Case: LULLU VAS (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AUDREY LUDWIG VAS Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the case are as follows: The Government of Bombay acquired the disputed property (now Worli Estate Scheme No. 58) prior to 1945, and vested the same in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as ?MCGM?). Thereafter, on 04.06.1945, the appellants? predecessor¬in-interest, Lullu Vas, submitted an application to the MCGM seeking lease of the said land for residential purposes and paid an earnest money of Rs. 8,232. The appellants contend that the MCGM decided to give leasehold rights in perpetuity to Lullu Vas. At that time, about 70 slum structures were pre¬existing on the said land. Since Lullu Vas demanded possession, on 05.11.1965, the MCGM handed over symbolic possession of the said plot on ?as is where is basis?- when it was still occupied by the encroaching hutments.4. In 1971, the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act (hereinafter referred to as ?Slum Act?) was enacted. Subsequently, in 1976 photo¬passes were issued to the slum dwellers who were residing in the disputed area and the said area attained the status of the declared slum, entitled for redevelopment under Regulation 33 (10) of the Development Control Regulations read with the provisions of the Slum Act.5. In 1996, the slum dwellers residing on the said land formed a co¬ operative housing society ?New Sagar Vihar? (respondent no. 4) and submitted a proposal for slum rehabilitation to the SRA, and the same was approved by issuing a Letter of Intent (hereinafter referred to as ?LoI?) and an Intimation of Approval (hereinafter referred to as ?IoA?) on 16.06.1999. In furtherance of the above, a commencement certificate was issued on 13.10.1999 and respondent no. 4 appointed a developer (respondent no. 5) and promoter for the implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme and to build new. Meanwhile, Lullu Vas and her family started residing outside India. Lullu Vas expired on 04.02.1997. In 2008, Mr. Shailesh Chheda, who claimed that he was the general power of attorney holder of the appellants (legal representatives of Lullu Vas), filed W.P No. 2714/2008 before the High Court against the State of Maharashtra and six others challenging the order of the SRA dated 16.06.1999 whereby the SRA had issued the LoI and IoA to respondents no. 4 and 5. The writ petition was withdrawn vide order dated 17.12.2008, with liberty to the appellants to file a representation before the HPC.7. Mr. Shailesh Chheda thereafter approached the HPC in Appeal No. 148 of 2008, seeking quashing of the order dated 16.06.1999 granting LoI in favour of the respondents no. 4 and 5. The HPC, upon hearing the parties, vide order dated 20.06.2009 concluded that the land belonged to the respondent no. 3 (MCGM) and the appellants are lessees for 999 years. However, as the LoI had lapsed and respondents no. 4 and 5 had filed a separate application for revalidation of the LoI dated 16.06.1999 before the SRA, the HPC directed the SRA to hear both the parties and pass orders on the merits of the case. It may be noted that the aforesaid first order of the HPC has not been challenged by the Respondents.8. Vide order dated 23.08.2010, the CEO, SRA, after hearing both sides, revalidated the LoI in favour of the respondents no. 4 and 5. The above order of revalidation by the SRA was challenged by the appellants in Appeal No. 2 of 2011 before the HPC. This appeal was allowed by order dated 05.02.2011 and consequently, the order of the CEO, SRA dated 23.08.2010, was set aside. Consequently, vide order dated 06.09.2013, the SRA allowed the application preferred by the appellants seeking to record the scheme.9. Subsequent to the aforesaid order of the SRA, respondent no. 2 (MCGM) issued letter dated 17.01.2015 withdrawing/cancelling its earlier orders, decisions and communications which were claimed as acceptance of the claim of late Lullu Vas as lessees, observing that the claims were founded upon erroneous representation based on legally inadmissible documents. It was found that not only were the lease documents invalid for want of adequate seal and signature, but also that the appellants had failed to make any effort to remove the encroachments. Moreover, in the absence of a registered lease deed, neither the original applicant nor the appellants herein have any rights whatsoever in the disputed property.10. Aggrieved, the appellants filed LC Suit No. 456 of 2016 in the City Civil Court, challenging the aforesaid letter dated 17.01.2015 issued by respondent no. 2 to be illegal and void. Additionally, the appellants also sought for a declaration that they are the lessees of MCGM. It is to be noted that this suit is still pending final adjudication. In the said suit, the appellants had filed Notice of Motion No. 1110 of 2016 seeking temporary injunction against the respondents from obstructing or disturbing the appellants? possession. Vide order dated 07.03.2018, the Notice of Motion was partly allowed and the respondent no. 2 and 4 were temporarily restrained, pending suit, from acting upon or implementing the decision/communication dated 17.01.2015.11. In the meantime, in 2011, respondents no. 4 and 5 filed Writ Petition No. 1507 of 2011, which is the subject matter of challenge before us. By way of this Writ Petition, respondents no. 4 and 5 challenged the second order passed by the HPC dated 05.02.2011 cancelling the LoI issued in their favour. Subsequent to the order dated 07.03.2018 in Notice of Motion No. 1110 of 2016 in LC Suit No. 456 of 2016 wherein the temporary injunction was granted in favour of the appellants, the respondents no. 4 and 5 preferred Notice of Motion No. 206 of 2018, seeking stay of the order dated 05.02.2011 in Appeal No. 2 of 2011 before the HPC.12. Vide order dated 07.06.2018, the court disposed of the Writ Petition filed by respondents no. 4 and 5 by setting aside the order of the HPC dated 05.02.2011, and quashing and setting aside the consequential orders or letters of the SRA dated 06.06.2011 and 06.09.2013.13. The High Court, while disposing of the Writ Petition, observed that at the time the application was preferred by Lullu Vas, the disputed property was already encroached upon by slum dwellers. The numbers of these slum dwellers kept on increasing due to the inaction of the appellants. In light of the same, the appellants? plea seeking execution of the lease in their favour stood frustrated and the appellants therefore could not object to the redevelopment of the said land. Moreover, the slum dwellers agreed to join the rehabilitation scheme and 70% of the dwellers appointed respondent no. 5 as their developer in compliance with Clauses 1.11 and 1.15 of Appendix¬IV of the Development Control Regulations. On the other hand, the appellants failed to show any such compliance. Furthermore, taking into account the delay in implementation of the rehabilitation scheme, the High Court rejected the appellants? plea seeking a stay on the redevelopment. Aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order, the appellants have preferred this Special Leave Petition.

Court's reasoning:
22. Even though the parties have argued at length and produced multiple documents regarding the lease¬holding rights in dispute, at the outset, we would like to clarify that at this stage of litigation we are not inclined to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to decide questions of law on merits which call for elaborate arguments or detailed scrutiny, as these issues are the subject matter of the trial. The aforesaid contentions raised by the parties are to be resolved during the trial.The adjudication of the dispute before us has to be based on principles of equity. The party seeking the remedy has to make out a prima facie case on merits, and has to satisfy the court that there is some basis to its claim regarding the existence of his right. Further, the court must balance the comparative hardship or mischief which is likely to occur from withholding the relief, against that which would likely arise from granting it. It has to be further established that non-interference by the court would result in ?irreparable injury? to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except to grant the relief sought.26. In the present case the genesis of the appellants? right is a lease which was allegedly entered into between the appellants? predecessor in interest and MCGM, which allegedly accepted the application and the premium amount on 17.11.1965. Respondent no. 2 has vehemently denied the existence of any lease on the ground that mere filing of an ?application? and an endorsement made thereunder of its acceptance does not result in a ?concluded contract? which creates any right.27. It may be noted that the very basis of the appellants? right, i.e., the lease deed, is itself disputed as there exists no registered document to that effect. It is pertinent to note herein that the appellants have taken the plea that by paying consideration towards the leasehold rights they now have a vested interest over the suit property. Hence, without any alleged violation of the conditions of the lease, the appellants claim that the revocation of their rights by the respondent no. 2 is malafide. In order to substantiate their claim, the appellants have averred that the name of the appellants appears in the records of the Estate Department as the lessees. Furthermore, our attention has been drawn to the fact that the first order of the HPC, dated 20.06.2009, declares the appellants to be lessees for 999 years. As the aforementioned order has not been challenged by the respondents, it has now attained finality. However, bearing in mind that this very issue is the subject matter of the pending civil suit, we refrain from making any observations regarding the same.28. While taking into consideration the rights of the appellants, we must also not lose sight of the fact that the Slum Act is a beneficial legislation meant to ameliorate the poor condition of slum dwellers. (See Balasaheb Arjun Torbole v. Administrator and Divisional Commissioner., (2015) 6 SCC 534 ). The legislative purpose behind this enactment is to provide statutory protection to the rights of slum dwellers in furtherance of their fundamental right to shelter and other basic amenities, enabling them to lead a dignified life as reflected in the Constitution. As such, where the rights of the appellants need to be analysed in light of the Slum Act, it is necessary to balance the interests of the appellants with that of the slum dwellers. In the present case, the slum dwellers, who are the primary beneficiaries of the redevelopment scheme, are not only at risk of losing their shelter, but also their means of livelihood.29. The averments made by the respondents reveal that pursuant to the implementation of the Slum Act, more than 70% of the slum dwellers formed respondent no. 4 (the housing society) and sought rehabilitation on the site in furtherance of their statutory rights. Further, respondent no. 5 has averred that demolition of the existing structures has already been initiated and the shifting of the slum dwellers is ongoing. The respondent no. 5 has brought to our notice that alternate accommodation for the slum dwellers has been arranged on a rental basis. But, owing to the ongoing litigation over the suit property, redevelopment has been pending for more than eight years. It is to be noted that ultimately it is the slum dwellers who are suffering. There is nothing on record to show that they have the support of 70% of the slum dwellers as mandated by the statute. Moreover, the appellants can be adequately compensated in the event of their success in the trial and, as such, have failed to prove any irreparable injury which cannot be remedied. In a situation such as this, where rights of the parties have not yet crystalized, and no irreparable injury can accrue to the plaintiff pending trial, the entire case then revolves around the principles of comparative convenience.30. The balance of convenience in the present case tilts in favour of the respondents, as the completion of the scheme is in greater public interest. However,it is noteworthy to observe that the appellants have vehemently contended that they have paid consideration in exchange of the lease¬hold right which is the subject matter of the trial.In order to substantiate their claim, the appellants have produced multiple documents on records, the genuineness of which is seriously doubted by the respondent authorities.It is to be noted that no material was produced before us so as to ascertain the quantum of damages that may have accrued to the appellants. Further, we cannot prohibit respondent no. 5 from disposing of the free saleable area, as it is only performing its contractual obligations and cannot be penalized for any irregularity committed by the respondent authorities. A specific averment has been made by respondent no. 2 that, in the event the appellants succeed before the trial court, they shall be entitled to adequate damages.