Case: Natvarlal Punjabhai And Another Vs. Dadubhai Manubhai And Others

The facts of the case, though a bit long, are not in controversy at the present stage and the entire dispute between the parties centers round certain points of law relating to the rights of the reversions, in whose favour a deed of surrender was executed by a Hindu widow, to recover possession of the properties, belong to the last male owner, during the lifetime of the widow from persons who acquired title to the same by adverse possession against theappreciate the contentions that have been raised by the parties before us, it will be convenient to give a brief narrative of the material facts in their chronological order. A reference to the short genealogical table given below will show at once the relationship between the parties to the presentJijibhai, whose name appears at the head of the table, had two sons, Tribhovan and Kashibhai. Tribhovan had a son named Mathurbhai who died in 1924 leaving, behind him, his widow Hirabai and a son Punjabhai. Kashibhai died in 1914 leaving a son Shankarbhai and a daughter Rukmini. Shankarbhai, whose property is the subject matter of dispute in the present case, died without any issue in 1922, leaving his widow Bai Kashi who is defendant No. 3 in the suit. It is said, that there was a notional partition between Kashibhai and Mathurbhai in 1913 which effected a severance of their joint status without any actual division of properties by metes and bounds. Mathurbhai died on 26th January, 1924, and on the 2nd of the June following Hirabai, his widow, made an application to the District Judge for appointment of a guardian of the person and property of her minor son Punjabhai, alleging, inter alia, that the minor was sole owner of the entire joint estate by right of survivorship. On the 1st of July, 1924, Bai Kashi, the widow of Shankarbhai, was served with a notice of this application. On the 17th of July following, she purported to adopt a son named Sivabhai and in answer to the notice in the guardianship proceeding served upon her, put forward the claim of her adopted son. The District Judge regarded the adoption to be invalid and by his order dated November 29, 1924, appointed the Deputy Nazir of his court as guardian of the properties of the minor Punjabhai, the properties including the share of Shankarbhai in the joint estate. The Deputy Nazir took possession of all the properties on behalf of the minor and it is not disputed that Bai Kashi never got possession of any portion of these properties since then. In 1926 Bai Kashi as the guardian of her infant adopted son Sivabhai brought a Title Suit, being Suit No. 180 of 1926, claiming partition of the joint family properties on the allegation that, by adoption, Sivabhai became a co-owner to the extent of a half share in them. The suit was resisted by Punjabhai represented by his court guardian and the main contention put forward on his behalf was that the adoption, by the widow, of Sivabhai was invalid in law. This contention was given effect to by the trial judge and by his judgment dated the 4th July, 1927, the suit was dismissed. An appeal was taken against this decision, on behalf of Sivabhai, to the High Court of Bombay, but the appeal was withdrawn on the 25th July,Thereafter in 1930, Rukmini, the sister of Shankarbhai and the mother of the present plaintiffs, instituted a suit, being Suit No. 350 of 1930, for a declaration that the joint status of the family was disrupted by the notional partition effected between Mathurbhai and Kashibhai in 1913 and she, as the next heir of Shankarbhai, was entitled to succeed to Shankarbhais share of the properties on the death of Bai Kashi. The trial judge was of opinion that there was, in fact, a severance of joint status by an informal partition between Mathurbhai and Kashibhai, but he dismissed the suit on the ground that a suit of this character was not maintainable in law. Rukmini died soon after that and her two sons, who were then minors, represented by their father as next friend, preferred an appeal to the High Court against this order of dismissal. The High Court allowed the appeal and gave a declaration in favour of the appellants to the effect that there was disruption of the joint family in the yearThis judgment is dated the 8th of February, 1939, and thereafter on the 30th of January, 1941, Bai Kashi executed a deed of surrender in favour of the plaintiffs relinquishing her widows estate in favour of the husbands nearest reversioners. On the basis of this deed of surrender the plaintiffs brought the suit, out of which this appeal arises, in the Court of the Civil Judge, Broach, claiming possession of the disputed properties as the next heirs of Shankarbhai against the defendants who are the sons and heirs of Punjabhai. Bai Kashi was impleaded as defendant No. 3 in thesuit was resisted by defendants 1 and 2 who raised a number of pleas in answer to the plaintiffs claim. The material defence was of a three-fold character. It was contended in the first place that there was no portion between Mathurbhai and Kashibhai as alleged by the plaintiffs and the family being still joint when Shankarbhai died, the entire joint estate vested in Mathurbhai by right of survivorship. It was alleged in the second place, that even if the family had separated the adopted son of Bai Kashi, being a nearer heir, the plaintiffs had no title to the property. The last and the main defence was that the defendants having acquired a title by adverse possession against the widow, and the widow having lost whatever interest she had in her husbands property, the deed of surrender was invalid, and even if it was valid, the surrenders could not claim possession so long as the widow was alive. The trial court overruled all these contentions and decreed the plaintiffs suit. The defendants 1 and 2 preferred an appeal against this decision to the High Court of Bombay and the appeal first came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Chagla C.J. and Dixit J. The learned Judges, by their judgment dated the 23rd January, 1948, which has been described as an interlocutory judgment, disposed of the first two points mentioned above and affirmed the decision of the trial court thereon. It was held that the decision in Rukminis Title Suit No. 350 of 1930, to which the defendants were made parties, precluded them from challenging the fact of there being a partition between Mathurbhai and Kashibhai in 1913 and also from contending that Sivabhai was a validly adopted son. There remained the only other question, namely, as to whether the plaintiffs could, on the basis of the deed of surrender, lay a claim for possession of the properties during the lifetime of the widow, as against persons, who had acquired title by adverse possession against her. In regard to this point, a contention was raised on behalf of the appellants that the deed of surrender was not duly proved and as there was no definite finding on this point, the learned Judges sent the case back for findings on the two following issues which they themselves framedWhether the plaintiffs proved the deed of surrender dated 30th January, 1941? and(ii) Whether Bai Kashi surrendered the whole of her husbands interest in the whole property of her husbandtrial court recorded its findings on both these issues after taking additional evidence and its findings were in favour of the plaintiffs. After the findings were returned to the High Court, the appeal was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Chagla C.J. and Weston and Dixit JJ. The Full Bench confirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. It was held by the learned Judges that even though the defendants acquired by adverse possession a title against the Hindu widow, the deed of surrender executed by her did not become infructuous or inoperative thereby; and as there was acceleration of inheritance in favour of the plaintiffs who were the next heirs of Shankarbhai, they were competent to recover possession of the properties at once by evicting the defendants and were not bound to wait till the widow actually died. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us by the defendants 1 and 2 in this appeal.

Court's reasoning:
The word "surrender" cannot be said to be free from ambiguity. If it connotes nothing more than the English doctrine of merger and a Hindu widow, whose interest is usually, though incorrectly, likened to that of a life tenant under the English law, merely accelerates the reversion by surrendering her limited interest in favour of the reversioner, undoubtedly no surrender can be effective if the widow has already parted with her interest in the property by a voluntary act of her own or her rights therein have been extinguished by adverse possession of a stranger. The English doctrine of merger, though it may have influenced some of the judicial pronouncements in our country has really speaking no application to a Hindu widows estate. The law of surrender by a Hindu widow, as it stands at present, is for the most part, judge-made law, though it may not be quite correct to say that there is absolutely no textual authority upon which the doctrine could be founded, at least, impliedly. So far as the Dayabhag law is concerned, its origin is attributed to Jimutabahans commentary on the well known text of Katyayana which describes the interest of a childless widow in the estate left by her husband and the rights of the reversioners after herEnglish law the reversioner or remainder man has a vested interest in the property and his rights are simply augmented by the surrender of the life estate. In the Hindu law, on the other hand, the widow, so long as she is alive, fully represents her husbands estate, though her powers of alienation are curtailed and the property after her death goes not to her but to her husbands heirs. The presumptive reversioner has got no interest in the property during the lifetime of the widow. He has a mere chance of succession which may not materialise at all. He can succeed to the property at any particular time only if the widow dies at that very moment. The whole doctrine of surrender is based upon this analogy or legal fiction of the widows death. The widows estate is an interposed limitation or obstruction which prevents or impedes the course of succession in favour of the heirs of her husband. It is open to the widow by a voluntary act of her own to remove this obstruction and efface herself from the husbands estate altogether. If she does that, the consequence is the same as if she died a natural death and the next heirs of her husband then living step in at once under the ordinary law of inheritance. In spite of some amount of complexity which is unavoidable in a law evolved by judicial decisions, this fundamental basis of the doctrine of surrender can be said to be established beyondsurrender is not really an act of alienation of the widow of her rights in favour of the reversioner. The reversioner does not occupy the position of a grantee or transferee, and does not derive his title from her. He derives his title from the last male holder as his successor-in-law and the rights of succession are opened out by the act of self-effacement on the part of the widow which operates in the same manner as her physical death. It is true that a surrender may and in the majority of cases does take the form of transfer, e.g., when the widow conveys the entire estate of her husband, without consideration and not as a mere device to share the estate with the reversioner, in favour of thesurrender conveys nothing in law and merely causes extinction of the widows rights in her husbands estate, there is no reason why it should be necessary that the estate must remain with the widow before she could exercise her power of surrender. The widow might have alienated the property to a stranger or some one might have been in adverse possession of the same for more than the statutory period. If the alienation is for legal necessity, it would certainly be binding upon the estate and it could not be impeached by any person under any circumstance. But if the alienation is not for legal necessity, or if a squatter has acquired title by adverse possession against the widow, neither the alienation nor the rights of the adverse possessor could affect the reversioners estate at all. These rights have their origin in acts or missions of the widow which are not binding on the husbands estate. They are in reality dependent upon the widows estate and if the widows estate is extinguished by any means known to law, e.g., by her adopting a son or marrying again, these rights must also cease to exist. The same consequences should follow when the widow withdraws herself from her husbands estate by an act of renunciation on her part. Whether any equitable principle can be invoked in favour of a third party who has acquired rights over the property by any act or omission of the widow may be a matter for consideration. But the learned counsel for the appellants is not right when he says that as adverse possession extinguished the rights of the widow, no fresh extinction by an act of surrender was possible. As the rights acquired by adverse possession are available only against the widow and not against the husbands heirs, the husbands estate still remain undestroyed and the widow may withdraw herself from that estate leaving it open to the reversioners to asks possession of it at once as heirs of the last male holder unless there is any other rule of law or equity which prevent them from doing so. The first branch of the appellants contention cannot, therefore,second ground is, that as the widow herself is incapable of disputing the title of the alienee or of the person who has acquired interest by adverse possession against her, a like disability attaches to the reversioner also who could not have obtained the properties but for the surrender made by the widow. The third ground assigned is that the law of surrender being a judge-made law, the courts in recognising the right of surrender by a Hindu widow can and ought to impose conditions on the exercise of her power based on considerations of justice, equity and good conscience, and surrender being a purely voluntary act on the part of the widow, she could not be allowed by her own act to prejudice the interests which she had already created.