Case: Nathoo Lal Vs. Durga Prasad

The property in dispute originally belonged to one Ramchandra who died sonless in the year 1903. He was survived by his mother, Sheokori, his widow, Mst. Badni, and his two daughters, Bhuri and Laxmi. It is alleged that he made an oral will under which he bequeathed the property in dispute to his daughter, Laxmi. On the 6th September, 1906, Mst. Sheokori and Mst. Badni purporting to act in accordance with the directions of the oral will, executed and registered a deed of gift of the property in dispute in favour of Mst. Laxmi. The gift deed contains the following recitalshouses are made a gift to you according to the will of your father, Ramchandra............. In this way, these houses belonging to us were purchased by your father, Ramchandra and he in his last days having made a gift of these houses to you, made a will to us that he had made a gift of that house to his daughter, Laxmi, and directed us to get the gift deed registered in her name. He further said that if we or our relations, kinsmen, creditors do raise any dispute with her he would damangir hoonga catch hold of him by his garments. According to his aforesaid will, we have got this gift deed executed in your favour, while in best of our sense and in discharge of our sacred duty enjoined by Dharma........... No other person except you has got any claim over the house. You deal with your house in any way you like. If anybody takes back the land gifted by himself or his ancestors, he will live in hell as along as the sun and moonscribe, it seems, did not in a appropriate language express the directions of the two widows and his ideas of the legal situation were somewhat confused but there can be no manner of doubt that the two executants were not conferring themselves any title which they had in the property on Laxmi but were merely giving effect to the oral will as executors and were putting the legatee in possession of the bequeathed property in this manner. That the widows had no title themselves is evident from the fact that Mst. Sheokori also joined in executing the gift deed. Admittedly Ramchandras estate could not devolve onthe second daughter, died in the year 1907, while Mst. Badni, the widow, died in the year 1927. Mst. Laxmi remained in possession of the property till her death in the year 1928. After her death Balabux, her husband, on the 5th of July, 1930, claiming as heir to her mortgaged the house in dispute to the defendant-appellant Nathoo Lal and later on the 5th of October, 1933, he sold it to him and put him into possession of it and since then he is inthe 4th October, 1945, that is one day before the expiry of the period of 12 years from the date of the defendants entry into possession of the house, the plaintiff, son of Mst. Bhuri, sister of Mst. Laxmi, claiming as an heir to her estate, filed this suit in forma pauperis for possession of the house. He alleged that he was in possession of the house till the 24th of August, 1933, through his tenant, that after it was vacated by the tenant he locked it and went away to his native village Harmara; and that on the 27th of September, 1944, he came to know that the house had been taken possession of by the appellant during his absence. It was contended by him that Balabux had no right either to mortgage or sell the house and that Laxmi was not the absolute owner of the property but had only a limited estate in it, and on her death he was entitled to possession of it.On the 28th August, 1947, the suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge, who held that Mst. Laxmi became the absolute owner of the property, and the plaintiff therefore had no title to claim possession of it after her death, Balabux being her stridhan heir. The learned Judge however held that the suit was within limitation. On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the District Judge. He expressed the opinion that the widow in executing the deed of gift was only acting as an executrix of the oral will made by Ramchandra at his death-bed and that Laxmi got under this will an absolute estate in the suit property. The plea of limitation raised by the defendant was negatived on the finding that the plaintiff was in possession of it within twelve years of thepreferred a second appeal to the High Court of Jaipur and this time with success. The High Court held that after the death of Laxmi the plaintiff continued in possession of the house till he was dispossessed by the defendant on the 5th of October, 1933, and that he was in possession even during her lifetime. On the main question in the case the High Court held that though the house was bequeathed to Laxmi by Ramchandra under an oral will, there was no proof that it conferred upon her an absolute interest in the property and that in the absence of any evidence indicating that the donor intended to convey an absolute interest to her, the gift being in favour of a female could only confer upon her a limited life estate and on her death revert to the donors heirs and the plaintiff being such an heir was entitled to succeed. In the result the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs suit was decreed with costsdefendant applied for a review of this judgment. Meanwhile the Jaipur High Court had become defunct and the review was heard by the Rajasthan High Court as successor to the Jaipur High Court under the High Courts Ordinance and was partially allowed on the 5th of April, 1950, and the decree was accordingly amended and it was provided therein that the plaintiff shall not be entitled to possession of the house except on payment of Rs. 4, 000 to the defendant as costs of improvements and repairs. It is against this judgment and decree passed after the coming into force of the Constitution of India that the present appeal has been preferred to this Court by leave of the Rajasthan High Court under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.

Court's reasoning:
In our opinion, this objection is not well founded. The only operative decree in the suit which finally and conclusively determines the rights of the parties is the decree passed on the 5th of April, 1950, by the Rajasthan High Court and that having been passed after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the provisions of article 133 are attracted to it and it is appealable to this Court provided the requirements of that article are fulfilled. The Code of Civil Procedure of the Jaipur State could not determine the jurisdiction of this Court and has no relevancy to the maintainability of the appeal. The requirement of article 133 having been fulfilled, this appeal is clearlyare unable to agree. An inquiry was made into the valuation of the property and it was reported that its value was Rs. 20, 000 or that the decision affected property of the value of above Rs. 20, 000. A substantial question of law was involved in the case, that is, whether a testamentary disposition by a Hindu in favour of a female heir conferred on her only a limited estate in the absence of evidence that he intended to confer on her an absolute interest in the property. In these circumstances the High Court was fully justified in granting the certificate. We ourselves would have been prepared to admit this appeal under our extraordinary powers conferred by article 136(1) of the Constitution, if such a certificate had not been given in the case. For the reasons given above we see no force in either of these two preliminary objections which wehas been found by the Courts below that the plaintiff was in possession of this house even during the lifetime of Laxmi and continued in possession thereafter. Even if the tenant vacated the house on the 24th August, 1933, and the plaintiff did not lock it, his possession would be presumed to continue till he was dispossessed by some one. The law presumes in favour of continuity of possession. The three Courts below have unanimously held that on the evidence it was established that after the death of Laxmi plaintiff continued in possession of the house and the suit was within limitation. There are no valid grounds for reviewing this finding in the fourth Court and the contention is thereforeour judgment, there is force in the contention of Dr. Tek Chand and none of the contentions raised by the respondents counsel have any validity. That Ramchandra bequeathed the suit property and did not gift it to his daughter Laxmi is a fact which cannot be questioned at this stage. It was admitted by the plaintiff himself in the witnessis no evidence to the contrary in the case. The gift deed fully supports the testimony of the plaintiff on this point. It definitely states that according to the will, the gift deed was executed in favour of Laxmi and it further recites that Laxmi was entitled to deal with the house in any manner she liked. Those who were directed to execute the oral will made by Ramchandra must be presumed to have carried out his directions in accordance with his wishes. It seems clear that the intention of the testator was to benefit his daughter, Laxmi, and to confer upon her the same title as he himself possessed. She was the sole object of his bounty and on the attendant circumstances of this case it is plain that he intended to confer on her whatever title he himself had. Laxmi therefore became the absolute owner of the property under the terms of the oral will of her father and the plaintiff is no heir to the property which under the law devolved on Laxmis husband who had full right to alienate it.We are further of the opinion that the High Court was in error in thinking that it is a settled principle of law that unless there are express terms in the deed of gift to indicate that the donor who had absolute interest intended to convey absolute ownership, a gift in favour of an heir who inherits only a limited interest cannot be construed as conferring an absoluteis the general principle of law which is recognized and embodied in section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act and unless it is shown that under Hindu Law a gift to a female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those that exist in a widows estate,  there is no justification for departing from this principle. There is certainly no such provision in Hindu Law and no text could be supplied in support of thelearned Judges of the High Court were therefore clearly wrong in law in holding that the will having been made by the father in favour of his daughter, it should be presumed that he intended to give her a limited life estate.