Case: Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd Vs. Bombay Iron &amp; Steel Labour Bd.

3. Two concurrent judgments of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, one written byJ.N. Patel andRoshan Dalvi, JJ. and a separate but concurrent judgment authored byDeshmukh, J. have fallen for consideration. The reference to Full Bench was occasioned on account of the two learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, principally not agreeing with another Division Bench judgment reported in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (II) CLR 279, in its interpretation of the termed by Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and Other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Mathadiprovided by Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The referring Bench was of the opinion that the interpretation given to those two terms in the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was in conflict with the statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature in the said Mathadi Act. The question referred to the Full Bench was asview of the statutory definition of the expressionin Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and Other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 is the interpretation placed by the Division Bench in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (II) CLR 279 on the aforesaid expression that it is only casually engaged workers who come within the purview of the Act, correct andthe two aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High Court, the Learned Judges, writing the majority judgment, recorded asthe aforesaid reasons, we find that the interpretation placed by the Division Bench in Century Textile and Industries Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2000 II CLR 270 on the definition of the wordsfor the purpose of applicability to Mathadi Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who come within the purview of the Act, is not correct and proper and it is erroneous which deserves to be ignored and islearned Single JudgeDeshmukh, J.) gave his final verdict in the followingconclude, therefore, to my mind it is clear that within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Actns every manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or not andin the meaning of the Act are definitely not only those manual workers who are casually engaged.The above two judgments are challenged basically on the contention that the judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) is essentially a correct judgment, while the view taken by the Full Bench and the interpretation put forth by the same of the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, is erroneous inasmuch as the impugned judgments have ignored to take into account the context in which these provisions have been enacted and they also ignored the intention of the Legislature, which is reflected from the Preamble and the other provisions of this Act.

Court's reasoning:
41. The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any Central legislation, whether made before or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both cover the same field. An exception to this lies in Sub-Article (2), which preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that this challenge is in the nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the State Act. Such was not the challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of the Act has already been upheld. Article 254 does not provide a guide for the interpretation of a State statute. The appellants are also not certain about the proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was received on 5.6.1969, since the said proposal could not be located by them. Therefore, all the arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential assent under Article 254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this question was never before the Full Bench and in our opinion, the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument on the ground that this was not the case of the appellants. Therefore, reliance placed on the decisions in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd., V (2002) SLT 555=2002 (8) SCC 182 ; and Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 1996 (3) SCC 15 , is of no consequence. The argument is thus