Case: Dineshchandra Jamnadas Gandhi Vs. State of Gujarat &amp; Another

Special leave is granted and the appeal is taken up for final hearing, heard and disposed of by this judgment.2. Appellant was charged before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad, by the Food Inspector, Navsari Municipality, with the offence of selling "Kesari coloured sweet supari sali" alleged to have been adulterated with "Yellow basic coal tar dye". The learned Magistrate found the appellant guilty of the offence and imposed a sentence of an years simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000 both of which were the statutorily compulsory minimum sentences under S.16(1)(A)(i) of the Act.Learned Sessions Judge, Valsad, by his judgment, dated 14-3-1980, in Criminal Appeal 32 of 1979 preferred by the appellant, however, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the appellant of the charge.On further appeal by the State against the said acquittal, the High Court of Gujarat allowed the States appeal and, in reversal of the judgment of acquittal of the learned Sessions Judge, restored the conviction an sentence passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate.3. Appellant is a tradesman carrying on business within the limits of Navsari Municipality. On 7-12-1978, respondent No. 2, the food inspector of Navsari Municipality, purchased from the appellant 600 gms. of "kesari coloured sweet supari sali" and after complying with the procedural formalities packed and sealed the "supari" into three separate packages of 200 gms. each and one of them was sent to the Public Analyst who by his report dated 20-12-1978 (Ext. 12) affirmed that the sample contained a "yellow basic coal tar dye" and that it did not conform to the standard laid down under the Rules. On 19-1-1979, the Food Inspector with the prior sanction of the District Health Officer, Valsad, (Exh .14), filed a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad. The prosecution culminated, as aforesaid, in the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, and later restored by the High Court. Appellant now seeks to assail the legality of the conviction.

Court's reasoning:
4. We have heard Sri V. B. Ganatra learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Girish Chandra and Sri M. V. Goswami learned counsel for Respondents 1 and 2, respectively. Though a number of grounds are taken in the memorandum of the petition for special leave, however, at the hearing Sri Ganatra confined his submission only to one aspect of the matter which, if accepted as correct, would go to the root of the case for the prosecution. Apparently, this contention in the form in which it is presented here was not placed before the High Court as we find no reference to it in the judgment.It was not disputed that supari was an article of food. It was so held in Pyarali K. Tejani v. M. R. Dange (1974-2 SCR 1541 : (AIR 1974 SC 228 ). It was also not disputed that if "supari" did not admit itself of being classified under "Fruit products" or under "Flavouring Agents" under R.29(f) or 29(m) respectively, the use in "supari" of even a coal tar food colours permitted under R.28 would amount to adulteration.The argument that "Supari" or "Betel nut" is a "Flavouring Agent" has clearly no substance. The first contention, therefore, narrows itself down to whether "supari" in the form in which it was offered for sale though vegetative in origin and is derived from the usufruct of areca palm can be said to be a "Fruit product" in the sense in which that expression is used and is required to be understood in R.20(f).To appreciate Sri Ganatras contention, the scheme of the relevant rules, in particular Rules 23,28 and 29, requires notice. R.23 prohibits the addition of any colouring matter to any article of food except as specifically permitted by the rules. R.28 provides that no coal tar food colour or mixture thereof, except the food colours specifically enumerated in R.28, shall be used in food. Item 2 of the list of food colours permitted under R.28 includes Sun set Yellow FCF. We shall proceed on the premise that the basic yellow coal tar dye found in the "supari" by the Public Analyst is amongst those enumerated food colours excepted from the prohibition under R.28 and is, therefore, permitted to be used. Then R.29 prohibits the use of even the coal tar food colours permitted under R.28 in or upon any food other than those enumerated in R.29. "Fruit Products" is one such item of food so enumerated under clause (f) of R.29. The result is that permitted coal tar food colours, i.e. food colours permitted by R.28, can be used if the food articles in question are "Fruit products" as understood in R.29(f). But this exception from prohibition, in favour of "Fruit Products" is further subject to such exceptions or restrictions as are otherwise made in Appendix B. Sri Ganatras contention is that there having been no provision otherwise made in Appendix B in respect of supari and supari being includible in "Fruit products" the use in it of permitted coal tar food colours is not prohibited. Shri Ganatra submits that the legislation being penal the expression "Fruit Products" in R.29(f) should receive a reasonable liberal construction and that, so construed, "supari" would reasonably admit of being considered such a "Fruit Product".6. We have had our attention drawn by Sri Ganatra to certain passages in Common Trees of India by Dr. Santatau (at page 111) in "Wealth of India Raw Materials" Vol. I A (pages 390, 402-03) and certain passages in the Dravya Guna Vignyan (Parts II and III : at page 672) in support of Sri Ganatras contention that "Supari" or "Betel nut" being the usufruct of "Areca" tree must be held to be a "Fruit Product". Sri Ganatra says that having regard to the accepted canons of construction appropriate to penal statutes, "supari" or "Betel nut" which was derived from the usufruct of Areca palm admits of being classified amongst "Fruit Products" in R.29(f). At all events, says learned counsel, such a construction being a plausible one, the appellant who had conducted his affairs on such a plausible meaning of the statute should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The distinction between literal and legal meaning of statutory language lies at the heart of the problem of interpretation of statutes. The court is not entitled to decline to determine the legal meaning of a statute on the principle non liquet. In the present case a wider construction of "Fruit Products" in clause (7) which is in the nature of exception to R.29 results automatically in a corresponding narrower construction of the substantive provision in R.29. This is not a case of a relieving provision excepting from the definition of an offence where the rule of construction against doubtful penalisation operates. The offence is really a violation of a prohibition imposed on a penalty as a social mechanism in a socio economic legislation. No form of words have ever yet be framed, with regard to which some ingenious counsel could not suggest a difficulty. But in the context of the present statute, it would be a strain on the statutory language and the statutory scheme to include "supari" in the form in which it was sold, within "Fruit Products" as understood in clause (f) of R.29. The first contention has, accordingly, nopresent case, as Sri Ganatra rightly pointed out, is one where bigger offenders who manufactured the supari and who distributed them to the retailers have gone scot free. Unfortunately, appellant did not, and perhaps could not, invoke the benevolent provisions of S.19(2) of the Act. The offence was ten years ago and the appellate court had acquitted the appellant. The expression "Fruit Products" in the context of what the Delegated legislative authority really meant and wanted to convey was not a model of precision. The degree of precision should be such that not only those who read it in good faith understand but also that those who read it in bad faith do not misunderstand.Indeed this somewhat imperfect definition of "Fruit Products" in R.29(f) has since been amended enumerating precisely the specific products in which the food colours permitted by R.28 could be used leaving no room for the possibility of any argument of the kind advanced in this case. This amendment which came into force with effect from 15-11-1984 deleted the expression "Fruit Products" and in its place specifically enumerated the items under R.29(f) in which the use of permitted coal tar food colours was allowed.