Case: Maulavi Abdur Rub Firoze Ahmed &amp; Co Vs. Jay Krishna Arora

The plaintiff respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from the first and second floors of the building No. 86, Purshottam Rai Street, Calcutta on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and that he had no other house in or around Calcutta where he could reside. The suit was instituted on the original side of the Calcutta High Court. It was contested by the appellant on several grounds. The learned Trial Judge decreed the suit. The appellants appeal was dismissed by a Bench of the High Court. It has come to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness from the High Court.

Court's reasoning:
The inclusion of the word proceeding in section 20 by the Amending Act of 1957, will not make any difference for the purpose of determination of the point at issue in this case. The schedule, however, does not seem to be happily worded. Yet it is not difficult to spell out the intention of thethe instant case the rental was about Rs. 110/- per month. On that basis the value of the suit ought to have been Rs. 1320/- only. That being so the suit, according to the contention of the appellant, was entertainable only by the City Civil Court and not by the High Court The argument so presented does not, however, stand scrutiny. Within the local limits of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court the legislature thought to provide that if the value of the suit exceeded Rs. 10, 000/- it was only entertainable by the High Court at Calcutta. If the value was below Rs. 10, 000/- the City Civil Court only will have the jurisdiction. But apart from the value of the suit if the value of the suit premises of which the recovery of possession is claimed exceeds Rs. 10, 000/- then the City Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try a suit. Only the High Court can entertain such a suit. The intention of the legislature seems to be that if the value of the premises exceeds Rs. 10, 000/- then irrespective of the value of the suit, the suit can be entertained only by the High Court and not by the City Civilthat apart, we may also rest our judgment on a simple basis. Assuming the plaintiff could have valued his suit at Rs. 1320/- but he chose to value it in accordance with the value of the suit premises, there was nothing in law to compel him to put the lower valuation and not the higher. The value of the suit premises mentioned in the plaint cannot be said to be contrary to law and the plaintiff is not obliged to put the 12 months rental value. In the instant case the plaintiff asserted in his plaint that the value of the suit premises exceeded Rs. 10, 000/-. The defendant asserted in its written statement that the suit was "under valued"; it ought to have been valued at the amount of one years rent. Perhaps the use of the word "under-valued" is a mistake for the word "over-valued". The statement in the plaint being squarely in accordance with the law and not contrary to it, the High Court was the proper forum for the institution and trial of the suit. The plaint could not be instituted in the City Civillaw does not require that the landlord must need the premises for his own occupation only for the purpose to which they were being put by the tenant. It may well be that a tenant cannot put the demised premises to any other use. But there is no bar in la w in the way of the landlord requiring the business premises for his residential occupation and vice versa, provided the premises are capable of being put to different uses, as they seem to be in thisapropos the last point urged on behalf of the appellant we find no error in the decision of the High Court. In view of the provision of law contained in sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act, the High Court has come to the conclusion that it was not a case where the eviction of the tenant could be ordered only from the part of the premises. Having appreciated the facts as they were placed before us by learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. G Mukhoty, learned counsel for the respondent, we agree with the conclusion of the High Court in this regard also.