Case: M. P. Shreevastava Vs. Mrs. Veena

1. On July 25, 1958 the parties to this appeal were married under the Special Marriages Act 43 of 1954. There was a child of the marriage. Alleging that on November 10, 1959, his wife Veena-who will hereinafter called the respondent-had without reasonable cause deserted him and had failed to return and live with him in spite of repeated request, the husband, M. P Shreevastava-hereinafter called the appellant - filed a petition in the Court of the District Judge, Delhi, for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights This petition was decreed ex parte on March 13, 1961. On May 21. l961 the respondent returned to the residence of the appellant and offered to live with him. She also wrote letters to the appellant requesting him to allow her to go to his house and live with him as his wife but the appellant refused to receive the letters. Attempts made through certain friends of the family to persuade the appellant to take the respondent back into the marital home were also unsuccessful. The respondent then applied to the District Court. Delhi, for an order that the decree he recorded as satisfied, since the appellant had failed and neglected to allow the respondent to resume conjugal relations even after she went to his house and made a request to that effect. The District Judge, Delhi, held that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent stood satisfied, and ordered that it be recorded that the decree was satisfied. In appeal to the High Court of Punjab, Dua, J. confirmed the order passed by the District Court. An appeal under the Letters Patent filed by the appellant met with no success. The husband-M. Shreevastava - has then appealed to this Court with special leave

Court's reasoning:
5. But it was said that the respondent could not maintain an application for recording adjustment of the decree. Under O. 21 R. 2 C. P. Code, nor could she maintain an application for recording satisfaction of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights so long as the husband did not apply to execute the decree. or did not claim a decree for divorce under Section 27 of the Special Marriages Act. O. 21 R. 2 prescribes the procedure for recording payment of money under any decree or for adjustment of any decree to the satisfaction of the decree-holder. If any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court or the decree is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, the decrees holder is enjoined by R. 2(1) of O. 21 to certify such payment or adjustment to the Court: the judgment-debtor may also inform the Court of such payment or adjustment and it may be recorded after enquiry: R. 2 (2) of O. 21. In the present case, however, there is no adjustment. Adjustment contemplates mutual agreement, and in the present case, there is no evidence of any consent on the part of the appellant who was never willing to take back the wife and resume conjugal relations. Order 21 R. 2 contemplate adjustment of the decree by consent-express or implied- of the parties where there is no such consent. O. 21 R. 2 does not apply6. But O. 21 R. 2 prescribes a special procedure for recording, adjustment of a decree, or for recording payment of money paid out of Court under any decree. However the plenary power conferred by S. 47 C. P. Code upon the Court executing the decree to determine all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, is not thereby affected. Whereas O. 21 R. 2 deals with the procedure to be followed in a limited class of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of decrees, where there has been payment of money or adjustment or satisfaction of the decree by consensual arrangement, S. 47 C. P. Code deals with the power of the Court executing the decree7. Counsel for the appellant does not deny to the Court executing the decree power to decide all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, but contends that since the power to record discharge or satisfaction of a decree is exercisable only by the Court executing the decree no substantive petition lies at the instance of the person against whom a decree is passed to record adjustment or satisfaction so long as the decree-holder has not applied for execution. Counsel says that the expression "Court executing the decree" means the "Court which is executing the decree at the instance of the decree-holder" and in support of his contention relies upon the different expressions used in O. 21, Rr. 1 and 2, C. P. Code. He points out that under O. 21. R. 1 (1) (a) money payable under a decree may be paid into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree. Similarly an application under Cl. (1) or Cl. (2) of R. 2, O. 21 for recording, payment of money under or adjustment of a decree has to be made to the Court whose dusty it is to execute the decree, whereas prohibition against recognition of an uncertified payment or adjustment is imposed upon the Court executing the decree by sub-r. (3).There is no doubt that the expression "Court whose duty it is to execute the decree" means a Court which is under the law competent to, and when requested bound to, execute the decree which is in law enforceable, and where an application is made under O.21, R.1 (1) (a) or under O.21, R.2 (1) or (2) there need (not?) be substantive application for execution pending. It also appears, from the terms of Cl. (3) of O.21, R 2, that the prohibition is against the Court executing the decree. But there is no warrant for the argument that the expression "Court executing the decree" as used in S.47, C. P. Code means a "Court which is seized of an application for execution of a decree at the instance of the decree-holder". Section 47 enacts the salutary rule that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined not by a separate suit, but in execution of the decree. The power so conferred may not be limited by any strained or artificial construction of the words "Court executing the decree". The expression "Court executing the decree" has not been defined, and having regard to the scheme of the Code it cannot have a limited meaning, as argued by counsel for the appellant. The principle of the section is that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree is passed, shall be determined in the execution proceeding, and not by a separate suit: it follows as a corollary that a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree may be raised by the decree-holder or by the judgment-debtor in the execution department and that pendency of an application for execution by the decree-holder is not a condition of its exercise. An application made by the judgment-debtor which raises a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree in a suit to which he, or the person of whom he is representative, was a party is an application before the Court executing the decree, and must be tried in that CourtWe are unable to hold that the dictum of the Punjab High Court in Mst. Bhagwani v. Lakhim Ram, AIR 1960 Punj 437 (438) that as no execution proceedings (at the instance of the decree-holder) were pending, the Court (which was called upon to determine whether there was an adjustment of decree by an executory contract) could not be regarded as one which was executing the decree" is correct. There is, in our judgment no antithesis between S. 47 and O. 21, R. 2: the former clears with the power of the Court and the latter with the procedure to be followed in respect of a limited class of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of decrees4. It was never argued on behalf of the appellant in the Court of First Instance and the High Court that attempts proved to have been made by the respondent to resume conjugal relations could not in law amount to satisfaction of the decree, and we do not think we would be justified at this stage in allowing that question to be raised for the first time in this Court.