Case: Competition Commission Of India Vs. Steel Authority Of India

5. Jindal Steel & Powers Ltd. (for short theinvoked the provisions of Section 19 read with Section 26(1) of the Act by providing information to the Commission alleging that M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (for shorthad, inter alia, entered into an exclusive supply agreement with Indian Railways for supply of rails. The SAIL, thus, was alleged to have abused its dominant position in the market and deprived others of fair competition and therefore, acted contrary to Section 3(4) (Anti-competitive Agreements) and Section 4(1) (Abuse of dominant position) of the Act. This information was registered by the Commission and was considered in its meeting held on 27th October, 2008 on which date the matter was deferred at the request of the informant for furnishing additional information. During the course of hearing, it was also brought to the notice of the Commission that a petition being Writ Petition (C) No. 8531 of 2009, filed by the informant against the Ministry of Railways, was also pending in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.6. Videorder dated 10th November, 2009 the Commission directed the informant to file an affidavit with respect to the information furnished by it. The Commission also directed SAIL to submit its comments in respect of the information received by the Commission within two weeks from the date of the said meeting and the matter was adjourned till 8th December, 2009. On 19th November, 2009 a notice was issued to SAIL enclosing all information submitted by the informant. When the matter was taken up for consideration by the Commission on 8th December, 2009, the Commission took on record the affidavit filed by the informant on 30th November, 2009 in terms of the earlier order of the Commission, but SAIL requested extension of six weeks time to file its comments.7. Finding no justification in the request of the SAIL, the Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, declined the prayer for extension of time. In this order, it also formed the opinion that prima facie case existed against SAIL, and resultantly, directed the Director General, appointed under Section 16(1) of the Act, to make investigation into the matter in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act. It also granted liberty to SAIL to file its views and comments before the Director General during the course of investigation. Despite these orders, SAIL filed an interim reply before the Commission along with an application that it may be heard before any interim order is passed by the Commission in the proceedings. On 22nd December, 2009 the Commission only reiterated its earlier directions made to the Director General for investigation and granted liberty to SAIL to file its reply before the Director General. The correctness of the directions contained in the order dated 8th December, 2009 was challenged by SAIL before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (for short, theThe Commission filed an application on 28th January, 2010 before the Tribunal seeking impleadment in the appeal filed by SAIL. It also filed an application for vacation of interim orders which had been issued by the Tribunal on 11th January, 2010, staying further proceedings before the Director General in furtherance of the directions of the Commission dated 8th December, 2009. It will be useful to refer to the order passed by the Commission on 8th December, 2009 at this stage itself which reads asThe meeting was held under the chairmanship of Sh. H.C. Gupta, Member.(2) The case was earlier considered by the Commission in its meetings held on 4.11.2009 and 10.11.2009. In the meeting of the Commission held on 10.11.2009, Mr. Suman Kr. Dey, VP and Head, Legal and Mrs. Pallavi Shroff, Advocate (along with their fellow Advocates) appeared before the Commission on behalf of the informant and made detailed admissions. As per decision taken during the meeting held on 10.11.2009, informant/his Counsel was directed to file an affidavit regarding the current status of the writ petition filed in the Delhi high Court, particular indicating its admission or otherwise and as to whether any other order has been passed by theHigh Court, in the matter so far. SAIL was also requested to furnish their views/comments in the matter within 2time.(3) In the meeting of the Commission held on 8.12.2009, the Commission took on record the affidavit filed by the informant on 30.11.2009 regarding the current status of the writ petition filed in the Delhi High Court and certified copies of all the orders passed by theHigh Court, in the matter, till date. However, SAIL did not file its reply within the stipulated time and requested to allow extension of time from 3.12.2009 for a further period of six weeks. The Commission considered the above request of SAIL. However, the Commission did not allow any further extension.(4) The case was discussed in detail. After considering the details filed by the informant with the information and the entire relevant material/record available in this context as well as detailed submission made by the advocates of the informant before the Commission on 10.11.2009. Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case. Therefore, the Commission decided that the case be referred to Director General for investigation in the matter.(5) Secretary was accordingly directed to refer the case to DG for investigation and submission of the report within 45 days of the receipt of orders of the Commission. SAIL informed that they may furnish their views/comments in the matter to thealready noticed, the legality of this order was questioned before the Tribunal by SAIL on one hand, while, on the other hand the Commission had pressed its application for impleadment. In the application for impleadment it was averred by the Commission that it is a necessary and proper party for adjudication of the matter before the Tribunal and therefore, it should be impleaded as a party and be heard in accordance with law. Emphasis was also placed on Section 18 of the Act to contend that powers, functions and duties of the Commission were such that it would always be appropriate for the Commission to be impleaded as a party in appeals filed before the Tribunal. It was also averred in the application that intervention of the Commission at the appellate proceedings would not prejudice anybody. The very maintainability of the appeal before the Tribunal was also questioned by the Commission on the ground that the order under appeal before the Tribunal was a direction simplicitor to conduct investigation and thus was not an order appealable within the meaning of Section 53A of the Act. The Tribunal in its order dated 15th February, 2010, inter alia, but significantly held as under:(a) The application of the Commission for impleadment was dismissed, as in the opinion of the Tribunal the Commission was neither a necessary nor a proper party in the appellate proceedings before the Tribunal. Resultantly, the application for vacation of stay also came to be dismissed.(b) It was held that giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review. Thus, the Commission is directed to give reasons while passing any order, direction or taking any decision.(c) The appeal against the order dated 8th December, 2009 was held to be maintainable in terms of Section 53A of the Act. While setting aside the said order of the Commission and recording a finding that there was violation of principles of natural justice, the Tribunal granted further time to SAIL to file reply by 22nd February, 2010 in addition to the reply already filed by SAIL.This order of the Tribunal dated 15th February, 2010 is impugned in the present appeal.

Court's reasoning:
Applying these principles to the provisions of Section 53A(1)(a), we are of the considered view that the appropriate interpretation of this provision would be that no other direction, decision or order of the Commission is appealable except those expressly stated in Section 53A(1)(a). The maxim est boni judicis ampliare justiciam, nonjurisdictionem finds application here. Right to appeal, being a statutory right, is controlled strictly by the provision and the procedure prescribing such a right. To read into the language of Section 53A that every direction, order or decision of the Commission would be appealable will amount to unreasonable expansion of the provision, when the language of Section 53A is clear and unambiguous. Section 53B(1) itself is an indicator of the restricted scope of appeals that shall be maintainable before the Tribunal; it provides that the aggrieved party has a right of appeal against ‘any direction, decision or order referred to in SectionIf the Legislature intended to enlarge the scope and make orders, other than those, specified in Section 53A(1)(a), then the language of Section 53B(1) ought to have been quite distinct from the one used by the Legislature.33. One of the parties before the Commission would, in any case, be aggrieved by an order where the Commission grants or declines to grant extension of time. Thus, every such order passed by the Commission would have to be treated as appealable as per the contention raised by the respondent before us as well as the view taken by the Tribunal. In our view, such orders cannot be held to be appealable within the meaning and language of Section 53A of the Act and also on the principle that they are not orders which determine the rights of the parties. No appeal can lie against such an order. Still the parties are not remediless as, when they prefer an appeal against the final order, they can always take up grounds to challenge the interim orders/directions passed by the Commission in the memorandum of appeal. Such an approach would be in consonance with the procedural law prescribed in Order 43 Rule 1A and even other provisions of Code of Civil Procedure.34. The above approach will subserve the purpose of the Act in the following manner:First, expeditious disposal of matters before the Commission and the Tribunal is an apparent legislative intent from the bare reading of the provisions of the Act and more particularly the Regulations framed thereunder. Second, if every direction or recording of an opinion are made appealable then certainly it would amount to abuse of the process of appeal. Besides this, burdening the Tribunal with appeals againstorders would defeat the object of the Act, as a prolonged litigation may harm the interest of free and fair market and economy. Finally, we see no ambiguity in the language of the provision, but even if, for the sake of argument, we assume that the provision is capable of two interpretations then we must accept the one which will fall in line with the legislative intent rather than the one which defeat the object of the Act.For these reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that no appeal will lie from any decision, order or direction of the Commission which is not made specifically appealable under Section 53A(1)(a) of the Act. Thus, the appeal preferred by SAIL ought to have been dismissed by the Tribunal as not maintainable.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point Nos. 2 & 535. The issue of notice and hearing are squarely covered under the ambit of the principles of natural justice. Thus, it will not be inappropriate to discuss these issues commonly under the same head. The principle of audi alteram partem, as commonly understood, means ‘hear the other side or hear both sides before a decision is arrivedIt is founded on the rule that no one should be condemned or deprived of his right even in quasi judicial proceedings unless he has been granted liberty of beingwe can classify compliance or otherwise, of these principles mainly under three categories. First, where application of principles of natural justice is excluded by specific legislation; second, where the law contemplates strict compliance to the provisions of principles of natural justice and default in compliance thereto can result in vitiating not only the orders but even the proceedings taken against the delinquent; and third, where the law requires compliance to these principles of natural justice, but an irresistible conclusion is drawn by the competent Court or forum that no prejudice has been caused to the delinquent and theis with regard to an action of directory nature. The cases may fall in any of these categories and therefore, the Court has to examine the facts of each case in light of the Act or the Rules and Regulations in force in relation to such a case. It is not only difficult but also not advisable to spell out any straight jacket formula which can be applied universally to all cases without variation.37. In light of the above principles, let us examine whether in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act read with Regulations in force, it is obligatory upon the Commission to issue notice to the parties concerned (more particularly the affected parties) and then form an opinion as to the existence of a prima facie case, or otherwise, and to issue direction to the Director General to conduct investigation in the matter.38. At the very outset, we must make it clear that we are considering the application of these principles only in light of the provisions of Section 26(1) and the finding recorded by the Tribunal in this regard. The intimation received by the Commission from any specific person complaining of violation of Section 3(4) read with Section 19 of the Act, sets into the motion, the mechanism stated under Section 26 of the Act. Section 26(1), as already noticed, requires the Commission to form an opinion whether or not there exists a prima facie case for issuance of direction to the Director General to conduct an investigation. This section does not mention about issuance of any notice to any party before or at the time of formation of an opinion by the Commission on the basis of a reference or information received by it. Language of Sections 3(4) and 19 and for that matter, any other provision of the Act does not suggest that notice to the informant or any other person is required to be issued at this stage. Into this, when the Commission receives the report from the Director General and if it has not already taken a decision to close the case under Section 26(2), the Commission is not only expected to forward the copy of the report, issue notice, invite objections or suggestions from the informant, Central Government, State Government, Statutory Authorities or the parties concerned, but also to provide an opportunity of hearing to the parties before arriving at any final conclusion under Sections 26(7) or 26(8) of the Act, as the case may be. This obviously means that wherever the Legislature has intended that notice is to be served upon the other party, it has specifically so stated and we see no compelling reason to read into the provisions of Section 26(1) the requirement of notice, when it is conspicuous by its very absence. Once the proceedings before the Commission are completed, the parties have a right to appeal under Section 53A(1)(a) in regard to the orders termed as appealable under that provision. Section 53B requires that the Tribunal should give, parties to the appeal, notice and an opportunity of being heard before passing orders, as it may deem fit and proper, confirming, modifying or setting aside the direction, decision or order appealed against.With some significance, we may also notice the provision of Regulation 33(4) of the Regulations, which requires that on being satisfied that the reference is complete, the Secretary shall place it during an ordinary meeting of the Commission and seek necessary instructions regarding the parties to whom the notice of the meeting has to be issued. This provision read with Sections 26(1) and 26(5) shows that the Commission is expected to apply its mind as to whom the notice should be sent before the Secretary of the Commission can send notice to the parties concerned. In other words, issuance of notice is not an automatic or obvious consequence, but it is only upon application of mind by the authorities concerned that notice is expected to bejurisdiction of the Commission, to act under this provision, does not contemplate any adjudicatory function. The Commission is not expected to give notice to the parties, i.e. the informant or the affected parties and hear them at length, before forming its opinion. The function is of a very preliminary nature and in fact, in common parlance, it is a departmental function. At that stage, it does not condemn any person and therefore, application of audi alteram partem is not called for. Formation of a prima facie opinion departmentally (Director General, being appointed by the Central Government to assist the Commission, is one of the wings of the Commission itself) does not amount to an adjudicatory function but is merely of administrative nature. At best, it can direct the investigation to be conducted and report to be submitted to the Commission itself or close the case in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act, which order itself is appealable before the Tribunal and only after this stage, there is a specific right of notice and hearing available to the aggrieved/affected party. Thus, keeping in mind the nature of the functions required to be performed by the Commission in terms of Section 26(1), we are of the considered view that the right of notice of hearing is not contemplated under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act. However, Regulation 17(2) gives right to Commission for seeking information, or in other words, the Commission is vested with the power of inviting such persons, as it may deem necessary, to render required assistance or produce requisite information or documents as per the direction of the Commission. This discretion is exclusively vested in the Commission by the Legislature. The investigation is directed with dual purpose; (a) to collect material and verify the information, as may be, directed by the Commission, (b) to enable the Commission to examine the report upon its submission by the Director General and to pass appropriate orders after hearing the parties concerned. No inquiry commences prior to the direction issued to the Director General for conducting the investigation. Therefore, even from the practical point of view, it will be required that undue time is not spent at the preliminary stage of formation of prima facie opinion and the matters are dealt with effectively and expeditiously. We may also usefully note that the functions performed by the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act are in the nature of preparatory measures in contrast to the decision making process. That is the precise reason that the Legislature has used the wordto be issued to the Director General for investigation in that provision and not that the Commission shall take a decision or pass an order directing inquiry into the allegations made in the reference to the Commission.50. The Tribunal, in the impugned judgment, has taken the view that there is a requirement to record reasons which can be express, or, in any case, followed by necessary implication and therefore, the authority is required to record reasons for coming to the conclusion. The proposition of law whether an administrative or quasi judicial body, particularly judicial Courts, should record reasons in support of their decisions or orders is no more res integra and has been settled by a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner, C.T.D.W.C. v. M/s. Shukla & Brothers, III (2010) SLT 565=II (2010) CLT 204 (SC)=JT 2010 (4) SC 35, wherein this Court was primarily concerned with the High Court dismissing the appeals without recording any reasons. The Court also examined the practice and requirement of providing reasons for conclusions, orders and directions given by the51. In this very judgment, the Court while referring to other decisions of the Court held that it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the affected persons and record explicit reasons in support of the order made by them. Even in cases of supersession, it was held in Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, (1979) 2 SCC 368  that reasons for supersession should be essentially provided in the order of the authority. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. By practice adopted in all Courts and by virtue oflaw, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of law and in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and, therefore, proper reasoning is foundation of a just and fair decision. Reference can be made to Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, 1974 ICR 120 in this regard.52. The above reasoning and the principles enunciated, which are consistent with the settled canons of law, we would adopt even in this case. In the backdrop of these determinants, we may refer to the provisions of the Act. Section 26, under its differentrequires the Commission to issue various directions, take decisions and pass orders, some of which are even appealable before the Tribunal. Even if it is a direction under any of the provisions and not a decision, conclusion or order passed on merits by the Commission, it is expected that the same would be supported by some reasoning. At the stage of forming a prima facie view, as required under Section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission may not really record detailed reasons, but must express its mind in no uncertain terms that it is of the view that prima facie case exists, requiring issuance of direction for investigation to the Director General. Such view should be recorded with reference to the information furnished to the Commission. Such opinion should be formed on the basis of the records, including the information furnished and reference made to the Commission under the various provisions of the Act, asHowever, other decisions and orders, which are not directions simpliciter and determining the rights of the parties, should be well reasoned analyzing and deciding the rival contentions raised before the Commission by the parties. In other words, the Commission is expected to express prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, without entering into any adjudicatory or determinative process and by recording minimum reasons substantiating the formation of such opinion, while all its other orders and decisions should be well reasoned.53. Such an approach can also be justified with reference to Regulation 20(4), which requires the Director General to record, in his report, findings on each of the allegations made by a party in the intimation or reference submitted to the Commission and sent for investigation to the Director General, as the case may be, together with all evidence and documents collected during investigation. The inevitable consequence is that the Commission is similarly expected to write appropriate reasons on every issue while passing an order under Sections 26 to 28 of the Act.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point No. 354. The concept of necessary and proper parties is an accepted norm of civil law and its principles can safely be applied to the proceedings before the Tribunal to a limited extent. Even some provisions of the Act and the Regulations would guide the discussion in this behalf. In terms of Section 7(2) of the Act the Commission is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to sue and be sued in its name. In terms of Section 53A, the Tribunal is constituted to hear and dispose of appeals against any direction issued, decision made or order passed under the provisions stated therein. The Tribunal is also vested with the power of determining the claim of compensation that may arise from the findings recorded by the Commission. As already noticed, the procedure for entertaining the appeals is specified under Section 53B of the Act.55. The right to prefer an appeal is available to the Central Government, State Government or a local authority or enterprise or any person aggrieved by any direction, decision or order referred to in Clause (a) of Section 53A (ought to be printed as 53A(1)(a)). The appeal is to be filed within the period specified and Section 53B(3) further requires that the Tribunal, after giving the parties to appeal an opportunity of being heard, to pass such orders, as it thinks fit, and send a copy of such order to the Commission and the parties to the appeal. Section 53S contemplates that before the Tribunal a person may either appear ‘inor authorize one or more chartered accountants or company secretaries, cost accountants or legal practitioners or any of its officers to present its case before the Tribunal. However, theright to legal representation in any appeal before the Tribunal has been specifically mentioned under Section 53S(3). It provides that the Commission may authorize one or more of chartered accountants or company secretaries or cost accountants or legal practitioners or any of its officers to act as presenting officers before the Tribunal.56. Section 53T grants a right in specific terms to the Commission to prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal to them. The expression ‘anyappearing in Section 53B has to be construed liberally as the provision first mentions specific Government bodies then local authorities and enterprises, which term, in any case, is of generic nature and then lastly mentions ‘anyObviously, it is intended that expanded meaning be given to the termi.e., persons or bodies who are entitled to appeal. The right of hearing is also available to the parties to appeal. The above stated provisions clearly indicate that the Commission a body corporate, is expected to be party in the proceedings before the Tribunal as it has a legal right of representation. Absence of the Commission before the Tribunal will deprive it of presenting its views in the proceedings. Thus, it may not be able to effectively exercise its right to appeal in terms of Section 53 of the Act. Furthermore, Regulations 14(4) and 51 support the view that the Commission can be a necessary or a proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The Commission, in terms of Section 19 read with Section 26 of the Act, is entitled to commence proceedings suo moto and adopt its own procedure for completion of such proceedings. Thus, the principle of fairness would demand that such party should be heard by the Tribunal before any orders adverse to it are passed in such cases. The Tribunal has taken this view and we have no hesitation in accepting that in cases where proceedings initiated suo motu by the Commission, the Commission is a necessary party. However, we are also of the view that in other cases the Commission would be a proper party. It would not only help in expeditious disposal, but the Commission, as an expert body, in any case, is entitled to participate in its proceedings in terms of Regulation 51. Thus, the assistance rendered by the Commission to the Tribunal could be useful in complete and effective adjudication of the issue before it. Regulations 24 to 26 define powers of the Commission to join or substitute parties in proceedings, permit person or enterprises to take part in proceedings and strike out unnecessary parties. Out of these provisions regulation 25(1) has a distinct feature as it lays down the criteria which should be considered by the Commission while applying its mind in regard to application of a party for impleadment. The person or enterprise sought to be impleaded should have substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings and/or that it is necessary in the public interest to allow such an application. In other words, substantial interest in proceedings and serving of larger public interest, amongst others, are the criteria which could be considered by the Commission. This principle would obviously stand extended for exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal. In our view, the Commission would have substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings in most of the cases as not only would the judgments of the Tribunal be binding on it, but they would also provide guidelines for determining various matters of larger public interest and affect the economic policy of the country.57. In light of the above statutory provisions, let us examine the scheme under the general principles as well. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure control the parties to the proceedings and their addition or deletion thereof. Wide discretion is vested in the Court/appropriate forum in regard to impleadment of necessary and proper parties to the proceedings. Of course, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with provisions of law and the principles enunciated by various judicial pronouncements. The consideration before the Court, while determining such a question, is whether the said party is a necessary or a proper party and its presence before the Court is essential for complete and effective adjudication of the subject matter, inter alia, it should also be kept in mind that multiplicity of litigation is to be avoided and that the necessary or proper party should not be left out from the proceedings, particularly, before the tribunal or theway to examine the matter is that if the proceedings cannot be concluded completely and effectively in absence of a party, that party should be normally impleaded as a party before the Court, of course, subject to other restrictions in law. Whileof necessary parties may prove fatal, theof proper parties may not be fatal to the proceedings, but would certainly adversely affect interest of justice and complete adjudication of the proceedings before the appropriate forum.58. As a normal rule, the applicant/informant is dominus litis and has the right to control the proceedings, but at the same time, such applicant is required to notify all other parties against whom the applicant wishes to proceed. Even if an applicant fails to join a party the Court has the discretion to direct joining of such party as the question of impleadment has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that a necessary or proper party may be added [Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 ].59. In the proceedings, which are initiated by the Commission suo motu, it shall be dominus litis of such proceedings while in other cases, the Commission being a regulatory body would be a proper party discharging inquisitorial, regulatory as well as adjudicatory functions and its presence before the Tribunal, particularly, in light of the above stated provisions, would be proper. The purpose is always to achieve complete, expeditious and effective adjudication. This Court in the case of Brahm Dutt v. Union of India, I (2005) SLT 633=117 (2005) DLT 1 (SC)=(2005) 2 SCC 431 , while considering the constitutional validity of Section 8 of the Act observed that the Commission is an expert body which had been created in consonance with international practice. The Court observed that it might be appropriate if two bodies are created for performing two kinds of functions, one, advisory and regulatory and other adjudicatory. Though the Tribunal has been constituted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, the Commission continues to perform both the functions stated by this Court in that case. Cumulative effect of the above reasoning is that the Commission would be a necessary and/or a proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point No.In the case in hand, the provisions of Section 33 are specific and certain criteria have been specified therein, which need to be satisfied by the Commission, before it passes an ex parte ad interim order. These three ingredients we have already spelt out above and at the cost of repetition we may notice that there has to be application of mind of higher degree and definite reasons having nexus to the necessity for passing such an order need be stated. Further, it is required that the case of theshould also be stronger than a mere prima facie case. Once these ingredients are satisfied and where the Commission deems it necessary, it can pass such an order without giving notice to the other party. The scope of this power is limited and is expected to be exercised in appropriate circumstances. These provisions can hardly be invoked in each and every case except in a reasoned manner. Wherever, the applicant is able to satisfy the Commission that from the information received and the documents in support thereof, or even from the report submitted by the Director General, a strong case is made out of contravention of the specified provisions relating toagreement or an abuse of dominant position and it is in the interest of free market and trade that injunctive orders are called for, the Commission, in its discretion, may pass such order ex parte or even after issuing notice to the other side.66. For these reasons, we may conclude that the Commission can pass ex parte ad interim restraint orders in terms of Section 33, only after having applied its mind as to the existence of a prima facie case and issue direction to the Director General for conducting an investigation in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act. It has the power to pass ad interim ex parte injunction orders, but only upon recording its due satisfaction as well as its view that the Commission deemed it necessary not to give a notice to the other side. In all cases where ad interim ex parte injunction is issued, the Commission must ensure that it makes the notice returnable within a very short duration so that there is no abuse of the process of law and the very purpose of the Act is not defeated.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point No. 667. In light of the above discussion, the next question that we are required to consider is, whether the Court should issue certain directions while keeping in mind the scheme of the Act, legislative intent and the object sought to be achieved by enforcement of these provisions. We have already noticed that the principal objects of the Act, in terms of its Preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons, are to eliminate practices having adverse effect on the competition, to promote and sustain competition in the market, to protect the interest of the consumers and ensure freedom of trade carried on by the participants in the market, in view of the economic developments in the country. In other words, the Act requires not only protection of free trade but also protection of consumer interest. The delay in disposal of cases, as well as undue continuation of interim restraint orders, can adversely and prejudicially affect the free economy of the country. Efforts to liberalize the Indian Economy to bring it at par with the best of the economies in this era of globalization would be jeopardised ifschedule and, in any case, expeditious disposal by the Commission is not adhered to. The scheme of various provisions of the Act which we have already referred to including Sections 26, 29, 30, 31, 53B(5) and 53T and Regulations 12, 15, 16, 22, 32, 48 and 31 clearly show the legislative intent to ensure time bound disposal of such matters.68. The Commission performs various functions including regulatory, inquisitorial and adjudicatory. The powers conferred by the Legislature upon the Commission under Sections 27(d) and 31(3) are of wide magnitude and of serious ramifications. The Commission has the jurisdiction even to direct that an agreement entered into between the parties shall stand modified to the extent and in the manner, as may be specified. Similarly, where it is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification to such combination, the Commission is empowered to direct such modification. These powers of the Commission, read with provisions mentioned earlier, certainly require issuance of certain directions in order to achieve the object of the Act and to ensure its proper implementation. The power to restructure the agreement can be brought into service and matters dealt with expeditiously, rather than passing of ad interim orders in relation to such agreements, which may continue for indefinite periods. To avoid this mischief, it is necessary that wherever the Commission exercises its jurisdiction to pass ad interim restraint orders, it must do so by issuing notices for a short date and deal with such applications expeditiously. Order 39 Rules 3 and 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure also have similar provisions. Certain procedural directions will help in avoiding prejudicial consequences, against any of the parties to the proceedings and the possibility of abuse of jurisdiction by the parties can be eliminated by proper exercise of discretion and for valid reasons. Courts have been issuing directions in appropriate cases and wherever the situation has demanded so. Administration of justice does not depend on individuals, but it has to be a collective effort at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of the Courts or the fora before whom the matters are sub judice, so that the persons awaiting justice can receive the same in a most expeditious and effective manner. The approach of the Commission even in its procedural matters, therefore, should be macro level rather than micro level. It must deal with all such references or applications expeditiously in accordance with law and by giving appropriate reasons. Thus, we find it necessary to issue some directions which shall remain in force till appropriate regulations in that regard are framed by the competent authority.Findings on Merits:69. Having examined various legal issues arising in the present case, we will now revert back to the facts of the case in hand. It is clear that Jindal Steel, the informant, had made a reference to the Commission. The Commission had initiated proceedings and asked for further information from the informant and thereafter, had even issued notice calling upon SAIL to submit its views and comments. From the record it is clear that parties had appeared before the Commission. The SAIL had failed to file the reply and prayed for extension of time, which was declined by the Commission in its order dated 8th December, 2009. The Director General was asked to conduct the investigation, but liberty was granted to SAIL to file its views and comments during the pendency of the investigation. Since further time was declined, SAIL preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, which resulted in passing of the order impugned in the present appeal. We are unable to accede to the submission that the Commission is not a necessary or proper party before the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Regulations and even the interest of justice demands that for complete and effective adjudication the Commission be added as a necessary and proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The direction issued by the Commission was set aside by the Tribunal and further time was granted to SAIL to file its further reply in addition to what has been filed on 15th December, 2009 and the Tribunal then directed the Commission to consider all such material and record a fresh decision. We have held that there is no statutory obligation on the Commission to issue notice for grant of hearing to the parties at the stage of forming an opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act unless, upon due application of mind, it finds it necessary to invite parties or experts to render assistance to and produce documents before the Commission at that stage. We are also unable to agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the inquiry commences as soon as the aspects highlighted in(1) to Section 19 are fulfilled and brought to the notice of the Commission. It is obvious that Regulation 18(2) was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal which resulted in error of law, particularly, when examined in the light of other provisions and scheme of the Act as well. The Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, had, for reasons stated therein, declined the extension of time to SAIL. This order of the Commission cannot be stated to be without jurisdiction or suffering from any apparent error of law. However, the Tribunal, in exercise of its judicial discretion, had interfered with the said order and granted further time to SAIL unconditionally. We do not propose to interfere in the exercise of the discretion by the Tribunal except to the extent of imposition of cost. We, therefore direct that SAIL should pay cost of Rs. 25,000/to the informant for seeking extension of time. The cost shall be conditional, whereafter, the additional reply filed by SAIL would be taken on record and the Commission shall apply its mind to form a prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, if the report of the Director General has not been received as yet. In the event the report prepared by the Director General during the period 8th December, 2009 to 11th January, 2010 has been received, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the principles of law enunciated in this judgment giving proper notice to the informant as well as to SAIL and pass appropriate orders.