Case: Indian Rayon Corpn. Ltd Vs. Raunaq &amp; Company Pvt. Ltd

On 10th January, 1978 the respondents advocate-on-record took out a Masters Summons and used the aforesaid affidavit as the ground for the prayers which were made in the summons. On 1st February, 1978 M/s. Khaitan &Company, solicitors, on behalf of the appellant, filed a Vakalatnama and a requisition in the department of the High Court for searching the records in this case. On 2nd February, 1978, M/s. Khaitan &Co. searched the records of the High Court of Calcutta. On 4th February, 1978, the appellant filed an affidavit stating that the award had been wrongly filed in the High Court of Calcutta and it should be taken off the3rd May, 1978 an order was passed as prayed in the affidavit an d the Masters Summons, and on 30th July, 1981, a notice under Section l4(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called `the Act) was served on the appellant. Section 14(2) of the Act enjoins the arbitrator or the umpire to give notice to the parties of filing of the award in order to facilitate the passing of the order thereon.On 18th August, 1981, the appellant applied for a certified copy of the award and the application for setting aside the award under Section 30 of the Act, was filed on 8th September, 1981. Under clause (b) of Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the time for setting aside an award or getting an award remitted for reconsideration is 30 days from the date of the service of the notice of the filing of the award. Hence, there must be filing of the award in Court. A notice must be given to the party/parties concerned of such filing of the award in the Court and on the expiry of 30 days from the service of the said notice limitation for setting aside an award expires. In this case, it appears that the appellant applied for a certified copy of the award on 18th August, 1981 and on 1st September, 1981, the appellant received the certified copy from the Court. The application under Section 30 of the Act, for setting aside the award was made on 8th September, 1981. Hence, if the date of service of the notice of the filing of award be 30th July, 1981, then in the events that have happened as narrated above, indisputably the application was within time. If, however, the notice is attributed to have been served prior to that date then the application was barred by lapse of time. The High Court held that the notice in this case was served prior to 30th July,appears as mentioned before that on 4th February, 1978 an affidavit had been filed in the High Court, stating on behalf of the appellant that the award had been wrongly filed in that Court. The appellant has, therefore, acknowledged that the award had been filed and a notice was issued to it in respect of the said award. In our opinion, this conclusion irresistibly follows from the narration of events mentioned hereinbefore. In order to be effective both for the purpose of obtaining the judgment in terms of the award and for setting aside the award, the award must be filed in the Court. There must be service of notice or intimation or communication of the filing of the said award by the Court to the parties. If all these factors are established or are present, the mode of service of the notice would be irrelevant. If the substance is clear, the form of the notice is irrelevant but the notice of the award having been filed in the court, is necessary. The filing in the Court is necessary and the intimation thereof by the Registry of the Court to the parties concerned, is essential. Beyond this there is no statutory requirement of any technical nature under Section 14(2) of the Act.This conclusion, in our opinion, irresistibly follows from the principles enunciated by this Court in Nilkantha Shidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Sommanna Ningashetti &Ors., [1962] 2 SCR 551  where this Court held that the communication by the Court to the parties concerned or their counsel, of the information that an award has been filed was sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. In the aforesaid decision this Court reiterated that the notice need not necessarily mean "communication in writing". The expression "give notice" in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award. Such intimation need not be given in writing and could be communicated orally or otherwise. That would amount to service of the notice when no particular mode was specified.

Court's reasoning:
We reiterate again that there must be (a) filing of the award in the proper court; (b) service of the notice by the court or its officer to the parties concerned; and (c) such notice need not necessarily be in writing. It is upon the date of service of such notice that the period of limitation begins and as at present under clause (b) of Article 119 of the Act, the limitation expires on the expiry of the thirty days of the service of that notice for an application for setting aside of the award. The importance of the matter, which need be emphasised, is the service of the notice by the Court. It is not the method of the service that is important or relevant. In this case as both the Courts have, in fact, found that the notice was issued and served and, in our opinion, that finding is based on cogent material and relevant evidence, prior to 30th July, 1981, the application made in this case was clearly barred by lapse of time.We find, therefore, no ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court.