Case: Ruchi Majoo Vs. Sanjeev Majoo

Conflict of laws and jurisdictions in the realm of private international law is a phenomenon that has assumed greater dimensions with the spread of Indian diasporas across the globe. A large number of our young and enterprising countrymen are today looking for opportunities abroad. While intellectual content and technical skills of these youngster find them lucrative jobs in distant lands, complete assimilation with the culture, the ways of life and the social values prevalent in such countries do not come easy. The result is that in very many cases incompatibility of temperament apart, diversity of backgrounds and inability to accept the changed lifestyle often lead to matrimonial discord that inevitably forces one or the other party to seek redress within the legal system of the country which they have adopted in pursuit of their dreams. Experience has also shown that in a large number of cases one of the parties may return to the country of his or her origin for family support, shelter and stability. Unresolved disputes in such situations lead to legal proceedings in the country of origin as well as in the adoptive country. Once that happens issues touching the jurisdiction of the courts examining the same as also comity of nations are thrown up forpresent happens to be one such case where legal proceedings have engaged the parties in a bitter battle for the custody of their only child Kush, aged about 11 years born in America hence a citizen of that country by birth. These proceedings included an action filed by the father- respondent in this appeal, before the American Court seeking divorce from the respondent-wife and also custody of master Kush. An order passed by the Superior court of California, County of Ventura in America eventually led to the issue of a red corner notice based on allegations of child abduction levelled against the mother who like the father of the minor child is a person of Indian origin currently living with her parents in Delhi. The mother took refuge under an order dated 4th April, 2009 passed by the Addl. District Court at Delhi in a petition filed under Sections 7, 8, 10, 11 of the Guardians and Wards Act granting interim custody of the minor to her. Aggrieved by the said order the father of the minor filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Delhi. By the order impugned in this appeal the High Court allowed that petition, set aside the order passed by the District Court and dismissed the custody case filed by the mother primarily on the ground that the Court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain the same as the minor was not ordinarily residing at Delhi - a condition precedent for the Delhi Court to exercise jurisdiction. The High Court further held that all issues relating to the custody of child ought to be agitated and decided by the Court in America not only because that Court had already passed an order to that effect in favour of the father, but also because all the three parties namely, the parents of the minor and the minor himself were American citizens. The High Court buttressed its decision on the principle of comity of courts and certain observations made by this Court in some of the decided cases to which we shall presentlyAPPEAL NO. 1184 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.10362 of 2010) In this appeal the appellant has challenged the correctness of an order dated 22nd September, 2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi, quashing FIR No.97 of 2009 registered against respondent-husband and three others in Police Station, Crime against Women Cell, Nanakpura, New Delhi, for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406 read with Section 34IPC. The High Court has recapitulated the relevant facts and found that the appellant-complainant is a citizen of USA and had all along lived in USA with her son and husband, away from her in laws. The High Court has, on the basis of the statement made by the appellant in California Court, further found that the alleged scene of occurrence was in USA and that her in-laws had no say in the matrimonial life of the couple. The appellant had further stated that all her jewelry was lying in the couples house in USA and no part of it was with her in-laws as was subsequently stated to be the position in the FIR lodged by the appellant. No locker number of the bank was disclosed in the FIR nor any date of the opening of locker or the jewelry items lying in it. The particulars of the bank in which the alleged locker was taken by him were also not given in the FIR. The High Court further held that the appellant had not lodged any report although the appellants parents in- laws were alleged to have stated that the jewelry items were not commensurate with the status of their family as early as in the year 1996. The High Court in that view held that no offence under Section 498A and 406IPC, was made out against her in-laws on the basis of the allegations made by the appellant in the FIR.

Court's reasoning:
he appellants case is that although the couple and their son had initially planned to return to U.S.A. that decision was taken with the mutual consent of the parties changed to allow the appellant to stay back in India and to explore career options here. Master Kush was also according to that decision of his parents, to stay back and be admitted to a school in Delhi. The decision on both counts, was free from any duress whatsoever, and had the effect of shifting the "ordinary residence" of the appellant and her son Kush from the place they were living in America to Delhi. Not only this the respondent father of the minor, had upon his return to America sent E-mails, reiterating the decision and offering his full support to the appellant. This is according to the appellant clear from the text of the E-mails exchanged between the parties and which are self-explanatory as to the context in which they arerespondents case on the contrary is that he was coerced to put in writing a tentative arrangement on the ground of appellant trying career options in dental medicine at Delhi and minor Kush allowed to stay at Delhi for the year 2008. This letter was, according to the respondent, obtained under deceit, pressure, threat and coercion. In his application challenging the jurisdiction of the Delhi Court the respondent further stated that even if it be assumed that the appellant and Kush had stayed back in India with the permission of the respondent, the same stood withdrawn. To the same effect was the stand taken by the respondent in his petition under Article 227 filed before thisis evident from the statement and the pleadings of the parties that the question whether the decision to allow the appellant and Kush to stay back in Delhi instead of returning to America was a voluntary decision as claimed by the appellant or a decision taken by the respondent under duress as alleged by him was a seriously disputed question of facts, a satisfactory answer to which could be given either by the District Court where the custody case was filed or by the High Court only after the parties had been given opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their respectivethe light of the above, we asked Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel for the respondent whether the respondent would adduce evidence to substantiate his charge of duress and coercion as vitiating circumstances for the Court to exclude the letter in question from consideration. Mr. Shishodia argued on instructions that the respondent had no intention of leading any evidence in support of his case that the letter was obtained under duress. In fairness to him we must mention that he beseeched us to decide the question regarding jurisdiction of the Court on the available material without remanding the matter to the Trial Court for recording of evidence from either party. Mr. Shishodia also give us an impression as though any remand on the question of duress and coercion would be futile because the respondent father was not willing to go beyond what he has already done in pursuit of his claim to the custody of the minor. In that view of the matter, therefore, we are not remanding the case for recording of evidence as we were at one stage of hearing thought of doing. We are instead taking a final view on the question of jurisdiction of the Delhi Court, to entertain the application on the basis of the available material. This material comprises the letter dated 19th July, 2008 written by the respondent and referred to by us earlier and the e- mails exchanged between the parties. That the letter in question was written by the respondent is not in dispute. What is argued is that the letter was written under duress and coercion. There is nothing before us to substantiate that allegation, and in the face of Mr. Shishodias categoric statement that the respondent does not wish to adduce any evidence to prove his charge of coercion and duress, we have no option except to hold that the said charge remainsis difficult to appreciate how the respondent could in the light of the above communications still argue that the decision to allow the appellant and master Kush to stay back in India was taken under any coercion or duress. It is also difficult to appreciate how the respondent could change his mind so soon after the above E-mails and rush to a Court in U.S. for custody of the minor accusing the appellant of illegal abduction, a charge which is belied by his letter dated 19th July, 2008 and the E-mails extracted above. The fact remains that Kush was ordinarily residing with the appellant his mother and has been admitted to a school, where he has been studying for the past nearly three years. The unilateral reversal of a decision by one of the two parents could not change the fact situation as to the minor being an ordinary resident of Delhi, when the decision was taken jointly by both thethe light of what we have stated above, the High Court was not, in our opinion, right in holding that the respondents version regarding the letter in question having been obtained under threat and coercion wasHigh Court appeared to be of the view that if the letter had not been written under duress and coercion there was no reason for the respondent to move a guardianship petition before U.S. Court. That reasoning has not appealed to us. The question whether or not the letter was obtained under duress and coercion could not be decided only on the basis of the institution of proceedings by the respondent in the U.S. Court. If the letter was under duress and coercion, there was no reason why the respondent should not have repudiated the same no sooner he landed in America and the alleged duress and coercion had ceased. Far from doing so the respondent continued to support that decision even when he was far away from any duress and coercion alleged by him till the time he suddenly changed his mind and started accusing the appellant of abduction. The High Court failed to notice these aspects and fell in error in accepting the version of the respondent and dismissing the application filed by the appellant. In the circumstances we answer question no.1 in the negative.Re: Questiondo not propose to burden this judgment by referring to a long line of other decisions which have been delivered on the subject, for they do not in our opinion state the law differently from what has been stated in the decisions already referred to by us. What, however, needs to be stated for the sake of a clear understanding of the legal position is that the cases to which we have drawn attention, as indeed any other case raising the question of jurisdiction of the court to determine mutual rights and obligation of the parties, including the question whether a court otherwise competent to entertain the proceedings concerning the custody of the minor, ought to hold a summary or a detailed enquiry into the matter and whether it ought to decline jurisdiction on the principle of comity of nations or the test of the closest contact evolved by this Court in Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu and Anr. (1984) 3 SCC 698  have arisen either out of writ proceedings filed by the aggrieved party in the High Court or this Court or out of proceedings under the Guardian & Wards Act. Decisions rendered by this Court in Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw and Anr. (1987) 1 SCC 42 , Sarita Sharmas case (supra), V. Ravi Chandrans case (supra), Shilpa Aggarwals case (supra) arose out of proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus. The rest had their origin in custody proceedings launched under the Guardian & Wards Act. Proceedings in the nature of Habeas Corpus are summary in nature, where the legality of the detention of the alleged detenue is examined on the basis of affidavits placed by the parties. Even so, nothing prevents the High Court from embarking upon a detailed enquiry in cases where the welfare of a minor is in question, which is the paramount consideration for the Court while exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction. A High Court may, therefore, invoke its extra ordinary jurisdiction to determine the validity of the detention, in cases that fall within its jurisdiction and may also issue orders as to custody of the minor depending upon how the court views the rival claims, if any, to such custody. The Court may also direct repatriation of the minor child for the country from where he/she may have been removed by a parent or other person; as was directed by this Court in Ravi Chandrans & Shilpa Agarwals cases (supra) or refuse to do so as was the position in Sarita Sharmas case (supra). What is important is that so long as the alleged detenue is within the jurisdiction of the High Court no question of its competence to pass appropriate orders arises. The writ courts jurisdiction to make appropriate orders regarding custody arises no sooner it is found that the alleged detenue is within its territorialcases arising out of proceedings under the Guardian & Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the Court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the Court exercises such jurisdiction. There is thus a significant difference between the jurisdictional facts relevant to the exercise of powers by a writ court on the one hand and a court under the Guardian & Wards Act on the other. Having said that we must make it clear that no matter a Court is exercising powers under the Guardian & Wards Act it can choose to hold a summary enquiry into the matter and pass appropriate orders provided it is otherwise competent to entertain a petition for custody of the minor under Section 9(1) of the Act. This is clear from the decision of this Court in Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde (1998) 1 SCC 112 , which arose out of proceedings under the Guardian & Wardsdoes not require much persuasion for us to hold that the issue whether the Court should hold a summary or a detailed enquiry would arise only if the Court finds that it has the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. If the answer to the question touching jurisdiction is in the negative the logical result has to be an order of dismissal of the proceedings or return of the application for presentation before the Court competent to entertain the same. A Court that has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for custody cannot pass any order or issue any direction for the return of the child to the country from where he has been removed, no matter such removal is found to be in violation of an order issued by a Court in that country. The party aggrieved of such removal, may seek any other remedy legally open to it. But no redress to such a party will be permissible before the Court who finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain thehave while dealing with question No.1 above held that the Court at Delhi was in the facts and circumstances of the case competent to entertain the application filed by the appellant. What needs to be examined is whether the High Court was right in relying upon the principle of comity of courts and dismissing the application. Our answer is in the negative. The reasons are not far to seek. The first and foremost of them being that `comity of courts principle ensures that foreign judgments and orders are unconditionally conclusive of the matter in controversy. This is all the more so where the courts in this country deal with matters concerning the interest and welfare of minors including their custody. Interest and welfare of the minor being paramount, a competent court in this country is entitled and indeed duty bound to examine the matter independently, taking the foreign judgment, if any, only as an input for its final adjudication. Decisions of this Court in Dhanwanti Joshi, and Sarita Sharmas cases, (supra) clearly support that proposition.Secondly, the respondents case that the minor was removed from the jurisdiction of the American Courts in contravention of the orders passed by them, is not factually correct. Unlike V. Ravi Chandrans case (supra), where the minor was removed in violation of an order passed by the American Court there were no proceedings between the parties in any Court in America before they came to India with the minor. Such proceedings were instituted by the respondent only after he had agreed to leave the appellant and the minor behind in India, for the former to explore career options and the latter to get admitted to a school. The charge of abduction contrary to a valid order granting custody is, therefore, untenable.Thirdly, because the minor has been living in India and pursuing his studies in a reputed school in Delhi for nearly three years now. In the course of the hearing of the case, we had an occasion to interact with the minor in our chambers. He appears to be happy with his studies and school and does not evince any interest in returning to his school in America. His concern was more related to the abduction charge and consequent harassment being faced by his mother and maternal grandparents. We shall advert to this aspect a little later, but for the present we only need to mention that the minor appears to be settled in his environment including his school studies and friends. He also holds the respondent responsible for the troubles which his mother is undergoing and is quite critical about the respondent getting married to another woman. Fourthly, because even the respondent does not grudge the appellant getting custody of the minor, provided she returns to America with the minor. Mr. Shishodia was asking to make a solemn statement that the respondent would not, oppose the appellants prayer for the custody of the minor, before the American Court. All that the respondent wants is that the minor is brought up and educated in America, instead of India, as the minor would benefit from the same. The appellant was not willing to accept that proposal, for according to her she has no intentions of returning to that country in the foreseeable future especially after she has had a very traumatic period on account of matrimonial discord with the respondent. Besides, the offer was according to the appellant, only meant to score a point more than giving any real benefit to thethe light of all these circumstances, repatriation of the minor to the United States, on the principle of `comity of courts does not appear to us to be an acceptable option worthy of being exercised at this stage. Dismissal of the application for custody in disregard of the attendant circumstances referred to above was not in our view a proper exercise of discretion by the High Court. Interest of the minor shall be better served if he continued in the custody of his mother the appellant in this appeal, especially when the respondent has contracted a second marriage and did not appear to be keen for having actual custody of the minor. Question No.2 is also for the above reasons answered in the negative.Re. Questiona boy so young in years, these and other expressions suggesting a deep rooted dislike for the father could arise only because of a constant hammering of negative feeling in him against his father. This approach and attitude on the part of the appellant or her parents can hardly be appreciated. What the appellant ought to appreciate is that feeding the minor with such dislike and despire for his father does not serve his interest or his growth as a normal child. It is important that the minor has his fathers care and guidance, at this formative and impressionable stage of his life. Nor can the role of the father in his upbringing and grooming to face the realities of life be undermined. It is in that view important for the childs healthy growth that we grant to the father visitation rights; that will enable the two to stay in touch and share moments of joy, learning and happiness with each other. Since the respondent is living in another continent such contact cannot be for obvious reasons as frequent as it may have been if they were in the same city. But the forbidding distance that separates the two would get reduced thanks to the modern technology in telecommunications. The appellant has been according to the respondent persistently preventing even telephonic contact between the father and the son. May be the son has been so poisoned against him that he does not evince any interest in the father. Be that as it may telephonic contact shall not be prevented by the appellant for any reason whatsoever and shall be encouraged at all reasonable time. Video conferencing may also be possible between the two which too shall not only be permitted but encouraged by thethe father shall be free to visit the minor in India at any time of the year and meet him for two hours on a daily basis, unhindered by any impediment from the mother or her parents or anyone else for that matter. The place where the meeting can take place shall be indicated by the trial Court after verifying the convenience of both the parties in this regard. The trial Court shall pass necessary orders in this regard without delay and without permitting any dilatory tactics in thethe vacations in summer, spring and winter the respondent shall be allowed to take the minor with him for night stay for a period of one week initially and for longer periods in later years, subject to the respondent getting the itinerary in this regard approved from the Guardian & Wards Court. The respondent shall also be free to take the minor out of Delhi subject to the same condition. The respondent shall for that purpose be given the temporary custody of the minor in presence of the trial court, on any working day on the application of the respondent. Return of the minor to the appellant shall also be accordingly before the trial court on a date to be fixed by the court for that purpose. The above directions are subject to the condition that the respondent does not remove the child from the jurisdiction of this Court pending final disposal of the application for grant of custody by the Guardian and Wards Court, Delhi. We make it clear that within the broad parameters of the directions regarding visitation rights of the respondent, the parties shall be free to seek further directions from the Court seized of the guardianship proceedings; to take care of any difficulties that may arise in the actual implementation of thisL NO. 1184 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.10362 ofheard learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that in the light of the findings recorded by the High Court the correctness whereof were not disputed before us, the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR filed by the appellant. In fairness to the learned counsel, we must mention that although a feeble attempt was made during the course of hearing to assail the order passed by the High Court, that pursuit was soon given up by him. In that view of the matter we see no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the High Court in Crl. M.C. No.3329 of 2009.