Case: Bangalore Woollen, Cotton &amp; Silk Mills Co. Ltd. &amp; Another Vs. Corporation of the City of Bangalore by its Commissioner, Bangalore City

2. On March 31, 1954, a resolution was passed purporting to be under S. 98(1) of the Act by which it was resolved to levy an octroi on cotton and wool as followsof the ArticlesRate of duty1. Raw cotton and wool (this includes both loose and compressed, made in India or Foreign)Rs. 1/9/per cent ad valorem2. ... ... ...This was notified in the Mysore Gazette on April 3, 1954, and was also published as required by S. 98 (1) of the Act. Objections were invited and it is admitted that both the appellants filed their objections. Final resolution under S. 98(2) was passed on December 21, 1954, and the resolution in regard to octroi came into force as from January 1, 1955. It may be mentioned that the final resolution passed under S. 98(2) of the Act was not published in the Official Gazette but was published in the local newspapers and a notice dated December 23, 1954, was also sent to the appellants to the effect that after considering their objections the Municipality had decided to levy an octroi on the goods at the rate already notified.3. The appellant in C. A. 448/57, filed a petition in the High Court on March 15, 1955, under Art. 226 challenging the validity of the imposition of the octroi on the groundsthat the tax was in contravention of S. 98(2) of the Act in so far as a notice was not published in the Official Gazette;(2) that the tax was in contravention of S. 130 of the Act and(3) that there was excessive delegation.4. The appellant in C. A. 449/57, filed its petition on March 17, 1955, in which besides challenging the validity of the imposition of the tax on grounds above set out. It also challenged the vires of the imposition on the groundsthat the levy of the octroi was in contravention of Art. 276(2) of the Constitution by which a tax on trade exceeding Rs. 250/per annum could not be imposed;2. that it was a contravention of Art. 301 which guaranteed freedom oftrade and commerce, and3. that it was in contravention of Art. 19 (l)(g) of the Constitution.5. The High Court rejected all these objections and the appellant has come to this court on a certificate of the High Court under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.

Court's reasoning:
It was argued that instead of passing a resolution imposing the octroi duty, the Corporation should have first published its "resolution" to impose the tax and that the Corporation could not at once pass a resolution" by which it imposed the tax. It published that resolution in the official Gazette and also in accordance with other provisions of S. 98(1) and invited objections which were filed. The only defect, if defect it can be called at all, was that instead of saying that it "intended" to impose a tax, the notice which was published said the tax "had been resolved to be levied".This is a technicality and is of no substance.7.The next objection raised was that after the Corporation adopted the resolution imposing the tax which was after considering all the objections the publication was only in local newspapers and there was no publication in the Government Gazette and this, it was submitted, was such a serious defect as to make the imposition illegal and ultra vires. In support counsel for the appellants relied on certain judgments where publication in the official Gazette was held to be a condition precedent to the legality of the imposition of the tax. These cases are Krishna Jute and Cotton Mills Co. v. Municipal Counsel, Vizianagram, AIR 1926 Mad 152   :Municipal Council, Rajamundry v. Jaladurga Prasadarayudu, AIR 1926 Mad 800  . Reference was made also to Municipal Council, Auantapur v. Vasudeva Rao, ILR 55 Mad 207  : (AIR 1981 Mad 808); Manak Chand v. Municipal Council, Jaipur AIR 1951 Raj 139   and State of Kerala v. P. J. Joseph, AIR 1958 SC 296   at p. 299.This question we are not considering as we are referring this case to a larger Bench*on certain constitutional points and shall refer this question also in theAct.9. It was next argued that the words of Class VIII in Part V of Schedule III where the words used are "other articles which are not specified above" and which may be approved by the Corporation by order in this behalf meant that the goods must be precisely defined and included by name in the Schedule and that the use if the word "in this behalf" meant adding to the list of articles in Schedule 3. Reliance was placed on the interpretation of the word "in this behalf" as given by this Court in Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Its Workmen,Lab LJ 262 ; (AIR 1960 SC692). But that case has no application to the facts of the present case because the resolution was, as a matter of fact, passed for the purpose of imposing an octroi duty on the goods in dispute. The words used inLab LJ 262; (AIR 1960 SC 692  ) were in another context and even there all that was said was that a notification had to issue making the Central Government the appropriate Government. As we have said above in the present case there was a resolution which sought to include these goods in the Schedule for the purpose of imposing theThe excessive nature of delegation under Class VIII in Part V of Schedule III was also urged but this was not a question which was raised in the High Court nor is there any substance in the matter. Theargument raised was that the power of the Municipal Corporation to specify, goods under Class VIII was excessive delegation which was both uncanalised and uncontrolled and reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554   but that case has no application to the facts of the present case.In the present case the Legislature has laid down the powers of the Municipality to tax various goods. It has enumerated certain articles and animals and Class VIII read with S. 97(e) of the Act has authorised the Municipality to impose tax on other articles and goods. This power is more in the nature of conditional delegation. as was held in Baxter v. Ah Way, (1909) 8 CLR 626   where it was held that under S. 52 (g) of the (Australian) Customs Act, 1901,a power given to prohibit by proclamation the importation of certain articles was not a delegation of legislative power but condition legislation because the prohibition of importation was a legislative act of Parliament itself and the effect of(g) of S. 52 was only to confer upon thein Council the discretion to determine to which class of goods other than those specified in the section and under what conditions the prohibition shall apply. All that the legislature has done in the present case is that it has specified certain articles on which octroi duty can be imposed and it has also given to the Municipal Corporation the discretion to determine on what other goods and under what conditions the tax should be levied. That, in our opinion, is not a case which falls under the rule laid down by this Court in AIR 1960 SC 554  .11.It was contended in C.A, 449/57 that the imposition of duty on raw cotton could not cover processed cotton that is cotton which had been ginned, combed and pressed.The High Court held that the cotton by being ginned or pressed in bales does not cease to be raw cotton and was to be regarded as raw for the purpose of the Act. The same would apply to wool. The notification levying the tax specifically stated that raw cotton and wool included both loose and compressed, i.e. compressed cotton and wool whether it was Indian cotton or foreign cotton. It will not, in our opinion, be a correct meaning to give to the notification if it were interpreted to apply only to cotton which had been gathered from the fields and had neither been ginned nor pressed. We agree with the High Court that this resolution covers the articles which the appellants . in the two cases were importing into the limits of the Corporation ofsection validates all defects and irregularities in any act or proceedings which do not affect the merits of the case. Itwas submitted that this section is in another chapter, i.e. ch. 2 dealing with provisions common to the Corporation and the Standing Committees.It may be that it is in another chapter but the language of the section is wide and applies to all defects or irregularities in any act or proceeding done not affecting the merits of the case.