Case: Thaorebhai Kevelbhai Patel Vs. The State Of Gujarat

1. By this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity ofthe Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 Gujarat Act No. 12 of 1972hereinafter referred to as the Acton the ground that it violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner granted under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. In the writ petition the petitioner claims that he owns 9559 square yards of land situate in District Bulsar,and Taluka Navsari, village Kahilpore. He intends to sell the said land but is unable to do so because of the prohibition of alienation imposed under the Act.

Court's reasoning:
5. We shall first refer to and wherever necessary read some of the relevant provisions of the Act. The Preamble of the Act indicates that it is an Act to prohibit alienation of certain vacant lands in urban areas in the State of Gujarat. The object of the Act is to prohibit alienation of the vacant lands so that ultimately the ownership and control of the material resources of the community may be so distributed as best to subserve the common good and may prevent the concentration of wealth to the common detriment. It may be pointed out here that the impugned Act is a temporary one. Originally it was to remain in force for one year but the period is being extended from time to time in order to enable the State legislature to pass the Urban Property Ceilings Act. Prohibition of alienation by the Act is a preparatory measure for distribution of the material resources of the community. The definition section of the Act is Section 3. Clause (b) defines "City" to mean a City as constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. The definition of "collector" includes certain other officers also as mentioned in clause (c). It is necessary to read clause (d) which defines the "compact block" to mean "any block of vacant land in an urban area exceeding one thousand square metres in extent, (whether owned by one person or jointly by more than one person or owned in continuous parts separately by one or more members of a family unit) and whether or not divided by a private road, street, lane, footway, passage or drain natural or artificial". Under clause (dd) "family unit" means an individual, his or her spouse and their children." Clause (e) defines "municipal borough" to mean " a municipal borough as constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963.It would be noticed that the urban area means any area which is comprised in the city or a Municipal borough. Surrounding distance of the City or municipal borough has to be fixed by a notification of the State Govt. in the Official Gazette having regard to the relevant considerations. The maximum distance of such an area cannot exceed sixteen kilometers. We were informed at the Bar by the learned Solicitor General that notifications have been issued fixing the maximum limit of 16 kilometers in case of big cities like Ahmedabad, Baroda etc. but lesser limits of distance have been notified in case of small municipal boroughs. Under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 a person is not prohibited from alienating one plot of vacant land owned by him not exceeding 1000 sq. meters provided it does not form part of a compact block. When the limit of the distance outside the City or town area differed from place to place it was not necessary to fix the limit of permissible area of transfer with reference to the value of the land. It was neither feasible nor expedient to do so. From the permissible limit of transfer the area forming part of the compact block had to be excluded as it would have led to manipulations and manoeuverings by persons belonging to the same family unit. The land belonging jointly to more than one person or owned in contiguous part separately by one or more members of a family unit, which unit is a narrow one as defined in clause (dd) of Section 3, comes under the definition of compact block. Then only the permissible limit of transfer does not apply.It is plain that the main object of the Act being ultimately to distribute the ownership and control of the material resources of the community as best to subserve the common good and to prevent concentration of wealth, a transfer in favour of the Govt. local authorities, Govt. companies or Corporations had to be excluded as such transfer could not possibly defeat the object of the Act, rather. it would give a fillip to it. Permitting transfers of vacant lands in favour of Co-operative Housing Building Societies is obviously a step for the fulfilment of the object of the Act. The Act cannot be held to be discriminatory on such grounds.The power of the State Government under sub-section (1) of Section 7 to exempt any area or any alienation or other transfer of vacant land from all or any of the provisions of the Act is a power which is to be exercised for the reasons to be recorded in the general or the special order and in furtherance of the object of the Act. The guideline is to be found in the object of the Act itself. The power under sub-section (2) has to be exercised by the State Government for avoiding any hardship. There is sufficient guideline for exemption in case of hardship which will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The order of exemption to be made by the collector can only be in a case where the land is to be used for any educational, scientific industrial or commercial purposes. It has not been left open to the collector to decide for what other purpose he can grant the exemption. Such other purpose can be only that as may be prescribed by the State Government by rules made under Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 is a good safety valve. The State Legislature will act as a Supervisor of the orders of exemption made by the State Government or the Collector. The exercise of the power of exemption by the collector is further controlled by providing an appeal to the State Government under S. 9 of the Act.In our opinion, therefore, there is no violation of the equal protection of law guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Classifications are all reasonable and there is a clear nexus between the object of the Act and the classifications. They have neither put unequals as equals nor has discriminated between equals.