Case: Jagannath Etc. Etc Vs. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms &amp; Ors. Etc

The Act received the assent of the President on the 13th April, 1962 and was published in the official gazette on the 2nd May, 1962. It is styled "An Act to provide for fixation of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and for certain other matters connected therewith in the State of Madras." The preamble to the Act shows that it was passed in furtherance of the directive principles of State policy as embodied in Art.39 of the Constitution and in particular, clauses (b) and (c) thereof, namely, that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community were to be distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system did not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. The Act sought to achieve this by acquiring agricultural land from persons owning large holdings of it and distributing the same to the landless and other persons so as to reduce the disparity in the ownership thereof. This was attempted to be brought about by fixing a ceiling on the holdings of agricultural land holdings so as to render the surplus available for distribution2. The scheme of the Act in a nut-shell is as follows. By Chapter II of the Act containing sections 5 to 18 provision is made for the fixation of ceiling of land holdings, furnishing of return by persons holding land in excess of the limits specified, preparation and publication of draft statements as regards land in excess of the ceiling area, exclusion of certain land from calculation of ceiling area and acquisition of surplus land after the publication of final statement as envisaged in the Chapter. In particular, S. 5 fixes the ceiling on holdings of land of every person and every family. Section 7 provides that subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII no person shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. Sections 8 to 16 provide for submission of return, obtaining of particulars and determination of the surplus land of a person. Section 18 provides for publication of notification by the Government to the effect that the surplus land is required for public purpose3. Chapter III of the Act provides for ceiling on future acquisitions, enquiries into the bona fides and validity of transfers between the date of the commencement of the Act and the notification thereafter, and the effect of certain future transfers. Chapter VI provides for determination of compensation for land acquired by Government under the provisions of the Act. Section 50 - the opening section in Chapter VI - provides for payment of compensation according to the rates specified in Schedule III to every person whose right, title and interest is acquired by Government under Chapter II. Section 55 provides for payment of compensation either in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds. Chapter IX provides for exemptions in certain cases from the provisions of the Act. Chapter XIII provides for disposal of the land acquired by the Government under the Act4. Section 3 is the definition section. Under cl. (7) thereof ceiling area means the extent of land which a person is entitled to hold under S. 5. By cl. (11) the date of commencement of the Act was fixed as the 6th April, 1960 i.e. the date on which the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Bill. 1960 was published in the official gazette. A "family" for the purpose of the Act is given an artificial definition in cl. (14). It means in relation to any person, the wife or husband as the case may be, of such person and his or her -(i) minor sons and unmarried daughters, and(ii) minor grandsons and unmarried grand-daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are deadUnder the Explanation to the clause minor sons and minor grandsons are not to include sons or grandsons(i) between whom and the other members of the family, a partition by means of a registered instrument has taken place; or(ii) in respect of whose family properties a preliminary decree for partition has been passed; before the commencement of the Act. Under cl. (19) to hold land means with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, to own land as owner or to possessor enjoy land as possessory mortgagee or as tenant or as intermediary or in one or more of those capacities. Under cl. (34) person includes any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Under cl. (45) "surplus land" means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be surplus land under Ss. 12, 13 or 14The Act was challenged by writ petitions filed in this Court in 1963 (A. P. Krishnaswamy Naidu v. State of Madras 1964-7 SCR 82   = (AIR 1964 SC 1515  ) on the ground that its provisions violated Arts. 14, 19 and 31 (2) of the Constitution. The first attack was at S. 5 of the Act laying down the ceiling area and the second at section 50 of the Act read with Schedule III thereof which provided for compensation. It was urged that the Act was not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution relying on the judgment of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 829 = (AIR 1962 SC 723  ). This Court held that the definition of family in S. 3 (14) was artificial and resulted in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced thus violating Art. 14. The Court also held that the provisions contained in S. 50 of the Act read with Schedule III with respect to compensation were also discriminatory and these two sections viz., Ss. 5 and 50, being the pivotal provisions of the Act the whole Act had to be struck down as unconstitutional. The judgment was rendered on 9th March, 19646. It appears that similar attacks had been made not only to the above Madras Act but to several Acts of other States imposing ceilings on the holding of land and attempting to effect similar agrarian reforms. To shield these Acts against such attacks Parliament passed the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act on the 20th June 1964. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act shows that inasmuch as"Several State Acts relating to land reform were struck down on the ground that the provisions of those Acts were violative of articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and that the protection of article 31-A was not available to them"was "proposed to amend the definition of "estate" in article 31A of the Constitution by including therein lands held under ryotwari settlement as also other lands in respect of which provisions are normally made in land reform enactments" and it was also "proposed to amend the Ninth Schedule by including therein certain State enactments relating to land reform in order to remove any uncertainty or doubt that may arise in regard to their validity". Accordingly Parliament passed the Seventeenth Amendment Act effecting change not only in Art. 31-A of the Constitution by adding a proviso after the existing proviso in cl. (1) but also substituting a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2) and including in the Ninth Schedule no less than forty four Acts of different States of which item 46 was the Act struck down by this Court7. The Seventeenth Amendment Act was itself challenged in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1965-1 SCR 933   = (AIR 1965 SC 845  ). A number of writ petitions were filed in this Court under Ar. 32 of the Constitution in the year 1966, Golaknath v. State of Punjab, 1967-2 SCR 762   = (AIR 1967 SC 1643  ), challenging not only the validity of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 1964 but also Constitution Fourth Amendment Act, 1955 and Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951 in so far as they affected the petitioners fundamental rights. The first petition in that group of cases was filed by a group of persons against an order made by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab holding that an area of 418 standard acres was surplus in the hands of the petitioners under the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953 read with S. 10-B thereof. Five learned Judges of this Court held all the amendments to be valid, while four others concurred in the judgment delivered by Subba Rao, C. J. holding that although the above Amendment Acts abridged the scope of the fundamental rights thus violating article 13 of the Constitution they could not be struck down because of the earlier decisions of this Court to the contrary. One learned Judge took the view that the fundamental rights were outside the amendatory process if the amendments sought to abridge or take away any of those rights; but the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments being part of the Constitution, by acquiescence for a long time could not be challenged and they contained authority for the Seventeenth Amendment. The judgments in Golaknaths case (supra) were rendered on 27th February, 1967.

Court's reasoning:
13. It must be noted that Das, C. J. with whom Sinha J. concurred did not think fit to embark upon the discussion of the question namely, whether the provisions of Part III of the Constitution enshrining the fundamental rights were mere checks or limitations on the legislative competency conferred on Parliament and whether the doctrine of eclipse was applicable only to pre-Constitution laws or those which fell under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution14. The Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964 came up for consideration in the case of 1965-1 SCR 933   = (AIR 1965 SC 845  ) (supra). Among the points there canvassed in support of the petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution was one based on the plea that the Seventeenth Amendment was a legislative measure in respect of land and since Parliament had no right to make a law in respect of a land, the Act was invalid; and since the Act purported to set aside decisions of Court of competent jurisdiction it was unconstitutional. Although the Court upheld the validity of the amendment, a doubt was expressed by Mudholkar, J. as to whether Parliament could validate a State law dealing with land. According to the learned Judge only that legislature has power to validate a law which has a power to enact the law23. In our view, although decision of the American Supreme Court and the comments of well known commentators like Willoughby and Cooley have great persuasive force, we need not interpret our Constitution by too much reliance on them. Nor is it necessary to scrutinise too closely the decisions wherein views appear to have been expressed that a law which is void under Art. 13 (2) is to be treated as still-born. Equally unfruitful would it be to consider the doctrine of eclipse24. Apart from the question as to whether fundamental rights originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the amendatory process of Article 368 it must now be held that Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect, if any, in the various Acts mentioned in the said schedule as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, and by the express words of Art. 31-B such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the statue book. These Acts even if void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Articles 13 (2) of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Article 31-B of the Constitution. The State could not, at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore the objection that the Madras Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force cannot be accepted30. The American decision is hardly in point and so far as the three Indian cases are concerned, they turned on the scope of Entries with which we are not concerned in this case. We were also referred to the observations of this Court in K. K. Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, 1960-3 SCR 887   at Pp. 927, 928 = (AIR 1960 SC 1080  ) that individual proprietary rights were ordinarily to be respected unless a clear case is made out for their restriction31. In our view, Entry 18 in List II like any other Entry in the three Lists only gives the outline of the subject matter of legislation and therefore the words in the entry are to be construed in their widest amplitude. The field of legislation covered by the entry is not to be narrowed down in any way unless there is anything in the entry itself which defines the limits thereof. Entry 18 in our opinion is meant to confer the widest powers on the State Legislature with regard to rights in or over land and such rights are not to be measured by or limited to the rights as between landlords and tenants or the collection of rents. The words which follow the expression "rights in or over land" are merely by way of illustration. The specification itself shows that the genus of the rights mentioned is not the one which landlords have vis-a-vis their tenants or vice versa. All kinds of legislation regarding transfers and alienations of agricultural land which may affect the rights there in of landlords and tenants are envisaged by the entry as also improvement of land and colonisation of such land. If the State Government seeks to enforce a measure by which the condition of barren or unproductive lands can be improved, it can do so even if the measure curtails the rights of landlords and tenants over them. If the State wants to enforce a measure of acquiring lands of people who hold areas over a certain ceiling limit so as to be able to distribute the same among the landless and other persons, to give effect to the directive principles in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution, it is not possible to say that the same would be outside the scope of Entry 18 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III. Such a measure can aptly be described as a measure of agrarian reform or land improvement in that persons who have only small holdings and work on the lands themselves would be more likely to put in greater efforts to make the land productive than those who held large blocks of land and are only interested in getting a return without much effort. The measure does not transgress the limits of the legislative field because it serves to remove the disparity in the ownership of land. Persons who lose the ownership of lands in excess of the ceiling imposed are compensated for the lands acquired by the State and distributed among others. Acquisition of land would not directly be covered by Entry 18 but read with Entry 42 in List III the State has the competence to acquire surplus land so as to give effect to the policy in Art. 39 of the Constitution32. This is not the first occasion when a measure of such kind has been challenged before this Court. In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 489 = (AIR 1959 SC 459  ), challenge was made to the vires of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 which was an Act further to amend the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The preamble to the Act showed that it was a measure for ensuring full and efficient use of land for agricultural purposes rendered necessary on account of the neglect of a landholder or disputes between a landholder and his tenants to the prejudice of the cultivation of the landlords estate. The attack on the Act was made on the ground that it was beyond the ambit of Article 31-A of the Constitution and was therefore vulnerable as infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and 31. It was contended on behalf of the State that it was a piece of legislation for extinguishment or modification of rights in relation to an estate within the definition of Article 31-A of the ConstitutionLastly, reference may be made to the case of 1968-3 SCR 712   = (AIR 1968 SC 1395  ) (supra) which has been already noted. There the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 1961 as amended by Act 13 of 1962 was upheld on the ground that it was enacted for securing the distribution of agricultural land to subserve the common good by imposing a ceiling and also ensuring that the persons to whom surplus lands had been granted after the same had vested in the State Government should supply sugarcane at fair prices. The impugned Act, apart from Section 28 already referred to, was held to be covered by Entry 18 in List II and Section 28 was held as within the ambit of Entry 35 of List II dealing with "Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the State."33. Referring to the principles laid down by the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, 1940 FCR 110 at p. 134 = (AIR 1941 FC 16), and by this Court in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay, City, 1955-1 SCR 829   = (AIR 1955 SC 58  ), it was observed by this Court that in construing the words in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power, the most liberal construction should be put upon words so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. It was held that having regard to the above principle of construction the impugned Act was covered by Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule and was a legislation with reference to land within the competence of the State Legislature35. The validity of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act I of 1957 came up for consideration in Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. v. Must. Mazirunnessa, 1962-1 SCR 724   = (AIR 1962 SC 137  ). Section 4 of the Act prescribed a ceiling on existing holdings and Section 5 empowered the appropriate authorities to call for submission of returns by persons holding lands in excess of the ceiling. Section 8 empowered the State Government to acquire such excess lands by publishing in the official gazette a notification to the effect that such lands were required for public purpose, and such publication was to be conclusive evidence of the notice of acquisition to the person or persons holding such lands. It was contended on behalf of the appellants there that the pith and substance of the Act and its main object was to acquire the property and dispose of it at a profit. Rejecting this contention it was observed by this Court (see p. 731) that:"The whole object of the Act which is writ large in all its provisions is to abolish the intermediaries and leave the lands either with the tiller or the cultivator."was also observed:"The State is paying compensation to the persons dispossessed under the principles prescribed by Section 12; amongst the persons entitled to such compensation tenants are included, and when the State proceeds to settle lands on tenants it expects them to pay a fair amount of price for the land and puts a ceiling on this price and it shall never exceed the amount of compensation payable in respect of the said land. In our opinion this provision is very fair and reasonable and it would be idle to attack it as a piece of colourable legislation."