Case: State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors Vs. Vishnu Prasad Sharma And Ors

9. On May 16, 1949, a notification was issued under S. 4(1) of the Act by which it was declare that lands in eleven villages including village Chhawani was likely to be needed for a public purpose, i.e., the erection of an iron and steel plant. It appears that thereafter notifications were issued under S. 6 with respect to the villages notified in the notification under S. 4(1) and it is not in dispute that a number of such notifications under S. 6 were issued with respect to village Chhawani and some land in that village was acquired under those notifications, the last of such acquisitions being in the year 1956. Thereafter on August 12, 1960, another notification under S. 6 of the Act was issued by the appropriate government proposing to acquire 486.17 acres of land in village Chhawani and the area which was proposed to be acquired was demarcated on a map kept in the office of the Collector of Drug for inspection. The notification also stated that the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act shall not apply thereto. Thereupon the respondents who are interested in some of the land notified filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the notification under S. 6. The principal contention raised on their behalf was that the notification under S. 6 of the Act was void as it had not been preceded by a fresh notification under S. 4(1) and the notification under S. 4 (1) issued in 1949 had exhausted itself when notifications under S. 6 with respect to this village had been issued previously and could not support the issue of another notification under S. 6. In substance the contention of the respondents in their petition was that a notification under S. 4 (1) could be followed only by one notification under S. 6 and that there could be no successive notifications under S. 6 with respect to lands comprised in one notification under S. 4(1)10. The petition was opposed on behalf of the appellant, and it was contended that it was open to the appropriate government to issue as many notifications as it deemed fit under S. 6 of the Act with respect to lands comprised in one notification under S. 4(1) and that it was not correct that the notification under S. 4(1) was exhausted as soon as one notification under S. 6 was issued with respect to a part of the land comprised in the notification under S. 4(1), and that it was always open to the appropriate government to issue successive notifications under S. 6 so long as these notifications were with respect to land comprised within the notification under S. 4(1)11. The High Court has accepted the contention of the respondents and has held that a notification under S. 4(1) can only be followed by one notification under S. 6 and that it is not open to the appropriate government to issue successive notifications with respect to parts of the land comprised in one notification under S. 4 and that as soon as one notification is issued under S. 6 whether it be with respect to part of the land comprised in the notification under S. 4(1) or with respect to the whole of it, the notification under S. 4(1) is exhausted and cannot support any further notification under S. 6 of the Act with respect to parts of land comprised in the notification under S. 6. In consequence the petition was allowed and the notification dated August 12, 1960 quashed. The appellant then applied to the High Court for a certificate which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.

Court's reasoning:
There are two answers to this argument. In the first place where the land to be acquired is of the kind mentioned is S. 17(1) and also of the kind not included in S. 17(1) there is nothing to prevent the Government from issuing two notifications under S. 4 (1) one relating to land which comes within S. 17 (1) and the other relating to land which cannot come within S. 17 (1). Thereafter the Government may issue a notification under S. 6 following the notification under S. 4(1) with respect to the land to which S. 17 (1) applies while another notification under S. 6 with respect to land to which S. 17 (1) does not apply can follow after the enquiry under S. 5-A.So S. 17 (4) does not necessarily mean that there can be two notifications under S. 6 where the provisions of that section are to be utilised for the Government can from the beginning issue two notifications under S. 4 and follow them up by two declarations under S. 6. But even assuming that it is possible to make two declarations under S. 6 (though in view of what we have said above this is not necessary and we express no final opinion about it) where the land to be acquired is both of the kind mentioned in S. 17 (1) and also of the kind not comprised therein, all that the Government can do in those circumstances after one notification under S. 4 (1) comprising both lands is to issue one notification under S. 6 comprising lands coming within S. 17 (1) and another notification under Section 6 with respect to land not coming within Section 17(1) sometime later after the enquiry under S. 5-A is finished. This, however, follows from the special provisions contained in S. 17(1) and (4) in a sense negatives the contention of the appellant based only on Ss. 4, 5-A and 6. It may be added that that is not the position in the present case. Therefore, even if it were possible to issue two notifications under S. 6 in the special circumstances arising out of the application of S. 17 (4), all that is possible is to issue one notification relating to land to which S. 17 (1) applies and another notification relating to land to which S. 17 (1) cannot apply. Further if both these kinds of land are included in the notification under S. 4(1), the issue of two notifications under S. 6 follows from the special provisions contained in S. 17 (1) and S. 17 (4) and not from the provisions of Ss. 4, 5-A and 6. The present is not a case of this kind, for the notification under Section 4 (1) in this case issued in May 1949 did not contain any direction relevant to S. 17 (4). It is true that the declaration under S. 6, dated August 12, 1960 contains a direction under S. 17 (4), but the effect of that merely is to allow the Government to take possession of the land within 15 days after the issue of notice under S. 9(1). This is on the assumption that a direction under S. 17 (4) can be issued along with the notification under S. 6 as to which we express no opinion. We are, therefore, of opinion that the provisions in S. 17 (4) do not lead to the conclusion that S.6 contemplates successive notifications following one notification under S. 4 (1). As we interpret Ss. 4, 5-A and 6 that is not the intention in a normal case. Even in a case of urgency there can at the most be only two notifications under S. 6 following one notification under S. 4(1), one relating to land which is covered by S. 17 (1) and the other relating to land which is not covered by S. 17 (1), provided both kinds of land are notified by one notification under S. 4(1). As we have said even that is not necessary for we are of opinion that in such a case the Government can issue two notifications under S. 4(1), one relating to land to which S. 17 (1) applies and the other relating to land to which S. 17 (1) does not apply and thereafter, there will be two notifications under S. 6 each following its own predecessor under S. 4 (1)Then reference is made to S. 49 (2) and (3). These sub-sections lay down a special provision applicable in certain circumstances. Among the factors to be taken into consideration in fixing the compensation is the damage if any sustained by the person interested at the time of the Collectors taking possession of the land by reason of severing such land from his other land. Section 49 (2) provides that if a person is claiming an unreasonable and excessive compensation for this kind of damage, the Government can order the acquisition of the whole of the land even though under S. 6 only part of the land may have been declared. Sub-section (3) provides that in such a case no action under S. 6 to S. 10 would be necessary and that all that the Collector is to do is to give an award under S. 11. The argument is that S. 49 (3) does not mention S. 4 and, therefore, it follows that successive notifications under S. 6 can be issued with respect to land in the locality specified in the notification under S. 4 (1). We have not been able to understand how this follows from the fact that S. 4(1) is not mentioned in S. 49 (3). As we have said already Section 49 (2) and (3) provide for a very special case and the order of Government under S. 49 (2) may in a sense be taken to serve the purpose of S. 4 (1) in such a special caseThereafter all that S. 49(3) provides is that the Collector may proceed straight off to determine compensation under S. 11, the reason for this being that all the other steps necessary for determining compensation under S. 11 have already been taken in the presence of the partiesWe fail to see how these provisions as to vesting can make any difference to the interpretation of Ss. 4, 5-A and 6. Section 16 deals with a normal case where possession is taken after the award is made while S. 17 (1) deals with a special case where possession is taken fifteen days after the notice under S. 9 (1). Vesting always follows taking of possession and there can be vesting either under S. 16 or under S. 17 (1) depending upon whether the case is a normal one or an urgent one. What we have said with respect to S. 17 (1) and S. 17 (4) would apply in this matter of vesting also and if the matter is of urgency the Government can always issue two notifications under S. 4, one relating to land urgently required and covered by S. 17 (1) and the other relating to land not covered by S. 17 (1).The argument based on these provisions in S. 16 and S. 17 can have no effect on the interpretation of Ss. 4, 5-A and 6 for reasons which we have given when dealing with Ss. 17 (1) and 17 (4). We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there can be no successive notifications under S. 6 with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under S. 4 (1). As it is not in dispute in this case that there have been a number of notifications under S. 6 with respect to this village based on the notification under S. 4 (1), dated May 16, 1949, the High Court was right in quashing the notification under S. 6 issued on August 12, 1960 based on the same notification under S. 4 (1)I am wholly unable to accept this argument First, I do not think that a supposed difficulty would provide any justification for accepting an interpretation of a statute against the ordinary meaning of the language used in it. General considerations of the kind suggested cannot authorise a departure from the plain meaning of words. Secondly, I cannot imagine a Government, which has vest resources, not being able to make a complete plan of its project at a time. Indeed, I think when a plan is made, it is a complete plan. I should suppose that before the Government starts acquisition proceedings by the issue of a notification under S. 4, it has made its plan for otherwise it cannot state in the notification, as it has to do, that the land is likely to be needed. Even if it had not then completed its plan, it would have enough time before the making of a declaration under S. 6 to do so. I think, therefore, that the difficulty of the Government, even if there is one, does not lead to the conclusion that the Act contemplates the making of a number of declarations under S. 6. I would like to observe here to avoid confusion that we are not concerned now with extension of a completely planned project conceived later. The present contention is not based on any difficulty arising out of such a case. It was said that if the Government has not finalised its plan when it makes a declaration under S. 6, it would have a start fresh acquisition proceedings beginning with a notification under S. 4 to provide for the complete plan if it could not make any more declarations and in such a case, in conceivable circumstances, it may have to pay more for the land that it then sought to acquire. This argument concedes that even if the Government has not been able to make its plan when making a declaration under S. 6, the result is not that it cannot acquire any more land later when the plan is completed. The real point, therefore, of the present argument is that the Act should be so interpreted that the Government should not be put to extra cost when it has been unable to complete its plan at a time. This seems to me to be a strange argument. First, there is no reason why the Act should provide for the Governments failure to complete the plan. Secondly, the argument is hypothetical for one does not know for sure whether a later acquisition will cost more or less. Arguments on hypothetical considerations can have little weight in interpreting statutes. But even otherwise, this view of the matter does not support the argument. After the issue of a notification under S. 4, an owner of land in the locality notified cannot have full beneficial enjoyment of his property; he cannot, for example, build on his land for if he does so and the land is acquired, he will get no compensation for the building put up and will lose the costs incurred for it. If it is a justification for saying that a number of declarations can be made under S. 6 because otherwise the Government may have to pay more, it seems to me that it is at least an equal justification for saying that such declarations cannot have been contemplated by the Act because that would mean an avoidable deprivation of the owners of their beneficial enjoyment of lands till such time as the Government is able to make its plan. As the Act is an expropriatory Act, that interpretation of it should be accepted which puts the least burden on the expropriated owner. The Government could, of course, always make a complete plan at a time and I am unable to hold that the Act contemplated that it need not do so and go on making declarations from time to time as its plan goes on taking shape even though the result might be to increase the hardship of persons whose lands are taken awayI do not think they do so. In any case, even if they did, then that would be because in a particular case the statute specially provided for successive declarations under S. 6. The present is not that special case. Furthermore, as I have said in connection with the argument based on S. 17, the fact that a special provision was necessary to enable successive declarations under S. 6 to be made would go to support the view that without a special provision there is no power given by the Act to issue successive declarations under S. 614. Itis in this background that we have to consider the question raised before us. Two things are plain when we come to consider the construction of Ss. 4,A and 6. The first is that the Act provides for acquisition of land of persons without their consent, and though compensation is paid for such acquisition; the fact however remains that land is acquired without the consent of the owner thereof and that is a circumstance which must be borne in mind when we come to consider the question raised before us. In such a case the provisions of the statute must be strictly constructed as it deprives a person of his land without his consent. Secondly, in interpreting these provisions the court must keep in view on the one hand the public interest which compels such acquisition and on the other the interest of the person who is being deprived of his land without his consent. It is not in dispute that it is open to the appropriate government to issue as many notifications as it deems fit under S. 4(1) even with respect to the same locality followed by a proper notification under S. 6 so that the power of the appropriate government to acquire land in any locality is not exhausted by the issue of one notification under S. 4(1) with respect to that locality. On the other hand as the compensation has to be determined with reference to the date of the notification under S. 4(1) the person whose land is to be acquired may stand to lose if there is a great delay between the notification under S. 4(1) and the notification under S. 6 in case prices have risen in the meantime. This delay is likely to be greater if successive notifications under S. 6 can be issued with respect to land comprised in the notification under S. 4 with greater consequential loss to the person whose land is being acquired if prices have risen in the meantime. It is however urged that prices may fall and in that case the person whose land is being acquired will stand to gain. But as it is open to the appropriate government to issue another notification under S. 4 with respect to the same locality after one such notification is exhausted by the issue of a notification under S. 6, it may proceed to do so where it feels that prices have fallen and more land in that locality is needed and thus take advantage of the fall in prices in the matter of acquisition. So it is clear that there is likely to be prejudice to the owner of the land if the interpretation urged on behalf of the appellant is accepted while there will be not prejudice to the government if it is rejected for it can always issue a fresh notification under S. 4(1) after the previous one is exhausted in case prices have fallen. It is in this background that we have to consider the question raised before usSections 4,A and 6 in our opinion are integrally connected. Section 4 specifies the locality in which the land is acquired and provides for survey to decide what particular land out of the locality would be needed. SectionA provides for hearing of objections to the acquisition and after these objections are decided the government has to make up its mind and declare what particular land out of the locality it will acquire. When it has so made up its mind it makes a declaration as to the particular land our of the locality notified in S. 4(1) which it will acquire. It is clear from this intimate connection between Ss. 4,A and 6 that as soon as the government has made up its mind what particular land out of the locality it requires, it has to issue a declaration under S. 6 to that effect. The purpose of the notification under S. 4(1) is at this stage over and it may be said that it is exhausted after the notification under S. 6. If the government requires more land in that locality besides that notified under S. 6, there is nothing to prevent it form issuing another notification under S. 4(1) making a further survey if necessary, hearing objections and then making another declaration under S. 6. The notification under S. 4(1) thus informs the public that land is required or would be required in a particular locality and thereafter the members of the public owning land in that locality have to make objections under S.; the government then makes up its mind as to what particular land in that locality is required and makes a declaration under S. 6. It seems to us clear that once a declaration under S. 6 is made, the notification under S. 4(1) must be exhausted, for it has served its purpose. There is nothing in Ss. 4,A and 6 to suggest that S. 4 (1) is a kind of reservoir from which the government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to it successively. If that was the intention behind sections 4,A and 6 we would have found some indication of it in the language used therein. But as we read these three sections together we can only find that the scheme is that S. 4 specifies the locality, then there may be survey and drawing of maps of the land and the consideration whether the land is adapted for the purpose for which it has to be acquired, followed by objections and making up of its mind by the government what particular land out of that locality it needs. This is followed by a declaration under S. 6 specifying the particular land needed and that in our opinion completes the process and the notification under S. 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. At the stage of S. 4 the land is not particularised but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of S. 6 the land in the locality is particularised and thereafter it seems to us that the notification under S. 4(1) having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence of events from a notification of the intention to acquire [S. 4(1)] to the declaration under S. 6 unmistakably leads one to the reasonable conclusion that when once a declaration under Section 6 particularising the area out of the area in the locality specified in the notification under Section 4(1) is issued, the remainingd area stands automatically released. In effect the scheme of these three sections is that there should be first a notification under S. 4(1) followed by one notification under S. 6 after the government has made up its mind which land out of the locality it requiresSection 16 provides for taking possession and vesting after the award has been made. Section 17 provides for taking possession and consequent vesting before the award is made in case of urgency.We fail to see how these provisions as to vesting can make any difference to the interpretation of Ss. 4,A and 6. Section 16 deals with a normal case where possession is taken after the award is made while S. 17 (1) deals with a special case where possession is taken fifteen days after the notice under S. 9 (1). Vesting always follows taking of possession and there can be vesting either under S. 16 or under S. 17 (1) depending upon whether the case is a normal one or an urgent one. What we have said with respect to S. 17 (1) and S. 17 (4) would apply in this matter of vesting also and if the matter is of urgency the Government can always issue two notifications under S. 4, one relating to land urgently required and covered by S. 17 (1) and the other relating to land not covered by S. 17 (1).The argument based on these provisions in S. 16 and S. 17 can have no effect on the interpretation of Ss. 4,A and 6 for reasons which we have given when dealing with Ss. 17 (1) and 17 (4). We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there can be no successive notifications under S. 6 with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under S. 4 (1). As it is not in dispute in this case that there have been a number of notifications under S. 6 with respect to this village based on the notification under S. 4 (1), dated May 16, 1949, the High Court was right in quashing the notification under S. 6 issued on August 12, 1960 based on the same notification under S. 4