Case: Jage Ram And Ors Vs. State Of Haryana And Ors

2. It appears that several contentions were sought to be advanced before the High Court but in this Court only three contentions have been pressed for our consideration i e., (1) the acquisition in question being one for a company, proceedings should have been taken under Sections 38 to 44-B of the Act, the same having not been taken, the proceedings taken are void; (2) there was no urgency and hence recourse should not have been had to Section 17 of the Act and (3) Section 17 (2) (c) is inapplicable to the facts of the case3. Now we may state the facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the questions in dispute4. On 14/17th March 1969, Government of Haryana issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act notifying for acquisition the land concerned in this case. The notification further directed that action under Section 17 (2) (c) of the Act shall be taken on the ground of urgency and the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply in regard to the said acquisition. The preamble to the said notification says that"whereas it appears to the Governor of Haryana that land is likely to be required to be taken by Government, at public expenses, for a public purpose, namely for the setting up a factory for the manufacture of Chinaware and Porcelain-ware including wall Glazed, Tiles, etc., at village Kasser, Tehsil Jhajjar, District Rohtak, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality described in the specification below is likely to be required for the above purpose"On March l 8, 1969 the Government issued a notification under Section 6 of the Act acquiring the land for a public purpose. On March 28, 1969 notices under Section 9 of the Act were served on the appellants. On April 8, 1969, the appellants filed the writ petition giving rise to this appeal.

Court's reasoning:
7. In the writ petition it was not denied that the acquisition in question was made at "public expenses". All that was challenged in the writ petition was that the purpose for which the acquisition was made was not a public purpose8. There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the new State of Haryana was lacking in industries and consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an area is in public interest. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose, the declaration of the Government that it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6 (3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose9. In view of the pleadings referred to earlier it is not open to the appellant to contend that the State Government had not contributed any amount towards the cost of acquisition. We were informed at the bar that the State Government had contributed a sum of Rs. 100/- towards the cost of the land which fact is also mentioned in the award of Land Acquisition Officer. That being so it was not necessary for the Government to proceed with the acquisition under Part VII of the Act-see Somavantis case, (1963) 2 SCR 774   = (AIR 1963 SC 151  ) (supra)10. Now coming to the question of urgency, it is clear from the facts set cut earlier that there was urgency. The Government of India was pleased to extend time for the completion of the project upto April 30, 1969. Therefore, urgent steps had to be taken for pushing through the project. The fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date on which the notification was issued, there was urgency or not. The conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to weight, if not conclusiveThe appellant had denied in the affidavit that the entire land acquired is either waste or arable land. That contention of his has not been examined by the High Court. Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that the case does not come within the scope of Section 17 (1). The State has also not purported to act under Section 17 (1). It has purported to act under Section 17 2) (c). Therefore, we have to see whether the State could have proceeded on the facts of this case under Section 17 (2) (c)13. The ejusdem generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a rule of construction to aid the Courts to find out the true intention of the legislature. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call into aid that rule18. Bearing in mind the principles set out earlier, we shall now consider whether the general import of the words in Section 17 (2) (c) should be cut down in view of Section 17 (2) (a) and (b). Under Clause (a) of Section 17 (2), the acquisition is to be made by the Railway Administration when owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency it becomes necessary for the administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of the traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station or for providing convenient connection with or access to any such station. We would like to emphasize that under this provision, the acquisition can only be made by the Railway Administration and that when it considers that immediate possession of any land is necessary for the purposes mentioned therein. Under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 17, before an acquisition can be made, the Collector must form an opinion that it has become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of the land concerned for the purposes mentioned therein. Under Clause (c) of Section 17 (2), the acquisition can be made only when the appropriate Government forms the opinion that because of urgent importance, the concerned land has to be acquired for the purposes mentioned in that provision. Under Clause (a) the decision to acquire has to be made by the Railway Administration. Under Clause (b), the acquisition can be made only on the formation of the required opinion by the Collector. Under Clause (c) the acquisition can be made only when the requisite opinion is formed by the appropriate Government. Further under Clause (a) the acquisition has to be made to meet certain unforeseen emergency as a result of which the immediate possession of the land is necessary. Under Clause (b) the Collector must form an opinion that it has become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of land but under Clause (c) the requirement is that the appropriate Government must form the opinion that the acquisition is of urgent importance. Under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 17, the decision to acquire land has not to be made by the same authority but by different authorities. Further the conditions under which the acquisition has to be made differ from clause to clause. Therefore, there is no basis to say that the general words in Clause (c) follow the particular and specific words in Clauses (b) and (c). Nor can it be said that the specific words contained in Clauses (a) and (b) constitute a category, class or genus. Hence, we are unable to accept the contention that in interpreting Clause (c) of Section 17 (2), we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis.