Case: Atma Ram Vs. State of Punjab &amp; Others

hereinafter as the Act), as amended by Act XI of 1955. The petitioners are land-owners of the lands affected by the provisions of the impugned Act. The State of Punjab and its officers, besides persons claiming benefits under the Act, are the respondents in these several petitions2. The impugned Act has a history which may shortly be set out. With a view to providing for the security of tenure to tenants, the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Ordinance IV of 1950, was promulgated with effect from 13th May 1950. That Ordinance was replaced by the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act XII of 1950, which came into force on 6th November 1950, on the date on which it was first published in the Punjab Government gazette. The Act prescribed a limit of one hundred standard acres of land (equivalent to two hundred ordinary acres) which could be held by a land-owner for his "self-cultivation"; and it was termed "permissible limit" - (S. 2 (3)). Any land-ower having land in excess of the "permissible limit," was authorized by S. 3 to select for "self-cultivation," land out of the entire area held by him in the State of Punjab, as land-owner, and reserve it for his own use to the extent of the "permissible limit." This "right of reservation" had to be exercised, first, in respect of land in his self cultivation; and if the extent of such land fell short of the "permissible limit, he could, under S. 4, make up the deficiency by ejecting tenants under him in respect of such lands as fell within his reserved area. Section 5 fixed the minimum period of tenancy as four years, subject to certain exceptions set out in S.. These were some of the salient features of the Act of 1950, which itself was amended by the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act (Punj. V of 1951), which came into force on 24-12-1951. By the amending Act, the "permissible limit" was reduced to 50 standard acres equivalent to 100 ordinary acres, and the minimum period of tenancy was raised to five years. It also made provisions for preferential right of pre-emption-(S.12A), and conferred a right of purchase on the tenant in respect of land in his possession - (S. 12B), subject to certain exceptions-(S. 12C). Another legislation in this series was the Prevention of Ejectment (Temporary Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1952, which came into force on 11-6-1952. Then, came the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj. X of 1953), now impugned, which repealed the aforesaid Acts XII of 1950 and V of 1951. It came into force on 15-4-1953. This Act itself was amended by Act LVII of 1953 and Act XI of 1955. Though this Act has undergone subsequent amendments in 1957 and 1958,. we are not concerned with those amendments, because they came into existence after this Court was moved under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We are concerned with the state of the law as it stood after the amendment of 1955, aforesaid.

Court's reasoning:
But it has been suggested that the several interests indicated in sub-cl. (b), quoted above, have been used with reference to the area of an entire estate, but knowing as we do, that a raiyats or an under-raiyats holding generally is not coextensive with the area of an entire estate but only small portions thereof, it would, in our opinion, be unreasonable to hold that the makers of the Constitution were using the expression "estate" or "rights" in an estate, in such a restricted sense. Keeping in view the fact that Art. 31A was enacted by two successive amendments-one in 1951 (First Amendment), and the second in 1955 (Fourth Amendment)-with retrospective effect, in order to save legislation effecting agrarian reforms, we have every reason to hold that those expressions have been used in their widest amplitude, consistent with the purpose behind those amendments. A piece of validating enactment purposely introduced into the Constitution with a view to saving that kind of legislation from attacks on the ground of constitutional invalidity, based on Arts. 14, 19 and 31, should not be construed in a narrow sense. On the other hand, such a constitutional enactment should be given its fullest and widest effect, consistently with the purpose behind the enactment, provided, however, that such a construction does not involve any violence to the language actually usedIn our opinion, there is no substance in this contention, because they must be attributed full knowledge of the legal maxim that "the greater contains the less" - Omne majus continet in se minus . In this connection, our attention was invited to the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Keshar Singh, 60 Pun L R 461: (AIR 1959 Punj 8), to the effect that a holding being a part of an estate, was not within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. In this connection, it is necessary to state the conflict of views in that High Court itself. In the case of Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab, A I R 1954 Punj 167 (FB), the validity of the very Act impugned before us, was challenged on grounds based upon Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench, unanimously held that the impugned Act did not infringe those provisions of the Constitution, and the restrictions on the right of land-holding, imposed by the Act, were reasonable, and that the classification did not exceed the permissible limit. But they also held that the Act was saved by Art. 31A of the Constitution, which applied equally to an entire estate or to a portion thereof. Besides giving other reasons, which may not bear close scrutiny, they made specific reference to the doctrine that the whole includes the part. Thus the Full Bench specifically held that Art. 31A of the Constitution applied equally to portions of estates also. This decision of the Full Bench was followed by a Division Bench of the same High Court, consisting of Bhandari C. J. and Dulat J., in the case of Hukam Singh v. State of Punjab, 57 Pun L R 359 : ((S) A I R 1955 Punj 220). That Bench was concerned with the provisions of another Act -Punjab Village Common Lands (Regula- tion) Act, 1954. In that case, the Division Bench, naturally, followed the decision of the Full Bench in so far as it had ruled that the whole includes the part, and that where an Act provides for rights in an estate, it provides for rights in a part of an estate also. The later Full Bench case referred to above, was decided by three Judges, including Bhandari C. J., who agreed with the judgment of the Court delivered by Grover J. Perhaps, the better course would have been to constitute a larger Bench, when it was found that a Full Bench of three Judges was inclined to take a view contrary to that of another Full Bench of equal strength.Such a course becomes necessary in view of the fact that otherwise the subordinate courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another, both equally binding upon their.In our opinion, the view taken by the earlier Full Bench is the correct one. The learned Chief Justice who was a party to both the conflicting views on the same question has not indicated his own reasons for changing his view. The Full Bench has accepted the force of the legal maxim that the greater contains the less, referred to above but has not, it must be said with all respect, given any good reasons for departing from that well-established maxim. The judgment of the Full Bench on this part of the case is based entirely upon the definition of an estate, as contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, set out above. It has not stopped to consider the further question why a holding, which is a share or a portion of an estate, as defined in the Punjab Act, should not partake of the characteristics of an estate. Keeping in view the background of the legislative history and the objective of the legislation, is there any rational reason for holding that the makers of the Constitution thought of abolishing only intermediaries in respect of an area constituting one entire estate but not of a portion thereof ?On the other hand, as indicated above, they have used the expression estate in an all-inclusive sense. They have not stopped at that; they have also added the words "or any rights therein". The expression "rights" in relation to an estate again has been used in a very comprehensive sense of including not only the interests of proprietors or sub-proprietors but also of lower grade tenants, like raiyats or under-raiyats, and then they added, by way of further emphasizing their intention the expression other "intermediary", thus, clearly showing that the enumeration of intermediaries was only illustrative and not exhaustive. If the makers of the Constitution have, thus, shown their intention of saving all laws of agrarian reform, dealing with the rights of intermediaries, whatever their denomination may be, in our opinion, no good reasons have been adduced in support of the view that portions or shares in an estate are not within the sweep of the expression "or any rights therein".A recent decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, Petns. Nos. 13 and 38 to 41 of 1957 and 55 of 1958, D/- 18-11-1958 : (A I R 1959 SC 459)  , dealt with the constitutionality of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956, which contains similar provisions with a view to doing away with intermediaries and establishing direct relationship between the State and tillers of the soil. In that case also, the contention had been raised that the expression "estate" had reference to only alienated lands and not to unalienated lands, and this Court was invited to limit the meaning of the expression in the narrower sense14. In this connection, it was further argued that extinguishment of a right, does not mean substitution of another person in that right, but total annihilation of that right.In our opinion, it is not necessary to discuss this rather metaphysical argument, because, in our opinion, it is enough for the purpose of this case to hold that the provisions of the Act, amount to modification of the landowners rights in the lands comprised in his "estate" or "holding". The Act modifies the land-owners substantive rights, particularly, in three respects, as indicated above, namely, (1) it modifies his right of settling his lands on any terms and to any one he chooses; (2) it modifies, if it does not altogether extinguish, his right to cultivate the "surplus area" as understood under the Act; and (3) it modifies his right of transfer in so far as it obliges him to sell lands not at his own price but at a price fixed under the statute, and not to any one but to specified persons in accordance with the provisions of the Act, set out above. Thus, there cannot be the least doubt that the provisions of the Act, very substantially modify the land-owners rights to hold and dispose of his property in any estate or a portion thereof. It is, therefore, clear that the provisions of Art. 31A save the impugned Act from any attack based on the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.That being so, it is not necessary to consider the specific provisions of the Act, which, it was contended, were unreasonable restrictions on the land-owners rights to enjoy his property, or whether he had been unduly discriminated against, or whether the compensation, if any, provided for under the Act, was illusory or, at any rate, inadequate. Those grounds of attack are not available to the petitioners. In the result, all these petitions are dismissed with costs, the State of Punjab and its officers being entitled to only one set of hearing fees in all the petitions.