Case: Ram Singh Vs. Sonia

Sonia [A-1] and Sanjiv [A-2], respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 895 of 2005, were tried and convicted by the trial court under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code [`IPC for short] and sentenced to death and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- each. A-1 and A-2 were further convicted under Sections 25(1-B)(b) and 25(1-B(a) of the Arms Act respectively and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. A-2 was further convicted under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- in default whereof to further undergo imprisonment for one month. The sentences were, however, ordered to run concurrently. Tried along with A-1 and A-2 were eight other accused persons but they were acquitted by the trial court for want of evidence. The order of convictions and sentences gave rise to a murder reference by the Sessions Judge, Hisar and appeals by both the accused before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. By the impugned judgment, while upholding their convictions under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 120-B of the IPC and other provisions, the High Court has commuted the sentence of death into life imprisonment. Hence these appeals by special leave.2. While Criminal Appeal Nos. 895 of 2005 and 894 of 2005 have been preferred by Ram Singh, brother of deceased Relu Ram, and the State of Haryana respectively for enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death, Criminal Appeal No.142 of 2006 is by the accused assailing the impugned judgment of their convictions and sentences. The case of the prosecution is that on 23.8.2001 when Jeet Singh [PW 57], one of the employees of deceasedRelu Ram, andwere sitting at the Saw Mill located by the side of Farm House of Relu Ram, a telephone call was received byconveying her desire to celebrate Priyankas [deceased sister ofbirthday at the Kothi at Litani Mor [place of occurrence] and that she would bring her from the hostel of Jindal School at Hisar the school she was studying in. At about 9.30 p.m.along with Priyanka reached home in a jeep. Thereafter, between 1112 p.m., on hearing some noise of footsteps, PW 57, who was present at the Farm House, woke up and noticed that light in the room, where the spare parts of tractors etc. were kept, was on and upon inquiry found thatwas there in the room and he saw her taking a rod to the first floor which rod is used for raising/tilting the tractor from the ground. He again heard the noise of explosion of fire works, but, thinking that Priyankas birthday was being celebrated, he went to sleep. PW 57 further stated that on 24.8.2001 at about 4.45 a.m. when he was sitting on his cot, he sawcoming down and taking the Jeep at a very fast speed and returning after half an hour. Thereafter, at about 5.30 a.m. Ram Phal, the Milk Vendor, brought milk, but on seeing him coming upstairs,instructed him to leave the milk on the ground floor. At about 6.15 a.m. the School Van came to take Lokesh [deceased], son of Sunil [deceased], but it left after waiting for some time as Lokesh did not come down despite blowing of horn. PW 57 thereafter sent Rohtas, another servant of Relu Ram, to the first floor for bringing Lokesh down for being dropped in the School onUpon being called by Rohtas, PW 57 went to the first floor and found thatwas lying in the porch with froth coming out of her mouth and was mumbling that she be saved and Sanjivbe called. Reaching inside the house, PW 57 found that Relu Ram [father], Krishna [mother], Sunil [brother], ShakuntalaPriyanka @ Pamma [sister], Lokesh [nephew] and Shivani and Preeti [nieces] ofhad been murdered in different rooms. He also found that Shakuntlas hands and feet were tied with cot. The tractor rod that PW 57 had seenremoving from the room on the previous night was lying on the bed ofNoticing a letter [Suicide Note Ext. 227] lying on the bed ofwritten in Hindi, PW 57 picked up the same and left for the Ulkana Police Station. While giving description of what had been seen by him at the place of occurrence and handing over the said Suicide Note to S.I. Vinod Kumar, PW 59, PW 57 also stated that it may be possible thatunder a conspiracy had either administered some poisonous substance or made them to inhale poisonous thing and upon becoming unconscious they had been murdered. It was further stated by him that about six months prior to this incident,with an intention to kill deceased Sunil had also fired a shot from the licensed gun of deceased Relu Ram over a dispute of property, but the matter was hushed up in the house.3. On the basis of sequence of events that had taken place at the place of occurrence from the evening of 23rd August until 24th morning, described by PW 57 to PW 59 and the Suicide Note alleged to have been written byFIR was registered in the Ulkana Police Station at 8.15 a.m. by PW 59 wherein contents of Suicide Note were also reproduced.4. On completion of the investigation, chargesheet was submitted against2 and eight other accused persons, cognizance taken and they were committed to the court of Sessions to face trial.5. Defence of the accused persons was that they were innocent and falsely implicated. The stand taken bywas that she was picked up by the police of CIA Staff on 24th August from Faridabad and was brought to Hisar, kept in illegal custody, tortured and threatened that in case she would not make the statement according to what they say, her only son would be killed and thereafter they forcibly obtained her signatures on blank papers.took the defence, inter alia, that he was falsely implicated at the instance of the employees of Relu Ram who had embezzled a lot of money of hisand by those people who had taken a loan from him and that it were they who had committed the murder of Relu Ram and his family members.6. So far asis concerned, the prosecution case principally rests on (1) the Suicide Note [Ext. 227] alleged to have been written by her wherein she admitted having murdered eight persons, including three tiny tots, who were none other than her own immediate family members, (2) the judicial confession [Ext. 187] made by her to the Magistrate in the hospital where she was removed by the Police immediately after the occurrence and (3) bloodstained clothes ofblood group of which tallied with the blood group of deceased Sunil and Lokesh.7. So far asis concerned, the case of the prosecution revolves around circumstantial evidence,confessions made by him to Sunder Singh, PW.48, and Rajni Gandhi, Scientific Assistant, PW 17, the result of the polygraph test to which he was put by the prosecution and the recoveries made at his instance by the police.

Court's reasoning:
14. Whether one is or is not in police custody could be discerned from the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. Insofar as the case at hand is concerned, the police party reached the place of occurrence within 10 minutes of lodgment of the FIR and PW.25, being aware of the fact thathad consumed poison and under instructions, seeinglying in front of the porch, removed her to the hospital. PW.52 having opined thatwas unfit at the time of her admission in the hospital to give any statement, PW.62 and PW.32 also having stated in their evidence that none else, except them, was present in the room in which the statement ofwas recorded and in the absence of any evidence to show that from the moment of her admission to and discharge from the hospital the police personnel were either present in the room whereinwas kept for treatment or even in the vicinity of the hospital or they made frequent visits to the hospital, it cannot be said that themovements were restricted or she was kept in some sort of direct or indirect police surveillance and that she was in police custody for the purpose of Section 26 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, in our view, Paramhansa [supra] is of no help insofar asis concerned. Turning now to the next submission of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused as to the judicial confession [Ext.187] made bybefore PW.62, it would be useful to refer to relevant provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code that deal with the recording of a judicial confession by a judicial magistrate and see whether the judicial confession recorded by PW.62 ofis according to the procedure prescribed by these provisions or whether any violation thereof has been made by the magistrate while recording it. The relevant Sections in the Cr.P.C. are Sections 164, 281 and 463.In the case on hand, the application that was made to PW.62 was for recording a dying declaration aswas suspected to have consumed poison. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused submits that as there was no danger to the life ofthere was no reason for the prosecution to call PW.62 for recording dying declaration ofWe have perused the Indoor Charts of Janta Hospital, [Exts. 192 and 193] which clearly depict that hers was a case of suspected poison. We have also been taken through the evidence of Dr. Jagdish Sethi, PW.52, who, in his testimony, has also stated thatwas admitted to the Janta Hospital in the morning of 24th August as a suspected case of poison and, therefore, she was declared to be unfit to make any statement. In our view, the prosecution rightly sent for PW.62 for recording dying declaration ofBefore adverting to the three decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused, we shall first analyse the judicial confession (Ext.187) recorded by PW 62 and see whether it has been recorded according to the procedure prescribed by Section 164. On 24th August, 2001, upon receipt of an application moved by Superintendent of Police for recording dying declaration ofby a magistrate, DSP Man Singh, who partly investigated the case, approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, who, in turn, marked the said application to Pardeep Kumar, PW.62. On its presentation to PW.62 by DSP Man Singh at 10 p.m. the same day, both PW.62 and DSP Man Singh left for the Janta Hospital, Barwala. After reaching the hospital and before recording the statement, PW.62 first sought opinion of Dr. Anant Ram (PW 32) as to the fitness ofto make the statement. As in the opinion of PW 32,was fit to make the statement, PW.62 proceeded to record it, which is in question and answer form. It appears from Ext. 187 as well as from the questions and answers which were put tothat PW.62 warnedthat she was not bound to make any confessional statement and in case she did so, it might be used against her as evidence. In spite of this warning,volunteered to make the statement and only thereafter the statement was recorded by PW.62. In the certificate that was appended to the said confessional statement PW.62 has very categorically stated that he had explained tothat she was not bound to make a confession and that if she did so, any confession she would make might be used as evidence against her and that he believed that the confession was voluntarily made. He further stated that he read over the statement to the person making it and admitted by her to be correct and that it contained a full and true account of the statement made by her. It has been further stated by PW.62 in his evidence that at the time of recording of the confession it was he and PW 32, who were present in the room and there was neither any police officer nor anybody else within the hearing or sight when the statement was recorded. It also appears from the evidence of PW.62 that it took abouthours for him to record the statement ofwhich runs into 5 pages, which he started at 10.53 p.m. and ended at 1.28 a.m. which goes to show thattook her time before replying to the questions put. PW.62 has also stated that she had given the statement after taking due time after understanding each aspect. It also appears that he was satisfied that she was not under any pressure from any corner. Therefore, it is evident from the certificate appended to the confessional statement by PW.62 that the confessional statement was made by the accused voluntarily. Of course, he failed to record the question that was put by him to the accused whether there was any pressure on her to give a statement, but PW.62 having stated in his evidence before the Court that he had asked the accused orally whethershe was under any pressure, threat or fear and he was satisfied thatwas not under any pressure from any corner, that in the room in which the said confessional statement was recorded it was only he and PW.32 who were present and none else and that no police officer was available even within the precincts of the hospital, the saiddefect, in our view, is cured by Section 463 as the mandatory requirement provided under Section 164(2), namely, explaining to the accused that he was not bound to make a statement and if a statement is made the same might be used against him has been complied with and the same is established from the certificate appended to the statement and from the evidence of PW.62. Therefore, in the light of our discussion above, we have no hesitation in holding that the judicial confession [Ext. 187] having been recorded according to the procedure set out in Section 164 read with Section 281 and the defect made while recording the same being curable by Section 463, it is admissible in evidence.18. We now advert to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused. In the case of Nazir Ahmad [supra] the accused, who was charged with dacoity and murder, was convicted on the strength of a confession said to have been made by him to a Magistrate of the class entitled to proceed under the provisions of Section 164 relating to the recording of confession. The confession was not recorded according to the procedure and the record of the confession was not available as evidence either. The Magistrate, however, appeared as a witness and gave oral evidence about the making of the confession. He stated that he made rough notes of what he was told, got a memorandum typed from the typist on the basis of the rough notes and thereafter destroyed the rough notes. The said memorandum, signed by him contained only the substance but not all of the matter to which he spoke orally. The recording Magistrate in the said memorandum just above his signature appended a certificate somewhat to the same effect as that prescribed in section 164 and, in particular, stating that the Magistrate believed that the statements were voluntarily made. As there was no record in existence at the material time, there was nothing to be shown or to be read to the accused and nothing he could sign or refused to sign. The Judicial Committee held that the oral evidence of the Magistrate of the alleged confession was inadmissible. The Magistrate offered no explanation as to why he acted as he did instead of following the procedure required by Section 164. When questioned by the Sessions Judge, the response of the accused was a direct and simple denial that he had ever made any confession. The Judicial Committee, considering the abject disregard by the Magistrate of the provisions contained in Section 164 of the Code, observed that "where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all". Nazir [supra] is a case where recording Magistrate did not at all follow the procedure prescribed by Section 164 of the Code as a result of which, he violated the provisions thereof whereas in the case on hand the omission that has been made by the magistrate is his failure to record the question that he asked to the accused whether she was under any pressure, threat or fear to make a confession in the confessional statement and the answer given byIn his evidence before the Court, PW.62 stated that he askedwhether she was under any pressure, threat or fear and after he was satisfied that she was not under any pressure from any corner, he recorded in the memorandum that was appended to the confessional statement ofthat he believed that the confession was voluntarily made. In our view, Nazir [supra] has no application to the facts of the present case as the failure of PW.62 to record the question put and the answer given in the confessional statement has not caused prejudice to the accused in her defence and is a defect that is curable under Section 463. In the case of Preetam [supra] the accused was arrested on 17.6.1973 and when produced before the Magistrate on the following day he was sent to police custody, where he remained until 22.6.1973 and, thereafter he was sent to judicial custody. Upon being produced before a Magistrate on 25.6.1973 for recording his confession, he was given two hours time to reflect. After cautioning the accused that he was not bound to make a confession and that if he did so, it might be used against him, the Magistrate went on to record his confession. Failure of the recording Magistrate to put questions to the accused to satisfy himself that the confession was voluntary so as to enable him to give the requisite certificate under(4) was termed by this Court as flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 164(2) and in utter disregard of the mandatory requirements of the said section. Preetam (supra) is a case where the accused remained in police custody for six days immediately before the recording of his confession by the Magistrate and, therefore, could be said to have been pressurized, tortured and harassed by the police. In such a situation, omission on the part of the recording Magistrate to put a question to the accused to satisfy himself that the confession was being made voluntarily can be said to be flagrant violation of law. However, in the case on hand,was removed by the police from the place of occurrence to the hospital in the morning of 24th August, 2001 where she remained until her arrest by the police in the evening of 26th August, 2001. It was at 10.58 p.m. on 24th August, 2001, i.e., during her hospitalization, that PW 62 recorded her confessional statement after cautioning her that she was not bound to make any confession and that if she did so, it might be used as evidence against her. PW 62 in his evidence has stated that it was only after administering the above caution and satisfying himself thatwas making the statement voluntarily that he proceeded on to record her confession. It also appears from his evidence that no police official was present either in the room in which he recorded the confessional statement ofor in the hospital. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that she was under direct or indirect vigil of the police authorities during her hospitalization and she having already confessed the crime in her Suicide Note, the omission on the part of the recording Magistrate to record the question and the answer given in the confessional statement cannot be said to be flagrant violation of law, especially in view of the fact that the recording Magistrate has stated in his evidence that he orally askedif she was under any pressure, threat or fear and it was only after satisfying himself that she was not under any pressure from any corner that he recorded her confessional statement. In the certificate that was appended to the confessional statement as well, PW 62 has stated that he believed that confession thatmade was voluntary. In our view, the defect committed being curable under Section 463 has not injured the accused in her defence on the merits and that she duly made the statement.19. Similarly, in the case of Tulsi Singh [supra], also relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused, the recording Magistrate did not explain to the accused that he was not bound to make a confession and that if he did so, it might be used against him, nor did he put any question to him to satisfy that the confession was being voluntarily made although, an endorsement to this effect was made by him in the certificate that was appended to the confessional statement. This court, while setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the accused under Section 302 IPC, held that the special court was not at all justified in entertaining the confession as a voluntary one, observing that mere endorsement would not fulfill the requirements of(4) of Section 164. This case too has no application at all to the facts of the present case for two reasons firstly, in this case too the appellant remained in police custody for a week and secondly, it is a case in which the recording Magistrate neither explained to the accused that he was not bound to make a confession and if he did so, it might be used against him nor satisfied himself upon questioning the accused that the confession was being voluntarily made. In the case on hand, PW 62 in his evidence has stated that he did ask the accused the question whether she was under any pressure, threat or fear and only after satisfying himself that she was not under any, that he proceeded on to record her confessional statement. Therefore, in view of our above discussion, the three decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused in the cases of Nazir (supra), Preetam (supra) and Tulsi (supra) are of no help to the accused.The three unusual features noticed by the Bench in Babu Singh [Supra] impelled the learned Judges to exclude from consideration the confessional statement made before the magistrate by the accused after having observed that the confession was admissible in evidence. As the charge of murder was founded exclusively on the confession, both the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC. In our view, the factual matrix in Babu Singh [supra] was distinct from the one with which we are dealing. In Babu Singh, both the accused remained in police custody for a long time and even after the substantial portion of the investigation was over. If one were or held to be in police custody, question of pressure, threat or fear would arise. We have already held that in the facts and circumstances of the present case,cannot be said to be in police custody during her hospitalization and, therefore, question of her being pressurized, threatened or put under any kind of fear does not arise. In the case of State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 358 , aBench of this Court observed that if the confession is not recorded in proper form as prescribed by Section 164 read with Section 281, it is a mere irregularity which is curable by Section 463 on taking evidence that the statement was recorded duly and has not injured the accused in defence on merits.In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that Ext.187 is admissible, having been recorded according to the procedure prescribed under law and the same is voluntary and truthful. Turning now to the medical evidence, Dr. Sanjay Sheoran [PW.1], Dr. R.S. Dalal, [PW.2], and Dr. Arun Gupta [PW.15], who conducted the autopsy on the dead bodies of the deceased, have opined that the injuries found on the persons of the deceased were ante mortem in nature, were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature and that injuries could be caused with the iron rod. We have already referred to the testimony of PW 57 wherein he stated that he had seenremoving the iron rod from the store room at the place of occurrence on the night of 23rd August, 2001 which iron rod was recovered from the bed ofat the place of occurrence by the prosecution. The medical evidence that injuries could be caused with the iron rod, the statement of PW.57 that he had seenremoving the iron rod from the store room at the place of occurrence and its recovery from the bed ofleave no scope for any doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case as againstFinding of bloodstains on the salwar ofand its matching with the blood group of deceased Sunil and Lokesh further strengthens the case of the prosecution. Insofar as other submissions made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused quaof FIR, tampering of Exts. 193 and 194 andof finger prints are concerned, we need hardly add anything to the exhaustive discussion in the elaborate judgments rendered by the trial court and the High Court while dealing with identical submissions.24. As a result of our above discussion, we hold that the case againsthas been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, order of conviction ofpassed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court is unassailable. We now proceed to consider the case of Sanjivwhose case revolves around the circumstantial evidence, apart fromconfessions made by him to Sunder Singh, PW 48 and Dr. Rajni Gandhi, PW.17, the result of the polygraph test and the recoveries made at his instance. Insofar as circumstantial evidence as againstis concerned, the courts below have very elaborately discussed the material produced by the prosecution while accepting each of the circumstances. In the normal course, there would have been no need for us to go into these circumstances as elaborately as was done by the two courts below in an appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, especially when the finding qua conviction is concurrent. However, taking into consideration that the accused were awarded death sentence by the trial court, which has been converted into life imprisonment by the High Court, and that the case in hand is one of circumstantial evidence, we think it appropriate and in the interest of justice to reappreciate the evidence. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has been indicated in a number of decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has been held that the Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to make the place of legal proof, for some times unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental distance between may be true and must be true and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions. In the light of the above principle, which principle has been reiterated in a series of pronouncements of this Court, we proceed to ascertain whether the prosecution has been able to establish a chain of circumstances so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.Examined in the light of the enunciation of law as above, we are of the view that the testimony of PW.48 as regards the confession made byis such as to inspire confidence in our minds. Indisputably,confession was made byto PW.48 prior to his arrest by the police and, therefore, question of it being made under any inducement, threat or promise does not arise. Moreover, there was absolutely no reason for PW 48 to unnecessarily implicate the accused, as he had no animus against him. In view of our above discussion, we see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW.48 and hold thatal confession which is voluntary and truthful.Insofar as motive qua the crime committed is concerned, it is clearly borne out from the factual matrix of the case on hand that both the accused had an eye on the property of deceased, Relu Ram, which was in crores and in order to gain full control over the property and to deprive deceased Relu Ram from giving it to anybody else, both the accused persons have eliminated his whole family. We have been taken through theconfession made byto PW. 48 wherein he has indicated that as deceased Relu Ram was not parting with the share ofin the property, bothtogether have done to death his whole family. Therefore, the motive qua the crime committed stands proved in the present case.was arrested on 19th September, 2001 and on 24th and 25th September when he was taken for the LDT he was in police custody and it was at that point of time he madeconfession to PW.17 at which point of time police personnel went away from the scene temporarily. Therefore, in the light of the decision rendered in Kishore Chand [supra], we are of the opinion thatconfession made byto PW.17 is hit by Section 26 of the Evidence Act, it having been made bywhile in police custody and, consequently, cannot be admitted into evidence and, therefore, has to be eschewed from consideration. However, even the exclusion ofconfession made bybefore PW.17 would be of no help to this accused as we are of the view that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubts againston the basis of circumstantial evidence enumerated above as well asconfession made bybefore PW.48.34. Insofar as the Polygraph [Lie Detection] Test which was conducted onis concerned, Mr. Sushil Kumar submits that since polygraph evidence is not subject of expert evidence as per Sec. 45 of Evidence Act being a science in mystique, it could at best be used as an aid to investigation and not as an evidence. In support of his submission, he has relied on Romeo Phillion and Her Majesty The Queen, (1978) 1 SCR 18 and R. v. Beland, (1987) 2 SCR 398 , which are decisions rendered by the Canadian Supreme Court, and on Mallard v. Queen, 2003 WASCA 296, a decision of the Australian Supreme Court. Mr. Tulsi, on the other hand, submits that the result of Polygraph Test can be used against the accused. As there are other materials sufficient for upholding conviction ofwe refrain ourselves from going into the question of admissibility or otherwise of the result of Polygraph Test in the present case.35. Having held that bothare guilty of murder of deceased Relu Ram and his family and that their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Sectionand other provisions inflicted upon them by both the courts below does not call for any interference by this Court, we now proceed to decide whether the instant case is one of rarest of rare cases warranting death sentence, as has been held by the trial court to be one, or the one in which sentence of life imprisonment would be appropriate, as has been held by the High Court while commuting the sentence of death to life imprisonment. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused submitted that the present case cannot be said to be rarest of the rare one so as to justify imposition of extreme penalty of death. This question has been examined by this Court times without number. In the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 684 , before a Constitution Bench of this Court validity of the provision for death penalty was challenged on the ground that the same was violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and while repelling the contention, the Court laid down the scope of exercise of power to award death sentence and the meaning of the expression `rarest of the rare so as to justify extreme penalty of death and considered that Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which India has acceded in 1979 do not abolish or prohibit the imposition of death penalty in all circumstances. All that they required is that, firstly, death penalty shall not be arbitrarily inflicted; secondly, it shall be imposed only for most serious crimes in accordance with a law, which shall not be an ex post facto legislation. The Penal Code prescribes death penalty as an alternative punishment only for heinous crimes, which are not more than seven in number. Section 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in keeping with the spirit of the International Covenant, has further restricted the area of death penalty. Now according to this changed legislative policy, which is patent on the face of Section 354(3), the normal punishment for murder and six other capital offences under the Penal Code, is imprisonment for life (or imprisonment for a term of years) and death penalty is an exception. The present legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences, including one under Section 302, Penal Code, the Court should not confine its consideration "principally" or merely to the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but also give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal. In many cases, the extremely cruel or beastly manner of the commission of murder is itself a demonstrated index of the depraved character of the perpetrator. And it is only when the culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity that "special reasons" can legitimately be said to exist. Judges should never be bloodthirsty. It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3), viz., that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception.Ultimately, in the said case of Machhi Singh (supra), the Court observed that if upon an overall global view of all the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid proposition and taking into account the answers to the questions posed hereinabove, the circumstances of the case are such that death sentence is warranted, the Court would proceed to do so.40. In the light of the law already laid down by this Court referred to above, now this Court is called upon to consider whether the present case would come within the realm of the rarest of the rare or not.41. The instant case is one wherein accused Sonia, along with accused Sanjiv [her husband] has not only put an end to the lives of her step brother and his whole family, which included three tiny tots of 45 days,years and 4 years, but also her own father, mother and sister in a very diabolic manner so as to deprive her father from giving the property to her step brother and his family. The fact that murders in question were committed in such a diabolic manner while the victims were sleeping, without any provocation whatsoever from the victims side indicates theand premeditated approach of the accused to cause death of the victims. The brutality of the act is amplified by the grotesque and revolting manner in which the helpless victims have been murdered which is indicative of the fact that the act was diabolic of most superlative degree in conception and cruel in execution and that both the accused persons are not possessed of the basic humanness and completely lack the psyche or mind set which can be amenable for any reformation. If this act is not revolting or dastardly, it is beyond comprehension as to what other act can be so. In view of these facts we are of the view that there would be failure of justice in case death sentence is not awarded in the present case as the same undoubtedly falls within the category of rarest of rare cases and the High Court was not justified in commuting death sentence into life imprisonment.