Case: P. Lakshmi Reddy Vs. L. Lakshmi Reddy

1. The plaintiff in the action out of which this appeal arises brought a suit for declaration of his title to a one-third share in the suit properties and for partition and recovery of that share. The suit was dismissed as having been barred by limitation and adverse possession. On appeal the District Judge reversed the decision and decreed the suit. The High Court maintained the decree of the District Judge on second appeal. Hence this appeal before us on special leave by the first defendant in the action, who is the appellant before us2. The property in suit belonged to one Venkata Reddy. He died as an infant on August 25, 1927. At that time, the properties were in the possession of the maternal uncles of the father of the deceased Venkata Reddy. One Hanimi Reddy, an agnatic relation of Venkata Reddy, filed a suit O. S. No. 26 of 1927 for recovery of the properties from the said maternal uncles and obtained a decree therein on March 15, 1929. A Receiver was appointed for the properties in February, 1928, during the pendency of the suit and presumably the properties were in his possession. This appears from the decree which shows that it directed the Receiver to deliver possession to the successful plaintiff in that suit. Hanimi Reddy obtained actual possession of these properties on January 20, 1930, and continued in possession till he died on August 16,1936. The first defendant in the present action who is the appellant before us is a son of the brother of Hanimi Reddy and came into possession of all the properties as Hanimi Reddys heir. The respondent before us is the plaintiff. The present suit was brought on the allegation that the plaintiff and the second defendant in the suit, his brother, were agnatic relations of Venkata Reddy, of the same degree as Hanimi Reddy and that all the three were equal co-heirs of Venkata Reddy and succeeded to his properties as such on his death. It was alleged that though Hanimi Reddy filed the prior suit and obtained possession of the properties thereunder, he did so as one of the co- heirs, with the consent of the plaintiff and the second defendant and that he was enjoying the properties jointly with the plaintiff and his brother as tenants in common but that the first defendant, who came into possession on the death of Hanimi Reddy denied the title of the plaintiff and his brother in or about the year 1940. The plaint in the present action was filed originally in the District Munsifs Court on October 23, 1941, and was ordered to be returned for presentation to the District Judges Court on November 30, 1942. It was actually represented in that Court on December 2, 1942. One of the questions raised in the suit was that the suit was barred by limitation on the ground that it must be taken to have been instituted not on October 23, 1941, but on December 2, 1942. This plea was upheld by the trial Court. On first appeal the District Judge held that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act and that the suit must be taken as having been instituted on October 23, 1941, and is, therefore, in time. He accordingly decreed the suit. In the High Court the question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act, though raised was not finally decided. It was held that the possession of Hanimi Reddy was not adverse to the plaintiff and that accordingly he was entitled to the decree as prayed for. The question as to the non-availability of the benefit of S. 14 of the Limitation Act to the plaintiff in the present suit has not been urged before us and the finding of the District Judge that the plaint must be taken to have been validly presented on October 23, 1941, stands.

Court's reasoning:
5. In the present case there can be no doubt that Hanimi Reddy obtained sole possession of the suit properties after the death of Venkata Reddy on the basis of an action against third parties in which he claimed to be the sole nearest male agnate having title to all the properties. After obtaining possession he was in continuous and undisputed possession of the properties till his death enjoying all the profits thereof. No doubt in an ordinary case such possession and enjoyment has to be attributed to his lawful title, he being one of the co-heirs. But the plaint in the suit of 1927 and the decree therein, render it reasonably clear that he filed the suit and obtained possession on the basis of his having exclusive title ignoring his co-heirs. It is urged that knowledge of the assertion of such exclusive title averred in a plaint cannot be imputed to other co-heirs who are not parties to the suit. But in this case it is not difficult on the evidence to say that the plaintiff and the second defendant must have been fully aware, at the time, of the nature of the claim made by Hanimi Reddy in the prior litigation and on the basis of which he obtained possession. That knowledge is implicit in the very case that they have put forward in the present plaint. Their case is that the prior suit was brought by Hanimi Reddy with the consent of the plaintiff and the second defendant and on their behalf. No doubt that specific case has been found against them and that finding is res judicata between the parties. But there is no reason why the admission as to the knowledge of the nature of the litigation and the contents of the plaint which such a case necessarily implies should not be attributed at least to the present plaintiff. It appears reasonable to think that the plaintiff being unable to explain his inaction for over fourteen years after the death of Venkata Reddy has been constrained to put forward a false case that the prior suit by Hanimi Reddy was with his consent and on his behalf. It is significant that the plaintiff has remained silent without asserting his right during Hanimi Reddys life time, and comes forward with this suit after his death, rendering it difficult to ascertain whether the fact of Hanimi Reddy completely ignoring the existence of the plaintiff and the second defendant as co-heirs was not in denial of their relationship and consequently of their title as co-heirs to their knowledge. The fact that even so late as in the written-statement of the first defendant relationship is denied may be indicative as to why Hanimi Reddy ignored the plaintiff and the second defendant and why they remained silent. The learned Judges of the High Court thought that there was nothing to show that Hanimi Reddy was aware that plaintiff and second defendant had any rights in the properties as co-heirs. This assumption is contrary to the admission of mutual knowledge of each others rights implicit in the plaintiffs case that Hanimi Reddy brought his suit with the consent of the plaintiff. In such circumstances and especially having regard to the fact that both the plaintiff and Hanimi Reddy were living in the same village and the plaintiff has put forward a false explanation to account for his inaction, a court of fact might well have inferred ouster. Sitting on an appeal in special leave, however, we do not feel it desirable to decide the case on this ground. We, therefore, proceed to consider the further question that arises in the case, viz, whether the Receivers possession can be tacked on to Hanimi Reddys possession on the assumption that Hanimi Reddys possession on and from January 20,1930, was adverse to the plaintiff. The doctrine of the Receivers possession being that of the successful party cannot, in our opinion, be pushed to the extent of enabling a person who was initially out of possession to claim the tacking on of Receivers possession to his subsequent adverse possession. The position may conceivably be different where the defendant in the suit was previously in adverse possession against the real owner and the Receiver has taken possession from him and restores it back to him on the successful termination of the suit in his favour. In such a case the question that would arise would be different, viz., whether the interim possession of the Receiver would be a discontinuance or abandonment of possession or interruption of the adverse possession. We are not concerned with it in this case and express no opinion on it7. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. It is well-settled that limitation cannot begin to run against a person unless at the time that person is legally in a position to vindicate his title by action.In the present case, the co-heirs out of possession such as plaintiff and the second defendant were not obliged to bring a suit for possession, against Hanimi Reddy until such time as Hanimi Reddy obtained actual possession. Indeed during the time when the Receiver was in possession, obviously, they could not sue him for possession to vindicate their title. Nor were they obliged during that time to file a futile suit for possession either against Hanimi Reddy or against the defendants in Hanimi Reddys suit when neither of them was in possession. It appears to us, therefore, that the adverse possession of Hanimi Reddy, if any, as against his co-heirs could not commence when the Receiver was in possession. It follows that assuming that the possession of Hanimi Reddy from January 20, 1930, was in fact adverse and amounted to ouster of the co-heirs such adverse possession was not adequate in time by October 23,1941 the date of suit to displace the title of the plaintiff. It follows that the plaintiff- respondent before us, is entitled to the decree which he has obtained and that the decision of the High Court is, in our view, correct, though on different grounds.It may be mentioned that objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent before us that the question of tacking on Receivers possession was not in issue in the lower courts and should not be allowed to be raised here. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to deal with this objection