Case: Purshottam Lal Dhawan Vs. Dewan Chaman Lal And Another

2. The appellant belongs to a group of evacuees which may for convenience be described as Dhawan Group. Diwan Chaman Lal, respondent No. 1, was a displaced person from West Pakistan where he owned considerable properties. On September 1, 1949, in lieu of land left behind in Pakistan, he was allotted 152.9 acres of land in village Kharwan in Tehsil Jagadhri, District Ambala. The appellant and his group also owned large extends of properties in West Pakistan. Each one of that group was allotted different extends of land in the same village. Before possession was taken by the allottees, two persons, namely, Hari Chand and Khilla Ram, filed applications dated November 14, 1949, and November 11, 1949, respectively for re-allotment on the ground that the soil of the village was not of uniform quality and the allotment on the basis of blocks was not justified. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, recommended the splitting of the land into four blocks and the said recommendation was accepted by the Director-General. Rural Rehabilitation, by his order dated December 2, 1949, Thereupon the village was divided into four blocks and was reallotted.On account of the re-allotment, the 1st respondent could not get his entire allotment in village Kharwan in one block and he was given instead land in different blocks and different villages. Aggrieved by this order, the first respondent filed a review application before the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, on September 27, 1950, praying for the restoration of his original allotment made on September 1, 1949. The Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, rejected that application on May 12, 1951. Against that order the first respondent preferred a revision to the Additional Custodian, who dismissed the same on August 25, 1952. Against that order of dismissal, the first respondent filed a revision to the Custodian-General on October 30, 1952. To that revision only the Custodian was made party; but the appellant and the members of his group were subsequently made parties by an order of the Deputy Custodian-General dated August 25, 1953. Thereafter notices were issued to them. The appellant and others on their being made parties raised various contentions. The Deputy Custodian-General cancelled the allotment made in favour of the Dhawan Group in respect of the excess area allotted to them and directed the land obtained by means of this cancellation to be utilised for the consolidation of the allotment of the first respondent in village Kharwan. He also gave further consequential directions. The present appeal is preferred by Purshotam Lal Dhawan, a member of the Dhawan Group, against the said order.

Court's reasoning:
Section 27 of the Act confers a plenary power of revision on the Custodian-General and it empowers him to exercise his revisional powers either suo motu or on application made in that behalf at any time. The phrase "at any time" indicates that the power of the Custodian-General is uncontrolled by any time factor, but only by the scope of the Act within which he functions. The Central Government cannot obviously make a rule unless S. 56 of the Act confers on it an express power to impose a time fetter on the Custodian-Generals power. We do not find any such power conferred on the Central Government under S. 56 of the Act. So the rule can only be read Custodian-General under S. 27 of the Act. That must have been the reason why R. 31(5) does not prescribe any limitation on the Custodian-General to exercise suo motu his revisional power.construction suggested by learned counsel for the appellant may lend scope to the argument that the rule is ultra vires the statute, for when a section says that there is no time limit for entertaining a revision, a rule cannot say that it shall be filed within a particular time. The argument that the principle underlying S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to a petition for revision under S. 27 of the Act has no force. Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal for which a period of limitation is prescribed and it empowers the court to admit the appeal after the period of limitation, if the applicant satisfied it that he has sufficient reason for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time. The principle thereunder cannot be made applicable to a revision petition under S. 27 of the Act in respect of which no period of limitation is prescribed. At the same time we must make it clear that the powers of the Custodian-General under S. 27, read with R. 31(5), are not intended to be exercised arbitrarily. Being a judicial power, he shall exercise his discretion reasonably and it is for him to consider whether in a particular case has should entertain a revision beyond the period of sixty days stated in R. 31 (5).In this case we cannot say that the Custodian-General had acted perversely or unreasonably in entertaining the revision. The revision was filed in time. The Dhawan Group was made party at the subsequent stage as the Custodian-General rightly thought that any order he would make in favour of the appellant might prejudice the Dhawan Group. After giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard within the meaning of the proviso to S. 27(1) of the Act, he made the order. The Custodian-General therefore, acted reasonably within his powers. This objection isquestion raised falls to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder.considering the first point, we have explained the scope of the rule and we have held that the said rule is only a rule of guidance and that in law a revision can be entertained at any time even after sixty days if the Custodian-General in his discretion thinks fit to entertain it. The prescribed time in the context of a revision to the Custodian-General can only mean sixty days or such other time within which the Custodian-General in his discretion thinks fit to entertain the revision. As the allotment in the present case was made before July 22, 1952 the Custodian-General was within his rights in cancelling theobservations do not record a clear finding that there was no allotment in favour of the appellant. Indeed the factum of allotment to the appellant was never questioned throughout the proceedings. In the circumstances, we must dispose of this appeal on the basis that there was an allotment in favour of the appellant. This contention is, therefore, rejected.