Case: Munshi Singh &amp; Others Etc. Etc Vs. Union Of India Etc. Etc

2. It is necessary to state the facts only in C. A. 1888 of 1970. The U. P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 received the assent of the President on October 8, 1958. On December 10, 1958 a notification was issued by the U. P. Government declaring Ghaziabad a regulated area under S. 3 of the aforesaid Act. In February 1959 the Controlling Authority under S. 4 of the Regulation Act was constituted. On July 16, 1960 a notification was issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by the State Government declaring its intention to acquire land measuring about 34,000 acres in fifty villages of Ghaziabad for planned development of the area. On December 23, 1961 a notification was issued under Ss. 6 and 17 of the Acquisition Act in respect of an area of 19.75 acres. This was followed by successive piece-meal notifications on various dates in 1962 and 1963. On February 9, 1962 another notification was issued under S. 4 of the Acquisition Act modifying the earlier notification dated July 16, 1960. By this notification the proposed area from 34,000 acres was reduced to 6158 acres. On July 4, 1962 the appellants made an application to the Special Land Acquisition Officer Ghaziabad for supplying a copy of the scheme of the planned development for which notification under S. 4 had been issued to enable them to make representations at the hearing of the objections filed under S. 5A of the Acquisition Act. It was mentioned inter alia in that application that the Government had not published the scheme of the planned development and without a copy of the scheme for which the notification had been published "no forceful arguments could be submitted". The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the following order on that application :"The scheme of the planned development is not necessary for a notification under S. 4 of the Act, as such, no such scheme of the planned development is available in this office"On September 4, 1962 the State Government sanctioned the Master Plan of Ghaziabad under the Regulation Act. On September 27, 1962 a writ petition was filed by the appellants in the High Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid notifications. Several other writ petitions were also filed by other petitioners. On December 10, 1965 a batch of 39 writ petitions including the appellants petition were allowed by the High Court and the notifications under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act were quashed on the ground of invalidity of piecemeal notifications. Another batch of writ petitions was similarly allowed quashing the notifications under Sec. 6 of the Acquisition Act on the same ground On February 9, 1966 this court decided in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, (1966) 3 SCR 557  = (AIR 1966 SC 1593 ) that piecemeal and successive notifications under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act was not permissible. On February 20, 1967 the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance No. 1 of 1967. The validity of this Ordinance apart from the legality of the notifications issued was challenged in the High Court by the appellants in February 1967.      In April 1967 an Act was passed on the same lines as the Ordinance. The provisions of the Act were also challenged before the High Court by necessary amendment in the writ petitions filed by the appellants. This Court in Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 41  = (AIR 1968 SC 1138 ) upheld the validity of the Acquisition Amending Act of 1967. On March 26, 1968 the High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellants. In view of the judgment of this court the High Court repelled the contentions of the appellants impugning the validity of the Acquisition Amendment Act 1967. Another point which was agitated before the High Court was that the notification under S. 4 was too vague and afforded no adequate basis for the lodging of objection under S. 5A of the Acquisition Act. Certain other points were raised which need not be mentioned. The High Court observed that all these points had been urged in the writ petition No. 55 of 1963 which had been heard along with many other writ petitions by the Division Bench which, by its judgment dated December 24, 1965, had negatived them. For the reasons mentioned in that judgment these contentions were also repelled.

Court's reasoning:
In Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 128  = (AIR 1960 SC 1203 ) it was stated in the notification under S. 4 (1) that the land was likely to be needed for purposes of a company which was named. A challenge was made against the validity of that notification on the ground that it was not stated that the land was required for a public purpose. It was laid down that where the land was required for a company the requirement of the law would be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government was satisfied on a report under Section 5A (2) or by an inquiry under Section 40 that the purpose of the acquisition was the same as contemplated by Section 40 of the Act. This Court said that the purpose of the notification under Section 4 was to carry out a preliminary investigation with a view to find out after the necessary survey and taking of levels and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purposes for which it was sought to be acquired. It was only under Section 6 that a firm declaration had to be made by the Government that land with proper description and area was needed for a public purpose or a company. Hence it was not correct to say that any defect in the notification under Section 4 was fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when the acquisition was for a company. We are unable to accede to the suggestion on behalf of the State that the observations made in this decision can be of any avail to it in the present cases. The question which we are called upon to decide is of an entirely different nature. It relates to the notification under Section 4 in the light of S. 5A with a view to giving full effect to that section and not simply wiping it out. We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which came into force on January 1, 1924 that S. 5A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly irrelevant but after the insertion of Section 5A the position has completely changed and it cannot be said that the owners wishes are not relevant and that he does not need an opportunity to file his objections. To take such a view would render S. 5A otios. If it has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the person interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to submit his objections and that he can only if the notification under S. 4 (1) while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such specific or particular purpose being stated the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under S. 5A which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under S. 4 (1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under S. 5A of the Acquisition Act.