Case: Patna Electric Supply Co., Ltd., Patna Vs. Bali Rai &amp; Another

4. The respondents carried an appeal against the said order of the Industrial Tribunal granting the appellants application under S. 33 of the Act before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. Calcutta. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the appellant before the Labour Appellate Tribunal that no substantial question of law was involved and as such the appeal was not maintainable. The Labour Appellate Tribunal was of the opinion that the appellant had alleged misconduct against respondents and could not be allowed to adopt the expedient of terminating their services by giving notice for the requisite period or payment of salary in lieu of notice and that the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, ought not to have entertained the application for amendment of the prayer of the original application in which the appellant wanted to dismiss the respondents for misconduct. This according to the Labour Appellate Tribunal was a substantial question of law and it therefore entertained the appeal. The Labour Appellate Tribunal thereafter considered whether the appellant had made out a case under Cl. 17 (b) (viii) of the Standing Orders and came to the conclusion that the respondents had not been guilty of any misconduct within the meaning of that clause and that therefore the order made by the Industrial Tribunal granting permission to the appellant to terminate the services of the respondents was liable to be set aside. In so far, however, as after obtaining the permission from the Industrial Tribunal the appellant had given notice of discharge to the respondents, the Labour Appellate Tribunal expressed its inability to give the respondents any substantial relief either in the shape of re-instatement or compensation5. The appellant has come up in appeal before us against this order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

Court's reasoning:
If the appellant had been actuated by any oblique motives and wanted to evade the consequences of its not having held a proper enquiry after submitting a charge-sheet to the respondents one could have understood the criticism made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in regard to the same. The Industrial Tribunal, however, expressly recorded the finding that the application for leave to discharge the respondents from its employ was bona fide and what the appellant did by making the application dated 6-12-1952, was actuated by an honest motive of exercising its right to discharge the respondents under Cl. 14 (a) of the Standing Orders instead of visiting upon the respondents the penalty of dismissing them from its employ under clause 17 (b) (viii), thereof.The discharge of the respondents was a discharge simpliciter in exercise of the rights of the employer under Cl. 14 (a) of the Standing Orders and was not a punitive discharge under Cl. 17 (b) (viii) thereof and if it was merely a discharge simpliciter, then, no objection could be taken to the same and the appellant would be well within its rights to do so, provided, however, that it was not arbitrary or capricious but was bona fide.The only question relevant to be considered by the Industrial Tribunal would be that in taking the step which it did the appellant was not guilty of any unfair labour practice or victimization. If the Industrial Tribunal did not come to a conclusion adverse to the appellant on these counts, it would have no jurisdiction to refuse the permission asked for by the appellant. Once the Industrial Tribunal was of opinion that the application dated 6-12-1952, and the discharge of the respondents for which the permission of the Industrial Tribunal was sought were in the honest exercise of the appellants rights, no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, could arise in the appeal filed by the respondents against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal was clearly in error when it entertained the appealThe argument that the discharge of the respondents though patently it was a discharge simpliciter was, in substance, retrenchment within the meaning of the definition contained in S. 2 (oo) of the Act is equally untenable, for the simple reason that the term "retrenchment" was for the first time defined in the manner in which it has been done by an Ordinance promulgated in October 1953 which was followed by Act 43 of 1953 which was published in the Gazette of India on 23-12-1953. The Industrial Tribunal made its order granting the permission under S. 33 of the Act on 14-5-1953, so that, this definition of the term "retrenchment" could not apply to the facts of the present case. If, therefore, at the relevant period the discharge simpliciter could not be deemed to be retrenchment of the respondents by the appellant, the decision of the Industrial Tribunal could not be said to be one in respect of any of the matters specified in sub-s. (1) (b) of S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. In that view also no appeal could lie from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We are, therefore, of opinion that no appeal lay from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order made by the Industrial Tribunal granting the appellant permission to discharge the respondents under S. 33 of the Act and that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is liable to be set aside.