Case: Babu Ram Gupta Vs. Sudhir Bhasin &amp; Anr

2. A detailed narrative of the facts culminating in the order impunged is to be found in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over again a brief resume of the important facts in order to appreciate the points of law that arise in the appeal. It appears that there was a partnership between Sudhir Bhasin and Jagatri Lal Bhasin as a result of which a firm under the style of Sitapur Theatres with its Head Office at Delhi was constituted. The partnership deed was executed as far back as 19.11.1965 and clause 25 of that deed contained the usual arbitration clause. Disputes arose between the partners as a result of which an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act was made before the High Court and the High Court on hearing the application referred the dispute to the sole arbitration of a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court. Along with the aforesaid application, the respondent Sudhir Bhasin had filed an application for appointment of a receiver as he apprehended that the appellant would misappropriate the funds of the partnership property. The application for appointment of a receiver was allowed and the respondent Sudhir Bhasin himself was appointed as a receiver of Laxmi Talkies, Sitapur. Thereafter the appellant being aggrieved by this order filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. In the appeal it appears that a consent order was passed with the agreement of the parties by which Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary, Bar Association Sitapur was appointed as a receiver of the Laxmi Talkies pending the decision of the arbitrator and was directed to run the said cinema after taking possession from the appellant. This order passed by the High Court may be quoted in extenso as it forms the solid basis for the proceedings for contempt taken against the appellant by the Highhearing the learned counsel for sometime on previous hearings, a suggestion has been mooted that if the receiver is changed, the applicant would not prosecute the present appeal except to the extent of getting the Receiver changed. We accordingly directed the Registrar to address letters to the District Judges, Sitapur and Lucknow to send names of three Advocates each from whom we could pick out one name for appointment as a Receiver in place of Sudhir Bhasin, who had been appointed Receiver by the learned Single Judge. Three names have been received from the District Judge, Sitapur. Shri S.C. Bhattacharya, President of the Bar Association, is not acceptable because he had been connected with the Cinema in question in the capacity of a Receiver previously. With the comment of the learned counsel of the parties, we therefore, appoint Shri Mahabir Prasad, Advocate and Secretary of the Bar Association, Sitapur, to be the Receiver of Laxmi Talkies pending decision of the disputes between the parties which have been referred to arbitration. The Receiver so appointed, will take charge of the Laxmi Talkies forthwith from the appellant, who is at present running the said Cinema. Shri Mahabir Prasad will run the Cinema himself through such Managers as he may appoint. He will be responsible to keep account, make disbursements and deposit the not proceeds in a Bank account to be opened by him in the name of Laxmi Talkies. The Receiver will submit quarterly reports to this Court regarding the running of the business of the said Cinema. The first report should be submitted to this Court on or before 14th August, 1977, Each subsequent report should be submitted by the middle of the month in which the quarter gets completed.The appellant is directed not to interfere with the Receiver appointed or with the ousiness of the running of the Laxmi Talkies. He will, however give to the Receiver appointed, all cooperation that the Receiver, may require.The licence for running the Cinema will be taken out by the Receiver in the name of Laxmi Talkies. He will approach the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur for issue of this licence in accordance with the above direction of this

Court's reasoning:
3. A perusal of the order extracted above clearly shows that there was no express direction to the appellant to hand over possession to the receiver although certain directions were given by the Court to the receiver for filing quarterly reports etc. The only direction given to the appellant was that he would not interfere with the receiver appointed or with the business of running of the Laxmi Talkies. The appellant was also directed to give all cooperation that the receiver may require. There was thus no specific direction to the appellant to hand over possession of the property to the receiver although impliedly this was meant to be done because the order was passed with the consent of the parties.These are the tests laid down by this Court in order to determine whether a contempt of court has been committed in the case of violation of prohibitive order. In the instant case, however, as indicated above, there is no application nor any affidavit nor any written undertaking given by the appellant that he would co-operate with the receiver or that he would hand over possession of the Cinema to the receiver. Apart from this, even the consent order does not incorporate expressly or clearly that any such undertaking had been given either by the appellant or by his lawyer before the Court that he would hand over possession of the property to the receiver. In the absence of any express undertaking given by the appellant or any undertaking incorporated in the order impugned, it will be difficult to hold that the appellant wilfully disobeyed or committed breach of such an undertaking. What the High Court appears to have done is that it took the consent order passed which was agreed to by the parties and by which a receiver was appointed, to include an undertaking given by the contemner to carry out the directions contained in the order. With due respects, we are unable to agree with this view taken by the Highthe offence committed by the person concerned is qua the party not qua the court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absent in such cases. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the court by the contemner or incorporated by the court in its order, there can be no question of wilful disobedience of such an undertaking. In the instant case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any such an undertaking. In the instant casse, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any such undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in the order impugned. Thus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise.