Case: Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj Vs. The State Of Delhi And Others

2. The petitioner was arrested on 10-3-1953 under an order of the District Magistrate of Delhi made under S. 3, Preventive Detention Act as amended. The grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner on 15-3-1953. Paragraph 1 of that communication states that "the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad have started an unlawful campaign in sympathy with the Praja Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the law, involving violence and threat to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the sub-paragraphs which follow. The incidents referred to in sub paras (a) to (1) are said to have ranged from 4 to 10-3-1953, the date on which the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly implicate the petitioner. They merely give particulars of the alleged unlawful activities of the three political organizations referred to above. Sub-paragraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner. It runs as follows;(m) On the evening of 11-3-53 there was very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or at the instance of Jan Sangh and Mahasabha workers in Sabzlmandi when the police dispersed a Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha procession and several persons including policemen, journalists and other non-officials were injured. An assault was made on Miss Mridula Sarabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her associates received a stab injury.

Court's reasoning:
The learned Attorney-General explained that the incidents of the 11th March were referred to not as a ground for the arrest and detention of the petitioner. but merely as evidencing the unlawful activities of the movement organized by the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which the petitioner was an activemember. The explanation is hardly convincing and we cannot but regard this lapse in chronology as a mark of carelessness. Notwithstanding repeated admonition by this Court that due care and attention must be bestowed upon matters involving the liberty of the individual, it is distressing to find that such matters are dealt with in a careless and casual manner. In view, however, of the statements in the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate before us that he carefully perused and considered the reports and materials placed before him by responsible Intelligence Officers and that he was fully satisfied that the petitioner was assisting the movement and agitation started by the Jan Sangh etc. we are not prepared to hold the District Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the relevant considerations before he made the detention order as suggested for the petitioner.This interpretation is plausible, but the petitioner, who is a layman not experienced in the interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected without legal aid, which is denied to him, to interpret the ground in the sense explained by the Attorney-General. Surely, it is up to the detaining authority to make his meaning clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person detained to his own resource for interpreting the grounds. We must, therefore. hold that the ground mentioned in sub-para. (e) of para 2 is vague in the sense explained above.The question, however, is not whether the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his release by his representation, but whether his constitutional safeguard has been infringed preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the petitioner has the right, under Art 22 (5). is interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him." We are of opinion that this constitutional, requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under c1. (6) of Art. 22. That not having been done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-para (e) of para. 2 of the statement of grounds, the petitioners detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of Art. 21: The petitioner is therefore, entitled to be released