Case: Major Gopal Singh And Others Vs. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab

1. The appellants who are admittedly displaced persons from West Pakistan were granted quasi-permanent allotment of 24 standard acres and 15 3/4 units in the village of Rajkot in Ludhiana District in 1949. Their father Sardar Nand Singh who was found entitled to quasi-permanent allotment of 40 standard acres and 5 1/4 units of land was given quasi-permanent allotment in another village named Humbran in the same district. The two villages are, however, 25 miles or so distant from each other. Nand Singh, therefore, made an application for consolidation of his lands with those of the appellants in the village Raikot. During the pendency of this application he died and after his death, the application was continued by the appellants. This application was rejected by the Assistant Custodian on July 23, 1951, on the ground that no land was available in the village Raikot. A revision petition preferred by the appellants against the order of the Assistant Custodian was dismissed by the Additional Custodian on August 20, 1952. On October 7, 1952, the appellants preferred a revision application before the Custodian General.2. During the pendency of the revision application the Additional Custodian for the State of Punjab cancelled the allotment of fourteen quasi-permanent allottees of the village Karodian in the same district on the ground that those persons were entitled to allotment of suburban land and had been wrongly fitted in the village Karodian. Acting suo motu the Additional Custodian made an order on October 3 1, 1952, cancelling the order of allotment of land in the village Raikot made in favour of the appellants in the year 1949 and instead allotted to them land in Karodian in substiution of the lands at Raikot and of the lands allotted to their father. The land allotted was out of the land released upon the cancellation of allotment of lands in favour of the aforementioned 14 allottees. These fourteen allottees preferred an application for review of the order cancelling their allotment on the ground that this cancellation was a result of misapprehension of the actual facts and that they were not entitled to allotment of suburban lands at all. The appellants also preferred an application for review of the order cancelling their quasi-permanent allotment in the village Raikot.3. The Additional Custodian for the State of Punjab recommended to the Custodian General the restoration of the land to the 14 allottees which had been taken away from them by reason of cancellation of the allotment in their favour by the order dated October 31, 1952. The Additional Custodian admitted that these persons were not entitled to allotment of suburban land and that consequently their allotment had been wrongly made but referred the matter back to the Additional Custodian for decision. The application made by the appellants was kept pending till the decision of the application of the 14 allottees of Karodian. The Additional Custodian, however, dismissed the application on the ground that R. 14(6) of the Evacuee Property Rules which came into force on July 22, 1952, stood in the way of cancellation of the allotment in favour of the appellant.4. On December 1 7, 1954, the Deputy Custodian-General before whom these allottees had preferred an application for revision, revised the order of the Additional Custodian and restored to the 14 allottees of Karodian the land which had been originally allotted to them and allotment of which had been cancelled earlier. As a result of this order the allotment of Karodian land made in favour of the appellants automatically stood cancelled.5. On January 6, 1955, the appellants moved the Deputy Custodian-General for calling up their review application and for revising the order of October 31, 1952, passed by the Additional Custodian cancelling the allotment of Raikot lands which had originally been made in their favour in the year 1949.6. Consequent upon the cancellation of the appellants allotment of the Raikot land they were allotted to respondents 2 to 4. These person were, therefore, impleaded as parties to the proceedings before the Deputy Custodian General. By the order dated November 8, 1957, the Deputy Custodian-General dismissed the appellants application. The appellants have, therefore, come up to this Court by way of appeal with special leave.

Court's reasoning:
8. There is no specific provision in this Act to the effect that after its commen-cement the jurisdiction of the various authorities created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to deal with the allotment or cancellation of allotment of evacuee property shalldoubt, under S. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act the Custodian in empowered to manage evacuee property and in exercise of his power he will be competent to allot such property to any person or to cancel an allotment or lease made in favour of a person. Apart from the fact that subsequent to the issue of the notification under S. 12 (1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation ) Act, the property would cease to be evacuee property, the aforesaid powers of the Custodian would be in conflict with those conferred by S. 19 of the 1954 Act on a managing officer or a managing corporation constituted under that Act. In other words, to that extent the provisions of S. 10 of the 1950 Act and S. 19 of the 1954 Act cannot stand together. As already stated the powers conferred by sub-sec (1) of S. 19 of the 1954 Act are to prevail notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, they must prevail over the provisions of S. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. It is true that there is nothing on record to show that a managing officer was appointed with respect to the Raikot properties acquired under the notification dated March 24. 1955.But it is not necessary to ascertain that fact. The point is who after the coming into force of the 1954 Act, could cancel an allotment. Section 10 says that only a managing officer or a managing corporation can do so even though some other law may have authorised another person or authority to cancel anis no doubt true that the Raikot lands were allotted to the appellants under the notification referred to in cl. (a) of this section and, therefore, they would be entitled to the benefits conferred by this section provided they satisfied all the other requirements of this section, express or implied. It is implicit in this section that the displaced person to whom land was allotted "held" the land and was in possession of such property at the date of the notification. It is not disputed that the appellants ceased to hold and had lost possession of the Raikot lands before the publication of this notification. Even assuming that the order of the Custodian cancelling the allotment in their favour was erroneous there will be no difference in the result because what is essential is the facts of holding and possession of the land on the date of thewould repeat that the appellants had lost their possession before the publication of the notification and are thus not entitled to the protection of the section. Moreover, the Custodian, by reason of the divesting of the property, as from March 24, 1955, had become functus officio with respect to it and could not rectify any error made by him in the past in the matter of cancellation of allotment. It is true that had the appellants been in possession at the critical time they would have had the right to obtain a permanent transfer in their favour of the Raikot lands and by virtue of what happened and without any fault on their part they have been deprived of that right. That is indeed unfortunate but none of the authorities created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act could rectify the wrong that has been done by them to the appellant. The question whether it could be rectified by any of the authorities constituted by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act or not was not canvassed before us and, therefore, there is no occasion for us to say anything aboutaforesaid rule is in Chapter X headed "Payment of compensation under S. 10 of the Act" and deals with a transfer of property to an allottee by way of final settlement of his claim to compensation and does not deal with the question of allotment on a quasi-permanent basis. Moreover, this rule applies to a proceeding before an authority created by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and not to an authority created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. There is, therefore, no sub- stance in thiscontention appears to be that there is nothing to show that this property was "entrusted" to a managing officer. In the first place the section confers the particular powers on managing officers or managing corporations only and no one else. Therefore, even if no managing officer or managing corporation was appointed with respect to that property no one else could exercise the power of cancellation of allotment. Further, there is no ground in the special leave petition or in the statement of the case that there is no entrustment in fact of this property or this class of properties to a managing officer or managing corporation. He cannot, therefore, be permitted to make out a new case at this stage of argument. That apart, this argument assumes that the property, despite the publication of the notification under S. 12(1) of the Act continues to be evacuee property. Again this provision is a general provision and the particular provision regarding cancellation of allotment is S. 19(1) of the Act which does not refer to entrustment at all and it is thiswe have said in regard to S. 17 would apply herecannot accept the argument because, apart from the fact that the acquired properties have ceased to be evacuee properties, cl. (d) of R. 102 permits the managing officer or managing corporation to cancel allotment "for any other sufficient reason to be recorded in writing." The only effect of R. 102 is to permit cancellation of an allotment for reasons stated. That is all. In our opinion therefore, this rule does not help the appellants.15. Mr. Khanna had raised three other points but upon the view which we have taken as to the effect of Ss. 12 and 19 of the Act it is not necessary to consider them.