Case: State Of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu

2. By order dated January 11, 1950 the Government of Madras applied the provisions of the Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act 30 of 1947 to the lands in the village Mallinadhapuram on the footing that the grant was of the whole village, and hence an estate within the meaning of S.3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and thereby sought to prevent the Inamdars from collecting contractual or customary rent from the tenants who held the lands under the Inamdars.3. G. V. Suryanarayana Garu and Prabha Yegneswara Sastri who collectively held 2-3/4 out of the 8 virttis constituting the inam thereupon served a notice under S. 80 Code of Civil Procedure upon the Government of the State of Madras. The notice recited that the cause of action for the proposed suit arose on the issue of the notification dated January 11, 1950 published in the Fort St. George Gazette on May 16, 1950 and on subsequent dates when the Government of Madras through its officers attempted to interfere with the collection of rent due from tenants, and called upon the Government of Madras to withdraw the notification and to refrain from collecting at reduced rates rent from the tenants and cultivators in Mallinadhapuram or otherwise interfering with the rights of ownership of the inamdars in Mallinadhapuram, and informed the Government that in default of compliance, with the notice, a suit to establish the right claimed would be filed against the State of Madras. The notice set out the names, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and Prabha Yegneswara Sastri. The Government of Madras failed to withdraw the notification, and G.V. Suryanarayana Garu alone instituted, for himself and on behalf of all Inamdars of Mallinadhapuran, Suit No. 45 of 1953 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam against the State of Madras for a declaration that "the agraharam of Thungathampara alias Mallinadhapuram covered by T. D. No. 279 is not an estate within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of Madras Estates Land Act, and the Notification No. 2970 of the Government defendant published at page 1399 of Fort St. George Gazette under Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act XXX of 1947 and subsequent proceedings thereunder are therefore void, illegal and ultra vires."4. The State of Madras contended that the grant in favour of the predecessors of the Inamdars was of the entire village and of a named village which had been enfranchised as such under title deed No. 279 and on that account the village constituted an estate as defined in S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and also as defined in Madras Act XXX of 1947, and the plaintiffs claim was not maintainable. It was also contended that the notice served by the plaintiff under S. 80, Code of Civil Procedure was "not valid and proper in law".5. The Trial Court held that the original grant in inam was not of the entire village, and was not so confirmed or recognised by the Government of the province of Madras and therefore within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, it was not an "estate", and Madras Rent Reduction Act, 1947 had no application thereto, but the suit was still liable to be dismissed because the notice served by the plaintiff and Prabha Yegneswara Sastri was "invalid and defective" inasmuch as the suit was filed by the plaintiff alone.6. In appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Guntur (which since the constitution of the State of Andhra was the proper Court to entertain the appeal) reversed the decree passed by the Trial Court. The learned Judges agreed with the Trial Court that the grant was not of an entire village or of a named village, and that the representative suit filed by the plaintiff for and on behalf of all the Inamdars, with the permission of the Court under O. 1 R. 8, Code of Civil Procedure was not defective. The High Court accordingly granted to the plaintiff the relief claimed in the plaint.

Court's reasoning:
The evidence therefore clearly establishes that the grant was not of the entire village and the Trial Court and the High Court were, in our judgment, right in declining to accept the case of the State.The notice in the present suit was served by the plaintiff and Yegneswara Sastri. They raised a grievance about the notification issued by the Government of Madras on May 16, 1950 : it was not an individual grievance of the two persons who served the notice but of all the Inamdars or agrahararndars. The relief for which the suit was intended to be filed was also not restricted to their personal claim. The notice stated the cause of action arising in favour of all the Inamdars, and it is not disputed that the notice set out the relief which would be claimable by all the Inamdars or on their behalf in default of compliance with the requisition. The plaintiff it is true alone filed the suit, but he was permitted to sue, for and on behalf of all the Inamdars by an order of the Court under O. 1, R.8 Code of Civil Procedure. The requirements as to the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff was therefore complied with and the relief which the plaintiff claimed was duly set out in the notice. The only departure from the notice was that two persons served a notice under S.80 informing the Government that proceedings would be started, in default of compliance with the requisition, for violation of the rights of the Inamdars, and one person only out of the two instituted the suit. That in our judgment is not a defect which brings the case within the terms of S. 80. The right to institute a representative action may be exercised by one or more persons having an interest which is common with the others but it can only be exercised with the permission of the Court. If the Court grants permission to one person to institute such a representative action and if that person had served the notice under S. 80, the circumstance that another person had joined him in serving the notice but did not effectuate that notice by joining in the suit, would not in our judgment be a sufficient ground for regarding the suit asthere is nothing in S. 80 of the Code or O. 1, R. 8 Code of Civil Procedure which supports this submission, and there is inherent indication in O. 1, R. 8 to the contrary. To enable a person to file a suit in a representative capacity for and on behalf of numerous persons where they have the same interest, the only condition is the permission of the Court. The provision which requires that the Court shall in such a case give, at the plaintiffs expense notice of the institution of the suit to all persons having the same interest, and the power reserved to the Court to entertain an application from any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted, indicate that no previous sanction or authority of persons interested in the suit is required to be obtained before institution of the suit. Nor is there anything in S. 80 that notice of a proposed suit in a representative capacity may be served only after expressly obtaining the authority of persons whom he seeks to represent. Section 80 requires that the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff must be set out in the notice and not of persons whom he seeks to represent. A suit filed with permission to sue for and on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest under O. 1, R. 8 is still a suit filed by the person who is permitted to sue as the plaintiff : the persons represented by him do not in virtue of the permission become plaintiffs in the suit. Such other persons would be bound by the decree in the suit, but that is because they are represented by the plaintiff, not because they are parties to the suit unless by express order of the Court they are permitted to be impleaded.14. In the present case G. V. Suryanarayana Garu has served the notice under S. 80 Code of Civil Procedure and he has also instituted the suit : the plaint complies with the requirements of S. 80, and the fact that Yegneswara Sastri had joined in serving the notice, but not in seeking permission of the Court, does not render the plaint and the proceedings in suitboth these cases the suit was instituted by two or more persons but not all had served the statutory notice. In the present case the person who instituted the suit had in fact served the notice. He had intimated the Government by the notice that a cause of action had arisen in favour of the Inamdar, and that proceedings would be started on behalf of the Inandars for relief set out in the notice. The cause of action as set out in the notice remained unchanged in the suit, and it is not, claimed that the relief set out in the plaint is different from the relief set out in the notice. The only discrepancy between the notice and the plaint is that the notice was given by two persons intimating that an action would be started against the Government for and on behalf of the Inamdars on the cause of action and relief set out therein, the action was instituted by one person but with the permission of the Court for and on behalf of the inamdars on the same cause of action and for the same relief15. The other contention raised by counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh that in a suit which is to be instituted against the State after notice under S. 80 Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff must first obtain the permission of the Court before serving a notice, is in our judgment futile. The permission of the Court has to be obtained for instituting a representative suit and not for serving the notice. The Code contains no machinery for granting permission to a party seeking to serve a notice upon the Government or a public servant.