Case: Kiran Singh And Others Vs. Chaman Paswan And Others

The appellants instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Monghyr, for recovery of possession of 12 acres 51 cents of land situated in mauza Bardth of which defendants 12 and 13. forming the second party are the proprietors. The allegations in the plaint are that on 12-4-1943 the plaintiffs were admitted by the second party as occupancy tenants on payment of a sum of Rs. 1,950 as salami and put into possession of the lands, and that thereafter, the first party consisting of defendants 1 to 11 trespassed on them and carried away the crops. The suit was accordingly laid for ejecting defendants 1 to 11 and for mesne profits, past and future, and it was valued at Rs. 2, 950, made up of Rs. 1,950 being the value of the relief for possession and Rs. 1,000, being the part mesne profits claimed.2. Defendants 1 to 11 contacted the suit. They pleaded that they had been in possession of the Lands as tenants on batal system, showing the produce with the landlord, from fasli 1336 and had acquired occupancy rights in the tenements, that the party had the right to settle them on the plaintiff, and that the latter acquired no rights under the settlement dated 12-4-1943. Defendants 12 and 13 remained ex parte.3. The Subordinate Judge held, relying on certain receipts marked as Exhibits A to A-114 which were in the handwriting of the patwaris of the second party and which ranged over the period fasli fall 1256 to 1347, that defendants 1 to 11 had been in possession for over 12 years as convicting tenants and had acquired occupancy rights and that the settlement dated 12-4-1943 conferred no rights on the plaintiffs. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against this decision to the Court of the District Judge, Monghyr, who agreed with the trial Court that the receipts, Exhibits A to A- 114 were genuine and that defendants 1 to 11 had acquired occupancy rights and accordingly dismissed the appeal.4. The plaintiffs took up the matter in second appeal to the High Court, Patna, S. A No. 1152 of 1946 and there, for the first time, an objection was taken by the Stamp Reporter to the valuation in the plaint and after enquiry, the Court determined that the correct valuation of the suit was Rs. 9,980. The plaintiffs paid the additional court-fees required of them, and then raised the contention that on the revised valuation, the appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge would be not to the District Court but to the High Court and that accordingly S. A. No 1152 of 1946 should be heared as a first appeal, ignoring the judgment of the District Court. The learned Judges held, following the decision of a Full Bench of that Court in --- Ramdeo Singh v. Raj Narian Singh, AIR 1949 Pat 278   (A), that the appeal to the District Court was competent and that its decision could be reversed only if the appellants could establish prejudice on the merits and folding that on a consideration of the evidence no such prejudice had been shown, they dismissed the second appeal. The matter now cones before us on special leave.

Court's reasoning:
It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether, it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pose any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District, Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would befrom supporting the contention of the appellants that the decree passed in appeal by the District Court of Monghyr should be regarded as a nullity, these observations show that an objection of the kind now put forward being highly technical in character should not be entertained if not raised in the Court of First Instance. We are therefore of opinion that the decree and judgement of the District Court, Monghyr, cannot be regarded as aargument proceeds on a misconception. The right of appeal is no doubt a substantive right and its deprivation is a serious prejudice; but the appellants have not been deprived of the right of appeal against the judgement of the Subordinate Court. The law does provide an appeal against that judgement to the District Court, and the plaintiffs have exercise that right. Indeed, the under-valuation has enlarged the appellants right of appeal, because while they would have had only a right of one appeal and that to the High Court if the suit ha been correctly valued, by reason of the under-valuation they obtained right to two appeals one to the District Court and another to the High Court. The complaint of the appellants really is not that they had been deprived of a right of appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Court which they have not been, but that an appeal on the facts against that judgment was heard by the District Court and not by the High Court. This objection therefore amounts to this that a change in the forum of appeal is by itself a matter of prejudice for the purpose of Section 11 of the Suit Valuationour judgment the opinion expressed in these decisions is correct.Indeed, it is impossible on the language of the Section to come to different conclusion. If the fact of an appeal being heard by a Subordinate Court of District Court where the appeal would have lain to the High Court if the correct valuation had been given, is itself a matter of prejudice, then the decree passed by the Sub-ordinate Court or the District Court must, without more, be liable to be set aside,and the words "unless the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits" would become wholly useless. These words clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are liable to be interfered with in an appellate Court not in all cases and as a mother of course, but only if prejudice such as is mentioned in the Section results. And the prejudice envisaged by that Section therefore must be something other than the appeal being heard in a different forum.A contrary conclusion will lead to the surprising result that the Section was enacted with the object of curing defects of jurisdiction arising by reason of overvaluation or under-valuation, but that, in fact this object has not been achieved. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the prejudice contemplated by the Section is something different from the fact of the appeal having been regard in a forum which would not have been competent to hear it on a correct valuation of the suit as ultimatelyit does, then it will be obligatory on the Court bearing the second appeal to examine the evidence in full and decide whetherthe conclusions reached by the lower appellate Court areright. If it agrees with those findings, then it will affirm the judgment, if it does not, it will reverse it. That means that the Court of second appeal is virtually in the position of a court of first appeal.The language of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is plainly against such a view. It provides that over valuation or under valuation must have prejudicially affected the disposal of the case on the merits. The prejudice on the merits must be directly attributable to over-valuation or under-valuation and an error in a finding of fact reached on a consideration of the evidence cannot possibly be said to have been, caused by over-valuation or under-valuation. Mere errors in the conclusions on the points for determination would therefore be clearly precluded by the language of the Section.It must further be noted that there is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code, which authorises a Court of second appeal to go into questions of fact on which the lower appellant Court has recorded findings and to reversemust accordingly hold that an appellate Court has no power under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act to consider whether the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court are correct, and that error in those findings cannot be held to be prejudice within the meaning of thatis neither possible not even desirable define such a jurisdiction closely, or confine it within stated bounds. It can only be predicated of it that it is in the nature of a revisonal jurisdiction to be exercised with caution and for the ends of justice, whenever the, facts and situation calls for it. Whether there has been prejudice or not, is accordingly a matter to be determined on the facts of each case.16. We have not to see whether the appellant have suffered any prejudice by season of the under valuation. They were the plaintiffs in the action. They valued the suit at Rs. 2,950. The defendants raised no objection to the jurisdiction of the Court at any time. When the plaintiffs lost the suit after an elaborate trial it is they who appealed to the District Court as they were bound to on their valuation. Even there, the defendants took no objection to the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear the appeal. When the decision went on the merits against the plaintiffs, they preferred S. A. No. 1152 of 1946 to the High Court of Patna, and if the Stamp Reporter had not raised the objection to the valuation and to the Court-fee paid the plaintiffs would not have challenged the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear the appeal. It would be an unfortunate state of law if the plaintiffs who initiated proceedings in a Court of their own choice could subsequently turn round and question its jurisdiction on the ground of an error in valuation which was their own.If the law were that the decree of a Court which would have had no jurisdiction over the suit or appeal but for the over-valuation or under-valuation, should be treated as a nullity, then of course, they would not be stopped from setting up want of jurisdiction in the Court by the fact of their having themselves invoked it. That, however, is not the position under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.There is considerable authority in the Indian Courts that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act should be read conjunctively, notwithstanding the use of the word "or". If that is the correct interpretation, the plaintiffs would be precluded from raising the objection about jurisdiction in an appellate Court. But even if the two provisions are to be construed disjunctively, and the parties held entitled under Section 11(1)(b) to raise the objection for the first time in the appellate Court, even then, the requirement as to prejudice has to be satisfied, and the party who has resorted to a forum of his own choice on his own valuation cannot himself be heard to complain of any prejudice. Prejudice can be a ground for relief only when it is due to the action of another party and not when it results from ones own act. Courts cannot recognise that as prejudice which flows from the action of the very party who complains about it.Even apart from this, we are satisfied that no prejudice was caused to the appellants by their appeal having been heard by the District Court. There was a fair and full hearing of the appeal by that Court it gave its decision on the merits on a consideration of the entire evidence in the case, and no injustice is shown to have resulted in its disposal of the matter. The decision of the learned Judges that there were no grounds for interference under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is correct.