Case: Ram Nath &amp; Others Vs. Union of India

1. A hangover of the hey day of Article 31 permeates the controversy in these two appeals. The attempt is to salvage something from the debris of repealed Art. 31 by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act 1978. In Re Civil Appeal No. 922/71: Ramnath, the appellant, who is now dead took on lease a plot of land bearing No. 64 Block L, Daryaganj, Delhi admeasuring 590 sq. yards from Delhi Improvement Trust under Exh. A-4 dated February 10, 1942. The period reserved under lease was 90 years. The appellant paid Rs. 10,253 as initial premium and had to pay recurring half-yearly rent in the amount of Rs. 102-8-6 under the agreed terms and conditions of the lease. On payment of Rs. 10,253 the initial payment, the appellant was put in possession. In Re Civil Appeal No. 923/71: Appellant R.S. Ram Pershad since deceased took on lease two plots of land bearing No. 66-67 in Block L, Daryaganj, Delhi from Delhi Improvement Trust. The appellant executed a registered lease deed dated March 9, 1943 in respect of Plot No. 66, and with respect to Plot No. 67, the transaction was through an oral sale dated May 1, 1942. Each plot admeasured 590.1 sq. yards. The appellant was put in possession of both the plots.2. The Chief Commissioner of Delhi issued the notification No. F. 6(3) 50 R and R dated December 15, 1950 under Section 3 of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons. (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (‘1948for short) for acquiring the plots of both the appellants. An arbitrator was appointed as envisaged by Section 7(l)(b) of the 1948 Act to assess the compensation. Both the appellants and the Union of India appeared before the arbitrator and the compensation was determined by the arbitrator.Both the appellants preferred two separate appeals against the award of the arbitrator in the then High Court of Punjab at Delhi. On the formation of the High Court of Delhi both the appeals came up before the Division Bench on two different dates. The Division Bench following the decision of the Full Bench in the Unionof India v. Smt.Mohinder Kaur, ILR 1969 Delhi 1154 dismissed the appeals but granted a certificate under Article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution. Hence both these appeals by certificate.3. The only contention canvassed before the High Court was that the 1st and 2nd proviso to sub-clause (e) of Sub-section 1 of Section 7 of the 1948 Act are violative of Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935 as it then stood and the compensation awarded by the arbitrator in consonance with the provisoes is illusory and therefore both the provisoes are constitutionally invalid. A Full Bench of the High Court in the decision hereinabove noticed negative this contention but granted the certificate under Art. 133(l)(c) on the ground that the decision in Union of India v. Smt. Mohinder Kaur (Supra) was pending in appeal before the Supreme Court and as the High Court in rejecting the appeals of the present appellants followed the same decision, it was imperative that the certificate should be granted.

Court's reasoning:
It was lastly urged that the decision of the larger Bench in RustomCavasjee Cooper v. Unionof India,(1970) 3 SCR 530     would clearly show that the decision of this Court in Stateof Gujarat v. ShantilalMangaldas and Others., (1969) 3 SCR 341     is no more good law-and therefore it is open to the Court to examinewhether compensation offered by the relevant provisions of the statute is illusory or prescribe principles well recognised for valuation of land. In our opinion, this aspect is hardly relevant because once the impugned statute of the impugned provisions of the statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B, it is not open to the Court to examine whether the principles for valuation therein prescribed are relevant to the land valuation because that question arises where a complaint as to be contravention of fundamental rights enacted in repealed Art. 31 can be entertained and examined.That complaint has to be rejected at the threshold as soon as it is pointed out that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 13B. It may be mentioned that in Smt. Mohindercase, a Full Bench of Delhi High Court examined and upheld the constitutional validity of the two provisoes to Section 7(l)(e) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken by the High Court and upheld the same.The 1948 Act is admittedly inserted in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which also simultaneously added Art. 13B. The Act finds its place at plecitum 16 in the Ninth Schedule. Once an Act is placed in the Ninth Schedule, Article 13B provides that either the act or any provision thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground of such act or any provision thereof is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution. Once the act is brought under the umbrella of protection of Art. 13B by inserting it in the Ninth Schedule, the act is not open to the challenge that it as a whole or any provision thereof violates or contravenes any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. The allegation here is that the two provisoes violate the guarantee of fair compensation and therefore it constitutes deprivation of property without just compensation, a relic of Art 31(2) lifted from Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935.The 1948 Act is a pre-Constitution statute. It was therefore urged that it does not qualify for the protection of Art. 13B in as much as when enacted it was violative of Section 299(2) ofthe Government of India Act, 1935 and as it was void ab initio, it was not an existing law within the meaning of expression in Article 366(10) and therefore is not qualified for umbrella of protection enacted in Art. 13B.