Case: Chemicals &amp; Fibres Of India Ltd Vs. D. G. Bhoir &amp; Ors

On 14th August, 1972 the Government of Maharashtra made a reference to the Labour Court under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act in respect of the dismissal by the appellant of one of its employees M. S. Bobhate. On 25th August 1972 the appellant dismissed three other workers, Dastoor, Shame and Soman after an enquiry and this led to a strike in the appellants factory. Towards the end of October 1972 the Company discharged about 312 of its employees and filed 12 applications before the Industrial Tribunal for approval of such discharge on the ground that a reference was pending before it. The appellant pleaded before the Tribunal that the strike was illegal as a reference was pending in respect of Bobhate and therefore the discharge of its workers by the appellant was in order and approval should be granted. On August 30, 1973 the Tribunal rejected all the applications for approval and these appeals have been filed in pursuance of a Special Leave granted by this Court.

Court's reasoning:
We are not concerned with Section 22 in this case though at one stage that seems to have been one of the grounds for contending that the strike waswas common ground that even though the dispute between the employer and the employees might relate to a case of a single workman the provisions of Section 23 (b) would apply if the single workmans cause has been espoused by a labour union which need not necessarily comprise of all the employees of the concerned employer. The decisions of some High Courts establish that even though the proceedings pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal might relate to certain matters only, there cannot be a strike or lock-out even in relation to matters other than those which are pending before the Labour Court, Tribunal or Nationale express our agreement with thisis in interpreting this clause that it has been held that even where the dispute relates to a single workman it is an industrial dispute if that dispute is espoused by the general body of the employees. Before the introduction of Section 2A an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated and whose case was not espoused by any labour union or by a substantial number of workmen had no remedy. It was to deal with that contingence that Section 2A was enacted.We would therefore be justified in concluding that in enacting Section 2A the intention of the legislature was that a individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated should be given relief without its being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole body of employees and attracted to that dispute and the dispute becoming a generalised one between labour on the one hand and the employer on the other. If this point of view is kept clear in mind, the solution of the problem before us becomesthese contentions are amply supported by authority and the duty of this Court is to see what exactly are the necessary implications of the deeming provision. We should say, however, that it does not make any difference to the decision of this question whether the deeming provision is in the form of a separate section like Section 2A as in the present case or is part of the definition of the industrial dispute itself as is suggested it should be on behalf of theis not possible to give such an extended meaning to that provision. As we have pointed out, even in respect of cl. (b) some limitation should be read confining it to the parties to the proceeding either actually or constructively, as in the case of a union espousing the cause of an individual workman. Nobody, for instance, can argue that because proceedings are pending in relation to one industrial establishment owned by an employer, there can be no strike in another industrial establishment owned by the employer because there are no words of limitation in clause (b).7. We are therefore of opinion that the proper point of view from which to look at the problem is to give limited application to the fact of the introduction of Section 2A in the Industrial Disputes Act and to hold that the pendency of a dispute between an individual workman as such and the employer does not attract the provisions of Section 23.5. These provisions bring out the elaborate nature of the proceedings relating to conciliation, arbitration, settlement, inquiry and award. The intention behind all these provisions is to avoid strikes and lock-outs as far as possible not only by bringing the parties together but also by referring points of dispute between them, either voluntarily or otherwise, for decision by Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals. Strikes are not banned even in the case of public utility services. The ban on strikes is subject to certain limitations. There is no doubt that the Act recognises strikes as a legitimate weapon in the matter of industrial relations. We need not concern ourselves about "aberrations like gheraos or go-slow.