Case: Workmen Of The Motor Industries Co. Ltd Vs. Management Of Motor Industries Co. Ltd.,Bangalore

On August 24, 1964 the said association handed over to the management a charter of demands. Negotiations between the parties having failed, the demands were taken before the conciliation officer when the parties arrived at a settlement dated December 23, 1964. On April 29, 1966, the management issued a notice suspending for a day, i.e., May 4, 1966, one B. G. Shenoy as and by way of penalty. In consequence of the protest by the association, the said suspension was postponed and on May 10, 1966, the management served a charge-sheet on Shenoy and suspended him pending an enquiry. On May 11, 1966 the association demanded withdrawal of the said suspension and the said charge-sheet. Discussions took place on that day from 9.45 A. M. to 12.30 P. M. between the association and the management and the parties thereafter adjourned at 1 P. M. for lunch having decided to resume the talks at 2-30 P. M. At 2 P. M. the first shift ended and the workers of the second shift began to come in. The workmen of the first shift, however, stayed on and those of the second shift along with the workmen of the general shift joined them and all of them went on strike. The discussions which were resumed at 2.30 P. M. ended in an agreement at 5 P. M. and the workmen returned to work. On May 18, 1966 the assistant establishment officer submitted a complaint to the chief personnel officer alleging certain acts of misconduct by a crowd of workmen mentioning therein the names of five of them including the said three workmen. On May 25, 1966 charge-sheets alleging stoppage of work, abandoning the place of work, inciting clerks and officers of G. 2 department to join the said strike, disorderly behaviour including intimidation and assault on one, A. Lakshman Rao, were served upon those five workmen. Correspondence thereafter ensued between the association and the management wherein the association protested against the managements decision to adopt disciplinary action against the said five workmen despite the agreement arrived at on May 11, 1966. Thereafter, a domestic enquiry was held on June 30, 1966 which was completed on July 27, 1966 when the enquiry officer made his report holding the said three workmen, Sandhyavoo, Prabhakar and Vasudevan, guilty of acts of misconduct under standing order 22 (2), (3), (13) and (18). He exonerated the other two workmen except on the charge of participating in the strike and loitering about under Cls. (2) and (18) of the said standing order. On August 12, 1966, the management, agreeing with the report, passed orders of dismissal against the said three workmen which gave rise to the said reference. On March 23, 1968 the Labour Court gave its award holding that the said enquiry was validly held and that the management were justified in passing the said orders of dismissal.

Court's reasoning:
In our view this argument cannot be sustained. The construction of Clause 5 of the settlement suggested by Mr. Ramamurthi is contrary to (a) the tenor of that settlement, and (b) the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act under which a settlement arrived at between an employer and a union representing the employees during conciliation proceedings is binding not only on such union but also the workmen whom it represents and(c) the principles of collective bargaining recognised by industrial law. The settlement was a package settlement by which the management and the workmen, through their association, arrived at certain terms in the presence of the conciliation officer. The settlement, besides settling the demands contained in the said charter of demands, sets out the necessity of harmonious relations and of co-operation between the management and the workmen so as to promote higher and better production. It was to achieve this object that direct action on the part of either of them such as a strike by the workmen and a lock out by the employer without notice was prohibited. Evidently the provision for four days notice before any direct action was taken by either of them was provided for so that during that period if there was any grievance it could be ironed out by negotiation. Clause 5 of the settlement falls in two parts: (1) the substantive part, and (2) the corollary thereof. The first part inter alia provided that neither the association nor the management would resort to any direct action, such as strike, go-slow tactics or lock out or any such coercive action without giving to the other a four days, notice. The second part provided an undertaking on the part of the association to co-operate with the management, if there was any strike by workmen without any call therefor from the association, if the management were to take disciplinary action against the workmen.If the construction of Clause 5 suggested by Mr. Ramamurthi were to be accepted, it would lead to a surprising result, namely, that though a strike at the instance of the association required four days notice, a strike by the workmen without any call from the association would not require any such notice and that the settlement left complete liberty to the workmen to launch a sudden strike. Such a construction appears on the very face of it contrary to the object and purpose of the settlement and particularly Clause 5 which envisaged a notice period of four days to enable the parties to resolve a dispute before direct action on its account is resorted to by either of them. The suggested construction is also untenable, for, surely the association irrespective of the workmen cannot by itself resort to any direct action. How can, for instance, the association resort to go-slow tactics without giving a call for it to the workmen?It is obvious, therefore, that Clause 5 does not contemplate any dichotomy between the association and the workmen as suggested by Mr. Ramamurthi, besides being repugnant to the principle that a settlement arrived at by the association must be regarded as one made by it in its representative character, and therefore, binding on the workmen. Therefore, although the settlement mentions in Clause 5 the management, workmen and the association, the expression workmen therein was unnecessary, for, without that expression also it would have been as efficaciously binding on the workmen as on the association. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the settlement mentions the management and the association on behalf of the workmen only as the parties thereto and the signatories thereto also are only the representatives of the two bodies. None of the workmen, nor any one separately representing them affixed his signature to it. If a lightening strike without notice is illegal under any provision of law (a question which we shall presently consider) standing Order 22 would come into operation and starting or joining such a strike and inciting others to join it would amount to misconduct for which disciplinary action by the management would be possible.7. It is clear that there is a distinction between a strike envisaged by Section 23 (c) in respect of a matter covered by a settlement and a strike in breach of a settlement envisaged by S.contention does not seem correct, firstly, because though an agreement not to resort to a strike without notice would be the subject matter of a settlement, a strike in contravention of such an agreement is not in respect of any of the matters covered by such settlement. Secondly, such a constriction would mean as if Parliament intended to provide two different penalties, one under Section 26 and the other under Sec. 29, for the very same offence, one higher than the other, an intention difficult to attribute. The strike was in the matter of the suspension of the said Shenoy pending a domestic enquiry against him, a matter which obviously was not one of the matters covered by the said settlement. It was, therefore, not a strike illegal under Section 24 read with S. 23 (c). However, the strike was in contravention of Clause 5 of the said settlement and that settlement being binding on the workmen concerned and in operation at the time was punishable under Sec. 29, and therefore, illegal under that section.8. The question whether a strike in contravention of a similar clause in a settlement was illegal arose in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. C. B. Mitter, C. A. No. 633 of 1963, D/- 2-4-1964 (SC). As in Cl. 5 of the settlement before us, the settlement there also provided that "in no case" would the parties thereto resort to direct action such as lock-outs, strikes, go-slow and other direct action without four days notice. The strike in question was commenced in respect of a demand by a workman for a pair of gum-boots, a demand not covered by the settlement. It was common ground that the strike would not fall within the ambit of Section 24 but the controversy was whether it was otherwise illegal, the workmens contention being that it was not, as the said clause against a strike without notice applied only to one declared for enforcing one or the other demands which formed the subject matter of the settlement and since the strike arose out of a matter not covered by the settlement, that clause was inapplicable. This Court negatived the contention and held that the words "in no case" in that clause meant a strike for whatever reason and though it was conceded that it was not illegal under Section 24, it was, nevertheless, held to be illegal not because it was in respect of a matter covered by the said settlement but because it was in contravention of the settlement which was binding on the concerned workmen which meant that the Court held the strike to be illegal under Section 29.In our view the decision in the present case must be the same. The strike was illegal not under Section 24 but because it was in contravention of the settlement binding on the workmen concerned. Consequently, standing order 22 would apply and participating in or inciting others to join such a strike would amount to misconduct for which the management were entitled to take disciplinaryagreement was oral. According to Bernard, Secretary of the association, the agreement was that (a) the charges and the suspension order passed against the said Shenoy should be withdrawn, (b) the Company should pay the wages for the 31/2 hours period of the strike provided the workmen made good the loss of production during that period, and (c) the management would take no action against any one for going on strike. The evidence of Martin, the companys technical director, on the other hand, was that the company agreed only not to punish the said Shenoy and to consider paying wages for the hours of the strike.The Labour Court on this evidence held that the association failed to prove that the management had agreed not to take action against any of the workmen in connection with the strike though it may be that they might have agreed not to victimise any workman for participating in the strike. In fact, the management did not impose any penalty against any workman for joining the strike, not even against the three concerned workmen. This finding being purely one of fact and the Labour Court having given cogent reasons for it, we would not interfere with it without the utmost reluctance. We have been taken through the evidence and the correspondence between the parties but we fail to see any error on the part of the Labour Court in reaching thatcharge-sheets, exs. M/4A, M/5A and M/6A against the three workmen alleged in express terms disorderly behaviour and intimidation. The report of the enquiry officer against the said Vasudevan clearly stated at the enquiry officer accepted the evidence of the managements witnesses and that on that evidence all the charges against him stood proved. While summarising those charges be, no doubt, did not in so many words use the expression "intimidation". But the evidence which he, as aforesaid accepted, was that Vasudevan along with other workmen entered the G. 2 department at about 3 P. M. on that day and thumping his hand on the table of the said Lakshman Rao threatened that officer in the following words "now I am in the forefront (of the crowd). You cannot do anything. You ask your people to come out and you also come out. Otherwise you can see what we can do for you now." The said Lakshman Rao had also deposed that he was surrounded by the workers who started pushing and pulling him. The evidence of other officers was that as the crowd which forced its way into this department got unruly they were also forced to leave their places of work. The evidence against Prabhakar was that he too was in the forefront of that crowd which squeezed Lakshman Rao and some members thereof inflicted kicks on him. Similarly, there was the evidence of one Raja, the assistant personnel officer, and others that Sandhyavoo was one of those in the forefornt of that crowd. According to Raja, Sandhyaoo tried to lift him from his seat with a view to force him to leave his table and finding that the crowd had became restive he left his place. Acceptance of this evidence by the enquiry officer must necessarily mean acceptance of the version of these officers that they were intimidated by the crowd which forced its way into their department led by these workmen. Though enquiry officer his not, in so many words used the expression "intimidation his finding of disorderly behaviour must be held to include acts oforders against the three workmen being identical in terms we take the order passed against Vasudevan as a specimen.That order sets out four acts of misconduct by him; (1) striking or stopping work, (2) inciting, (3) riotous and disorderly behaviour and (4) loitering about in the companys premises. Though each one of these acts, according to the order, was misconduct punishable with dismissal, the order states that so far as acts 1 and 4 were concerned, the management did not wish to take a serious view of them as a large number of "misguided" workmen had stopped work and left their places of work without permission. The management, therefore, took action only in respect of acts falling under Clauses 3 and 13 of Standing order 22 evidently for the reason that thy considered incitement, intimidation and riotous and disorderly behaviour as "very grave in nature." We do not think that in taking this view the management discriminated against the three workmen concerned as against the rest or that they dismissed them with the object of victimising. The evidence in the enquiry clearly disclosed that when the crowd forced its way into the G. 2 department it was led by these three workmen,all of whom were in the forefront thereof and two of them had defiantly forced the officers to leave their tables. One of them had threatened as to what he and the others who were behind him in that crowd could do to him if he did not comply and the other had tried even to lift another officer from his chair to compel him to leave his place of work. In these circumstances the management cannot be blamed if they took a serious view of these acts of the three workmen concerned, who had taken up their position in the forefront of that crowd, a position indicative of their having led that crowd into that department and having acted as its leaders.An act of discrimination can only occur if amongst those equally situated an unequal treatment is meted out to one or more of them. Having been found to be the leaders of the crowd, action taken against them cannot on any principle be regarded as discriminatory or unequal.The decision in Burn and Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, 1959-1 Lab LJ 450 = (AIR 1959 SC 529  ) relied on by Mr. Ramamurthi has no bearing on the facts of this case and cannot assist him. Once a misconduct graver than that of the rest was found proved against these three workmen and for which the punishment is dismissal, victimisation cannot legitimately be attributed to the management. It is relevant in this connection to remember that so far as their participation in the strike and loitering about were concerned, no action was taken against these three workmen on the ground that those acts were common with those of the rest of the workmen. In view of these facts it is not understandable how the impugned orders of dismissal could be characterised as acts of victimisation.It is also not possible to say that the finding of incitement and disorderly behaviour of these three workmen was perverse or such as no reasonable body of persons could come to on the evidence on record on the ground only that the others also were guilty of those acts. For there would be nothing wrong if those who misled or misguided other workmen were selected for disciplinary action and not the victims of their persuasion, who in following their precept did similar acts.