Case: Lala Ram Swarup And Others Vs. Shikar Chand And Another

1. Appellant No. 1, Lala Ram Swarup, and five other members of his family sued the two respondents, Shikar Chand and his son, for ejectment from the shop situated in Qasba Chandausi, Bazar Waram, on the allegation that the said premises had been let out to the respondents to conduct their shop on a monthly rent with effect from the 11th April 1952, for a year. At the time when the present suit was brought, the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act III of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act) was in force. Section 3 of the Act imposes certain restrictions on the landlords right to eject his tenant from the premises to which the Act applies. Broadly stated, the effect of the provisions contained in S. 3 (1) is that a landlord can evict his tenant if he satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that he must obtain the permission of the District Magistrate to file such a suit; and the second condition is that he must prove the existence of one or the other of the seven grounds enumerated in Cls. (a) to (g) of S. 3 (1).In their plaint, the appellants pleaded that they needed the premises in suit to carry on their own businesses in the shop, and they alleged that they had applied for permission to the District Magistrate, Moradabad, under s. 3 (1) of the Act; that the said permission had been refused by him, whereupon they had moved the Commissioner in his revisional jurisdiction under S. 3 (2) of the Act; and that the Commissioner had given them permission to file the suit that is how the appellants claimed to have satisfied both the conditions prescribed by Section 3 (1). The appellants further claimed ejectment of the respondents and asked for a decree for damages for use and occupation of the suit premises form 11th April 1953 to 11th July 1954 @ Rs.35 per month. The suit (No. 349 of 1954) was filed on the 14th July 1954.3. The respondents resisted the claim made by the appellants on several grounds. They urged that the suit was bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties; that the permission to sue granted to the appellants by the Commissioner was not valid in law, that the rent note executed by them was not admissible in evidence: and that the notice given by the appellants under S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act was also invalid in law.4. On these pleadings, the learned Munsif, Chandausi, framed appropriate issues. Evidence was led by both the parties in support of their respective contentions. The learned trial Judge recorded findings in favour of the appellants on all the issues and decreed their suit with costs on the 25th March 1955.5. The respondents then preferred an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1955) in the Court of the District Judge, Moradabad, and urged that the findings recorded by the trial Judge were erroneous and asked for the reversal of the decree passed by him. The learned District Judge rejected the respondents contentions and confirmed the decree under appeal on the 2nd June 1955.6. That took the respondents to the High Court at Allahabad in second appeal (No. 1106 of 1955). The learned single Judge of the said High Court who heard this appeal, upheld the respondents contention that the permission granted by the Commissioner under S. 3 (3) of the Act as invalid in law; and so, he came to the conclusion that the appellants suit was incompetent. This judgment was delivered on the 26th July 1956. The learned Judge, however, allowed the appellants leave to file a Letters Patent Appeal.7. The Letters Patent Appeal was placed before a larger Bench of three learned Judges of the High Court, because it was thought that the question raised by the appellants was of some importance. On the question as to whether the permission granted by the Commissioner was valid or not, the learned Judges who heard the appeal differed. Two of the learned Judges held that the said permission was invalid, whilst the third learned Judge held that it was valid. In accordance with the majority opinion the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed on the 13th September 1960. The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with the sad certificate that this appeal has come to this Court.

Court's reasoning:
10. It would thus be seen that the scheme of S. 3 is that if a landlord wants to bring a suit to eject his tenant, he has to apply to the District Magistrate for permission to do so. The District Magistrate may grant or refuse to grant such permission. After the District Magistrate makes an order on the landlords application, the party aggrieved by the order can apply in revision to the Commissioner within 30 days; and the Commissioner, in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, has to deal with the revision application under S. 3 (3). If he is satisfied that the District Magistrate has acted illegally or with material irregularity, or has wrongly refused to act, he can make an appropriate order; and the order thus made by him is final under sub-s. (4), subject to any order that the State Government may pass under S. 7-F of theis clear that the power conferred on the State Government by S. 7-F to revise the orders passed by the Commissioner under S. 3 (3) is very wide. In the first place, the State Government need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf. It may call for the record suo motu and it can exercise its powers in the interest of justice. In other words, whenever it is brought to the notice of the State Government either by a party aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner or otherwise, that the order passed by the Commissioner is unfair or unjust, the State Government may in the ends of justice pass an appropriate order revising the order made by the Commissioner. That, in brief, is the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act relating to the grant of permission to the landlord to sue his tenant in ejectment.12.One of the points which is often treated as relevant in dealing with the question about the exclusion of civil Courts jurisdiction, is whether the special statute which, it is urged, excludes such jurisdiction, has used clear and unambiguous words indicating that intention. Another test which is applied is: does the said statute provide for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material provisions? Applying these two tests, it does appear that the words used in S. 3 (4) and S. 16 are clear. Section 16 in terms provides that the order made under this Act to which the said section applies shall not be called in question in any Court. This is an express provision excluding the civil Courts jurisdiction. Section 3 (4) does not expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, but, in the context, the inference that the civil Courts jurisdiction is intended to be excluded, appears to be inescapable. Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Goyal is right in contending that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is excluded in relation to matters covered by the orders included within the provisions of S. 3 (4) and S. 16.This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean that the plea against the validity of the order passed by the District Magistrate, or the Commissioner, or the State Government, can never be raised in a civil Court. In our opinion, the bar created by the relevant provisions of the Act excluding the jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot operate in cases where the plea raised before the civil Court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is athe special statute prescribes certain mandatory conditions subject to which the order in question can be passed, and the said mandatory provisions are violated, the validity of the said orders can be challenged in a civil proceeding. Similarly, if principles of natural justice are not complied with, the orders passed in violation of the said principles would be wholly inoperative in law and their validity can be impeached in civil proceedings.19.Therefore, while upholding the contention raised by Mr. Goyal that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred, we wish to make it clear that this contention will not avail Mr. Goyal if the respondents plea, if upheld, would render the permission granted by the Commissioner totally invalid and ais, we think, fallacious to assume that a party can move the Commissioner under S. 3 (3) in cases where the District Magistrate just refuses to make an order on the application made by the landlord for permission to bring a suit against the tenant. If a District Magistrate just does not deal with the application and passes no order on it, the party aggrieved may be justified in applying for an appropriate writ to the High Court or adopt some other suitable remedy in law; but a revision in such a case does not appear to be competent under S. 3 (3). Besides, the illegality or the irregularity to which S. 3 (3) refers need not necessarily be correlated with questions of jurisdiction. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in introducing a limitation pertaining to questions of jurisdiction in determining the scope of the width of the revisional power conferred on the Commissioner by S. 3 (3). That is why it must be held that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the permission granted by the Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred on him by S. 3 (3) is invalid in law. As we have already emphasised, the only plea which can be raised before a Civil Court in relation to orders passed under the relevant provisions of the Act can be a plea which, if sustained, would render the order wholly invalid and as such, a nullity. No other plea can be raised, because all other pleas are barred by Ss. 3 (4) and 16 of the Act.It may also be relevant to point out that the power conferred on the State Government at all material times by S. 7-F, was very wide. As we have already indicated, in exercise of its powers under S. 7-F, the State Government can pass such orders as appear to it to be necessary in the ends of justice. Therefore, there is no doubt that the relevant provisions of the Act did not intend, even prior to the amendment of 1954, to limit the jurisdiction of the Commissioner only to cases where irregularity or illegality had been committed by the District Magistrate in granting or refusing to grant permission.