Case: Naresh Charan Das Gupta Vs. Paresh Charan Das Gupta

This appeal arises out of an application filed by the first respondent for probate of a will dated 28-11-1943 executed by one Bhabesh Charan Das Gupta. The testator died on 27-10-1944 leaving him surviving two sons, Paresh Charan Das (the first respondent), Naresh Charan Das (the appellant), and a daughter, Indira (the second respondent). The estate consisted of a sixth share in some ancestral lands at Matta in the District of Dacca, and a house No. 50, South End Park, Calcutta, built by the testator on a site purchased by him. By his will, he directed that a legacy of Rs. 10 per mensem should be paid to his younger son, the appellant, for the period of his life; that his daughter should be entitled to a life estate in five specified rooms in the house to be enjoyed either personally by her and the members of the family, or by leasing them to others; that a legacy of Rs. 10 per mensem should be paid to one or the other of two hospitals named, and that subject to the legacies aforesaid, the first responded should take the estate, perform the sraddha, and pay one-sixth of the expenses for the worship of the deity installed in the ancestralfirst respondent who was the sole executor under the will, applied in due course for probate thereof. The appellant entered caveat, and thereupon, the application was registered as a suit. He then filed a written statement, and on that, the following issues were framed"Was the Will in question lawfully and validly executed and attested ?(2) Had the testator testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will ?(3) Was the Will in question executed under undue influence and pressure exerted by Paresh Charan Das GuptaAdditional District Judge of the 24-Parganas who tried the suit held in favour of the first respondent on issues 1 and 2, but against him on issue 3, and in the result, probate wasfirst respondent took the matter in appeal to the High Court and that was heard by G. N. Das and S. C. Lahiri, JJ. Before them, the appellant did not contest the correctness of the finding of the Additional District Judge that the testator had testamentary capacity when he executed the will. The two contentions that were presses by him were (1) that the will in question was executed by the testator under undue influence of the first respondent, and (2) that it was not validly attested, and was therefore invalid. On both the questions, the learned Judges held in favour of the first respondent, and accordingly allowed the appeal, and directed the grant of probate. Against this judgment, the caveator prefers this appeal, and contends that the findings of the Court below on both the points are erroneous.

Court's reasoning:
In the present case, it is not in dispute that the testator executed the will in question, and that he had the requisite mental capacity at that time. The burden, therefore, is on the appellant to establish that the will was the result of undue influence brought to bear on him by the firstis not disputed that these recitals accord with what the testator had expressed in the correspondence at the time of the marriage and for some yearsare unable to agree. It is one thing for a father who feels that he has been wronged by a disobedient son to wish him well in life, and quite another thing to give him any of his properties. In the whole of the correspondence which has been read to us, there is nothing to suggest that he wanted the appellant to share in the estate. On the other hand, there are indications that even when the appellant was in financial difficulties, the testator considered that he was under no sort of obligation to come to his help. Vide Exs. 5(c) and C(1). It may be mentioned that after making the will on 28-11-1943 the testator continued to correspond with the appellant and the members of his family precisely in the same terms as before. Vide Exs. B(2), C(4) and A(10). That shows that the two currents of natural affection and settlement of properties flowed in distinct channels, and that the change in the course of the one had no effect on the direction of thecannot, therefore, be any doubt that the testator was all along smarting under a sense of social humiliation by reason of the inter-caste marriage, and that the recitals in the will were manifestations of a sore in his heart which had remained unhealed to theregard to the character of the testator and his filings in the matter it is not a matter for surprise that he should have cut off the appellant with a smalldo not consider that it is safe to act on this evidence. It is clear from Exhibit 1 that Indira and her husband had taken sides with the appellant as against the first respondent, and wrote to him that in spite of the will the appellant "should have his share as early as possible in order to avoid further complication", though it may be noted that they insisted on their rights under the will. Stripped of all its embellishments, the evidence of Indira, if true, comes only to this that the first respondent told his father that he could not live under the same roof with his brother, and that in view of that attitude, the testator gave no share to the appellant in the house. We are unable to see any undue influence in this. The first respondent was entitled to put forward his views in the matter, and so long as the ultimate decision lay with the testator and his mental capacity was unimpaired, there can be no question of undue influence.It is elementary law that it is not every influence which is brought to bear on a testator that can be characterised as "undue". It is open to a person to plead his case before the testator and to persuade him to make a disposition in his favour. And if the testator retains his mental capacity, and there is no element of fraud or coercion - it has often been observed that undue influence may in the last analysis be brought under one or the other of these two categories - the will cannot be attacked on the ground of undueif we accept the evidence of Indira, the case would, on the facts, fall within this Illustration. It is not disputed that the testator was in full possession of his mental faculties. There is no proof that the first respondent did or said anything which would have affected the free exercise by the testator of his volition. On the other hand, it is proved that the first respondent had no act or part in the preparation, execution, or registration of the will. It is a holograph will, and the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 is that it was the testator himself who made all the arrangements for its execution, and that it was actually executed at the residence if P.W. 1. The document was presented for registration by the testator, and he kept it with himself, and it was taken out of his cash box after his death. He lived for nearly a year after the execution of the will, and even on the evidence of Indira, he was often thinking of it, and discussing it, but declared that it should stand. The cumulative effect of the evidence is clearly to establish that the will represents the free volition of the testator, and that it is not the result of undue influence by the first respondent or his relations. It should be mentioned that Indira herself sought to enforce her rights under the will shortly after the death of the testator, and that the appellant also obtained payment of legacy under the will for a period of 15 months. No ground has been established for our differing from the High Court in its appreciation of the evidence, and we agree with its conclusion that the will is not open to question on the ground of unduethe Courts below have held against the appellant on this contention. The learned Judges of the High Court were of the opinion that as the execution and attestation took place at one sitting at the residence of P.W. 1, where the testator and the witnesses had assembled by appointment, they must all of them have been present until the matter was finished, and as the witnesses were not cross-examined on the question of attestation, it could properly be inferred that there was due attestation. It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination-in-chief that they signed the will in the presence of the testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend on the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. This is a pure question of fact depending on appreciation of evidence. The finding of the Court below that the will was duly attested is based on a consideration of all the materials, and must be accepted. Indeed, it is stated in the judgment of the Additional District Judges that "the fact of due execution and attestation of the will was not challenged on behalf of the caveator at the time of the hearing of the suit". This contention of the appellant must also be rejected.