Case: Rajammal And Anr Vs. Mookan @ Peria Perumal Theval &amp; Ors

The material facts of the case are that the suit land belonged to one Venkataramabhadra Naidu, a Zamindar (hereinafter Naidu), who donated it to Bhoodan Yagna on August 18, 1953 by executing documents, Exs. B-1 and B-2, which were unregistered deeds. Later in 1958, in Madras Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1958 (hereinafter The Bhoodan Act) came into force. The Madras Bhoodan Yagna Board constituted under section 3 of the Bhoodan Act and functioning under the Act allotted the suit land to the defendants who claimed to have been in possession of the land since before the donation. On August 3, 1960, Naidu sold the suit land to the plaintiff b y a registered sale- deed for a sum of Rs. 2000. The plaintiffs alleged that they were in possession of the suit land but as the defendants were interfering in their possession, they filed the suit for declaration of their title to, and possession of, the suit land.The plaintiffs case was that as the donation of the land by Naidu was not by any registered deed, no title passed to the Bhoodan Board and subsequently to its allottees, namely, the defendants and that Naidu validly transferred tit le to them.2. The defendants case, inter alia, was that the land vested in the Bhoodan Board under the provisions of the Bhoodan Act, and Naidu had no saleable interest thereto which he could transfer to the plaintiffs by the sale deed.3. The Trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit. The decree was upheld by the First Appellate Court on appeal by the defendants. Both the courts held that the donation of the suit and by Naidu was not in conformity with Section 17 of the Registration Act and Section 12 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such title to the suit land did not pass from Naidu to the Bhoodan Board. The defendants preferred a second appeal before the High Court. The High Court reversed the decree of the courts below and dismissed the plaintiffs suit.4. It has to be mentioned that the First Appellate Court passed its decree on October 1, 1962 while the High Court passed its impugned decree on 31st December, 1969; while in the meantime, in 1964, the Madras Bhoodan Yagna Act of 1958 was amended by the Madras Bhoodan Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1964 (hereinafter the Bhoodan (Amendment) Act).

Court's reasoning:
Section 23 made the order of Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar under sub-section (4) of Section 17, final and not subject to appeal or revision. An aggrieved party however was not without remedy. Under the proviso of section 23, any person whose interest was affected as a result of the donation to the Bhoodan Yagna, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, might file a suit to set aside the order of the Tahsildar or the Deputy Tahsildar. The plaintiffs in the present suit (appellants before us) filed no such suit.11.It is thus seen that the law both under the old and the new Acts so far as the operation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act is concerned, is the same. The law ingrained in section 11 is merely declaratory in express terms of the already existing law under the Bhoodan Act of 1958.The second appeal that was pending before the High Court fell within the mischief of clause (b) of section 11. Even if there had been no appeal by the defendants, the execution of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court could have been successfully objected to by the defendant or any other person as void on the ground that the suit itself was barred under section 23 of the old Acttwo are deeming provisions and are a complete answer to the appellants contention. The meaning of the proviso is that although the Bhoodan Act was not in existence at the time a donation was made its acceptance by the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar later on after the commencement of the Act, (as in the case in hand), by virtue of the deeming provision, the Act shall be deemed to be in existence on the date of the donation.(4) had made a similar deeming provision for the grant made in favour of a grantee before the coming into force of the Bhoodan Act.It is thus seen that the law both under the old and the new Acts so far as the operation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act is concerned, is the same. The law ingrained in section 11 is merely declaratory in express terms of the already existing law under the Bhoodan Act of 1958.e second appeal that was pending before the High Court fell within the mischief of clause (b) of section 11. Even if there had been no appeal by the defendants, the execution of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court could have been successfully objected to by the defendant or any other person as void on the ground that the suit itself was barred under section 23 of the old Act