Case: Bhupendra Kumar Chimanbhai Kachiya Patel &amp; Others Vs. Divisional Controller GSRTC Nadiad

4. For the sake of convenience, the facts mentioned in Reference I.T. No.44/2011 (Annexure12) of the paper book of SLP Nos.of 2017 are mentioned hereinbelow.5. Prafulbhai Hirabhai Solanki, one of the appellants herein, whose name appears at page 18 of the SLP paper book joined the services of theState Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to asCorporation) on 04.06.1999 as "Badali Kamdar" at Mangrol Depot of Junagadh Section. He was employed as a daily wager.6. On 21.12.1989, the Corporation and the Union of the workers entered into a settlement to resolve several issues in relation to the service conditions of the employees working in the Corporation.7. Clause 20 of the Settlement, which is relevant for the disposal of these appeals, deals with the placement and absorption of thein the permanent cadre of conductor and grant of time scale to such workers. It provides a procedure as to how, when and in what manner, the services of all be regularized and absorbed in a particular time scale.8. In terms of clause 20 of the settlement dated 21.12.1989, the Corporation considered the case of the appellant when the vacancy occurred in the permanent cadre on the post of Conductor and accordingly he was absorbed as permanent employee in the services of the Corporation on 27.08.2008 as Conductor. He was given the time scale with effect from 27.08.2008 with consequential benefits.9. Like the appellant, there were hundreds ofKamdars" who were working in the set up of Corporation at all relevant time. The cases of thesere also considered with a view to find out as to whether they fulfill the conditions set out in clause 20 for making them permanent in the set up of the Corporation as and when permanent vacancy arose in the cadre of the Conductor. Those who were found eligible and fulfilled the conditions were absorbed in the services as permanent employees on the post of conductor and were accordingly given the time scale on the expiry of completion of 180 days in the cadre. They were accordingly made permanent in terms of the procedure prescribed in clause 20 of the Settlement.10. This led to dispute between these employees and the Corporation. The dispute was essentially as to from which date this benefit, namely, to make them permanent and the benefit of time scale should be granted to such. According to the employee (appellant), he was entitled to claim this benefit on his completing 180 days of the service from the date of his initial joining of the service as "Badali Kamdar", i.e., 04.06.1999 and not from the date of absorption whereas according to the Corporation, the appellant and all employees alike the appellant were rightly granted the benefit on the expiry of 180 days from the date when they were absorbed in the permanent cadre, i.e., as in the case of the appellant from 27.08.2008 as provided in clause 20 of the Settlement.12. This issue was accordingly referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot at the instance of the appellant under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act (hereinafter referred to as. Several such references were made to the Industrial Tribunal at the instance of similarly situated employees.13. By award dated 08.08.2013the Industrial Tribunal answered the reference in favour of the employees and accordingly granted them benefit, which the employees had claimed. In other words, the Industrial Tribunal held that the appellant (employee) is entitled to claim the permanent absorption in his service in the time scale as Conductor with effect from the completion of his 180 days of service period from the date of his initial joining, i.e., 04.06.1999. The Corporation was accordingly asked to pay all consequential benefits from such date. In substance, the Industrial Tribunal rejected the stand taken by the Corporation.14. The Corporation felt aggrieved and filed writ petition in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad. The Single Judge of the High Court, by order dated 18.09.2014, allowed the writ petition and set aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal. The Single Judge accepted the stand taken by the Corporation and accordingly upheld their action in granting the benefit to the employee (appellant) from 27.08.2008 as provided in clause 20 of the Settlement.15. The appellants (employees) felt aggrieved and filed intra court appeals before the Division Bench. By impugned judgments and orders, the Division Bench dismissed the appeals filed by the employees and upheld the orders of the Single Judge, which has given rise to filing of these appeals by way of special leave by the employees in this Court.

Court's reasoning:
23. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in the appeals.24. As rightly argued by the learned ASG, the issue in question has to be decided in the light of clause 20 of the Settlement.25. One cannot dispute the legal proposition that the settlement once arrived at between the employer and the employees as provided in Section 18 of the Act, it is binding on the employer and the employees.It is also clear from the undisputed facts that firstly, the appellant (employee concerned) was appointed as "Badali Kamdar" in the set up of Corporation on 04.06.1999; Secondly, clear vacancy arose in the permanent cadre of Conductor in and around 27.08.2008; Thirdly, as per the seniority list of the, the appellant was accordingly absorbed in the permanent cadre at the time scale with effect from 27.08.2008 on completion of 180 days of his service in the cadre and, as a consequence thereof, was given all the benefits of the said post from the said date; and lastly, since then the appellant and all employees alike him are continuing on their respective post.30. In our considered opinion, in the light of what we have held above, there is no basis for the appellants (employees) to claim the aforesaid benefit from the date of their initial appointment as. Indeed, there is neither any factual foundation nor any legal foundation to claim such benefit.31. Learned counsel for the appellants was also not able to show any document, such as any term/condition in the appointment letter or in the settlement or any Rule/Regulation framed by the Corporation recognizing such right infavour to enable them to claim such benefit from the date of their initial appointment.32. Clause 20 of the Settlement is the only clause which recognizes theright for consideration of his case on individual basis and to grant him the benefit subject to his fulfilling conditions specified therein which, incase, were found satisfied and accordingly, he was granted the benefit along with each such employees.33. It is pertinent to mention that the appellants neither challenged the settlement nor its applicability. In other words, the legality or/and binding nature of settlement dated 21.12.1989 was never questioned in these proceedings. In this view of the matter, the settlement is binding on both parties in terms of Section 18 of the Act.34. The concept ofis statutorily recognized under the Act. Explanation to Section 25C defines the term. The appellant never questioned his status as. Indeed, it is due to the status of, which he enjoyed for few years in the service of Corporation, he got the benefit of absorption in permanent cadre.35. So far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on some previous judicial orders are concerned, in our view, they are of no help to the appellants inasmuch as those orders turned on the facts involved in the case and secondly, we find that in those cases, parties did not even lead any evidence (seeof the order dated 27.01.2000 passed in SCA No. 393/2000 page 45 of Paper Book), and lastly, one case was based on clause 49 of 1956 settlement and clause 19 of 1985 settlement.36. In substance, in our view, those orders did not directly deal with the issues, which are the subject matter of these appeals and, even if, they deal with the issue in question, as urged by the learned counsel, then also, in our view, those cases turned on their own facts.37. In this view of the matter, those orders were rightly not relied on by the High Court and we find no good ground to take different view and accordingly reject this submission.38. Mr. Colin Gondsalves, learned senior counsel for the appellants then referred extensively to the evidence led by the parties to support his submission.39. We are afraid we cannot appreciate the evidence in the appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is more so when the Single Judge and Division Bench did not agree with the factual findings of the Tribunal and rightly reversed those findings. It is binding on this Court.