Case: B.C. Kame Vs. Nemi Chand Jain

1. Nemi Chandthe owner of five tenements in the town of Jabalpur and B. C.called the defendant is the tenant of those tenements under distinct tenancy agreements. After determining the tenancies by a notice, the plaintiff instituted five suits in the Court of the Civil Judge, Second Class, Jabalpur, for orders in ejectment against the defendant in respect of the five tenancies, on the pleas that the defendant had failed and neglected to pay the rent for a period exceeding three years. The summonses in the suits were served upon the defendant on May 6, 1963. The Courtafter the summer recess on June 10, 1963, and the defendant deposited in Court on June 11, 1963 Rs. 1,841 being the amount of rent and other dues for 38 months. The deposit was not supported by an application by the defendant for extension of time or for condonation of delay in making the deposit. The defendant also did not continue thereafter to pay regularly the rent due by him every month according to law. Between the months of June, 1963 and May, 1965 except on two occasions, he did not pay within the prescribed time the rent accrued due.2. By order of the Civil Judge the suits were consolidated for trial. After the evidence was recorded and during the course of the argument the defendant applied on July 26, 1965 for extension of time in making payment of rent due. This application was rejected and the Civil Court passed a decree against the defendant in respect of the five tenements. Against the orders passed by the Civil Judge, five appeals were preferred to the District Court at Jabalpur. The defendant contended that in respect of the two tenements Nos. 374 and 382 rent due was sent by money order, and the Trial Court had wrongly rejected his application for producing evidence to support the case that he was not in default in respect of those tenements, and he applied for permission to lead additional evidence. The learned District Judge was of the view that the Trial Court had "rather acted harshly in refusing to give an opportunity to the defendant for adducing evidence with regard to money order coupons which he had sought to produce". In the view of the Court the "circumstances alleged and not denied by the plaintiff did point out that the fault in not getting the evidence regarding those coupons produced was not entirely due to the negligence of the defendant, and therefore the defendant should not have been solely blamed for that", and that the defendant should have been given the opportunity to lead that evidence.The learned Judge further held that in respect of the three other premises there was default and no case was made out for extension of time. But on the assumption that by virtue of the order of consolidation there was only one trial and one judgment arising out of the suits pending before him and since the order of the Trial Court in respect of the suits arising out of the claim to premises Nos. 374 and 382 was set aside, the District Judge directed that the orders be set aside in all the five suits and the suits be remanded for trial according to law.3. Against the order made by the District Court five revision applications were preferred to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Two revision applications, insofar as they related to the claim for possession in respect of tenements Nos. 374 and 382 were summarily rejected by the High Court. But in the other three revision applications Nos. 409, 410 and 412 of 1965 rule was issued to the defendant to show cause why the orders made by the District Court should not be set aside. The High Court confirmed the view of the District Court that no case was made out for extension of time for payment of the amount under Section 13 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The High Court further held that the District Court was in error in setting aside the decree passed by the Trial Court which was theof the three revision applications. The High Court accordingly reversed the order passed by the District Court and restored the decree passed by the Trial Court in respect of those three tenements. With special leave, the defendant has appealed to this Court.

Court's reasoning:
4. The order passed by the District Court setting aside the judgment passed by the court of First Instance in respect of those premises in respect of which there was default in payment of rent was plainly erroneous and the High court was right in setting aside the order.In the present case the defendant did not pay the rent due by him within one month from the date on which the amount of rent was payable by him. We need not consider the question, whether if the amount if paid on June 10, 1963, rent would have been deemed to be properly paid. The amount was deposited in Court on June 11, 1963. The deposit was clearly beyond time. The defendant made no application for extension of time and no order was made by the Court extending the time. Even after the first payment the defendant did not continue to pay regularly the amount of rent falling due by him during the pendency of the suit. It was only on July 28, 1965, that he applied for extension of time and the Court rejected the defendants prayer for extension.7. It is true that the learned District Judge in the course of his judgment mixed up the discussion on two different contentions, one with regard to striking out the defence of the defendant for nonpayment of rent, and the other relating to extension of time for payment of rent. But on a fair reading of the judgment it appears that he was of the view that on the facts before him no case was made out by the defendant for extension of time in exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. The High Court declined to enter upon an enquiry whether the District Judge was right in so holding, because in the view of the High Court, in a revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the decision of the District Court was binding.8. We are unable to agree with Mr. Patel that the District Court held that it had no jurisdiction to extend the time. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to extend the time but on merits no case was made out for an order extending the time.