Case: B. Shah Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore &amp; Ors

2. It appears that in October, 1967, Sub-bammal, respondent No. 2 herein, who is a woman worker employed in Mount Stuart Estate (hereinafter referred to as "the establishment"), which is carrying on plantation industry, was allowed leave of absence by the establishment on the basis of a notice given by her of her expected delivery which actually took place on December 16, 1967. After her delivery, the respondent was paid by her employers on account of maternity benefit an amount equivalent to what she would have earned on the basis of her average daily wage in 72 working days falling within twelve weeks of the maternity period. While calculating the aforesaid amount of maternity benefit the establishment admittedly excluded twelve Sundays being wageless holidays, which fell during the period of the respondents actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and the six weeks immediately following that day. Dissatisfied with this computation, the respondent made a representation to her employers claiming maternity benefit for the entire period of twelve weeks under the Act, i.e., for 84 days on the plea that a week consisted of seven days. As her demand did not evoke a favourable response, the respondent applied to the Labour Court, Coimbatore, under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for redress of her grievance. The claim preferred by the respondent was resisted by the appellant herein who contended that the respondent was admittedly working and was being paid only for six days in a week and that a pregnant woman worker is entitled to maternity benefit for 72 days which are the normal working days in twelve weeks and not for 84 days, as no wage is payable for the seventh day of the week, i.e., Sunday, which is a non-working wageless holiday. By its order dated February 26, 1969, the Labour Court allowed the claim of the respondent. Thereupon the establishment moved the High Court at Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Labour Court contending that the claim made by the respondent was untenable as normally a worker works only for six days in a week and the maternity benefit had to be computed only for 72 days. As against this, the respondent pleaded that the computation had to be made not with reference to the actual number of working days but with reference to total number of days covered by twelve weeks, i.e., 84 days. The single Judge of the High Court to whom the case was assigned allowed the petition holding that twelve weeks for which maternity benefit is provided for in sub-s.(3) of S.5 of the Act must be taken to mean twelve weeks of work and the computation of the benefit had to be made with reference to the actual days on which the woman would have worked but for her inability. Aggrieved by this decision, the respondent field an appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters patent which, as already stated, was allowed by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court observing that the maternity benefit which the respondent was entitled to receive was for the period of her absence before delivery including the day of delivery and also six weeks thereafter, each week consisting of even days including Sundays. Dissatisfied with this decision, the establishment has, as already stated, come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

Court's reasoning:
12. The provisions of S.5 of the Act quoted above make it clear that a woman worker who expects a child is entitled to maternity benefits for a maximum period of twelve weeks which is split up into two periods, viz., pre-natal and post-natal. The first one, i.e., pre-natal or ante-natal period is limited to the period of womans actual absence extending upto six weeks immediately preceding and including the day on which her delivery occurs and the second one which is post-natal compulsory period consists of six weeks immediately following the day of delivery. The benefit has to be calculated for the aforesaid two periods on the basis of the average daily wage. According to the explanation appended to S.5(1) of the Act, the average daily wage has to be computed taking into consideration the average of the womans wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity, or one rupee a day, whichever is higher. For fixing the average daily wage, it has, therefore, first to be ascertained whether the wages which were paid or were payable to the woman was for "time work" or for "piece work". It has next to be ascertained as to what were the cash wages paid or payable to her in terms of the definition contained in S.3(n) of the Act for the days on which she worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date of delivery, reckoned according to the British calendar month. The total wages thus worked out are to be divided by the number of days in the aforesaid three calendar months in order to arrive at the average daily wage. After thus finding out the average daily wage, the liability of the employer in respect of the maternity benefit has to be calculated in terms of S.5 of the Act for both pre-natal and post-natal period indicated above.Bearing in mind the above mentioned dictionary or popular meaning of the term "week", we think that in the context of sub-ss.(1) and (3) of S.5 of the Act, the term week has to be taken to signify a cycle of seven days including Sundays. The language in which the aforesaid sub-sections are couched also shows that the Legislature intended that computation of maternity benefit is to be made for the entire period of the woman workers actual absence, i.e., for all the days including Sundays which may be wageless holidays falling within that period and not only for intermittent periods of six days thereby excluding Sundays falling within that period for if it were not so the Legislature instead of using the words "for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day" would have used the words "for the working days falling within that period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and the six weeks immediately following that day but excluding the wageless days." Again the word "period" occurring in S.5(1) of the Act is a strong word. It seems to emphasize, in our judgment, the continuous running of time and recurrence of the cycle of seven days. It has also to be borne in mind in this connection that in interpreting provisions of beneficial pieces of legislation like the one in hand which is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to women workers employed in the plantations and which squarely falls within the purview of Art. 42 of the Constitution, the beneficent rule of construction which would enable the woman worker not only to subsist but also to make up her dissipated energy, nurse her child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and maintain the level of her previous efficiency and output has to be adopted by the Court.Thus we are of opinion that computation of maternity benefit has to be made for all the days including Sundays and rest days which maybe wageless holidays comprised in the actual period of absence of the woman intending upto six weeks preceding and excluding the day of delivery as also for all the days falling within the six weeks immediately following the day of delivery thereby ensuring that the woman worker gets for the said period not only the amount equalling 100 per cent of the wages which she was previously earning in terms of S.3(n) of the Act but also the benefit of the wages for all the Sundays and rest days falling within the aforesaid two periods which would ultimately be conducive to the interest of both the woman worker and her employer.21. In view of what we have stated above, we cannot uphold the view of the law expressed by the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Malayalam Plantations Ltd., Cochin v. Inspector of Plantations, Mundakayam and others (supra).