Case: Thakur Manmohan Deo And Another Vs. The State Of Bihar And Others.(And Connected Appeal)

2. The plaintiffs of those two suits are the appellants before us. One of the appellants Thakur Manmohan Deo was the holder of a ghatwali tenure commonly known as the Rohini ghatwali, situate within the subdivision of Deoghar in the district of the Santal Parganas. The other appellant Tikaitni Faldani Kumari was the holder of the Pathrole ghatwali also situate in the same sub-division. Both these ghatwali tenures were formerly known as Birbhum ghatwalis and were governed by Bengal Regulation XXIX of 1814. In the year 1950 was enacted the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 30 of 1950), hereinafter called the Act. The Act came into force on September 25, 1950. The validity of the Act was challenged in the Patna High Court on grounds of a violation of certain fundamental rights and the High Court held it to be unconstitutional on those grounds. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was enacted on June 18, 1951, and in appeals from the decision of the Patna High Court this Court held in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, 1952 SCR 889     at p. 898 : (AIR 1952 SC 252   at p. 262) that the Act was not unconstitutional or void on the grounds alleged, except with regard to the provisions in S. 4(b) and S. 23(f) thereof. The validity of the Act is, therefore, no longer open to question on those grounds, though in one of the suits out of which these two appeals have arisen, it was contended that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution3. The principle issue in the two suits which now survives is issue No. 3 which said : "Do the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, purport to acquire the plaintiffs ghatwalis? If so, are they ultra vires in their application to such ghatwalis?" This issue was decided against the appellants by the learned Subordinate Judge and the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was upheld on appeal by the High Court of Patna in its judgment and decree dated December 10, 1954, from which decision these two appeals have come to us.

Court's reasoning:
7. Where a statute says in express terms that the expression tenure includes a ghatwali tenure and the expression tenure-holder includes a ghatwal and the successors-in-interest of a ghatwal, there must be compelling reasons to cut down the amplitude of the two expressions. The Bihar legislature must have been aware of the distinction between Government ghatwalis and zamindari ghatwalis and if the intention was to exclude Government ghatwalis, nothing could have been easier than to say in the two definition clauses that they did not include Government ghatwalis. On the contrary, the legislature made no distinction between Government ghatwalis and zamindari ghatwalis but included all ghatwali tenures within the definition clauses. There are no restrictive words in the definition claused and we see no reasons why any restriction should be read into them. It is worthy of note that the two definition clauses first state in the substantive part what the general meaning of the two expressions is, and then say that the expressions shall inter alia include a ghatwali tenure and a ghatwal and the successors-in-interest of a ghatwal. Thus, the two definition clauses are artificially extended so as to include all ghatwali tenures and all ghatwals and their successors-in-interest, irrespective of any consideration as to whether they come within the general meaning state in the substantive part of the two clauses. Such artificial extension of the two definition clauses is also apparent from sub-cl. (v) of cl. (r) and sub-cl. (iii) of cl. (q). Sub-clause (iii) of cl. (q) excludes certain tenures from the definition clause which would otherwise come within the general meaning of the expression tenure, and sub-cl. (v) of cl. (r) extends the expression tenure holder to guardians, committees and curators. When we are dealing with an artificial definition of this kind which states "means and shall include etc., there is no room for an argument that even though the definition expressly states that something is included within a particular expression, it must be excluded by reason of its now coming within the general meaning of that expressionIt is enough to point out that assuming that the argument of the appellants is correct and cl .(f) of S. 23(1) does not apply, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants ghatwali tenures cannot be acquired by the State Government under S. 3 of the Act. Section 23(1) (f) provides only for the deduction of a particular item from the gross asset of the tenure-holder for the purpose of computing the net income. Even if cl. (f) does not apply, the statute provides for other deductions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e). Those clauses indisputably apply to a ghatwali tenure and a Compensation Assessment-roll can be prepared on their basis. It would not be correct to say that because a particular item of deduction does not apply in the case of a Government ghatwali, such ghatwali tenure must be excluded from the ambit of the Act; such a view will be inconsistent with the scheme of S23. The scheme of S. 23 is that certain deductions have to be made to compute the net income; some of the items may apply in one case and some may not apply. The section does not contemplate that all the items must apply in the case of each and every proprietor or tenure-holderTherefore, the result is not that Government ghatwalis will go out of the Act, because sub-s. (4) does not apply. The result only is that the holders of such tenures will be paid compensation in a different manner. What rights others having a proprietary interest in a ghatwali tenure have against the compensation money does not fall for decision here10. Therefore, we are of the view that neither S. 23(1) (f) nor S. 32(4) have the necessary and inevitable result contended for by the appellants, viz., that the appellants ghatwali tenures must be excluded from the operation of the Act even though the definition clauses expressly include themIt is, we think, quite obvious that the Act has no connection whatsoever with the defence of India or the armed forces of the Union.As Lord Sumner had pointed out as far back as 1923, though ghatwali duties might be divided into police duties and quasi-military duties, both classes had lost their importance and the latter were rarely if ever demanded12. Now, as to the last argument founded on Regulation XXIX of 1814.In our view the Act in pith and substance related to acquisition of property and consequently no question of the repeal of Regulation XXIX of 1914 arose; nor is it necessary to consider the principle that a special law relating to special tenures is not affected by a subsequent general law of land reforms. Such a principle has no application in the present case. The Act expressly includes all ghatwali tenures within its ambit and provides for the vesting of all rights therein absolutely in the State of Bihar on the issue of a notification under S. 3 and under S. 4 certain consequences ensue on the issue of such a notification notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.It is worthy of note that the Bengal Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1793 (Bengal Regulation I of 1793), did not stand in the way of acquisition of other permanently settled estates, and it is difficult to see how Regulation XXIX of 1814 can stand in the way of acquisition of ghatwali tenuresFor the reasons given above, we hold that none of t he three points urged on behalf of the appellants has any substance.