Case: Prabitra Kumar Bannerji Vs. The State Of West Bengal

The four petitioners in the petition, as originally presented, are advocates duly enrolled in the Calcutta High Court (to be hereinafter referred to as the Court) between the years 1948 and 1952, and claim to be entitled to appear and plead in the said High Court in the exercise of its Original as well as Appellate jurisdictions. The respondents are: (1) the State of West Bengal, represented by the Chief Secretary, and (2) the Chief Justice of the Court.2. It appears that the petitioners generally practise in the Court in the exercise of its Original jurisdiction. In the year 1956 they were called to the English Bar by the Honble Society of the Middle Temple in the Michaelmas Term. The petitioners duly notified to the Registrar, Original Side of the Court, to correct the register of advocates practising on the Original side, by adding "Barrister-at-law" after their names. Thus, the petitioners who started as advocates of the Court claim to have become entitled to the additional qualification of a "Barrister" though they had not read for a period of 12 months in the chambers of a practising Barrister in England or a practising Barrister in Calcutta, as required by the rules of the Original side of the Court. In other words, according to the rules of the Court, there were three classes of advocates practising in the Court; namely, (1) a Barrister who had read for not less than 12 months in the chambers of a practising Barrister in England or in Calcutta; (2) a Barrister who had not so read in the chambers of a Barrister; and (3) any person who had obtained a Bachelors degree in Law of a recognised university and had obtained the qualification to practice on the Original side of the Court after passing the necessary tests. The High Court is said to maintain two lists of advocates entitled to appear and plead in the said Court on the Original side, namely, list I containing the names of persons, enrolled as advocates on the basis of their being Barristers-at-law, and list II containing the names of other advocates than Barristers-at-Law. The petitioners claim that inasmuch as they were persons duly qualified to appear and plead in the said Court in the exercise of its Original jurisdiction and were so enrolled as advocates, it was not necessary for them to further read in the chambers to become advocates of list I, of the Court, according to the classification set out above. A portion of the building of the said Court has been allotted for the use of advocates of the Court. That portion has again been sub-divided into two portions; (1) one occupied by the Bar Library Club consisting of advocates of list I aforesaid, and (2) the other in the occupation of the Bar Association which consists of advocates other than advocates of list I. The petitioners though they have been able to add the word "Barrister" to their names, have not been admitted to the Bar Library Club, which is rather of an exclusive character. The petitioners thus suffer from a disability, because it is said that litigants and/or solicitors generally prefer to engage an advocate who is a Barrister and is a member of the club. The petitioners application for becoming members of the Club was not entertained by it, and, thus, they are being excluded from that portion of the Court building which is in the exclusive occupation of advocates of list I aforesaid. The petitioners and another advocate made representations to the Honble the Chief Justice of the Court for having equal advantage and facilities of accommodation meant for the advocates of the Court, that is to say, for that portion of the building which is in the occupation of the Bar Library Club. In reply to the aforesaid representation, the petitioners were informed by the secretary to the Honble the Chief Justice that free accommodation had been provided by the Court, in different parts of the Court building, to the different sections of the legal profession, namely, for Barristers, advocates other than Barristers, and attorneys who are entitled to practise in the Court as such, and not for the use of any Club,. But it was further pointed out in that communication from the Secretary to the Chief Justice that as the petitioners had not read in the chambers of a Barrister for one year, they were not entitled to the use of the rooms allotted to Barristers of that class.3. The petitioners made further representations to the Honble the Chief Justice but without any tangible results. It further appears that a suit had been instituted in the City Civil Court, which was pending in 1960, but was withdrawn later, with reference to the rights of accommodation similar to that claimed by the petitioners, though they were not parties to that suit. The petitioners were informed in February 1960 by the Secretary to Honble the Chief Justice that the Chief Justice could not do anything in the matter in view of the pending suit. The petitioners grievance seems to be contained in paragraphs 36 and 37 of their petition which is to the following effectexclusive use of a large portion of the said space and the reference to or of the Advocates who are members of the said Club as members of the English Bar and/or reference to them as counsel and to the other Advocates as Advocates had generally given an impression that Advocates who are members of the said Club are superior class of Advocates than the Advocates who are members of the Indian Bar. Since your petitioners are not members of the said Club your petitioners are generally included in the latter category.Your petitioners state that due to the discrimination exercised and the non-availability of equal opportunities to your petitioners as hereinbefore stated your petitioners have been and are being greatly prejudiced in their profession. The provisions made in the rules for original side of the said Court and for Barristers are ultra vires of the Indian Bar Councils Act and/or amounts to discrimination."

Court's reasoning:
15. We have, therefore, to take full notice of the fact that there are two sections of Advocates practising at the Bar of the Court, besides the Attorneys, namely, the members of the Bar Library Club who only plead but do not act, and, secondly the members of the Bar Association who not only plead but act also, though there may be many who only plead but do not act. And then there are the Attorneys who only act. It is entirely the lookout of the litigants through their attorneys, to engage as their advocates, only for pleading, such members of the Bar as they choose. It is not entirely correct to assert that membership of the Club is determining factor in being chosen to plead a case. Litigants are naturally interested in the best results in their litigation and must be presumed to act in the best interests of their cause. And, therefore, what has happened in the Bombay High Court during the last 50 years and more, may also happen in the Court, if the Bar Association is able to throw up advocates of the right calibre.In view of what we have said, the final position which emerges is this. There are three sections of the Bar in the Court, viz., (1) those who only plead, (2) those who both plead and act and (3) those who only act. This classification in our opinion is reasonable taking into account the past history to which we have already referred. Grant of separate accommodation therefore to these three sections of the Bar cannot amount to denial of equality before the law. The Bar Library Club has already agreed before us to change its rules so that the Club conforms exactly to the first section; and admission to it will be governed by rules which are common to all lawyers who want only to plead; there is therefore no reason to interfere with accommodation provided by the Court to the three sections of the Bar. We have also no doubt that the Chief Justice will see that the undertaking given by the Bar Library Club will be carried out. We may add that in case the undertaking is not carried out, the Chief Justice will see that necessary and appropriate rules are framed which will carry out the purpose for which the accommodation is placed at the disposal of the three sections of the Bar and the same are implemented so that there is no denial of equality before the law and accommodation is used for the three sections we have indicated above.It will be noticed that we have not dealt with this case in the legalistic way in which it was sought to be presented on either side. We have been chiefly guided by considerations of pubic good, that is to say, that the Court should be assured of efficient and willing assistance from the Bar. It is only to be hoped that this forward step is a precursor of further improvements in the relations between the different sections of the Bar so that they may grow into a unified bar with all the best traditions which it has inherited from the past and which it is its duty to uphold in the years to come to the lasting credit of the legal profession and to the lasting benefit of all concerned with law and litigation.