Case: S. Pritam Singh Chahil Vs. The State of Punjab &amp; Others

The petitioner owned land measuring about 284 bighas situated in village Narinderpura. In the year 1956 he transferred one half of the said land in favour of his wife Shrimati Charanjeet Kaur. Excluding the land so transferred, the land remaining in the hands of the petitioner is admittedly below the ceiling prescribed under the Act. On October 30, 1956, Act XV of 1956 was passed by the Legislature of the Patiala and East Punjab Union. It amendedthe Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. By the amendment Chapter 4-A was added to the earlier Act and also a ceiling was imposed on land under personal cultivation. The petitioner is admittedly in personal cultivation of his land, which, excluding that sold to his wife, is below the ceiling prescribed under the Act. On January 14, 1959 the Punjab Legislature passed Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land (Amendment) Act, 1959, (Act III of 1959). Under the said amending Act, no transfer or other disposition of land effected after August 21, 1956, except in favour of persons mentioned thereunder, shall affect the right of the State Government under the Act to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer or disposition. Relying upon that section and including in the total area held by the petitioner the land transferred by him in favour of his wife, the Special Collector, Chandigarh. on May 31, 1962, served a draft statement on the petitioner holding that certain extent of land was surplus area. The petitioner, questioning the order of the Collector on various grounds, filed this petition for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.

Court's reasoning:
The proposal to introduce the said bill must have caused apprehension in the minds of the landowners that they would lose the lands above the permissible area and naturally they must have transferred their lands in favour of their relatives. Section 32-FF was added to frustrate such devices and to make the enforcement of the Act really effective. Under the said section such a transfer made after August 21, 1956, shall not affect the rights of the State Government under the Act to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer. Between the transferor and the transferee the transfer would be good, but it would not be effective against the State Government. That is to say for ascertaining` the surplus area the land transferred would be included in the transferors land. Out of the total extent, the land above the ceiling, that is the permissible limit, would be the surplus land. The Legislature certainly is competent to make such a law. The validity of such a provision may perhaps be questioned under certain circumstances on the ground that it is an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution But that is not open to the petitioner as the amending Act giving retrospective operation relates to an estate. Therefore. Art. 31-A operates as a bar against raising any such question. We, therefore, hold that S. 32-FF is valid and as the land acquired is admittedly above the ceiling, the second proviso to Art. 31-A has no applicationIt has clearly laid down the policy and on the basis of that policy enumeration of the relations can easily be worked out. The expression relation is comprehensive and has a local significance. The relatives must be such as those in whose favour benami transactions are usually entered into, or those whose benefit is indirectly the benefit of the transferor himself. The fact that under R. 23-A comparatively distant relations are mentioned but the sister is omitted, is relied upon to prove the indefiniteness of the policy laid down in the Act. But a perusal of R. 23-A shows that all relations are mentioned, but, by some mistake, sister is omitted. We, therefore, reject this contentionThe petitioner is not questioning the law of acquisition on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right under Arts. 19, 14 or 31, but complains that the State is infringing his fundamental right under Art. 19 without any valid law to support its action. So stated there is considerable force in the argument. But the whole edifice would be brought down if the Rules prescribing the compensation are valid, for, in that event the petitioners fundamental rights are infringed under the law of acquisition and by reason of Art. 31A he cannot question the validity of the law on the ground that it infringes the three fundamental rights mentioned thereinIt will be seen from the said two sub-paragraphs of para 18 of the affidavit of the petitioner that his complaint is that the classification of the soil is that which obtained 50 years ago and that the yield can be ascertained from Khasra Girdawari. But there is no allegation that the yield of the land in respect of any crop per acre has so increased that it will be unreasonable to take the yield recorded in the last Settlement as the criterion for arriving at the fair rent. So far as the classification is concerned, as we have pointed out earlier, R. 28 (3) of the Rules enjoins the Commission to reclassify the lauds, if owing to supervening circumstances there is change in the category of the land. On the record, as placed before us, without an allegation that there is an increase in the yield per acre in regard to a particular crop it is not possible for us to hold that the relevant rules are ultra vires the Act. It may be that in some other case where specific allegations are made in that regard and established, the validity of the Rules may have to be considered.