Case: Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. The Union of India and Anr

The petition is based on the following allegations. The petitioner will be referred to as the appellant in the course of this judgment. He was aged 45 years 262 days on August 12, 1954. He was holding a regular commission in the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, which were amalgamated with the Defence Forces of the Union with effect from September 1, 1949. The appellants holding the substantive rank of Lieut. Col, in the amalgamated forces had the right to continue in service until he attained the age of 53 years, which event will happen on November 20, 1961. The Government of India issued a letter dated July 31, 1954, retiring the appellant from the service with effect from August 12, 1954. This decision of the Government of India is not based on any allegations or charge of inefficiency, indiscipline or any other irregularity on the part of the appellant. The aforesaid decision of the Government of India prematurely retiring the appellant is impugned as illegal, unwarranted and discriminatory and as having been made in contravention of Art. 16(1) of the Constitution.3. The petition was opposed on behalf of the respondents aforesaid on a number of preliminary grounds of which it is only necessary to mention the first, namely, that the authority against whom the writ is sought, that is to say, respondent No. 1, being outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, the same was not maintainable. This preliminary objection was heard by a Division Bench, (Janki Nath Wazir, C. J. and M. A. Shahmiri, J.), Jammu and Kashmir High Court. By its judgment dated December 7, 1954, the High Court upheld the preliminary objection. The High Court, relying upon the decisions of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, 1953 SCR 1144  : (AIR 1953 SC 210  ) and K. S. Rashid and son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., 1954 SCR 738  : (AIR 1954 SC 207  ) held that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the first respondent and, therefore, dismissed the petition, but the High Court granted the necessary certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution; hence this appeal.4. The matter was first heard by a Bench of five judges. In the course of hearing it became clear to us that the appellant not only sought to distinguish the two decisions aforesaid of this Court, but questioned the correctness of those decisions. Hence this larger Bench was constituted in order to examine the correctness of the decisions aforesaid of this Court on the strength of which the High Court had refused to entertain the appellants petition, on merits.It is sufficient to state that the appellant filed an application to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 32(2A) of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ, order or directions restraining the Union of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir from enforcing an order conveyed in the Government of Indias letter dated July 31, 1954, whereby the Government of India ordered the premature compulsory retirement of the appellant with effect from August 12, 19547. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that Government of India is not a Government within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court and so the application was not maintainable. The High Court accepted this objection as valid and dismissed the application.

Court's reasoning:
7. The question that we have to determine in this case is of far-reaching importance and is not a matter of first impression. The question was first raised in this Court in 1952 and was determined by a Constitution Bench in the case of 1953 SCR 1144: (AIR 1953 SC 210   (supra). In that case a writ was applied for in the Madras High Court for restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into the alleged disqualification of the respondent. A single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Madras issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the President of India, with its office permanently located at New Delhi, when the matter was heard by the learned single Judge of the High Court. In the High Court the Election Commission demurred to the jurisdiction of the Court to issue any writ against it on the ground that the Commission was not within the territory in relation to which the High Court exercised jurisdiction, apart from other objections. The learned Judge of the High Court overruled the preliminary objection and decided the case on merits, and issued a writ prohibiting the Commission from proceedings with the enquiry. The learned Jude granted the certificate under Art. 132 that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The Election Commission according by came up on appeal in the Court and challenged the jurisdiction of the Madras High court to issue the writ it had purported to do. This Court overruled the contention on behalf of the respondent which was based on the decision of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Pralakimeadi, 70 Ind App 129 : (AIR 1943 PC 164) that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ is analogous to the jurisdiction of a court to grant a decree or order against persons outside the limits of its local jurisdiction provided that the cause of action arose within those limits. This Court overruled that contention in theserule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Art. 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercise jurisdiction".8. The Constitution Bench in that case considered that the language of Art. 226 of the Constitution was "reasonably plain" and that the exercise of the power conferred by that Article was subject to a two-fold limitation, namely, (1) that the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction" and (2) that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue the writs must "within those territories". In other words, the writ of the Court could not run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or authority affected by the writ must be amenable to the Courts jurisdiction, either by residence or location within those territories.9. The second case of this Court which dealt with this question is 1954 SCR 738   : (AIR 1954 SC 207  ) (supra). That was a case on appeal from the judgment and order dated August 10, 1950, of the High Court Judicature, Punjab, at Simla, in a number of miscellaneous matters, in which the High Court had been moved under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying for quashing proceedings started against the appellants under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act (XXX of 1947). It was prayed in the High Court that a writ of prohibition might issue against the Income-tax Investigation Commission directing it not to proceed with the investigation of cases referred to it under the provisions of the Act. The writ petitions in the High Court were opposed on behalf of the Commission on a number of grounds, one of them being that the Punjab High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writs prayed for under Art. 226 of the Constitution, simply because the Commission was located in Delhi. Reliance was placed on behalf of the Commission on the decision of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case, 70 Ind App 129 : (AIR 1943 PC 164) (supra) that the substance of the matter was that the assessees against whom the investigation had been started belonged to U.P. and all the assessment proceedings, including reference to the High Court, would be in Uttar Pradesh. The High Court gave effect to this contention and dismissed the application primarily on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ to the Commission. The assessees came up in appeal to this Court, and this Court substantially adopted the reasons given by it in its previous judgment in the case of 1953 SCR 1144   : (AIR 1953 SC 210  ) (supra). It is to be noted that when the High Court of Punjab decided the case, the decision of this Court referred to above had not been given. Relying upon its previous decision, this Court held that the Punjab High Court was in error in holding that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on other grounds, not material to thiscase does lend a great deal of support to this contention on behalf of the appellant. It was held by the High Court in that case that the words "any Government" in Art. 226(1) of the Constitution clearly indicated that the Allahabad High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Art. 226 not only against the State of Uttar Pradesh but also against the Union Government for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the Government to forbear from giving effect to the order asking the petitioner to leave India. The ratio of the decision was that, even though the capital of the Government of India is in Delhi, its executive power extends throughout the territory of India and that the real test to determine the jurisdiction would be residence of the petitioners and the effect of the impugned order upon them. After holding that the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition, the Court dismissed it on other grounds, not material to this case. The Allahabad High Court distinguished the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated January 17, 1951, in the case of Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Calcutta Branches) which was unreported till then, since reported in ILR (1954) 2 Cal11. In that case Harries, C. J., speaking for the Court, had held that though Art. 226 of the Constitution had gone beyond the English practice by providing that writs in the nature of prerogative writs could issue even against a Government, that Government must be located within the territorial limits of the Court which was moved to exercise its power under that Article. He further observed that the Government of India could not be said to be located in the State of West Bengal and, therefore, writs under Art. 226 could not issue against that Government by the High Court of Calcutta. That decision of the Calcutta High Court was distinguished by the Allahabad High Court on the ground that "the effects of the orders of the Union Government were not operative within the jurisdiction of the Court". It may be added that that decision came up in appeal to this Court in Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1952 but the appeal was dismissed by this Court by its judgment dated April 20, 1952, on other grounds. It will be noticed that when the Allahabad decision, so strongly relied upon by the appellant, was given the two decisions referred to above of this Court were not there. The Allahabad High Court may not have given that judgment if the two decisions of this Court had then been in existence.The first argument is that the word "authority" used in Art. 226 cannot and does not include Government. We are not impressed by this argument. In interpreting the word "authority" we must have regard to the clause immediately following it. Art. 226 provides for "the issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government" within those territories. It is clear that the clause "including in appropriate cases any Government" goes with the preceding word "authority, and on a plain and reasonable construction it means that the word "authority" in the context may include any Government in an appropriate case. The suggestion that the said clause is intended to confer discretion on the High Court in the matter of issuing a writ or direction on any Government seems to us clearly unsustainable. To connect this clause with the issuance of a writ or order and to suggest that in dealing with cases against Government the High Court has to decide whether the case is appropriate for the issue of the order is plainly not justified by the rules of grammar. We have no hesitation in holding that the said clause goes with the word "authority" and that its effect is that the authority against whom jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court to issue a writ or appropriate order may in certain cases include a Government. Appropriate cases in the context means cases in which orders passed by a Government or their subordinates are challenged, and the clause therefore means that where such orders are challenged the High Court may issue a writ against the Government. The position therefore, is that under Art. 226 power is conferred on the High Court to issue to any person or authority or in a given case to any Government, writs or orders there specified for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Having thus dealt with the two subsidiary points raised before us, we may now proceed to consider the two main contentions which arise for our decision in the presentmain argument in this connection is that the Government of India is all-pervasive and in functioning throughout the territory of India and therefore every High Court has power to issue a writ against it, as it must be presumed to be located within the territorial jurisdiction of all State High Courts. This argument in our opinion confuses the concept of location of a Government with the concept of its functioning. A Government may be functioning all over a State or all over India; but it certainly is not located all over the State or all over India. It is true that the Constitution has not provided that the seat of the Government of India will be at New Delhi. That, however, does not mean that the Government of India as such has no seat where it is located. It is common knowledge that the seat of the Government of India is in New Delhi and the Government as such is located in New Delhi. The absence of a provision in the Constitution can make no difference to thisit is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Art. 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief; it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Art. 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the persons or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Courts jurisdiction. Thus if a person residing or located in Bombay, for example is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, say, in Calcutta, the forum in which he has to seek relief is not the Bombay High Court though the order may affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where the authority passing the order is located. It would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Art. 226. The introduction of such a concept may give rise to confusion and conflict ofwe read the relevant words of Art. 226 (quoted above) there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction conferred by that Article on a High Court is with respect to the location or residence of the person or authority passing the order and there can be no question of introducing the concept of the place where the order is to have effect in order to determine which High Court can give relief under it. It is true that this Court will give such meaning to the words used in the Constitution as would help towards its working smoothly. If we were to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order is to have effect we would not be advancing the purposes for which Art. 226 has been enacted. On the other hand, we would be producing conflict of jurisdiction between various High Court as already shown by the illustration given above. Therefore, the effect of an order by whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the High court which can taken action under Art. 226.Now, functioning of a Government is really nothing other than giving effect to the orders passed by it. Therefore it would not be right to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the functioning of Government when determining the meaning of the words "any person or authority within those territories". By introducing the concept of functioning in these words we shall be creating the same conflict which would arise if the concept of the place where the order is to have effect is introduced in Art. 226.There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that these words in Art. 226 refer not to the place where the Government may be functioning but only to the place where the person or authority is either resident or is located. So far therefore as a natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanently or temporarily. So far as an authority (other than a Government) is concerned, it is within the territories if its office is located there. So far as a Government is concerned it is within the territories only if its seat is within those territories.15. The seat of a Government is sometimes mentioned in the Constitutions of various countries but many a time the seat is not so mentioned. But whether the seat of a Government is mentioned in the constitution or not there is undoubtedly a seat from which the Government as such functions as a fact. What Art. 226 requires is residence or location as a fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within whose territories that seat is located will be the High Court having jurisdiction under Art. 226 so far as the orders of the Government as such are concerned. Therefore, the view taken in 1953 SCR 1144   : (AIR 1953 SC 210  ) (supra) and 1954 SCR 738 (AIR 1954 SC 207) (supra)that there is twofold limitation on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Art. 226, namely (i) the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which its exercise jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction, and (ii) the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories" which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories, is the correctin this connection has been placed on the judgment of the Privy Council in 70 Ind App 129 : (AIR 1943 PC 164). In that case the Privy Council held that even though the impugned order was passed by the Board of Revenue which was located in Madras the High Court would have no jurisdiction to issue a writ quashing the order, as it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ beyond the limits of the city of Madras except in certain cases, and that particular matter was not within the exceptions. This decision of the Privy Council does apparently introduce an element of the place where the cause of action arose in considering the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. The basis of that decision, however, was the peculiar history of the issue of writs by the three Presidency High Courts as successors of the Supreme Courts, though on the literal construction of cl. 8 of the Charter of 1800 conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Madras, there could be little doubt that the Supreme Court would have the same jurisdiction as the Justices of the Court of Kings Bench Division in England for the territories which then were or thereafter might be subject to or depend upon the Government of Madras. It will therefore not be correct to put to much stress on the decision in that case. The question whether the concept of cause of action could be introduced in Article 226 was also considered in Saka Venkata Subba Raos case, 1953 SCR 1144   : (AIR 1953 SC 210  ) and was repelled in these wordsrule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to write issuable under Art. 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercise jurisdiction."17. Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already been indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitutional limitation and say that the High Court can issue a writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories? It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the express provision in Art. 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it. Nor do we think that it is right to say that because Art. 300 specifically provides for suits by and against the Government of India, the proceedings under Art. 226 are also covered by Art. 300. It seems to us that Art. 300 which is on the same line as S. 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935, dealt with suits as such and proceedings analogous to or consequent upon suits and has no reference to the extraordinary remedies provided by Art. 226 of the Constitution. The concept of cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Art. 226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may result in some inconvenience to persons residing far away from New Delhi who are aggrieved by some order of the Government of India as such, and that may be a reason for making a suitable constitutional amendment in Art. 226.But the argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect the plain language of Art. 226, nor can the concept of the place of cause of action be introduced into it for that would do away with the two limitations on the powers of the High Court contained in it.18. We have given our earnest consideration to the language of Art. 226 and the two decisions of this Court referred to above. We are of opinion that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which cannot be denied, we should not depart from the interpretation given in these two cases and indeed from any interpretation given in an earlier judgment of this Court, unless there is a fair amount of unanimity that the earlier decisions are manifestly wrong. This Court should not, except when it is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that its previous ruling, given after due deliberation and full hearing, was erroneous, go back upon its previous ruling, particularly on a constitutional issue. In this case our reconsideration of the matter has confirmed the view that there is no place for the introduction of the concept of the place where the impugned order has effect or of the concept of functioning of a Government, apart from the location of its office concerned with the case, or even of the concept of the place where the cause of action arises in Art. 226 and that the language of that article is plain enough to lead to the conclusion at which the two cases of this Court referred to above arrived. If any inconvenience is felt on account of this interpretation of Art. 226 the remedy seems to be a constitutional amendment. There is no scope for avoiding the inconvenience by an interpretation which we cannot reasonably, on the language of the Article, adopt and which the language of the Article does not bear.