Case: Muddada Chayana Vs. Karnam Narayana And Anr. Etc

The petitioner who lost before the Subordinate Tribunals and the High Court is the appellant in this appeal by special leave. Alleging that he was the landlord and that the respondents were his tenants in respect of certain lands in Bhommika village, the appellant filed petition before the Tehsildar, Pathapatnam under Section 13 of the Andhra Tenancy Act for the eviction of the respondents on the ground of default in payment of rent. The respondents pleaded that the lands were situated in an Inam Estate which had been taken over by the Government under the provisions ofthe Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, and that, they and their ancestor s, who had occupancy rights were always in cultivating possession of the lands. It was also pleaded that after the taking over of the estate by the Government there was no longer any relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents. The Tehsildar dismissed the petition for eviction on the ground, among others, that the respondents had occupancy rights in the land. The landlord preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tekkali. The Revenue Divisional Officer rejected the appeal on the ground that the petition for eviction was not maintainable since the question as to who was the lawful ryot in respect of any holding in an estate had to be decided by the Settlement Officer under Section 56(1)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, and that the decision of such question was within the exclusive competence of the Settlement Officer. A revision petition filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Article 227 of the Constitution was dismissed by the High Court again for the reason that the question as to who was entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta had to be decided by the Settlement Officer under Section 56 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and that the decision of such question was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer. The appellant has preferred this appeal b y special leave of this Court.

Court's reasoning:
We are, however, unable to see any justification for restricting the scope of Section 56(1)(c) in the manner suggested by Shri Sarathi. We will briefly indicate our reasons for holding that the scope of Section 56(1) (c) is not to be restricted as was done by the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. (supra). We are fortunately relieved of the necessity of considering the matter more elaborately in view of the fact that the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. on this part of the case has since been over-ruled by a Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in I. Munuswami Naidu (died) &Ors. v. R. Venkata Reddy &Ors. after a thorough and exhaustive consi deration of the question. We may also add here that until the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors., for several years it was understood that Section 56(1) (c) conferred complete and exclusive jurisdiction on the Set tlement Officer to decide rival claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta and Section 55 or 56(1)(a) and (b) were never understood as controlling Section 56(1)(c).A brief resume of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act relevant for our present purpose is permissible here. As stated in the preamble the Act was enacted to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the Rights of land-holders in permanently settled and certain other estates and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. Section 1(4) provides for the notification of estates and Section 3 enumerates the consequences of notifying an estate under Section 1(4) of the ActBut in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors (supra) it was held that an enquiry as to who was the lawful ryot was permissible under Section 56(1) (c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrear of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose. The conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed context in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held that Section 56(1) (c) occurred so closely on the heels of Section 55 and Section 56(1)(a) and (b), that the applicability of Section 56(1)(c) must be held to be "intimately and integrally connected" with those provisions. We think that the approach of the Full Bench was wrong. Apart from the fact that Section 55 and 56(1)(a), (b) and (c) occur under the heading "Miscellaneous", and, therefore, a contextual interpretation may not be quite appropriate, the Full Bench over looked the serious anomaly created by its conclusion. The anomaly is that while express provision is found in Section 15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by land-holders for the grant of ryotwari pattas., there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas. It would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries, is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1) (c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding has, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provision to the bounds of Section 55 and 56(1) (a) and (b) on the ground of "contextual interpretation". Interpretation of a statute, contextural or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthuyya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &ors. (supra) was wrongly decided in so far as it held that ambit of Section 56(1)(c) was controlled by Section 55 and Section 56(1) (a) and (b). We do not think it necessary to consider the matter in further detail in view of the elaborate consideration which has been given to the case by the later Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Muniswami Naidu (died) &Ors v. R. Venkata Reddi &Ors. (supra) except to add that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v.