Case: State of West Bengal Vs. Dalhousie Institute Society

2. The dispute between the parties in this appeal relates to the title to the compensation amount awarded in the land acquisition proceedings to the site of Dalhousie Institute building, premises No,. 34 Dalhousie Square. There is no dispute about the amount of Rs. 7,45,640/awarded as compensation for the land. The appellant claimed the entire amount as being payable to it whereas, on the other hand, the respondent Dalhousie Institute Society (hereinafter to be referred as the Institute) claimed the amount for itself, Therefore, the question of title to the land which is in controversy between the appellant and the respondent has to be decided and on that will depend the right of the party entitled to the compensation amount.3. Originally the properties acquired under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act II of 1948 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) were No. 34 Dalhousie Square and certain other properties, namely premises No. 34/1 and 35 Dalhousie Square. The controversy regarding premises Nos. 34/1 and 35 Dalhousie Square had been closed even at an early stage. Similarly the parties have agreed that the respondent Institute is entitled to the sum of Rupees 3,90,000/awarded as compensation for the building standing on premises No. 34 Dalhousie Square. The Land Acquisition Officer referred to the Special Land Acquisition Judge the question regarding apportionment of the compensation amount in respect of the land, premises No. 34 Dalhousie Square.4. The Special Land Acquisition Judge by his judgment dated July 28, 1953 held that the site 34 Dalhousie Square on which the Dalhousie Institute had been constructed was intended to be given as a grant to the respondent by the Government and that it was given as such for the purpose of putting up the Dalhousie Memorial Hall and Institute. The Special Land Acquisition Judge further held that although the grant was an invalid one, the respondent has been in possession adverse to the Government for over 60 years and in consequence the Institute has perfected its title by such adverse possession. In this view the Special Land Acquisition Judge held that the compensation money in respect of the site belongs to the Institute and not to the Government. The Special Land Acquisition Judge further held that as the intention of the Government while granting the land to the respondent was to provide a site solely for the purpose of construction of the Dalhousie Institute and not for any other purpose, the respondent is in the position of a trustee of the site for the said purpose. In consequence, he held that the compensation amount could not be withdrawn by the respondent except for the purpose of acquiring a new site for the purpose for which the original grant was intended to be made. We have not referred to the other findings recorded by the Special Land Acquisition Judge with regard to the claim in respect of premises Nos. 34/1 and 35 Dalhousie Square, as well as the compensation amount awarded for the building on 34 Dalhousie Square because they are not material for the purpose of this appeal. The respondent filed an appeal against the original decree No. 111 of 1954 in the Calcutta High Court attacking the view of the Special Land Acquisition Judge that the respondent was in the position of a trustee with reference to the compensation amount and placing restrictions regarding the manner in which the amount could be withdrawn.5. Taking advantage of the appeal filed by the respondent, the State of West Bengal fileddisputing the Institutes title to the land as well as the compensation money. According to the State no grant of any land either in fact or in law, valid or invalid, of any land was ever made to the Institute. The Institute, according to the State, was only permitted to put up a building on the site and the finding that the Institute has completed title by adverse possession was erroneous.6. The appeal and thewere heard by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The learned Judges felt that the question whether there was a grant, valid or invalid in law, and the character of the respondents possession of the land from about 1865 requires further careful and detailed consideration. The learned Judges were also of the view that from the various exhibits referred to by the parties before them further records may be available from the Government, the Corporation or the Institute, which may throw considerable light on the point in controversy between the parties. In this view the learned Judges felt that the parties must be permitted to adduce further oral and documentary evidence before the Special Land Acquisition Judge and that the appeal should be disposed of finally after the receipt of such evidence. Accordingly by order dated June, 23, 1959 the learned Judges, retaining the appeal and theon the file of the High Court, directed the Special Land Acquisition Judge to record any additional evidence that may be adduced by the parties.7. After remand it is seen that excepting examining an Assistant Engineer on the side of the appellant State, no further oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the parties. The appeal and thewere taken up for final hearing after receipt of this evidence. The learned Judges by judgment and decree dated September 9, 1963 agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent as well as thefiled by the appellant.8. The respondent has not further challenged the dismissal of its appeal. Therefore the point that arose for consideration by the High Court in thefiled by the appellant alone arises for consideration in this appeal.

Court's reasoning:
11. We have been taken through the material evidence on record and we are satisfied that there is no scope for interfering with the decision under appeal.12. Regarding the first contention of Mr. Sen, it is no doubt true that in the order of remand dated June 23, 1959 the learned Judges have adverted to the material exhibits referred to in the award and have stated that from those exhibits the case of a grant or gift though invalid in law may not immediately or quite easily follow. But a full and complete reading of the discussion contained in the order of remand clearly shows that the learned Judges have not expressed a final view in the manner urged by Mr. Sen. On the other hand, they have stated in more than one place in the order that the view indicated by them is only a prima facie view and that they are not pronouncing a final opinion on the matter with regard to the issue between the parties. Further it is clear from the order of remand that the learned Judges were referring to some of the exhibits only to show that from those exhibits it could be gathered that further material may be available from the parties concerned for the production of which they must be given a further opportunity. We do not find any indication in the order of remand that the learned Judges have expressed a final opinion on the basis of the exhibits referred to by them. If that were so, the learned Judges could have very well proceeded to pronounce judgment as an order or remand would not have served any purpose whatsoever. Therefore, it follows that the first contention of Mr. Sen has to be rejected.We are not inclined to accept these contentions. As, both the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court have elaborately considered the correspondence and other evidence on record, we do not think any useful purpose will be served by referring to them over again. We are in complete agreement with the High Court in the inference drawn from those materials. As early as November 1, 1860 in the letter Ext. 1 addressed to the Institute by the Home Department of the Government of India, it is clearly stated that the sanction of Her Majestys Government has been given to the grant of the site referred to in thecorrespondence, for the Dalhousie Institute. Exhibit 1 is in reply to a letter of December of the previous year addressed by the Institute to the Government, which is not before the Court. It is further stated in Ext. 1 that thein Council will accordingly be prepared to state the definite terms on which the ground will be made over to the Institute . . .  There is no controversy that this letter relates to a Maidan and subsequently as it becamea plot of land in the Dalhousie Square appears to have been thought of. Exhibit 1 categorically refers to the grant of the site for the Dalhousie Institute and it also states that the ground will be made over to the Institute. These expressions, in our opinion, clearly show that the intention of the Government from the very beginning was to make a grant of a piece of land in favour of the Institute. Mr. Sen found considerable difficulty in explaining away the recitals in this letter. His attempt was to satisfy us that at the stage when Ext. 1 was written, the Government of India did have an intention of making a grant of land in favour of the Institute, but when once the property referred to therein ceased to be available, the Government changed its mind and it was only prepared to give permission to the Institute to put up a building in 34 Dalhousie Square. We are of the opinion that the subsequent correspondence does not support the stand taken by Mr. Sen. On the other hand, they establish that the Government at no time gave up its idea of making a grant in favour of theletter of the Government concludes the case against the appellant. The Government itself has admitted that there are papers available in their office and that the site in question has been made over to the respondent and it has been so made over unconditionally without receiving any rent for the same. This document completely destroys the claim made on behalf of the appellant that though originally there was an intention to make a grant of land, that intention was abandoned later on. On the other hand, the original intention to make a grant was present at all times; and that there was a grant of this identical site is amply established by the documents referred to above and in particular the letter of the Government of Bengal just now referred to. Therefore, we are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that there was a grant of the site by the Government in favour of the Institute as early as 1865.16.There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. In this respect the material documentary evidence referred to by the High Court clearly establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only by the Corporation, but also by the Government. The possession of the respondent must have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which no doubt, is invalid inabove extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires title by adverse possession.In the case before us there are concurrent findings recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the respondent on this point and we agree with those findings.