Case: Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Salesco-Operative Society L Vs. Secretary (Food And Agriculture) Govt. Ofandhra Pradesh, Et

The appellant was registered by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Yelamanchili, on 26th September, 1975. The area of operation of the appellant was provided in its bye-laws was for the entire taluk with a view to grant arrack licences to it in respect of all the arrack shops within the said taluk. There w as, however, an infection of the cooperative movement and it appears that trials in the various villages in the taluk were. also encouraged by the Cooperative Department to form their own village cooperative societies and to ask for grant of licences of their village shops in favour of the respective village societies instead of granting all the licences of the taluk to a single society, such as the appellant. With this purpose of initiating them into the liquor trade, the village societies were registered on 4th October,thus registered the village co-operative societies (briefly the village societies), the Deputy Registrar of Co- operative Societies gave a notice to the appellant under section 16(5) ofthe Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, calling upon it to, amend its bylaws so as to restrict its area of operation only to the taluk head-quarters.The underlying idea behind such a notice was that the appellant should be given the licence in respect of shops situated in the taluk headquarters while licences in respect of shops Situated within the villages should be granted to the respective village societies which have since beenappellant filed a petition of revision before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies challenging the above notice. The petition was allowed by the Registrar by his order dated 10th December, 1975. In the said order the Registrar not only set aside the afore said notice of the Deputy Registrar but also directed the District Co-operation authorities to recommend the case of the appellant for grant of licences for all the shops situated within the taluk for the excise year 1975-76 ending 30th September, 1976. This direction, however, could not be implemented since by that time the village societies had already been granted licences in respect of shops situated in the respective villages. The appellants licence was confined to the area in taluk headquarters for the yearthe said recommendation staring in the face, the village societies apprehended trouble in the year 1976-77 and filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the Registrars order of 10th December, 1975. Indeed the licences for 1976-77 were granted to the appellant for the entire area as recommended by the Registrar. No stay orders could be obtained by the respondents and hence the licences, for 1976-77 continued with thevillage societies also, almost simultaneously approached the Government by way of revision under section 77 ofthe Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (briefly the Act) against the order of the Registrar of 10th December, 1975. On 6th October 1970, the Government suspended the operation of the order of the Registrar dated 10th December 1975 and further directed the Collector (Cooperation) Visakhapatnam to recommend the case of the village societies to the Excise Superintendent for the issue of licences for the excise year 1976-77. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against the aforesaid order of the Government dated 6th October 1976. The High Court issued Rule nisi, but declined to stay the impugned order. We are not concerned with this writ petition which was dismissed asthe very day, viz., 6th October, 1976, when the respondents filed their revision before the Government, the appellant filed an application to the Government disputing the claim of the village societies. The appellant also field before the Government a similar application on 28th October, 1976. On 5th November, 1976, the appellant prayed to the Government for an opportunity to file counter in the revision petition filed by the respondents. The Government, however, without any notice to the appellant, passed final orders on 4th December, 1976, allowing the two review petitions filed by the village societies and set aside the order of the Registrar dated 10th December,the aforesaid order the Government "requested" the Excise Superintendent, Visakhapatnam, to take action under section 32 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 196 8, for withdrawal of the licence already granted in favour of the appellant and to issue a fresh licence amending the area of operation restricting it only to Chintapalli village. The Excise Superintendent was also requested to issue thereafter fresh individual licences to all the village level societies in the Chintapalli taluk for arrack shops existing in their respective villages. It was, however. mentioned in that order that the appellant should have opportunity to represent its grievances, if any, before the Divisional Co- operative Officer, Yalamanchili, who issued the notice under section 16(5) of the Act. The appellant felt aggrieved by the, above order of the Government and filed two writ petitions Nos. 3947 and 3987 of 1976, in which the impugned order was passed by the High Court and with which alone we are concerned in these appeals.

Court's reasoning:
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act the Governor of the Andhra Pradesh has conferred, inter alia, powers under section 16 on the Deputy Registrars of Co-operative Societies incharge of Divisions. It was therefore competent for the Deputy Registrar to issue the notice under section 16(5) to theis, therefore, clear that the Deputy Registrar belongs to the category of "other persons" appointed under sub-section (1) of section 3. When, therefore, powers of the, Registrar are conferred upon him be has to act "under the general superintendence of the Registrar" as specifically mentioned in sub section (2) of section 3.Again, we may refer to section 76 of the Act which provides for appeals. Under section 76(2) any person or society aggrieved by any decision under section 6, refusal to register a society under section 7 or amendment of the bye- laws under section 16, etc. may appeal to the Government if the order is passed by the Registrar [section 76(2) (i)] and to the Registrar if the decision is of any other person [section 76 (2) (ii) ]. The Explanation in sub-section (2 ) of section 76 provides that the Registrar includes the Additional Registrar, the Joint Registrar, the District Collector and the Special Cadre Deputy Registrar working as Personal Assistant to the Collector, but not the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies incharge of the Divisions. Thus under the scheme of the Act, "any other person" appointed under section 3 (1) on whom Government confers powers under section 3 (2) is not equated with the Registrar. It is manifest that the Deputy Registrar is an officer subordinate to the Registrar for all purposes and has to act under the supervision of the Registrar. Any order passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies under section 16 is appealable to the Registrar under section 76(2)the present case it is true the power under section 16 is that of the Registrar but the Deputy Registrar exercises that power as empowered by the Government but always "under the general superintendence of the Registrar". Again, under section 76(2) any order passed in pursuance of the power so exercised under section 16 is appealable to the Registrar as an order passed by "any other officer" appointed under section 3(1). The scheme of the Consolidation Act which this Court had to deal with in Roop Chands case (supra) is different from that of the Co-operative Act. The submission of counsel that the Registrars order in revision is a nullity is devoid ofmentioned earlier in the judgment the Government did not give any notice communicating to the appellant about entertainment of the application in revision preferred by the respondents. Even though the appellant bad filed some representations, in respect of the matter, it would not absolve the Government from loving notice to the appellant to make the representation against the claim of the respondents. The minimal requirement under section 77(2) is a notice informing the opponent about the application and affording him an opportunity to make his representation against whatever has been alleged in his petition. It is true that a personal hearing is not obligatory but the minimal requirement of the principles of natural justice which are ingrained in section 77(2) is that the party whose rights are going to be affected and against whom some allegations are made and some prejudicial orders are claimed should have a written notice of the proceedings from the authority disclosing grounds of complaint or other objection prefer ably by furnishing a copy of the petition on which action is contemplated in order that a proper and effective representation may be made. This minimal requirement can no on account be dispensed with by relying upon the principle of absence of prejudice or imputation of certain knowledge to, the party against whom action is sought for.It is admitted that no notice whatever had been given by the Government to the appellant. There is, therefore, clear violation of section 77(2) which is a mandatory provision. We do not agree with the High Court that this provision can by-passed by resort to delving into correspondence between the appellant and the Government. Such non-compliance with a mandatory provision gives rise to unnecessary litigation which must be avoided at allimpugned order of the Government is invalid being in the teeth of section 77(2) of the Act and in violation of the principles of natural justice and the High Court should have quashed the same under Article 226 of the Constitution. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court as well as the order of the Government dated 4th December,we are allowing these appeals by setting aside the order of the Government, we express no opinion as to whether the Government in exercising revision power under section 77 of the Act was competent to issue directions to the Excise. Department in the matter of settlement of arrack"request&quot; of the Government to a subordinate authority is tantamount to a positive direction or order and it will be difficult for the subordinate authority to disregard thewe would have remanded the revision petition to be disposed of by the Government in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment but since the period of the arrack licences will expire on 30th September, 1977, no useful purpose would be served by a remand. It will however, be open to the Government to notify its policy with regard to the settlement of arrack shops in future in such appropriate manner as it may deem fit. This judgment will govern both thethe present case it is true the power under section 16 is that of the Registrar but the Deputy Registrar exercises that power as empowered by the Government but always "under the general superintendence of the Registrar". Again, under section 76(2) any order passed in pursuance of the power so exercised under section 16 is appealable to the Registrar as an order passed by "any other officer" appointed under section 3(1). The scheme of the Consolidation Act which this Court had to deal with in Roop Chands case (supra) is different from that of theAct. The submission of counsel that the Registrars order in revision is a nullity is devoid ofare, however, unable to accept this submission ast; of the Government to a subordinate authority is tantamount to a positive direction or order and it will be difficult for the subordinate authority to disregard the