Case: Budhan Singh &amp; Anr Vs. Nabi Bux &amp; Anr

2. The facts relevant for deciding this appeal are no more in dispute. The respondents were ryots under the appellants in village Nagli Abdulla, a hamlet of village Machhra. The site of the building in dispute in this appeal had been taken by the father of the respondents from the appellants ancestors over 6 years ago and thereafter the respondents put up some buildings on that site for their residential purposes. During the communal disturbances in 1947 they left the village temporarily as a measure of safety and took shelter with some of their relations in some other village at a distant place. They came back to their village in the year 1949 when the conditions improved. At that time they found the appellants occupying that site after putting up a cowshed on the site in which their residential buildings stood. Those residential buildings had been demolished and the site in question included as a part of the house of the appellants, As the appellants refused to deliver possession of the suit property, the respondents instituted a suit for possession of the same on January 9, 1951.3. On January 26, 1951, the Act came into force. Section 4 of the Act provided for the vesting of the estates in the State. It prescribed that as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified, all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest, except otherwise provided in the Act, in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 of the Act enumerates the consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State. Section 9 deals with the buildings in the abadi. Reading Sections 4, 6 and 9, together, it follows that all estates notified under Section 4 vest in the State free from all encumbrances. The quondam proprietors or tenure-holders of those estates lose all interests in those estates. As proprietors or tenure-holders they retain no interest in respect of them whatsoever. But in respect of the lands or buildings enumerated in Section 6 and Section 9, the State settled on the persons who held them certain rights.Though in fact the vesting of the estates and the deemed settlement of some rights in respect of certain classes of lands or buildings included in the estate took place simultaneously, in law the two must be treated as different transactions: first there was a vesting of the estates in the State absolutely and free of all encumbrances. Then followed the deemed settlement by the State of some rights with the persons mentioned in Sections 6 and 9. Therefore, in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in the State are only those interests not coming within Section 6 or 9: see Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad, (1962) 2 SCR 441  = (AIR 1961 SC 1790 ).In this connection reference may also usefully be made to the decision of this Court in Shivashankar Prasad Shah v. Vaikunth Nath Singh, Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1966, D/- 3-7-1969 (SC), a decision rendered under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1959, the relevant provisions of which are similar to the provisions of the Act. In this case notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on July 1, 1952. Hence, the vesting contemplated under Section 4 took place on that date.

Court's reasoning:
We have no material before us from which we can find out the value of the buildings demolished by them and the value of the buildings put up by them unlawfully. From the description of the buildings given in evidence, it appears that the newly put up building is only cattle-shed. We are not satisfied that the newly put up building is worth more than the buildings that had been demolished by the appellants. In the circumstances of the case all that can be said is that the old buildings have been substituted by the new building. Therefore, the owners of the old buildings continue to be the owners of the new building. In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether if a stranger builds a building on the land of another, the true owner of the land is entitled to recover the land with the building on it. Equitable considerations persuade us to hold that when the respondents came back to their village in 1949, they were entitled to recover not only the site but also the buildings constructed on it by the appellants. Hence, it should be held that on the date of vesting, the respondents were the owners of the building in question. In law they were holding thesee no merit in this argument.The settlement contemplated by Section 9 is a deemed settlement. That settlement took place immediately the vesting took place. No inquiry was contemplated before that settlement. If there is any dispute as to who is the settlee, the same has to be decided by the Civil Courts. The State is not concerned with the same. Section 9 merely settles the building on the persons who was holding it on the date of vesting.The expression "held" has been used in the Act in various other sections-see Sections 2 (1) (c), 13, 17, 18, 21, 144, 204, 240-A, 298, 304 and 314 to connote possession by legal title. Mr. Misra, learned counsel for the appellants, does not deny that the expression "held" in those sections means held lawfully. But according to him that is because of the context in which the word is used. Mr. Misra is right in saying so but he overlooks the context in which that expression is used in Section 9. We have already made reference to that context. He failed to point out to us any section in the Act, leaving aside Section 9 for the time being where the word "held" has been used as meaning mere holding, lawful or otherwise. In K. K. Handique v. Member, Board of Agricultural Income-tax, Assam, AIR 1966 SC 1191 , this Court was called upon to consider the meaning of the word "holds" in Sections 12 and 13 of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act. Subba Rao J.(as he then was), speaking for the Court, observed that the expression "holds" includes a twofold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title though sometimes it is used only to mean actual possession. After reading Sections 12 and 13 together, he observed that the word "holds" in these sections mean holding by legal title. In Eramma v. Verupana, (1966) 2 SCR 626  = (AIR 1966 SC 1879 ), this Court considered the meaning of the word "possessed" in Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act which laid down that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner". It held that the property possessed by a female widow, as contemplated in the section, is clearly a property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act. It is true that in arriving at that conclusion the Court took into consideration the language of the provision as a whole and also the explanation to the section. The scheme of the Act is to abolish all estates and vest the concerned property in the State but at the same time certain rights were conferred on persons in possession of lands or building. It is reasonable to think that the persons who were within the contemplation of the Act are those who were in possession of lands or buildings on the basis of some legal title. Bearing in mind the purpose with which the legislation was enacted, the scheme of the Act and the language used in Section 9, we are of opinion that the word "held" in Section 9 means lawfully held. In other words, we accept the correctness of the view taken by Mukerji and Dwivedi JJ. For the reasons already mentioned, we are unable to agree with Desai, C. J. that the fact that the appellants had demolished the buildings put up by the respondents and put up some other building in their place had conferred any rights on them under Sectionis unfortunate that the latter Division Bench should have thought it proper to sit in judgment over the correctness of a decision rendered by a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction.Judicial propriety requires that if a Bench of a High Court is unable to agree with the decision already rendered by anotherBench of the same High Court, the question should be referred to a larger Bench. Otherwise, the decisions of High Courts will not only lose respect in the eyes of the public, it will also make the task of the subordinate Courts difficult.We are unable to persuade ourselves to believe that the Legislature intended to ignore the rights of persons having legal title to possession and wanted to make a gift of any building to a trespasser howsoever recent the trespasser might have been if only he happened to be in physical possession of the building on the date of vesting. We are also unable to discernany legislative policy in support of thatsettlement contemplated by Section 9 is a deemed settlement. That settlement took place immediately the vesting took place. No inquiry was contemplated before that settlement. If there is any dispute as to who is the settlee, the same has to be decided by the Civil Courts. The State is not concerned with the same. Section 9 merely settles the building on the persons who was holding it on the date of vesting.