Case: State Of Gujarat Vs. Patel Raghav Natha &amp; Ors

2. In order to appreciate the contentions raised before us it is necessary to set out a few facts. The petitioner was a resident of the State of Rajkot and at an auction effected by the State be acquired on or about September 22, 1988, agricultural land bearing survey No. 417 which in all measured about 12 acres and 12 gunthas, After some acquisitions by the State out of this survey number he was left with 2 acres and 10 gunthas of agricultural land. On October 20, 1958, the petitioner applied to the Collector for permission to convert this land to nonagricultural use, under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, hereinafter referred to as the Code. This petition was first rejected by the Collector but the Divisional Commissioner remanded the matter to the Collector. On remand, the then Collector of Rajkot, after holding an enquiry, granted permission to the petitioner to use the land for nonagricultural use by his order dated July 2, 1960. Pursuant to this order a sanad was issued by the Collector to the petitioner on July 27, 1960. It appears that the sanad was amended on November 3, 1960 and December 1, 1960. The sanad was in form M1 and a number of conditions were appended to the sanad. Condition 6 of the main sanad provided that "save as herein provided, the grant shall be subject to the provisions of the said Code." The special conditions originally included a condition that the land shall be used exclusively for constructing residential houses (condition 5) but this condition was altered in November, 1960.3. It appears that the Municipal Committee of Rajkot had objected to the grant of permission before the Collector when a sketch of the land was sent to the Municipality. The objections as they appear from the order of the Collector granting the sanad were directed against the accuracy of the sketch, showing the northern and the western corners of the Ramkrishna Ashram, and regarding the boundaries and situation of the roads in Survey Nos. 417 and 418. The Collector had overruled these objections.4. The Municipal Committee approached the Commissioner to exercise powers under Section 211 of the Code. The Commissioner noted the objections of the Municipality and after reciting the objections and the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and after inspecting the site,this inspection the contentions of the Municipality as to the existence of the various roads as well as the nature of the Kharaba land have been proved beyond doubt.In light of the above arguments as well as the site inspection and the papers of the case, I set aside the order of the Collector granting N. A. Permission. I consider, on weighing all evidence cited above, that the land does not belong to Shri Raghavis this order which has been quashed by the High Court.5. The following grounds were urged before the learnedThe Commissioner or the State Government had no authority under S. 211 of the Code to revise the order of theCollector so as to the agreement or sanad granted to him.(2) The commissioners order is not a speaking order as no reasons are given by him for setting aside the Collectors order and, therefore, it should be quashed.(3) The question of title to the land was not in controversy at all before the Collector and, therefore, it was not open to the Commissioner to permit the Municipality to agitate that question and the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide that question.(4) In case the above points are not accepted, the order of the Commissioner is bad even on merits as the Commissioner had erred in law in allowing the questions to be agitated before him which were not agitated before the Collector and which involved considerations which were completely foreign to those which were actually before the Collector.While dealing with ground No. 1 the learned Judge held that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass an order which would nullify the sanad and that the sanad was binding on both the parties till it was set aside in due course of law.On the second he held that there was some force in the submission. But heat the same time if I had to decide this case on this contention raised, I may not have interfered only on this ground with the decision of thethe third ground he found that it was true that the question of title was agitated by the Municipal Committee for the first time before the Commissioner, though it was primarily for the petitioner to show that he was an occupant within the meaning of Section 65 of the Code. But then the learned Judge decided not to enter into the merits of the case as he had come to the clear conclusion that the Commissioner had no authority to pass the order that he did under Section 211 of the Code.

Court's reasoning:
9. We need not give our views on this alleged distinction for two reasons; first, that this point was not debated before the High Court in this case or in earlier cases,**and secondly, because we have come to the conclusion that the order of the Commissioner must be quashed on other grounds.The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time.It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plan that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined of the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i. e., more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late.13. We are also of the opinion that the order of the Commissioner should be quashed on the ground that he did not give any reasons for his conclusions. We have already extracted the passage above which shows that after reciting the various contentions he baldly stated his conclusions without disclosing his reasons. In a matter of this kind the Commissioner should indicate his reasons, however briefly, so that an aggrieved party may carry the matter further if so advised.14. We are also of the opinion that the Commissioner should not have gone into the question of title. It seems to us that when the title of an occupant is disputed by any party before the Collector or the Commissioner and the dispute is serious the appropriate course for the Collector or the Commissioner would be to refer the parties to a competent court and not to decide the question of title himself against theis true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plan that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined of the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.