Case: Durai Muthuswami Vs. N. Nachiappan &amp; Ors

2. Before the Returning Officer another candidate by the name Ramaswami had represented an objection petition to the reception of the 1st respondents nomination on the ground that he had a subsisting contract with the Highways Department of the State of Tamil Nadu, and with the Panchayat Union, Thiagadurgam and was also an agent for selling tickets in the raffle conducted by the State of Tamil Nadu. The Returning Officer rejected those contention and accepted the nomination papers of the 1st respondent. Subsequently, Ramaswami withdrew from the contest and the appellant and the 1st respondent were the only candidates, in the election. In his election petition the appellant had mentioned that on the date of presenting his nomination papers the 1st respondent had a subsisting contract with the State Government, to widen and black-top the Ulundurpet-Salem road between 74 km and 86 km at an estimated cost of Rs. 2 1akhs, that on the eve of presentation of nomination papers he purported to surrender the contract by submitting an application for cancellation to the Division Engineer, Highways, Cuddalore, whereas the contract was signed by the Superintending Engineer, Madras Circle on behalf of the Government of Tamil Nadu, that this letter of cancellation was not valid and therefore there was no valid cancellation of the contract. He, therefore, specifically urged that the election of the 1st respondent was void on that ground. The 1st respondent on the other hand maintained that the cancellation of the contract was valid and there was no subsisting contract on the date of filing of the nomination and that the contention of the petitioner that his election was void on that ground was not legally sustainable. He also contended that as the petitioner had not alleged that by reason of such improper acceptance the result of the election, in so far as it concerned the 1st respondent, had been materially affected, that allegation cannot he inquired into. He also contended that in any case the result of the election had not been materially affected. The learned Judge who dealt with this matter upheld the contention of the respondent on the ground that the allegations in the petition had not stated that the result had been materially affected by the alleged improper reception of the (1st respondents) nomination papers. He was of the opinion that this allegation relating to the improper acceptance of the nomination of the first respondent cannot be considered a valid ground, which could be gone into the absence of a specific averment that the election had been materially affected. To complete the narrative it is necessary to mention that the appellant had filed an application for summoning the necessary documents in order to sustain his case. The documents necessary to be referred to, so far as the present appeal is concerned, are only four inObjections to the nomination of he 1st respondent; (N. Nachiappan) by A. Ramaswami.2. Documents produced by the 1st respondent (N. Nachiappan) at the time of the scrutiny of nomination.3. The signed agreement between the Superintending Engineer, Highways, Madras Circle and N. Nachiappan in respect of the contract for widening the existing black top surface to 22 ft. with Ulundurpet-Salem Road Kilometer 74/2 to 86/4.4. Proceedings of the Divisional Engineer. Highways and Rural Work, Cuddalore of termination of the contract made by Rec. No, 8280/70-B-3 datedfirst two documents were to be summoned to be produced by the District Election Officer and the other two by the Superintending Engineer, Highways, Madras Circle.

Court's reasoning:
"Materially affected" is not a formula that has got to be specified but it is an essential requirement that is contemplated in this section. Law does not contemplate a mere repetition of a formula. The learned Judge has failed to notice the distinction between a ground on which an election can be declared to be void and the allegations that are necessary in an election petition in respect of such a ground. The petitioner had stated the ground on which the 1st respondents election should be declared to be void. He had also given the material facts as required under S. 83 (l) (a). We are, therefore, of opinion that the learned Judge erred in holding that it was not competent for him to go into the question whether the lst respondents nomination had been improperlydo not know whether any further material would or would not be necessary to establish the ground sought to be made out by the appellant or whether any oral evidence would be necessary. In any case we do not consider it either necessary or expedient that we should deal with the matter directly ourselves.