Case: The Hindustan Forest Company Vs. Lal Chand And Others

2. Sometime in November 1946 the parties entered into an agreement in writing for the supply, by the sellers, the respondents, to the buyer, the appellant, of 5,000 maunds of maize, 500 maunds of wheat and 100 maunds of Dal at the rates and times specified. The agreement stated that on the date it had been made the buyer had paid to the sellers as, 3,000 and had agree to pay a further sum of Rs. 10,000 with ten or twelve days as advance and the balance due for the price of goods delivered after the expiry of every month. It is admitted that the said sum of Rs. 10,000 was later paid by the buyer to the sellers.3. Various quantities of goods were thereafter delivered by the sellers to the buyer and though such deliveries had not been made strictly at the times specified in the contract, they had been accepted by the buyer. The buyer in its turn made various payments towards the price of the goods delivered but not month by month and had not further paid it in full. The last delivery of goods was made on June 23, 1947, and the suit was brought on October 10, 1950, for the balance of the price due.4. The learned Judge of the High Court who heard the suit held that Art. 115 had no a application and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. The sellers went up in appeal which was heard by two other learned Judges of the High Court. The learned Judges of the appellate bench of the High Court held that Art. 115 of the Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act applied and the suit was not barred. They thereupon allowed the appeal and passed a decree in favour of the sellers. The buyer has now come up in appeal to this Court.

Court's reasoning:
9. This reasoning is clearly erroneous. On the facts stated by the learned Judges there was no reciprocity of dealings; there were no independent obligations.What in fact had happened was that the sellers had undertaken to make delivery of goods and the buyer had agreed to pay for them and had in part made the payment in advance. There can be no question that in so far as the payments had been made after the goods had been delivered, they had been made towards the price due. Such payments were in discharge of the obligation created in the buyer by the deliveries made to it to pay the price of the goods delivered and did not create any obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer.The learned Judges do not appear to have taken a contrary view of the result of these payments.10. The learned Judges however held that the payment of Rs. 13,000 by the buyer in advance before delivery had started, made the sellers the debtor of the buyer and had created an obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer. This apparently was the reason which led them to the view that there were reciprocal demands and that the transactions had created independent obligations on each of the parties. This view is unfounded.The sum of Rs. 13,000 had been paid as and by way of advance payment of price of goods to be delivered. It was paid in discharge of obligations to arise under the contract. It was paid under the terms of the contract which was to buy goods and pay for them. It did not itself create any obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer; it was not intended to be and did not amount to an independent transaction detached from the rest of the contract. The sellers were under an obligation to deliver the goods but that obligation arose from the contract and not from the payment of the advance alone. If the sellers had failed to deliver goods, they would have been liable to refund the monies advanced on account of the price and might also have been liable in damages, but such liability would then have arisen from the contract and not from the fact of the advances having been made. Apart from such failure, the buyer could not recover the monies paid in advance.No question has, however, been raised as to any, default on the part of the sellers to deliver goods. This case therefore involved no reciprocity of demands. Article 115 of the Jammu and Kashmir Limitation Act cannot be applied to the suit.11.The learned Judges appear also to have taken the view that since the goods were not delivered at the times fixed in the contract, and the prices due were not paid at the end of the months, the parties clearly indicated their intention not to abide by the contract. We are unable to agree with this view. Such conduct only indicated that the parties had extended the time fixed under the contract for delivery of the goods and payment of price, leaving the contract otherwise unaffected.We think it fit also to observe that it is somewhat curious that any question as to the application of Art, 115 was allowed to be raised. The applicability of that article depends on special facts. No such facts appear in the plaint. There is no hint there that the account was mutual. We feel sure that if the attention of the learned Judges of the High Court had been drawn to is aspect of the matter, they would not have permitted any question as to Art. 115 being raised, and the parties would have saved considerable costs thereby.The learned Judges also observed that the contract did not provide how the amount advanced was to be adjusted.But it seems clear that when the contract provided that the advance was towards the price to become due, as the learned Judges themselves held, it followed by necessary implication that the advance had to be adjusted against the price when it became due. So there was a provision in the contract for adjusting the advance.