Case: Mayawati  Vs. Markandeya Chand and Ors.

5. There is no need to elaborate on the facts as they, by themselves, are compendious. Elections held to the Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) in 1996 resulted in a hung Assembly as no political party secured absolute majority. However, appellant Ms. Mayawati became Chief Minister of the State as her party consisting of 67 MLAs in the Assembly was supported by the MLAs belonging to Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). But she demitted the office of Chief Minister on 29.9.1997 as per an understanding between the aforesaid two parties. On the next day Shri Kalyan Singh, leader of the BJP Legislature Party became Chief Minister on the assumption that BSP would support him. But contrary to the said assumption BSP withdrew support to Kalyan Singh Government on 17.10.1997. Kalyan Singh was thereupon directed by the Governor to prove that he enjoyed the support of majority MLAs in the Assembly. On 20.10.1997 the appellant Ms Mayawati issued a whip to all the MLAs of her party in the following terms.You are hereby informed that you should be present in the Session of the UP Legislative Assembly on 21.10.1997 from 11 A.M. till the end of the sitting and vote against the Motion of Confidence moved by the BJP Government.6. On 21.10.1997 twelve MLAs from BSP (respondents) voted in favour of the motion of confidence moved by Shri Kalyan Singh. A violent pandemonium broke out inside the House in which a number of MLAs were assaulted by some other members and consequently no business could be transacted. On 24.10.1997 appellant filed a petition before the-Speaker Under Rule 7 of the Members of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Rules, 1987, which will hereinafter be referred to for convenience, as Disqualification Rules, for a declaration that the twelve respondents became disqualified as per Paragraph 2(1 )(b) of the Xth Schedule of the Constitution. When respondents took up the plea that they, along with some more MLAs, the total of which reached 23 in number, have formed themselves into a new political party by name Janatantrik Bahujan Samaj Party (for short JTBSP). Appellant thereupon moved for amendment of the petition on 5.12.1997 seeking incorporation of an additional ground for disqualification which is envisaged in Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Xth Schedule. Additional written statement was filed by the respondents to the amended petition.7. As the names of all the 23 MLAs who allegedly formed the split have not been furnished, the Speaker directed the respondents to file a list of such names by 29.1.1998. As they failed to give names on that day also, the Speaker gave another date as a last chance and posted it to 09.02.1998. But respondents failed to furnish the names of such MLAs even by that extended time, and instead again they pleaded for more time. On 25.2.1998 a list of 26 MLAs was furnished to the Speaker claiming that they were the MLAs who formed a split on 21.10.1997.8. The speaker passed the impugned order holding that (1) respondents are not liable to be disqualified under Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Xth Schedule on the syllogism that the person who issued the direction on 20-10-1997 is not proved to be an authorised person. (2) Such direction was superseded by another oral direction which was subsequently issued and hence no disqualification would visit on the ground of non-compliance with the former direction. (3) At any rate the whip issued on 20-10-1997 was ineffective since it was silent as to the consequences of its non-compliance. (4) Nor are the respondents liable to be disqualified under Paragraph 2(1 )(a) of the Xth Schedule because they belong to a faction which came into being as sequel to a split which arose in the BSP on 21-10-1997 consisting of not less than l/3rd of the total members of the Legislature Party of the BSP.B. CHRONOLOGY.55. In the general elections to the U.P. Legislative Assembly which took place in 1996 no political party obtained absolute majority. There was an agreement between the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP for short) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP for short) to support each other for running the Government. The BSP had 67 MLAs who were elected on its election symbol. The BSP had 175 members in its fold. Pursuant to the agreement the appellant belonging to BSP became the Chief Minister of the State on 21.3.97. On 21.9.97, Kalyan Singh belonging to the BJP became the Chief Minister. On 19.10.97 the appellant announced withdrawal of participation and support of BSP to the coalition government. All the BSP Ministers resigned from the Government. Immediately the Governor of the State convened a special Session of Assembly at 11.00 A.M. on 21.10.97 and told Kalyan Singh to prove his majority on the Floor of the House. On 20.10.97 the appellant issued a whip directing all BSP MLAs to remain present in the House throughout the proceedings on the next day and vote against the Motion of Confidence to be moved by the Chief Minister.56. On 21.10.97 there was pandemonium and violence in the Assembly and several MLAs went out of the House. In the proceedings which followed, 222 Members of the Assembly voted in favour of the Government. There was no vote opposing the Motion.57. In the speeches which followed, Mr. Sardar Singh congratulated the speaker for being able to preside over the Assembly without getting hurt. He narrated as to how instructions were given by the appellant to the members of BSP to indulge in violence and cause confusion including causing hurt to the Speaker. Markandeya Chand another member told the Speaker that along with him 23 others had quit the BSP and supported the Government. Respondents 1 to 12 had voted in support of the Motion.58. On 24.10.97, 13 petitions were filed by the appellant seeking disqualification of respondents 1 to 12 as well as one Hari Krishan on the ground of violation of whip issued by her on 20.10.97. The petitions invoked only Clause 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. On 27.10.97 respondents 1 to 12 became Ministers and joined the Cabinet. On 11.11.97 o another set of 13 petitions similar to those filed by the appellant were filed by one Mr. R.K. Chowdhary claiming the same relief on the same ground. After removal of defects by amendments, the petitions were taken on file and notice was ordered. In these proceedings we are not concerned with the petition against Hari Krishan which was later dismissed as withdrawn. On 25.11.97 respondents 1 to 12 filed written statement in which it was inter alia pleaded that a split took place between the Members of the BSP on 21.10.97 and more than l/3rd Legislators of the BSP got separated. It was averred that the appellant had instructed the members of her Legislature Party to disturb the proceedings of the Assembly and cause hurt to the Speaker. On the very next day i.e. 26.11.97 the appellant filed a replication statement in answer to the written statement of the respondents. There was no denial whatever of the split referred to in the written statement. The only plea in that replication pertained to the whip issued on 20.10.97 and the non-withdrawal of the same by the appellant on 21.10.97.59. On 5.12.97 the appellant filed an application for amendment of the petition in which disqualification of the respondents was sought under Clause 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. The relevant part of the pleading was as follows:That it is clear from the perusal of the reply of the respondent filed on this petition on 25.11.97 that the respondent has voluntarily given up the membership of Bahujan Samaj Vidhan Dal. That the respondent had contested and won the elections of Vidhan Sabha on the ticket of BSP and in this manner he is disqualified from the membership of the Vidhan Sabha.There was also a denial of the correctness of the Statement made by Markandeya Chand on the Floor of the Assembly on 21.10.97 that 23 Legislators of BSP were supporting him.60. Inspite of opposition by the respondents the amendment was allowed by the Speaker. That order was challenged by the respondents in W.P. No. 348 of 1998 on the file of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench. That writ petition is said to be pending after notice. Thereafter an additional written statement was filed by Vansh Narain Singh on 02.02.1998. These was a narration of the split in BSP and formation of new group named as Jantantrik BSP (JBSP for short). The reasons for such a split were set out in detail. It was further stated that the members of JBSP were not less than l/3rd of the total number of BSP MLAs. It was also averred that the appellant and a few other members of the BSP started terrorising and threatening the members of the JBSP with attack on their lives and also prevented their coming to and going from Lucknow. There was also an allegation that signatures of some of those persons who had become members of JBSP were taken on blank papers by coercion. The appellant did not file any reply statement.61. On 24.2.98 the hearing of the matter started. It continued on 25.2.98. During the course of the hearing respondents 1 to 12 filed two affidavits containing a list of 26 names who formed part of the group on 21.10.97. An explanation was given in the affidavits as to why there was delay in furnishing the names of those MLAs. Some of the members mentioned in the list were present before the Speaker along with the respondents. The appellant filed nine affidavits on the same day around 7.40 P.M. The hearing concluded on 25.2.98 and orders were reserved.62. Thereafter on 4.3.98 and 10.3.98 the respondents filed another set of affidavits repeating almost the case already put forward. On 16.3.98 R.K. Chaudhary applied for certified copies of those affidavits. When the said certified copies were furnished he was informed that if he had any submissions to be made in regard to those affidavits he could present the same on 19.3.98 at 1.00 P.M. No further affidavits were filed by the appellant or R K Chaudhary. The speaker pronounced the judgment on 23.3.98 dismissing the petitions for disqualification. He recognized 19 MLAs as forming a separate political party by the name JBSP.63. It is that judgment of the Speaker which is challenged in this appeal. Originally S.L.P. was filed against respondents 1 to 12 only. When the matter came before Court on 10.8.98, on the request of the appellants counsel the Speaker was added as a party (13th respondent) and the matter was adjourned to 25.8.98. On the latter date the following order was passed:Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner states that the Speaker was got impleaded as a party because of the first respondent having raised an objection in his counter that the Speaker should have been made a party. Mr. Sibal further states that the Speaker, otherwise, is a proforma party and he need not file a counter.64. The matter was directed to be listed for final disposal on 8.9.98 and liberty was given to the counsel for respondents to file additional affidavits if necessary. The case was heard on 8th to 10th, the afternoon of 11th and the afternoon of 14th.C. FINDINGS OF THE SPEAKER12. (i) The direction/whip dated 20.10.97 by the appellant was not issued in accordance with paragraph 2 (1) of the Xth Schedule of the Constitution and as such it was unconstitutional and illegal with the result the respondents are not liable to be disqualified under that paragraph for voting contrary to it.(ii) The petitions filed by the appellant did not fulfil the requirements of The Members of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on grounds of Defection) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) in as much as they did not contain a statement of material facts and consequently the petitions were liable to be dismissed Under Rule 8(ii) of the said rule.(iii) The appellant had in fact issued a direction on 21.10.97 to the B.S.P. M.L. As for creating disturbances and committing violence in the House on that date and, therefore, the direction issued by her earlier on 20.10.97 was superseded/withdrawn/waived and made ineffective. As such, the respondents could not be disqualified for having voted contrary to the direction dated 20.10.97.(iv) There was a split in the B.S.P. on 21.10.97 as a result of which there arose a faction and 26 M.L. As mentioned in annexures 1 and 2 of Chowdhary Narender Singhs affidavit dated 24.2.98, who were more than l/3rd members of the BSP Legislature Party, constituted a group representing the said faction. Consequently, the group became the original political party known as JBSP. The members of the said group were entitled to protection of para 3 of the Xth Schedule of the Constitution. Further, after the split of the BSP and formation of the group of 26 MLAs on 20.10.97, there was a further split in the JBSP on 15.1.98 as a result of which 19 MLAs continued to remain members of JBSP Legislature Party.(v) As a result of the aforesaid findings the petitions filed by the appellant and the petitions filed by R.K. Chaudhary were dismissed. The 19 persons set out in the order were declared as members of JBSP in the Assembly.

Court's reasoning:
10. Two conditions are sine qua non for avoiding the disqualification when any member of the House voluntarily gives up membership of his original political party. First is that the member concerned should have made a claim that the split in the original Political Party has arisen resulting in the Constitution of a group in its Legislature Party representing a faction thereof. Second is that such group should consist of not less than l/3rd of the members of such Legislature Party.11. In order to establish that the first condition has been fulfilled the first respondent (Shri Markandeya Chand) has made a statement in the House on 21-10-1997 that the split of BSP Legislature Party had arisen consisting of a group which represents a faction of not less than l/3rd of the members thereof. It appears that the Speaker has proceeded on the assumption that a claim has been made as provided in the said Paragraph.12. Regarding the second condition the Speaker held that there was a split in the Bahujan Samaj Party on 21-10-1997 and a faction had arisen as a result of the split in the BSP and a group consisting of 26 BSP MLAs was constituted on 21-10-97 itself representing the faction which did arise and that group is known as Janatantrik BSP.15. Venkatachaliah, J (as the learned Chief Justice then was) has delved into the importance of the office of the Speaker and found that the Speaker holds a high, important and ceremonial office, he is the very embodiment of propriety and impartiality and he performs wide ranging functions including the performance of important functions of a judicial character, and observed thus:It would, indeed, be unfair to the high traditions of that great office to say that the investiture in it of this jurisdiction would be vitiated for violation of a basic feature of democracy. It is inappropriate to express distrust in the high office of the Speaker, merely because some of the Speakers are alleged, or even found, to have discharged their functions not in keeping with the great traditions of that high office. The robes of the Speaker do change and elevate the man inside.16. Accordingly, the contention that vesting of adjudicatory functions in the Speaker would vitiate the provision on the ground of likelihood of political bias was rejected.17. Paragraph 6 of the Xth Schedule renders the decision of the Speaker final. The Constitution Bench considered its validity in Kihoto Hollohan (supra). In the majority judgment it was held that the finality clause in Paragraph 6 does not completely exclude the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Ultimately the Constitution Bench upheld the validity of the Xth Schedule subject to the aforesaid rider. However, the Bench further held that the scope of judicial scrutiny is limited to ascertain whether the decision of the Speaker is vitiated by jurisdictional errors viz. infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.22. Learned Judges who decided Ravi S. Naik were considering the contention that petitions filed before the Speaker did not fulfil the requirements of Rule 6(5)(a)(b) and (6) of the Disqualification Rules inasmuch as those petitions were bereft of facts on which petitioner therein was relying and also for not appending copies of the documents and evidence in those petitions. It was hence contended before the Bench that such petitions were liable to be dismissed on that count alone. Learned Judges, while dealing with the above contention have observed thus:The Disqualification Rules have been framed to regulate the procedure that is to be followed by the Speaker for exercising the power conferred on him under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Xth Schedule to the Constitution. The Disqualification Rules are, therefore, procedural in nature and any violation of the same would amount to an irregularity in procedure which is immune from judicial scrutiny in view of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6 as construed by this Court in Kihoto Hollohan case.23. In Kihoto Hollohan the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the deeming provision contained in Para 6(2) of the Xth Schedule, made the observation that the immunity adumbrated therein is only for the irregularities of the procedures. In this context it is worthwhile to refer to the next observations made by the Bench in the succeeding portion in Kihoto Hollohan:The very deeming provision implies that the proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the house; but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject to the approval by the House. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule.24. We will not say that rules of procedure are on par with the constitutional mandate incorporated in the Xth Schedule of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the procedure prescribed in the Disqualification Rules are meant to be followed for the purpose for which they are made. It is by virtue of the authority conferred by the Xth Schedule that Disqualification Rules are formulated for giving effect to the provisions of this Schedule. What would have happened if the Rules have not been formulated as enjoined by Paragraph 8 of the Xth Schedule? The provisions of the Xth Schedule would remain ineffective. So the Rules cannot be read in isolation from the provisions of the Xth Schedule, in stead they must be read as part of it. Of course, mere violation of a Rule is not enough to constitute violation of the provisions of the Xth Schedule. When a certain procedure is required by the Rules to be adopted for giving effect to the provisions of the Constitution, the non-adopted of the procedure cannot be side-lined altogether as a mere procedure and of no consequence. Compliance or non-compliance with the Rules of procedure would very much help the authorities to decide whether there was violation of the constitutional provision envisaged in the Xth Schedule.25. Before a claim is made by a member of the House under Paragraph 3 of the Xth Schedule a split in the political party should have arisen. Such a split must have caused its reaction in the Legislature Party also by formation of a group consisting of not less than one third of the members of that Legislature party. We have to bear in mind that Clause (b) of Paragraph 3 mandates that for the purposes of this paragraph such factions shall be deemed to be the original political party of the member concerned from the time of such split. What is the overt act through which formation of such a group can be perceived by the Speaker? It is in this context that Rule 3 of the Disqualification Rules assumes relevance and importance. Unless the particulars required in the Rule are furnished how would the Speaker know, authoritatively, of the formation of such a group? Ordinarily such information must be furnished as early as possible. But there can be rare cases in which it may not be possible, due to situational reasons, to furnish the particulars soon after the formation of such a group. But the 30 days time provided in the Rule is not to be understood as any indication to dispense with the promptitude in furnishing those particulars. The time 30 days fixed in Rule 3 must be treated as the outer limit within which the Speaker should be informed of the particulars required. So the need for compliance with Rule 3 is not a bare formality. Insistence on compliance with the Rule is, therefore, to enable the Speaker to decide whether the protection envisaged in the 3rd Paragraph can be afforded to the members concerned.26. We are of the opinion that a Speaker has to consider the repercussions of non-compliance of a particular rule in the Disqualification Rules to ascertain how far it has affected the credibility of the case of a claimant who seeks protection under Paragraph 3 of the Xth Schedule.27. The Speaker has accepted the plea of the respondents that there was a split as envisaged in Paragraph 3 of the Xth Schedule. The said finding can be subjected to judicial scrutiny only in the limited sphere indicated in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) viz. whether the infirmities are based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with the rules of natural justice and perversity. This is a case where appellant did not succeed in showing a case of mala fides or non-compliance with the rules of natural justice as for the conclusion arrived at by the Speaker. As pointed out earlier the main endeavour of the learned counsel was to show that the finding of the Speaker is vitiated by perversity in the sense that the conclusion is so unreasonable that no tribunal would have arrived at it on the given facts.29. The said extreme proposition may lead to the situation that, no matter, however illegal the order may be, it cannot be touched if its author is the Speaker. I am unable to concede such an immunity to any constitutional functionary to be above law or to have unfettered jurisdiction to pass unreasonable orders with immunity. The test cannot be whether it is possible for the Speaker to record such a conclusion, because the very fact that the Speaker passed an order itself is the instance to show that it is possible. The test is whether the conclusion or the finding made by the Speaker is so unreasonable or so unconscionable that no tribunal should have arrived at it on the given materials.30. Parameters for scrutinising what is unreasonable are, of course, nebulous. What appears to be reasonable to one man may be unreasonable to another and vice versa. It was perhaps that approach which made Lord Hailsham to make his quaint comment that two reasonable persons can reach diametrically opposite conclusion on the same set of facts without either of them forfeiting the credential to be reasonable. However, the test of perversity has now bogged down to this: No conclusion can be dubbed as perverse unless the unreasonableness is of such a dimension that no authority vested with the jurisdiction would have come to such a conclusion. Even the oft-quoted Wednesbury principle of reasonableness as propounded by Lord Greene MR Picture House v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680 has not changed the said approach.32. No departure from the said principle is warranted, more so because the Wednesbury ratio has gained approval of this Court in a number of decisions vide Sitaram Sugar Company Limited v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCR 909 ; Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR1996SC11; Union of India v. Ganayutham, (2000) II LLJ 648 SC.34. In substance the crucial circumstance which persuaded the Speaker to rely on the ipse dixit in the affidavit filed by Markandeya Chand and Vansh Narain Patel on 25-2-1998 is that appellant has not controverted it.35. It must be remembered that it is an undisputed fact that at no time the number of BSP MLAs who voted for Kalyan Singhs Government had reached the number 23 (which is the minimum number necessary to constitute the required percentage for forming a split as envisaged under the 3rd Paragraph of the Xth Schedule). It must further be remembered that the number of individual MLAs who held out that they left BSP had never reached 23 either then or even now. (Of course appellant had admitted that in addition to 12 respondents, who had defected on 21-10-1997, some more MLAs subsequently crossed the floor and their number was only 5 and thus the total number of defectors reached 17).36. If what the Speaker has pointed out is correct (that the assertion contained in the affidavit filed by R-l and R-6 on 25-2-1998 have not been controverted despite granting opportunity to do so) it is not proper to question the conclusion arrived at by the Speaker that there was a split as envisaged in the Third Paragraph of the Xth Schedule. If that is the position, this Court will not probe into all other criticisms made against the order passed by the Speaker. But a scrutiny of the materials first shows that as a matter of fact no opportunity whatsoever was given to the appellant to controvert the assertions made in the affidavit of 25-2-1998. The observation of the Speaker to the contrary is without any foundation. The proceedings minuted by the Speaker himself on 25-2-1998 at 6.00 P.M. contained the following entries after referring to the two affidavits being filed by Shri Narendra Singh and Markandeya Chand:The same was objected to by Shri Umesh Chand learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that those affidavits have been filed after 9-2-1998 which was the last date to produce evidence. Whether the above affidavits should be taken on record or not, or whether they should be read in evidence or not, will be considered presently during argument.37. The second glaring feature which has winched to the fore during judicial scrutiny is that the appellant had in fact strongly controverted the stand of the respondents regarding formation of a split. On the same day when 6th respondent filed the affidavit (i.e. 25.2.1998) specifying the names of 26 MLAs, the appellant had, on her own initiative, filed a petition at 7.40 P.M. pointedly repudiating the above claim of the respondents. The relevant passage from the said petition is extracted below:Today at about 4 P.M. I have been informed that Shri Narendra Singh submitted an additional list of 9 MLAs in addition to the above referred (2+5=7) MLAs before you, claiming that they were also with him and that they have not returned to the BSP....I submit that the above referred claims of Shri Narendra Singh are totally false and baseless excepting the above referred 12 MLAs. Other MLAs belong to the BSP and they are continuing in the BSP.But when we perceived the promptitude with which appellant controverted it and supported her statement with the affidavits of all the 9 MLAs, we feel that it is very unfortunate that she is accused of the charge that she has not controverted the affidavits filed by the respondents on 25.2.1998.40. Thus the basis of Speakers conclusion i.e. appellant has not denied the assertion of the respondents made in the affidavit dated 25.2.1998, is nonexistent. If so, the Speaker must necessarily have other materials to decide that the number of deserters reached the crucial limit of 23. Even on the day when 1st respondent announced in the Assembly (21.10.1997) that 23 BSP MLAs under his leadership have separated from the parent party and decided to support Kalyan Singhs Government, the fact remained that only 12 MLAs (who are the respondents) voted in favour of the Government. The other MLAs who are alleged to have joined the faction repudiated the allegation in unmistakable terms. Thus, when admittedly the number of BSP MLAs who supported Kalyan Singhs Government had never reached the figure 23 at any time, even subsequently, and when respondents could never even mention the names of those 23 MLAs at any time in spite of the Speaker granting opportunities to them for that purpose, including the last opportunity on 09.02.1998, it is a perverse conclusion, overlooking the aforesaid formidable circumstances that 23 MLAs had split from the BSP on 21.10.1997. We have absolutely no doubt that no authority vested with jurisdiction to decide the question should ever have reached such a conclusion on the facts and materials made available to him.41. The danger involved in upholding such a conclusion of the Speaker merely relying on the ipse dixit of the defectors can be illustrated thus: From one Legislature Party (having a strength of say one hundred members) two MLAs, A and B, defected and when they were confronted with the consequence of disqualification, they sought protection under the Third Paragraph of Xth Schedule by saying that along with them 31 more MLAs of their party have also gone out of the Party and A and B mentioned their names also. But all those 31 MLAs repudiated the allegations. In such a case the Speaker holds that the two defectors have the protection of the 3rd Paragraph for the simple reason that the Speaker chose to believe their ipse dixit. Such a syllogism, if adopted, would be preposterous and revolting to judicial conscience from any standard of reasonableness and would toll the death knell of the Constitutional philosophy enshrined in the Xth Schedule. The finding in the impugned order is not materially different from the aforecited illustration.42. I, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the finding of the Speaker that a split arose in the BSP on 21.10.1997 forming a group representing a faction consisting of not less than 1/3rd of the members of the Legislature party of BSP is vitiated by perversity. The corollary of it is that the 12 respondents who have defected from the BSP on the said date cannot escape from the consequence provided in sub-clause (a) paragraph 2(1) of the Xth Schedule.43. In the light of our above finding, it is unnecessary to consider the next question relating to sub-clause (b) of Paragraph 2(1) of the Xth schedule because such a venture would only be of academic utility now.47. In cases where the authority vested with jurisdiction has to consider and reach a fresh decision, it is necessary that after exercising judicial scrutiny the matter must go back to such authority for fresh decision. But in the present case the situation is different. A remit to the Speaker will not serve any additional purpose because there is nothing further for him to decide. As the respondents, having given up their membership from the parent political party voluntarily, have sought to insulate such severance with the cover provided in Paragraph 3 of the Xth Schedule, the only issue to be decided is whether the respondents are entitled to such protection. When this Court found that the aforesaid protection is not available to them under law in substitution of the contra finding made by the Speaker, its inevitable sequester is that all the twelve respondents stand disqualified under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Xth Schedule of the Constitution. The impugned order would stand thus altered.48. I may point out, in this context, that the action of the Speaker, in allowing the 12 respondents to register their votes in a composite poll held by the Speaker on 26.2.1998 (as between Sri Kalyan Singh and Sri Jagdambika Pal - a rival claimant to the post of Chief Ministership) without deciding the complaint made by the appellant seeking their disqualification from the membership of the House, was criticised before this Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4495 of 1998. This Court then noted in the Order dated 27.2.1998 that out of 225 MLAs who voted in favour of Sri Kalyan Singh as against 196 MLAs (who supported Sri Jagdambika Pal) the votes of 12 respondents were also counted. However, the Court did not in that case pursue the said criticism made against the Speaker mainly for the following reasoning:Even when those 12 members are taken to have voted in favour of Sri Kalyan Singh, their votes when subtracted from those polled, still leaves him to be the one having majority in the House. Correspondingly, those 12 votes do not go to Sri Jagdambika Pal who would still be in minority.49. Presumably on the above premise, it was submitted before us that disqualification of 12 respondents would not affect the government of Sri Kalyan Singh which even otherwise commands a majority in the House. We make it clear that our decision, on the present issue, is not intended to disturb the government of Sri Kalyan Singh in any manner so long as he commands majority in the Legislative Assembly. But that aspect cannot detract us from exercising power of judicial review of the impugned verdict.