Case: State of Madhya Pradesh &amp; Anr Vs. Akhilesh Jha &amp; Anr

3. The first respondent was posted as Superintendent of Police at Alirajpur from June 2012 to June 2015. It has been alleged that in spite of the instructions issued by the Inspector General of Police, Indore Zone to disband the Gunda squad, the first respondent constituted, supervised and operated the squad. It has been alleged that on 1 June 2014, individuals belonging to such a squad, acting under the supervision of the first respondent arrested an accused who was taken into custody after being called to the police station by the members of the Gunda Squad. The person, who was under interrogation, died in custody on 3 June 2014. A magisterial enquiry was conducted into the custodial death and a report was submitted on 10 October 2014. The report contained observations against the first respondent on his role in illegally constituting the squad.4. Challenging the observations made by the JMFC Alirajpur, in his report dated 10 October 2014, the first respondent instituted proceedings before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. By its order dated 2 March 2016, the High Court expunged some of the observations contained in the magisterial report against the first respondent on the ground that they were in violation of the principles of natural justice. On 21 April 2016, the High Court directed that in case any action is initiated against the first respondent on the basis of the magisterial report, a proper opportunity of being heard in response to the allegations should be granted to him before drawing any adverse conclusion.5. On 8 June 2016, a departmental enquiry was convened against the first respondent and a charge-sheet was issued. The allegation in the charge-sheet was that the first respondent had committed acts of indiscipline and insubordination by not following the instructions issued by his superior officers regarding the disbanding of the Gunda Squad. The first respondent submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 7 July 2016, denying the allegations levelled against him. Soon thereafter, he moved the Central Administrative Tribunal(Tribunal) at Jabalpur for challenging the charge-sheet which was served on him on 8 June 2016. The Tribunal, by its order dated 28 July 2016, declined to interfere with the charge-sheet but granted an opportunity to the first respondent to initiate appropriate proceedings, if a decision adverse to him was taken on the basis of the reply to the charge-sheet.6. The first respondent once again moved the Tribunal for challenging the chargesheet dated 8 June 2016 in OA 587 of 2017 on the ground that no decision had been taken following his reply to the charge-sheet and that as a result of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, his deputation and promotional avenues had been adversely affected.7. The Tribunal, by its order dated 5 January 2018, quashed the charge-sheet issued to the first respondent. The following three grounds weighed with the Tribunal:(i) There was a delay of nearly two years;(ii) The charges were ambiguous; and(iii) The High Court had expunged the remarks in the magisterial enquiry which was held to enquire into the custodial death.8. The order of the Tribunal was assailed by the appellants before the High Court. By its judgment dated 5 September 2019, the Division Bench dismissed the petition, affirming the findings of the Tribunal.

Court's reasoning:
15. On the basis of the above material which has been placed on the record, it was impossible to come to the conclusion that the charge against the first respondent is vague or ambiguous. The charge-sheet, together with the statement of imputations, contains a detailed elaboration of the allegations against the first respondent and does not leave the recipient in a measure of doubt or ambiguity over the nature of the case he is required to answer in the disciplinary enquiry. The finding that the charge is vague is palpably in error. The Tribunal declined to quash the charge-sheet by its initial order dated 28 July 2016. However, by a subsequent order dated 5 January 2018, it proceeded to do exactly what it had declined to do by its previous order. The Tribunal purportedly did so on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by the denial of an opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings. The line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have been justified in directing the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in its entirety. This, in our view, was clearly impermissible. Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, in our view, has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by simply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of the Tribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matter and which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court.