Case: Super Forgins &amp; Steels Vs. Thayabally Rasuljee (Dead) By Lrs

2. Messrs Fakruddin and Company is a partnership firm the business of which was formerly carried on by Thyabally Rasuljee,al building No. 155 Linghi Chetty Street, Madras, taken on rent, not being his own.3. Messrs Super Forgings and Steels Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act is the tenant, which was carrying on its business in abuilding No. 118, Linghi Chetty Street, Madrasal building of whichwas the landlord. The landlord filed a petition against the tenant on the ground available to him under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act before the Rent Controller at Madras for eviction of the tenant from the petitionbuilding, by stating the facts which constituted the said ground, thus :``The petitioner submits that he is carrying on business in the name and style of Messrs Fakruddin and Company which is a partnership firm at No. 155 (Old No. 307) Linghi Chetty Street, G.T.which is a rented building and there is a threat of eviction. The petitioner is not in occupation of any building of his own for the business which he is carrying on anywhere in the City of Madras.4. Since it was found by the Rent Controller that the facts constituting the said ground of eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, on which the landlord had sought eviction of the tenant from the petitionbuilding were satisfactorily established, eviction order was made by him in respect of the petitionbuilding. Though, that eviction order was challenged by the tenant before the Appellate Authority and the High Court, in appeal and revision, respectively, both the appeal and revision were dismissed by judgments and orders made in them. The present appeal by special leave, filed by the tenant in the year 1982 is directed against the said eviction order of the Rent Controller and judgments and orders of the Appellate Authority and the High Court.

Court's reasoning:
e of the said true facts disclosed from the report of the Court of Small Causes at Madras which have emerged as a result of developments in the case during the pendency of the present appeal, the main question that needs our consideration and decision is, whether respondents 5, 6 and 9, the sons of the deceaseders ofbuilding No. 151, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras, are carrying on the business of their partnership M/s. Fakruddin and Company in thatg be regarded as landlords not occupying abuilding in the city which is their own, for obtaining under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, possession of the petitionThat a landlord who, for purposes of carrying on his business, is not occupying abuilding of his own in the city can get under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, possession of anotherbuilding of his own in the city in the occupation of a tenant was not disputed on behalf of theBut it was contended on behalf of thethat a landlord occupying for purposes of carrying on his business abuilding, of which he is acannot claim the benefit on ground of eviction available under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act against a tenant in abuilding of which he is a owner of aThe sustainability of that contention was questioned, rather strenuously, by learned counsel for respondents 2 to 11 on the plea that a landlord who is aal building where he carries on his business, not being its sole owner, such building cannot be regarded as `his own envisaged under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act as would disentitle him to the benefit of the ground of eviction, available thereunder. We find it difficult to accept the plea advanced on behalf of respondents 2 to 11 in questioning the sustainability of the contention raised on behalf of thea landlord is aial building in the city, town or village concerned, which he is occupying for purposes of carrying on his business, will he not be occupying therefor abuilding of his own envisaged in the above Section 10(3)(a)(iii), as would disentitle him to the ground of eviction available thereunder being the real question needing our answer in the light of the aforesaid plea of learned counsel for respondents urged in questioning the sustainability of the contention raised on behalf of thewe have to find the answer therefor.9. The answer to the said question, in our view, cannot be anything other than that abuilding in occupation of landlord which is `his own envisaged in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) above, is not only that of which he is an absolute owner, but also that of which he is aner of a building who is its landlord is regarded under Rent Control Laws of our country as its owner entitled to obtain possession of such a building from a tenant for his bona fide requirement.The owner in the expression `if he is the owner in Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1956 when as opined by this Court ought to be regarded as `theinasmuch as `the owner, like any sole owner of property, there would be no justification for us to hold that `the nonTherefore, we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the respondents, who are carrying on the business of M/s. Fakruddin and Company inbuilding No. 151, Linghi Chetty Street, Madras, of which they arecan be regarded as landlords, who are occupying their nonresidential building envisaged under clause (iii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act, as would disentitle them to retain the benefit of the eviction order made by the Rent Controller against the tenant in respect of the petition nonresidential building at the instance of the deceasedfor carrying on his business on the ground that he did not occupy his own nonresidential building for the purpose. Consequently, the eviction order of the Rent Controller as affirmed by the Appellate Authority and the High Court, which is under challenge in this appeal, calls to be set aside taking into consideration the developments which have taken place during its pendency in thiswas submitted on behalf of respondent 2 to 11 was that a proceeding for eviction under the Act should be regarded as having created a vested right when the eviction order of the Controller was affirmed by the High Court in a revision petition allowed under the Act and an appeal pending in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against that eviction order, being special appeal provided for under the Constitution cannot be considered as a continuation eviction proceeding as would entitle this Court to deny the relief got by a party from the Rent Controller and the High Court because of the subsequent developments taking place during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. We find it difficult to accede to the said submission made on behalf of respondents 2 to 11 in this appeal.The said legal position adumbrated by theBench of this Court, leaves no room for us to doubt the power of this Court to take note of the circumstances which have cropped up during the pendency of an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution for granting, denying or moulding the relief to be given to a party in such appeal, for meeting the ends of justice. Hence, the power of this Court in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution to take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to institution of eviction proceeding and grant, deny, mould the relief sought by a party, in consonance with justice and fair play is not restricted merely because it is exercising its power to deal with an appeal conferred upon it by the Constitution.17. In the facts of the present case as we have pointed out earlier respondents 2 to 11 become disentitled to obtain eviction order under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act because they areial building, where they are carrying on the business of M/s. Fakruddin and Company for carrying on which business the deceasedhad sought eviction of the appellant tenant from anotherbuilding of which also respondents 2 to 11 have become theafter the demise ofThus, the subsequent developments which have arisen during the pendency of the present appeal warrant the setting aside of the eviction order which is questioned in appeal.