for which the appellant had applied and that the chief officer went out of his way to help his president. The High Court concluded that if the appellant had not been a councillor of the municipality and its president, his application would have met with the same fate as Karan Kanjis.The legality of the chief officers order is not however an issue in this case, and the question whether or not the intended use of the plot by the appellant was beyond the scope of by-law 4 need not detain us. According to the High Court it was only because the appellant held the office of president of the municipality that the chief officer allowed his application. This may or may not be true, but it is not a matter relevant to the real question that arises for consideration in this case. Section 38(1)(b)(i) disables a councillor from continuing as such if he "acts as a councillor" in the matter of allotment of any land to himself, there is no bar in the Act to a councillor getting a lease of the land from the municipality as would appear from section 11(3)(A)(i). It is only in a case where he acts as a councillor in getting the lease that he is disqualified. There is nothing in the record of this case to show that the appellant had acted as a councillor to have the plot allotted to himself. Even if the chief officer was influenced by the fact that the applicant before him was president of the municipality, that would not attract section 38(1)(b)(i). It is true that section 45 confers a general power of supervision and control on the president over the acts of all officers of the municipality and section 49, which enumerates the power and duties of chief officer, also makes him subject to the general control of the president in the discharge of these powers. But the general power of supervision conferred on the president does not, in our opinion, imply that in every case where he applies for a lease, which he is entitled to do as section 11(3)(A) (i) indicates, he should be deemed to have "acted" within the meaning of section 38(1)(b), otherwise, the president of a municipality under this Act, by virtue of his office would be disentitled altogether from applying for permission to use any land of the municipality. If this were the correct position then there was no point in limiting the disqualification contemplated in section 38(1) (b) (i) to cases where the councillor acts as a councillor. The words "acts as a councillor" cannot be treated as redundant. In our view the councillor acts as a councillor within the meaning of section 38(1)(b) when he performs any of the functions which under the Act he is required to perform. An allegation of misuse of his position against a councillor would not attract the disability under section 38(1) (b)(i) unless it was shown further that he has acted as a councillor in the matter. In view of the clear provision of section 38(1)(b)(i) we do not find it possible to support the impugned judgment.