Case: Jayam &amp; Co Vs. Assistant Commissioner &amp; Another

5. The appellants are dealers and registered as such under the provisions of VAT Act. For example, the appellant in Civil Appeal No.of 2013 deals in electronic home appliances. It purchases appliances from local registered dealers on payment of VAT under the VAT invoice issued by the vendors. Thereafter, the appellantto consumers under VAT invoice charging appropriate VAT on their selling price. It had purchased LCD Televisions from M/s. LG Electronics Private Limited forThe vendors, i.e., M/s. LG Electronics had charged VAT on the selling price, as per the VAT invoice issued by M/s. LG Electronics to the dealers. Based on the price shown in the invoice, VAT was paid. Under the scheme of VAT Act, as would be seen hereinafter, onwhen the VAT is paid by the dealer, the dealer is entitled to avail Input Tax Credit (for short, ITC), i.e., he is entitled to get the credit of the VAT which was paid by the dealer to M/s. LG Electronics on purchase of these T.V. sets from the said vendors.6. It so happened that after the original tax invoice and availing ITC, the vendor had given discount and purchase credit note was issued for a lesser price. The dealer took into account the price it paid to M/s. LG Electronics after adjusting the discount that was subsequently given to the dealer to arrive at net cost and adding VAT which was limited to the vendors by the dealer, the goods wereat a lesser price.

Court's reasoning:
12. It is a trite law that whenever concession is given by statute or notification etc. the conditions thereof are to be strictly complied with in order to avail such concession. Thus, it is not the right of the dealers to get the benefit of ITC but its a concession granted by virtue of Section 19. As a fortiorari, conditions specified in Section 10 must be fulfilled. In that hue, we find that Section 10 makes original tax invoice relevant for the purpose of claiming tax. Therefore, under the scheme of the VAT Act, it is not permissible for the dealers to argue that the price as indicated in the tax invoice should not have been taken into consideration but the net purchase price after discount is to be the basis. If we were dealing with any other aspect do hors the issue of ITC as per the Section 19 of the VAT Act, possibly the arguments of Mr. Bagaria would have assumed some relevance. But, keeping in view the scope of the issue, such a plea is not admissible having regard to the plain language of sections of the VAT Act, read along with other provisions of the said Act as referred to above.13. For the same reasons given above, challenge to constitutional validity of(20) of Section 19 of VAT Act has to fail. When a concession is given by a statute, the Legislature has power to make the provision stating the form and manner in which such concession is to be allowed.(20) seeks to achieve that. There was no right, inherent or otherwise, vested with dealers to claim the benefit of ITC but for Section 19 of the VAT Act. That apart, we find that there were valid and cogent reasons for inserting Section 19(20). Main purport was to protect the Revenue against clandestine transactions resulting in evasion of tax.At the same time, this Court has also held that retrospective legislation would be admissible in cases of validation laws, i.e., where the laws as initially passed was held to be inoperative by the court and when there is a new provision inserted, it should normally be prospective. We may refer to the judgment of this Court in Tata Motors Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2004) 5 SCC 783. In that case, the appellantassessee company, manufactured motor vehicle chassis and spare parts. It procured steel in primary form covered by Entry 6 of Schedule B to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 for use in the manufacturing process which resulted also in iron and steel crap which was covered by the said entry. Therefore, in Assessment Yearthe appellant therein claimedof a certain amount in terms of Rulefor the quantum of iron and steel purchased which was converted into iron and steel scrap. The claim was allowed. Subsequently, Maharashtra Act 9 of 1989 was enacted and by Sections 26 and 27, the benefit of Rulewas denied altogether for the period88 where the manufactured goods falling under Schedule B were in the nature of waste goods/scrapThe validity of such retrospective amendment to Rulewas unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court. The High Court took the view that the impugned amendment of Rulewas clarificatory to remove the doubts in interpretation. However, by the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment) Rules, 1992 Rulewas amended. That amendment removed the exclusionary clause of goods manufactured out of waste or scrap goods or products and restored the position as it stood prior to 1981. The appellants appeal and another connected appeal were heardee contended that retrospective operation of a provision depriving the assessee of the vested statutory right and covering a long period (eight years in that case) imposed a prima facie unreasonable restriction and was, therefore, unconstitutional. More so, when the original provision was subsequently reintroduced deleting the amendments and there was no material to justify the special treatment given for the said eight years. The respondent State could not meet the said contention. The assessee company further contended that since the CST Act had not been extended to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, where the assessees branch office was located, the requirement under Rulefor registration of the assessee under the CST Act in that place was impossible of performance and should, therefore, be ignored.The entire gamut of retrospective operation of fiscal statues was revisited by this Court in a Constitution Bench judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited, (2015) 1 SCC 1  in the followingA Constitution Bench of this Court in Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas [AIR 1968 SC 1336 : (1968) 3 SCR 623 ] , while considering the nature of amendment to Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965, observed as follows: (AIR p. 1339, para 8)"8. ... The amending clause does not seek to explain anylegislation which was ambiguous or defective. The power of the High Court to entertain a petition for exercising revisional jurisdiction was before the amendment derived from Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the legislature has by the amending Act not attempted to explain the meaning of that provision. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act."34. It would also be pertinent to mention that assessment creates a vested right and an assessee cannot be subjected to reassessment unless a provision to that effect inserted by amendment is either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective. (See CED v. M.A. Merchant [1989 Supp (1) SCC 499 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 404] .)35. We would also like to reproduce hereunder the following observations made by this Court in Govind Das v. ITO [(1976) 1 SCC 906 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 133] , while holding Section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act to be prospective and inapplicable for any assessment year prior tothe date on which the Income Tax Act came into force: (SCC p. 914, para 11)"11. Now it is arule of interpretation hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial decisions that, unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that`all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only."(emphasisWhen we keep in mind the aforesaid parameters laid down by this Court in testing validity of retrospective operation of fiscal laws, we find that the amendmentfails to meet these tests. The High Court has primarily gone by the fact that there was no unforseen or unforeseeable financial burden imposed for the past period. That is not correct. Moreover, as can be seen,(20) of Section 19 is altogether new provision introduced for determining the input tax in specified situation, i.e., where goods are sold at a lesser price than the purchase price of goods. The manner of calculation of the ITC was entirely different before this amendment. In the example, which has been given by us in the earlier part of the judgment, dealer was entitled to ITC of Rs. 10/, which was paid by the dealer as VAT while purchasing the goods from the vendors. However, in view of Section 19(20) inserted by way of amendment, he would now be entitled to ITC of Rs. 9.50. This is clearly a provision which is made for the first time to the detriment of the dealers. Such a provision, therefore, cannot have retrospective effect, more so, when vested right had accrued in favour of these dealers in respect of purchases and sales made between January 01, 2007 to August 19, 2010. Thus, while upholding the vires of(20) of Section 19, we set aside and strike down Amendment Act 22 of 2010 whereby this amendment was given retrospective effect from January 01, 2007.