Case: State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors Vs. Krishnarao Shinde And Ors

2. The order of the Additional Collector, Gwalior, which was impugned the High Court, was made consequent on the failure of the Company to pay the rent agreed upon between the government and the Company subsequent to the unconditional withdrawal by the Company of its Civil Appeal No. 299 of 1967 which was pending in this Court. That appeal had been brought to this Court by the Company against an earlier judgment of the High Court dated June 30, 1964 in First Appeal No. 1 of 1961 whereby the High Court, confirming the judgment of the trial court and dismissing the Companys appeal, held that the land admeasuring 495.05 acres was held by the Company in terms of the lease granted by the State and the Company as not a pakka tenant and did not enjoy the status of a "gair maurusi" tenant3. The Company entered into a contract of lease with the Gwalior State Government (Sanitary Engineering Department) for a period of one year in Samvat 1999. The lease was extended for a further period of ten years in Samvat 2000. When proceedings were initiated on July 16, 1952 to eject the Company, the Company filed Suit No. 14 of 1960 for declaration of title and perpetual injunction. Issue No. (1) in that suit was in the following words"Whether the plaintiff in accordance with paras 5 and 6 of the plaint was a gair maurusi tenant and now by virtue of the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of Samvat 2007 has become a pakka tenantIf so, what is its effect on the suit ?" *That issue was answered in the negative. The court held that the Company did not enjoy the status of gair maurusi tenant and that it had not become a pakka tenant under Section 54(vii) of Part II of Act 66 of 1950 in respect of the land in question. The court held that the Company was "a government lessee under Section 181 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 with the rights and liabilities enumerated in Section 182". It was also held that Company was not an occupancy tenant under Section 185 of the Code as it had not become an ordinary tenant earlier in Madhya Bharat under Act 66 of 1950. This judgment, as stated earlier, was affirmed by the High Court by its judgment dated June 30, 1964 in First Appeal No. 1 of 1961. The High Court observed that the land held by the Company under the lease neither zamindari nor ryotwari land. The Zamindari Abolition Act did not apply to the land as it had become vested in the State long prior to the Act. The High Court observed"... the lands comprised in the Gwalior Sewage Farm were never notified to be a ryotwari village. The lands which have been acquired by the Gwalior State in connection with the Gwalior Sewage Farm could not, after their acquisition for a public purpose be notified to be part of ryotwari village ... the lands were not Pandat lands nor were the lands included in ryotwari village. Special leases granted by the erstwhile Gwalior State in respect of such lands as had been acquired for a public purpose, namely construction of a sewage system were governed not by any law for the time being in force but by the terms of lease in each case. I have already explained above that to these lands the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act did not apply, since they were already held by the State when that came into force ... the defendant (the State) has been successful in showing that the plaintiff (the Company) never acquired the status of a gair maurusi tenant in respect of the land in dispute at any time prior to the coming into force of the Act 66 of 1950 and that he could not, by virtue of the provisions of that Act become a pakka tenant thereof." *4. It was from that judgment that the Company had brought to this Court Civil Appeal No. 299 of 1967 and that appeal was, as stated earlier, unconditionally withdrawn by the Company in 1971. Subsequently, the State entered into an agreement with the Company to grant a fresh lease for a period of ten years from February 9, 1971 subject to the payment of enhanced rent as agreed upon between the parties. Since the Company failed to pay the agreed rents and thus contravened the conditions of the lease, proceedings were initiated by the Additional Collector by his order dated October 1, 1977 for eviction of the Company from the land in question. That order was made under Section 182(2)(i) of the Code. It was that order which was quashed by the High Court is impugned order dated September 20, 1980. The High Court held that the lease in question was to covered by Section 181 of the Code and that the Company could not be evicted by the summary proceeding provided for under that section

Court's reasoning:
t is to be noticed that subsequent to the withdrawal of the appeal from this Court, fresh terms were agreed upon between the Company and the government to enable the Company to remain in possession of the land as a lessee. The Company is thus a person holding the land from the State Government. This is so whether or not the Company is deemed to be holding over under the old lease or holding, upon termination of that lease, under and in terms of the fresh conditions agreed upon between the parties to enable the Company to remain in possession of the land as a lessee. In either event, the Company has been holding the land from the State. It is not and cannot be disputed that the original lease was obtained from the predecessor State and the Company continued to remain in possession of the land under the newly stipulated terms agreed upon between the Company and the successor State, namely, the Madhya PradeshIt was in terms of sub-section (2)(i) Section 182 that the Additional Collector made his order for eviction of the Company. The finding of the Additional Collector is a finding of fact based on evidence and is not liable to be questioned in these proceedings. His finding shows that large amounts are due and payable by the Company as rent and that the rents have remained unpaid for a period far in excess of three months from the dates on which they became due. In the circumstances, the Additional Collector was well justified in having recourse to be proceeding prescribed under Section 182 of the Code. The finding of the High Court to the contrary was, in our view, totally unjustified and opposed to law