Case: K. Eapen Chacko Vs. The Provident Investment Company (P) Ltd

This appeal is by certificate from the judgment dated February 17, 1969 of the High Court of Kerala.2. The respondent filed this suit against the appellant for recovery of property with arrears of rent and mesne profits and damages for waste.3. The property measuring 550.37 acres consisted of 279.86 acres of planted area and the rest was unplanted area.4. By a lease dated October 7, 1950, the respondent leased out to the appellant the plantations together with bungalow, quarters of what is described as "Beenachi Estate." The lease was for a period of 12 years with effect from January 1, 1950. The rent for the first six years was fixed at Rs. 3600 per annum. The rent for the second period of six years was fixed at Rs. 4500 per annum. The rent was payable in advance on January 1 of each calendar year.5. The respondents case is that since 1953 the appellant failed and neglected to pay rent fixed under the lease. Clause 4 of the lease provided that if the rent would be in arrears and unpaid for 30 days after the same would become due it would be lawful for the lessor respondent to forfeit the lease notwithstanding the fact that the term had not expired. The lease provided that the respondent lessor wouldthe premises in that event and the lease would cease and determine. The respondent by notice dated March 5, 1959 called upon the appellant to quit, vacate and deliver to the respondent vacant possession of the property. The notice was consequent upon the wilful default of the appellant to pay rent and consequent on the several breaches of covenants as alleged in the notice.6. The respondent filed the suit on February 5, 1960. The respondent claimed possession of the property known as the Beenachi Estate together with movables, a declaration that the lease had determined and claimed arrears of rent, mesne profits a sum of Rs. 2, 20, 394 as damages for waste.7. At the trial the appellant raised the plea that the tenancy is governed by the Malabar Tenancy Act, and, therefore, the suit is barred by Act 1 of 1957. The respondent pleaded that the tenancy is covered by exception in Section 2(1) of the Malabar Tenancy Act VII of 1954. The trial Court accepted the preliminary objection of the appellant and dismissed the suit.8. The High Court on appeal remanded the case to the subordinate Judge for fresh trial. The trial Court on remand decreed the suit on October 25, 1966. The respondent obtained a decree for eviction with arrears of rent and damages amounting to Rs. 1, 00, 000 for certain items and a further sum of Rs. 51, 030 for other items of damages. The trial Court held that in view of the proviso to Section 3(1)(vii) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act I of 1964 hereinafter referred to as the 1964 Act a tenant having fixity of tenure under the Act as it stood on January 21, 1961 would continue to enjoy it under the 1964 Act notwithstanding the fact that the landlord might be a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of India or by any State Government in India as provided in Section 3(1)(c) of the 1964 Act. The appellant was held by the trial Court to be disentitled to resist the prayer for eviction in the suit because his holding was a plantation exceeding 30 acres in extent as provided in Section 3(1)(vii) of the 1964 Act.9. The appellant filed an appeal. The respondent filed cross objections. The High Court dismissed the appellants appeal and allowed the cross objections of the respondent. The High Court enhanced the damages from Rs. 1, 00, 000 to Rs. 2, 20, 394 and confirmed the award of Rs. 51, 030 as damages as under other heads.

Court's reasoning:
37. A statute has to be looked into for the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied. In that connection the former state of the law is to be considered and also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute. Words not requiring retrospective operation so as to affect an existing statutory provision prejudicially ought not be so construed. It is a well recognised rule that statute should be interpreted if possible so as to respect vested rights. Where the effect would be to alter a transaction already entered into, where it would be to make that valid which was previously invalid, to make an instrument which had no effect at all, and from which the party was at liberty to depart as long as he pleased, binding, the prima facie construction of the Act is that it is not to be retrospective. (See Gardner v. Lucas [(1878) 3 AC 582]).38. In Moon v. Durden [(1848) 2 Ex 22 : 154 ER 389] a question arose as to whether Section 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845 which came into effect in August 1845 was retrospective so as to defeat an action which had been commenced in June 1845. The relevant section provided that no suit shall be brought or maintained for recovering any such sum of money alleged to have been won upon a wager. It was held that it was not retrospective. Parke, B. saidseems a strong thing to hold that the legislature could have meant that a party who under a contract made prior to the Act, had as perfect a title to recover a sum of money as he had to any of his personal property, should be totally deprived of it without compensation.Again in Smithies v. National Union of Operative Plasterers [(1909) 1 KB 310 : 78 LJ KB 259 : 25 TLR 205] Section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 which enacted that an action for tort against a trade union shell not be entertained by any court was held not to prevent the courts from hearing and giving judgment in actions of that kind begun before the passing of the Act. It is a general rule that when the legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. But there is an exception to this rule, namely, where enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action. See Re Joseph Suche & Co. Ltd. If the legislature forms a new procedure alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. In other Words, if a statute deals merely with the procedure in an action, and does not affect the rights of the parties it will be held to apply prima facie to all actions, pending as well as future.