Case: Rattan Kumar Tandan  Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh

3. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short "the Act") was published in the State Gazette on 14-2-1986 acquiring an extent of 4 acres, 2 rods, 21 poles equivalent to 22, 528 sq. yds. situated in Allahabad City for public purpose, namely, planned development of the urban area. The Land Acquisition Officer determined by his award under Section 11 on 28-10-1987 a total compensation of Rs. 4, 57, 750.88. Dissatisfied therewith, the appellants sought reference. The Additional District Judge by his award and decree dated 20-7-1989 determined compensation @ Rs. 500 per sq. yd. He also awarded Rs. 50, 000 towards the value of trees, Rs. 8, 33, 700 towards the value of the building together with the statutory solatium and interest. On appeal, the High Court reversed the valuation of the trees and confirmed the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, namely, Rs. 23, 219.97. The High Court also confirmed the value of the building as awarded by the reference court but as regards the value of the land the High Court disagreed and determined market value @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd. by the impugned judgment dated 22-10-1992 in First Appeal No. 149 of 1990. Thus, this appeal by special leave

Court's reasoning:
Since they have not discharged their burden, the evidence is not sufficient to hold that the value of the trees would be Rs. 50, 000. The Additional District Judge accepted the ipse dixit of the claimants and gave arbitrary amount on mere asking. The High Court, therefore, was right, though for different reasons, in reversing the award of the reference court in that behalf and confirming that of the Land Acquisition Officer. In this case, since the land is separately valued, the building cannot again be separately assessed and compensation awarded except the value of debris. However, since State has not come in appeal, we need not go into the legality of the award of the Additional District Judge and of the High Court in that behalf. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to go into that question and we confirm of the compensation in respect of building at Rs. 8, 33, 000 and oddIt is seen that the appellants have relied upon a solitary sale deed dated 1-1-1985 with reference to an extent of Rs. 434 per sq. yd. which worked out @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd. The appellants, on the basis of the report given by the valuation officer who was not examined, claimed @ Rs. 500 per sq. yd. They have also relied upon the paper-cutting in respect of the prevailing prices notified in the newspapers. It is settled law that either the vendor or vendee of a sale deed should be examined in proof of the circumstances in which the sale deed came to be executed and the consideration passed thereunder and in respect of the value etc. The said sale deed is a freehold small piece of land as compared to encumbered leasehold land of 4 acres and odd. The vendor of the sale deed by name Jai Prakash Singh was not examined. Therefore, the sale deed cannot be relied upon as proof of valuation prevailing in the area. The High Court has relied upon that document and granted the compensation @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd. Since the State had not come up in appeal, nor filed cross-objections, we need not go into the correctness of the award of compensation on that rate. The paper-cutting as to the publication of the prices in the local newspapers is not evidence and the reference court, therefore, committed clear error in relying upon those transactions and in proof of document of the sale deed executed by Jai Prakash Singh. If those documents are excluded, there is no other evidence to further enhance the compensation. The High Court granted the maximum compensation as reflected in unproved solitary sale deed of small extent of land. Accordingly, we are constrained to uphold the valuation of the land @ Rs. 423 per sq. ydIt is not in dispute that the lands are situated in the urban agglomeration and 1500 sq.m. is the urban vacant land ceiling limit in Allahabad to which the holder is entitled under the Ceiling Act. It appears that the appellants have filed three writ petitions in the High Court which are pending disposal on the question of surplus lands. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to go into the question of the actual extent of the surplus landThis controversy was considered in H.E.H., Nizam case, after surveying the relevant provisions of the Ceiling Act. It is not necessary to traverse the ground once over. It was held that it is not necessary for the Government to determine the compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act in respect of the excess land found under the Ceiling Act since Ceiling Act is a special Act, notwithstanding any contrary law. In that case, it was noticed that the Government have exempted the acquired land from the purview of the Ceiling Act, the determination of the compensation in respect of that land by civil court was upheld with modification. Far from helping the appellants, the ratio therein is against the appellants. This question was also considered in another judgment of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Parshottamdas Ramdas Patel. It was held therein that the provisions of the Ceiling Act have overriding effect on all other lands. In Surendra Kumar case, the purchase of vacant land within ceiling limit pending determination by competent authority came up for consideration. Therein this Court had pointed out the procedure to be adopted in dealing with the situation. The Bombay case, with due respect, was not correctly decided. The principle of withdrawing notification under Section 48(1) of the Act need not be followed for the reason that compensation for the land within ceiling limit be determined under Section 23(1) and excess land is covered by Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act. Until ceiling area and excess land are determined, it would be difficult to postulate as to what extent of excess vacant land would be available to pay compensation either under Section 23(1) of the Act or Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act. The excess urban land covered under the Ceiling Act is not required to be denotified as it statutorily stands vested in the Government and the Government cannot be compelled to acquire the excess urban vacant land covered under the provisions of the Ceiling Act, and compensation paid under the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition ActIt is seen that the Government has given instructions to the respective authorities under Section 35 of the Ceiling Act that where the authorities were not able to dispose of the matter under the Ceiling Act and land is required for public purpose, it would be necessary to drop the proceedings under the Ceiling Act and to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act. These are only administrative instructions. They do not have any statutory effect on the operation of law. In case of yearning gaps, they may guide the officers. In view of the law laid down by this Court, the instructions do not have any overriding effect on the operation of the Ceiling Act and the law declared by this Court under Article 141. Therefore, it is not necessary for the State to proceed with the determination of the compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act to the extent of the excess land found under the Ceiling Act. Compensation shall be paid only as per Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act14. A reading of this sub-section would indicate that without prejudice to the provisions in sub-section (1), the Land Reforms Commissioner where he considers the amount of compensation allowed by the award under Section 11 to be excessive, may require the Collector that the matter may be referred to the court for determination of the amount of compensation. It is settled law that the award of the Collector is an offer and it binds the Government without objections thereto. The State Legislature felt that where the Collector under Section 11 made excess award of compensation for the land which was not capable of fetching that value, the Land Reforms Commissioner has been empowered to seek a reference to the court for determination of the compensation. The limited right given to the State is only in respect of excess compensation awarded by the Collector. Therefore, in respect of the apportionment of the compensation covered under the Ceiling Act, there is no need for reference under Section 18(3). Moreover, it could be seen that on a reference made under Section 18(1) to the court, as required under Section 20(c) of the Act, the court is enjoined to give notice to the Collector when the objection relates to the area of the land or the amount of compensation. Section 21 restricts the scope of the proceedings envisaging that "the Court shall restrict the scope" of consideration of "interests of the persons affected by the objection". Thus, it could be seen that the court is enjoined to go into the acquisition of the land of the persons entitled to the compensation. On a reference made, the compensation would be restricted to the interest in the land held by the claimant and the court should enquire as to the extent to which the claimant will be entitled to get compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act towards his interest in the acquired land. The interest consists of right and title to the compensation. Admittedly, the appellants had lease of Government land for 50 years on 1-10-1892 obviously under Crown Grants Act with a right to a renewal for further period of 50 years. Admittedly, further renewal was granted on 30-9-1942 for a further period of 50 years which stood expired on 30-9-1992. It would, therefore, be clear that the term of the lease as granted by the Government was up to 30-9-1992.It is then contended by Shri Satish Chandra that it was a licence since the appellants were permitted to construct permanent building under the lease and, therefore, it is in perpetuity by operation of Section 60 of the Easement Act.We find no force in the contention. The lease itself expressly mentions demising the vacant land to the appellants with exclusive possession but subject to construction of the building within the specified period and be in peaceful exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof subject to paying the lease amount to the Government under the Act. Therefore, it cannot be treated to be a licence but a leaseWe are not concerned with regard to the legality of the mandamus or directions issued in the above case. Suffice it to state that since the State had acquired the property before the expiry of the first renewal, we are constrained to go into the language used in the first lease. It expressly mentions that lease initially was granted for a period of 50 years and a right of another renewal for another 50 years, i.e., up to 30-9-1992. Before its expiry, the Government have already acquired the lands for public purpose and taken possession. The question of further renewal would not arise in this case. Under these circumstances, residuary period of lease is hardly 7 yearsIn Inder Parshad case, land was sought to be acquired for public purpose but the Land Acquisition Officer was unable to decide the proportion in which the leaseholders and the Union of India are entitled to the compensation. On reference under Section 30, the reference court had determined the compensation at a particular rate ultimately the High Court determined the proportion at 75% and 25%. Since the Union of India had not filed appeal, this Court upheld the proportion to the leaseholders and the Government of India. It was a perpetual lease. In that backdrop, this Court had upheld the view of the High Court granting apportionment in the ratio of 75 : 25 to the lessee and the Government. In Piedade Fernandes case [(1994) 3 Scale 860], the covenant expressly gave power to the Government to get the land for a public purpose without payment of the compensation. That was not covered under the Ceiling Act. Instead of invoking the clause thereunder, proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were initiated. It was, therefore, held that the State is enjoined to pay full compensation for the land acquired. The ratio of either case does not help the appellants in this case. As seen, the appellants have got hardly 7 years leasehold right in the land and thereafter the lands would stand revested to the State. Thereafter, the State would be entitled to resume the land after ejectment of the appellants. Under those circumstances, they are not entitled to the full compensation. The High Court directed that compensation should be apportioned for the extent of land within the limit in the ratio of 50:50 to the State and the appellants. It is also to be seen that the State has not questioned at least the apportionment granted by the High Court. Considered from this perspective, we hold that it is not a fit case to reserve the judgment