Case: Rajendra Jha Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, District

The appellant was appointed as a Dresser in the Medical Department of the Steel Authority of India, formerly the Bokaro Steel Plant Ltd. On March 1, 1975 he was dismissed from service as a result of a domestic inquiry on charges of misconduct consisting of absence from duty, falsification of entries in the registers, destruction of records, etc Since an industrial dispute was pending in the Labour Court, Bokaro, between the management and its workmen, and application was filed by the management under section 32(2) (b) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking approval of the Labour. Court, Chota Nagpur, to the order of dismissal passed against the appellant. The decision of that application was partly in favour of the appellant and partly against him. By a judgment dated November 16, 1976, the Labour Court held that (i) the domestic inquiry was invalid because, the Chief Medical officer of Bokaro Steel Ltd. was neither competent to issue the charge-sheet nor to constitute the Enquiry Committee which held the appellant guilty of the charges framed against him; but, that (ii) the management should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence to justify the order ofappellant filed a writ petition (No. CWJC 336 of 1976 ) against the second part of the Labour Courts order, his contention being that the management should not be allowed to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The High Court issued a Rule on that writ petition and granted stay of further proceedings in the Labour Court. The management filed a writ petition (No. CWJC 27 of 1977) against the first part of the order of the Labour Court by which it was held that the enquiry was vitiated. The High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench, dismissed both the writ petitions by a JUDGMENT dated April 26, 1978.Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court which resulted in the dismissal of its writ petition, the management filed Civil Appeal No. 1682 (L) of 1978 in this Court, complaining of the finding of the High Court that it was not competent to the Chief Medical officer to charge-sheet the appellant or to constitute the Enquiry Committee. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on July 23, 1980. The finding of the Labour Court and the High Court that the enquiry which resulted in the dismissal of the appellant was vitiated, was upheld by thisappellant did not appeal to this Court against the dismissal of his writ petition by the Highthe order of the Labour Court that the management should be allowed to lead evidence in order to justify the order of dismissal was not stayed by this Court in the appeal which was filed by the management, the Labour Court called upon it to lead its evidence. The appellant filed an application objecting to the management leading the evidence but that application was dismissed by the Labour Court on August 24, 1978. Being aggrieved by that order, the appellant filed a writ petition (No. 531 of 1980) in the High Court of Patna contending that the management should not be allowed to lead evidence, especially, because, instead of leading evidence, in pursuance of the order of the Labour Court, it h ad chosen to challenge the finding that the inquiry was vitiated. The writ petition having been dismissed on February 5, 1981 by the Ranchi Bench of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

Court's reasoning:
10. We do not consider that either of these decisions can help the appellant. A question of law which does not require fresh investigation into facts may be allowed to be raised at a later stage of a proceeding but, that is subject to the qualification that the question is not concluded by a decision between the same parties.In this case, the question as to whether the Labour Court was right in giving an opportunity to the employers to lead evidence, is not being raised by the appellant for the first time in this Court.It was raised by him in the writ petition which he had filed in the Patna High Court and that writ petition was dismissed. In so far as the question of res judicata is concerned, if an erroneous decision on a question of law is rendered by a Court by assuming jurisdiction which it does not possess, it may be possible to argue that the decision cannot operate as res judicata even between the same parties. But, in the case before us, the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to decide whether to allow the employers to lead evidence or not. It may have acted irregularly in the exercise of that jurisdiction but that is to be distinguished from cases in which the Court inherently lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding or to pass a particular order. Besides, as we have stated earlier, though it would be true to say that the employers did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence simultaneously with the filing of the application under section 33(2) (b) of the Act, it is not possible to hold on the basis of the data placed before us that they asked for such an opportunity after the proceedings had terminated. What seems to have happened is that the application filed by the employers under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act was taken up for consideration first. When the hearing of that application was nearing completion, but before the final orders were passed therein, the employers asked for an opportunity to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The Labour Court disposed of both the matters together by a common judgment which is dated November 16, 1976. It held by one and the same order that the departmental inquiry was vitiated but that the employers should be allowed to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The appellants contention that the employers did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence at all and that the Labour Court acted gratuitously is not possible to accept. Thus, in passing the order allowing the employers to lead evidence, the Labour Court cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction.For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal and hold that the employers may lead evidence to justify the order whereby the appellant was dismissed from service on March 1, 1975. There will be no order as to costs.11. A longtime has gone by since the appellant was dismissed. Nine years is frightful delay. A large part of that period was wasted in dealing with several obstacles raised by the appellant himself in the disposal of the matter, including the allegations which he made against the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. Twice , he obtained orders staying further proceedings in the Labour Court: once from the High Court in Writ Petition No. 336 of 1976 and then in this