Case: Shree Sita Ram Sugar Co. Ltd., Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court &amp; Others

2. The appellant, a public limited company, carrying on business of manufacture and sale of sugar from sugarcane, employs about a thousand workmen in its factory at Baitalpur. The appellant retired three workmen, namely. Chhatradhari Lal, Chendrika Prasad Srivastava and Bal Karan. This led to an industrial dispute. The State Government by Notification No. 765/ LC/XVIII/LA-97 GP,/1959 dated October 25, 1960, referred the said dispute to the Labour Court Gorakhpur, for adjudication. This reference (hereinafter to be referred to as Reference No. I) was registered by the Labour Court as adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960. The parties filed their written statements and proceedings went on resulting in the Labour Court passing an award dated February 26, 1961, holding that the retirement of the three workmen was neither legal nor justified. This award was published in the U. P. Gazette dated May, 6, l961, by the State Governments Notification dated April, 4, 1961 No. 1176(819) 36/-/46(ST)-58. There were similar disputes regarding the retirement of several such workmen and accordingly that dispute was referred by the State Government to the same Labour Court for adjudication by Notification No. 822(BC)XVIII-LA-115(CR) 1959 dated October 31, 1960. This reference (hereinafter to be referred to as Reference No. II) was registered by the Labour Court as Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960. At this stage it must be mentioned that Reference No. II related to several workmen numbering about thirty or forty which included also the three workmen covered by Reference No. I. The three. workmen covered by Reference No. made an application to the Labour Court for deleting their names from Reference No. II on the ground that, their grievance is the subject of adjudication in Case No. 93 of 1960. Though the appellant opposed this application, the Labour Court in its order dated February 21, 1961, accepted the prayer of the three workmen and. as such they ceased to have anything to do further in Reference No. II. Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of Preference No. II, also resulted in an award being passed by the Labour Court on February 27, 1961. In this award, the Labour Court has decided the dispute on merits. But it has specifically stated that it is not recording any finding with regard to the three workmen covered by Reference No. I as their names have been excluded from adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of Reference No. II. This award dated February 27, 1961, was published in the State Gazette on April 4, l961.3. We have earlier mentioned that the award dated February 26, 1961, in Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960, arising out of Reference No. I, was published in the State Gazette on May 6, 1961. After the award was made on February 26, 1961, the State Government issued a Notification on February 28, 1961, withdrawing the Notification dated October 25, 1960, making Reference No. I. The order of withdrawal runs asOF UTTAR PRADESH LAB OUR (A) DEPARMENTNo. 167(LG)/XVIII-LA-97 (GR/1959Dated Kanpur, February 28, 1961.ORDERWhereas an industrial dispute between the employers and the workmen of the concern known as Shree Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. Baitalpur, Distt. Deoria relating to retirement of the workmen, was referred for adjudication to the Labour at Gorakhpur in G. O. No. 785 (LG)/XVIII LA- 97 (GR)/1959, dated October 25, 1960.And whereas the same dispute is also covered by GS. No. 822 (LG)/XVIII-LA-115 (GR)1959, date October 31, 1960, as amended by G. O. No. 912 (LG)/XVIII-LA-115 (GR)/1959,dated November 21, 1960, referring the same question of retirement of workmen to Labour Court at Gorakhpur;Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 6-G of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947), the Governor is pleased to order that G. O. No. 785 (LG)/ XVIII-LA-97 (GR)/1959, dated October 25, 1960 referring the said dispute for adjudication, shall be and is hereby withdrawn".Sd/- J. Prasad.Under Secretary.It will be noted from the above Notification that the State Government had withdrawn its previous order referring the dispute by virtue of powers stated to be conferred under sub-section 6-G of the Act. We have also referred to the fact that the award in Reference No. I was published in the state Gazette on May 6, 1961. It will be noted that the material dates to be considered with regard to Reference No. 1 are asThe dispute was referred for adjudication by Notification dated October 25, 1960.(b) The award was made on February 26, 1961.(c) The Notification dated October 25, 1960, referring the dispute was withdrawn by Notification dated February 28, 1961.(d) The award was published in the State Gazette dated May 6, l961. It will be noted from these dates that the order withdrawing the original reference was made two days after the Tribunal had passed the award. The publication of the award was after the State Government had withdrawn its original order making the reference.The appellant filed the writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 for the issue of writ of certiorari quashing the award dated February 26, 1961 and also for a mandamus directing the State Government to withdraw its Notification dated 6-5-1961, publishing the award. The proceedings before the High Court related to the matters arising out of Reference No. I. According to the appellant, the award dated February 26, 1961, had become ineffectual and useless in view of the State Government having withdrawn the Notification dated October 25, 1960, referring the dispute for adjudication. Its further contention was that having withdrawn on February 28, 1961, its previous order referring the dispute, the State Government had no power to publish the award, as it had done on May 6, 1961 and that the said order publishing the award had to be revoked. The union contested the Writ Petition on the ground that the State Government has no power under S. 6-G to withdraw an order already passed referring a dispute for adjudication and that, in any event, it has no surh power after an award has been made by a Labour Court or Tribunal. According to the union, the order of withdrawal dated February 28, 1961, is of no effect and that the publication of the award on May 6, 1961, was valid and that the State Government cannot be called upon to revoke the same.6. The learned single Judge posed two questions for consideration:(1) Whether the power to withdraw under Section 6-G of the Act is confined to withdrawal for purposes of transferring the proceedings to another Court or Tribunal; and(2) Whether the power under S. 6-G can be exercised at any stage until the award of the Labour Court or Tribunal has become enforceable under S. 6-A of the Act.The learned- single Judge did not consider the first question and proceeded on the assumption that under S. 6-G the State Government has power to withdraw a reference already made. But, after considering the second question, he came to the conclusion that the power of withdrawal cannot be exercised after an award had been made by the Tribunal concerned. In this view, the learned single judge held that the order of withdrawal dated February 28, 1961, was of no effect and that the publication of the award on May 6, 1961, was according to law. In this view, the Court declined to grant any relief to the appellant.7. The appellant challenged the decision of the learned single Judge in Special Appeal No 960 of 1964. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that the State Government has power under Section 6-G to withdraw any proceedings pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal. But it held that as the award had been made on February 26, l961, there were no proceedings pending before the Labour Court on February 28, 1961, when the order of withdrawal was passed by the State Government. In this view the Division Bench held that it was not open to the State Government to withdraw the proceedings after the award had been made by the Tribunal and, therefore the Notification dated February 28, 1961, is of no effect. By judgment and order dated August 2, 1966, the learned Judges confirmed the order of the Single Judge and dismissed the Special Appeal. The management has come to this Court in this appeal.

Court's reasoning:
The above section clearly indicates that when once an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to conduct its proceedings expeditiously and it has to submit its award to the State Government The award has to be published within thirty days of its receipt by the State Government. Power has no doubt been given to the State Government, before publication of an award, to remit the same for reconsideration. When the same is received after reconsideration, the State Government is bound to publish the same, as provided under sub-section (3). An award published under sub-section (3) is final subject to the provision of Section 6-A. The Labour Court or Tribunal has power to correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake in the award. But if any such correction is made, a copy of the order making the correction will have to be sent to the State Government. The provisions relating to publication of an award apply to the order making a correction in the award.We have already pointed out that Section 6 casts a duty on the Tribunal, when a dispute has been referred to it, to deal with it expeditiously and to submit its award to the State Government. The State Government has also an obligation to publish the award within thirty days of its receipt. No doubt sub-section (4) of Section 6 gives power to the State Government, before publishing the award, to remit the same for reconsideration. But still a duty is cast upon the State Government to publish the award as reconsidered by the Tribunal within thirty days of its receipt. Section 6-A also gives certain powers to the State Government regarding the award, which normally becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication.15. Section 6-G, in our opinion, deals only with the power of the State Government to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another and for purposes of such transfer to withdraw the proceedings from the Labour Court or Tribunal from whom it is being transferred. We are free to admit that the wording of sub-section (1) is capable of being construed as conferring in the State Government a power to withdraw any proceedings or to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. But having regard to the scheme of Section 6-G, read in the light of the other provisions referred to earlier, the section will have to be interpreted as giving to the State Government only a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court to another. When Section 6 makes it obligatory that an award has to be made by the Tribunal concerned and that it has to be published by the State Government within thirty days of its receipt and declare that the award on publication becomes final, it is idle to expect that the legislature intended to nullify the entire proceedings by conferring an absolute power of withdrawal on the State Government under Section 6-G. The proper way of reading Section 6-G is to limit the power of withdrawal, referred to therein, only for the purpose of transferring the proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. That the expression or in Section 6-G (1) interposed between withdraw any proceedings - or transfer a proceeding will have to be understood as and. So read, the power conferred under Section 6-G on the State Government is that of withdrawing any proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transferring the same tohave already referred to this aspect and expressed the view that a superficial reading of Section 6-G will support the contention of Mr. Pai. If the expression or as mentioned earlier, is read as and the section does not present any difficulty. That having due regard to the scheme of the statute and the purpose sought to be served the expression or can be read under certain circumstances as and as has been laid down by this Court in Mazgaon Dock Ltd. v. Commr. of Income - tax and Excess Profits Tax, 1959 SCR 843 = ( AIR 1958 SC 861  ). Adopting the same principle and having due regard to the object of Section 6-G, which essentially is only to confer in the State Government a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another, the expression or has to be read in Section 6-G as and. If so read sub-section (1) of Section 6-G confers on the State Government only a power to withdraw a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transfer the same to another. It is needless to state that transfer of a proceeding can only be when it is pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal.17. Section 6-D, in our opinion, has no relevancy in construing S. 6-G. Section 6-D is enacted for a totally different purpose. For instance S. 6-B provides for conditions of service etc. to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceedings. Similarly under S. 6-F a question may arise whether an employer has contravened the provisions of Section 6-E during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal. It may be quite essential to consider whether any proceedings were pending, before a Labour Court or Tribunal. For the purpose of considering the question whether any proceedings were pending, the Act has created a fiction under Section 6-D by indicating the starting point of a proceeding before a Labour Court as well as its conclusion. The starting point of the proceedings has been fixed from the date of the reference and its termination has been fixed as the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A. During this period broadly it has to be considered that proceedings are pending before a Labour. Court or Tribunal. We need not refer to the other provisions of the Act where the duration of the pendency of proceedings may assume importance. Section 6-D can be invoked only in those cases. But it does not come into the picture, as mentioned earlier in construing Sectionhave already referred to the fact that in Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of Reference No. II, respondents 4 to 6 herein had requested the Labour Court to exclude them from the said adjudication on the ground that they are already covered by Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960 arising out of Reference No. I. The Labour Court passed an order on February 21, 1961, excluding the said three workmen from Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960. That means the said three workmen had no further interest in the said Adjudication Case. If that is so, the award passed on February 26, 1961, in the case arising out of Reference No. I was perfectly correct and the publication of the said award on May 6, 1961, was also in pursuance of the mandatory provisions of the Act. There is no question of any conflict between the two awards. Hence the appellant cannot seek any assistance from the decision of this Court in (1964) 2 SCR 448   = (AIR 1964 SC 160  ) and it cannot ask for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to cancel the publication of the award.