Case: State of West Bengal &amp; Others Vs. Bata Krishna Burman

2. The respondent was appointed in June 1945 as aunder the Director General (Transportation and Storage) of the Civil Supplies Department of West Bengal Government. In December 1951, he was attached to the movement section under the Directorate of Transportation in the Department of Food. He was placed under suspension by an order dated December 21, 1951. That order provided that he would be paid 25 per cent of his basic pay during the period of suspension. On January 19/21, 1952 he was served with acontaining four charges (1) that he published a certain pamphlet without obtaining the previous sanction required by Rule 20 of the said Rules, (2) that the said pamphlet contained criticism of the Government capable of embarrassing the relations between the Government and the public, thus violating Rule 20 (1) (a), (3) that the pamphlet showed that he was taking active part in politics in breach of R. 23 and (4) that the said publication constituted propaganda in connection with general elections and therefore, was in breach of Rule 23 and the standing orders of the Government in that regard. The rules on which the charges were thus founded were Rules 20 (1) (a) and (2), and Rule 23 (1) (i) of the said Rules. Though the charges mentioned standing orders of the Government, it was conceded in the High Court that there were no such standing orders.3. The explanation of the respondent was that he had neither printed nor published the said pamphlet, that a pamphlet of the kind mentioned in thewas printed by one M. K Mukhopadhyaya and that his name (the respondents) was printed therein as its publisher without his knowledge or consent. As regards the rest of the charges, he denied them all. Since they flowed from the first charge, and that charge depended upon his having published the said pamphlet, those charges, according to him, were not sustainable in view of his not having been responsible for its publication.4. After a departmental enquiry, the Directorate of Transportation passed an order dated June 7, 1952 allowing the respondent to resume duty with effect from the date when the order would be served upon him The order, however, providedhis period of suspension at the rate admissible under the rules, as disciplinary measure.The period of his suspension will be treated as on dutywith this order, and as was conceded in the High Court, as part of it, a warning also was administered to the respondent drawing his attention to Rule 23 and directing him not to take part in any political activities in future.

Court's reasoning:
5. It may be noticed that the order did not contain any finding on the four charges served on the respondent or any one of them It did not also state that the respondent had published the said pamphlet or that in consequence of his having published it, he was responsible for embarrassing the Government in its relations with the public or any section thereof, or that the publication by him constituted his participating actively in politics, or that because of such alleged publication by him he was guilty of carrying on propaganda in connection with any general elections or that he was, therefore, guilty of breach of Rules 20 and 23 of the said rules.6. As appearing from thefiled by the Director (Transportation), no such finding was possible as none of the said charges was brought home to the respondent. Indeed, the Director, in the said affidavit, could only say that the documentary and oral evidence adduced in the said enquiry showed; (a) that the petitioner was the secretary of the Arya Samaj at whose instance the said pamphlet had been printed and the respondents name was printed as its publisher, (b) that it was admitted by the respondent that the books and pamphlets of the Arya Samaj were printed at the Satyanarain Press and (c) that the respondent had actively been participating in politics. He conceded that the only conclusion he could come to was that the petitioner (i.e., the respondent) was politically connected although it vas difficult to establish the same from the available records and as a disciplinary measure the petitioner was granted a subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension and warned not to take part in any political activities."It is clear from this concession that it was not possible for the Director to hold, on the available data before him, the respondent guilty of any of the four charges preferred against him. A fortiori he could not be held guilty of having violated Rule 20 or Rule 23 That being so, it is impossible to understand how the order of suspension, the payment to the respondent of only 25 per cent of his basic pay and the warning ad ministered to him, all as disciplinary measures, i.e., as penalties, could possibly beis true, as thestated that the respondent was the secretary of the Arya Samaj at whose instance the said pamphlet had been printed and the respondents name was published therein as its publisher. But the respondents case all throughout was that his name was mentioned in the said pamphlet as its publisher without his knowledge or consent. There was no finding that the respondents case was untrue. In the absence of such a finding and holding the respondent responsible for the publication of the said pamphlet, the charge of violating Rule 20 against him was clearly unsustainable. Further, there was no finding that the said pamphlet contained any statement of fact or opinion which was capable of embarrassing the relations between the Government and the people of India or any section thereof, or the relations between the Government on the one hand and any foreign country or the ruler of any State in India as required by Rule 20 (1).9. The position in regard to Rule 23 was even less sustainable. None of the four charges preferred against him alleged that he had taken part in or subscribed in aid of or assisted in any way any political movement in India or relating to Indian affairs. There was no finding, nor was there any allegation in the Directors saidthat the Arya Samaj, of which the respondent was the secretary, was a political movement in which the respondent had taken part or had rendered any assistance. There being no such charge or finding, the respondent obviously could not be held guilty of any breach of Rule 23. As already stated, the only conclusion arrived at by the Director, if it could at all be characterised as a conclusion. was that the respondent was "politically connected". Such a statement was not a conclusion because the Director did not specify with what movement or party or organisation the respondent was politically connected. The only connection referred to was with the Arya Samaj which was not found or named by the Director as a political movement or a political organisation. The statement, therefore, was not only vague but was a mere speculation on the part of the Director, since it was not based on any evidence andas the Director himself confessed in his"it was difficult to establish the same from the available records". Such a finding was therefore, no finding based on any evidence, and could not be depended upon and made the basis for any disciplinary penalty.10.There was, therefore, no question of either R. 20 or R. 23 being enforced against the respondent. The order imposing the penalty of3/4th of the basic pay and directing to pay to the respondent only 1/4th thereof and the warning issued to him both as and by way of penalties was without any basis and was therefore bad. The Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, therefore, was right in allowing the respondents writ petition and setting aside the order even on the assumption that said two rules were valid.11. The aforesaid conclusion of the Letters Patent Bench really concluded the matter and the respondents writ petition had to be allowed. But the learned Single Judge, as also the learned Judges forming the Letters Patent Bench, went into the question of the validity of the said rules. That, in our view, was not necessary for the purposes of the case. It is true that the learned Single Judge went into the question of the validity of the said rules as it was contended before him that the said rules placed unreasonable restrictions on the respondents freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a) and (b), and were not saved by cl. (2) of that article.We are of the opinion that In view of the clear statements made by the Director in histhe respondent could not be held responsible for the publication of the said pamphlet. As aforesaid, there was not and could not be such a finding, and therefore, R. 20 could not be invoked against him. Similarly, since even according to the Director, the respondent was connected only with the Arya Samaj, in the absence of any finding that the Arya Samaj was either a political movement or a political organisation, R. 23 also could not be invoked against him. That being the position, the impugned order passed, as a disciplinary measure against him was not sustainable under either of the said two rules and had, therefore, to be quashed. In this view the Letters Patent Bench could have concluded the appeal before it without going into the question as to the validity of the said two rules.13. It is true that the learned Single Judge had cast doubt on the correctness of the decision of Sinha, J. on R. 20 of the said Rules in the case of Krishna C. Chatterjee, AIR 1955 Cal 76  . But he had not based his decision in the present case on any finding that the respondent had published the said pamphlet and was therefore guilty of breach of R. 20. Consequently, R. 20 could not be applied by him against the respondent in the absence of any finding by the Director that the respondent had published the said pamphlet. It was, therefore, not necessary for the Letters Patent Bench to go into the question of the validity of R. 20. Regarding R. 23, that rule was not the subject matter in the case of Krishna C. Chatterjee, AIR 1955 Cal 76  . For the reasons already set out above, R. 23 also could not be pressed into service against the respondent. The learned Single Judge, no doubt, upheld the impugned order but that was on an assumption by him that the respondent was guilty of misconduct, i.e., misconduct of being politically connected. But that assumption was unjustified as there was no such charge against the respondent nor was any finding that he was connected or associated with any political organisation or party. On this ground alone the judgment of the learned Single Judge was liable to be reversed. Thus it was not necessary for the Letters Patent Bench to decide the question of validity of either R. 20 or R. 23 and that question was only academic.14. In these circumstances, we ourselves do not feel called upon to go into the question of the validity of the said two rules on which, we feel, much can be said by both the sides It may be that the view taken by the Letters Patent Bench will bind the State Government whenever it seeks to take action against any one of its servants in future. But the correctness of the view taken by the Bench in this case can be challenged in future by the Government, if it considers it necessary, in a more suitable case. So far as the present case is concerned, the controversy is altogether academic as on merits neither of the two rules could be invoked against the respondent.