Case: Indian Mica &amp; Micanite Industries Ltd Vs. State Of Bihar &amp; Ors

3. The appellant is a consumer of denatured spirit. It purchases denatured spirit from the wholesalers or the manufacturers for the purpose of manufacturing micanite. The Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act 2 of 1915) came into force on January 19, 1916. In pursuance of the provisions of that Act the impugned Rule was framed by the Board of Revenue for levying licence fee. The fee for the licence to possess denatured spirit in 1919 was only Rs. 2/- per annum irrespective of the quantity in the possession of a person. This rate continued to be in force till 1937. At this stage it may be remembered that under sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provinces were authorised to continue to levy tax, duties, cesses or fees which were being lawfully levied prior to the commencement of that Act. Under the 1935 Act as under our present Constitution, the power to levy duties on alcoholic liquor fit for human consumption was allocated to the Provincial Legislature whereas the power to levy duty on alcoholic liquor not fit for human consumption was allocated to the Central Legislature. Denatured spirit though an alcoholic liquor is not fit for human consumption. The power to levy duty on the same was and is given to the Central Legislature. But the same being intoxicating liquor, the Provincial Legislature under the 1935 Act and at present the State Legislature has power to levy fee. The power of any legislature to levy fee is conditioned by the fact that it must be by and large a quid pro quo for the services rendered. If a levy purporting to be a fee is found to be an exaction without doing any service or if it is found that the levy is wholly disproportionate to the services rendered then the levy becomes invalid.

Court's reasoning:
According to the finding of the High Court the only services rendered by the Government to the appellant and to other similar licensees is that the Excise Department have to maintain an elaborate staff not only for the purposes of ensuring that denaturing is done properly by the manufacturer but also for the purpose of seeing that the subsequent possession of denatured spirit in the hands either of a wholesale dealer or retail seller or any other licensee or permit-holder is not misused by converting the denatured spirit into alcohol fit for human consumption and thereby evade payment of heavy duty. So far as the manufacturing process is concerned, the appellant or other similar licensees have nothing to do with it. They are only the purchasers of manufactured denatured spinsHence the cost of supervising the manufacturing process or any assistance rendered to the manufactures cannot be recovered from the consumers like the appellant. Further under Rule 9 of the Boards rules, the actual cost of supervision of the manufacturing process by the Excise Department is required to be borne by the manufacturer. There cannot be a double levy in that regard. In the opinion of the High Court the subsequent transfer of denatured spirit and possession of the same in the hands of various persons such as whole-sale dealer retail, dealer or other manufacturers also requires close and effective supervision because of the risk of the denatured spirit being converted into potable liquor and thus evading heavy duty. Assuming this conclusion to be correct, by doing so, the State is rendering no service to the consumer. It is merely protecting its own rights. Further in this case, the State which was in a position to place material before the Court to show what services had been rendered by it to the appellant and other similar licensees, the costs or at any rate the probable costs that can be said to have been incurred for rendering those services and the amount realised as fees has failed to do so On the side of the appellant, it is alleged that the State is collecting huge amount as fees and that it is rendering little or no service in return. The correlationship between the services rendered and the fee levied is essentially a question of fact. Prima facie, the levy appears to be excessive even if the State can be said to be rendering some service to the licensees. The State ought to be in possession of the material from which the correlationship between the levy and the services rendered can be established at least in a general way. But the State has not chosen to place those materials before the Court. Therefore, the levy under the impugned Rule cannot be justifiedIn this Court Counsel for the State prayed for an opportunity to place material to show that the levy in question is not disproportionate to the value of the services rendered by the State. Ordinarily we would not have acceded to that request coming at such a late stage, particularly in view of fact that the legal position had been clarified by a long chain of decisions of this Court. There is no doubt that the State has failed to place the necessary material before the Court to justify the levy. But the fact remains that because of the negligence of those in-charge of the defence of the State, the State may suffer considerable financial loss, it we hold that the impugned Rule is void. Hence we are constrained to give the State a further chance to prove its case.