Case: Banwari Lal &amp; Others Vs. Sukhdarshan Dayal

2. An extensive area comprised in Plot No. 765 of Mauza Bhaunjar, Tehsil Ghaziabad, wass into small plots, as a part of a housing scheme called Chandrapuri Colony. The case of the plaintiffs who on behalf of the various purchasers of the, brought the present suit under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that a representation was made to them that plot No. 19 will be reserved for bieng used in common as a Dharmashala and yet it was sold to one Manohari Devi who in turn sold it to the defendant. The defendant constructed a boundary wall around the plot, rendering impossible the use of the plot for common benefit. Plaintiffs therefore asked for a declaration that plot No. 19 was earmarked for a Dharmshala, for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the construction of a Dharmashala and for possession of the plot after demolition of the boundary wall3. Defendant denied that plot No. 19 was reserved for the use of a Dharmshala and contended that Manohari Devi who, under the sale in her favour had become an absolute owner of the plot was entitled to sell it to him4. While decreeing the suit, the trial Court and the 1st appellate Court held that plot No. 19 was set apart from the construction of a Dharmshala, that thes had lost their ownership over that plot and therefore they had not right to sell it. The High Court having reversed those findings and dismissed the suit, plaintiffs have filed this appeal.

Court's reasoning:
5. The principal contention of the plaintiffs, is that a representation was made to the purchasers by or on behalf of thes that plot No. 19 would be reserved for a Dharmshala, that the purchasers paid high prices for the plots by reason of that representation and therefore thes had no right to sell the plot to Manohari Devi who, in turn, had no right to sell it to the defendant.There are numerous difficulties in accepting this contention. There is no evidence as to who, on behalf of the, made the particular representation. It is said that it was announced over a loudspeaker, while the housing scheme was being advertised, that a plot will be reserved for a Dharmshala. Who made the announcement and under whose authority are matters on which plaintiffs have been unable to shed any light. Thus, the argument lacks basis. Besides, though modern contrivances like microphones are useful aids in propagation of views or dissemination of information, they have not yet acquired notoriety as carriers of binding representations. Promises held out over loudspeakers are often claptraps of politics. In the instant case, the announcement, was if at all, a puffing up of property put up for sale6. It would appear that in the maps which were annexed to some of the, plot No. 19 was described as Dharmshala. But, in the context, that circumstance cannot be construed as containing a representation that the particular plot will in perpetuity remain unbuilt upon. It was on September 21, 1946 that the plot was sold to Manohari Devi. And yet, maps annexed to subsequents described the plot as Dharmshala. The transfer in favour of Manohari Devi was effected by a registered deed of sale and therefore, subsequent purchasers of the other plots in Chandrapuri Colony had notice, constructive at any rate, that plot No. 19 was not subject to any restraining ovenant. It seems clear that, in fact, thes had at no time created fetters on their disposing power. The decision in K. S. Nanji and Co. v. Jatashankar Dossa, (1962) 1 SCR 492  = (AIR 1961 SC 1474 ) on which plaintiffs rely proceeded on different facts for, there the map was annexed to the deed of lease in order to delineate the boundary line between the holding of the parties.The maps in the instant case are not annexed to thes and cannot therefore be deemed to be a part of thes by incorporation or otherwise. In fact nod refers to any map in the context of the use of plot No. 197. It is significant that none of thes on record contains a stipulation that plot No. 19 would be reserved for common use as a Dharmshala. For the matter of that, no reservation is made in any of thes contain an express recital that the8. In the first two Courts, arguments revolved round a plea of estoppel. Learned counsel for the plaintiff put the same plea in the forefront before us contending that thes were estopped from disputting the right of the plaintiffs to ask that plot No. 19 shall remain reserved for the use of a Dharmshala. There is no merit in this contention. Evidence regarding the representation is vague and true facts were known to those who purchased thes after plot No. 19 was sold to Manohari Devi in 1946. Besides, estoppel is but a rule of evidence and except in cases like those under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, when a grant is fed by estoppel, the rule does not operate to create interest in property regarding which the representation is made. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot claim that possession of plot No. 19 be given to them so as to enable them to construct a Dharmshala. The learned Additional Civil Judge in First Appeal observes that the description of plot No. 19 in the map as Dharmshala would show that the plot was more or less in trust for general benefit. That shows like saying, if the issue be whether there is a binding agreement between the parties, that the agreement is more or less a contract. Such fluid phrases cannot give rise to legal rights.