Case: The Employee's State Insurance Corporation Vs. Union of India &amp; Ors

3. ESIC, the appellant, is a statutory body constituted under the Employees State Insurance Act 1948 (ESI Act). The recruitment and promotion of its teaching staff are governed by the Employees State Insurance Corporation (Medical Teaching Faculty Posts) Recruitment Regulations 2015 (ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015) which came into effect on 5 July 2015. Respondent 3 to 25 (interchangeably referred to as contesting respondents) joined the appellant as Assistant Professors at ESIC Model Hospital, Rajajinagar, Bengaluru. They joined service between 7 February 2012 and 26 June 2014. The Central Government, through the Central Health Service Division of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, had issued the DACP Scheme through an Office Memorandum dated 29 October 2008. The DACP Scheme contemplated promotion as Associate Professor upon completion of two years of service in the post of Assistant Professor as an officer under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. After two years of service as Assistant Professor on 2 February 2017, the contesting respondents sought promotion under the DACP Scheme and instituted proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Bengaluru.4. On 7 February 2018, the CAT relied on the submission by the Counsel for the appellant and held that the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 were not relevant for adjudication of the matter. The CAT also relied on a letter dated 23 September 2014 addressed by the Joint Director of ESIC to the Dean of ESIC which mentioned the implementation of the DACP Scheme to the Medical Officer Cadres. Thus, the CAT directed the appellant to consider the contesting respondents for promotion under the DACP Scheme.5. The appellant challenged the order of the CAT in a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka. The High Court dismissed the petition on 5 September 2019 by holding that:(i) Since the contesting respondents were recruited before the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 came into effect, they would get the benefit of the DACP Scheme;(ii) The DACP Scheme has statutory effect under Section 17 of the ESI Act. The ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 have departed from the DACP Scheme without seeking the prior approval of the Central Government; and(iii) Counsel for the appellant conceded that the appellant would implement the DACP Scheme and the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 do not apply.

Court's reasoning:
13. The ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 and ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 have statutory effect by virtue of Section 97(3) of the ESI Act. It is settled law that regulations framed by statutory authorities have the force of enacted law. A Constitution Bench in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (1975) 1 SCC 421  considered the regulations framed by several statutory authorities considered as State within the terms of Article 12. Chief Justice A N Ray held that the regulations have the same effect of law and bind the statutory authorities:21. The characteristic of law is the manner and procedure adopted in many forms of subordinate legislation. The authority making rules and regulation must specify the source of the rule and regulation making authority. To illustrate, rules are always framed in exercise of the specific power conferred by the statute to make rules. Similarly, regulations are framed in exercise of specific power conferred by the statute to make regulations. The essence of law is that it is made by the law-makers in exercise of specific authority. The vires of law is capable of being challenged if the power is absent or has been exceeded by the authority making rules or regulations.23. The noticeable feature is that these statutory bodies have no free hand in framing the conditions and terms of service of their employees. These statutory bodies are bound to apply the terms and conditions as laid down in the regulations. The statutory bodies are not free to make such terms as they think fit and proper. Regulations prescribe the terms of appointment, conditions of service and procedure for dismissing employees. These regulations in the statutes are described as status fetters on freedom of contract. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act in Section 12 specifically enacts that the terms and conditions of the employees may be such as may be provided by regulations. There is a legal compulsion on the Commission to comply with the regulations. Any breach of such compliance would be a breach of the regulations which are statutory provisions. In other statutes under consideration viz. the Life Insurance Corporation Act and the Industrial Finance Corporation Act though there is no specific provision comparable to Section 12 of the 1959 Act the terms and conditions of employment and conditions of service are provided for by regulations. These regulations are not only binding on the authorities but also on the public.15. Respondent 3 to 25 joined the service of the ESIC Model Hospital, Rajajinagar, Bengaluru as Assistant Professors on different dates, between 07 February 2014 and 26 June 2016. On completing two years in the post of Assistant Professor, Respondent 3 to 25 made representations to the appellant seeking promotion to the grade of Associate Professor, claiming the benefit of the DACP Scheme. The Preamble to the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015, recites that the prior approval of the Central Government, as necessitated by Section 17(2) of the ESI Act was duly sought. In the event of a conflict between an executive instruction, an office memorandum in this case, and statutory regulations – the latter prevail. A Constitution Bench in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1910  considered the applicability of the letters issued by the Government of India detailing the administrative practice for promotions, against the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954. The Constitution Bench held that:7. We proceed to consider the next contention of Mr N.C. Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.18. The contesting respondents have referred to certain letters and to an internal communication of the appellant to urge that the DACP Scheme was to be implemented for promotions at the appellant. However, these letters, similar to the Office Memorandum dated 29 October 2008 implementing the DACP Scheme, would not have the force of law until they were enforced through an amendment to the recruitment regulations. In considering a similar factual situation, a three-judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Majji Jangamayya (1977) 1 SCC 606  held that:31. The second question is whether the requirement of 10 years experience was a statutory rule. The High Court held that the requirement of 10 years experience is not a statutory rule. Counsel for the respondents contended that the requirement of 10 years experience is statutory because the letter dated January 16, 1950 is by the Government of India and the Government of India has authority to frame rules and one of the letters dated July 21, 1950 referred to it as a formal rule. The contention is erroneous because there is a distinction between statutory orders and administrative instructions of the Government. This Court has held that in the absence of statutory rules, executive orders or administrative instructions may be made. (See CIT v. A. Raman & Company [AIR 1968 SC 49  : (1968) 1 SCR 10  : 67 ITR 11]  )34. Counsel on behalf of the respondents contended that the requirement of 10 years experience laid down in the letter dated January 16, 1950 had the force of law because of Article 313. Article 313 does not change the legal character of a document. Article 313 refers to laws in force which mean statutory laws. An administrative instruction or order is not a statutory rule. The administrative instructions can be changed by the Government by reason of Article 73(1)(a) itself.36. The expression ordinarily in the requirement of 10 years experience shows that there can be a deviation from the requirement and such deviation can be justified by reasons. Administrative instructions if not carried into effect for good reasons cannot confer a right. (See P.C. Sethi v. Union of India [(1975) 4 SCC 67  : 1975 SCC (L&S) 203 : (1975) 3 SCR 201 ] .)….19. On the dates when the contesting respondents joined the service of the appellant - 07 February 2014 till 26 June 2016 - their promotions were governed by the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 which came into effect on 2 May 2009 and mandated four years of qualifying service for promotion from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. When the contesting respondents had completed two years of service, they were governed by the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 which came into effect on 5 July 2015 and mandated five years of qualifying service for promotion from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. Thus, the DACP Scheme facilitating promotion on the completion of two years of service is not applicable to the contesting respondents, when the regulations have a statutory effect that overrides the Office Memorandum dated 29 October 2008 which implemented the DACP Scheme.20. The advertisements issued by the appellant mentioned that the DACP Scheme would be applicable for its recruits. However, it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that in the event of a conflict between a statement in an advertisement and service regulations, the latter shall prevail. In Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission (2006) 9 SCC 507  [Malik Mazhar Sultan] a two-judge Bench of this Court clarified that an erroneous advertisement would not create a right in favour of applicants who act on such representation. The Court considered the eligibility criteria for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) under the U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001 against an erroneous advertisement issued by the U.P. Public Service Commission and held:21. The present controversy has arisen as the advertisement issued by PSC stated that the candidates who were within the age on 1-7-2001 and 1-7-2002 shall be treated within age for the examination. Undoubtedly, the excluded candidates were of eligible age as per the advertisement but the recruitment to the service can only be made in accordance with the Rules and the error, if any, in the advertisement cannot override the Rules and create a right in favour of a candidate if otherwise not eligible according to the Rules. The relaxation of age can be granted only if permissible under the Rules and not on the basis of the advertisement. If the interpretation of the Rules by PSC when it issued the advertisement was erroneous, no right can accrue on basis thereof. Therefore, the answer to the question would turn upon the interpretation of the Rules.21. In Ashish Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 3 SCC 55  a two-judge Bench of this Court followed the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) in interpreting an advertisement issued by the Director, Social Welfare Department, Uttar Pradesh for the position of a psychologist. This Court declined to give precedence to the erroneous qualifications prescribed in the advertisement against the relevant recruitment rules and held:27. Any part of the advertisement which is contrary to the statutory rules has to give way to the statutory prescription. Thus, looking to the qualification prescribed in the statutory rules, the appellant fulfils the qualification and after being selected for the post denying appointment to him is arbitrary and illegal. It is well settled that when there is variance in the advertisement and in the statutory rules, it is the statutory rules which take precedence….In Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Chanan Ram (1998) 4 SCC 202  a two-judge Bench of this Court held that an earlier advertisement becomes infructuous after a subsequent amendment to the service rules:13. Under these circumstances, therefore, it is difficult to appreciate how the Division Bench of the High Court could persuade itself in agreeing with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner that despite this change of cadres and the provision for recruitment on new posts the old advertisement of 5-11-1993 Annexure P-1 seeking to consider the candidature of applicants for erstwhile 23 advertised vacancies in the posts of Assistant Directors (Junior) in the Agricultural Marketing Service of the State of Rajasthan would still be pursued further and recruitment should be effected for these 23 erstwhile vacancies as per the old advertisement. It is easy to visualise that even if such an earlier advertisement of 5- 11-1993 was proceeded with further it would have resulted into a stalemate and an exercise in futility. No appointment could have been given to the selected candidates to the posts of Assistant Directors (Junior) after 1995 amendment of Rules as there were no such posts in the hierarchy of State Service. Consequently it must be held that on account of the amendments to the Rajasthan Agricultural Marketing Service Rules the earlier advertisement dated 5-11-1993 had become infructuous and otiose. Only on this short ground the writ petition of the respondent-writ petitioner should have been dismissed by confirming the order of dismissal of the writ petition earlier passed by the learned Single Judge…….While this Court expresses its disapproval at the lack of proper instructions being tendered to the Counsel of the appellant, there can be no estoppel against a statute or regulations having a statutory effect. In Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao AIR 1963 SC 884  a three-judge Bench of this Court decided a central point of the dispute in favour of a party, irrespective of the concession of its Counsel since it was on a point of law. Justice M Hidayatullah (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking on behalf of the Court observed:20. From the above analysis of the documents, it is quite clear that the documents on the side of the appellant established that this was a Karnikam service inam, and the action of the Zamindar in resuming it as such, which again has a presumption of correctness attaching to it, clearly established the appellants case. Much cannot be made of a concession by counsel that this was a Dharmilainam, in the trial court, because it was a concession on a point of law, and it was withdrawn. Indeed, the central point in the dispute was this, and the concession appears to us to be due to some mistake or possibly ignorance not binding on the client. We are thus of opinion that the decision of the two courts below which had concurrently held this to be jeroyti land after resumption of the Karnikam service inam, was correct in the circumstances of the case, and the High Court was not justified in reversing it.25. Recently, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Director of Elementary Education, Odisha v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo (2019) 10 SCC 674  observed that a concession on a question of law concerning service rules would not bind the State:11. The concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal was a concession in law and contrary to the statutory rules. Such concession is not binding on the State for the reason that there cannot be any estoppel against law. The rules provide for a specific grade of pay, therefore, the concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal is not binding on the appellant.The concession of the Counsel for the appellant before the CAT does not preclude the finding on the law that is arrived at by this Court.26. The CAT and the High Court failed to notice the applicability of the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 to the promotions of the Teaching Cadre in the appellant corporation. The ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 have precedence over the Office Memorandum dated 29 October 2008 which implemented the DACP Scheme in respect of officers of the Central Health Service under the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The concession by the Counsel of the appellant before the CAT does not stand in the way of the appellant supporting the correct position of law before this Court.27. The contesting respondents did not challenge the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 or the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 before the CAT or the High Court. The argument on lack of prior approval as per Section 17(2) of the ESI Act is obviated by the preamble to the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015. The contesting respondents have only supported the applicability of the DACP Scheme to claim promotion as Associate Professor after two years of service. The advertisements for recruitment mentioning the DACP Scheme would have no effect since they were in contravention of the applicable recruitment regulations. Therefore, for the above reasons, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed.