Case: Municipal Corporation Of City Of Hubli Vs. Subha Rao Hanumatharao Prayag &amp; Ors

This appeal by special leave raises two questions relating to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 . The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated asrespondents are rate-payers liable to pay property tax in respect of their lands and buildings situate within the limits of the erstwhile Municipal Borough of Dharwar now converted into the Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation. The Municipal Borough of Dharwar (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Borough) was at the material time governed by the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Chief Officer of the Municipal Borough prepared an assessment list for the official year 1951-52 containing revised valuation and assessment of the lands and buildings situated within the limits of t he Municipal Borough and published it on 1st May, 1951 in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The respondents and several other rate-payers filed their objections against the valuation and assessment in the assessment list and consequent on the decisions on the objections, modifications were made in the assessment list and the assessment list so finalised was authenticated on 24th July, 1952. Since the authentication of the assessment list was made after the expiry o f the official year, the respondents and other rate-payers took the view that the assessment list was void and inoperative and the Municipal Borough was not entitled to recover property tax at the revised rates which were higher than the rates charged in the previous official years. It seems, however, that from a few persons, whose names do not appear in the record property tax in accordance with the revised rates was collected by the Municipal Borough. There was consequently an agitation amongst the rate-payers and a body called the Citizens Welfare Association championing the causes of the rate-payers addressed a communication dated 30th November, 1952 to the Director of Local Authorities requesting him to direct the Municipal Borough to refund the excess amount of property tax collected from the rate-payers, because according to them the levy and collection of property tax at the revised rates was illegal in view of the fact that the assessment list was authenticated only on 24th July, 1952 beyond the expiration of the official year for which the property tax was sought to be levied. The Director of Local Authorities by his reply dated 16th December, 1952 informed the Citizens Welfare Association that the levy of property tax under the authenticated assessment list was, according to him, perfectly valid. The President of the Municipal Borough thereafter issued a public notice dated 10th November, 1954 calling upon the rate-payers to "pay immediately all the tax still due from them and extend their full cooperation to the Municipal Borough". Since the Municipal Borough was determined to recover the amount of property tax from the rate-payers at the enhanced rates appearing in the assessment list, the respondents, acting for and on behalf of themselves and other rate-payers, filed a suit against the Municipal Borough on 6th June, 1955. after giving notice dated 1st April, 1955 on the hypothesis that such notice was required to be given under s 206A of the Act. The main reliefs claimed in the suit were, firstly, a declaration that the Municipal Borough was not entitled to recover property tax from the rate-payers at the revised rates since the assessment list was authenticated beyond the expiration of the official year and secondly, an order directing the Municipal Borough to refund the excess property tax recovered by it from the rate-payers.The Municipal Borough in its written statement raised a preliminary objection that the suit was barred by limitation since it was not filed within six months of the accrual of the cause of action as required by s. 206A of the Act and it also disputed the claim of the rate-payers on merits on t he ground that there was nothing in the Act which required that the assessment list should be authenticated before the expiration of the official year and that even if the assessment list was authenticated beyond the expiration of the official year, it did not have the effect of invalidating the assessmentTrial Court negatived the plea of limitation based on s. 206A of the Act and so far as the merits were concerned, held that since the authentication of the assessment list was admittedly made beyond the expiry of the official year, the assessment list was void and inoperative and the Municipal Borough was not entitled to levy and collect property tax at the revised rates on the strength of such assessment list. The Municipal Borough, being aggrieved by this decision, filed an appeal to the District Court, but the appeal was unsuccessful and a second appeal to the High Court also failed. Hence the present appeal by the Municipal Borough wit h special leave obtained from this Court.

Court's reasoning:
But, apart from this consideration, there is inherent evidence in the sections themselves which shows that the authentication was intended by the legislature to be a step which must be taken before the close of the official year. Section 84 provides that it shall not be necessary to prepare a new assessment list every year but, subject to the conditions that every part of the assessment list shall be completely revised not less than once in every four years, the Chief Officer may adopt the valuation and assessment contained in the list for any year, with such alterations as may be deemed necessary, for the year immediately following. This provision postulates that there would be an assessment list for each official year at the close of that official year, so that the valuation and assessment contained in it can be adopted by the Chief Officer for the immediately following year. Now clearly the assessment list which can be adopted for the immediately following year is the authenticated assessment list and it would, therefore, seem that the legislative assumption underlying this provision is that in respect or each official year, there would be an authenticated assessment list before the close of that official year, so that the valuation and assessment contained in it can be adopted by the Chief Officer for the immediately following year. Otherwise, it would not be possible for the Chief Officer to adopt the valuation and assessment of the preceding official year and he would have to prepare a new provisional assessment list every time when the assessment list for the preceding year is not finalised and authenticated and this might lead to the rat her startling result of there being several provisional assessment lists for different official years in the process of finalisation at the same time. We should be slow to accept an interpretation which might lead to such a strange consequence.Then again considerable light on this question is thrown by the provision enacted in s. 82. It is a well settled rule of interpretation that the Court is "entitled and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act." The statute must be read as a whole and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Obviously, therefore, section 78 to 81 must be so construed as to harmonise with s. 82. They must be read together so as to form part of a connected whole. Section 82, sub-s. (1) provides for making of an amendment in the assessment list by insertion or alteration of an entry in certain events after hearing objections which may be made by any person interested in opposing the amendment. Sub-section (3) of s. 82 makes the amendment effective from "the earliest day in the current official year on which the circumstances justifying the entry or alteration existed." The expression current official year in the context in which it occurs in s. 82, sub-s. (3) clearly signifies the earliest day in the official year which is current when the amendment in the assessment list takes place and that expression refers only to the official year which is running at the time when the amendment is made by insertion or alteration of an entry under sub-s. (1) of s. 82. It would, therefore, seem clear , on a combined reading of sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 82, that an amendment, in order to be effective in levying tax for an official year, must be made during the currency of the official year. That is now well settled as a result of several decisions of the Bombay High Court culminating in the Full Bench decision in Sholapur Municipal Corporation v. Ramchandra (supra) and we do not see any reason to take a different view. Now the scheme of ss. 78 to 81 is identical with that of s. 82 and in both cases what is contemplated first is a proposal to which objections are invited and after the objections are investigated and disposed of, the assessment list in the one case and the altered entry in the other are authenticated giving rise to liability in the rate-payer. It must follow a fortiori that if an alteration in the assessment list, in order to fasten liability on the rate-payer, is required to be made during the currency of the official year, equally, on a parity of reasoning, the assessment list, in order to give rise to liability in the rate-payer, must also be authenticated before the expiry of the official year. Moreover, it is difficult to behave that the legislature did not intend that there should be any time limit in regard to the levy of tax for an official year and that the tax should be legally leviable at any time after the close of the official year. There is, in our opinion, sufficient indication in the various provisions of the Act to show that the authentication of the assessment list, in order to be valid and effective, must be made within the official year, though the tax so levied may be collected and recovered even after the expiry of the official year.We may point out that the Karnataka High Court is not alone in taking this view the present case. This view has been consistently taken by the Bombay High Court in a series of decisions over the years and it has also been followed by the Gujarat High Court. When we find that three High Courts having jurisdiction over the territories in which the Act is in force have all taken this view over a course of years, we do not think we would be justified in departing from it, merely on the ground that a different view is possible. This Court is ordinarily loathe to interfere with the interpretation of a State statute which has prevailed in the State for a long number of years and which the State Legislature has chosen not to disturb by legislative amendment. As a matter of fact, we find that, in the present case, the Bombay Legislature accepted this interpretation of ss. 78 to 81 and gave legislative recognition to it by introducing s. 84A by Bombay Act 53 of 19 54. That section provides that where in any year a new assessment list is prepared, or a list is revised, or the valuation and assessment contained in the list for the year immediately preceding is adopted with or without alteration, such new, revised or adopted assessment list shall be authenticated in the manner provided by section 81 at any time not later than the thirty-first day of July of the official year to which the list relates, and if it is not so authenticated, then the State Government shall appoint such person or persons as it thinks fit to prepare, revise or adopt and authenticate the assessment list, and thereupon such person or persons shall duly authenticate such list at any time before the last day of the official year to which such list relates, and sections 78 to 81 or section 84 shall, as far as may be, apply to the preparation, revision or adoption of the list, as the case may be, by the person or persons appointed by the State Government. It is clear from this provision that the Legislature not only did not amend the Act for the purpose of removing the time limit of the official year or enlarging such time limit, but on the contrary, made the time limit more stringent by providing that the authentication shall be made by the Municipal Borough not later than 31st July of the official year and if the authentication is not made within that time, the State Government shall be entitled to appoint a person fo r the purpose of authenticating the assessment list and the authentication by such person shall not. in any event, be later than the last day of the official year. We are, therefore, of the view that the assessment list, in order to be effective in levying the tax, not be authenticated before the expiry of the official year and if it is not, the assessment list would be void and inoperative and not give rise to liability in the rate-payers to pay tax.That takes us to the second contention urged on behalf of the Municipal Borough based on s. 206A. That section provides inter alia that no suit shall lie against a municipality or against any officer or servant of any municipality in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of the Act, unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. The argument of the Municipal Borough was that the cause of action for the suit arose in favour of the respondents and other rate-payers on 24th July, 1952 when the assessment list was authenticated and since the suit was not filed within six months from that d ate, it was barred by limitation under s.206A. This argument is plainly unsustainable. The assessment list being authenticated on 24th July, 1952, after the expiry of the official year 1951-52, was void and inoperative and the respondents and other rate-payers were entitled to ignore it as a nullity. It is only when the Municipal Borough sought to recover the amount of tax from them on the strength of the assessment list, that it became necessary for them to challenge the validity of the assessment list with a view to resisting the demand of the Municipal Borough. Then and then only could a cause of action be said to have accrued to them which they were required to enforce within a period of six months. Now, in the present case, there is no material to show as to when notices of demand requiring the respondents and other rate-payers to pay the amount of tax were issued by the Municipal Borough or which rate-payers paid the amount of tax and when. It is not possible to say, in the absence of such material, as to when the cause of action for filing the suit arose to the respondents and other rate- payers and whether it arose within six months before the filing of the suit or at a point of time earlier than that. The Municipal Borough cannot, in the circumstances, be held to have established that the suit was not commenced by the respondents and other rate-payers within six months after the accrual of the cause of action and the plea of limitation based on s. 206A must fail.