Case: State of Gujarat Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Others

In the present appeals, certain facts are no longer in dispute. The respondents are the erstwhile taluqdars or inamdars what was known as Ghogha Mahal, which now forms part of the Bhavnagar district. There were vast stretches of hilly tracts described as Dunger, which were incapable of cultivation, but on which there was spontaneous growth of grass. These lands formed part of their taluqdari estates or inams. They used to sell the grass growing on these lands and it was a definite source of income to them. It appears that the lands were recorded as Kharaba in the record of rights and, therefore, consequent upon the abolition of taluqdari rights by the Taluqdari Abolition Act and with the Abolition of inams under the Personal Inams Abolition Act, the lands were recorded as having vested in The Government. Thereupon, the respondents made separate claims before the Mahalkari, Ghogha Mahal, seeking a declaration under s. 37(2) of the Bombay I and Revenue Code, 1879 that the lands were neither vacant lands nor uncultivated lands and being in their possession, they become the occupantsan enquiry held under s. 3(2), the Mahalkari examined the claimants individually, the village talatis and the relevant entries in the records of rights which showed that the taluqdars and inamdars were deriving income from the grass growing on the lands. It was also in evidence that considerable effort and expenses had to be incurred by them for se curing the income of this grass i.e., by keeping watchmen etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought on land or trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass, but that it grew to full stature so as to give a fair and full yield. When operation for cutting of the grass used to commence, the stubs were not cut off but were allowed to remain intact so that the next year after The rains, the grass would grow naturally again. A portion of the grass-lands were also kept apart by the respondents for the grazing of their cattle by fencing of the area. The Mahalkari, Ghogha Mahal by his order dated October 28, 1958 held on this evidence that the lands could not be treated as waste lands or uncultivated lands, and since the respondents were in possession thereof, they became the occupants.The Collector, Bhavnagar, in exercise of his suo motu powers of revision under s. 211 of the Code by his order dated February 28, 1961 set aside the orders of the Mahalkari and held in all these twenty-seven cases, that since the lands in question were not being cultivated by taluqdars or inamdars, they must, by reason of Explanation to s. 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and Explanation to s. 7 of the Inams Abolition Act, be treated to be unoccupied lands, and, therefore, the lands vest in the Government. The Revenue Tribunal, however, by its two orders dated June 19, 1962 and March 26, 1965, reversed the order of the Collector and restored that of the Mahalkari holding the respondents to be the occupants of the lands in question. The State Government of Gujarat filed twenty-seven writ petitions in the High Court for quashing the orders of the Revenuewith the Revenue Tribunal, the High Court held that there was evidence that the lands in dispute were not lying desolate, abandoned or barren with no vegetation, but were, in fact, productive lands, in the sense that grass grew naturally and so, t hey could not be regarded as waste lands, although they were wrongly recorded as such. It also held that the hilly tracts on which grass grew naturally, by their very nature were unfit for cultivation and, therefore, could not be treated as uncultivated lands. It relied on the Explanation to the two sections and observed that it contemplates only those lands which could be cultivated but which were left fallow and uncultivated for a continuous period of three years. In its opinion, the expressions waste lands and uncultivated lands, therefore, did not cover grass-lands on hilly tracts which by their very nature are incapable of cultivation, but which are not useless so as to be not capable of any use.The question for consideration in these appeals is whether the High Court was right in holding that the respondents, who were taluqdars or inamdars, were entitled to settlement of these grass-lands on hilly tracts as occupants thereof under s. 5(1) (b) of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 5(2) (b) of the Inams Abolition Act.

Court's reasoning:
It is therefore, evident that the determination of the question whether a particular category of property belonging to a taluqdar in a taluqdari estate is vested in the Government or not, and the determination of the question whether the rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished or not, will depend upon the category of that property. The expression all waste lands has been joined by conjunctive and with the expression all uncultivated lands. They, therefore, indicate two distinct types of lands. If the legislature had intended that the aforesaid expression should indicate one class of lands, the expression rather would have been all waste and uncultivated lands as against the expression all waste lands and all uncultivated lands" were we have, therefore, two distinct categories of properties viz. ( 1 ) waste lands, and (2) uncultivated lands. The contention that the grass-lands on hilly tracts which are incapable of cultivation were waste lands or uncultivated lands within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be accepted.Now, the expression waste lands has a well-defined legal connotation. It means lands which are desolate, abandoned, and not f it ordinarily for use buildinga fair reading of the section, it would be evident that the vesting is in respect of properties which could be put to public use. It leaves the private properties of the taluqdar untouched. The legislative intent is manifested by clear enumeration of certain specific properties not situate within the wantas of a taluqdar. It begins by specifying All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, etc. and ends up with all village site lands, al l waste lands and all uncultivated lands. and these being public properties situate in a taluqdars estate must necessarily vest in the Government because they are meant for public use. In spite of vesting of such property in the Government, however, the conferral of the rights of an occupant on a taluqdar under s. 5(1)(b) in respect of the lands in his actual possession, isthere, it is fair to observe that the words in parenthesis excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes, exemplify the intention of the legislature not to deprive a taluqdar of such land, even though such property is uncultivated land, due to its inherent character as well as by reason of theis therefore, evident that the determination of the question whether a particular category of property belonging to a taluqdar in a taluqdari estate is vested in the Government or not, and the determination of the question whether the rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished or not, will depend upon the category of that property. The expression all waste lands has been joined by conjunctive and with the expression all uncultivated lands. They, therefore, indicate two distinct types of lands. If the legislature had intended that the aforesaid expression should indicate one class of lands, the expression rather would have been all waste and uncultivated lands as against the expression all waste lands and all uncultivated lands" were we have, therefore, two distinct categories of properties viz. ( 1 ) waste lands, and (2) uncultivated lands. The contention that the grass-lands on hilly tracts which are incapable of cultivation were waste lands or uncultivated lands within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be accepted.Now, the expression waste lands has a well-defined legal connotation. It means lands which are desolate, abandoned, and not f it ordinarily for use buildingis clear that these grass-lands on hilly tracts were not waste lands. They were productive lands in the sense that grass grew naturally and so they were not desolate, abandoned or barren waste lands with no vegetation. The expression waste lands in the context would be clearly, in the original sense of the term waste as meaning barren or desolate lands which are unfit for any use or which are worthless. That test is not clearlyseems to be no doubt on the facts of the case that there were no such basic operations as tilling of the land, sowing or disseminating of seeds, and planting of grass. The subsequent operations i.e., operations performed after the grass grew on the land, e.g., the act of securing the income of this grass by engaging watchmen etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought on land or trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass but that it grew to full stature so as to give a fair and full yield, or when operations for cutting off the grass used to commence, the act of tending the stubs so that they were not cut off but were allowed to remain intact so that the next year after the rains, the grass would grow naturally again, by themselves would not be tantamount to cultivation of the land.In our opinion, the High Court as well as the Revenue Tribunal were, therefore, right in holding that the disputed lands did not vest in tile government under s. of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 7 of the Personal Inams Abolitionreaching. that conclusion, we cannot but take into consideration the fact that the Acts make no provision whatever for payment of any compensation for the acquisition of the rights of the former taluqdars and inamdars in such lands. They are not entitled to any compensation either under s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 10.(1) (b) (i) of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. These provisions speak of the extinguishment of any right or interest in land which is waste or uncultivated but is culturable. The lands in question not being fit for cultivation, were not culturable and. therefore, they do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If the contention of the appellant were to prevail, it would lead to an anomalous position. It would have the effect of taking these lands out of the purview of s. 14 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 17 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act, though such lands are not governed by s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the former Act and s. 10 (1)(i) of the latter Act. This would result in deprivation of property without payment ofthe observation that since it is admitted that no agricultural operations were carried out on the lands for the purpose of raising or growing grass on the lands, the contention that the lands on which grass grew naturally could not be said to be uncultivated, cannot be accepted, even though the inamdars were making use of these lands and were realising income by selling the grass which grew thereon, appears to proceed on a wrongful assumption that the sine qua non for the applicability of s. 5 was actual cultivation. This observation, in our view, cannot be supported