Case: SATLUJ JAL VIDYUT NIGAM LTD Vs. RAJ KUMAR RAJINDER SINGH(D)THRU LRS

3. The facts project how a litigant has filed a slew of litigations one after the other and faced with a situation that it was likely to be dismissed, he would withdraw it; again, file it on new grounds, or having lost it, would withdraw it again at appellate stage, and in the meantime, in different proceedings by playing fraud, getting unjust enrichmentby receiving compensation at the expense of public exchequer.The facts in the instant case reveal that Late Rajinder Singh, son of erstwhile ruler Late Maharaja Padam Singh was Jagirdar of the land, and thus was recorded as owner of thousands of bighas of land in Tehsil Rampur, Sub-Tehsil Nankhari and Tehsil Rohru of erstwhile Mohasu district which is presently a part of Shimla district and Tehsil Nichhar of district Kinnaur of State of Himachal Pradesh.The land in village ‘Jhakri? of 393 khasra numbers admeasuring 1011 bighas, 6 Biswas was declared to have vested in the State under section 27 of the Abolition Act and the intermediary Rajinder Singh as per order dated 14.11.1962 was permitted to retain only 64.12 bighas ofland which was under his personal cultivation. In Himachal Pradesh, one acre comprises 5 bighas of land. Vide order dated 19.9.1964 passed by the Assistant Collector, the order of vesting was modified to the extent that he was given 13 bighas 12 Biswas of land comprised in Khatauni No.1 out of 14 Khasra numbers, i.e., 14, 122, 125, 142, 143, 165, 212, 238, 241, 288, 423, 494, 511 and 512. Some of the aforesaid survey numbers were unmeasured. However, the fact remains that the total area which was found to be under personal cultivation, was 13 bighas, 12 Biswas.Late Jagirdar Rajinder Singh assailed the order of vestingy filing W.P. [C] No. 15/1962.Before the Judicial Commissioner who used to hear writ petitions at the relevant time, held that the land which was not under personal cultivation, would not vest in the State unless and until compensation was paid.Pursuant to the order of vesting, the competent authority under the Abolition Act i.e. Compensation Officer, Mahasu, vide order dated 12.4.1966 determined the compensation of Rs.28,019.45. Since the Zamindar had already received an amount of Rs.1,703.25 in excess from the tenants who had acquired proprietary rights under section 11 of the Abolition Act, same was deducted from the amount and the amount payable was found to be Rs.26,316.20 and it was actually paid on 6.5.1966.As against the order passed by the Compensation Officer dated 12.4.1966,the appeal was preferred before the District Judge, Mahasu. The appeal was partly allowed and the direction which was made of deduction of Rs.1703.25 was set aside and the payment of entire Rs.28,019.45 was ordered without aforesaid deduction.As against thedecision of the Judicial Commissioner dated 14.11.1962, the matter travelled to this Court in C.A. Nos.1186- 1191/1966. This Court held that vesting under section 27, the right, title and interest of the owner in landholding in case land revenue of the holding exceed Rs.125 per year, would vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government and the vesting is automatic and without being contingent on the happening of any other event. Compensation and rehabilitation grant can be determined and paid later. This Court in the order dated 17.9.1969 made the followingis apparent that S.27 deals with lands the annual land revenue of which exceeds Rs.125 per year. It says in unequivocal terms that the right. title and interest of the owner in such lands shall be deemed to have been transferred land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. This essentially means that on the enforcement of the Act the vesting takes place automatically and without beingcontingent on the happening of any other event. The High Court in the full Bench decision referred to above took the same view and was right in observing that wherever the legislature intended to defer the date of vesting such as in S.11 and 15 clear provisions were made to that effect and the reasons thereof were obvious. In 8.11 the tenant had to exercise the option to acquirethe right. title and interest of the landowner. The vesting of such rights- would necessary depends on the time of the exercise of such option. Similarly in 8.15. a future date had to be provided in view of its special provisions. We do not consider that the provisions of sub S.53 (3) and (4) of S.27 contain any indication that the vesting of rights of ownership in the Government would be dependent onthe determination of compensation. The vesting takes place under sub-S. (1) immediately on the enforcement of the Act. Thereafter, under sub-S. (3) compensation has to be paid to the landowner in accordance with the provisions mentioned therein. Under sub 8(4) the State Government shall transfer the rights of ownership to a tenant who cultivates the land only on payment of compensation.That cannot prevent or have any bearing on the vesting which takes place under sub S(1). The payment of rehabilitation grant which is provided by sub 8(5) to a small landowner strengthens the reasoning in favour of vesting being automatic and immediate under sub S(1). There can be no manner of doubt that in respect of land which falls within the ambit of S.27(1) transfer and vesting of the rights of ownership to and in the Government takes place immediately on the enforcement of the Act and thereafter compensation and rehabilitation grant are payable. For all these reasons, the appeals are allowed and the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner is set aside. The cases are remanded to the High Court for disposal of the questions which were not decided. In view of the entire circumstances, there will be no order as tois Court remitted the matter to the High Court for disposal of the questions which were not decided. In particular, the question of personal cultivation of Jagirdar as that land was only saved from vesting.Faced with the observation made by this Court that the land which is not under personal cultivation vested automatically in the State and as after remand the High Court was required to decide the matter in view of the said observations of this Court, Rajinder Singh prayed for withdrawal of W.P. No.15/1962 with permission to file a civil suit. The High Court vide order dated 9.7.1970 permitted to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a civil suit. Thus, the mandate of this Court in the order dated 17.9.1969 to decide the question of personal cultivation was avoided by the withdrawal of writ petition.Late Rajinder Singh then filed Civil Suit No.15/1970 in which he took a somersault and prayed for a declaration of title and sought a declaration that the suit property was not the ‘land? under Section 2(5) ofthe Abolition Act and as such it did not vest in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The case of personal cultivation was abandoned by him. The trial court framed the issues; whether the plaintiff was in possession of the land in dispute and whether the disputed land, in whole or in part, vested in the State Government? The issue was also framed whether the land in dispute is covered under the definition of ‘land? in the Abolition Act. What is the effect of the decision dated 12.4.1966? The issue was also framed with respect to the finality of thedecision of the Compensation Officer dated 12.4.1966, and whether the suit was barred as the order had attained finality. The trial court also framed the issue with respect to the aspect whether the plaintiff had received compensation of the part of the area in dispute and, as such, estopped from filing the suit.The suit 15/1970 filed in the High Court was dismissed on 26.6.1973. The High Court has held that the suit land was within the purview of the term ‘landas defined in the Abolition Act and the plaintiff was not in the personal cultivation of the said land. Hence, the entire land had vested in the State Government under section 27 of the Act on 26.1.1955, the date on which the Abolition Act came into force. It was held that the plaintiff was not the owner of the said land. The High Court has recorded the following findings:In this view of the matter I hold, that the land in dispute is decidedly land as defined in the Abolition Act and the plaintiff not being in the personal cultivation of such land, the entire of it has vested in the State Government under section 27 of the Act. The two issues are thus decided against the plaintiff.41. In view of my decision given above for respective issues, the relief of declaration cannot be granted. The disputed land has automatically vested in the State Government under section 27 on 26 th January 1955, when the Abolition Act came into force.As such the plaintiff is not the owner of such land. Since the plaintiff has not proved his "personal cultivation" for such land, the same is not exempt from vestment under sub-section (2) of section 27. The executive instructions issued by the defendants, for this reason, cannot be considered to be wrong or illegal. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief."The High Court in C.S. No.15 of 1970 also decided issue Nos.5, 11 and 12 and held that the suit was expressly barred by estoppel and also by res judicata. The suit being for the mere declaration was not maintainable and was barred under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.Rajinder Singh filed the appeal before Division Bench of the High Court as against the judgment and decree dated 26.6.1973 of Single Judge.The first appeal was ultimately withdrawn by making a statement by his counsel that the disputed land had been acquired under the provisions of section 8 of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, and the compensation had been paid to the appellant. In view of the subsequent event, prayer was made to withdraw the suit and appeal as it had become infructuous. However, the High Courtpermitted the appellant to withdrawthe suit with permission to file a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the suit on the same cause of action in case there was any necessity to file such a subsequent suit, and the appeal was dismissed as infructuous. It is apparent that the appellant has accepted the factual position that land was declared surplus and he has received compensation of the disputed land under the provisions of the Ceiling Act, 1972. From which actual factual position and admission, he has tried to wriggle out falsely in the instant matter.The withdrawal of suit C.S. No.15 of 1970 was aimed at defrauding the court as the trial court has held that the suit land was not personally cultivated as such, it had vested automatically in the State Government and it was the ‘land? as defined in the Abolition Act and the plaintiff was estopped from filing a suit. During the pendency of the aforesaid matter in spite of the land having been vested in the State, under Abolition Act compensation was obtained second time under the provisions of the Ceiling Act, though the compensation was earlier too paid to him as determined by the Compensation Officer in 1966.The Ceiling Act was enacted in the year 1972 and it provided for consolidation of holding and amend the laws relating to ceiling on land holdings. Section 11 of the Act of 1972 provided that the surplus land would vest in the State, and would be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government free from all encumbrances for a public purpose on payment of a certain amount.On 10.6.1980 the Collector (Ceiling) that is the Sub-Divisional Officerdeclared 10,027.5 bighas of land as surplus. It was not questioned by Rajinder Singh. Compensation was determined and also paid. The reference was made by the department that the additional land was required to be declared as surplus. On 5.9.1985, Financial Commissioner (Appeals) decided references and did not interfere in the aforesaid declaration of land as surplus, however conclusively held thatadditional land was required to be declared surplus. The declaration of 10,027.5 bighas of land as surplus vide order dated 10.6.1980 was not sufficient. The case was accordingly remanded. The limited remand order also attained finality. Ultimately order was passed by the Collector, Rampur Bushahr, Distt. Shimla, on 10.11.1993. It was observed that the compensation of Rs.57,888.80 had been received for the land that had already been declared surplus i.e. 10027.5 bighas. It was also held that in the order dated 10.6.1980, two units of permissible area to the landowner and his minor son were erroneously allowed, therefore, the additional area of one unit given to minor son was declared as surplus. It was held that family of Rajinder Singh was entitled only for one unit and the final draft statement was accordingly published.The area in question has also declared a surplus in 1980 and acquired by State under section 11 of Ceiling Act before the land acquisitionwas started in 1987 and the order dated 10.6.1980 declaring 10,027.5 Bighas of land as surplus so far as Rajinder Singh was concerned attained finality as it was not questioned by him.As against theorder dated 10.11.1993declaring additional approximately 9000 bighas of land as surplus, the appeal was filed, the same was dismissed by the Commissioner on 30.8.1996. Against thesaid appellate order revision was filed before the Financial Commissioner and the same was dismissed on 18.1.2002. On 1.8.2013 the Commissioner passed an order upholding the mutation order against which revision was filed before the Financial Commissioner. Ultimately the review petition was also dismissed as not maintainable which the appellant is stated to have questioned.With respect to the present acquisition proceedings out of which appeal arises, notification under section 4 was issued on 9.1.1987 for the acquisition of land for H.P. State Electricity Board for construction of an approach road at Jhakri. The Electricity Board was later on replaced by Nathpa Jhakri Power Corporation (NJPC) and later on by the appellant Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam. The Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on 24.2.1989 determining the rate of compensation at the rate of Rs.20,000 per bigha. However, it was observed in the awardthat there was a dispute about the ownership of Rajinder Singh. Hence, it was ordered that compensation should not be disbursed in view of the pendency of ceiling proceedings. It be deposited in a bank instead of court. A reference was sought under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the LA Act?). The Reference Court vide award dated 23.7.1991 determined the compensation at the rate of Rs.1 lakh per bigha.acquisition proceeding was initiated by issuanceof notification under section4 which was published in theOfficial Gazette for the acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of residential colony for the Jhakri Hydel Power Project. On 11.7.1988 amended notification under section 4 was issued. On 27.2.1991 award was passed according to the classification of the land. On 4.7.1991, a supplementary award was passed. The references were made to the Court. The Reference Court awarded Rs.1 lakh per bigha vide award dated 27.3.1997.As against theaward passed by the Reference Court appeals were preferred before the High Court. It was contended that the land acquisitionproceedings were commenced in collusion with the Government officials. The land stood vested in the Government under the Abolition Act. There was no question of acquiring the same. A prayer was made in the appeals to file additional documents under Order 41 Rule XXVII and to amend the written statement. The High Court dismissed the said applications along with appeals.As against thedismissal of the appeals and the applications, C.A. Nos.3741-52 and 3753-57 of 2001 were filed in this Court by the appellant. They were decided on 3.5.2001. The judgment of the High Court was set aside. The applications under Order 41 Rule XXVII and Order 6 Rule XVII were allowed. This Court in the final order dated 3.5.2001course of hearing of the appeals it was fairly agreed by learned counsel for the parties that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the contentions raised it will be apt and proper to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal taking into consideration the averments in the amendment petitionand the documents filed as additional evidence. Such an order in the fact situation of the case will serve the ends of justice. In view of the agreed position fairly stated by learned counsel for the parties and in our view, rightly, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High court which is underchallenge; allow the petitions filed by the appellants under Order 6 Rule XVII CPC and under Order 41 Rule XXVII CPC and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.After the case was remitted to the High Court, appeals have been dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 25.2.2008. Aggrieved thereby the appeals have been preferred by Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam.The Reference Court decided 72 land reference cases wherein it washeld that the respondents were neither the owner nor in possession of the land under acquisition, and the land in question stoodvested in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The award was challenged by way of Regular First Appeal and the same is stated to be pending in the High Court.Civil Appeals arising out of SLP [C] No.9281/2014 arise out of a common judgment dated 18.9.2013 passed by the High Court. Writ petitions were filed before the High Court by one of them by Sita Devi & Ors. being CWP No.2931/2010 with respect to a redetermination of compensation.They were decided by a common judgment and order dated 18.9.2013 and it has been held that notwithstanding the fact that Rajinder Singh may not have a title, the status of the appellants had been held to be that of bona fide transferees earlier and that order has attained finality and was not questioned in appropriate proceedings. Thus, they were entitled to the re-determination of compensation under section 28A of the LA Act. Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam has filed the appeals impugning the judgment in the year 2014.

Court's reasoning:
42. A reading of section 27 makes it clear that on the abolition of estates except for the land which is under personal cultivation of the landowner, vests in the State. Vesting is automatic and would not depend upon the payment of compensation and this has already been held by this Court vide order dated 17.9.1969 in the case filed by Late RajinderSingh. It is crystal clear that vesting of the land is not confined to the land held under the tenancy right. The expression used in section 27 is ?landowner? who holds the land. Thus, there is no scope for the submission that section 27 is applicable only to a land held by the tenant in tenancy. It is applicable to all kinds of land asdefined in the Abolition Act held by the landowner and the definition of the land in Abolition Act is inclusive and would include all kinds of land in a town or village which is not occupied by any site of the building. Thus, all land which is not occupied by any building situated in a town or building would vest in the State and a land whichhas been let for agricultural purpose or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture including the sites of building and other structure of the land, orchard, and ghasnies would vest in the State. Thus, it is apparent that the land which is Banjar, Abadi, Gharat, Kalhu, and Gair-Mumkin are all covered under the definition of land.The big estates were sought to be abolished by the H.P. Abolition Act. When section 27 of the Abolition Act and definition of land is read with ‘holding? and ‘estate? and ‘landowner? as defined in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 it is clear that the land held by late Rajinder Singh definitely exceeded revenue of Rs.125 per year as is apparent from documents and various orders passed in the case. The object of the Abolition Act is to provide for the abolition of big landed estates and to bring land reform in the law relating to tenancies and to make provisions for matters connected therewith. The land holding of Late Rajinder Singh was a big estate and was definitely covered under the purview of the Act and in particular under section 27 and all the lands vested in the State except the land under his personal cultivation.Thus, we are of the considered opinion thatthe area under personal cultivation which was saved in favour of Rajinder Singh was 64 bighas 12 Biswas only as specified. It is apparent from the order dated 27.2.1962 Khata No.1 Kita measuring 1011 bighas 6 Biswas vested in the ownership of Government of Himachal Pradesh in village Jhakri. In the review on 19.9.1964, there was only partial modification with respect to area 14 bighas 12 Biswas. The land revenue of land at Jakhri as apparent from Jamabandi of 1955-56 at the time when the Abolition Act came into force was Rs.155.58 it was more than Rs.125 as such the land which was Banjar kadim or otherwise not under personal cultivation had vested in the State.The fact is conclusively established that land in question had been declared as surplus and compensation under the Ceiling Act had also been received, even though the land had already vested in the Stateunder the Abolition Act. Once the disputed land had been admittedly declared surplus in Ceiling Act vide order dated 30.6.1980, there was no question of payment of compensation to Rajinder Singh or to his legal representatives in proceedings initiated later on in the year 1987 under the L.A. Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in 1989 was justified in directing that the compensation determined should not be paid due to the effect of the Ceiling Act and that question was raisedin the Reference Court also, it was incumbent upon the Reference Court to go into the aforesaid aspects. It was not fact situation that question of the title has been disputed and decided in reference proceedings but whether Rajinder Singh or his LRs. were entitled to claim compensation in view of the proceedings and that orders passed under the Abolition Act and Ceiling Act were definitely required to be gone into.Thus, we are of the considered opinion thatonce land has been declared surplus and compensation has been received. It was not open to receive it again in the land acquisition case. (iii) In Re: Effect of withdrawal of C.S. No.15/1970 inThe proceedings were initiated in the year 1987for the acquisition of land whereas the order of ceiling was passed earlier in 1980 and 1985 subsequently the surplus area was increased in 1993. By no stretch of any principle of law, Late Rajinder Singh or his successors could have claimed compensation in the proceedings in questioninitiated under the LA Act in the year 1987. In our considered opinion the respondents Rajinder Singh and his family were not entitled to claim any monetary compensation under the LA Act for the said land. The amount that had been withdrawn under the LA Act, was wholly impermissible and tantamount to playing fraud upon the legal system. As a matter of fact, compensation has been taken for the land in the proceedings under the Abolition Act. Even if compensation in respect of certain land was not payable or paid, vesting would not depend upon the same. Land not under personal cultivation of Jagirdars had vested in the State, as such it was not open even to obtain compensation for the very same land either under the provisions of the Ceiling Act which has been received or under the provisions of the LA Act. It was wholly impermissible and illegal and tantamountto scam committed by fraudsters. The cases were withdrawn one after the other just to perpetuate the fraud on the legal system by raising the inconsistent pleas and taking unfair and undue advantage of the wrong continuation of entries in the revenuethe instant case, there had been earlier proceedings which makes it clear that Rajinder Singh was not entitled to claim compensation under the LA Act. It is apparent that there was no subsisting right, title or interest left with Rajinder Singh or his LRs., thus, they could not be permitted to obtain thethe instant case, the order was passed in ceiling matter in the year 1980 and the adjudication order of Collector (Ceiling) was not questioned nor the order of remand to declare land as surplus and then the additional land was declared surplus in 1993. It was not the case of re-opening of the case. In fact, the land has vested in the State under the Abolition Act.Thereafter, compensation has been obtained, obviously once land has vested in the State, the possession of such land/open land is deemed to be that of the owner. In any view of the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, compensation could not have been claimed.H.P. v. Harnama, (2004) 13 SCC 534, this Court observed that possession of land was not taken and the tenant was in occupation of the land and had acquired ownership rights before the land was declared surplus as against the landlord. It was further observed that the land in question had been notified as surplus and the fact that the original owner of the land had been paid compensation, would be of no avail to the State if before the date of actual vesting non-occupant tenant in possession of the land had acquired ownership rights.It is totally distinguishable and cannot be applied to the instantwas held that the expression in Section 27(4), such tenant who cultivates such land, does not entitle a sub-tenant either to claim proprietary rights or apply for the same under Section 27(4).It was held that he was not a sub-tenant. The decision is of no help to the cause espoused on behalf of LRs. of Rajinder Singh. In the peculiar facts projected in the case the principle fraud vitiates is clearly applicable it cannot be ignored and overlooked under the guise of the scope of proceedings under Section 18/30 of the LA Act.With respect to the appeals filed by SJVN Ltd. arising out of judgment and order of 2013 in the matter of bona fide transferees, filed in the year 2014, the High Court has held that the respondents are bona fide transferees from Rajinder Singh. However, it was pointed out on behalf of the appellants that in 72 reference cases, the regular first appeal is still pending in the High Court. It has been held by the ReferenceCourt that the claimants are not entitled to any compensation. In case regular first appeal is pending in the High Court as against the order of reference court against the respondents who claim to be bona fide transferees, obviously, the question of bona fide transferee has to be decided finally in the pending regular first appeal before the High Court. In case appeal has not been filed or has been decided, the compensation to follow the decision. We do not proposeto give final verdict on issue at this stage. We leave the question open to the High Court to adjudicate. However, in case compensation has been paid to transferees, the compensation paid shall not be recovered till such time pending appeal is decided. In case no matter against transferees is pending and appeal has been decided in favour of land owners, obviously they have to be paid and this Order will not come in the way.