Case: Kapur Chand Jain Vs. B. S. Grewal &amp; Others

1. The appellant obtained on lease from the 4th respondent (Raja Charanjit Singh) 208 canals of agricultural land for five years commencing from Rabi 1951 to Kharif 1955 on an annual rent of Rs. 7,500. The lease deed was registered and was executed on November 20, 1950. The appellant paid a sum of Rs. 7,500 as advance rent for one year. There was a tube well on the land and one of the terms of the lease was that the Raja would put the tube well into working order and the lease was to commence on the day this was done. The tube well was repaired on July 11, 1951 and the lease is said to have commenced on that day. According to the appellant the tube well did not deliver the right quantity of water and that led to certain disputes.2. The appellant did not pay rent for the subsequent years. On August 15, 1952 the Raja filed a suit or recovery of Rs. 7,500 as rent for Rabi and Kharif, 1951. He claimed that Rs. 7,500 paid to him was to be retained as deposit to be adjusted towards the final payment. The appellant resisted this demand mainly on the ground that the tube well was not functioning as required by the lease deed. This suit was decreed on March 23, 1957 and an amount of Rs. 859-4-0 was found due. This was because on April 15, 1953 the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 came into force and under S.12 of that Act the maximum rent payable by a tenant for any land held by him was not to exceed 1 / 3rd of the crop of such land or of the value of the crop determined in the manner to be prescribed by Rules. For this period an amount of Rs. 4,313 was held to be the value of the produce and after making deduction for sundry payments to the Raja the decree was for the amount stated. The appellant paid that amount forthwith. The appellant did not pay the rent for the years 1952, 1953 and 1954  on January 5, 1955 the Raja brought another suit for the recovery of Rupees 22,500 as arrears of rent for these three years and on October 8, 1956 filed a revised application under S. 14-A(ii) added from 1955 to the Act. During the pendency of this suit the appellant was asked to deposit a sum of Rupees 7,000 which he did on January 22, 1957. Later, the amount payable under S.12 of the Act was found to be Rs. 13,378-2-0 and on June 22, 1957 the appellant deposited the balance. The appellant did not pay rent for the year 1955 and though his lease expired with Khar if, 1955 he continued holding over and did not pay rent for Rabi 1956. The Raja made an application on October 10, 1956 under S. 14-A(i) for the eviction of the appellant on the ground inter alia that he had failed to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause. Under S.14-A (i) the application for eviction lay before an Assistant Collector, First Grade, while under S. 14-A (ii) the application for recovery of arrears of rent (to which category belonged the revised application dated October 8, 1956, which we have mentioned before) lay before an Assistant Collector Second Grade. As a result the question of the eviction of the tenant on the ground that he was irregular in payment of rent was tried in one Court and the recovery proceedings were tried in another Court. The proceedings under S.14-A (i) terminated in favour of the appellant on December 24, 1958, the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Jullundur holding that the tenant had sufficient cause not to pay rent fixed by the lease deed and the Raja could not claim ejectment on that ground. The Raja appealed. The Collector, Jullundur District, on May 20, 1959 reversed the order and directed that the appellant be evicted. An appeal by the appellant before the Commissioner, Jullundur Division failed as also an application for revision before the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The appellant then moved the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. His petition was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench on March 9, 1961. The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

Court's reasoning:
In our opinion, the conduct of the tenant prior to the coming into form of the new section can be taken into account. No doubt a statute must be applied prospectively. But a statute is not applied retrospectively because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a moment of time prior to its passing. The clause in question makes a particular conduct the ground for an application for eviction. The necessary condition for the application of S.9(1)(ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act. cannot be overlooked. The Tribunals were, therefore, right in considering conduct of the appellant prior to the coming into force of S.14-A while determining whether the appellant was irregular in paying the(ii) deals with eviction as punishment for non-compliance with the orders of the Court. Clause (i) deals with evictions for any of the reasons given in S. 9 (1). One such reason is that the tenant has failed to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause. Eviction under the second clause is for failure to carry out the orders to deposit arrears of rent within the time fixed for payment and eviction under the first clause is a penalty for not paying the rent regularly without sufficient cause. The clauses are on different-footing and as the scheme of the Act itself shows different Tribunals determine the two issues. The appellant tried to have the various proceedings consolidated in the same Court, but curiously enough he asked that the proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent should be stayed. His motive is quite apparent. He wanted to defend himself against liability arising under S. 9 (1)(i) on the ground that he could not pay the rent till 1/ 3rd of the produce or its value was determined under the Rules. We have said above that his statement was that he wanted to pay the exact amount but the landlord did not receive it. It is quite obvious that he avoided payment over the years under one pretext or the other and the Tribunals were right in holding that he had failed to make out sufficient cause for non-payment. Indeed such a finding given concurrently by the High Court and the three Tribunals below would be sufficient for the disposal of the case. We have only allowed the argument to be raised because Mr. Iyengar claimed that conditions on which persons can be evicted under the two clauses of S. 14-A, were inconsistent. On examination it is apparent that the reasons for eviction under the two clauses are entirely different. The appellant could not be evicted under the second clause of S. 14-A but it is obvious that his case is covered by the first clause. The irregularity in payment is patent and there was no sufficient cause.