Case: Shyam Sunder &amp; Others Vs. The State of Rajasthan

2. Navneetlal was a resident of Udaipur. He was in the employment of the State of Rajasthan and was, at the material time, working in the office of the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department. Bhilwara as a Store Keeper. In connection with the famine relief work undertaken by the department, he was required to proceed to Banswara. For that purpose, he boarded truck No. RJE - 131 owned by the department from Bhilwara on May 19, 1952 and reached Chittorgarh in the evening. Besides himself, there were Fateh Singh, Fundilal and Heera Singh, the driver, cleaner and a stranger in the truck. On May 20, 1952, they resumed the journey from Chittorgarh at about 11 A. M. and reached Pratapgarh in the same evening. The truck started from Pratapgarh to Banswara at about 10 A. M. on May 21, 1952. After having travelled for 4 miles from Pratapgarh, the engine of the truck caught fire. As soon as the fire was seen, the driver cautioned the occupants to jump out of the truck, Consequently, Navneetlal and the other persons jumped out of truck. While doing so, Navneetlal struck against a stone lying by the side of the road and died instantaneously.3. Parwati Devi, widow of Navneetalal brought a suit against the State of Rajasthan for damages under the provisions of the Act.4. The plaintiff alleged that it was on account of the negligence of the driver of the truck that a truck which was not road-worthy was put on the road and that it caught fire which led to the death of Navneetlal and that the State was liable for the negligence of its employee in the course of his employment. The plaint also alleged that the deceased had left behind him his widow, namely, the plaintiff, two minor sons, one minor daughter and his parents. The plaintiff claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 20, 000/- and prayed for a decree for that amount.5. The State contended that the truck was quite in order when it started from Bhilwara and even when it started from Pratapgarh to Banswara and that if it developed some mechanical trouble suddenly which resulted in its catching fire, the defendant was not liable as there was no negligence on the part of the driver.6. The trial Court found that the act of the driver in putting the truck on the road was negligent as the truck was not road-worthy and since the driver was negligent, the State was vicariously liable for his act. The Court assessed the damages at Rs. 14,760/- and granted a decree for the amount to the plaintiff.7. It was against this decree that the State appealed to the High Court.8. The High Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not proved by evidence that the driver was negligent, that the mere fact that the truck caught fire was not evidence of negligence on his part and that the maxim res ipsa loquitur had no application. The Court said that the truck travelled safely from Bhilwara to Pratapgarh and that the engine caught fire after having travelled a distance of 4 miles from Pratapgarh and that there was nothing on record to show that the engine of the truck was in any way defective or that it was not functioning properly. The Court was of the view that the mechanism of an automobile engine is such that with all proper and careful handling it can go wrong while it is on the road for reasons which it might be difficult for a driver to explain. The Court then discussed the evidence and came to the conclusion that no inference of negligence on the part of the driver was possible on the basis that the engine of the truck got heated of and on and that water was put in the radiator frequently, or that it took considerably long time to cover the distance between Bhilwara and Chittorgarh and that between Chittorgarh and Pratapgarh. The High Court, therefore, allowed the appeal.

Court's reasoning:
The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to call for a rebuttal from the defendant, without having to allege and prove any specific act or omission on the part of the defendant. The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defendant responsible for it, even when the facts bearing in the matter are at the outset unknown to him and often within the knowledge of the defendant. But thought the parties relative access to evidence is an influential factor, it is not controlling. Thus, the fact that the defendant is as much at a loss to explain the accident or himself died in it does not preclude an adverse inference against him, if the odds otherwise point to hisThe plaintiff merely proves a result, not any particular act or omission producing the result. If the result, in the circumstances in which he proves it makes it more probable than not that it was caused by the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability.12. The answer needed by the defendant to meet the plaintiffs case may take alternative forms. Firstly, it may consist in a positive explanation by the defendant of how the accident did in fact occur, of such a kind as to exonerate the defendant from any charge of negligence.Res ipsa loquitur is an immensely important vehicle for importing strict liability into negligence cases. In practice, there are many cases where res ipsa loquitur is properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to show affirmatively either that he took all reasonable precautions to avoid injury or that the particular cause of the injury was not associated with negligence on his part. Industrial and traffic accidents and injuries caused by defective merchandise are so frequently of this type that the theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite overshadowed by its practical significance.We are inclined to think the learned District Judge was correct in inferring negligence on the part of the driver. Generally speaking, an ordinary road-worthy vehicle would not catch fire. We think that the driver was negligent in putting the vehicle on the road. From the evidence it is clear that the radiator was getting heated frequently and that the driver was pouring water in the radiator after every 6 or 7 miles of the journey. The vehicle took 9 hours to cover the distance of 70 miles beteween Chittorgarh and Pratasgarh. The fact that normally a motor vehicle would not catch fire if its mechanism is in order would indicate that there was some defect in it. The District Judge found on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses that the driver knew about this defective condition of the truck when he started from Bhilwara.18. It is clear that the driver was in management of the vehicle and the accident is such that it does not happen in the ordinary course of things. There is no evidence as to how the truck caught fire. There was no explanation by the defendant about it. It was a matter within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant. It was not possible for the plaintiff to give any evidence as to the cause of the accident.We are of the view that, as the law stands today, it is not possible to say that famine relief work is a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. It is a work which can be and is being undertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legitimately undertake the work.22. In the view we have taken on the merits of the case, we do not think it necessary to canvass the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court that the appeal by the State before the High Court did not abate even though the legal representatives of the plaintiff-respondent there were not impleaded within the period ofmaxim does not embody any rule of substantive law nor a rule of evidence. It is perhaps not a rule of any kind but simply the caption to an argument on the evidence. Lord Shaw remarked that if the phrase had not been in Latin, nobody would have called it a principle. See Ballardv. North British Rly. Co., 1923 SC (HL)The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to call for a rebuttal from the defendant, without having to allege and prove any specific act or omission on the part of the defendant. The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defendant responsible for it, even when the facts bearing in the matter are at the outset unknown to him and often within the knowledge of the defendant. But thought the parties relative access to evidence is an influential factor, it is not controlling. Thus, the fact that the defendant is as much at a loss to explain the accident or himself died in it does not preclude an adverse inference against him, if the odds otherwise point to hisnegligence (see John G. Fleming. The Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 264). The mere happening of the accident may be more consistent with the negligence on the part of the defendant than with other causes. The maxim is based on commonsense and its purpose is to do justice when the facts bearing on causation and on the care exercised by defendant are at the outset unknown to the plaintiff and are or ought to be within the knowledge of the defendant. (see Barkwavv. South Wales Transport, (1950) 1 All ER. It should be noticed that the defendant does not advance his case by inventing fanciful theories, unsupported by evidence, of how the event might have occurred. The whole inquiry is concerned with probabilities and facts are required, not mere conjecture unsupported byother words, an inference is a deduction from established facts and an assumption or a guess is something quite different but not necessarily related to established facts.14. Alternatively, in those instances where the defendant is unable to explain the accident, it is incumbent upon him to advance positive proof that he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.It is clear that the driver was in management of the vehicle and the accident is such that it does not happen in the ordinary course of things. There is no evidence as to how the truck caught fire. There was no explanation by the defendant about it. It was a matter within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant. It was not possible for the plaintiff to give any evidence as to the cause of the accident.In these circumstances, we think that the maxim res ipsa loquitur isdo not pause to consider the question whether the immunity of the State for injuries on its citizens committed in the exercise of what are called sovereign functions has any moral justificationhardly anyone agrees that the stated ground for exempting the sovereign from suit is either logical or practical. We do not also think it necessary to consider whether there is any rational dividing line between thesovereign and proprietary or commercial functions for determining the liability of the State.21.We are of the view that, as the law stands today, it is not possible to say that famine relief work is a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. It is a work which can be and is being undertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legitimately undertake the work.