Case: State Bank of India &amp; Another Vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim

3. The relevant facts are as hereunder:The respondent/writ petitioner while working as a Assistant (Accounts) in the State Bank of India at Thanjavur Branch was convicted of the offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the IPC") and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 03.11.1997. Following the aforesaid conviction, he was discharged from the service by a order dated 07.06.1999. Aggrieved by the conviction, the respondent had filed an appeal which was allowed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ramanathapuram by order dated 22.02.2002. The order of acquittal, on a plain reading, appears to be based on the finding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.4. Thereafter, on a demand being raised, the respondent was reinstated in service on 07.11.2002. However, back wages for the period that he had remained out of service was not granted. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of thethe respondent filed the writ petition (W.P.No.8079 of 2005) in question seeking the relief of back wages for the period he was kept out of employment i.e. from 07.06.1999 (date of discharge from service) upto 07.11.2002 (date of reinstatement). As already noticed, the learned Single Judge of the High Court having granted the aforesaid relief which was affirmed in the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant herein, this appeal, by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, has been filed.

Court's reasoning:
The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. While in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra), the basis of refusal of back wages by this Court would appear to be the inability of the employer to avail of the service of the employee due to his incarceration in jail, in Banshi Dhar (supra0, the refusal of back wages by this Court was in a situation largely similar to the case before us, namely, where the employee was all along on bail and was thus available for work. In Banshi Dhar (supra), this Court answered the question against the employee by holding that grant of back wages is not automatic and such an entitlement has to be judged in the context of the totality of the facts of a given case. It is on such consideration that back wages was declined. In the present case, it will not even be necessary for the Court to perform the said exercise and delve into the surrounding facts and circumstances for the purpose of adjudication of the entitlement of the respondent to back wages in view of the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The said provisions impose a clear bar on a banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. No discussion as to the meaning of the expression moral turpitude is necessary having regard to the nature of the offences alleged against the respondent, namely, under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. No doubt, the respondent was not in custody during the period for which he has been denied back wages in as much as the sentence imposed on him was suspended during the pendency of the appeal. But what cannot be lost sight of is that conviction of the respondent continued to remain on record until it was reversed by the appellate court on 22.02.2002. During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on thefrom employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with theduring the said period on account of the provisions of the Act. it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate to retrospectively wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same have been granted by the appellant bank.11. The respondent was acquitted on 22.02.2002; the demand for reinstatement was made by him on 22.04.2002 and he was reinstated in service by the appellant bank on 07.11.2002. On the view that we have taken, at the highest what can be said in favour of the respondent is that he is entitled to wages from the date he had lodged the demand for the same following his acquittal, namely, from 22.04.2002, until the date of his reinstatement, if the same has not already been granted by the appellant bank.