Case: Baikuntha Nath Das And Anr Vs. Chief Distt. Medical Officer, Baripada And Anr

2. The appellants in both the appeals have been compulsorily retired by the government of Orissa in exercise of the power conferred upon it by the first proviso to Rule 71(a) of the Orissa Service Code. Since the relevant facts in both the appeals are similar, it would be sufficient if we set out the facts in Civil Appeal No. 869 of 1987.3. The appellant, Sh. Baikuntha Nath Das was appointed as a Pharmacist (then designated as Compounder) by the Civil Surgeon, Mayurbhanj on 15.3.1951. By an order dated 13.2.1976 the government of Orissa retired him compulsorily under the first proviso to Sub-rule (a) of Rule 71 of the Orissa Service Code. The order reads asexercise of the powers conferred under the first proviso to Sub-rule (a) of Rule 71 of Orissa Service Code, the Government of Orissa is pleased to order the retirement of Sh. Baikunthanath Das, Pharmacist now working under the Chief District Medical Officer, Mayurbhanj on the expiry of three months from the date of service of this order on him.By order of the Governor.The petitioner challenged the same in the High Court of Orissa by way of a writ petition, being O.J.C. No. 412 of 1976. His case was that the order was based on no material and that it was the result of ill-will and malice the Chief District Medical Officer bore towards him. The petitioner was transferred by the said officer from place to place and was also placed under suspension at one stage. He submitted that his entire service has been spotless and that at no time were any adverse entries in his confidential character rolls communicated to him. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the government, it was submitted that the decision to retire the petitioner compulsorily was taken by the Review Committee and not by the Chief Medical Officer. It was submitted that besides the remarks made in the confidential character rolls, other material was also taken into consideration by the Review Committee and that it arrived at its decision bona fide and in public interest which decision was accepted and approved by the government. The allegation of mala fides was denied.5. The High Court looked into the proceedings of the Review Committee and the confidential character rolls of the petitioner and dismissed the writ petition on the following reasoning: An order of compulsory retirement after putting in the prescribed qualifying period of service does not amount to punishment as has been repeatedly held by this court. The order in question was passed by the State Government and not by the Chief Medical Officer. It is true that the confidential character roll of the petitioner contained several remarks adverse to him which were, no doubt, not communicated to him, but the decision of this court in Union of India v. M.E. Reddy, 1979(2) SLR 792 (SC) holds that uncommunicated adverse remarks can also be relied upon while passing an order of compulsory retirement. The said adverse remarks have been made by successive Civil Surgeons and not by the particular Chief District Medical Officer against whom the petitioner has alleged malafides. It is unlikely that all the Chief District Medical Officers were prejudiced against the petitioner. In particular, the court observed,"the materials placed before us do not justify a conclusion that the remarks in the confidential character rolls had not duly and properly been recorded."The decision to retire has been taken by the Review Committee on proper material and there are no grounds to interfere with its decision, it opined.6. The adverse remarks make against the petitioner in the words of the High Court are to the followingmost insincere, irregular in habits and negligent and besides being a person of doubtful integrity, he had been quarrelsome with his colleagues and superior officers and had been creating problems for the

Court's reasoning:
8. It is evident that the latter half of the proviso which empowers the government to retire a government servant in public interest after he completes 30 years of qualifying service or after attaining the age of 50 years is in pari materia with the Fundamental Ruleare referring to the said aspect inasmuch as the proviso to Rule 71(a) of the Orissa Service Code, concerned in the appeals before us, also does not contain the word "absolute".The blurring of the dividing line between a quasi-judicial order and an administrative order, pointed out in Kraipak has no effect upon the above position, more so when compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it imply any stigma. Kraipak - or for that matter, Maneka Gandhi - cannot be understood as doing away with the concept of subjective satisfaction.29. On the above premises, it follows, in our respectful opinion that the view taken in J.N. Sinha is the correct one viz., principles of natural justice are not attracted in a case of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to it. In this context, we may point out a practical difficulty arising from the simultaneous operation of two rules enunciated in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra. On one hand, it is stated that only the entries of last ten years should be seen and on the other hand, it is stated that if there are any adverse remarks therein, they must not only be communicated but the representations made against them should be considered and disposed of before they can be taken into consideration. Where do we draw the line in the matter of disposal of representation. Does it mean, disposal by the appropriate authority alone or does it include appeal as well. Even if the appeal is dismissed, the government servant may file a revision or make a representation to a still higher authority. He may also approach a court or Tribunal for expunging those remarks. Should the government wait until all these stages are over. All that would naturally take a long time by which time, these reports would also have become stale. A government servant so minded can adopt one or the other proceeding to keep the matter alive. This is an additional reason for holding that the principle of M.E. Reddy should be preferred over Brij Mohan Singh Chopra and Baidyanath Mahapatra, on the question of taking into consideration uncommunicated adverse remarks.30. Another factor to be borne in mind is this : most often, the authority which made the adverse remarks and the authority competent to retire him compulsorily are not the same. There is no reason to presume that the authority competent to retire him will not act bona fide or will not consider the entire record dispassionately. As the decided cases show, very often, a Review Committee consisting of more than one responsible official is constituted to examine the cases and make their recommendation to the government. The Review Committee, or the government, would not naturally be swayed by one or two remarks, favourable or adverse. They would form an opinion on a totality of consideration of the entire record - including representations, if any, made by the government servant against the above remarks - of course attaching more importance to later period of his service. Another circumstances to be borne in mind is the unlikelihood of succession of officers making unfounded remarks against a government servant.31. We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the Rules/orders in that behalf. Any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56(j) (or the Rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation or representations, as the case may be. In some cases, it may happen that some adverse remarks of the recent years are not communicated or if communicated, the representations received in that behalf are pending consideration. On this account alone, the action under F.R. 56(j) need not be held back. There is no reason to presume that the Review Committee or the government, if it chooses to take into consideration such uncommunicated remarks, would not be conscious or cognizant of the fact that they are not communicated to the government servant and that he was not given an opportunity to explain or rebut the same. Similarly, if any representation made by the government servant is there, it shall also be taken into consideration. We may reiterate that not only the Review Committee is generally composed of high and responsible officers, the power is vested in government alone and not in a minor official. It is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed present, may be indicative of malice in law. We may mention in this connection that the remedy provided by Article 226 of the Constitution is no less an important safeguard. Even with its well-known constraints, the remedy is an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action.At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. There may be any number of remarks, observations and comments, which do not constitute adverse remarks, but are yet relevant for the purpose of F.R. 56(j) or a Rule corresponding to it. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well-stated in J.N. Sinha and other decisions referred supra.32. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.(iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 29 to 31are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem - is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words, the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Government, there is no room for importing the said facet of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma.34. So far as the appeals before us are concerned, the High Court which has looked into the relevant record and confidential records has opined that the order of compulsory retirement was based not merely upon the said adverse remarks but other material as well. Secondly, it has also found that the material placed before them does not justify the conclusion that the said remarks were not recorded duly or properly. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the order of compulsory retirement suffers from mala fides or that it is based on no evidence or that it is arbitrary.