Case: Messrs Kodar &amp; Others Vs. State of Kerala &amp; Others

2. The appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court of Madras challenging the validity of the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act (Act No. 14 of 1970), 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that the State Legislature has no competence to enact it, thatprovisions violated their fundamental rights under19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and Article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions by a common judgment. These appealare filed on the basis of a certificate from the High Court.

Court's reasoning:
9. As regards the contention that the Statehas no power to pass the measure, we are of the view that additional tax is really a tax on the sale of goods. The object of the Act, as is clear from its provisions, is to increase the tax on the sale or purchase of goods imposed by Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the fact that quantum of the additional tax is determined with reference to the sales tax imposed would not alter its character. It may be noted that additional tax is to be imposed only if the turnover of a dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs. It is in reality a tax on the aggregate of saleeffected by a dealer during a year. The additional taxtherefore, is an enhancement in the rate of the sales tax whenturnover of a dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs a year and it is a tax on the aggregate of the sales affected by the dealer during the year. The decision in Ernakulam Radiowhich was affirmed by aBench of the Kerala High Court in. Sales Taxtook that view. The same view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in. Ramachandra RaoState of AndhraThis is the correct view. Entry 54es the state legislature to imposetax on the sale or purchase of goods. Sothe contention of the appellants that the additional sales tax is not a tax on salebut on the income of the dealer is without any basis.As regards the second contention that the provisions of the Act are violative of the fundamental rights of the appellants under Article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g), as the tax is upon the sale of goods and is not shown to be confiscatory, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Actany unreasonable restrictions upon theright to carry on trade. It is, no doubt, true that every tax imposesrestriction upon the right to carry on a businesswould not follow that the imposition of the tax in question is an unreasonable restriction uponfundamental right to carry on trade. Generally speaking, the amount or rate of a tax is a matter exclusively within the legislative judgment and as long as a tax retains its avowed character and does not confiscate property to the State under the guise of a tax, its reasonableness is outside the judicial ken.But it was contended that as the dealer is prohibited from passing on the incidence of tax to the purchaserthe additional tax, unlike sales tax, is a tax on income of the dealer which he mustwhether he makes any profit or not and is, therefore, an unreasonable restrictionThe legal incidence ofa tax on saleof goods under the Tamil Nadu General59 falls squarely on the dealer. It may be that he can add the tax to the price of the goods sold and thus pass it on to the purchaser. But it is not necessary that the dealer should be enabled to pass on the incidence of the tax on sale to the purchaser in order that it might bea tax on5. As we said, the additional tax is a tax upon sales of goods and not upon the income of a dealer and so long as it is not made out that the tax is confiscatory, it is not possible to accept the contention that because the dealer is disabled from passing on the incidence of tax to the purchaser, the provisions of the Act impose an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental rights of the appellants under Article 19(1)(g) or 19(1)(f).The last contention namely that the provisions of the Act impose different rates of tax upon different dealers depending upon their turnover which in effect means that the rate of tax on the sale of goods would vary with the volume of the turnover of a dealer and are, therefore, violative of Article 14 is also without any basis. Classification of dealers on the basis of their respective turnover for the purpose of graded imposition so long as it is based on differential criteria relevant to the legislative object to be achieved is not unconstitutional. A classification, depending upon the quantum of the turnover for the purpose of exemption from tax has been upheld in several decided cases. By parity of reasoning, it can be said that a legislative classification making the burden of the tax heavier in proportion to the increase in turnover would be reasonable. The basis is that just as in taxes upon income or upon transfers at death, so also in imposts upon business, the little man, by reason of inferior capacity to pay, should bear a lighter load of taxes, relatively as well as absolutely, than is borne by the big one. The flat rate is thought to be less efficient than the graded one as anof social justice. The large dealer occupies a position of economic superiority by reason of his greater volume of his business.And, to make his tax heavierboth absolutely and relatively, is not arbitrary discrimination, but an attempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus to arrive in the end at a more genuine equality. The economic wisdom of a tax is within the exclusive province of legislature. The only question for the court to consider is whether there is rationality in the belief of the legislature that capacity to pay the tax increases, by and large, with an increase ofit is that merchants have faith in such a correspondence and act upon thatdid not teach that economic advantage goes along with larger sales, there would be an end to the hot pursuit for wide and widerIn brief, there is a relation of correspondence between capacity to pay and the amount of business done. Exceptions, ofthere are. The law builds upon theand shapes the measure of the taxAt the very least, an increase of gross sales carries with it an increase of opportunity for profit, which supplies a rational basis for division into classes, at all eventwhen coupled with evidence of a high degree of probability that the opportunity will bethe dissenting judgmentJustice Brandeis and Justicereasoning of the minority in that case appeals to us as more in consonance with social justice in an egalitarian state than that of the majority.As we said, a large dealer occupies a position of economic superiority by reason of his volume of business and to make the tax heavier on him both absolutely and relatively is not arbitrary discrimination but an attempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus arrive in the end at a more genuine equality. The capacity of a dealer, in particular circumstances, to pay tax is not an irrelevant factor in fixing the rate of tax and one index of capacitythe quantum of turnover. The argument that while a dealer beyond certain limit is obliged to pay higher tax, when others bear a less tax, and it is consequently discriminatoryreally misses the point namely that the former kind of dealers are in a position of economic superiority by reason of their volume of business and form a class byThey cannot be treated as on a par with comparatively small dealers. An attempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus bring about a real and factual equality cannot be ruled out as irrelevant in levy of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. The object of a tax is not only to raise revenue but also to regulate the economic life of the society.