Case: O. K. Ghosh And Another Vs. E. X. Joseph

1. The respondent E. X. Joseph is in the service of the Government of India in the Audit and Accounts Department at Bombay. He was the Secretary of the Civil Accounts Association which consists of non-gazetted staff of the Accountant-Generals Office. The said Association was affiliated to the All India Non-Gazetted Audit and Accounts Association. The latter Association had been recognised by Government of India in December, 1956. In May, 1959, the Government withdrew recognition of the said Association. In spite of the withdrawal of the recognition of the said Association, the respondent continued to be its Secretary-General and refused to dissociate himself from the activities of the said Association, though called upon to do so. As a result of his activities, on or about 3-6-1960, he was served with a charge-sheet for having deliberately committed breach of R. 4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules (1955) (hereinafter called the Rules). Appellant 1 O. K Ghosh accountant General, Maharashtra, who held the enquiry, found the respondent guilty of the charges levelled against him. Accordingly, a notice to show cause why he should not be removed from service was served on the respondent.2. On 25-7-1960, appellant 1 served a memo on the respondent intimating to him that it was proposed to hold an enquiry against him for having deliberately contravened the provision of R. 4-A of the Rules in so far as he participated actively in various demonstrations organised in connection with the strike of Central Government employees and had taken active part in the preparations made for the said strike.3. On 8-8-l960. the respondent filed a writ petition on the original side of the Bombay High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed that a writ of certiorari should be issued to quash the charge-sheets issued against him by appellant 1 in respect of the alieged contravention of Rr. 4-B and 4-A and a writ of prohibition should be issued prohibiting appellant 1 from proceeding further with the departmental proceedings against the respondent. In his petition, the respondent asked for other incidental reliefs.4. The main ground on which the respondent challenged the validity of the departmental proceedings initiated against him was that Rr. 4-A and 4-B were void in so far as they contravened the "fundamental rights guaranteed to the respondent under Art. 19(1) (a), (b), (c) and (g). This contention was resisted by appellant 1 and appellant 2, the Union of India, who had been impleaded as respondents to the said petition. it was urged on their behalf that the impugned rules were valid and so, the claim for a writ of certiorari or writ of prohibition was not justified.5. The writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. On 18-1-1961, the High Court rejected the petition in so far as the respondent had claimed writs in regard to the enquiry for breach of R. 4-A; the Court held that the said rule was valid and so, the departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent in respect of the breach of the said rule could not be successfully impeached. In respect of the proceedings under R 4B, however, the High Court held that the said rule was invalid and so, the departmental proceedings in respect of the breach of the said rule have been quashed. It is against this decision that the appellants, the A. G. and the Union of India, have come to this Court by Appeal No. 378/1962; whereas E. X. Joseph, the respondent, has preferred Appeal No. 379/1962.Both the appeals have been brought to this Court by special leave.

Court's reasoning:
Can it be said that the rule imposes a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order ?There can be no doubt that Government servants can be subjected to rules which are intended to maintain discipline amongst their ranks and to lead to an efficient discharge of their duties. Discipline amongst Government employees and their efficiency may in a sense, be said to be related to public order. But in considering the scope of cl. (4), it has to be borne in mind that the rule must be in the interests of public order and must amount to a reasonable restriction. The words "Public orders" occur even in cl. (2), which refers, inter alia, to security of the State and public order. There can be no doubt that the said words must have the same meaning in both cls. (2) and (4). So far as cl. (2) is concerned, security of the State having been expressly and specifically provided for, public order cannot include the security of State, though in its widest sense it may be capable of including the said concept. Therefore, in cl. (2), public order is virtually synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquillity. The denotation of the said words cannot be any wider in cl. (4). That is one consideration which it is necessary to bear in mind. When cl. (4) refers to the restriction imposed in the interests of public order, it is necessary to enquire as to what is the effect of the words "in the interests of ". This clause again cannot be interpreted to mean that even if the connection between the restriction and the public order is remote and indirect the restriction can be said to be in the interests of public order. A restriction can be said to be in the interests of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is proximate and direct. Indirect or far-fetched or unreal connection between the restriction and public order would not fall within the purview of the expression "in the interests of public orders." This interpretation is strengthened by the other requirement of cl. (4) that, by itself, the restriction ought to be reasonable. It would be difficult to hold that a restriction which does not directly relate to public order can be said to be reasonable on the ground that its connection with public order is remote or far-fetched. That is another consideration which is relevant. Therefore, reading the two requirements of cl. (4), it follows that the impugned restriction can be said to satisfy the test of cl. (4) only if its connection with public order is shown to be rationally proximate and direct.A reference: to R. 5 of the Recognition of Service Association Rules recently made in 1959 would clearly show that there is no necessary connection between recognition or its withdrawal and public order. Rule 5 enumerates different conditions by cls. (a) to (I) which every Service Association must comply with; and R .7 provides that if a Service Association recognised under the said rules has failed to comply with the conditions set out in Rr. 4, 5 or 6, its recognition may be withdrawn. one of the conditions imposed by R. 5(1) is that communications addressed by the Service Association or by any office bearer on its behalf to the Government or a Government authority shall not contain any disrespectful or improper language. Similarly, R.5(g) provides that the previous permission of the Government shall be taken before the Service Association seeks affiliation with any other Union, Service Association or Federation; and R. 5(h) prohibits the Service Association from starting or publishing any periodical, magazine or bulletin without the previous approval of the Government. It is not easy to see any rational, direct or proximate connection between the observance of those conditions and public order. Therefore, even without examining the validity of all the conditions laid down by Rr. 4, 5 or 6, it is not difficult to hold that the granting or withdrawing of recognition may be based on considerations some of which have no connection whatever either with the efficiency or discipline amongst the Services or with public order. It might perhaps have been a different matter if the recognition or its withdrawal had been based on grounds which have a direct, proximate and rational connection with public order. That, however, cannot be said about each one of the conditions prescribed by Rr 4, 5 or 6. Therefore, it is quite possible that recognition may be refused or with drawn on grounds which are wholly unconnected with public order and it is in such a set-up that the right to form associations guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (c) is made subject to the rigorous restriction that the association in question must secure and continue to enjoy recognition from the Government. We are, therefore, satisfied that the restriction thus imposed would make the guaranteed right under Art. 19 (1) (c) ineffective and even illusory. That is why we see no reason to differ from the conclusion of the High Court that the impugned R. 4-B is invalid.In regard to Appeal No. 379/1962 though we have partly reversed the conclusion of the High Court in respect of the validity of the whole of R. 4-A, it appears that the departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent in respect of the alleged breach of R. 4-A, have to be quashed, because the alleged contravention of the said rule on which the said proceedings are based is contravention of that part of R. 4-A which has been held to be invalid by this Court. The material charge against the respondent in that behalf is that he had deliberately contravened the provisions of R. 4-A in so far as he has participated actively in the various demonstrations organised in connection with the strike of Central Government employees and took part in the preparations made for the said strike. It will be noticed that the result of the decision of this Court in Kameshwar Prasads case is that in so far as the rule prohibits any form of demonstration, it is invalid. It is not invalid in so far as it may prohibit participation in strikes. The charge against the respondent is not that he participated in any strike: the charge is that he participated in the various demonstrations: and that is a charge based upon that part of the rule which prohibits demonstrations altogether. It is true that the demonstrations in which he is alleged to have participated actively were organised in connection with the strike; but that does not mean either in fact or in law that he participated in the strike itself. Similarly, the charge that he took- active part in the preparations made for the said strike, also does not mean in fact or in law that he participated in the strike. If he joined demonstrations organised in connection with the strikes, or if he took part in the preparations for the strike, it cannot be said that he took part in the strike as such, and so, the charge cannot be reasonably construed to mean that his conduct amounted to a contravention of the rule which prohibits strikes. Therefore, though R. 4-A is partly, and not wholly, invalid as held by this Court in the case of Kameshwar Prasad, the particular charge against the respondent being on the basis of that part of the rule which is invalid, it must follow that the departmental proceedings based on that charge are also invalid.