Case: Dejapada Das and Another Vs. Union of India and Others

1. Survival after death is the expression that aptly describes these writ petitions relating to coal mining by private agencies long after a prohibitory legislation and an order by this Court repelling the challenges to the vires of that Act. Parliament by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976 (Act No. LXVII of 1976) (For short, the 1976 Act) totally prohibited all mining of coal save by instrumentalities s et out in s. 3, sub s. (3) which we may excerpt here:      (3) on and from the commencement of Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976(a) no person, other than(i) the Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or      (ii) a person to whom a, referred to in the proviso to cl. (c), has been granted by any such Government, company or corporation, or      (iii) a company engaged in the production of iron and steel shall carry on coal mining operation, in India, in any form;      (b) excepting the mining leases granted before such commencement in favour of the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause (a), and anysubleasegranted by any such Government, company or corporation, all other mining leases and subleases in force immediately before such commencement, shall, in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated;      (c) no lease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause (a) .      Provided that the Government, company or corporation to whom a lease for winning or mining coal has been granted may grant asubleaseto any person in any are a on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the instrument granting the, if the Government, company or corporation is satisfied that(i) the reserves of coal in the area are in isolated small pocket s or are not sufficient for scientific and economical development in a coordinated and integrated manner, and      (ii) the coal produced by thesubleasewill not be required to be transported by rail.      It is obvious that the provision is peremptory and the prohibition is mandatory because there is punishment provided for contravention of that provision. Section 4(1) of the 1976 Act makes a breach of s. 3(3) punishable with imprisonment .      2. This broad spectrum ban in law arrested the extraction of coal and was naturally assailed as ultra vires by the managements themselves in writ petitions under Art. 32. A bench of seven judges of this court heard erudite and elaborate arguments, at the end of which the writ petitions were dismissed. But it is not unusual for many litigants even though vanquished, to argue still. Here, however, the challenge and challenger are of different colour. For, the petitioners before us claim to be workmen who are thrown out of employment on account of the 1976 Act and lament in this Court that they are discriminated against and on that score the law is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The plea put forward is that in regard to nationalised coal mines the workmen are taken care of and their benefits assured, while in regard to coal mines where mining is prohibited by s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act the workmen are left in the cold. This is stated to be discrimination between workmen and workmen, thus contravening the mandate of equality before the law. Maybe, the writ missiles of the managements proved damp squibs but the workers undaunted by that rebuff, want to try a new weapon of ultra vires. The coal will go to the employers and the wages to the workers.      3. The Union of India resists this relief and contends that the writ petitioners are mere reincarnations of the old managements which have fought and lost and are masquerading as w orkmen so as to facilitate a second challenge. The State asserts that clandestine coal mining mafia having been stopped, these racketeers are playing the maricha game through bogus workers in tears. Without going into the merits of this averment we may state that every other conceivable objection to the validity of the 1976 Act and other sister enactments had been urged in vain before the seven judges bench. Now the alleged workmen are complaining of discriminatory denial of benefits to one class of workers. The Union of India counters this plea as factually a ruse for clandestine mining operations by management and legally a second battle after the legal Waterloo, hoping against hope that there is nothing to lo se in a gamble. Even if a spell of stay were got the gain will outweigh possible losses in litigation. Indeed, the States contention is that considerable losses to Government and traumatic consequences on the nation are being daily inflicted by such cla ndestine operations. The whole mischief contemplated by the 1976 Act is being continued under the guise of invalidity of the legislation and, alternatively, by going to court and getting receivers appointed so that a legal colour is imp arted to lawless depradations.

Court's reasoning:
8. The notification required under s. 5 authorising the mine to be worked, is admittedly absent. No such notification exists or has been hinted at or is existing. In the absence of the relevant notification contemplated by s. 5, it is impossible to postulate deemed custodianship. There are scheduled mines or notified mines, under the scheme of statutory management in the Managementr Act. Notifications are a sine sua non for, actual or deemed and absent such notification taking over management no private agency cane itself as deemed custodian. It follows that on any view of the matter the managements other than those specified under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act can claim to extract coal from any coal mines. If this conclusion is sound, as we have demonstrated it is, the inference is irresistible that no one can claim to extract coal as a workman, although in public interest, it is imperative that such operation should stop. We hold that there is no violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution,a visis the workmen concerned assuming them to be real workmen. We have grave doubts about the veracity of this piece of workmanship that the petitioner and others of their ilk are actual, not imaginary. Anyway, after the dismissal of the managements writ petitions, the argument that the Act impugned is ultra vires visa visworkmen is a daring legal workmanship. If a larger bench of this Court has already upheld the vires of a statute the discovery of a new argument cannot invalidate that decision . That proposition will make the binding effect of precedents, read in the light of Art. 141, a vanishing cream once a novel thought strikes a legal brain9. The question of discrimination between two classes of workmen hardly arises because one set of mines has been closed down validly. If the closure is valid, no one employed there has a right to force it open on the score of discrimination. Denial off or other benefits belong to a different jurisdiction. If any workmen are really aggrieved that their interests are not protected and that their future is in jeopardy, it is certainly open to them to make representation to the Central Government for consideration of their lot, and certainly a welfare State will give due consideration for such representation if it is satisfied that he grievance is genuine. We dismiss the Writ Petition with costs10. It has been mentioned on more than one occasion in this court that interlocutory orders have been passed, that Receivers have been appointed by civil courts, including High Courts, and that working of mines is licitly going on. In the face of thee statutory prohibition which is peremptory in language and punishable in consequence, it is surprising that any Receiver could at all dare to work mines. While we disapprove of that conduct we make it perfectly plain that there will be no more sanction for any receiver or other officer of court to extract coal or coking coal from any mine in India. Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act being mandatory and having been held constitutional by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India to appoint a receiver or otherwise permit extraction of coal or cooking coal. We vacate all interim orders forthwith11. It may be fair to the learned Attorney General, whose hunch we share to state that this wealth of "workers" writ petitions is a kind of litigative puppetry, the illicit mine exploiters being the puppetteers an d those who figure as worker petitioners being the puppets.