Case: Krishnapasuba Rao Kundapur (Dead) After Him His 1. r. &amp; Another Vs. Dattatraya Krishnaji Karani

1. This appeal arises out of a suit by a landlord against a tenant and afor recovery of land situate near the cloth market in the city of Gadag, taluk Gadag, bearing City Survey No. 1577/17 measuringsq. yards, excluding a portion thereof towards the northeast corner measuring aboutfeet in length andfeet in breadth. The Civil Judge Junior Division, Gadag dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Second Additional District Judge, Dharwar, set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit. The High Court of Mysore dismissed a revision petition preferred by the defendants. The defendants now appeal to this Court by special leave.

Court's reasoning:
The Courts below have concurrently found that the suit in respect of the land excluding the northeastern portion is maintainable. This finding is no longer challenged. In this appeal, we are, therefore, not concerned with the tenancy in respect of the portion on the northeast corner. Defendant No. 1 constructed a building on the suit land, and both defendants are carrying on business there.The definition of landlord in S. 5(3) of the Act shows that a landlord is a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises or who would be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant. Section 5(11) shows that a tenant is a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for anyThe language of S. 13(1) read with the definitions of premises, landlord and tenant in S. 5 shows that the expression premises in S. 13(1) refers to theof a letting for which rent is payable and in respect of which there is a relationship of landlord and tenant.6. A combined reading of Ss. 5(8) and 13(1)(i) shows that under S. 13(1)(i) the landlord can obtain a decree for eviction in respect of premises which are land and not in respect of premises which are building or are garden, grounds etc., appurtenant to thea plain reading of the lease, it is clear that theof the letting was open land and the rent was payable in respect of the open land only and not in respect of the structures raised by defendant No. 1. We were referred to decisions in respect of building leases. It is a question of construction of a building lease whether the lease is a demise of the land only, or whether it is a demise of the land together with the building to be constructed by the tenant. See BhatiaHousing Society Ltd. v. 12. V. D. C. Patel, 1953 SCR 185   at pp(AIR 1953 SC 16   at pp.Dr. K. A. Dhairvawan v. J. R. Thakur, 1959 SCR 799     at pp.(AIR 1958 SC 789   at pp.In this case, we are not concerned with a building lease. The building on the land was constructed by the tenant at this own cost before the execution of the rent note. The building belonged to the tenant and was not theof the letting. The land only was theof the letting. Consequently, the premises are land within the meaning of S.a plain reading of the lease, it is clear that theof the letting was open land and the rent was payable in respect of the open land only and not in respect of the structures raised by defendant No. 1. We were referred to decisions in respect of building leases. It is a question of construction of a building lease whether the lease is a demise of the land only, or whether it is a demise of the land together with the building to be constructed by the tenant. See Bhatiag Society Ltd. v. 12. V. D. C. Patel, 1953 SCR 185   at ppR 1953 SC 16   at pp.. K. A. Dhairvawan v. J. R. Thakur, 1959 SCR 799     at pp.R 1958 SC 789   at pp.In this case, we are not concerned with a building lease. The building on the land was constructed by the tenant at this own cost before the execution of the rent note. The building belonged to the tenant and was not theof the letting. The land only was the13(1)(i).8. The decision in Vinayak Gopal v. Laxman Kashinath, AIR 1957 Bom 94   relied on by the appellants has no application. That case decided that an open plot of land may be premises let for residence, education, business, trade or storage within the meaning of S. 6 (1) of the Act. The problem in the present case is not whether an open plot of land can be let for residence, education, business, trade or storage, but whether an open plot of land only has been let by the landlord to the tenant. No other contentions were urged before us.