Case: Jyoti Pershad Vs. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi

3. The petitioner-Jyoti Pershad-is the owner of a house in Delhi in which respondents 3 to 11 were tenants. Each of these nine individuals occupied a single room in this house. As the petitioner considered the house to be old and required to be demolished and reconstructed, he submitted a plan to the Council of the Delhi Municipal Committee and applied for sanction for the reconstruction of the house. The plan was sanctioned and thereafter the petitioner filed suits against these nine tenants under S. 13(1)(g) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 38 of 1952 (which will hereafter be referred to as the Rent Control Act). The suits were resisted by the tenants. Two matters had to be proved under S. 13(1)(g) of the Rent Control Act by a plaintiff before he could obtain an order of eviction: (i) that there was a plan which had been sanctioned by the municipal authorities which made provision for the tenants then in occupation of the house being accommodated in the house as reconstructed, and (ii) that the plaintiff had the necessary funds to carry out the reconstruction. The plan which had been approved by the Delhi Municipal Committee made provision for the construction of a double-storeyed building with twelve rooms which was, therefore, more than ample for the nine tenants for whom accommodation had to be provided. The plaintiff also established that he had deposited cash in the State Bank of India sufficient for reconstructing the house as sanctioned in the plan. On December 8, 1956, the Civil Court in Delhi passed decrees in favour of the petitioner for the eviction of respondents 3 to 11. Section 15 of the Rent Control Act1. The Court shall, when passing any decree or order on the ground specified in cl. (f) or cl. (g) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 13, ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be places in occupation of the premises or part thereof, from which he is to be evicted and if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the decree or order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building as the case may be.2. If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the decree or order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building, place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof.3. If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the decree or order the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building, within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work, fails to place the, tenant in occupation of the premises in accordance with sub-sec. (2), the Court may, on the application of the tenant made within one year from the specified date, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof on the original terms and conditions or to pay to such tenant such compensation as may be fixed by thetenants, however, refused to give up possession within the three months time granted to them by the decrees to vacate the premises but went up in appeal against the orders of eviction under S. 34 of the Rent Control Act to the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi. These appeals were finally disposed of against the tenant-appellants, some on the merits and some by reason of abatement, by the end of October, 1957. Under the rules governing the construction of houses on plans sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Committee, the sanctioned building had to be completed within a period of one year from the date of sanction. As a result of this rule the sanction obtained by the petitioner lapsed and he had, therefore, to obtain fresh sanction if in consequence of his success in the appeals before the Senior Sub-Judge he still desired to demolish and reconstruct the building.4. Meanwhile, two changes came about in the law governing matters relevant to the present case. The first was that the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 96 of 1956, which will be hereafter referred to as the Act, was enacted by Parliament and came into force in the Delhi area. Section 19 of the Act which is impugned in these petitions1. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force no person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area shall be entitled to execute such decree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority.2. Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.3. On receipt of such application the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to the tenant of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing either grant such permission or refuse to grant such permission.4. Where the competent authority refuses to grant the permission it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to theother change in the law was that due to the enactment of rules and regulations providing for a co-ordinated development and planning of buildings in the Delhi Area the type of constructions that could be sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Committee underwent a radical alteration as a result of which in the area now in question double-storeyed buildings were not permitted to be constructed and that if the petitioners house had to be reconstructed it could only have three living rooms making allowance for the size of the rooms and the free space that had to be left on either side of the building in accordance with the revised municipal regulations.5. It would have been noticed that the right of the tenants to insist on the landlord providing accommodation for them in the reconstructed building guaranteed to them by S. 15 of the Rent Control Act, had ceased by reason of their failure to quit and deliver vacant possession of the tenements occupied by them within 3 months fixed by the order of the Civil Court (vide S. 15) and hence they had no statutory right under the Rent Control Act to be provided with accommodation by the landlord.6. Thus freed from obligation to the tenants the petitioner filed on the strength of these decrees for eviction nine applications under S. 19 of the Act before the competent authority for the eviction of the tenants from the nine rooms in the building on the ground that the building had to be reconstructed as it was in a dilapidated condition. These petitions were dismissed by the competent authority by his order dated January 13, 1958, on the ground that the sanction to reconstruct the building which the petitioner had obtained from the municipality in 1956.had expired. The orderit may take some time for the petitioner to obtain fresh sanction for reconstruction and there is also the possibility of sanction not being given at all, it would be no use continuing with these proceedings until it is definitely known that the landlord has obtained sanction for reconstruction. These nine applications are accordingly filed with the option to the petitioner to have them revived without payment of extra fee in case he is able to obtainthe petitioner applied to the municipal authorities for sanctioning a building plan. As stated earlier the building plan approved by the municipality could permit only a building consisting of one floor in which there were three living rooms and sanction for the construction of a building with such accommodation was granted. With this sanctioned plan, the petitioner renewed his application under S. 19 for permission to execute the decree of the Civil Court and evict the tenants. By order dated July 30, 1958, all these applications were dismissed. The reason assigned for the order was stated in thesethe decree is allowed to be executed they will be thrown out and it will be impossible for them to get accommodation in the reconstructed building. They are old tenants and as stated above also very poor. The execution of the decree will involve very real hardship to them. They are all occupying only one Kothri each and paying rent at Rs. 3/- per mensem, and they have no complaint to make about the condition of their Kothries. The landlord has four or five other houses which he has let out on rent. The case has a human aspect and I disallow the execution of the decree against thepetitioner preferred appeals against this order to the Administrator of the Union Territory, Delhi, to whom appeals lay under S. 20 of the Act. The appeals were dismissed, the appellate authoritywould have allowed the appellant permission to evict the tenants, if the property itself was dilapidated and declared unfit for human habitation by a competent authority. This is not so. The landlord naturally desires to get a better return from land in the congested areas of the city by rebuilding on it to better specifications, so that he can get higher rent from it. But if this tendency is permitted to have an unrestricted play, then the result will be the eviction of a large number of poor people from slum areas.In the circumstances, the appellant should wait until either his property is declared dangerous by the Municipal Corporation, or under a Slum Clearance Scheme he is asked by the competent authority itself to demolish it or re-build it in a particular manner.In these circumstances the petitioner has moved this Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash these orders on the ground already adverted to, viz., that S. 19 of the Act is invalid and unconstitutional as violative of the petitioners rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. In passing we may observe that we are not concerned with the validity of the particular orders passed in the case but only with the general question as to the constitutionality of the impugned S. 19 of the Act.

Court's reasoning:
If the statute itself or the rule made under it applies unequally to persons or things similarly situated, it would be an instance of a direct violation of the constitutional guarantee and the provision of the statute or the rule in question would have to be struck down.2. The enactment or the rule might not in terms enact a discriminatory rule of law but might enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated. This would happen when the legislature vests a discretion in an authority, be it the Government or an administrative official acting either as an executive officer or even in a quasi-judicial capacity by a legislation which does not lay down any policy or disclose any tangible or intelligible purpose, thus clothing the authority with unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate.It is manifest that the above rule would not apply to cases where the legislature lays down the policy and indicates the rule or the line of action which should serve as a guidance to the authority. Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power, no question of violation of Art. 14 could arise, unless it be that the rules themselves or the policy indicated lay down different rules to be applied to persons or things similarly situated. Even where such is not the case, there might be a transgression by the authority of the limits laid down or an abuse of power, but the actual order would be set aside in appropriate proceedings not so much on the ground of a violation of Art. 14, but as really being beyond its power.It is not, however, essential for the legislation to comply with the rule as to equal protection, that the rules for the guidance of the designated authority, which is to exercise the power or which is vested with the discretion, should be laid down in express terms in the statutory provision itself.In the light of what we have stated above we have now to consider the point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Act has vested in the competent authority the power to withhold eviction in pursuance of orders or decrees of courts without affording any guidance or laying down any principles for his guidance on the basis of which he could exercise his discretion. In other words, that the Act lays no fetters and has vested in him an arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose the decree-holders to whom he would permit execution and those to whom he would refuse such relief. On the other hand, the learned Attorney-General submitted that the discretion vested in the competent authority was not unguided and that though S. 19 of the Act did not in terms lay down any rules for his guidance, the same could be gathered from the policy and purpose of the Act as set out in the preamble and in the operative provisions of the Act itself.We consider that there is considerable force in this submission of the learned Attorney-General. The preamble describes the Act as one enacted for two purposes: (1) the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories, and (2) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction. These twin objects are sought to be carried out by Chapters II to VI of the enactment. Chapter II which consists of one section-S. 3-provides a definition of what are "slum areas" and their declaration as such. The tests for determining whether the area could be declared a "slum area" or not briefly are whether the buildings in the area are (a) unfit for human habitation, or (b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, etc., detrimental to safety, health or morals: It is in areas so declared as "slum areas" that the rest of the enactment is to operate. The provisions, however, make it clear that in order that an area may be declared a "slum area" every building in that area need not be unfit for human habitation or that human habitation in every building in such area should be detrimental to the safety, health or morals of theview of the foregoing we consider that there is enough guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion under S. 19(1) of the Act and we, therefore, reject the contention that S. 19 is obnoxious to the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. We need only add that it was not, and could not be, disputed that the guidance which we have held could be derived from the enactment, and that it bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the object to be attained by the Act and, in fact, would fulfil the purpose which the law seeks to achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of slums, with interim protection for the slum dwellers until they were moved into better dwellings. We are further of the opinion that the order of the competent authority in the present case is not open to challenge either, because it would be seen that the grounds upon which he has rejected the petitioners application for execution is in line with what we have stated to be the policy and purpose of thethe context of modern conditions and the variety and complexity of the situations which present themselves for solution, it is not possible for the Legislature to envisage in detail every possibility and make provision for them. The Legislature, therefore, is forced to leave the authorities created by it an ample discretion, limited, however, by the guidance afforded by the Act. This is the ratio of delegated legislation, and is a process which has come to stay, and which one may be permitted to observe is not without its advantages. So long therefore, as the Legislature indicates, in the operative provision of the statute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those entrusted with administering the law, affords no basis either for the contention that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. The second is that if the power or discretion has been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating thecriteria for determining the degree of restriction on the right to hold property which would be considered reasonable, are by no means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from age to age and be related to the adjustments necessary to solve the problems which communities face from time to time. The tests, therefore, evolved by communities living in sheltered or placid times, or laid down in decisions applicable to them can hardly serve as a guide for the solution of the problems of post-partition India with its stresses and strains arising out of movements of populations which have had few parallels in history. If law failed to take account of unusual situations of pressing urgency arising in the country, and of the social urges generated by the patterns of thought-evolution and of social consciousness which we witness in the second half of this century, it would have to be written down as having failed in the very purpose of its existence. Where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts laws, which is its wisdom, are considered necessary for the solution of what after all is a very human problem the tests of "reasonableness" have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and particularly in judging of their validity the Courts have necessarily to approach it from the point of view of furthering the social interest which it is the purpose of the legislation to promote, for the Courts are not, in these matters, functioning as it were in vacuo, but as parts of a society which is trying, by enacted law, to solve its problems and achieve social concord and peaceful adjustment and thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as aargument is clearly untenable. If, however, that was not meant, but that in the context of the restrictions already imposed by the Rent Control Act S. 19 of the Act was really unnecessary and therefore an unreasonable restraint on the freedom of the landlord, what we have said earlier ought to suffice to repel thethis section stood alone, the argument of learned counsel that by reason of the width and sweep of its language, even a special legislation, such as the Act was comprehended within the non obstante provision would have required serious consideration, but that has been rendered unnecessary, because even apart from S. 19 of the Act which opens with the words: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force", S. 39 of the Act also contains a non obstante clause on the same lines as S. 38 of the Rent Control Act. The result therefore would be that the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is, will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent Control Act. The argument therefore that the Act is inapplicable to buildings covered by the Rent Control Act is without substance, particularly when it is seen that it is only when a decree for eviction is obtained that S. 19 of the Act comes into play.We therefore consider that none of the points urged in support of the petitions has any substance.