Case: JAGJIT SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

1. The appeal after granting special leave to appeal is filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High court of Punjab and Haryana affirming the judgment of the trial Court convicting the appellant under SectionIPC but reducing the sentence from 8 years rigorous imprisonment to a period of 7 years under the aforesaid section. The appellant who was tried along with his parents and two brothers was acquitted of the charge under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code by the trial Court. In view of his conviction under SectionIPC, the trial Court did not find it necessary to record a separate conviction under Section

Court's reasoning:
12. We noticed that it was a case where the courts had acquitted all the accused for the offence under Sectionof the IPC.The Court noted that the case of the prosecution is that there is a demand for scooter and proceeded to hold inter alia as follows:18. Applying these principles to the instant case, we find that there is no evidence as to the demand of dowry or cruelty and that deceased Karamjit Kaur was subjected to dowry harassmentExcept the demand of scooter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in our view, it can only be attributed to the husband Jagsir Singh who in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. In the absence of any evidence that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowryby the appellants, the conviction of the appellants under SectionIPC cannot be sustained. The trial court and the High Court have not analysed the evidence in the light of the essential ingredients of SectionIPC and the conviction of the appellants under SectionIPC is liable to be set4. We have already noticed that the essential ingredients of SectionIPC as noticed by this Court in Major Singh & Another vs. State of Punjab (supra). Parliament has inserted Sectionin the Evidence Act. In order that the presumption therein has to be applied it must be established that soon before her death, such woman must have been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand of dowry. Upon this fact being established, undoubtedly, the court is mandated to assume that the person has indeed caused the dowry death as contemplated in SectionIPC. Therefore, the presumption cannot apply unless it is established that soon before her death, a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry. The wordser death has also been considered in a large number of cases.In the perspective of aforesaid state of the law, two issues would arise. Whether there is material within the meaning of Sectionof the Evidence Act for the Court to have come to the conclusion that soon before the death, the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassed for or in connection with demand for dowry. In this regard we have noticed that there is a material in the form of testimony of PW1 and PW3. The marriage between theand the deceased took place on 24.1.1998 and it survived only for a little over three (3) years. It is on 16.2.2001 that the deceased goes to the house of PW3, her elder sister, spent 5 to 7 minutes, according to the said witness, complained of cruelty or harassment by the accused and her own daughter was with her. On the same day, she goes to the PCO, phones her father PW1 and tells him about the harassment. PW4 the person working at the PCO has also stated that she was weeping and the she made a call. PW1 has spoken about the contents of the telephonic conversation namely, all the accused were maltreating and taunting her and that she was very much upset and the accused had thrown her out from their house with the daughter and that she will not be allowed to come back without a Maruti car or Rupees two lakhs. If he is to be believed (In fact, two courts have), this would amount to cruelty/harassment in connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, the law enjoins under Sectionof the Evidence Act drawing of the presumption that the accused has committed the dowry death.The trial Court, however, finds solace in rejecting the defence version on the score that it cannot be squared with the deceased visiting the home of PW3 onand it takes the view that she would have been the last person for her to visit. It is also found that the deceased did not go on being called by PW3. The trial Court had the advantage of watching the demeanor of the witnesses. We cannot hold that the view taken by the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court is not warranted as such by the materials on record. We cannot possibly hold that the view taken by the courts is manifestly perverse or that it is based on no evidence. Even if we are persuaded to take a different view as canvassed by the appellant we would not be justified in interfering. See the observations in Mst. Dalbir