Case: Gurugobinda Basu Vs. Sankari Prasad Ghosal And Ors

The appellant before us is Gurugobinda Basu who is a chartered accountant and a partner of the firm. of auditors carrying on business under the name and style of G. Basu and Company. This firm acted as the auditor of certain companies and corporations, such as the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the Durgapur Projects Ltd., and the Hindustan Steel Ltd., on payment of certain remuneration. The appellant was also a Director of the West Bengal Fi- nancial Corporation having been appointed or nominated as such by the State Government of West Bengal. The appointment carried with it the right to receive fees or remuneration as director of the saidFebruary-March, 1962, the appellant was elected to the House of the People from Constituency No. 34 (Burdwan Parliamentary Constituency) which is a single member constituency. The election was held in February, 1962. There were two candidates, namely, the appellant and respondent No. 3 to this appeal. The appellant was declared elected on March 1, 1962, he having secured 1, 55, 485 votes as against his rival who secured 1, 23, 015 votes. This election was challenged by two voters of the said constituency by means of an election petition dated April 10, 1962. The challenge was founded on two grounds : (1) that the appellant was, at the relevant time, the holder of offices of profit both under the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal and this disqualified him from standing for election under Art. 102 (1)(a) of the Constitution; and (2) that he was guilty of certain corrupt practices which vitiated his election. The second ground was abandoned at the trial, and we are no longer concerned with it.The election Tribunal held that the appellant was a holder of offices of profit both under the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal and was therefore disqualified from standing for election under Art. 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Election Tribunal accordingly allowed the election petition and declared that the election of the appellant to the House of the People was void. There was an appeal to the High Court under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The High Court dismissed the appeal, but granted a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(1) (c) of the Constitution.

Court's reasoning:
We think that this contention is correct. We agree with the High Court that for holding an office of profit under the Government, one need not be in the service of Government and there need be no relationship of master and servant between them., The Constitution itself makes a distinction between the holder of an office of profit under the Government and the holder of a post or service under the Government; see Arts. 309 and 314. The Constitution has also made a distinction between the holder of an office of profit under the Government and the holder of an office of profit under a local or other authority subject to the control of Government; see Art. 58(2) andis clear from the aforesaid observations that in Maulana Abdul Shakurs case([1958] S.C.R. 387.) the factors which were held to be , , decisive were (a) the power of the Government to appoint a person to an office of profit or to continue him in that , office or revoke his appointment at their discretion, and (b) payment from out of Government revenues, though it was pointed out that payment from a source other than Government revenues was not always a decisive factor. In the case before us the appointment of the appellant :as also his continuance in office rests solely with the Government of India in respect of the two companies. His remuneration is also fixed by Government. We assume for the purpose of this appeal, that the two companies are statutory bodies distinct from Government but we must remember at the same time that they are Government com- panies within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and 1000% of the shares are held by the Government. We must also remember that in the performance of his functions the appellant is controlled by the Comptroller and Auditor-General who himself is undoubtedly holder -of an office of profit under the Government, though there are safeguards in the Constitution as to his tenure of office -and removability therefrom. Under Art. 148 of the Constitution the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India is appointed by the President and he can be removed from office in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge , of the Supreme Court. The salary and other conditions of service of the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall be such as may be determined by Parliament by law and until they are so determined shall be as specified in the Second Schedule to the Constitution. Under cl. (4) of Art. 148 the Comptroller and Auditor-General is not eligible for further office either under the Government of India or under the Government of any State after he has ceased to hold his office. Cl. (5) of the said Article lays down that subject to the provisions of the Constitution and of any law made by Parliament, the administrative powers of the Comptroller and Auditor- General shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the President after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Under Art. 149 of the Constitution the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall perform such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the States and of any other authority or body as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, shall perform such duties and exercise such powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the States as were conferred on or exercisable by the Auditor General of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution in relation to the accounts of the Dominion of India and of the Provinces respectively. The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India relating to the accounts of the Union have to be submitted to the President and the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General relating to the accounts of 2 State have to be submitted to the Governor. From the aforesaid provisions it appears to us that the Comptroller and Auditor-General is himself a holder of an office of profit under the Government of India, being appointed by the President and his administrative powers arc such as may be prescribed by rules made by the President, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and of any law made by Parliament. Therefore if we look at the matter from the point of view of substance rather than of form, it appears to us that the appellant as the holder of an office of profit in the two Government companies, the Durgapur Projects Ltd. and the Hindustan Steel Ltd., is really under the Government of India; he is appointed by the Government of India, lie is removable from office by the Government of India; he performs functions for two Government companies under the control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General who himself is appointed by the President and whose administrative powers may be controlled by rules made by theagain the decisive test was held to be the test of appointment. In view of these decisions we cannot accede to the submission of Mr. Chaudhury that the several factors which enter into the determination of this question-the appointing authority, the authority vested with power to terminate the appointment, the authority which determines the remuneration, the source from which the remuneration is paid, and the authority vested with power to control the manner in which the duties of the office are discharged and to give directions in that behalf-must all co-exist and each must show subordination to Government and that it must necessarily follow that if one of the elements is, absent, the test of a person holding an office under the Government, Central or State, is not satisfied. The cases we have referred to specifically point out that the circumstance that the source from which the remuneration is paid is not from public revenue is a neutral factor-not decisive of the question. As we have said earlier whether stress will be laid on one factor or the other will depend on the facts of each case. However, we have no hesitation in saying that where the several elements, the power to appoint, the power to dismiss, the power to control and give directions as to the manner in which the duties of the office are to be performed, and the power to determine the question of remuneration are all present in a given case, then the officer in question holds the office under the authority so empowered.For the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that the Election Tribunal and the High Court were right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant as an auditor of the two Government companies held an office of profit under the Government of India within the meaning of Art. 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. As such he was disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament. It is unnecessary to consider the further question whether he was a holder of an office of profit either under the Government of India or the Government of West Bengal by reason of being an auditor for the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a Director of the West Bengal Financial Corporation.