Case: Regionl P.F.Commissioner Vs. Hooghly Mills Co.Ltd

Initially the case of the respondent company is that after the grant of exemption it framed a scheme and created a Trust and appointed a Board of Trustees from the Management of the said Trust fund and was thus enjoying exemption under Section 17(1A) (a) of the Act. It is also common ground that there were defaults on the part of the respondent company in making timely payment of dues towards provident fund for the period between October 1999 to October 2000 and then again from November 2000 to July 2002. In view of such admitted defaults, proceedings were initiated against the respondent company and by notices dated 10.9.2003 and 11.10.2003 enclosing therewith the detailed statement of delayed remittance of provident fund and allied dues. As contemplated under Section 14(B) of the Act, respondent was offered an opportunity to represent their case on several dates by the authorities under the Act and their case was listed for hearing but nobody appeared on their behalf on several dates. Thereafter, on the basis of some representation on their behalf the matter was heard and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner II, Sikkim and Andaman & Nicobar Islands by a detailed order directed the respondent company to remit an amount of Rs.32,62,153/- by way of damages to the respective accounts, failing which, it was stated that further action as provided under the Act and the Schemes framed thereunder shall be initiated.7. It is not in dispute that the said order dated 9.6.2004 is an appealable order under the provisions of Section 7I of the Act. However, without filing any appeal the respondent company filed a writ petition before the learned Single Judge of the High Court which ultimately upheld the contention of the respondent company and, inter alia, came to followingsuch circumstances, this court holds that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law as the concerned authority demanded damages from the petitioners not only on account of delayed payment of contribution to the trust fund but also on account of delayed payment of the contribution to the pension fund and insurance fund.The impugned order, thus, stands set aside.The Provident Fund Authority may, however, ascertain damages under Section 14B of the said Act afresh for delayed payment of contribution to the pension fund as well as the insurance fund.The writ petition, thus, stands allowed with the above

Court's reasoning:
hold if there is a default in payment of contribution to such a scheme it amounts to contravention of Section 14B and damages can be levied.with great respect, erred by coming to a contrary conclusion.In the instant case,led to discern the correct principle of interpretation of a social welfare legislation. In this connection we may profitably refer to what was said by Chief Justice Chagla about interpretation of a social welfare or labour legislation in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Bombay reported in (1957) 2 LLJ 490. Justice Chagla unerringly laid down:labour legislation, no social legislation, no economic legislation, can be considered by a court without applying the principles of social justice in interpreting the provisions of these laws. Social justice is an objective which is embodied and enshrined in our Constitution......it would indeed be startling for anyone to suggest that the court should shut its eyes to social justice and consider and interpret a law as if our country had not pledged itself to bringing about social justice.sed this well settled principle of interpretation of social welfare legislation while construing the expressionfar as mayin interpreting the provision of Section 17 (1A)(a) of the Act and unduly restricted its application to the employer of an exempted establishment.s interpretation also was in error for not considering another well settled principle of interpretation. It is not uncommon to find legislature sometime using words by way of abundant caution. To find out whether the words are used by way of abundant caution the entire scheme of the Act is to be considered at the time of interpretation. In this connection we may remember the observation of LordReid in I.R. Commissioner v. Dowdall OMahoney & Co. reported in (1952) 1 All E.R. 531 at page537, wherein the learned Law Lord said that it is not uncommon to find that legislature is inserting superfluous provisions under the influence of what may be abundant caution. The same principle has been accepted by this Court in many cases.by adopting, if we may say so, a rather strait jacket formula inthe interpretation of the expressionfar as mayhas in our judgment, misinterpreted the intent and scope and the purpose of the