Case: J.K. Synthetics Ltd Vs. K.P. Agrawal

The first respondent was working as an Assistant in the appellant company. He was issued three charge-sheets dated 5.2.1977, 17.2.1977 and 24.2.1977 (amended on 1.3.1977). First respondent filed his objections/explanation in respect of each charge-sheet. An inquiry was held into the charges. Accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer, which held that the charges were proved, the employer imposed the punishment of dismissal on the first respondent, by order datedproceedidngs initiated in respect of such dismissal, failed. Consequently, the State Government referred the following dispute to the Labour Court forthe termination of the services of its workman Shri Kashi Prasad (s/o Shri Lala Shyam Lal), Assistant, Accounts Department by the Employers from 6.4.1977 is proper, and/or legal? If not, for what benefits/compensation the workman is entitled to and any other, withorder dated 20.12.1980, the Labour Court held that the inquiry was not fair and proper, and permitted parties to adduce evidence. The Labour Court made its award dated 8.3.1983. The Labour Court held that the charge of insubordination and disorderly behaviour in the first charge-sheet, was not proved. The charge under the second charge-sheet, that the first respondent made false (indecent) allegations against his superior officer, and thereby violated office discipline, was held to be proved. In regard to the charge under the third charge-sheet, the Labour Court found that the employee had admitted that he had not prepared the annual accounts correctly, but gave the employee the benefit of doubt by holding that the mistakes in the accounts might not have been committed knowingly or deliberately, and therefore, may not amount to habitual negligence or carelessness. Thus in effect, the findings in regard to three charges were (i) not proved, (ii) proved, and (iii) entitled to benefit of doubt. On the said findings, it made an award dated 8.3.1983, the operative part of which readsconcerned workman has been working in the company for four years and there was no such complaint against him in the past, hence instead of the punishment of termination of service as a result of Ex. E-2 (dated 17.2.1977) being proved against him, I deem it proper that the increments of two years of the concerned workman should be stopped assaid award was published on 27.4.1983 and became enforceable from4.5.1983, first respondent filed an application under section 6(6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act for short) seeking corrections of the award, stating that the workman was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back-wages from 6.4.1977. The appellant resisted the said application contending inter alia that (i) the Labour Court became functus officio after publication of the award on 27.4.1983 and therefore, it could not amend the award; (ii) the prayer amounted to seeking review of the award, and there was no jurisdiction or power to grant such relief; and (iii) the first respondent was not entitled to the relief of back-wages, as the Labour Court had held that a misconduct wasLabour Court by order dated 29.6.1983 allowed the application under section 6(6) and added the following paragraph at the end of the Award, on the ground that it had been omitted due to an accidentalit is my decision in this case that the termination of services of Mr. Kashi Prasad Agarwal, Assistant, Accounts Department from 6.4.77 by his employer will not be justified but instead, his two annual increments which were admissible to him after the date of his termination, i.e. 6.4.77, be stopped. In view of the punishment of stoppage of two annual increments, the employer shall pay the full wages of the period under unemployment i.e. 6.4.77 to the date of reinstatement in which the amount which was paid to the workman as interim relief or any other mode, shall be adjusted."t challenged the said award and the amendment thereto in C.M.W.P. No.10714/83. A learned Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated 28.7.2003 dismissed the petition holding asa perusal of the award of the labour court, it is apparent that the tenor of the order is that the workman could not be punished by resorting to termination. The spirit of the order also shows that in fact the labour court had in mind to grant back-wages to the workman, but by omission, the aforesaid mistake has crept in. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted and in my opinion, there was an omission which could be corrected under section 6(6). Though a plea has been made that the court becomes functus officio after tendering the award, in my view, this argument has only to be stated to be rejected. Section 6(6) gives power to the labour court for making corrections in an award."

Court's reasoning:
8. A careful reading of section 6(6) and the two decisions shows that the two decisions considered two different situations. In Tulsipur Sugar Company, this Court found that the reference to the Labour Court consisted of two parts. The award answered only the first part and had omitted to answer the second (consequential) part. While modifying the award on an application under section 6(6), the Labour Court neither upset nor altered any of the findings recorded in its original award, but only answered the second part of the reference, which had earlier been omitted. Therefore, this Court held that such correction was permissible. On the other hand in Imtiaz Hussain, the Labour Court, in its award had specifically refusedto the employee on the ground that his name was not in the list of permanent employees. But on an application under section 6(6), itthe issue and held that though his name was not in the list of permanent employees, he was entitled to payment of salary and allowances from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement with continuity of service. In Tulsipur Sugar Company, there was a correction of an omission which fell within section 6(6). In Imtiaz Hussain, there was a review of the original order which of course, was impermissible. We may now summarize the scope of section 6(6) of the Act thus:a) If there is an arithmetical or clerical or typographical error in the order, it can be corrected.b) Where the court had said something which it did not intend to say or omitted something which it intended to say, by reason of any accidental slip/omission on the part of the court, such inadvertent mistake can be corrected.c) The power cannot be exercised where the matter involves rehearing on merits, or reconsideration of questions of fact or law, or consideration of fresh material, or new arguments which were not advanced when the original order was made. Nor can the power be exercised to change the reasoning and conclusions.9. In this case, the reference to Labour Court consisted of two partswhether the termination of the workmen was proper and legal, andanswer was in the negative, then the benefits or compensation to which the workmen was entitled. The award originally made, answered the first part in the negative, but did not answer the consequential second part of the reference. In fact the award ended rather abruptly. On an application being made under section 6(6), the Labour Court recorded that it had accidentally omitted to answer the second part of the reference and rectified the omission by adding a paragraph. This case, therefore, squarely falls under Tulsipur Sugar (supra). We are of the view that the Labour Court had the power to amend the award.In this case, the Labour Court found that a charge against the employee in respect of a serious misconduct was proved. It, however, felt that the punishment of dismissal was not warranted and therefore, imposed a lesser punishment of withholding the two annual increments. In such circumstances, award of back wages was neither automatic nor consequential. In fact, back wages was not warranted at all.s takes us to the next question as to whether the Labour Court was justified at all in interfering with the punishment of dismissal.The Labour Court held that one serious charge was proved, another charge was not proved and in regard to the third charge gave benefit of doubt to the employee. The Labour Court also relied on the decisions of this Court in Rama Kant Misra vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1982 SC 952], wherein it was held that the punishment of dismissal was excessive where the employee was found to have uttered indecent words and used abusive language and substituted it by the lesser punishment of stoppage of two annual increments. The said decision depended on its special facts and may not apply to this case. The recent trend in regard to scope of interference with punishment in matters involving discipline at the workplace has been different. We may refer to some of the recent decisions.In this case, we have already found that the charge established against the employee was a serious one. The Labour Court did not record a finding that the punishment was harsh or disproportionately excessive. It interfered with the punishment only on the ground that the employee had worked for four years without giving room for any such complaint. It ignored the seriousness of the misconduct. That was not warranted. The consistent view of this Court is that in the absence of a finding that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charge established, the Labour Court should not interfere with the punishment. We, therefore, hold that the punishment of dismissal did not call for interference.It is true that when the employer challenged the award of the labour court and sought stay of the award, the High Court only stayed the order dated 29.6.1983 in regard to thebut did not stay the award dated 08.3.1983 directing reinstatement; and that if he had been reinstated in 1983, he would have served till 31.3.1991 when he attained the age of superannuation. The learned counsel for the employee made a submission before the High Court at the final hearing that in spite of the award directing reinstatement not being stayed, he was not reinstated. On the said submission, the High Court held that the employer had wilfully violated the lawful order and was not entitled to exercise of equitable discretion under Article 226/227. Firstly, the assumption that there was a lawful order or that there was wilful violation thereof is not sound. Further, the employer was not given an opportunity to explain why the employee was not reinstated. In fact, the contention of employer is that the first respondent did not report back to service, even though it was ready to reinstate him subject to final decision. Be that as it may. The mere fact that the first respondent was not reinstated in pursuance of the award of the Labour Court cannot result in dismissal of the writ petition challenging the award.