Case: Engineering Kamgar Union Vs. M/S. Electro Steels Castings Ltd

The appellant herein is a Trade Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. The first respondent herein is an industrial establishment carrying on business in Engineering Industry. It admittedly employed more than 100 persons in its factory at Ghaziabad. A notice was issued by it on or about 21.9.1998 declaring its intention to close down the said factory at Ghaziabad with effect from23.9.1998 as a result whereof it was notified that services of 99 workmen would be terminated.3. An industrial dispute was raised by the appellant herein on or about 23.9.1998 questioning the validity of the said notice raising a factual plea that more than 300 workman are employed by the first respondent in its Ghaziabad establishment and, thus, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) would be applicable. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the purported complaint made by the appellant herein, a notice was served by the Assistant Labour Commissioner upon the first respondent herein directing it to show cause as to why it should not be prosecuted for contravention of the provisions contained in Section 25 of the Central Act. In its reply dated 3.10.1998, the first respondent raised a plea to the effect that as the number of employees in the said industrial undertaking was less than300, no permission for closure of the industrial undertaking was required in view of Section 6-W read with Section 6-V of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the State Act).4. Two recovery certificates were issued against the first respondent towards the salary of the workmen under the State Act. Three writ petitions came to be filed by the first respondent questioning the show-cause notice as also the recovery certificates aforementioned. The appellant herein also filed a writ petition questioning the closure notice issued by the appellant. By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ petitions filed by the first respondent were allowed, whereas the writ petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed.High Court Judgment:5. The High Court in its impugned judgment held that having regard to the fact that Chapter V-B of the Central Act (Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) was inserted on or about 21.8.1984, the State Act (U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) having been enacted in the year 1983 whereby and whereunder Section 6-V to 6-X were inserted, the latter shall, having regard to Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, prevail over the former.The High Court although took notice of the fact that the Chapter V-B of the Central Act came into force in the year 1984, it was held that in view of the phraseology used in Article 254 the repugnancy has to be tested in terms of the date of enactment of the legislation in preference to the date of its coming into force. In support of its aforementioned conclusion, strong reliance was placed by the High Court on the decision of this Court in Pt. Rishikesh and Another vs. Salma Begum (1995 (4) SCC 718 ).

Court's reasoning:
. It may be true that the reason for amending Chapter V-B of the Central Act by reason of Act No. 46 of 1982 inter alia was to extend the beneficent provisions to workmen of small establishments by reducing the existing employment limit thence from 300 to 100. But it is equally true that the State Act was amended by Act No. 26 of 1983 after the amendment of the Central Act. It is not in dispute that Section 25K and Section 250 of the Central Act are in pari materia with Sections 6V and 6W of the State Act. We must also notice that whereas the Central Act received the Presidents Assent on 31.8.1982, the State Act received the Presidents Assent on 10.10.1983. It is also not in dispute that by reason of the State Act the Chapter relating to layoff retrenchment and closure was made applicable in relation to an industrial establishment wherein not less than 300 workmen are employed. The amending Act of 1982 was published in Gazette of India on 1.9.1982 and was given effect to form 21.8.1984 whereas the State Act was published in the U.P. Gazette on 12.10.1983 and was given effect to fromjurisdiction of the State Legislature to enact a law by a Parliamentary legislation is not impermissible. Subject to the provisions contained in Article 254 of the Constitution of India, both will operate in their respective fields. The Constitutional Scheme in this behalf is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In this case, this Court is not concerned with the conflicting legislations operating in the same field by reason of enactments made by the Parliament and the State in exercise of their respective legislative powers contained in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule of Constitution of India but admittedly the field being the same, a question wouldas regard the effect of the one Act over the other in the event it is found that there exists a conflict. For the said purpose, it is not necessary that the conflict would be direct only in a case wherein the provisions of one Act would have to be disobeyed if the provisions of the other is followed. The conflict may exist even where both the laws lead to different legal results.Keeping in view the plain language used in Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India we are of the opinion that the State Act in the fact and circumstances of this case, keeping in view the Presidential Assent given thereto shall prevail over the Centralcontention of Mr. Banerjee to the effect that Section 25J of the Central Act has been incorporated by reference in Section 25S cannot be accepted. Section 25S does not introduce a non-obstante clauses as regard Chapter V-A. Furthermore, Section 25J is not a part of Chapter V-B. By reason of Section 25S, the provisions of Chapter V-A were made applicable only in relation to certain establishments referred to in Chapter V-B. The Parliament has deliberately used the words so far as may be which would also indicate that provisions of Chapter V-B were to apply to the industrial establishments mentioned in Chapter V-A. The non-obstante clause contained in Section 25J does not apply to the entire Chapter V-B. Applicability of Chapter V-A in relation to the industrial establishments covered by Chapter V-B in terms of Section 25J vis-a-vis Section 25S is permissible but the contention cannot be taken any further so as to make Section 250 of the Central Act prevail over the State Act by taking recourse to the non-obstante clause. Non-obstante clause contained in Section 25J is, thus, required to be kept confined to Chapter V-A only and in that view of the matter we have no hesitation in holding that Chapter V-B does not have an overriding effect over the State Act.41. In any event, such a question could have arisen for consideration if the Central Act and the State Act had been enacted in terms of different entries of List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In this case, admittedly both the Central Act and the State Act had been enacted in terms of Entry 22 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of Constitution of India. In case of any conflict therefor the constitutional Scheme contained in Article 254 will have to be applied. Even if Section 255 of the State Act is read to have an overriding effect. Undoubtedly the provisions of the supreme lax shall prevail over a statute. A non-obstante clause contained in a statute cannot override the provisions of the Constitution of India.