Case: Juggilal Kamlapat Vs. Pratapmal Rameshwar

The question arises on the following facts. The plaintiff and the defendant are both firms registered under the Indian Partnership Act, dealing in the sale and purchase of jute goods. By four different contracts entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant, the latter agreed to buy from the plaintiff diverse quantities of B twill deliverable in the months of April, May and June, 1952. By another contract, the defendant agreed to buy from the plaintiff a certain quantity of hessian goods, also deliverable in April, May and June, 1952. The appeal before us concerns only the June quota of B twill and the May and June installments of hessian. The April and May installments of B twill and the April quota of hessian do not form theof this appeal.It is not disputed that all the contracts were in the standard forms of the Indian Jute Mills Association. In all these contracts there is a clause for payment which is in the followingto be made in cash in exchange for Delivery Orders on Sellers, or for Railway Receipts or for Docks Receipts or for Mates Receipts (which Docks or Mates Receipts are to be handed by a Dock or Ships officer to the Sellersrespect of the June, quota of B twill and the May and June installments of hessian, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant pucca delivery orders on mills like Fort Gloster, Fort William or Auckland generally described as European Mills. These pucca delivery orders which were issued by European Mills passed through several hands before they came into appellants possession. They contain a stipulation that the Mills were not bound to recognise any transferee, except the original buyer and require the transferees to give an undertaking to the Mills that they would take delivery of the goods in terms of the contract between the Mills and the original buyer. The appellant, as already stated, was not the original buyer of these pucca delivery orders. The respondent having refused to accept the pucca delivery orders tendered by the appellant or pay for the same, the appellant instituted the suit out of which the appeal arises.

Court's reasoning:
The question is not one of estoppel but the inference to be, drawn from the conduct of the respondent. The pleadings as well as the conduct lead one to the conclusion that the delivery orders were in accordance with the contract which the respondent accepted, as Mills pucca delivery orders. In the result apart from the questions of law which have been discussed in full by all the courts the appellant is entitled to succeed on the simple ground that he has established that in the cases in dispute the delivery orders were in accordance with the contracts. The is allowed with costs.