Case: Delhi Transport Undertaking Vs. Balbir Saran Goel

1. This is an appeal by special leave in which the sole question for determination is whether the services of the respondent who was an employee of the appellant could be terminated under Regulation 9 (b) without complying with the procedure prescribed by Regulation 15 of the D. R. T. A (Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations), 1952, as amended, which were framed under Section 53, sub-sections (1) and (2) (c) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950.      2. The respondent was originally appointed as a booking agent under the Gwalior Northern Transport Company. He was promoted to the rank of Travelling Ticket Examiner in 1947. In 1948 the Government of India, Ministry of Transport, took over the aforesaid company. On March 7, 1950 the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act was passed. The services of the respondent were transferred to the said Authority. In March, 1952 the respondent was demoted from the rank of Travelling Ticket Examiner to that of a Conductor. He filed a writ petition in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in April 1953. The writ petition was dismissed and thereafter his services were terminated on November 11, 1953. The order of termination which was passed by the Manager of the Delhi Road Transport Authority was in the following terms :"Your services will not be required by this organisation with effect from November 12, 1953. You will be paid one months salary In lieu of notice"3. There were certain proceedings before the Conciliation Officer and in answer to a query made by that officer the General Manager wrote a letter on August 14, 1956 in which it was stated, inter alia that the respondent had approached the High Court when he had been demoted at the previous stage without exhausting the normal official channel of redress and without putting in his representation before the Appellate Authority as provided in the Service Rules. His services were therefore terminated under Regulation 9 (b) after paying one months salary in lieu of notice. It may be mentioned that the Service Rule of which the breach was alleged to have been committed by the respondent was Standing Order No. 17 which enjoined that no employee should have recourse to a Court of law without first resorting to the normal official channels of redress.      4. The suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed by the respondent containing all the above facts in which it was alleged that the order dated November 11, 1953 was one of dismissal and had been passed as a measure of punishment, the procedure prescribed by Regulation 15 not having been followed. In para 29 of the plaint the sole allegation relating to mala fides was made in these terms :"......... It was male fide on the part of the General Manager, D. R. T. A to terminate the services of the plaintiff without assigning any reason"A declaration was sought that the order of dismissal was illegal, male fide etc., and that the plaintiff continued to remain in the employment of the appellant without any interruption of rights. A claim for certain amount was also made on account of salary etc. The only two issues framed on the merits were:(1) "Whether the order dated 11th November, 1953 terminating the services of the plaintiff is illegal and ultra vires as alleged ?      (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of any amount by way of consequential relief ? If so, at what rate and for what Period ?"The trial Court held that the order terminating the services of the respondent was not covered by Regulation 9 (b) but was an order of dismissal from service under Regulation 15 (2) Clause (7) and therefore the order of termination was nothing short of dismissal. It was held that the dismissal of the respondent was illegal and that he was entitled to the pay and allowance in the sum of Rs. 4,500.      5. An appeal was taken to the District Court which confirmed the decree of trial Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court who disposed of the Second appeal preferred by the present appellant affirmed the decree of the courts below but on different grounds. It was held by him that Regulation 9 (b) did not confer any power on the Authority to terminate the employment of its employees. A Division Bench which heard the appeal under the Letters Patent affirmed the decisions of the courts below but on different grounds. It was held that the real reason for dispensing with the services of the respondent was one given by the General Manager in his letter to the Conciliation Officer. It was the alleged breach of the Service Rules A breach of the Standing Order amounted to misconduct as provided by Regulation 15 (l). One of the penalties prescribed by Regulation 15 (2) was dismissal that though the order of termination of services of the respondent did not, on its face, contain the reason for the non-requirement of his services the real reason was the misconduct of the respondent in that he had committed a breach of the Standing Order. The procedure laid down in Regulation 15 (2) (c) of enquiry etc. not having been followed the impugned order was void and illegal. In fact that order had been made by way of punishment.

Court's reasoning:
In that case the departmental enquiry did not proceed beyond the stage of submission of charge-sheet followed by the respondents explanation thereto. The enquiry was not proceeded with, there were no sittings of any enquiry Officer, no evidence was recorded and no conclusions arrived at on the enquiry. It was, therefore held that the services had been terminated simpliciter under the rules of employment and Article 311 was not attracted. In the present case even if it is assumed that the law is the same as would be applicable to a case governed by Article 311 it is difficult to say on the principles laid down in the above case that the services of the respondent were not mercy terminated in accordance with Regulation 9 (b) which governed the conditions of his employment. It may be that the motive for termination of his services was the breach of Standing Order 17, i e., of filing a writ petition in the High Court against the demotion without exhausting departmental remedies but the question of motive is immaterial. No charge-sheet was preferred under Regulation 15 nor was enquiry held in accordance therewith before the order under Regulation 9 (b) was made. It may be that if the respondent had successfully pleaded and proved male fides on the part of the authority terminating his services the impugned order could be legitimately challenged but no foundation was laid in that behalf in the plaint nor was the question of male fides investigated by the Courts below10. As regards the punishment having been inflicted for misconduct the order being a mere camouflage we are unable to endorse the view that any such question could arise in the present case. Regulation 9 (b) clearly empowered the authorities to terminate the services after giving one months notice or pay in lieu of notice. The order was unequivocally made in terms of that Regulation. Even if the employers of the respondent thought that he was a cantankerous person and it was not desirable to retain him in service it was open to them to terminate his services in terms of Regulation 9 (b) and it was not necessary to dismiss him by way of punishment for misconduct.