Case: Samnuggur Jute Factory Company, Limited Vs. Their Workmen

It appears that at the time when the appellant held the enquiry against Ramrachha, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its workmen and so under S.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act the appellant applied for permission to dismiss Ramrachha. This application was made on 18 July, 1955. Soon thereafter, Ramrachha applied under S.33A of the Act complaining that the appellant had contravened the provision of S. 33. Whilst these two applications were pending, the main dispute itself ended under the award which was pronounced on 6 October, 1955 and so the tribunal before which the two applications were pending was no longer entitled to deal with those applications. The said award was challenged by the appellant by appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal; and pending the said appeal the appellant moved the Appellate Tribunal for permission to dismiss Ramrachha. As a counterblast, Ramrachha also moved the Appellate Tribunal as he had done before the tribunal itself. It appears that the Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the enquiry which had been held by the appellant against Ramrachha was not proper and so it directed that a fresh enquiry should be held. Incidentally, the Appellate Tribunal also passed an order directing the suspension of Ramrachha on condition that subsistence allowance at the rates specified should be paid to him and accommodation should be continued to be given to him pending the final disposal of the domestic enquiry.4. This latter portion of the directions issued by the Appellate Tribunal was challenged by the appellant by the appellant by a writ petition before the High Court and ultimately, the writ petition was allowed and the impugned directions were set aside. Meanwhile, the appellant held a fresh enquiry which lasted between 11 July, 1956 and 26 February, 1957. This enquiry was held by Mr. Jacks. As a result of this enquiry the appellant dismissed Ramrachha and the order was communicated to him on 27 May, 1959. Thus the proceedings which began against Ramrachha in the first week of July, 1955 ended in so far as the appellant was concerned on 27 May, 1959 when the appellant informed Ramrachha that he had been dismissed. Its this order of dismissal which has given rise to the present dispute between the parties.The tribunal has found that the enquiry had been held by Mr. Jacks as pleaded by the appellant. It has also found, rejecting the version of Ramrachha, that the enquiry on the whole was fairly conducted. It has rejected the respondents contention that the dismissal of Ramrachha was mala fide. Even so, the tribunal took notice of the fact that the report made by Mr. Jacks had not been Produced before the tribunal and in fact there was no evidence to show that a report had been made Having reached the conclusion that either a report was not made or was not produced before it, the tribunal was inclined to draw an adverse inference against the appellant and so it decided to consider the evidence for itself. Even so, in a part of its judgment, the tribunal has applied the tests laid down by this Court in dealing with industrial disputes of this kind.

Court's reasoning:
d, if the industrial tribunal deals with the question of the validity of the dismissal of an industrial employee and it a appears that the dismissal was the result of a domestic enquiry, fairly and properly held, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited. The award delivered by the tribunal in the present case shows a somewhat combined approach. It examined the evidence for itself and it also observed in two or three places that it was not sitting as a Court of appeal over the domestic enquiry. In our opinion, the tribunal need not have adopted this halting approach in the present case, because, as we have recently held, if at the end of the domestic enquiry the inquiring officer does not make a report, that itself introduces a serious infirmity in the enquiry and the industrial can in that case ignore the domestic enquiry and deal with the merits of the dispute for itself. Therefore it must be said that in the present case when the tribunal took the view that it should not deal with the matter as a Court of appeal, it was really limiting its jurisdiction unduly. As the tribunal has adopted a somewhat mixed approach, we have heard Sri Setalvad at length in support of his contention that the tribunal was in error in ordering the reinstatement of Ramrachha.As we have just indicated, the dispute between the parties lies within a very narrow compass. Since the report made by Mr. Jacks has not been produced and it may well be that no report was made, the evidence produced before Mr. Jacks would serve no purpose in the present enquiry and the tribunal would therefore have been justified in confining its attention to the evidence led before it. That is in fact what the tribunal has done in a part of its judgment. Now this evidence consists of the testimony of three witnesses. Ramrachha himself gave evidence and Tewari purported to support it. It is true as Sri Setalvad has pointed out that Ramrachha has gone back upon his previous statement, that he had received the money within the premises of the factory. In his evidence before the tribunal, he has stated that the money was paid to him by mainuddin at his own place. Tewari also attempts to support Ramrachha in that part of the case. Ramrachha however has stated that he had advanced money to Mainuddin along with four other durwans and it was that loan which was repaid by Mainuddin. Though Tewari supported Ramrachha in a part of his case, he did not agree that he had advanced any money to Mainuddin. That is the state of the evidence adduced on behalf of Ramrachha. Then we have the evidence of Ukil. Ukil was told that some scuffle had taken place and on that he went to the rear side of godown 1. On reaching that place, he found that Mainuddin had been caught by Kesoram. He also noticed that four durwans including Ramrachha were also there and they were sitting. On enquiry the witness was told by Mainuddin that all his money had already been taken away by Ramrachha and that he was about to come to the witness to lodging a complaint. Then Ukil told Ramrachha to return the money to Mainuddin and the money was accordingly returned. In histhe witness has attempted to improve his story by adding that when he reached the spot he heard Mainuddin crying and shouting that everything of him has been snatched away. That is the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant. Now it is clear that the evidence given by Ukil can hardly justify Sri Setalvads contention that either of the two charges framed against Ramrachha had been proved. Ukil was not present when money passed hands and so it would not be possible to treat his evidence as establishing the fact that Mainuddin had been robbed of his money and that it doing so, Ramrachha and his companions were guilty of riotous conduct. It is true that the witness had referred to the fact that Mainuddin was crying and shouting but considering the way in which this detail has been introduced inwe are not prepared to attach any value to that evidence.It has also been shown that the other durwan who gave evidence denied that he had advanced any money. But the tribunal has pointed out and we think rightly that the said denial would not really assist the appellants case, because Tewari would very much like to support the appellants version in the present proceedings. It is somewhat remarkable that though four durwans were involved in the incident along with Ramrachha, Ramrachha alone has been proceeded against in this drastic way. A charge was framed against another durwan and he was suspended of four days; he was then reprimanded and taken back in service. Therefore, as the tribunal has observed, it is not surprising that the other durwans would not be too keen in supporting the case of Ramrachha. In our opinion, therefore, the tribunal was right in holding that the appellants case against Ramrachha had not been proved.5.Sri Setalvad, however, contends that if we read Cl. 14(c) (xv) of the standing orders, the case against Ramrachha must be held to be proved. He argues that the said clause prohibits the collection of moneys within the mill premises during working hours for purposes not sanctioned by the management. And he has invited our attention to the fact that notice had been put up on theby the appellant prohibiting employees from advancing loans towithin the premises of the factory. The argument is that if this clause in the standing orders is read in the light of the circulars, it would cover the case of a receipt by Ramrachha of the loan advanced by him to Mainuddin.We do not think that we can accept this contention. The collection of moneys within the mill premises to which the clause refers must be collection made by the person who collects them; if a debtor makes over to hisand returns some amount received by him by way of loan of his own account, we do not think that this conduct could be brought within the mischief of the relevant clause of the standing orders. It whilst collecting moneys force had been used and Mainuddin had been compelled to part with money, that might have been another matter. Therefore, on the facts proved in this case, we do not think that the case of Ramrachha can be legitimately brought within the purview of Cl. 14(c)(xv) of the standing orders.Sri Setalvad has then pressed us to consider the question as to whether it would be expedient to direct reinstatement of Ramrachha. As we have repeatedly, held, in cases where it is shown that an industrial employee has been improperly dismissed, as a general has been improperly dismissed, as a general rule he is entitled to claim reinstatement. There may however be cases in which industrial adjudication may take the view that if the case presents certain unusual features reinstatement may not be granted and compensation instead may meet the ends of justice. We do not think that the present case falls in this latter category. It is true that the incident book place in 1955 and we are dealing with this appeal today. But for the delay made in the present case, the blame must substantially be shared by the appellant itself. Therefore we are not impressed by the argument that instead of ordering reinstatement of Ramrachha some compensation should be ordered to be paid to him.