Case: Firm of Harbanslal Jagmohandas &amp; Another Vs. Prabhudas Shivlal

1. The petitioners in both these applications have taken on lease the ground floor portion of property in Ward No. V Nondh No. 1088 of Surat. The respondent became the owner of the said property by purchasing it from the previous owner by a registered sale deed dated September 18, 1958. The petitioners who were the tenants of the premises even prior to the date of purchase by the respondent, have continued to be his tenants and they are using the premises for their business purpose. The respondent landlord filed on February 12, 1967 a Civil Suit No. 144 of 1967 in the Court of the Third Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Surat for evicting the petitioners.2. According to the landlord the petitioners had not paid the rent for a period of over six months and had also not complied with the notice issued under Section 12 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (Act 57 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Bombay Rent Act). The respondent had alleged that he had terminated the tenancy of the petitioners by notice dated November 24. l966. The respondent sought eviction of the petitioners on two grounds, namely, (1) default in payment of rent, and (2) premises being required for bona fide personal use and occupation.3. The petitioners contested the suit on various grounds and denied that they were in arrears and pleaded that they had raised a dispute in respect of the standard rent within the time allowed by law. They also contended that the landlords requirement for use and occupation was not bona fide. Both the trial court as well as the Appellate Court the Extra Assistant Judge, Surat, have concurrently rejected the plea of the respondent that he required the premises bona fide for personal use. Both the courts held that the petitioners have not raised any dispute about the standard rent within one month of service of suit notice either by preferring a standard rent application or by sending a reply to the suit notice raising such a dispute. On this basis both the Courts held that the respondent-plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the premises on the ground of non-payment of rent under Section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act and accordingly passed an order directing eviction of the petitioners from the suit premises.4. The petitioners filed Civil Revision Application No. 1353 of 1970 before the Gujarat High Court challenging the decision of the two Subordinate Courts ordering their eviction. The High Court summarily rejected the said application by its order dated December 22, 1970.5. The petitioners filed Special Leave Petition No. 342 of 1971 seeking special leave to appeal against the decision of the Gujarat High Court. In the special leave petition it has been stated that the appeal raises important questions of law relating to the scope and applicability of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act, which applies in all material particulars to both the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat. It has been further stated that there is a direct conflict regarding the interpretation of this section between the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and the Gujarat High Court.6. According to the petitioners, the Bombay High Court has held that the matter will not fall under S. 12 (3)(a) even in those cases where a dispute in respect of standard rent has been raised in the written statement whereas the Gujarat High Court has held to the contrary and, therefore, there is a direct conflict between the two High Courts on this point. Along with the special leave petition the petitioners have filed C. M. P. No. 854 of 1971 praying for the stay of operation of the order of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 1353 of 1970. In view of the conflict between the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts regarding the interpretation of the above section, this court granted special leave by its order dated February 15, 1971. This Court further granted ex parte stay pending disposal of the notice of motion, which was made returnable within three weeks.7. The respondent entered appearance and filed his counter-affidavit in C. M. P. No. 854 of 1971. In the counter-affidavit the respondent has made two prayers, namely, (1) to revoke the special leave granted to the petitioners and (2) to dissolve the order of stay granted ex parte. In order to clarify the prayers made in C. M. P. No. 854 of 1971, the petitioners have filed C. M. P. No. 2282 of 1971 requesting permission to amend their original application C. M. P. No. 854 of 1971 by stating that the relief asked for is for stay of eviction of the petitioners from the suit premises and to grant stay of operation of the judgments of the trial Court as well as of the Appellate Courts. Reading the two applications it is clear that the petitioners seek relief from dispossession pending the disposal of the appeal by this Court. We will deal with the prayers for grant of stay of dispossession after disposal of the plea raised by the respondent that the special leave granted by this Court should be revoked. The grounds on which the respondent requests for cancellation of special leave are that the petitioners have completely misled this Court in regard to the true facts of the case and that they are guilty of suppressio veri or suggestion falsi.The bone of contention in this regard as pointed out by Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the respondent, is Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court which is stated to be in direct conflict with the decision of the Gujarat High Court has never been placed before the Gujarat High Court when it dismissed in limine C.R.P. No. 1353 of 1970.

Court's reasoning:
9. It, therefore, appears that the petitioners have completely misled this Honble Court in regard to the true facts and have thereby obtained from this Honble Court Special Leave to Appeal, which in all probability, this Honble Court would not have been pleased to grant had the petitioners placed before this Honble Court true facts of theit will be seen from the material averments of the respondent that his bone of contention regarding the statements of fact by the petitioners is that the statements contained in the relevant paragraphs of the special leave petition, adverted to earlier, give the impression that the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court was placed before the Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court when C. R. P. No. 1353 of 1970 was being disposed of. That the said judgment was not brought to the notice of the High Court is clear from the fact that no grounds were taken in the Civil Revision Petition regarding any conflict between the Gujarat and the Bombay High Courts on identical provisions of thecan be no controversy that if the petitioners have made an untrue averment regarding material statements or false statement of matters of importance or a deliberate untrue statement of material facts so as to mislead this Court or if there has been any suppression on any point of importance, the special leave granted by this Court will have to be revoked.Having due regard to the principles laid down above and applying them to the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the request of the respondent for revoking special leave granted has to be rejected. We are also satisfied that there has been no false or untrue averment on material facts made by the petitioners for the purpose of misleading this Court.Paragraph No. 2 of the special leave petition refers to the conflict between the Gujarat and Bombay High Courts with regard to the scope and applicability of S. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act. The contrary view taken by the Gujarat High Court is the one reported in Chunilal Shivlal v. Chimanlal Nagindas, (1966) 7 Guj LR 945 which has been followed by the two subordinate courts. No doubt the High Court has summarily rejected the Civil Revision Petition.Therefore, what is stated in paragraph No. 2 is a pure statement of the legal position and factually it is correct. We have also referred to the grounds Nos. 2, 3 and 16 which are purely legal contentions. The contention of Mr. Shroff, learned counsel for respondent is that a reading of these grounds gives the impression that the attention of the Gujarat High Court was drawn to the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court when the Civil Revision Petition was disposed of. Assuming it is so, in our opinion, it cannot be stated that there is any mis-statement or untrue averment contained in these grounds. It must be remembered that they are legal contentions taken in the grounds attacking the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. We fail to see in what other manner a party can draw the attention of this Court to a conflict between two High Courts with regard to the interpretation of a substantially similar provision of a statute. It is needless to state that if a party wants to have a particular legal position settled in a High Court reconsidered on the basis of a different decision on identical point by the other High Court and specially with regard to the same statute, he must draw the attention of the learned Judge to that decision bearing on the point in question. This will be a very proper thing for a party to do. But that is far from saying that if he has omitted to place a particular decision of another High Court on an identical matter, but nevertheless when the judgment so given is before a higher Tribunal, he should not be allowed to challenge the decision on the ground that the other High Courts have taken a different view.For instance, if a matter is disposed of by a Division Bench of the same High Court and a similar matter is disposed of by a Single Judge on the next day without being made aware of the decision of the Division Bench in our opinion, it will be perfectly open to the party aggrieved by the judgment of the Single Judge, when filing an appeal against that judgment to urge that it is contrary to the Division Bench decision of the same court though that judgment was not brought to the notice of the Single Judge.The grounds taken on legal points should not, in our opinion, be confused or mixed up with the averments regarding material facts or matters of importance.17. We are of the opinion that none of the statements in the special leave petition relied on by Mr. Shroff can be considered to be untrue or false statements on the material facts or matters of importance. Therefore, the prayer of the respondent for revoking the special leave granted will have to be rejected. The C. M. P. No. 2282 of 1971 is allowed and the prayer in C. M. P. No. 854 of 1971 will stand suitably amended.