Case: Shramik Utkarsha Sabha Vs. Raymond Woollen Mills Limited

( 3 ) THE appellant who had filed the writ petition, is a Trade Union duly registered under the relevant provisions of the Trade Union Act. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the industrial Court on 27th February, 1991 in complaint proceedings bearing No. 22 of 1991, rejecting the application filed by the appellants for impleading them as a party respondent in the original complaint, a writ petition bearing No. 1772 of 1991 came to be filed. Simultaneously, they have also impugned the interim orders passed by the learned Industrial Court on 23rd january, 1991 in the said complaint proceedings, under provisions of(2) of Section 30 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 1 of 1972. The facts leading to the filing of the writ Petition are briefly stated4 ) THE Original Complaint (ULP) No. 22 of 1991 is filed by respondent No. 1, M/s. Raymond woollen Mills Ltd. , against respondent No. 2, Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha, a recognised and an approved Trade Union under relevant provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, hereinafter referred to as "the B. I. R. Act", alleging therein that the agitating employees along with other suspended or dismissed employees have engaged in or are engaging in unfair labour practices listed in Items 5 and 6 of Schedule III of the Act No. 1 of 1972 on and from 11th december, 1990. The Schedule III of the Act enumerates the various types of unfair labour practices indulged in by the Trade Unions and Item 5 thereof is to stage, encourage or instigate such forms of coercive actions as wilful go slow, squatting on the work premises after working hours or gherao of any of the members of the managerial or other staff. Similarly Item 6 refers to unfair labour practices of staging demonstration at the residence of the employers or the managerial staff members. Various instances of the employees having indulged in such unfair labour practices is disclosed in the complaint on specific dates. Initiallyorders restraining the respondent No. 2 union was passed by the learned Industrial Court from indulging in unfair labour practices complained of by the employer respondent No. 1. That order was made absolute in terms of all the prayers made in the complaint vide order passed on 23rd January, 1991.( 5 ) THE appellant viz. Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha moved an application in the aforesaid complaint proceedings for impleading the said Union as a party respondent in the original complaint. The reason disclosed was that several workmen of the respondent No. 1 company had approached the appellant recently requesting to enroll them as members of the Union. It is further alleged that these workmen were disgusted with the manner of functioning of the respondent No. 2 Union and, therefore, they had decided to take such a step. A further allegation is also made that the management of the respondent No. 1 company were to support the respondent No. 2 Union despite the fact that the said union had lost the hold on the workmen. In this context it is also stated in the application that the respondent No. 1 company wanted to make deductions from the salaries of the employees towards subscription payable to the respondent No. 2 Union without authorization, and against their wishes, a complaint came to be filed by the applicant union before the Industrial Court, Thane. A restraint order came to be passed whereunder the respondent No. 1 company, was directed not to hand over the deducted sum of membership subscription to respondent No. 2 union. The said order as can be seen was ex parte. It is then alleged that the respondent No. 2 union realising the fact that they have lost the majority membership is now trying to reestablish itself with the help and assistance of the respondent No. 1 company. The complaint is filed by the respondent No. 1 company in collusion with respondent No. 26 ) THE appellant then alleged that theorder was obtained by the respondent No. 1 company misrepresenting the learned Industrial Court in order to curb the legitimate trade union activities of the employees who are now the members of the appellant union. In this connection, it is stated in the application that the Secretary of appellant union wanted to address meeting on 24th January, 1991 but he could not do so because of theorder passed by the learned industrial Court. The said order being detrimental to thethey desire to intervene by joining as a party to the complaint7 ) THE respondent No. 1 company opposed the application on various grounds. Initially it was contended that application is not tenable because theorder dated 9th January, 1991 came to be confirmed on 23rd January, 1991. The locus standi of the appellant union to be joined as party was next challenged. In this regard it was pointed out that the respondent No. 1 company is a unit in Woollen Textile Industry in the local area of Thane Municipal Corporation and is governed by the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 that is, B. I. R. Act. The respondent No. 2 is the representative and a recognised union for the industry in question. The said Union is, therefore, a proper party to represent the employees employed in the undertaking. No other Union can claim that status or have a right to insist upon being joined as a party for representing the employees on the assumed ground that some of the employees have joined the appellant Union. A further plea is also raised that the forum to establish that the appellant union has a right to represent the employees employed in the Undertaking is totally different. The B. I. R. Act provides for gettingof the representative union and obtaining of recognition as registered representative union by the appellant for employees in woollen Textile Industry in the local area of Thane Municipal Corporation. Unless the steps required to be taken are adopted the appellant union is not entitled to represent the8 ) APART from the aforesaid legal pleas it was also contended in the reply that respondent No. 2 is a proper party to the complaint capable of representing all the employees who are engaged in unfair labour practices. The appellant union cannot avail of the right to get control of the employees by such means onmethods. It is also alleged that the respondent No. 1 is being made a scapegoat because of the( 9 ) THE respondent No. 2 union also came forward to resist the application vehemently. It was contended that the union being a recognised and a representative one it enjoys several privileges. It can collect the subscription for which written authority has been obtained. Along with the application the names of those employees who have joined the appellant union is not disclosed by them. The respondent No. 2 further asserts that none of the employees who are its members have left the union to join the appellant union. Being a representative union the respondent No. 2 believed in settling all disputes across the table without disturbing industrial peace. The respondent No. 2 also emphasised that the appellant union had individual right to file a complaint if, according to them, the management was indulging in unfair labour practices of the type alleged in the application. The respondent No. 2 further made it clear that they have no intention of indulging in or have indulged in unfair labour practices detailed in Items 5 and 6 of schedule III of Act No. 1 of 1972. It is for this reason they did not oppose the grant of interim10 ) FOR the reasons elaborated in the order dated 27th February, 1991, the learned Industrial court rejected the application. Hence the writ petition came to be filed.

Court's reasoning:
In any event the respondent No. 2 enjoys the special privilege of getting their annual membership subscription deducted directly from the salary of the employees who are members of that Union and such a privilege cannot be curtailed even by the Court unless the employee himself applies to the employer not to do so or revoked the authority granted to the representative union. Such deductions are permissible deductions not liable to be questioned at least by an unrecognised union. We hence cannot accept that the appellant union has substantial membership and that they have a right to defend suchare dealing with this point notwithstanding our finding given above. it was contended that merely because the respondent No. 2 is a recognised and representative union it cannot deprive other Trade Unions from representing the employees who are its members under Act No. 1 of 1972. In this context reliance was heavily placed upon(2) of Section 21 of the Act No. 1 of 1972 and section 27a of the B. I. R. Act. It was urged that the two provisions read together the recognised union like respondent No. 2 have a right to represent the employees only to the extent specified therein. In particular it was submitted that the right of a recognised union to represent employees under the B. I. R. Act was unlimited but it is not so under the Act No. 1 of 1972. We will shortly point out that the submissions are devoid of any merits and must beno doubt is left that a recognised and an approved union has every right to appear and act in every proceeding irrespective of the fact whether those employees are members of the Union or not with certain exceptions as carved out also under sectionof the B. I. R. Act. That section specifically provides that no employee shall be allowed to appear and act in any proceeding under the B. I. R. Act except through the representative of employees and the representative of employees is provided for in Section 30 of the Act. A representative union is first in the order of preference. No doubt, Sectionalso provides for some exceptions because the Section begins by the words "save as provided in sections 32, 33 and 33a" with which we are not presently concerned. An unequivocal right is hence established that the representative union have the sole privilege of representing employees in an industry and that right is not taken away or in any manner affected in proceedings under act No. 1 of 1972. For alt purposes a recognised union continues to be a representative union and shall remain as such till the recognition is lost orappellant not having adopted that procedure is a clear pointer to the fact that they cannot establish their claim of having large membership with them. Actually the aim of the appellant union appears to be to somehow gam entry in the industry of respondent No. 1 company so that it could create chaos in already charged atmosphere and also achieve the object of propagating membership which presently they have none or is very meagre. By this we however do not desire to lay down that the trade unions other than the representative one cannot carry out the trade union activities by propagating for membership by legal, just and constitutionalthese contentions it was urged on behalf of the appellant that their right to carry on trade union activities was seriously impaired and, therefore, the interim order passed deserves to be struck down being unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights.( 18 ) WE find absolutely no substance in the contention raised and canvassed. An ingenious mode is found out by the appellant to attack the interim order which right they do not have since having failed to establish their locus standi to appear and defend the proceedings. The appellants, therefore, cannot challenge the interim orders judicially passed by such indirect means. In any event, the appellant union could have held the meeting which they had really proposed to hold, a little distance away from the restrained limits specified in the interim order in case they were certain of their following. A slight curb or the restriction imposed in disturbed circumstances cannot be taken advantage of to contend that their constitutional rights to carry on trade union activities is infringed. If the contentions raised and canvassed were to be accepted it would make the Courts below impossible to function. We say so because it would always be open for a trade union more so by a rival union to impose itself in a pending proceeding and stall the same with the result that the purpose for which the proceeding was initiated should stand frustrated. We hence do not agree that the appellant right to carry on the trade union activities is in any manner19 ) IT was then urged that the learned Industrial Court had granted reliefs without properly perusing the complaint which is absolutely vague, lacking in material particulars and without joining proper parties. According to the appellant no prima facie case is made out to grant interim relief as prayed for by the respondent No. 1 company. For this purpose the appellant relied upon Sections 27 and 28 of Act No. 1 of 1972 and Regulation 100 of the Industrial Court regulations, 1975. Since we have already held that the appellant has no locus standi to appear and act as a party respondent, we refrain from deciding this question. Even otherwise, it is for the learned Court below to find out whether the allegations in the complaint constitute unfair labour practices within the ambit of Items 5 and 6 of Schedule III of the Act No. 1 of 1972 at the appropriate stage. In case the learned Court finds that the allegations are factually vague, lacking in material particular and want of proper parties, the complaint would be dismissed. The final order would, however, depend upon the pleadings of both the parties. For the time being the learned Court below has passed the order by way of interim reliefs in the circumstances then prevailing. We do not find any ground to interfere with it more so while exercising writ jurisdiction. It may be relevant to observe here theorder was confirmed by the learned Court below even before the application was moved by the appellant to join them as party respondent.