Case: Mahant Harnam Singh, Chela Ofbhai Narain Singh Vs. Gurdial Singh &amp; Anr

2. The respondents claimed in the plaint that there is one Guru Granth Sahib at village Jhandawala in the name of Gurudwara Jhandanwala which is managed by Mahant Harnam Singh appellant as a Mahatmin, and that he is in possession of the Dera and agricultural land belonging to Guru Granth Sahib, Gurudwara, Jhandawala. The Gurudwara was alleged to be a public religious place which was established by the residents of the village, and it was pleaded that this religious institution was a public trust created by the residents of the village for the service of the Public to provide food to the visitors from the Lungar (free kitchen) to allow the people to fulfil religious beliefs and for worship etc. The plaintiff-respondents stated that, in the capacity of representatives of owners of lands situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala, they submitted an application for permission to institute this suit on the ground that the appellant was indulging in various undesirable activities and was misusing the funds of the trust which justified his removal from the office of the Mahant. The respondents claimed that, in their capacity of representatives of the owners of the land situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala, they were entitled to institute this suit under S.92, C.P.C.3. The suit was contested by the appellant on various grounds, amongst which the principal one, which we are concerned, is that the plaintiff-respondents had no such interest in this public trust as would entitle them to institute the suit. At the initial stage, the appellant did not admit that there was a public trust in existence at all, but the trial Court held that the institution was a public trust of a religious character; and that finding was not challenged on behalf of the appellant before the High Court. The two principal grounds, on which the dismissal of the suit by the District Judge was sought to be justified before the High Court, were that the plaintiffs-respondents had no right to institute the suit under S. 92, C. P. C., for want of interest in the trust, and that the respondents had failed to prove that the appellant had indulged in any such activities as would justify his removal from the office of the Mahant .

Court's reasoning:
6. As we have indicated earlier, in the plaint the plaintiffs claimed interest in the trust property in their capacity of representatives of the owners of the land situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala. The findings of fact recorded show that the land, which was donated to this institution, was given by the inferior owners of this village out of their joint land. The plaintiffs respondents did show that they were Lambardars in the village but no attempt has been made at any stage to prove that any of the two plaintiffs was an inferior owner of land situated in this village, or that he was a descendant or a successor in-interest of any of the inferior owners who donated the land to this institution in the year 1904. The mere capacity as Lambardars does not entitle the plaintiffs respondents to claim that they are representatives of the inferior owners of the land who donated the land to this institution The second ground of claim was that the plaintiffs/respondents were residents of village Jhandawala, but, again, there is no pleading and no evidence tendered to show that the residents of village Jhandawala in general had any such interest in this trust which could entitle them to institute such a suit. The only allegation was that a Langar used to be run in this institution where free kitchen was provided to visitors, It was nowhere stated that any such free kitchen was being run for the general residents of village Jhandawala who could, as of right, claim to be fed in the Langar. Mere residence in a village where free kitchen is being run for providing food to visitors does not create any interest in the residents of the village of such a nature as to claim that they can institute a suit for the removal of thewith the view expressed by the Privy Council, we hold that in the present case the plaintiffs/respondents, who were merely Lambardars and residents of village Jhandawala, had, in those capacities, no such interest as could entitle them to institute thisit appears that during the trial of the suit as well as in the appeal before the High Court, the claim of the plaintiffs that they had an interest entitling them to institute the suit was actually presses and examined on thisare unable to agree that these passages relied upon by the High Court are enough to lead to an inference that Nirmala Sadhus are Sikhs and they still retain the essential characteristics of the Sikh faith. It is true that, in their origin, Nirmala Sadhus started as a section of Sikhs who were followers of Guru Gobind Singh, but, subsequently, in the period of about 300 years that has since elapsed, they have veered away from the Sikh religion. That is why, after giving their historical origin, Macauliffe expressed the opinion that Nirmalas were only nominally Sikhs. In Maclagans Census Report also it was mentioned that Nirmala Sadhus are treated as Sikhs in some places, while in other places they are returned as Hindus. He has mentioned the Districts in Punjab where they are returned mainly as Hindus, and others where they were considered as Sikhs. Faridkot, the District with in which the institution with which we are concerned is situated, is mentioned as a place where they are regarded as Hindus and in the census they have been returned as such. In these circumstances, we do not think that this material by itself, which the High Court culled out of the judgment of Bhide, J., could properly lead to the inference that Nirmalas are Sikhs.Sikhs.11. Further, in this case, there was material showing that this institution at Jhandawala was registered as one of the branches of the principal institution of Nirmala Sadhus known as the Panchayati Akhara situated at Kankhal near Hardwar. There was further evidence showing that in this institution the wordship is primarily of a Samadh which is against all tenets of the Sikh religion. Nirmala Sadhus, it appears, as a class worship at Samadhs which goes to show that they can no longer be regarded as people following the Sikhdecisions clearly indicate the principle that, though the Sikh Guru Granth Sahib is read in the shrines managed by the members of the Udasi sect, that was not enough to hold that those shrines were Sikh Gurdwaras.In the case before us, the mere fact that at some stage there was a Guru Granth Sahib in this Dera cannot thus lead to any conclusion that this institution was meant for, or belonged ro, the followers of the Sikh religion. Clearly, the Dera was maintained for an entirely distinct sect known as the Nirmala Sadhus who cannot be regarded as Sikhs and, consequently, in their mere capacity of followers of Sikh religion residing in village Jhandawala, the plaintiffs/ respondents could not v be held to have such an interest as could entitle them to institute the suit under S. 92 of theCode of Civil Procedure. The judgment of the High Court has to be set aside on this ground.12. In view of the fact that we are holding that this suit was not instituted properly by persons interested as required by Sec. 92, C.P. C., we consider it unnecessary to express any opinion at all on the second main point decided against the appellant by the High Court, viz., that there were sufficient grounds for the removal of the appellant from the office of the Mahant. In this case it is not at all necessary to record any finding on that aspect of the case and consequently, we refrain from commenting on the finding recorded by the High Court on this question.