Case: State Of Gujarat Vs. Jetawat Lal Singh Amar Singh &amp; Ors

2. Respondent No. 1 was the Bhayyat of the Jagir of Ghantoil. That Jagir was situated in the Idar State, a former Indian State. The area comprised in that State is a part of the State of Gujarat at present. The said Jagir was a proprietary Jagir and for the purpose of succession and inheritance, it was governed by the rule of primogenitor. The eldest son succeeded to the Gaddi; the other junior members of the family were granted maintenance known as Jiwarak out of the Jagir estate. The former Thakore of Ghantoil, Shri Dalpatainhji Kumansingh granted as Jitwarak to the father of the present respondent, a half share in a village by means of a deed dated February 18, 1916. In 1928 dispute arose between the Thakore and the Bhayyats in the matter of aforesaid Jiwarak. Hence the first respondent and his brother filed a suit in the Sadar Court of the then ldar State claiming Jiwarak. The Court of first instance decreed the suit in favour of the first respondent and his brothers. The Thakore went in appeal against the said judgment. When the appeal was pending, the dispute was compromised and a consent decree was passed on September 23, 1940. Under the consent decree the following rights were given to the first respondent and his brothers asRights to recover assessment (Vighoti) of Survey Nos. 382-387, 396, 398, 399, 542, 543, 544, 545 and 546 assessed at Rs.175/-.(2) Right to own and possess Gharkhed Lands consisting of Survey Nos. 219, 220, 225, 227, 228 and 229 assessed at Rupees 74/8/- free from payment of assessment and(3) Right to receive a cash allowance of Rs. 234/12/- annually from the Jagir.The Act came into force on August 1, 1954 as a result of which all Jagirs in the merged territories of Bombay including the Jagir of Ghantoil were abolished. Thereafter respondent No. 1 claimed compensation under S. 14 (1) of the Act. He applied to the Jagir Abolition Officer for fixing the compensation due to him in respect of his aforementioned rights. That officer rejected his claim but when the matter was taken up in appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, the Tribunal granted him compensation in respect of his rights to recover assessment of Rs. 175/- annually, but it rejected his claim for compensation under the remaining two heads. The first respondent then took up the matter to the Gujarat High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution in Special Civil Application No. 560 of 1961. The High Court allowed that application. It held that the first respondent is entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act both in respect of Gharkhed lands as well as in respect of his right to receive cash allowance of Rs. 234/12/- annually. The Jagir Abolition Officer was directed to hold further enquiry for determining a compensation payable to the first respondent in respect of those rights. This appeal is directed against the said order of the High Court.

Court's reasoning:
Admittedly the first respondent was enjoying those lands without any liability to pay assessment. That was a right conferred on him under the compromise decree. No material was placed before us to show that the Jagirdar was competent in spite of the compromise decree to collect assessment from him in respect of those lands. This was not a case of suspension of land revenue. The first respondents right was to enjoy the land free of the liability to pay the land revenue. That was the position on the date the Act came into force. So far as the Thakore was concerned the right to collect the assessment of those lands had been given as Jagir to the Jagirdar. We see no merit in the contention of Mr. N. S. Bindra, the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Sovereign had an inherent right to levy assessment and any agreement not to collect assessment has necessarily to be considered as a concession and not a right. That question is wholly irrelevant for our present purpose. In this case we are not called upon to consider the nature of the power of the Sovereign to levy assessment. The only question for our decision is that whether by abolishing the Jagir and by levying assessment on the Gharkhed lands any of the respondents rights to or interest in property were abolished, extinguished or modified. We are considering the plaintiff-respondents right to or interest in property as it stood before the Act and not after S. 5 of the Act came into force.There is no denying the fact that right to enjoy a property without the liability to pay assessment is a more valuable right than the right to enjoy the same property with the liability to pay assessment. Before the Act, the first respondent was enjoying Gharkhed lands without the liability to pay assessment but after the Act came into force he is enjoying those very lands with the liability to pay assessment. Therefore there is hardly any doubt that his interest in that property stands modified. In this case it is not necessary to consider whether that interest can be considered as a right in the property.8. We are also in agreement with the High Court that the right to receive cash allowance of Rs. 234/12/- annually from the Jagir is one of those rights that have got to be compensated under S. 14 (1). That liability was not the personal liability of the Jagirdar. The first respondent was entitled to get that amount from the Jagir. In other words it was a charge on the Jagir. Therefore it is an interest in property.