Case: Chariman &amp; M.D.,Bharat Pet.Corpn.Ltd&amp;Ors Vs. T.K. Raju

The Respondent was a Senior Sales Officer (LPG) in the Sales Department at Bombay Office of the Appellants. The Chief Divisional Manager of the Cochin Divisional Office under whom the Respondent had been working received complaints from All India LPG Distributors Federation (Kerala Circle) alleging financial irregularities on the part of the Respondent. Allegedly, the Respondent collected diverse amounts from the distributors purported to be by way of Short Term Hand Loans. The same had not been repaid to some of them. On or about 27.7.1992, a charge memo was served upon the Respondent alleging:That in November 1991 you had taken the loan of Rs.5000/- from M/s. Rose Flames, Cochin and the said amount was repaid by you only after a period of five months i.e. only after show cause notice Ref. C. PERS. STF dated December 10, 1991 was served on you by CDM, Cochin Divisional Office. At that time you had also taken one DPR (Differential Pressure Regulator) from the aforesaid Distributor which has not been returned or replaced by you. You had taken a loan of Rs. 1,000/- from Jyothi Gas, Tripunithura and the said amount was returned only after a period of about 2 weeks. You had also taken a DPR (Differential Pressure Regulator) from this Distributor which was returned only in February 1992 after a period of more than an year. You had taken a loan of Rs. 10,000 in July 1991 from M/s. Krishna Gas, Ernakulam which amount has not been returned by you. Furthermore, you have also solicited further loan from this distributor. You had also taken a loan of Rs. 1,000/-from M/s. Cherukara Gas Agencies, Alleppey during July 1991 which was returned by you after a period of 30 days. You had demanded a loan of Rs. 10,000/-from M/s. Seena Gas who had subsequently given you Rs. 5,000/- on September 7, 1991 which has not been returned by you till date. You had taken a loan of Rs. 10,000/- from M/s. Maria Flames for finalising a house site which has not been returned till now. On assuming charge as LPG Sales Officer in the month of April 1991, you had demanded Rs. 5000/- again from this distributor. When the distributor explained his difficulties you had demanded at least Rs. 2000/- which was not paid by the distributor. On 6.11.91 on your visit to the distributor for an inspection, you demanded an LPG stove which was given to you on credit which amount has also not been settled by you. You had taken articles and availed services worth Rs. 2487/- from our dealer M/s. K.P. Varghese & Sons on credit. This amount has also not been settled by you so far. You had taken supplies of petrol on credit from M/s. K.K. Abraham, Ernakulam during the period April 1990 and a sum of Rs. 2329.90 due for the supplies has not yet been paid2. A disciplinary proceedings was initiated against the Respondent. He was found guilty therein. The said charges were levelled against him purported to be in terms of Rules 4 and 22 of Part II read with Clauses 4, 6, 20, 22, 31 and 37 of Rule A in Part III of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules for the Management Staff (for short the Rules)3. The Management in the said departmental enquiry examined Mr. Jayaraman, Secretary of the Federation. Other distributors being eight in number were also examined. The said witnesses were also cross-examined by the Respondent. An enquiry report was submitted before the disciplinary authority and the latter by an order dated 5.12.1994 imposed a punishment of dismissal of services upon the Respondent. He performed a statutory appeal there against before the Chairman and the Managing Director of the Appellant-Corporation who was the designated appellate authority. The said appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority by an order dated 6.6.1995 stating:Having come to the conclusion that charges were duly proved and established against Sri Raju, as above, I feel I have considered the question of punishment. I feel that any one of eight charges, if proved, against Sri Raju, would warrant the punishment of dismissal from service, considering the position held by him as well as the nature of the misconduct involved. I have already mentioned about the admissions relating to charges 7 and 8. Taking all this into account, I feel that in the interests of the Corporation, it is not proper to retain a person like Sri Raju who is guilty of such misconducts proved against him in the service of the Corporation4. In the above circumstances, I conclude that the various submissions, averments made by Sri T.K. Raju in his Appeal dated 9.3.1995 do not provide any ground meriting review of the order passed by the Director (Marketing)5. Considering the grave nature of acts of misconducts proved against Sri T.K. Raju, I hold that the order of dismissal of Sri T.K. Raju from Corporations services, passed by the Director (Marketing) on 5.12.94 is proper, just and equitable, and I do not, therefore, wish to interfere with the said Order6. A writ petition, questioning the legality and validity of the said orders was filed by the Respondent in the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam which was marked as Original Petition No. 15479 of 1995. Although the learned Single Judge held that the principles of natural justice had been complied with and there was no violation of the Rules, he was of the opinion that quantum of punishment is disproportionate to the charges of misconduct levelled against him and as such remitted the matter back to the appellate authority for imposing appropriate punishment. The Appellants as also the Respondent preferred appeals there against. By a common judgment dated 21st December, 2001, the Division Bench disposed of both the appeals. The Division Bench relying on or on the basis of decisions of this Court in M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (L) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others [AIR 1984 SC 1361 ], A.L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. [AIR 1984 SC 1361 ], Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville [405 US 156] and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569] , opined:8. We find that those charges include the violation of Clause 4 Part II apart from other charges and the punishment order also relies on the said clause to impose the penalty of dismissal from service. It is a fairly settled principle of law that when a penal provision is vague, it denies the equal protection of laws guaranteed under Article 14. In the light of the above legal principles, the reliance placed on Clause 4 of Part II of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules for the Management Staff, the impugned order is vitiated. 9. When a disciplinary authority takes a decision regarding the guilt of a delinquent employee, it is taking the decision objectively on the basis of the materials before it. So even if irrelevant considerations have also been looked into for forming the conclusion of guilt, the Court judicially reviewing the action can consider whether the remaining ground would have been sufficient for entering the finding of guilt. So, even if the irrelevant considerations are excluded, still according to us, the finding of guilt of the writ petitioner will remain7. Having said so, it agreed with the opinion of the learned Single Judge and directed:11. Now it is for the appellate authority to take a decision as to what must be the penalty which should be imposed on the delinquent employee. The learned single Judge has suggested a penalty that may be appropriate on the facts of the case. Going through the judgment, we feel that the learned Judge only wanted the imposition of a penalty commensurate with the misconduct proved other than a penalty resulting in loss of job to him. We feel that the exercise of discretion made by the learned single Judge that the penalty should be something other than dismissal or removal from service cannot be said to be perverse warranting interference at our hands. We notice that the writ petitioner is a member of the scheduled caste. There is no allegation that he has taken the loans etc. for giving undue pecuniary advantage to the dealers concerned. Nor is there any allegation that they have gained any advantage by succumbing to the demands made by the writ petitioner. Therefore, we affirm the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge subject to the modifications and clarifications mentioned, above. Therefore, we remit the matter for fresh decision by the appellate authority in the light of the observations contained hereinabove. The authority will be free to take any decision regarding penalty to be imposed on the writ petitioner except the penalty of dismissal or removal from service. The said authority shall take a decision within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

Court's reasoning:
19. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court in our opinion committed a manifest error in relying upon Kalra (supra) and Glaxo (supra), as we have noticed hereinbefore, that the Respondent was not charged in terms of the Rules alone. He was charged for violation of several other clauses of the Rules. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in coming to the conclusion that as some of the charges were vague and indefinite, thus, no punishment could have been imposed on the basis thereof20. We also do not agree with the submission of Mr. Krishnamani that two of the eight charges have not been found to be proved. The charges levelled against the Respondent must be considered on a holistic basis. By reason of such an action, the Respondent had put the company in embarrassment. It might have lost its image. It received complaints from the Federation. There was reason for the Appellant to believe that by such an action on the part of the Respondent the Appellants image has been tarnished. In any event, neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench came to any finding that none of the charges had been proved21. The power of judicial review in such matters is limited. This Court times without number had laid down that interference with the quantum of punishment should not be done in a routine manner. [See V. Ramana v. A.P.SRTC and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 338 , and State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohammed Ayub Naz, 2006 (1) SCALE 79 ]22. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the quantum of punishment was wholly disproportionate to the charges levelled against the Respondent.