Case: Karam Singh Sobti &amp; Anr Vs. Shri Pratap Chand &amp; Anr

2. The facts giving rise to the appeal have been stated fully in the judgment of Sarkar, J. and we need not re-state the facts. The respondent, Pratap Chand, relied on cl. (c), sub-cl. (i) of the proviso to Section 13 (1) of the Control Act of 1952 in support of his claim for eviction of the appellant from a room, being room No.6, in Pratap Buildings situate in Connaught Circus, New Delhi. Sub- s. (1) of S. 13 of the Control Act of 1952 states that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no degree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated) ; the proviso creates certain exceptions and states that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the case comes within the exceptions mentioned in the proviso. One of the exceptions is mentioned in cl. (c) sub-cl. ( i ), of the proviso. That exception relates to a case where the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlord has before the commencement of the Control Act of 1952 sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises. The principal question for decision in the appeal is whether the respondent -landlord is entitled to rely on the exception provided by cl. (c), sub-cl. ( i ), of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of the Control Act of 1952.3. The learned trial judge by his judgment dated June 11, 1956 gave a decree in favour of the respondent-landlord. One of the questions raised before the learned trial Judge was whether the respondent landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting in favour of the appellant. The learned trial Judge decided against the appellant on the question of acquiescence. There was then an appeal which was heard by the learned Additional Senior Subordinate Judge of Delhi. The learned Subordinate Judge found - (1) that the sub-letting had commenced not later than November, 1950, and (2) that thereafter the respondent-landlord continued to receive rent with full knowledge of the sub-letting. On these findings he held that the respondent-landlord was not entitled to avail himself of the exception stated in cl. (c), sub-cl. ( i ), of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of the Control Act of 1952. The learned Subordinate Judge gave his judgment on June 11, 1957. It has to be noted that these judgments were given prior to the coming into force of the Control Act of 1958. That Act came into force on February 9, 1959. On August 26, 1957 the respondent -landlord moved the High Court of Punjab in revision under S.35 of the Control Act of 1952. When the revision was pending in the High Court, the Control Act of 1958 came into force. The High Court held that there was no evidence to justify the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the respondent -landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting of the room in favour of the appellant, and the case being one where there is no evidence to justify a finding, it was open to the High Court to interfere in revision. The question of the true scope and effect of S.57 of the Control Act of 1958 was agitated before the High Court and the High Court held that by reason of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958, the revision before it had to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition in revision and restored the decree for possession made by the trial Court. The appellant then moved this court for special leave and having obtained such leave has preferred the present appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court dated December 13, 1962.

Court's reasoning:
Two questions arise out of S. 57 . It is clear beyond dispute that had(2) of S.57 stood by itself, then the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, assuming that an application in revision is a proceeding within the meaning of theThere are however two provisos to(2) of S.57. It is the interpretation of these two provisos which had caused much difficulty in the present case.however, we decide against the appellant on the first question and hold that the application in revision, assuming it to be a proceeding within the meaning of(2), must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, then the second question need not be decided by us in the present case.With the details of these provisions we are not concerned in the present case except to point out that the Control Act of 1958 made radical changes in the matter of eviction of tenants on the ground ofIn the matter ofthe relevant date was taken as June 9, 1952 the date on which the Control Act of 1952 came into force, and a distinction was made betweenbefore that date andafter that date. Abefore June 9, 1952 was treated as lawfulant was in occupation of the premises at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958; but aafter June 9, 1952 without the previous consent in writing of the landlord was treated as unlawful for the purposes of the Control Act, of 1958.10. Let us now consider S. 57, of the Control Act of 1958 against the background of the scheme of the two Control Acts, as stated above.The first sub-section of S. 57 repeals the Control Act of 1952 in so far as it is applicable to the Union territory of Delhi. If the repeal stood by itself the provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would have applied with regard to the effect of the repeal and the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. The provisions of the General Clauses Act will not, however, apply where a different intention appears from the repealing enactment. Such an intention is clear from sub-s. (2) of S. 57 which contains the saving clause. It states in express terms that notwithstanding the repeal of the Control Act of 1952; all suits and proceedings under the Control Act of 1952 pending before any court or other authority at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958, shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control Act of 1952 had continued in force and the Control Act of 1958 had not been passed. Nothing can be more emphatic in the matter of a saving clause than what is contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 57. We had said earlier that had sub-s. (2) of S. 57 stood by itself without the provisos, then the incontestable position would have been that the present case would be governed by the provisions of the Control Act offirst proviso states inter alia that in the matter of eviction of a tenant from any premises to which S. 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. Section 54 need not be considered by us as it merely saves the operation of certain enactments which do not apply to the premises under ourare unable to agree that such is the meaning of the first proviso. We think that the first proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the only way of harmonising the two is to accept the view which the Punjab High Court has accepted, namely, that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act merely mean that "where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, these modifications and clarifications should be applied. We see no other way of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto.We do not think that it would be right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in that way. It was argued before us that the first proviso related only to two matters, (a) fixation of standard rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention was that in these two matters only the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 would apply and not in others. If that was the intention, nothing would have been easier than to say in sub-s. (2) - "Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant etc. Sub-s. (2) does not, however, say so, and if the first proviso is to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant, the provisions as to jurisdiction in the new Act would affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction.We do not wish, however, to base our decision on these grounds. We think that the proper way of reading sub-s. (2) and the first proviso thereto is to harmonise both in the best way possible. In Bulaqi Das Madan Mohan v. Ram Sarup, 62 Pun LR 231 the view expressed was that the proviso must have some meaning and force and the proviso intended that where the old provisions had been repeated with modifications, the old Act should be interpreted in the light of the modifications so long as they did not involve creating any rights and liabilities. A similar view was expressed by the same Judge in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadaramal, 62 Pun LR 664. The question was considered by a Division Bench in Shri Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad, 65 Pun LRagree with the view expressed by Dulat J. We also agree with the High Court that if the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 is interpreted in the way contended for by the appellant here, it would really be giving effect to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 retrospectively, though sub-s. (2) of S. 57 states in clear terms that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. This is really putting the same argument that the proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision in another way.13. For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to S. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952 and the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 does not stand in his way. He is therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord to the sub-letting in question.