Case: M.P.Gopalakrishnan Nair  Vs. State Of Kerala

Background Fact:1. Sri Krishna Temple situated at Guruvayoor is one of the most famous temples in the world. The history and legends of the temple are intimately linked with great saints like Villwamangalam Swamiyar, Melpathur, the author of Narayaneeyam, Poonthanam and Kururamma. The Temple attracts millions of devotees from all over the world. Zamorin Raja and the Karanavan of the Ministry Illom were the hereditary trustees of the temple. Disputes and differences arose between the Zamorian Raja and the Karanavan of the Illom mainly about Orrayma rights which were ultimately determined by a judgment of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 35/1887 on 1.11.1880.2. After the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1926 came into force, a scheme for administration of the Temple and its properties was framed in terms whereof the Zamorin Raja was entrusted with the management of the Temple under the supervision of the officers of the Board. The Karanavan of the Mallissery Illom thereupon filed O.S. No. 1 of the 1929 before the District Court of South-Malabar.3. The worshippers of the Temple also filed O.S. No. 2 of 1929 in the same court praying for framing up of a proper scheme which would give appropriate representation to the non-hereditary trustees from among the devotees. The District Court by a judgment and decree dated 25.10.1929 upheld the claim of the Karanavan of the Mallissery Illom to be made a joint trustee along with Zamorin Raja as a result whereof the scheme was amended. The Zamorian Raja preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court of Madras which were marked as A.S. No. 211 and 212 of 1930. The High Court of Madras disposed of the appeals by a common judgment dated 21.11.1930 confirming the decision of the District Court rejecting the prayer for appointment of non-hereditary trustees. Some modifications in the said scheme were made later on.4. The Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1971, Act 6 of 1971 was framed after the Government established a Commission to enquire into the cause of the fire, which destroyed the temple in 1970. The validity of the Act was challenged before the Kerala High Court by the hereditary trustees in O.P. No. 812 of 1971, claiming infringement of their fundamental rights under Articles 19, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissed the said writ petition. The Act was thereafter amended by Act 12 of 1972, which again came to be challenged in O.P. No. 314 of 1973 in a writ petition filed on behalf of the denomination of the temple. A Bench of Five Judges of the Kerala High Court struck down the said Amending Act in Krishnan vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee (Since reported in 1979 KLT 350). The Governor of Kerala promulgated an ordinance known as Guruvayur Devaswom Ordinance, No. 25 of 1977.5. The Legislature of the State of Kerala thereafter enacted Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978 (the 1978 Act) with a view to make provision for the proper administration of the Guruvayoor Devaswom. The 1978 Act was enacted having regard to the decision of the 5-Judge Bench of Kerala High Court in Krishnan (supra).Proceedings Before the High Court:6. The First Appellant herein is President, Kerala Kshethra Samrakshina Samithi and the Second Appellant herein is the General Secretary, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Kerala State. They filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for the followingdeclare that the Hindus in the Council of Ministers of the Leftist Democratic Front, respondents 4 to 14 herein, have no manner of authority to nominate Members to the Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee in the light of the pronouncement of this Honourable Court in 1985 KLT 629 and other ruling of the Kerala High Court and that any move initiated by them to so nominate and constitute the Managing Committee will be illegal and unconstitutional and violative of the petitioners Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 21, 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India;ii) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing respondents 4 to 14 to refrain from nominating any members to the Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee in pursuance of the provisions of Section 4 of the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act 1978;iii) issue an interim order of stay of all steps initiated by respondents 1 & 4 to 14 to nominate any member/ members to the Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee pending disposal of the above original petition before this HonourableA Division Bench of the said Court having regard to the importance of the question involved in the writ petition by an order dated 9th July, 1999 referred the matter to a larger bench. By reason of the impugned judgment, a 5-Judge Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissed the said writ petition. The Appellants herein, are, thus, before us.

Court's reasoning:
18. India is a secular country. Secularism has been inserted in the Preamble by reason of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976. The object of inserting the said word was to spell out expressly the high ideas of secularism and the integrity of the nation on the ground that these institutions are subject to considerable stresses and strains and vested interests have been trying to promote their selfish ends to the great detriment of the public good.From its provisions it is clear that the Act has ensured that only persons who believe in temple worship are to be in the management of the temple. The Act has further ensured that none except the Thanthri gets any voice in the spiritual administration of the temple and that his voice alone will prevail in such matters. The practice of religion by the denomination including customs, practices and rituals is, therefore, preserved in its entirety and there is no tampering therewith in any manner whatsoever.The only ground, which weighed with the Bench declaring Section 4(1) of the 1978 as unconstitutional, in confirmation of naked and arbitrary power upon the Government without any safeguard being provided for ensuring that the Committee would be a body representing the denomination. The 1978 Act was, as noticed hereinbefore, enacted to overcome the same. The composition of the body which would have the power of nomination in terms of Sections 4(1)(d) and 4(1)(e) would consist of the Hindu Ministers professing Hindu religion only. While making such nominations, they are statutorily bound to nominate such persons who would fulfill the criteria laid down therein. Section 4, therefore, lays down guidelines for ensuring that the Committee would be a body representing the denomination.The Bench in Krishnan (supra) upheld the right of the Executive Government to oversee control and management of a temple, but merely made the followingmay, however, observe that in the light of the recent amendment of the preamble to the Constitution emphasizing the secular character of the State it is desirable that the legislature should consider whether the power to nominate the members of the Committee should not be conferred on an independent statutory body other than the State Government with sufficient guidelines furnished to it for ensuring that the nominations will be effected in such a way as to be truly representative of the denomination consisting of the worshipping public.It is not clear how vesting of such a right on the Hindus in the Council of Ministers can effect their denominational rights when the members of the Managing Committee, the Commissioner and the Administrator have all got to be believers in temple worship. To insist on such a qualification in the electorate will be as bad saying that when the law relating to a temple is under consideration in the legislature, only Hindu legislatures can vote and they must further be qualified as believers in temple worship.30. It is expected that the action of such a body would be bona fide and reasonable. Once a committee is constituted which would be representing the denomination, in our opinion, it would be not be correct to contend that even the authority empowered to nominate must also be representative of the denomination.31. Indisputably the State has the requisite jurisdiction to oversee the administration of a temple subject to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The grievance as regard the violation of the constitutional right as enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India must be considered having regard to the object and purport of the Act. For fulfilling the said requirements, the denomination must have been enjoying the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of the institutions. If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India is not available.32. Assuming such a denomination exist, the question which is required to be posed is, what is the right that is sought to be protected. The right sought to be preserved is that under clauses (d) and (e) of Section 4(1). It does not depend upon the persons who nominates the members of the Managing Committee. The crux of the matter is who are the persons who are qualified to be in the Managing Committee. To fulfill the said object, the statute has taken particular care to see that only those who believe in temple worship among the Hindus can be nominated under clauses (d) and (e) of Section 4.33. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding as regard categorical existence of a subsisting religious practice that as on the date of coming into force of the Constitution of India it has not been established that the denomination of temple worshippers had any right to be on the management committee or the members of such a committee were being elected / nominated by an electoral college consisting exclusively of members of such denomination. Nothing has been pointed out before us to show that such a finding is contrary to the materials on records.It is also now trite that although State cannot interfere with the freedom of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the secular matters connected therewith can be the subject matter of control by the State. The management of the temple primarily is a secular act. The temple authority controls the activities of various servants of the temple. It manages several institutions including educational institutions pertaining to it. The disciplinary power over the servants of the temple, including the priest may vest in a committee. The payment of remuneration to the temple servants was also not a religious act but was of purely secular in nature. (See Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee represented through its Administrator and another vs. Chintamani Khuntia and others (1997) 8 SCC 422 ), Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Others vs. State of A.P. and another (1996) 2 SCC 498  and Bhuri Nath and others vs. State of J & K and others (1997) 2 SCC 745 ).The decision of the Kerala High Court in Krishnan (supra) did not lay down any proposition of law that the person authorized to nominate the persons of the Managing Committee should also form part of the denomination. With respect, the Full Bench in Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) misread and misinterpreted Krishnan (supra). Even assuming that the decision in Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) is correct (which it is not) it is not proper or correct to brand all Ministers of leftist Government as persons not believing in temple worship. There is no presumption that a Communist or Socialist (who may normally form part of a leftist Council of Ministers) are ipso facto non believers in god or in temple worship. Such a sweeping allegation or premise on which the prayer is based need not be correct. It depends on each individual approach. The observations in a judgment should not be, it is trite, read as a ratio. A decision, as is well-known, is an authority of what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. (See Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and another para 42 - (2005) 1 SCALE 385 ) and Haryana State Coop. Land Dev. Bank vs. Neelam, JT 2005(2) SC 600 ).41. So far as the decision of Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court in its impugned judgment has rightly held the same to be not applicable to the fact of the present case.The High Court for the aforementioned purpose considered the history of the provisions as was understood at the relevant time. It noticed the Full Bench decision of Krishnan (supra) and while doing so fell into an error as was done in Krishnankutty (supra) that therein a proposition of law has been laid down in the fact that the person who professes Hindu religion but not a believer in temple worship and may even be opposed to the practice of idol worship cannot be considered a representative of the public having believed in God and temple worship.45. This decision cannot, thus, be said to be an authority for the proposition that the "electoral college" should also be believers in temple worship.46. The crucial question may now be addressed whether the vesting of power in the "Hindus" in the Council of Ministers to nominate the members of the Managing Committee could be held to violate Articles 25 and 26. The temple is visited by millions every year. Apart from proper management of the funds flowing from these devotees, the Devaswom also owns other properties, runs a college, a guest house, choultries etc., all of which require efficient and prompt management. This is quiet apart from the spiritual management dealing with religious side which is under the sole control management and guidance of the Thanthri. It is the secular aspect of the management that is vested in the Management Committee.47. We have noticed hereinbefore that it is one thing to say that prejudice may be caused if the management of temple is entrusted to a person who has no faith in temple worship it is another thing to say that such persons are nominated by those who may not have any such faith but those nominated would not only be believers in God but also in temple worship. The function of a statutory and constitutional authority while exercising its power of nomination cannot be equated with the power of management of a temple, particularly, in relation to the religious aspects involved therein.48. One further question which may arise is as to whether Articles 25 or 26 can be invoked on the facts of the present case. There is no case for the Appellant that Section 4 insofar as it provides for the constitution of the Managing Committee is violative of any rights. If this be the position, the claim that the right of nomination has not been vested in a proper body is beside the point. The right to manage the Devaswom was at the inception of the Constitution vested in the two hereditary trustees, viz., the Zamorain Raja of Calicut and the Karnavam (Manager) of the Malliseery Illom (A Namboodri Family). The denomination of devotees at large had no say in the administration, except to watch the counting of the contents, the Bhandarams of the hundies of sealed locks where the devotees deposit their offering to prevent any defalcation or pilferage. [See Krishnan (supra), para 3] The denomination of devotees had no say or right in the administration - secular or religious - of the temple. Article 26 does not create any rights in any denomination which it never had. It only safeguards and guarantees existing rights, which such a denomination had. [See Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi (supra)]. Since the denomination had no right prior to January 26, 1950, they cannot claim any such rights after the enactment of the impugned Act. If it had no such right even in the matter of management of the temple, it is all most so in the matter of the constitution of the "electorate".49. The said decision, therefore, also has no application to the fact of the present case.The contention by the Appellant that the "electorate" should be representative of the denomination of believers in temple worship (assuming such a denomination exists) also cannot be accepted, who will determine the electorate from amongst the millions of devotees of Lord Krishna visiting the temple? It will be impossible and impracticable to select such a College of "electors" from among them. The whole exercise will be arbitrary and time consuming and will be open to further challenge. The present mode has the advantage of being precise as the same has the advantage that only believers in temple worship are put incharge of the administration.56. A statute, it is trite, should not be interpreted in such a manner as would lead to absurdity. [See Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi vs. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Kalyan & Dombivali and Ors. JT 2004 (9) SC 242 and Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsingh Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., JT 2005 (4) SC 123 ].57. It is necessary to bear in mind the principle - ut res magis valeat quam pereat in terms whereof a statute must be read in such a manner which would make it workable. [See Balram Kumawat vs. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628 , Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi (supra), para 19 and Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand and Anr., JT 2005(2) SC 271 , para 82].The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that in Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) Section 4(1) was read down on the basis of the concession made by the Additional Advocate General and Special Counsel appearing for the Devaswom, in our opinion, with respect, have rightly been held to be not binding on the State by the High Court.