Case: Sultan Singh Vs. State of Haryana

nt was married to the deceased Lavjeet Kaur on 27th February, 1990. On 17th June, 1994, PW 4-Gurmeet Singh lodged First Information Report to the effect that Lavjeet Kaur was burnt to death by theand his mother. It was further stated that she was harassed for dowry soon before her death. Apart from other demands of dowry, it was stated that 5-6 days before the death, thevisited the parental house of the deceased and made a demand offor purchase of land. Since the said demand was not met, he left the house under protest. On the fateful day, when he (PW-4) visited the house of thehe found that themother poured oil from aon the deceased and theignited the fire. He came to his parents and thereafter he went to the Civil Hospital where he learnt that the accused was referred to the PGI Chandigarh but she died on the way.3. On the basis of this First Information Report, the investigation was conducted by PW 6-ASI, Madan Pal Singh and after investigation, theand his mother (who has been acquitted by the High Court) were sent up for trial.4. The prosecution examined PW 4-Gurmeet Singh, brother of the deceased, PW 5-Ujjagar Singh, father of the deceased, apart from evidence of Investigating Officer and the Medical Officer and other evidence.5. Thedenied the allegations and took the plea that the deceased caught fire accidentally while working on a stove. He had gone to the school near their house for giving his photo for the Identity Card for voting purpose. When he learnt about the accident, he immediately took Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital.6. The trial Court held that though the version of PW 4-Gurmeet Singh and PW 5-Ujjagar Singh that they had seen thesetting the deceased on fire was not reliable, their reversion of demand of dowry soon before the death could not be rejected. Since her death was within seven years of marriage, demand of dowry was proved and the death was under the circumstances other than normal, presumptionSection 113B of the Indian Evidence Act could be raised. Thus, the commission of offencesSections 498-A and 304-B,was proved. It was held that story of bursting of stove was not reliable. The relevant discussion in this regard, is as followsthe sworn testimony of PWs Gurmeet Singh and Ujjagar Singh discussed above it has become very clear that deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused persons for the demand of dowry right from the beginning of her marriage till death. Even soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons when father of the deceased could not pay a sum ofto accused Sultan Singh 5/6 days prior to the death of deceased. Deceased was married with accused Sultan Singh on 27.2.1990 and she died on 17.6.1994 on account of burn injuries at the matrimonial home. The fact that the deceased died on account of burn injuries is well proved from the medical evidence consisting of the statements of Dr. S.K. Gupta who medico-legally examined the deceased immediately on arrival at Civil Hospital Ambala Cantt., and also of Dr. Gajinder Yadav PW-3 who conducted the post mortem examination of the dead body of deceased. The deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur aged about 22 years had suffered 70% burn injuries and died on account of the same. Thus, it has been well established that the death of deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur was caused by burns and she died unnatural death. It has also been established that she died within a period of seven years of her marriage. As already discussed by me that it has also been established that the deceased was also subjected to cruelty by the accused persons for the demand of dowry soon before her death. Thus in view of the provisions contained in Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act it can very well be presumed that the accused persons have caused dowry death. Since the deceased Lavjeet Kaur was at the house of the accused and therefore now it is for the accused persons to explain how she died an unnatural death within a period of aboutyears of her marriage.The explanation furnished by the accused persons with respect to the death of Smt. Lavjeet Kaur in the form of their defence version to the effect that the deceased died just by mere accident as she caught fire on account of bursting of stove when she was cooking meals cannot be accepted. The investigating officer ASI Madan Pal took into possession a plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling kerosene oil and half burnt Gadda from inside the room of the house. If Smt. Lavjeet Kaur had been caught fire while working on the stove I fail to understand as to how the Gadda lying in the bed room of the house would have caught fire. Secondly if the stove would have burst the same must have been found lying at the place of occurrence, but the same was not available to the Investigating Officer when he visited the spot. It clearly negatives the defence version that Smt. Lavjeet Kaur caught fire on account of bursting of stove. The argument of the learned defence counsel to the effect that PW Gurmeet Singh has deposed that he had seen the accused setting Smt. Lavjeet Kaur on fire by sprinkling kerosene oil upon her in the court yard of the house does not effect the prosecution case in any way, because I have already observed in the earlier part of the judgment that the deposition of PW Gurmeet Singh so far as he has given an eye version account cannot be believed that therefore the story of the court yard put forward by him automatically goes. However, the fact remains that the Investigating Officer found the half burnt Gadda Ex.P-2 and the plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling kerosene inside the bed room of the house. Thus, the non-availability of the burst stove on the spot itself speaks that the defence version is nothing but is simply made up story and cannot be believed.The medical evidence as pointed out by the learned defence counsel also does not help the accused persons in any way. It has been deposed by Dr. Gajinder Yadav that there were deep burns on legs and chest of the deceased. It has come in the statements of both the medical officers that the deceased suffered 70% burn injuries and died as a result thereof. It has been categorically stated by Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted the post-mortem examination that the deceased died on account of burn injuries which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. I fail to understand as to what help the accused could take from the statements of the medical officers by pointing out that the Medical Officers have deposed that there was no smell of kerosene from the body and clothes of the deceased. If it was so then it also smashes the defence version, because if the deceased had caught fire by bursting of stove then also there must be smell of kerosene oil on her clothes. In my view, the smell of kerosene might have evaporated in between the time of occurrence till the post mortem examination because the occurrence had taken place on 17.6.1994 at about noon time, whereas the post mortem examination was conducted on 18.6.1994.Further, the deceased was unconscious when she was admitted in the hospital and therefore, it is not known how the deceased could tell Dr. S.K. Gupta that she had caught fire while working on a stove. Another person from whom Dr. S.K. Gupta derived this information was one Amar Nath a private Medical practitioner, who accompanied the deceased to the hospital. However, Shri Amar Nath was not produced in defence to ascertain whether he had told this fact to the Medical Officer and if so how he acquired the said knowledge whether from the deceased orin the ruka Ex.PC sent by Dr. S.K. Gupta to the police there is no mentioning of the bursting of stove, nor it has been mentioned as to how he learnt that the deceased caught fire while working on a stove. It has simply been mentioned that the deceased was alleged to have sustained burns 70% while working on a stove. The wordis missing in this ruka, whereas, it was so stated by Dr. S.K. Gupta when he appeared in the witness box. If the story of bursting of stove came to his knowledge it is not known why he omitted to mention this fact in his ruka Ex. PC sent to the police. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances I am of the definite view that the statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta to the effect that there was the history of burns allegedly sustained by the deceased due to bursting of stove while cooking food is not legally sound because neither Amar Nath was produced, nor deceased could speak anything before her death.nt preferred an appeal. The High Court upheld the conviction of thewhile acquitting his mother Mohinder Kaur, the co-accused, of the chargebut upheld her convictionIt was observed that the allegation of demand of dowry soon before the death was only against theand not against his mother. Rejecting the defence plea of accidental burning, the High Court observed as underaccused or their persons might have accompanied Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital. The accused are naturally interested to save themselves from legal punishment and such as the said history might have been given by them or Amar Nath to save the accused. PW-2 Dr. S.K. Gupta has no personal knowledge about the occurrence and has stated that there was history of burns sustained by Lavjeet Kaur due to bursting of stove while cooking food. So, that history was given by the accused or Amar Nath, accompanying the injured to the hospital.One another circumstance which militates against the case of the accused is that the police found the blood sustained Gadda in the room where the occurrence is stated to have taken place and not in the kitchen, as per stand of the accused. That fact belied the stand of accused.The statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that history was given by the patient does not appeal todeceased was having 70% burn injuries and as such she was not in a position to narrate the occurrence. The police had no reason to change the place of occurrence from the kitchen to the room as shown in the rough site plan. There were singeing of the skull hair of Lavjeet Kaur besides having burn injuries on the chest and lower part of the body. The fact of bursting of stove and giving the case history by Lavjeet Kaur is not mentioned by Dr. S.K. Gupta in the record. The doctor is not supposed to orally know all the facts. It seems that Dr. S.K. Gupta has stated that the history of the case was given by the patient simply to favour the accused, moreso when there is nothing in this regard on the record. So, no reliance can be placed on the statement made by Dr. S.K. Gupta, in this regard.PW-3 Dr. Gajinder Yadav, has stated that there was probability of the deceased receiving burn injuries by accidental fire but he has not stated it with confidence that in all probability, the death could be accidental, in the present case. That doctor has not seen the other circumstantial evidence at the spot before arriving at the conclusion. So, the learned trial Court has rightly held that Lavjeet Kaur, deceased, has died due to unnatural injuries and not by accidental burn

Court's reasoning:
A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-Bshows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview ofoccurring otherwise than in normalis very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-Bare pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution.is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumptionSection 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expressionused in the substantive Section 304-Band Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expressionis not defined. A reference to the expressioned in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goodsafter the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for theirThe determination of the period which can come within the termis left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expressionld normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.Having regard to the entirety of material, we do not find any ground to interfere with the concurrent finding recorded by the courts below that it was not a case of accidental death but a death taking place in circumstances other than normal.der Section113B of the Indian Evidence Acthas been rightly invoked and the offence against thehas been proved. There is no tangible circumstance to rebut the3B of the Indian Evidence Actis attracted only in case of suicidal or homicidal death and not in case of an accidentalis true that in case of accidental death presumption3B of the Indian Evidence Actis not available but there is no reason to hold that in the presentrn injuries were by accident.Applying this principle, it is clear that the earlier law was not sufficient to check dowry deaths hence aforesaid stringent provisions were brought in, so that persons committing such inhuman crimes on married women should not escape, as evidence of a direct nature is not readily available except of the circumstantial kind. Hence it is that interpretation which suppresses the mischief, subserves the objective and advances the remedy, which would be acceptable. The objective is that men committing such crimes should not escape punishment. Hence stringent provisions were brought in by shifting the burden onto the accused by bringing in the deemed clause. Asthe definition ofwas amended with effect fromto include the period even after the marriage.16. The offence alleged against thewhich makesitself punishable. Demand neither conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under the clutches of law. When Sectionand ofit refers to thety or valuable security as referred to inthe definition ofunder the 1961 Act. It was argued on behalf of theand ofscooter or fridge would not be a demand for dowry. We find from the evidence on record that within a few days after thethe deceased wastortured, maltreated and harassed for not bringing the aforesaid articles in marriage. Hence the demand is in connection with marriage. The argument that there is noy, in the present case, has no force. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides, circumstantial evidence plays an important role and inferences can be drawn on the basis of such evidence. That could be either direct or indirect. It is significant that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, was also amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, under which it is an offence to demand dowry directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride. The wordreferred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances of each case. The interpretation that theseeks, that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary to the mandate and object of the Act.definition is to be interpreted with the other provisions of the Act including Section 3, which refers to giving or taking dowry and Section 4 which deals with penalty for demanding dowry, under the 1961 Act and the Indian Penal Code. This makes it clear that evenry on other ingredients being satisfied is punishable. This leads to the inference, when persistent demands for TV and scooter are made from the bride after marriage or from her parents, it would constitute to be in connection with the marriage and it would be a case ofry within the meaning of Section. It is not always necessary that there be any agreement foris a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:(1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry.(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.