Case: Padmini Kunwar Jusahiba Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Another

The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these : The appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Panna, issued on December 29, 1953, to the effect that the appellants rights in certain villages would be resumed from January 1, 1954, in pursuance of the notification of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh dated December 20, 1953, under S. 5 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952 (hereinafter called the Act) resuming all jagirs with a gross annual income of Rs. 1,000/- or above, be quashed. The appellants case was that she was granted as a special case a Lambardari lease in certain villages by His Highness the Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945, for a period of thirty years and had been in possession thereof in accordance with the terms of the lease. The appellant contended that she was not a jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and thus the said notification did not apply to her lands and the order issued by the Deputy Commissioner under the said notification was therefore without the authority of law and liable to be quashed. She contended further that she was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing jagirdars in force in any part of the State, and therefore her lands could not be resumed in the manner in which the resumption had been made.2. The petition was opposed on behalf of the State and it was contended that the appellant was a jagirdar within the meaning of that term in the Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appellant was an Ijaredar and therefore a jagirdar within the meaning of S. 2(1)(c) of the Act. In consequence he dismissed the petition. An application was then made for a certificate to appeal to this Court, which was granted and that is how the appeal has come up before us.

Court's reasoning:
4. It is not in dispute that the lands were not granted to the appellant by the Ruler of Panna as a jagir. It is also not in dispute that the appellant was not recognized as a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing jagirdars in force in any part of thethe words used in the inclusive part of the definition have not been defined anywhere in the Act. It appears that some of those words are words of common use while other are not. For example, the Rewa Land Revenue and tenancy Code deals with a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar and Ilakedar who is big Pawaidar. It is not clear whether the other words used in the inclusive part of the definition of "jagirdar" appear in any other laws in force in the various States which amalgamated to form the State of Vindhya Pradesh, though the word "Ubaridar" appears to be somewhat uncommon and must have some special local significance. It will therefore be not unreasonable to hold that where these words used in the inclusive part of the definition appear in any law in force in any part of the State, they must have that meaning; but if they do not appear in any such law they must be given their ordinary meaning. The Judicial Commissioner in his judgment says that "an Ijaredar as such has not been defined under any law relating to land revenue and tenancy in force in any part of Vindhya Pradesh." Therefore, the word "Ijaredar" must be given its ordinary meaning. Now the ordinary meaning of the word "Ijara" from which the word "Ijaredar" is derived is a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as distinguished from a patta or lease of land for cultivation, though sometimes it is used to indicate just a lease of land of any kind. The question then is what meaning should be given to the word "Ijaredar" in S. 2(1)(c) of the Act. We are of opinion that considering the setting in which the word "Ijaredar" has been used in the section, it must take colour from it and cannot be held to mean any lease of land of whatever kind. In the setting in which the word is used it should in our opinion be confined to a person holding an Ijara which is a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as distinguished from other kinds of leases oflease in the present case is called a Lambardaridoes appear from this paragraph that a Lambardari lease originally was a kind of lease of land revenue; but such leases were abolished in the area from which this case comes long ago. It is true that this lease is called a Lambardari lease but the mere name will not matter and we have to see whether this was a lease of landthe circumstances we cannot agree with the learned Judicial Commissioner that the transaction evidenced by this lease is a mere Ijara in the sense explained above and the appellant is a mere Ijaredar who comes within the meaning of that word in S. 2(1)(c). The lease in our opinion confers rights in lands and is much more than an Ijara. In the circumstances the appellant cannot be held to be a mere Ijaredar covered by the definition of that word as used in S. 2(1)(c). The case of the appellant in our opinion is similar to the case put forward in Petn. No. 392 of 1954 with respect to Khandela estate (see Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 SCR 303   at p. 367 : ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 504  at p. 537). There also was an Ijara or lease on payment of an annual assessment of Rs. 80,001 and it was held that it was not covered by the terms of the Rajasthan Land reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The present case in our opinion is similar and we are of opinion that the lease granted in this case cannot make the appellant a mere Ijaredar within the meaning of that word in S. 2(1)(c).