Case: D. C. Roy Vs. The Presiding Officer, Madhya Pradesh Industrial Court,Indo

The appellant was working as a Ticket Examiner in the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation at its Nagpur Depot. On March 21, 1964 a bus belonging to the Corporation was checked by the Flying Squad when nine and half passengers out of 26 were found traveling without tickets. The appellant was on the bus in the discharge of his duties as a Ticket Examiner. The Flying Squad prepared a Panchnama on the spot obtaining thereon the signatures of the appellant, the driver and the ticked conductor. It was found that the conductor had collected the fare from all the 26 passengers who were travelling in the bus but had not issued tickets to 9 1/2 passengers. Since it was the duty of the appellant as a Ticket Examiner to check whether the conductor had collected fare from all the passengers and in token thereof had issued tickets to them, a charge sheet was served on the appellant for breach of clauses 12(b) and (d) of the Madhya Pradesh Standard Standing Orders which govern the matter by reason of Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963. A Domestic inquiry was thereafter held into the charges and the appellant having been found guilty the Corporation, through its Depot Manager, dismissed him by an order dated August 14,December 9, 1964 the appellant filed an application in the Labour Court, Jabalpur, under section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act challenging the validity of the inquiry on various grounds and praying that the order of dismissal be set aside an d that an order of reinstatement be passed with back wages. By a preliminary order dated December 7, 1966 the Labour Court held that the Domestic tribunal did not hold a proper inquiry into the charges leveled against the appellant but that it w as open to the parties to lead evidence before it on the merits of the case and to satisfy it whether the appellant was guilty of the charges and further whether the conduct of the appellant was such as to call for an order of dismissal. Parties thereafter led evidence before the Labour Court, on a consideration of which it held by an order dated August 18, 1967 that the appellant was guilty of the charges leveled against him and that in the circumstances of the case the punishment of dismissal was neither harsh nor unjust.Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Labour Court the appellant preferred a revision application to the Industrial Court, Indore, under section 66 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relation s Act. The Industrial Court confirmed the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and upheld the order of dismissal. As regards back wages, the Industrial Court held that the order of the Labour Court dated August 18, 1967 would relate back t o the date when the appellant was dismissed by the Corporation and therefore the appellant was not entitled to back wages till the date when the Labour Court passed its finalappellant thereafter filed a petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Industrial Court. The High Court by its order dated March 6, 1968 dismissed the petition in limine, though with a speaking order. It held that the omission of the appellant to check ticket less travelers in the bus which he had boarded as a Ticket Examiner amounted to major misconduct under Standing Order 12(b). The High Court further held that no interference was called for on the question whether the order of dismissal was justified and since the order of the Labour Court related back to the date when the order of dismissal was passed by the Corporation, the appellant was not entitled to wages until the date on which the Labour Court passed the judgment. The appellant has filed this appeal in forma pauperis by special leave of this Court.

Court's reasoning:
Counsel for the appellant also relied on the decision of this Court in M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan &Ors.(1) but that case is clearly distinguishable. As pointed out by this Court in P. H. Kalyanis case, Sasa Musa was a case where an application had been made under section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act for permission to dismiss the employees and such permission was asked for, though no inquiry whatsoever was held by the employer and no decision was taken that the employees be dismissed. The case for dismissal of the employees was made out for the first time in the proceedings under section 33(1) and it was for that reason that it was held that the employees were entitled to back wages until the decision of the application filed under section 33. Commenting on the decision in Sasa Musa, this Court observed in P. H. Kalyanis case that the matter would have been different if in Sasa Musa, an inquiry had been held, the employer had come to the conclusion that the dismissal was the proper punishment and had then applied under section 33(1) for permission to dismiss the employees. "In those circumstances the permission would have related back to the date when the employer came to the conclusion after an inquiry that dismissal was the proper punishment and had applied for removal of the ban by an application under section 33(1)." (page 113).The second contention must also therefore fail. We would, however, like to add that the decision in P. H. Kalyanis case is not to be construed as a charter for employers to dismiss employees after the pretence of an inquiry. The inquiry in the instant case does not suffer from defects so serious or fundamental as to make it non-est. On appropriate occasion, it may become necessary to carve an exception to the ratio of Kalyanis case so as to exclude from its operation at least that class of cases in which under the facade of a domestic inquiry, the employer passes an order gravely detrimental to the employees interest like an order of dismissal. An inquiry blatantly and consciously violating principles of natural justice may well be equated with the total absence of an inquiry so as to exclude the application of the relation-back doctrine. But we will not pursue the point beyond this as the facts before us do not warrant a closer consideration thereof.