Case: BSES YAMUNA POWER LTD Vs. GHANSHYAM CHAND SHARMA

6. In the present case, the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi relied on the decision in Asger Ibrahim Amin to hold that the first respondent was entitled to pensionary benefits. The Single Judge noted that the first respondent had completed more than twenty years of service and would have been eligible for pension upon voluntary retirement. Therefore, despite the first respondent using the term, on an independent determination of the facts of the case, the Single Judge held that he had in fact3. The second question of whether by resigning, the first respondent forfeited his past service must be addressed at the outset. If the first respondents resignation resulted in a forfeiture of past service, the question of whether he has completed twenty years of service is rendered irrelevant for such service would stand forfeited. In holding the that the legal effect of the first respondents letter of resignation would amount to voluntary resignation, the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi relied on the judgement of this Court in Asger Ibrahim Amin v LIC

Court's reasoning:
12. In the present case, the first respondent resigned on 7 July 1990 with effect from 10 July 1990. By resigning, the first respondent submitted himself to the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the provisions applicable to his serviceWe have noted above that the approach adopted by the court in Asger Ibrahim Amin has been held to be erroneous since it removes the important distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement. Irrespective of whether the first respondent had completed the requisite years of service to apply for voluntary retirement, his was a decision to resign and not a decision to seek voluntary retirement. If this court were to re-classify his resignation as a case of voluntary retirement, this would obfuscate the distinction between the concepts of resignation and voluntary retirement and render the operation of Rule 26 nugatory. Such an approach cannot be adopted. Accordingly, the finding of the Single Judge that the first respondent15. On the issue of whether the first respondent has served twenty years, we are of the opinion that the question is of no legal consequence to the present dispute. Even if the first respondent had served twenty years, under Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules his past service stands forfeited upon resignation. The first respondent is therefore not entitled to pensionary benefits14. This argument cannot be accepted. Even if he was denied voluntary retirement on 25 May 1990, the first respondent did not challenge this decision but resigned, on 7 July 1990. The denial of voluntary retirement does not mitigate the legal consequences that flow from resignation. No evidence has been placed on the record to show that the first respondent took issue with the denial of voluntary retirement between 25 May 1990 and 7 July 1990. To the contrary, in the legal notice dated 1 December 1992 sent by the first respondent to the appellant, the first respondent admitted to having resigned. The first respondents writ petition was instituted thirteen years after the denial of voluntary retirement and eventual resignation. In the light of these circumstances, the denial of voluntary retirement cannot be invoked before this Court to claim pensionary benefits when the first respondent has admittedly resignedRule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service.We have noted above that the approach adopted by the court in Asger Ibrahim Amin has been held to be erroneous since it removes the important distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement. Irrespective of whether the first respondent had completed the requisite years of service to apply for voluntary retirement, his was a decision to resign and not a decision to seek voluntary retirement. If this court were to re-classify his resignation as a case of voluntary retirement, this would obfuscate the distinction between the concepts of resignation and voluntary retirement and render the operation of Rule 26 nugatory. Such an approach cannot be adopted. Accordingly, the finding of the Single Judge that the first respondent