Case: Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar and Others

2. The circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as follows:Respondents 1 and 2 are owners of a site, bearing Survey No. 98 in the town of Mehmadabad. They made an application under Rule 3 of the Rules to the District Magistrate, Kaira, for the grant of a Certificate that there was no objection to the location of a cinema theatre at this site. The District Magistrate then notified in the prescribed Form, the substance of the application by publication in newspapers, inviting objections to the grant of a No-objection Certificate. In response thereto, several persons lodged objections, but the appellants, who are the proprietors of a cinema house, situated on Station Road, Mehmadabad, were not among those objectors. Some of the objections were that a Muslim graveyard, a Durgah, a compost depot, a school and public latrines were situated in the vicinity of the proposed site3. The District Magistrate (Res. 3 herein) invited the opinions of the Chairman of Nagar Panchayat, Executive Engineer Roads and F, Buildings, and the District Superintendent of Police. These three authorities opined that they had no objection to the grant of the Certificate applied for. The District Magistrate visited the site on 27-7-1970 Thereafter he submitted a report to the State Government (Res. 4) that the proposed site was not fit for the location of a cinema house. He recommended that the No-obje ction Certificate should be refused. The State Government did not agree with the recommendation of the District Magistrate and directed the latter to grant the Certificate. Accordingly, the District Magistrate granted the No-objection Certificate on 27-11-1970 to Respondent 1 and 2.4. On 16-12-1970, the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, mandamus, or any other appropriate writ or order directing the Respondents to treat the No-objection Certificate granted to Respondents 1 and 2 as illegal, void and ineffectual They further asked for an injunction restraining Respondents 1 and 2 from utilising the certificate for the purpose of building a cinema theatre5. The main grounds of challenge were: that the impugned Certificate had been issued by the District Magistrate, not in the exercise of his own discretion with due regard to the principles indicated in the Bombay Cinematograph Act, 1918 (for short, the Act) and the Rules, but mechanically at the dictates of the State Government; that Rules 5 and 6, according to an earlier judgment of the High Court being ultra vires and void, the Government had no power to grant or refuse the No-Objection Certificate; that such power belonged to the District Magistrate who was the Licensing Authority, and had to be exercised by him objectively, in a quasi judicial manner in accordance with the statutory principles; since it was not so exercised, the grant of the Certificate in question suffers from lack of jurisdiction6. In the affidavit filed in reply, by the District Magistrate (on behalf of Respondents 3 and 4) a preliminary objection was taken that the appellants had no locus standi to file the writ petition because their rights were not in any manner affected by the grant of the No-objection Certificate. It was stated that the deponent had reported the case and submitted the records to the State Government under Rule 5, recommending that on account of the location of a graveyard, a church, a temple, a mosque and a school near the proposed site, the no-objection certificate be refused. It was admitted that on receipt of the order of the State Government he granted the No-Objection Certificate to Respondents 1 and 2 in compliance with the Governments directive.7. The High Court, purporting to rely on this Courts decision in State of Gujarat v. Krishna Cinema([1971] 2 S.C.R. 110.) and an earlier decision of its own in Kishore Chander Ratilal v. State of Gujarat(Special Civil Application No. 912 of 1970, decided by Gujarat High Court on 25/27th Nov. 1970.), held that Rule 5(2) in its entirety, and the words the previous permission of the Government obtained under Rule S in Rule 6 being ultra vires and invalid, have to be ignored as non est, with the result that the District Magistrate had to come to his own conclusion on relevant considerations and objective norms whether a No objection Certificate should be granted or refused; that under the Act the District Magistrate and not the Government-is the Licencing Authority, and he was bound to exercise this power, which is an integral part of the process of licensing, in a quasi judicial manner, that since the District Magistrate exercised this power not on his own in accordance with objective principles, but solely at the dictates of the Government, his act in granting the No- Objection Certificate suffers from a patent lack of jurisdiction8. The High Court, however, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no right vested in the appellant had been infringed, or prejudiced or adversely affected as a direct consequence of the order impugned by him, and as such, he was not an aggrieved person having a locus standi in the matter.

Court's reasoning:
The expression aggrieved person denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad, tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioners interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. E nglish Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression aggrieved person. However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or standing to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. We will first take up that line of cases in which an aggrieved person has been held to be one who has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public, in seeing that the law is properly administered. The leading case in this line in Queen v. Justices of Surrey([1870] S B. 466.) decided as far back as 1870. There, on the application by the highway board the Justices made certificates that certain portions of three roads were unnecessary. As a result, it was ordered that the roads should cease to be repaired by the parishes.16. The ratio of the decision in Queen v. Justices of Surrey (supra) was followed in King v. Groom and ors. Ex Parte([1901] 2 K. B. 157.). There, the parties were rivals in the liquor trade. The applicants (brewers) had persistently objected to the jurisdiction of the justices to grant the ` license to one J. K. White in a particular month. It was held that the applicants had a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.17. A distinguishing feature of this case was that unlike the appellants in the present case who did not, despite public notice, raise any objection before the District Magistrate to the grant of the No-objection Certificate, the brewers were persistently raising objections in proceedings before the Justices at every stage. The law gave them a right to object and to see that the licensing was done in accordance with law. They were seriously prejudiced in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of the jurisdiction on the part of the Justices.32. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though (1) the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal rig ht or prejudice to some legal interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter [See The State of orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta([1952] S.C.R.28.); Calcutta . Gas Co. v. The State of West Bengal([1962] Supp.3 S.C.R. 1.); Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Membe r, Board of Revenue, orissa([1967] 1, S.C. Appeals 413.); Gadda Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh(A.I.R. 1966 S.C.828-[1966] 2 S.C.R.172.); State of orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall(A.T.R.1972 S.C.2112.); Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal &Co.(A.I.R.1973 S.C.2720-(1974) I S.C.R 615.)]33. The expression ordinarily indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, r even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject- matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.35. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold36. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of persons aggrieved. In the grey outer-circle the. bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be persons aggrieved37. To distinguish such applicants from strangers, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered.38. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, the expression person aggrieved must receive a strict construction.The answer in the circumstances of the case must necessarily be in the negative40. The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellant did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publication of which was not d enied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the Objection Certificate before the District Magistrate or the Government. Even if he had objected before the District Magistrate and failed, the Act would not give him a right of appeal. Section 8A of the Act confers a right of appeal to the State Government, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license, or revoking or suspending any licence under section 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a person aggrieved within the contemplation of Section 8A.41. Section 8B of the Act provides that the State Government may either of its own motion, or upon an application made byan aggrieved person, call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act, and pass such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. Assuming that the scope of the words aggrieved person in Section 8B is wider than the ambit of the same words as used in Sec. 8A, then also, the appellant cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as a person aggrieved having the requisite legal capacity to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. The Act and the Rules recognise a special interest of persons residing, or concerned with any institution such as a school, temple, mosque etc. located within a distance of 200 yards of the site on which a cinema house is proposed to be constructed. The appellant does not fall within the category of such persons having a special interest in the locality. It is not his case that his cinema house is situated anywhere near the site in question, or that he has any peculiar interest in his personal, fiduciary or representative capacity in any school, temple etc. situated in the vicinity of the said site. It cannot therefore be said that the appellant is a person aggrieved on account of his having a particular and substantial interest of his own in the subject matter of the litigation, beyond the general interest of the public. Moreover the appellant could not be said to have been, in fact, aggrieved. As already noticed, he, despite adequate opportunity, never lodged any objection with the District Magistrate, nor went in revision before the State Government. Thus the present case is not in line with the decisions which are within the ratio of Queen v, Justices of Surrey (supra)42. Having seen that the appellant has no standing to complain of injury, actual or potential, to any statutory right or interest, we pass on to consider whether any of his rights or interests, recognised by the general law, has been infringed as a result of the grant of No-objection Certificate to the respondents ? Here, again, the answer must be in the negative.44. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a person aggrieved and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No-objection Certificate45. It is true that, in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular, is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guide lines indicated by us, coupled with other well established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc., can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money. While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the Court should not interfere at the instance of a stranger unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a stranger, and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstance s in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellants monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundament al rights of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law.46. The instant case falls well-high within the ratio of this Courts decision in Rice and Flour Mills v. N. T. Gowda ([1970] S.C.R. 846.), wherein it was held that a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of s. 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed.