Case: BRAHMANI RIVER PELLETS LIMITED Vs. KAMACHI INDUSTRIES LIMITED

3. Brief facts which led to filing of this appeal are as under:-The appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent for sale of 40,000 WMT (Wet Metric Tonne) of Iron Ore Pellets on FOB terms and payment was to be made by Letter of Credit in Bhubaneswar. The loading port was Dhamra Port, Bhadrak, Odisha and destination was Chennai/Ennore Ports, Tamil Nadu. Dispute arose between the parties regarding the price and payment terms and the appellant did not deliver the goods to the respondent. The respondent claimed for damages alleging that it had to procure the Iron Ore Pellets from other sources at higher rates. The appellant denied any liability to pay damages on the ground that contract was later modified and that the respondent breached the material terms of the contract and this led to the dispute between the parties4. Clause 18 of the agreement between the parties contains an arbitration clause which reads as under:-18. Arbitration shall be under Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Law 1996 and the Venue of Arbitration shall be Bhubaneswar5. The respondent on 07.10.2016 invoked arbitration clause. The appellant did not agree for the appointment of the arbitrator. Hence, the respondent filed petition being OP No.398 of 2018 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the Act) before the Madras High Court on 24.01.2018 for appointment of sole arbitrator. The appellant contested the petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court on the ground that the parties have agreed that Seat of arbitration be Bhubaneswar and therefore, only the Orissa High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint the arbitrator. The Madras High Court vide impugned order appointed a former judge of the Madras High Court as the sole arbitrator by holding that mere designation of Seat by parties does not oust the jurisdiction of other courts other than at the Seat of arbitration. The High Court held that in absence of any express clause excluding jurisdiction of other courts, both the Madras High Court and the Orissa High Court will have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings. Challenging the impugned order, the appellant has preferred this appeal.

Court's reasoning:
13. As per Section 20 of the Act, parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Party autonomy has to be construed in the context of parties choosing a court which has jurisdiction out of two or more competent courts having jurisdiction. This has been made clear in the three-Judges Bench decision in Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2013) 9 SCC 32.   In the said case, respondent-Indian Oil Corporation Limited appointed M/s. Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan as their consignment agent. The dispute arose between the parties as huge quantity of stock of lubricants could not be sold by the applicant and they could not be resolved amicably. In the said matter, clause 18 of the agreement between the parties provided that the agreement shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. The appellant-Swastik invoked clause 18 – arbitration clause and filed application under Section 11(6) of the Act before the Rajasthan High Court for appointment of arbitrator. The respondent contested the application made by Swastik inter alia by raising the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court in the matter. The plea of Indian Oil Corporation was that the agreement has been made subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata and Rajasthan High Court lacks the territorial jurisdiction in dealing with the application under Section 11(6) of the Act. The designated judge held that Rajasthan High Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 11(6) of the Act and gave liberty to Swastik to file the arbitration application in Calcutta High Court which order came to be challenged before the Supreme Court. Pointing out that the words like alone, only, exclusive or exclusive jurisdiction have not been used in the agreement and use of such words is not decisive and non-use of such words does not make any material difference as to the intention of the parties by having clause 18 of the agreement that the courts at Kolkata shall have the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held as under:-31. In the instant case, the appellant does not dispute that part of cause of action has arisen in Kolkata. What appellant says is that part of cause of action has also arisen in Jaipur and, therefore, the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court or the designate Judge has jurisdiction to consider the application made by the appellant for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11. Having regard to Section 11(12)(b) and Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The question is, whether parties by virtue of Clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of Clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded?32. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like alone, only, exclusive or exclusive jurisdiction have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties—by having Clause 18 in the agreement— is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner14. In Swastik, the Supreme Court held that clause like (18) of the agreement will not be hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act and it is not forbidden by law nor it is against public policy. It was so held that as per Section 20 of the Act, parties are free to choose the place of arbitration. This party autonomy has to be construed in the context of choosing a court out of two or more courts having competent jurisdiction under Section 2(1) (e) of the Act16. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed that the venue of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering the agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the venue of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik, non-use of words like exclusive jurisdiction, only, exclusive, alone is not decisive and does not make any material difference17. When the parties have agreed to have the venue of arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Madras High Court erred in assuming the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act. Since only Orissa High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.