Case: M/s Jeevan Diesels &amp; Electricals Ltd Vs. M/s Jasbir Singh Chadha (Huf) &amp; Another

3. The material facts of the case are that the respondents-plaintiffs, claiming to be the landlords/owners of the premises bearing Flat No.205, (2nd Floor), Arunachal Building, 19, Barakhambha Road, New Delhi-110001 having area of 581 sq. ft., (super area) (hereinafter, `the suit premises) filed a suit against the appellant for recovery of possession and mesne profit. The case of the plaintiff-landlord in the plaint is that the appellant was inducted as a tenant vide lease deed dated 07.07.2003 at a monthly rent of Rs.23,200/- for a period of three years with effect from 07.07.2003. According to the respondents-plaintiffs the said lease dated 07.07.2003 was initially for a period of three years and which was to be renewed for a further period of three years as per the mutual consent of both the parties with 20% increase in the monthly rent. The main case of the plaintiff-landlord is that the said lease deed had expired by efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to appellant which was enclosed with the plaint. In paragraph 6 of the plaint further averment is that the appellant, despite determination of its tenancy of the suit property, has failed to vacate the suit property, and handover the possession thereof to the respondents-plaintiffs.4. The stand of the respondents-plaintiffs before the Civil Court and also the High Court and before this Court also was that the case of termination of tenancy has been admitted by the appellant in its written statement.

Court's reasoning:
13. Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by one party of the case of the other party is essentially a question of fact and the decision of this question depends on the facts of the case. This question, namely, whether there is a clear admission or not cannot be decided on the basis of a judicial precedent. Therefore, even though the principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the instant case in view of totally different fact situation.14. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank of India and others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120  the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 came up for consideration before this Court. This Court on a detailed consideration of the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 made it clear "wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed" the principle will apply. In the instant case it cannot be said that there is a clear admission of the case of theabout termination of tenancy by the appellant in its written statement or in its reply to the petition of theunder Order 12 Rule 6.15. It may be noted here that in this case parties have confined their case of admission to their pleading only. The learned counsel for the respondentsIn this connection reference may be made to an old decision of the Court of Appeal between Gilbert vs. Smith reported in(2) Chancery Division 686.Dealing with the principles of Order XL, Rule 11, which was a similar provision in English Law, Lord Justice James held, "if there was anything clearly admitted upon which something ought to be done, the plaintiff might come to the Court at once to have that thing done, without any further delay or expense" (see page 687). Lord Justice Mellish expressing the same opinion made the position further clear by saying, "it must, however, be such an admission of facts as would shew that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the order asked for". The learned Judge made it further clear by holding, "the rule was not meant to apply when there is any serious question of law to be argued. But if there is an admission on the pleading which clearly entitles the plaintiff to an order, then the intention was that he should notit but might at once obtain any order" (see page 689).17. In another old decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hughes vs. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Company (Limited) reported in The Times Law ReportsVolume 8 at page 81, similar principles were laid down by Lord Justice Lopes, wherein His Lordship held "judgment ought not to be signed upon admissions in a pleading or an affidavit, unless the admissions were clear and unequivocal". Both Lord Justice Esher and Lord Justice Fry concurred with the opinion of Lord Justice Lopes.18. In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in Landergan vs. Feast reported in TheLaw Times Reports85 at page42, in an appeal from Chancery Division, Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Lopes held that party is not entitled to apply under the aforesaid rule unless there is a clear admission that the money is due and recoverable in the action in which the admission is made.19. The decision in Landergan (supra) was followed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Koramall Ramballav vs. Mongilal Dalimchand reported in 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes1017. Chief Justice Sanderson, speaking for the Bench, accepted the formulation of Lord Justice Lopes and held that admission in Order 12, Rule 6 must be a "clear admission".20. In the case of J.C. Galstaun vs. E.D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd., reported in 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes783, a Bench of Calcutta High Court presided over by Honble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee sitting with Justice Rankin while construing the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code followed the aforesaid decision in Hughes (supra) and also the view of Lord Justice Lopes in Landergan (supra) and held that these provisions are attracted "where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed. This rule applies where there is a clear admission of the facts on the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed". In saying so His Lordship quoted the observation ofJustice Sargent in Ellis vs. Allen1 Ch. D.