Case: Sohan Lal Passi   Vs. P. Sesh Reddy and Ors.

2. An accident look place on 8th June 1980 at Panaji between a bus bearing No. DLP-5843 and scooter bearing No. GDC-9713, as a result whereof one Dr. P. Ramachandra Reddy who was driving the scooter fell down and succumbed to the injuries, the same day. A claim petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 claiming compensation. The appellant is the owner of the bus which had been insured by respondent No. 3, the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Insurance Company).3. According to the claimants, the respondent No. 4, Rajinder Pal Singh who was the cleaner/conductor of the bus was driving the bus at the relevant time when the accident took place resulting into the death of Dr. P. Ramachandra Reddy, on account of his rash and negligent driving. The claim for compensation was resisted by the appellant (owner of the vehicle) contending that when the accident took place the bus was driven by Gurbachan Singh who was employed by him as a driver and who had the licence to drive the bus in question and as such the respondent Insurance Company was liable to pay the compensation. The Insurance Company, however, took the defence that as the bus was being driven by respondent No. 4, Rajinder Pal Singh, cleaner/conductor of the bus who was not holding the driving licence and, therefore, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable to pay compensation because under the terms of the policy only person holding a driving licence could have driven the bus in question.4. The Tribunal on consideration of materials on record came to the conclusion that accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the bus by respondent No. 4 who did not have a driving licence. On that finding the Tribunal discharged the liability of the Insurance company and directed the owner and the driver i.e. appellant and respondent No. 4 to pay an amount of Rs. 66,000 along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum to the claimants as compensation. One appeal was filed on behalf of the Claimants for enhancement of the amount of the compensation, whereas the other appeal was filed on behalf of the appellant along with respondent No. 4 for setting aside the award of the Tribunal. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs. 66,000 to Rs. 1,57,500 and directed payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum to the claimants. In respect of the dispute regarding the liability to pay the compensation between the appellant, the owner of the bus, vis-a-vis the Insurance Company, the High Court came to the conclusion that the Insurance Company was not liable because the vehicle was being driven by a person at the time of the accident, who was not holding a driving licence. The High Court rejected the claim of the appellant holding that at the time of the accident the vehicle was being driven by Gurubachan Singh who was holding the driving licence.

Court's reasoning:
8. In the case of Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. [1977]3SCR372 , it was said:we would like to point out that the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term in course of the employment as ordinarily understood. We have referred to Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt where this Court accepted the law laid down by Lord Denning ind v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd.that the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is with the owners consent, driving the car on the owners business or for the owners purposes. This extension has been accepted by this Court. The law as laid down by Lord Denning in Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd. already referred to i.e. the first question is to see whether the servant is liable and if the answer is yes, the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the servants liability, has been uniformly accepted as stated in Salmonds Law of Torts, 15th Edn., p.606, in Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 and approved by the House of Lords iny Iron and Chemical Co. Ltd. v.Jones and ICI Ltd. v.Same is the position in the present case. The appellant had authorised Gurubachan Singh to drive the vehicle, but Gurubachan Singh allowed Rajinder Pal Singh, the cleaner/conductor who was also the employee of the appellant to drive the vehicle because of which the accident took place. It is not the stand of the appellant that Rajinder Pal Singh was driving the vehicle without the knowledge or consent of Gurubachan Singh, for his personal pursuit. He was driving the bus for the business of the appellant, that is to carry on the passengers. In this background, the appellant cannot escape the liability so far the third parties are concerned on the ground that he had not actually authorised the particular manner in which the act was done. As it has been established that the negligent act of Gurubachan Singh and respondent Rajinder Pal Singh was in the course of employment the appellant shall be liable for the same. In the present case, the accident took place when the act authorised was being performed in a mode which may not be proper but nonetheless it was directly connected within the course of employment. It was not an independent act for a purpose which had no nexus or connection with the business of the appellant so as to absolve the appellant from the liability.10. Some of the aforesaid significant amendments introduced in the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 have been referred to above only to indicate that even parliament is conscious that right to claim compensation by the claimants in connection with the motor vehicles accidents should not be defeated on technical grounds.In the present case the accident took place when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force. Section 96 of that act prescribed the duty of the insurers to satisfy the judgment against persons insured in respect of third party risks (the parallel provision being Section 149 in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988).In view of Sub-section (1) of Section 96 if after the certificate of insurance has been issued in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy, the insurer shall subject to the provisions of the said section pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he was the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability. (emphasis supplied). Sub-section (2) of Section 96 enjoins that notice of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, has to be given to the insurer and such insurer shall be entitled to defend the action on any of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 96. We are concerned in the present case only with Section 96(2)(b)(ii), a condition excluding driving by any person who is not duly licensed.According to us, Section 96(2)(b)(ii) should not be interpreted in a technical manner. Sub-section (2) of Section 96 only enables the insurance company to defend itself in respect of the liability to pay compensation on any of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (2) including that there has been a contravention of the condition excluding the vehicle being driven by any person is not duly licensed. This bar on face of it operates on the person insured. If the person who has got the vehicle insured has allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person who is not duly licensed then only that clause shall be attracted. In a case where the person who has got insured the vehicle with the insurance company, has appointed a duly licensed driver and if the accident takes place when the vehicle is being driven by a person not duly licensed on the basis of the authority of the driver duly authorised to drive the vehicle whether the insurance company in that event shall be absolved from its liability? The expression breach occurring in Section 96(2)(b) means infringement or violation of a promise or obligation. As such the insurance company will have to establish that the insured was guilty of an infringement or violation of a promise. The insurer has also to satisfy the Tribunal or the Court that such violation or infringement on the part of the insured was wilful. If the insured has taken all precautions by appointing a duly licensed driver to drive the vehicle in question and it has not been established that it was the insured who allowed the vehicle to be driven by a person not duly licensed, then the insurance company cannot repudiate its statutory liability under Sub-section (1) of Section 96.In the present case far from establishing that it was the appellant who had allowed Rajinder Pal Singh to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, there is not even any allegation that it was the appellant who was guilty of violating the condition that the vehicle shall not be driven by a person not duly licensed. From the facts of the case, it appears that the appellant had done everything within his power inasmuch as he has engaged a licensed driver Gurubachan Singh and had placed the vehicle in his charge. While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunal and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment-debtor in respect of the liability in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. It need not be pointed out that the whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in normal course they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of the Accident Claims Tribunal for realisation of such amount by sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. The procedure and result of the execution of the decree is well known.12. This Court in the case of Kashiram Yadav and Anr. v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. and Ors. [1989]3SCR811 reiterated the views expressed in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, (supra). While referring to that case it was said:There the facts found were quite different, the vehicle concerned in that case was undisputedly entrusted to the driver who had a valid licence. In transit the driver stopped the vehicle and went to fetch some snacks from the opposite shop leaving the engine on. The ignition key was at the ignition lock and not in the cabin of the truck. The driver had asked the cleaner to take care of the truck. In fact the driver had left the truck in care of the cleaner. The cleaner meddled with the vehicle and caused the accident. The question arose whether the insured (owner) had committed a breach of the condition incorporated in the certificate of insurance since the cleaner operated the vehicle on the fatal occasion without driving licence. This Court expressed the view that it is only when the insured himself entrusted the vehicle to a person who does not hold a driving licence, he could be said to have committed breach of the condition of the policy. It must be established by the Insurance Company that the breach is on the part of the insured. Unless the insured is at fault and is guilty of a breach of the condition, the insurer cannot escape from the obligation to indemnify the insured. It was also observed that when the insured has done everything within his power inasmuch as he has engaged the licensed driver and has placed the vehicle in his charge with the express or implied mandate to drive himself, it cannot be said that the insured is guilty of any breach.We affirm and reiterate the statement of law laid down in the above case. We may also state that without the knowledge of the insured, if by drivers acts or omission others meddle with the vehicle and cause an accident, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured. The insurer in such a case cannot take the defence of a breach of the condition in the certificate of insurance.We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the case of Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, (supra).13. As in the facts of the present case, the appellant shall be deemed to be liable to pay compensation applying the principle of vicarious liability because the accident took place when the act authorised was being performed in a mode which may not be proper but was directly connected with in the course of employment, Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act shall come into play and the insurance company shall be deemed to be the judgment-debtor, so far the claim made by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased is concerned.