Case: Laxmi Chand Vs. Indore Improvement Trust, Indore And Ors

Brief facts of Writ Petition No. 517 of 1972 may alone be sufficient. There was an earlier attempt to acquire the land of the petitioner by sanctioning a scheme in July 1961 but the same was cancelled some time in September 1962. The petitioner personally wanted to develop his land for industrial purposes and with that end in view obtained No Objection Certificates from various Government Departments as well as from the Trust. The petitioner also succeeded in converting his patta from agricultural purpose to industrial purpose subject inter alia to the limitation that the construction work on the land shall be carried out in accordance with the plans sanctioned by the same Improvement Trust (Annexure G). Later, however, the petitioner found from a letter for the Trust of October 26, 1964 that a scheme was being approved for his land and other neighbouring lands and, therefore, the Trust was unable to issue the "No Objection Certificate" for development of his land on individual basis. The Trust framed a Scheme No. 62 under Section 46 (1) of the Act and published a notice to that effect in the Gazette and in local newspapers in January 1965. The Scheme includes the land of the petitioner. The representations which the petitioner made against the Scheme were of no avail. The trust served a notice dated February 10, 1965, upon the petitioner under Section 48 (1) of the Act proposing to acquire his land for the purpose of the Scheme. The petitioner submitted his objections on April 15, 1965, stating inter alia that the land was being developed into industrial area and several small scale industries were functioning there and as such development was already in progress. It was also stated "that the land having been put to the use of industrial purposes could not be re-converted for the purposes of housing accommodation". It was further stated that the land was mortgaged to the State Bank for about Rs. 2 lakhs and the compensation that would be required to be paid by the Trust would be necessarily higher than in the case of other suitable vacant lands. The petitioner was given a hearing but ultimately the representations were rejected. The Trust duly applied to the State Government for sanction of the Scheme which was accorded on April 19, 1968, under Sec. 51 of the Act. The Trust published a notice dated July 12, 1968, under Sec. 68 (1) of the Act declaring its intention to acquire the land. The petitioner filed his objections under Section 68 (2) against the proposed acquisition of the land but these were rejected and the Trust obtained sanction of the State Government (respondent No. 2) to acquire the land under Sec. 70 of the Act. and the Notification was duly published on September 27, 1968. Thereafter the Trust published a Notification in the Government Gazette dated September 8, 1972, acquiring the said land and under Section 71 (2) of the Act the land vested absolutely with the Trust free from encumbrances from the date of the publication. Before the Trust could take possession of the petitioners land, he filed the writ application under Art. 32 of the Constitution and obtained Rule Nisi and interim stay of dispossession was granted pending disposal of the matter.

Court's reasoning:
The argument fails to take count of Section 31 which permits in terms for combining two or more schemes or supplementing some special features of a particular scheme in another scheme. In other words Sec. 31 envisages composite schemes. Section 39 which provides for a town expansion scheme authorises under sub-section (3) to indicate the method of layout as well as the purposes for which particular areas under the scheme may be utilised. This Section goes to show that there is no legal bar in framing a housing accommodation scheme with some of the features of a town expansion scheme which will even indicate the purposes for which particular areas may be utilised. There is nothing in the Act to ban industrial purposes from consideration under Section 39 (3). The fact that a scheme is described merely as housing accommodation scheme does not prevent the adaptation of the scheme to the incidental requirements which may be overlapping in another scheme. We are also not satisfied that housing accommodation scheme must necessarily be a residential scheme only and that it cannot admit of providing housing accommodation for any other purpose or object.Again it is difficult to appreciate how Section 31 prevents the Trust from framing an industrial scheme. We do not find anything in section 31 or in any of the provisions of the Act disabling the Trust from framing a scheme for industrial purposes. To mention only Section 39, it is clear that under that section a town expansion scheme may be framed even without the limits of the town and that would indicate that a town expansion scheme may envisage industrial expansion to meet the growing needs of the community. We, therefore, do not see any substance in the aforesaid three submissions on behalf of the petitioners.With regard to the fourth submission of the petitioners, it is difficult to accept the same. Section 45 requires certain matters specified in (a) to (c) therein to be considered when framing an improvement scheme. The specified matters touch on the inherent utility, efficiency and adequacy of the scheme and the objections and representations of the persons affected will be directed to negative such assumptions. The Scheme in question was open to inspection. There was no ambiguity or vagueness about the Scheme or its purposes. From even the nature of the representations and objections it is apparent that the Trust did have all relevant matters in their mind in framing the Scheme. Indeed without actually taking into consideration the various matters specified in Sec. 45 it may not be possible to frame a scheme and finally to obtain sanction of the Government in the teeth of objections and representations against the same. Where factual satisfaction is evident formal recitals being omitted may not matter. At any rate subsection (2) of Section 52 puts a final seal of imprimatur on the scheme after publication of the sanction of the Government. The submission is, therefore, devoid of merit.With regard to the fifth submission, which is actually urged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 517 of 1972, we are not satisfied that the acquisition of the land for the purpose of the present Scheme is mala fide. It is submitted that the Trust by formulating the present Scheme had an oblique motive to change the ownership of the land already under a private scheme for development to let it out to tenants who will run the existing enterprises already started on the land. We are not satisfied that any oblique motive can be attributed to the Trust in making the impugned Scheme. It is clear that the land was originally owned by the petitioner for agricultural purpose and when he obtained a patta converting it to industrial purpose, it was clearly made subject to a condition that construction work on the land shall be carried out in accordance with the plans sanctioned by the Trust. The petitioner had been given reasonable opportunity to submit representations and was given a hearing by a Committee constituted under the Act. The State Government on the application of the Trust examined the Scheme and sanctioned the acquisition of the land under Sec. 70 when it was satisfied that the acquisition was in public interest. There is no particular allegation of mala fide against the State Government whose sanction was a pre-requisite for the acquisition. The order of acquisition cannot, therefore, be characterised as mala fide and the submission fails.With regard to the sixth and last submission there was a good deal of argument at the bar. The respondents urged that this point was not specifically taken in the petitions Under Section 72 (1) of the Act where any land is acquired by the Trust it shall pay for such acquisition "compensation the amount of which shall be determined in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained." Under Section 73 a Tribunal is constituted for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Section 77 provides for matters to be considered for determining compensation, namely, "firstly, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 68" and six other factors. It is also provided in the same section that the Tribunal shall not take into consideration certain factors mentioned under eight heads. Under sub-section (2) of Section 77 "in addition to the market value of the land as above provided the Tribunal, shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market-value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition." There being no provision for payment of interest from the date of compulsory acquisition of the land up to the date of payment, acquisition, it is submitted, is invalid in law.The petitioners, however, have an indirect object. They are not interested in the interest as such but want the land back and will not be satisfied unless the order of acquisition is quashed. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible for this Court to quash the acquisition in these cases in absence of a challenge of the vires of the provisions of the Act. Presumption of constitutionality will forbid casting an evil eye on the Act in absence of a clear challenge. The Act must be assumed to be valid for the purpose of these petitions and we will proceed on that basis. Then law being valid the attack will reverberate upon the quantum of compensation, pure and simple. It is sufficient to point out that the quantum of compensation which may be determined according to the provisions of the Act for acquisition of the land cannot be challenged under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. In that view of the matter this submission of the learned counsel also fails.n Writ Petition No. 240 of 1973., Mr. Patel additionally urged that publication of the notice of the Scheme was not made in accordance with Section 46 (2) of the Act which requires weekly publication in the Gazette for three consecutive weeks.Apart from the fact in this case, that the petitioner was well aware of the Scheme and submitted objections and representations, Section 52 (2) appears to be conclusive on the question. That sub-section provides that the publication of notification by the State Government sanctioning the scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned. In view of this, ticklish skirmishes over publication on technical grounds at a distant date are completely out of place. The submission is devoid of merit.from the fact in this case, that the petitioner was well aware of the Scheme and submitted objections and representations, Section 52 (2) appears to be conclusive on the question. Thatprovides that the publication of notification by the State Government sanctioning the scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned. In view of this, ticklish skirmishes over publication on technical grounds at a distant date are completely out of place. The submission is devoid of merit.