Case: K. Narasimhah Vs. H. C. Singri Gowda

2. The appellant was elected as the President of Holenarsipur Municipality on September 11, 1962. At a special general meeting of the Municipal Council held on October 14, 1963, a resolution was passed in the following terms:-This Council has no confidence in the Municipal President of Holenarsipur Municipality3. On November 2, 1963 Mr. Narasimhiah, the President of the Council applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of an appropriate writ quashing the proceedings of the meeting which culminated in the resolution of no confidence against him. Prayers were made also for some consequential reliefs4. Holenarsipur Municipality has twenty Councillors. Thirteen out of them sent a request to the President to convene a special general meeting to discuss a resolution expressing no confidence in him as President. This request was handed over to the President on 25th September, 1963. As however he did not take any steps for convening the meeting the Vice President acted in the matter-calling a meeting to discuss the resolution to express no confidence in the President. A notice under the Vice-Presidents signature stating that it was proposed to hold a special general body meeting of the Municipality on the 14th October 1963 at 10 A. M. in the office premises and asking the members to be present in time was served on the Councillors. One copy of the notice was also posted up at the Municipal Office as required by S. 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The notice bore the date 10th October 1963. On fifteen of the twenty Councillors the notice was personally served on that very date, i.e., the 10th October. On three of the Councillors, viz., the President Narasimhiah, Mr. Dasappa and Mr. Sanniah, the notice was served on the 13th October. It was served on Councillor Mirza Mohammad Hussain on the 12th October and on the Councillor R. G. Vaidyanatha on the 11th October 19635. When the meeting was held on October 14, 1963, nineteen of the twenty Councillors were present. The President, Mr. Narasimhiah was among them. He claimed to preside over the meeting. But, ultimately, he appears to have left the meeting. The meeting was then held under the presidentship of the Vice-President Mr. Singri Gowda. The no-confidence motion against the President was moved and was passed, fifteen members having voted for it6. In challenging the legality of the proceedings of this meeting of the 14th October and the validity of the resolution of no confidence passed there, the petitioner urged three principal grounds. The first is that the requisite three days notice was not served on all the members and so the meeting was not validly held. The second ground urged was that the meeting cannot be said to be properly held as he was not allowed to preside and the Vice-President presided, and thus S. 24(1) (a) of the Act was contravened. Thirdly, it was urged that the requisition for moving the resolution of no confidence did not comply with the proviso to S. 23(9) of the Act as 15 days notice was not given of the intention to move the resolution7. The High Court held that on the materials before it, it was not possible to pronounce as to the circumstances under which the Vice-President presided at the meeting. So the High Court rejected the contention that there was any contravention of S. 24(1) (a) of the Act. The case made in the petition that 15 days notice had not been given of the intention to move the resolution does not appear to have been pressed at the hearing; as there is no mention in the judgment of any such argument. On the question whether the failure to serve three days notice of the meeting on all the Councillors, the High Court followed its own decision in another Writ Petn. No. 2280 of 1963 (Mys) and rejected the petitioners contention. The judgment in Writ Petn. No. 2280 of 1963 (Mys) which was produced before us shows that the High Court took the view that as the notices were sent on the 10th October they must be held to have been given on that date even though they were actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th; but apart from that the High Court was of opinion that the provision about three days notice was only directory and not mandatory and so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution.

Court's reasoning:
As regards the petitioners contention that the meeting was not held in accordance with law as he was not allowed to preside, we are of opinion, on a consideration of what material there is on the record, that it was after he left the meeting that the Vice-President took the chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved and passed. There can therefore be no question of any contravention of the requirement that the President shall preside9. There is, in our opinion, no substance also in the contention that the proviso to S. 23(9) was contravenedWe find it difficult to agree with the High Court that sending the notice amounts to giving the noticeAdmittedly, the notice was signed by more thand of the whole number of Councillors. It is said, however, that fifteen days notice of the intention to move the resolution was not given. This argument which Mr. Iyengar addressed to us but which does not appear to have been urged before the Highs on the assumption that fifteen days notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given not only to the President but also to the other Councillors. We do not think that that assumption is justified. In our opinion, what is required is that fifteen days notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given to the President. In other words, all that is required is that before the resolution is actually moved the President has got fifteen days notice. In the present case, the meeting was held on October 14, and the President received the notice on the 25th September. There was thus more than 15 days notice given to him11.Giving of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given. In the eye of law however giving is complete in many matters where it has been offered to a person but not accepted by him. Tendering of a notice is in law therefore giving of a notice even though the person to whom it is tendered refuses to accept it. We can find however no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person with a legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was wrong in thinking that the notices were given to all the Councillors on the 10th October. In our opinion, the notice given to five of the Councillors was of less than three clear daysThe use of the word shall is not conclusive on the question. As in all the other matters of statutory construction the decision of this question depends on the ascertainment of the legislatures intention. Was it the legislatures intention in making the provision that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law? That is the question to be answered. To ascertain the intention the Court has to examine carefully the object of the statute, the consequence that may follow from insisting on a strict observance of the particular provision and above all the general scheme of the other provisions of which it forms a partWe see considerable force in this argument. The very fact that while three clear days notice is not to be given of all special general meetings and for some such meetings notice only of such shorter period as is reasonable has to be given justifies the conclusion that the three clear days mentioned in the section was given by the legislature as only a measure of what it considered reasonable19. The existence of this provision in S. 36 is a further reason for thinking that the provision as regards any motion or proposition of which notice must be given in S. 27(3) is only directory and not mandatory20. We are, therefore, of opinion that the fact that some of the Councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did not by itself make the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution passed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated, nineteen of the twenty Councillors attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no-confidence against the appellant. There is thus absolutely no reason for thinking that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the irregularity in the service of notice21. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the failure to give three clear days notice to some of the Councillors did not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no confidence passed there against the appellant.