Case: Rajkamal Kalamandir Private, Limited Vs. Indian Motion Pictures Employees' Union and Others

1. This appeal has been brought to this Court by the appellant Rajkamal Kalamandir (Private), Ltd., with a certificate issued by the Bombay High Court against its order passed under Art. 227 of the Constitution and the narrow point which Mr. Phadke for the appellant has raised in support of the appeal is that the order under appeal is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227.2. It appears that between the appellant and its employees, industrial disputes arose in respect of several items and they were referred to the industrial tribunal at Bombay for adjudication on 30 March, 1957. The tribunal first took up the question of dearness allowance, leave with wages, provident fund and other subsidiary matters for its decision, and on 4 June, 1958 it pronounced its award on these points. A claim for revisedand increase in wage had also been included in the reference and for dealing with this claim in a scientific way, the tribunal obtained the assistance of four assessors, two on each side. The assessors made their report on 2 February, 1959. This report was intended to assist the tribunal to ascertain the relative skill of workmen before classifying them into several categories. After receiving this report, the tribunal proceeded to pronounce its award in respect of the claim for wages and classification of workmen. This award was pronounced on 3 February, 1960. In this award, the tribunal considered the question as to whether the relief granted by it to the respondents in regard to dearness allowance and revisedshould be retrospective. In respect of dearness allowance, it directed that the dearness allowance ordered to be paid by the award should take effect from 1 April, 1957. In regard to the wages, however, it held that the revisedshall be introduced as from 1 April, 1959. As invariably happens, after a newwas directed by the award, an order had to be made in respect of adjustments of the several employees in different categories evolved by the award and so, an appropriate direction was given by the tribunal in respect of such adjustments. After this award was pronounced, the respondents moved the High Court by an application under Art. 227 of the Constitution on 13 June, 1960. On their behalf, it was urged that the tribunal had committed an obvious error in not directing the enforcement of the newas from 1 April, 1957. This application has been allowed by the High Court and the award has been corrected in that behalf. Under the order passed by the High Court, the operation of the award which deals with the revisedhas to come into force from 1 April, 1957. It is the validity of this order that Mr. Phadke challenges before us in the present appeal.

Court's reasoning:
7. Therefore, there can be no doubt that in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the tribunal or the court which is brought before it and cannot upset its discretionary orders on the ground that if the matter had been raised before it, it might have exercised its discretion differently. In the present case. The tribunal had considered the question as to whether the revisedshould take effect from 1 April, 1957 or not. It was urged before the tribunal that the demand in that behalf had been made by the respondents much earlier and that the reference itself had been made in pursuance of the said demands in March 1957 and so the argument before the tribunal was that like the dearness allowance, revisedshould also be made effective from 1 April, 1957. The tribunal did not accept this contention. It held that unlike the dearness allowance, the revisedshould take effect from 1 April, 1959. It would be noticed that the award was pronounced in February 1960 and ordinarily it would have been enforceable within a month after its publication. The tribunal, however, thought that the ends of justice required that the revisedshould come into effect from an earlier date which it fixed as 1 April, 1959. The High Court has considered the question as to whether the reasons by the tribunal is valid or not; and it held that the tribunal and really given no reason worth the name. The High Court, in considering the propriety of the order, has referred to the fact that the dispute between the parties has been aaffair and that the appellant, according to the High Court, was responsible for the delay because it adopted an obstructive attitude. Then the High Court has proceeded to observe that normally speaking, when a matter is referred to the tribunal for settlement of a dispute between the parties, the award should in fairness be effective at least from the date of the reference. Acting on these reasons, the High Court set aside the order passed by the tribunal and has directed that the revisedshould come into force as from 1 April 1957.It is clear that in reversing the order of the tribunal, the High Court has in substance purported to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. Whether or not the award should be retrospective in its effect is a question that is usually to be determined by the tribunal in its discretion. Undoubtedly, like all matters left to judicial discretion, the question about the retrospective operation of the award must also be considered on reasonable grounds, but that is not to say that the matter is not one of direction. Therefore, in interfering with an order which was within the discretion of the tribunal, the High Court has really purported to substitute its discretion for that of the tribunal and that clearly is outside its jurisdiction under Art.in our opinion, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the special civil application preferred by the respondents and reversing the discretionary order passed by the tribunal.It is somewhat unfortunate that the appellant was not represented before the High Court when the special civil application was argued. We were told by Mr. Phadke that the failure of the appellant to appear by its representative before the High Court was due to some default on the part of one of its officers and we are also told that, after the judgment was pronounced, an application for restoration was made, but was rejected. However, the High Court was then moved for a certificate and the appellant was granted the certificate. It may be that if the appellant had appeared before the High Court and invited its attention to the relevant facts, the High Court may not have interfered with the discretionary order passed by the tribunal.