Case: Mrs. Helen C. Rebello &amp; Ors Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corpn. &amp; Anr

3. The husband of appellant No. 1, father of appellants Nos. 2 to 6 was travelling in the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus from Rathare Badruk to Pune on 12th April, 1973 at about 4.00 P.M. when this bus passed the village Umbraj and came near village Kotri near milestone No. 89/4, Karnataka State Transport bus was seen coming from the opposite direction, i.e., from Satara side towards Kolhapur. The drivers of the two buses were not able to control their buses resulting into collision between the two, seriously injuring the deceased claimant Rebello and Mr. Vincy John Pereira, in which Mr. Rebello received multiple fractures and died on the spot. The appellants filed a Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 1975 against the aforesaid two State Road Transport Corporations. It was averred in the plaint that the deceased was aged about 40 years and was the sole bread winner of the family. He was a well known boat builder and businessman of the Bassein. He was doing business in partnership under the name and style of Marine Engineering Works. He was a person of great skill and hard worker. He was a person of robust health and sober habits. His income from the business and other activities was about Rs. 40,000/- per annum. He was assessed for an income of about Rs. 43,000/- by the Income Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 1971-72. Being the sole bread winner, he used to provide the family with the support of Rs. 25,000/- per year. The claim made by the appellants for damages/compensation under the various admissible heads of damages was for Rs. 4 lacs. The claim of the appellants was allowed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara, holding that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of respondent No. 2, namely, Karnataka Road Transport Corporation. It was also held that the deceased had supported his family with an amount of Rs. 25,000/- per annum. It was found that as the deceased was of 40 years old at the time of his death and his father had lived upto the age 85 years, the normal longevity of his life would have been 25 years from the date of death, but since the claimants had claimed a compensation only taking a period of 20 years, the trial Court held that the appellants were entitled to a compensation of Rs. 3,80,000/- by way of pecuniary loss and Rs. 10,000/- on account of pain and suffering, in total Rs. 3,90,000/-. However, in view of the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Jaikumar Chhaganlal Patni and others v. Mary Jerome DSouza and others, AIR 1978 Bombay 239, the Trial Court deducted the amount of life insurance received by the appellants to the tune of Rs. 3,15,067.95 from the aforesaid compensation calculated and held that only the balance amount of Rs. 74,935.05 with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum is payable by the respondent No. 2 to the claimants.4. Through the witness Shashikant Dattatraya Kale, Exhibit 67, who was serving in LIC at Bombay, it was elicited that the deceased clement had insured his life under said policy. The claimants were entitled to get an amount of Rs. 4,40,193.65, out of which an amount of Rs. 1, 52,125.70 was deducted by way of estate duty and the remaining amount of Rs. 3,15,067.95 was paid to the aforesaid heirs. It is this amount, as aforesaid, which was deducted in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court referred to above. On appeal, preferred both by the appellants and also the respondents, the High Court rejected the cross appeal of respondent No. 2, namely, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. However, the appeal (No. 209/81) of the appellants was dismissed as it could not be pressed in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court, as aforesaid. It is against this judgment, this appeal has been preferred by the appellants.

Court's reasoning:
16. It is true that the aforesaid two English decisions were cases of injuries, but the principle as spelt out is equally applicable in cases of death. The English Court held that any money coming under the contract of insurance, it would be unjust and unreasonable to hold that the money which he prudently spent on premiums, the benefit from it should ensure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. To this, we fully endorse. Under the life insurance, in case one lives upto the time of maturity, after paying full premium he receives the assured money back, based on the terms of the contract. In fact, he receives less than the total premium paid. It is for this gain to the insurer it is obliged to pay to the extent the sum assured, to the claimant in case of injury or death under the contract. In other words, payable only on the contingency as referred, if the contingency of injury or death does not happen, the insurer is the gainer as it receives more under premium than to pay on maturity of the policy, and in case contingency occurs the claimant, the gainer as he receives the amount even before paying the full premiums and the gain is to the proportion of the balance unpaid premium, whether it is injury or death. A large number of persons, under the policy may live upto the maturity of policy by paying full premium and the contingency of injury or death may not happen. On each of such matured policies, Life Insurance Corporation has their gain in mind enters into its business, to offer to the policy holders in term, in case of happening of the said contingency to pay the full amount assured, if it takes place earlier, without paying the full premium. It is this game of gain or loss the Life Insurance Corporation enters into the contract.Many invest through this policy for variety of reasons, may be, to secure the same for himself as forced saving, may be, as in India, for deduction towards his income-tax liability, to secure loan by himself in case needed on a meagre interest for building his residence or to secure sum in case of happening of the said contingencies etc. He enters into this contract with an open eye, as an act of wisdom, of course, not towards the gain to the tortfeasor. The English Court expressing concern on this aspect in the aforesaid decision recorded : "why should the plaintiff be left worse off than if he had never insured". Thus, the interpretation of deduction of life insurance would result into the gain to the wrong-doer in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid by the insured for no contribution of his and loss to the claimant in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid, as he would have received the compensation amount without payment of any premium.y invest through this policy for variety of reasons, may be, to secure the same for himself as forced saving, may be, as in India, for deduction towards his income-tax liability, to secure loan by himself in case needed on a meagre interest for building his residence or to secure sum in case of happening of the said contingencies etc. He enters into this contract with an open eye, as an act of wisdom, of course, not towards the gain to the tortfeasor. The English Court expressing concern on this aspect in the aforesaid decision recorded : "why should the plaintiff be left worse off than if he had never insured". Thus, the interpretation of deduction of life insurance would result into the gain to the wrong-doer in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid by the insured for no contribution of his and loss to the claimant in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid, as he would have received the compensation amount without payment of any premium.y invest through this policy for variety of reasons, may be, to secure the same for himself as forced saving, may be, as in India, for deduction towards his income-tax liability, to secure loan by himself in case needed on a meagre interest for building his residence or to secure sum in case of happening of the said contingencies etc. He enters into this contract with an open eye, as an act of wisdom, of course, not towards the gain to the tortfeasor. The English Court expressing concern on this aspect in the aforesaid decision recorded : "why should the plaintiff be left worse off than if he had never insured". Thus, the interpretation of deduction of life insurance would result into the gain to the wrong-doer in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid by the insured for no contribution of his and loss to the claimant in proportion to the higher scale of premium paid, as he would have received the compensation amount without payment of any premium.Fleming has also expressed that the deduction or set off of the life insurance could not be justifiable. When he uses the words not be justifiable he refers to ones conscience, fairness and contrary to what is just. In this context, the use of the word just, which was neither in the English 1846 Act nor in the Indian 1855 Act, now brought in under 1939 Act, gains importance. This shows that the word just was deliberately brought in Sections 110-B of the 1939 Act to enlarge the consideration in computing the compensation which, of course, would include the question of deductibility, if any. This leads us to an irresistible conclusion that principle of computation of the compensation both under the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and underthe Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 by the earlier decision, were restrictive in nature in the absence of any guiding words therein, hence the courts applied the general principle at the common law of loss and gain but that would not apply to the considerations under Section 110-B of 1939 Act which enlarges the discretion to deliver better justice to the claimant, in computing the compensation, to see what is just. Thus, we find that all the decisions of the High Courts, which based its interpretation on the principles of these two Acts, viz., English 1846 Act and Indian 1855 Act to hold deductions, were valid cannot be upheld. As we have observed above, the decisions even with reference to the decision of this Court in Gobald Motor Service (supra), where the question was neither raised nor adjudicated and that case also, being under the 1855 Act, cannot be pressed into service. Thus, these Courts by giving restrictive interpretation in computation of compensation based on the limitation of the language of the Fatal Accidents Act, fell into an error, as it did not take into account the change of language in the 1939 Act and did not consider the widening of the discretion of the Tribunal under Section 110-B. The word just, as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having large peripheral field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed as unfair, unreasonable, unequilable, not just. Thus, this field of wider discretion of the Tribunal has to be within the said limitations and the limitations under any provision of this Act or any other provision having force of law.Thus, we have no hesitation in concluding that the Tribunal, while computing the compensation under Section 110-B of the 1939 Act, has a wider discretion, that what it had under the 1855 Act. Various provisions of this Act indicate legislatures intent conferring visible benefit to the claimant by securing compensation through casting obligation on the tortfeasor and the insurer. Section 94 makes it obligatory to insure a vehicle against third party risk before putting on the road. Statutory obligations and the limit of the insurer is provided under Section 95. Under Section 95-AA in addition to the deposits under Sec. 7 ofthe Insurance Act, 1938, the insurer has to deposit with the Reserve Bank of India or State Bank of India a security of thirty thousand for discharging any liability covered by the insurance policy. Then, Section 96 casts obligation on the insurers to satisfy judgments in respect of third party risks. No settlement between insurer and insured in respect of any claim to which the third party is entitled, is valid unless third party is a party to such settlement under Section 97. All these and such other provisions are clearly beneficial legislation, hence should be interpreted which confers benefit and not which usurp its benefit.27. This being so, we finally revert to the question, which is in issue for consideration, whether the compensation computed under 1939 Act, the life insurance amount received by the claimants occasioned by the death of the deceased, is deductible from it or not?28. Submission by the learned counsel for the appellants is, the insurance money is by virtue of a contractual relationship between the deceased and the Insurance Company and is payable to the legal heirs of the deceased in terms of the contract. Such money cannot be said to have been received by the heirs only on account of the death of the deceased, but truly it is a fruit of the premium paid by the deceased during his life time. The deceased bought this insurance policy as an act of his prudence, to confer benefit either to himself or to his heirs in case of death. This amount is receivable by the claimant irrespective of the accidental death, even if he would have died the natural death. He further submits that the interpretation given by the High Court confers benefit to the tortfeasor for his negligence and wrong leading to the untimely death without any contribution by him. It permits him to escape from the liability cast by the statute. Thus, his submission is, any amount payable under any contract of social assurance or any insurance, ought not to be deducted as the same is payable to the heirs because of the contract and not on account of the death of the insured person. Referring on the dictionary meaning of the word compensation, he submits it would mean anything given to make things equal in value. He submits that in this case the death of the deceased-husband of the claimant was due to the negligence of the respondents has to be offset by a just equivalent, where claimants are put back in position where they would have been but for such death. On this, he draws the conclusion, the benefits of insurance policy cannot be deducted while awarding the compensation. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents restricted the argument as was advanced before the High Court and submitted, the High Court, after considering all aspects including English decisions and the decisions of this Court, rightly concluded to deduct the life insurance money out of the compensation payable to the claimant.29. So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death with the pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, co-relating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident, through train, air flight not involving motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must co- relate to this type of injury or deaths, viz., accidental. If the words pecuniary advantage from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the pecuniary advantage resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable, shares, bank accounts, case and every amount receivable under any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intentions of the legislature. By such an interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death, would have in many cases no liability or meagre liability. In our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus, under the present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and not other form of death.This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. It is significant to record herein both the sources, viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of ones labour or contribution towards ones wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or for his family, which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a will could be said to be the pecuniary gain only on the account of ones accidental death. This, of course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any co-relation with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or any provisions of law.As we have observed the whole scheme of the Act, in relation to the payment of compensation to the claimant, is a beneficial legislation, the intention of the legislature is made more clear by the change of language from what was in Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and what is brought under Section 110-B of 1939 Act. This is also visible through the provision of Section 168(1) under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and Section 92-A of 1939 Act which fixes the liability on the owner of the vehicle even on no fault. It provides where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident in spite of no fault of the owner of the vehicle, an amount of compensation fixed therein is payable to claimant by such owner of the vehicle. Section 92-B ensures that the claim for compensation under Section 92-A is in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect whereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. This clearly indicates the intention of the legislature which is conferring larger benefit to the claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled. Whenever there be two possible interpretations in such statute then the one which subserves the object of legislation, viz., benefit to the subject should be accepted. In the present case, two interpretations have given of this statute, evidenced by two distinct sets of decisions of the various High Courts. We have no hesitation to conclude that the set of decisions, which applied the principle of no deduction of the life insurance amount should be accepted and other set, which interpreted to deduct, is to be rejected. For all these considerations, we have no hesitation to hold that such High Courts were wrong in deducting the amount paid or payable under the life insurance by giving restricted meaning to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act basing mostly on the language of English statutes and not taking into consideration the changed language and intents of the legislature under various provisions ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.33. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 9th September, 1985 and restore the judgment of the tribunal dated 29th September, 1980 and hold that the amount received by the claimant on the life insurance of the deceased is not deductible from the compensation computed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The concerned respondent shall make the payment accordingly, if not already paid in terms thereof.