Case: Shiveshwar Prasad Narain Singh &amp; Anr Vs. Gharahu &amp; Anr. Etc

The facts concurrently found and not in dispute are that the deceased plaintiff was an intermediary who held the land involved in the dispute as sir and under section 18 of the Abolition Act became a bhumidhar of the land. Defendant in each case was the tenant of sir. Deceased plaintiff was paying more than Rs. 250/- per a nnum and, therefore,section 16 would not be attracted. Plaintiff was a disabled person A within the meaning of section 10 and section 157. All the Courts are agreed that the defendant in each suit was recorded as tenant of sir in the khasra of 1356 Fasli.

Court's reasoning:
Therefore, the construction suggested by Mr. Goyal cannot be accepted.A tenant of sir or a sub-tenant would become under s. 20(a) (i) or (ii), as the case may be, an adhivasi. Now let us recall th e object in enacting the legislation which was to confer certain rights on person who were in actual possession of land. Legislature must have in view the eventuality where a tenant of sir or sub-tenant as contemplated by s. 20(a) (i) or (ii), as the case may be, would not be in possession but some one else is in possession and enjoyment and, therefore, may have been recorded as an occupant in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F. The statute in such a situation in tended to confer the status of adhivasi on such occupant in preference to a tenant of sir or sub-tenant who is not in possession. This construction advances the object to be achieved by the legislation, namely to remove intermediaries au d to bring the tiller of the soil in direct relation to the State. Section 20(b) (i) contemplates an occupent who is recorded in respect of land therein mentioned as being in actual possession because khasra records possession and enjoyment of the land and therefore the expression occupant was interpreted to mearl a person holding a land in possession or actual enjoyment. If this meaning of the expression occupant is kept in view, s. 20(a) &(b) present no difficulty for construction. Section 20(a)(i) and (ii) provide for conferring the status of adhivasi on a tenant or sir or subtenant, as the case may be, but it also comprehends the situation that such a tenant of sir or a sub-tenant may not be in possession and there may be some one else recorded as occupant in khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. which would mean that some one other than the tenant of sir, or a sub-tenant was in possession or actual enjoyment of the land. It is such an occup ant who is in actual possession and enjoyment of land being the tiller of soil, was to be adhivasi in preference to tenant of sir or sub-tenant of such land. Such class of occupant envisaged in s. 20(b) (i) is taken out of the operation of s. 20(a) (i) or (ii) by engrafting an exception; except as provided in s. 20(b) (i) . That ii why s. 20(a) (i) and (a) (ii) open with an exception, namely, except as provided in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) which would mean that except where there is an occupant recorded in 1356 F. On the land of which there is a tenant of sir or sub-tenant, the latter would become adhivasi, but where there is an occupant on land recorded in 1356 F. such occupant would be adhivasi. Allahabad High Court in Kumari Radha Kishori v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P.(1972 Allahabad Law Journal 738.) interpreted s. 20(a) (i) and (ii) to mean what we have indicated above when it observed that except as provided in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) occurring in s. 20(a) (i) indicates that if a is a tenant of sir on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and b is recorded as occupant of sir in 1356 F., then b will acquire adhivasi rights in preference to a. It was further held CC that a person who is in fact a tenant of sir and who is so recorded in the records of 1356 F., will acquire adhivasi rights under s. 20(a) (i) and not under s. 20(b) (i).Mr. Goyal, however, contended that this Court in Amba Prasads (supra) case has in terms held tha t a person in possession alone can be recorded as an occupant and that if a tenant of sir was in possession and actual enjoyment and was, therefore, recorded as occupant in 1356 F. he is an occupant and the case would fall under s. 20(b) (i). In a slightly different context this Court observed as under:The word occupant is not defined in the Act. Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word occupant must mean a person holding the land in possessi on or actual enjoyment. The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the sub-tenant and other person in actual pos session, as the case may be. If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is cl ear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the sub tenant the sub-tenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as Dawedar Qabiz the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the section which does away with all intermediariesInstead of supporting the construction as canvassed for by Mr. Goyal, this observation accords with the construction as put by us. T he whole gamut of law under discussion proceeds in the direction of removal of intermediaries of all sorts and kinds so as to bring the tiller in direct relation to the State. Now, if there is a tenant of sir or a sub-tenant of 11 a land who held the status or character on the day just preceding the date of vesting but some one other than the tenant or sir or sub-tenant is recorded as occupant in khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. Obviously the tenant o f sir or sub-tenant is intermediary and by conferring adhivasi status on the occupant in such circumstances the intermediaries are being done away with. The hierarchy set out in Amba Prasads (supra) case would show that Dawedar Qabiz means person in actual possession but whose possession is not referable to a valid title would become an occupant. This would indicate that in considering relative rights s. 20(b) accords preference to one in actual possession against one who holds some right in the land. The construction, therefore., as put by us accords with the object and purpose of the legislation and it is a well settled rule of construction that where two constructions are possible, one which advances the object of the, legislation must be preferred to one which may retard or frustrate the object of the legislation.The view in Amba Prasads (supra) case was affirmed by this Court in Nath Singh &ors. v. The Board of Revenue &ors.([1968] 3 S.C.R. 498.)If dependant in each ca se was a tenant of sir in respect of land of which the possession is sought by the plaintiff and no one else was shown as the occupant of such land in 1356 F., obviously the defendant in each case would become adhivasi under s. 20(a) (i). Therefore, s. 21 (h) would not be attracted as contended for by Mr. Goyal in this case because the third clause of s. 21 (h) refers to an occupant as envisaged in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of s. 20 and, therefore, the defendant would not become an asami as therein contemplated.