Case: Union Vs. Aluminium Factory Workers 'Indian Aluminium Company, Limited

1. The appellant is a union of the workmen of the Indian Aluminium Co., Ltd., the respondent in this appeal. The appeal concerns certain Industrial disputes. The question raised Is whether the order of reference of these disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was competent.2. It appears that on 28 March 1951, the Government of the State ofwhich later became the State of Kerala, made under the Act two orders of reference of certain Industrial disputes between the company and its workmen. The first order of reference concerned disputes between the company and its workmen, represented by a union called the factory staff association and the second concerned disputes between the company and its workmen represented by the appellant union. After various proceedings these disputes were settled and awards by the industrial tribunal concerned wore made on 19 January 1952 in terms of settlements arrivedtribunal decided these preliminary objections against the company and proposed to proceed with the reference. The company then moved the High Court of Kerala under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an order quashing the reference on the same grounds.The High Court did not decide the first two preliminary objections but quashed the reference on the ground that there could be no reference till the awards had been terminated by notice under S. 19(6) as till then It had to be held In view of the settlement that Mathai was not a workman within the meaning of the Act as it stood in 1954. It had not been disputed before the High Court that Mathai was not a supervisor, nor that no notice terminating the awards had been given. The present appeal is from the judgment of the High Court.

Court's reasoning:
There is no reason to doubt thisSastri, therefore, contended that Mathai was not a supervisor within the meaning of the earlier awards. It seems to us that this contention is unsound. The departmental orders were of the year 1953, that is to say, of later dates than the awards of 1952. These departmental orders cannot therefore prove that Mathai was not a supervisor in 1952. The awards clearly show that Markose who held the post below that of a foreman was considered to be a supervisor. Likewise they indicate that Mathai was at the date of the awards a supervisor. The evidence also shows that there wore two types of supervisory staff, one below and one above foreman. The fact that Mathai held a rank below that of a foreman did not show that he was not a supervisor. Sri Sastris first point must therefore fall. So long as the awards of 1952 are not terminated, it cannot be contended that Mathai was a workman. On that basis the reference would be incompetent and, therefore, liable to beseems to us that the provision in the award that supervisors shall not be deemed to be workmen was clearly incidental to the points of reference. One of the points of reference resulting in the earlier award to which the staff association was a party was whether Markose, a supervisor, should have been promoted as foreman. The company agreed to promote Markose as a foreman only on the condition that the union would accept the principle that no supervisor would be considered to be a workman. In fact the award provided that promotion would be given to Markose only after the workmen had excluded him from their union. The award settled this point by providing for the promotion of Markose as foreman on the condition that the workmen agreed that supervisors would no longer be regarded as workmen. The company would not have agreed to promote Markose as a foreman unless the workmen had agreed that supervisors would no more be considered to be workmen. One provision was the consideration for the other. Hence the provision that supervisors would not be workmen was clearly incidental to the dispute referred. Again it was as a part of the entire settlement that the dispute concerning Mathai, who was also a supervisor, was abandoned. The two awards had obviously been made together and were connected with each other. Both awards wore made in respect of disputes with workmen of the same employer. The tribunal has recorded that the disputes in the two references had been settled by a joint agreement. The award concerning the appellant union contained the same provision that supervisors would not be regarded as workmen. It was because of this that the workmen had been given certainpayment. The learnedappearing for the respondent drew our attention to certain correspondence which passed before and after the awards. This correspondence shows that the appellant union and the staff association of the company fully accepted the principle that supervisors would no longer be regarded as workmen and that all the supervisors had resigned from membership of the workmens unions. Indeed one of the letters that the staff association and the workers union jointly wrote to the companys works manager shows that in terms of the award Markose and Mathai had been excluded from the unions. This is clear evidence that Mathai was a supervisor and further that the provision that supervisory staff should not be regarded as workmen was incidental to the points of reference also in the matter in which the appellant union was a party