Case: Delhi Transport Undertaking Vs. Industrial Tribunal Delhi, and Another

1. An application was made by the appellant, the management of Delhi Transport Undertaking, to the industrial tribunal, Delhi, for approval of the action which the appellant proposed to take against Jagdish Lal who was in the employment of the appellant as a conductor. It appears that on 3 September, 1959 Jagdish Lal was detailed on duty with bus No. 320 on route No. 20A, duty No. 1, along with aInder Raj by name. Jagdish Lal refused to join duty on the ground that he did not think it safe to run the bus which was going to put in charge of theHe insisted that a driver in the regular employment of the appellant should be put in charge of the bus and then he would join duty. This was regarded as an act of insubordination amounting to misconduct and so a chargesheet was served on Jagdish Lal and an enquiry was held. At the end of the enquiry the appellant came to the conclusion that Jagdish Lal should be dismissed from service. That is way the present application was made by the appellant under S. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Court's reasoning:
It would, therefore, be unreasonable to assume that Inder Raj was a trainee in the sense that he was unfamiliar with driving public service vehicles. The award clearly gives an impression that the tribunal was satisfied that there was grave risk is allowing Inder Raj to drive the bus, and that proceeded on a misconception as to the the qualifications of Inder Raj in that behalf. In coming to the conclusion that Jagdish Lal was justified in refusing to join duty the tribunal seems to have overlooked completely the statement made by Jagdish Lal. He was asked whether he knew that Inder Raj had three years experience of heavydriving and he admitted that he knew. He, however, pleaded that he apprehended danger even so because he said that he expected that thewould collide with the railway bridge and hence he refused to go on duty with him. Having regard to the fact that Inder Raj was a duly qualified driver, we do not see how it could be held that Jagdish Lal was justified in refusing to join duty solely on the ground that a permanent driver was not on duty.The other point on which the tribunal has relied is about the badge. The tribunal has observed that without the badge Inder Raj could not have driven the vehicle and it has assumed that Inder Raj was asked to drive the vehicle without a badge. This again is the result of a complete misconception on the part of the tribunal. It is true that the Delhi Motor Vehicle Rule 443 provides for the drivers badge but that only means that a person who holds the relevant licence is entitled to have the badge on payment of the fee prescribed by(3) of the said rule. The tribunal has taken into account the fact that at no stage had Jagdish Lal made it his case that he apprehended that there would be a breach of the rules if Inder Raj was allowed to drive the bus because Inder Raj has nothe tribunal appeals to have accepted this argument without noticing the fact that no allegation has been made in that behalf and the appellant had therefore no opportunity to show that there was no substance in that point. Even in the statement filed before the tribunal thedid not take any point about this badge. Therefore, the other argument on which the award is based is, in our opinion, wholly unjustified.2. We have repeatedly pointed out that in dealing with disciplinary matters the tribunals jurisdiction is very limited. In the present case the tribunal was merely called upon to consider whether a prima facie case had been made out for according approval to the action of the appellant proposed to be taken against Jagdish Lal. In such a case we do not see how the tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that because Inder Raj was aJagdish Lal was justified in refusing to join duty. In this connexion the tribunal seems to have attached some importance to the conditions on which trainees are admitted in the school started by the appellant. One of the conditions is that at the end of the training period there is no guarantee of the employment. That of course is true; but that is not to say that the appellant cannot legitimately and reasonably avail itself of the services of thesewhenever it thought it necessary to do so, e.g., incase emergencies or unexpected circumstances arise. The record shows that such a course is often adopted and provision is made for payment to thewhose services are requisitioned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the appellant was justified in taking the view that the conduct of Jagdish Lal amounted to misconduct and so a prima facie case had been made out in that case.