Case: Sunder Lal Vs. Paramsukhdas

Before dealing with the above contentions it is necessary to state the relevant facts. Sunderlal, appellant, owned some land (field No. 22) in Mouzah Umari Taluq and District Akola. This field had been leased to Khushal Singh under a registered lease for 5 years commencing from April 1, 1954. The field was acquired by the Government. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award on January 30, 1960, and assessed the total compensation at Rupees 2B,105.58, and apportioned the amount equally between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. On February 17, 1960, the Land Acquisition Officer noted the following regarding Khushal SinghKhushal Singh S/o Tolaram(a) According to letter No. 154/60 of 15th February 1980 from the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Khamgaon, and the attachment order issued by that Court, in C. S. No. 4-B/1958, the amount to be paid to Khushal Singh Tolaram be kept in Revenue Deposit.(b) One Sunderlal minor guardian father Madanlal Harjimal, of Akola has presented an objection-petition against this payment.Sunderlal filed an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, claiming more compensation and also complaining in regard to the apportionment of the amount of compensation between him and Khushal Singh. According to him Khushal Singh was not a protected tenant and his period of lease having expired, he was not at all entitled to any portion of the amount of compensation. A reference under Section 18 was made on June 27, l961, and this reference was numbered Land Acquisition Case No. 189 of 1961. Khushal Singh also applied for a reference and he claimed enhancement of compensation and challenged the basis of apportionment adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Collector made the reference and it was numbered Land Acquisition No. 190 of 1961.4. Before we deal with what happened before the Civil Judge, it is necessary to give some facts about the litigation between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. On July 21, 1956, Sunderlal filed a suit (Civil Suit No. 133-B of 1956) against Khushal Singh for rent due on January 1, 1955, and January 1, 1956, in the Court of Civil Judge, Akola. On July 22, 1957, the Civil Court referred the matter to the Revenue Court under Section 16-A of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. On July 25, 1958 the Sub-Divisional Officer Akola, answered the reference (Revenue Case No. 79 of 1957-58 holding that Khushal Singh was not a protected lessee. On appeal, the Deputy Collector, Akola, held, on October 8, 1959, that Khushal Singh was a protected lessee. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal confirmed the order of the Deputy Collector on March 22, 1960. Sunderlal filed a petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was numbered Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. On February 8, 1961, a compromise petition (Civil Application No. 163 of 1961) was filed in the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. It was stated in the compromise petition that Khushal Singh did not wish to dispute Sunderlals contention that the land was leased for horticulture purposes and that he had not acquired the status of a protected lessee, as defined in the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. Khushal Singh further stated that he had no objection to the quashing of the orders of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal dated March 22, 1960, and of the Deputy Collector dated October 8, 1959.5. On March 11, 1961, Paramsukhdas flied an application (Civil Application No. 246 of l96l) in the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960, claiming to be heard. He alleged that he had obtained a decree against Khushal Singh and started execution proceedings for Rs. 20,013 and the amount of Rs. 13,644.27 ordered to be paid to Khushal Singh as compensation had been attached by him for the satisfaction of his decree. He alleged that Khushal Singh and Sunderlal had male fide entered into an agreement and had filed a compromise application asking for quashing of the orders of the Revenue Courts with the sole object of setting at naught the attachment and execution of his decree. He prayed, therefore, for leave to appear in the case as a party vitally interested. He further prayed that the compromise application should not be entertained and should be dismissed in the interest of justice.6. It appears that on March 20, 1961, this application came up for hearing before the High Court. Paramsukhdas, however, took three weeks more time from the High Court, which was granted to him. It further appears that Paramsukdas withdrew the said amount of Rs. 13,644.27 towards satisfaction of his decree. On April 18, 1961, he filed another application (Civil Application No: 365/61) wherein he stated that he had withdrawn the amount and alleged that he was now an interested party, and, therefore, he should be joined as a party. On the same date, his Advocate, Mr. Sohoni, gave an undertaking in the following termsSohoni undertakes to hold the moneys withdrawn by his client subject to the orders of this Court on this application."On August 3, 1961, the High Court disposed of Civil Application No. 163 of 1961, Civil Application No. 246 of 1961 and Civil Application No. 365 of 1961. The High Court held that in the circumstances"we do not consider it advisable to proceed in this matter ourselves. The parties will be at liberty to file the compromise petition in the Civil Court where proceedings are pending on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act."The High Court, in order to safeguard the interests of the parties kept these proceedings pending till the decision on the compromise petition by the Civil Court. The compromise petition was directed to be returned to Sunderlal.7. On September 18, 1961, Sunderlal and Khushal Singh filed applications for compromise in both the Land Acquisition references. Paramsukhdas filed applications under Order 22, Rule 10, read with Section 151, C. P. C., praying that his name be substituted or added as an applicant. He alleged that the compromise was fraudulent and that Khushal Singh was abandoning the case, and as an attaching creditor he was entitled to be added a party to the case. Both Khushal Singh and Sunderlal objected, and by two orders dated April 9, 1962, the Civil Judge rejected the applications of Paramsukhdas. He framed the issueParamsukhdas can be permitted to be substituted or added as a party to these twoheld that admittedly Paramsukhdas had not approached the Land Acquisition Officer in the proceedings in which the award was passed on January 30, 1960. He had not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer as a person interested in the land or the compensation that would be determined by the authorities. He further held that under the circumstances Paramsukhdas was not one of the persons interested in the acquired land before the Collector, and he also could not be one of the persons interested in the objections under Section 20 (b) of the Act. After referring to Manjur Ahmed v. Rajlakshmi Dasi, AIR 1956 Cal 263   and Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Mukherjee, (1907) ILR 34 Cal 451,   he held that the scope of the reference under Section 18 was limited and new questions not covered by the reference could not be entertained. He reviewed his orders on July 6, 1962, but nothing turns on that in the present appeals.8. Paramsukhdas filed two revisions, Nos. 294 and 295 of l962, before the High Court on June 30, 1962. On August 22, 1962, Sunderlal filed an application for withdrawal of Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. The High Court, on September 24, 1962, orderedmain petition dismissed as withdrawn. Nothe High Court a preliminary objection was raised in Civil Revisions Nos. 294 and 295 of l962, that revisions were not competent because appeals lay against the orders of the Civil Judge. The High Court overruled this objection. Regarding the claim of Paramsukhdas to be added as a party, the High Court held that his applications showed that he was not claiming any interest in the lands themselves but was only claiming an interest in the compensation for the land which had been deposited in the Court for payment to the person concerned, and as such was a person interested as defined in Section 3 (b) of the Act, and he would, therefore, be entitled to claim that he should be allowed to join as a party.

Court's reasoning:
It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas is a "person interested" within Section 3 (b) of the Act because he claims an interest in compensation.But before he can be made a party in a reference it has to be seen whether he comes within Section 20 (b) and Section 21 of the Act.11. The scheme of the Act seems to be to first deal with persons who are interested in land. These persons are heard under Section 5A of theprovisions of the Act, including Ss. 20 and 21, do not prescribe that his claim to an interest in compensation should be "as compensation", as urged by Mr. Desai. This is really a contradictory statement. For, a fortiori, he has no interest in land, and compensation is given for interests in land. He can never claim compensation qua compensation for what he claims is an interest in the compensation to be awarded. This is not to say that A person claiming an interest in compensation may not claim that the compensation awarded for the acquired land is low, if it affects hishas not been urged before us that Paramsukhdas was a party before the Collector and that having not applied for a reference under Section 18 he is now debarred from being added as athree cases are distinguishable inasmuch as they are dealing with the cases of persons who having a right to seek a reference failed to claim that reference but sought to raise the point in a reference made at the instance of another party.It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections, within Section 21 He was accordingly entitled to be made a party. In the result we uphold the order made by the High Court in thisare unable to accept this submission. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under Section 21 should be gone into by the Court.21. This leaves only the two points regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court. In our view, the High Court is quite right in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge dated April 9, 1962, were not awards within Section 54 of the Act. The awards had still to be made. If no appeal lay, then the revisions were competent and the High Court was right in entertaining the revisions because the Civil Judge had either refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction.