Case: Sree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadharao Panthulu Bahadur Garu (dead) by his legal representatives Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh &amp; Others

1. These two appeals (Civil Appeals Nos. 1619 and 1620 of 1968) on certificate by the High Court arise out of the same suit and are directed against a common judgment and decree of the High Court disposing of twos presented in that Court and will, therefore, be disposed of by one judgment. The principal question canvassed lies within a narrow compass. It relates to the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to entertain and decide the present suit questioning the legality of the notification Exhibit3 dated 2nd November, 1948, reducing the rates of rent in respect of the delta dry ryoti lands in village Kalipatnam under the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act XXX of 1947 (hereafter called the Reduction of Rent Act). The trial Court decreed the suit in part but the High Court to which both parties preferred appeals held that the civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is this short question which requires determination in these appeals2. It is unnecessary to state at length the past history of the landed estate in question. The necessary relevant facts in brief may only be mentioned. Shree Eaja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur was the Inamdar of village Kalipatnam in Narsapuram Taluk in the West Godavari District. On 2nd November, 1948, the Government issued a notification (Exhibit) under section 3 (2) of the Reduction of Rent Act reducing the rates of rent payable in respect of delta dry ryoti lands in Kalipatnam village. The Inam Settlement Officer, Vijayawada, then took proceedings to determine whether Kalipatnam was an inam estate as defined in section 2 (7) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948. After inquiry he made the order dated 31st May, 1950 (Exhibit) holding that the suit village was an inam estate. Feeling aggrieved by these two orders the appellant instituted the suit, out of which the present appeals arise.

Court's reasoning:
The submission seems to us to be justifiedThere is no dispute that clause (i) the only relevant clause to be considered in this connection.8. The general principle on which the jurisdiction of civil Courts can successfully be excluded in respect of decisions by special Tribunals is well settled. The difficulty usually arises in its application to given cases. As observed by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask and Company the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Further even if the jurisdiction is so excluded the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into the cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It is unnecessary to refer to other cases dealing with this question. We need only refer to the recent decision of this Court in Dhulabhai and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another, in which after an exhaustive discussion of the case law the legal position was summarised by the Court speaking through Hidayatullah, C.J., as follows:(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunal the civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil CourtWhere there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals:(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply13. Shri J. Satyanarayana, Tahsildar, who appeared as D.W. 7 stated in hisn that the lands in Kalipatnam were sanctioned with two crops, though he could not say whether they were under cultivation since 1948. He was also unable to say whether the settlement register for Kalipatnam was available in Taluk Office. According to him water rate in the year 1958 was increased 50 per cent, for all lands including Kalipatnam. The cess was also increased proportionately. He was unable to explain the figures given under the description of the soil in Exhibit4 and indeed he expressed his ignorance about the existence of any register for Kalipatnam on this subjectThe submission appears to us to possess merit. The Special Officer had an obligation under section 2 of the Reduction of Rent Act to determine in respect of Kalipatnam village the average rate of cash rent per acre for each class of ryoti land in existence at the time of the commencement of the Act, such as, wet, dry and garden. This had to be determined on the basis of relevant material. The Special Officer, however, proceeded to found his determination only on the report of the Special Assistant (Exhibit, as discussed above, only took into account the entry in the settlement register with respect to the soil of Losaragutlapadu. This really means that the determination of the Special Officer is solely based on the settlement register containing no entry in regard to Kalipatnam. This material is irrelevant and cannot constitute a rational basis for founding thereon the determination of the Special Officer. His determination must, therefore, be held to be based 6n no evidence, with the result that it must be held to be in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. A fortiori the order of the Government made under section 3 (2) exclusively on the basis of the recommendation of the Special Officer must in consequence be held to be not in conformity with the provisions of the Reduction of Rent Act and, therefore, outside the purview of section 3 (2) of that Act. Section 8 (i) would accordingly be inapplicable and the jurisdiction of civil Courts cannot be excluded. The notification Exhibit3 must, therefore, be struck down as contrary to law and ultra vires the Reduction of Rent Act.