Case: Balmukand Vs. Kamla Wati &amp; Ors

2-3. The relevant facts are these :The plaintiff owned 79/120th share in Khasra Nos. 494, 495, 496, 497, 1800/501, 1801/501, and 529 shown in the zamabandi of 1943-44, situate at Mauza Faizpur of Batala. On October, 1943, he purchased 23/120th share in this land belonging to one Devisahai. He thus became owner of 17/20th share in this land. The remaining 3/20th share belongs to the joint Hindu family of which Pindidas was the Manager and his brother Haveliram, Khemchand and Satyapal were the members. According to the plaintiff he paid Rs. 175/- per marla for the land which he purchased from Devisahai. In order to consolidate his holding, the plaintiff desired to acquire the 3/20th share held by the joint family of Pindidas and his brothers. He, therefore, approached Pindidas in the matter and the latter agreed to sell the 3/20th share belonging to the family at the rate of Rs. 250/- per marla. The contract in this regard was entered into on October 1, 1945 with Pindidas and Rs. 100/- were paid to him as earnest money. As the Manager of the family failed to execute the sale-deed in his favour, the plaintiff instituted the suit and made Pindidas and his brothers defendants thereto.4. The suit was resisted by all the defendants. Pindidas admitted having entered into a contract of sale of some land to the plaintiff on October 1, 1945 and of having received Rs. 100/- as earnest money. According to him, however, that contract pertained not to the land in suit but to another piece of land. He further pleaded that he had no right to enter into a contract on behalf of his brothers who are defendants 2 to 4 to the suit and are now respondents 13 to 15 before us. The defendants 2 to 4 denied the existence of any contract and further pleaded that even if Pindidas was proved to be the Karta of the joint family and had agreed to sell the land in suit the transaction was not binding upon them because the sale was not for the benefit of the family nor was there any necessity for that sale. The courts below have found in the plaintiffs favour that Pindidas did enter into a contract with him for the sale of 3/20th share of the family land in suit and received Rs. 100 as earnest money. But they held that the contract was not binding on the family because there was no necessity for the sale and the contract was not for the benefit of the family.

Court's reasoning:
We have no doubt that for a transaction to be regarded as one which is of benefit to the family it need not necessarily be only of a defensive character. But what transaction would be for the benefit of the family must necessarily depend upon the facts of such case. In the case before the Full Bench the two managers of family found it difficult to manage the property at all with the result, apparently, that the family was incurring losses. To sell such property, and that too on advantageous terms, and to invest the sale proceeds in a profitable way could certainly be regarded as beneficial to the family. In the present case there is unfortunately nothing in the plaint to suggest that Pindidas agreed to sell the property because he found it difficult to manage it or because he found that the family was incurring loss by retaining the property. Nor again is there anything to suggest that the idea was to invest the sale proceeds in some profitable manner. Indeed there are no allegations in the plaint to the effect that the sale was being contemplated by any considerations of prudence. All that is said is that the fraction of the familys share of the land owned by the family bore a very small proportion to the land which the plaintiff held at the date of the transaction. But that was indeed the case even before the purchase by the plaintiff of the 23/120th share from Devisahai. There is nothing to indicate that the position of the family vis-a-vis their share in the land had in any way been altered by reason of the circumstance that the remaining 17/20th interest in the land came to be owned by the plaintiff alone. Therefore, even upon the view taken in the Allahabad case the plaintiff cannot hope to succeed in thisobservations make it clear that where adult members are in existence the judgment is to be not that of the Manager of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the manager. In the case before us all the brothers of Pindidas were adults when the contract was entered into. There is no suggestion that they agreed to the transaction or were consulted about it or even knew of the transaction. Even, therefore, if we hold that the view expressed by the learned Chief Justice is right it does not help the plaintiff because the facts here are different from those contemplated by the learned Chief Justice. The other Judge who was a party to that decision Manohar Lal J., took more or less the same view.Thus, as we have already stated, that for a transaction to be regarded as of benefit to the family it need not be of defensive character so as to be binding on the family. In each the court must be satisfied from the material before it that it was in fact such as conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. We have pointed out that there is not even an allegation in the plaint that the transaction was such as was regarded as beneficial to the family when it was entered into by Pindidas. Apart from that we have the fact that here the adult members of the family have stoutly resisted the plaintiffs claim for specific performance and we have no doubt that they would not have done so if they were satisfied that the transaction was of benefit to the family. It may be possible that the land which was intended to be sold had risen in value by the time the present suit was instituted and that is why the other members of the family are contesting the plaintiffs claim. Apart from that the adult members of the family are well within their rights in saying that no part of the family property could be parted with or agreed to be parted with by the Manager on the ground of alleged benefit to the family without consulting them. Here, as already stated, there is no allegation of any such consultation.10. In these circumstances we must hold that the courts below were right in dismissing the suit for specific performance. We may add that granting specific performance is always in the discretion of the court and in our view in a case of this kind the court would be exercising its discretion right by refusing specific performance.