Case: Seth Balgopal Das Vs. The State Of U.P. &amp; Ors

The appellant, here, by special leave, is a tenant of premises in Dehradun in respect of which the landlord respondent No. 4 had sought permission, under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent &Eviction Act III of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to sue for his eviction. The permission was granted by the Rent Control and Eviction officer, Dehradun, as long ago as 11 August, 1969, and, thereafter, the suit for ejectment of the appellant was filed on 19th November,3, sub. sec. (1) of the Act had merely imposed a bar on suits in Civil Courts filed without the permission of the District Magistrate except on certain grounds which are given there. The plaintiff respondent, one Mrs. Sheila Kalha wife of a retired army officer, was given permission to file her suit on the ground that she required the accommodation for personal residence. She is said to have been living at considerable expense to her at New Delhi due to inability to live in her own house at Dehradun as it has been occupied by thetenant had applied on 19th August, 1969, for a certified copy of the order of the Rent Control officer granting the landlord permission to sue and got its copy on 25th August, 1969. Thereafter, the tenant filed a revision application under section 3(2) of the Act, purporting to be made to the Commissioner, Meerut Division, but actually filed on 16th September, 1969, before an Additional District Magistrate of Dehradun who had forwarded it on to the Commissioner. The Revision Application was received in the Commissioners office on 24th September, 1969. It was rejected by the Commissioner on the ground that it was filed beyond the time prescribed by Section 3(2) of the Act which reads as follows:"(2) Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate, grants or refuses to grant the permission, the party aggrieved by his order may within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to revise theState Government also rejected the revision application of the appellant tenant, filed under section 7F of the Act, against the Commissionersappellant tenant then approached the Allahabad High Court with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was rejected by a learned Judge on 21st October, 1972, on two grounds: firstly, under Section 3(2) of the Act; and, secondly, that the time spent on obtaining the certified copy of the order of the District Magistrate could not be excluded under Section 12(2) of the L imitation Act of 1963. For the second proposition reliance was placed upon Shyam Sunder Bajpai v. Commissioner Allahabad Division, Allhabad &Anr. and Ram Lakhan v. Commissioner, Varanasi Division, VaranasiDivision Bench of the Alla habad High Court had rejected the tenants Special Appeal summarily. This Court, however, granted special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution on 20th July, 1975. We need not express any opinion on the correctness of the second proposition here if we agree with the High Courts view on the first point because, in that case, the tenants application would be time barred even if the time spent in obtaining the copy was excluded.

Court's reasoning:
We think it is difficult to reconcile the Division Bench decision in Pasrichas case, decided on 5th April, 1973, with the summary rejection of the Special Appeal No. 180 of 1973 on 8th August, 1973, which is under appeal before us, although we find that one of the learned Judges is common to both the Division Benches.We prefer the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in Seth Bal Gopal Das v. St ate of U.P. (supra) to the reasoning of the Division Bench in Pasrichas case (supra). A wrong practice cannot possibly modify what naturally and logically follows from the language in Section 3(2) of the Act. This provision says that the party aggrieved must "apply to the Commissioner to revise the order". The natural inference is that the party must apply to the Commissioner directly and not through some other authority oris true that Section 3(2) does not prescribe the manner and place of presentation of applications. But, unless there is some rule made to confer authority, upon the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate concerned or his office, to act as the agent of the Commissioner, or a clear and specific authorisation by the Commissioner is proved, we fail to see how filing a revision application before the Additional District Magistrate can be deemed to amount to making the application to thetherefore, think that the reasoning of the Division Bench in Pasrichas case (supra) is unacceptable. The alleged practice cannot be held to have been even established. And, in any event, such a practice was not enough to confer authority to receive petitions on behalf of the Commissioner. For that purpose, proof of at least specific authorisation by the Commissioner, after the introduction of the new provision, was required.The result is that we are unable to find any merit in the case of the appellant who has been able to hold up proceedings for his eviction long enough in respect of accommodation which, on the allegations made on behalf of the landlord (this term includes the "land-lady"), has been required to meet the landlords dire personal needs since at least 1969. We hope that the trial of the suit in such a case will not be delayed now.