Case: Mobilox Innovations Private Ltd Vs. Kirusa Software Private Ltd

The appellant was engaged by Star TV for conductingfor the "Nach Baliye" program on Star TV. The appellant in turn subcontracted the work to the respondent and issued purchase orders between October and December, 2013 in favour of the respondent. In the "Nach Baliye" program, the successful dancer was to be selected on various bases, including viewers votes. For this purpose, the respondent was to provide toll free telephone numbers across India, through which the viewers of the program could cast their votes in favour of one or more participants. For this purpose, a software was customized by the respondent, who then coordinated the results and provided them to the appellant. Since the respondent obtained toll free numbers from telephone operators in terms of the purchase orders, the appellant was liable to make payment of rentals for the toll free numbers, as well as primary rate interface rental to the telecom operators. The respondent provided the requisite services and raised monthly invoices between December, 2013 and November, 2014the invoices were payable within 30 days from the date on which they were received. The respondent followed up with the appellant for payment of pending invoices throughsent between April and October, 2014. It is also important to note that aagreement (hereinafter referred to as the NDA) was executed between the parties on 26th December, 2014 with effect from 1st November, 2013.2. More than a month after execution of the aforesaid agreement, the appellant, on 30th January, 2015, wrote to the respondent that they were withholding payments against invoices raised by the respondent, as the respondent had disclosed on their webpage that they had worked for the "Nach Baliye" program run by Star TV, and had thus breached the NDA. The correspondence between the parties finally culminated in a notice dated 12th December, 2016 sent under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013. Presumably because winding up on the ground of being unable to pay ones debts was no longer a ground to wind up a company under the said Act, a demand notice dated 23rd December, 2016 was sent for a total of Rs.20,08,202.55 under Section 8 of the new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the Code). By andated 27th December, 2016, the appellant responded to the aforesaid notice stating that there exists serious and bona fide disputes between the parties, that the notice issued was a pressure tactic, and that nothing was payable inasmuch as the respondent had been told way back on 30th January, 2015 that no amount will be paid to the respondent since it had breached the NDA.3. An application was then filed on 30th December, 2016 before the National Company Law Tribunal under Sections 8 and 9 of the new Code stating that an operational debt of Rs.20,08,202.55 was owed to the respondent.4. On 19th January, 2017, the respondent was orally intimated to remove a defect in the application, in that it did not contain the appellants notice of dispute. This was rectified by an affidavit in compliance dated 24th January, 2017, by which various other documents were also supplied by the respondent to the Tribunal. On 27th January, 2017, the Tribunal dismissed the aforesaid application in the followingperusal of this notice dated 27.12.2016 disputing the debt allegedly owed to the petitioner, this Bench, looking at the Corporate Debtor disputing the claim raised by the Petitioner in this CP, hereby holds that the default payment being disputed by the Corporate Debtor, for the petitioner has admitted that the notice of dispute dated 27th December 2016 has been received by the operational creditor, the claim made by the Petitioner is hit by Section (9)(5)(ii)(d) of The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, hence this Petition is hereby rejected.An appeal was then filed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal which was decided on 24th May, 2017. This appeal was allowed in the followingIn the present case the adjudicating authority has acted mechanically and rejected the application under(5)(ii)(d) of Section 9 without examining and discussing the aforesaid issue. If the adjudicating authority would have noticed the provisions as discussed above and what constitutes `dispute in relation to services provided by operational creditors then it would have come to a conclusion that condition of demand notice under(2) of Section 8 has not been fulfilled by the corporate debtor and the defence claiming dispute was not only vague, got up and motivated to evade the liability.40. For the reasons aforesaid we set aside the impugned order dated 27.1.2017 passed by adjudicating authority in CP No.01/I &BP/NCLT/MAH/2017 and remit the case to adjudicating authority for consideration of the application of the appellant for admission if the application is otherwise complete.41. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations. However, in the facts and circumstances there shall be no order as to

Court's reasoning:
29. It is, thus, clear that so far as an operational creditor is concerned, a demand notice of an unpaid operational debt or copy of an invoice demanding payment of the amount involved must be delivered in the prescribed form. The corporate debtor is then given a period of 10 days from the receipt of the demand notice or copy of the invoice to bring to the notice of the operational creditor the existence of a dispute, if any. We have also seen the notes on clauses annexed to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Bill of 2015, in which "the existence of a dispute" alone is mentioned. Even otherwise, the word "and" occurring in Section 8(2)(a) must be read as "or" keeping in mind the legislative intent and the fact that an anomalous situation would arise if it is not read as "or". If read as "and", disputes would only stave off the bankruptcy process if they are already pending in a suit or arbitration proceedings and not otherwise. This would lead to great hardship; in that a dispute may arise a few days before triggering of the insolvency process, in which case, though a dispute may exist, there is no time to approach either an arbitral tribunal or a court. Further, given the fact that long limitation periods are allowed, where disputes may arise and do not reach an arbitral tribunal or a court for upto three years, such persons would be outside the purview of Section 8(2) leading to bankruptcy proceedings commencing against them. Such an anomaly cannot possibly have been intended by the legislature nor has it so been intended. We have also seen that one of the objects of the Code qua operational debts is to ensure that the amount of such debts, which is usually smaller than that of financial debts, does not enable operational creditors to put the corporate debtor into the insolvency resolution process prematurely or initiate the process for extraneous considerations. It is for this reason that it is enough that a dispute exists between the parties.It is important to notice that Section 255 read with the Eleventh Schedule of the Code has amended Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 so that a company being unable to pay its debts is no longer a ground for winding up a company. The old law contained in Madhusudan (supra) has, therefore, disappeared with the disappearance of this ground in Section 271 of the Companies Act.35. We have already noticed that in the first Insolvency and Bankruptcy Bill, 2015 that was annexed to the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Report, Section 5(4) defined "dispute" as meaning a "bona fide suit or arbitration proceedings...". In its present avatar, Section 5(6) excludes the expression "bona fide" which is of significance. Therefore, it is difficult to import the expression "bona fide" into Section 8(2)(a) in order to judge whether a dispute exists or not.It is clear, therefore, that once the operational creditor has filed an application, which is otherwise complete, the adjudicating authority must reject the application under Section 9(5)(2)(d) if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor or there is a record of dispute in the information utility. It is clear that such notice must bring to the notice of the operational creditor the "existence" of a dispute or the fact that a suit or arbitration proceeding relating to a dispute is pending between the parties. Therefore, all that the adjudicating authority is to see at this stage is whether there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation and that the "dispute" is not a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence. It is important to separate the grain from the chaff and to reject a spurious defence which is mere bluster. However, in doing so, the Court does not need to be satisfied that the defence is likely to succeed. The Court does not at this stage examine the merits of the dispute except to the extent indicated above. So long as a dispute truly exists in fact and is not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, the adjudicating authority has to reject the application.41. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the argument of Shri Mohta that the requisite certificate by IDBI was not given in time will have to be rejected, inasmuch as neither the appellant nor the Tribunal raised any objection to the application on this score. The confirmation from a financial institution that there is no payment of an unpaid operational debt by the corporate debtor is an important piece of information that needs to be placed before the adjudicating authority, under Section 9 of the Code, but given the fact that the adjudicating authority has not dismissed the application on this ground and that the appellant has raised this ground only at the appellate stage, we are of the view that the application cannot be dismissed at the threshold for want of this certificateare afraid that we cannot accede to such a contention. First and foremost, the definition is an inclusive one, and we have seen that the word "includes" substituted the word "means" which occurred in the first Insolvency and Bankruptcy Bill. Secondly, the present is not a case of a suit or arbitration proceeding filed before receipt of noticeSection 5(6) only deals with suits or arbitration proceedings which must "relate to" one of the three subclauses, either directly or indirectly.We have seen that a "dispute" is said to exist, so long as there is a real dispute as to payment between the parties that would fall within the inclusive definition contained in Section 5(6). The correspondence between the parties would show that on 30th January, 2015, the appellant clearly informed the respondent that they had displayed the appellants confidential client information and client campaign information on a public platform which constituted a breach of trust and a breach of the NDA between the parties. They were further told that all amounts that were due to them were withheld till the time the matter is resolved. On 10th February, 2015, the respondent referred to the NDA of 26th December, 2014 and denied that there was a breach of the NDA. The respondent went on to state that the appellants claim is unfounded and untenable, and that the appellant is trying to avoid its financial obligations, and that a sum of Rs.19,08,202.57 should be paid within one week, failing which the respondent would be forced to explore legal options and initiate legal process for recovery of the said amount. This email was refuted by the appellant by andated 26th February, 2015 and the appellant went on to state that it had lost business from various clients as a result of the respondents breaches. Curiously, after this date, the respondent remained silent, and thereafter, by andated 20th June, 2016, the respondent wished to revive business relations and stated that it would like to follow up for payments which are long stuck up. This was followed by andated 25th June, 2016 to finalize the time and place for a meeting. On 28th June, 2016, the appellant wrote to the respondent again to finalize the time and place. Apparently, nothing came of the aforesaidand the appellant then fired the last shot on 19th September, 2016, reiterating that no payments are due as the NDA was breached.Going by the aforesaid test of "existence of a dispute", it is clear that without going into the merits of the dispute, the appellant has raised a plausible contention requiring further investigation which is not a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of facts unsupported by evidence. The defense is not spurious, mere bluster, plainly frivolous or vexatious. A dispute does truly exist in fact between the parties, which may or may not ultimately succeed, and the Appellate Tribunal was wholly incorrect in characterizing the defense as vague,and motivated to evadeperiod of limitation for filing such proceedings has admittedly not yet elapsed. Further, the appellant has withheld amounts that were due to the respondent under the NDA till the matter is resolved. Admittedly, the matter has never been resolved. Also, the respondent itself has not commenced any legal proceedings after thed 30th January, 2015 except for the present insolvency application, which was filed almost 2 years after the saidl these circumstances go to show that it is right to have the matter tried out in the present case before the axe