Case: Sarwan Singh &amp; Others Vs. State of Punjab &amp; Others

2. The facts of one appeal (Civil Appeal No. 345 of 1971) may be sufficient for our purpose. Land measuring 165 acres including the appellants land measuring 6 bighas, 4 biswas and 17 biswasi, comprised in various khasra numbers situated in the revenue estate of Piru Banda within the municipal limits of Ludhiana Municipal Committee, was acquired for a development scheme of the Ludhiana Improvement Trust (hereinafter called the Trust) styled as Model Town Extension Scheme No. 1. A notification under Section 98 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act (hereinafter called the Improvement Act), which is analogous to Section 4 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Acquisition Act) was published on September 16, 1960. The present appeal relates to the acquisition of the appellants land in village Piru Banda only. The Land Acquisition Collector, Improvement Trust Ludhiana, made his award on March 31, 1965, with regard to the said land. Aggrieved by the said award the appellant and other land owners made separate applications under Section 18 of the Acquisition Act for making a reference to the Tribunal constituted under the Improvement Act (hereinafter respondent No. 2). The cases were then referred to the Tribunal. The second respondent took up all the references together and delivered a common judgment on October 16, 1968. The Collector had earlier classified the land acquired under three categories, namely, belts A, B and C fixing the price for valuation at the rate of Rs. 60/-, Rs. 40/-and Rs. 20/- per square yard respectively. The Tribunal in the case of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 345 of l971 under discussion, modified the award to the extent that the price of the land comprised in belt C was raised from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 30/- per square yard while the price for the area covered by belt B was upheld. The appellant challenged the order High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court following an earlier decision dismissed the writ petition. The High Court however, granted a certificate to apnea) to this Court under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution.

Court's reasoning:
6. It is clear there can be no complaint that there is no guideline in the Improvement Act for determining compensation since referentially the principles under the Acquisitions Act have been adopted and such other principles are also added as may be appropriate in the nature of things. Land acquired for the Trusts under the Improvement Act, as will be shown below, can be reasonably placed under a well-defined category in view of the scheme underlying the detailed provisions in the said Act. It is well settled that Article 14 does not abhor a reasonable classification provided the basis of the classification has a rational relation to the object to be achieved by the Act. Here the object of the Improvement Act being improvement of the towns covers a specific, though a wide, field as may be evidenced by the elaborate provisions for preparation and implementation of schemes by the Trust under the said Act.Leaving aside the case of companies, which are dealt with under different provisions, the Government under the Acquisition Act acquires land for public purposes without the preliminary requirements of any schemes for utilisation of the particular land. On the other hand, under the Improvement Act there is a statutory obligation upon the trusts first to frame appropriate schemes in which case the matter is likely to take air and the public as well as the land owners may benefit materially from knowledge of acquisition prior to the actual notification under Section 36 as against a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act which appears in the gazette all of a sudden. This pre-acquisition difference of procedure is significant as the material date for determination of compensation in either case is the publication of the notification under Section 36 and Section 4 respectively. This fact is of great relevance as the real grievance in these appeals is against the denial of a right of appeal against the decision of the Tribunal appertaining to the domain of possibility of enhancement of compensation in appeals.Although acquisition under the Acquisition Act is also generally for public purpose, the character of the acquisition under the Improvement Act is different and the difference has a definite and intimate nexus with the principal object of the Act, namely, improvement of towns which is the dominant purpose. No valid exception can, therefore, be taken to adoptation of the Acquisition Act with modifications to suit the requirements of the Improvement Act and in particular to the deletion of the provisions of appeal under Section 54 of the Acquisition Act. Acquisition of land under the Improvement Act admits of a reasonable basis of classification and Section 59 (a) is therefore, not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.7. Again denial of the right of appeal available in the case of acquisition under the Acquisition Act does not make Section 59 (a) ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. The Improvement Act constitutes a Tribunal with two assessors unlike in the Acquisition Act. The President of the Tribunal shall be a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. One of the assessors is appointed by the State Government and the other assessor is appointed by the Municipal Committee and on failure to do so by the Committee, by the State Government The legislature by making the order of the Tribunal final under Section 59 (d) seeks to avoid delay in the course of litigation to defeat the purpose of the schemes framed under the Act. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and mere denial or taking away of such a right under the law cannot be considered as an infringement of a parsons fundamental right. The first submission of the reamed counsel cannot, therefore, be accepted.8. With regard to the second submission, Mr. Sen submits that the Tribunal has taken into account only the sale deeds that have been produced in the cases executed prior to the date of the notification under Section 36, namely, September 16, 1960. According to counsel the Tribunal also took into account sale deeds executed within five years before that date but refused to take into consideration the sale deeds executed after the said date of notification. This, says the learned counsel, is absolutely unreasonable and is a wrong principle which the Tribunal has adopted in determining compensation under the Act. We are unable to accept this submission. Under Section 23 of the Acquisition Act, as amended in 1923, the Court has to take into consideration the market value of the land at the date of publication of the notification under Section 4,(1) of that Act. Under para 10 of the Schedule to the Improvement Act, the Court has to take into consideration under Section 23 (1) of the Acquisition Act the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 36 of the Improvement Act, in the present case, which is not one of acquisition under Section 32 of the Improvement Act.The notification under Section 36 in the present case being of September 16, 1960, that is the material date which should be reckoned for pun poses of determining compensation. It is well known that once a notification for acquisition is published people start upon various speculations and the future potentiality of the land becomes very important and that affects the price of the land sold in the area sought to be acquired or in close proximity to it and this rise in potential value has a definite connection with the issuance of the notification for acquisition of the land. The sale that takes place after the date of a notification under Section 36, as distinct from one under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, cannot be taken as a reasonable guide for determination of compensation under Section 23 of the Acquisition Act as amended by the Improvement Act.The Tribunal has, therefore, not adopted any unreasonable principles in ignoring the sales that have taken place after the date of notification under Section 36. The second submission of the learned counsel also fails.9. With regard to the third and last submission of the appellants we are unable to interfere with the quantum of compensation when no case of gross injustice and discrimination has been made out on the facts and circumstances taken into account by the Tribunal.