Case: Kanaiyalal Maneklal Chinai &amp; Anr Vs. State Of Gujarat &amp; Ors

1. The appellants are owners of "China Baug" situated on the southern bank of the river Sabarmati within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation resolved to move the State Government to acquire a part of the land of the appellants for setting up a Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi. On September 10, 1959, the Commissioner, Ahmedabad Division, in the State of Bombay, issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,it appears to the Commissioner, Ahmedabad Division, that the lands specified in the schedule hereto are likely to be needed for public purpose viz., for "The Memorial of Rashtrapita Mahatmais hereby notified under the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894)"that the said lands are likely to be needed for the purpose specifiedwas made under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act and after receiving report of the Collector, the Commissioner, Baroda Division of the State of Gujarat (who by virtue of the Bombay Recognization Act, 1960, was the appropriate authority) issued a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on August 31, 1961, that the lands were required for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule to the notification i. e., "Memorial of Mahatma Gandhi".2. The appellants moved a petition in the High Court of Gujarat for a writ quashing the proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act and the two notifications dated September 10, 1959 and August 31, 1961 and for a writ restraining the Commissioner, Baroda Division, and the Government of the State of Gujarat from enforcing the notifications. The High Court rejecting the petition. With certificate granted by the High Court under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution this appeal is preferred by the appellants.

Court's reasoning:
This Court has in Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, 1966-3 SCR 885   = (AIR 1966 SC 1788  ) by majority held that the powers conferred by Section 3 (4) on the State Government are not unguided and that the State Legislature has by enacting Section 3 (4) not abdicated its power in favour of the executive, for it has laid down the legislative policy and has left it to the State Government to reorganise the administration consequent on the setting up of Commissioners Divisions. The challenge to the vires of the Commissioners of Divisions Act 8 of 1958 must fail.7. The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the Commissioner, Ahmedabad Division, exercising powers as an officer of the State of Bombay. But after the notification was issued, the State of Bombay was recognized and the area in which the land is situated was included in the new State of Gujarat. The Commissioner of Baroda Division was competent to exercise the powers under the Commissioners of Divisions Act which continued to remain in force in the new State of Gujarat in respect of the Land Acquisition Act and had on that account power to issue a notification under Section 6 of the Act. The notification under Section 4 was issued by the Commissioner, Ahmedabad Division, who was competent to issue it in the set-up then in existence and the Commissioner competent to issue the notification under Section 6 had issued that notification.The authority of the Commissioner of the State of Gujarat to issue the notification under Section 6 not being open to challenge, there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act or the Commissioners of Divisions Act, which requires that to invest the notification under Section 6 with validity, the Commissioner of the State of Gujarat had in the first instance to issue a notification under Section 4 of the Aft declaring that the land was needed or was likely to be needed for any publicis not necessary for us to express any opinion on this part of the case, for, we are clearly of the view that the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act does not refer to any purpose of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation nor is the acquisition for a purpose for which the Commissioner is required by the provisions of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, to acquire the land . The land is needed for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi at a place associated with him, and we regard, because of the universal veneration in which the memory of Mahatma Gandhi is held in our country, that the purpose was a public purpose. Counsel for the appellants has not attempted to argue that acquisition of land for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi at a place which has some association with him is not a public purpose.He merely argued that setting up of a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi is not a purpose for which the Commissioner is required by the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, to acquire the land, nor is it a purpose of the Municipality under the Municipal Corporations Act. The purpose of acquisition being one which falls within the normal connotation of the expression "public purpose" within the meaning of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is unnecessary to rely upon the extended meaning of the expression "public purpose" as provided by Section 78 (1) of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act,we are not concerned in the present case to determine whether if the funds are utilised, they will be lawfully utilised:that is a matter which is not within the periphery of the inquiry in this appeal. The land is being acquired for a purpose which is a public purpose, and once that condition is fulfilled no further inquiry need be made, whether if the municipal funds are to be utilised for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi, after the land is vested in the State after acquisition, the Municipality will be acting within the limits of its authority.We may observe that a notification issued under Section 6 is by sub-section (3) conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a publicis, however, to be noticed that the entire Survey No. 348B was not notified for acquisition: only a part of the land was notified for acquisition under the notification under Section 4. Under the notification 3428 sq. yards 3 sq. ft. were notified, but the notification under Section 6 the declaration related to 3562 sq. yards. Under the notification under Section 6 it was recited that the remaining area of the land out of Survey No. 348B was declared as not likely to be needed for a public purpose.The use of the expression "the remaining area of the laid lands notified under Section 4 ........ is hereby abandoned" does not justify an inference that the Commissioner did not apply his mind. It may be reasonably inferred that it was intended to be covered thereby that a part of the land out of Survey No. 348B which was not needed for a public purpose was excluded from the notification.