Case: Income-Tax Officer, Alleppey Vs. M.C. Ponnoose &amp; Ors

2. The facts in one of the appeals (C. A. 942/66) may be stated: One Kunchacko of Alleppey allowed the income-tax dues from him to fall into arrears. The Income-Tax Officer took steps to recover the arrears through the Tahsildar. Certain shares standing in the name of the assessee were attached by the Tahsildar. The first respondent Ponnoose claimed to have obtained a decree for a certain sum against the assessee. He also got the shares standing in the name of the assessee attached in execution proceedings. Ponnoose filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Kerala in which he challenged the action taken by the revenue officials including the Tahsildar for getting the shares, which had been attached, sold for satisfaction of the income-tax dues of the asssessee.3. The learned Single Judge held that the notification empowering the Tahsildar to exercise the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer under the Act with retrospective effect was invalid. Consequently the attachments made by the Tahsildar were quashed. This view was affirmed by a Division Bench in appeal.

Court's reasoning:
6. It can hardly be said that the impugned notification promulgates any rule, regulation or bye-law all of which have a definite signification. The exercise of the power under sub-clause (ii) of Clause (44) of Section 2 of the Act is more of an executive than a legislative act. It becomes, therefore, all the more necessary to consider how such an act which has retrospective operation can be valid in the absence of any power conferred by the aforesaid provision to so perform it as to give it retrospectiveStrawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd., v. Gutta Mill Workers Union 1953 SCR 439   = (AIR 1953 SC 95  ) an industrial dispute had been referred by the Governor to the Labour Commissioner or a person nominated by him with the direction that the award should be submitted not later than April 5, 1950. The award, however, was made on April 13, 1950. On April 26, 1950 the Governor issued a notification extending the time up to April 30. It was held that in the absence of a provision authorising the State Government to extend from time to time the period within which the Tribunal or the adjudicator could pronounce the decision, the State Government had no authority to extend the time and the award was, therefore, one made without jurisdiction and a nullity.This decision is quite apposite and it is difficult to hold in the present case that the Taluka Tahsildar could be authorised by the impugned notification to exercise powers of a Tax Recovery Officer with effect from adate prior to the date of theonly effect of the substitution made by the Finance Act was to make the new definition a part of the Act from the date it was enacted. The legal fiction could not be extended beyond its legitimate field and the aforesaid words occurring in Sec. 4 of the Finance Act 1963 could not be construed to embody conferment of a power for a retrospective authorisation by the State in the absence of any express provision in Section 2 (44) of the Act itself.It may be noticed that in a recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in B. S. Vadera v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 118   it has been observed with reference to rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution that these rules can be made with retrospective operation. This view was, however, expressed owing to the language employed in the proviso to Article 309 that "any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act". As has been pointed out the clear and unambiguous expressions used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged in by any limitations. Moreover when the language employed in the main part of Article 309 is compared with that of the proviso it becomes clear that the power given to the legislature for laying down the conditions is identical with the power given to the President or the Governor, as the case may be, in the matter of regulating the recruitment of Government servants and their conditions of service. The legislature, however, can regulate the recruitment and conditions of service for all times whereas the President and the Governor can do so only till a provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate legislature. As the legislature can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively there can be hardly any justification for saying that the President or the Governor should not be able to make rules in the same manner so as to give them prospective as well as retrospective operation.For these reasons the ambit and content of the rule-making power under Article 309 can furnish no analogy or parallel to the present case. The High Court was consequently right in coming to the conclusion that the action taken by the Tahsildar in attaching the shares was unsustainable.